The Kantian versus Frankfurt

Alex Blum

In a recent paper Gideon Yaffe (1999) faults David Widerker’s argument

(Wiedeker 1991) in which he contends that the ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ prin-
ciple entails
PAP: An agent is morally blameworthy for what she has done only if
she could have done otherwise.
Yaffe questions the implication and Harry Frankfurt in one of his classic
papers on PAP denies it.1 Much weight is given to the ‘ought’ implies ‘can’
principle as an arbiter of moral intuition.
But does ‘ought’ imply ‘can’? Not on a literal reading. That is, not if the
Kantian2 injunction is meant to read that an agent is forbidden to do x only
if she is capable of refraining from performing x. For a kleptomaniac is no
less permitted to steal than anyone else is, but yet she is incapable of
refraining.
So the Kantian injunction in our context cannot be about moral obliga-
tion but must be about moral responsibility.3 That is, if an agent is forbid-
den to do x she is morally responsible for performing x only if she could
have refrained from performing x. Hence only if she did not have to do
it. But in that case, the Kantian injunction implies, contrary to Yaffe’s
contention:
Weak PAP: An agent is morally blameworthy for what she has done
only if it was possible that she should not have done as
she did.
PAP is of course stronger than Weak PAP. But the moral intuition behind
the opposition to PAP does not discriminate between PAP and Weak PAP.
In fact none of Harry Frankfurter’s known arguments in opposition to PAP
justify rejecting the stronger PAP as opposed to the Weak PAP.4 Hence, if

1
See Frankfurt [1983] 1988: 96.
2
‘Kantian’, we say. The principle goes back at least to Pelagius (in the fifth century AD).
Augustine, who lived around the same time, modified the ‘can’ to allow for God’s
grace. See Matthews 1998.
3
Frankfurt vacillates unselfconsciously despite his 1983 title. See his [1983] 1988:
95–96.
4
The Frankfurt counterexamples adjust easily from a force which would intervene if
the person had chosen or desired to do otherwise to one which would intervene if the
person had chosen or desired not to act. Or as Yaffe puts it, ‘Weak PAP is impugned’

Analysis 60.3, July 2000, pp. 287–88. © Alex Blum

288 michael otsuka

the Kantian principle is true, so is Weak PAP; and Frankfurter’s known

arguments in opposition to PAP are in conflict with this basic Kantian
moral intuition.5

Bar-Ilan University
Ramat–Gan 52900, Israel
blumal@mail.biu.ac.il

References
Frankfurt, H. 1969. Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. Journal of Phi-
losophy 66: 829–39. Reprinted in Frankfurt 1988.
Frankfurt, H. 1983. What we are morally responsible for. In How Many Questions? ed.
L. Couman, 312–35. Indianapolis: Hackett. Reprinted in Frankfurt 1988.
Frankfurt, H. 1988. The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Matthews, G. 1998. Augustine. The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E.
Craig, 555–56. London and New York: Routledge.
Widerker, D. 1991. Frankfurt on ‘ought implies can’ and alternative possibilities. Analy-
sis, 51: 222–24.
Yaffe, G. 1999. ‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ and the principle of alternate possibilities. Analy-
sis, 59: 218–22.

by them as well. And this would have to be so. For Frankfurt’s underlying contention
is that what matters for moral responsibility are your reasons and intentions and not
what could have been.
5
I wish again to express my thanks to my colleagues in the phil-logic list for the years
of stimulation.

Scanlon and the claims of the many versus the one

Michael Otsuka

John Taurek (1977) has famously argued that, when faced with the choice
between saving one stranger’s life and two (or more) different strangers’
lives, we should follow a principle that directs us to flip a fair coin to deter-
mine whom to save just as we would do so when faced with a choice
between saving one stranger and a single other stranger. We should flip a
fair coin because we treat each of the one and the many with equal concern
and respect only if we give each an equal and positive chance of being
saved. We give the one no chance of being saved if we instead follow a prin-
ciple of saving the greater number in such cases.

Analysis 60.3, July 2000, pp. 288–93. © Michael Otsuka