Persons and Family Relations Case Digest

Persons and
Family
Relations
Compliled Case Digest
Bautista, Bryan, Bautista, Paulo, Bilas, Gelliane Christine, Bogbog, Aleli, Bolide, Rouelli Gift,
Corres, Kaiser John, De Guzman, Mageryl Shay, Diaz, Charina, Donggayao, Bryan Christopher
Gironella, Jsa Noble, Mabitazan, Tedd, Macarimpas, Raihanah Sarah, Narag, Janro, Reyes,
Jareed, Rosario, Keouh, Savellano, Michael Niño Jesus, Solda, Ace Aries
S.y 2013 -2014

Case Title G.R./SCRA No.
EFFECTIVITY
Lara v. Del Rosario 94 Phil 778
DATE OF EFFECTIVITY
Tanada v. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27
G.R.
Philippines International Trading Corp. v. Angeles 108461
No.
G.R.
National Electrification Administration v. Gonzaga 158761
No.
G.R.
Basa v. Mercado L-42226
No.
Association of Southern Tagalog Electric Cooperatives Inc. v. Energy G.R.
192717
Regulatory Commission No.
COMPUTATION OF TIME
G.R.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown 162155
No.
G.R.
People v. Del Rosario L-7234
No.
PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW
G.R.
D.M. Consunji Inc v. Court of Appeals 137873
No.
G.R.
People v. Gasacao 168445
No.
PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION
G.R.
Yao Kee v. Sy Gonzales L-55960
No.
G.R.
Laureno v. Court of Appeals 114776
No.
Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee v. V.P. Eusebio G.R.
140047
Construction Inc. No.
PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS
G.R.
Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals 112193
No.
G.R.
Bernabe v. Alejo 140500
No.
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Stockholders of Intercity G.R.
181556
Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. No.
G.R.
Montanez v. Cipriano 181089
No.
G.R.
Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice 188056
No.
WAIVER OF RIGHTS
G.R.
Guy v. Court of Appeals 163707
No.
Persons and Family Relation 1

G.R.
F.F. Cruz & Co.., Inc. v. HR Construction Corp. 187521
No.
G.R.
People v. Morial 129295
No.
EXPRESS AND IMPLIED REPEAL
G.R.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown 1622155
No.
G.R.
Magkalas v. National Housing Authority 138823
No.
EFFECT OF REPEAL OF REPEALING LAW
G.R.
Garcia v. Sandiganbayan 165835
No.
STARE DECISIS
G.R.
Ting v. Velez-Ting 166562
No.
G.R.
Negros Navigation Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals 110398
No.
LAW OF THE CASE
G.R.
Fulgencio v. National Labor Relations 141600
No.
OBITER DICTUM
G.R.
Villanueva v. Court of Appeals 142947
No.
G.R.
Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals 146486
No.
G.R.
Ayala Corporation v. Rosa-Diana Realty and Development Corporation 134284
No.
DURA LEX SED LEX
People v. Veneracion 249 SCRA 251
CONCEPT OF CUSTOMS
G.R.
Yao Kee v. Sy Gonzales L-55960
No.
EQUITY IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW
G.R.
Floresca v. Philex Mining Corp. L-30642
No.
G.R.
Ursua v. Court of Appeals 112170
No.
APPLICATION OF PENAL LAWS, EXCEPTIONS
G.R.
Asaali v. Commissioner of Customs L-24170
No.
NATIONALITY/ CITIZENSHIP THEORY
G.R.
Llorente v. Court of Appeals 124371
No.
INCIDENTS OF SUCCESSION
G.R.
Miciano v. Brimo L-22595
No.

RENVOI
G.R.
Aznar v. Garcia L-16749
No.
G.R.
Bellis v. Bellis L-23768
No.
G.R.
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin L-27860
No.
FORMS, SOLEMNITIES OF CONTRACTS, WILLS
G.R.
Van Dorn v. Romillo L-68470
No.
G.R.
Bank of America NT and SA v. American Realty Co. 133876
No.
PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS
G.R.
University of the East v. Jader 13234417
No.
G.R.
G.F. Equity Inc. v. Valenzona 156841
No.
G.R.
Go. V. Cordero 164703
No.
G.R.
Villanueva v. Rosqueta 180764
No.
G.R.
Yuchengco v. The Manila Chronicle Publishing Corp. 184315
No.
DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA
G.R.
Custodio v. Court of Appeals 116100
No.
G.R.
Equitable Banking Corporation v. Calderon 156168
No.
VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA
G.R.
Hotel Nikko v. Reyes 154259
No.
LIABILITY OF EX-MALEFICIO OR EX-DELICTO
G.R.
Manuel v. People of the Philippines 165842
No.
G.R.
Romero v. People of the Philippines 167546
No.
ACTS CONTRA BONOS MORES
G.R.
Pe v. Pe L-17396
No.
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY
G.R.
Hermosisima v. Court of Appeals L-14628
No.
G.R.
Galang v. Court of Appeals L-17248
No.
G.R.
Gasheem Shookagt Baksh v. Court of Appeals 97336
No.

G.R.
Wassmer v. Velez L-20089
No.
G.R.
Natividad v. Tunac 143130
No.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
G.R.
Shinryo Company Inc. v. RRN Inc. 172525
No.
G.R.
Car Cool Philippines v. USHIO Realty and Development Corporation 138088
No.
G.R.
Elegir v. Philippine Airlines 181995
No.
PARENS PATRIAE DOCTRINE
G.R.
Valenzuala v. Court of Appeals L-56168
No.
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
G.R.
Concepcion v. Court of Appeals 120706
No.
G.R.
Padalhin v. Lavina 183026
No.
NON-FEASANCE, MISFEASANCE, MALFEASANCE
G.R.
Philex Mining Corp. v. Commisioner of Internal Revenue 125704
No.
ACTION FOR DAMAGES BASED ON CRIME
G.R.
Manantan v. Court of Appeals 107152
No.
G.R.
Nuguid v. Nicdao 150758
No.
G.R.
People v. Agacer 177751
No.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (OTHER SOURCES OF
OBLIGATIONS)
G.R.
People v. Bayotas 102007
No.
G.R.
Cancio, Jr. v. Isip 133978
No.
G.R.
Heirs of Guaring v. Court of Appeals 108395
No.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (DEFAMATION, FRAUD,
PHYSICAL INJURIES)
G.R.
Arafiles v. Philippine Journalists, Inc. 150256
No.
G.R.
International Flavors and Fragrance (Phils.) Inc. v. Argos 130362
No.
G.R.
Ruiz v. Ucol L-45404
No.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (VIOLATION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS)

G.R.
Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corp. 141309
No.
G.R.
Cojuanco v. Court of Appeals 119398
No.
G.R.
Manila Electric Company v. Castillocase 182976
No.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (QUASI-DELICTS/TORTS)
G.R.
Barredo v. Garcia 48006
No.
G.R.
Safeguard Security Agency v. Tangco 165732
No.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
G.R.
City of Pasig v. COMELEC 165732
No.
G.R.
Beltran v. People 125646
No.
G.R.
Merced v. Diez L-15315
No.
G.R.
Donato v. Luna L-53642
No.
G.R.
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals 150758
No.
PRESUMPTIVE CIVIL PERSONALITY
Geluz v. Court of Appeals 2 SCRA 801
RESTRICTIONS OR MODIFICATION ON CAPACITY TO ACT
G.R.
Catalan v. Basa 159657
No.
G.R.
Domingo v. Court of Appeals 127540
No.
G.R.
Mendezona v. Ozamis 143370
No.
G.R.
Oposa v. Factoran Jr. 101083
No.
KINDS OF DOMICILE
G.R.
Marcos v. COMELEC 119976
No.
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION
G.R.
Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals 112193
No.
G.R.
Bernabe v. Alejo 140500
No.
DEFINITION AND NATURE OF MARRIAGE
G.R.
Ancheta v. Ancheta 145370
No.
Adm. MTJ-92-
Abadilla v. Tabiliran
No. 716

PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF
MARRIAGE
G.R.
Dela Rosa v. Heirs of Rustia vda. De Damian' 155733
No.
G.R.
Eugenio v. Velez 85140
No.
G.R.
Balogbog v. Court of Appeals 83598
No.
LEGAL CAPACITY
G.R.
Silverio v. Republic 174689
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Cagandahan 166676
No.
AUTHORITY OF SOLEMNIZING OFFICER
A.M. MTJ-99-
Beso v. Judge Daguman
No. 1211
A.M. MTJ-02-
Aranes v. Occiano
No. 1390
MARRIAGE LICENSE
G.R.
Alcantara v. Alcantara 167746
No.
Republic v. Court of Appeals 477 SCRA 277
G.R.
Carino v. Carino 132529
No.
Sy v. Court of Appeals 330 SCRA 550
G.R.
Sevilla v. Cardenas 167684
No.
G.R.
Abbas v. Abbas 183896
No.
MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE
REQUIREMENT
A.M. MTJ-00-
Manzano v. Sanchez
No. 1329
G.R.
Ninal v. Badayog 133778
No.
A.M. MTJ-92-
Cosca v.Palaypayon
No. 721
MARRIAGE CEREMONY
G.R.
Morigo v. People 145226
No.
THREE-FOLD LIABILITY
A.M. MTJ-94-
Moreno v. Bernabe
No. 963
A.M. MTJ-96-
Navarro v. Domagtoy
No. 963
MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE

G.R.
Vda. De Jacob v. Court of Appeals 135216
No.
FOREIGN DIVORCE
G.R.
Republic v. Iyoy 152577
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Obrecido III 154380
No.
G.R.
Van Dorn v. Romillo L-68470
No.
G.R.
San Luis v. San Luis 133743
No.
G.R.
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas 186571
No.
G.R.
Garcia-Recio v. Recio 138322
No.
NO MARRIAGE LICENSE
A.M. MTJ-
Atienza v. Brillantes
No. 92706
BIGAMOUS/ POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES
G.R.
Enriquez Vda. De Catalan v. Catalan Lee 183622
No.
G.R.
Quita v. Court of Appeals 124862
No.
G.R.
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals 150758
No.
G.R.
Jarillo v. People of the Philipppines 164435
No.
A.C.
Macarrubo v. Macarrubo 6148
No.
G.R.
Weigel v. Sempio Dy L-53703
No.
G.R.
Montanez v. Cipriano 181089
No.
VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES
G.R.
Republic v. Nolasco 94053
No.
Republic v. Court of Appeals 477 SCRA 277
G.R.
Bienvenido v. Court of Appeals 111717
No.
G.R.
Manuel v. People of the Philippines 165842
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Bermudes 160258
No.
G.R.
Calisterio v. Calisterio 136467
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Granada 187512
No.

MARRIAGE IN VIOLATION OF ART. 40 FC
G.R.
Domingo v. Court of Appeals 1084818
No.
A.M. MTJ-
Atienza v. Brillantes
No. 92706
CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
G.R.
Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals and Lao 119190
No.
G.R.
Santos v. Court of Appeals 112019
No.
G.R.
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals 126010
No.
G.R.
Yambao v. Republic of the Philippines 184063
No.
GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY
G.R.
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina 108763
No.
G.R.
Barcelona v. Court of Appeals 130087
No.
G.R.
Tongol v. Tongol 157610
No.
G.R.
Marcos v. Marcos 136490
No.
G.R.
Te v. Te 161793
No.
G.R.
Agraviador v. Agraviador 170729
No.
G.R.
Marable v. Marable 178741
No.
G.R.
Aurelio v. Aurelio 175367
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Court of Appeals 159594
No.
OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
G.R.
Republic v. Encelan 170022
No.
G.R.
Mendoza v. Republic 157649
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Galang 168796
No.
G.R.
Ochosa v. Alano 167459
No.
G.R.
Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes 185286
No.
G.R.
Toring v. Toring 165321
No.

G.R.
Ligeralde v. Patilunghug 168796
No.
G.R.
Suazo v. Suazo 164493
No.
G.R.
Aspillaga v. Aspillaga 170925
No.
G.R.
Alcazar v. Alcazar 174451
No.
G.R.
Najera v. Najera 164817
No.
G.R.
Halili v. Santos-Halili 165424
No.
G.R.
Paras v. Paras 147824
No.
G.R.
Zamora v. Court of Appeals 141917
No.
G.R.
Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris 162368
No.
G.R.
Antonio v. Reyes 155800
No.
G.R.
Carating v.-Siayngco v. Siayngco 158896
No.
G.R.
Villalon v. Villalon 167206
No.
G.R.
Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals 127358
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Quintero-Hamano 149498
No.
G.R.
Dedel v. Court of Appeals 151867
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Dagdag 109975
No.
G.R.
Pesca v. Pesca 136921
No.
ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE,
GROUNDS
G.R.
Mallion v. Alcantara 141528
No.
PROPER ACTION AND PROCEDURE
G.R.
Leonor v. Court of Appeals 112597
No.
PARTIES
G.R.
Juliajvo-Llave v. Republic 169766
No.
G.R.
Enrico v. Heirs of Medinaceli 173614
No.

G.R.
Catalan v. Court of Appeals 167109
No.
G.R.
Ninal v. Badayog 133778
No.
G.R.
Carlos v. Sandoval 179922
No.
G.R.
Ablaza v. Republic 158298
No.
APPEARANCE OF THE STATE
G.R.
Maquilan v. Maquilan 155409
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Cuison-Melgar 139676
No.
G.R.
Malcampo-Sin v. Sin 137590
No.
G.R.
Tuason v. Court of Appeals 116607
No.
A.M. RTJ-04-
Corpus v. Ochotorena
No. 1861
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
G.R.
Pacete v. Carriaga L-53880
No.
FINAL JUDGMENT AND SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS
G.R.
Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis 138509
No.
G.R.
Ty v. Court of Appeals 127406
No.
EFFECTS
G.R.
Valdes v. RTC and Valdes 122749
No.
G.R.
Dino v. Dino 178044
No.
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES, CONCEALMENT
G.R.
Villaneva v. Court of Appeals 132955
No.
G.R.
Anaya v. Palaroan L-27930
No.
G.R.
Buccat v. Buccat-Mangonon 47101
No.
FORCE, INTIMIDATION, UNDUE INFLUENCE
G.R.
Villaneva v. Court of Appeals 132955
No.
A.C.
Macarrubo v. Macarrubo 6148
No.
G.R.
Reyes v. Zaballero L-3561
No.

DOCTRINE OF TRIENNIAL COHABITATION
G.R.
Alcazar v. Alcazar 174451
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
Jimenez v. Canizares L-12790
No.
LEGAL SEPARATION, GROUNDS
G.R.
Ong Eng Kiam v. Ong 15320
No.
G.R.
Gaudioncio v. Penaranda 79284
No.
G.R.
Prima Partosa-Jo v. Court of Appeals 82606
No.
DEFENSES, CONDONATION/ PARDON
G.R.
Arroyo v. Court of Appeals 96602
No.
G.R.
Ginez v. Bugayong L-10033
No.
G.R.
People v. Zapata L-3047
No.
G.R.
De Ocampo v. Florenciano L-13553
No.
DEFENSES, CONSENT
G.R.
Matubis v. Praxedes L-11766
No.
G.R.
People v. Schneckenburger 48183
No.
G.R.
People v. Sensano 37720
No.
DEFENSES, MUTUAL GUILT
G.R.
Benedicto v. De La Rama 1056
No.
DEFENSES, COLLUSION
G.R.
No.
DEFENSES, PRESCRIPTION
G.R.
Brown v. Yambao L-10699
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
Contreras v. Macaraig L-29138
No.
ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION, PROCEDURE
G.R.
Banez v. Banez 132592
No.

G.R.
Lapuz Sy v. Eufemio L-30977
No.
MANDATORY COOLING-OFF PERIOD
G.R.
Araneta c. Concepcion L-9667
No.
G.R.
Somosa-Ramos v. Vamenta Jr. L-34132
No.
G.R.
No.
NECESSITY OF TRIAL AND INTERVENTION OF STATE
G.R.
No.
LEGAL SEPARATION PENDENTE LITE
G.R.
Sabalones v. Court of Appeals 106169
No.
G.R.
Espiritu and Layug v. Court of Appeals 115640
No.
G.R.
Lapuz Sy v. Eufemio L-30977
No.
DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION
G.R.
Laperal v. Republic L-18008
No.
G.R.
Siochi v. Gozon 169900
No.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES
G.R.
Pelayo v. Lauron 129295
No.
G.R.
Go v. Court of Appeals 114791
No.
G.R.
Arroyo v. Vasquez-Arroyo 17014
No.
G.R.
Illusorio v. Bildner-Illusorio 139789
No.
G.R.
Goitia v. Campos Rueda 11263
No.
G.R.
Cuenca v. Cuenca L-7231
No.
PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION TO EACH OTHER
G.R.
Arcaba v. Vda De Batocael 146683
No.
G.R.
Matabuena v. Cervantes L-28771
No.
G.R.
Harding v. Commercial Union Assurance Company 12707
No.
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY, COMPONENTS

G.R.
Navarro v. Escobido 153788
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
Imani v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. 187023
No.
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY, EXCLUDED PROPERTY
G.R.
Ching v. Court of Appeals 124642
No.
G.R.
Tan v. Court of Appeals 120594
No.
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY, DISSOLUTION
G.R.
In Re Muller v. Muller 149615
No.
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, COMPONENTS
G.R.
Dela Pena v. Avila 187490
No.
G.R.
Titan Construction Co. v. David 169584
No.
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, LIABILITIES
G.R.
Ayala Investment & Development Co. v. Court of Appeals 188305
No.
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, DISPOSITION
G.R.
Heirs of Go, Sr. v. Servavio 157537
No.
G.R.
Ros v. Philippine National Bank 170166
No.
G.R.
Siochi v. Gozon 169900
No.
G.R.
Aggabao v. Parulan 165803
No.
G.R.
Fuentes v. Roca 178902
No.
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, DISSOLUTION
G.R.
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v Pascual 163744
No.
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, LIQUIDATION
G.R.
Quiao v. Quiao 176556
No.
VOID MARRIAGES OR LIVE-IN RELATIONSHIPS
G.R.
Dino v. Dino 178044
No.
G.R.
Maxey v. Court of Appeals L-45870
No.
G.R.
No.

G.R.
Valdes v. RTC and Valdes 122749
No.
G.R.
Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals 127358
No.
G.R.
Maquilan vs. Maquilan 155409
No.
G.R.
Gonzales vs. Gonzales 159521
No.
G.R.
Mercado-Fehr vs. Fehr 152716
No.
BIGAMOUS, ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIPS
G.R.
No.
G.R.
Tumlos v. Fernandez 137650
No.
G.R.
Francisco v. Master Iron Works 151967
No.
G.R.
Joaquino v. Reyes 154645
No.
G.R.
Saguid vs. Court of Appeals 150611
No.
G.R. L-50127-
Juaniza v. Jose
No. 28
G.R.
Adriano v. Court of Appeals 124118
No.
COVERAGE OF FAMILY RELATIONS
Guerrero v. Regional Trial Court 229 SCRA 274
SUITS AMONG MEMBERS OF THE SAME FAMILY
Hiyas v. Acuna 500 SCRA 514
Hontiveros v. Regional Trial Court 309 SCRA 340
G.R.
Vda. De Manalo v. Court of Appeals 129242
No.
Santos v. Court of Appeals 475 SCRA 1
PROHIBITED COMPROMISE
Mendoza v. Court of Appeals 19 SCRA 756
FAMILY HOME
G.R.
Trinidad-Ramos v. Pangilinan 185920
No.
G.R.
Modequillo v. Breva 86355
No.
G.R.
Josef v. Santos 165060
No.
G.R.
Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Product, Inc. 172263
No.
G.R.
Gomez v. Sta. Ines 132537
No.

G.R.
Manacop v. Court of Appeals 97898
No.
G.R.
Taneo v. Court of Appeals 108532
No.
G.R.
Fortaleza v. Lapitan 178288
No.
KINDS/ STATUS OF CHILDREN
G.R.
De Asis v. Court of Appeals 108532
No.
G.R.
Fernandez v. Fernandez 143256
No.
ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY, GROUNDS
G.R.
Concepcion v. Court of Appeals 123450
No.
G.R.
Angeles v. Maglaya 153798
No.
G.R.
Jao v. Court of Appeals L-49162
No.
G.R.
Babiera v. Catotal 138493
No.
ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY
G.R.
Liyao, Jr.v. Tanhoti-Liyao 138961
No.
G.R.
De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon 142877
No.
ACTION TO CLAIM LEGITIMACY
G.R.
Tijing v. Court of Appeals 125901
No.
VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION
G.R.
Cabatania v. Court of Appeals 124814
No.
G.R.
Eceta v. Eceta 157037
No.
G.R.
Alberto v. Court of Appeals 86639
No.
COMPULSORY RECOGNITION
G.R.
Rivero v. Court of Appeals 141273
No.
G.R.
People v. Bayani 120894
No.
G.R.
People vs. Manahan 128157
No.
PROOF OF ILLEGITIMACY
G.R.
Nepomuceno v. Lopez 181258
No.
Rivera vs. Heirs of Villanueva 496 SCRA 135

G.R.
Cruz v. Cristobal 140422
No.
G.R.
Perla v. Baring 172471
No.
PROBATIVE VALUE OF DNA TESTS IN PATERNITY CASES
G.R.
Tijing v. Court of Appeals 125901
No.
Agustin v. Court of Appeals 460 SCRA 315
Herrera v. Alba 460 SCRA 197
G.R.
People v. Vallejo 144656
No.
G.R.
Estate of Ong v. Diaz 171713
No.
COMPULSORY RECOGNITION
G.R.
Guy v. Court of Appeals 163707
No.
G.R.
Marquino v. Itermediate Appelaye Court 72078
No.
G.R.
Tayag v. Tayag-Gallor 174680
No.
RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
G.R.
Briones v. Miguel 156343
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Abadilla 133054
No.
G.R.
Verceles v. Posada 159785
No.
G.R.
People v. Glabo 129248
No.
G.R.
Tonog v. Court of Appeals 122906
No.
G.R.
Mossesgeld v. Court of Appeals 111455
No.
G.R.
Silva v. Court of Appeals 114742
No.
G.R.
David v. Court of Appeals 111180
No.
RIGHTS OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN
G.R.
De Santos v. Angeles 105619
No.
Abadilla v. Tabiliran 249 SCRA 448
WHO MAY ADOPT
G.R.
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Toledano 94147
No.

G.R.
Republic v. Alarcon-Vergara 95551
No.
REQUIREMENTS FOR ADOPTION
G.R.
In re: adoption of Michelle and Michael Lim 168992
No.
G.R.
Landingin v. Republic 164948
No.
G.R.
Cang v. Court of Appeals 105308
No.
A.M. RTJ-96-
Department of Social Welfare and Development v. Belen
No. 1362
NATURE AND EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
G.R.
Republic v. Hernandez 117209
No.
G.R.
No.
G.R.
In re: adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia 148311
No.
G.R.
Teotico v. Del Val L-18753
No.
RESCISSION OF ADOPTION
G.R.
Lahom v. Sibulo 143989
No.
SUPPORT
G.R.
Lam v. Chua 131286
No.
WHO IS ENTITLED TO SUPPORT
G.R.
Briones v. Miguel 156343
No.
G.R.
Quimiging v. Icao L-26795
No.
G.R.
Francisco v. Zandueta 43794
No.
G.R.
Santero v. Court of Appeals L-61700
No.
G.R.
Gotardo v. Buling 165166
No.
WHEN DEMANDABLE
G.R.
Lacson v Lacson 150644
No.
WHO MUST PAY SUPPORT
G.R.
Lim v. Lim 163209
No.
G.R.
Verceles v. Posada 159785
No.

G.R.
Mangonon v. Court of Appeals 125041
No.
G.R.
De Guzman v. Perez 156013
No.
RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS WHO PAY
G.R.
Lacson v. Lacson 150644
No.
SUPPORT PENDENT LITE
G.R.
Estate of Ruiz v. Court of Appeals
No. 118671
SUPPORT DURING PROCEEDINGS
G.R.
Reyes v. Ines-Luciano
No. L-48219
CHARACTERISTICS OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY
G.R.
Silva v. Court of Appeals
No. 114742
WHO EXERCISES PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND CUSTODY
G.R.
Tonog v. Court of Appeals
No. 122906
G.R.
Vancil v. Belmes
No. 133323
G.R.
Bondagjy v. Fouzi Ali Bondagjy
No. 140817
G.R.
Sagala-Eslao v. Court of Appeals 116773
No.
G.R.
Sombong v. Court of Appeals
No. 111876
TENDER AGE PRESUMPTION RULE
G.R.
Gamboa-Hirsch v. Court of Appeals
No. 174485
G.R.
Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto
No. 154994
G.R.
Santos v. Court of Appeals 113054
No.
G.R.
Golangco v. Court of Appeals 124724
No.
G.R.
David v. Court of Appeals
No. 111180
G.R.
Espiritu v. Court of Appeals
No. 115640
G.R.
Perez v. Court of Appeals
No. 118870
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PERSONS EXERCISING PARENTAL
AUTHORITY
G.R.
Libi v. Intermediate Appellate Court
No. 70890

G.R.
Tamargo v. Court of Appeals
No. 85044
SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY
G.R.
Aquinas School v. Inton
No. 184202
G.R.
St. Joseph's College v. Miranda
No. 182353
G.R.
St. Mary's Academy v. Carpitanos
No. 143363
G.R.
Amadora v. Court of Appeals
No. L-47745
G.R.
Salvosa v. Intermediate Appellate Court
No. L-70458
G.R.
Philippine School of Business Administration v. Court of Appeals
No. 84698
USE OF SURNAME BY WOMEN
G.R.
Remo v. Scretary of Foreign Affairs
No. 169202
G.R.
Yasin v. Judge Shari's District Court
No. 94986
USE OF SURNAME BY CHILDREN
G.R.
In re: adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
No. 148311
G.R.
In re Julian Lim Wang
No. 159966
G.R.
In re Change of name of Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte
No. L-51201
USE OF DIFFERENT NAME
G.R.
People v. Estrada
No. 164368
G.R.
Ursua v. Court of Appeals
No. 112170
AMMENDMENTS/ CORRECTIONS OF ENTRIES
G.R.
Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo
No. 189476
G.R.
Lee v. Court of Appeals
No. 118387
G.R.
In re change of name of Julian Wang
No. 159966
G.R.
Silverio v. Republic
No. 174689
G.R.
Republic v. Cagandahan
No. 166676
G.R.
Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himalayan City
No. 181174

EFFECTIVITY
LARA vs. DEL ROSARIO

G.R. No. L-6339 April 20, 1954
Facts:
In 1950 defendant Petronilo Del Rosario, Jr., owner of twenty-five taxi cabs or cars, operated
a taxi business under the name of “Waval Taxi.” He employed among others three mechanics and 49
chauffeurs or drivers, the latter having worked for periods ranging from 2 to 37 months. On
September 4, 1950, without giving said mechanics and chauffeurs 30 days advance notice, Del Rosario
sold his 25 units or cabs to La Mallorca, a transportation company, as a result of which, according to
the mechanics and chauffeurs above-mentioned they lost their jobs because the La Mallorca failed to
continue them in their employment. They brought this action against Del Rosario to recover
compensation for overtime work rendered beyond eight hours and on Sundays and legal holidays, and
one month salary (mesada) provided for in article 302 of the Code of Commerce because the failure
of their former employer to give them one month notices. Subsequently, the three mechanics
unconditionally withdrew their claims. So only the 49 drivers remained as plaintiffs.
Issue:
Whether or not the claim of the plaintiffs-appellants for overtime compensation under the
Eight-Hour Labor Law is valid.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the month pay (mesada) under article 302 of the Code of
Commerce, article 2270 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act 386) appears to have repealed said Article
302 when it repealed the provisions of the Code of Commerce governing Agency. This repeal took
place on August 30, 1950, when the new Civil Code went into effect, that is, one year after its
publication in the Official Gazette. The alleged termination of services of the plaintiffs by the
defendant took place according to the complaint on September 4, 1950, that is to say, after the repeal
of Article 302 which they invoke. Moreover, said Article 302 of the Code of Commerce, assuming
that it were still in force speaks of “salary corresponding to said month.” commonly known as
“mesada.” If the plaintiffs herein had no fixed salary either by the day, week, or month, then
computation of the month’s salary payable would be impossible. Article 302 refers to employees
receiving a fixed salary.

DATE OF EFFECTIVITY
LORENZO M. TAÑADA vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
Facts:
Petitioners herein are seeking a writ of mandamus to compel public officials to publish and/or
cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and administrative orders.
Respondents, on the other hand, claimed that this case has no legal personality or standing. Further,
they argued that the publication in the Official Gazette in necessary for the effectivity of the law where
the law themselves provides for their own effectivity dates.
Issue:
Whether or not the presidential decrees in question which contain special provisions as to the
date they are to take effect still need to be published in the Official Gazette.
Ruling:
Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does
not provide for its effectivity date, for then the date of publication is material for determining the date
of the effectivity which must be 15 days following the completion of its publication, but not when the
law itself provides for the date when it goes to effect. Article 2 does not prevent the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The
publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is mandated by
law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures, or penalties for their violation
or otherwise impose burdens on the people, such as tax revenue measures, fall within this category.
Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concern. The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general
application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.

DATE OF EFFECTIVITY
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION vs.HON. PRESIDING

JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES
G.R. No. 108641 October 21, 1996
Facts:
PITC issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 under which applications to the
PITC for importation from the People’s Republic of China must be accompanied by a viable and
confirmed export program of Philippine products. PITC barred Remington and Firestone from
importing products from China on the ground that they were not able to comply with the requirement
of the said administrative order. Thereafter they filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus against
the said order of PITC in which the trial court upheld and declared to be null and void for being
unconstitutional. The court contends further authority to process and approve applications for
imports SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 144 has already been repealed
by EO 133 issued on February 27, 1987. Hence, the PITC filed a certiorari seeking the reversal of the
said decision.
Issue:
Whether or not PITC’s Administrative Order 89-08-01 is valid.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that PITC is empowered to issue such order; nevertheless, the said
AO is invalid within the context of Article 2 of the New Civil Code. The Court cited Tanada vs Tuvera
which states that all statues including those of local application and private laws shall be published as
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication in the Official Gazette or a
newspaper of general circulation unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. The AO
under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its effectivity since it is
punitive in character.

DATE OF EFFECTIVITY
NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION vs. VICTORIANO B.

GONZAGA
G.R. No. 158761 December 4, 2007
Facts:
On November 13, 2000, respondent Victoriano B. Gonzaga filed his Certificate of Candidacy
for membership in the Board of Directors of Zamboanga Del Sur II Electric Cooperative, Inc.,
District II (ZAMSURECO). Later that day, the screening committee resolved to disqualify respondent
because his spouse was an incumbent member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Diplahan, Zamboanga
del Sur. Based on the Electric Cooperative Election Code (ECEC), promulgated by petitioner National
Electrification Administration (NEA), a candidate whose spouse occupies an elective government
position higher than Barangay Captain is prohibited to run as director of an electric cooperative.
ZAMSURECO’s by-laws, however, do not provide for such ground for disqualification. Respondent
averred that the ECEC was null and void because it had not been published. NEA, on the other hand,
failed to prove whether the ECEC was indeed published in a newspaper of general circulation as
required by the New Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987.
Issue:
Whether or not Electric Cooperative Election Code was null and void for not complying with
the publication requirement.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Electric Cooperative Election Code was null and void for not
complying with the publication requirement. It observed that while ZAMSURECO complied with the
requirements of filing the code with the University of the Philippines Law Center, it offered no proof
of publication neither in the Official Gazette nor in a newspaper of general circulation. Without
compliance with the requirement of publication, the rules and regulations contained in the ECEC
cannot be enforced and implemented. Article 2 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall take
effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or
in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. Covered by
this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly
conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. The ECEC applies
to all electric cooperatives in the country. It is not a mere internal memorandum, interpretative
regulation, or instruction to subordinates. Thus, the ECEC should comply with the requirements of
the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987.

DATE OF EFFECTIVITY
JOAQUINA BASA, ET AL., vs. ATILANO G. MERCADO

G.R. No. L-42226 July 26, 1935
Facts:
Hon. Hermogenes Reyes, Judge of Pampanga CFI, allowed and probated the last will and
testament of Ines Basa, decedent. The same judge also approved the account of the administrator of
the estate, declared him the only heir, and closed the administration proceedings. Joaquin Basa, et al.,
filed a motion to reopen the proceedings, alleging that the court lacked jurisdiction because there was
failure to comply with the requirements as to the publication of the notice of hearing.
They contended that the hearing took place only twenty-one days after the date of first
publication instead of three full weeks. Moreover, the Ing Katipunan where the notice was published
was not a newspaper of general circulation as contemplated by law.
Issues:
a) Whether or not there was compliance with the publication requirement
b) Whether or not Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation
Ruling:
The language used in section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the
notice, referred to therein, should be published for three full weeks before the date set for the hearing
of the will. In other words, the first publication of the notice need not be made 21 days before the day
appointed for the hearing.
The records show that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation in view of the fact
that it is published for the dissemination of local news and general information; that it has a bona fide
subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is published at regular intervals and that the trial court
ordered the publication to be made in Ing Katipunan precisely because it was a newspaper of general
circulation in the Province of Pampanga.

DATE OF EFFECTIVITY
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN TAGALOG ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. vs.

ENERGY REGULATROY COMMISSION
G.R. No. 192117 September 18, 2012
Facts:
Petitioners Batangas I Electric Cooperative, Inc., Quezon I Electric Cooperative, Inc., Quezon
II Electric Cooperative, Inc. and Pampanga Rural Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. are rural electric
cooperatives established under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 269 or the National Electrification
Administration Decree. BATELEC I, QUEZELCO I and QUEZELCO II are members of the
Association of Southern Tagalog Electric Cooperatives, Inc. PRESCO is a member of the Central
Luzon Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. Petitioners are engaged in the distribution of . On 8
December 1994, R.A. No. 7832 was enacted. The law imposed a limit on the recoverable rate of
system lossthat may be charged by rural electric cooperatives to their consumers. The Implementing
Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7832 required every rural electric cooperative to file with the
Energy Regulatory Board on or before 30 September 1995, an application for approval of an amended
PPA Clause incorporating the cap on the recoverable rate of system loss to be included in its schedule
of rates. On 8 June 2001, R.A. No. 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 was
enacted. Section 38 of the EPIRA abolished the ERB, and created the Energy Regulatory
Commission. The powers and functions of the ERB not inconsistent with the provisions of the
EPIRA were transferred to the ERC, together with the applicable funds and appropriations, records,
equipment, property and personnel of the ERB. All electric cooperatives were directed to implement
the PPA in the manner the then Energy Regulatory Board had prescribed. Subsequently, the ERC
issued policy guidelines on the treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers. Petitioners attack
the validity of the 22 March 2006 Order, 16 February 2007 Order, 7 December 2005 Order, and 27
March 2006 Order of the ERC directing the refund of over-recoveries for having been issued pursuant
to ineffective and invalid policy guidelines. Petitioners assert that the policy guidelines on the treatment
of discounts extended by power suppliers are ineffective and invalid for lack of publication, non-
submission to the U.P. Law Center, and their retroactive application.
Issue:
Whether the policy guidelines issued by the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by
power suppliers are ineffective and invalid for lack of publication, non-submission to the University
of the Philippines (U.P.) Law Center, and their retroactive application.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that publication is a basic postulate of procedural due process. Article
2 of the Civil Code, as amended by Section 1 of Executive Order No. 200, states that "laws shall take
effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or
in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided." Covered by
this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of

legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly
conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. However, there
are several exceptions to the requirement of publication such as an interpretative regulation. It seeks
to regulate only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the general public. The policy
guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers are interpretative
regulations. The policy guidelines merely interpret R.A. No. 7832 and it’s IRR, particularly on the
computation of the cost of purchased power. The policy guidelines did not modify, amend, or supplant
the IRR. Hence, it is exempt from the publication requirement.

COMPUTATION OF TIME
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP,

INC.
G.R. No. 162155 August 28, 2007
Facts:
On April 14, 1998 Primetown Property Group. Inc. filed its final adjusted return. On March
11, 1999 Gilbert Yap, vice chair of Primetown Property Group. Inc., filed for the refund or tax credit
of income tax paid in 1997. However, it was not acted upon. Thus Primetown filed a petition for
review but the Court of Tax Appeals dismissed it claiming that it was filed beyond the two-year
reglementary period provided by section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code. The Court of
Tax Appeals further argued that in National Marketing Corp. vs. Tecson the Supreme Court ruled
that a year is equal to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent’s petition was filed within the two-year reglementary period.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the petition was filed within the two-year reglementary period
because Article 13 of the New Civil Code that provides that a year is composed of 365 years is repealed
by Executive Order 292 or the Administrative Code of the Philippines. Under Executive Order 292,
a year is composed of 12 calendar months.

COMPUTATION OF TIME
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PAZ M. DEL ROSARIO

G.R. No. L-7234 May 21, 1955
Facts:
On May 28, 1953, Paz M. Del Rosario committed slight physical injuries. The information was
filed on July 27, 1953. Thereupon, the accused filed a motion to quash the information to ground that
the offense charged had already prescribed in accordance with Article 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal
Code. The municipal court sustained this motion and dismissed the case. Thus, this appeal of dismissal
is made directly to the court.
Issue:
Whether or not the offense charged to the plaintiff-appellant had already prescribed.
Ruling:
The offense have not yet prescribed because the provision in the Revised Penal Code does
not provide the computation of month therefore it must be supplied by Article 13 of the Civil Code
which provides for the computation of years, months, days and nights. According to Article 13 of the
Civil Code a month is a 30-day month not the solar or civil month. Further, the Supreme Court held
that the case took effect on May 28, 1953 after the New Civil Code take effect so the new provisions
should apply.

PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW, EXCEPTIONS
D.M. CONSUNJI, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO

G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2010
Facts:
Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance
Tower, to his death. Jose Juego’s widow then filed a petition for damages in the Regional Trial Court
against the deceased employer. The employer raised the defense that Maria Juego already availed of
the benefits provided by the State Insurance Fund. Considering the ruling in Pacarra vs. Cebu Autobus
Company, an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts
set by the Workmen’s Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tort fees
for higher damages but he cannot pursue both actions simultaneously. The Regional Trial Court
rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is prohibited from recovering damages under the Civil Code.
Ruling:
No. Respondent is not barred from recovering damages under the Civil Code although she
has already availed the benefits of the State Insurance Fund. The respondent’s case is an exception
because private respondent was not aware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for
benefits from the State Insurance Fund. She was not only ignorant of the facts, but of her rights as
well. The decision of the court is affirmed.

PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW, EXCEPTIONS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FLORENCIO GASACAO

G.R. No. 168445 November 11, 2005
Facts:
Capt. Florencio O. Gasacao was the crewing manager of Great Eastern Shipping Agency, Inc.,
which company was headed by his nephew. On August 4, 2000 appellant and Jose Gasacao were
charged with Large Scale Illegal Recruitment. The appellant was arrested while his nephew remained
at large. The lower court found Capt. Gasacao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of large scale illegal
recruitment. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the decision. Hence, Capt. Gasacao appealed to the
Supreme Court claiming that he can’t be held liable for illegal recruitment because he was just a mere
employee of the manning agency. He also claimed that he was not aware of the law against prohibition
on bonds and deposits under section 60 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations implementing R.A.
8042.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of large scale illegal
recruitment.
Ruling:
There is no merit in appellant’s contention that he was just a mere employee of the manning
agency because he was the company’s crewing manager. As testified by the witnesses, the accused
appellant actively participated in the recruitment process from receiving job applications, interviewing
the applicants, and informing them of the agency’s requirement of payment of performance or cash
bond prior to the deployment. The Supreme Court held further that appellants defense of ignorance
is not commendable as provided for by Article 3 of the Civil Code which states that ignorance of the
law excuses no one from compliance therewith. The defense of goodwill is neither unavailable because
the appellant failed to deploy the complainants without valid reasons.

YAO KEE vs. AIDA SY-GONZALES

G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988
Facts:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese National died on January 17, 1977, leaving behind real and personal
properties here in the Philippines worth more or less Php 300,000. Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales,
Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe, and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition alleging that they are the children of
the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. However, Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on
Jan. 19, 1981 through a Chinese marriage with Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Chun Yen as their
children. Petitioners provided that fact of marriage through evidences like Yao Kee’s and Gan Ching’s
testimony, Sy Kiat’s Master Card of Registration stating his marriage with Yao Kee, and the certificate
by the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China affirming the fact of the marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee was valid.
Ruling:
Under Article 71 of the Civil Code to establish the validity of foreign marriages the existence
of the foreign law as a question of fact must be proven and the alleged foreign marriage must be
proven by convincing evidence. The petitioners have provided the fact of marriage however the same
do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage with Chinese Law or custom. In such absence
of foreign law, the doctrine of processual presumption must be applied. The Supreme Court then held
that in the absence of a foreign law it must be presumed as the same as ours. In the Philippine Laws,
a marriage cannot be valid without the presence of a solemnizing officer; therefore the marriage of Sy
Kiat to Yao Kee was null and void.

LAUREANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 114776 February 2, 2000
Facts:
Menandro Laureano was employed with the Singapore Airlines Limited on 1979. However
because of the recession that hit the Airline Industry sometime in 1982, Defendant Company initiated
cost-cutting measures such as terminating its A-300 pilots including the plaintiff. Subsequently,
plaintiff filed a case of illegal dismissal against defendant. Laureano then cited Singapore Laws to his
case since he was employed in the Singapore Airlines Ltd.
Issue:
a) Whether or not Singaporean Laws shall be applied in this case.
b) Whether or not there was illegal dismissal on the part of Singapore Airlines Ltd.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that foreign laws must be proved as fact in order to employ them.
The plaintiff was not able to prove the applicability of the laws of Singapore that he cited to his case.
Under the principle of processual presumption, if foreign laws are not proved as facts it will be
presumed as the same as ours. Hence, Philippine Laws should apply. Further, under Article 291 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines, the petitioner’s action for damages due to illegal dismissal has already
prescribed having been filed on January 8, 1987, or more than four (4) years after the effective date
has prescribed.

PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION vs.

V.P. EUSEBIO CONSTRUCTION, INC.
G.R. No. 140047 July 13, 2004
Facts:
On November 8, 1980, State Organization of Buildings, Ministry of Housing, and
Construction, Baghdad, Iraq, awarded the construction of the Institute of Physical Therapy–Medical
Rehabilitation Center, Phase II, in Baghdad, Iraq, to Ajyal Trading and Contracting Company, a firm
duly licensed with the Kuwait Chamber of Commerce.
On March 7, 1981, in behalf of Spouses Eduardo and Iluminada Santos, 3-Plex International,
Inc a local contractor engaged in construction business, entered into a joint venture agreement with
Ajyal. However since it was not accredited under the Philippine Overseas Construction Board, it had
to assign and transfer all its right to VPECI and entered into an agreement that the execution of the
project will be under their joint management. To comply with the requirements of performance bond,
3-Plex and VPECI applied for the issuance of a guarantee with Philguarantee, a government financial
institution empowered to issue guarantees for qualified Filipino contractors to secure the performance
of approved service contracts abroad. Subsequently, letters of guarantee were issued by Philguarantee
to the Rafidain Bank of Baghdad. Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait was engaged to provide a counter-guarantee
to Rafidain Bank, but it required a similar counter-guarantee in its favor from the Philguarantee.
The Surety Bond was later amended to increase the amount of coverage and to change the bank in
whose favor the petitioner's guarantee was issued, from Rafidain Bank to Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait.
SOB and the joint venture VPECI and Ajyal executed the service contract for the construction of the
project. However, they were not able to start the project on schedule because of that surety bond was
also extended and the Advance Payment Guarantee was extended three times more until it was
cancelled for reimbursement.
On 26 October 1986, Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait sent a telex call to the petitioner demanding full
payment of its performance bond counter-guarantee. VPECI advised the Philguarantee not to pay Al
Ahli Bank because efforts were being exerted for the amicable settlement of the Project.
VPECI received another telex message from Al Ahli Bank stating that it had already paid to Rafidain
Bank but VPEIC insisted on not paying however Central Bank authorized the remittance to Al Ahli
Bank. Philguarantee informed VPECI that it would remit payment to Al Ahli Bank, and reiterated the
joint and solidary obligation of the respondents to reimburse the Philguarantee for the advances made
on its counter-guarantee but they failed to pay so a case was filed.
Issue:
Whether or not the Philippine laws or Iraq’s laws should be applied in determining VPECI's
failure to pay in the performance of its obligations under the service contract.
Ruling:
Yes. In this case, the laws of Iraq bear important link to the contract, since one of the parties
is the Iraqi Government and the place of performance is in Iraq. Consequently, the problem of
whether respondent VPECI evaded its obligations may be determined by the laws of Iraq. However,
those foreign laws of Iraq were not properly alleged and prove. Under the doctrine of processual
presumption, where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption

is that foreign law is the same as ours. Further, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner guarantor
should have waited for the natural course of guaranty. Petitioner as a guarantor cannot be compelled
to pay the creditor SOB unless the property of the debtor VPECI has been exhausted and all
legal remedies against the said debtor have been resorted to by the creditor. It could also set up
compensation as regards what the creditor SOB may owe the principal debtor VPECI. In this case,
however, the petitioner has clearly waived these rights and remedies by making the payment of an
obligation that was yet to be shown to be rightfully due the creditor and demandable of the principal
debtor.

JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 112193 March 31, 1996
Facts:
In 1959, Jose M. Aruego Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with Luz M. Fabian
until his death on March 30, 1982. Out of this relationship were born Antonio Aruego and Evelyn F.
Aruego. On March 7, 1983, a complaint for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional
rights was filed by the minors, Antonia and Evelyn. However, Jose Aruego Jr., and the petitioners also
filed a complaint to declare the private respondents as illegitimate children of their defunct father. The
lower court decided that Antonia Aruego is an illegitimate daughter or Jose Aruego Sr., and Luz M.
Fabian and that she is entitled to a share of equal to one-half portion of share of the legitimate. So the
petitioners filed a motion for partial reconsideration alleging loss of jurisdiction on the part of the trial
court over the complaint by virtue of the passage of E.O. 209 or the Family Code of the Philippines.
It was denied, hence this petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not the provisions of the Family Code be applied retroactively.
Ruling:
Private respondent’s action for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child was brought
under Book I, Title VIII of the Civil Code on Persons under Art. 285 thereby stating that the
recognition of natural children is brought only the lifetime of the presumed parents except when the
parents die during the minority of the child. Petitioners, on the other hand submit that with the New
Family Code on August 31, 1988, the trial court lost jurisdiction on the ground of prescription.
Further, the Family Code provides that it shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not impair the
vested right of others. The Supreme Court held that the present law which is the Family Code cannot
be applied retroactively because its application will impair the vested right of the respondent to have
her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code which has vested to her by the fact that she filed
her action under the regime of the Civil Code.

BERNABE vs. ALEJO

G.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002
Facts:
Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary, Carolina Alejo. The son
was born on September 18, 1981and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe died as well
as his legitimate wife, leaving Ernestina Bernabe the sole surviving heir.
Carolina, in behalf of her son, filed a complaint praying that Adrian be declared an
acknowledged child of the deceased and also be given the share of Bernabe’s estate. Regional Trial
Court dismissed the complaint and said that the death of the putative father had barred the action.
Further, under the law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within
the lifetime of the alleged parent to give the latter an opportunity to either affirm or deny the child’s
filiation.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the rights of Adrian are governed under Article 285 of the
Civil Code which allows an action for recognition to be filed within 4 years after the child has attained
the age of majority and that subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away his right.
Issue:
Whether or not Adrian Bernabe may be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son.
Ruling:
The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter
died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new code a chance to dispute the claim, considering
that “illegitimate children” are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family
being aware of their existence. Furthermore, the grounds or instances for the acknowledgment of
natural children are utilized to establish the filiation of spurious children. Hence, the petition was
denied and assailed decision was affirmed.

PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. STOCKHOLDERS OF
INTERCITY SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, INC.
G.R. No. 181556 December 14, 2009
Facts:
The Central Bank of the Philippines, now known as BangkoSentralngPilipinas, filed on June
17, 1987 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation
of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (Intercity Bank) alleging that said bank was already insolvent
and its continuance in business would involve probable loss to depositors, creditors and the general
public. The trial court gave it due course.Petitioner Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation was
eventually substituted as the therein petitioner, liquidator of Intercity Bank. In the meantime, Republic
Act No. 9302 which provides that “After the payment of all liabilities and claims against the closed
bank, the Corporation shall pay any surplus dividends at the legal rate of interest, from date of takeover
to date of distribution, to creditors and claimants of the closed bank in accordance with legal priority
before distribution to the shareholders of the closed bank”. Relying on Republic Act No. 9302 PDIC
filed on August 8, 2005 a Motion for Approval of the Final Distribution of Assets and Termination
of the Liquidation Proceedings
Issue:
Whether or not Section 12 of RA 9302 should be applied retroactively in order to entitle
Intercity Bank creditors to surplus dividends.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Statutes are prospective and not retroactive in their operation,
they being the formulation of rules for the future, not the past. Hence, the legal
maxim lex de futuro, judex de praeterito — the law provides for the future, the judge for the past,
which is articulated in Article 4 of the Civil Code: “Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided.” The reason for the rule is the tendency of retroactive legislation to be unjust
and oppressive on account of its liability to unsettle vested rights or disturb the legal effect of prior
transactions. Further, a perusal of RA 9302 shows that nothing indeed therein authorizes its retroactive
application. In fact, its effectivity clause indicates a clear legislative intent to the contrary, Section
28. Effectivity Clause. “This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following the completion of its
publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation”.

MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTANEZ vs. LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO
G.R. No. 181089 October 22, 2012
Facts:
On April 8, 1976, Lourdes Tajolosa married Socrates Flores. On January 4, 1983 Lourdes re-
married Silverio V. Cipriano. In 2001, respondent filed a Petition for the Annulment in the Regional
Trial Court in the ground of psychological incapacity as defined in Article 36 of the Family Code. On
July 8, 2003, the marriage was declared null and void. On May 14, 2004, Silverio’s daughter filed a
complaint of bigamy against Lourdes under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Lourdes then
contended that sine her two marriages were contracted prior to the Family Code, Article 40 cannot be
retroactive effect because it will impair her right to remarry without need of securing a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage. The RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that the existing law at the
time of the second marriage do not require a judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition
precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage. The complainant then filed a motion for
reconsideration but the decision rendered was again in favor of the respondent. Hence, this petition
was filed.
Issue:
Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code is a
valid defense for the crime of bigamy.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had already
been consummated. The Supreme Court ruled further that what is required for a crime of bigamy to
prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. Even the
accused eventually secured a declaration that his first marriage is a void ab initio, the first and second
marriage was subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. Also, Art. 40 should be applied
retroactively because it does not prejudice or impair the right of anyone. The petition is thereby
granted.

DACUDAO vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 188056 January 8, 2013
Facts:
Petitioners were among the investors whom Celso G. Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates in
the Legacy Group of Companies allegedly defrauded through the Legacy Group's "buy back
agreement" that earned them check payments that were dishonored. After their written demands for
the return of their investments went unheeded, they initiated a number of charges for syndicated estafa
against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City on February 6,
2009.
On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of Justice (DOJ) Order No.
182 (DO No. 182), directing all Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City
Prosecutors to forward all cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat of the
DOJ Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action. Thereafter, the petitioners directly went to the
Supreme Court via petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to respondent
Secretary of Justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing DOES No 182. They further argued that DO
No. 182 was an obstruction of justice and a violation of the rule against enactment of laws with
retroactive effect.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuance of DOJ Order No. 182 should cover only future cases against
Delos Angeles, Jr., et al., not those already being investigated.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that as a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However,
exceptions exist, and one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The reason is
that a remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure does not create new
rights or take away vested rights but only operates in furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation
of already existing rights.A statute or rule regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage. All procedural laws are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The retroactive application is not violative of any right of
a person who may feel adversely affected, for, verily, no vested right generally attaches to or arises
from procedural laws. Therefore DOJ Order No. 182 can be applied retroactively in the cases the
petitioners filed against Delos Angeles.
WAIVER OF RIGHTS

MICHAEL C. GUY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006
Facts:
On October 29, 1992, Sima Wei died in Makati City leaving an estate valued 10 million more
or less. His known heirs are his spouse Shirley Guy with their children five children. On June 13, 1997,
private respondents Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei represented by their mother Remedios
filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court alleging that they are duly
acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei. However, petitioner and co-heirs alleged that private
respondent’s claim had been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished by Remedios’ June
7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and educational support
received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei and any
and all liabilities.
The petition was denied in the lower court and the motion for reconsidered dismissed in the
Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition was made.
Issue:
Whether or not the Release and Waiver of Claim bar respondents from claiming successional
rights.
Ruling:
The Release and Waiver of Claim does not bar respondents from claiming successional rights
because it does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios
received Php 300,000 and an educational plan for her daughters. The document does not specifically
mention private respondents’ hereditary rights, hence it can’t be construed as a waiver of successional
rights. The Supreme Court held that under Art. 1044 of the Civil Code any inheritance left to minors
or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parent or guardian. Parents may repudiate the
inheritance only by judicial authorization. Not having been judicially approved, the release and waiver
claim is null and void. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
WAIVER OF RIGHTS

F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC. vs. HR CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION
G.R. No. 187521 March 14, 2012
Facts:
Sometime in 2004, FFCCI entered into a contract with the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) for the construction of the Magsaysay Viaduct, known as the Lower Agusan
Development Project. On August 9, 2004, FFCCI, in turn, entered into a Subcontract Agreement with
HR Construction Corporation (HRCC) for the supply of materials, labor, equipment, tools and
supervision for the construction of a portion of the said project called the East Bank Levee and Cut-
Off Channel in accordance with the specifications of the main contract. Pursuant to the Subcontract
Agreement, HRCC would submit to FFCCI a monthly progress billing which the latter would then
pay, subject to stipulated deductions, within 30 days from receipt thereof.
The parties agreed that the requests of HRCC for payment should include progress
accomplishment of its completed works as approved by FFCCI. Additionally, they agreed to conduct
a joint measurement of the completed works of HRCC together with the representative of DPWH
and consultants to arrive at a common quantity. Thereafter, HRCC commenced the construction of
the works pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement. However, before the project was completed,
HRCC pursuant to the arbitration clause in the subcontract agreement filed with the Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission a complaint praying that FFCI pay the overdue application plus
legal interests they have not paid. FFCCI maintained that HRCC failed to comply with the condition
stated under the Subcontract Agreement for the payment of the latter’s progress billings, i.e. joint
measurement of the completed works, and, hence, it was justified in not paying the amount stated in
HRCC’s progress billings.
Issue:
Whether or not FFCCI is already barred from contesting HRCC’s valuation of the completed
works having waived its right to demand the joint measurement requirement.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that FFCCI had waived its right to demand for a joint measurement
of HRCC’s completed works under the Subcontract Agreement. Further, on account of its failure to
demand the joint measurement of HRCC’s completed works, had effectively waived its right to ask
for the conduct of the same as a condition sine qua non to HRCC’s submission of its monthly progress
billings. Basically, the instant issue calls for a determination as to which of the parties’ respective
valuation of accomplished works should be given credence. FFCCI claims that its valuation should be
upheld since the same was the result of a measurement of the completed works conducted by it and
the DPWH.
On the other hand, HRCC maintains that its valuation should be upheld on account of
FFCCI’s failure to observe the joint measurement requirement in ascertaining the extent of its
completed works. FFCCI admits that in all three instances where it paid HRCC for its progress billings,
it never required compliance with the aforequoted contractual provision of a prior joint quantification.
Such repeated omission may reasonably be construed as a waiver by FFCCI of its contractual right to
require compliance of said condition and it is now too late in the day to so impose it. Article 6 of the
Civil Code expressly provides that “rights may be waived unless the waiver is contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals or good customs”. The tribunal cannot see any such violation in this case.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS
PEOPLE vs. MORIAL

G.R. No. 129295 August 15, 2001
Facts:
Edwin Morial, Leonardo Morial and Nonelito Abinon were convicted of Robbery with
Homicide. During the custodial investigation, Leonardo Morial made an extrajudicial confession
admitting to the crime. However, later on, he recanted his confession saying that the police tortured
him into admitting the crime. On appeal, Morial moved to quash the extrajudicial confession claiming
that such confession was made without the assistance of counsel given him by the police was not
present during the whole interrogation. He left to attend some personal matters while the interrogation
of Morial was still going on. However, said attorney claimed that he was present when Morial signed
the admission.
Issue:
Whether or not the extrajudicial confession can be used as evidence against the accused.
Ruling:
The extrajudicial confession cannot be used against the accused. An excused under custodial
interrogation must continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very start until the termination
of such investigation. An effective and vigilant counsel “necessarily and logically requires that the
lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first
question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the confessant answers the first question
asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession.” Section 2A of RA
No 7438 requires that “any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times
be assisted by counsel. In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted”.
Additionally, there was an invalid waiver of the right to counsel since this right cannot be waived
unless the same is made in writing and in the presence of counsel. No such written and counseled
waiver of these rights was offered in evidence.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. PRIMETOWN

G. R. No. 162155 August 28, 2007
Facts:
On April 14, 2000, the Taxpayer filed its petition for review claiming refund based on its final
adjusted return filed on April 14, 1998, Counting 365 days a year pursuant to Article 13 of the Civil
Code, the CTA found that the petition was filed beyond the two year respective period equivalent to
730 days for filing the claim under Section 229 of the NIRC, ruling that the petition was filed 731 days
after the filing of the return.On Appeal, the CA reversed the CTA and ruled that Article 13 of the
Civil Code did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap year.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the CTA.
Ruling:
The SC affirmed the CA's reversal but ruled that the basis for the reversal is EO 292 of the
Administrative Code of 1987, a more recent law, which provides that a year is composed of 12 calendar
months.
Section 31 provides that a “year” shall be understood to be 12 calendar months. Both article
13 of the Civil Code and Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject
matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days
whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is
composed of 12 calendar months and the number of days is irrelevant. There obviously exists a
manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the
Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, the Supreme Court held that Section 31, Chapter VIII,
Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of
legal periods.
Using this, the petition was filed on the last day of the 24th month from the day the taxpayer
filed its final adjusted return.
MAGKALAS vs. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY

G.R. No. 138823 September 17, 2008
Facts:
Plaintiff and her predecessors-in-interest have been occupying a lot designated as TAG-77-
0063, Block 1, Barangay 132, located at the corner of 109 Gen. Concepcion and Adelfa Streets, Bagong
Barrio, Caloocan City, for the past 39 years.
On March 26, 1978, P.D. No. 1315 was issued expropriating certain lots at Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City. In the same Decree, the National Housing Authority (NHA) was named Administrator
of the Bagong Barrio Urban Bliss Project with the former to take possession, control (sic) and
disposition of the expropriated properties with the power of demolition. During the Census survey of
the area, the structure built by the plaintiff was assigned TAG No. 0063. After conducting studies of
the area, the NHA determined that the area where plaintiff’s structure is located should be classified
as an area center (open space). The Area Center was determined in compliance with the requirement
to reserve 30% open space in all types of residential development.
Plaintiff, together with Mr.& Mrs. Josefino Valenton and Mr.& Mrs. Rey Pangilinan, through counsel,
filed an appeal from the decision to designate the area where the plaintiff and the two other spouses
have erected structures, as an Area Center. The said appeal was denied by the NHA. In a letter, dated
August 6, 1985, the NHA sent a Notice of Lot Assignment to plaintiff recognizing the latter as a
Censused Owner of a structure with TAG No. 0063-04 which was identified for relocation.
On August 23, 1985, plaintiff filed a Complaint for Damages with prayer for the issuance of
a restraining order and writ of Preliminary Injunction against the NHA with the Regional Trial Court
of Caloocan City.
The Order denying plaintiff’s prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was
appealed, by way of Petition for Certiorari, to the Court of Appeals (docketed therein as CA-G.R. No.
33833). On March 10, 1999, the trial court promulgated its assailed decision dismissing petitioner’s
complaint. Petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the trial court
in its Order dated May 14, 1999. Hence, this petition for review of the said decision and order of the
RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the demolition or relocation of the petitioner’s structure will violate the vested
rights of the petitioner over the acquired property under the social justice clause of the constitution.
Ruling:
Petitioner maintains that she had acquired a vested right over the property subject of this case
on the ground that she had been in possession of it for forty (40) years already. Thus, to order her
relocation and the demolition of her house will infringe the social justice clause guaranteed under the
Constitution.
Petitioner’s contentions must necessarily fail. The NHA’s authority to order the relocation of
petitioner and the demolition of her property is mandated by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1315.
Under this Decree, the entire Bagong Barrio in Caloocan City was identified as a blighted area and
was thereby declared expropriated. The properties covered under P.D. No. 1315 included petitioner’s
property. The NHA, as the decree’s designated administrator for the national government, was

empowered to take possession, control and disposition of the expropriated properties with the power
of demolition of their improvements.
P.D. No. 1315 explicitly vests the NHA the power to immediately take possession, control
and disposition of the expropriated properties with the power of demolition. Clearly, the NHA, by
force of law, has the authority to order the relocation of petitioner, and the demolition of her structure
in case of her refusal as this is the only way through which the NHA can effectively carry out the
implementation of P.D. No. 1315.
Inasmuch as petitioner’s property was located in the area identified as an open space by the
NHA, her continued refusal to vacate has rendered illegal her occupancy thereat. Thus, in accordance
with P.D. No. 1472, petitioner could lawfully be ejected even without a judicial order.
Neither can it be successfully argued that petitioner had already acquired a vested right over the subject
property when the NHA recognized her as the census owner by assigning to her a tag number (TAG
No. 77-0063).
EFFECT OF REPEALING LAW ON LAW FIRST REPEALED

GARCIA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 165835 June 22, 2005

Facts:
This is a petition filed by Clarita Garcia, wife or retired Major General Carlos F. Garcia, with
application for injunctive relief in order issued by the Fourth Division of Sandiganbayan denying the
motion to quash or dismiss Civil Case No. 0193. This is a suit for the forfeiture commenced by the
Republic against petitioner and her immediate family.
The forfeiture suit was to recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties that the Garcias
allegedly acquires and amassed. Then Republic then filed the Sandiganbayan through the OMB a
petition for forfeiture of those alleged unlawfully acquires properties of the Garcias. The case was
docketed as civil case 0193(forfeiture I) and subsequently another case of forfeiture involving the same
parties was filed docketed as Civil Case 0196(forfeiture II). Thus the two cases were consolidated for
convenience and clarity. Before the filing of Forfeiture II but subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I,
the OMB charged the Garcias with violation of RA 7080(plunder) and the case raffled to the second
division of SB. The plunder charge covered substantially the same properties identified in both
Forfeiture I and II.
Petitioner now contends, after denying there motion to dismiss the Forfeiture I case, that the
plunder case and the Forfeiture I case should be consolidated in the second division of SB pursuan to
R 8249. On May 20, 2005, the SB 4th Division denied the motion for the reason that the forfeiture
case is not the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the criminal
case of plunder.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture under RA
1379.
Ruling:
The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over forfeiture proceedings pursuant to RA 1379.
Forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem and civil in nature. It is a divestiture of property without
compensation in consequence of an offense.
STARE DECISIS
TING vs. VELEZ-TING

G.R. No. 166562 March 31, 2009
Facts:

On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their
youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City
for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed
that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their
marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter.
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its decision declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Onate’s findings and the
admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
On October 19, 2000, the petitioner appealed to the CA, reversing the trial court’s decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological
incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code
has been realized
Ruling:
No. By the very nature of case involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and
understood to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the
psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedent, gravity
and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are
not conditions in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat
such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In
fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always base its decision not solely
on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the
course of the proceedings.
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and
expert opinion of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a party’s alleged
psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and according, be weighed by
the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage.
The petition for review on certiorari is granted.
STARE DECISIS
NEGROS NAVIGATION CO. vs COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 110398 November 7, 1997
Facts:

In April of 1980, private respondent Ramon Miranda purchased from the Negros Navigation
Co., Inc. four special cabin tickets (#74411, 74412, 74413 and 74414) for his wife, daughter, son and
niece who were going to Bacolod City to attend a family reunion. The tickets were for Voyage No.
457-A of the M/V Don Juan, leaving Manila at 1:00 p.m. on April 22, 1980. The ship sailed from the
port of Manila on schedule.
At about 10:30 in the evening of April 22, 1980, the Don Juan collided off the Tablas Strait in
Mindoro, with the M/T Tacloban City, an oil tanker owned by the Philippine National Oil Company
(PNOC) and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC). As a result, the
M/V Don Juan sank. Several of her passengers perished in the sea tragedy. The bodies of some of
the victims were found and brought to shore, but the four members of private respondents’ families
were never found.
Private respondents filed a complaint on July 16, 1980 in the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 34, against the Negros Navigation, the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), and the
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC), seeking damages for the death of Ardita
de la Victoria Miranda, 48, Rosario V. Miranda, 19, Ramon V. Miranda, Jr., 16, and Elfreda de la
Victoria, 26. In its answer, petitioner admitted that private respondents purchased ticket numbers
74411, 74412, 74413 and 74414; that the ticket numbers were listed in the passenger manifest; and
that the Don Juan left Pier 2, North Harbor, Manila on April 22, 1980 and sank that night after being
rammed by the oil tanker M/T Tacloban City, and that, as a result of the collision, some of the
passengers of the M/V Don Juan died. Petitioner, however, denied that the four relatives of private
respondents actually boarded the vessel as shown by the fact that their bodies were never
recovered. Petitioner further averred that the Don Juan was seaworthy and manned by a full and
competent crew, and that the collision was entirely due to the fault of the crew of the M/T Tacloban
City.
On January 20, 1986, the PNOC and petitioner Negros Navigation Co., Inc. entered into a
compromise agreement whereby petitioner assumed full responsibility for the payment and
satisfaction of all claims arising out of or in connection with the collision and releasing the PNOC and
the PNOC/STC from any liability to it. The agreement was subsequently held by the trial court to be
binding upon petitioner, PNOC and PNOC/STC. Private respondents did not join in the agreement.
Issues:
a) Whether the members of private respondents’ families were actually passengers of the Don
Juan;
b) Whether the ruling in Mecenas v. Court of Appeals, finding the crew members of petitioner
to be grossly negligent in the performance of their duties, is binding in this case;
c) Whether the total loss of the M/V Don Juan extinguished petitioner’s liability; and
d) Whether the damages awarded by the appellate court are excessive, unreasonable and
unwarranted.
Ruling:
First. The trial court held that the fact that the victims were passengers of the M/V Don
Juan was sufficiently proven by private respondent Ramon Miranda, who testified that he purchased
tickets numbered 74411, 74412, 74413, and 74414 at P131.30 each from the Makati office of petitioner
for Voyage No. 47-A of the M/V Don Juan, which was leaving Manila on April 22, 1980. This was

corroborated by the passenger manifest (Exh. E) On which the numbers of the tickets and the names
of Ardita Miranda and her children and Elfreda de la Victoria appear.
Second. In finding petitioner guilty of negligence and in failing to exercise the extraordinary
diligence required of it in the carriage of passengers, both the trial court and the appellate court relied
on the findings of this Court in Mecenas v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which case was brought for
the death of other passengers. In that case it was found that although the proximate cause of the
mishap was the negligence of the crew of the M/T Tacloban City, the crew of the Don Juan was
equally negligent as it found that the latter’s master, Capt. Rogelio Santisteban, was playing mahjong
at the time of collision, and the officer on watch, Senior Third Mate Rogelio De Vera, admitted that
he failed to call the attention of Santisteban to the imminent danger facing them. This Court found
that Capt. Santisteban and the crew of the M/V Don Juan failed to take steps to prevent the collision
or at least delay the sinking of the ship and supervise the abandoning of the ship.
Third. The next issue is whether petitioner is liable to pay damages notwithstanding the total
loss of its ship. The issue is not one of first impression. The rule is well-entrenched in our
jurisprudence that a ship-owner may be held liable for injuries to passengers notwithstanding the
exclusively real and hypothetic nature of maritime law if fault can be attributed to the ship-owner.
Fourth. Petitioner contends that, assuming that the Mecenas case applies, private respondents
should be allowed to claim only P43,857.14 each as moral damages because in the Mecenas case, the
amount of P307,500.00 was awarded to the seven children of the Mecenas couple. Under petitioner’s
formula, Ramon Miranda should receive P43, 857.14, while the De la Victoria spouses should
receive P97, 714.28.
LAW OF THE CASE
FULGENCIO vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

G.R. No. 141600 September 12, 2003
Facts:

Petitioners failed to indicate in their petition with the CA the dates showing when they received
notice of the NLRC’s June 16, 1998 Decision, and the date when they filed a motion for
reconsideration therefrom, in violation of Section 3, Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended. Petitioners also failed to include in their petition the required explanation under Section 11,
Rule 13 of the same Rules as to why personal service upon the respondents was not resorted to; hence,
the dismissal thereof by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not strict adherence to technicalities in the application of the provisions of the
Rules of Court impede the cause of justice.
Ruling:
Rules of procedure applied in a very rigid, technical sense override substantial justice. It is a
far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse the parties a
review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality
and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while
actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.
OBITER DICTUM
VILLANUEVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 142947 March 19, 2002
Facts:

In April 1988, Orly married Lilia before a trial court judge in Puerto Princesa. In November
1992, Orly filed to annul the marriage. He claimed that threats of violence and duress forced him to
marry Lilia. He said that he had been receiving phone calls threatening him and that Lilia even hired
the service of a certain Ka Celso, a member of the NPA, to threaten him. Orly also said he was
defrauded by Lilia by claiming that she was pregnant hence he married her but he now raises that he
never impregnated Lilia prior to the marriage. Lilia on the other hand denied Orly’s allegations and
she said that Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage and she showed 14 letters that shows
Orly’s affection and care towards her.
Issue:
Whether or not there is duress and fraud attendant in the case at bar.
Ruling:
The SC ruled that Orly’s allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. On its face, it is
obvious that Orly is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have the pending appealed
bigamy case to be dismissed. On the merits of the case, Orly’s allegation of fear was not concretely
established. He was not able to prove that there was a reasonable and well-grounded reason for fear
to be created in his mind by the alleged intimidation being done against him by Lilia and her party.
Orly is a security guard who is well abreast with self-defense and that the threat he so described done
against him is not sufficient enough to vitiate him from freely marrying Lilia. Fraud cannot be raised
as a ground as well. His allegation that he never had an erection during their sexual intercourse is
incredible and is an outright lie. Also, there is a prolonged inaction on the part of Orly to attack the
marriage. It took him 4 and half years to file an action which brings merit to Lilia’s contention that
Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage.
OBITER DICTUM
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 146486 March 4, 2005

Facts:
The enumeration in the Constitution of the impeachable officers is exclusive. The
Ombudsman is only one man, not including his Deputies. Thus, only the Ombudsman, not his
deputies, is impeachable.
On 29 December 1999, twenty- two officials and employees of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that then Deputy Ombudsman
for the Visayas, herein private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed (1) sexual harassment against
Rayvi Padua- Varona, mulcting money from confidential employees: James Alueta and Eden Kiamco
and (3) oppression against all employees in not releasing P7,200.00 in benefits of OMB- Visayas
employees on the date the said amount was due for release. Fact-finding investigation was conducted
by the Office of the Ombudsman and the report was referred by the Ombudsman to a constituted
Committee of Peers which initially recommended that the investigation be converted into one solely
for purposes of impeachment. However, this recommendation was denied by the Office of the
Ombudsman and following the stand of the Office of the Ombudsman that the Deputy Ombudsmen
and The Special Prosecutor are not removable through impeachment. On 18 December 2000, despite
the expiration of private respondent Mojica's term of office, the Court of Appeals nevertheless
rendered the assailed Decision on the grounds of public interest. CA ruled that the Deputy
Ombudsman is an impeachable officer. Thus, OMB's appeal.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the Ombudsman’s Deputies are impeachable.
b) Whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman may be held criminally and/or administratively
liable.
Ruling:
Order of the CA is reversed and set aside. The complaints in Criminal Case No.OMB-0-00-
0616 and Administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 is reinstated and the Office of the
Ombudsman is ordered to proceed with the investigation relative to the above cases. The Deputy
Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. Sec. 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that
“The President, the Vice- President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the
Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for,
and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other
high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from
Office as provided by law, but not by impeachment”.
Records of the Constitutional Commission, as well as the opinions of leading commentators

in Constitutional Law reveal that the term Ombudsman in Sec. 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
refer to the rank in itself. The Ombudsman is only one man, not including his Deputies. Leading legal
luminaries on the Constitution are one in their opinion as to whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman
is impeachable. All of them agree that the enumeration impeachable officers in Section 2, Article XI
of the 1986 Constitution, are exclusive. In their belief, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is
impeachable. Thus, where the issue involved was not raised nor presented to the court and not passed
upon by the court in the previous case, the decision in the previous case is not stare decisis of the
question presented.

Criminal and Administrative Liability of Deputy Ombudsman As to whether or not the private
respondent, then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, may be held criminally and/or administratively
liable, we likewise resolve the issue in favor of the petitioner. The rule that an impeachable officer
cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses which constitute grounds for impeachment
presupposes his continuance in office. Hence, the moment he is no longer in office because of his
removal, resignation, or permanent disability, there can be no bar to his criminal prosecution in the
courts. Nor does retirement bar an administrative investigation from proceeding against the private
respondent, given that, as pointed out by the petitioner, the former’s retirement benefits have been
placed on hold in view of the provisions of Sections 12 and 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.
OBITER DICTUM
AYALA CORPORATION vs. ROSA-DIANA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION

G.R. No. 134284 December 1, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner Ayala Corporation was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Alfaro
Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City. On April 20, 1976, Ayala sold the lot to Manuel Sy married to
Vilma Po and Sy Ka Kieng married to Rosa Chan. The Deed of Sale executed between Ayala and
the buyers contained Special Conditions of Sale and Deed Restrictions. Among the Special
Conditions of Sale were: a) the vendees shall build on the lot and submit the building plans to the
vendor before September 30, 1976 for the latter’s approval b) the construction of the building shall
start on or before March 30, 1977 and completed before 1979. Before such completion, neither the
deed of sale shall be registered nor the title released even if the purchase price shall have been fully
paid and c) there shall be no resale of the property.
Issue:
Whether or not the deed of restriction can be enforced by Ayala Corporation.
Ruling:
Contractual obligations between parties have the force of law between them and absent any
allegation that the same are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy,
they must be complied with in good faith. The party guilty of violating the deed of restrictions may
only be held alternatively liable for substitute performance of its obligation, that is, for the payment
of damages.
DURA LEX SED LEX
PEOPLE vs. VENERACION

G.R. No. 119987-88 October 12, 1995
Facts:
On August 2, 1994, four accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with
homicide of a seven year old girl in the RTC presided by Judge Lorenzo P. Veneracion. Respondent
judge however, refused to impose the corresponding penalty of death and he rather imposed reclusion
perpetua to each of the accused. The city prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration praying that
the penalty of death be imposed upon the four accused. The respondent judge refused to act.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge can impose penalty lower than that prescribed by law.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose the
proper penalty provided for by the law on the accused regardless of his own religious or moral beliefs.
In this case the respondent judge must impose the death penalty. This is consistent in the rule laid
down in the Civil Code Article 9 that no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of
the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.
CONCEPT OF CUSTOMS
YAO KEE vs. SY GONZALES

G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988

Facts:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 leaving behind properties here in the
Philippines.Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration
alleging that they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. The petition was opposed
by Yao Kee et al alleging that Yao Kee is the lawful wife of the deceased whom he married in China.
The trial court rendered decision in favor of the opposition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered
a decision, modifying the decision declaring the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee as not has been proven
valid in accordance with the laws of China. Hence, both parties moved for reconsideration to which
the Supreme Court granted.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in accordance with Philippine
laws.
Ruling:
Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proven as any other fact. To establish the validity of
marriage, the existence of foreign law as a question of fact and the alleged marriage must be proven
by clear and convincing evidence.For failure to prove the foreign law or custom and consequently of
the marriage, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat in China cannot be recognized in the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts.
FLORESCA vs. PHILEX MINING CORP.

G.R. No. L-30642 April 30, 1985

Facts:
Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground operations at
Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the
mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations,
negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its
men working underground. Floresca et al moved to claim their benefits pursuant to the Workmen’s
Compensation Act before the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. They also petitioned before
the regular courts and sue Philex for additional damages. Philex invoked that they can no longer be
sued because the petitioners have already claimed benefits under the WCA.
Issue:
Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at the same time sue.
Ruling:
Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for benefits under the
WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a civil case before the regular courts.
Conversely, if they sued before the civil courts then they would also be estopped from claiming
benefits under the WCA. The SC however ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this deficiency
due to ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may have not availed of such a
remedy. However, if in case they’ll win in the lower court whatever award may be granted, the amount
given to them under the WCA should be deducted. The SC emphasized that if they would go strictly
by the book in this case then the purpose of the law may be defeated. Idolatrous reverence for the
letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures man’s survival and ennobles
him. As Shakespeare said, the letter of the law killeth but its spirit giveth life.
URSUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996

Facts:
Petitioner Cesario Ursua was convicted for violation of Sec. 1 of CA No. 142, as amended by
RA 6085 otherwise known as “An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases” by the RTC of Davao City
which was affirmed by the CA. Allegedly petitioner when asked by his counsel to take his letter of
request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firm’s messenger Oscar Perez had personal
matters to attend to, instead of writing his name wrote the name “Oscar Perez” when he was requested
to sign. However, Loida Kahulugan who gave him the copy of complaint was able to know through
Josefa Amparo that petitioner is not Oscar Perez. Loida reported the matter to the Deputy
Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged. Petitioner comes for review
of his conviction to the SC as he reasserts his innocence.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Cesario Ursua should be acquitted on the ground that he was
charged under the wrong law.
Ruling:
The SC held that petitioner be acquitted of the crime charged. Time and again the SC has
decreed that the statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evil
sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in
mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The
court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers.
APPLICATION OF PENAL LAWS, EXCEPTION
ASAALI vs. COMMISSION OF CUSTOMS

G.R. No. L-24170 December 16, 1968

Facts:
The SC held that petitioner be acquitted of the crime charged. Time and again the SC has
decreed that the statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evil
sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in
mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The
court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers.
Issue:
Whether or not the interception and seizure by custom officials on the high seas is valid on
the contention that the seizure was affected outside our territorial waters.
Ruling:
The SC held that it is a settled doctrine of International Law that a state has the right to protect
itself and its revenues, a right not limited to its own territory but extending to the high seas. The
Revised Penal Code leaves no doubt as to its application and enforceability not only within the
Philippines, its interior waters and maritime zone but also outside of its jurisdiction while on Philippine
ship.
NATIONALITY/CITIZENSHIP THEORY
LLORENTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner Paula Llorente was married to a US Navy enlisted serviceman Lorenzo Llorente, in
Nabua, Camarines Sur, on February 22, 1937. Before the outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed for
the US and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in Nabua. Lorenzo became an American citizen on
November 30, 1943. Upon the liberation of the Philippines (1945), Lorenzo was granted by the US
Navy to visit his wife in the Philippines and found out that Paula was living in with Lorenzo’s brother
Ceferino. In December 1945, Paula gave birth to Crisologo with the birth certificate saying that the
child was illegitimate, and the father’s name was left blank.
On February 2, 1946, Paula and Lorenzo had a written agreement, dissolving their marital
union, suspending his support upon her, and waiving his authority to file a case of adultery against
her. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for a divorce in 1951 which was granted in 1952.On January
16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Fortuno, in the Philippines; after which, they bore three children:
Raul, Luz, and Beverly. In 1981, Lorenzo executed a will, bequeathing all his property to Alicia and
three children. Before the proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died in 1985.
On Sept. 4, 1985, Paula filed with the RTC of Iriga a petition for letters of administration over
Lorenzo’s estate, contending that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse.In 1987, the RTC granted her
petition, stating that Lorenzo’s divorce decree was void and inapplicable in the Philippines and
therefore his marriage to Alicia was void. The RTC entitled Paula to one-half of their conjugal
properties, and one-third of the estate – the two-thirds would be divided equally among the illegitimate
children. Paula was appointed as legal administrator of the estate.
Issue:
Whether or not Paula Llorente was entitled to inherit from the estate of Lorenzo Llorente.
Ruling:
Since Lorenzo was an American citizen, issues arising from the case are governed by foreign
law. The CA and RTC called to the for the renvoi doctrine, where the case was referred back to the
law of the decedent’s domicile, in this case, the Philippine law. Most US laws follow the domiciliary
theory. Thus, the Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzo’s will. The case was
remanded to the RTC for the ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.
INCIDENTS OF SUCCESSION, EXCEPTION
MICIANO vs. BRIMO

G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927

Facts:
Joseph G. Brimo, a citizen of Turkey, died and left a partition of the estate. Juan Miciano, the
judicial administrator of the estate left filed a scheme of partition. However, Andre Brimo, one of the
brothers of the deceased, opposed it. Brimo’s opposition is based on the fact that the partition in
question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph Brimo’s will which are not in accordance with the
laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation of Article 10 of
the Civil Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary
disposition.
Ruling:
Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen, though he declared in his will that Philippine laws must
govern the disposition of his estate; however, it must not prejudice the heir or legatee of the testator.
Therefore, the testator’s national law must govern in accordance with Article 10 of the Civil
Code.Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that “it be made and disposed
of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island”, this condition, described as
impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee
in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. Impossible conditions are
further defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national law of the testator shall govern
in his testamentary dispositions.
The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such
manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.
RENVOI
AZNAR vs. GARCIA

G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963

Facts:
Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to California where he resided
for a period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his
death. In his will, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen (legitimate),
as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia (illegitimate).
Counsel for Helen claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, California law should
be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile. On the
other hand, counsel for Maria, averred that the national law of the deceased must apply, illegitimate
children not being entitled to anything under California law.
Issue:
Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in determining the
successional rights of his heirs.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that
there are two rules in California on the matter; the internal law which applies to Californians domiciled
in California and the conflict rule for Californians domiciled outside of California. Christensen being
domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his domicile must be followed. The case was remanded to the
lower court for further proceedings – the determination of the successional rights under Philippine
law only.
RENVOI
BELLIS vs. BELLIS

G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

Facts:
Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first wife
whom he divorced he had five legitimate children, by his second wife, who survived him, he had three
legitimate children, and three illegitimate children. Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing
of his Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, his illegitimate
children were not given anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will on the ground that they
have been deprived of their legitimates to which they should be entitled, if Philippine law were to be
applied.
Issue:
Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights of
the illegitimate children.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled to their legitimes under the
Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes.The parties admit that the
decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas,
there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the
will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law
on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of
succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will;
and (d) the capacity to succeed.
Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
RENVOI
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK vs. ESCOLIN

G.R. No. L-27860 March 29, 1974

Facts:
Linnie Jane Hodges, a married woman and a citizen of Texas, USA, was a domiciliary of the
Philippines at the moment of her death. With respect to the validity of certain testamentary provisions
she had made in favor of her husband, a question arose as to what exactly were the laws of Texas on
the matter at the precise moment of her death (for while one group contended that the Texan law
should result to renvoi, the other group contended that no renvoi was possible).
Issue:
Whether or not Texas Law should apply.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to
be resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. Texas law at the time of her
death (and not said law at any other time).
FORMS, SOLEMNITIES OF CONTRACTS, AND WILLS
ALICE REYES VAN DORN vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR.

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
Facts:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a
citizen of the United States; they were married in Hong Kong in 1972. Thereafter, they established
their residence in the Philippines and begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18,
1975. Subsequently, they were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982, and that petitioner has re-
married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner’s business in Ermita,
Manila is their conjugal property; that petitioner he ordered to render accounting of the business and
that private respondent be declared to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the
case contending that the cause of action is barred by the judgment in the divorce proceedings before
the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community
property" as of June 11, 1982. The denial now is the subject of the certiorari proceeding.
Issue:
Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to the alien spouse.
Ruling:
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards
of American Law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own country’s court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is stopped by his own
representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
FORMS, SOLEMNITIES OF CONTRACTS, AND WILLS
BANK OF AMERICA, NT and SA vs. AMERICAN REALTY CORPORATION

G.R. No. 133876 December 29, 1999

Facts:
Petitioner Bank of America NT & SA (BANTSA) is an international banking and financing
institution duly licensed to do business in the Philippines. As borne by the records, BANTSA and
BAIL on several occasions granted three major multi-million United States (US) Dollar loans to the
following corporate borrowers: (1) Liberian Transport Navigation, S.A.; (2) El Challenger S.A. and (3)
Eshley Compania Naviera S.A., all of which are existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic
of Panama and are foreign affiliates of private.
As security, the latter mortgaged a property located in the Philippines owned by herein
respondent ARC. ARC is a third party mortgagor executed two real estate mortgages, dated 17
February 1983 and 20 July 1984, over its parcels of land including improvements thereon, located at
Barrio Sto. Cristo, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, and which are covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. T-78759, T-78760, T-78761, T-78762 and T-78763.
The debtors failed to pay. Thus, petitioner filed collection suits in foreign courts to enforce
the loan. Subsequently, it filed a petition in the Sheriff to extra-judicially foreclose the said mortgage,
which was granted.
On 12 February 1993, private respondent filed before the Pasig RTC, Branch 159, an action
for damages against the petitioner, for the latter’s act of foreclosing extra-judicially the real estate
mortgages despite the pendency of civil suits before foreign courts for the collection of the principal
loan.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors for the
recovery of the loan before foreign courts constituted a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure.
Ruling:
Yes.In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute against
the mortgage debtor either a personal action or debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. In
other words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause of
action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in itself.In the instant
case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved in said
foreign law would still not find applicability.Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is
contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order
shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have
for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws
or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.The

public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction
proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable
injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of
law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles
of Conflict of Laws.Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST vs. ROMEO A. JADER

G.R. No. 132344 February 17, 2000
Facts:
Romeo Jader graduated at UE College of law from 1984-19988. During his last year, 1st
semester, he failed to take the regular final examination in Practical Court 1where he was given an
incomplete grade remarks. He filed an application for removal of the incomplete grade given by Prof.
Carlos Ortega on February 1, 1988 which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after the
payment of required fees. He took the exam on March 28, 1988 and on May 30, 1988 the professor
gave him a grade of 5.The commencement exercise of UE College of law was held April 16, 1988,
3PM. In the invitation, his name appeared. In preparation for the bar exam, he took a leave of
absence from work from April 20- Sept 30, 1988. He had his pre-bar class review in FEU. Upon
learning of such deficiency, he dropped his review classes and was not able to take the bar exam. Jader
sued UE for damages resulting to moral shock, mental anguish, and serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, and sleepless nights when he was not able to take the 1988 bar
examinations due to UE’s negligence.
Issue:
Whether UE should be held liable for misleading a student into believing JADER satisfied all
the requirements for graduation when such is not the case. Can he claim moral damages?
Ruling:
Supreme Court held that petitioner was guilty of negligence and this liable to respondent for
the latter’s actual damages. Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their
academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. However, respondent should
not have been awarded moral damages though JADER suffered shock, trauma, and pain when he was
informed that he could not graduate and will not be allowed to take the bar examinations as what
Court of Appeals held because it’s also respondent’s duty to verify for himself whether he has
completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. As a senior law student,
he should have been responsible in ensuring that all his affairs specifically those in relation with his
academic achievement are in order. Before taking the bar examinations, it doesn’t only entail a mental
preparation on the subjects but there are other prerequisites such as documentation and submission
of requirements which prospective examinee must meet. Wherefore, the assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals is affirmed with modification. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of Thirty-
five Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal interest of 6% per annum
computed from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid; the amount of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) as attorney's fees; and the costs of the suit. The award of moral damages is deleted.
GF EQUITY, INC. vs. VALENZONA

G.R. No. 156841 June 30, 2005

Facts:
GF Equity, represented by its Chief Financial Officer, W. Steven Uytengsu, hired Valenzona
as head coach of the Alaska basketball team in the PBA under a contract of employment. He was
tasked to coach at all practices and games scheduled for the Alaska team, coach exhibition games,
coach if invited to participate in any all-star game, attending every event conducted, play-off games,
etc.
He was also tasked to comply with all requirements respecting to the conduct of its team and
players, to implement. He also agreed to report from time to time as fixed by the corporation in good
physical condition, give his best services, loyalty, to be neatly and fully attired in public and to conduct
himself on and off the court according to the highest standards of honesty, morality, fair play and
sportsmanship, and not to do anything detrimental to the best interest of the corporation.
He also agreed to endorse the corporation’s products in commercial advertising, promotions,

will allow himself to be taken pictures with others for still photographs, motion pictures or TV. For
his services, he will be paid P35, 000.00 monthly, net of taxes, provide him with a service vehicle and
gasoline allowance. The contract was for two (2) years starting January 1, 1988 to December 31, 1989,
with the condition that if at any time during the contract, the coach fails to exhibit sufficient skill or
competitive ability to coach the team, the contract can be terminated by the corporation. (Paragraph
3)
Before signing the contract, Valenzona consulted his lawyer who pointed out that the contract
was one-sided, but still, Valenzona acceded to the terms of the contract as he had trust and confidence
in Uytengsu who recommended him to GF Equity.
Alaska placed third both in the open and all-Filipino PBA Conference in 1988, he was advised
of the termination of his services by way of a letter dated September 26, 1988, invoking their right as
specified in paragraph 3 of the contract and to return the service vehicle no later than September 30,
1984. He will still be paid the balance of P75, 868.38 for his services. Six (6) years after or on July 30,
1994, Valenzona’s counsel demanded from GF Equity payment of compensation arising from the
arbitrary and unilateral termination of his employment. But GF Equity refused the claim. Valenzona
filed before the RTC of Manila a complaint for breach of contract with damages, ascribing bad faith,
malice and disregard to fairness and to the rights of the plaintiff by unilaterally and arbitrarily pre-
terminating the contract without just cause and legal and factual basis. He prayed award for damages,
moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and cost of the suit. He challenged the condition
in paragraph 3 as lacking the elements of mutuality of a contract, a clear transgression of Art. 1308 of
the NCC and reliance thereon did not warrant his unjustified and arbitrary dismissal.
GF Equity maintained that it merely exercised its right under the contract to pre-terminate
Valenzona due to incompetence, and that he was guilty of laches, in any event, complaint should be

instituted before a labor arbiter. The trial court dismissed the complaint on June 28, 1997 and it
declared Valenzona as fully aware of the bargain. The CA reversed the RTC’s decision and ordered
GF Equity to pay him damages. The CA concluded that GF Equity abused its right by arbitrarily
terminating Valenzona’s employment, finding Valenzona’s claim for damages as valid. The court
ordered GF Equity to pay compensatory damages, moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not, the CA concluded wrongly from established facts in a manner violative of
applicable laws and established jurisprudence.
Ruling:
GF Equity argued that it entered into a contract protected by law, as it was not contract to
law, morals, good customs public policy or public order, hence, no bad faith. Valenzona is guilty of
laches for his unexplained inaction of six (6) years.
In the case at bar, paragraph 3 gives GF Equity the unbridled prerogative to pre-terminate the
contract irrespective of the soundness, fairness, or reasonableness, or even lack of bass of its opinion.
To validate the paragraph would open the gate for arbitrary and illegal dismissals, for void contractual
stipulations would be used as justification therefor.
Laches applies to equity, prescription applies to law. The claims was filed within the statutory
period of prescription, doctrine of laches cannot be applied. The action was filed for breach of
contract, way well within the prescriptive period of ten (10) years, considering he filed the action six
(6) years from the date of his cause of action.
Valenzona is entitled to recover actual damages, however, award for moral damages,
exemplary damages, must be set aside, as there is no showing that GF Equity acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive manner. Attorney’s fees are awarded because GF Equity refused to
pay the balance of Valenzona’s salaries therefore to protect himself, was compelled to litigate.
GO vs. CORDERO
G.R. No. 164703 May 4, 2010

Facts:
Sometime in 1996, Mortimer F. Cordero, Vice-President of Pamana Marketing Corporation
(Pamana), ventured into the business of marketing inter-island passenger vessels. After contacting
various overseas fast ferry manufacturers from all over the world, he came to meet Tony Robinson,
an Australian national based in Brisbane, Australia, who is the Managing Director of Aluminium Fast
Ferries Australia (AFFA).
After negotiations with Felipe Landicho and Vincent Tecson, lawyers of Allan C. Go who is
the owner/operator of ACG Express Liner of Cebu City, a single proprietorship; Cordero was able
to close a deal for the purchase of two (2) SEACAT 25 as evidenced by the Memorandum of
Agreement dated August 7, 1997. Accordingly, the parties executed Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825
for one (1) high-speed catamaran (SEACAT 25) for the price of US$1,465,512.00. Per agreement
between Robinson and Cordero, the latter shall receive commissions totaling US$328,742.00, or
22.43% of the purchase price, from the sale of each vessel.
However, Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing directly with Robinson when he was
informed by Dennis Padua of Wartsila Philippines that Go was canvassing for a second catamaran
engine from their company which provided the ship engine for the first SEACAT 25. Padua told
Cordero that Go instructed him to fax the requested quotation of the second engine to the Park Royal
Hotel in Brisbane where Go was then staying. Cordero tried to contact Go and Landicho to confirm
the matter but they were nowhere to be found, while Robinson refused to answer his calls. Cordero
immediately flew to Brisbane to clarify matters with Robinson, only to find out that Go and Landicho
were already there in Brisbane negotiating for the sale of the second SEACAT 25. Despite repeated
follow-up calls, no explanation was given by Robinson, Go, Landicho and Tecson who even made
Cordero believe there would be no further sale between AFFA and ACG Express Liner.
On August 21, 1998, Cordero instituted Civil Case No. 98-35332 seeking to hold Robinson,
Go, Tecson and Landicho liable jointly and solidarily for conniving and conspiring together in
violating his exclusive distributorship in bad faith and wanton disregard of his rights, thus depriving
him of his due commissions. Robinson filed a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of jurisdiction over
his person and failure to state a cause of action, asserting that there was no act committed in violation
of the distributorship agreement. Said motion was denied by the trial court on December 20, 1999.
Robinson was likewise declared in default for failure to file his answer within the period granted by
the trial court. As for Go and Tecson, their motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of
action was likewise denied by the trial court on February 26, 1999. Subsequently, they filed their
Answer denying that they have anything to do with the termination by AFFA of Cordero’s authority
as exclusive distributor in the Philippines. On the contrary, they averred it was Cordero who stopped
communicating with Go in connection with the purchase of the first vessel from AFFA and was not
doing his part in making progress status reports and airing the client’s grievances to his principal,
AFFA, such that Go engaged the services of Landicho to fly to Australia and attend to the documents
needed for shipment of the vessel to the Philippines. In any case, Cordero no longer had cause of

action for his commission for the sale of the second vessel under the memorandum of agreement
dated August 7, 1997 considering the termination of his authority by AFFA’s lawyers on June 26,
1998.
On May 31, 2000, the trial court rendered its judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against
defendants Allan C. Go, Tony Robinson, Felipe Landicho, and Vincent Tecson. On January 29, 2001,
the CA rendered judgment granting the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 60354 and setting
aside the trial court’s orders of execution pending appeal.The case before the Supreme Court is a
consolidation of the petitions for review under Rule 45 separately filed by Go (G.R. No. 164703) and
Cordero (G.R. No. 164747).
Issue:
a) Whether petitioner Cordero has the legal personality to sue the respondents for breach of
contract; and
b) Whether the respondents may be held liable for damages to Cordero for his unpaid
commissions and termination of his exclusive distributorship appointment by the principal,
AFFA.
Ruling:
While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued for breach of contract because only
parties can breach contractual provisions, a contracting party may sue a third person not for breach
but for inducing another to commit such breach. The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence
of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of a contract; and
(3) interference of the third person is without legal justification.
The presence of the first and second elements is not disputed. Through the letters issued by
Robinson attesting that Cordero is the exclusive distributor of AFFA in the Philippines, respondents
were clearly aware of the contract between Cordero and AFFA represented by Robinson. In fact,
evidence on record showed that respondents initially dealt with and recognized Cordero as such
exclusive dealer of AFFA high-speed catamaran vessels in the Philippines. In that capacity as exclusive
distributor, petitioner Go entered into the Memorandum of Agreement and Shipbuilding Contract
No. 7825 with Cordero in behalf of AFFA.
The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with contractual relations cannot
be held liable for more than the amount for which the party who was inducted to break the contract
can be held liable. Respondents Go, Landicho and Tecson were therefore correctly held liable for the
balance of petitioner Cordero’s commission from the sale of the first SEACAT 25, in the amount of
US$31,522.09 or its peso equivalent, which AFFA/Robinson did not pay in violation of the exclusive
distributorship agreement, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from June 24, 1998 until the
same is fully paid. Respondents having acted in bad faith, moral damages may be recovered under
Article 2219 of the Civil Code.

TITUS B. VILLANUEVA vs. EMMA M. ROSQUETA

G.R. No. 180764 January 19, 2010
Facts:

Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta (Rosqueta), formerly Deputy Commissioner of the Revenue
Collection and Monitoring Group of the Bureau of Customs (the Bureau), tendered her courtesy
resignation from that post on January 23, 2001, shortly after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
assumed office. But five months later on June 5, 2001, she withdrew her resignation, claiming that she
enjoyed security of tenure and that she had resigned against her will on orders of her superior.
Meantime, on July 13, 2001 President Arroyo appointed Gil Valera (Valera) to respondent
Rosqueta’s position. Challenging such appointment, Rosqueta filed a petition for prohibition, quo
warranto, and injunction against petitioner Titus B. Villanueva (Villanueva), then Commissioner of
Customs, the Secretary of Finance, and Valera with the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner Villanueva,
Valera, and the Secretary of Finance challenged the injunction order before the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP 66070. On September 14, 2001 the CA issued its own TRO, enjoining the
implementation of the RTC’s injunction order. But the TRO lapsed after 60 days and the CA
eventually dismissed the petition before it.
But the RTC dismissed respondent Rosqueta’s complaint, stating that petitioner Villanueva
committed no wrong and incurred no omission that entitled her to damages. The RTC found that
Villanueva had validly and legally replaced her as Deputy Commissioner seven months before the
Bureau’s centennial anniversary. But the CA reversed the RTC’s decision, holding instead that
petitioner Villanueva’s refusal to comply with the preliminary injunction order issued in the quo
warranto case earned for Rosqueta the right to recover moral damages from him.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding petitioner Villanueva liable in damages to respondent
Rosqueta for ignoring the preliminary injunction order that the RTC issued in the quo warranto case
(Civil Case 01-101539), thus denying her of the right to do her job as Deputy Commissioner of the
Bureau and to be officially recognized as such public officer.
Ruling:
Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in the
exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acts in bad faith,
with intent to prejudice another. Complementing this principle are Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code which grant the latter indemnity for the injury he suffers because of such abuse of right or duty.
But petitioner Villanueva cannot seek shelter in the alleged advice that the OSG gave him.
Surely, a government official of his rank must know that a preliminary injunction order issued by a
court of law had to be obeyed, especially since the question of Valera’s right to replace respondent
Rosqueta had not yet been properly resolved. That petitioner Villanueva ignored the injunction shows
bad faith and intent to spite Rosqueta who remained in the eyes of the law the Deputy Commissioner.
ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO vs. THE MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 184315 November 25, 2009
Facts:
In his Complaint, plaintiff Alfonso T. Yuchengco alleges that in the last quarter of 1994,
Chronicle Publishing Corporation ("Chronicle Publishing" for brevity) published in the Manila

Chronicle a series of defamatory articles against him. In two of the subject articles (November 10 and
12, 1993 issues), he was imputed to be a "Marcos crony" or a "Marcos-Romualdez crony," which term
according to him is commonly used and understood in Philippine media to describe an individual who
was a recipient of special and underserving favors from former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and/or
his brother-in-law Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez due to special and extra-ordinary closeness to either
or both, and which favors allowed an individual to engage in illegal and dishonorable business
activities.
The subject articles insinuated that he personally and intentionally caused the failure of
Benguet Corporation and that if even if he ever assumed control of Oriental, it would suffer the same
fate as the former. According to him, at the time he assumed chairmanship of Benguet Corporation,
it was already experiencing financial downturns caused by plummeting world prices of gold and
unprofitable investments it ventured into. Moreover, one of the articles portrayed him as being an
unfair and uncaring employer when the employees of Grepalife Corporation, of which he is the
Chairman, staged a strike, when the truth being that he had nothing to do with it. And that if his group
takes over Oriental, it will experience the same labor problems as in Grepalife.
In their Answer, the defendants deny liability claiming that the subject articles were not
defamatory since they were composed and published in good faith and only after having ascertained
their contents. In any event, they claim that these articles are privileged and/or constitute reasonable
and balance[d] comments on matters of legitimate public interest which cannot serve as basis for the
finding of libel against them. They likewise alleged that they were acting within the bounds of
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of libel.
Ruling:
In sum, this Court upholds the ruling of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the
subject articles contain defamatory imputations. All of the following imputations: (1) the labeling of
Yuchengco as a Marcos crony, who took advantage of his relationship with the former President to
gain unwarranted benefits; (2) the insinuations that Yuchengco induced others to disobey the lawful
orders of SEC; (3) the portrayal of Yuchengco as an unfair and uncaring employer due to the strike
staged by the employees of Grepalife; (4) the accusation that he induced RCBC to violate the
provisions of the General Banking Act on DOSRI loans; and (5) the tagging of Yuchengco as a
"corporate raider" seeking to profit from something he did not work for, all exposed Yuchengco to
public contempt and ridicule, for they imputed to him a condition that was dishonorable.
There is, thus, a presumption of malice in the case of every defamatory imputation, where
there is no showing of a good intention or justifiable motive for making such imputation.In the instant
case, there is preponderance of evidence showing that there exists malice in fact in the writing and
publication of the subject libelous articles. When malice in fact is proven, assertions and proofs that
the libelous articles are qualifiedly privileged communications are futile, since being qualifiedly
privileged communications merely prevents the presumption of malice from attaching to a defamatory
imputation.
Neither is there any reason for this Court to reverse the findings of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals that there was actual malice on the part of the respondents. As held by the courts a

quo, Yuchengco was able to show by the attendant circumstances that respondents were animated by
a desire to inflict unjustifiable harm on his reputation, as shown by the timing and frequency of the
publication of the defamatory articles. Finally, even if we assume for the sake of argument that actual
malice was not proven in the case at bar, we nevertheless cannot adhere to the finding of the Court
of Appeals in the Amended Decision that the subject articles were fair commentaries on matters of
public interest, and thus fell within the scope of the third type of qualifiedly privileged
communications.
In view of the foregoing, this Court is constrained to grant the instant Petition and reinstate
the Decision of the trial court, as previously affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its original Decision.
This Court, however, finds the award of damages in the total amount of One Hundred Million Pesos
by the trial court to be rather excessive given the circumstances.
CUSTODIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 116100 February 9, 1996
Facts:
Respondents owned a parcel of land wherein a two-door apartment was erected. Said property
was surrounded by other immovables owned by petitioners, spouses Custodio and spouses Santos.
As an access to P. Burgos Street from the subject property, there are two possible passageways. The
first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters distant from Mabasa’s

residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in between the previously mentioned row of houses.
The second passageway is about 3 meters in width and length from plaintiff Mabasa’s residence to P.
Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing thru said passageway, a less than a meter wide path
through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in length, has to be traversed. Petitioners constructed an
adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first constructed
by defendants Santoses along their property which is also along the first passageway. Defendant
Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire
passageway was enclosed. As a result, the tenants left the apartment because there was no longer a
permanent access to the public street. Respondents then filed an action for the grant of an easement
of right of way. The trial court ordered the petitioner to give respondents a permanent access to the
public street and that in turn, the respondent will pay a sum of Php 8,000.00 to the petitioner as an
indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway. On appeal by the respondent to the CA, the
decision of the trial court was affirmed, such that a right of way and an award of actual, moral and
exemplary damages were given to the respondents. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the award of damages is proper?
Ruling:
No. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong
inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage,
or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the
remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. There is a material distinction between
damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm
which results from the injury, and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or
harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque
injuria. In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must
establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff.
There must be a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing
it.
In the instant case, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim
of respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order
that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential
that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or
injury to the plaintiff. The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise
of their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law
recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those
established by law. It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property.
Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that “(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements
by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes
constituted thereon.”
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There
was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. The
fact that respondents had no existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision

of the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of just compensation.
It was only that decision which gave private respondents the right to use the said passageway after
payment of the compensation and imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the
exercise of said right. The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which
an action will lie, although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded.
One may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted may
cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in the latter’s favor. An injury or damage occasioned
thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts can give no redress for hardship to an individual
resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful means.
EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION vs. CALDERON

GR. No. 156168 December 14, 2004
Facts:
Jose T. Calderon is a businessman engaged in several business activities here and abroad, either
in his capacity as President or Chairman of the Board thereon. He is also a stockholder of PLDT and
a member of the Manila Polo Club, among others. He is a seasoned traveler, who travels at least seven
times a year in the U.S., Europe and Asia. On the other hand, Equitable Banking Corporation is one
of the leading commercial banking institutions in the Philippines, engaged in commercial banking,
such as acceptance of deposits, extension of loans and credit card facilities, among others.Sometime

in September 1984, Calderon applied and was issued an Equitable International Visa card. The said
Visa card can be used for both peso and dollar transactions within and outside the Philippines.
The credit limit for the peso transaction is twenty thousand pesos; while in the dollar
transactions, Calderon is required to maintain a dollar account with a minimum deposit of $3,000.00,
the balance of dollar account shall serve as the credit limit.In April 1986, Calderon together with some
reputable business friends and associates went to Hongkong for business and pleasure
trips. Specifically on 30 April 1986, Calderon accompanied by his friend, Ed De Leon went to Gucci
Department Store located at the basement of the Peninsula Hotel Hongkong. There and then,
Calderon purchased several Gucci items (t-shirts, jackets, a pair of shoes, etc.). The cost of his total
purchase amounted to HK$4,030.00 or equivalent to US$523.00. Instead of paying the said items in
cash, he used his Visa card to effect payment thereof on credit. He then presented and gave his credit
card to the saleslady who promptly referred it to the store cashier for verification.
Shortly thereafter, the saleslady, in the presence of his friend, Ed De Leon and other shoppers
of different nationalities, informed him that his Visa card was blacklisted. Calderon sought the
reconfirmation of the status of his Visa card from the saleslady, but the latter simply did not honor it
and even threatened to cut it into pieces with the use of a pair of scissors.Deeply embarrassed and
humiliated, and in order to avoid further indignities, Calderon paid cash for the Gucci goods and items
that he bought.
Issue:
Whether or not Calderon can be indemnify with damages.
Ruling:
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from
the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus,
there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of
a violation of a legal duty. In such cases the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone,
the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury
or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he
complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant
owed to the plaintiff- a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person
causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was
injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition
of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the
proximate cause of the injury.

VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA
HOTEL NIKKO vs. REYES

GR. No. 154259 February 28, 2005
Facts:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari regarding the reversing decision of the Court of
Appeals in the decision of the Trial Court and thus, making the petitioners liable for damages through
the abusive conduct of petitioner Lim, imposing upon them P200,000 as exemplary damages,
P200,000 as moral damages, and P10,000 as attorney’s fees.
Plaintiff Roberto Reyes (Amay Bisaya) was having coffee at the Nikko Hotel lobby on October
13, 1994 at around six in the morning when Dr. Violeta Filart, a long-time friend, approached him

and invited him to a party at the penthouse where the hotel’s former manager’s birthday was being
celebrated. He consented and carried the latter’s present. At the party, when he was helping himself
at the buffet table, Ruby Lim, one of the petitioners, approached him and asked him to leave in a loud
voice enough to be heard by those around the buffet table. Then, a Makati policeman accompanied
the embarrassed Amay Bisaya in leaving the penthouse.
Ruby Lim accepted the fact that she asked Mr. Reyes to leave but not in the manner he claimed.
She said she politely asked Mr. Reyes to finish his food and leave the party as the celebrant wants the
party to be intimate, and that he was not invited. On the other hand, Dr. Filart denied Amay Bisaya’s
claim that she invited him to the party.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Lim’s conduct was abusive enough to make the petitioners liable for
damages caused to plaintiff.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that any damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered through
Ms. Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be
his to bear alone.
The plaintiff failed in proving the ill-motive of the petitioners. It was from his confession that
when Ms. Lim approached him, they were very close that they nearly kissed each other. Considering
the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when she requested the latter to leave the party, it is
apparent that the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have been no intention
on her part to cause him embarrassment. It was plaintiff’s reaction to the request that must have made
the other guests aware of what transpired between them. Had plaintiff simply left the party as
requested, there was no need for the police to take him out. Therefore, we find the petitioners not
guilty of violating Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
LIABILITY EX-MALEFICIO OR EX-DELICTO
EDUARDO MANUEL vs. PEOPLE

GR. No. 165842 November 29, 2005
Facts:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of Appeals affirming
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the petitioner for the crime of
bigamy.
Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus Gaña on July 18, 1975,
who, according to the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was
never seen again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996 when the

latter was only 21 years old. Three months after their meeting, the two got married through a civil
wedding in BaguioCity without Gandalera’s knowledge of Manuel’s first marriage. In the course of
their marriage, things got rocky and Gandalera learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when
he married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo Manuel. The latter’s defense
being that his declaration of “single” in his marriage contract with Gandalera was done because he
believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he had to go to
court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court
ruled against him sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to ten years, and
an amount 0f P200,000.00 for moral damages.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally liable
for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any
malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the RTC’s decision.
Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary reward for moral damages
was affirmed.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that
petitioner’s wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there
was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family
Code.
b) Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the
award of Php200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in law.
Ruling:
The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice
or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith
of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or
criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know
the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the
present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the
presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present
spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a
subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee
spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. The court rules against the petitioner.
The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after
his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to
the latter. The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they undermine
and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of
society. Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s perfidy, she is not
barred from claiming moral damages. Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court
finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.

LIABILITY EX-MALEFICIO OR EX-DELICTO
SONNY D. ROMERO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 167546 July 17, 2009
Facts:
On April 1, 1999 at around 12:00 noon, the JC Liner driven by petitioner Sonny Romero and
the Apego Taxi driven by Jimmy Padua figured in a head-on collision along Governor Jose Fuentebella
Highway at Barangay Hibago, Ocampo, Camarines Sur. The bus was bound for Naga City while the
taxi was going in the opposite direction of Partido Area. The collision resulted in the death of Gerardo
Breis, Sr., Arnaldo Breis, Gerardo Breis, Jr., Rene Montes, Erwin Breis and Jimmy Padua. Luckily,
Edwin Breis and his son Edmund Breis survived although they sustained serious injuries.

As a consequence, petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
multiple homicide and multiple serious physical injuries with damage to property in the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Ocampo, Camarines Sur. After trial on the merits, the MTC acquitted petitioner
of the crime charged in a decision dated November 9, 2000. Petitioner was, however, held civilly liable
and was ordered to pay the heirs of the victims the total amount of P3,541,900 by way of actual
damages, civil indemnity for death, moral damages, temperate damages and loss of earning capacity.
Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur which on July 17, 2001,
affirmed the MTC judgment in toto. Refusing to give up, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On March 3, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed decision affirming the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner’s acquittal freed him of civil liability?
Ruling:
In view of the pronouncements of the MTC and the RTC, the Supreme Court agrees with the
conclusion of the CA that petitioner was acquitted not because he did not commit the crime charged
but because the RTC and the MTC could not ascertain with moral conviction the wanton and reckless
manner by which petitioner drove the bus at the time of the accident. Put differently, petitioner was
acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, his
civil liability for the death, injuries and damages arising from the collision is another matter. While
petitioner was absolved from criminal liability because his negligence was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt, he can still be held civilly liable if his negligence was established by preponderance
of evidence. In other words, the failure of the evidence to prove negligence with moral certainty does
not negate (and is in fact compatible with) a ruling that there was preponderant evidence of such
negligence. And that is sufficient to hold him civilly liable.
ACTS CONTRA BONOS MORES
CECILIO PE ET AL. vs. ALFONSO PE

G.R. No.L-17396 May 30, 1962
Facts:
Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time of her
disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a married man
and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. He used to stay in the town of Gasan,
Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying with her parents in the
same town. Defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of
Lolita's father. Because of such fact and the similarity in their family name, defendant became close to
the plaintiffs who regarded him as a member of their family. Sometime in 1952, defendant frequented
the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two

eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine trysts not only in the town of Gasan
but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. They exchanged love notes with each
other the contents of which reveal not only their infatuation for each other but also the extent to
which they had carried their relationship. The rumors about their love affairs reached the ears of
Lolita's parents sometime, in 1955, and since then defendant was forbidden from going to their house
and from further seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant
who is a Chinese national. The affair between defendant and Lolita continued nonetheless.
Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters at their residence at
54-B España Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. After
she left, her brothers and sisters checked up her thing and found that Lolita's clothes were gone.
However, plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled piece of paper inside Lolita's aparador. Said note,
written on a small slip of paper approximately 4" by 3" in size, was in a handwriting recognized to be
that of defendant's. The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the NBI
but up to the present there is no news or trace of her whereabouts. The trial court said: "In the
absence of proof on this point, the court may not presume that it was the defendant who deliberately
induced such relationship. We cannot be unmindful of the uncertainties and sometimes inexplicable
mysteries of the human emotions. It is a possibility that the defendant and Lolita simply fell in love
with each other, not only without any desire on their part, but also against their better judgment and
in full consciousness of what it will bring to both of them. This is specially so with respect to Lolita,
being an unmarried woman, falling in love with defendant who is a married man."
Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to moral, compensatory, exemplary and corrective
damages.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's
affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or
trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact
that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to
pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family who was allowed free access
because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two eventually
fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but also in Boac
where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affairs reached the
knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing
Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national.
Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental
home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not
only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita

to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed
immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to
Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in
Article 21 of the new Civil Code.
FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL.

G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960
Facts:
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher in
the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger
than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise
of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter in
the City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her and the petitioner, since one evening in 1953,
when after coming from the movies; they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V "Escaño,"
to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that
she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was

born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954,
defendant married one Romanita Perez. On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas filed with said of her
child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise. Petitioner
admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever
promised to marry the complainant. Upon her motion, said court ordered petitioner, on October 27,
1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50.00 a month, which was, on February 16, 1955,
reduced to P30.00 a month.
The judgment of the RTC is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima, as the
natural daughter of defendant, and confirming the order pendente lite, ordering defendant to pay to
the said child, through plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth day
of every month sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of four thousand five hundred pesos
(P4,500.00) for actual and compensatory damages; the sum of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) as
moral damages; and the further sum of five thousand pesos (P500.00) as attorney's fees for plaintiff,
with costs against defendant. On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this
decision, except as to the actual and compensatory damages and the moral damages, which were
increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.
Issue:
Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to
marry?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that seduction does not exist in the present case thus the petitioner
is not morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than
the complainant — who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high
school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with
petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that,
complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she
"wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy."
Thus the complainant is not entitled to award of damages.

BEATRIZ GALANG vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL.

G.R. No.L-17248 January 29, 1962
Facts:
Rodrigo courted Beatriz in 1953 and they, thereafter, became engaged, albeit Rodrigo's mother
was opposed to their marriage; that on April 15, 1955 Rodrigo and his father went to her house and
her marriage with Rodrigo were arranged, with the concurrence of her mother, appellant Maximino
Quinit having agreed to give dowry and to defray the expenses of the marriage, with the exception of
the wedding dress of appellee; that they agreed to have the marriage celebrated in Baguio, for which
reason on April 27, 1955, appellee, Rodrigo and the latter's father left for Baguio; that upon arriving
at Colorado Falls, however, Maximino made them alight from the bus and took them to the house of
Adolfo Dagawan with whom Maximino agreed that appellee and Rodrigo would stay in said house,

Maximino to pay P5.00 daily for their lodging and asked Dagawan to make all arrangements for their
wedding in Baguio and to act as their sponsor; that after making these arrangements Maximino left,
while appellee and Rodrigo remained in Dagawan's house where they lived as husband and wife until
May 9, that on May 7, appellee and Rodrigo, accompanied by Dagawan, went to Baguio to secure a
marriage license but failed because Rodrigo did not have a residence certificate, although both
prospective contracting parties signed the corresponding application; that on May 9, on the pretext
that he going to their hometown to get his residence certificate, Rodrigo left Colorado Falls and never
returned; that when appellee returned to their hometown (Sison, Pangasinan), she found out that
Rodrigo's parents had sprinted him away because, in their opinion, appellee's reputation was unsavory.
The Court of First Instance sustained plaintiff's pretense, but the Court of Appeals considered
her evidence unworthy of credence, and, hence, absolved Maximino Quinit.
Issues:
Whether or not Rodrigo and Maximo Quinit are liable for damages due to the alleged breach
of promise to marry?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the reason that mere
breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.In the light of the clear and manifest intent of
our law making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, the award of moral
damages made by the Court of First Instance is, accordingly, untenable.
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
Facts:
Private respondent, Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October 27, 1987 for damages
against the petitioner for the alleged breach of their agreement to get married. She met the petitioner
in Dagupan where the latter was an Iranian medical exchange student who later courted her and
proposed marriage. The petitioner even went to Marilou’s house to secure approval of her
parents. The petitioner then forced the respondent to leave with him in his apartment. Marilou was
a virgin before she lived with him. After a week, she filed a complaint because the petitioner started
maltreating and threatening her. He even tied the respondent in the apartment while he was in school
and drugged her. Marilou at one time became pregnant but the petitioner administered a drug to abort
the baby.

Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and told Marilou to not live with him since he
is already married to someone in Bacolod. He claimed that he never proposed marriage or agreed to
be married neither sought consent and approval of Marliou’s parents. He claimed that he asked
Marilou to stay out of his apartment since the latter deceived him by stealing money and his
passport. The private respondent prayed for damages and reimbursements of actual expenses.
Issue:
Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to cause for damages.
Ruling:
The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. The
court held that when a man uses his promise of marriage to deceive a woman to consent to his
malicious desires, he commits fraud and willfully injures the woman. In that instance, the court found
that petitioner’s deceptive promise to marry led Marilou to surrender her virtue and womanhood.
Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to marry was a deceptive ploy to have
carnal knowledge with the woman and actual damages should be paid for the wedding preparation
expenses. Petitioner even committed deplorable acts in disregard of the laws of the country.
Therefore, SC set aside the decision of CA awarding damages to the respondent.
WASSMER vs. VELEZ

G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
Facts:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get
married and set Sept. 4, 1954 as the big day. On Sept. 2, 1954, Velez left a note for his bride-to-be
saying that he wants to postpone the marriage as his mother opposes it and that he is leaving. But the
next day, Sept. 3, he sent her a telegram and told her that nothing has changed, that he is returning
and he apologizes. Thereafter, Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again. Wassmer sued him
for damages. Velez filed no answer and was declared in default.
Issue:
Is the case at bar a mere breach of promise to marry?
Ruling:

Surely, this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of
promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the
preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is
quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must
be held answerable in damages in accordance with Art. 21 of the NCC which provides that "any
person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."

NATIVIDAD vs. TUNAC

G.R. No. 143130 July 10, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner Elsa Natividad and respondent Ronald Tunac grew up together in Barangay Quiling,
Talisay, Batangas where their respective parents resided. At age nineteen (19), the two became lovers.
One day, Ronald asked Elsa to go with him to his boarding house in Pasig City to get the bio-data
which he needed in connection with his application for employment. Upon arrival at the boarding
house, they found no one there. Ronald asked Elsa to go with him inside his room and, once inside,
started kissing Elsa until he succeeded in making love with her. Elsa cried at the loss of her virginity,
but Ronald appeased her by promising to marry her.
Their intimate relations continued, resulting in Elsa getting pregnant sometime in June 1992.
Ronald reassured her, again promising her marriage. True enough, on October 31, 1992, Ronald and
his parents, accompanied by several relatives numbering twenty in all, went to Elsa's house and asked
her parents for the hand of their daughter.The two families agreed to have the wedding in January
1993 but Elsa's sister had gotten married that year so they postponed it. Meanwhile, Elsa started living
with Ronald in the house of the latter's family while waiting for the baby to be born. Unfortunately,
on December 19, 1992, Elsa gave birth to a premature baby which died after five (5) hours in the
incubator. After Elsa's discharge from the hospital, the two families decided that Elsa should go back
to her parents so her mother could take care of her during her postnatal period. During said period,
Ronald occasionally slept in Elsa's house.
It seems that after Elsa's miscarriage, a marked change in Ronald's attitude towards the former
occurred. In January of 1993, the Natividads confronted the Tunacs. In that meeting, Ronald informed
Elsa that he no longer wanted to get married to her. Petitioners succinctly contend they are suing
respondents not merely because Elsa became pregnant but because Ronald reneged on his promise to
marry her after their agreement had already been much publicized in their town.
Issue:
Whether or not Ronald performs moral seduction.
Ruling:
In the case at bar, it is clear that no moral seduction was employed by Ronald, much less by
his parents. Form the narration of the trial court, the evident conclusion is that the two became lovers
before they engaged in any sexual intercourse. Also, the moral seduction contemplated by the Code
Commission in drafting Article 21 of the Civil Code is one where the defendant is in a position of
moral ascendancy in relation to the plaintiff. We fail to see any of these circumstances in this case.
In addition, as the trial court noted, marriage plans were in fact arranged between the families
of the parties. That their relationship turned sour afterwards, or immediately after Elsa's miscarriage,
is already beyond the punitive scope of our laws. This is simply a case of a relationship gone awry.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT

SHINRYO (PHILIPPINES) COMPANY, INC. vs. RRN INC.
G.R. No. 172525 October 20, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Shinryo (Philippines) Company, Inc. (hereinafter petitioner) is a domestic
corporation organized under Philippine laws. Private respondent RRN Incorporated (hereinafter
respondent) is likewise a domestic corporation organized under Philippine laws. Respondent filed a
claim for arbitration against petitioner before CIAC for recovery of unpaid account which consists of
unpaid portions of the sub-contract, variations and unused materials in the total sum of P5, 275,184.17
and legal interest in the amount of P442, 014.73. Petitioner filed a counterclaim for overpayment in
the amount of P2, 512,997.96. The parties admitted several facts before the CIAC. It was shown that
petitioner and respondent executed an Agreement and Conditions of Sub-contract. Respondent
signified its willingness to accept and perform for petitioner in any of its projects, a part or the whole
of the works more particularly described in Conditions of Sub-Contract and other Sub-contract
documents.
On June 11, 2002, the parties executed a "Supply of Manpower, Tools/Equipment,

Consumables for the Electrical Works-Power and Equipment Supply, Bus Duct Installation" for the
Phillip Morris Greenfield Project (hereafter Project) covered by Purchase Order Nos. 4501200300-
000274 and 4501200300-000275 amounting to P15,724,000.00 and P9,276,000.00 respectively, or a
total amount of P25,000,000.00. The parties also agreed that respondent will perform variation orders
in the Project. In connection with the Project, petitioner supplied manpower chargeable against
respondent. Respondent was not able to finish the entire works with petitioner due to financial
difficulties. Petitioner paid respondent a total amount of P26,547,624.76. On June 25, 2005 [should
read 2003], respondent, through its former counsel sent a letter to petitioner demanding for the
payment of its unpaid balance amounting to P5,275,184.17. Petitioner claimed material back charges
in the amount of P4,063,633.43. On September 26, 2003, respondent only acknowledged
P2,371,895.33 as material back charges. Thereafter, on October 16, 2003, respondent sent another
letter to petitioner for them to meet and settle their dispute. On January 8, 2004, respondent sent
another letter to petitioner regarding the cost of equipment rental and the use of scaffolding.
Thereafter, on August 12, 2004, petitioner sent a letter to respondent denying any unpaid account and
the failure in their negotiations for amicable settlement.
Issue:
Whether or not the Claimant's claim for inventory of excess materials is constitutes to unjust
enrichment.
Ruling:
No, the court of appeals committed a grave reversible error in affirming that the CIAC award
for the values of inventoried materials considering that respondent RRN has no basis to claim because
Engr. Bonifacio admitted that respondent RRN failed to establish whether the materials came from
respondent or from petitioner and that it was petitioner that actually installed the said materials as part
of remaining works that the petitioner took over from respondent rrn. The claim for the value of
inventoried materials is a doubled claim or a doubled entry because in the computation of the final
account, respondent RRN was credited the full contract price and the cost of variations which included
the inventoried materials.
Despite petitioner's attempts to make it appear that it is advancing questions of law, it is quite
clear that what petitioner seeks is for this Court to recalibrate the evidence it has presented before the

CIAC. It insists that its evidence sufficiently proves that it is entitled to payment for respondent's use
of its manlift equipment, and even absent proof of the supposed agreement on the charges petitioner
may impose on respondent for the use of said equipment, respondent should be made to pay based
on the principle of unjust enrichment. Petitioner also questions the amounts awarded by the CIAC
for inventoried materials, and costs incurred by petitioner for completing the work left unfinished by
respondent.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT

CAR COOL Philippines, Inc. v. USHIO Realty and Development Corporation
G.R. NO. 138088 January 23, 2006
Facts:
On December 19, 2005, USHIO Realty and Development Corporation filed an ejectment case
against CAR COOL Philippines Inc., to recover the possession of a parcel of land at Quezon Avenue.
USHIO Realty contends that despite several and repeated demands and notices from the former
owners of the land, spouses Lopez, and also from the new owners, USHIO Realty, CAR COOL still
failed to vacate the property. On December 3, 1995 USHIO Realty sent the final demand to CAR
COOL, giving a non extendable 15 days within which to vacate the property. CAR COOL refused to
vacate the property, hence the ejectment case.
The Metropolitan Trial Court rendered in the ejectment case in favor of USHIO Realty. CAR
COOL appealed to the Regional Trial Court which rendered a decision affirming the decision of the
MeTC. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification, granting rentals to
USHIO Realty.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages by way of rentals and
attorney’s fees in favor of USHIO Realty
Ruling:
USHIO Realty as the new owner of the property has a right to physical possession of the said
property. Since CAR COOL deprived USHIO Realty of its property, CAR COOL should pay USHIO
Realty rental as a reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property. Contrary to
CAR COOL’s contention the payment of damages in the form of rentals for the property does not
constitute unjust enrichment.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT

ELEGIR vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.
G.R. No. 181995 July 16, 2012
Facts:
Petitioner Bibiano C. Elegir was hired by Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) as a commercial pilot,
specifically designated as HS748 Limited First Officer, on March 16, 1971. In 1995, PAL embarked
on a refleeting program and acquired new and highly sophisticated aircrafts. Subsequently, PAL posts
a bid for the opening of slots for the crew of the new aircrafts. Elegir was one of those awarded with
the opportunity.
Elegir, along with 7 other pilot, were sent for training in Seattle, Washington, United States of
America on May 8, 1995 for the necessary training of his skills and knowledge to handle the new
aircraft. He completed his training on September 19, 1995. On November 5, 1996 after rendering 25
years, 8 months, and 20 days of continuous service, the petitioner applied for an optional retirement
authorized under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between PAL and the Airline Pilots
Association of the Philippines (ALPAP). PAL asked him to reconsider his retirement in that the
company has yet to recover the cost of his training. In the event that he finally decides to leave, PAL
will deduct the unrecovered cost of his training from his Retirement Pay. He decided to leave
thereafter. Elegir’s counsel sent PAL a letter of correspondence stating that the cost of training should
not be deducted from his retirement pay.
Issue:
Whether or not PAL had the right to reimburse themselves from Elegir’s retirement pay the
amount unrecovered from his training.
Ruling:
PAL had the right to be reimbursed. According to Article 22-23 of the New Civil Code, they
had the right to demand payment since Elegir will unjustly enrich himself at the expense of PAL.
Unjustly enriching is unduly profiting one’s self on something which does not meritoriously belong to
him, this is well enshrined in the Latin maxim, “Nemo cum alteriusdetrimentolocupletaripotest”. Elgir
has the right to retire since he has reached a certain number of flight hours which is considered a long
stay in PAL, but his bid for the vacancy and his subsequent training sponsored by PAL was put to
waste when he decides to have an early retirement from PAL after his training. It would be unfair for
PAL if Elegir has gained new skills for the service of PAL but then leave even after PAL has still not
even recovered the cost of training.
PARENS PATRIAE DOCTRINE

VALENZUELA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-56168 December 22, 1988
Facts:
Carlos Telosa is a farmer and a fisherman. He had very limited education. Telosa initiated a
loan with the Rural Bank of Lucena with a contract of mortgage. The mortgage covered a parcel of
land measuring 50,000 square meters. Several months later the Rural Bank of Lucena experienced
financial distress. The Central Bank appraised Rural Bank of Lucian’s shareholders. It was found out
in its investigation that key officers of the bank had certain anomalies or had resorted to unsound
banking practices which were prejudicial to the government, the public, and its creditors.
Rural Bank of Lucena has then undergone liquidation. It had received orders to turn its non-
monetary assets into cash to satisfy claims. Among one of the accounts it decides to liquidate was the
Telosa account in the amount of Php 5000.00. Rural Bank of Lucena sent for a demand letter asking
for the payment of the account. Carlos Telosa thought that he owes the bank only Php 300.00 and
not Php 5000.00, so Telosa filed a protest on the demand received. Meanwhile Carlos Telosa died in
January 13, 1968. The rural bank claiming that the payment was not fully paid petitioned the
foreclosure the Telosa’s land to satisfy the claim. The lot was then sold to the highest bidder and was
consequently registered in the Registry of Deeds on September 11, 1972. Telosa now pray for the
annulment of the land back to them because they have already paid the loan of Php 300.00.
Issue:
Whether or not the state can intervene via parenspatriae for the return of the Telosa’s land.
Ruling:
The state can protect its citizens; it is a supreme power the state can exercise at any time the
rights of its citizen is being prejudiced. The bank took advantage of the Telosa’s by making a document
that was not the contract that they have agreed upon. Needless to state in this regard the particular
transaction was one of the fraudulent and anomalous transactions involving the officer of the Rural
Bank of Lucena, Inc. The state can intervene because there has been a preponderance of proof that
the loan only amounts to Php 300.00 and not Php 5000.00. By virtue of the power of the state the
bank was ordered to return the land it extra judicially settled.
RIGHT TO PRIVACY

CONCEPCION vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 120706 January 31, 2000
Facts:
Sometime in 1985, the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas are living in an apartment
being leased to them by Florence “Bing” Concepcion, who also resides in the same compound where
the apartment was located. Nestor was engaged in the business of supplying government agencies and
private entities with office equipment, appliances and other fixtures on a cash or credit basis. Bing
joined the venture and contributed capital on the condition that after her capital investment was
returned to her, any profit earned would be divided equally between her and Nestor.
Sometime in the second week of July 1985, Rodrigo Concepcion the brother of the deceased
husband of Bing accosted Nestor at the latter’s apartment and accusing him of having adulterous
relationship with Bing. Rodrigo threatened that should something happen to Rodrigo’s sick mother,
in case the latter learned of the affair, he would kill Florence.
As a result of the incident, Nestor felt extreme embarrassment and shame to the extent that
he could no longer face his neighbors. Florence also ceased to do business with him by not
contributing capital anymore so much so that the business venture was no longer feasible. To make
matters worse, the relationship between Allem and Nestor has soured from the doubt of fidelity and
frequent bickering and quarrels. Allem even expressed her desire to leave her husband. Nestor was
forced to demand from Rodrigo damages and a public apology.
Issue:
Whether or not Nestor’s right to privacy had been shattered by Rodrigo and is Nestor entitled
to damages.
Ruling:
The court has ruled that Nestor is entitled to damages. Although the defendant claims that
there was neither violation done that was enlisted under Article 26 and 2219 of the New Civil Code
which constitute libel, slander, or any other form of defamation nor does it involve prying into the
privacy of another’s residence, it was still adjudged that the act done was form of that manner. The
Code commission stresses in no uncertain terms that the human personality must be exalted. The
sacredness of human personality is a concomitant consideration of every plan for human amelioration.
The touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and civilization of every county, is how far it
dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a person from being unjustly humiliated, in short if
human personality is not exalted then the laws are indeed defective, thus, under this article, the right
of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations of a person’s dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind. There is no question that Nestor suffered mental anguish,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and social humiliation as a proximate result of petitioner’s
abusive, scandalous, and insulting language. Nestor, therefore is entitled to damages.

RIGHT TO PRIVACY

PADALHIN vs. LAVINA
G.R. No. 183026 November 14, 2012
Facts:
Lavina and Nestor were both diplomats assigned in Kenya as Ambassador and Consul
General, respectively. In the course of their stay at Kenya , the residence of Lavina was raided twice.
Prior to the raids, BienvenidoPasturan delivered messages to the Filipino household helpers in the
ambassador’s residence instructing them to allow the entry of an officer who would come to take
photographs of the ivory souvenirs kept therein. The first raid was conducted while Lavina and his
wife were attending a diplomatic dinner. Officials from the Criminal Investigation Division Intelligent
Office of Kenya took picture of Lavina’s house with the aid of Lavina’shouse helpers. The second
raid again took place when Lavina was not present at the house, pictures were taken.
Lavina received information from the DFA in Manila that an investigation team was sent to
Kenya to inquire into the complaints filed against him by the employees of the Philippine Embassy in
Kenya, own one hand, and his own complaint against the spouses Padalhin. The investigating team
comprised by Manalo, Ebdalin, and Dizon entered the Lavina residence without any search warrant,
court order or letter from the DFA Secretary. Lavina alleged that the team destroyed cabinet locks,
damaged furniture and took three sets of carved ivory tusk. Lavina subsequently filed before the RTC
for damages against the spouses Padalhin, and the 3 members of the investigation team.
Issue:
Whether or not the unwarranted search and seizure made by the petitioners violated Lavina’s
right to privacy.
Ruling:
The Article 26 of the civil code state the instances when a person’s right are disturbed. There
is no doubt that the unwarranted seizures done where against Lavina’s privacy rights. The act was
defended by Padalhin stating that he had no malice or bad faith when he ordered the search and
seizure. The Supreme Court ruled that Nestor’s surreptitious acts negate his allegation of good faith.
If it were true that Lavina kept the ivories in his diplomatic residence then, his behavior deserves
condemnation. However, that is not the issue in the case at bar. Nestor violated the New Civil Code
prescriptions concerning the privacy of one’s residence and he cannot hide behind the cloak of his
supposed benevolent intentions to justify the invasion. Damages are in order against the Padalhins.
NON-FEASANCE, MISFEASANCE, MALFEASANCE

PHILEX MINING CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 125704 August 28, 1998
Facts:
On August 5, 1992, the BIR sent a letter to Philex asking it to settle its tax liability for the 2nd,
3rd, and 4th quarter of 1991 as well as the 1st and 2nd of 1992 in the total amount of P123,821.52. In a
letter dated August 1992, Philex protested the demand for payment of the tax liabilities stating it has
pending claims for VAT input/refund for taxes it paid for the years 1989 to 1991 in the amount of
P119,977,032.02 plus interest. Therefore these claims for tax credit/refund should be applied against
the tax liabilities. BIR stated that it was the mistake of its employees who in investigating tax claims
are seen to drag their feet needlessly.
Issue:
Whether or not the malfeasance of the employee justified the non-payment of the taxes due
by Philex.
Ruling:
The BIR being a collector of taxes has the right to demand for due taxes. The non-payment
of Philex cannot be justified by the lapse of duty by the tax collector. The Officer having a mistake
cannot be a reason not to pay because it was in neglect of his duty. Philex regardless has to pay the
taxes. The taxes in the first place could not be subject to legal compensation because taxes cannot be
offset against claims of taxes by the government; the relationship of the government and its taxpayers
is not a debtor-creditor relationship.
CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM ACQUITTAL

MANANTAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 107125 January 29, 2001
Facts:
In the morning of September 25, 1982, Fiscal WilfredoAmbrocio decided to catch shrimps at
the irrigation canal at his farm. He invited the deceased, Ruben Nicolas, who told him that they should
borrow the Ford Fiera of George Manantan. So Ambrocio and Manantan came to get Nicolas at the
Manantan Technical School.
When they arrived at the farm they had drank beer. At about 12:00 they went home. Then at
about 2:00 or 3:00 P.M., Miguel Tabangin (Defense Witness), Nicolas, and Ambrocio returned home
with a duck. They ate and drank up to 8:00 in the evening. Manantan, soon after, invited the others to
go bowling in Santiago. They went to Santiago and were not able to bowl but rather decided to go to
a night club. They decided to go home after the festivities.
Manantan drove the car. Tabangin sat with Manantan at the front seat while Nicolas and
Ambrocio sat at the back seats. Manantan was driving at a speed of about 40 kilometers per hour
along the middle of the highway because he was about to overtake a tricycle when they met a jeepney
with bright lights on. Manantan tried to swerve the car to the right to avoid the collision but was no
able to avoid the oncoming vehicle and the two vehicles collided with each other at the center of the
road. The men were brought to the hospital but unfortunately Nicolas died. Ambrocio suffered minor
injuries to his head and legs.
The parents of the deceased filed a criminal case against Manantan but the case was ruled in
favor of Manantan for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The parents of the Ruben Nicolas now
seek for the enforcement of civil liability against Manantan. Manantan argues that he can be held no
longer be civilly liable since he was acquitted of the crime.
Issue:
Whether or not a suit for civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of an accused.
Ruling:
The answer at the case at bar is in the affirmative. The acquittal of Manantan was due to
reasonable doubts therefore civil action can prosper. There exist two types of acquittal, the first is
acquittal because the accused was not the author of the crime or there is no crime while the second is
the acquittal due to reasonable doubts. In the former the criminal and civil liability is extinguished
while in the latter the criminal aspect is the only one extinguished since civil liability merely requires
preponderance of evidence. The case prospers in pursuance of article 29 of the New Civil Code.
EXTINGUISHMENT OF CIVIL LIABILITY BY ACUITTAL

NUGUID vs. NICDAO
G.R. No. 150785 September 15, 2006
Facts:
The accused, Clarita Nicdao is charged with fourteen counts of violation of Batas
PambansaBilang 22 otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law. Sometime 1996 from April to
August thereof, Clarita Nicdao and her husband went to Emma Nuguid. The petitioner asked if they
could borrow money to settle some obligations. Due to their close relationship, Nuguid lent the
Nicdao spouses money.
Nuguid released the loan in installment of One Hundred Thousand Pesos until the amount
reached to an aggregate of One Million One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos. Nuguid, to show good
faith in her part, issued Hermosa Saving Bank open-dated check in the same amount as the loan. The
checks are to be deposited in Nuguid’s account upon non-payment of the amount within one year. In
June 1997, Nuguid, together with Samson Ching, demanded payment of the loan but Nicdao refused
to acknowledge the indebtedness. Nuguid then decided to deposit the checks in her account in Ching’s
account since it was Ching whom Nuguid got the money to loan to Nicdao. The checks were all
dishonored because of it being drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF).
A verbal and written notice of dishonor was sent to Nicdao. This was to give them chance to
make good on their loan as represented in the checks. The notice was for naught. Hence, a complaint
was brought against Nicdao for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. In the Regional Trial Court
Nicdao was found guilty of and was sentenced to pay the principal plus interest and suffer
imprisonment of one year per bouncing check for a total of 14 years. The Court of Appeals reversed
the decision due to substantial fact that was overlooked by the trial court. Nuguid now filed for a
petition to the Supreme Court raising the issue for civil liability.
Issue:
a) Whether or not the civil liability was also extinguished upon the acquittal of Nicdao of the
violation of B.P. 22.
b) Whether or not interest is enforceable in the contract.
Ruling:
The civil liability was extinguished due to the findings of the Supreme Court that Nicdao has
already made overpayments of the amount due. The acquittal was due to the reason that the crime
was non-existent already since payment were made over and above what was agreed upon. The
criminal and civil liability will not persist since there the checks were only to be deposited upon non-
compliance of the payment of the principal debt
Interest was being enforced by the Nuguid in the case. It was one of the reasons why the debt
of Nicdao was continually rising as payment are applied first to interest. The interest was

unconscionable. The Court ruled that since the interest was not stipulated in writing, the debt
remained in its principal amount. The principal was actually paid in full already as per Article 1956 of
the Civil Code.
CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM DELICT

PEOPLE vs. AGACER
G.R. No. 177751 January 7, 2013
Facts:
The victim, CesarioAgacer, was clearing and preparing the soil bedding section of his farm in
preparation for the rice seedlings intended for the coming planting season. Genesis Delanter, his
brother Andy, Rafael, and brother Roden were at the nearby rice field harvesting the palay that Cesario
had raised.
Suddenly, Florencio, Eddie, Elynor, Franklin, and Eric, all surnamed Agacer, came out of the
nearby banana plantation and went in the direction of Cesario. The group of men then surrounded
Cesario and intimidated him. Cesario felt the hostilities and tried to get away. But the accused started
fire on Cesario’s harvest which prompted Cesario to return for his burning crops. While Cesario was
trying to put the fire out, Florencio ordered to go near Cesario. Eddie did what was told and pulled
out a shotgun from the rice sack that he was holding and shot Cesario on the left portion of his chest.
As Cesario fell, they fired then another shot inflicting mortal wounds on Cesario. The gang of men
then fled the scene. The Supreme Court affirmed the guilt of the accused.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil liability of the brother’s arose upon the final judgment of the Supreme
Court of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court found them guilty and since the civil action for damages was deemed
instituted in the criminal action then their civil liability has also been proven. According to Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code, Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Also Article
20 of the Civil Code states that every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same. And the same is strengthened finally by
Article 1161 of the Civil Code which states that civil obligation arising from criminal offenses shall be
governed by the penal laws. Underlying this principle is that a person who is criminally liable is also
civilly liable is the view that from the standpoint of its effects, a crime has dual character; First, as an
offense against the state because of the disturbance of the social order, and second as an offense
against the private person injured by the crime.
DEATH AS A MODE OF EXTINGUISMENT OF CIVIL LIABILITY

PEOPLE vs. BAYOTAS
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
Facts:
The accused, Rogelio Bayotas, was charged with rape and eventually convicted on June 19,
1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction the accused
died. The findings of the National Bilibid Hospital declared him dead on February 4, 1992.
The Supreme Court in its resolution dated May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the
appeal but then required the Solicitor General to file its comment on Bayotas’ civil liability arising
from the crime. In the Solicitor General’s comment the civil liability hasn’t yet expired. The solicitor
general based its judgment on the case of People vs. Sendaydiego. The counsel of the accused-
appellant had a different view; where the death occurred after final judgment the criminal and civil
liability shall be extinguished.
Issue:
Whether or not the death of Bayotas extinguished his criminal and civil liability.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the accused. According to the Supreme Court, the
controlling statute was Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code. The provision states that death
extinguishes the criminal aspect. In the case at bar, there was no reservation of an independent civil
action against the accused; the criminal and civil aspects are therefore considered as instituted in the
criminal action. Since the civil action was anchored with the criminal case then it follows that the death
dissolves both civil and criminal liability.
The Solicitor General’s dependence on the Sendaydiego case was misplaced. What was
contemplated in the Sendaydiego case was the civil liability arising from other sources of obligation
other than delicts. It is therefore safe to say that what death extinguishes is criminal liability and civil
liability arising from delict only.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION

CANCIO vs. ISIP
G.R. No. 133978 November 12, 2002
Facts:
The accused, EmerenciaIsip, was charged with 3 counts of violation of B.P. 22, also known as
the Bouncing Checks Law and 3 cases of Estafa. One of the B.P. 22 cases was dismissed due to it
being deposited before 90 days from the date written on the check. The other two cases of B.P. 22
were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga and were then dismissed due to the
failure of the prosecution to prosecute the crime.
Meanwhile the three cases of Estafa were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga.
After failing to present its second witness, the prosecution dismissed the Estafa case. The prosecution
reserved its right to file a separate civil action from the said criminal cases. The court granted the
reservation. The criminal case of Estafa was then dismissed without prejudice to the civil action. On
December 15, 1997, petitioner filed the instant case for the collection of the sum of money, seeking
to recover the amount of the check subject to the Estafa cases. Respondent then filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint contending that the petition is already barred by the doctrine of Res Judicata.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents can file a separate civil action regardless of the dismissal of
the criminal case of estafa.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the civil action can prosper. The reservation for civil action was
made by the prosecution on time. According to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure states that civil liability is deemed instituted with the criminal case unless there is a
reservation of the right to file a separate civil action.
In the case at bar, the complaint is clearly based on culpa contractual. The cause of action was
the breach of the respondent’s breach of the contractual obligation. Evidently, the petitioner was
seeking to make good the value written on the checks in exchange for cash. The case was not anchored
the criminal aspect of estafa but on the civil aspect of culpa contractual. As such, it is distinct and
independent from the estafa case filed against the offender and may proceed regardless of the result
of the criminal proceedings.
CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM ACQUITTAL
HEIRS OF GUARING vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 108395 March 7, 1997
Facts:
On November 7, 1987, the car driven by TeodoroGuaring Jr. collided with the Philippine
Rabbit Bus driven by Angelo Cuevas and with a Toyota Cressida Car driven by Eligio Enriquez,
along the North Luzon Expressway in San Rafael, Mexico Pampanga. As a consequence, Guaring
died.The trial court ruled in favor of herein petitioners, but lost in the Court of Appeals where the
accused was acquitted based on reasonable doubt. This was because it was found out that the
deceased was the one who acted negligently. The accused the claimed appealed in the court that the
civil case filed against him be extinguished since the extinguishment of his criminal liability
necessarily follows the extinguishment of his civil liability, since his civil liability aroused from his
criminal liability. The petitioners disagreed on this ground, claiming that the civil case should pursue.
This was then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil liability of the accused is extinguished due to his acquittal.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the acquittal of the bus driver was based on reasonable doubt,
which means that the civil case for damages was not barred since the cause of action of the heirs was
based on quasi-delict. Even if damages are sought on the basis of crime and not quasi-delict, the
acquittal of the bus driver will not bar recovery of damages because the acquittal was based not on a
finding that he was not guilty but only on reasonable doubt. Thus, it has been held that the judgment
of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration
that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished
by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal
but only civil in nature as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief
committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability; and, where the civil liability does
not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted.Therefore,
the Supreme Court ruled that the proceedings for the civil case of the said incident must continue for
the recovery of damages of the victim’s heirs. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine
the civil liability of the accused.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (DEFAMATION)
ARAFILES vs. PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC.

G.R. No. 150256 March 25, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner CatalinoArafiles seeks a review of the CA decision which dismissed his complaint
for damages against respondent’s publisher Philippine Journalists Inc, Manuel Villareal Jr., Editor Max
Buan Jr. and reporter Romy Morales. Respondent Morales wrote a report that appeared on People’s
Journal Tonight, which related how EmelitaDespuig, an employee of the National Institute of
Atmospheric Sciences (NAIS) of PAG-ASA, lodged a complaint against petitioner, a NAIS director,
for forcible abduction with rape and forcible abduction with attempted rape and the supposed details
of the rape. About a year after the report was published, Arafiles instituted the complaint for damages,
alleging that on account of the “grossly malicious and overly sensationalized reporting in the news
item”, his reputation as a director of NAIS was injured, that he became the object of public contempt
and ridicule as he was depicted as a sex-crazed stalker and serial rapist and that the news deferred his
promotion.
Issue:
Whether or not the article published constitute a libelous material, which would make the
editors liable for defamation.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the news article is not malicious.In actions for damages for libel,
it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain libelous material must be examined and
viewed as a whole.In order to ascertain the meaning of a published article, the whole of the article
must be considered, each phrase must be construed in the light of the entire publication. The headlines
of a newspaper must also be read in connection with the language which follows.The presentation of
the news item subject of petitioner’s complaint may have been in a sensational manner, but it is not per
se illegal.
Respondents could of course have been more circumspect in their choice of words as the
headline and first seven paragraphs of the news item give the impression that a certain director of the
NIAS actually committed the crimes complained of by Emelita. The succeeding paragraphs, in which
petitioner and complainant Emelita were eventually identified, sufficiently convey to the readers,
however, that the narration of events was only an account of what Emelita had reported at the police
headquarters.Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do
not consider that the respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or
abused the freedom of the press.
The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously
and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press
reporters and editors usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and

reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or
imperfection in the choice of words.
INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGANCES vs. ARGOS

G.R. No. 130362 September 10, 2001
Facts:
Merlin J. Argos and Jaja C. Pineda, general manager and commercial director respectively of
the International Flavors and Fragrances Incorporated (IFFI) filed a libel case against Hernan H.
Costa, the managing director of IFFI after being described by the latter as pesona non grata in his
personal announcement after termination of their services. They later filed a separate civil case for
damages against Costa and IFFI in its subsidiary capacity as employer with the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig wherein IFFI moved to dismiss the complaint. The Regional Trial Court granted IFFI’s
motion to dismiss for respondent’s failure to reserve its right to institute a separate civil action. Upon
a motion for reconsideration, the Regional Trial Court granted Argos and Pineda’s petition which was
later affirmed by the appellate court.
Issue:
Whether or not Argos and Pineda could sue IFFI for damages based on subsidiary liability in
an independent civil action.
Ruling:
IFFI, petitioner contends that respondents did not allege that IFFI was primarily liable
for damages and on the contrary, the complaint was replete with references that IFFI was being sued
for its subsidiary capacity. Article 33 of the New Civil Code provides that in cases of defamation, a
civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party. As ruled in Joaquin vs. Aniceto however, article 33 contemplates an action against the
employee in his primary capacity. It does not apply to an action against the employer to enforce its
subsidiary civil liability as such liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case
or when the employee adjudged guilty of the wrongful act. Thus, the Supreme Court granted IFFI’s
petition for dismissal.

RUIZ vs. UCOL
G.R. No.L-454404 August 7, 1987
Facts:
AgustinaTagaca, laundry-woman for plaintiff-appellant Atty. Jesus B. Ruiz filed an
administrative charge against defendant-appelleeEncarnacionUcol, a midwife in the health center of
Sarratt, Ilocos Norte. In an answer to the charges, Ucol alleged that Tagaca was a mere tool used by
Atty. Ruiz to get back to her because of a case filed by Ucol’s husband against Ruiz. She was also
alleged to have made remarks that Ruiz instigated the complaint and fabricated the charges. The said
case was dismissed but Ruiz decided to file his own criminal case against Ucol based on the alleged
libelous portions of Ucol’s answer. After the trial, the lower court rendered judgment acquitting Ucol
on the ground that her guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt. Instead of appealing the
civil aspects of the case, Ruiz filed a separate complaint for damages. Ucol moved for a motion to
dismiss on the ground of res judicata which was then granted by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte after being remanded by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not Ruiz is barred by the criminal case of libel from filing a separate civil action
for damages.
Ruling:
Ruiz contends that there can be no res judicata in the case, since the decision of the trial
court did not pass upon the civil aspect of the criminal case. Article 33 of the Civil Code which gives
an offended party in cases of defamation, among others, the right to file a civil action distinct from
the criminal proceedings is not without limitations. The Supreme Court found that the appeal of Ruiz
is without merit as records of the trial court manifest that the suit being charged by Ruiz to be a
harassment suit on the followinggrounds. (1)Ruiz had something to do with the administrative
complaint, (2) Ruiz filed a criminal case for libel against Mrs. Ucol’s answer in the administrative case
after the administrative case’s dismissal, (3) Ruiz acted as a private prosecutor in the criminal
caseactively handling as a lawyer the very case where he was the complainant, and (4) After Ucol was
acquitted, Ruiz pursued his anger at the Ucols by filing a civil action for damages.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS)

VINZONS-CHATO vs. FORTUNE TOBACCO
G.R. No. 141309 June 19, 2007
Facts:
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally manufactured
cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an ad valorem tax of 55%
provided that the maximum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos per pack. Prior to the effectivity of
RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More”, all manufactured
by Fortune, as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to the 55% Ad Valorem
tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands were already covered. In a case filed
against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of the rule violated its
constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal
protection of the laws. For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent
has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official
function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the
Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also contended that the
complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.
Issue:
Whether or not an independent civil action under Article 32 of the Civil Code would prosper
against the petitioner.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner can be subject to a civil action under Article 32
of the Civil Code. The general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person
may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned
tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she
heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge
against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its consent.
However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts
done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle
of immunity for official actions. Under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise
where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And,
under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officer’s act is
characterized by willfulness or negligence.
The decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special law, which prevails over a general law,
the Administrative Code. A quasi-delict has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by
one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property or
reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in quasi-delict is determined
by the conduct and not by the mental state of the offender, and there are circumstances under which

the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule
is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine
whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does
not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort
in not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.
COJUANGCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 119398 July 2, 1999

Facts:
Eduardo Cojuangco is a known businessman-sportsman owing several racehorses which he
entered in the sweepstake races on March 6, 1986 to September 18, 1989. Several of his horses won
the races on various dates, landing first, second or third places, respectively, and winning prizes
together with the 30% due for trainer and grooms. Unfortunately, the winnings were being withheld
on the advice of Presidential Commission on Good Government Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz.
The Chairman of PCSO and the Private Respondent, Fernando O. Carrascoso, offered to give
back the winnings but it was refused by the petitioner for the reason that the matter is already in court.
The trial court held that Carrascoso had no authority to withhold the winnings since there was no writ
of sequestration evidencing the orders of PCGG. Carrascoso feared that if he did not withhold the
winning he would be liable for neglect of duty. Carrascoso maintained that bad faith did not attend
his acts therefore he is not liable for damages. In fact, Carrascoso stated that he returned the principal
amount of the winning evidencing his good faith. Petitioner begs to differ.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to damages for the violation of his constitutional rights
to due process.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that petitioner is entitled for damages in accordance with Article 32
of the Civil Code. Article 32(6) of the Civil Code provides that any public officer or employee, or any
private individual, who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or
impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages, in this case the right against deprivation of property without due process of law.
Carrascoso's decision to withhold petitioner's winnings could not be characterized as arbitrary

or whimsical, or even the product of ill will or malice. He had particularly sought from PCGG a
clarification of the extent and coverage of the sequestration order issued against the properties of
petitioner. Although it is true that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary
damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, the Court nevertheless states that bad
faith is not necessary in praying for damages in Article 32 of the Civil Code. Under the Article, it is
not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith.To be liable, it is enough that there
was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or
good faith in the performance of one's duties.
A little exercise of prudence would have disclosed that there was no writ issued specifically
for the sequestration of the racehorse winnings of petitioner. There was apparently no record of any
such writ covering his racehorses either. The issuance of a sequestration order requires the showing
of a prima facie case and due regard for the requirements of due process.The withholding of the prize
winnings of petitioner without a properly issued sequestration order clearly spoke of a violation of his
property rights without due process of law.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. CASTILLO

G.R. No. 182976 January 14, 2013

Facts:
Respondents are spouses engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling fluorescent
fixtures, office steel cabinets and related metal fabrication under the name and style of Permanent
Light Manufacturing Enterprise. In the afternoon of April 19, 1994, Joselito Ignacio and Peter Legaspi
, Fully Phased Inspectors of Meralco sought permission to inspect Permanent Lights electric meter.
Ignacio and Legaspi, together with an employee of Permanent Light, proceeded to check the electric
meter. Upon inspection, the MERALCO inspectors noticed that the electric meter was tampered and
right there and then took down the meter. It was found out that indeed the meter has been tampered
with.
Permanent Light agreed to pay the deficient bills. MERALCO installed a new electric meter.
The respondents alleged that the electric meter registered unusually high readings. The petitioners are
now requesting that the old electric meter be re-installed since it shows a more accurate reading. The
respondents also pray for damages since the electric meter was allegedly removed without following
the required procedure. The RTC ruled in favor of respondents entitled to damages. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision stating that the petitioner abused its rights when it disconnected the
electricity of Permanent Light. The petitioners raise the issue of damages to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not MERALCO is liable for damages in for the violation of the constitutional
rights of the respondent.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Permanent Light is entitled to exemplary damages for the
violation of their constitutional rights. The Supreme Court based its judgment on Section 4 of
Republic Act 7832 which provides that taking down of tampered electric meter should be personally
witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the Energy
Regulatory Board. MERALCO failed to show evidence that there was an officer of the law or a duly
authorized representative of ERB therefore there is no prima facie evidence that the meter is tampered
and they have no right to disconnect the electric meter. Besides, even if there is prima facie evidence
of illegal use of electricity, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7832 provides that even if flagrante delicto,
there must be still be a written notice or warning to the owner of the house or the establishment
concerned. In light or the following the Supreme Court awards exemplary damages to Permanent
Light for the recompense of their injured rights. Article 32 of the Civil Code provides for awards of
damages in cases where the rights of individuals, including the right against deprivation of property
without due process of law are violated.
BARREDO vs. GARCIA

G.R. No. 48006 July 8, 1942
Facts:

At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanilla’s taxi collided with a horse-drawn carriage thereby
killing the 16 year old Faustino Garcia. Faustino’s parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and
reserved their right to file a separate civil suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After the criminal
suit, Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo, the owner of the taxi and the employer of Fontanilla. The
suit was based on Article 1903 of the civil code which provides that negligence of employers in the
selection of their employees can be civilly liable. Barredo assailed the suit arguing that his liability is
only subsidiary and that the separate civil suit should have been filed against Fontanilla primarily and
not him.
Issue:
Whether or not Barredo can be civilly liable for the crime committed by his employee.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Barredo can be civilly liable. He is primarily liable under Article
1903 which is a separate civil action against negligent employers. Garcia is well within his rights in
suing Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil action and this is more expeditious because
by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving his sentence and has no property. It was
also proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees because it was shown that Fontanilla had
had multiple traffic infractions already before he hired him, something he failed to overcome during
hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil action, Barredo would have only been
subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being sued for damages arising from a criminal act, but
rather for his own negligence in selecting his employee under Article 1903.
SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY vs. TANGCO

G.R. No. 165732 December 14, 2006
Facts:

On November 3, 1997, Evangeline Tangco went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch,
Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advice of the bank's cashier as she would sign a specimen
card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the same outside
her residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and pulled out
her firearm from her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with
his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death.
Respondent filed a complaint for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline
and against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage committed by its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages
and attorney's fees.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages under quasi-delicts.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that respondent is entitled to damages. It ruled that while it may be
conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees, particularly of
Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's evidence simply showed that it
required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not the supervision contemplated under
the law; that supervision includes not only the issuance of regulations and instructions designed for
the protection of persons and property, for the guidance of their servants and employees, but also the
duty to see to it that such regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with.
CITY OF PASIG vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 125646 September 10, 1999
Facts:

On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be separated
from its mother Barangay Manggahan and Dela Paz, City of Pasig, and to be converted and separated
into a distinct barangay to be known as Barangay Karangalan, the City of Pasig passed and approved
Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Karangalan in Pasig City. Plebiscite on the
creation of said barangay was thereafter set for June 22, 1996.
Meanwhile on Sep. 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued Ordinance No. 52 creating
Barangay Napico in Pasig City. Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15, 1997.Immediately
upon learning of such Ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta moved to suspend or cancel the
respective plebiscites scheduled, and filed Petitions with the COMELEC on June 19, 1996, and March
12, 1997, respectively. In both Petitions, the Municipality of Cainta called the attention of the
COMELEC to a pending case before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, for settlement of
boundary dispute. According to the Municipality of Cainta, the proposed barangays involve areas
included in the boundary dispute subject of said pending case. Hence, the scheduled plebiscites should
be suspended or cancelled until after the said case shall have been finally decided by the court.
Issue:
Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and Napico
should be suspended or cancelled due to a prejudicial question of territory.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that this is an exception to the general rule of prejudicial questions
and that the suspension or cancellation of the plebiscite be granted. A case involving a boundary
dispute between Local Government Units presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided
before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held.While it may be the general
rule that a prejudicial question contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not come into play
where both cases are civil, in the interest of good order, the SC can very well suspend action on one
case pending the outcome of another case closely interrelated/linked to the first.
A requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly
identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. Primarily
becauseterritorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in a pending civil case, until and unless such issue is
resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be an
exercise in futility.
BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000
Facts:

Petitioner was married to Charmaine Felix on June 16, 1973. After 24 years of marriage and
having four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on ground of psychological
incapacity. Charmaine on the other hand filed a criminal complaint for concubinage against petitioner
and his paramour. To forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the criminal complaint,
petitioner filed for the suspension of the criminal case on concubinage arguing that the civil case for
the nullification of their marriage is a prejudicial question.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage under psychological incapacity is a
prejudicial question to the criminal case of concubinage.
Ruling:
The rationale on the existence of prejudicial questions is to avoid two conflicting issues. Its
requisites are 1) that a civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue in the
criminal action and 2) the resolution of the issue determines whether or not the criminal action will
proceed. In the present case, the accused need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage
void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than the proof
of a final judgment. More importantly, parties to a marriage should not be allowed to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the competent courts. So long as there is no
such final judgment the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore
he who cohabits with a woman not his wife risks being prosecuted for concubinage.
MERCED vs. DIEZ

G.R. No. L-15315 August 26, 1960
Facts:

Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of his marriage to Elizabeth Ceasar alleging that he
married Elizabeth by reason of force, threat and intimidation upon his persons by Elizabeth’s relatives.
Elizabeth on the other hand filed a criminal complaint alleging that petitioner has been previously
married to one Eufrocina Tan. He now files a petition for the suspension of the criminal case on
grounds of prejudicial question.
Issue:
Whether or not an action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question.
Ruling:
In order that a person may be held liable for the crime of bigamy, the subsequent marriage
must have all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage. One of the essential elements of a valid marriage is that the consent thereto of the
contracting parties must be freely given. Without the element of consent a marriage would be illegal
and void. Since the validity of the second marriage is in question, subject of the action for bigamy,
cannot be determined in the criminal case and since prosecution for bigamy does not lie unless all the
elements concur, it is necessary then that a decision in a civil action must first be secured.
DONATO vs. LUNA

G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988
Facts:

An information for bigamy against herein petitioner was filed. It is alleged that petitioner
married Rosalindo Maluping on June 30, 1978, he however married for the second time with Paz
Abayan on September 26, 1978. Prior to the trial for the criminal case, petitioner filed a motion to
suspend on grounds of a prejudicial question. He claims that the civil case for the nullity of his second
marriage is a prejudicial question.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage is a prejudicial question to the criminal
case of bigamy.
Ruling:
The issue of the nullity of the marriage in the civil case is not determinative of petitioner’s guilt
or innocence in the crime of bigamy. It is noteworthy that the complaint for annulment of the second
marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit was filed by Paz Abayan, the
second wife. He who contracts a second marriage before a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. The case for annulment of marriage can only be
considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the
petitioner’s consent to marriage was obtained through duress, violence or intimidation. Such is not
the case at bar. Petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of
the criminal case. Records reveal that prior to petitioner’s second marriage he had been living with
private respondent as husband and wife for more than five years. He only came up with the story that
his consent to the marriage was secured through force, threat and intimidation one year from the
solemnization of the second marriage.
TENEBRO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004
Facts:

Petitioner contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. Less than a year after,
petitioner told Leticia that he has been previously married and that he is leaving to live with his first
wife, Hilda Villareyes. On January25, 1993 petitioner contracted yet another marriage with Nilda
Villegas. Ancajas learned of this third marriage she verified if the petitioner is truly married to Hilda,
to which it was affirmative. She then filed a criminal complaint of bigamy against herein petitioner.
His marriage to Ancajas however was subsequently nullified on ground of psychological incapacity
while the criminal complaint was pending. He now raises the defense that the bigamy is not committed
in lieu of the nullity of the marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not the declaration of the nullity of marriage on ground of psychological incapacity
bars the prosecution of the crime of bigamy.
Ruling:
A marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void; the
nullity of the second marriage is not per se an argument for avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
The declaration of nullity is absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.
There is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void
purely because it is a second marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on ground of
psychological incapacity. Although the judicial declaration for nullity of marriage retroacts to the date
of the celebration of marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, the marriage
is not without legal effects. Among these effects is the liability of incurring criminal liability for bigamy.
PRESUMPTIVE CIVIL PERSONALITY
GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R.No . L-16439 July 20, 1961
Facts:

Peitioner and Nita Villanueva were lovers. Before they were married Nita got pregnant to
which she had got an abortion from private respondent Oscar Lazo. After Nita’s marriage with
plaintiff, she again became pregnant but due to her work priorities, she again had again had abortion
with the same doctor. She had a third abortion done by the same. The plaintiff now sues an award for
damages against Doctor Oscar alleging that he did not know of, nor gave his consent to the abortions.
He is suing for damages for the unborn child.
Issue:
Whether or not an action for damages can be instituted on behalf of the unborn child.
Ruling:
No action for damages could be instituted in behalf of the unborn child on account of the
injuries it received; no such action could derivatively accrue to its parents. No transmission of rights
can take place from on due to the lack of juridical personality. Article 40 of the Civil Code limits the
application of the presumptive civil personality by imposing the condition that the child should be
subsequently born alive. However, moral damages could be awarded for the illegal arrest of the normal
development of the fetus on account of distress and anguish attendant to is lost, and the
disappointment of their parental expectations. The records do not bear such case. It is clear that the
husband is only intent on recovering money from the doctor.
CATALAN vs. BASA

G.R. No. 159567 July 31, 2007

Facts:
Feliciano Catalan was discharged from military service due to his psychological incapacity of
schizophrenia on October 20, 1948. He married Corazon Cerezo on September 1949. On June 1951
he donated a parcel of land to his sister Mercedes Catalan. On December 1953 Feliciano was declared
incompetent and BPI was appointed as his guardian. Mercedes sold the properties to herein
respondents in 1979. In 1997, BPI, acting as Feliciano’s guardian filed an action or declaration of
nullity od documents and recovery of possession and ownership alleging that the donation to
Mercedes was void ab initio as Feliciano not of sound mind when he effected the donation, ipso facto,
the sale to herein respondents are void ab initio.
Issue:
Whether or not Feliciano’s donation is void for lack of consent due to incapacity.
Ruling:
In order for a donation to be valid, the donor’s capacity to give consent at the time of the
donation is existing. There lies no doubt that insanity impinges on consent freely given. However the
burden of proving such incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it, if no sufficient proof to this
effect is presented, capacity is presumed. The evidence presented by petitioners was insufficient to
overcome the presumption that Feliciano was competent when he donated the property in question.
A study of the nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could still be presumed capable of
attending to his rights.
DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 127540 October 17, 2001

Facts:
Paulina Rigonan owns three parcels of land. She allegedly sold them to spouses Felipe and
Concepcion Rigonan who claim to be her relatives. In 1966, herein petitioners who claim to be her
closest surviving relatives allegedly took possession of the properties. Petitioners claim that the sale
was void for being spurious as well as lacking consideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale was void.
Ruling:
At the time of the execution of the alleged contract, Paulina Rigonan was already of advanced
age and senile. She died an octogenarian. The general rule is that a person is not incompetent to
contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities. However when such
age or infirmities have impaired the mental faculties so as to prevent the person from properly ,
intelligently and firmly protecting her property rights then she is undeniably incapacitated. The
unrebutted testimony shows that at the time of the execution of the deed, Paulina was already
incapacitated physically and mentally. She played with her waste and urinated in bed. Given these
circumstances, there is sufficient reason to seriously doubt that she consented to the sale of and the
price for her parcels of land.
MENDEZONA vs. OZAMIZ

G.R. No. 143370 February 6, 2002
Facts:

Petitioners own a parcel of land and to remove a cloud on their said respective titles caused
by the inscription thereon of a notice of lis pendens initiated a suit. They ultimately trace their
ownership to a deed of sale executed by Carmen Ozamiz. Respondents are now impugning the deed
of sale, alleging that Carmen Ozamiz was incapacitated at the time of the execution of the sale.
Issue:
Whether or not the deed of sale is void due to the incapacity of the seller.
Ruling:
The testimonies on record all made sweeping statements which failed to show the true state
of mind of Carmen Ozamiz at the time of the execution of the disputed document. It has been held
that a person is not incapacitated to contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical
infirmity. Only when such age or infirmity impair her mental faculties to such extent as to prevent her
from properly, intelligently and fairly protecting her property rights is she considered incapacitated.
Respondents utterly failed to show adequate proof that at the time of the sale on April 28, 1989
Carmen Ozamiz has allegedly lost control of her mental faculties.
OPOSA vs. FACTORAN

G.R. No. 101083 July 10, 1993

Facts:
Petitioners are all minor duly represented and joined by their respective parents. The minors
further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. They seek to
cancel all existing timber license agreements and restrain the Secretary of DENR from issuing anymore
TLAs in the protection of our forest reserves and nature in general.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners have the requisite standing and capacity to sue.
Ruling:
Petitioner minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn.
The court finds no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for other of their generations and
for succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality in behalf of the succeeding generations
can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology is concerned.
KINDS OF DOMICILE
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
Facts:

Petitioner filed for the candidacy of the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte. Private respondent who was then the incumbent representative filed a petition for the
cancellation and disqualification alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement
for residency.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner satisfies the residency requirement or not.
Ruling:
Domicile includes the twin elements of 1) the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed
place and 2) animus manendi or the intention of returning there permanently. Residence implies the
factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given
area. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the
intent to leave when the purpose which the resident has taken up his abode ends. If a person’s intent
be to remain, it becomes his domicile. It is thus quite normal for an individual to have different
residences but have only one domicile. These concepts however have evolved in political law to be
used synonymously. When the Constitution however speaks of residence in election law, it actually
means only domicile. An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained
residences in different places. Based on the evidence, petitioner clearly only had numerous residences,
but maintained her domicile to be in Leyte.
ARUEGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 112193 March 13, 1996

Facts:
Jose Aruego Sr. had an amorous relationship with Luz Fabian out of this were born two
children. Jose died on March 30 1982. After his death private respondents filed a case for declaration
of acknowledgement as illegitimate children. Petitioners herein are challenging such action interposing
that under the Family code the method by which respondents can prove their filiation has already
prescribed, that his while the putative parent is alive.
Issue:
Whether or not the Family code finds a retroactive application in the case.
Ruling:
Respondents are establishing their filiation by “open and continuous possession of the status
of a legitimate child” under the Civil Code which provides for four years before the attainment of age
of majority. The Family Code on the other hand provides that such manner of establishing filiation
can only be brought within the lifetime of the parent. The Family Code cannot be applied in the case.
Retroactive application cannot be applied if a vested right is impaired or prejudiced in the process.
The right of action of the minor child for recognition has been vested by the filing of complaint in
court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior effectively of the Family Code.
BERNABE vs. ALEJO

G.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002

Facts:
Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary Carolina Alejo. The son was
born on September 1981. The Fiscal died on August 1993. On May 1994, Carolina in behalf of Adrian
filed a complaint for Adrian to be declared and acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and
such entitled to his share in the estate. Petitioners are challenging the petition on grounds that the
action has prescribed on ground that the Family code has retroactive application and hence, the
manner of proving filiation by “open and continuous possession of a status of a legitimate child” must
have been brought within the lifetime of the putative parent.
Issue:
Whether or not the Family code finds a retroactive application in the case.
Ruling:
The right to an action for recognition which was granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code has
already vested to Adrian prior the enactment of the Family Code. A vested right is one which is
absolute, complete and unconditional to the exercise of which no obstacle exists and which is
immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. Certainly the retroactive effect
of the family code finds no application in this case.

ANCHETA vs. ANCHETA

G.R. No. 145370 March 4, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent got married on March 1959. They had eight children. On December
1992, respondent left the conjugal home and abandoned petitioner and their children. On January
1994, petitioner filed a separate case for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and judicial
separation of property with a plea for support and pendent lite. On April 1994 the parties executed a
compromise agreement. Respondent wanting to marry again filed a declaration of nullity of his
marriage with petitioner on ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner was never served the
summons because of misrepresentation. She was declared in default and the marriage declared void
and null. Petitioner now seeks a new trial and nullification of the decision declaring the marriage void
on ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not there is basis for a new trial.
Ruling:
Petitioner was never served the summons; the trial court never gained jurisdiction of her,
hence the decision null and void. Article 48 of the Family Code states that in cases of annulment or
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage the court shall order the appearance of the prosecuting
attorney to avoid collusion and in Rule 18 Section 6 of the Rules of Court, it is expressly stated that
there can be no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or legal separation. The court just did
the opposite as mandated by the aforementioned provisions of law. Our Constitution is committed to
the basic policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on the
policy that marriage is not a mere contract but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested.
The motion for a new trial is granted.

ABADILLA vs. TABILIRAN

A.M. No. MTJ-92-716 October 25, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner is the assigned clerk of court at the sala of herein respondent Judge. Respondent
stands charged with gross immorality, deceitful conduct and corruption unbecoming of a Judge. It is
alleged that he has scandalously and publicly cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan during the existence
of a previous marriage, represented himself as single in the marriage contract with Priscilla. He also
caused the registration of his three illegitimate children as legitimate.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of the charges.
Ruling:
Respondent is guilty of gross immorality for having scandalously and openly cohabited with
said Priscilla Baybayan during the existence of his marriage with Teresita Tabiliran. It makes mockery
of the inviolability and sanctity of marriage as a basic social institution. It is not only a civil contract,
but is a new relation, an institution on the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently every intendment of the law leans towards legalizing matrimony. Respondent Judge is
dismissed from service.

PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE
DELA ROSA vs. HEIRS OF RUSTIA VDA. DE GUZMAN

G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006
Facts:
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died not only intestate, but they died without
descendants. Guillermo outlived Josefa by two years. Herein petitioners and respondents are their
respective relatives claiming rights to their intestate estate. The alleged heirs of Josefa consist of her
half and full-blood siblings, nephews. On Guillermo’s side, his sisters, nephews and nieces, illegitimate
child and de facto adopted child. The petitioner for letters of administration stated that Guillermo and
Rustia were never married. Josefa Delgado estate claimants are her natural siblings. Josefa was the
daughter of Felisa by one Lucio Ocampo with five other children without the benefit of marriage.
Felisa had another son by way of Ramon Osorio who is Luis Delgado, one of the claimants in Josefa’s
estate. If Luis Delgado is the legitimate child of Felisa she is barred from inheriting from Josefa by the
principle of absolute separation between the legitimate and illegitimate families.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid marriage between Guillermo and Josefa and between Felisa
and Ramon.
Ruling:
Every intendment of the law leans towards legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together
apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.Always
presume marriage. Several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed
between Guillermo and Josefa. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Although
a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof that
no marriage in fact took place. Once the presumption of marriage arises other evidences may be
presented just as herein. The certificate of identity issued to Josefa as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the
passport issued to her as Josefa Rustia, the declaration under oath of Guilermo that he was married
to Josefa buttress the presumption of the existence of marriage. Guillermo and Josefa are married.
Anent the marriage of Felisa by Ramon, the factors and evidence presented sufficiently overcame the
rebuttable presumption of marriage. Hence Luis Delgado can inherit from Josefa.

EUGENIO vs. VELEZ
G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990
Facts:
Herein private respondents filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging that their sister,
Vitaliana, was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by herein
petitioner in his residence in Misamis Occidental. Unknown to respondents, Vitaliana has died and
petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana reasoning that the corpse cannot be the subject
of habeas corpus proceedings. As her common law husband, petitioner now claims custody over
Vitaliana’s body.
Issue:
Whether or not the common law husband has custody over Vitaliana’s body instead of the
immediate relatives.
Ruling:
Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally
married who cohabit for years as husband and wife may be considered legally mauled in common law
jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. Notwithstanding, such relationship produces a community of
property and interest and there is authority in case law that exists to the effect that such form of co-
ownership requires that the man and the woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated
to contract marriage. Herein petitioner had a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal
impediment which disqualified him from legally marrying Vitaliana. Custody of the dead body must
be awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the Revised
Administrative Code.

BALOGBOG vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 83598 March, 7, 1997
Facts:
Petitioners are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Geneveva Arnibal who died intestate.
They had an older brother named Gavino but he died predeceasing their parents. Private respondents
on the other hand are the alleged children of Gavino with Catalina Ubas and as such are entitled to
inherit from the estate of their grandparents. Petitioners aver that Gavino did not marry hence barring
respondents from inheriting from the estate.
Issue:
Whether or not there the presumption of marriage between Gavino and Catalino was
successfully overcome.
Ruling:
Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves
as husband and wife are legally married. This presumption is rebutted only by cogent proof of which
the petitioners failed to do so. Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of
marriage the failure to present it is no proof that no marriage took place. Private respondents proved
through testimonial evidence that Gavino and Catalina were married and that their children were
recognized as legitimate children of Gavino. The law favors the validity of marriage because the State
is interested in the preservation of the family and the sanctity of it is a matter of constitutional concern.
LEGAL CAPACITY
SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner avers that he is a male transsexual. He underwent psychological examination,
hormone treatment and breast augmentation culminating with sex reassignment surgery in Thailand.
From then on, petitioner deposed himself as female and got engaged. He now seeks to have his name
in his birth certificate changed and his sex from male to female.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner can change the entry of sex in his birth certificate.
Ruling:
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. However
a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. R.A. 9048 does not sanction such
change of name under such cause. It is further a substantial change for which the applicable procedure
is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. However no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify
the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment. A person’s sex is an
essential requisite in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil
status. To grant the changes sought by the petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the
laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has
undergone sex reassignment.
LEGAL CAPACITY
REPUBLIC vs. CAGANDAHAN

G.R. No. 166676 September 12, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner was born on January 1981 and was registered as a female in the birth certificate.
While growing up she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed with Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a condition where a person thus afflicted possess both male and female
characteristics. While maturing it was the male characteristics that continued to develop and be
pronounced and hence, he deposed himself as a male person. He now seeks to alter his name of
Jennifer to Jeff.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for the change of name can be effected.
Ruling:
Respondent undisputedly has CAH which involves intersex anatomy. The court is of the view
that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex, the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with
good reasons thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that
his body produces high levels of male hormones there is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male. The petition is granted.

AUTHORITY OF SOLEMNIZING OFFICER
BESO vs. DAGUMAN

A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211 January 28, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner and Bernardito Yman got married on August 28, 1997 by herein respondent Judge.
After the wedding herein petitioner was abandoned by her husband hence prompting her to check
with the Civil Registrar to inquire regarding the marriage contract to which it was found out that the
marriage was no registered. She now filed this administrative complaint against herein respondent
Judge alleging that the marriage was solemnized outside of his jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the Judge has authority to solemnize the marriage.
Ruling:
Article 7 of the Family Code provides that the Judge can solemnize a marriage within the court
jurisdiction. Considering that the respondent Judge’s jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta.
Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize the
marriage in the City of Calabayog where herein marriage was solemnized.

AUTHORITY OF A SOLEMNIZING OFFICER
MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO

A.M. No.MTJ-02-1390 April 11, 2002
Facts:
On 17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized petitioner’s marriage to her late groom
Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is
outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband
passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner’s right to inherit the “vast
properties” left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of
Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge should be sanctioned for solemnizing marriage with lack
of marriage license and beyond his jurisdiction?
Ruling:
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial
court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial
jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of
respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the
marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects
him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly
solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for
violating the law on marriage.
The respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.

MARRIAGE LICENSE
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARAvs.ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and

COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 167746 August 28, 2007
Facts:
On December 8,1982, Rosita Alcantara (respondent) and Restituto Alcantara (petitioner) went
to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for
them. They met a person “fixer” who arranged their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro,
a minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the
parties securing a marriage license. The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in
CDCC BR Chapel. However, there was a marriage license obtained in Carmona, Cavite but neither of
the parties is a resident of Carmona, Cavite and they never went to the said place to apply for a license
with its local civil registrar. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the
San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila on March 26, 1983 utilizing the same marriage license.
The marriage license number “7054133” is not identical with the marriage license number which
appears in their marriage contract. There is also a case filed by the respondent against herein petitioner
before the MTC of Mandaluyong for concubinage.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between the petitioner and respondent is void.
Ruling:
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of Family Code,
the applicable law would be the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of
which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 53 of the same
Code. The law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage
contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such
marriage license was issued to the parties. In the case at bar, the marriage contract between the
petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. Moreover, the certification issued by the
local civil registrar specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued further
validating the fact that a license was issued to the parties herein.
Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the
contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to
the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not
affect the validity of the marriage. The court still holds that there is no sufficient basis to annul their
marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the
parties or party responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally, administratively liable.
The discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of the Municipal
civil registrar, which states that the marriage license number issued to the parties is No. 7054133, while
the marriage contract states that the marriage license number of the parties is number 7054033. It is

not impossible to assume that the same is a mere typographical error. It therefore does not detract
from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the parties.
The authority of the solemnizing officer shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will
be presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary. The solemnizing officer is not duty-bound
to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil
registrar. All the said officer needs to know is that the license has been duly and regularly issued by
the competent official. Lastly, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby
cleansing whatever irregularities or defect attended the civil wedding.
The instant petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
decision of the RTC of Makati City is affirmed.

MARRIAGE LICENSE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.COURT OF APPEALS and

ANGELINA M. CASTRO
GR No. 103047 September 2, 1994
Facts:
Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin
Cardenas. They did not immediately live together and it was only upon Castro found out that she was
pregnant that they decided to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only 4
months. Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her brother with the
consent of Cardenas.
The baby was brought in the US and in Castro’s earnest desire to follow her daughter wanted
to put in order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a petition seeking a declaration for
the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that there was no marriage license issued prior
to the celebration of their marriage proven by the certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig.
Issue:
Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is sufficient
to establish that no marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the solemnization of their
marriage?
Rulings:
The court affirmed the decision of Court of Appeals that the certification issued by the Civil
Registrar unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that the office did not
issue a marriage license to the contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the testimony of Castro is not
supported by any other witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition because of the peculiar
circumstances of her case. Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the proceedings,
which he chose to ignore.
Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by
private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.
MARRIAGE LICENSE

SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑOvs.SUSAN YEE CARIÑO
GR No. 132529 February 2, 2001
Facts:
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages; the first
was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño, with whom he had two children. And the
second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño with whom he had no children
in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982. In November 23, 1992, SPO4 Santiago
Cariño passed away under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both
petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the
deceased from various government agencies.
On December 14, 1993, respondent filed the instant case for collection of sum of money
against the petitioner praying that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one
hundred forty-six thousand pesos. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent
contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was
solemnized without the required marriage license confirmed by the marriage certificate of the deceased
and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number and a certification dated March 9, 1994,
from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Manila stating that they have no record of marriage license
of the spouses Santiago Cariño and Susan Nicdao Cariño who allegedly married in the said
municipality on June 20, 1969.
Issue:
Whether or not the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño are
valid in determining the beneficiary of his death benefits?
Ruling:
Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao
and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage and the
absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders a marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar,
there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the marriages
exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license was indispensable to the validity of their
marriage. The records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no
marriage license number and as certified by the Local Civil registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their
office has no record of such marriage license. The certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data to the issuance
of a marriage license. Therefore, the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages
exempt from the said requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
The declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and
petitioner does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact
remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the
marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan
Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio. To reiterate, under article 40 of Family Code, for
purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous

marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage
would also be void.
Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would
not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, is governed by the
provisions of articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code, wherein, the properties acquired by the parties
through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. By intestate succession, the
said “death benefits” of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs and respondent, not being the legal
wife is not one of them. Conformably, even if the disputed “death benefits” were earned by the
deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership, entitling the petitioner
to share one-half thereof. There is no allegation of bad faith in the present case; both parties of the
first marriage are presumed in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny
shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the
deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children.
MARRIAGE LICENSE

FILIPINA SYvs.COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 127263 April 12, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November
15, 1973 at the Church of our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both were then 22 years old. Their
union was blessed with two children. On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling.
Since then, the spouses lived separately and their two children were in the custody of their mother.
On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation before the RTC of San Fernando,
Pampanga and was later amended to a petition for separation of property. Judgment was rendered
dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of separation of properties based
on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses. In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal
action for attempted parricide against her husband. RTC Manila convicted Fernando only of the lesser
crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment. Petitioner filed a petition
for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological
incapacity on August 4, 1992. RTC and Court of Appeals denied the petition and motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this appeal by certiorari, petitioner for the first time, raises the issue of the
marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage license at the time of its celebration. The date of issue
of marriage license and marriage certificate is contained in their marriage contract which was attached
in her petition for absolute declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court. The date
of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and
marriage license are different and incongruous.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the
beginning for lack of marriage license at the time of the ceremony?
b) Whether or not the private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said
marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity?
Ruling:
A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. The
pieces of evidence presented by petitioner at the beginning of the case, plainly and indubitably show
that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. The marriage contract also
shows that the marriage license number 6237519 was issued in Carmona, Cavite yet neither petitioner
nor respondent ever resided in Carmona.
From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued almost one year after the
ceremony took place. Article 80 of the Civil Code is clearly applicable in this case, there being no claim
of exceptional character enumerated in articles 72-79 of the Civil Code. The marriage between
petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning. The remaining issue on the psychological
capacity is now mooted by the conclusion of this court that the marriage of petitioner to respondent
is void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized.
Petition is granted. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina
Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of marriage license
at the time of celebration.
MARRIAGE LICENSE
JAIME O. SEVILLA vs. CARMELITA N. CARDENAS

G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006
Facts:
On 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by
Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of
the Philippines, Jaime and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a
certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the father
of Carmelita caused Jaime and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said Minister of the
Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to
Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no
marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.
On March 28, 1994, a complaint was filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC. In its Decision
dated January 25, 2002, the RTC declared the nullity of the marriage of the parties for lack of the
requisite marriage license. Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 20
December 2004, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court. Jaime filed a Motion for
Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated 6
April 2005.
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.
Issue:
Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties herein
prior to the celebration of the marriages in question?
Ruling:
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not
exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the
presumption of regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing
the certifications, is effectively rebutted.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage
License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just
cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we
cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of
the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The courts look upon this presumption with
great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
Therefore, the instant petition is denied.
MARRIAGE LICENSE
SYED AZHAR ABBAS vs. GLORIA GOO ABBAS

G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013

Facts:
Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and
they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. He arrived in the Philippines
in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-
in-law’s residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with
two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the
requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony. During
the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony
was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite
to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to
the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked
to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be found. The
Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the
effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage
License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado
and Myra Mabilangan.
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was
issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed thus their
marriage on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio. Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated
November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal the questioned decision
to the Court of Appeals.
The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the
marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be
accorded probative value. The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary
evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the
requisites laid down by law.
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008 but the same was denied by
the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008 hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing and setting aside the decision of the
RTC granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage?
Ruling:
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and
Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria
and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another couple,
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967
was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do
not appear in the document.

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his
motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not
make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the
weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed
to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage
license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
The petition is therefore granted.
MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE REQUIREMENT
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001

Facts:
Herminia Borja-Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having
been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan
City. Four children were born out of that marriage. On 22 March 1993, however, her husband
contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When respondent
Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as
the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were “separated.” For this act,
complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a
sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator
recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to
pay a fine of P2,000.00, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with
more severely.
Respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law?
Ruling:
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment
impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. In fact, in his Comment, he
stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from
contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzano’s and
Payao’s subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which
were subscribed and sworn to before him.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void
and bigamous marriage. The maxim “ignorance of the law excuses no one” has special application to
judges, who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the
law and basic legal principles. And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to
know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
The recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED,with

theMODIFICATIONthat the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez
is increased to P20,000.00.
ENGRACE NIÑAL vs. NORMA BAYADOG

G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000

Facts:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage
were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985.
One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog
got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit
dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a
car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.
The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would
affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners
have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment
of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the second marriage is covered by the exception to the requirement of a
Marriage license?
b) Whether or not the petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father’s
marriage void after his death?
Ruling:
The second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement
of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element. In this case, at the
time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first
marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had
elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito
and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains
that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in
the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence
of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with
respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated
in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance
of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with
any third party as being one as "husband and wife".Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail
it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects
except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership
or ownership through actual joint contribution,and its effect on the children born to such void
marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of
the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally
conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment is legitimate.
JUVY N. COSCA vs. HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR.

A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994
Facts:

In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on October
5, 1992, herein respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization
of marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in consideration of an
appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5) infidelity in the
custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities.
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite
marriage license. Thus, these couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of paying the
marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license. It is alleged that
respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7) marriages in the month of July, 1992,
when in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null and void; that respondents likewise
made it appear that they have notarized only six (6) documents for July, 1992, but the Notarial Register
will show that there were one hundred thirteen (113) documents which were notarized during that
month; and that respondents reported a notarial fee of only P18.50 for each document, although in
fact they collected P20.00 therefor and failed to account for the difference. Complainants allege that
because of the retirement of the clerk of court, respondent judge forwarded to the Supreme Court the
applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and Jessell Abiog. However, they were surprised when
respondent Baroy reported for duty as clerk of court on October 21, 1991. They later found out that
respondent Baroy was the one appointed because she gave a brand-new air-conditioning unit to
respondent judge. Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from the Rural Bank
of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Inc. although such entity is exempt by law from the payment of said
fees, and that while the corresponding receipt was issued, respondent Baroy failed to remit the amount
to the Supreme Court and, instead, she deposited the same in her personal account.
Issue:
Whether or not the Respondent Judge and the clerk of court were responsible of the
complaints charged?
Ruling:
The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation
of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety and
decorum but, above all else, must be beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an example of
integrity, uprightness and honesty.Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity. It
applies, without qualification as to rank or position, from the judge to the least of its personnel, they
being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and morality imposed upon a Court of justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal
requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein.
Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally
render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect
the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally
and administratively liable.
The Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon.
Jr., with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future will definitely
be severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby dismissed from the service, with

forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to employment in any branch, agency or
instrumentality of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
MARRIAGE CEREMONY
LUCIO MORIGO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 145226 February 6, 2004
Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were board mates at the house of Catalina Tortor at
Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978). After school year
1977-78, LucioMorigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other. In 1984, LucioMorigo was

surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an
exchange of letters, they became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again
for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant communication. In 1990, Lucia
came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed
to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at
Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving
appellant Lucio behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce
against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February
17, 1992. On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at the
Virgensa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol to seek the declaration of nullity of accused’s marriage with Lucia,
on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. On October 19, 1993, appellant was
charged with Bigamy in the Information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, with the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The RTC of Bohol rendered a decision finding Lucio Morigo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No.
20700 was pending before the appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No.
6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony
actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC decision on the criminal case.
Issue:
Whether or not Lucio Morigo is guilty of bigamy?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between
Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage
contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the
marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. As the dissenting
opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This simply means that there was no marriage
to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other
words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as
void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of
the law, never married."
The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case
No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory. The first element of bigamy as a
crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the
petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the
principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from
the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its

logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted
the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential
element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained
where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant
charge.
MARILOU NAMA MORENO vs. JUDGE JOSE C. BERNABE

A.M. No. MJT-94-963 July 14, 1995
Facts:
On October 4, 1993, Marilou and Marcelo Moreno were married before respondent Judge
Bernabe. Marilou avers that Respondent Judge assured her that the marriage contract will be released
ten (10) days after October 4, 1993. Complainant then visited the office of the Respondent Judge on

October 15, 1993 only to find out that she could not get the marriage contract because the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar failed to issue a marriage license. She claims that Respondent Judge connived
with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to deceive her.
In his comment,Respondent denied that he conspired with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno
to solemnize the marriage for the purpose of deceiving the complainant.The Respondent Judge
contends that he did not violate the law nor did he have the slightest intention to violate the law when
he, in good faith, solemnized the marriage, as he was moved only by a desire to help a begging and
pleading complainant who wanted some kind of assurance or security due to her pregnant condition.
In order to pacify complainant, Marcelo Moreno requested him to perform the marriage ceremony,
with the express assurance that "the marriage license was definitely forthcoming since the necessary
documents were complete.
In its Memorandum dated January 17, 1995, the Office of the Court Administrator
recommended that Respondent be held liable for misconduct for solemnizing a marriage without a
marriage license and that the appropriate administrative sanctions be imposed against him.
Issue:
Whether or not the Respondent Judge is guilty of grave misconduct and gross ignorance of
the law by solemnizing the marriage without the required marriage license?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Respondent Judge, by his own admission that he solemnized
the marriage between complainant and Marcelo Moreno without the required marriage license, has
dismally failed to live up to his commitment to be the "embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence"and to his promise to be "faithful to the law."
Respondent cannot hide behind his claim of good faith and Christian motives which, at most,
would serve only to mitigate his liability but not exonerate him completely. Good intentions could
never justify violation of the law. Respondent is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P10,000.00 and is
sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
RODOLFO NAVARRO vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTAY

A.M. No. MJT-96-1088 July 19, 1996
Facts:
On September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A.
Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first
wife. It is also alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between FlorianoDadorSumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds
office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigaodel
Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa,
which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos,
located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigaodel Norte.
Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigaodel Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint

respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy for exhibiting gross misconduct
as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
Issue:
Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of gross misconduct, as well as inefficiency in
office and ignorance of the law?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal
principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated;
prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension
of the law. The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in
the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent
in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles like the ones involved in instant case. It is not too much to expect them to know and apply
the law intelligently. Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed, compounded
by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at times make mistakes
in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary
provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and ArlynBorga is considered bigamous and void,
there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda. The Office of the
Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month suspension and a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering
that one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other
lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation.
Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper
understanding of the law.

MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE
TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB vs. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL.

G.R. No. 135216 August 19, 1999
Facts:
Tomasa Vda. de Jacob claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob
and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a
reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased. Defendant-appellee on the other
hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he presented an Order

dated 18 July 1961 issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the
petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil. During the proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo, the defendant-appellee Pedro sought to intervene
therein claiming his share of the deceased’s estate as Alfredo's adopted son and as his sole surviving
heir. Pedro questioned the validity of the marriage between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father
Alfredo. Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and filed a complaint for injunction
with damages questioning appellee's claim as the legal heir of Alfredo. The Regional Trial Court
rendered a decision in favor of Pedro Pilapil and against TomasaGuison. Such decision was affirmed
in toto by the Court of Appeals.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff TomasaVda. De Jacob and deceased
Alfredo E. Jacob was valid?
b) Whether or not defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the existence of a valid marriage is established. It has been
established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. An
affidavit to this effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner. Clearly then, the marriage was
exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code.The
Civil Code governs this case, because the questioned marriage and the assailed adoption took place
prior the effectivity of the Family Code.
On the second issue some considerations cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The alleged
Order was purportedly made in open court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that he
did not dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open court were criminal
cases, in which the accused pleaded guilty.Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch where he
was assigned was always indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order did not contain
this information. Furthermore, Pilapil’s conduct gave no indication that he recognized his own alleged
adoption, as shown by the documents that he signed and other acts that he performed thereafter. In
the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted child. Likewise,
both the Bureau of Records Management in Manila and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Tigaon, Camarines Sur, issued Certifications that there was no record that Pedro Pilapil had been
adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances inexorably negate the alleged adoption of
respondent. The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such
relationship. This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented by petitioner
shows that the alleged adoption is a sham.

FOREIGN DIVORCE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRASUS L. IYOY

G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005
Facts:
Respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones
Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children – Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie,
Calvert, and Carlos – who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent
Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the
Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest
then being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the
U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce
papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the
letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually
had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu
Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he
might not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines
several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain
operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with
her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her American
husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations
made in which she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time the Complaint was filed, it had
been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of
reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Fely’s acts
brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to
perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing,
constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68,
70, and 72, of the Family Code.
On 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent
Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the trial
court’s declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the
finding of psychological incapacity of Fely?
b) Whether or not Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is applicable to
the case at bar?
Ruling:
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his
testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other
corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the
recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely,
such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus,
Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husband’s surname. Even considering the
admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasus’s Complaint filed with the RTC,
the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that
prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple
getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated.
By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent

Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen.
Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC
that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in
1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that
she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino
citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and
legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do
not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained
a divorce from respondent Crasus.
FOREIGN DIVORCE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III

G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
Facts:
On May 24, 1981, CiprianoOrbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son
and a daughter, KristofferSimbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986,

Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano
learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent
Stanley.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition,
the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not CiprianoOrbecido III can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his
allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such foreign law must also be proved as our
courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and
proved. Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to
remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to
declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage. Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our
holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No.
227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present
petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on
respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained
a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such
declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in
his favor.
EFFECTS OF FOREIGN DIVORCE
ALICE REYES VAN DORN vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR.

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
Facts:
The petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United
States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their

residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18,
1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner
has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita,
Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be
ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right
to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause
of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein
respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11,
1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the
property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.
The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Issue:
Whether or not the divorce decree affected the property regime of the parties?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. The case involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which
marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that
the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the
properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the
validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the
Filipino wife after the divorce.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered
still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of
the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect
and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of
her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.
EFFECTS OF FOREIGN DIVORCE
EDGAR SAN LUIS vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS

G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
Facts:
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis, who was the
former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages.

His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children,
namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased
Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a
son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America
(U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then
surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire
Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for
18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Thereafter, respondent
sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate.
On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City. Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his
death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro
Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first
marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and
exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts.
Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration
be issued to her. On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo
by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state
a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been
filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He
further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a
mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking
the dismissal of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order denying the two
motions to dismiss.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It
held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the
Province of Laguna. Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the
orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998
Issues:
a) Whether or not the venue was properly laid in the case
b) Whether or not respondent Felicidad has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters
of administration?
Ruling:

The Supreme Court finds that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for
letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction
over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time,
Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati
City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. Thus, the subject petition was validly filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
On the second issue, the Supreme Court held that respondent would qualify as an interested
person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence
of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s
capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the
laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code.
This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the
property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property
be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging
to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. The case therefore is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the evidence to prove the validity of the divorce
between Felicisimo and Merry Lee.
ACTION FOR RECOGNITION AND PROOF
GERBERT R. CORPUZ vs. DAISYLYN TINOL STO. TOMAS

G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
Facts:
Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T.
Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left
for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise
Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and
disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of
Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The
divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006. Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has
moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in
the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian
divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce
decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between
him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree
must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4,
series of 1982.
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not
file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court.
She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case
herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be
considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s. In its October 30, 2008 decision,
the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to
institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian
citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.
Issue:
Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the
right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court qualifies its conclusion that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this
conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the
unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily
strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree.
The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law
have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right
in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the
effect of foreign judgments.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority,
Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1)
official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the

copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine Foreign Service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. The records
show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required
certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. Under
this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence,
unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce
decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law. The petition was granted and the case is remanded
to the trial court for further proceedings.
ACTION FOR RECOGNITION AND PROOF
GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO vs. REDERICK A. RECIO

G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001
Facts:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18,

1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family
court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of
Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government. Petitioner – a Filipina – and respondent
were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City.In their
application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino." Starting October
22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance
with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the
court a quo, on the ground of bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the
time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to
Editha Samson only in November, 1997.The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground
that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage
ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondent's
alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained
by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union
to nullify or annual.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven?
b) Whether or not the respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson
appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court.However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated. Fortunately
for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel
for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in
the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to
petitioner's qualification.Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed,
petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the
Family Court of Sydney, Australia. Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family
Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired
Australian citizenship in 1992.Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with
the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak
of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian,
respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to
Philippine personal laws.

On the second issue, the Supreme Court held that there is absolutely no evidence that proves
respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that
only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A"
– Complaint;(b) Exhibit "B" – Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian)
and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;(c) Exhibit "C" –
Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on
March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;(d) Exhibit "D" – Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan
City Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson
was in its records;and (e) Exhibit "E" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;(2)
for respondent: (Exhibit "1" – Amended Answer;(b) Exhibit "S" – Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi
of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;(c) Exhibit "3" – Certificate of Australian
Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;(d) Exhibit "4" – Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the
Family Court of Australia Certificate;and Exhibit "5" – Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation
Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995. Based on the records,
the Supreme Court cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen,
was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. The Court agrees with petitioner's
contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent
with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the
Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract
the second marriage. The case is thus remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
NO MARRIAGE LICENSE
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR.

A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995
Facts:
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together
at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. In December 1991, upon opening
the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed. Thereafter,

respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of his children
for him. Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has
five children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the
filing of the administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which
was disputed by De Castro. Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he
admits having five children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage
ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for
lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through
another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a
marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and
custody as a single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on
December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was
single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 40 of the Family Code apply to respondent considering that his first
marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second
marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
Ruling:
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family
Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article
40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the
application of Article 40 to his case. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants'
rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. Respondent made a mockery
of the institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him
five children. Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of
law in 1963. It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership
in the legal profession.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his behavior
as a private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also judged by his private life.
A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must
behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life.

These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand
on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary.
BIGAMOUS/POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES
MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN vs. LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE

G. R. No. 183622 February 8, 2012
Facts:
Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in
the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with petitioner
herein. On November 18, 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.Thereafter, petitioner filed

a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the
intestate estate of Orlando. Respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from
his first marriage, filed a similar petition. The two cases were subsequently consolidated.
On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person
qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Orlando. In
support of her contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against
petitioner. On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy. Furthermore, it took note
of the action for declaration of nullity then pending action with the trial court in Dagupan City filed
by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner.
On June 26, 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the Petition for the
issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private respondent. The
CA held that petitioner undertook the wrong remedy. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this
Decision. On June 20, 2008, the CA denied her motion.Hence, this Petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the divorce is valid.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a
valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was established as early as
1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. wherein we said:It is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage.
Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself.
Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act
or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a
copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship
in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil
rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former
states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his
allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.

Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain
the rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
FE D. QUITA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN

G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998
Facts:
Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May
1941. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in
San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On July 23, 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3)
weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also ended
in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.

On April 16, 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. Javier Inciong filed a petition with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo
in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the surviving
spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed
Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment
instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the
oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. Later Ruperto T. Padlan,
claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.
On the scheduled hearing, the trial court required the submission of the records of birth of
the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the
documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The
prescribed period lapsed without the required documents being submitted. On November 27, 1987
only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo.
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present
proofs that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis
who was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of birth. Private
respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was stated in the aforementioned records of birth
that she and Arturo were married on April 22, 1947, their marriage was clearly void since it was
celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the case should be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
b) Who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent is one of
law which can be resolved in the present petition based on establish facts and admissions of
the parties?
Ruling:
If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person
or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be
heard and decided as in ordinary cases. Reading between the lines, the implication is that petitioner
was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted
the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain
the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the
arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court
perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escaño. The
doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial
court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a
Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could
very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and
Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning
under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit
from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship.

The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case to the court of
origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita
and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying
its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children,
namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed
Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however
emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should be limited to the hereditary rights
of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the
present petition for forum shopping is denied.
VERONICO TENEBRO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant
Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. Tenebro and
Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when
Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on

November 10, 1986. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling
which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas,
before Judge German Lee, Jr. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes
whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner which was confirmed by Villareyes.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. On November 10, 1997, the
Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the Court a quo convicting petitioner
of the crime of bigamy despite non-existence of the first marriage and insufficiency of
evidence.
b) Whether or not the Court erred in convicting the petitioner for the crime of bigamy despite
the clear proof that the marriage between the accused and private complainant had been
declared null and void.
Ruling:
The Court held that after a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason
to disturb the assailed judgment. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the
crime of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the
existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. All three of these documents fall in
the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to public documents are
applicable to all. The documents issued by the National Statistics Office merely attest that the
respective issuing offices have no record of such a marriage. The marriage contract presented by the
prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of
any record of the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law
that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the
validity of a marriage. As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the
prosecution to prove the first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. The State’s penal laws
protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special
contract between spouses, and punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent character
of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.

Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for
validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential
(legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the
solemnizing officer) and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage
ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing
officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or
female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in
Articles 37and 38may contract marriage.As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the
crime of bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage
a third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. The act of the
accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look kindly
on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic of which is its permanence.
When an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the State’s basic social
institution, the State’s criminal laws on bigamy step in.
VICTORIA S. JARILLO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 164435 September 29, 2009
Facts:
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding
ceremony. On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a church
wedding ceremony. Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with
Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy. In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-
93582 for annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court. On appeal to the CA,
petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in toto. In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140,
rendered a Decision dated March 28, 2003, declaring petitioner’s 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo
null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. Said decision became final
and executory on July 9, 2003. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration
of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her conviction. Hence, the present petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in rendering their decision.
Ruling:
Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until
declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a
declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage
were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.
Petitioner’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of petitioner’s two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in
the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one
having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because
at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo, which had not
yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting.
Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s marriage to Uy make any difference.
Petitioner’s defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.
Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty under the
Revised Penal Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken. The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the
accused shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal
Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance
attendant to the commission of the crime. However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that
petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo has after all been declared by final judgment to be void ab initio on
account of the latter’s psychological incapacity, by reason of which, petitioner was subjected to
manipulative abuse, the Court deems it proper to reduce the penalty imposed by the lower courts.
Thus, petitioner should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from

Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and
1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.

FLORENCE TEVES MACARRUBO vs. ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARRUBO

A.C. No. 6148 February 27, 2004
Facts:
Florence Teves Macarrubo (complainant), by herself and on behalf of her two children, filed
on June 6, 2000 a verified complaint for disbarment against Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbo
(respondent) with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), alleging that respondent deceived her
into marrying him despite his prior subsisting marriage with a certain Helen Esparza.

Complainant averred that he started courting her in April 1991, he representing himself as a
bachelor; that they eventually contracted marriage which was celebrated on two occasions; and that
although respondent admitted that he was married to Helen Esparza on June 16, 1982, he succeeded
in convincing complainant, her family and friends that his previous marriage was void. Complainant
further averred that respondent entered into a third marriage with one Josephine T. Constantino; and
that he abandoned complainant and their children without providing them any regular support up to
the present time, leaving them in precarious living conditions. After hearing during which both
complainant and respondent took the witness stand, the Investigating Commissioner rendered a
Report and Recommendation that the said respondent is suspended for three months for gross
misconduct reflecting unfavorably on the moral norms of the profession.
The final disposition of the present administrative case is now before this Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Edmundo Macarrubo is guilty of gross misconduct.
Ruling:
Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative
case against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course,then
the judgment of annulment of respondent's marriage does not also exonerate him from a wrongdoing
actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof - clear preponderance of evidence - in disciplinary
proceedings against members of the bar is met, then liability attaches.
The disturbing fact that respondent was able to secure the annulment of his first two marriages
and is in the process of procuring the annulment of his third bears noting. Contrary to the finding of
the Investigating Commissioner, respondent, by his own admission, contracted a third marriage.
Such pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of marriage and family,
institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values
essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation
as a whole. This must be checked if not stopped. As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in
fact be of good moral character but must also be perceived to be of good moral character and must
lead a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. The moral delinquency
that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such, including that which makes a
mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage, outrages the generally accepted moral
standards of the community.
There can then be no other fate that awaits respondent, as a consequence of his grossly
immoral conduct, than to be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.

LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL vs. THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY

G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986
Facts:
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the
declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian
Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and
defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the
ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City.
Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was

null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said
marital union.
Issue:
Was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds the petition devoid of merit.There is no need for petitioner to prove
that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming this to
be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until
annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was
still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80,
Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first
husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according
to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be
regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz
Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the
law.
The petition is dismissed.
MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAÑES vs. LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO.

G.R. No. 181089 October 22, 2012
Facts:
On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in Lezo, Aklan. On January
24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano
(Silverio) in San Pedro, Laguna. In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch
256, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latter’s
psychological incapacity. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256, rendered an
Amended Decision declaring the marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void. On May 14,

2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from the first marriage, filed with
the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint for Bigamy against respondent.
On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through counsel, filed a Motion to
Quash Information (and Dismissal of the Criminal Complaint) alleging that her marriage with Socrates
had already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more marriage to speak of prior
to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983; that the basic element of the crime of bigamy, i.e., two
valid marriages, is therefore wanting. She also claimed that since the second marriage was held in 1983,
the crime of bigamy had already prescribed.
On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed Order dismissing the case. Dissatisfied, a
Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the prosecution, but opposed by respondent. In a Resolution
dated January 2, 2008, the RTC denied the same ruling, among others, that the judicial declaration of
nullity of respondent's marriage is tantamount to a mere declaration or confirmation that said marriage
never existed at all, and for this reason, her act in contracting a second marriage cannot be considered
criminal.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in quashing the Information for bigamy filed against
respondent.
Ruling:
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes bigamy. The elements of the
crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second
or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the
celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy
that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for
the subsistence of the first marriage.
In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second marriage with Silverio in
1983, her first marriage with Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the same had not yet
been annulled or declared void by a competent authority. Thus, all the elements of bigamy were alleged
in the Information. Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage
was still subsisting as it had not yet been legally dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned
jurisprudence, the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the
fact that she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus,
respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense
charged were sufficiently alleged.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same
must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is
so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that
the marriage exists.Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

The petition is granted.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GREGORIO NOLASCO

G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993
Facts:
Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British
subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that chance meeting onwards,
Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they returned
to respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his seaman's contract
expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in
Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.

Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained another
employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in
January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing him
that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left
Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately asked permission to leave his ship to return home.
He arrived in Antique in November 1983.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked
in England proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No.
38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first
met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had
no news of Janet Monica.
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Antique, Branch 10, a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica
Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared
presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void.The trial court
granted Nolasco's petition.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that
respondent had sufficiently established a basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.
Issue:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.
Ruling:
The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code
which provides that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provision of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence
of only two years shall be sufficient.
The Family Code prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted. As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are
four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive
years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances
laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife
with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.In the case at bar, the
Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain

Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded
belief that she was already dead. The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined
to give any information as to her personal background even after she had married respondent too
convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the alleged
letters respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent
said he had lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from
their friends of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his
testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during
trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by its nature, be rebutted. In any case,
admissibility is not synonymous with credibility
Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death must be denied. The law does not view marriage like an ordinary
contract. In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law
that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet
Monica Parker presumptively dead.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 159614 December 9, 2005
Facts:
On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia (Lea) A.
Julaton. On May 28, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a Motion to Dismissthe petition, which was, however, denied by the court.
At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were married on January 20, 1995 in
Catbalogan, Samar.He testified that, on February 6, 1995, Lea arrived home late in the evening and he
berated her for being always out of their house. Alan narrated that, when he reported for work the
following day, Lea was still in the house, but when he arrived home later in the day, Lea was nowhere

to be found.However, Lea did not return to their house anymore.Sometime in June 1995, he decided
to go to Manila to look for Lea, but his mother asked him to leave after the town fiesta of Catbalogan,
hoping that Lea may come home for the fiesta. He failed to find out Lea’s whereabouts despite his
repeated talks with Janeth. Alan decided to work as a part-time taxi driver. On June 20, 2001, Alan
reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police station.
After Alan rested his case, neither the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor nor the Solicitor General
adduced evidence in opposition to the petition. On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment
granting the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in granting the petition.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious. The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse
has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before
the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a
well-grounded belief. Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It
may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree,
to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or
circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life
which usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends
to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions, competence evidence
on the ultimate question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries
and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still
alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of
the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring
before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries
made by present spouse.In sum, the Court finds and so holds that the respondent failed to prove that
he had a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition in the RTC, that his spouse Rosalia (Lea)
Julaton was already dead.
NENITA BIENVENIDO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LUISITA CAMACHO and

LUIS FAUSTINO C. CAMACHO
G.R. No. 111717 October 24, 1994
Facts:
Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3, 1942. On February 6,
1962, without his marriage to Consejo Velasco being dissolved, Aurelio P. Camacho contracted
another marriage with respondent Luisita C. Camacho (Luisita) with whom he had been living since
1953 and by whom he begot a child, respondent Aurelio Luis Faustino C. Camacho (Chito) born on
May 22, 1961. The marriage was solemnized in Tokyo, Japan where Aurelio and Luisita had been
living since 1958.

There were instances during Luisita and Aurelio's marriage when, because of their quarrels,
one or the other left the dwelling place for long periods of time. In her case Luisita stayed on those
occasions at various times in Davao City, Hongkong or Japan.In 1967 Aurelio met petitioner Nenita
T. Bienvenido, who had been estranged from her husband, Luis Rivera. Aurelio courted her and
apparently won her heart because from June 1968 until Aurelio's death on May 28, 1988, he lived with
her, the last time in a duplex apartment on 84 Scout Delgado Street, Quezon City. Petitioner's
daughter, Nanette, stayed with them as did Aurelio's son, Chito, who lived with them for about a year
in 1976.
On April 30, 1982, Aurelio bought the house and the lot on Delgado Street in which they were
staying from the owners, Paz Lorenzo Infante and Suzette Infante-Moñozca. In the deed of sale and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 288350 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, issued in his name,
Aurelio was described as single.On November 26, 1984, Aurelio executed a deed of sale of the
property in favor of petitioner Nenita in consideration of the sum of P250,000.00, by virtue of which
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681 was issued in petitioner's name on January 11, 1985. Between
1985 and 1987 Nenita and Luisita came to know each other. On May 28, 1988, Aurelio died. Petitioner,
using her Loyola Life Plan and Aurelio's account in the PCI Bank, took care of the funeral
arrangements. Respondent Luisita was then in the United States with respondent Chito, having gone
there, according to her, at the instance of Aurelio in order to look for a house in San Francisco so that
Aurelio could follow and rejoin them. Upon learning of the death of Aurelio she and her son Chito
came home on May 30, 1988. She had the remains of Aurelio transferred from the Loyola Memorial
Chapels, first to the St. Ignatius Church and later to the Arlington Memorial Chapels. Luisita paid for
the funeral services.
Respondent Luisita was granted dealt benefits by the Armed Forces of the Philippines as the
surviving spouse of Aurelio. Soon she also claimed ownership of the house and lot on Scout Delgado
Street in which Nenita had been living. The two met at a barangay conciliation meeting but efforts to
settle their dispute failed.
On September 7, 1988, Luisita and her son Chito brought this case in the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, seeking the annullment of the sale of the property to petitioner and the payment to
them of damages. Luisita alleged that the deed of sale was a forgery and that in any event it was
On August 29, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision upholding the sale of the property to
petitioner and dismissing the complaint of Luisita. It found the deed of sale in favor of petitioner to
be genuine and respondents Luisita and Chito to be in estoppel in not claiming the property until 1988
despite knowledge of the sale by the late Aurelio who had represented himself to be single.
Respondents moved for a reconsideration but the trial court denied their motion. On appeal the
respondents prevailed. On June 4, 1993, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court
and declared respondents to be the owners of the house and lot in dispute.
Issue:
Whether or not Aurelio’s marriage to respondent Luisita is valid.
Ruling:

The Supreme Court findsthe petition to be meritorious. This Court finds that the presumption
of the validity of the marriage between Aurelio and Luisita has not been successfully assailed by
appellee. Art. 83 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance, unless:
(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead
and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage
so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent
court.
In the case at bar, the burden of proof was on respondents to show that Luisita and Aurelio's
marriage falls under any of these exceptions in order to be considered valid. They failed to discharge
this burden. Instead the contrary appears. What applies in this case, therefore, is the general rule, i.e.,
since Aurelio had a valid, subsisting marriage to Consejo Velaso, his subsequent marriage to
respondent Luisita was void for being bigamous.Consequently, there is no basis for holding that the
property in question was property of the conjugal partnership of Luisita and the late Aurelio because
there was no such partnership in the first place. In the second place, until otherwise shown in an
appropriate action, the sale to petitioner must be presumed. Petitioner's ownership is evidenced by a
deed of absolute saleexecuted with all the solemnity of a public document and by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 326681 issued in due course in her name.Petitioner is in possession of the property. It
was error for the Court of Appeals to annul petitioner's title at the instance of one whose marriage to
the seller is void.
Indeed, the property in question was acquired by Aurelio during a long period of cohabitation
with petitioner which lasted for twenty years (1968-1988). While petitioner knew respondent Chito to
be Aurelio's son way back in 1976, there is nothing to show that she knew Aurelio to be married to
Luisita. To the contrary, Aurelio represented himself to be single. As far as petitioner was concerned,
Chito could have been Aurelio's child by a woman not his wife. There was, therefore, no basis for the
Court of Appeals' ruling that Nenita was not a buyer in good faith of the property because she ought
to have known that Aurelio was married to Luisita.

EDUARDO P. MANUEL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005
Facts:
On July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaña before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in
Makati, which was then still a municipality of the Province of Rizal.He met the private complainant
Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City
for two days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while
Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led
to another, they went to a motel where, despite Tina’s resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his
way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single.
Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina’s parents, and was assured by them

that their son was still single.Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March
1996. They were married on April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the
RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61. It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was "single."
The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their joint
efforts, they were able to build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting
1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina
was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her.Sometime in January
2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.
Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National
Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. She
secured an NSO-certified copy of the marriage contract.She was so embarrassed and humiliated when
she learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged their own vows.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy. On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of
the RTC with modification as to the penalty of the accused.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner’s wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the
Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided under Article 41 of
the Family Code.
Ruling:
The petition is denied for lack of merit.The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to
preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage established by law.The phrase "or before the absent
spouse had been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings" was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the law were of the
impression that "in consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption of death after
an absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment of marriage
should be a justification for bigamy."
For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony:
(a) he/she has been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former
marriage having been lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second
marriage or subsequent marriage.It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second
marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the
first marriage.
The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the
benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second marriage,
precisely because he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based
on mere testimony is found incredible.The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit
of the State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the "State shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution." Marriage is a social institution of the highest
importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest of society require that the marital relation

should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in the manner prescribed and the
causes specified by law.The laws regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety,
good order, comfort or general welfare of the community and the parties can waive nothing essential
to the validity of the proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable
relationships over transient ones; it enhances the welfare of the community.
In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and an approving
State. On marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other and the State touching nearly on
every aspect of life and death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent
parties and to society, are so serious that the law may well take means calculated to ensure the
procurement of the most positive evidence of death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death
of the absent spouseafter the lapse of the period provided for under the law. One such means is the
requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death of an absent spouse as
proof that the present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death
of the first spouse.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GLORIA BERMUDEZ-LORINO

G.R. No. 160258 January 19, 2005
Facts:
Respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino and her husband were married on June 12, 1987.
Because of her husband’s violent character, Gloria found it safer to leave him behind and decided to
go back to her parents together with her three (3) children. In order to support the children, Gloria
was compelled to work abroad. From the time of her physical separation from her husband in 1991,
Gloria has not heard of him at all. She had absolutely no communications with him, or with any of
his relatives. On August 14, 2000, nine (9) years after she left her husband, Gloria filed a verified
petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
In a decision dated November 7, 2001, the RTC, finding merit in the summary petition,
rendered judgment granting the same. In a decision dated September 23, 2003, the Court of Appeals,

treating the case as an ordinary appealed case under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure,
denied the Republic’s appeal and accordingly affirmed the appealed RTC decision.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the Court of Appeals duly acquired jurisdiction over the appeal on a final and
executory judgment of the Regional Trial Court
b) Whether or not the factual and legal bases for a judicial declaration of presumptive death under
Article 41 of the Family Code were established in this case.
Ruling:
The Court rules against petitioner Republic. Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI:
SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, sets the tenor for cases covered
by these rules. In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary
period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express
provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are "immediately final and executory". It was erroneous,
therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due course to the Republic’s appeal and order the transmittal
of the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision

of law, is immediately final and executory. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition
for declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the
RTC decision of November 7, 2001. But, if only to set the records straight and for the future guidance
of the bench and the bar, let it be stated that the RTC’s decision dated November 7, 2001, was
immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties. It was erroneous for the OSG to file a
notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due course thereto. The Court of Appeals acquired no
jurisdiction over the case, and should have dismissed the appeal outright on that ground.
The Court, therefore, finds in this case grave error on the part of both the RTC and the Court
of Appeals. To stress, the Court of Appeals should have dismissed the appeal on ground of lack of
jurisdiction, and reiterated the fact that the RTC decision of November 7, 2001 was immediately final
and executory.
As it were, the Court of Appeals committed grave reversible error when it failed to dismiss
the erroneous appeal of the Republic on ground of lack of jurisdiction because, by express provision
of law, the judgment was not appealable.

ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO

G.R. No. 136467 April 6, 2000
Facts:
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land with an
estimated value of P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife, herein respondent Marietta
Calisterio.Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to James
William Bounds on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan City. James Bounds disappeared without a trace on
11 February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years later, or on 08 May 1958, without
Marietta having priorly secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead.
On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of

Teodorico, filed a petition entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate Estate of the Deceased Teodorico
Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas, Petitioner," claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving heir of
Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and respondent Marietta Espinosa Calisterio
being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void.

Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first marriage with James
Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's absence, his whereabouts being unknown, for more
than eleven years before she contracted her second marriage with Teodorico. Contending to be the
surviving spouse of Teodorico, she sought priority in the administration of the estate of the decedent.
On 05 February 1993, the trial court issued an order appointing jointly Sinfroniano C. Armas,
Jr., and respondent Marietta administrator and administratrix, respectively, of the intestate estate of
Teodorico. On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in favor of petitioner
Antonia. On 31 August 1998, the appellate court reversed the lower court’s decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta is
valid, that, in turn, would be determinative of her right as a surviving spouse.
Ruling:
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 of the New
Civil Code which provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though
he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by
the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed
dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three
cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the
first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved. A judicial
declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the prescribed period of
absence is met.
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband, James
William Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered
into a second marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having
been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding
the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds.
The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having been adduced to
indicate another property regime between the spouses, pertains to them in common. Upon its
dissolution with the death of Teodorico, the property should rightly be divided in two equal portions
— one portion going to the surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of the deceased
spouse. The successional right in intestacy of a surviving spouse over the net estate of the deceased,
concurring with legitimate brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces (the latter by right of
representation), is one-half of the inheritance, the brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces, being

entitled to the other half. Nephews and nieces, however, can only succeed by right of representation
in the presence of uncles and aunts; alone, upon the other hand, nephews and nieces can succeed in
their own right which is to say that brothers or sisters exclude nephews and nieces except only in
representation by the latter of their parents who predecease or are incapacitated to succeed. The
appellate court has thus erred in granting, in paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion of its judgment,
successional rights, to petitioner's children, along with their own mother Antonia who herself is
invoking successional rights over the estate of her deceased brother.
It is hereby DECLARED that said one-half share of the decedent's estate pertains solely to
petitioner to the exclusion of her own children.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA

G.R. No. 187512 June 13, 2012
Facts:
In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda) met Cyrus Granada (Cyrus) at
Sumida Electric Philippines, an electronics company in Paranaque where both were then working.
The two eventually got married at the Manila City Hall on 3 March 1993. Their marriage resulted in
the birth of their son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio Granada.Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric
Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that
time, she had not received any communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate
him. Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latter’s whereabouts,
to no avail. After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared
presumptively dead. On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as
presumptively dead.

In its 23 January 2009 Resolution, the appellate court granted Yolanda’s Motion to Dismiss
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,the CA ruled that a petition
for declaration of presumptive death under Rule 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding.
Issues:
a) Whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the Decision of
the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately
final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal.
b) Whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration
of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that
respondent presented.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirms the CA ruling with regard to the first issue.Clearly, a petition for
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent
marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding "as provided for" under the
Family Code. Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a
petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court
therein shall be immediately final and executory.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family
Code/By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the
trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party
may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such
petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of
Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent
with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing
party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the
Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction
are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in
rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
On whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration
of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that respondent
had presented. The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness
inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse
is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of
death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances

occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the
inquiries made by present spouse.
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent
Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. Nevertheless, we are
constrained to deny the Petition. The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to
prove her "well-founded belief" that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the
Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be modified or reversed.
Indeed, "[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it
becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law."
MARRIAGE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 40
ROBERTO DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993
Facts:
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition for
"Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto Domingo.
The petition which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others that: they
were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage
Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite;
unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which
marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983
when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been
working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines only when she would avail of the
one-month annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer since 1983 up to the present, he
has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and subsistence; out of her
personal earnings, she purchased real and personal properties with a total amount of approximately
P350,000.00, which are under the possession and administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989,

while on her one-month vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she
further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or
consent; she confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her
attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over the possession and
administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized to
administer and possess the same on account of the nullity of their marriage.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appealsdismissed the petition. The motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of merit.
Issues:
a) Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the
affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
b) Whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain
real and personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.
Ruling:
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while
the former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such,
it is from the beginning.Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage
be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. The invalidity of
a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage invalid, except
as provided in Article 41. The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the
prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other incident of
their marriage such as the separation of their properties."
The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one
of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them.
It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought
is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's properties.
Accordingly, the respondent court committed no reversible error in finding that the lower court
committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.

MARRIAGE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 40
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR.

Adm. Matter No. MTJ-92706 March 29, 1995
Facts:
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together
at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which he
purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila. In December 1991, upon opening the door to his
bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed. Thereafter, respondent prevented
him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of his children for him.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has
five children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities. For his part,
respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the filing of the
administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was disputed
by De Castro. Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having
five children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before
a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage
license.

Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage
ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license.
Ongkiko abandoned respondent 19 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a single
parent. Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on
December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was
single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of an immoral and illegal act by cohabiting with De Castro.
Ruling:
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages
entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the
first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws."
This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not
shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case. Respondent is
the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of marriage and
employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who begot him five children. His failure to secure
a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith. It is evident that
respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession.
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan
Trial Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he
was already in the judiciary. The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must
be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but
also as to his behavior as a private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also
judged by his private life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial
duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No
position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat
in the judiciary.

CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
Facts:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral,
Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. After the celebration of their marriage
and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's
mother. In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during
their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her
mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them.
They stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse
between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just
sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on
the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt
of sexual intercourse between them.
She claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers. Because
of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at
the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989. The results of their physical examinations were
that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept
confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed

medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For
her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show
his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the
cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino
citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the
appearance of a normal man.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties
and that the evidence is not fabricated."After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive
portion of which reads: ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as void. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual
communion with petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds the petition to be bereft of merit.The case has reached this Court
because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is no
collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have
never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. Appellant admitted
that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it
appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness
to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind
of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on
who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact
remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to
declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the
question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.If a spouse, although physically
capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is
senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered
a sign of psychological incapacity.
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is
the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity
or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the
"spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order"
(Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no
man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This
is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural
order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and
a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and
ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That
is — a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way
process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long
way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting
adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing
commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped
in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
LEOUEL SANTOS vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA

ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
Facts:
Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The
meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two
exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed,
shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia
Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened
Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred,
because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs.
Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and
where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would
express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite
Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called
up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the
expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United

States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in
touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was
ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
Issue:
Whether or not Leouel’s marriage with Julia can be declared invalid.
Ruling:
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to
adopt the provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow
some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code
Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No.
106429, 13 June 1994); thus:The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for
fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights and duties,
to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no
juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's
enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the
interpretation or construction of the codal provision. So the progress was from psycho-sexual to
psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be, however,
incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of
psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary
obligations of marriage.
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of
this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a real
inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter
a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit
oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love,
the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the inability must be
tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be
overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder

which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987).
However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only
that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the person,
at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and
consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded

that innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1
of the Family Code. The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our
laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards
required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even
desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the
specific answers to every individual problem.
The petition is denied.
LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 126010 December 8, 1999
Facts:
Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were
married and three children were born to them. On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional
Trial Court, a petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of
psychological incapacity of the latter. She claimed that private respondent, after they were married,
cohabited with another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs with
different women, and that, because of his promiscuity, private respondent endangered her health by
infecting her with a sexually transmissible disease (STD). Petitioner prayed that for having abandoned
the family, private respondent be ordered to give support to their three children in the total amount
of P9,000.00 every month; that she be awarded the custody of their children; and that she be adjudged
as the sole owner of a parcel of land located in Cavite.
On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for annulment
of marriage filed by petitioner. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January 30,
1996, rendered its decision affirming the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
Issue:

Whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be annulled on the
ground of private respondent's psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held:"Psychological incapacity" should refer
to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality, disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of
the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the
Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party
being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage,
they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions
of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that
may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every
case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is
peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with
expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
The Court, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals
whose conclusions, affirming the trial court's finding with regard to the non-existence of private
respondent's psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage, are entitled to great weight and even
finality.
The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for us to pass upon petitioner's
contentions on the issue of permanent custody of children, the amount for their respective support,
and the declaration of exclusive ownership of petitioner over the real property. These matters may
more appropriately be litigated in a separate proceeding for legal separation, dissolution of property
regime, and/or custody of children which petitioner may bring.

YAMBAO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 184063 January 24. 2011
Facts:
Petitioner Cynthia E. Yambao and respondent Patricio E. Yambao married on December 21,
1968. On July 11, 2003, after 35 years of marriage and three children raised into adulthood, petitioner
filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, praying the marriage be declared null and
void due to her husband’s psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner claims that her marriage is marred by bickering, quarrels and recrimination because of the
respondent’s difficulty to find a stable job, failure in the family business, refusal to change children’s
diapers while petitioner was still recovering from her Caesarean operation, insecurity and jealousy
towards acquaintances and relatives, eating and sleeping all day, gambling, and threats to kill her. She
then consulted with a psychiatrist who concluded that the respondent suffered from Dependent
Personality Disorder. On February 9, 2007, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition for lack of
merit. On April 16, 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court’s Decision; hence,
this petition for review before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence establishes the respondent’s psychological
incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Ruling:

No. Though there are existing antecedents, assumptions, predilections, or generalizations, this
case must be treated uniquely, given its facts and idiosyncrasies. For marriage to be annulled under
Article 36 of the Family Code, it must be proven that the incapacitated spouse manifested mental, not
physical, incapacity causing him or her to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants. The
spouse must suffer from a mental incapacity so severe that he is and becomes unaware of his marital
and familial obligations. Psychological incapacity must be judged according to:
(a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability.
Article 36 considers incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations as totally different from mere difficulty, refusal, neglect or ill will in the performance of
marital obligations. Incapacity is defined as:
(a) true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage;
(b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the
community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and
(c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality.

All marriages go through “bickerings, quarrels and recrimination” and rough patches. In this
case, the respondent may not be the ideal husband for petitioner’s exacting standards but they have
gone through 35 years of marriage and have raised 3 children into adulthood “without any major
parenting problems”. Moreover, respondent never committed infidelity or physically abused the
petitioner or their children. These facts do not prove psychological incapacity.

GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MOLINA

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
Facts:
On April 14, 1985, Roridel Olaviano Molina, respondent was married to Reynaldo Molina at
the Church of Saint Augustine, Manila. From their marriage was borne a child named Albert Andre
Olaviano Molina. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo started exhibiting signs of “immaturity and
irresponsibility”. He preferred to spend more time with the company of his friends and peers on
whom he squandered money, he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, ;and he was never
honest with the family finances. These circumstances led to frequent quarrels between the petitioner
and respondent. In February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, making Roridel the
sole breadwinner.
On October 1986, they were both estranged from each other. In February 1986, Roridel
moved back to Baguio with her parents and a few weeks later Reynaldo abandoned Roridel and left
Albert in her custody. Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband
and wife because of Roridel’s strange behavior and insistence to leave his group of friends eve after
their marriage, Roridel’s refusal to perform some of her marital duties like cooking meals, and Roridel’s
failure to run the household and handle their finances. On May, 1991, the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio rendered judgment and declared the marriage void. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
Regional Trial Court’s decision.
Issue:

Whether or not “opposing and conflicting personalities” is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
Ruling:
No. Psychological incapacity must be judged according to: (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability. In this case, there was no clear showing of the psychological incapacity but the
mere showing of difficulty, refusal, neglect and irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities
which do not constitute psychological incapacity. In this case, it is not enough to prove that the parties
failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons. Essentially, it must be shown that
they are incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. Although there was
evidence that the couple could not get along or are incompatible with each other, there was no
evidence of the gravity of the psychological incapacity; neither its juridical antecedence nor incurability.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological, not physical.
The following guidelines must be proved in invoking psychological incapacity:

(1) The burden of proof to show nullity of the marriage lies in the plaintiff;
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
a. Medically or clinically identified,
b. Alleged in the complaint,
c. Sufficiently proven by experts, and
d. Clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state.

BARCELONA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 130087 September 24, 2003
Facts:
Diana M. Barcelona, petitioner, and Tadeo R. Bengzon, respondent were legally married at
Holy Cross Parish after a whirlwind courtship. They established their residence at Quezon City and
begot five children. The couple had frequent quarrels because Diana was from a rich family, was a
disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house playing tennis all day. During a family
crisis where Diana suffered from several miscarriages and during sickness of a child, the petitioner
would withdraw herself and would not talk to the husband. During her pregnancy, she would insist
the husband to offer her more freedom and leave their conjugal dwelling. The husband would
eventually leave and the both of them would eventually become estranged from each other.
On March 29, 1995, respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage
on the grounds of psychological incapacity against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona. On July 21, 1995,
respondent filed a second Petition for Annulment of Marriage against the petitioner. Petitioner filed
a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the second petition fails to state a cause of action and that it
violated Supreme Court Circular No. 04-49 in failing to state the filing of a previous petition for
annulment of marriage, its termination and status.
On September 18, 1996, in an Order (first Order) Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo deferred resolution
of the Motion until the parties have ventilated their arguments in a hearing. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration. However, on January 21, 1997, the trial court through Pairing Judge Rosalina L.
Luna Pison issued an Order (second Order) denying the motion for reconsideration on the ground

that when the ground for dismissal is the complaint’s failure to state a cause of action, the trial court
determines such fact solely from the petition itself. According to Judge Pison, a perusal of the
allegations in the second petition shows that petitioner has violated respondent’s right, thus resulting
to a cause of action. Judge Pison also rejected petitioner’s claim that respondent was guilty of forum
shopping explaining that when respondent filed the second petition, the first petition was no longer
pending and was dismissed without prejudice.
The Court of Appeals affirmed with the Regional Trial Court’s decision that the allegations in
the second petition state a cause of action sufficient to sustain a valid judgment if proven true as well
as the decision that the respondent has not committed forum shopping.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the second petition for annulment sufficiently states the cause of action.
b) Whether or not the respondent violated Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-49 in
failing to state the filing of a previous petition for annulment of marriage, its termination and
status.
Ruling:
Yes. The second petition states a legal cause of action since it states the legal right of
respondent, the correlative obligation of the petitioner, and the act or omission of the petitioner in
violation of the legal right. After Santos and Molina, the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages provided that expert opinions need not be
alleged, to wit:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages –

x x x.
(d) What to allege. – A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying
with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
No. The first petition was already dismissed without prejudice. Therefore, there is no litis
pendentia since respondent has already withdrawn and caused the dismissal of the first petition when
he subsequently filed the second petition. Neither is there res judicata because the dismissal order was
not a decision on the merits but a dismissal “without prejudice”.

TONGOL vs. TONGOL

G.R. No. 157610 October 19, 2007
Facts:
On August 27, 1967, petitioner Orlando G. Tongol and respondent Filipinas M. Tongol were
married. From their marriage they begot four children.
On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the Regional Trial Court, Makati a verified petition
for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Filipinas on the ground that she is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations.
In his petition, Orlando stated that he and Filipinas’ marriage was objected by the latter’s
family. The continuous interference of Filipinas’ parents, their attempts to break up their union and
their influence on Filipinas made their marriage an unhappy one. Because of the influence of Filipinas’
parents, she regarded Orlando with contempt. When Orlando started a junk shop business, he was
met with ridicule, instead of encouragement, from his wife. Eventually, his junk shop business
flourished and became profitable enough for Orlando to embark on a new business venture by putting
up a pharmaceutical company. Filipinas became interested and began to interfere with the operation
of the business; however, the employees of the company were aloof. She also resented that her
husband was getting along with the employees and, as a result, was the subject of their frequent and
continued quarrels. She even suspected Orlando of diverting the income of his business to his
relatives. The continued fighting persisted and affected their children.

Filipinas, in her counter-petition claimed that the marriage was, indeed, fruitless; however, this
was the fault of Orlando’s psychological incapacity. In 1990, Orlando decided to live separately from
Filipinas and on May 13, 1994, Orlando and Filipinas filed a petition for dissolution of their conjugal
partnership gains, granted by the Makati Regional Trial Court.
Evidence for Orlando consisted of his testimony, his sister’s, his employee’s, and Dr. Cecilia
Villegas’ psychological examination of both parties. Meanwhile, evidence for the respondent only
consisted of her testimony.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional
Trial Court’s decision in toto.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated.
Ruling:
No. First, psychological incapacity must be more than just “difficulty”, “refusal” or “neglect”.
Second, the personality disorder or psychological incapacity of the respondent must be grave enough
to bring about her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Third, there was no
evidence that the psychological incapacity is incurable. Fourth, the psychological incapacity considered
in Article 36 must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage like, in this case, the family business. Marriage obligations must correspond to the
management of the household and the provision of support for the family. Fifth, marital obligations
must not only include the spouse’s obligation to the spouse but also that to her children. No evidence
was shown that the respondent was negligent in the rearing and care of her children as enumerated in
Article 220 of the Family Code. Although, the respondent exhibited Inadequate Personality Disorder,
there was no evidence to prove that, indeed, the respondent was incapacitated or incapable of
complying with the essential obligations of marriage.

MARCOS vs. MARCOS

G.R. No. 136490 October 19, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos married twice. First was on
September 6, 1982, with Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu as solemnizing officer of the marriage held at the
Municipal Court of Pasig and second was on May 8, 1983 by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command
Chaplain at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacañang Park, Manila. They were both
military personnel. They begot 5 (five) children. Wilson left military service in 1987 and started a
business that did not prosper. Brenda put up a business until she was able to put up a trading and
construction company.Their frequent quarrels stemmed from the petitioner’s urges on respondent to
be gainfully employed to convince their children that their father, as the breadwinner, is the head of
the family and a good provider. Because of Wilson’s failure to provide for his family, he began beating
the children for slight mistakes and forcibly having sex with his already weary wife. The tipping point
was when they had a quarrel on October 16, 1994 when she did not want him to stay in their house
anymore. Wilson became violent and inflicted physical harm on her and her mother. The following
day, Brenda and her children sought refuge at her sister’s house. On October 19, 1994, she was
diagnosed with contusions from the bitter quarrel. The Regional Trial Court found respondent to be
psychologically incapacitated. The Court of Appeals negated the Regional Trial Court’s ruling.
Issues:
a) Whether or not personal medical or psychological evaluation is a requirement for the
declaration of psychological incapacity.

b) Whether or not the demeanor or behaviors of the respondents determine psychological
incapacity.
Ruling:
No. The guidelines in Santos and Molina do not require that a physician examine the person
to be declared psychologically incapacitated even if the root cause be “medically or clinically
identified”. What is most important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s
psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination is not necessary.
No. Although the respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have
resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, these do not necessitate psychological incapacity. The
evidence presented do not zero in on the Santos and Molina guidelines on psychological incapacity.
The behaviors can be attributed to the respondent’s loss of employment for a period of more than six
years. It was from this that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support
and leave the family home. Therefore, his psychological incapacity can be traced to this certain period
and not before the marriage nor during the inception of the marriage. Equally important, the condition
was not proven to be incurable, especially now that he is again gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
TE vs. TE
G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009
Facts:
In January 1996, Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te decided to court Rowena Ong Gutierrez
Yu-Te after seeing her in a Filipino-Chinese association in their college. He decided to court Rowena
after learning that her close friend had a boyfriend. They shared the same angst towards their families
and developed a closeness with each other. In March 1996, Rowena asked Edward that they elope
despite being bickering about being young and jobless. Edward eventually gave in to Rowena’s plans,
left Manila, and sailed for Cebu that month with P80,000 pension. He provided the traveling money
and she purchased their boat ticket. Because of their house accommodation, daily sustenance and
joblessness, their pension lasted for only a month. After Edward proceeded to his parents’ home,
Rowena kept on telephoning him and threatening him that she would commit suicide. Edward agreed
to stay with Rowena at her uncle’s place.
On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to court to get married. He was 25 years
old and she was 20. They continued to stay at her uncle’s place but he Edward was being treated like
a prisoner. In one instance, Rowena insisted Edward to claim his inheritance so they could live
independently but this request was angrily denied by his father who insisted that Edward go home
else, he would be disinherited. After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowena’s uncle and
stayed with his parents. His family hid him from Rowena when she called. In June 1996, Edward was
able to talk to Rowena but, unmoved by Edward’s persistence that they live together, she decided that
they should separate ways. On January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City for the annulment of his marriage with Rowena on the ground of psychological
incapacity.

On August 23, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor submitted an investigation report
stating that it could not determine if there was collusion between the parties and therefore,
recommended trial on the merits. Upon the findings of the clinical psychologist of psychological
incapacity of Edward (dependent personality disorder) and Rowena (narcissistic and antisocial
personality disorder), the Regional Trial Court declared the marriage null and void. However, the
Appellate Court reversed and set aside the Trial Court’s decision on the ground that the clinical
psychologist did not examine the respondent and merely banked on the testimony of the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity given
the petitioner’s totality of evidence.
Ruling:
Yes. The courts must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert
opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties. The psychological assessment
adequately, sufficiently and decisively points to Edward’s dependent personality disorder and
Rowena’s narcissistic and anti-social personality disorder. Also, the Regional Trial Court viewed, at
first-hand, the witnesses’ deportment. With Edward’s affliction of dependent personality disorder, he
cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love and respect and
rendering help and support because he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from
others, allows others to make most of his important decisions, tends to agree with people even when
he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are
demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone
and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. The petitioner followed everything dictated
to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a
person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.Rowena’s affliction
with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations.
This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment
and control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the
conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society.Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent
is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of
blackmail and of committing suicide.Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable
psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared
null and void, reversing and setting aside the decision of the appellate court.

AGRAVIADOR vs. AGRAVIADOR

G.R. No. 170729 December 8, 2010
Facts:
In 1971, Petitioner Enrique A. Agraviador met respondent Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador at a
beerhouse where Erlinda worked. The petitioner was a 24-year old security guard of the Bureau of
Customs while the respondent was a 17-year old waitress. They soon entered a common-law
relationship. On May 23, 1973, the petitioner and the respondent married in a ceremony officiated by
Reverend Juanito Reyes at a church in Tondo Manila. The petitioner’s family was apprehensive
because of the nature of the respondent’s work and that she came from a broken family. They begot
four (4) children. On March 1, 2001, Enrique filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition of the
nullity of his marriage with Erlinda. Petitioner alleged that Erlinda was carefree, irresponsible
immature and whimsical, and refused to do household chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed away
from their conjugal dwelling for long periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian; did not take care of
their sick child; consulted a witch doctor in order to bring him bad fate; and refused to use the family
name Agraviador in her activities. Enrique also claimed that Erlinda refused to have sex with him
since 1993 because she became “very close” to a male tenant in their house, discovered their love
notes, and even caught them inside his room several times. Respondent denied that she engaged in
extra-marital affairs and maintained that it was Enrique who refused to have sex with her. She claimed
that the petitioner wanted to have their marriage annulled because he wanted to marry their former
household helper, Gilda Camarin. She added that she was the one who took care of their son at the
hospital before he died. The Regional Trial Court ordered to investigate if collusion existed between
parties. On November 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court then allowed the petitioner to present his
evidence ex parte. The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary evidence as well as a certified
true copy of their marriage contract and the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Juan Cirilo L. Patac
which found that respondent was afflicted with mixed personality disorder. The Appellate Court,

however, reversed and set aside the Regional Trial Court’s decision on the grounds that the psychiatric
evaluation report failed to establish that the mental incapacity was serious, grave and permanent.
Issue:
Whether or not the totality of evidence established the respondent’s psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
No. The petitioner’s testimony established “difficulty”, “refusal”, and “neglect”. However, it
did not reveal utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Moreover, Dr. Patac’s psychological report only enumerated the respondent’s behavioral defects but
failed to prove the gravity or seriousness of the psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity must
be judged according to: (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Additionally, the
Molina case set stricter guidelines in establishing psychological incapacity:
(1) The burden of proof to show nullity of the marriage lies in the plaintiff;
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
a. Medically or clinically identified,
b. Alleged in the complaint,
c. Sufficiently proven by experts, and
d. Clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological, not physical.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state.
These guidelines were incorporated with the basic requirements established in Santos. In
Marcos v. Marcos, it was no longer necessary for the defendant or respondent spouse to be personally
examined by a physician or psychologist. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert
opinion under Article 36 of the Family Code so long as gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability
can be duly established. In Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, Ting vs. Velez-Ting, and Suazo vs. Suazo. the Molina
precedent was flexibly applied (yet never abandoned) instead of used as a strict criteria or
“straightjacket”.

MARABLE vs. MARABLE

G.R. No. 178741 January 17, 2011
Facts:
In 1967, petitioner Rosalino L. Marable and respondent Myrna F. Marable met while still
classmates studying at Arellano University. He only became attracted to her only after they happened
to sit beside each other in a passenger bus. Despite having a girlfriend, petitioner courted the
respondent and eventually became sweethearts with Myrna demanding more love, time and attention
from Rosalino who appreciated this gesture. On December 19, 1970, the two eloped and were married
in civil rites at Tanay, Rizal before Mayor Antonio C. Esguerra. This was followed by a church wedding
on December 30, 1970 at the Chapel of the Muntinlupa Bilibid Prison. They begot five children. The
relationship turned sour. Verbal and physical quarrels increased when their eldest daughter transferred
from several schools because of juvenile misconduct and had an unwanted teenage pregnancy.
Rosalino then sought for peace, love and affection from a relationship with another woman. Myrna
eventually found out about the affair. These aggravated their quarrels. Their business ventures failed.
Rosalino felt unloved, unwanted, and unappreciated; felt indifferent toward the respondent; left the
conjugal home; gave up all properties; and converted to Islam after dating several women. On October
8, 2001, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with respondent on grounds
of psychological incapacity. Petitioner also alleged that his family background from a poor family and
his father being a compulsive gambler and womanizer, made him obsess for attention and strive for
success only to find himself in misery and loneliness because of the void in his relationship with his
family. To support these, petitioner presented the Psychological Report of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag and
stated that he suffered from Antisocial Personality Disorder. The Regional Trial Court rendered a
Decision annulling the marriage while the Court of Appeals reversed the said decision.
Issues:
Whether or not the totality of evidence established psychological incapacity therefore
rendering the marriage null and void.
Ruling:
No. The findings of Dr. Tayag’s psychological report merely made a general conclusion that
the petitioner suffered from Anti-Social Personality Disorder; however, it failed to prove the root
cause of the psychological incapacity. It also failed to fit into the framework of the Molina Doctrine.
Moreover, there was no factual basis that the petitioner was a socially deviant, rebellious, impulsive,
self-centered and deceitful person. In fact, he was proven to act responsibly during the marriage by
working hard to provide for his family especially his children. Petitioner also tried to make it appear
that his family background was one of the reasons why he engaged in extra-marital affairs when,
actually, he was simply dissatisfied with his marriage. He was also shown to have learned from his
extra-marital affairs and has immediately terminated them.
In short, petitioner’s marital infidelity, their squabbles, and conflicts in child-rearingdoes not
appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of
performing his spousal obligations. It has been held in various cases that sexual infidelity, by itself, is
not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity.It must be shown that
the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.That not being the case with
petitioner, his claim of psychological incapacity must fail. It bears stressing that psychological
incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned party was incapable of doing so, due to
some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. In Santos v. Court
of Appeals,the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.

AURELIO vs. AURELIO

G.R. No. 175367 June 6, 2011
Facts:
On March 23, 1988, petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio
were married. They begot two sons. On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the basis of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The psychological assessment revealed that
respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic features as seen from her
quick changes in temperament, self-indulgence, intolerance, and inability to delay her needs. On the
part of the petitioner, it has been revealed in the same assessment that he suffers from Passive
Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder as seen from his lack of drive to discern the plight of
his working wife, consistent jealousy and distrust toward his wife, arrogance and insensitivity toward
his wife. These findings were found to be grave, incorrigible, and incurable. On November 8, 2002,
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. On January 14, 2003, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision
denying the motion. On February 21, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and found
that respondent’s petition for declaration for nullity of marriage complied with the Molina Doctrine
and that the merits of the case depend upon the proofs presented in trial. On February 16, 2004,
petitioner appealed the Regional Trial Court decision to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari.
On October 6, 2005, Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.
Issues:
Whether or not the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.
Ruling:
Yes. For a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage to be valid, it must comply with the
standards or criteria set by the Molina Doctrine. Petitioner asserts that the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage is invalid because it did not comply with the following cited in the Molina Doctrine:
(a) root cause of the psychological incapacity, (b) gravity of such illness, and (c) non-compliance of

marital obligations. First, the root cause of the psychological incapacity was stated and alleged in the
complaint. The root cause being their family backgrounds, as determined by a competent and expert
psychologist. Second, the petition establishes that the respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality
Disorder with Narcissistic Features as well as the petitioner suffers from Passive Aggressive
(Negativistic) Personality Disorder which are conditions that are allegedly grave, incorrigible and
incurable. Lastly, the Court also finds that the essential marital obligations were not complied with.
Petition for dismissal is denied.
REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DE QUINTOS, JR.

G.R. No. 159594 November 12, 2012
Facts:
Eduardo De Quintos, Jr. and Catalina Delos Santos-De Quintos were married on March 16,
1967 in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor of Lingayen Pangasinan. They were not blessed
with children due to Catalina’s hysterectomy after her second miscarriage. On April 6, 1998, Eduardo
filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, citing Catalina’s psychological incapacity
to comply with her essential marital obligations. Eduardo testified that Catalina’s psychological
incapacity manifested when she always left their house without his consent; engaged in petty
arguments with him; constantly refused to do household chores or take care of their adopted daughter;
gossiping with the neighbors; gambling; and abandoning their conjugal home to live with Bobbie
Castro. A neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Annabelle L. Reyes revealed that Catalina exhibited
traits of Borderline Psychiatric Disorder and was not curable. These manifested through her
immaturity that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to meet her marital obligations. Catalina
did not interpose any objection to the petition, but prayed to be given her share in the conjugal house
and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan.The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Eduardo;
however, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Issues:
Ruling:
No. First, Catalina’s supposed behavior was not corroborated by others and, therefore, was
not established. Eduardo’s testimony was self-serving. Second, Dr. Reyes’ neuro-psychiatric evaluation
was ostensibly vague on the root cause, gravity, and incurability of the disorder. Dr. Reyes merely
established that Catalina was immature and childish and that her immaturity and childishness could
no longer be treated due to Catalina’s reaching of an age of maturity. Thirdly, Dr. Reyes had only one

interview with Catalina and, therefore, lacked depth and objectivity which would have been achieved
if her report corroborated not only with Eduardo’s statements but also with interviews by other
persons. Fourth, no proof was made to establish the natal or supervening disabling factor which
effectively incapacitated Catalina from complying with her basic marital functions. In this case, the
Court cited Santos and Molina in setting the criteria or standards to dispute psychological incapacity.
REPUBLIC vs. ENCELAN

G.R. No. 170022 January 9, 2009
Facts:
On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita and the union bore two children, Maricar and
Manny. To support his family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On June 12,
1986, Cesar, while still in Saudi Arabia, learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with Alvin
Perez. Sometime in 1991, Lolita allegedly left the conjugal home with her children and lived with
Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. On June 16, 1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a
petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolita’s psychological
incapacity.
Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that Alvin used to be an associate
in her promotions business. She insisted that she is not psychologically incapacitated and that she left
their home because of irreconcilable differences with her mother-in-law. At the trial, Cesar affirmed
his allegations of Lolita’s infidelity and subsequent abandonment of the family home. He testified that
he continued to provide financial support for Lolita and their children even after he learned of her
illicit affair with Alvin.
Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima
Flores of the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Flores found that Lolita was "not suffering from
any form of major psychiatric illness," but had been "unable to provide the expectations expected of
her for a good and lasting marital relationship"; her "transferring from one job to the other depicts
some interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as her impatience in attaining her
ambitions"; and "her refusal to go with her husband abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a good
marital and family relationship."
In its June 5, 2002 decision, the RTC declared Cesar’s marriage to Lolita void, finding
sufficient basis to declare Lolita psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The CA originally set aside the RTC’s verdict, finding that Lolita’s abandonment of the
conjugal dwelling and infidelity were not serious cases of personality disorder/psychological illness.

In its amended decision,the CA found two circumstances indicative of Lolita’s serious psychological
incapacity that resulted in her gross infidelity: (1) Lolita’s unwarranted refusal to perform her marital
obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolita’s willful and deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling.
OSG filed the present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not there exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the ground
of psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
No. In interpreting Article 36 of the Family Code, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed
that psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of
and to assume the basic marital obligations", not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will, on the part of the errant spouse. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical
antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of
the condition of the errant spouse.Cesar testified on the dates when he learned of Lolita’s alleged affair
and her subsequent abandonment of their home, as well as his continued financial support to her and
their children even after he learned of the affair, but he merely mentioned in passing Lolita’s alleged
affair with Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.Sexual infidelity and abandonment of
the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; simply
grounds for legal separation. To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the
unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely
prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations.No evidence on record
exists to support Cesar’s allegation that Lolita’s infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of
any psychological illness.
Dr. Flores’ observation on Lolita’s interpersonal problems with co-workers does not suffice
as a consideration for the conclusion that she was – at the time of her marriage – psychologically
incapacitated to enter into a marital union with Cesar. Aside from the time element involved, a wife’s
psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with her professional/work relationship;
workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apart from their marital counterparts. Dr. Flores’
further belief that Lolita’s refusal to go with Cesar abroad signified a reluctance to work out a good
marital relationship is a mere generalization unsupported by facts.

MENDOZA vs. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 157649 November 12, 2012
Facts:
Petitioner Arabelle J. Mendoza and private respondent Dominic C. Mendoza met in 1989
upon his return to the country from his employment in Papua New Guinea. They had been next-door
neighbors in the apartelle they were renting while in college – she, at Assumption College while he, at
San Beda taking a business management course. After a month of courtship, they became intimate
which led to the pregnancy with their Daughter Alyssa Blanca. They got married when she was eight
months into her pregnancy in civil rites solemnized in Pasay City, June 24, 1991, after which they
moved to her place, remaining dependent on their parents for support.
Dominic remained jobless and dependent upon his father for support until he finished college
in October 1993. She took on various jobs, being the one with the fixed income, she shouldered all
of the family’s expenses (i.e., rental, food, other bills and their child’s educational needs). In September
1994, she discovered his illicit relationship with Zaida, Dominic’s co-employee at Toyota Motors.
Eventually, communication between them became rare until they started to sleep in separate rooms,
thereby affecting their sexual relationship.
In November 1995, Dominic gave her a Daihatsu Charade car as a birthday present and later
asked her to issue two blank checks for the car’s insurance coverage, only to find out that the checks
were not paid for the car’s insurance coverage but for his personal needs. Worse, she also found out
that he did not pay for the car itself, forcing her to rely on her father-in-law to pay part of the cost of
the car, leaving her to bear the balance.
To make matters worse, Dominic was fired from his employment after he ran away with
P164,000.00 belonging to his employer. He was criminally charged with violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 and estafa, for which he was arrested and incarcerated. She and her mother bailed him out of
jail, but discovered that he had also swindled many clients some of whom were even threatening her,
her mother and her sister.

On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal home because Arabelle asked him for
"time and space to think things over." A month later, she refused his attempt at reconciliation, causing
him to threaten to commit suicide. At that, she and her family immediately left the house to live in
another place concealed from him.
On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the declaration of the nullity
of her marriage with Dominic based on his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition. In the RTC, petitioner
presented herself as a witness, together with a psychiatrist, Dr. Rocheflume Samson, and Professor
Marites Jimenez. On his part, Dominic did not appear during trial and presented no evidence. On
August 18, 2000, the RTC found all characteristics of psychological incapacity – gravity, antecedence,
and incurability as set forth in Molina and declared the marriage between petitioner and Dominic an
absolute nullity. On March 19, 2003 the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment
of the RTC.
Issue:
Ruling:
No. The findings of Dr. Samson were one-sided, self-serving and uncorroborated because
only Arabelle was evaluated. Dr. Samson even conceded that there was a need to verify her findings
concerning Dominic’s psychological profile which were colored by Arabelle’s ill-feelings toward him
during her evaluation. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be equated with psychological
incapacity. Santos v. Court of Appeals sets the guidelines for psychological incapacity as characterized
by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." These guidelines do not necessarily require
the root cause to be “medically or clinically identified” by a physician or a psychologist. What is
important is that totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. Finally,
petitioner contends that the Court’s Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10 rendered appeals by the OSG
no longer required. On the contrary, the Resolution explicitly requires the OSG to actively participate
in all stages of the proceedings as seen in its provisions.

REPUBLIC vs. GALANG

G.R. No. 168335 June 6, 2011
Facts:
On March 9, 1994, respondent Nestor Galang and Juvy married in Pampanga. They lived in
Nestor’s father’s house in San Francisco, Mabalacat, Pampanga. Nestor worked as an artist-illustrator
at the Clark Development Corporation, earning P8,500.00 monthly. Juvy, stayed at home as a
housewife. Christopher is their only child.
On August 4, 1999, Nestor filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Juvy, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. He alleged that Juvy was
psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage because she was a
kleptomaniac and a swindler. The respondent’s testimony showed that Juvy: (a) refused to wake up
early to prepare breakfast; (b) left their child to the care of their neighbors when she went out of the
house; (c) squandered a huge amount of the P15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to her; (d) stole
the respondent’s ATM card and attempted to withdraw the money deposited in his account; (e)
falsified the respondent’s signature in order to encash a check; (f) made up false stories in order to
borrow money from their relatives; and (g) indulged in gambling.According to the respondent, Juvy
suffers from “mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted discernment and total lack of care, love
and affection towards him and their child.” He posited that Juvy’s incapacity was “extremely serious”
and “appears to be incurable.Prosecutor Angelito I. Balderama formally manifested, on October 18,
1999, that he found no evidence of collusion between the parties. The RTC set the case for trial in its
Order of October 20, 1999. The respondent presented testimonial and documentary evidence to
substantiate his allegations.
Aside from his testimony, the respondent also presented Anna Liza S. Guiang, a psychologist,
who testified that she conducted a psychological test on the respondent. According to her, she wrote
Juvy a letter requesting for an interview, but the latter did not respond.
On January 22, 2001, the RTC nullified the parties’ marriage. On November 25, 2004, the CA
affirmed the RTC decision in toto explaining that Juvy’s indolence and lack of responsibility coupled
with her gambling and swindling undermined her capacity to comply with her marital obligations. The

testimony of psychologist Anna Liza S. Guiang characterized Juvy’s condition as permanent, incurable
and existing at the time of celebration of her marriage with respondent.
Issue:
Ruling:
No. The testimony of the petitioner only showed isolated incidents, not recurring acts.
Psychological incapacity must be more than difficulty, refusal or neglect. It is essential that he or she
must be shown to be incapable of complying with the responsibility and duty as a married person
because of some psychological, not physical, illness. In other words, proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person – an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage – had to be shown. The psychological test was uncorroborated and one-sided; therefore,
biased towards Juvy’s negative traits. First, the psychologist did not identify the types of psychological
tests to determine the root cause of Juvy’s psychological condition. Second, the report failed to prove
the gravity or severity of Juvy’s condition. Lastly, the report failed to prove incurability. The
psychologist’s testimony was totally devoid of any information or insight into Juvy’s early life and
associations, how she acted before and at the time of the marriage, and how the symptoms of a
disordered personality developed. Simply put, the psychologist failed to trace the history of Juvy’s
psychological condition and to relate it to an existing incapacity at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.

OCHOSA vs. ALANO

G.R. No. 167459 January 26, 2011
Facts:
Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa met Bona J. Alano in August 1973 – he, a young lieutenant
in the AFP; she, a 17-year-old 1st year college drop-out. They had a whirlwind romance that
culminated into sexual intimacy and eventual marriage on October 27, 1973 before the Honorable
Judge Cesar S. Principe in Basilan. The couple did not acquire any property. Neither did they incur
any debts. Their union produced no offspring. In 1976, however, they found an abandoned and
neglected one-year-old baby girl whom they later registered as their daughter, naming her Ramona
Celeste Alano Ochosa.
During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of the Philippine archipelago
as an officer in the AFP. Bona did not cohabit with him in his posts, preferring to stay in her
hometown of Basilan. Neither did Bona visit him in his areas of assignment, except in one (1) occasion
when Bona stayed with him for four (4) days.
Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as the Battalion Commander of the Security Escort
Group. He and Bona, along with Ramona, were given living quarters at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City
where they resided with their military aides.In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his alleged
participation in the failed coup d’etat. He was incarcerated in Camp Crame.
Even at the onset of their marriage when Jose was assigned in various parts of the country,
Bona had illicit relations with other men. Bona entertained male visitors in her bedroom whenever
Jose was out of their living quarters at Fort Bonifacio. On one occasion, Bona was caught by Demetrio
Bajet y Lita, a security aide, having sex with Jose’s driver, Corporal Gagarin. Rumors of Bona’s sexual
infidelity circulated in the military community. When Jose could no longer bear these rumors, he got
a military pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona.During their confrontation, Bona admitted
her relationship with Corporal Gagarin who also made a similar admission to Jose. Jose drove Bona
away from their living quarters. Bona left with Ramona and went to Basilan.In 1994, Ramona left
Bona and came to live with Jose. It is Jose who is currently supporting the needs of Ramona.

Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, seeking to nullify his marriage to
Bona on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of
marriage.In a Decision dated 11 January 1999, the trial court granted the petition and nullified the
parties’ marriage. The OSG appealed with the CA which granted the appeal, reversed and set aside
the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.
Ruling:
No. There is inadequate credible evidence that her “defects” (sexual disloyalty with Jose, sexual
promiscuity with other men) were already present at the inception of, or prior to, the marriage. In
other words, her alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the jurisprudential requisite of
“juridical antecedence.” Verily, Dr. Elizabeth E. Rondain evaluated Bona’s psychological condition
(Histrionic Personality Disorder) indirectly from the information gathered solely from Jose and his
witnesses. This factual circumstance evokes the possibility that the information fed to the psychiatrist
is tainted with bias for Jose’s cause, in the absence of sufficient corroboration. It is apparent from the
above-cited testimonies that Bona, contrary to Jose’s assertion, had no manifest desire to abandon
Jose at the beginning of their marriage and was, in fact, living with him for the most part of their
relationship from 1973 up to the time when Jose drove her away from their conjugal home in
1988. On the contrary, the record shows that it was Jose who was constantly away from Bona by
reason of his military duties and his later incarceration. A reasonable explanation for Bona’s refusal
to accompany Jose in his military assignments in other parts of Mindanao may be simply that those
locations were known conflict areas in the seventies. Any doubt as to Bona’s desire to live with Jose
would later be erased by the fact that Bona lived with Jose in their conjugal home in Fort Bonifacio
during the following decade. In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bona’s alleged psychological
incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period
of time after her marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said marriage.

CAMACHO-REYES vs. REYES

G.R. No. 185286 August 18, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University of
the Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years old. Petitioner and
respondent got marriedon December 5, 1976. At that time, petitioner was already five (5) months
pregnant and employed at the Population Center Foundation.Thereafter, they lived with the Ramon’s
family in Mandaluyong City. All living expenses were shouldered by Ramon’s parents, and the couple’s
respective salaries were spent solely for their personal needs.
Financial difficulties started. A year into their marriage, the monthly allowance ofP1,500.00
from respondent stopped because Ramon resigned from his family’s business. Because of this, Ramon
engaged into (1) a fishpond business in Mindoro and eventually, (2) a scrap paper and carton trading
business which both failed..To prod respondent into assuming more responsibility, petitioner
suggested that they live separately from her in-laws. After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses
transferred residence and, this time, moved in with Maria Socorro’s mother where petitioner
continued to carry the financial burdens
Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair.
One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties’ marriage was a surgical operation on
petitioner for the removal of a cyst where respondent remained unconcerned and unattentive; and
simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany her as she
was wheeled into the operating room.
As a last resort, petitioner approached respondent’s siblings and asked them to intervene,
Adolfo Reyes, respondent’s elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, members of a marriage encounter
group, invited, sponsored and scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner and respondent, but these
did not improve the parties’ relationship as respondent remained uncooperative. In 1997, Adolfo
brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological assessment; however, respondent
resisted and did not continue with the clinical psychologist’s recommendation to undergo
psychotherapy.At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondent’s siblings, told
respondent to move out of their house. With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not
improve. Neither did respondent’s relationship with his children.

Finally, in 2001, petitioner filed before the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage with the respondent, alleging the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital
obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code. RTC affirmed petitioner. CA reversed and set aside
RTC’s decision.
Issue:
Ruling:
Yes. The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person
diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of Dr. Estrella T.
Tiongson-Magno and Dr. Cecilia C. Villegas. Neither do their findings automatically constitute hearsay
that would result in their exclusion as evidence. The clinical psychologists’ and psychiatrist’s
assessment were not based solely on the narration or personal interview of the petitioner. Other
informants such as respondent’s own son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister of petitioner),
testified on their own observations of respondent’s behavior and interactions with them, spanning the
period of time they knew him. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan’s recommendation that respondent should
undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the finding that respondent’s psychological incapacity is
incurable.
In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the respective
testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have problems; and (2)
these problems include chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work towards providing the
needs of his family; several failed business attempts; substance abuse; and a trail of unpaid money
obligations.
It is true that a clinical psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s diagnoses that a person has personality
disorder is not automatically believed by the courts in cases of declaration of nullity of marriages.
Indeed, a clinical psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s finding of a personality disorder does not exclude a
finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting, and not beset by one of the parties’ or both parties’
psychological incapacity. In the case at bar, however, even without the experts’ conclusions, the factual
antecedents (narrative of events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to
the inevitable conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations. In the instant case, respondent’s pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a
psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic
financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid
money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses; and (7)
criminal charges of estafa.

TORING vs. TORING

G.R. No. 165321 August 3, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Ricardo P. Toring was introduced to Teresita M. Toring in 1978 at his aunt’s house
in Cebu. Teresita was then his cousin’s teacher in Hawaiian dance and was conducting lessons at his
aunt’s house. They became sweethearts after three months of courtship and eloped soon after,
hastened by the bid of another girlfriend, already pregnant, to get Ricardo to marry her.
Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4, 1978 before Hon. Remigio Zari of the
City Court of Quezon City. They begot three children: Richardson, Rachel Anne, and Ric Jayson.
On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years after their wedding, Ricardo filed a petition for
annulment before the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the celebration of their
marriage. Before the RTC, Ricardo offered in evidence their marriage contract; the psychological
evaluation and signature of his expert witness, psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran, and his and Dr.
Albaran’s respective testimonies.
Ricardo alleged that Teresita was an adulteress and a squanderer – that she was very
extravagant, materialistic, controlling and demanding. He was an overseas seaman, and he regularly
sent money to his wife to cover the family’s living expenses and their children’s tuition. However, not
only did she fail at paying the rent, utilities and other living expenses, she also she incurred debts from
other people and failed to remit amounts collected as sales agent of a plasticware and cosmetics
company. Also, during one of his visits to the country, he noticed that Teresita’s stomach was slightly
bigger. He tried to convince her to have a medical examination but she refused. Her miscarriage five
months into her pregnancy confirmed his worst suspicions. Ricardo alleged that the child could not
have been his, as his three instances of sexual contact with Teresita were characterized by
“withdrawals”; other than these, no other sexual contacts with his wife transpired, as he transferred
and lived with his relatives after a month of living with Teresita in Cebu. Ricardo reported, too, of

rumors that his wife represented herself to others as single, and went out on dates with other men
when he was not around.
Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran diagnosed Teresita with Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
Issue:
Whether or not Teresita should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with
Ruling:
No. Dr. Albaran’s psychological evaluation merely relied on Ricardo and Richardson’s
testimonies. The mere narration of the statements of Ricardo and Richardson, coupled with the results
of the psychological tests administered only on Ricardo, without more, does not constitute sufficient
basis for the conclusion that Teresita suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Other than from
the spouses, such evidence can come from persons intimately related to them, such as relatives, close
friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on the allegedly incapacitated spouse’s
condition at or about the time of marriage, or to subsequent occurring events that trace their roots to
the incapacity already present at the time of marriage. Richardson, the spouses’ eldest son, would not
have been a reliable witness as he could not have been expected to know what happened between his
parents until long after his birth. He merely recounted isolated incidents. The root cause must be
alleged and not just the manifestations during the marriage described as “refusal”, “difficulty” or
“neglect”.

LIGERALDE vs. PATALINGHUG

G.R. No. 168796 April 15, 2012
Facts:
Silvino and May got married on October 3, 1984. They were blessed with four
children. Sometime in September 1995, May arrived home at 4:00 o’clock in the morning. Her excuse
was that she had watched a video program in a neighboring town, but admitted later to have slept
with her Palestinian boyfriend in a hotel. In the midst of these, Silvino’s deep love for her, the thought
of saving their marriage for the sake of their children, and the commitment of May to reform dissuaded
him from separating from her. He still wanted to reconcile with her. May was back again to her old
ways. This was demonstrated when Silvino arrived home one day and learned that she was nowhere
to be found. He searched for her and found her in a nearby apartment drinking beer with a male lover.
Later, May confessed that she had no more love for him. They then lived separately. Silvino referred
the matter to Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio for psychological evaluation. The psychologist certified that
May was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations; that the incapacity
started when she was still young and became manifest after marriage; and that the same was serious
and incurable. On October 22, 1999, the RTC declared the marriage of Silvino and May null and
void. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision.
Issues:
(a) Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
jurisdiction.
(b) Whether or not May is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
Ruling:
No. On procedural grounds, the Court agrees with the public respondent that
the petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 instead of this petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. For having availed of the wrong remedy, this petition deserves outright
dismissal.In order to avail of the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court, the petitioner must clearly show that the public respondent acted without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction. By grave abuse of discretion
is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of

jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. In
sum, for the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary or whimsical
exercise of power. These were not proven in the close scrutiny of the records.
No. (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2)
the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the
complaint, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision; (3) the incapacity must
be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the marriage; (4) such incapacity must also
be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; and (5) such illness must be grave
enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage
(Republic v. Court of Appeals). The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a
psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the totality of the
evidence presented during trial. An adulterous life is not tantamount to psychological incapacity as
contemplated in Article 36. Petitioner must be able to establish that respondent's unfaithfulness is a
manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes her completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state.

SUAZO vs. SUAZO

G.R. No. 164493 March 10, 2010
Facts:
Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985; they were residents
of Laguna at that time. After months of courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila with Angelito and some
friends. Having been gone for three days, their parents sought Jocelyn and Angelito and after finding
them, brought them back to Biñan, Laguna. Soon thereafter, Jocelyn and Angelito’s marriage was
arranged and they were married on March 3, 1986 in a ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Biñan.
Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with Angelito’s parents
after their marriage. They had by this time stopped schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked for
Angelito’s relatives as household help. Angelito, on the other hand, refused to work and was most of
the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent quarrels often resulted because of
Jocelyn’s efforts.
Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found another woman with
whom he has since lived. They now have children.
Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. She claimed
that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. In addition to the above historical narrative of their relationship, she alleged in her
complaint that from the start of their marriage until their separation in July 1987, their relationship
has been marred with bitter quarrels that caused unbearable physical and emotional pain inflicted upon
by Angelito; that one of the main reasons for their quarrels was Angelito’s refusal to work, his
indolence and excessive drinking; and that Angelito’s psychological incapacity started at the time of
their marriage and proves to be continuous, permanent and incurable.
In the RTC, Jocelyn reiterated the incidents of her physical beating by Angelito but told the
Court that she was not treated violently before the marriage. Maryjane Serrano, Jocelyn’s aunt,
corroborated Jocelyn’s testimony. The psychologist testified that Angelito haed Chronic Antisocial

Disorder which was permanent and incurable. The RTC annulled the marriage on the grounds
provided by Santos v. Court of Appeals. The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not Angelito is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
Ruling:
No. Both the psychologist’s testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively show
the root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelito’s alleged psychological condition. The psychologist
derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot
of course be doubted. Jocelyn merely testified on Angelito’s habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal
to seek employment and the physical beatings she received from him – all of which occurred after the
marriage.
Significantly, she declared in her testimony that Angelito showed no signs of violent
behavior, assuming this to be indicative of a personality disorder, during the courtship stage or at the
earliest stages of her relationship with him. She testified on the alleged physical beatings after the
marriage, not before or at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She did not clarify when these
beatings exactly took place – whether it was near or at the time of celebration of the marriage or
months or years after. This is a clear evidentiary gap that materially affects her cause, as the law and
its related jurisprudence require that the psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative
of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. Standing alone,
physical violence does not constitute psychological incapacity.

ASPILLAGA vs. ASPILLAGA

G.R. No. 170925 October 26, 2009
Facts:
Rodolfo Aspillaga met Aurora Apon sometime in 1977 while they were students at the
Philippine Merchant Marine Academy and Lyceum of the Philippines, respectively. Rodolfo courted
her and five months later, they became sweethearts. Thereafter, Aurora left for Japan to study
Japanese culture, literature and language. Despite the distance, Rodolfo and Aurora maintained
communication.
In 1980, after Aurora returned to the Philippines, she and Rodolfo got married. They begot
two children, but Rodolfo claimed their marriage was “tumultuous.” He described Aurora as
domineering and frequently humiliated him even in front of his friends. He complained
that Aurora was a spendthrift as she overspent the family budget and made crucial family decisions
without consulting him. Rodolfo added that Aurora was tactless, suspicious, given to nagging and
jealousy as evidenced by the latter’s filing against him a criminal case (concubinage) and an
administrative case. He left the conjugal home, and filed on March 7, 1995, a petition for annulment
of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Aurora. He averred
that Aurora failed to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
Aurora, for her part, alleged that sometime in 1991, Rodolfo gave her a plane ticket to Japan to
enable her to assume her teaching position in a university for a period of three months. In August
1991, upon her return to Manila, she discovered that while she was in Japan, Rodolfo brought into
their conjugal home her cousin, Lecita Rose A. Besina, as his concubine. Aurora alleged that
Rodolfo’s cohabitation with her cousin led to the disintegration of their marriage and their eventual
separation. In May 1992, Rodolfo abandoned their conjugal home to live with
Besina. Aurora claimed custody of the children.
Psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Eduardo Maaba revealed that both parties suffered psychological
handicaps traced from unhealthy maturational development. Both had strict, domineering,
disciplinarian role models. However, respondent’s mistrust, shallow heterosexual relationships
resulted in incapacitation in her ability to comply with the obligation of marriage. RTC found the
parties psychologically incapacitated. The CA reversed and set aside the decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the parties are psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations.
Ruling:
No. Psychological incapacity is not mere “difficulty”, “refusal”, or “neglect”. Noteworthy, as
aptly pointed out by the appellate court, Rodolfo and Aurora initially had a blissful marital union for
several years. They married in 1982, and later affirmed the ceremony in church rites in 1983, showing
love and contentment with one another after a year of marriage. The letter of petitioner dated April
1, 1990 addressed to respondent revealed the harmonious relationship of the couple continued during
their marriage for about eight years from the time they married each other.
From this, it can be inferred that they were able to faithfully comply with their obligations to
each other and to their children. Aurora was shown to have taken care of her children and remained
faithful to her husband while he was away. She even joined sales activities to augment the family
income. She appeared to be a very capable woman who traveled a lot and pursued studies here and
abroad. It was only when Rodolfo’s acts of infidelity were discovered that the marriage started to fail.
While disagreements on money matters would, no doubt, affect the other aspects of one’s marriage
as to make the wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a ground to declare a marriage null and void. At this
juncture while this Court is convinced that indeed both parties were both found to have psychological
disorders, nevertheless, there is nothing in the records showing that these disorders are sufficient to
declare the marriage void due to psychological incapacity. Incurability was not proven. Incompatibility
or irreconcilable differences could not be equated with psychological incapacity.

ALCAZAR vs. ALCAZAR

G.R. No. 174451 October 13, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar alleged in her Complaint that she was married to
respondent Rey C. Alcazar on 11 October 2000 by Rev. Augusto G. Pabustan (Pabustan), at the
latter’s residence. After their wedding, petitioner and respondent lived for five days in San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, the hometown of respondent’s parents. Thereafter, the newlyweds went back
to Manila, but respondent did not live with petitioner at the latter’s abode at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos
Avenue, Tondo, Manila. On 23 October 2000, respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
where he worked as an upholsterer in a furniture shop. While working in Riyadh, respondent did not
communicate with petitioner by phone or by letter. Petitioner tried to call respondent for five times
but respondent never answered. About a year and a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a co-teacher
informed petitioner that respondent was about to come home to the Philippines. Petitioner was
surprised why she was not advised by respondent of his arrival.
Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in the Philippines,
the latter did not go home to petitioner at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. Instead,
respondent proceeded to his parents’ house in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Upon learning that
respondent was in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, petitioner went to see her brother-in-law in
Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed that he was not aware of respondent’s
whereabouts. Petitioner traveled to San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, where she was informed that
respondent had been living with his parents since his arrival in March 2002.
Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines, he never
contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of consummating
his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph
5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code). There was also no more possibility
of reconciliation between petitioner and respondent.
During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita Cabacungan (Cabacungan), and
clinical psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Tayag) as witnesses. The psychologist diagnosed the respondent
to have Narcissistic Personality Disorder. The RTC denied petitioner’s complaint for annulment of

her marriage. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. The CA affirmed RTC’s
decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Rey is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
Ruling:
No. Article 46 of the Family Code contemplates an annulment of marriage on the ground
ofincapacity to consummate specifically denoting the permanent disability on the spouses to perform
and complete the act of sexual intercourse. What petitioner was actually seeking was the declaration
of nullity of marriage contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. Nevertheless, Article 36should
refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. Petitioner’s evidence, particularly her and her mother’s testimonies,
merely established that respondent left petitioner soon after their wedding to work in Saudi Arabia;
that when respondent returned to the Philippines a year and a half later, he directly went to live with
his parents in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and not with petitioner in Tondo, Manila; and that
respondent also did not contact petitioner at all since leaving for abroad. These testimonies though
do not give us much insight into respondent’s psychological state. Tayag, in evaluating respondent’s
psychological state, had to rely on information provided by petitioner.
Hence, we expect Tayag to have been more prudent and thorough in her evaluation of
respondent’s psychological condition, since her source of information, namely, petitioner, was hardly
impartial. The psychologist failed to trace Rey’s experiences in childhood, did not describe the “pattern
of behavior” that led her to conclude that, indeed, Rey was suffering from Narcissistic Personality
disorder; and did not relate how this rendered him “truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.” Psychological
incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,” a “refusal,” or a “neglect” in the performance of some
marital obligations.

NAJERA vs. NAJERA

G.R. No. 164817 July 3, 2009
Facts:
On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage with Alternative Prayer for Legal Separation, with Application for Designation as
Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains.Petitioner alleged that she and
respondent are residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is presently living in the United
States of America (U.S.A). They were married on January 31, 1988. They are childless. Petitioner
claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity became manifest
only after marriage.
On June 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Orderterminating the pre-trial conference after the parties signed
a Formal Manifestation/Motion, which stated that they had agreed to dissolve their conjugal
partnership of gains and divide equally their conjugal properties.Psychologist Cristina Gates testified
that the chances of curability of respondent’s psychological disorder were nil. Its
curability depended on whether the established organic damage was minimal -- referring to the
malfunction of the composites of the brain brought about by habitual drinking and marijuana,
which possibly afflicted respondent with borderline personality disorder and uncontrollable
impulses.Further, SPO1 Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan, testified that
on July 3, 1994, he received a complaint from petitioner that respondent arrived at their house under
the influence of liquor and mauled petitioner without provocation on her part, and that respondent
tried to kill her. The complaint was entered in the police blotter.
Issue:
Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence was able to prove that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the
annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the evidence
submitted by petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential obligations of marriage .The root cause of respondent’s alleged
psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable.
HALILI vs. SANTOS- HALILI

G.R. No. 165424 June 9, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner and the respondent married on July 4, 1995 at the City Hall of Manila. After the
wedding, they continued to live with their respective parents and never lived together but maintained
their relationship nonetheless.Petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City a petition for
the nullity of their marriage on the ground that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
fulfill his essential marital obligations. He also pointed out that they never lived together as husband
and wife and they never consummated their marriage. On April 17, 1998, the Regional Trial Court
declared thatthe marriage between the petitioner and the respondent is null and void. The respondents
appealed to the Court of Appeals, on January 26, 2004. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside
the decision of the Regional Trial Court on the ground that totality of the evidence presented failed
to established petitioner's psychological incapacity. The petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court for
reconsideration. On June 9, 2009, the Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals
and reinstated the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the totality of evidence presented is sufficient to prove that the petitioner
suffered from psychological incapacitywhich effectively prevented him to comply from his
Ruling:
Yes, because ultimately the psychologist sufficiently established that petitioner had
psychological condition that was grave andincurable and had a deeply rooted cause and that already
existed at the time of the celebration of his marriage to the respondent.

PARAS vs. PARAS

G.R. No 147824 August 2, 2007
Facts:
On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in Bindoy, Negros
Oriental. They begot four (4)children, namely: Raoul (deceased), Cindy Rose (deceased), Dahlia, and
Reuel. Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993,Rosa filed with the Regional Trial Court
a complaint for annulment of her marriage with Justo,under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed
as Civil Case No. 10613. She was then a student of San Carlos University, Cebu City. He courted
her, frequently spending time at her "Botica." Eventually, in 1964, convinced that he loved her, she
agreed to marry him. Their wedding was considered one of the "most celebrated" marriages in Bindoy.
Sometime in 1975, their daughter Cindy Rose was afflicted with leukemia. It was her family who paid
for her medication. Also in 1984, their son Raoul was electrocuted while Justo was in their rest house
with his "barkadas." He did not heed her earlier advice to bring Raoul in the rest house as the latter
has the habit of climbing the rooftop. To cope with the death of the children, the entire family went
to the United States. However, after three months, Justo abandoned them and left for the Philippines.
Upon her return to the Philippines, she was shocked to find her "Botica" and other businesses heavy
in debt and he disposed without her consent a conjugal piece of land. At other times, he permitted
the municipal government to take gasoline from their gas station free of charge. His act of maintaining
a mistress and siring an illegitimate child was the last straw that prompted her to file the present case.
She found that after leaving their conjugal house in 1988, Justo lived with Jocelyn Ching. Their
cohabitation resulted in the birth of a babygirl, Cyndee Rose, obviously named after her (Rosa)
and Justo‘s deceased daughter Cindy Rose Paras.
He also denied forging her signature in one mortgage transaction. He maintained that he did
not dispose of a conjugal property and that he and Rosa personally signed the renewal of a sugar crop
loan before the bank’s authorized employee. He did not abandon his family in the United States. For
his part, he was granted only three (3) months leave as municipal mayor of Bindoy, thus, he
immediately returned to the Philippines. He spent for his children’s education. At first, he resented
supporting them because he was just starting his law practice and besides, their conjugal assets
were more than enough to provide for their needs. He admitted though that there were times he failed
to give them financial support because of his lack of income. What caused the inevitable family break-
out was Rosa’s act of embarrassing him during his birthday celebration in 1987. She did not prepare
food for the guests. When confronted, she retorted that she has nothing to do with his birthday. This
convinced him of her lack of concern. This was further aggravated when she denied his request for
engine oil when his vehicle broke down in a mountainous and NPA-infested area. As to the charge of
concubine, he alleged that Jocelyn Ching is not his mistress, but her secretary in his Law Office. She
was impregnated by her boyfriend, a certain GrelleLeccioness. Cyndee Rose Ching Leccioness is not
his daughter.
After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision upholding the validity of the
marriage. On December 8, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in the present case,
holding that "the evidence of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls short of the standards required by law to decree
a nullity of marriage." It ruled that Justo’s alleged defects oridiosyncrasies "were sufficiently explained
by the evidence," Rosa contends that this Court’s factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 fordisbarment are

conclusive on the present case. Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in rendering contrary factual
findings. Also, she argues that she filed the instant complaint sometime in May, 1993
Issues:
a) Whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present
case;
b) Whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of expert testimony on the root
cause of Justo’s alleged psychologicalincapacity is necessary; and
c) Whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on the part of
Justo.
Ruling:
A reading of the Court of Appeals’ Decision shows that she has no reason to feel aggrieved.
In fact, the appellate court evenassumed that her charges "are true," but concluded that they are
insufficient to declare the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Justo's alleged
infidelity, failure to support his family and alleged abandonment of their family home are true,such
traits are at best indicators that he is unfit to become an ideal husband and father. However, by
themselves, these grounds areinsufficient to declare the marriage void due to an incurable
psychological incapacity. These grounds, we must emphasize, do notmanifest that he was truly in
cognitive of the basic marital covenants that he must assume and discharge as a married person.
Whilethey may manifest the "gravity" of his alleged psychological incapacity, they do not necessarily
show ‘incurability’, such that while hisacts violated the covenants of marriage, they do not necessarily
show that such acts show an irreparably hopeless state of psychological incapacity which prevents him
from undertaking the basic obligations of marriage in the future.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacitymust be psychological -- not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince thecourt
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known theobligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of suchincapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, neverthelesssuch root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may begiven by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

ZAMORA vs. ZAMORA

G.R. No. 141917 February 7, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent were married on June 4, 1970 in Cebu City. After their marriage,
they lived together at No. 50-AGorordo Avenue, Cebu City. The union did not produce any child. In
1972, private respondent left for the United States to work as anurse. She returned to the Philippines
for a few months, and then left again in 1974. Thereafter, she made periodic visits to Cebu Cityuntil
1989, when she was already a U.S. citizen. Petitioner filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage anchored on thealleged "psychological incapacity" of private respondent, as provided for
under Article 36 of the Family Code. To support his position,he alleged that his wife was "horrified"
by the mere thought of having children as evidenced by the fact that she had not bornepetitioner a
child. Furthermore, he also alleged that private respondent abandoned him by living in the United
States and had in fact become an American citizen; and that throughout their marriage they lived
together for not more than three years. Respondentdenied that she refused to have a child. She
portrayed herself as one who loves children as she is a nurse by profession and that shewould from
time to time borrow her husband’s niece and nephews to care for them. She also faulted her husband
for the breakup of their marriage, alleging that he had been unfaithful to her. He allegedly had two
affairs with different women, and he begot at leastthree children with them. On June 22, 1995, the
trial court rendered its decision. The plaintiff consented to defendant’s trip to theUnited States in
1974. She [defendant] wanted to earn money there because she wanted to help her husband build a
big house at theBeverly Hills, Cebu City. The plaintiff himself admitted that he has a child, and the
court is also convinced that he has two children.However, nothing in the evidence of plaintiff shows
that the defendant suffered from any psychological incapacity or that she failed tocomply with her
essential marital obligations. There is no evidence of psychological incapacity on the part of defendant
so that shecould not carry out the ordinary duties required in married life. Neither has it been shown
that there was an incurable defect on thepart of defendant.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the Court of Appeals misapplied facts of weight and substance affecting the
result of the present case;
b) Whether or not the presentation of psychologists and/or psychiatrists is still desirable, if
evidence in this case already showsthe psychological incapacity of private respondent;
c) Whether or not private respondent’s refusal to live with petitioner under one roof for more
than twenty (20) years, her refusalto bear children with petitioner, and her living a solitary life
in the United States for almost three (3) decades are enough indications of psychological
incapacity to comply with essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
The Courts merely said in that case that "the well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons withexpertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable." However, no expert opinion is helpful or even desirable todetermine whether private
respondent has been living abroad and away from her husband for many years; whether she has a
child;and whether she has made her residence abroad permanent by acquiring U.S. citizenship.

Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, waspsychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if suchincapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.
A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts
showing that either or both partieswere psychologically incapacitated from complying with the
essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

FERRARIS vs. FERRARIS

G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006
Facts:
Armida and Brix are a showbiz couple. The couple’s relationship before the marriage and even
during their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively short period
of time, Armida was happy and contented with her life in the company of Brix. Armida even admits
that Brix was a responsible and loving husband. Their problems began when Armida started doubting
Brix’ fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about the calls from women that Brix began to
withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-called marital obligations. Brix could
not understand Armida’s lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions
irrational. Brix could not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. Armida presented a psychological
expert (Dr. Dayan) who finds Brix to be a schizoid and a dependent and avoidant type. This is
evidenced by Brix’s “leaving-the-house” attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies
during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference
to spend more time with his band mates than his family.
Issue:
How shall psychological incapacity be proven?
Ruling:
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code, refers to aserious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanentas to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have
certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality
disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It is for this
reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human
personality. However, the rootcause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature must be fully explained, which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.Quite apart from
being plainly self-serving, petitioner’s evidence showed that respondent’s alleged failure to perform
his so-called marital obligations was not at all a manifestation of some deep-seated, grave, permanent
and incurable psychological malady. To be sure, the couple’s relationship before the marriage and even
during their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively short period
of time, petitioner was happy and contented with her life in the company of respondent.
Infact, by petitioner’s own reckoning, respondent was a responsible and loving husband. Their
problems began when petitionerstarted doubting respondent’s fidelity. It was only when they started
fighting about the calls from women that respondent began towithdraw into his shell and corner, and
failed to perform his so- called marital obligations. Respondent could not understandpetitioner’s lack
of trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Respondent could not
relate to heranger, temper and jealousy.At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her
diagnosis that respondent has a mixed personality disorder called"schizoid," and why he is

the "dependent and avoidant type." Notably, when asked as to the root cause of respondent’s alleged
psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan’s answer was vague, evasive andinconclusive. She replied that
such disorder "can be part of his family upbringing" She stated that there was a history of respondent’s
parents having difficulties in their relationship. But this input on the supposed problematic history of
respondent’sparents also came from petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly demonstrate that there
was really "a natal or supervening disablingfactor" on the part of respondent, or an "adverse integral
element" in respondent’s character that effectively incapacitated him fromaccepting, and, thereby
complying with, the essential marital obligations. We find respondent’s alleged mixed personality
disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they quarreled, the violenttendencies during
epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to
spend moretime with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological
condition but a mere refusal orunwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
While petitioner’s marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope of
reconciliation, the remedy however isnot always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not anull and void marriage. No less
than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it
decreesmarriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties.
Both the family and marriage are to be"protected" by the state. Petition dismissed with finality.

ANTONIO vs. REYES
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
Facts:
Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989. Barely
a year after their first meeting, they got married at Manila City Hall and then a subsequent church
wedding at Pasig in December 1990. A child was born but died 5 months later. Reyes persistently
lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other
events or things. She even did not conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which she represented to her
husband as adopted child of their family. They were separated in August 1991 and after attempt for
reconciliation, he finally left her for good in November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition
to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for declaring their
marriage null and void.
Ruling:
Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage as
opposed to a mere inability to comply with them. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony
presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy
of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior, which
amounts to psychological incapacity. Respondent’s fantastic ability to invent, fabricate stories and
letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live in a world of make-believe that made her
psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her
marriage. The root causes of Reyes’ psychological incapacity have been medically or clinically
identified that was sufficiently proven by experts. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity
was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting marriage without their consent. It
would be difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to commit the basic tenets of relationship between
spouses based on love, trust and respect. Furthermore, Reyes’ case is incurable considering that
petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remain unchanged.
Hence, the court concludes that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration
of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

CARATING-SIAYNGCO vs. SIAYNGCO

G.R. No. 158896 October 27, 2004
Facts:
Juanita Carating-Siayngco was married to Manuel Siayngco. Their marriage did not produce
children however, the adopted a boy. Manuel, after being married for 24 years filed a petition to the
court seeking the nullification of their marriage by reason of psychological incapacity exhibited
through over domineering attitude and causing him embarrassment and humiliation. The lower court
denied his petition. The CA on the other hand reversed the decision relying on the doctor’s findings
that both parties are psychologically incapacitated.
Issue:
Whether or not one or both of the parties were proven psychologically incapacitated sufficient
to warrant the nullification of their marriage.
Ruling:
The court ruled in the negative. Manuel’s relationship with another was caused merely by his
sexual infidelity which does not fall within the purview of psychological incapacity. This action caused
by his desire to have children which he himself admitted. The testimonies of the doctor failed to show
that this infidelity is caused by a psychological illness or disorder. It is necessary that it his by reason
of a psychological disorder that he will be completely unable to perform his marital obligations. With
regard to Juanita, Manuel failed to show that her actions constitute psychological incapacity that would
render her unable to perform her marital obligations and that a doctor has in fact stated otherwise.
The evidence adduced failed to show sufficiently that the couple or either of the spouse were
psychologically incapacitated, rather it showed that they were merely having the marital trouble of
becoming strangers to each other and wanting to get out of it. The marriage thus cannot be declared
null and void

VILLALON vs. VILLALON

G.R. No. 167206 November 18, 2005
Facts:
On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime F. Villalon filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage
to respondent Ma. Corazon N. Villalon before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City where it was
docketed as JDRC No. 3917 and raffled to Branch 69. As ground therefor, petitioner cited his
psychological incapacity which he claimed existed even prior to his marriage.On September 25, 1996,
respondent filed an answerdenying petitioner’s allegations. She asserted that her 18-year marriage to
petitioner has been “fruitful and characterized by joy, contentment and hopes for more growth in
their relationship” and that their marital squabbles were normal based on community
standards. Petitioner’s success in his professional life aided him in performing his role as husband,
father, and provider. Respondent claimed that petitioner’s commitment to his paternal and marital
responsibilities was beyond reproach.
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical psychologist, to testify on his alleged
psychological disorder of “Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder” with “Casanova Complex”.
Dr. Dayan described the said disorder as “a pervasive maladaptation in terms of interpersonal and
occupational functioning” with main symptoms of “grand ideation about oneself, self-centeredness,
thinking he is unique and wanting to always be the one followed, the I personality.” A person afflicted
with this disorder believes that he is entitled to gratify his emotional and sexual feelings and thus
engages in serial infidelities. Likewise, a person with “Casanova Complex” exhibits habitual adulterous
behavior and goes from one relationship to another.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision which was denied
in an order dated October 28, 2004. Thus, petitioner took this recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, asserting that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that he failed to prove his psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Villalon is null and void on the grounds of psychological
incapacity of the husband.
Ruling:
No, the totality of the evidence in this case does not support a finding that petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations. On the contrary, what is evident is the
fact that petitioner was a good husband to respondent for a substantial period of time prior to their
separation, a loving father to their children and a good provider of the family. Although he engaged
in marital infidelity in at least two occasions, the same does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave
psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. The same
appears as the result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder
rooted in petitioner’s personal history. The petition has no merit.

BUENAVENTURA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 127358 March 31, 2005
Facts:
July 12 1992, Noel Buenaventura filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on
the ground that he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated. The Regional Trial Court in its
decision declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio. The
court ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property; ordered petitioner a
regular support in favor of his son in the amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to modification as the
necessity arises, and awarded the care and custody of the minor to his mother. Petitioner appealed
before the Court of Appeals and while the appeal was pending, the Court of Appeals, upon
respondent’s motion issued a resolution increasing the support pendants like to P20, 000. The Court
of Appeals dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to the RTC decision. Petitioner
motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage.
Ruling:
The general rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property
regime applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership. Since the
properties ordered to be distributed by the court were there, both by the Regional Trial Court and the
Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered
by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been
included or involved in said distribution.

REPUBLIC vs. QUINTERO-HAMANO

GR No. 149498 May 20, 2004
Facts:
Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her marriage
with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. She and Toshio
started a common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter,
Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave birth on November 16,
1987. In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their marriage,
Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his
family. Toshio sent money for two months and after that he stopped giving financial support. She
wrote him several times but never respondent. In 1991, she learned from her friend that Toshio
visited the country but did not bother to see her nor their child.
Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him remained
unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons
by publication. The motion was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition,
was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Toshio
filed to respond after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed a motion to refer the
case to the prosecutor for investigation.
Issue:
Whether or not abandonment by one spouse tantamount to psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
The court find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was
doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological
illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was
presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder.
Abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. There was no showing that the case at bar
was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. It cannot presume
psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the
celebration of the marriage. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility
and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to
some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a
person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage. In proving
psychological incapacity, the court finds no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse.
It cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to
determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in
general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person
regardless of nationality.

DEDEL vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 151867 January 29, 2004
Facts:
David Dedel and Sharon Corpuz were married on September 28, 1996 and May 20, 1967 in a
civil and church wedding, respectively. They had four children. David instituted a case for the nullity
of their marriage on account of Sharon’s psychological incapacity to perform basic marital obligations.
He claimed that Sharon had extra-marital affairs with several men including a dentist in the AFP, a
lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command, and a Jordanian national. Despite the treatment by
a clinical psychiatrist, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian, whom she married
and with whom she had two children. When the Jordanian national left the country, Sharon returned
to David bringing along her two children by the Jordanian national. David accepted her back and even
considered the illegitimate children as his own. However, Sharon abandoned David to join
the Jordanian national with her two children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the country
on special occasions. Dra. Natividad Dayan testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation of
David and found him to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks
and projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts his best in whatever he does.
On the other hand, Dra. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social
Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several
indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse even bringing with her the two children of the Jordanian
to live with David. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts
of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of the said disorder amounting to
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. The trial court declared their
marriage null and void on the ground of the psychological incapacity of Sharon to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. While the Court of Appeals set aside the trial court’s judgment and
ordered the dismissal of the petition. David’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, he
appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Sharon’s infidelity is equivalent to psychologically incapacity.
Ruling:
No. Sharon’s infidelity is not equivalent to psychologically incapacity. Psychological incapacity
should refer to no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly in cognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The law intended to
confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. Sharon’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity.

It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality, which make
the respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not
merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity. At best, the circumstances relied upon
by David are grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code not for declaring a
marriage void. The grounds for legal separation, which need not be rooted in psychological incapacity,
include physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like. Decision affirmed. Petition is denied.

REPUBLIC v. DAGDAG
G.R. No. 109975 February 9, 2001
Facts:
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20
years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. The marriage certificate
was issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of on October 20,
1988. Erlinda and Avelino begot two children. The birth certificates were issued by the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija also on October 20, 1988. A week
after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for
months, suddenly re-appear for a few months, and then disappear again. During the times when he
was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He
would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical
injuries to her.
In October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last that they heard from
him. Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail and
remains at large to-date. In July 1990, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a petition for
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino
could not be located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of
general circulation. On the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel
appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law as her only witness.
The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991 to
manifest in writing whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that should
he fail to file said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision. The Investigating
Prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there was no collusion between the parties.
However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence. Without

waiting for the investigating prosecutor’s manifestation, the trial court declared the marriage of Erlinda
and Avelino void under Article 36. The investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment
on the ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to
manifest whether he was presenting controverting evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General
likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is not in
accordance with the evidence and the law. Since the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration,
the Solicitor General appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court holding that
“Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the duties and
obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic,
and a criminal.”
Issue:
Whether or not Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated.

Ruling:
Erlinda Matias and Avelino Dagdag contracted marriage on September 7, 1975. They begot
two children. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He
would from time to time, disappear and suddenly reappear for a few months. He was always drunk
and would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and inflict physical injuries on her if she
refused. On October 1993, he left his family and was never heard from him again. Erlinda was forced
to work and learned that Avelino was imprisoned and that he escaped from jail. Erlinda filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage on the grounds of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino could
not be located, summons was served by publication. Upon trial, Erlinda presented Virginia Dagdag
who attested to the psychological incapacity of Avelino. The trial court rendered a decision in favor
of respondent without waiting for the prosecutor’s manifestation. The Court of Appeals affirmed
trials’ court decision. The court contented that Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which
requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and
sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged
psychological incapacity of her husband. Furthermore, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive
from justice was not sufficiently proven. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an
opportunity to present controversy evidence since the trial court’s decision was prematurely rendered.

PESCA vs. PESCA

G. R. No. 136921 April 17, 2001
Facts:
The case at bar is a petition for certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner and private respondent married in 1975, a union that begot four children. She contends that
respondent surprisingly showed signs of “psychological incapacity” to perform his marital obligations
starting 1988. His “true color” of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became
apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00
o’clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o’clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least,
minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner
with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children
themselves were not spared from physical violence.
Petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in Quezon
City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, she returned home to give him
a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected. On the morning of 22
March 1994, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the presence of the children.
She was battered black and blue. He was imprisoned for 11 days for slight physical injuries.
Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. The trial court declared their marriage to be null and
void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, which in turn
reversed the decision of the trial court. Thus, the marriage of respondent and petitioner still subsists.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the appellate court erred in reversing the decision of the trial court.
b) Whether or not the guidelines in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina should
be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature.
Ruling:
The appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there was absolutely no evidence showed
and proved by petitioner the psychological incapacity on the part of respondent. Article 36 of the
Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. Psychological incapacity, as laid down in the case of
Santos vs. Court of Appeals and further explained in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, refer
to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.

The “doctrine of stare decisis,” ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The
rule follows the settled legal maxim – “legis interpretado legis vim obtinet” – that the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The interpretation or
construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The
latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute
is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view
is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have
relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule
of “lex prospicit, non respicit.” The petition was denied.

GROUNDS FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
MALLION vs. ALCANTARA

GR No. 141528 October 31, 2006
Facts:
Oscar Mallion filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court seeking a declaration of nullity oh
his marriage with Editha Alcantara due to psychological incapacity. The RTC denied the petition. As
the decision attained finality, Mallion filed another petition for a declaration of nullity of marriage, this
time alleging that his marriage was null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid
marriage license.
Issue:
Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the grounds ogf lack
of marriage license?
Ruling:
Res judicataapplies.
Mallion is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of action which is the nullity
of marriage. When the second case was filed based on another ground, there is a splitting of a cause
of action which is prohibited. He is estopped from asserting that the first marriage had no marriage
license because in the first case he impliedly admitted the same when he did not question the absence
of a marriage license.

PROPER ACTION AND PROCEDURE FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE
LEONOR vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R No. 112597 April 2, 1996
Facts:
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari assailing the validity of the judgment of the lower
court. It was shown that she was married to the private respondent and they had three kids. While her
husband was studying and working abroad, he cohabited with another woman. This prompted her to
file for separation and alimony against her husband. Her husband in return filed a divorce case against
her in Swiss Courts, contending that their marriage was void for absence of valid marriage certificate.
The Swiss Court held infavour of the private respondent. Subsequently the Private Respondent filed
a petition for the cancellation of the marriage certificate in the Philippines. The trial court granted his
petition and denied Petitioner’s appeal. The Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari in the
CA, but the latter denied the same. She filed this petition with the Supreme Court to assail the validity
of CA’s decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring the marriage null and void?
Ruling:
Yes. Rule 108 as the basis of the private respondent’s contention is untenable. The Court
explained that the Rule only applies to cases concerning typographical or other clerical errors in the
marriage contract. It does not apply to cases where the status of the parties and their children shall be
affected. The Supreme Court held in favour of the petitioner contending that “A void judgment for
want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all”.

PARTIES FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
LLAVE vs. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011
Facts:
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice – initially under
the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil
ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their marriage
contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil status was indicated as “divorced”. Since then, Estrellita has been
representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano’s wife, and upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and
her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano’s
legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of
nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint alleged
that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained
subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.
Issue:
Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous.
Ruling:
Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zorayda and late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was
never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized
under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims
and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage
can exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized
except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed
by way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083
cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to “marriage and
divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage
is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.” But Article
13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and
Muslim rites.”

ENRICO vs. HEIRS OF MEDINACELI
G.R. No. 173614 September 28, 2007
Facts:
Spouses Uelogio Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-medicani were married on June 14 1962. They
had seven children, herein respondents. Trinidad died on may 1 2004 and on august 26 2004, Eulogio
marries petitioner Lolita Enrico on february 10 2005. respondent filed an action for declaration of
nullity of marriage between Eulogio and Lolita on two grounds:
1) that the marriage was entered into without the requisite marriage license and
2) lack of a marriage ceremony due to Eulogio's illness.
Enrico contended that she has been living with Eulogio for 21 years hence exempt from
getting a marriage license under Art. 34 of the Family Code. More importantly, she sought the
dismissal of his action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an
action for the declaration of nullity of marriage pursuant to AM 02-11-10 SC which provides in sec. 2
(a) that the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of a void marriage may be filled solely by the
husband or the wife. The heirs invoked the ruling in the case of Ninal vs. Bayadog.
Issue:
a) Whether or not the marriage between Eulogio and Enrico is exempt from securing marriage
license.
b) Whether or not the respondent heirs can assail the validity of said marriage after the death of
Eulogio.
Ruling:
Petition is dismissed.
Under Art. 34 of the family code, a man and a woman who have been living together for at
least five years without any legal impediments are exempt from securing a marriage license. The said
exemption cannot possibly apply because the second marriage contracted by Eulogio with Enrico
took place barely 3 months after Trinidad dies. Moreover, the respondent heirs have no standing to
assail the validity of the second marriage even after te death of their father, Eulogio.
While it is true that Ninal vs. Bayadog allowed the heirs therein to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of the Father's 2nd marriage after the death, the court held that the same rule
cannot be applied for the reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the family code.
Nonetheless, the heirs are not left without remedy. They can still protect their successional
rights as compulsory or intestate heirs of Eulogio by questioning the validity of his second marriage
with Enrico, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but in a proceeding for the settlement of
the estate deceased father filed in the regular courts.

CATALAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 167109 February 6, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini,
Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became
naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988.
On June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Petitioner contends that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting
marriage with Eusebio Bristol. She filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages
in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy?
Ruling:
A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action. A petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife. Petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained
because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. After all, she may have
the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce or a mensa et
thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes absolute. We
note that it was the petitioner who alleged in her complaint that they acquired American citizenship
and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce decree. It is settled rule that one who alleges
a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence
Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary
to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law
which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was
obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial court should
declare respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void ab initio.

NIÑAL vs. BAYADOG

G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000
Facts:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage
were born herein petitioners. Pepito resulting to her death on April 24, 1985 shot Teodulfa. One year
and 8 months thereafter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Bayadog got
married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated
December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and
were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.
After Pepito’s death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage
license.
Issue:
What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code (now Article
34 of the Family Code) to warrant the counting of the 5-year period in order to exempt the future
spouses from securing a marriage license.
Ruling:
The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it
should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party was involved
at any time within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken.
Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal
and void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved
or annulled.
In this case, at the time Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be said that they have
lived with each other as husband and wife for at least 5 years prior to their wedding day. From the
time Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about 20
months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with
respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated
in fact from his lawful spouse.
The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third
party as being one as “husband and wife”.
Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such
element.

CARLOS vs. SANDOVAL

G.R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008
Facts:
Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos were brothers who each have three parcels
of land by virtue of inheritance. Later Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad
Sandoval and their son, Teofilo Carlos II. Upon Teofilo’s death, two parcels of land were registered
in the name of Felicidad and Teofilo II. In August 1995, Carlos commenced an action against
respondents before the court a quo. In his complaint, Carlos asserted that the marriage between his
late brother and Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He
likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of Teofilo
Carlos II. He argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including the sums
received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.
Issue:
a) Whether or not Court of Appeals should apply the Rule 35 of the Rules of Court
b) Whether or not both parties should file for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
Ruling:
The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment
on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed. Carlos
argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary judgment,
instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings. Petitioner is misguided. Whether it is based on
judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the summary
judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary
judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment
of marriage
A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code. Under the Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the
marriage. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable
marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they
do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights
prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of

the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular courts.
PARTIES
ABLAZA vs. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010
Facts:
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan,
Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December
26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated
without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering
the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his
being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half
of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in
interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between
Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being
void ab initio.
Issue:
Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the
marriage of his deceased brother
Ruling:
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December
26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of
the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to
initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely
no application to the petitioner.
Pursuant to the provisions of the old Civil Code, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or
illegitimate children of the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to
the deceased's estate. Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon
a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate
or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano's surviving heir.
The petition is returned to the RTC for further proceedings of the case.

VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN

G.R. No. 155409 June 8, 2007
Facts:
Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful married
life and out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar coated romance turned
bitter when petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her
paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery against private respondent
and the latter’s paramour. Consequently, both the private respondent and her paramour were
convicted of the crime charged and were sentenced to suffer an imprisonment ranging from one (1)
year, eight (8) months, minimum of prision correccional as minimum penalty, to three (3) years, six
(6) months and twenty one (21) days, medium of prision correccional as maximum penalty.
Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages on June 15,
2001 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, docketed as Civil
Case No. 656, imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner.
During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a
Compromise Agreement. The said Compromise Agreement was given judicial imprimatur by the
respondent judge in the assailed Judgment On Compromise Agreement, which was erroneously dated
January 2, 2002.
Issue:
Whether the partial voluntary separation of property made by the spouses pending the petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.
Ruling:
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil
registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested
person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact
of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. Where a subsequent marriage
is terminated because of the reappearance of an absent spouse; while Article 63 applies to the effects
of a decree of legal separation. The present case involves a proceeding where the nullity of the marriage
is sought to be declared under the ground of psychological capacity.
Article 2035 of the Civil Code is also clearly inapplicable. The Compromise Agreement
partially divided the properties of the conjugal partnership of gains between the parties and does not
deal with the validity of a marriage or legal separation. It is not among those that are expressly
prohibited by Article 2035. Moreover, the contention that the Compromise Agreement is tantamount
to a circumvention of the law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal properties is
misplaced. Existing law and jurisprudence do not impose such disqualification.

Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or
for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement which was
judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law. This conclusion
holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending. However,
the Court must stress that this voluntary separation of property is subject to the rights of all creditors
of the conjugal partnership of gains and other persons with pecuniary interest pursuant to Article 136
of the Family Code.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NORMA CUISON-MELGAR

G.R. No. 139676 March 31, 2006
Facts:
On March 27, 1965, Norma and Eulogio were married before the Catholic Church in Dagupan
City. Their union begot five children. On August 19,1996, Norma filed for declaration of nullity of
her marriage on the ground of Eulogio’s psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital
obligations. According to Norma the manifestations of Eulogio’s psychological incapacity are his
immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, laziness, and abandonment of his
family since December 27, 1985.
Issue:
Whether or not the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent is in the nature
contemplated by Article 36.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court set aside and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The marriage
between Norma and Eulogio is valid. The immaturity, habitual alcoholism, laziness, jealousy and
abandonment of respondent do not constitute psychological incapacity. The Court ruled that it is not
enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is
essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some psychological,
not physical, illness. In other words, proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person –
an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage – had to be shown.
A cause has to be shown and linked with the manifestations of the psychological incapacity.

FLORENCE MALCAMPO-SIN vs. PHILIPP T. SIN

G.R. No. 137590 March 26, 2001
Facts:
On January 4, 1987, Florence and respondent Philipp Sin, a Portuguese citizen, were married
at St. Jude Catholic Parish in San Miguel, Manila. On September 20, 1994, Florence filed with the
RTC, Pasig City, a complaint for “declaration of nullity of Marriage” against Philipp. Trial ensued and
the parties presented their respective evidences.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in not ordering a prosecuting attorney or fiscal on behalf of
the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.
Ruling:
Article 48 of the Family Code states that “in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on
behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence
is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court should have ordered the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition
as the case may be, to the petition. The records are bereft of an evidence that the State participated
in the prosecution of the case thus, the case is remanded for proper trial.
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals.

EMILIO R. TUASON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 116607 April 10, 1996
Facts:
Maria Victoria Lopez and Emilio Tuason were married on June 3,1972. Lopez alleged that at
the time of the marriage. Emilio was already psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations that became manifested afterwards. The same resulted in violent fights. Emilio was
also said to be using prohibited drugs, he was a womanizer and gave minimal support to the family.
Likewise, he became spendthrift and abusive of his administration of the conjugal partnership by
alienating some of their assets without Victoria’s consent. Attempts for reconciliation failed because
Emilio’s refusal to reform. In the prayer of Victoria for annulment of marriage, she further prayed for
powers of administration to save the conjugal properties from further dissipation. At variance, Emilio
denied the imputation against him. Thereafter, trial ensued and Victoria presented four witnesses
including documentary evidence consisting of newspaper articles of Emilio’s relationship with other
women, his apprehension for illegal possession of drugs and copies of prior church annulment decree.
After Victoria rested her case, reception for Emilio’s evidence was scheduled. It was postponed and
on the reset date, he failed to appear. The court then declared Emilio to have waived his right to
present evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision.
On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of Victoria’s marriage
to Emilio and awarded custody of the children to Ms. Lopez. Emilio filed a petition for relief from
judgment but was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not a petition for relief from judgment is warranted under the circumstance of the
case where petitioner was declared in default due to non-appearance during the hearing.
Ruling:
Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, governs a petition for relief from judgment.
Under the rules, a final and executor judgment or order of the Regional Trial Court may be set aside
on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In addition, the petitioner must
assert facts showing that he has a good, substantial and meritorious defense or cause of action. If the
petition is granted, the court shall proceed to hear and determine the case as if a timely motion for
new trial had been granted therein. Furthermore, the failure of counsel to notify his client on time of
an adverse judgment to enable the latter to appeal there from is negligence that is not excusable.
Similarly inexcusable is the failure of a counsel to inform the trial court of his client’s confinement
and medical treatment as the reason for his non-appearance at the scheduled hearings. Indeed, a
petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy, allowed only in exceptional cases where there
is no other available or adequate remedy.

MARGIE MACIAS CORPUS vs. JUDGE WILFREDO G. OCHOTORENA

A.M. No. RTJ-04-1861 July 30, 2004
Facts:
Mrs. Macias asserts before the Court that the respondent judge's actuations constitute bias,
partiality and conduct unbecoming a judge. Moreover, according to her, what is more glaring and
conclusive from the records is that the respondent is grossly ignorant of the law and procedure. For
these administrative lapses, Mrs. Macias concludes that the Court should sanction him.
The conclusion is amply supported by the Court of Appeals' Decision which states that the
respondent judge totally disregarded Mrs. Macias' right to due process when he proceeded with the
trial on the merits of the case completely ignoring the fact that her Motion to Dismiss, which was filed
within the 30-day reglementary period, was still pending resolution.
The respondent judge disregarded the provisions of Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules on
Civil Procedure, which states that: "After the last pleading has been served and filed, it shall be the
duty of the plaintiff to promptly move ex-parte that the case be set for pre-trial." Considering that the
last pleading was Mrs. Macias' Motion to Dismiss, the respondent judge should have first resolved the
motion and then waited for Mr. Macias' motion to set the case for pre-trial.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law
and incompetence.
Ruling:
Under Section 3 in relation to Section 10 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross ignorance
of the law is considered a serious offense, for which a penalty of either dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of benefits, suspension from office for more than three (3) months but not exceeding six
(6) months or a fine of more than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) but not exceeding Forty
Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) may be imposed. With this, Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena is found
GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and incompetence and is hereby FINED the amount of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be taken from the amount earlier withheld from his
retirement benefits. The Fiscal Management Office of the OCA is DIRECTED to immediately release
to the respondent judge the remaining balance of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) from the
aforesaid retained amount, unless there are other valid reasons for its further retention.

DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
PACETE vs. CARRIAGA

G.R. No. L-53880 March 17, 1994
Facts:
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as
for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She averred in
her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo;
that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she
learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible
since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file
an answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in
communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the
plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The
court received plaintiffs’ evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980. After
trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17, 1980.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for
extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision.
Ruling:
The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the
court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists.
If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that
the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.”
The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of
uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to
emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract. Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58
of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation must “in no case be tried
before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,” obviously in order to provide
the parties a “cooling-off” period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties
to reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by
the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in actions
for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, “if the defendant in an action for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to investigate whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion,
to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.

MARBELLA-BOBIS vs. BOBIS

G.R. No. 138509 July 31, 2000
Facts:
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce Javier.
Without said marriage having been annulled the same respondent contracted a second marriage with
petitioner Imelda Marbella- Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain
Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioner’s complaint a n information for bigamy was files against
respondent. Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license.
Respondent filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the
pending civil case as a prejudicial question.
Issue:
Whether or not the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of the marriage posed
a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case of respondent
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ordered the Trial Court to immediately proceed with the Criminal Case.
A pending civil case is not a prejudicial question. A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case
the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. I t is a question based on
a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the
guilt or innocence of the accused.

TY vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 127406 November 27, 2000
Facts:
In 1977, private respondent Edgardo Reyes married Ana Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil
ceremony. A church wedding ensued. However, the Juvenile and Domestic Relatives want to declare
their marriage null and void ab initio lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding was also
declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties.
In 1979, before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, Edgardo Reyes
married Ofelia Ty in a ceremony officiated by a judge, then a church wedding followed. In 1991,
Edgardo reyes filed a civil case with the Regional Trial Court praying that his marriage with Ofelia be
declared null and void on the ground that here was no marriage license when they got married. He
also averred at that time he married Ofelia, the decree of nullity of the marriage to Anna Maria was
rendered only when his civil marriage to petitioner, Ofelia Ty, null and void ab initio. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision
Issue:
Whether or not the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent
marriage can be entered into validly
Ruling:
The second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979, before the case of Wiegel.
At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon, wherein there was no
need for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage for lack of license and consent, before such person
may contract a second marriage. The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license
and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second
marriage. In this case therefore, the Court concluded that private respondent’s second marriage to
Ofelia Ty is valid.
Moreover, the provision of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied where to do so
would prejudice the vested rights of a party and her children. As held in Jison versus Court of Appeals,
the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there is impairment of vested rights.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution declared valid and subsisting.

EFFECTS
VALDES vs. RTC AND VALDES

G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996
Facts:
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on January 5, 1971. Begotten during their
marriage were five children. In a petition dated June 22, 1992, Valdes sought the declaration of nullity
of the marriage pursuant to article 36 of the Family Code. After hearing the parties following the
joinder of issues, the marriage of Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez is declared null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground of their mutual Psychological Incapacity to comply with
their essential marital obligations. The three older children shall choose which parent they would want
to stay with, the younger children shall be placed in the custody of their mother. The petitioner and
respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties.
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification on that portion directing compliance with Articles 50,
51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the
procedure for the liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage.” Parenthetically,
during the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire to remain
with their father Antonio Valdes.
Issue:
Whether the trial court failed to apply the correct law that should govern the disposition of a
family dwelling in a situation wherein a marriage is declared null and null and void because of
Psychological Incapacity on the part of either or both parties to the contract.
Ruling:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of cause thereof, the
property relation of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of
Article 137 or Article 148. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have
obtained through their joint efforts.The rules set up to govern liquidation of either the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and
voidable marriages are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exist between common-
law spouses.
EFFECTS

ALAIN M. DIÑO vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO
G.R. No. 178044 January 19, 2011
Facts:
Alain M. Diño and Ma. Caridad L. Diño were childhood friends and sweethearts. They started
living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent
decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar
of Las Piñas City. Petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent.
Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time of the filing of the
petition, was already living in the United States of America. Despite receipt of the summons,
respondent did not file an answer to the petition within the reglementary period. Petitioner later
learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner, which
was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5
October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara. The Office of the Las Piñas
prosecutor found that there were no indicative facts of collusion between the parties and the case was
set for trial on the merits. Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a
psychological report establishing that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder
which was deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that
respondent's disorder was long-lasting and by nature, incurable. In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the
trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was psychologically incapacited to
comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court made mistake when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity
of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties' properties.
Ruling:
Yes, petitioner's marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family
Code and not under Article 40 or 45. What governs the liquidation of properties owned in common
by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. The property relations of parties in a void
marriage during the period of cohabitation are governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the
Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated
in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Partition may be made by agreement
between the parties or by judicial proceedings. It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the
spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
FRAUD, ARTICLES 45 PARAGRAPH 3 AND 46, FC

G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006
Facts:
Respondent Villadores is one of the accused in the crime of Illegal Falsification of Public
Documents. It appears that petitioner Villanueva filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against several
parties and among them is the IBC 13. The labor arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioner. IBC 13
appealed to National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). IBC 13 filed a surety bond but this
document was found to be falsified. The two complaints for falsification of document was brought
before Manila prosecutor’s office and dismissed the charges against Atty. Eulalio Diaz III and
respondent Villadores. The petitioned filed for review of the case with the DOJ, the latter affirmed
the dismissal of Atty. Diaz III but ordered the inclusion of respondent Villadores as an accused in the
two criminal cases. Accordingly, the original informations were amended to include the respondent
among those charged. Following the arraignment, the private prosecutor, Rico and Associates, filed a
new Motion to Admit Amended Informations alleging damages sustained by the petitioner as a result
of the crimes committed by the accused. The motion was admitted by the trial court. The respondent
moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Subsequently, respondent moved for the
disqualification of Rico and Associates and the appellate court pronounced that petitioner did not
sustain any damages for the crime committed by the respondent and the same has redounded to his
benefit. Rico and Associates opposed such pronouncement since it is a mere obiter dictum.
Issue:
Whether or not the pronouncement of appellate court that petitioner Villanueva is not an
offended party is a mere obiter dictum.
Ruling:
The pronouncement of appellate court that petitioner Villanueva is not an offended party is
not a mere obiter dictum. An adjudication on any point within the issue presented by the case cannot
be considered as obiter dictum, and this rule applies to all pertinent questions, although incidentally
involved, which are presented and decided in the regular course of the consideration of the case and
led up to the final conclusion and to any statement as to matter on which the decision is predicated.
Hence, in the instant case, the pronouncement of the appellate court is not an obiter dictum as it
touched upon a matter clearly raised by respondent Villadores in his petition assailing the admission
of the amended informations. Argument on whether petitioner Villanueva was the offended party
was, thus, clearly raised by respondent. The body of decision contains the discussion on that point
and it clearly mentioned certain principles of law.
ANAYA vs. PALAROAN

G.R. No. L-27930 November 26, 1970
Facts:
Plaintiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were married on December 4, 1953; that defendant
Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage on January 7, 1954 on the ground that his
consent was obtained through force and intimidation. Fernando had divulged to Aurora that several
months prior to their marriage he had a pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his; and that
“the non divulgement to her of the aforementioned pre-marital secret on the part of the defendant
that definitely wrecked their marriage, which apparently doomed to fail even before it had hardly
commenced…Plaintiff herein from going thru the marriage that was solemnized between them
constituted ‘FRAUD’’ in obtaining her consent, She prayed for the annulment of the marriage and for
moral damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship
with anither woman is a ground for annulment of marriage
Ruling:
Non-disclosure of a husband’s pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the
enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded
by the last paragraph of the Article, providing that “no other misrepresentation or deceit as to chastity”
shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage.
BUCCAT vs. MANGONON DE BUCCAT

G.R. NO. 47101 April 25, 1941
Facts:
On March 1938, Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat first met, then they came
engaged September of the same year. After few months later, on November 26, 1938, they got
married.However, after 89 days of their marriage dated February 23, 1939, Luida gave birth to a son.
After knowing this, Godofredo left Luida and never returned to married life with her. On March 23,
1939, he filed for an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when he agreed to married
Luida, she assured him that she was a virgin.
The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.
Issue:
Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccat’s marriage be granted on the grounds that Luida
concealed her pregnancy before the marriage?
Ruling:
No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred institution in
which the State is interested and where society rests.In this case, the court did not find any proof that
there was concealment of pregnancy constituting fraud as a ground for annulment. It was unlikely that
Godofredo, a first-year law student, did not suspect anything about Luida’s condition considering that
she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy (highly developed physical manifestation, ie. enlarged
stomach ) when they got married.
SC affirmed the lower court’s decision. Costs to plaintiff-appellant.

G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006
Facts:
Respondent Villadores is one of the accused in the amended in formations in Criminal Cases
entitled, “People of the Philippines v. Atty. Tomas Bernardo, Roque Villadores, Alberto Adriano and
Rolando Advincula for Falsification of Public Document before the RTC of Manila. It appears that
petitioner Villanueva Jr. filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against several parties among them IBC
13.When the labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner Villaneva Jr. IBC 13 appealed to the National
Labor Relations Commission. Thus the two complaints for falsification of public document were filed
before the Manila City Prosecutor’s Office. The charges against Respondent Villadores and Atty.
Eulalio Diaz 111 were dismissed by the City Prosecutors Office.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in failing to appreciate that Francisco Villanueva Jr. was in fact
an aggrieved party.
Ruling:
Francisco Villanueva is not the offended party in these cases. It must be underscored that it
was IBC 13 who secured the falsified surety bond for the purpose of the appeal it had taken from an
adverse judgment of the labor case filed by Villanueva. We see no reason how Villanueva could have
sustained damages as a result of the falsification of the surety appeal bond and its confirmation letter
when it could have redounded to his own benefit if the appeal would be dismissed as a result of the
forgery. If there be anyone who was prejudiced, it was IBC 13 when it purchased a fake surety bond.
MACCARUBO vs. MACCARUBO

A.C. No. 6148 February 27, 2004
Facts:
This is a disbarment case against Atty. Edmundo Maccarrubo. Complainant Florencie
Maccarrubo averred that she was started courting by respondent Atty. Edmundo Maccarrubo in April
1991, he representing himself as a bachelor; that they eventually contracted marriage which was
celebrated on two occasions administered by Rev. Rogelio J. Bolivar, the first on December 18, 1991
in the latter’s Manila office, and the second on December 28, 1991 at the Asian Institute of Tourism
Hotel in Quezon City; and that although respondent admitted that he was married to Helen Esparza
on June 16, 1982, he succeeded in convincing complainant, her family and friends that his previous
marriage was void. Complainant further averred that respondent entered into a third marriage with
one Josephine T. Constantino; and that he abandoned complainant and their children without
providing them any regular support up to the present time, leaving them in precarious living
conditions. But respondent filed a petition for nullity of marriage since it was contracted with vitiated
consent.
Issue:
Whether or not the disbarment case be dismissed basing it from the court’s declaration of
nullity of the marriage.
Ruling:
While the marriage between complainant and respondent has been annulled by final judgment,
this does not cleanse his conduct of every tinge of impropriety. He and complainant started living as
husband and wife in December 1991 when his first marriage was still subsisting, as it was only on
August 21, 1998 that such first marriage was annulled, rendering him liable for concubinage. Such
conduct is inconsistent with the good moral character that is required for the continued right to
practice law as a member of the Philippine bar. It imports moral turpitude and is a public assault upon
the basic social institution of marriage. Hence the respondent was disbarred for gross misconduct.
REYES VS. ZABALLERO

G.R. No. L-3561 May 23, 1951

Facts:
This case originated from a loan of P6,500 with interest at 10 per cent per annum payable in
advance, made by Dr. Ceasar Reyes to Agripino Zaballero on October 1, 1942. Zaballero secured the
payment with a first mortgage on ten parcels of land.
The installments due for 1942 and 1943 totaling the sum of P1,300 plus interest were paid in
Japanese Military Script and the Payments were unreservedly accepted. On November 30, 1944,
Zaballero offered to pay the third installments and its interests which fell due on October of the same
year, but Reyes refused to accept on the ground that it was immoral and unjust that the payment be
made in Japanese Military notes which had considerably devaluated, and that he had an option
according to the contract to have the payment in Philippine or United States currency. Zaballero
announced that the next day he would tender the whole balance. Reyes, acting upon advice given by
his attorneys to whom he had meanwhile resorted for guidance, received the money and executed the
notarial deed of release of the real estate mortgage. On the same day, he received payment, the
mortgagee (Reyes), executed an affidavit in secret, without defendants’ knowledge, before a Notary
Public stating that he had accepted under protest the payment of P5,200 plus interest in the sum of
P612, and that he had deposited the whole amount paid by the debtors.
Issue:
What constitutes Duress or Intimidation?
Ruling:
According to the Civil Code, there is Duress or intimidation when one of the contracting
parties is inspired by a rational and well-grounded fear or suffering an imminent and serious injury to
his person or property, of his spouse, descendants and ascendants. Mere reluctance does not detract
from the voluntariness of one’s acts. There is a distinction between a case where a person gives his
consent reluctantly and even against his good sense and judgment, and where he, in reality, gives no
consent at all, as where he executed a contract or performs an act against a pressure which he cannot
resist. It is clear that one acts as voluntarily and independently in the eye of the law when he acts
reluctantly and with hesitation as when he acts spontaneously and joyously. Legally speaking he acts
as voluntarily and freely when he acts wholly against his better sense and judgment as when he acts in
conformity with them. Between the two acts there is no difference in law.
IMPOTENCY, ARTICLE 45 PARAGRAPH 5, FC
ALACAZAR vs. ALACAZAR

G.R. No. 174451 October 13, 2009

Facts:
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan,
Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December
26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The petitioner alleged that
the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to
such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for
having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother
of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired
by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person,
himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any
time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.
Issue:
Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the
marriage of his deceased brother
Ruling:
`Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on
December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having
the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
Pursuant to the provisions of the old Civil Code, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or
illegitimate children of the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to
the deceased's estate. Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon
a prior determinationof whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate
or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano's surviving heir.
The petition is returned to the RTC for further proceedings of the case.

G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006

Facts:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got married
on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with the trial
court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him
into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior to the marriage;
that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he later learned that private respondent's
child died during delivery on August 29, 1988.
On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which
states:1) Dismissing the above-entitled case; and 2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral
damages in the amount of P100,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and
attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00, plus the costs of suit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court’s dismissal of the petition and the award of attorney’s fees and costs, but reduced the award
of moral and exemplary damages to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively. The Court of Appeals
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, hence, the instant petition for review based on the
following assigned errors:
Issue:
Whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent
Ruling:
The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not
disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a
bank. Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the rudiments
of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm’s way. For sure, it is
even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear upon appellant, what with the fact that he never
sought the assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the police regarding the activities of
those who were threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about his predicament prior to
solemnizing their marriage.
JOEL JIMENEZ vs. REMEDIOS CAÑIZARES

G.R. No. L-12790 August 31, 1960

Facts:
Plaintiff Joel Jimenez in a complaint prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant
Remedios Cañizares upon the ground that the office of her genitals or vagina was too small to allow
the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation; that the condition of her genitals as described
above existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist; and that for that reason he left the
conjugal home two nights and one day after they had been married.
Defendant however failed to submit her answer within the required period. Thereafter, the
Court entered an order requiring the defendant to submit to a physical examination by a competent
lady physician to determine her physical capacity for copulation. This was not followed by the
defendant however. Moreover, the defendant was not present during the scheduled hearings. Because
of this, the judge ordered a judgment annulling the marriage of the parties. The city attorney then filed
a motion for reconsideration on the ground that defendant’s impotency has not been satisfactorily
proven since the defendant refused to undergo the physical examination.
Issue:
Whether the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony
of the husband-plaintiff.
Ruling:
Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested. The
state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The security
and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It is the interest of each and every member of
the community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that would shake its foundation and
ultimately lead to its destruction. The incidents of the status are governed by law, not by will of the
parties. The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that must be proved to exist by indubitable
evidence, to annul a marriage.
In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole
testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the
annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed
to have been satisfactorily established, because from the commencement of the proceedings until the
entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined
or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption
arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred because women of this country
are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled
to by competent authority.
"Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in

favor of potency." The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual
intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.
GROUNDS FOR LEGAL SEPARATION
ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG vs. LUCITA G. ONG

G.R. No. 153206 October 23, 2006
Facts:

Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong and Lucita G. Ong were married on July 13, 1975
They have three children: Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton who are now all of the age of majority.
Thereafter, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation alleging that her life with William was marked
by physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct; William would also scold and
beat the children at different parts of their bodies using the buckle of his belt; whenever she tried to
stop William from hitting the children, he would turn his ire on her and box her; on December 9,
1995, William hit her on the stomach and she bent down because of the pain, he hit her on the head
then pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house; she then went to her sister’s house in
Binondo where she was fetched by her other siblings and brought to their parents house in Dagupan;
the following day, she went to her parent’s doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzano for treatment of her injuries.
William for his part denied all the allegations. While he admits that he and Lucita quarreled on
December 9, 1995, at their house at Tondo, he claimed that he left the same, stayed in their Greenhills
condominium and only went back to their Tondo house to work in their office below.
Both the lower courts and the appellate court issued a decree of legal separation due to the
repeated physical abuses felt by both Lucita and their children. William on the other hand maintains
that the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the case is to wrest control and ownership of
properties belonging to the conjugal partnership which were acquired through his sole efforts also,
William reiterated that Lucita cannot file the petition since it Lucita who abandoned their conjugal
dwelling.
Issue:
Whether nor not the defenses of William are valid.
Ruling:
William posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case for legal separation is in order
for her side of the family to gain control of the conjugal properties; that Lucita was willing to destroy
his reputation by filing the legal separation case just so her parents and her siblings could control the
properties he worked hard for. The Court finds such reasoning hard to believe. What benefit would
Lucita personally gain by pushing for her parents’ and siblings’ financial interests at the expense of her
marriage? What is more probable is that there truly exists a ground for legal separation, a cause so
strong, that Lucita had to seek redress from the courts. The claim of William that a decree of legal
separation would taint his reputation and label him as a wife-beater and child-abuser also does not
elicit sympathy from this Court. If there would be such a smear on his reputation then it would not
be because of Lucita’s decision to seek relief from the courts, but because he gave Lucita reason to go
to court in the first place.
Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a
decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which
provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation.
The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more
than one year. As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not
constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.

FROILAN C. GANDIONCO vs. HON. SENEN C. PEÑARANDA

G.R. No. 79284 November 27, 1987
Facts:

Private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner, filed a complaint against petitioner for legal
separation, on the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages.
Private respondent also filed a criminal complaint against petitioner for concubinage. Respondent
Judge then issued a decree ordering petitioner to provide support to the private respondent.
In this recourse, petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents
consequent thereto, such as, application for support pendente lite, should be suspended in view of the
criminal case for concubinage filed against him the private respondent since the civil action arises from
the criminal action of concubinage. Petitioner also argues that his conviction for concubinage will
have to be first secured before the action for legal separation can prosper or succeed, as the basis of
the action for legal separation is his alleged offense of concubinage.
Issue:
Whether or not the contention of petitioner is valid, that the civil action for legal separation
should first be suspended and that he must first be convicted before deciding upon the said civil
action.
Ruling:
A civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or
simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one "to enforce
the civil liability arising from the offense" even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are
related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with
the legal consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody
of offsprings, support, and disqualification from inheriting from the innocent spouse, among others.
An action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability, in the main, but is aimed at the conjugal
rights of the spouses and their relations to each other.
Also, a decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof
by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction
is necessary. To this end, the doctrine in Francisco vs. Tayao has been modified, as that case was decided
under Act. No. 2710, when absolute divorce was then allowed and had for its grounds the same
grounds for legal separation under the New Civil Code, with the requirement, under such former law,
that the guilt of defendant spouses had to be established by final judgment in a criminal action. That
requirement has not been reproduced or adopted by the framers of the present Civil Code, and the
omission has been uniformly accepted as a modification of the stringent rule in Francisco v. Tayao.
PRIMA PARTOSA-JO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HO HANG

G.R. No. 82606 December 18, 1992
Facts:

Petitioner was legally married to Jose Jo alias Ho Hang.However, in 1980, the petitioner filed
a complaint against Jo for judicial separation of conjugal property, in addition to an earlier action for
support, also against him. The two cases were consolidated and tried jointly. Thereafter, the judge
rendered a decision of legal separation between the spouses and further ordered the payment of
support by Ho Hang to petitioner. However, there was no definite disposition for the judicial
separation of their property. Hence, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals seeking
for the judicial separation of their conjugal properties.
The Court of Appeals however dismissed the complaint for judicial separation of property for
lack of a cause of action and on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered by Article
178 of the Civil Code since the separation of the conjugal property was agreed by the spouses.When
their motions for reconsideration were denied, both parties came to this Court for relief.
Issue:
Whether or not the courts erred in finding that the judicial separation of property was not
allowed.
Ruling:
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling
without any intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three
months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall
be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling.Under the this
provision, the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial separation on either of these grounds: 1.
Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause; and 2. Failure of one spouse to comply
with his or her obligations to the family without just cause, even if she said spouse does not leave the
other spouse.
The record shows that as early as 1942, the private respondent had already rejected the
petitioner, whom he denied admission to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City when she returned
from Zamboanguita. The fact that she was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he had
no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. Moreover, beginning 1968 until the
determination by this Court of the action for support in 1988, the private respondent refused to give
financial support to the petitioner. The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by
the private respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a
ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property.
In addition, the petitioner may also invoke the second ground allowed by Article 128, for the
fact is that he has failed without just cause to comply with his obligations to the family as husband or
parent. Apart from refusing to admit his lawful wife to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City, Jo has
freely admitted to cohabiting with other women and siring many children by them. It was his refusal
to provide for the petitioner and their daughter that prompted her to file the actions against him for
support and later for separation of the conjugal property, in which actions, significantly, he even
denied being married to her. The private respondent has not established any just cause for his refusal
to comply with his obligations to his wife as dutiful husband.

CONDONATION/PARDON
EDUARDO ARROYO, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 96602 November 19, 1991
Facts:

Dr. Jorge B. Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery against his wife, Ruby Vera Neri, and
Eduardo Arroyo committed on 2 November 1982 in the City of Baguio. Both defendants pleaded not
guilty and after trial, the RTC convicted petitioner and Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri of adultery. According to
the facts of the case, the accused Ruby Neri in the company of a friend went to Baguio City and
proceeded at Mines View Park Condominium. At 7:00 in the evening, co-accused Eduardo Arroyo
entered the unit and thereafter proceeded inside the master's bedroom where Ruby Neri and her friend
was waiting. Ruby Neri's friend was thereafter instructed to leave the room. After 45 minutes, both
Ruby Neri and Eduardo Arroyo came out from the room and joined Ruby Neri's friend at the living
room.
Both Ruby Neri and Eduardp Arroyo filed a motion for reconsideration contending that a
pardon has been extended by Ruby Neri's husband and that her husband had later contracted marriage
with another woman. As proof of this, Ruby Neri showed the Affidavit of Desistance made by Dr.
Neri.
Issue:
Whether or not the Affidavit of Desitance executed by Dr. Neri signifies pardon.
Ruling:
The rule on pardon is found in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which provides: "ART.
344. The crime of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by
the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both
parties, if they are both alive, nor in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders."
While there is a conceptual difference between consent and pardon in the sense that consent
is granted prior to the adulterous act while pardon is given after the illicit affair, nevertheless, for either
consent or pardon to benefit the accused, it must be given prior to the filing of a criminal complaint.
In the present case, the affidavit of desistance was executed only on 23 November 1988 while the
compromise agreement was executed only on 16 February 1989, after the trial court had already
rendered its decision dated 17 December 1987 finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
It should also be noted that while Article 344 of the Revise Penal Code provides that the crime
of adultery cannot be prosecuted without the offended spouse's complaint, once the complaint has
been filed, the control of the case passes to the public prosecutor. Enforcement of our law on adultery
is not exclusively, nor even principally, a matter of vindication of the private honor of the offended
spouse; much less is it a matter merely of personal or social hypocrisy. Such enforcement relates, more
importantly, to protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation
of which the State has the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental
kind.
The same sentiment has been expressed in the Family Code of the Philippines in Article 149:
"The family, being the foundation of the ration, is a basic social institution which public policy
cherishes and protects." Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice
or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect.

CONDONATION/PARDON
BENJAMIN BUGAYONG vs. LEONILA GINEZ

G.R. No. L-10033 December 28, 1956
Facts:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to defendant
Leonila Ginez. Immediately after their marriage, the couple lived with their sisters who later moved

to Sampaloc, Manila. After some time, Leonila Ginez left the dwelling of her sister-in-law and
informed her husband by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in Asingan, Pangasinan.
Afterwards, Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters from some anonymous writers
informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. Benjamin Bugayong then went to Asingan,
Pangasinan and sought for his wife. Both husband and wife then proceeded to the house of Pedro
Bugayong, a cousin of Benjamin, where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and
wife. Then they returned to the plaintiff's house and again passed the night therein as husband and
wife. On the third day, Benjamin tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received
that she had committed adultery but, instead of answering his query, she merely packed up and left,
which he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her. After that and despite such
belief, plaintiff exerted efforts to locate her.
Benjamin then filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife, who timely filed an
answer vehemently denying the averments of the complaint and stating than she was condoned by her
husband.
Issue:
Whether or not there was condonation in this case.
Ruling:
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation.
A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-husband, clearly shows that there was a
condonation on the part of the husband for the supposed "acts of infidelity amounting to adultery"
committed by defendant-wife. Admitting for the sake of argument that the infidelities amounting to
adultery were committed by the defendant, a reconciliation was effected between her and the plaintiff.
The act of the latter in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact that she went with him
and consented to be brought to the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong and together they slept there
as husband and wife for one day and one night, and the further fact that in the second night they again
slept together in their house likewise as husband and wife — all these facts have no other meaning in
the opinion of this court than that a reconciliation between them was effected and that there was a
condonation of the wife by the husband. The reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came
to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery.It has been held in a long line of decisions of
the various supreme courts of the different states of the U. S. that 'a single voluntary act of sexual
intercourse by the innocent spouse after discovery of the offense is ordinarily sufficient to constitute
condonation, especially as against the husband'. In the lights of the facts testified to by the plaintiff-
husband, of the legal provisions above quoted, and of the various decisions above-cited, the inevitable
conclusion is that there is condonation.
CONDONATION/PARDON
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GUADALUPE ZAPATA

G.R. No. L-3047 May 16, 1951
Facts:
A complaint for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc against Guadalupe Zapata, his wife, and
Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting and having repeated sexual intercourse during the

period from the year 1946 to 1947. The complaint was filed on March 14, 1947 whereby Dalmacio
Bondoc knows his codefendant to be a married woman. The defendant wife entered the plea of guilty
and was sentenced to suffer four months which penalty she served. In the same court, on September
17, 1948, the offended husband filed another complaint for adulterous acts committed by his wife and
her paramour from March 1947 to September 1948. Each of the defendants filed a motion to quash
the complaint of the ground that they would be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. The trial court upheld the contention of the defendants and quashed the second complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the second complaint be quashed for double jeopardy.
Ruling:
A second complaint charging the commission of adulterous acts not included in the first
complaint does not constitute a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the constitution is that, if
the second complaint places the defendants twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense,
the adultery committed by the male defendant charged in the second complaint, should he be absolved
from, or acquitted of, the first charge upon the evidence that he did not know that his codefendant
was a married woman, would remain or go unpunished. The defense set up by him against the first
charge upon which he was acquitted would no longer be available, because at the time of the
commission of the crime charged in the second complaint, he already knew that this defendant was a
married woman and he continued to have carnal knowledge of her.
Even if the husband should pardon his adulterous wife, such pardon would not exempt the
wife and her paramour from criminal liability for adulterous acts committed after the pardon was
granted because the pardon refers to previous and not to subsequent adulterous acts.
The order appealed from, which quashed the second complaint for adultery, is hereby reversed
and set aside, and trial court directed to proceed with the trial of the defendants in accordance with
law, with costs against the appellees.
CONDONATION/PARDON
JOSE DE OCAMPO vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO

G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938. They begot several children who are
now living with plaintiff. In March, 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife was
betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant

carrying marital relations with another man plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty
culture, where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city defendant
was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June, 1952, when
defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately.
On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another
man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal
separation, to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery
in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff a petition for legal separation. Defendant poses as defense
that plaintiff condoned her adulterous acts with Nelson Orzame since plaintiff never sought for her
after having discovered her adulterous acts.
Issue:
Whether or not plaintiff condoned the acts of defendant.
Ruling:
We do not think plaintiff's failure actively to search for defendant and take her home (after
the latter had left him in 1952) constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous relations with
Orzame. It will be remembered that she "left" him after having sinned with Arcalas and after he had
discovered her dates with other men. Consequently, it was not his duty to search for her to bring her
home. Hers was the obligation to return.
Two decisions are cited wherein from apparently similar circumstances, this Court inferred
the husband's consent to or condonation of his wife's misconduct. However, upon careful
examination, a vital difference will be found: in both instances, the husband had abandoned his wife;
here it was the wife who "left" her husband.
Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband's petition we hereby reverse the
appealed decision and decree a legal separation between these spouse, all the consequent effects.
CONSENT AND FORMS
SOCORRO MATUBIS vs. ZOILO PRAXEDES

G.R. No. L-11766 October 25, 1960
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were legally married on January 10, 1943. For failure to agree on how
they should live as husband and wife, the couple agreed to live separately from each other, which
status remained unchanged until the present. On April 3, 1948, plaintiff and defendant entered into

an agreementwhich provides among others that “neither of them can prosecute the other for adultery
or concubinage or any other crime arising from their separation.”
In January, 1955, defendant began cohabiting with one Asuncion Rebulado and said Asuncion
gave birth to a child. It was shown also that defendant and Asuncion deported themselves as husband
and wife and were generally reputed as such in the community.
Plaintiff thereafter filed an action for legal separation against the defendant. The trial court
however dismissed the action on the ground that under Art. 102 of the new Civil Code, an action for
legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff
became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when the cause occurred.
The plaintiff became aware of the illegal cohabitation of her husband with Asuncion Rebulado in
January, 1955. The complaint was filed on April 24, 1956. The present action was, therefore, filed out
of time. Also, article 100 of the new Civil Code provides that the legal separation may be claimed only
by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage. As shown in the facts, the plaintiff has consented to the commission of concubinage by
her husband as proven by their “agreement.”
Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiff condoned the acts of the defendant.
Ruling:
An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date
on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from after the date when
cause occurred.The complaint was filed outside the periods provided for by the above Article. By the
very admission of plaintiff, she came to know the ground (concubinage) for the legal separation in
January, 1955. She instituted the complaint only on April 24, 1956. It is to be noted that appellant did
not even press this matter in her brief.
The very wording of the “agreement” gives no room for interpretation other than that given
by the trial judge. Condonation and consent on the part of plaintiff are necessarily the import of the
agreement. The condonation and consent here are not only implied but expressed. Article 100 Civil
Code, specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided
there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Having condoned
and/or consented in writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court's sympathy.
CONSENT AND FORMS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, ET AL

G.R. No. L-48183 November 10, 1941
Facts:
On March 16, 1926, the accused Rodolfo A. Schneckenburger married the compliant Elena
Ramirez Cartagena and after seven years of martial life, they agreed, for reason of alleged

incompatibility of character, to live separately each other and on May 25, 1935 they executed a
document which in part recites “en completa libertad de accion en calquier acto y todos concepto.”
On June 15, 1935, the accused Schneckenburger, secured a decree of divorce from the civil
court of Juarez, Bravos District, State of Chihuahua, Mexico. Subsequently, he contracted another
marriage with his co-accused, Julia Medel and since then they lived together as husband and wife.
Complainant then instituted two actions against the accused, one for bigamy and the other for
concubinage. The accused posed as defense the act of condonation made by the complainant.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid condonation in this case.
RULING:
The Court believes and so holds that the accused should be acquitted of the crime of
concubinage. The document executed by and between the accused and the complaint in which they
agreed to be "en completa libertad de accion en cualquier acto y en todos conceptos," while illegal for
the purpose for which it was executed, constitutes nevertheless a valid consent to the act of
concubinage within the meaning of section 344 of the Revised Penal Code. There can be no doubt
that by such agreement, each party clearly intended to forego to illicit acts of the other.
The second paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code provides: The offended party
cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive,
nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.As the term "pardon"
unquestionably refers to the offense after its commission, "consent" must have been intended
agreeably with its ordinary usage, to refer to the offense prior to its commission. No logical difference
can indeed be perceived between prior and subsequent consent, for in both instances as the offended
party has chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy to come to court
and invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong. We, therefore, hold that the prior consent is as
effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense.
The Court reiterate that the agreement should be misconstrued as legalizing an agreement to
do an illicit act, in violation of law. Our view must be taken only to mean that an agreement of the
tenor entered into between the parties herein, operates, within the plain language and manifest policy
of the law, to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense. If there is anything morally
condemnatory in a situation of his character, the remedy lies not with us but with the legislative
department of the government. What the law is, not what it should be, defines the limits of our
authority.
CONSENT AND FORMS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. URSULA SENSANO

G.R. No. L-37720 March 27, 1933
Facts:
Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on April 29, 1919. They had one child.
Shortly after the birth of his child, the husband left his wife to go to the Province of Cagayan where
he remained for three years without writing to his wife or sending her anything for the support of

herself and their son. Poor and illiterate, without relatives upon whom she could call, she struggled
for an existence for herself and her son until a fatal day when she met the accused Marcelo Ramos
who took her and the child to live with him.
On the return of the husband (in 1924), he filed a charge against his wife and Marcelo Ramos
for adultery and both were sentenced to four months and one day. The court, in its decision, stated
the following: "In the opinion of the court, the husband of the accused has been somewhat cruel in
his treatment of his wife having abandoned her as he did." After completing her sentence, the accused
left her wife. She thereupon appealed to this municipal president and the justice of the peace to send
for her husband so that she might ask his pardon and beg him to take her back. At the house of the
president she begged his pardon and promised to be a faithful wife if he would take her back.
He refused to pardon her to live with her and said she could go where she wished, that he
would have nothing more to do with her, and she could do as she pleased. Abandoned for the second
time, she and her child went back to her co-accused Marcelo Ramos (this was in the year 1924) and
they have lived with him ever since. The husband, knowing that she resumed living with her
codefendant in 1924, did nothing to interfere with their relations or to assert his rights as husband.
Shortly thereafter he left for the Territory of Hawaii where she remained for seven years completely
abandoning his said wife and child. On his return to these Islands, he presented the second charge of
adultery here involved with the sole purpose, as he declared, of being able to obtain a divorce.
Issue:
Whether or not the husband is still entitled to his relief
Ruling:
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty
parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.
Apart from the fact that the husband in this case was assuming a mere pose when he signed the
complaint as the "offended" spouse, we have come to the conclusion that the evidence in this case
and his conduct warrant the inference that he consented to the adulterous relations existing between
the accused and therefore he is not authorized by law to institute this criminal proceeding.We cannot
accept the argument of the Attorney-General that the seven years of acquiescence on his part in the
adultery of his wife is explained by his absence from the Philippine Islands during which period it was
impossible for him to take any action against the accused. There is no merit in the argument that it
was impossible for the husband to take any action against the accused during the said seven years.
RATIONALE OF RECRIMINATION/MUTUAL GUILT
BENEDICTO vs. DE LA RAMA

G.R. NO. L-1056 December 8, 1903
Facts:
Plaintiff and Defendant were married on July 1891.Both were happily living together until
August of 1892 when the defendant without any previous warning, took his wife to the house of her
parents and left her there. It was found out that in plaintiff’s complaint for separation, she charges
defendant of committing adultery with Gregoria Bemejo. The lower courts believed such adulterous
acts committed by the defendant.

On the part of the defendant however, he stated that the reason why he left his wife was
because he received a letter made by the plaintiff herself, addressed to a Spanish civil guard named
Zabal who was her lover. When the defendant asked plaintiff regarding the said letter, she admitted
the genuineness of the letter, fell upon her knees, and implored him to pardon her. That same day he
took her to the home of her parents, told what had occurred, and left her there. The mother testified
that about a year after her daughter was returned to her she heard that the defendant believed that
illicit relations existed between Zabal and the plaintiff on account of a certain letter.
Issue:
Whether or not mutual guilt was committed by both parties in this case
Ruling:
It is expressly provided in Law 8, title 2, partida 4, as follows: “For the sin of each one of them
is of itself a bar to an accusation against the other.”The Court’s conclusion is that neither one of the
parties is entitled to a divorce. Section 497authorizes us in cases of this kind "to make such findings
upon the facts and render such final judgment as justice and equity require." The judgment below is
reversed, and we find from the evidence the following facts: The allegations of the complaint as to the
marriage of the parties and as to the acts of adultery committed by the defendant are true as therein
stated except as to the date of the adultery committed with Gregoria Bermejo. The plaintiff, in the
summer of 1892, at Talisay, in the Province of Occidental Negros, committed adultery with one Zabal,
a corporal of the civil guard.
As conclusion of law from the foregoing facts we hold that neither party is entitled to judgment
of divorce against the other; that judgment be entered that the plaintiff take nothing by her action or
the defendant by his cross demand, and that neither party recover of the other any costs either in this
court or the Court of First Instance.
COLLUSION

G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960
Facts:

in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal separation.
Issue:
Whether or not collusion existed in this case.
Ruling:
Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement between husband and wife for
one of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to be represented in court as having committed,
a matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the
other to obtain a divorce. This agreement, if not express, may be implied from the acts of the parties.
It is a ground for denying the divorce.
In this case, there would be collusion if the parties had arranged to make it appear that a
matrimonial offense had been committed although it was not, or if the parties had connived to bring
about a legal separation even in the absence of grounds therefor. Here, the offense of adultery had
really taking place, according to the evidence. The defendant could not have falsely told the adulterous
acts to the Fiscal, because her story might send her to jail the moment her husband requests the Fiscal
to prosecute. She could not have practiced deception at such a personal risk.
In this connection, it has been held that collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that
the guilty party confesses to the offense and thus enables the other party to procure evidence necessary
to prove it
PRESCRIPTION
WILLIAM H. BROWN vs. JUANITA YAMBAO

G.R. No. L-10699 October 18, 1957
Facts:
On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to
obtain legal separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that while interned
by the Japanese invaders, from 1942 to 1945, at the University of Sto. Tomas internment camp, his
wife engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl. Brown
learned of his wife’s misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from internment. Thereafter the spouse

lived separately. Yambao however testified that after liberation, Brown lived martially with another
woman and had begotten children by her.
The court denied the legal separation filed on the ground that Brown’s action had already
prescribed.
Issue:
Whether or not the action had already prescribed.
Ruling:
The court below also found, and correctly held that the appellant's action was already barred,
because Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his
wife's adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945. Under Article 102 of the new
Civil Code, action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one (1) year from and after the
plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when such cause
occurred. Appellant's brief does not even contest the correctness of such findings and conclusion.
The courts can take cognizance of prescription as a defense because actions seeking a decree
of legal separation, or annulment of marriage, involve public interest and it is the policy of our law
that no such decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record.
PRESCRIPTION

G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960
Facts:

in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal separation. Both
lower and appellate courts denied the petition on the ground that there was confession of judgment.
Issue:
Whether or not there was confession of judgment.
Ruling:
Art. 100 of the Civil Code do not exclude, as evidence, any admission or confession made by
the defendant outside of the court. It merely prohibits a decree of separation upon a confession of
judgment. Confession of judgment usually happens when the defendant appears in court and
confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiff's
demand. This is not present in this case. Yet, even supposing that the above statement of defendant
constituted practically a confession of judgment, inasmuch as there is evidence of the adultery
independently of such statement, the decree may and should be granted, since it would not be based
on her confession, but upon evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment
based exclusively or mainly on defendant's confession. If a confession defeats the action ipso facto,
any defendant who opposesthe separation will immediately confess judgment, purposely to prevent
it.
The mere circumstance that defendants told the Fiscal that she "like also" to be legally
separated from her husband, is no obstacle to the successful prosecution of the action. When she
refused to answer the complaint, she indicated her willingness to be separated. Yet, the law does not
order the dismissal. Allowing the proceeding to continue, it takes precautions against collusion, which
implies more than consent or lack of opposition to the agreement.
PRESCRIPTION
ELENA CONTRERAS vs. CESAR J. MACARAIG

G.R. No. L-29138 May 29, 1970
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were married on March 16, 1952. Out of their Marriage, three children
were born. All the children are in the care of plaintiff wife.In September, 1962, Avelino Lubos, driver
of the family car, told plaintiff that defendant was living in Singalong with one Lily Ann Alcala.
Defendant would be away for a month, and would be home for three days. During these times
defendant was home, plaintiff refrained from verifying Lubos’ report in her desire not to anger
defendant.

Plaintiff also heard rumors that Lily Ann Alcala gave birth to a baby. Plaintiff then entreated
her father-in-law, Lucilo Macaraig, to intercede with defendant and to convince him to return to his
family. Defendant however told his father that he could not do anything. Thereafter, plaintiff met with
Lili Ann Alcala. The latter informed that former that she was willing to give defendant but it was
defendant who refused to break relationship with her.
In the early part of December, 1963, plaintiff went to talk to defendant at his place of work
where plaintiff pleaded with defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala and to return to the conjugal home,
assuring him that she was willing to forgive him. Defendant informed plaintiff that he could no longer
leave Lily Ann and refused to return to his legitimate family.On December 14, 1963, plaintiff instituted
the present action for legal separation.
Issue:
Whether or not prescription has already set in
Ruling:
The requirement of the law that a complaint for legal separation be filed within one year after
the date plaintiff become cognizant of the cause is not of prescriptive nature, but is of the essence of
the cause of action. It is consonant with the philosophy that marriage is an inviolable social institution
so that the law provides strict requirements before it will allow a disruption of its status.The only
question to be resolved is whether the period of one year provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code
should be counted, as far as the instant case is concerned from September 1962 or from December
1963. After a careful review of the record, We are persuaded that, in the eyes of the law, the only time
when appellant really became cognizant of the infidelity of her husband was in the early part of
December 1963 when plaintiff pleaded the defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala.
From all the foregoing We conclude that it was only on the occasion mentioned in the
preceding paragraph when her husband admitted to her that he was living with and would no longer
leave Lily Ann to return to his legitimate family that appellant must be deemed to be under obligation
to decide whether to sue or not to sue for legal separation, and it was only then that the legal period
of one year must be deemed to have commenced. The one year prescriptive period is thus followed
in this case.
PROCEDURE OF ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION
AIDA P. BAÑEZ vs. GABRIEL B. BAÑEZ

G.R. No. 132592 January 23, 2002
Facts:
On September 23, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 20, decided Civil Case No.
CEB-16765, decreeing among others the legal separation between petitioner Aida Bañez and
respondent Gabriel Bañez on the ground of the latter’s sexual infidelity; the dissolution of their
conjugal property relations and the division of the net conjugal assets; the forfeiture of respondent’s
one-half share in the net conjugal assets in favor of the common children.

Defendant then filed a Notice of Appeal before the appellate court. Petitioner however
contends that an action for legal separation is among the cases where multiple appeals may be taken.
She concludes that respondent’s appeal should have been dismissed for his failure to file the record
on appeal within the reglementary period.
Issue:
Whether or not multiple appeals form part of the procedure for legal separation cases.
Ruling:
In said case, the two issues raised by therein petitioner that may allegedly be the subject of
multiple appeals arose from the same cause of action, and the subject matter pertains to the same
lessor-lessee relationship between the parties. Hence, splitting the appeals in that case would only be
violative of the rule against multiplicity of appeals.
The same holds true in an action for legal separation. The issues involved in the case will
necessarily relate to the same marital relationship between the parties. The effects of legal separation,
such as entitlement to live separately, dissolution and liquidation of the absolute community or
conjugal partnership, and custody of the minor children, follow from the decree of legal separation.
They are not separate or distinct matters that may be resolved by the court and become final prior to
or apart from the decree of legal separation. Rather, they are mere incidents of legal separation. Thus,
they may not be subject to multiple appeals.
PROCEDURE OF ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION
CARMEN LAPUZ SYvs. EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY

G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972
Facts:
On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio
S. Eufemio, alleging that they were married civilly on 21 September 1934; that they had lived together
as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that they had no child;
and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa
Street, Manila, on or about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation,

which, among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his
share of the conjugal partnership profits.
Respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio however counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab

initio of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage,
celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok. On May 31,
1969, petitioner died in a vehicular accident. Respondent moved to dismiss the case on the ground
that the death abated the action for legal separation.
Issue:
Whether or not the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation,
abate the action
Ruling:
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation
of the spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100,
by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108,
by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even
rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the
death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself “... When one of the spouses is
dead, there is no need for divorce, because the marriage is dissolved. The heirs cannot even continue
the suit, if the death of the spouse takes place during the course of the suit (Article 244, Section 3).”
The action is absolutely dead
Marriage is a personal relation or status, created under the sanction of law, and an action for
divorce is a proceeding brought for the purpose of effecting a dissolution of that relation. The action
is one of a personal nature. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the death of one of the parties
to such action abates the action, for the reason that death has settled the question of separation beyond
all controversy and deprived the court of jurisdiction, both over the persons of the parties to the action
and of the subject-matter of the action itself. For this reason the courts are almost unanimous in
holding that the death of either party to a divorce proceeding, before final decree, abates the action.
However, it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains
(or of the absolute community of property), the loss of right by the offending spouse to any share of
the profits earned by the partnership or community, or his disqualification to inherit by intestacy from
the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of testamentary provisions in favor of the offending
spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by the very terms of the Civil
Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by their nature and intent, such
claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable or transmissible. Hence, a claim to said
rights is not a claim that "is not thereby extinguished" after a party dies, under Section 17, Rule 3, of
the Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of the action through a substitute of the deceased party.

LUIS MA. ARANETA vs. HONORABLE HERMOGENES CONCEPCION

G.R. No. L-9667 July 31, 1956
Facts:
The main action was brought by the husband against his wifefor legal separation on the ground
of adultery. The wife however filed an omnibus petition to secure custody of their three minor
children, a monthly support of P5,000 for herself and said children, and the return of her passport.
The husband opposed the petition, denying the misconduct imputed to him and alleging that the wife
had abandoned the children. The respondent judge resolved the omnibus petition granting custody of
the children to the wife and a monthly allowance of P2,300.00 for support for her and her children.

The main reason given by the judge, for refusing the huisband’s request that evidence be
allowed to be introduced on the issues, is the prohibition contained in Article 103 of the Civil Code,
which reads as follows: “ART. 103. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six
months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition.”
Issue:
Whether or not the six month cooling-off period be followed
Ruling:
It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein Article 103 (Civil Code) is evidently
intended as a cooling off period to make possible a reconciliation between the spouses. The recital of
their grievances against each other in court may only fan their already inflamed passions against one
another, and the lawmaker has imposed the period to give them opportunity for dispassionate
reflection. But this practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative policy, does not have the
effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of the children and
alimony and support pendente lite according to the circumstances. (Article 105, Civil Code.) The law
expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to the circumstances. If these
are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank in justice may be caused.
Take the case at bar, for instance. Why should the court ignore the claim of adultery by the
husband in the face of express allegations under oath to that effect, supported by circumstantial
evidence consisting of letter the authenticity of which cannot be denied. And why assume that the
children are in the custody of the wife, and that the latter is living at the conjugal dwelling, when it is
precisely alleged in the petition and in the affidavits, that she has abandoned the conjugal abode?
Evidence of all these disputed allegations should be allowed that the discretion of the court as to the
custody and alimony pendente lite may be lawfully exercised.
Thus the determination of the custody and alimony should be given effect and force provided
it does not go to the extent of violating the policy of the cooling off period. That is, evidence not
affecting the cause of the separation, like the actual custody of the children, the means conducive to
their welfare and convenience during the pendency of the case, these should be allowed that the court
may determine which is best for their custody.
LUCY SOMOSA-RAMOS vs. THE HONORABLE CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR.

G.R. No. L-34132 July 29, 1972
Facts:
On June 18, 1971, petitioner filed in the sala of respondent Judge against respondent Clemente
Ramos for legal separation, on concubinage on the respondent's part and an attempt by him against
her life being alleged. She likewise sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
for the return to her of what she claimed to be her paraphernal and exclusive property, then under the
administration and management of respondent Clemente Ramos. There was an opposition to the
hearing of such a motion based on Article 103 of the Civil Code. Thereafter, petitioner received an
order of respondent Judge granting the motion of respondent Ramos to suspend the hearing of the
petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction. That is the order complained of in this petition
for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 103 of the Civil Code prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal
separation before the lapse of six months from the filing of the petition, would likewise preclude the
court from acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy
to such a suit.
Ruling:
After a careful consideration of the legal question presented, it is the holding of this Court that
Article 103 the Civil Code is not an absolute bar to the hearing motion for preliminary injunction prior
to the expiration of the six-month period.The court where the action is pending according to Article
103 is to remain passive. It must let the parties alone in the meanwhile. It is precluded from hearing
the suit. There is then some plausibility for the view of the lower court that an ancillary motion such
as one for preliminary mandatory injunction is not to be acted on. If it were otherwise, there would
be a failure to abide by the literal language of such codal provision. That the law, however, remains
cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power to assert itself are discernible from what is set
forth in the following article. It reads thus: "After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the
spouse shall be entitled to live separately from each other and manage their respective property. The
husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but if the court deems it proper,
it may appoint another to manage said property, in which case the administrator shall have the same
rights and duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to dispose of the income or of the capital
except in accordance with the orders of the court."There would appear to be then recognition that
the question of management of their respective property need not be left unresolved even during such
six-month period. An administrator may even be appointed for the management of the property of
the conjugal partnership. The absolute limitation from which the court suffers under the preceding
article is thereby eased. The parties may in the meanwhile be heard. There is justification then for the
petitioner's insistence that her motion for preliminary mandatory injunction should not be ignored by
the lower court. There is all the more reason for this response from respondent Judge, considering
that the husband whom she accused of concubinage and an attempt against her life would in the
meanwhile continue in the management of what she claimed to be her paraphernal property, an
assertion that was not specifically denied by him.
ENRICO L. PACETE vs. HON. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA, JR.

G.R. No. L-53880 March 17, 1994
Facts:
In Concepcion Alanis’ complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete on 30 April 1938;
that Pacete subsequently contracted (in 1948) a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion; that
she learned of such marriage only on 01 August 1979; that during her marriage to Pacete, the latter
acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and several motor vehicles; that he
fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his name and Clarita or in the names of his
children with Clarita and other dummies.
The defendants asked for a motion of extension if their time to file their answers, which was
granted by the judge. However, defendants still failed to file their respective answers. Thus, Alanis

asked that defendants be declared in default which was approved by the judge. Thereafter, Alanis
submitted all evidences favoring her. Thus, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the declaration of default is proper
Ruling:
Art. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment.In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between the parties exists. If there is no
collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence
for the plaintiff is not fabricated.
The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the intervention of the state
attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages,
under Article 88), is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a social
institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or interruption cannot be
made to depend upon the parties themselves.
It is consonant with this policy that the inquiry by the Fiscal should be allowed to focus upon
any relevant matter that may indicate whether the proceedings for separation or annulment are fully
justified or not. Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates
that an action for legal separation must "in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since
the filing of the petition," obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this
interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further underscored by the
inclusion of the following provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court: Sec. 6. No defaults in actions
for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. — If the defendant in an action for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
investigate whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene
for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.
The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to possible jeopardy
are impelled by no less than the State's interest in the marriage relation and its avowed intention not
to leave the matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone dictate.

NECESSITY OF TRIAL AND INTERVENTION OF STATE
ENRICO L. PACETE vs. HON. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA, JR.

G.R. No. L-53880 March 17, 1994
Facts:
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as
for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She averred in
her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo;
that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she
learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible
since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file
an answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in

communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the
plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The
court received plaintiffs’ evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980. After
trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17,1980.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for
extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision
on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to be null and
void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.
Ruling:
The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the
court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists.
If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that
the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.” The above stated provision calling for the intervention
of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of
marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an
action for legal separation must “in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the
filing of the petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling-off” period. In this interim,
the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile. The significance of the above
substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18
of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for
legal separation. Therefore, “if the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not
a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order
to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.”
SAMSON T. SABALONES vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and REMEDIOS GAVIOLA-

SABALONES
G.R. No. 106169 February 14, 1994
Facts:
As a member of our diplomatic service assigned to different countries during his successive
tours of duties, petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to his wife, herein respondent Remedios Gaviola-
Sabalones, the administration of some of their conjugal, properties for fifteen years. Sabalones retired
as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his wife and their children. Four
years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot located at #17
Eisenhower St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, belonging to the conjugal partnership. He claimed
that he was sixty-eight years old, very sick and living alone without any income, and that his share of
the proceeds of the sale to defray the prohibitive cost of his hospitalization and medical treatment. In
her answer, the private respondent opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal
separation.

The Court notes that the wife has been administering the subject properties for almost
nineteen years now, apparently without complaint on the part of the petitioner. He has not alleged,
much less shown, that her administration has caused prejudice to the conjugal partnership. What he
merely suggests is that the lease of the Forbes Park property could be renewed on better terms, or he
should at least be given his share of the rentals.
In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the decree of legal separation and order the
liquidation of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband's share therein because of his
adultery. She also prayed that it enjoin the petitioner and his agents from a) disturbing the occupants
of the Forbes Park property and b) disposing of or encumbering any of the conjugal properties. The
petitioner now assails this order, arguing that since the law provides for a joint administration of the
conjugal properties by the husband and wife, no injunctive relief can be issued against one or the other
because no right will be violated. In support of this contention, he cites Art. 124 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the injunction ha permanently installed the respondent wife as the
administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets.
Ruling:
The Court has carefully considered the issues and the arguments of the parties and finds that
the petition has no merit. We agree with the respondent court that pending the appointment of an
administrator over the whole mass of conjugal assets, the respondent court was justified in allowing
the wife to continue with her administration. It was also correct, taking into account the evidence
adduced at the hearing, in enjoining the petitioner from interfering with his wife's administration
pending resolution of the appeal.
The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the conjugal properties as
clearly provided in the above-cited Article 124 of the Family Code. However, Article 61, also above
quoted, states that after a petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in the absence
of a written agreement between the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a third person to act
as the administrator.
While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such
designation was implicit in the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the
conjugal properties (and thus also disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation was in
effect approved by the Court of Appeals when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the preliminary
injunction now under challenge.

REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

TERESITA MASAUDING
G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan City where
Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a
local hospital. Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. Reynaldo was sent by his
employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and
Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife. On
1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. While they were on a brief vacation in the
Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United States, their
second child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born on 1988.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate. Instead of giving
their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the

children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but
because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to
Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus starting the whole
proceedings now reaching this Court. The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It
suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have
sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to
be approved by the Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain custody over the children be
granted.
Ruling:
The SC dismissed the writ of habeas corpus petition by the mother and retain the custody of
the children to the father. The illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused emotional
disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values against the children.
The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they
prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person. The children
understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional
growth by her behavior.
CARMEN LAPUZ SY vs.EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO

G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972
Facts:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August
1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They had
lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her husband
abandoned her. They acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her
husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the
issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio
should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the
ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced
their respective evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent already scheduled
to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly
notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on June

1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year period provided in Article
102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. Petitioner’s
counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.
Issue:
Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation, abate
the action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.
Ruling:
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are
involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself;
without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these
claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no
decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected
consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be
no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned
union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee
or by the heirs of the appellant.
ELISEA LAPERAL vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHIPPINES

G.R. No. L-18008 October 30, 1962
Facts:
On May 10, 1960, Elisea Laperal filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio (Sp Proc. No.
433) a petition which reads: That petitioner's maiden name is ELISEA LAPERAL; that on March 24,
1939, she married Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria; that in a partial decision entered on this Honorable
Court on January 18, 1958, in Civil Case No. 356 of this Court, entitled 'Enrique R. Santamaria vs.
Elisea L. Santamaria' Mr. Enrique Santamaria was given a decree of legal separation from her; that the
said partial decision is now final; That during her marriage to Enrique R. Santamaria, she naturally
used, instead of her maiden name, that of Elisea L. Santamaria; that aside from her legal separation
from Enrique R. Santamaria, she has also ceased to live with him for many years now; That in view of
the fact that she has been legally separated from Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria and has likewise ceased
to live with him for many years, it is desirable that she be allowed to change her name and/or be
permitted to resume using her maiden name, to wit: ELISEA LAPERAL.
Petitioner respectfully prayed that after the necessary proceedings are had, she be allowed to
resume using her maiden name of Elisea Laperal. The petition was opposed by the City Attorney of

Baguio on the ground that the same violates the provisions of Article 370 (should be 372) of the Civil
Code, and that it is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the specific
provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally separated from his
husband.
Ruling:
In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance
of the vinculum. The finding that petitioner’s continued use of her husband surname may cause undue
confusion in her finances was without basis. It must be considered that the issuance of the decree of
legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had
automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there could be no more occasion for an eventual
liquidation of the conjugal assets.
Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of
Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the mandatory provision
of Art. 372.
Petition was dismissed.
SIOCHI vs. GOZON

G.R. No. 169900 March 18, 2010
Facts:
Alfredo and Elvira are married. Winifred is their daughter. The property involved in this case
is a 30,000 sq. m. lot in Malabon which is registered in the name of Alfredo. The property regime of
the couple is conjugal partnership of gains.Elvira filed for legal separation. B filed a notice of lis
pendens over the title of the lot in Malabon. While the legal separation case was still pending, Alfredo
entered into an agreement with Mario who paid P5 million in earnest money and took possession of
the property. Title still with notice of lis pendens.
Cavite RTC granted legal separation. CPG was dissolved and liquidated. Alfredo, the guilty
spouse, did not receive his share in the net profits, which instead went to their daughter, Winifred.
Cavite RTC ruled land in Malabon as conjugal property. Alfred executed a Deed of Donation over
the property in favour of Winifred. Malabon RTC issued new TCT in the name of Winifred without
annotating the agreement between Alfredo and Mario Siochi, nor the notice of lis pendens filed by
Elvira, the wife. Then, through an SPA, Winifred gave authority to her father, Alfred, to sell the lot.
Alfred sold it to Inter-Dimensional Realty for P18 million. A TCT was issued to Inter-Dimensional
Realty. Mario filed a case with Malabon RTC (property was in Malabon) to Annul donation to

Winifred, Annul the Sale to Inter-Dimensional, and to remove notice of lis pendens over title of land.
Malabon RTC upheld original agreement to buy and sell between Mario and Alfredo and declared
void the sale by Alfredo and Winifred to Inter-Dimensional. However, Court of Appeals said
agreement between Mario and Alfredo is void because (1) it was entered into without the consent of
Elvira, Alfredo’s wife; and, (2) Alfredo’s ½ undivided share has been forfeited in favour of Winifred
by the grant of legal separation by the Cavite RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the agreement between Mario and Alfredo valid?
Ruling:
The SC says the CA was right in declaring the sale between Mario and Alfredo as void. Under
Art 124 of the Family Code, if one of the spouses was incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate
in the administration of the properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration.
These powers, however do not include the power to dispose or encumber the properties which require
a court order or the written consent of the other spouse. The agreement is void in its entirety, not just
to the share of the husband, Alfredo. The Court however said that the CA erred in saying that the ½
undivided share of Alfredo was forfeited in favour of Winifred. As regards Mario’s contention that
the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by Elvira’s acceptance before the offer is
withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold
to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn.
The Court said the CA erred in saying that Alfredo forfeited his ½ share in the conjugal
property as a result of the grant of legal separation by the Cavite RTC. Art 63 (Effects of legal
separation) in relation to Art 43(2) (Effects of termination of subsequent marriage) provides that the
guilty spouse in legal separation forfeits his share in the net profits of the property. The Court said,
“Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredo’s share in the conjugal partnership
property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property.” Thus, as regards this
point, the CA erred. Inter-Dimensional says it is a buyer in good faith. SC says no. Inter-Dimensional
knew of the notice of lis pendens.

PELAYO vs. LAURON

G.R. No. 129295 August 15, 2001
Facts:
On November 23, 1906, a physician named Arturo Pelayo filed a complaint against Marelo
Lauron and Juana Abellana. On the night of October 13th of the same year, the plaintiff was called to
render medical assistance to the defendant’s daughter-in-law, who was about to gie birth. After the
consultation of Dr. Escaño, it was deemed that the operation was going to be difficult for child birth,
but regardless, Dr. Pelayo proceeded with the job of operating on the subject and also removed the
afterbirth. The operation went on until morning, and on the same day, visited several times and billed
the defendants the just amount of P500 for the services rendered to which defendants refused to pay.
In answer to the complaint, counsel for the defendants denied all of the allegation and alleged as a
special defense, that their daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the said childbirth, that when
she was alive she lived with her husband independently and in a separate house without any relation
whatever with them, and that, if on the day when she gave birth she was in the house of the defendants,
her stay their was accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances. Therefore, he prayed that the
defendants be absolved of the complaint with costs against the plaintiff.
Issue:
Can the defendants be held liable to pay for the obligation?
Ruling:
No. According to article 1089 of the Civil Code, obligations are created by law, by contracts,
by quasi-contracts, and by illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence
occurs. Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly determined in the code or in
special laws, etc., are the only demandable ones. Obligations arising from contracts have legal force
between the contracting parties and must be fulfilled in accordance with their stipulations. (Arts. 1090
and 1091.) The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness was comprised among the mutual
obligations to which the spouses were bound by way of mutual support. (Arts. 142 and 143.) If every
obligation consists in giving, doing or not doing something (art. 1088), and spouses were mutually
bound to support each other, there can be no question but that, when either of them by reason of
illness should be in need of medical assistance, the other was under the unavoidable obligation to
furnish the necessary services of a physician in order that health may be restored, and he or she may
be freed from the sickness by which life is jeopardized. The party bound to furnish such support was
therefore liable for all expenses, including the fees of the medical expert for his professional services.
In the face of the above legal precepts, it was unquestionable that the person bound to pay the fees
due to the plaintiff for the professional services that he rendered to the daughter-in-law of the
defendants during her childbirth, was the husband of the patient and not her father and mother- in-
law of the defendants herein.

NANCY GO and ALEX GO vs COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 114791 May 29, 1997
Facts:
In 1981, Hermogenes Ong and Jane Ong contracted with Nancy Go for the latter to film their
wedding. After the wedding, the newlywed inquired about their wedding video but Nancy Go said it’s
not yet ready. She advised them to return for the wedding video after their honeymoon. The newlywed
did so but only to find out that Nancy Go can no longer produce the said wedding video because the
copy has been erased. The Ongs then sued Nancy Go for damages. Nancy’s husband, Alex Go, was
impleaded. The trial court ruled in favor of the spouses Ong and awarded in their favor, among others,
P75k in moral damages. In her defense on appeal, Nancy Go said: that they erased the video tape
because as per the terms of their agreement, the spouses are supposed to claim their wedding tape
within 30 days after the wedding, however, the spouses neglected to get said wedding tape because
they only made their claim after two months; that her husband should not be impleaded in this suit.
Issue:
Whether or not Nancy Go is liable for moral damages.
Ruling:
Yes. Her contention is bereft of merit. It is shown that the spouses Ong made their claim after
the wedding but were advised to return after their honeymoon. The spouses advised Go that their
honeymoon is to be done abroad and won’t be able to return for two months. It is contrary to human
nature for any newlywed couple to neglect to claim the video coverage of their wedding; the fact that
the Ongs filed a case against Nancy Go belies such assertion. Considering the sentimental value of the
tapes and the fact that the event therein recorded — a wedding which in our culture is a significant
milestone to be cherished and remembered — could no longer be reenacted and was lost forever, the
trial court was correct in awarding the Ongs moral damages in compensation for the mental anguish,
tortured feelings, sleepless nights and humiliation that the Ongs suffered and which under the
circumstances could be awarded as allowed under Articles 2217 and 2218 of the Civil Code. Anent
the issue that Nancy Go’s husband should not be included in the suit, this argument is valid. Under
Article 73 of the Family Code, the wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in business
without the consent of the husband. In this case, it was shown that it was only Nancy Go who entered
into a contract with the spouses Ong hence only she (Nancy) is liable to pay the damages awarded in
favor of the Ongs.

ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ-ARROYO

G.R. No. 17014 August 29, 1921
Facts:
Plaintiff Mariano and defendant Dolores were married in 1910, and lived in Iloilo City. They
lived together with a few short intervals of separation. On July 4, 1920, defendant Dolores went away
from their common home and decided to live separately from plaintiff. She claimed that she was
compelled to leave on the basis of cruel treatment on the part of her husband. She in turn prayed for
a decree of separation, a liquidation of their conjugal partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees
and permanent separate maintenance. CFI ruled in favor of the defendant and she was granted alimony
amounting to P400, also other fees Plaintiff then asked for a restitution of conjugal rights, and a
permanent mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to return to the conjugal home and live with
him as his wife.
Issues:
a) Whether or not defendant had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home
b) Whether or not plaintiff may be granted the restitution of conjugal rights or absolute order or
permanent mandatory injunction
Ruling:
The wife had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home. Cruelty done by plaintiff to
defendant was greatly exaggerated. The wife was inflicted with a disposition of jealousy towards her
husband in an aggravated degree. No sufficient cause was present. Courts should move with caution
in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife since this recognizes the de
facto separation of the two parties. Continued cohabitation of the pair must be seen as impossible,
and separation must be necessary, stemming from the fault of the husband. She is under obligation to
return to the domicile. “When people understand that they must live together…they learn to soften
by mutual accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot shake off; they become good
husbands and wives…necessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties which it imposes…” (Evans
v. Evans)
On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. It is not within the province of the courts to
compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. In the case of
property rights, such an action may be maintained. Said order, at best, would have no other purpose
than to compel the spouses to live together. Other countries, such as England and Scotland have done
this with much criticism. Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration that the defendant absented herself
without sufficient cause and it is her duty to return. She is also not entitled to support.

ILUSORIO vs. BILDNER

G.R. No. 139789 May 12, 2000
Facts:
Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a period
of thirty years. Out of their marriage, the spouses had six children. In 1972, they separated from bed
and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived in Makati when he was in Manila and in Ilusorio
penthouse when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City. When
Potenciano arrived from United States and lived with Erlinda in Antipolo City for five months. The
children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that their mother overdosed their father with an antidepressant drug
which the latter’s health deteriorated. Erlinda filed with RTC of Antipolo City a petition for
guardianship over the person and property of her husband due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health,
poor eyesight and impaired judgment. Potenciano did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived in
a condominium in Makati City after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City. With these, Erlinda
filed with CA a petition for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband and also for the reason that
respondent refused petitioner’s demands to see and visit her husband and prohibiting Potenciano
from living with her in Antipolo City.
Issue:
Whether or not Erlinda Ilusorio may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband
to live with her in conjugal bliss.
Ruling:
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person there from if such restraint is illegal. To justify the grant
of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of
action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral. No
court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot
be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other means
process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice.
Therefore, a petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

GOITIA vs. CAMPOS-RUEDA

G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916
Facts:
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and immediately
thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for about
a month, when the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. Eloisa Goitia, plaintiff-appellant, and
Jose Campos-Rueda, defendant, were legally married in the city of Manila. They established their
residence 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together. The allegations of the complaint were
that the defendant, one month after they had contracted marriage, demanded plaintiff to perform
unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs in which the latter reject the said demands. With
these refusals, the defendant got irritated and provoked to maltreat the plaintiff by word and deed.
Unable to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease of maltreating her,
plaintiff was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents. The
plaintiff appeals for a complaint against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile.
However, the defendant objects that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action.
Issue:
Whether or not Goitia can claim for support outside of the conjugal domicile.
Ruling:
Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties and
obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines
and prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the object of a marriage is defeated by
rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the
community, relief in some way should be obtainable. The law provides that defendant, who is obliged
to support the wife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining
her in his own home at his option. However, the option given by law is not absolute. The law will not
permit the defendant to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife was forced to
leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assaults of the defendant, Beatriz
may claim support from the defendant for separate maintenance even outside of the conjugal home.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES: MARITAL COMMUNICATION RULE

CUENCA vs. CUENCA
G.R. No. L-72321 December 8, 1988
Facts:
Private respondents Restituto Cuenca and Meladora Cuenca claimed ownership over the
subject parcels of land on the ground that they are the legitimate children of Agripino Cuenca and
Maria Bangahon, both deceased, owners of the subject parcels of land. They alleged that some of the
parcels are paraphernal property of Maria while all the others are conjugal properties of Maria and
Agripino They also alleged that Agripino Cuenca and Engracia Basadre were not legally married
because at the time they lived together Agripino was married to a certain Jesusa Pagar.
On the other hand, the petitioners (defendants below) Diosdidit, Baldomero, Filomeno
Elpidio, Aida, Anita and Engracia Vda.de Cuenca denied the legitimacy of the marriage between
Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon as well as the legitimacy of the plaintiffs as children of the
couple. They claimed that Agripino Cuenca and their mother Engracia Basadre were legally married
and that they are the legitimate children of the couple. They contend that the subject parcels of lands
are conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia.
That parcel of land situated in Rendon, Butuan, Agusan, planted to rice with irrigation under
the present possession of the heirs, bounded on the North by Mariano Agagdang on the East by
Clerencia Tagonsod on the South by Suatan River and on the West by Mariano Agagdang containing
an area of 1.2500 hectares, more or less, under Tax Dec. 3055, assessed at P250.00 by the property
records of Agusan.
That parcel of land situated in Rendon, Butuan, Agusan, planted to coconut, under the present
possession of the heirs, bounded on the North by Maximo Bangahon, on the East, by Sergio Pagar,
on the South, by Macaria Agagdang on the West, by Folgencio Buyan, containing an area of 1.1722
hectares, more or less, assessed at P670.00 by Tax Dec. No. 4026 of Agusan belong to Maria Bangahon
as her inheritance from her parents. This declaration against interest is further reiterated by Agripino
Cuenca in that judicial settlement and sale executed by him on October 19, 1950. These two
documents, as rightly contended by the plaintiffs, are ample proofs that the properties in question
described in par. 2 of the complaint, belong exclusively to Maria Bangahon as her paraphernal
property, a fact declared by no less than the husband himself in a declaration against his interest. It
was error for the trial court to unceremoniously brush aside the importance of the declaration of
Agripino Cuenca in the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Maria Bangahon. These public
documents carry sufficient evidentiary weight to prove the origin of the properties in question and the
nature of their ownership as properties brought into the marriage by Maria Bangahon to Agripino
Cuenca as against the bare testimony of the defendants and their witnesses, More importantly, Juan
Buyan and former Judge Francisco Ro.
Issue:
Whether or not the parcels of lands are conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia
Ruling:

The records show that defendant Bartolome Sanchez upon manifestation of his counsel is no
longer a necessary party as Engracia Basadre-Cuenca has repurchased that portion of the land in
question sold to Bartolome Sanchez making plaintiffs' claim against defendant Bartolome Sanchez
moot and academic.
Our review of the evidence shows that Agripino Cuenca in his lifetime expressed in the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Maria Bangahon executed on June 13, 1950 before Notary
Public Francisco Ro. Cupin (Exh. "C") that:
Parcel of agricultural land situated in Pinamangculan Butuan, Agusan, planted to coconut,

under the present possession of the heirs of Maria Bangahon, bounded on the North, Lot No. 3062,
Lucio Plaza, Lot No. 4319, A. Cuenca, portion of Lot No. 3063, in the possession of A. Cuenca, on
the south Road, on the West by Lot No. 3057, S. Dumanon 3058, B. Adormio, 3059, A. Cuenca and
east portion of Lot No. 3063, containing an area of six (6) hectares, more or less (This is a portion of
Lot No. 3063, Pls-22 of Cad. of Municipality of Butuan which parcel of land belongs exclusively to
Maria Bangahon during her lifetime and which property is separate from the conjugal property of the
marriage of said Maria Bangahon and Agripino Cuenca. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides
that "All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife," In the cases of Philippine National
Bank v. Court of Appeals, (153 SCRA 435 [August 31, 1987); Magallon v. Montejo (146 SCRA 282
[December 16, 1986]) and Maramba v. Lozano (20 SCRA 474 [June 29, 1967]) this Court ruled that
the presumption refers only to the property acquired during marriage and does not operate when there
is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired.
In the case at bar, the documents sought to be presented as newly discovered evidence do not
show that the claims to the subject parcels consisting of homestead lands were perfected during the
marriage of Agripino Cuenca and petitioner Engracia Basadre. The perfection of the homestead claims
is considered the time of acquisition of the properties. The fact that these parcels were surveyed for
Agripino Cuenca and approved during the marriage of Agripino Cuenca and petitioner Engracia
Basadre is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the parcels were the conjugal properties
of Agripino and Engracia. Moreover, the documents show that 5 of the 8 parcels covered by the
documents are titled in the name of either respondent Meladora Cuenca or respondent Restituto
Cuenca. The presumption cannot prevail "when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the
rights of innocent third parties are involved. Under the circumstances of this case, the non-
applicablility of the presumption should also be upheld.
In the light of these findings a new trial would only be an unnecessary exercise and ineffective.
The documents sought to be presented during a new trial would not in any way change the result. The
motion for new trial was correctly denied although not for the reason given by the respondent court.

RELATION BETWEEN SPOUSES: PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION TO EACH
OTHER
ARCABA vs. VDA. DE BATOCAEL

G.R. No. 146683 November 22, 2001
Facts:
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of two lots
in Zamboanga del Norte. After the death of Zosima, Francisco and his mother-in-law executed a deed
of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her ¼ share of the property.
Thereafter, Francisco registered the lot in his name. Having no children to take care of him after his
retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia, the latter’s cousin Luzviminda and petitioner Cirila
Arcaba, to take care of his house and store.
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila and
Francisco. Leticia said that the previous party was lovers since they slept in the same room while
Erlinda claimed that Francisco told her that Cirila was his mistress. On the other hand, Cirila said she
was mere helper and that Francisco was too old for her.
A few months before Francisco’s death, he executed an instrument denominated “Deed of

Donation Inter Vivos” in which he ceded a portion of the lot together with is house to Cirila, who
accepted the donation in the same instrument. The deed stated that the donation was being made in
consideration of the “faithful services she had rendered over the past ten years.” Thereafter, Francisco
died and the respondents filed a complaint against Cirila for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation
inter vivos, recovery of possession and damages. Respondents, who are nieces, nephews and heirs by
intestate succession of Francisco, alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco and the
donation inert vivos is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco Comille be
declared void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
Where it has been established by preponderance of evidence that two persons lived together
as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made
by one in favor of the other is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Therefore, respondents having proven by preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco
lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the donation inter vivos is considered
null and void.

OTHER
MATABUENA vs. CERVANTES

G.R. No. L-28771 March 31, 1971
Facts:
Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this period, Felix Matabuena donated
to respondent a parcel of land. Later the two were married. After the death of Felix Matabuena, his
sister, Petitioner, sought the nullification of the donation citing Art.133 of the Civil Code
“Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void.”
The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition because the donation
was made at the time the deceased and Respondent were not yet married and were simply cohabitating.
Issue:
Whether or not the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners.
Ruling:
Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the
law is as much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason
for the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the possibility of
undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on the other, there is no reason
why this prohibition shall not apply also to common-law relationships.
The court, however, said that the lack of the donation made by the deceased to
Respondent does not necessarily mean that the Petitioner will have exclusive rights to the
disputed property because the relationship between Felix and Respondent were legitimated by
marriage.

OTHER
HARDING vs. COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY

G.R. No. 12707 August 10, 1918
Facts:
In February 1916, Mrs. Harding applied for car insurance for a Studebaker she received as a
gift from her husband. She was assisted by Smith, Bell and Co which was the duly authorized
representative (insurance agent) of Commercial Union in the Philippines. The car’s value was
estimated with the help of an experienced mechanic (Mr. Server) of the Luneta Garage. The car was
bought by Mr. Harding for P2,800.00. The mechanic, considering some repairs done, estimated the
value to be at P3,000.00. This estimated value was the value disclosed by Mrs. Harding to Smith, Bell
and Co. She also disclosed that the value was an estimate made by Luneta Garage (which also acts as
an agent for Smith, Bell and Co).
In March 1916, a fire destroyed the Studebaker. Mrs. Harding filed an insurance claim but
Commercial Union denied it as it insisted that the representations and averments made as to the cost
of the car were false; and that said statement is a warranty. Commercial Union also stated that the car
does not belong to Mrs. Harding because such a gift [from her husband] is void under the Civil Code.
Issue:
Whether or not Mrs. Harding is entitled to the insurance claim.
Ruling:
Yes. Commercial Union is not the proper party to attack the validity of the gift made by Mr.
Harding to his wife.
The statement made by Mrs. Harding as to the cost of the car is not a warranty. The evidence
does not prove that the statement is false. In fact, the evidence shows that the cost of the car is more
than the price of the insurance. The car was bought for P2,800.00 and then thereafter, Luneta Garage
made some repairs and body paints which amounted to P900.00. Mr. Server attested that the car is as
good as new at the time the insurance was effected.
Commercial Union, upon the information given by Mrs. Harding, and after an inspection of
the automobile by its examiner, having agreed that it was worth P3,000, is bound by this valuation in
the absence of fraud on the part of the insured. All statements of value are, of necessity, to a large
extent matters of opinion, and it would be outrageous to hold that the validity of all valued policies
must depend upon the absolute correctness of such estimated value.

ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY (COMPONENTS)
NAVARRO vs. ESCOBIDO

G.R. No 153788 November 27, 2009
Facts:
Private respondent (Karen Go) files a complaint with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
replevin against petitioner (Navarro) for the seizure of 2 motor vehicles under lease agreement.
Petitioner maintains among others in the case at bar that the complaints were premature because no
prior demand was made on him to comply with the provisions of the lease agreements before the
complaints for replevin were filed.
Issue:
Whether or not prior demand is a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.
Ruling:
No. Petitioner erred in arguing that prior demand is required before an action for a writ of
replevin is filed since we cannot liken a replevin action to an unlawful detainer.
For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an affidavit and bond,
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules, which states:
Sec. 2.Affidavit and bond.

The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who
personally knows the facts:
(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is
entitled to the possession thereof;
(b) That the property is wrongfullydetained by the adverse party, alleging the cause of
detention thereof according to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief;
(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant
to law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed
under custodialegis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or custody; and
(d) The actual market value of the property.
The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in double the value of the
property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned, for the return of the property to the adverse party
if such return be adjudged, and for the payment to the adverse party of such sum as he may recover
from the applicant in the action.
The SC held that there is nothing in the afore-quoted provision which requires the applicant
to make a prior demand on the possessor of the property before he can file an action for a writ of
replevin. Thus, prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.

VILLANUEVA MIJARES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 143286 April 12, 2000
Facts:
Felipe Villanueva left a 15,336-square-meter parcel of land in Kalibo, Capiz to his eight
children: Simplicio, Benito, Leon, Eustaquio, Camila, Fausta and Pedro. In 1952, Pedro declared under
his name 1/6 portion of the property (1,905 sq. m.). He held the remaining properties in trust for his
co-heirs who demanded the subdivision of the property but to no avail. After Leon’s death in 1972,
private respondents discovered that the shares of Simplicio, Nicolasa, Fausta and Maria Baltazar had
been purchased by Leon through a deed of sale dated August 25, 1946 but registered only in 1971. In
July 1970, Leon also sold and partitioned the property in favor of petitioners, his children, who
thereafter secured separate and independent titles over their respective pro- indiviso shares.
Private respondents, who are also descendants of Felipe, filed an action for partition with
annulment of documents and/or reconveyance and damages against petitioners. They contended that
Leon fraudulently obtained the sale in his favor through machinations and false pretenses. The RTC
declared that private respondents’ action had been barred by res judicata and that petitioners are the
“legal owners of the property in question in accordance with the individual titles issued to them.
Issue:
Whether or not laches apply against the minor’s property that was held in trust.
Ruling:
No. At the time of the signing of the Deed of Sale of August 26,1948, private respondents
Procerfina, Prosperedad, Ramon and Rosa were minors. They could not be faulted for their failure to
file a case to recover their inheritance from their uncle Leon, since up to the age of majority, they
believed and considered Leon their co-heir administrator. It was only in 1975, not in 1948, that they
became aware of the actionable betrayal by their uncle. Upon learning of their uncle’s actions, they
filed for recovery. Hence, the doctrine of stale demands formulated in Tijam cannot be applied here.
They did not sleep on their rights, contrary to petitioner’s assertion.
Furthermore, when Felipe Villanueva died, an implied trust was created by operation of law
between Felipe’s children and Leon, their uncle, as far as the 1/6 share of Felipe. Leon’s fraudulent
titling of Felipe’s 1/6 share was a betrayal of that implied trust.

IMANI vs. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY

G.R. No. 187023 November 17, 2010
Facts:
On August 28, 1981, Evangeline D. Imani (petitioner) signed a Continuing Suretyship
Agreement in favor of respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank), with Cesar P.
Dazo, Nieves Dazo, Benedicto C. Dazo, Cynthia C. Dazo, Doroteo Fundales, Jr., and Nicolas Ponce
as her co-sureties. As sureties, they bound themselves to pay Metrobank whatever indebtedness C.P.
Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but not exceeding Six Million Pesos (P6, 000,000.00).
Later, CPDTI obtained loans of P100,000.00 and P63,825.45, respectively. The loans were
evidenced by promissory notes signed by Cesar and Nieves Dazo. CPDTI defaulted in the payment
of its loans. Metrobank made several demands for payment upon CPDTI, but to no avail. This
prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit against CPDTI and its sureties, including herein
petitioner. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 15717.
After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Metrobank.
The dispositive portion of the (1) Under the First Cause of Action, the sum of P175,451.48
plus the stipulated interest, penalty charges and bank charges from March 1, 1984 and until the whole
amount is fully paid; (2) Under the Second Cause of Action, the sum of P92,158.85 plus the stipulated
interest, penalty charges and bank charges from February 24, 1985, and until the whole amount is fully
paid; (3) The sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total amount due under the First and Second
Cause of Action; and (4) Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of suit and expenses of litigation.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in ruling the levy on execution and the auction sale, and for
canceling the certificate of sale that occurs in the petitioners’ conjugal partnership.
Ruling:
Petitioner takes exception to the CA ruling that she committed a procedural gaffe in seeking
the annulment of the writ of execution, the auction sale, and the certificate of sale. The issue on the
conjugal nature of the property, she insists, can be adjudicated by the executing court; thus, the RTC
correctly gave due course to her motion. She asserts that it was error for the CA to propose the filing
of a separate case to vindicate her claim.
We agree with petitioner.
The CA explained the faux pas committed by petitioner in this Under [Section 16, Rule 39], a
third-party claimant or a stranger to the foreclosure suit, can opt to file a remedy known as terceria
against the sheriff or officer effecting the writ by serving on him an affidavit of his title and a copy
thereof upon the judgment creditor. By the terceria, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property
and could be answerable for damages. A third-party claimant may also resort to an independent
“separate action,” the object of which is the recovery of ownership or possession of the property
seized by the sheriff, as well as damages arising from wrongful seizure and detention of the property

despite the third-party claim. If a “separate action” is the recourse, the third-party claimant must
institute in a forum of competent jurisdiction an action, distinct and separate from the action in which
the judgment is being enforced, even before or without need of filing a claim in the court that issued
the writ. Both remedies are cumulative and may be availed of independently of or separately from the
other. Availment of the terceria is not a condition sine qua non to the institution of a “separate action.”
It is worthy of note that Sina Imani should have availed of the remedy of “terceria” authorized
under Section 16 of Rule 39 which is the proper remedy considering that he is not a party to the case
against petitioner. Instead, the trial court allowed [petitioner] to file an urgent motion to cancel and
nullify the levy of execution the auction sale and certificate of sale over TCT No. T27957
[P](M).Petitioner then argues that it is the ministerial duty of the levying officer to release the property
the moment a third-party claim is filed.
It is true that once a third-party files an affidavit of his title or right to the possession of the
property levied upon, the sheriff is bound to release the property of the third-party claimant unless
the judgment creditor files a bond approved by the court. Admittedly, [petitioner’s] motion was already
pending in court at the time that they filed the Affidavit of Crisanto Origen, the former owner, dated
July 27, 2005.

ABSOLUTE COMMUINTY PARTY (EXCLUDED PROPERTY)
CHING vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 124642 February 23, 2004
Facts:
On September 1978, Philippine Blooming Mills Company (PBMCI) obtained a 9-million peso
loan from Allied Banking Corporation (ABC).Alfredo Ching together with two other persons
executed a continuing guarantee with ABC binding themselves jointly and severally liable for the
PBMCI obligations.The extent of their guarantee is up to 38 million pesos.
PBMCI failed to settle the loans which amounted to P12,612,972.88 (exclusive of interests, penalties
and other bank charges.)Together with the writ of preliminary attachment, the sheriff levied (seized)
the 100,000 common shares of City Corporation stocks registered solely to Alfredo Ching.Mrs. Ching
filed a petition to set aside the levy of the 100,000 common shares.According to her, the shares were
purchased out of the conjugal funds.She also argued that the loan of PBMCI did not redound to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership (or family).
Issue:
Whether or not the argument of Mrs. Ching is tenable.
Ruling:
Yes.. ABC has the burden of proof to show that the common shares registered solely to the
name of Alfredo Ching were owned by the latter. Just because Mr. Ching’s name appeared as the sole
registrant of the shares in the corporate books of CityCorp, that doesn’t mean that it is his exclusive
property and not to the conjugal partnership.
As held in the case of Ayala Investment and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,
the court said that “signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession. It is
not embarking in a business.”
For the conjugal partnership to become liable, it is important to show that the family received
benefits and advantages from the liability incurred. There is no presumption that when a husband
entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would be
benefited.
The benefits must be those directly resulting from the loan.
Therefore, Mr. Alfredo Ching’s common shares must not be levied because he is not the sole
owner of such stocks. The shares belong to the conjugal partnership.
Under Article 121 of the Family Code.

EXCLUDED PROPERTY
TAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 120594 June 10, 1997
Facts:
Petitioner ChiaoLiong Tan claims to be the owner of a motor vehicle, particularly described
as Isuzu Elf van, 1976 Model that he purchased in March 1987. As owner thereof, petitioner says he
has been in possession, enjoyment and utilization of the said motor vehicle until his older brother,
Tan Ban Yong, the private respondent, took it from him.
Petitioner relies principally on the fact that the van is registered in his name under Certificate
of Registration. He claims in his testimony before the trial court that the said motor vehicle was
purchased from Balintawak Isuzu Motor Center for a price of over P100, 000. 00; that he sent his
brother to pay for the van and the receipt fro payment was placed in his name because it was his
money that was used to pay for the vehicle; that he allowed his brother to use the van because the
latter was working for his company, the CLT Industries; and that his brother later refused to return
the van to him and appropriated the same for himself.
On the other hand, private respondent testified that CLT Industries is a family business that
was placed in petitioner’s name because at that time he was then leaving for the United Stated and
petitioner remaining Filipino in the family residing in the Philippines. When the family business needed
a vehicle in 1987 for use in the deliver of machinery to its customers, he asked petitioner to look for
a vehicle and gave him the amount of P5,000.00 to be deposited as down payment for the van, which
would be available in about a month. After a month, he himself paid the whole price out of a loan of
P140, 000.00 from his friend Tan Pit Sin. Nevertheless, respondent allowed the registration of the
vehicle in petitioner’s name. It was also their understanding that he would keep the van for himself
because CLT Industries was not in a position to pay him. Hence, from the time of the purchase, he
had been in possession of the vehicle including the original registration papers thereof, but allowing
petitioner from time to time to use the van for deliveries of machinery.
After hearing, the trial court found for the private respondent. Finding no merit in the appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trail court.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner-appellant established proof of ownership over the subject motor
vehicle.
Ruling:
No. Petitioner did not have in his possession the Certificate of Registration of the motor
vehicle and the official receipt of payment for the same, thereby lending credence to the claim of
private respondent who has possession thereof, that he owns the subject motor vehicle. A certificate
of registration of a motor vehicle in one’s name indeed creates a strong presumption of ownership.
For all practical purposes, the person in whose favor it has been issued is virtually the owner thereof
unless proved otherwise. In other words, such presumption is rebuttable by competent proof.

The New Civil Code recognizes cases of implied trusts other than those enumerated therein.
Thus, although no specific provision could be cited to apply to the parties herein, it is undeniable that
an implied trust was created when the certificate of registration of the motor vehicle was placed in the
name of the petitioner although the price thereof was not paid by him but by private respondent. The
principle that a trustee who puts a certificate of registration in his name cannot repudiate the trust
relying on the registration is one of the well-known limitations upon a title. A trust, which derives its
strength from the confidence one reposes on another especially between brothers, does not lose that
character simply because of what appears in a legal document.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

DISSOLUTION
IN RE ELENA BUEANAVENTURA MULLER vs. HELMUT MULLER

GR. No. 149615 August 29, 2006
Facts:
Elena Muller, petitioner, got married in to Helmut Muller, a German national, on Hamburg
dated Sept. 22, 1989. Then they resided there in a house owned by Helmut’ s parents but later on
sometime 1992 they permanently resided in the Philippines. Helmut inherited the house in Germany
from his parents which he subsequently sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of
land in Antipolo as well as for the construction of a house. That property was registered in the name
of Elena Muller. During their marriage they had some incompatibilities and Helmut was alleged
womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment. With that, the spouses eventually got separated. On
September 26, 1994, Helmut, respondent, filed a petition for separation of properties before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
RTC terminated the regime of absolute community of property. It ruled that the separation
of properties shall be applied between the petitioner and respondent. The RTC ordered the equal
partition of personal properties located within the Philippines, except those acquired by gratuitous
title during their marriage. In relation to the property, respondent cannot recover his funds expensed
since it was a violation of Section7, Article XII of the Constitution which prohibits aliens from
procuring private lands.
The Court of Appeals ruled that there was no provision in the Constitution which specifically
prevents Helmut from procuring private land. With that decision it also ordered Elena to reimburse
him accordingly.
Issue:
Whether or not Helmut Muller, respondent, is entitled to be reimbursed by Elena Muller,
petitioner, with the funds used to purchase the property in Antipolo and to construct the house.
Ruling:
No, Helmut cannot seek reimbursement because it was clear that he willingly and knowingly
bought the property using the proceeds of his sold inherited property in Germany despite the
constitutional prohibition. It is provided in the Constitution that alien can’t own lands here in the
Philippines and this provision is absolute only to the exception of lands here in the Philippines
inherited. With that violation he is not favored in any way in the case. Also, reimburse is considered a
fruit of the property, with that Helmut can’t claim the fruits as well.

COMPONENTS OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP GAINS
ANTONIA R. DELA PEÑA vs GEMMA REMILYN C. AVILA

G.R. No. 187490 February 8, 2012
Facts:
A parcel of residential land, together with the improvements in Marikina City was previously
registered in the name of petitioner Antonia R. Dela Peña (Antonia), “married to Antegono A. Dela
Peña” (Antegono). On 7 May 1996, Antonia obtained from A.C. Aguila & Sons, Co. (Aguila) a loan
in the sum of P250,000.00 secured by a Promissory Note and notarized Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over the property.
On 4 November 1997, Antonia executed a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over the property
to Gemma Remilyn C. Avila (Gemma with that it resulted to naming Gemma as the owner of the
subject realty on the Registry of Deeds. On 26 November 1997, Gemma also constituted a real estate
mortgage over said parcel to Far East Bank and Trust Company [now Bank of the Philippine Islands]
(FEBTC-BPI), to secure a loan facility evidenced by the Promissory Notes
On 3 March 1998, in the meantime, Antonia filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina
an Affidavit of Adverse Claim that she was the true and lawful owner of the property which had been
titled in the name of Gemma. Gemma failed to pay the principal as well as the accumulated interest
and penalties on the loans she obtained hence, FEBTC-BPI caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
real estate mortgage constituted over the property. FEBTC-BPI later consolidated its ownership over
the realty and caused the same to be titled in its name.
On 18 May 1998, Antonia and her son filed against Gemma the complaint for annulment of
deed, claiming that the subject realty was conjugal property.
Issue:
Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Antonia to Gemma is null and void
Whether or not the FEBTC-BPI is a mortgagee/purchaser in bad faith.
Ruling:
No, Pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, all property of the marriage
is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife. Although it is not necessary to prove that the property was acquired with
funds of the partnership, proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for the
operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.
Since foreclosure of the mortgage is but the necessary consequence of non-payment of the
mortgage debt,FEBTC-BPI was, likewise, acting well within its rights as mortgagee when it foreclosed
the real estate mortgage on the property upon Gemma’s failure to pay the loans secured thereby.

COMPONENTS OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP GAINS
TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION vs. MANUEL DAVID SR.

G.R. No. 169548 March 15, 2010
Facts:
Manuel A. David, Sr. (Manuel) and Martha S. David (Martha) were married on March 25,
1957. In 1970, the spouses acquired a lot located at White Plains, Quezon City. In 1976, the spouses
separated, and no longer communicated with each other. March 1995, Manuel discovered that Martha
had previously sold the property to Titan Construction Corporation (Titan) with which the previous
title registered in the Register of Deeds was replaced. March 13, 1996, Manuel filed a Complaintfor
Annulment of Contract against Titan CC. Manuel alleged that the sale executed by Martha in favor of
Titan was without his knowledge therefore void. He prayed that the Deed of Sale be invalidated, that
the property be returned to the spouses with a new title be issued in their names.
Titan claimed that it was a buyer in good faith and for value because it relied on a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) by Manuel which authorized Martha to dispose of the property on behalf
of the spouses. Manuel claimed that the SPA was spurious, and that the signature purporting to be his
was a forgery; hence, Martha was wholly without authority to sell the property. Subsequently, Manuel
filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaintwhich was granted by the trial court. Thus,
on October 15, 1996, Manuel filed an Amended Complaint. Martha failed to file an answer so she was
declared in default.
Issue:
Whether or not the deed of sale is null and void.
Ruling:
Yes, since the property was undoubtedly part of the conjugal partnership, the sale to Titan
required the consent of both spouses. Article 165 of the Civil Code expressly provides that “the
husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership”. Likewise, Article 172 of the Civil Code
ordains that “the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband’s consent, except in
cases provided by law”. Similarly, Article 124 of the Family Code requires that any disposition or
encumbrance of conjugal property must have the written consent of the other spouse, otherwise, such
disposition is void.

LIABILITIES/ CHARGES
AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 1185305 February 12, 1998
Facts:
Petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC) granted a loan to
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) amounting P50,300,000.00 loan. Respondent Alfredo Ching, Exec.
Vice President PBM, executed security agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making him
jointly and severally liable with PBM’s indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan with that,
AIDC filed a complaint against PBM and Ching.
In the RTC’s decision it ordered PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the
principal amount plus the interests. RTC issued a writ of execution of pending appeal. Then, deputy
sheriff Magsajo caused issuance and service upon respondents- Ching spouses of a notice of sheriff
sale on three of their conjugal properties.
Spouses Ching filed a case of injunction against petitioner alleging that petitioner cannot
enforce the judgment against conjugal partnership levied on the ground that the subject loan did not
redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. Upon application of private respondents, the
RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to prevent Magsajo from proceeding with the
enforcement of the writ of execution and with the sale of the said properties at public auction.
Issue:
Whether or not the loan acquired by PBM from Ayala Investments as guaranteed by Alfredo
Ching be redounded to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.
Ruling:
The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM and not for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. AIDC failed to prove that Ching contracted the debt for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM as a corporation has a personality distinct and
separate from the family of Ching despite the fact that they happened to be stockholders of said
corporate entity. Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse to Ching as surety is
only to the extent of his corporate ownership.
The contract of loan between AIDC and PMB guaranteed by Ching was clearly for the benefit
of PMB and not for the Ching with his family. Ching only signed as a surety for the loan contracted
with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or
profession. With that, the conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement
which was clearly for the benefit of PBM.

DISPOSITION
THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. vs. ESTER L. SERVACIO

G.R. No. 157537 September 7, 2011
Facts:
Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land to Protacio B. Go, Jr. (Protacio Jr.). Twenty three
years later Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver, whereby he affirmed under
oath that it was his father, Protacio Go Sr. (Protacio Sr.), not he, who had purchased the two parcels
of land (the property). Marta Barola Go died wife of Protacio, Sr. Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go
sold a portion of the property to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio).
The petitioners, Heirs of Go Sr., demanded the return of the property, but Servacio did not
follow their demand in which the petitioners decided to sue Servacio. According to the petitioners,
they contend that with the Protacio Jr.’s renunciation, the property became conjugal property of the
spouses Go Sr. and his wife. They also contend that the sale of the property to Servacio without the
prior liquidation of the community property between spouses Go Sr. and his Marta was null and void.
RTC affirmed the validity of the sale declaring that the property was the conjugal property of
Protacio Sr. and Marta, not then exclusive property of Protacio Sr., because the sale includes the
children of Marta, that the participation had been by virtue of their being heirs of the late Marta- that
under Article 160 of the Civil Code. The law states that when the property all property acquired by
either spouse during the marriage is conjugal unless there is a proof that the property thus acquired
pertained exclusively.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale by Protacio Sr with some of his children to Servacio was void because
it was made without prior liquidation.
Ruling:
No. Since Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the affectivity of the Family Code.
Their property relation was properly considered as a conjugal partnership governed by the Civil Code.
With Marta’s death, the conjugal partnership was dissolved pursuant to Article175 (1) of the Civil
Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta
with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its
liquidation. Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Marta’s share
in the conjugal partnership, could not claim title to any specific portion of Marta’s share without an
actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then,
all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta’s share and as a co-owner he could sell his
undivided share, he had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest
of his co-owners.
DISPOSITION

JOE A. ROS vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK - LAOAG BRANCH
G.R. No. 170166 April 6, 2011
Facts:
Joe Ros obtained a loan of P115,000.00 from PNB Laoag Branch on October 14, 1974 and as
security for the loan, petitioner, Ros, executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land with
all the. Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, PNB instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale, a Certificate of Sale
was issued in favor of PNB, Laoag as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one (1) year without the
property being redeemed, the property was consolidated and registered in the name of PNB, Laoag
Branch on August 10, 1978.
Estrella Agueta, wife of Joe Ros claims that she has no knowledge of the loan obtained by her
husband nor she consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal property. On January 13, 1983,
spouses Ros and Agueta filed to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and
consolidation of the property – interposing the defense that her signatures affixed on the documents
were forged and that the loan did not redound to the benefit of the family. PNB seeks for the dismissal
of the complaint for lack of cause of action, and insists that it was petitioners’ own acts of omission
that bar them from recovering the subject property on the ground of estoppel, laches, abandonment
and prescription.
The Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioners declaring deed of real estate mortgage Null
and Void and ordered the Register of Deeds to rename the title of the lot to the petitioners. Upon
PNB’s appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the decision of the Trial Court and dismissed the
complaint of the petitioners. The Petitioner’s then petitioned for review to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the debt/loan was chargeable to the conjugal property.
Ruling:
Yes. At the time of the mortgage the Civil Code was the applicable law. Article 161 of the Civil
Code enumerated the instances of which the spouses-conjugal partnership shall be liable and
paragraph (1) one of the said provision states “all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose,
in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership”. The loan was used for additional working
capital for their family business hence, it is considered that such loan was acquired for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership and not merely for the benefit of Ros.

DISPOSITION
MARIO SIOCHI vs. ALFREDO GOZON

G.R. No. 169900 March 18, 2010
Facts:
A parcel of land was registered TCT No. 5357 in the name of
AlfredoGozon. On 23 December 1991, Elvira Gozon, Alfredo’s wife, filed a petition for legal
separation against her husband Alfredo. After a month, Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens, which was
then annotated on the title of the land. While the legal separation case of the spouses was still pending,
Alfredo and Mario Siochi entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell which was also annotated on the
title of the land. After granting the decree of legal separation, Alfredo executed a Deed of Donation
over the property in favor of their daughter, Winifred Gozon. The Register of Deeds of Malabon,
cancelled TCT No. 5357 and issued TCT No. M-10508 in the name of Winifred, without annotating
the Agreement and the notice of lis pendis on TCT No.M-10508.
October 26, 1994 when Alfredo sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc (IDRI).
Through a Special Power of Attorney executed in favor of Winifred. Subsequently, the Register of
Deeds of Malabon cancelled TCT No. M-10508 and issued TCT No. M-10976 to IDRI. Mario then
filed a complaint for Specific Performance and Damages, Annulment of Donation and Sale with
Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order.
Issues:
a) Whether or not Mario can invoke his right over the property due to the Agreement to Buy
and Sell he entered with Alfredo.
b) Whether or not IDRI can invoke right over the property due to the Sale entered with Alfredo.
Ruling:
No. Alfredo was the sole administrator of the conjugal property because Elvira, with whom
Alfredo was separated in fact, was unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal property.
Still, Alfredo can’t sell said property without the written consent of Elvira or given authority of the
court. Without consent or authority, the agreement is void.
No. IDRI is not a buyer in good faith. IDRI had actual knowledge of facts regarding the
property hence it should seek further inquiries about the vendor’s title to the property. Besides, had
IDRI been more prudent before buying the property, it would have discovered that Alfredo’s donation
of the property to Winifred was without the consent of Elvira. Under Article 125 of the Family Code,
a conjugal property cannot be donated by one spouse without the consent of the other spouse. Clearly,
IDRI was not a buyer in good faith.

DISPOSITION
SPOUSES AGGABAO vs. PARULAN, JR.

G.R. No. 165803 September 1, 2010
Facts:
Real estate broker Marta Atanacio offered 2 lots to the spouses Aggabao on January 1991. On
February 2, 1991, the petitioners met up with Elena Parulan at the site of the property and showed
them the following documents: (a.) Owner’s original copy of the TCT of the 2 lots; (b.) tax
declarations; (c.) a copy of the special power of attorney dated January 7, 1991 executed by Dionisio
Parulan authorizing Elena to sell the property. On March 18, 1991, the petitioners delivered the final
amount of their balance to Elena, who executed a deed of absolute sale in their favor. However, Elena
did not turn over the owner’s duplicate copy of the TCT claiming that said copy was in the possession
of a relative who was then in Hongkong. She assured them that the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT
would be turned over after a week.
On March 19, 1991, TCT was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of the
petitioners. Elena did not turn over the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT as promised. Thus, on April
15, 1991, Dionisio commenced an action vs Elena Parulan and the Aggabao spouses praying for the
declaration of the nullity of the deed of absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena, and the cancellation of
the title issued to the petitioners by virtue thereof. In turn, the petitioners, Aggabao spouses and Elena
Parulan, filed on July 12, 1991 their own action for specific performance with damages against the
respondent. On July 26, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 136, in Makati City annulled
the deed of absolute sale executed in favor of the petitioners.
Issue:
Which between Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article 124 of the Family Code should apply
to the sale of the conjugal property executed without the consent of Dionisio?
Ruling:
The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family
Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that any
alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the Family Code is
governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
“The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to
the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of
the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without
authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed
as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected
as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before
the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.”

Next, according to Article 256 of the Family Code, the provisions of the Family Code may
apply retroactively provided no vested rights are impaired. Herein, however, the petitioners did not
show any vested right in the property acquired prior to August 3, 1988 that exempted their situation
from the retroactive application of the Family Code. Also, the petitioners failed to substantiate their
contention that Dionisio, while holding the administration over the property, had delegated to his
brother, Atty. Parulan, the administration of the property, considering that they did not present in
court the SPA granting to Atty. Parulan the authority for the administration.

DISPOSITION
MANUEL FUENTES vs. CONRADO ROCA

G.R. No. 178902 April 21, 2010
Facts:
Sabina Tarroza owned a land in Canelar, Zamboanga City and she sold it to her son, Tarciano
T. Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale. Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the
lot to petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses) and eventually they entered into
an agreement. After 6 months, a new title was issued in the name of the spouses who immediately
constructed a building on the lot. Thereafter Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife Rosario who
died nine months afterwards.
Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely, respondents
(collectively, the Rocas), filed an action for annulment of sale and re-conveyance of the land against
the Fuentes spouses before the RTC. The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was void since
Tarciano’s wife, Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her signature on the affidavit of consent had
been forged. They thus prayed that the property be reconvened to them upon reimbursement of the
price that the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano.The spouses denied the Rocas’ allegations. They
presented Atty. Plagata who testified that he personally saw Rosario sign the affidavit at her residence.
All the same, the Fuentes spouses pointed out that the claim of forgery was personal to Rosario and
she alone could invoke it. Besides, the four-year prescriptive period for nullifying the sale on ground
of fraud had already lapsed.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the signature of Rosario representing her consent was forged.
b) Whether or not the Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses
already prescribed?
c) Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to
annul that sale?
Ruling:
Yes it was forged as the Supreme Court ruled. A defective notarization will merely strip the
document of its public character and reduce it to a private instrument that falsified jurat, taken together
with the marks of forgery in the signature, dooms such document as proof of Rosario’s consent to
the sale of the land. That the Fuentes spouses honestly relied on the notarized affidavit as proof of
Rosario’s consent does not matter. The sale is still void without an authentic consent.
No. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property
to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took effect on August
3, 1988. The Family Code applied for this case. The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
Its Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil
Code on Property Relations between Husband and Wife. Further, the Family Code provisions were
also made to apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to vested rights. Article
124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may
assail her husband’s sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other spouse’s written
consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void. Here, the Rocas filed an action

against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment of sale and re-conveyance of the real property that
Tarciano sold without their mother’s (his wife’s) written consent. The passage of time did not erode
the right to bring such an action.
Yes. As stated above, that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained
the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the
ownership of the property to their heirs.

DISSOLUTION
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO.vs. NICHOLSON PASCUAL

G.R. No. 163744 February 29, 2008
Facts:
Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga got married on 1985. During the union,
Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot in with an apartment
standing thereon. On year 1994, Florencia filed suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity on part of Nelson under Article 36 of the Family Code. RTC
declared the marriage null and void. Also, it ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the ex- spouses'
conjugal partnership of gains. The spouses weren’t able to liquidate their conjugal partnership even
after the declaration of their legal separation.
Sometime in 1997, Florencia with Sps. Norberto and Elvira Oliveros obtained a loan from
petitioner, Metrobank secured the obligation several Real Estate Mortgage (REM) on their properties
including one involving the lot bought from Sering and showed a waiver made in favor of Florencia,
covering the conjugal properties with her ex-husband, but did not incidentally include the lot in
question (bought from Sering).
When Florencia and Sps. Oliveros failed to pay their loan due, Metrobank initiated foreclosure
proceedings and caused the publication of auction sale on 3 issues of the REM’s. Nicholson filed a
Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property alleging that the property,
which is conjugal, was mortgaged without his consent. Metrobank in its answer: Alleged that the lot
registered in the name of Florencia was paraphernalia. Metrobank also asserted having approved the
mortgage in good faith. Florencia was declared in default for failure to file an answer within
reglementary period. RTc declared the REM Invalid and Metrobank is mortgagee in bad faith on
account of negligence. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. Petitioner then appealed to the Supreme
Court.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage between the respondents dissolved the
regime of community of property of the spouses.
b) Whether the lot in question was conjugal and rendered the REM over the lot invalid.
Ruling:
No. The mere declaration of nullity of marriage, without more, does not authomatically result
in a regime of complete separation when it is shown that there was no liquidation of the conjugal
assets.While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond
and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such
declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of
the partnership.
No.Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the property relationship between the former
spouses, where:“Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or

the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.”
Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her ½ undivided interests in the disputed party
even without the consent of Nicholson. However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited
only to the 1/2 undivided portion that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage contract insofar
as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is null and void, Nicholson not having
consented to the mortgage of his undivided half.

LIQUIDATION
BRIGIDO QUIOA vs. RITA QUIAO

G.R. No. 176556 July 4, 2012
Facts:
Respondent Rita Quiao, the offended spouse, filed a legal separation against the petitioner
Brigido Quiao on October 26, 2000 before the RTC. The decision of the court dated October 10,
2005 declared the legal separation, custody of children to Rita, equal partition on the personal and real
properties, and forfeiture on the part of Brigido the net profits earned from the conjugal properties in
favor of the common children. Neither party filed a Motion for Reconsideration and appealed within
the required period for legal separation. December 12, 2005, Rita filed a Motion for Execution and
was later on granted.
Brigido file a Motion for Clarification on the “net profit earned”. The Court defined it asthe
remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the]
spouse and the debts basing on Articles 63 and 43 of the Family Code. Brigido filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on September 8, 2006. Though the petition was after the required prescriptive period,
the court granted the petition since its purpose was to clarify the meaning of the “net profit earned”.
With that on November 8, 2006 the court ordered that the “net profit earned” be based on the Article
102 of the family Code.
November 21, 2006, the respondent, Rita, filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) praying
for the reversal of the Nov. 8, 2006 court order. The Court then granted the MR. Brigido then filed a
Petition for Review questioning the following: dissolution and liquidation of the common properties,
meaning of the “net profit earned”, and the law governing the property relation between him and Rita.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner can question decision by the RTC dated October 10, 2005.
Ruling:
No. Brigido wasn’t able to timely appeal the decision of the court dated October 10, 2005,
thus, the decision on that date is deemed final and executory hence, he had slept on his right to
question.The respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of the exchange
of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they
did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations between the petitioner and the
respondent is the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gain. And under this
property relation, "the husband and the wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate
property and the income from their work or industry." The husband and wife also own in common
all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains. the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and
the respondent's marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant
case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities
is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The
latter provision is applicable because according to Article 256 of the Family Code "this Code shall
have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other law."

VOID MARRIAGES OR LIVE-IN RELATIONSHIPS
ALAIN DIÑO vs. MA CARIDAD DIÑO

G.R. No. 178044 January 19, 2011
Facts:
Petitioner Alain M. Diño and respondent Caridad L. Diño have beenchildhood friends and s
weethearts. They lived together for ten years thenseparated. After two years, they reunited and later
on decided to get married. However, Alain filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of marriage based
on the psychological incapacity (Article 36 of the Family Code) of Caridad.
Healleged that Caridad failed to give him love and support throughout theirmarriage and was
irresponsible, unfaithful, and prodigal. He also alleged that Caridad tends to be violent toward him.
Extrajudicial service of summons was sent to Caridad who was living in the United Stated at that time.
She did file any answer within the reglementary period. It was also learned that she already filed a
divorce in the United States, which was granted by the Superior Court of California, and is now
married to another man. The prosecutor of Las Piñas declared that there was no collusion between
the two parties.
A psychological report was submitted stating that Caridad was suffering from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder which rooted from her early formative years and which was founded
to be long-lasting and incurable.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present: 1. The man
and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other; 2. They live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife; and 3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void. All
these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code
applies to the property relations between Alian and Caridad. The Court agrees with Alain that the
trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of theFamily Code.
The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section19(1) of the Rule provides: Sec. 19.

PROPERTY REGIME OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE
MARGARET MAXEY vs THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-45870 May 11, 1984
Facts:
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales started living together in 1903. They were united in
1903 in a marriage performed "in the military fashion". During the period of their (Melbourne and
Regina) cohabitation, or in 1911 and 1912, respectively, the late Melbourne Maxey acquired the parcels
of land before their 1919 church marriage. Regina Morales Maxey died in 1919 sometime after the
church wedding. The husband remarried and in 1953, his second wife Julia Pamatluan, using a power
of attorney, sold the properties to the respondent spouses, Mr. and Mrs. Beato C. Macayra.
Plaintiffs, children of Maxey and Morales, instituted the present case on January 26, 1962,
before the Court of First Instance of Davao, praying for the annulment of the documents of sale
covering the subject parcels of land and to recover possession thereof with damages from the herein
defendants-spouses, alleging, among others, that the aforesaid realties were common properties of
their parents, having been acquired during their lifetime and through their joint effort and capital.
The trial court applied Article 144 of the Civil Code which provide “When a man and a woman
live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the
beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their
wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.” Thus, the property in question is
owned both by Maxey and Morales in which the sale of the property by Maxey alone was invalid.
The Court of Appeals adjudged that the property was exclusive property of Melbourne Maxey
thus the sale was valid making the buyer, Spouses Macayra, the absolute owner of the land.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the “military fashion” marriage of Maxey and Morales was recognized as
valid.
b) Whether or not the property in question is co-owned by Maxey and Morales applying
Article 144 of the Civil Code.
Ruling:
No. Maxey and Morales were legally married at a church wedding solemnized on February 16,
1919. Since Act No. 3613 was approved on December 4, 1929 and took effect six months thereafter,
it could not have applied to a relationship commenced in 1903 and legitimized in 1919 through a
marriage performed according to law. The marriage law in 1903 was General Order No. 70. There is
no provision in General Order No. 68 as amended nor in Act No. 3613 which would recognize as an
exception to the general rule on valid marriages, a so called "Military fashion" ceremony or
arrangement.
Yes. As far as there was no vested right that would be impaired or prejudiced by applying
Article 144 then it shall be applied retroactively. The properties were sold in 1953 when the new Civil
Code was already in full force and effect. Neither can this be said of the rights of the private
respondents as vendees insofar as one half of the questioned properties are concerned as this was still

open to controversy on account of the legitimate claim of Regina Morales to a share under the
applicable law. The disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne Maxey and the estate
of his late wife, Regina Morales, when they were sold. Technically speaking, the petitioners should
return one-half of the purchase price of the land while the private respondents should pay some form
of rentals for their use of one-half of the properties. Equitable considerations, however, lead us to rule
out rentals on one hand and return on the other.

SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO vs. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO

Facts:
SPO4 Santiago CAriño married petitioner Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969, with whom he
had two children, Sahlee and Sandee. On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cariño also married respondent
Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4 Cariño became bedridden due to diabetes and tuberculosis, and died on
November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both
Susans filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance from various government agencies
pertaining to the deceased. Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 from MBAI, PCCVI, commutation,
NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig, while Yee received a total of P21,000 from GSIS burial and SSS burial
insurance.
On December 14, 1993, Yee filed for collection of money against NIcdao, praying that
Nicdao be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the P146,000 NIcdao had collected. For failing
to file her answer, NIcdao was declared in default.
Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of and
without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and Cariño. But
she claimed good faith, having no knowledge of the previous marriage until at the funeral where she
met Nicdao who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. Yee submitted that Cariño’s marriage
to Nicdao was void because it was solemnized without the required marriage license.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and void.
b) Whether or not, if yes to above, the wife of the deceased is entitled to collect the death
benefits from government agencies despite the nullity of their marriage.
Ruling:
No. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage
void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes
of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be
free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for
purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy
of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a
suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage,
and the absence therof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio.
No. It does not follow, however, that since the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased was
void ab initio, the death benefits would now be awarded to Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the

Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage; otherwise, the second
marriage would also be void. One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the
separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. Considering
that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would be not absolute
community nor conjugal partnership of property, but governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and
148 of the Family Code, on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.

ANTONIO VALDES vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996
Facts:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez
filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological
incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings
are free to choose which they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage”. During the hearing on the motion,
the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.
Issue:
Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party
who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.

NOEL BUENAVENTURA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. Nos. 127358 & G.R. Nos. 127449 March 31, 2005
Facts:
Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground
that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated. The RTC in its decision, declared the
marriage entered into between petitioner and respondent null and violation ordered the liquidation of
the assets of the conjugal partnership property; ordered petitioner a regular support in favor of his
son in the amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity arises, and awarded the
care and custody of the minor to his mother. Petitioner appealed before the CA. While the appeal was
pending, the CA, upon respondent’s motion issued a resolution increasing the support pendants. The
CA dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to the RTC decision. Petitioner motion
for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage.
Ruling:
Yes. Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the
provisions of article 50 in relation to articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the
dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case maybe, do not
apply. Rather the general rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property
regime applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the RTC
and the CA, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the
co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or
involved in said distribution.
VOID MARRIAGES

VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN
G.R. No. 155409 June 8, 2007
Facts:
Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful married
life and out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar coated romance turned
bitter when petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her
paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery against private respondent
and the latter's paramour. Consequently, both accused were convicted of the crime charged.
Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages imputing
psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner. During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner
and private respondent entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for the repudiation of the AGREEMENT. This
motion was denied. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of
Appeals on the ground that the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery disqualify her
from sharing in the conjugal property. The Petition was dismissed.
Issue:
Is the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery a disqualification for her to share
in the conjugal property?
Ruling:
No. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction. Article 34
of the Revised Penal Code provides for the consequences of civil interdiction:
Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. — Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of
the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of
the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.
Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery is prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods. Article 333 should be read with Article 43 of the same Code. The
latter provides:
Art. 43. Prision correccional — Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prision correccional shall carry with
it that of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender
shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same
shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA that the crime of adultery does not carry
the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which deprives the person of the rights to manage her
property and to dispose of such property inter vivos.

VOID MARRIAGES
BARRETO GONZALES vs. GONZALES

G.R. No. 159521 March 7, 1933

Facts:
The plaintiff & defendant were both citizens of the Philippines, married & lived together
fromJanuary 1919 until Spring of 1926. After which they voluntary separated & have not lived
together as man & wife, they had 4 minor children together. After negotiations, both parties mutually
agreed to allow Manuela Barreto (plaintiff) for her & her children’s support of P500 (five hundred
pesos) monthly which to be increased in cases of necessity & illness, and that the title of certain
properties be put in her name.
Shortly after the agreement, Augusto Gonzales (defendant), when to Reno, Nevada & secured
inthat jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion dated November 28, 1927. Onthat
same date he went through the forms of marriage with another Filipino citizen as well & had 3children
with her. When Gonzales left the Philippines, he reduced the amount he had agreed to pay monthly
for thesupport of Manuela Barreto & her children & has not made the payments fixed in the
Renodivorce as alimony. Gonzales came back to the Philippines in August 1928 and shortly after,
Barreto brought anaction at the CFI-Manila requesting to confirm & ratify the decree of divorce issued
by the courtsof Nevada & invoked sec 9 of Act 2710. Such is requested to be enforced, and deliver to
theGuardian ad litem the equivalent of what would have been due to their children as their legalportion
from respective estates had their parents died intestate on November 28, 1927, they alsoprayed that
the marriage existing between Barreto & Gonzales be declared dissolved & Gonzalesbe ordered to
pay Barreto P500 per month, counsel fees of P5000 & all the expenses incurred ineducating the 3
minor sons. The guardians of the children also filed as intervenors in the case.
After the hearing, the CFI-Manila granted the judgement in favor of the plaintiff &
intervenors, butreduced the attorney’s fees to P3000 instead & also granted the costs of the action
against thedefendant, Hence, this appeal by Gonzales saying that the lower court erred in their
decision.
Issue:
Whether or not any foreign divorce, relating to citizens of the Philippine Islands, will be
recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and under conditions for which the courts of
the PhilippineIslands would grant a divorce.
Ruling:
No. The lower court erred in granting the relief as prayed for on granting the divorce, because:
The court said that securing the jurisdiction of the courts to recognize & approve the divorcedone in
Reno, Nevada cannot be done according to the public policy in this jurisdiction on thequestion of
divorce. It’s clear in Act No. 2710 & court decisions on cases such as Goitia VS. Campos Rueda that
theentire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the case was submitted
prayingthe ratification of the Reno Divorce was clearly a circumvention of the law regarding divorce &
willbe done under conditions not authorized by our laws. The matrimonial domicile of the couple had
always been the Philippines & the residence acquiredby the husband in Reno, Nevada was a bona fide
residence & did not confer jurisdiction upon thecourt of that state to dissolve the matrimonial bonds
in which he had entered in 1919.
Art 9 & Art 11 of the Civil Code & The Divorce Law of the Philippines does not allow such
to bedone, the effect of foreign divorce in the Philippines says that litigants cannot compel thecourts

to approve of their own actions or permit the personal relations of the Citizens of the Philippines to
be affected by decrees of divorce of foreign courts in manner which out government believes is
contrary to public order & good morals.
VOID MARRIAGES
MERCADO-FEHR vs. FEHR

G.R. No. 152716 October 23, 2003

Facts:
In March 1983, after 2 years of long-distance courtship, Elna left Cebuand moved in with
Bruno in Manila. They had their first child in December thesame year. They purchased a condominium
unit (Suite 204) at LGCcondominium by a contract TO sell dated July 26, 1983. They got married
inMarch 1985. In 1998, trial court declared the marriage between Elna and Bruno,void ab initio under
FC 36 and subsequently ordered the liquidation of theirconjugal partnership. The court found Suite
204 to be exclusive property of Bruno because it was purchased on installment basis using Bruno s
exclusivefunds prior to the marriage. Their properties were also divided into 3 (1/3-Elna;1/3-Bruno;
1/3-2 children).
Issue:
Whether or not Suite 204 is Bruno’s exclusive property
Ruling:
No. The Family Code, Article 147 applies in this case because 1) both of them were capacitated
tomarry each other; 2) they lived exclusively as husband and wife; and 3) theirunion is without the
benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. Evidenceshows that the property was acquired during
their cohabitation and in applyingFC 147, the rules on co-ownership should govern. Suite 204 must
be consideredas common property of Elna and Bruno. 3-way partition of properties does not apply
also. Property regime should be divided in accordance with the law on co-ownership
BIGAMOUS, ADULTEROUS, ETC. RELATIONSHIPS
SUSAN NICDAO-CARINO vs. SUSAN YEE CARINO


Facts:
SPO4 Santiago CAriño married petitioner Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969, with whom he had
two children, Sahlee and Sandee. On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cariño also married respondent
Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4 Cariño became bedridden due to diabetes and tuberculosis, and died on
November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both
Susans filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance from various government agencies
pertaining to the deceased. Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 from MBAI, PCCVI, commutation,
NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig, while Yee received a total of P21,000 from GSIS burial and SSS burial
insurance.
On December 14, 1993, Yee filed for collection of money against NIcdao, praying that Nicdao
be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the P146,000 NIcdao had collected. For failing to file
her answer, Nicdao was declared in default. Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place
during the subsistence of and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage
between Nicdao and Cariño. But she claimed good faith, having no knowledge of the previous
marriage until at the funeral where she met Nicdao who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased.
Yee submitted that Cariño’s marriage to Nicdao was void because it was solemnized without the
required marriage license.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and void;
b) Whether or not, if yes to above, the wife of the deceased is entitled to collect the death benefits
from government agencies despite the nullity of their marriage.
Ruling:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void. Meaning,
where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting
a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of
the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage,
so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence
therof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. It does not follow, however,
that since the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased was void ab initio, the death benefits would now
be awarded to Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage,
there must be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a
party can enter into a second marriage; otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property.

BIGAMOUS, ADULTEROUS, etc. RELATIONSHIPS
GUILLERMA TUMLOS vs.SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES

FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 137650 April 12, 2000

Facts:
On July 5, 1996, the said spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment
building located at ARTE SUBDIVISION III, Lawang Bato, Valenzuela, Metro Manila; that through
tolerance they had allowed Guillerma, petitioner, Toto and Gina Tumlos to occupy the apartment
building for the last seven (7) years, since 1989, without the payment of any rent; that it was agreed
upon that after a few months, defendant Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a month while the
other promised to pay P1,000.00 a month, both as rental, which agreement was not complied with by
the said defendants.
She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action against her, since she
is a co-owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that she
is a co-vendee of the property in question together with Mario Fernandez.
Mario Fernandez and Guillerma had an amorous relationship, and that they acquired the
property in question as their love nest. It was further alleged that they lived together in the said
apartment building with their two (2) children for around ten (10) years, and that Guillerma
administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees of the other apartments, until she
discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Guillerma Tumlos is the co-owner of the property by virtue of
cohabiting with Mario Fernandez who is legally married to Lourdez Fernandez.
Ruling:
In the present case Article 148 of the family Code shall apply. Article 148 states that “In cases
of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them
in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary,
their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall
accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage.”
Guillerma Tumlos fail to present an evidence of her actual contribution to the purchase of the
property. In Article 148 did not include also administration of the property as contribution, it is
unsubstantiated.

JOSEFINA C. FRANCISCO vs. MASTER IRON WORKS

G.R. No. 151967 February 16, 2005
Facts:
On January 15, 1983, Eduardo and Josefina Francisco got married. On August 31, 1984,
Josefina purchased two parcels of lands. The Registry of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of title in
the name of “Josefina Castillo Francisco married to Eduardo G. Francisco”. On January 13, 1986,
Josefina mortgaged the said property to Leonila Cando. It appears that Eduardo affixed his marital
conformity to the deed.
On June 11, 1990, Eduardo bought 7,500 bags of cement from Master Iron Works and
Construction Corporation (MIWCC) but failed to pay the same. The court issued writ of execution
levying the two parcel of land as for payment to MIWCC.
On July 3, 1994, Josefina executed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim over the two parcel of
land in which she claimed that they were her paraphernal property, and that her husband had no
proprietary right or interest over them as evidenced by his affidavit of waiver, a copy of which she
attached to her affidavit.
Before she could commence presenting her evidence against MIWCC, Josefina filed a petition
to annul her marriage to Eduardo in the RTC of Parañaque, on the ground that when they were
married on January 15, 1983, Eduardo was already married to one Carmelita Carpio.
On September 9, 1996, the RTC of Parañaque rendered judgment, declaring the marriage
between Josefina and Eduardo as null and void for being bigamous.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject properties were paraphernal property of Josefina and cannot be
held liable for the Eduardo’s personal obligations.
Ruling:
No. The subject properties are not the paraphernal property of Josefina and can be held to
answer the liabilities of Eduardo.
Even though Eduardo and Josefina’s marriage is bigamous, the properties cannot be held
conjugal, Josefina failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that she contributed money, property
or industry in the acquisition of the subject property and hence, is not a co-owner of such. Also, the
Court doubted that when she acquired the property at 23 years of age, she had enough funds to pay
for it. Her claim that the funds for the property were provided by her mother and sister, the Court
believed, was just an afterthought.

MILAGROS JOAQUINO a.k.a. MILAGROS J. REYES vs. LOURDES REYES,

MERCEDES, MANUEL, MIRIAM and RODOLFO JR.
G.R. No. 154645 July 13, 2004
Facts:
In the marriage between Lourdes Reyes and the deceased husband Rodolfo Reyes, Rodolfo
has an illicit relationship with Milagros Joaquino. The deceased allegedly "put into custody" some of
the couple's conjugal properties to Milagros.
On July 12,1979, there is a transfer of property in favor of the petitioner and for which
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 90293 of the Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District IV was
issued in the name of petitioner Milagros B. Joaquino. The complainant alleges that that the funds
used to purchase the property were conjugal funds and earnings of the deceased.
The complaint finally alleges that the deceased had two cars in petitioner’s possession and that
the real and personal properties in petitioner’s possession are conjugal partnership properties of the
spouses Lourdes P. Reyes and Rodolfo A. Reyes and one-half belongs exclusively to respondent
Lourdes P. Reyes and the other half to the estate of Rodolfo A. Reyes to be apportioned among the
other respondents as his forced heirs. Respondents therefore, pray that the property covered by T.C.T.
No. 90293 be declared conjugal property of the spouses Lourdes P. Reyes and Rodolfo A. Reyes and
that petitioner be ordered to reconvey the property in respondents’ favor; that the two cars in
petitioner’s possession be delivered to respondents and that petitioner be made to pay actual,
compensatory and moral damages to respondents as well as attorney’s fees.
Issue:
Whether or not the common law relationship between Milagros Joaquino and the deceases
validates her claim of ownership.
Ruling:
No. Under Article 145 of the Civil Code, a conjugal partnership of gains (CPG) is created
upon marriage and lasts until the legal union is dissolved by death, annulment, legal separation or
judicial separation of property. Conjugal properties are by law owned in common by the husband and
wife. As to what constitutes such properties are laid out in Article 153 of the Code, which we quote:
"(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common
fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work, or as salary of the spouses, or of either of
them;
(3) The fruits, rents or interests received or due during the marriage, coming from the common
property or from the exclusive property of each spouse."
Moreover, under Article 160 of the Code, all properties of the marriage, unless proven to
pertain to the husband or the wife exclusively, are presumed to belong to the CPG. For the rebuttable

presumption to arise, however, the properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the
existence of the marriage.
In default of Article 144 of the Civil Code, Article 148 of the Family Code has been applied.
Thus, when a common-law couple has a legal impediment to marriage, only the property acquired by
them -- through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry -- shall be owned by
them in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Milagros likewise failed to prove
that she was indeed financially capable of purchasing the house and lot, that she actually contributed
to the payments, and that she was employed any time after 1961 when the property was purchased.
The Certification and Affidavits stating that she borrowed money from her siblings and had earnings
from a jewelry business were also deemed to have no probative values, they were not cross-examined
by the respondents.

JACINTO SAGUID vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 150611 June 10, 2003
Facts:
Gina S. Rey, private respondent and seventeen years old, was married but separated de facto
from her husband. Sometime in July 1987, she met Jacinto, petitioner, after a brief courtship they
decided to cohabit as husband and wife. In 1996, the couple decided to end up their nine-year
cohabitation.
On January 9, 1997, respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal
Property with Receivership against the petitioner in the RTC. She prayed that she be declared the sole
owner of the personal properties she contributed during her cohabitation with Jacinto and the amount
of 70,000.00 representing her contribution to the construction of their house be reimbursed to her.
Issue:
Whether or not Gina Rey is entitled to the ownership of the personal properties and
reimbursement of her contributions to the construction of their house.
Ruling:
Yes, Gina is entitled to the ownership of the personal properties and reimbursement of her
contributions to the construction of their house.
It is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other because the
former was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their
property regime therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous
marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both
man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under
this regime, "…only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions..."Proof of actual contribution is required.
The fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous
relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property.
While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there
is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to
Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties’ respective
contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal.

VICTOR JUANIZA vs. EUGENIO JOSE

G.R. No. L-50127-28 March 3, 1979
Facts:
In November 23, 1967, the defendant Jose, registered owner and operator of a passenger
jeepney, involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the Philippine National Railways
which resulted in the death to seven (7) and physical injuries to five (5) of its passengers. At that time
the defendant is legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with Rosalia Arroyo for
sixteen years.
The court charged the defendant and Rosalia Arroyo for damages.
Motion for reconsideration was filed by Rosalia Arroyo praying that the decision be
reconsidered insofar as it condemns her to pay damages jointly and severally with her co-defendant,
but was denied. The lower court based her liability on the provision of Article 144 of the Civil Code.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 144 of the Civil Code is applicable in a case where one of the parties
in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code
requires that the man and the woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract
marriage. Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there is an impediment for him to
contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo. Under the provision of the Civil Code, Arroyo cannot be a co-
owner of the jeepney. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership of Jose and his legal wife. There
is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for damages arising from the death of, and physical
injuries suffered by, the passengers of the jeepney, which figured in the collision.

MARINO, RENATO, LETICIA, IMELDA, ALICIA, LIGAYA, and ZENAIDA, all
surnamed ADRIANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 124118 March 27, 2000
Facts:
On October 29, 1933 Lucio Adriano and Gliceria Dorado got married. Sometime in 1942 or
prior thereto, Lucio and Gliceria separated, and Gliceria settled in Rizal, Laguna where she died on
June 11, 1968. On November 22, 1968, or five months after the death of Gliceria, Lucio married
Vicenta. On October 10, 1980, Lucio executed a last will and testament disposing of all his properties,
and assigning among others, his second wife Vicenta and all his children by his first and second
marriage as devisees and legatees.
On February 11, 1981, Lucio died and private respondent Celestina Adriano, who was
instituted in Lucio's will as its executrix, filed a petition for the probate of the will on February 18,
1981 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City. The RTC allowed the probate of the will.
On August 17, 1988, and while the proceedings for settlement of estate were pending before
the RTC, petitioners instituted an action for annulment of Lucio Adriano's will. In the complaint
plaintiffs-petitioners alleged that before the marriage of Lucio and their mother, Vicenta, on
November 22, 1968, the two lived together as husband and wife and as such, acquired properties
which became the subject of inventory and administration.
Issue:
Whether or not the estate of Lucio are conjugal properties of his first marriage.
Ruling:
Yes. The co-ownership in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man and woman
living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage must not in any way be
incapacitated to marry. Considering that the property was acquired in 1964, or while Lucio's marriage
with Gliceria subsisted, such property is presumed to be conjugal unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. As found by both the trial court and respondent court in
this case, not only did petitioners fail to overcome the presumption of conjugality of the disputed
property, private respondents have also presented sufficient evidence to support their allegation that
the property was in fact purchased by Lucio with proceeds of the conjugal fund of his first marriage.
Although in cases of common-law relations where an impediment to marry exists, equity

would dictate that property acquired by the man and woman through their joint endeavor should be
allocated to each of them in proportion to their respective efforts, petitioners in the instant case have
not submitted any evidence that Vicenta actually, contributed to the acquisition of the property in
question.

COVERAGE OF FAMILY RELATIONS
GAUDENCIO GUERRERO vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOCOS NORTE

G.R. No. 109068 January 10, 1994
Facts:
Guerrero and Pedro are brothers in law, their respective wives being sisters. Filed by petitioner
as an accion publicana against private respondent, this case assumed another dimension when it was
dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground that the parties being brother-in-law the complaint
should have alleged that earnest efforts were first exerted towards a compromise.
Issue:
Whether or not brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family.
Ruling:
Considering that Art. 151 starts with the negative word “No”, the requirement is mandatory
for that the complaint or petition, which must be verified, should allege that earnest efforts towards a
compromise have been made but that the same failed, so that “If it is shown that no such efforts were
in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
No. The court already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon that the enumeration of “brothers and sisters”
as members of the same family does not comprehend “sisters-in-law”

HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC. vs. HON. EDMUNDO T. ACUÑA
G.R. No. 154132 August 31, 2006
Facts:
On November 24, 2000, Alberto Moreno (private respondent) filed with the RTC of Caloocan
City a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (petitioner), his wife Remedios, the
spouses Felipe and Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of
mortgage contending that he did not secure any loan from petitioner, nor did he sign or execute any
contract of mortgage in its favor; that his wife, acting in conspiracy with Hiyas and the spouses Owe,
who were the ones that benefited from the loan, made it appear that he signed the contract of
mortgage; that he could not have executed the said contract because he was then working abroad.
On May 17, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that private respondent
failed to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code wherein it is provided that no suit between
members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or
petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed.
Issue:
Whether or not necessity of earnest effort is needed.
Ruling:
No. Article 151 of the Family Code provides as follows: “No suit between members of the
same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no
such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.” This rule shall not apply to cases which
may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. Article 222 of the Civil Code from which
Article 151 of the Family Code was taken, essentially contains the same provisions, to wit: “No suit
shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations
in Article 2035.” In the case of Martinez v. Martinez ruled that Article 151 of the Family Code applies
to cover when the suit is exclusively between or among family members.
Hence, once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family, the
law no longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise
before the action can prosper.

SPOUSES AUGUSTO HONTIVEROS and MARIA HONTIVEROS vs. REGIONAL

TRIAL COURT, and, SPOUSES GREGORIO HONTIVEROS and TEODORA AYSON
G.R. No. 125465 June 29,1999
Facts:
Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against
private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson. The petitioners alleged that they are
the owners of a parcel of land in Capiz and that they were deprived of income from the land as a result
of the filing of the land registration case.
In the reply, private respondents denied that they were married and alleged that Gregorio was
a widower while Teodora was single. They also denied depriving petitioners of possession of and
income from the land. On the contrary, according to the private respondents, the possession of the
property in question had already been transferred to petitioners by virtue of the writ of
possession. Trial court denied petitioner’s motion that while in the amended complaint, they alleged
that earnest efforts towards a compromise were made, it was not verified as provided in Article 151.
Issue:
Whether or not the court can validly dismissed the complaint due to lack of efforts exerted
towards a compromise as stated in Article 151.
Ruling:
No. Supreme Court held that the inclusion of private respondent Teodora Ayson as defendant
and Maria Hontiveros as petitioner take the case out of the scope of Article 151. Under this provision,
the phrase "members of the same family" refers to the husband and wife, parents and children,
ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full or half-blood. Religious
relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effect in this jurisdiction.
Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is described in the complaint as the spouse of
respondent Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner
Augusto Hontiveros, are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family.

PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO, and

ISABELITA MANALO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 129242 January 16, 2001
Facts:
Troadio Manalo died intestate on February 14, 1992. His wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven
children, who are all of legal age, survived him. At the time of his death, Troadio Manalo left several
real properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name
and style Manalo's Machine Shop.
The eight of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo filed a petition with the
respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila of the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father
and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator.
The trial court issued an order and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein. However,
the trial court upon motion of set this order of general default aside herein petitioners who were
granted then 10 days within which to file their opposition to the petition. Several pleadings were
subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating in the filling of an Omnibus
Motion.
Issue:
Whether or not the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where earnest efforts toward
compromise should first be made prior the filing of the petition.
Ruling:
It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the
averments and the character of the relief were sought in the complaint or petition, shall be
controlling. The careful scrutiny of the petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement
and distribution of the estate belies herein petitioners’ claim that the same is in the nature of an
ordinary civil action. The provision of Article 151 is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. It is
clear from the term “suit” that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other
in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy that the law affords him for the redress
of an injury or enforcement of a right.
It is also the intention of the Code Commission as revealed in the Report of the Code
Commission to make the provision be applicable only to civil actions. The petition for issuance of
letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate is a special proceeding and as such a
remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. Hence,
it must be emphasized that herein petitioners are not being sued in such case for any cause of action
as in fact no defendant was pronounced.

NICANOR T. SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CONSUELAO T. SANTOS-

GUERRERO and ANDRES GUERRERO
G.R. No. 134787 November 15, 2005
Facts:
Petitioner Nicanor T. Santos and private respondent Consuelo T. Santos-Guerrero are brother
and sister, born to spouses Urbano Santos and Candelaria Santos, now both deceased. Sometime in
1956, Nicanor, Consuelo and eight of their siblings, executed a "Basic Agreement of Partition"
covering properties they inherited from their parents.
Two years later, Consuelo, joined by her husband, herein respondent Andres Guerrero
(collectively, the "Guerreros"), filed suit with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal against
petitioner Nicanor and two (2) other brothers, for recovery of inheritance.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 222 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court has no application
Ruling:
A lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers.Thus, the
provision making honest efforts towards a settlement a condition precedent for the maintenance of
an action between members of the same family. As it were, a complaint in ordinary civil actions
involving members of the same family must contain an allegation that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made pursuant to Article 222of the Civil Code, now pursuant to Article 151
of the Family Code.Otherwise, the complaint may be dismissed under Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court.Admittedly, the complaint filed in this case contains no such allegation. But a complaint
otherwise defective on that score may be cured by the introduction of evidence effectively supplying
the necessary averments of a defective complaint.

PROHIBITED COMPROMISE
CECILIO MENDOZA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and LUISA DE

LA ROSA MENDOZA
G.R. No. L-23102 April 24, 1967
Facts:
In the complaint, private respondent, Luisa De La Rosa Mendoza averred that she was married
to Cecilio Mendoza on 2 September 1953, that they lived together as husband and wife until 14 July
1954, when the husband departed for the United States to further his studies and practice his
profession. Since then, defendant Mendoza, without justifiable cause or reason deliberately abandoned
and neglected plaintiff and despite repeated demands by plaintiff, defendant has failed and refused,
and still fails and refuses, to provide for the maintenance and support of plaintiff, who is allegedly to
be pregnant, sickly and without any source of revenue, while defendant (now petitioner) is employed
in a hospital in the United States.
Issue:
Whether or not the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where earnest efforts toward
compromise should first be made prior the filing of the petition, and invoking Article 222 of the New
Civil Code of the Philippines.
Ruling:
Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines requires that before a suit between members
of the same family (in this case between husband and wife) is filed or maintained, it must appear that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, and the only way to make it so appear when
the suit isfiledis by a proper averment to that effect in the complaint. Since the law forbids a suit being
initiated filed or maintained unless such efforts at compromise appear, the showing that efforts in
question were made is a condition precedent to the existence of the cause of action. It follows that
the failure of the complaint to plead that plaintiff previously tried in earnest to reach a settlement out
of court renders it assailable for lack of cause of action and it may be so attacked at any stage of the
case even on appeal.
While the Supreme Court agree that petitioner's position represents a correct statement of the
general rule on the matter, we are nevertheless constrained to hold that the Court of Appeals and the
Court of First Instance committed no error in refusing to dismiss the complaint, for on its face, the
same involved a claim for future supportthat under Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
cannot be subject of a valid compromise, and is, therefore, outside the sphere of application of Article
222 of the Code upon which petitioner relies. This appears from the last proviso of said Article 222,
future support.

FAMILY HOME
JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS vs. DANILO PANGILINAN

G.R. No. 185920 July 20, 2010
Facts:
Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a
company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos, the patriarch of herein petitioners. The labor arbiter ordered
Ramos and the company to pay the respondents’ back-wages, separation pay, 13th month pay &
service incentive leave pay. The decision became final and executory so a writ of execution was issued
which the Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) implemented by
levying a property in Ramos’ name situated in Pandacan.
Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home, hence, exempt from execution to
satisfy the judgment award, Ramos and the company moved to quash the writ of execution.
Respondents argued that it is not the family home there being another one in Antipolo and that the
Pandacan address is actually the business address. The motion was denied and the appeal was likewise
denied by the NLRC.
Issue:
Whether or not the levy upon the Pandacan property was valid.
Ruling:
Yes. For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what
law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the
judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are applicable. If
the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988,
then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225,
229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Meanwhile, Articles 240 to 242 governs extrajudicial constitution.
On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extra judicially or judicially, and the exemption is
effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154
actually reside therein. Moreover, the family home should belong to the absolute community or
conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have been with consent of
the other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area where it is located.
Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art. 155 for
which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. In both
instances, the claim for exemption must be proved.
In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to
August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944, they must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code.
There being absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extra judicially
constituted as the Ramos’ family home, the law protecting the family home cannot apply thereby
making the levy upon the Pandacan property valid.

FAMILY HOME
JOSE MODEQUILLO vs. HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO SALINAS

G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990
Facts:
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur
on July 1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located at
Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur also registered in the latter’s name. A motion to quash
was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the family home is built since 1969
prior the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment
sought to be enforced against the family home is not one of those enumerated. With regard to the
agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the
original possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural minority. The residential house in
the present case became a family home by operation of law under Article 153.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is deemed to be a family home.
Ruling:
The petitioner’s contention that petitioner and his family should consider it a family home
from the time it was occupied in 1969 is not well taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it
provides that the provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing family residences insofar as said
provisions are applicable. It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a retroactive effect
such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the
time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from the execution
for payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Code. The said article simply means
that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered
family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family
Code. The debt and liability, which was the basis of the judgment, was incurred prior the effectivity
of the Family Code. This does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family
Code.

FAMILY HOME
ALBINO JOSEF vs. OTELIO SANTOS

G.R. No. 165060 November 27, 2008
Facts:
In Civil Case No. 95-110-MK, Petitioner Albino Josef was the defendant, which is a case for
collection of sum of money filed by herein respondent Otelio Santos, who claimed that petitioner
failed to pay the shoe materials which he bought on credit from respondent on various dates in 1994.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City found petitioner liable to respondent. Petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s decision in Toto. Petitioner filed
before this Court a petition for review on certiorari, but it was dismissed in a Resolution dated
February 18, 2002. The Judgment became final and executory on May 21, 2002.
A writ of execution was issued on August 20, 2003and enforced on August 21, 2003. On
August 29, 2003, certain personal properties subjects of the writ of execution were auctioned off.
Thereafter, a real property located at Marikina City was sold by way of public auction to fully satisfy
the judgment credit.
On November 5, 2003, petitioner filed an original petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, questioning the sheriff’s levy and sale of the abovementioned personal and real properties.
Petitioner claimed that the personal properties did not belong to him but to his children; and that the
real property was his family home thus exempt from execution.
Issue:
Whether or not the levy and sale of the personal belongings of the petitioner’s children as well
as the attachment and sale on public auction of his family home to satisfy the judgment award in favor
of respondent is legal.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family,
a sacred symbol of family love and repository of cherished memories that last during one’s lifetime. It
is the sanctuary of that union which the law declares and protects as a sacred institution; and likewise
a shelter for the fruits of that union. It is where both can seek refuge and strengthen the tie that binds
them together and which ultimately forms the moral fabric of our nation. The protection of the family
home is just as necessary in the preservation of the family as a basic social institution, and since no
custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect, the trial
court’s failure to observe the proper procedures to determine the veracity of petitioner’s allegations,
is unjustified.
The same is true with respect to personal properties levied upon and sold at auction. Despite
petitioner’s allegations in his Opposition, the trial court did not make an effort to determine the nature
of the same, whether the items were exempt from execution or not, or whether they belonged to
petitioner or to someone else.

FAMILY HOME
SPOUSES AUTHER G. KELLEY, JR. and DORIS A. KELLEY vs. PLANTERS

PRODUCTS, INC. and JORGE A. RAGUTANA
G.R. No. 172263 July 9, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner Auther G. Kelley, Jr. (Auther) acquired agricultural chemical products on
consignment from respondent Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) in 1989. Due to Auther’s failure to pay
despite demand, PPI filed an action for sum of money against him in the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City. After trial on the merits, the RTC Makati City decided in favor of PPI and issued a writ
of execution. After being belatedly informed of the said sale, petitioners Auther and his wife Doris A.
Kelley filed a motion to dissolve or set aside the notice of levy in the RTC Makati City on the ground
that the subject property was their family home which was exempt from execution.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is the family home of the petitioners.
Ruling:
Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or
extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3, 1988)
are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family residences as of August 3, 1988 are
considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home
under the Family Code.
The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such and
lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.Moreover, the debts for which the family
home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that is, if it was
incurred prior to August 3, 1988), the alleged family home must be shown to have been constituted
either judicially or extrajudicially pursuant to the Civil Code.
The rule, however, is not absolute. The Family Code, in fact, expressly provides for the
following exceptions: Article 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except: (1) For non-payment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of
the family home; (3) For debts secured by a mortgage on the premises before or after such
constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and
others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.

FAMILY HOME
MARY JOSEPHINE GOMEZ and EUGENIA SOCORRO C. GOMEZ-SALCEDO

vs. ROEL, NOEL and JANNETTE BEVERLY STA. INES and HINAHON STA. INES
G.R. No. 132537 October 14, 2005
Facts:
Purificacion dela Cruz Gomez (deceased), mother of Mary Josephine C. Gomez and Eugenia
Socorro C. Gomez-Salcedo, entrusted rice land in Nueva Vizcaya to Marietta dela Cruz Sta. Ines.
Josephine and Socorro demanded for an accounting of the produce of said rice lands while under the
management of Marietta and for the return of the Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) of the property.
Trial court rendered judgment against Marietta and ordered her to deliver the owner’s copy of
the TCT and pay damages. In order to satisfy damages, a writ of execution was issued, by virtue
of which, a parcel of land in Nueva Vizcaya registered in Marietta’s name was sold at a public auction
wherein Josephine was the highest bidder. Marietta’s husband, Hinahon together with their children,
filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale before the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya on the ground that
said house and lot sold during the public auction is their family residence and is thus exempt from
execution under Article 155 of the Family Code. Respondents assert that the house and lot was
constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family home from the time they occupied it in
1972
Issue:
Whether or not the property can be sold.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that under article 155 of the Family Code, the family home shall
be exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment, except for, among other things, debts incurred
prior to the constitution of the family home. While the respondent contends that the house and lot
was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family home in 1972, it is not deemed
constituted as such at the time Marietta incurred her debts.
Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as the family home only upon the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. The complaint against Marietta was instituted in
1986 to for acts committed as early as 1977, thus, her liability arose years before the levied property
was constituted as the family home in 1988. The liability incurred by Marietta falls within the exception
provided for in Article 155 of the Family Code: debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family
home.

FAMILY HOME
FLORANTE F. MANACOP vs. COURT OF APPEALS and E & L MERCANTILE, INC.

G.R. No. 97898 August 11, 1997
Facts:
Petitioner Florante F. Manacopand his wife Eulaceli purchased on March 10, 1972 a residential
lot with a bungalow, in consideration of P75,000.00.On March 17, 1986, Private Respondent E & L
Merchantile, Inc. filed a complaint against petitioner and F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc. before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila to collect an indebtedness of P3,359,218.45. Instead
of filing an answer, petitioner and his company entered into a compromise agreement with private
respondent, the salient portion of which provides: That defendants will undertake to pay the amount
of P2,000,000.00 as and when their means permit, but expeditiously as possible as their collectibles
will be collected. On April 20, 1986, the trial court rendered judgment approving the aforementioned
compromise agreement. It enjoined the parties to comply with the agreement in good faith. On July
15, 1986, private respondent filed a motion for execution which the lower court granted. However,
execution of the judgment was delayed. Eventually, the sheriff levied on several vehicles and other
personal properties of petitioner. In partial satisfaction of the judgment debt, these chattels were sold
at public auction for which certificates of sale were correspondingly issued by the sheriff.
On August 1, 1989, petitioner and his company filed a motion to quash the alias writs of
execution and to stop the sheriff from continuing to enforce them on the ground that the judgment
was not yet executory. They alleged that the compromise agreement had not yet matured, as there was
no showing that they had the means to pay the indebtedness or that their receivables had in fact been
collected.
Issue:
Whether or not the final and executory decision promulgated and a writ of execution issued
before the effectivity of the Family Code can be executed on a family home constituted under the
provisions of the said Code.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed
constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to
constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually
resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors
should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses
or head of the family who owns the home.
Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows: Art. 155. The family home shall be
exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: (1) For nonpayment of taxes; (2) For debts
incurred prior to the constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the
premises before or after such constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborer, mechanics, architects,
builders, material men and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction
of the building. The exemption provided, as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution
of the family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. In the
present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether

judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only
under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila
Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).

FAMILY HOME
PABLITO TANEO, JR., JOSE TANEO, NENA T. CATUBIG and HUSBAND, CILIA T.
MORING and HUSBAND vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ABDON GILIG
G.R. No. 108532 March 9, 1999
Facts:
As a result of a judgment in Civil Case No. 590 (for recovery of property) in favor of private
respondent, two (2) of petitioners' properties were levied to satisfy the judgment amount of about
P5,000.00: one was a parcel of land located in Barrio Igpit, Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental
with an area of about five (5) hectares, and the other was the family home also located at Igpit, Opol,
Misamis Oriental. The subject properties were sold at public auction on February 12, 1966 to the
private respondent as the highest bidder. Consequently, after petitioners' failure to redeem the same,
a final deed of conveyance was executed on February 9, 1968, definitely selling, transferring, and
conveying said properties to the private respondent.
To forestall such conveyance, petitioners filed an action on November 5, 1985 (docketed as

Civil Case No. 10407) to declare the deed of conveyance void and to quiet title over the land with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. In their complaint, it was alleged that petitioners are the
children and heirs of Pablo Taneo and Narcisa Valaceras who died on February 12, 1977 and
September 12, 1984, respectively. Upon their death, they left the subject property covered by OCT
No. P-12820 and Free Patent No. 548906. Considering that said property has been acquired through
free patent, such property is therefore inalienable and not subject to any encumbrance for the payment
of debt, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 141. Petitioners further alleged that they were in
continuous, open and peaceful possession of the land and that on February 9, 1968. Deputy Provincial
Sheriff Jose V. Yasay issued a Sheriffs Deed of Conveyance in favor of the private respondent over
the subject property including their family home that was extra judicially constituted in accordance
with law. As a result of the alleged illegal deed of conveyance, private respondent was able to obtain
in his name Tax Declaration No. 851920 over the land, thus casting a cloud of doubt over the title
and ownership of petitioners over said property.
Issue:
Whether or not the family home is exempt from execution.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the applicable law, therefore, in the case at bar is still the Civil
Code where registration of the declaration of a family home is a prerequisite. Nonetheless, the law
provides certain instances where the family home is not exempted from execution, forced sale or
attachment. The trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the house in
question, erected on the land of Plutarco Vacalares, as the family home. The instrument constituting
the family home was registered only on January 24, 1966. The money judgment against Pablo Taneo
was rendered on January 24, 1964. Thus, at that time when the "debt" was incurred, the family home
was not yet constituted or even registered. Clearly, petitioners' alleged family home, as constituted by
their father is not exempt as it falls under the exception of Article 243 (2).

FAMILY HOME
SPOUSES CHARLIE FORTALEZA and OFELIA FORTALEZA vs. SPOUSES RAUL

LAPITAN and RONA LAPITAN
G.R. No. 178288 August 15, 2012
Facts:
Spouses Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza obtained a loan from spouses Rolando and Amparo
Lapitan (creditors). As security, spouses Fortaleza executed on January 28, 1998 a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over their residential house and lot situated in Barrio Anos, Municipality of Los Baños,
Laguna (subject property). When spouses Fortaleza failed to pay the indebtedness including the
interests and penalties, the creditors applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage
before the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Calamba City. The public auction
sale was set on May 9, 2001.
At the sale, the creditors’ son Dr. Raul Lapitan and his wife Rona emerged as the highest
bidders. Then, they were issued a Certificate of Salethat was registered with the Registry of Deeds of
Calamba City. The one-year redemption period expired without the spouses Fortaleza redeeming the
mortgage. Thus, spouses Lapitan executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership on November
20, 2003 and the registration of the subject property in their names on February 4, 2004. Despite the
foregoing, the spouses Fortaleza refused spouses Lapitan’s formal demandto vacate and surrender
possession of the subject property.
Issue:
Whether or not the Honorable court of appeals gravely erred in not holding that the petitioners
were prevented by the respondent from exercising their right of redemption over the foreclosed
property by demanding a redemption over the foreclosed property by demanding a redemption price
of a highly equitable and more than double the amount of the foreclosed property, especially that the
foreclosed mortgaged property is the family home of petitioners and their children.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Article 155(3) of the Family Code explicitly allows the forced
sale of a family home "for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such
constitution." In this case, there is no doubt that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily executed on January
28, 1998 a deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property, which was even notarized by their
original counsel of record. And assuming that the property is exempt from forced sale, spouses
Fortaleza did not set up and prove to the Sheriff such exemption from forced sale before it was sold
at the public auction.
KIND/STATUS OF CHILDREN

MANUEL DE ASIS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 127578 February 15, 1999
Facts:
Vircel D. Andres, as the legal guardian of the minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, filed an
action for maintenance and support against Manuel de Asis. She alleged that Manuel is the father of
Glen but as a father, he failed to provide support to his child. Manuel countered that he is not the
father of the child and so he has no obligation to support mentioned child. Thereafter, Vircel moved
for the dismissal of the case because of the father's judicial declaration denying that he is the father of
subject minor child. Six years later, Vircel filed a similar complaint against the putative father. Manuel
moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of res judicata.
Issue:
a.) Whether or not the civil status of a son or his filiation and paternity could be left to the will
or agreement of his parents.
b.) Whether or not the child is barred from filing an action to ask for support from his alleged
father due to the dismissal of the first case filed.
Ruling:
No, a child’s civil status or his filiation and paternity cannot be left to the will of his parents.
Such issue must be judicially established and it is for the court to declare its existence or absence. In
the case at bar, the civil status of a son having been denied, and this civil status, from which the right
to support is derived being in issue, no conclusion could be given to such a denial until an authoritative
declaration has been given.
No, the child is not barred from filing an action to ask for support. The right to receive support
can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Furthermore, future support cannot be
the subject of a compromise.
The right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to maintain his existence,
he is not entitled to renounce or transfer the right for this would mean sanctioning the voluntary
giving up of life itself. The right to life cannot be renounce; hence, support which is the means to
attain the former, cannot be renounced.
KIND/STATUS OF CHILDREN

RODOLFO FERNANDEZ, et al. vs. ROMEO FERNANDEZ, et al.
G.R. No. 143256 August 28, 2001
Facts:
The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and Generosa A. de Venecia being childless by the
death of their son, purchased from a certain Miliang for P20.00 a one month baby boy. The boy being
referred to was later on identified as Rodolfo Fernandez, the herein appellant. Appellant was taken
care of by the couple and was sent to school and became a dental technician. He lived with the couple
until they became old and disabled. On August 31, 1989, after the death of Dr. Jose, appellant and
Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition dividing and allocating to themselves
the estate left by the deceased. Same day, Generosa sold her share to Rodolfo’s son, Eddie Fernandez.
After learning the transaction, Romeo, Potenciano, Francisco, Julita, William, Mary, Alejandro,
Gerardo, Rodolfo and Gregorio, all surnamed Fernandez, being nephews and nieces of the deceased
Jose K. Fernandez, their father Genaro being a brother of Jose, filed on September 21, 1994, an action
to declare the Extra-Judicial Partition of Estate and Deed of Sale void ab initio. They claimed that
Rodolfo is not a legitimate nor a legally adopted child of spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez and Generosa
de Venecia Fernandez, hence Rodolfo could not inherit from the spouses.
Issue:
Whether or not Rodolfo is a legitimate or a legally adopted child of Jose Fernandez and
Generosa de Venecia Fernandez.
Ruling:
No, Rodolfo is neither a legitimate nor a legally adopted child of Jose Fernandez and Generosa
de Venecia Fernandez. Rodolfo failed to come up with evidences to prove his filiation. The only public
document he could show was the Application for Recognition of Back Pay Rights under Act No. 897.
897. Such is a public document but nevertheless, it was not executed to admit the filiation of Jose K.
Fernandez with him. Rodolfo also claims that he enjoyed and possessed the status of being a legitimate
child of the spouses openly and continuously until they died. Open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child is meant the enjoyment by the child of the position and privileges usually
attached to the status of a legitimate child such as bearing the paternal surname, treatment by the
parents and family of the child as legitimate, constant attendance to the child's support and education,
and giving the child the reputation of being a child of his parents. However, it must be noted that
possession of status of a child does not in itself constitute an acknowledgment; it is only a ground for
a child to compel recognition by his assumed parent. His baptismal certificate, although public
documents, is evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein
specified, but not the veracity of the statements or declarations made therein with respect to his
kinsfolk. It may be argued that a baptismal certificate is one of the other means allowed by the Rules
of Court and special laws of proving filiation but in this case, the authenticity of the baptismal
certificate was doubtful when Fr. Raymundo Q. de Guzman of St. John the Evangelist Parish of
Lingayen-Dagupan, Dagupan City issued a certification on October 16, 1995 attesting that the records
of baptism on June 7, 1930 to August 8, 1936 were all damaged. The pictures he presented do not also
constitute proof of filiation.

GERARDO B. CONCEPCION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 123450 August 31, 2005
Facts:
Gerardo B. Concepcion and Ma. Theresa Almontewere married on December 29, 1989. A
year later, they begot Jose Gerardo. On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to annul his
marriage to Ma. Theresa on the ground of bigamy. This was because it was found out that Ma. Theresa
had already married a Mario Gopiao nine years before their marriage. Such marriage of Ma. Theresa
to Mario was never annulled. The trial court ruled that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa’s marriage was
bigamous and that her marriage to Mario is valid and subsisting. It declared the child as being
illegitimate. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision but on appeal, reversed its ruling
and held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first
marriage.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the child born out of a bigamous marriage is considered legitimate.
b) Whether or not Gerardo could assail Jose Gerardo’s legitimacy.
Ruling:
Yes, a child born out of a bigamous marriage is considered legitimate. The legitimacy would
come from the validity of the first marriage and not on the bigamous marriage for that bigamous
marriage is void from the very beginning(ab initio). Ma. Theresa was married to Mario Gopiao, and
that she had never entered into a lawful marriage with the Gerardo since the so-called “marriage” with
the latter was void ab initio. Ma. Theresa was legitimately married to Mario Gopiao when the child
Jose Gerardo was born on December 8, 1990. Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo – under the law – is
the legitimate child of the legal and subsisting marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao; he
cannot be deemed to be the illegitimate child of the void and non-existent ‘marriage’ between Ma.
Theresa and Gerardo.The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the
Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate.
As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the
Family Code provides that the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
No, Gerardo is not in a position to assail Jose Gerardo’s legitimacy. He has no standing in law
to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresa’s husband Mario or, in a proper case, his
heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife.Impugning the
legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since
the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning; he never became her
husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.

BELEN SAGAD ANGELES vs. ALELI “CORAZON” ANGELES MAGLAYA
G.R. No. 153798 September 2, 2005
Facts:
Francisco M. Angeles died intestate on January 21, 1998 in the City of Manila, leaving
behind four parcels of land and a building, among other valuable properties. Respondent Aleli claims
that she is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado, and, together with
petitioner, Belen S. Angeles, decedent’s wife by his second marriage, are the surviving heirs of the
decedent. For this matter, respondent prays that she be made administratrix of Francisco’s estate.
Petitioner Belen opposed respondent’s claim, alleging that the respondent could not be the daughter
of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Francisco’s legitimate daughter, the corresponding
birth certificate was not signed by him. Belen petitioner further alleged that respondent, despite her
claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has not presented the
marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such
union.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Aleli could validly claim that she is the legitimate daughter of
Francisco Angeles.
Ruling:
No, respondent’s legitimacy was impugned, and for failing to establish the presumption of her
legitimacy, she could not validly claim that she is the legitimate child of the deceased. The presumption
of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code may be availed only upon convincing proof of the
factual basis- that the child’s parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth
occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. In the case at bar, respondent failed to prove such
legal marriage of her parents, for she failed to show any marriage certificate or marriage contract. She
failed to present any priest, judge, mayor, or other solemnizing authority to the witness box
to declare that he solemnized the marriage between her parents. Clearly, therefore, respondent
could not be vested with the legal presumption of legitimacy which, as above explained, should flow
from a lawful marriage between Francisco and Genevova.
Article 172 of the Family Code provides that the legitimate filiation of a child can be
established by any of the modes therein defined even without direct evidence of the marriage of
his/her supposed parents. But respondent failed to prove her legitimacy even in this aspect.
Respondent presented, in support of her claim of legitimacy, a copy of her Birth Certificate dated
November 23, 1939 issued by the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila. But such birth certificate was
not signed by her putative father. Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as
validating proof of paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the father and
mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses.

JANICE MARIE JAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. L-49162 July 28, 1987
Facts:
In 1967, Arlene Salgado was introduced to PericoJao. After such introduction, Jao courted
Arlene. Not long thereafter, they had sexual intercourse and subsequently, they lived together. 1968,
Arlene became pregnant. Jao paid for all the expenses related to Arlene’s pregnancy but when the
child, Janice was born, Jao insisted that she could not be the father of such child. When the case was
filed with the RTC, the RTC ordered the NBI for a group blood testing. The group blood testing
result showed that Janice could not have been the possible offspring of Jao and Arlene.
Issue:
Whether or not group blood testing could be conclusive evidence to impugn the legitimacy of
Janice.
Ruling:
Yes, group blood testing could be admitted as conclusive evidence to impugn the legitimacy
of Janice. For the past three decades, the use of blood typing in cases of disputed parentage has already
become an important legal procedure. There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood
grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity — that is, the
fact that the blood type of the child is a possible product of the mother and alleged father does not
conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not the
possible blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the alleged father are cross matched,
then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.
Medical science has shown that there are four types of blood in man which can be transmitted
through heredity. Although the presence of the same type of blood in two persons does not indicate
that one was begotten by the other, yet the fact that they are of different types will indicate the
impossibility of one being the child of the other. Thus, when the supposed father and the alleged child
are not in the same blood group, they cannot be father and child by consanguinity.

TEOFISTA BABIERA vs. PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL

G.R. No. 138493 June 15, 2000
Facts:
TeofistaBabiera claims that she was born to the spouses Eugenio and HermogenaBabiera then
65 and 54 years old respectively, at the time of her birth. PresentacionBabiera-Catotal, daughter of the
late spouses Eugenio and Hermogena counters this claim, saying that she saw with her own eyes that
Teofista was actually born to their housemaid named Flora Guinto. Presentacion testified that Teofista
was born through the help of a “hilot” and that her mother Flora forged the Teofista’s birth certificate,
making it appear that HermogenaBabiera was the mother by forging Hermogena’s signature.
Presentacion further claims that Teofista’s real surname is Guinto, her mother being single; the father,
a carpenter, refused to sign the birth certificate. Teofista on her defense, claims that Presentacion has
no legal capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code which states
that only the father could impugn the child's legitimacy, and that the same was not subject to a
collateral attack.
Issue:
Whether or not such petition may prosper considering Teofista’s claim that Presentacion has
no legal capacity to file the instant petition and can the presumption of regularity in the issuance of
her birth certificate be upheld.
Ruling:
Yes, the petition may prosper. The case at bar is not covered by Article 171 for the prayer
therein is not to declare that Teofista is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the
former is not the latter's child at all. The present action does not impugn Teofista’s filiation to Spouses
Eugenio and HermogenaBabiera, because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place.
Presentacion only aims to assail and cancel Teofista’s birth certificate for the void and simulated birth
certificate of the latter would affect the former’s hereditary rights.
Also, Teofista’s birth certificate cannot be taken into consideration for there were already
irregularities regarding the birth certificate itself. It was not signed by the local civil registrar.More
importantly, the Court of Appeals observed that the mother’s signature therein was different from her
signatures in other documents presented during the trial. The most significant piece of evidence,
however, is the deposition of HermogenaBabiera which states that she did not give birth to Teofista,
and that the latter was not hers nor her husband Eugenio’s.

WILLIAM LIYAO, JR. vs. JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, et al.

G.R. No. 138961 March 7, 2002
Facts:
Corazon Garcia alleges that she was cohabiting with William Liyao from 1965 up to William’s
death in December, 1975 even though Corazon is still legally married but living separately to a Ramon
Yulo. William Liyao himself was legally married to Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao at the time of his
cohabitation with Corazon. Corazon and deceased lived together with the company of Corazon’s two
children from her subsisting marriage- Enrique and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo. In 1974, they
begot a child, William Liyao, Jr. It was alleged that William Liyao paid for all the expenses for the
subsistence of William Jr. and also that of Corazon and her two children from her subsisting marriage
during their cohabitation. William Jr. was said to be in continuous possession and enjoyment of the
status of the child of said William Liyao, having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by
the decedent during his lifetime. Upon the death of his alleged father, William Jr. prays that he be
recognized as an illegitimate child and an heir by the family of the deceased from his subsisting
marriage. The deceased’s legitimate children on their part, alleges that the deceased could not have
fathered petitioner for their father and mother have never been separated.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner may impugn his legitimacy with that of his mother’s subsisting
marriage and establish his claim of filiation with the late William Liyao.
Ruling:
Holding that Corazon’s marriage with Ramon Yulo is still subsisting, it is presumed that
petitioner is the legitimate child of Ramon Yulo and not the illegitimate child of William Liyao. Under
the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate.
This presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be
overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Article 255 of the New Civil Code provides: “Children born
after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred
days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.” No
evidence other than that of physical impossibility of the husband having access to his wife within the
first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child can be
admitted. Such physical impossibility may be caused by: (a) By the impotence of the husband; (b) by
the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible; (c) by
the serious illness of the husband.
Petitioner cannot impugn his own legitimacy. Article 255 of the Civil Code provides that only
the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil
Code can impugn such legitimacy. And, in the case at bar, the petition was initiated by petitioner
himself through his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo who are
the undisputed children of Corazon and Ramon Yulo. The child himself cannot choose his own
filiation.

JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS vs. ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA
DIZON
G.R. No. 142877 October 2, 2001
Facts:
Danilo and Carolina de Jesus were married on 23 August 1964. It was within this marriage
that the petitioners, Jinkie and Jacqueline were born. In 1991 though, Juan Dizon acknowledged
petitioners as his own illegitimate children through a notarized document. Thereafter, Juan died
intestate and petitioners filed a prayer that they be given their legitime and be recognized as illegitimate
children by the surviving spouse and legitimate children of Juan Dizon.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners’ legitimacy as children of Danilo may be impugned and they be
recognized as illegitimate children of Juan Dizon.
Ruling:
No. The petitioners were born under the subsisting marriage of Danilo and Carolina. It is
presumed that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption becomes conclusive in the
absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120
days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity
of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact the husband and wife are living
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband,
which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. And only the father, or in exceptional instances the
latter's heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Since the
petitioners failed to show records of the impossibility of their parents’ access to each other during the
first 120 days of the 300 days which preceded their birth, they cannot assail their presumed legitimacy.
Failing therefore to impugn their legitimacy, petitioners cannot claim that they are the acknowledged
illegitimate children of the deceased, Juan Dizon.
ACTION TO CLAIM LEGITIMACY

EDGARDO A. TIJING vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001
Facts:
Edgardo and BienvenidaTijing are husband and wife, they have six children, youngest of
whom is Edgardo Tijing Jr. In August 1989, Angelita Diamante fetched Bienvenida for an urgent
laundry job. Bienvenida left to Angelita her 4-month old child, Edgardo Jr. as she usually let Angelita
take care of her child while she was doing laundry. When Bienvenida returned from work to get her
son, Angelita was nowhere to be found, and despite her and her husband’s efforts, they could not
locate Angelita and their child’s whereabouts.
Four years later, Bienvenida read about the death of Tomas Lopez, the common-law husband
of Angelita, whose interment is in Bulacan. She went there and allegedly saw her son Edgardo Jr., now
named John Thomas Lopez. John is now being claimed by Angelita as her own son, sired by her
common-law husband Tomas Lopez during their cohabitation. Bienvenida now alleges that the child
cannot possibly be born to Angelita and Tomas for it was the latter’s own brother who admitted that
Tomas was rendered sterile, caused by an accident. Tomas begot no children from his legal marriage
nor with the cohabitation with Angelita. Tomas’ brother even testified that Tomas himself admitted
to him that the subject child was adopted.
Issue:
Who among the claimants is the true parent of the subject child.
Ruling:
Bienvenida. It was Bienvenida who was able to produce the competent evidences to establish
the child’s filiation with her and her husband. She substantiated her claim with sufficient clinical
records, presenting the proper and credible witnesses who assisted her in her child’s birth. Not to
mention the fact that it could be readily observed that Bienvenida and the child have strong similarities
in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent
is competent and material evidence to establish parentage. Whereas, Angelita had been known to have
undergone ligation years before the alleged birth of the child and the admission of Tomas’ own brother
that Tomas was sterile makes it impossible that he and Angelita could have produced subject child.
More importantly, the birth certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent were
legally married which is false because even private respondent had admitted she is a common-law wife.
This false entry puts to doubt the other data in said birth certificate.
KINDS OF RECOGNITION

CAMELO CABATANIAvs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 124814 October 21, 2004
Facts:
Florencia is the mother of the respondent. Her husband left her in 1981 and she was hired as
petitioner’s household help. It was then that petitioner and Florencia had sexual intercourse. After a
month, petitioner’s wife noticed that Florencia is pregnant. For this reason, petitioner’s wife dismissed
Florencia and told her to go home. Petitioner was surprised when Florencia demanded from him
support for their alleged child. Petitioner refused, denying paternity and claimed that Florencia was
already pregnant when they had sexual intercourse. During trial, Florencia claimed that petitioner
voluntarily recognized respondent when he rented a house for her after the dismissal and
misrepresented herself as a widow when in fact her husband is still alive. Trial court brushed this
misrepresentation and used as one of its bases of its decision the similarities on personal appearances
of the petitioner and respondent and favored the respondent’s claim.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent may compulsorily be recognized by petitioner.
Ruling:
No. Respondent failed to show conclusive evidence as to establish his filiation with petitioner.
Aside from Florencia’s self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a house for her, private
respondent failed to present sufficient proof of voluntary recognition. A certificate of live birth
purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no
showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. The local civil
registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third
person.
More importantly, the fact that Florencia’s husband is living and there is a valid subsisting
marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is
legitimate even though Florencia may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced
as an adulteress. Only the husband or in exceptional cases, his heirs may impugned the presumed
legitimacy of the child.
With regards the personal appearance of the child, the Supreme Court provided that in this
age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective test of
physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and
filiation before the courts of law.

ROSALINA P. ECETA vs.MA. THERESA VELL LAGURA ECETA
G.R. NO. 157037 May 20, 2004
Facts:
Isaac and Rosalina married in 1926. The begot a child named Vicente. When Isaac died, he
left behind properties to which Rosalina and Vicente were the compulsory heirs. Thereafter, Vicente
also died but he had an illegitimate daughter, Ma. Theresa. Thus, the latter is a compulsory heir
together with Rosalina. Theresa then filed for a petition that she be made co-owner of a property
which was originally owned by Isaac, passed to Rosalina and Vicente upon his death. Ma. Theresa’s
contention was that she should be made as co-owner by virtue of her father’s death. During pre-trial,
Rosalina already admitted that she is the grandmother of Ma. Theresa. On appeal though, she
questions the alleged filiation and whether if such could be established by mere birth certificate and
by her admission during the trial.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent’s filiation to her alleged father could be established by the birth
certificate and by the admission made.
Ruling:
Yes. Ma. Theresa successfully established her filiation with Vicente through the duly
authenticated birth certificate. Vicente himself signed respondent’s birth certificate thereby
acknowledging that she is his daughter. By this act alone, Vicente is deemed to have acknowledged his
paternity over Ma. Theresa, thus, the filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is
established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules
of Court and special laws.
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the
child. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in
itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.

MA. THERESA R. ALBERTO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 86639 June 2, 1994
Facts:
Aurora Reniva and Juan M. Alberto had a child born out of wedlock in the person of the
petitioner. Accordingly, petitioner used "Alberto" as her surname in all her school records and
correspondences. On September 18, 1967, Juan M. Alberto, felled by a bullet from an assassin’s gun,
died intestate. His widow, Yolanda R. Alberto, filed a petition for the administration of his estate. The
petition was granted but was reopened as petitioner filed a motion that she be declared to have
acquired the status of a natural child and be entitled to share in the estate of the deceased. The court
favored the petitioner but CA reversed such ruling.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner be declared to have acquired the status of a natural child.
Ruling:
Yes. During his lifetime, deceased acted in such a manner as to evince his intent to recognize
petitioner as his flesh and blood, first, by allowing her from birth to use his family name; second, by
giving her and her mother sums of money by way of support and lastly, by openly introducing her to
members of his family, relatives and friends as his daughter. Supplementing such unmistakable acts of
recognition were those of his kin and gang mates, and openly visiting his daughter in school, had
meetings with her at the MOPC, manifesting open acceptance of such relationship. Taken altogether,
the claimed filiation would be hard to disprove.
Deceased died during the minority of the petitioner, thus, Art 285 of the Civil Code allows
her to file an action for recognition 4 years from the time she reaches majority age. Such motion was
filed seasonably before the expiration of the 4-yr period.

JOSE RIVERO, JESSIE RIVERO and AMALIA RIVEROvs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 141273 May 17, 2005
Facts:
Benito DyChiao, Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with Shirley Arevalo. They
begot a son, BenedickArevaloDyChiao. When Benito Sr. died, Benedick, through her natural mother
and guardian ad litem, being a minor, filed a complaint on his behalf, against the legitimate children
of the deceased for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child and that he be given his share in
the estate left by the deceased. This was opposed by Mary Jane, daughter of the deceased, but later on
signed a compromise agreement with Benedick, recognizing the latter as illegitimate son of her father
and giving him his share in the estate. Attached to the agreement was a SPA appointing Mary Jane to
represent her brothers who are confined in a mental hospital. Such compromise agreement was
approved by the court, thus requiring the compulsory recognition of Benedick. Thereafter, the Dy-
Chiao brothers, through their uncle, assailed such compromise agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not the recognition of Benedick’s illegitimacy by Mary Jane is valid based on the
compromise agreement made.
Ruling:
No. Article 2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides that no compromise upon the civil status
of persons shall be valid. As such, paternity and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a relationship that
must be judicially established, and it is for the court to determine its existence or absence. It cannot
be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Further, such recognition is ineffectual because under
the law, the recognition must be made personally by the putative parent and not by any brother, sister
or relative.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SGT. MORENO BAYANI
G.R. No. 120894 October 3, 1996
Facts:
Victim Ma. Elena Nieto, then 15 yrs old, was living with her paternal grandmother together
with her siblings as their parents were abroad. Appellant frequented their house as he was a neighbor
and a “kumpadre” of her paternal uncles. One day, appellant asked victim’s grandmother for her
consent to let victim accompany him to visit a friend. Victim’s grandmother consented. After visiting
his friend who was allegedly his mistress, appellant invited her to have lunch in a hotel restaurant but
victim declined and suggested they go home. Appellant however said they would still visit another
friend. Turns out, the building they went to was a motel, where appellant deceived the friend they
were going to visit was in the 2nd floor. When appellant opened a room, he forcibly let victim in and
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her, intimidating and threatening her with a gun pointed
at her. After his lust was sated, he threatened to kill her and her family if ever she’ll divulge the incident.
Victim did not divulge the incident because of fear, until it became apparent that she was pregnant.
She was then sent to another place for her safety and as the trial ensued, appellant’s contention was
that victim consented to the act, she being the appellant’s mistress. The trial court found him guilty of
rape.
Issue:
Whether or not appellant may be made to compulsorily recognize the child borne of his crime.
Ruling:
No. Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape, seduction, or
abduction, shall be sentenced to: (a) indemnify the offended woman; (b) acknowledge the offspring,
unless the law should prevent him from so doing; and (c) in every case, to support the offspring. While
under Article 283 of the Civil Code, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child in
cases of rape, abduction, and seduction when the period of the offense coincides, more or less, with
the period of the conception. It has been held, however, that acknowledgment is disallowed if the
offender is a married man, with only support for the offspring as part of the sentence. Therefore,
under article 345 of the Revised Penal Code, the offender in a rape case who is married, as in the case
at bar, can only be sentenced to indemnify the victim and support the offspring, if there be any.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.MANUEL MANAHAN

G.R. No. 128157 September 29, 1999
Facts:
Victim TeresitaTibigar, then 16 yrs old was working at a canteen as stay-in waitress, and sleeps
at the 2nd floor of the canteen. Manahan is the brother-in-law of the owner of the canteen. He and his
wife lives temporarily with the owner as his wife was then pregnant. One night, as victim was sleeping,
she was suddenly awakened when she felt someone beside her. When she opened her eyes, she saw
that it was Manahan who immediately placed himself on top of her. Victim tried to shout but accused
covered her mouth. She tried to free herself but to no avail. In her weakened state, accused succeeded
in raping her. Thereafter, he left her. Within the month, victim left the canteen and returned to her
parents. The incident resulted to her pregnancy, thus, she was forced to divulge the rape incident to
her parents. They then filed a criminal complaint against accused. The accused on his part, alleged that
they were lovers and that the sexual congress between them were consensual. The court favored the
testimony of the victim and convicted accused of rape.
Issue:
Whether or not accused may be made to compulsorily recognize the child borne of his crime.
Ruling:
No. Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape shall also be
sentenced to "acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from doing so," and "in
every case to support the offspring." In the case at bar, compulsory acknowledgment of the child
Melanie Tibigar is not proper there being a legal impediment in doing so as it appears that the accused
is a married man
BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO vs. ARHBENCEL ANN LOPEZ, represented by her mother

ARACELI LOPEZ

G.R. No. 181258 March 18, 2010
Facts:
Respondent Arhbencel claims to be the illegitimate child of petitioner, Ben-hur. She therefore
filed a complaint for recognition. What she presents to the court as evidence is her birth certificate
which had not been signed by her alleged father as the latter allegedly refused to do so. Another
evidence that she adduced was a handwritten note by the petitioner obligating himself to give her
financial support in the amount of P1,500 on the 15th and 30th days of each month.
Issue:
Whether or not evidences adduced by respondent is sufficient proof of illegitimacy.
Ruling:
No. Art 175 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Thus such is to
be based on Art 172 which provides that filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. In the case at bar, the adduced evidence which
is the note written by the alleged father, does not contain any statement whatsoever about Arhbencel’s
filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore, not a competent evidence of illegitimate filiation as an admission
of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.
Under Art 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective,
the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must be the writing
of the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by the
putative father is considered acceptable evidence. In the present case, the note cannot be accorded
the same weight as the notarial agreement to support the child for it is not even notarized. Further,
the notarial agreement must be accompanied by the putative father’s admission of filiation to be an
acceptable evidence of filiation. Here, however, not only has petitioner not admitted filiation through
contemporaneous actions. He has consistently denied it.
Lastly, the copy of her Certificate of Birth, has no probative value to establish filiation to
petitioner, the latter not having signed the same.
ELINO RIVERA, et al. vs. HEIRS OF ROMUALDO VILLANUEVA represented by

MELCHOR VILLANUEVA, et al.
G.R. No. 141501 July 21, 2006

Facts:
Gonzales cohabited with Villanueva without the benefit of marriage because the latter was
married to one Amanda Musngi. They allegedly had an illegitimate daughter, respondent Angelina.
Thereafter, Gonzales died intestate. Villanueva and respondent Angelina then executed an
extrajudicial settlement of Gonzales' estate, some were allegedly acquired during the cohabitation. In
this document, Villanueva, for the amount of P30,000, conveyed his interests in the estate to Angelina.
Petitioners who are Gonzales’ half-brothers contested such extra-judicial settlement and
questioned Angelina’s illegitimacy.Angelina adduced her birth certificate to prove her filiation.
Issue:
Whether or not the adduced birth certificate is able to prove Angelina’s filiation.
Ruling:
No. A close examination of the birth certificate reveals that respondent Angelina was listed as
"adopted" by both Villanueva and Gonzales. It was previously held that the mere registration of a
child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, and
does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child.
Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the
facts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there
by the interested parties. Angelina should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of the
contents of her birth certificate. The records, however, are bereft of any such evidence.
Lastly, Gonzales was already 44 years old and on the verge of menopausal and that she had
been living childless with Villanueva for 20 years at the time of the alleged birth. Thus, it was not
sufficiently established that respondent Angelina was Gonzales' biological daughter, nor even her
adopted daughter.
MERCEDES CRISTOBAL CRUZ, et al. vs. EUFROSINA CRISTOBAL, et al.

G.R. No. 140422 August 7, 2006
Facts:

Petitioners are the alleged children of Buenaventura during his first marriage. Private
respondents on the other hand, claim to be Buenaventura’s children from his second marriage. Long
after their alleged father died, petitioners learned that respondents had executed an extrajudicial
partition of a certain property belonging to their alleged father and transferred such to their names.
Such was contested by the petitioners and filed a complaint to recover their alleged shares in the
property.
To prove their filiation, petitioners presented their baptismal certificates. Such contention was
also confirmed by witnesses presented during the trial.
Issue:
Whether or not the alleged filiation of the petitioners to Buenaventura was sufficiently proven.
Ruling:
Yes. Article 172 of the Family Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
"Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws," may consist of the child’s
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which the child’s name has been entered,
common reputation respecting the child’s pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of witnesses,
and other kinds of proof of admission.
In the case at bar, the baptismal certificates of respondents were adduced. In the case of
Mercedes, she produced a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar attesting to the fact that
records of birth for the year she was born were all destroyed. A witness was also presented who
testified that petitioners enjoyed that common reputation in the community where they reside as being
the children of Buevaventura. Testimonies of witnesses were also presented to prove filiation by
continuous possession of the status as a legitimate child. The foregoing evidences thus suffice to prove
that petitioners are children of the late Buenaventura.
ANTONIO PERLA vs. MIRASOL BARING, et al.

G.R. No. 172471 November 12, 2012
Facts:

Mirasol alleges that she and Antonio cohabited for about 2 years. As a result, Randy was born
to her. However, when Antonio landed a job as seaman, he left them and refused to give support to
their son. Antonio for his part, denied that they ever cohabited although admitted that he had a one
night stand with Mirasol. During the trial, Mirasol presented Randy’s birth and baptismal certificates.
She avers that she and Antonio supplied the information indicated in the certificates, as the ‘hilot’ who
assisted her went to Antonio’s house to solicit the said information. Randy also testified, saying that
he even had a vacation at her aunt, Antonio’s sister for a week with which he 1st met Antonio, calling
him Papa and while the latter hugged him, he promised to support Randy.
Issue:
Whether or not Randy’s filiation to Antonio was sufficiently proven.
Ruling:
No. Respondents failed to establish Randy’s illegitimate filiation to Antonio. The rules for
establishing filiation are found in Arts.175 and 172 of the Family Code. Whereas, in the case at bar,
the birth and baptismal certificates presented have no probative value to establish the alleged filiation
since the Antonio had not signed them. It is settled that such evidences adduced identifying the
putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative
father had a hand in their preparation. Mirasol failed to present the mentioned hilot to prove her claim
that it was Antonio who supplied the information in the certificates. Besides, they do not contain
Antonio’s signature and that there were also inconsistencies such as Antonio’s middle name, signifying
that he had no hand in their preparation.
Neither does the testimony of Randy establish his filiation. The single instance of Antonio’s
hug and promise to support Randy cannot be considered as proof of continuous possession of the
status of a child. To emphasize, the father’s conduct towards his son must be spontaneous and
uninterrupted for this ground to exist. Whereas, except for this mentioned single instance, there were
no other acts of Antonio treating Randy as his son.
Lastly, assuming that Antonio indeed had sexual contact with Mirasol, still, none of these
sexual congresses could have led to the conception of Randy who was born two years later.
PROBATIVE VALUE OF DNA TESTS IN PATERNITY CASES
EDGARDO A. TIJING, et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001
Facts:

Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing are husband and wife, they have six children, youngest of
whom is Edgardo Tijing Jr. In August 1989, Angelita Diamante fetched Bienvenida for an urgent
laundry job. Bienvenida left to Angelita her 4-month old child, Edgardo Jr. as she usually let Angelita
take care of her child while she was doing laundry. When Bienvenida returned from work to get her
son, Angelita was nowhere to be found, and despite her and her husband’s efforts, they could not
locate Angelita and their child’s whereabouts.
Four years later, Bienvenida read about the death of Tomas Lopez, the common-law husband
of Angelita, whose interment is in Bulacan. She went there and allegedly saw her son Edgardo Jr., now
named John Thomas Lopez. John is now being claimed by Angelita as her own son, sired by her
common-law husband Tomas Lopez during their cohabitation. Bienvenida now alleges that the child
cannot possibly be born to Angelita and Tomas for it was the latter’s own brother who admitted that
Tomas was rendered sterile, caused by an accident. Tomas begot no children from his legal marriage
nor with the cohabitation with Angelita. Tomas’ brother even testified that Tomas himself admitted
to him that the subject child was adopted.
Issue:
Who among the claimants is the true parent of the subject child.
Ruling:
Bienvenida. She presented sufficient clinical records, presenting the proper and credible
witnesses who assisted her in her child’s birth. Not to mention that it could be readily observed that
Bienvenida and the child have strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes.
Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish
parentage. Whereas, Angelita had been known to have undergone ligation years before the alleged
birth of the child and the admission of Tomas’ own brother that Tomas was sterile makes it impossible
that he and Angelita sired subject child. More importantly, the birth certificate of the child stated
Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally married which is false because even Angelita had
admitted she is a common-law wife. This false entry puts to doubt the other data in said birth
certificate.
In this case, the Supreme Court made mention of the DNA test for identification and
parentage testing. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish
parentage. The use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge, but as the appropriate case
comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on its admissibility. Though it is not necessary in this case to
resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of
parentage and identity issues.
RULES ON DNA EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 162571 June 15, 2005

Facts:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son, Martin sued Martin’s alleged biological father, petitioner
Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the RTC. The respondents alleged that the
petitioner impregnated her and bore a son Martin out of wedlock. The baby’s birth certificate was
purportedly signed by the petitioner as the father. Arnel even shouldered the prenatal and hospital
expenses but later refused Fe’s repeated requests for Martin’s support despite his adequate financial
capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption.
The petitioner denied having sired Martin because his affair and intimacy with Fe had allegedly
ended in 1998, long before Martin’s conception. He admitted that their affair started in 1993 but theirs
was an on-and-off relationship. He terminated the affair when he was unable to bear the prospect of
losing his wife and family. Finally, the petitioner claims that the signature and the community tax
certificate attributed to him in the acknowledgement of Martin’s birth certificate were falsified.
The private respondents moved for the issuance of an order directing the parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner
opposed said motion invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination and stating that there
was no cause of action, considering that his signature on the birth certificate was a forgery and that
under the law, an illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not recognized by the putative father.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. CA affirmed the trial court.
Issues:
a) Whether or not the respondent court erred in denying the petitioner’s MTD.
b) Whether or not the court erred in directing parties to subject to DNA paternity testing and
was a form of unreasonable search.
Ruling:
No. The trial court properly denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss because the private
respondents’ complaint on its face showed that they had a cause of action against the petitioner. The
elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiff’s primary right and the defendant’s corresponding
primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by which the primary
right and duty have been violated. The cause of action is determined not by the prayer of the complaint
but by the facts alleged.
No. In Ople v. Torres, the Supreme Court struck down the proposed national computerized
identification system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said:In no uncertain terms, we
also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right
is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the
common good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance
public service and the common good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the
infringement of privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been critically

at issue. Petitioner’s case involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right against
self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water.
HERRERA V. ALBA
G.R. No. 148220 June 15, 2005

Facts:
On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba (“respondent”), represented by his
mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and
damages against petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim where he
denied that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with
respondent’s mother.
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the
proceedings. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted
that the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.Petitioner opposed DNA
paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA
paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.
In an Order dated 3 February 2000, the trial court granted respondent’s motion to conduct
DNA paternity testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi Alba.Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the 3 February 2000 Order. He asserted that “under the present circumstances, the
DNA test is compelled to take would be inconclusive, irrelevant and the coercive process to obtain
the requisite specimen, unconstitutional.”In an Order dated 8 June 2000, the trial court denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
On 29 November 2000, the appellate court issued a decision denying the petition and affirming
the questioned Orders of the trial court. The appellate court stated that petitioner merely desires to
correct the trial court’s evaluation of evidence. Thus, appeal is an available remedy for an error of
judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The appellate court also stated
that the proposed DNA paternity testing does not violate his right against self-incrimination because
the right applies only to testimonial compulsion. Finally, the appellate court pointed out that petitioner
can still refute a possible adverse result of the DNA paternity testing.
Issue:
Whether or not DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation.
Ruling:
Before discussing the issues on DNA paternity testing, we deem it appropriate to give an
overview of a paternity suit and apply it to the facts of this case. We shall consider the requirements
of the Family Code and of the Rules of Evidence to establish paternity and filiation.Filiation
proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated
with paternity, such as citizenship, support, or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the
person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child. There are four
significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have to face: a prima facie
case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative
father and child.
A prima facie case exists if a woman declares that she had sexual relations with the putative
father. In our jurisdiction, corroborative proof is required to carry the burden forward and shift it to
the putative father.There are two affirmative defenses available to the putative father. The putative
father may show incapability of sexual relations with the mother, because of either physical absence

or impotency. The putative father may also show that the mother had sexual relations with other men
at the time of conception.
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. The child’s
legitimacy may be impugned only under the strict standards provided by law.Finally, physical
resemblance between the putative father and child may be offered as part of evidence of paternity.
Resemblance is a trial technique unique to a paternity proceeding. However, although likeness is a
function of heredity, there is no mathematical formula that could quantify how much a child must or
must not look like his biological father. This kind of evidence appeals to the emotions of the trier of
fact.
In the present case, the trial court encountered three of the four aspects. Armi Alba,
respondent’s mother, put forward a prima facie case when she asserted that petitioner is respondent’s
biological father. Aware that her assertion is not enough to convince the trial court, she offered
corroborative proof in the form of letters and pictures. Petitioner, on the other hand, denied Armi
Alba’s assertion. He denied ever having sexual relations with Armi Alba and stated that respondent is
Armi Alba’s child with another man. Armi Alba countered petitioner’s denial by submitting pictures
of respondent and petitioner side by side, to show how much they resemble each other.
Paternity and filiation disputes can easily become credibility contests. We now look to the law,
rules, and governing jurisprudence to help us determine what evidence of incriminating acts on
paternity and filiation are allowed in this jurisdiction.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS GERRICO VALLEJO

G.R. No. 144656 May 9, 2002

Facts:
On July 10, 1999 9-year old Daisy Diolola went to her neighbor’s house to seek help in an
assignment. It was a Saturday. Gerrico Vallejo, the neighbor, helped Daisy in her assignment. At 5pm
of the same day, Daisy’s mom noticed that her child wasn’t home yet. She went to Vallejo’s house and
Daisy wasn’t there. 7pm, still no word of Daisy’s whereabouts. The next morning, Daisy’s body was
found tied to a tree near a river bank. Apparently, she was raped and thereafter strangled to death.
In the afternoon of July 11, the police went to Vallejo’s house to question the latter as he was
one of the last persons with the victim. But prior to that, some neighbors have already told the police
that Vallejo was acting strangely during the afternoon of July 10. The police requested for the clothes
that Vallejo wore the day Daisy disappeared. Vallejo complied and the clothes were submitted for
processing.
The person who processed the clothing was Pet Byron Buan, a Forensic Biologist of the NBI.
At the instance of the local fiscal, he also took mouth/cheek swabs from Vallejo and a vaginal swab
from Daisy’s body for DNA testing. Dr. Buan found that there were bloodstains in Vallejo’s clothing
– Blood Type A, similar to that of the victim, while Vallejo’s Blood Type is O. Buan also found that
the vaginal swab from Daisy contained Vallejo’s DNA profile.
Meanwhile, Vallejo already executed a sworn statement admitting the crime. But when trial
came, Vallejo insisted that the sworn statement was coerced; that he was threatened by the cops; that
the DNA samples should be inadmissible because the body and the clothing of Daisy were already
soaked in smirchy waters, hence contaminated. Vallejo was convicted and was sentenced to death by
the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the DNA samples gathered are admissible as evidence.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the findings of Dr. Buan are conclusive. The court
reiterated that even though DNA evidence is merely circumstantial, it can still convict the accused
considering that it corroborates all other circumstantial evidence gathered in this rape-slay case.The
Supreme Court also elucidated on the admissibility of DNA evidence in this case and for the first time
recognized its evidentiary value in the Philippines, thus: DNA is an organic substance found in a
person’s cells which contains his or her genetic code. Except for identical twins, each person’s DNA
profile is distinct and unique.When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the
crime or from the victim’s body for the suspect’s DNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence
sample is then matched with the reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim.
The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the evidence sample
and the reference sample. The samples collected are subjected to various chemical processes to
establish their profile.
ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG V. JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ

G.R. No. 171713 December 17, 2007
Facts:

A Complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending litigation was filed
by minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz (Joanne), represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz (Jinky),
against Rogelio G. Ong (Rogelio) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City.
As alleged by Jinky in her Complaint in November 1993 in Tarlac City, she and Rogelio got acquainted.
This developed into friendship and later blossomed into love. At this time, Jinky was already married
to a Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding solemnized on 19 February 1993 by
Municipal Trial Court Judge Panfilo V. Valdez. From January 1994 to September 1998, Jinky
and Rogelio cohabited and lived together. From this live-in relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz
was conceived and on 25 February 1998 was born at the Central Luzon Doctors’ Hospital, Tarlac
City.
Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne and Jinky home after delivery.
Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and provided for all of minor Joanne’s
needs that is recognizing the child as his.
In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and stopped supporting
minor Joanne, falsely alleging that he is not the father of the child.Rogelio, despite Jinky’s
remonstrance, failed and refused and continued failing and refusing to give support for the child and
to acknowledge her as his daughter, thus leading to the filing of the heretofore adverted complaint.On
28 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion to lift the order of default and a motion for reconsideration
seeking the court’s understanding, as he was then in a quandary on what to do to find a solution to a
very difficult problem of his life.
Issue:
Whether or not the court of appeals erred when it remanded the case to the court a quo for
DNA analysis despite the fact that it is no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio G. Ong.
Ruling:
As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination of filiation of minor Joanne for
purposes of support in favor of the said minor. Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to
adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship,
support, or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative
father is the biological father of the child. There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional
paternity action which parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of
legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and child.
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. As a
guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code
provides:Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
COMPULSARY RECOGNITION
MICHAEL GUY V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006
Facts:

The special proceeding case concerns the settlement of the estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufina
Guy Susim). Private-respondents Karen and Kamille alleged that they are the
acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei who died intestate. On June 13,1997 the minors were
represented by their mother Remedios Oanes who filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration before the RTC of Makati City.
Petitioner who is one of the children of the deceased with his surviving spouse, filed for the
dismissal of the petition alleging that his father left no debts hence, his estate may be settled without
the issuance of letters administration. The other heirs filed a joint motion to dismiss alleging that the
certification of non-forum shopping should have been signed by Remedios and not by counsel.
Petitioners further alleged that the claim has been paid and waived by reason of a Release of
Claim or waiver stating that in exchange for financial and educational assistance from the petitioner,
Remedios and her minor children discharged the estate of the decedent from any and all liabilities.The
lower court denied the joint motion to dismiss as well as the supplemental motion ruling that the
mother is not the duly constituted guardian of the minors hence, she could not have validly signed the
waiver. It also rejected the petitioner's objections to the certificate of non-forum shopping. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the orders of the lower court.
Issue:
Whether or not a guardian can validly repudiate the inheritance.
Ruling:
No, repudiation amounts to alienation of property and parents and guardians must necessarily
obtain judicial approval. Repudiation of inheritance must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect
the best interest of the ward. Not having been authorized by the court, the release or waiver is
therefore void. Moreover, the private-respondents could not have waived their supposed right as they
have yet to prove their status as illegitimate children of the decedent. It would be inconsistent to rule
that they have waived a right which, according to the petitioner, the latter do not have.
The court is not precluded to receive evidence to determine the filiation of the claimants even
if the original petition is for the issuance of letters administration. Its jurisdiction extends to matters
collateral and incidental to the settlement of the estate, with the determination of heirship included.
As held in previous decision, two causes of action may be brought together in one complaint, one a
claim for recognition, and the other to claim inheritance.
MARQUINO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

GR. No. 72078 June 27, 1994
Facts:

Respondent Bibiana filed action for Judicial Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of Partition,
Support and Damages against Eutiquio. Bibiana was born on December 1926 allegedly of Eutiquio
and in that time was single. It was alleged that the Marquino family personally knew her since she was
hired as domestic helper in their household at Dumaguete. She likewise received financial assistance
from them hence, she enjoyed continuous possession of the status of an acknowledged natural child
by direct and unequivocal acts of the father and his family. The Marquinos denied all these.
Respondent was not able to finish presenting her evidence since she died on March 1979 but the sue
for compulsory recognition was done while Eustiquio was still alive. Her heirs were ordered to
substitute her as parties-plaintiffs.
Petitioners, legitimate children of Eutiquio, assailed decision of respondent court in holding

that the heirs of Bibiana, allegedly a natural child of Eutiquio, can continue the action already filed by
her to compel recognition and the death of the putative parent will not extinguish such action and can
be continued by the heirs substituting the said deceased parent.
Issues:
a) Whether or not right of action for acknowledgment as a natural child be transmitted to the
heirs and
b) Whether or not Article 173 can be given retroactive effect.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that right of action for the acknowledgment as a natural child can
never be transmitted because the law does not make any mention of it in any case, not even as an
exception. The right is purely a personal one to the natural child. The death of putative father in an
action for recognition of a natural child cannot be continued by the heirs of the former since the party
in the best position to oppose the same is the putative parent himself.
Such provision of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect so as to apply in the
case at bar since it will prejudice the vested rights of petitioners transmitted to them at the time of
death of their father.IAC decision was reversed and set aside. Complaint against Marquino is
dismissed.
TAYAG vs. TAYAG-GALLOR

GR. No. 174680 March 24, 2008
Facts:

On January 15, 2001, respondent, Felicidad A. Tayag-Gallor, filed a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration over the estate of Ismael Tayag. The respondent alleged that she is one of
the illegitimate children of the late Ismael Tayag and Ester Angeles.
On September 7, 2000, Ismael Tayag died intestate, leaving behind two real properties both
of which are in the possession of petitioner, and a motor vehicle which the latter sold on 10 October
2000 preparatory to the settlement of the decedent’s estate. Petitioner allegedly promised to give
respondent and her brothers P100, 000.00 each as their share in the proceeds of the sale. However,
petitioner only gave each of them half the amount she promised.
In a Motion dated August 31, 2001, petitioner reiterated her sole ownership of the properties
and presented the transfer certificates of title thereof in her name. She also averred that it is necessary
to allege that respondent was acknowledged and recognized by Ismael Tayag as his illegitimate child.
There being no such allegation, the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be
brought after the death of the putative father. To prevent further encroachment upon the court’s
time, petitioner moved for a hearing on her affirmative defenses.
The motion was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters of administration sufficiently
states a cause of action considering that respondent merely alleged therein that she is an illegitimate
child of the decedent, without stating that she had been acknowledged or recognized as such by the
latter.
Ruling:
The appellate court held that the mere allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child
suffices. Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person. The Court, applying the provisions of the Family
Code which had then already taken effect, ruled that since Graciano was claiming illegitimate filiation
under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, i.e., open and continuous possession
of the status of an illegitimate child, the action was already barred by the death of the alleged father.
In contrast, respondent in this case had not been given the opportunity to present evidence to
show whether she had been voluntarily recognized and acknowledged by her deceased father because
of petitioner’s opposition to her petition and motion for hearing on affirmative defenses. There is, as
yet, no way to determine if her petition is actually one to compel recognition which had already been
foreclosed by the death of her father, or whether indeed she has a material and direct interest to
maintain the suit by reason of the decedent’s voluntary acknowledgment or recognition of her
illegitimate filiation.
BRIONES vs. MIGUEL

GR. No. 156343 October 18, 2004
Facts:

On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus to obtain
custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda.The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin
Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on September
17, 1996 as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a
Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan. The petitioner prays that the custody of his son
Michael Kevin Pineda be given to him as his biological father and has demonstrated his capability to
support and educate him.
Issue:
Whether or not the natural father may be denied the custody and parental care of his own
child in the absence of the mother who is away.
Ruling:
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of
petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly
provides that "illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is the rule regardless
of whether the father admits paternity.
Parental authority over recognized natural children who were under the age of majority was
vested in the father or the mother recognizing them. If both acknowledge the child, authority was to
be exercised by the one to whom it was awarded by the courts; if it was awarded to both, the rule as
to legitimate children applied. In other words, in the latter case, parental authority resided jointly in
the father and the mother.
REPUBLIC vs. ABADILLA

GR. No. 133054 January 28, 1999
Facts:

Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino have been living together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage. During their cohabitation, Luzviminda begot two children, Emerson
and Rafael. In the Certificates of Birth of these two children, they were registered with the surname
“Abadilla” and the name of their father was entered as “Herson” Abadilla. Moreover, the entry in the
date and place of marriage of the children’s parents appeared as June 19, 1987 at Dingras, Ilocos
Norte.
On February 5, 1997, Gerson Abadilla, Luzviminda Celestino and their two minor children,
Emerson and Rafael,filed a petition for correction of the birth certificates.The petition was granted.
The instant petition for review on certiorari is now being interposed by the Office of the Solicitor
General on the ground that the trial court committed a reversible error when it allowed the deletion
of the “date and place of marriage of parents” from the birth certificates of minors Emerson C.
Abadilla and Rafael C. Abadilla but failed to order the change of the minors’ surname from “Abadilla”
to “Celestino.”
Issue:
Whether or not the court committed an error in their ruling of the case.
Ruling:
Yes. According to Article 176 "Illegitimate children shall use zthe surname and shall be under
the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.
The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one half of the legitime of a legitimate
child.”Thus, as illegitimate children, Emerson and Rafael should bear the surname of their mother,
Luzviminda Celestino.
VERCELES vs. POSADA

GR. No. 159785 April 27, 2007
Facts:

On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., Verceles fetched Clarissa Posada from "My
Brother’s Place" where the seminar was being held.Clarissa avers that he told her that they would have
lunch at Mayon Hotel with their companions who had gone ahead. When they reached the place her
companions were nowhere. After Verceles ordered food, he started making amorous advances on her.
She panicked, ran and closeted herself inside a comfort room where she stayed until someone
knocked. She said she hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid of the mayor, she kept the incident to
herself. She went on as casual employee. One of her tasks was following-up barangay road and
maintenance projects.
On December 22, 1986, on orders of Verceles, she went to Virac, Catanduanes, to follow up
funds for barangay projects. At around 11:00 a.m. the same day, she went to Catanduanes Hotel on
instructions of petitioner who asked to be briefed on the progress of her mission. They met at the
lobby and he led her upstairs because he said he wanted the briefing done at the restaurant at the
upper floor.
Instead, Verceles opened a hotel room door, led her in, and suddenly embraced her, as he told
her that he was unhappy with his wife and would "divorce" her anytime. He also claimed he could
appoint her as a municipal development coordinator. She succumbed to his advances. But again she
kept the incident to herself.Sometime in January 1987, when she missed her menstruation, she said
she wrote petitioner that she feared she was pregnant.
Issue:
Whether or not the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada as the illegitimate child of petitioner was
proven.
Ruling:
The letters are private handwritten instruments of petitioner which establish Verna Aiza’s
filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In addition, the arrays of evidence presented by
respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, are convincing, and irrefutable evidence
that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioner’s illegitimate child.
Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he himself presented no evidence
of his own. His bare denials are telling. Well-settled is the rule that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear
and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit no weight in law and cannot be
given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters.
PEOPLE vs. GLABO
GR. No. 129248 December 7, 2001

Facts:
One afternoon in October, 1991, 21-year old victim Mila Lobrico, a mental retardate, and her
11-year old sister, Judith, were summoned by Justiniano Glabo, their maternal uncle, to his house. He
told them to wash the clothes of his wife. After the two sisters finished their chore, accused-appellant
ordered Judith to wash the dishes in the nearby creek, about 200 meters away from his house. When
Judith was gone, accused-appellant dragged Mila from the yard, where she was hanging the washed
clothes, into the house. He pushed her to the floor and made her lie down. He undressed the victim,
and then he inserted his penis into her private organ and made push and pull motions. Mila was
overpowered by accused-appellant’s brute strength. She shouted for help, but there were no neighbors
nearby.
Suddenly, it started to rain hard, so Judith had to run back to the house for shelter. She went
directly under the house, which was elevated 3 feet above the ground. While underneath the house,
she heard someone crying on the floor above. She looked up through the bamboo floor and saw
accused-appellant on top of her elder sister. Both were naked. Judith went to the kitchen, and she
saw accused-appellant’s penis as he stood up and raised his briefs.
The two girls went home silently. They did not say a word about the incident. However, the
victim became pregnant as a result of the rape, and after six months her condition could no longer be
concealed. Severino Lobrico, Mila’s father, confronted her, but she said nothing. It was her sister,
Judith, who told their father that accused-appellant raped Mila. Severino brought Mila to the police
and filed a complaint for rape before the Municipal Trial Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the offspring is illegitimate.
Ruling:
Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil liability that may be
imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgement of the offspring, unless the law
should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. With the passage of
the Family Code, the classification of acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal
fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate children. Since parental
authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother and considering that an
offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses the power to exercise parental authority over
his children, no “further positive act is required of the parent as the law itself provides for the child’s
status.” Hence, accused-appellant should only be ordered to indemnify and support the victim’s child.
However, the amount and terms of support shall be determined by the trial court after due notice and
hearing in accordance with Article 201 of the Family Code.
DINAH B. TONOG v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 122906 February 7, 2002

Facts:
Dinah gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate child with Edgar V.
Daguimol. The two cohabited for a time and lived with Edgar's parents and sister. A year after Dinah
left for US where she found work as a registered nurse. Gardin was left in the care of her father and
grandparents. Edgar later filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin and the trial court granted the
petition and appointed Edgar as the legal guardian. Dinah filed a petition for relief from judgment and
the court set aside the original judgment and allowed Dinah to file her opposition to Edgar's petition.
Edgar filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied and the court issued a resolution granting
Dinah's motion for custody over Gardin.
Edgar filed a petition for certiorari before the CA who modified their previous decision and
granted Edgar custody over Gardin. Dinah contends that she is entitled to the custody of the minor,
Gardin Faith, as a matter of law. As the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority
upon her as the mother of the illegitimate minor.
Issue:
Whether or not Dinah is entitled to the custody of Gardin.
Ruling:
No. The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has
seen her baby torn away from her. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for “compelling
reasons” for the good of the child. A mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is
below seven years of age for “compelling reasons.” Instances of unsuitability are neglect,
abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of
the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. If older than seven years of age, a child
is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound by that choice. The court may exercise
its discretion by disregarding the child’s preference should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, in
which instance, custody may be given to the other parent, or even to a third person.
Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, SC find that the
appellate court did not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime parental custody over
her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a
strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed an
attachment. Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be properly
entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court.
MOSSESGELD vs. COURT OF APPEALS

GR. No. 111455 December 23, 1998

Facts:
Marissa Alfaro Mossesgeld , single, gave birth to a baby boy on December 2, 1989. The
presumed father is Eleazar Siriban Calasan, a married lawyer. The father signed the birth certificate of
the child as the informant, indicating hat the child’s name is Jonathan Mossesgeld Calasan. He also
executed an affidavit admitting the paternity of the child. The person in charge at the hospital
refused to place the presumed father’s surname as the child’s surname in the certificated of live
birth. Thus, petitioner himself submitted the certificate to the office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Mandaluyong for registration.
Again, the municipal treasurer, as officer in charge of the local civil registrar’s office, rejected
the registration on the basis of the Civil Reg istrar General’s Circular No. 4, which
provides that under Article 176 of the Family Code, illegitimate children born on or after
August 3, 1988 shall use the surname of their mother. Upon inquiring about the status of the
status of the registration of his child, Calasan was furnished with a copy of the letter of the Civil
Registrar General denying the registration of the certificate of live birth on the grounds that it is
contrary to law. Calasan, thereafter, filed a petition for mandamus with the Pasig RTC to compel the
local civil registrar to register the certificate of live birth of his illegitimate son using his surname. His
petition was denied. He filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion to for leave to amend the
petition to substitute the child’s mother as the petitioner. His motion to amen was granted, but motion
for reconsideration was denied. He elevated the petition to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the RTC’s decision
Issue:
Whether or not mandamus lies to compel the Local Civil Reg istrar to register
thecertificate of live birth of an illegitimate child using the alleged father’s surname where
the latter admitted paternity.
Ruling:
No. Local Civil Registrar correctly refused. Illegitimate children must use the surname of
their mother, regardless of whether or not they had been acknowledged by their fathers in
their record of birth. Article 176 of the Family Code effectively repealed Article 366 of the Civil Code,
which gives a natural child the right to use the surname of his/her father where he/she has been
acknowledged by both parents. Article 176 explicitly states that illegitimate children shall use the
surname of their mother, be under her parental authority, and be entitled to support
inconformity with the provisions of the Family Code.
SILVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

GR. No. 114742 July17, 1997

Facts:
Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried local actress,
cohabited without the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth of two children: Ramon Carlos
and Rica Natalia. Not very long after, a rift in their relationship surfaced. It began, according to Silva,
when Gonzales decided to resume her acting career over his vigorous objections. The assertion was
quickly refuted by Gonzales who claimed that she, in fact, had never stopped working throughout
their relationship. At any rate, the two eventually parted ways.
The instant controversy was spawned, in February 1986, by the refusal of Gonzales to allow
Silva, in apparent contravention of a previous understanding, to have the children in his company on
weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 78, of Quezon City. The petition was opposed by Gonzales who averred that Silva often
engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and social values of
the children.
Issue:
Whether or not the Father can visit his children.
Ruling:
The biological father has visitorial right over his illegitimate children in view of the
constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children. This right is
personal to the father; no other person, like grandparents, can exercise this right for him.
Silva (the father) may have won with the Supreme Court’s upholding of his visitation rights, but this
favorable decision did not prevent Suzanne (the mother) in the exercise of her parental authority from
immigrating to Holland with her two children.
DAVID vs. COURT OF APPEALS

GR. No. 111180 November 16, 1995
Facts:
Daisie David had an intimate relationship with her boss Ramon Villar, who is married, and a
father of 4 children, all grown-up. They first had a son, Christopher, who was eventually followed by
2 more girls, Christine and Cathy Mae. The relationship became known to Villar’s wife when Daisie
took Christopher J, to his house and introduced him to Villar's wife. After this, Daisie’s were freely
brought by Villar to his house as they were even accepted by his legal family.
Then Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then 6 years old, to go with his family to
Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give Christopher back and had enrolled him
at the HolyFamilyAcademy for the next school year. Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf
of Christopher J. which the RTC granted, giving custody to Daisie and ordering Villar to give
temporary support of P3K a month to the 3 kids and to pay the costs of suit.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not custody should be given to Daisie
Ruling:
Yes. CA ruling reversed, custody granted to Daisie and Villar ordered to givetemporary
support in the amount of P3K, pending the fixing of the amount of support in an appropriate action.
Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father Villar, was married
to another woman other than his mother.
As such, pursuant to Art. 176, FC, he is under the parental authority of his mother, who, as a
consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. And because she has been deprived
of her rightful custody of her child by Villar, Daisie is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Rule 102, Sec. 1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from her
husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who,
by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child. The
fact that Villar has recognized the Christopher may be a ground for ordering him to give support to
the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Article 213, FC, "no child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise."
LEGITIMATED CHILDREN
DE SANTOS vs. ANGELES
GR. No. 105619 December 12, 1995
Facts:

On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was blessed
with a daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. After some time, their relationship became
strained to the breaking point. Thereafter, Antonio fell in love with a fellow doctor, Conchita Talag,
private respondent herein. Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first marriage by obtaining a
divorce decree from a Nevada court in 1949. Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in 1951 to marry
private respondent, with whom he had been cohabiting since his de factoseparation from Sofia. This
union produced eleven children. On March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Less than a month
later, on April 23, 1967, Antonio and private respondent contracted a marriage in TagaytayCity
celebrated under Philippine laws. On March 8, 1981, Antonio died intestate leaving properties with
an estimated value of P15, 000,000.00.
On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court for the issuance of letters of administration
in her favor in connection with the settlement of her late husband's estate. She alleged, among other
things, that the decedent was survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely, herself, their ten surviving
children, and petitioner. After six years of protracted intestate proceedings, however, petitioner
decided to intervene. Thus, in a motion she filed sometime in November 1987, she argued inter aliathat
private respondent's children were illegitimate. This was challenged by private respondent although
the latter admitted during the hearing that all her children were born prior to Sofia's death in 1967.
The court, declared private respondent's ten children legitimated and thereupon instituted and
declared them, along with petitioner and private respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de Santos. Hence,
she filed the instant petition for certiorari on June 16, 1992, contending that since only natural children
can be legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared as legitimated her half brothers and sisters.
Issue:
Whether or not natural children by legal fiction be legitimized.
Ruling:
Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside wedlock of parents,
who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry
each other, are natural. In other words, a child's parents should not have been disqualified to marry
each other at the time of conception for him to qualify as a "natural child."
In the case at bench, there is no question that all the children born to private respondent and
deceased Antonio de Santos were conceived and born when the latter's valid marriage to petitioner's
mother was still subsisting. That private respondent and the decedent were married abroad after the
latter obtained in Nevada,U.S.A. a decree of divorce from his legitimate wife does not change this
fact, for a divorce granted abroad was not recognized in this jurisdiction at the time. Evidently, the
decedent was aware of this fact, which is why he had to have the marriage solemnized in Tokyo,
outside of the Philippines. It may be added here that he was likewise aware of the nullity of the Tokyo
marriage for after his legitimate, though estranged wife died, he hastily contracted another marriage
with private respondent, this time here in Tagaytay, attention must be drawn to the fact that this case
has been decided under the provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code which now recognizes
only two classes of children: legitimate and illegitimate. "Natural children by legal fiction" are nothing
if not pure fiction.

LEGITIMATED CHILDREN
ABADILLA vs. TABILIRAN

AM No. MTJ-92-716 October 25, 1995
Facts:

Ma. Blyth Abadilla, a Clerk of Court, filed a complaint against Judge Tabiliran on the grounds
of gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge. With respect to the
charge on gross immorality, she contended that the judge scandalously and publicly cohabited with
Priscilla Baybayan during subsistence of his marriage with Teresita Banzuela. Tabiliran and Priscilla
got married in May 1986. On the other hand, with respect to the charge on deceitful conduct,
petitioner claims that the judge caused his 3 illegitimate children with Priscilla be registered as
legitimate by falsely executing separate affidavits stating the delayed registration was due to
inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight when in fact, he knew these children cannot be legally
registered as legitimate. The judge averred that 25 years had already elapsed since the disappearance
of her wife in 1966 when he married Priscilla hence the cohabitation was neither bigamous nor
immoral. However, as early as 1970, based on the record, Priscilla had begotten her 3 children.
Issue:
Whether or not the 3 children can be considered legitimate.
Ruling:
The 3 children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since the time
they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between Tabiliran and Teresita. Only natural
children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural.
Under Article 177 of the Family Code, only children conceived and born outside of wedlock
of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment
to marry each other may be legitimated. Reasons for this limitation:
1) The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed;
2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights;
3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change;
4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy the
sanctity of marriage;
5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of the child.
ADOPTED CHILDREN
REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS

GR. No. 100835 October 26, 1993
Facts:

James Hughes, a natural born citizen of the UnitedStates of America, married Lenita Mabunay,
a Filipino Citizen,who herself was later naturalized as a citizen of that country.The spouses jointly filed
a petition with the RTC to adopt theminor niece and nephews of Lenita, who had been living withthe
couple even prior to the filing of the petition. The minors, aswell as their parents, gave consent to the
adoption. The RTCrendered a decision granting the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Can the spouses adopt the minors.
Ruling:
While James Anthony unquestionably is not permitted to adopt under any of the exceptional
cases, Lenita, however, can qualify. Lenita may not thus adopt alone since Article 185 requires a joint
adoption by the husband and the wife, a condition that must be read alongtogether with Article 184.
Art 185 provides: Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one
spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
child of the other. As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential Decree No. 603 had thus made it
mandatory for both the spouses to jointly adopt when one of them was an alien. The law was silent
when both spouses were of the same nationality. The Family Code has resolved any possible
uncertainty. Article 185 thereof now expresses the necessity for joint adoption by the spouses except
in only two instances: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own legitimate child; or (2) When one
spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186
of the Code, on the subject of parental authority, can aptly find governance. Article 186. In case
husband and wife jointly adaptor one spouse adopts the legitimate child of the other, joint parental
authority shall be exercised by the spouses in accordance with this Code.
ADOPTED CHILDREN
REPUBLIC vs. TOLEDANO

GR.No. 94147 June 8, 1994
Facts:

Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are aliens filed a petition to adopt the
minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of
adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor. Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989
upto the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and custody of private
respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise
consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate her son. The RTC
granted the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the spouses can adopt Solomon.
Ruling:
Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family
Code of the Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting
Solomon Joseph Alcala.Article 184, paragraph three of Executive Order No. 209expressly enumerates
the persons who are not qualified to adopt, An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks
to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her
Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or
her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions
may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided
by law. Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to
paragraph three of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her
younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without
violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads: Article 185.
Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to
adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the
other. Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read
along together with Article 184.
ADOPTED CHILDREN
REPUBLIC vs. ALARCON VERGARA

GR. No. 95551 March 20, 1997

Facts:
On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition before
the RegionalTrialCourtofAngelesCity to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and 12 years
old, respectively, younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr, a member of the United States Air
Force, is an American citizen who resided at the Clark Air Base in Pampanga. His wife Rosalina is a
former Filipino who became a naturalized American. They have two children. Maricel and Alvin Due,
as well as their natural parents, gave their consent to the adoption.
The Republic filed this petition for review on a pure question of law, contending that the
spouses Dye are not qualified under the law to adopt Maricel and Alvin Due. As a general rule, aliens
cannot adopt Filipino citizens.
Samuel Robert Dye, Jr. who is an American and, therefore, an alien is disqualified from
adopting the minors Maricel and Alvin Due because he does not fall under any of the three afore
quoted exceptions in the law. He is not a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity. Nor does he seek to adopt his wife's legitimate child. Although he seeks to adopt with
his wife her relatives by consanguinity, he is not married to a Filipino citizen, for Rosalina was already
a naturalized American at the time the petition was filed, thus excluding him from the coverage of the
exception. The law here does not provide for an alien who is married to a former Filipino citizen
seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity, as an exception to the
general rule that aliens may not adopt.
On her own, Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her brother and sister for the law mandates joint
adoption by husband and wife, subject to exceptions. Article 29 of Presidential Decree No. 603 (Child
and Youth Welfare Code) retained the Civil Code provision that husband and wife may jointly adopt.
The Family Code amended this rule by scrapping the optional character of joint adoption and making
it now mandatory.
Issue:
Whether or not the adoption is valid.
Ruling:
Article 185 of the Family Code provides: Husband and wife must adopt, except in the
following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child;
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other."
None of the above exceptions applies to Samuel and Rosalina Dye, for they did not petition
to adopt the latter's child but her brother and sister. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally,
in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied with
compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes,
love, care and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm
the trial court's decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be
modified without violating the proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time however, that
the law on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses' petition for adoption.

IN RE: ADOPTION OF MICHELLE LIM AND MICHAEL JUDE LIM

GR No. 168992-93 May 21, 2009
Facts:

Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were
childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown
by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if they were the
parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in
December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA
8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for
adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already
married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband including Michael
and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.
Ruling:
Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at bar.
In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercise parental authority. The use of the word
“shall” signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the
concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate
child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario will
not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. He must
meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification
of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is
merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-
being.
LANDINGIN vs. REPUBLIC

GR No. 164948 June 27, 2006
Facts:

Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the adoption
of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the former’s brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged
in her petition that when her brother died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother for
their biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by her second marriage
and no longer communicates from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption. After the
paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported by the petitioner and her children
abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption. A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a
Report recommending for the adoption and narrated that Amelia, the biological mother was consulted
with the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily
consented. However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in evidence
the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any
documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption.
Issue:
Whether or not a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the adoptee’s
biological mother
Ruling:
No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological parent(s) of the
child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if
the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained. The general requirement of consent
and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from
unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests
of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. The written consent of the biological parents is
indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his
child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be
terminated and re-establish in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written
consent of Amelia Ramos to adopt. Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform
the filial and legal obligations of love and support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time
undisturbed in the care of others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of
consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.
CANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998
Facts:
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27, 1973,
begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and

Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981. During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple’s
relationship was undisturbed. Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her husband’s
alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos.
Upon learning of her husband’s alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal
separation with alimony pendente lite with the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Cebuwhich rendered a decision approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses providing that
they agreed to “live separately and apart or from bed and board. Petitioner then left for the United
States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie before the Second Judicial District Court of the
State of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce decree that also granted sole custody of the three minor
children to Anna Marie, reserving “rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places” to petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American
citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife and never remarried.Upon learning of the petition
for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an opposition thereto,
alleging that, although private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were financially capable
of supporting the children while his finances were “too meager” compared to theirs, he could not “in
conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his beloved children.”
Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to reacquire custody over
his children alleging that Anna Marie had transferred to the United States thereby leaving custody of
their children to private respondents. On January 11, 1988, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 19, issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in effect, relinquished custody over the
children and, therefore, such custody should be transferred to the father. The court then directed the
Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to petitioner.
Issue:
Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the
ground that the latter has abandoned them?
Ruling:
This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate facts
and circumstances that should have elicited a different conclusion on the issue of whether petitioner
has so abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption unnecessary. In its ordinary
sense, the word “abandon” means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly. The dictionaries
trace this word to the root idea of “putting under a ban.” The emphasis is on the finality and publicity
with which a thing or body is thus put in the control of another, hence, the meaning of giving up
absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim one’s rights or interests. In reference to abandonment
of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports “any conduct of the parent which evinces a
settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.” It means
“neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe
their children.”

In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner’s conduct did not manifest a settled purpose
to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to constitute
abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount
to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United
States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children.
He maintained regular communication with his wife and children through letters and telephone. He
used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims. t abandoned them.The questioned Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu,
are SET ASIDE thereby denying the petition for adoption of Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony,
all surnamed Cang, by the spouse respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. This Decision is
immediately executory.
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT vs. JUDGE

ANTONIO M. BELEN
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1362 July 18, 1997
Facts:

Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano, both of whom are naturalized
American citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo
Ibea. Respondent Judge Belen granted the petition after finding that petitioner spouses were highly
qualified to adopt the child as their own, basing his decree primarily on the "findings and
recommendation of the DSWD that the adopting parents on the one hand and the adoptee on the
other hand have already developed love and emotional attachment and parenting rules have been
demonstrated to the minor." On these considerations, respondent judge decided and proceeded to
dispense with trial custody. He asserted that the DSWD findings and recommendations are contained
in the "Adoptive Home Study Report" and "Child Study Report" prepared by the local office of the
DSWD through respondent Elma P. Vedaña. However, when the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea
sought to obtain the requisite travel clearance from the DSWD in order to join her adoptive parents
in the United States, the DSWD found that it did not have any record in its files regarding the adoption
and that there was never any order from respondent judge for the DSWD to conduct a "Home and
Child Study Report" in the case. Furthermore, there was no directive from respondent judge for the
social welfare officer of the lower court to coordinate with the DSWD on the matter of the required
reports for said minor's adoption.
Issue:
May a decree of adoption be granted on the basis of case study reports made by a social welfare
officer of the court?
Ruling:
No. Article 33 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides in no uncertain terms that:
No petition for adoption shall be granted unless the Department of Social Welfare, or the Social Work
and Counseling Division, in case of Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, has made a case study
of the child to be adopted, his natural parents as well as the prospective adopting parents, and has
submitted its report and recommendations on the matter to the court hearing such petition. The
Department of Social Welfare shall intervene on behalf of the child if it finds, after such case study,
that the petition should be denied. Circular No. 12, as a complementary measure, was issued by this
Court precisely to obviate the mishandling of adoption cases by judges, particularly in respect to the
aforementioned case study to be conducted in accordance with Article 33 of Presidential Decree No.
603 by the DSWD itself and involving the child to be adopted, its natural parents, and the adopting
parents. It definitively directs Regional Trial Courts hearing adoption cases:
(1) To NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services and Development, thru its local agency, of the
filing of adoption cases or the pendency thereof with respect to those cases already filed;
(2) To strictly COMPLY with the requirement in Article 33 of the aforesaid decree . . .
The Staff Assistant V. (Social Worker) of the Regional Trial Courts, if any, shall coordinate
with the Ministry of Social Services and Development representatives in the preparation and submittal
of such case study. .The error on the part of both respondent judge and social worker is thus all too
evident. Pursuant to Circular No. 12, the proper course that respondent judge should have taken was

to notify the DSWD at the outset about the commencement of Special Proceeding No. 5830 so that
the corresponding case study could have been accordingly conducted by said department which
undoubtedly has the necessary competence, more than that possessed by the court social welfare
officer, to make the proper recommendation. Moreover, respondent judge should never have merely
presumed that it was routinely for the social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD regarding
the adoption proceedings. It was his duty to exercise caution and to see to it that such coordination
was observed in the adoption proceedings, together with all the other requirements of the law.
By respondent's failure to do so, he may well have wittingly or unwittingly placed in jeopardy
the welfare and future of the child whose adoption was under consideration. Adoption, after all, is in
a large measure a legal device by which a better future may be accorded an unfortunate childlike
Zhedell Bernardo Ibea in this case. Treading on equally sensitive legal terrain, the social welfare officer
concerned, respondent Elma P. Vedaña, arrogated unto herself a matter that pertained exclusively to
the DSWD, her task being to coordinate with the DSWD in the preparation and submission of the
relevant case study reports, and not to make the same and recommend by herself the facts on which
the court was to act.
ACCORDINGLY, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future shall be dealt with more severely by this Court, respondent Judge Antonio M. Belen of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, of Lingayen, Pangasinan is hereby CENSURED for violating Article
33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 and Circular No. 12 of this Court; and respondent Elma P. Vedaña,
Social Welfare Officer II of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, is REPRIMANDED for violating Circular No. 12.
REPUBLIC vs. HERNANDEZ

Facts:
The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and
simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron
Joseph, to complement the surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his

adoption. Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition for
adoption objecting to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for the change of name
in a single proceeding, arguing that these petition should be conducted and pursued as two separate
proceedings.
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special
proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from and are not related to each other,
being respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules. Petitioner further contends that what the
law allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with that of
the adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change
of the registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a substantial change of one’s legal
name, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the
substantive and adjective requisites therefor being conformably satisfied.
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a prayer
for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of
action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and
vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of
adoption and change of name being pleaded as two separate but related causes of action in a single
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the change of the given or proper
name if the adoptee in a petition for adoption.
Ruling:
No. Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal effect of adoption: (1) For
civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall
acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including
the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the
adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptee’s surname to follow
that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must
specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must
remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does
not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee’s registered Christian or first name. The
automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of
a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such

that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be
granted.
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name
appearing therein. If a change in one’s name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly
complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of
name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor
can be threshed out and accordingly determined. A petition for change of name being a proceeding
in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court
with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by
itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other
proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be
to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law
system.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 103695 March 15, 1996
Facts:
The petition below was filed on September 21 1988 by private respondents spouses Jaime B.
Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then fifteen years old, who had
been living with private respondent Jaime B. Caranto since he was seven years old. When private

respondents were married on January 19, 1986, the minor Midael C. Mazon stayed with them under
their care and custody. Private respondents prayed that judgment be rendered:
a) Declaring the child Michael C. Mazon the child of petitioners for all intents and purposes;
b.) Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child; and
c) That the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the petitioners and that the first
name this was mistakenly registered as “MIDAEL” be corrected to “MICHAEL."
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his contention that the
correction of names cannot be effected in the same proceeding for adoption. As additional ground
for his appeal, he argued that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for adoption because
in the notice published in the newspaper, the name given was "Michael," instead of "Midael," which
is the name of the minor given in his Certificate of Live Birth.
On January 23, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. The Court
of Appeals ruled that the case of Cruz v. Republic, invoked by the petitioner in support of its plea that
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, was inapplicable because that case involved a
substantial error. Like the trial court, it held that to require the petitioners to file a separate petition
for correction of name would entail "additional time and expenses for them as well as for the
Government and the Courts."
Issue:
Does the trial court have jurisdiction over the present case?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the RTC correctly granted the petition for adoption of the minor
Midael C. Mazon and the Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the trial court, correctly did
so. With regard to the second assignment of error in the petition, we hold that both the Court of
Appeals and the trial court erred in granting private respondents' prayer for the correction of the name
of the child in the civil registry. Contrary to what the trial court thought, Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court applies to this case and because its provision was not complied with, the decision of the trial
court, insofar as it ordered the correction of the name of the minor, is void and without force or effect.
The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule 108 to be applicable only to the correction of errors
concerning the civil status of persons
IN RE: ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE GARCIA

G.R. No. 148311 March 31, 2005
Facts:
Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Astorga
Garcia. He averred that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been using her

mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting
parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name be changed to Garcia, her mother’s surname, and
that her surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig” his surname.
The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that pursuant to article 189 of the
Family Code, the minor shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Honorato filed a motion for
classification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie be allowed to use the surname of her
natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The lower court denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the
surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
Issue:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name
when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Ruling:
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adapter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 of
Article V of RA 8557.
Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear
the surname of her father and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the
Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of
the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
TEOTICO vs. DEL VAL

G.R. No. L-18753 March 26, 1965
Facts:
Rene Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. The testatrix Josefina
Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of
in the will. Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the CIF of Manila which
was set for hearing after the requisite publication and service to all parties concerned.
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of
the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same
testatrix, filed an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds. Vicente B.
Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor had no legal personality
to intervene. The probate court, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisca
Mortera, and the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging the additional ground that the will is
inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico.
After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision
admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void
with the statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs
by way of intestate succession.
Issue:
Whether or not oppositor Ana del Val Chan has the right to intervene in this proceeding.
Ruling:
Oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir,
executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will, because
it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of
the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any
claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof.
The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of
Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to
the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the
adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between
the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of
the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
RESCISSION OF ADOPTION
LAHOM vs. SIBULO

G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003
Facts:
A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom
commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),

Branch 22, of Naga City. In her petition, she averred. That despite the proddings and pleadings of
said spouses, respondent refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to the frustrations of
petitioner particularly her husband until the latter died, and even before his death he had made known
his desire to revoke respondent's adoption, but was prevented by petitioner's supplication, however
with his further request upon petitioner to give to charity whatever properties or interest may pertain
to respondent in the future. Respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter disregard of
the feelings of herein petitioner, and his records with the Professional Regulation Commission showed
his name as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued in 1978 until the present, and in all his dealings
and activities in connection with his practice of his profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.
That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this city with only her household
helps to attend to her, has yearned for the care and show of concern from a son, but respondent
remained indifferent and would only come to Naga to see her once a year. for the last three or four
years, the medical check-up of petitioner in Manila became more frequent in view of a leg ailment,
and those were the times when petitioner would need most the care and support from a love one, but
respondent all the more remained callous and utterly indifferent towards petitioner which is not
expected of a son.
That herein respondent has recently been jealous of petitioner's nephews and nieces whenever
they would find time to visit her, respondent alleging that they were only motivated by their desire for
some material benefits from petitioner.
That in view of respondent's insensible attitude resulting in a strained and uncomfortable

relationship between him and petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded feelings, knowing that after
all respondent's only motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the properties
of herein petitioner and her late husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of Civil Case No. 99-4463
for partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love and affection towards respondent,
rendering the decree of adoption, considering respondent to be the child of petitioner, for all legal
purposes, has been negated for which reason there is no more basis for its existence, hence this
petition for revocation,"
Issue:
Can the adoption be rescinded?
Ruling:
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to
rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable,
it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the
hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that
an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause
the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the
grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and
testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.

SUPPORT
LAM vs. CHUA

G.R. No. 131286 March 18, 2004
Facts:
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage by Adriana Chua against Jose Lam in the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch 109). Adriana alleged in the petition that: she and Jose
were married on January 13, 1984; out of said marriage, they begot one son, John Paul Chua Lam;
Jose was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage but

said incapacity was not then apparent; such psychological incapacity of Jose became manifest only
after the celebration of the marriage when he frequently failed to go home, indulged in womanizing
and irresponsible activities, such as, mismanaging the conjugal partnership of gains; in order to save
what was left of the conjugal properties, she was forced to agree with Jose on the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership of gains and the separation of present and future properties; said agreement was
approved by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (Branch 149) in a Decision dated February 28,
1994; they had long been separated in bed and board; they have agreed that the custody of their child
will be with her, subject to visitation rights of Jose. Adriana prayed that the marriage between her and
Jose be declared null and void but she failed to claim and pray for the support of their child, John
Paul.
Issue:
Should Jose give the corresponding support
Ruling:
The Pasay RTC should have been aware that in determining the amount of support to be
awarded, such amount should be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the
necessities of the recipient, pursuant to Articles 194, 201 and 202 of the Family Code. It is incumbent
upon the trial court to base its award of support on the evidence presented before it. The evidence
must prove the capacity or resources of both parents who are jointly obliged to support their children
as provided for under Article 195 of the Family Code; and the monthly expenses incurred for the
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation of the child.
BRIONES vs. MIGUEL

G.R. No. 156343 October 18, 2004
Facts:
On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against
respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child
Michael Kevin Pineda. On April 25, 2002, the petitioner filed an Amended Petition to include Loreta
P. Miguel, the mother of the minor, as one of the respondents.

A Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by this Court on March 11, 2002 ordering the
respondents to produce before this Court the living body of the minor Michael Kevin Pineda on
March 21, 2002 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.
The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with
respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his Birth
Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and is presently
residing in Japan. Respondent Loreta P. Miguel prays that the custody of her minor child be given to
her and invokes Article 213, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code and Article 363 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines
Issue:
Whether or not as the natural father, may be denied the custody and parental care of his own
child in the absence of the mother who is away.
Ruling:
Petitioner concedes that Respondent Loreta has preferential right over their minor child. He
insists, however, that custody should be awarded to him whenever she leaves for Japan and during the
period that she stays there. In other words, he wants joint custody over the minor, such that the
mother would have custody when she is in the country. But when she is abroad, he -- as the biological
father -- should have custody.
According to petitioner, Loreta is not always in the country. When she is abroad, she cannot
take care of their child. The undeniable fact, he adds, is that she lives most of the time in Japan, as
evidenced by her Special Power of Attorney dated May 28, 2001, granting to her sister temporary
custody over the minor.
At present, however, the child is already with his mother in Japan, where he is studying,9 thus
rendering petitioner’s argument moot. While the Petition for Habeas Corpus was pending before the
CA, petitioner filed on July 30, 2002, an "Urgent Motion for a Hold Departure Order," alleging therein
that respondents were preparing the travel papers of the minor so the child could join his mother and
her Japanese husband. The CA denied the Motion for lack of merit.
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of
petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly
provides that "illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is the rule regardless
of whether the father admits paternity

QUIMIGING vs. ICAO

G.R. No. L-26795 July 31, 2970
Facts:
Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan
City and had close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he succeeded to
have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation and without her
consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs supplied by defendant and as a
consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month, damages
and attorney’s fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del Norte on the

ground lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint that as a result of the
intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled that “no amendment was allowable since
the original complaint averred no cause of action”.
Issue:
Whether or not, the CFI erred in dismissing Carmen’s complaint.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that “a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law
a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40
of the Civil Code of the Philippines”. The conceive child may also receive donations and be accepted
by those persons who will legally represent them if they were already born as prescribed in Article 742.
Lower court’s theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of
parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn violates
article 40 aforementioned.
Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman not
his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmen’s rights. Thus, she is entitled
to claim compensation for the damage caused.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded
to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee
Felix Icao.
FRANCISCO vs. ZANDUETA

G.R. No. 43794 August 9, 1935
Facts:
Eugenio Francisco, represented by his natural mother and curator ad litem, Rosario Gomez,
instituted an action for support against petitioner Luis Francisco in a separate case, alleging that he is
the latter’s acknowledged son and as such is entitled to support. Luis denied the allegation, claimed
that he never acknowledged Eugenio as his son and was not present at his baptism and that he was
married at time of Eugenio’s birth.

Despite the denial of paternity however, respondent judge Francisco Zandueta issued an order
granting Eugenio monthly pension, pendente lite. Luis moved for reconsideration but was denied,
hence the writ for certiorari. Praying to have the trial transferred, counsel of herein petitioner, in
compromise, agreed that his client would pay the monthly pension during the pendency of the case.
Issue:
Whether or not Eugenio Francisco is entitled to support without first establishing his status
as petitioner’s son
Ruling:
No. The answer as to whether or not petitioner’s counsel really agreed to have him pay the
pension during the case’s pendency is not necessary to the solution of the case. As in the case
of Yangco vs Rohde, the fact of the civil status must be proven first before a right of support can be
derived. The Court ruled that it is necessary for Eugenio to prove, through his guardian ad litem, his
civil status as the petitioner’s son. As such, no right of support can be given because the very civil
status of sonship, from which the right is derived, is in question.
It held that “(t)here is no law or reason which authorizes the granting of support to a person
who claims to be a son in the same manner as to a person who establishes by legal proof that he is
such son. In the latter case the legal evidence raises a presumption of law, while in the former there is
no presumption, there is nothing but a mere allegation, a fact in issue, and a simple fact in issue must
not be confounded with an established right recognized by a final judgment.” Additionally, the
respondent judge was without jurisdiction to order for the monthly support in light of herein private
respondent’s absence of aforementioned status.
SANTERO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-61700 September 14, 1987
Facts:
Pablo Santero, the only legitimate son of Pascual and Simona Santero, had three children with
Felixberta Pacursa namely, Princesita, Federico and Willie (herein petitioners). He also had four
children with Anselma Diaz namely, Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina, and Miguel (herein private
respondents). These children are all natural children since neither of their mothers was married to
their father. In 1973, Pablo Santero died.

During the pendency of the administration proceedings with the CFI-Cavite involving the
estate of the late Pablo Santero, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court
questioning the decision of CFI-Cavite granting allowance (allegedly without hearing) in the amount
of Php 2,000.00, to private respondents which includes tuition fees, clothing materials and subsistence
out of any available funds in the hands of the administrator. The petitioners opposed said decision on
the ground that private respondents were no longer studying, that they have attained the age of
majority, that all of them except for Miguel are gainfully employed, and the administrator did not have
sufficient funds to cover the said expenses.
Before the Supreme Court could act on saod petition, the private respondents filed another
motion for allowance with the CFI-Cavite which included Juanita, Estelita and Pedrito, all surnamed
Santero, as children of the late Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz, praying that a sum of Php 6,000.00
be given to each of the seven children as their allowance from the estate of their father. This was
granted by the CFI-Cavite.
Later on, the CFI-Cavite issued an amended order directing Anselma Diaz, mother of private
respondents, to submit a clarification or explanation as to the additional three children included in the
said motion. She said in her clarification that in her previous motions, only the last four minor children
were included for support and the three children were then of age should have been included since all
her children have the right to receive allowance as advance payment of their shares in the inheritance
of Pablo Santero. The CFI-Cavite issued an order directing the administrator to get back the allowance
of the three additional children based on the opposition of the petitioners.
Issue:
a) Are the private respondents entitled to allowance?
b) Was it proper for the court a quo to grant the motion for allowance without hearing?
Ruling:
Yes, they are entitled. Being of age, gainfully employed, or married should not be regarded as
the determining factor to their right to allowance under Articles 290 and 188 of the New Civil Code.
Records show that a hearing was made. Moreover, what the said court did was just to follow
the precedent of the court which granted previous allowance and that the petitioners and private
respondents only received Php 1,500.00 each depending on the availability of funds.
GOTARDO vs. BULING

G.R. No. 165166 August 15, 2012
Facts:
On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, for compulsory recognition and
support 458endent lite, claiming that the petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze. In his answer, the
petitioner denied the imputed paternity of Gliffze. For the parties’ failure to amicably settle the
dispute, the RTC terminated the pre-trial proceedings. Trial on the merits ensued.

The respondent testified for herself and presented Rodulfo Lopez as witness. Evidence for the
respondent showed that she met the petitioner on December 1, 1992 at the Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank, Maasin, Southern Leyte branch where she had been hired as a casual employee,
while the petitioner worked as accounting supervisor.
The respondent responded by filing a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Maasin,
Southern Leyte for damages against the petitioner for breach of promise to marry. Later, however, the
petitioner and the respondent amicably settled the case. The respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze
on March 9, 1995. When the petitioner did not show up and failed to provide support to Gliffze, the
respondent sent him a letter on July 24, 1995 demanding recognition of and support for their
child. When the petitioner did not answer the demand, the respondent filed her complaint for
compulsory recognition and support 459endent lite.
The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for himself. He denied the imputed
paternity, claiming that he first had sexual contact with the respondent in the first week of August
1994 and she could not have been pregnant for twelve (12) weeks (or three (3) months) when he was
informed of the pregnancy on September 15, 1994. During the pendency of the case, the RTC, on the
respondent’s motion, granted a P2, 000.00 monthly child support, retroactive from March 1995.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should provide support.
Ruling:
One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth appearing
in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession
of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws. We have held that such other proof of one’s filiation may be a “baptismal certificate, a
judicial admission, a family bible in which [his] name has been entered, common reputation respecting
[his] pedigree, admission by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
[admissible] under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Since filiation is beyond question, support follows
as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount
of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and
the necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the
reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person
obliged to support.

WHEN IS SUPPORT DEMANDABLE
LACSON vs. LACSON

G.R. No. 150644 August 28, 2006
Facts:
The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters of
petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Maowee was born on December 4,
1974, while Maonaa, a little less than a year later. Not long after the birth of Maonaa, petitioner left
the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and children to seek, apparently for
financial reason, shelter somewhere else. For a month, they stayed with Lea’s mother-in-law, Alicia
Lacson, then with her (Lea’s) mother and then with her brother Noel Daban. After some time, they
rented an apartment only to return later to the house of Lea’s mother. As the trial court aptly observed,
the sisters and their mother, from 1976 to 1994, or for a period of eighteen (18) years, shuttled from
one dwelling place to another not their own.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is obliged to give support.
Ruling:
Petitioner admits being obliged, as father, to provide support to both respondents, Maowee
and Maonaa. It is his threshold submission, however, that he should not be made to pay support in
arrears, i.e., from 1976 to 1994, no previous extrajudicial, let alone judicial, demand having been made
by the respondents. He invokes the following provision of the Family Code to complete his
point:Article 203 – The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who
has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date
of judicial or extrajudicial demand.
To petitioner, his obligation to pay under the afore quoted provision starts from the filing of
Civil Case No. 22185 in 1995, since only from that moment can it be said that an effective demand
for support was made upon him
LIM vs. LIM

G.R. No. 163209 October 30, 2009
Facts:
In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim (Edward), son of petitioners.
Cheryl bore Edward three children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III.
Cheryl, Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City,
together with Edward’s ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano Lim (Mariano).
Edward’s family business, which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered the family
expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income.

On 14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children with
her (then all minors), after a violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house
midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial court described "a very compromising situation." Cheryl, for
herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants) in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 (trial court) for support. The trial court ordered
Edward to provide monthly support of P6,000 pendente lite.
Issue:
Whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to respondents.
Ruling:
By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of ascendants to provide legal support
to their descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much – they limit their petition
to the narrow question of when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying on
provisions found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners theorize
that their liability is activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by its
termination or suspension during the children’s minority. Because at the time respondents sued for
support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their children, petitioners submit that
the obligation to support the latter’s offspring ends with them.
VERCELES vs. POSADA

G.R. No. 159785 April 27, 2007
Facts:
Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada (Clarissa), young lass from the barrio of Pandan,
Catanduanes, sometime in 1986 met a close family friend, petitioner Teofisto I. Verceles, mayor of
Pandan. He then called on the Posadas and at the end of the visit, offered Clarissa a job. Clarissa
accepted petitioner’s offer and worked as a casual employee in the mayor’s office starting on
September 1, 1986. From November 10 to 15 in 1986, with companions Aster de Quiros, Pat del
Valle, Jaime and Jocelyn Vargas, she accompanied petitioner to Legaspi City to attend a seminar on
town planning. They stayed at the Mayon Hotel.

On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., petitioner fetched Clarissa from "My Brother’s
Place" where the seminar was being held. Clarissa avers that he told her that they would have lunch at
Mayon Hotel with their companions who had gone ahead. When they reached the place her
companions were nowhere. After petitioner ordered food, he started making amorous advances on
her. She panicked, ran and closeted herself inside a comfort room where she stayed until someone
knocked. She said she hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid of the mayor, she kept the incident to
herself. She went on as casual employee. One of her tasks was following-up barangay road and
maintenance projects.
Issue:
Whether or not there is proof of filiation.
Ruling:
Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code are the rules for establishing filiation. They are as
follows:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the
action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during
the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The letters, one of which is quoted above, are private handwritten instruments of petitioner
which establish Verna Aiza’s filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In addition, the array
of evidence presented by respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, is convincing,
and irrefutable evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioner’s illegitimate child.
Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he himself presented no evidence
of his own. His bare denials are telling. Well-settled is the rule that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear
and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit no weight in law and cannot be
given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters

MANGONON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 125041 June 30, 2006
Facts:
On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica
and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente lite with
the RTC Makati. In said petition, it was alleged that on 16 February 1975, petitioner and respondent Federico
Delgado were civilly married by then City Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay. At that time,
petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was
solemnized without the required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was annulled on 11 August
1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.

On 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their marriage, petitioner
gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second
husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private respondents had totally abandoned
them. At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the
United States of America (USA) where petitioner, together with her daughters and second husband,
had moved to and finally settled in. Rica was admitted to the University of Massachusetts (Amherst)
while Rina was accepted by the Long Island University and Western New England College. Despite
their admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina were, however, financially incapable of pursuing
collegiate education because of the following:
i) The average annual cost for college education in the US is about US$22,000/year, broken
down as follows:
Tuition Fees US$13,000.00
Room & Board 5,000.00
Books 1,000.00
Yearly Transportation &
Meal Allowance 3,000.00
Total US$ 22,000.00
Or a total of US$44,000.00, more or less, for both Rica and Rina
Issue:
Whether or not Federico is obliged to provide support
Ruling:
In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco could not avail himself of the
second option. From the records, we gleaned that prior to the commencement of this action, the
relationship between respondent Francisco, on one hand, and petitioner and her twin daughters, on
the other, was indeed quite pleasant. The correspondences exchanged among them expressed
profound feelings of thoughtfulness and concern for one another’s well-being. The photographs
presented by petitioner as part of her exhibits presented a seemingly typical family celebrating kinship.
All of these, however, are now things of the past. With the filing of this case, and the allegations hurled
at one another by the parties, the relationships among the parties had certainly been affected.
Particularly difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who they had considered and
claimed as family denied having any familial relationship with them. Given all these, we could not see
Rica and Rina moving back here in the Philippines in the company of those who have disowned them.
Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, we take our bearings from the provision of
the law mandating the amount of support to be proportionate to the resources or means of the giver
and to the necessities of the recipient. Guided by this principle, we hold respondent Francisco liable
for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as support pendente lite. As
established by petitioner, respondent Francisco has the financial resources to pay this amount given
his various business endeavors.

DE GUZMAN vs. PEREZ

G.R. No. 156013 July 25, 2006
Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent Shirley F. Aberde became sweethearts while studying law in
the University of Sto. Tomas. Their studies were interrupted when private respondent became
pregnant. She gave birth to petitioner’s child, Robby Aberde de Guzman, on October 2, 1987.
Private respondent and petitioner never got married. In 1991, petitioner married another woman with
whom he begot two children.
Petitioner sent money for Robby’s schooling only twice — the first in 1992 and the second in
1993. In 1994, when Robby fell seriously ill, petitioner gave private respondent P7,000 to help defray

the cost of the child’s hospitalization and medical expenses. Other than these instances, petitioner
never provided any other financial support for his son.
In 1994, in order to make ends meet and to provide for Robby’s needs, private respondent
accepted a job as a factory worker in Taiwan where she worked for two years. It was only because of
her short stint overseas that she was able to support Robby and send him to school. However, she
reached the point where she had just about spent all her savings to provide for her and Robby’s needs.
The child’s continued education thus became uncertain.
Issue:
May a parent who fails or refuses to do his part in providing his child the education his station
in life and financial condition permit, be charged for neglect
Ruling:
The law is clear. The crime may be committed by any parent. Liability for the crime does not depend
on whether the other parent is also guilty of neglect. The law intends to punish the neglect of any parent, which
neglect corresponds to the failure to give the child the education which the family’s station in life and financial
condition permit. The irresponsible parent cannot exculpate himself from the consequences of his neglect by
invoking the other parent’s faithful compliance with his or her own parental duties.
Petitioner’s position goes against the intent of the law. To allow the neglectful parent to shield himself
from criminal liability defeats the prescription that in all questions regarding the care, custody,
education and property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
However, while petitioner can be indicted for violation of Article 59(4) of PD 603, the charge against
him cannot be made in relation to Section 10(a) of RA 7610 which provides:
SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the
Child’s Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for
other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including those covered by Article 59 of PD No. 603,
as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty ofprision mayor in
its minimum period.
The law expressly penalizes any person who commits other acts of neglect, child abuse, cruelty
or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including
those covered by Article 59 of PD 603 "but not covered by the Revised Penal Code." The "neglect of
child" punished under Article 59(4) of PD 603 is also a crime (known as "indifference of parents")
penalized under the second paragraph of Article 277 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, it is excluded
from the coverage of RA 7610.

RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS WHO PAY
LACSON vs. LACSON

G.R. No. 150644 August 28, 2006
Facts:
The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters of
petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Maowee was born onDecember 4,
1974, while Maonaa, a little less than a year later. Not long after the birth of Maonaa, petitioner left
the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and children to seek, apparently for
financial reason, shelter somewhere else. For a month, they stayed with Lea’s mother-in-law, Alicia
Lacson, then with her (Lea’s) mother and then with her brother Noel Daban. After some time, they
rented an apartment only to return later to the house of Lea’s mother. As the trial court aptly observed,
the sisters and their mother, from 1976 to 1994, or for a period of eighteen (18) years, shuttled from
one dwelling place to another not their own.

It appears that from the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger her husband Edward
for support, relying initially on his commitment memorialized in a note dated December 10, 1975 to
give support to his daughters. As things turned out, however, Edward reneged on his promise of
support, despite Lea’s efforts towards having him fulfill the same. Lea would admit, though, that
Edward occasionally gave their children meager amounts for school expenses. Through the years and
up to the middle part of 1992, Edward’s mother, Alicia Lacson, also gave small amounts to help in
the schooling of Maowee and Maonaa, both of whom eventually took up nursing at St. Paul’s College
in Iloilo City. In the early part of 1995 when Lea, in behalf of her two daughters, filed a complaint
against Edward for support before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33, Maowee was
about to graduate.
In that complaint dated January 30, 1995, as amended, docketed as Civil Case No. 22185,
Maowee and Maonaa, thru their mother, averred that their father Edward, despite being gainfully
employed and owning several pieces of valuable lands, has not provided them support since 1976.
They also alleged that, owing to years of Edward’s failure and neglect, their mother had, from time to
time, borrowed money from her brother Noel Daban. As she would later testify, Lea had received
from Noel, by way of a loan, as much as P400,000.00to P600,000.00.
In his Answer, Edward alleged giving to Maowee and Maonaa sufficient sum to meet their
needs. He explained, however, that his lack of regular income and the unproductivity of the land he
inherited, not his neglect, accounted for his failure at times to give regular support. He also blamed
financial constraint for his inability to provide the P12,000.00 monthly allowance prayed for in the
complaint.
As applied for and after due hearing, the trial court granted the sisters Maowee and Maonaa
support pendente lite at P12,000.00 per month, subject to the schedule of payment and other
conditions set forth in the court’s corresponding order of May 13, 1996. The RTC rendered on June
26, 1997 judgment finding for the plaintiff sisters, as represented by their mother. In that judgment,
the trial court, following an elaborate formula set forth therein, ordered their defendant father Edward
to pay them a specific sum which represented 216 months, or 18 years, of support in arrears. In time,
Edward moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the appellate court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Noel Daban can rightfully exact reimbursement from the petitioner.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Pursuant to Article
207 of the Family Code, Noel Daban can rightfully exact reimbursement from the petitioner. The
provision reads:
When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when
urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right
of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support.
Mention may also be made that, contextually, the resulting juridical relationship between the
petitioner and Noel Daban is a quasi-contract, an equitable principle enjoining one from unjustly
enriching himself at the expense of another.

Petitioner, unlike any good father of a family, has been remiss in his duty to provide
respondents with support practically all throughout their growing years. At bottom, the sisters have
been deprived by a neglectful father of the basic necessities in life as if it is their fault to have been
born. This disposition is thus nothing more than a belated measure to right a wrong done the herein
respondents who are no less petitioner’s daughters.
SUPPORT PENDENT LITE
ESTATE OF RUIZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 118671 January 29, 1996
Facts:
Hilario Ruiz executed a holographic will where he named the following as his heirs: (a.)
Edmond Ruiz – only son; (b.) Maria Pilar Ruiz – adopted daughter; (c.) Maria Cathryn,
Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline - 3 granddaughters, all daughters of Ruiz. Testator bequeathed
to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his
estate. Hilario Ruiz died and the cash component of his estate was immediately distributed among
Ruiz and respondents. Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his
father's holographic will. Four years after, Pilar filed before the RTC a petition for the probate and
approval of the deceased’s will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz. Edmond
opposed the petition on the ground that the will was executed under undue influence. The house and
lot in Valle Verde, Pasig which the testator bequeathed to the 3 granddaughters was leased out by
Edmond to third persons. Probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court
the rental deposit and payments totalling P540,000.00 representing the one-year lease of the Valle

Verde property. Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the real estate taxes on the real
properties of the estate. The probate court approved the release of P7,722.00. Edmond withdrew his
opposition to the probate of the will. Probate court admitted the will to probate and ordered the
issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the amount of
P50,000.00 Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte Motion
for Release of Funds. Prayed for release of the rent payments deposited with the Branch Clerk of
Court. Montes opposed and praying that the release of rent payments be given to the 3
granddaughters. Probate court denied the release of funds and granted the motion of Montes due to
Edmond’s lack of opposition. Probate Court ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only
"such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and allowances for
support" of the testator's three granddaughters subject to collation and deductible from their share in
the inheritance. CA sustained probate court’s order.
Issues:
Whether or not the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of
the estate's debts and obligations, has the authority:
a) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testator's
grandchildren
b) to order the release of the titles to certain heirs
c) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.
Ruling:
No. Grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent's
estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend it to the
deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.
Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Allowance to widow and family. —
The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive
therefrom under the direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law.
In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made:
a. after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax
have been paid; or
b. before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed
by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs, or
when provision is made to meet those obligations.
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde property
and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six months from the date
of first publication of the notice to creditors
c. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had not hitherto been
paid, much less ascertained.
d. The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of the estate.
i. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or make such provisions as
to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the inheritance.
ii. at the time the order was issued the properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried and
appraised.

The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic validity and settles only
the question of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law
e. Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise
or legacy may be raised even after the will has been authenticated
i. The intrinsic validity of Hilario's holographic will was controverted by petitioner before the
probate court in his Reply to Montes' Opposition to his motion for release of funds and his
motion for reconsideration of the August 26, 1993 order of the said court.
ii. Therein, petitioner assailed the distributive shares of the devisees and legatees inasmuch as
his father's will included the estate of his mother and allegedly impaired his legitime as an
intestate heir of his mother.
iii. The Rules provide that if there is a controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of the decedent
and their distributive shares in his estate, the probate court shall proceed to hear and decide
the same as in ordinary cases.
The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real and
personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised "so long as it is necessary
for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration
SUPPORT DURING PROCEEDINGS
REYES vs. INES-LUCIANO

G.R. No. L-48219 February 28, 1979
Facts:
Manuel Reyes attacked his wife twice with the intent to kill. A complaint was filed on June 3,
1976: the first attempt on March was prevented by her father and the second attempt, wherein she
was already living separately from her husband, was stopped only because of her driver’s intervention.
She filed for legal separation on that ground and prayed for support pendente lite for herself and her
three children. The husband opposed the application for support on the ground that the wife
committed adultery with her physician. The respondent Judge Ines-Luciano of the lower court granted
the wife pendente lite. The husband filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating that his wife is not
entitled to receive such support during the pendency of the case, and that even if she is entitled to it,
the amount awarded was excessive. The judge reduced the amount from P5000 to P4000 monthly.
Husband filed a petition for certiorari in the CA to annul the order granting alimony. CA dismissed
the petition which made the husband appeal to the SC.
Issue:
Whether or not support can be administered during the pendency of an action.
Ruling:

Yes – provided that adultery is established by competent evidence. Mere allegations will not
bar her right to receive support pendente lite. Support can be administered during the pendency of
such cases. In determining the amount, it is not necessary to go into the merits of the case. It is enough
that the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record. [The
SC on July, 1978 ordered the alimony to be P1000/month from the period of June to February 1979,
after the trial, it was reverted to P4000/month based on the accepted findings of the trial court that
the husband could afford it because of his affluence and because it wasn’t excessive.
CHARACTERISTICS OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY
SILVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 114742 July 17, 1997
Facts:
Carlitos Silva and Suzanne Gonzales had a live-in relationship and they had two children,
namely, Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Silva and Suzanne eventually separated. Silva and Suzanne
had an understanding that Silva would have the children in his company on weekends. The legal
conflict began when Silva claimed that Suzanne broke that understanding on visitation rights. Silva
filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the Regional Trial Court Branch 78 of
Quezon City. The petition was opposed by Gonzales who claimed that Silva often engaged in
"gambling and womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and social values of the children.
The Quezon City RTC ruled in favor of Silva giving him visitorial rights to his children during
Saturdays and/or Sundays.
The court however explicitly stated that in no case should Silva take the children out without
the written consent of Suzanne. Suzanne filed an appeal from the RTC’s decision to the Court of
Appeals. In the meantime, Suzanne had gotten married to a Dutch national. She eventually immigrated
to Holland with her children Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia.

The Court of Appeals overturned the ruling of the Quezon City RTC. The CA, stated that as
alleged by Suzanne, Silva’s womanizing would have a negative influence on the children.
Issues:
a) Whether or not Silva has visitation rights.
b) Whether or not the mother has parental authority over the children.
Ruling:
The High Court set aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the Quezon City
RTC’s decision favoring Silva’s visitation rights on weekends with Suzanne’s written permission. The
Supreme Court ruled that the biological father has visitorial right over his illegitimate children in view
of the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children. The Court
clarified: “Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care for their children,
see to their proper upbringing and safeguard their best interest and welfare. This authority and
responsibility may not be unduly denied the parents; neither may it be renounced by them. Even when
the parents are estranged and their affection for each other is lost, their attachment to and feeling for
their offspring remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer, absent
any real, grave or imminent threat to the well-being of the child.”
The mother has exclusive parental authority over her illegitimate child (Art. 176 of the Family
Code). The biological father has visitorial right over his illegitimate children in view of the
constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children. This right is
personal to the father; no other person, like grandparents, can exercise this right for him. Silva (the
father) may have won with the Supreme Court’s upholding of his visitation rights, but this favorable
decision did not prevent Suzanne (the mother) in the exercise of her parental authority from
immigrating to Holland with her two children. The right to visitation and the duty to pay child support
are distinct and separate. If the mother and the father of the illegitimate child can agree on the terms
and conditions of the visitation, then there will be no problem. In case of disagreement however, the
father must file a petition asking the court to settle the terms and conditions.

PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND CUSTODY
TONOG vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 122906 February 7, 2002
Facts:
In 1989, Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate daughter
with Edgar V. Daguimol. A year after the birth of Gardin, Dinah left for the USA where she found a
work as a registerednurse. Gardin was left in the care of her father and paternal grandparents.
Edgar filed a petition forguardianship over Gardin in the RTC of Quezon City. In March 1992,
the court granted the petition and appointed Edgar as legal guardian of Gardin. In May 1992, Dinah
filed a petition for relief from judgment. She averred that she learned of the judgment only on April
1, 1992. The trial court set aside its original judgment and allowed Dinah to file her opposition to
Edgar's petition. Edgar, in turn, filed a motion for reconsideration.
In 1993, Dinah filed a motion to remand custody of Gardin to her. In 1994, the trial court
issued a resolution denying Edgar's motion for reconsideration and granting Dinah's motion for
custody of Gardin. Dinah moved for the immediate execution of the resolution.
Edgar, thus, filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the
petition for lack of merit. Upon motion for reconsideration, CA modified its decision and let Gardin

remain in the custody of Edgar until otherwise adjudged. Dinah appealed to the Supreme Court,
contending that she is entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin, as a matter of law. First, as the
mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority upon her as the mother of the illegitimate
minor. Second, Gardin cannot be separated from her since she had not, as of then, attained the age
of seven. Employing simple arithmetic however, it appears that Gardin Faith is now twelve years old.
Issue:
Who is entitled to the temporary custody of the child pending the guardianship proceeding?
Ruling:
In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-being
of the child. Statute sets certain rules to assist the court in making an informed decision. Insofar as
illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children
shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Likewise, Article 213 of the Family Code
provides that “[n]o child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.” It will be observed that in both provisions, a strong
bias is created in favor of the mother. This is especially evident in Article 213 where it may be said
that the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. As explained by the Code Commission:
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby
torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child
of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for “compelling reasons” for the good of
the child.
For these reasons, even a mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is below
seven years of age for “compelling reasons.” Instances of unsuitability are neglect, abandonment,
unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child,
insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. If older than seven years of age, a child is allowed
to state his preference, but the court is not bound by that choice. The court may exercise its discretion
by disregarding the child’s preference should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which instance,
custody may be given to the other parent, or even to a third person.
In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin
Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not been
terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody of the minor.
Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, we find that the appellate
court did not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime parental custody over her.
Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange
environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed an attachment.
Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be properly
entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court. It should be recalled that in a petition for
review on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law. We are not in the best position to assess the
parties’ respective merits vis-à-vis their opposing claims for custody. Yet another sound reason is that
inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the statutory bar of seven years, a
fortiori, her preference and opinion must first be sought in the choice of which parent should have
the custody over her person.

For the present and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor should
remain with her father, the private respondent herein pending final judgment of the trial court.
VANCIL vs. BELMES

G.R. No. 132223 June 19, 2001
Facts:
Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a US Navy serviceman who died on 1986.
During his lifetime, Reeder had two children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife,
Helen G. Belmes. Bonifacia obtained a favorable court decision appointing her as legal and judicial
guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie and Vincent.
On August 13, 1987, Helen submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings
asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition for guardianship before the RTC of Pagadian
City. On June 27, 1988, Helen followed her opposition with a motion for the Removal of Guardian
and Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and
exercising parental authority over the subject minors at Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are
permanently residing. She also states that at the time the petition was filed, Bonifacia was a resident
of Colorado, U.S.A. being a naturalized American citizen.
On October 12, 1988, the trial court rejected and denied Helen’s motion to remove and/or to
disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered
its decision reversing the RTC. Since Valerie had reached the age of majority at the time the case
reached the Supreme Court, the issue revolved around the guardianship of Vincent.
Issue:

Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian?
Ruling:
Respondent Helen Belmes, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right
over that of petitioner Bonifacia to be his guardian. Article 211 of the Family Code provides: "Art.
211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their
common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial
order to the contrary. xxx." Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, Helen has the
corresponding natural and legal right to his custody.
"Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that ‘the right of parents
to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood,’ a right
supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the
state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship."
Bonifacia contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent. Bonifacia’s claim to be
the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of substitute parental authority pursuant to
Article 214 of the Family Code, thus: "Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the
parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. xxx."
Bonifacia, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case
of death, absence or unsuitability of Helen. Considering that Helen is very much alive and has
exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, Bonifacia has to prove, in asserting her right
to be the minor’s guardian, Helen’s unsuitability. Bonifacia, however, has not proffered convincing
evidence showing that Helen is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Bonifacia merely insists that
Helen is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her live-in partner raped Valerie several
times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding.
Even assuming that Helen is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still Bonifacia cannot qualify
as a substitute guardian. She is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will
not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian. In fact, in her
petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian by an expatriate, like her.
To be sure, she will merely delegate those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a
guardian.
There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as
administrators or guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory
requirements upon this question, the courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting the estates
of deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with this duty by
appointing administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to their jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement; the courts should not consent to the
appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to the
jurisdiction of our courts here.

BONDAGJY vs. FOUZI ALI BONDAGJY

G.R. No. 140817 December 7, 2001
Facts:
Respondent Fouzi (then 31 years of age) and Sabrina (then 20 years of age) were married on
February 3,1988, at the Manila Hotel, Ermita, Manila under Islamic rites. On October 21, 1987, or
four (4) months before her marriage, Sabrina became a Muslim by conversion. However, the
conversion was not registered with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. Out of their
union, they begot two (2) children, namely, Abdulaziz, born on June 13, 1989, and Amouaje, born on
September 29, 1990. The children were born in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. At the time of their marriage,
unknown to petitioner, respondent was still married to a Saudi Arabian woman whom he later
divorced.
After their marriage, the couple moved in with respondent's family in Makati City. In 1990,
the parties migrated and settled in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia where they lived for more than two years.
Sometime in December 1995, the children lived in the house of Sabrina's mother in 145 Tanguile
Street, Ayala Alabang. Fouzi alleged that he could not see his children until he got an order from the
court. Even with a court order, he could only see his children in school at De La Salle-Zobel, Alabang,
Muntinlupa City .
On December 15, 1996, Sabrina had the children baptized as Christians and their names
changed from Abdulaziz Bondagjy to Azziz Santiago Artadi and from Amouaje Bondagjy to Amouage
Selina Artadi. Respondent alleged that on various occasions Sabrina was seen with different men at
odd hours in Manila,and that she would wear short skirts, sleeveless blouses, and bathing suits. Such

clothing are detestable under Islamic law on customs. Fouzi claimed that Sabrina let their children
sweep their neighbor's house for a fee of P40.00 after the children come home from school. Whenever
Fouzi sees them in school, the children would be happy to see him but they were afraid to ride in his
car. Instead, they would ride the jeepney in going home from school.
Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City an action for
nullity of marriage, custody and support, ordered the parties to maintain status quo until further orders
from said court. On March 2, 1999, petitioner filed another motion to dismiss on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case since P.D. No. 1083 is applicable only to Muslims.
On March 3, 1999, Fouzi filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss and argued that at the inception
of the case, both parties were Muslims, Fouzi by birth and Sabrina by conversion.
The Shari'a District Court held that P.D. No. 1083 on Custody and Guardianship does not
apply to this case because the spouses were not yet divorced. The Shari' a District Court found
petitioner unworthy to care for her children. The Shari'a Court found that respondent Fouzi was
capable both personally and financially to look after the best interest of his minor children.
Issue:
Whether or not a wife, a Christian who converted to Islam before her marriage to a Muslim
and converted back to Catholicism upon their separation, still bound by the moral laws of Islam in
the determination of her fitness to be the custodian of her children?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court in the case stated that the welfare of the minors is the controlling
consideration on the issue. The Court also said that the factors that determine the fitness of any parent
are: [1] the ability to see to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children, and [2]
the ability to give them a healthy environment as well as physical and financial support taking into
consideration the respective resources and social and moral situations of the parents.
The standard in the determination of sufficiency of proof, however, is not restricted to Muslim
laws. The Family Code shall be taken into consideration in deciding whether a non-Muslim woman is
incompetent. What determines her capacity is the standard laid down by the Family Code now that
she is not a Muslim.
Indeed, what determines the fitness of any parent is the ability to see to the physical,
educational, social and moral welfare of the children, and the ability to give them a healthy
environment as well as physical and financial support taking into consideration the respective
resources and social and moral situations of the parents. Article 211 of the Family Code provides that
the father and mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common
children.
Similarly, P.D. No. 1083 is clear that where the parents are not divorced or legally separated,
the father and mother shall jointly exercise just and reasonable parental authority and fulfill their
responsibility over their legitimate children.

SAGALA-ESLAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 116773 January 16, 1997
Facts:
Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married. After their marriage, the couple
stayed with Teresita Eslao, mother of Reynaldo. The couple had two children namely Leslie and
Angelica. Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of Maria's mother while Angelica was entrusted
with her parents at Teresita's house. Reynaldo died 4 years later. Maria intended to bring Angelica
to her mother's place but Teresita prevailed and entrusted to the custody of Angelica. Maria returned
to her mother's house and stayed with Leslie. Years later, Maria married James Manabu-Ouye, a
Japanese-American orthodontist, and she migrated to US with him. A year after the marriage, Maria
returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her children and bring them to US. Teresita, however,
resisted by way of explaining that the child was entrusted to her when she was 10 days old and accused
Maria of having abandoned Angelica. The trial court rendered a decision where Teresita was directed
to cause the immediate transfer of custody of the child to Maria. CA affirmed with the lower court's
decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Teresita has the right to the custody of the child?
Ruling:
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced
except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the
law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a

children's home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another,
such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it
does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest,
the law still disallows the same.
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-bound
and entitled to keep them in their custody and company. In this case, when Maria entrusted the custody
of her minor child to Teresita, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did
not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority.
Thus, Teresita does not have the right to the custody of the child.
SOMBONG vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 111876 January 31, 1996
Facts:
Petitioner was the mother of Arabella O. Sombong who was born on April 23, 1987 in Taguig,
Metro Manila. Sometime in November, 1987, Arabella, then only six months old, was brought to the
Sir John Clinic, owned by Ty located at Caloocan City, for treatment. Petitioner did not have enough
money to pay the hospital bill in the balance of P300.00. Arabella could not be discharged as a result.
Petitioner said that she paid 1,700 for the release even if the bill was only 300. The spouses
Ty, who had custody of the daughter, would not give Arabella to her. Petitioner filed a petition with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus against the
spouses Ty. She alleged that Arabella was being unlawfully detained and imprisoned at the Ty
residence. The petition was denied due course and summarily dismissed, without prejudice, on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction given that the detention was in Caloocan.
Ty claimed that Arabella was with them for some time, but given to someone who claimed to
be their guardian.The Office of the City Prosecutor of Kalookan City, on the basis of petitioner’s
complaint, filed an information against the spouses Ty for Kidnapping and Illegal Detention of a
Minor before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City. Ty then revealed that the child may be found
in quezon city. When Sombong reached the residence, a small girl named Christina Grace Neri was
found. Sombong claimed the child to be hers even if she wasn’t entirely sure that it was Arabella.

On October 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus
with the Regional Trial Court. The court ruled in Sombong’s favor and ordered the respondents to
deliver the child. The Appellate Court took cognizance of the following issues raised by respondent:
(1) The propriety of the habeas corpus proceeding vis-a-vis the problem respecting the identity of the
child subject of said proceeding; (2) If indeed petitioner be the mother of the child in question, what
the effect would proof of abandonment be under the circumstances of the case; and (3) Will the
question of the child’s welfare be the paramount consideration in this case which involves child
custody.
The RTC decision was reversed. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy for taking back Arabella?
Ruling:
Yes but the requisites are not met. In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application
for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal
restraint of liberty. “The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy
to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The
essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
To justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature
of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. This is the basic requisite under the
first part of Section 1, Rule 102, of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that “except as
otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty.”
In the second part of the same provision, however, Habeas Corpus may be resorted to in cases
where “the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.” Thus,
although the Writ of Habeas Corpus ought not to be issued if the restraint is voluntary, we have held
time and again that the said writ is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of
a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of her own free will.
It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary
restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy; rather, the
writ of habeas corpus is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child.
The foregoing principles considered, the grant of the writ in the instant case will all depend
on the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the petitioner has the right of custody over the
minor; (2) that the rightful custody of the minor is being withheld from the petitioner by the
respondent; and (3) that it is to the best interest of the minor concerned to be in the custody of
petitioner and not that of the respondent.

Petition is dismissed.
GAMBOA-HIRSCH vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 174485 July 11, 2007
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to set aside the decision of the CA
which granted private respondent Franklin joint custody with petitioner Agnes of their minor daughter
Simone.
Spouses Franklin and Agnes started to have marital problems as Agnes wanted to stay in
Makati City, while Franklin insisted that they stay in Boracay Island. When Agnes came to their
conjugal home in Boracay, and asked for money and for Franklin’s permission for her to bring their
daughter to Makati City for a brief vacation she has an intention not to come back to Boracay.
Franklin then filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA for Agnes to produce Simone
in court; CA issued a Resolution which ordered that a writ of habeas corpus be issued ordering that
Simone be brought before said court. CA granted Franklin joint custody with Agnes of their minor
child. Agnes filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint custody in
utter disregard of the provisions of the Family Code, as to minors seven (7) years of age and below.
Ruling:
The court held that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint custody
of the minor child to both parents. The so-called "tender-age presumption" under Article 213 of the
Family Code may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness. The mother is

declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following instances: neglect,
abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the
child, insanity, or affliction with a communicable disease. Here, the mother was not shown to be
unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring for her minor child. All told, no compelling reason has been
adduced to wrench the child from the mother’s custody. Sole custody over Simone Noelle Hirsch is
hereby AWARDED to the mother, petitioner Agnes Gamboa-Hirsch.
PABLO-GUALBERTO vs. GUALBERTO

G.R. No. 154994 June 28, 2005
Facts:
Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of
his marriage to Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4 year old son,
Rafaello, whom her wife took away w/ her from their conjugal home and his school when she left
him.
The RTC granted the ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite, since the wife failed to appear
despite notice. A house helper of the spouses testified that the mother does not care for the child as
she very often goes out of the house and even saw her slapping the child. Another witness testified
that after surveillance he found out that the wife is having lesbian relations.
The judge issued the assailed order reversing her previous order, and this time awarded the
custody of the child to the mother. Finding that the reason stated by Crisanto not to be a compelling
reason as provided in Art 213 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be awarded to the mother.
Ruling:
Article 213 of the Family Code provided: “Art 213. In case of separation of parents parental
authority shall be exercised by the parent des granted by the court. The court shall take into account
all relevant consideration, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent
chosen is unfit.” No child under seven yrs of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise,” This Court has held that when the parents separated,
legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the custody of their child. Article 213 takes its
bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, which reads: “Art 363. In all question on the care, custody,
education and property pf children, the latter welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be
separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reason for such
measure.”
SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 113054 March 16, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were
married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born July
18, 1987. From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been
in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia
Bedia.
On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household,
where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that through deceit and false
pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in
Bacong, Negros Oriental.
The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel
Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as respondent. After an ex-
parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on the same day awarding custody of
the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals. In its decision dated April 30, 1992,
respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's order.
Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to award custody
of his minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under Art. 214 of the
Family Code, substitute parental authority of the grandparents is proper only when both parents are

dead, absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to him, has not been successfully shown
by private respondents.
Issue:
Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.
Ruling:
The minor should be given to the legitimate father. When a parent entrusts the custody of a
minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary
custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Only in case of the parents'
death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparent.
The court held the contentions of the grandparents are insufficient as to remove petitioner's
parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor. Private respondents'
demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred
over the grandparents.
The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the
present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy. While petitioner's previous inattention is
inexcusable, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision against
him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify
his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the bond between parent and son. The
Court also held that his being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So
many men in uniform, who are assigned to different parts of the country in the service of the nation,
are still the natural guardians of their children.
Also, petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though
unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him.

GOLANGCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 124724 December 22, 1997
Facts:
A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by private respondent Lucia Carlos Golangco
against petitioner Rene Uy Golangco before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The couple had two
children, Justin Rene and Stefan Rafael. During the proceedings of the case, a hearing for custody
pendente lite of the two children was held. In an order dated July 21, 1994, the trial court awarded
the two children to Lucia while Rene was given visitation rights of at least one week in a month.
Thereafter Rene questioned the order dated July 21, 1994 with the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals, however, dismissed the petition and instead affirmed the order of the trial court. Not
contented, Rene appealed the resolution of the Court of Appeals affirming the order dated July 21,
1994 before this Court. On July 17, 1995, the Court resolved to dismiss the petition for failure of
petitioner Rene to show that grave abuse of discretion had been committed by the appellate court.
On August 15, 1995, Lucia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. She sought redress due to an alleged incident on
July 5, 1995, in which her estranged husband physically abused their son Justin. Due to the incident,
a criminal complaint for slight physical injuries was filed on July 1995 against Rene by his son Justin
with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati on the basis of Justin’s complaint-affidavit. On August
16, 1995, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order against him and set the hearing of the
motion. After it was decided in favor of Luisa, Rene filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court in issuing the October 4, 1995 order.

Issue:
Whether or not Rene is denied of due process of law.
Ruling:
The trial court gave both parties the opportunity to present their respective evidence and
witnesses. An adequate hearing was conducted and, based on the evidence, the trial court deemed it
proper to grant the writ of preliminary injunction.
The assessment and evaluation of evidence in the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
involves findings of facts ordinarily left to the trial court for its conclusive determination.
It is a fundamental and settled rule that conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are entitled
to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal, unless strong and cogent reasons dictate
otherwise. This is because the trial court is in a better position to examine the real evidence, as well
as to observe the conduct of the witnesses while testifying in the case.
This Supreme Court finds no justifiable reason or exception sufficient to cause the reversal of
the trial court’s declaration in granting the writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner. The
petition was partially granted.
DAVID vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 111180 November 16, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a
businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four children, all
grown-up. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private respondent developed into
an intimate one, as a r esult of which a son, Christopher J., was born on March 9, 1985 to them.
Christo pher J. was followed by two more children, both girls, namely Christine, born on
June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.
The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J,
to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villar's legal
wife. After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were eventually
accepted by his legal family.In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then
six years of age, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after th e trip, Villar refused to
give back the child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next
school year. On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.
Issue:
Whether or not Daisie is entitled to the custody of the child.
Ruling:
Yes. Daisie in turn filed this petition for review of the appellate court's decision. Rule 102, §1
of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal

confinement or detention by which any person is d eprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." It is indeed true, as the Court of
Appeals observed, that the determination of the right to the custody of minor children is relevant in
cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason separated from each
other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other situation. For example, in the case
of Salvaña v. Gaela, it was held that the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to enable parents
to regain the custody of a minor daughter even though the latter be in the custody of a third person
of her free will because the parents were compelling her to marry a man against her will.
In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his
father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the child's
mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental
authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled
to have custody of him. 2 Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of
her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Indeed, Rule 1021 §1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated
from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate
child who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her
child.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering
him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art.213 of the
Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."
Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the grant of
support in this case is justified by the fact that private respondent has expressed willingness to support
the minor child. The order for payment of allowance need not be conditioned on the grant to him of
custody of the child. Under Art. 204 of the Family Code, a person obliged to give support can fulfill
his obligation either by paying the allowance fixed by the court or by receiving and maintaining in the
family dwelling the person who is entitled to support unless, in the latter case, there is "a moral or
legal obstacle thereto."
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven years
of age at least at the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's custody.
Even now that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's custody over him will have to be
upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213
of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the
parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have
custody of her child. Indeed, ifprivate respondent loves his child, he should not condition the grant
of support for him on the award of his custody to him (private respondent).

ESPIRITU vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan City where
Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a
local hospital. Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. Reynaldo was sent by his
employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and
Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife. On
1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. While they were on a brief vacation in the
Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United States, their
second child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born on 1988.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate. Instead of giving
their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the
children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but
because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to
Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus starting the whole
proceedings now reaching this Court. The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It
suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have
sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to
be approved by the Court.
Issue:

Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain custody over the children be
granted.
Ruling:
Supreme Court dismissed the writ of habeas corpus petition by the mother and retain the
custody of the children to the father. The illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused
emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values against the
children.
The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they
prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person. The children
understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional
growth by her behavior.
PEREZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R.No. 118870 March 29, 1996
Facts:
Ray Perez is a doctor practicing in Cebu while Nerissa, his wife, (petitioner) is a registered
nurse. After six miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, Nerissa finally gave birth to
Ray Perez II in New York on July 20, 1992. Ray stayed with her in the U.S. twice and took care of her
when she became pregnant. Unlike his wife, however, he had only a tourist visa and was not
employed.
On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only
Nerissa returned to the U.S. She alleged that they came home only for a five-week vacation and that
they all had round-trip tickets. However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his sick mother
and promised to follow her with the baby. According to Ray, they had agreed to reside permanently
in the Philippines but once Nerissa was in New York, she changed her mind and continued
working. She was supposed to come back immediately after winding up her affairs there.
When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray II’s first birthday, the couple was no longer
on good terms. They had quarrels. Nerissa did not want to live near her in-laws and rely solely on her
husband’s meager income of P5,000.00. On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here, where he could
raise his son even as he practiced his profession. He maintained that it would not be difficult to live
here since they have their own home and a car. Despite mediation by the priest, the couple failed to
reconcile.
Nerissa filed a petition to surrender the custody of their son to her. The trial court issued an
Order awarding custody to Nerissa citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code
which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. Upon appeal by Ray Perez, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court’s order and held that granting custody to the boy’s father would be for the
child’s best interest and welfare.
Issue:
Whether or not Nerissa has rightful custody of a child?
Ruling:
Yes. Aside from Article 213 of the Family Code, the Revised Rules of Court also contains a
similar provision. Rule 99, Section 6 (Adoption and Custody of Minors) provides: “SEC. 6.
Proceedings as to child whose parents are separated.Appeal. - When husband and wife are divorced
or living separately and apart from each other, and the questions as to the care, custody, and control
of a child or children of their marriage is brought before a Court of First Instance by petition or as an
incident to any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing the testimony as may be pertinent, shall
award the care, custody, and control of each such child as will be for its best interest, permitting the
child to choose which parent it prefers to live with if it be over ten years of age, unless the parent
chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness,
incapacity, or poverty x x x. No child under seven years of age shall be separated from its mother,
unless the court finds there are compelling reasons therefor.”
The provisions of law quoted above clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall
not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The
use of the word “shall” in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules
of Court connotes a mandatory character.
The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother
finds its reason in the basic need of a child for his mother’s loving care. Only the most compelling of
reasons shall justify the court’s awarding the custody of such a child to someone other than his mother,
such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past the following grounds have been
considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and parental authority: neglect,
abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of
the child, insanity and being sick with a communicable disease.
It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare
and best interest of the child. In fact, no less than an international instrument, the Convention on the
Rights of the Child provides: “In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the
best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
In the case, financial capacity is not a determinative factor inasmuch as both parties have
demonstrated that they have ample means. Nerissa’s present work schedule is not so unmanageable
as to deprive her of quality time with her son. Quite a number of working mothers who are away
from home for longer periods of time are still able to raise a family well, applying time management
principles judiciously. Also, delegating child care temporarily to qualified persons who run day-care
centers does not detract from being a good mother, as long as the latter exercises supervision, for even
in our culture, children are often brought up by housemaids under the eagle eyes of the mother.

Although Ray’s is a general practitioner, the records show that he maintains a clinic, works for
several companies on retainer basis and teaches part-time. He cannot possibly give the love and care
that a mother gives to his child.
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PERSONS EXERCISING PARENTAL AUTHORITY
LIBI vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R.No. 70890 September 18, 1992
Facts:
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi died, each from a single gunshot
wound from a revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi. The respondents, parents
of Julie Ann, filed a case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter’s
vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The trial court dismissed the complaint. On
appeal, the IAC set aside the judgment of the lower court dismissing the complaint of Julie Ann’s
parents.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by the respondent
Court to make petitioners liable for vicarious liability.
Ruling:
Yes. The petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently supervising
the activities of their son. Both parents were wanting in their duty and responsibility in monitoring
and knowing the activities of their son. The petitioners utterly failed to exercise all the diligence of a
good father of a family in preventing their son from committing the crime by means of the gun which
was freely accessible to Wendell Libi because they have not regularly checked whether the gun was
still under lock, but learned that it was missing from the safety deposit box only after the crime had
been committed. The civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as contemplated
in Article 2180, is primary and not subsidiary.

RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PERSONS EXERCISING PARENTAL AUTHORITY
TAMARGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R.No. 85044 June 3, 1992
Facts:
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998; Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot
Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil
complaint for damages was filed with the RTC of Ilocos Sur by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's
adopting parent and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against
respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at
the time of the tragic incident.
Prior to the incident, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the
minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings before the then CIF of Ilocos Sur. This petition for
adoption was granted that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. Respondent spouses
Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed
that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were
indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from
the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with
his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and
granting of a petition for adoption. The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that
respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.
Issues:
a) Whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal, may still file the
instant petition.

b) Whether the Court may still take cognizance of the case even through petitioners' appeal had
been filed out of time.
Ruling:
Supreme Court granted the petition. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting
of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage
in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been
retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that
they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented would be unfair and
unconscionable.
Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of parents,

their parental authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In the case
at bar, during the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural
parents. It follows that they are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. “Parents and
guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in
accordance with the civil code”.
AQUINAS SCHOOL vs. INTON

G.R. No. 184202 January 26, 2011
Facts:
This case is about the private school’s liability for the outside catechist’s act of shoving a
student and kicking him on the legs when he disobeyed her instruction to remain in his seat and not
move around the classroom. In 1998, Jose Luis Inton (Jose Luis) was a grade three student at Aquinas
School (Aquinas). Respondent Sister Margarita Yamyamin (Yamyamin), a religion teacher who began
teaching at that school only in June of that year, taught Jose Luis’ grade three religion class. Jose Luis
left his seat and went over to a classmate to play a joke of surprising him. Yamyamin noticed this and
sent him back to his seat. After a while, Jose Luis got up again and went over to the same classmate.
Yamyamin approached the Jose Luis and kicked him on the legs several times. She also pulled and
shoved his head on the classmate’s seat. She also made the child copy the notes on the blackboard
while seating on the floor. Respondents Jose and Victoria Inton (the Intons) filed an action for
damages on behalf of their son Jose Luis against Yamyamin and Aquinas before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City in Civil Case 67427. The Intons also filed a criminal action against
Yamyamin for violation of Republic Act 7610 to which she pleaded guilty and was sentenced
accordingly. With regard to the action for damages, the Intons sought to recover actual, moral, and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees, for the hurt that Jose Luis and his mother Victoria
suffered. The RTC dismissed Victoria’s personal claims but ruled in Jose Luis’ favor, holding
Yamyamin liable to him for moral damages of P25,000.00, exemplary damages of P25,000.00, and
attorney’s fees of P10,000.00 plus the costs of suit. They elevated the case to the CA to increase the
award of damages and hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA was correct in holding Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin for
the damages awarded to Jose Luis.

Ruling:
No. The school directress testified that Aquinas had an agreement with a congregation of
sisters under which, in order to fulfill its ministry, the congregation would send religion teachers to
Aquinas to provide catechesis to its students. Aquinas insists that it was not the school but Yamyamin’s
religious congregation that chose her for the task of catechizing the school’s grade three students,
much like the way bishops designate the catechists who would teach Religion in public schools.
Aquinas did not have control over Yamyamin’s teaching methods. The Intons had not refuted the
school directress’ testimony in this regard. Aquinas still had the responsibility of taking steps to ensure
that only qualified outside catechists are allowed to teach its young students. In this regard, it cannot
be said that Aquinas took no steps to avoid the occurrence of improper conduct towards the students
by their religion teacher. They showed records, certificates and diploma that Yamyamin is qualified to
teach. There is no question that she came from a legitimate congregation of sisters. They provided
Faculty Staff Manual in handling the students. They pre-approved the content of the course she
wanted to teach. They have a classroom evaluation program for her unfortunately, she was new,
therefore do not have sufficient opportunity to observe her.
ST. JOSEPH’S COLLEGE vs. MIRANDA

G.R. No. 182353 June 29, 2010
Facts:
While inside the premises of St. Joseph’s College, the class where respondent Miranda
belonged was conducting a science experiment about fusion of sulfur powder andiron fillings under
the tutelage of Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the teacher and the employee, while the adviser is
Estafania Abdan.
Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without having adequately secured it
from any untoward incident or occurrence. In the middle of the experiment, Jayson, who was the
assistant leader of one of the class groups, checked the result of the experiment by looking into the
test tube with magnifying glass. The test tube was being held by one of his group mates who moved
it close and towards the eye of Jayson. At that instance, the compound in the test tube spurted out
and several particles of which hit Jayson’s eye and the different parts of the bodies of some of his
group mates. As a result thereof, Jayson’s eyes were chemically burned, particularly his left eye, for
which he had to undergo surgery and had to spend for his medication. Upon filing of this case [in] the
lower court, his wound had not completely healed and still had to undergo another surgery.
Upon learning of the incident and because of the need for finances, [Jayson’s] mother, who
was working abroad, had to rush back home for which she spent P36,070.00 for her fares and had to
forego her salary from November 23, 1994 to December 26, 1994, in the amount of at least
P40,000.00.
Jason and his parents suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish and wounded feelings as a
result of his injury due to the petitioner’s fault and failure to exercise the degree of care and diligence
incumbent upon each one of them. Thus, they should be held liable for moral damages.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners were liable for the accident.
Ruling:
Yes. As found by both lower courts, proximate cause of the Jason’s injury was the concurrent
failure of petitioners to prevent to foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science
experiment. Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of care, caution and
foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators and teachers. "The defense of due diligence
of a good father of a family raised by [petitioner] St. Joseph College will not exculpate it from liability
because it has been shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in the supervision of its teachers
despite an apparent rigid screening process for hiring and in the maintenance of what should have
been a safe and secured environment for conducting dangerous experiments. Petitioner school is still
liable for the wrongful acts of the teachers and employees because it had full information on the nature
of dangerous science experiments but did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to
students. Schools should not simply install safety reminders and distribute safety instructional
manuals. More importantly, schools should provide protective gears and devices to shield students
from expected risks and anticipated dangers.
ST. MARY’S ACADEMY vs. CARPITANOS

G.R. No. 143363 February 6, 2002
Facts:
Defendant-appellant St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for
the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from
where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Mary’s Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos
was part of the campaigning group.
Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in
a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary
School, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the
same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned
turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. The parents
of Sherwin filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel,
the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Mary’s Academy before the RTC of Dipolog City and
claimed for damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner St. Mary’s Academy is liable for damages for the death of
Sherwin Carpitanos.
Ruling:
GRANTED and REMANDED to the RTC for determination of any liability of the school.
The Court held that for the school to be liable there must be a finding that the act or omission
considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because of negligence, must have
causal connection to the accident. There is no showing of such.

Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel
spouses that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep,
it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages
for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
AMADORA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988
Facts:
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the commencement
exercises where he would ascend the stage and in the presence of his relatives and friends receive his
high school diploma. As it turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that awaited
experience. While they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a
classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his
life as well.
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, the herein
petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code
against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and
the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents.
The complaint against the students was later dropped. After trial, the CIF of Cebu held the remaining
defendants liable to the plaintiffs. On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was
reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved.
Issue:
Whether or not teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for the
death of Alfredo Amadora.
Ruling:
The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question (Art. 2180) should apply
to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Following the canon of reddendo singular singuli,
where the school is academic, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the
teacher in charge of such student. This is the general rule. Reason: Old academic schools, the heads
just supervise the teachers who are the ones directly involved with the students.
Where the school is for arts and trades, it is the head and only he who shall be held liable as
an exception to the general rule. Reason: Old schools of arts and trades saw the masters or heads of
the school personally and directly instructed the apprentices.
Therefore, the heads are not liable. The teacher-in-charge is not also liable because there’s no
showing that he was negligent in enforcing discipline against the accused or that he waived observance
of the rules and regulations of the school, or condoned their non-observance. Also, the fact that he
wasn’t present can’t be considered against him because he wasn’t required to report on that day.
Classes had already ceased.
SALVOSA vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. L-70458 October 5, 1988
Facts:
Petitioners in this case were impleaded in the civil case for damages filed against Abon. Salvosa
being the (Executive Vice President of BCF).Jimmy Abon was a commerce student of the Baguio
Colleges Foundation. He was also appointed as armorer of the school’s ROTC Unit. As armorer of
the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon received his appointment from the AFP. He received orders from
Captain Roberto C. Ungos, the Commandant of the Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit,
concurrent Commandant of other ROTC units in Baguio and an employee (officer) of the AFP. On
3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon shot Napoleon
Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which the former took from
the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a result, Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon was
prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime of Homicide by Military Commission No. 30, AFP.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages under
Article2180 of the Civil Code, as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B. Abon.
Ruling:
Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for "damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody." The rationale of such
liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain
extent, in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is]called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over
the conduct of the [student]."

Likewise, "the phrase used in[Art. 2180— 'so long as (the students) remain in their custody
means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over
the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school , including recess time." In
line with the case of Palisoc , a student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess" thereat.
A"recess," as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a
situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of
his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the area within which the school
activity is conducted. Recess by its nature does not include dismissal.
Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more
does not constitute "attending school" or being in the "protective and supervisory custody' of the
school, as contemplated in the law.
Upon the foregoing considerations, we hold that Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to
have been "at attendance in the School," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. .
Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with
Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992
Facts:
Carlitos Bautista was a third year student at the Philippine School of Business Administration.
Assailants, who were not members of the school’s academic community, while in the premises of
PSBA, stabbed Bautista to death. This incident prompted his parents to file a suit against PSBA and
its corporate officers for damages due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security
precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the compliant states no cause of action against
them based on quasi-delicts, as the said rule does not cover academic institutions. The trial court
denied the motion to dismiss. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise dismissed, and was
affirmed by the appellate court. Hence, the case was forwarded to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not PSBA is liable for the death of the student.
Ruling:
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA
and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows
that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise
only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this
impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there
obtains a contract.

Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule in in loco
parentis. Article 2180 provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or
students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students
while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier
indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could
be made liable. But it does not necessarily follow that PSBA is absolved form liability.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract
between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties is bound to comply with. For its
part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice
to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. This
includes ensuring the safety of the students while in the school premises. On the other hand, the
student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and
regulations.
Failing on its contractual and implied duty to ensure the safety of their student, PSBA is
therefore held liable for his death.
Petition denied.
USE OF SURNAME BY WOMEN, ARTICLES 370-373, CIVIL CODE
REMO vs. SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

G.R. No. 169202 March 5, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine passport was
then expiring on 27 October 2000. Petitioner being married to Francisco R. Rallonza, the following
entries appears in her passport: “Rallonza” as her surname, “Maria Virginia” as her given name, and
“Remo” as her middle name. Prior to the expiry of the validity of her passport, petitioner, whose
marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in
the replacement passport.
However, the petitioner’s request has been denied. With this reason, she filed a petition to change her
surname to her middle name in the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Maria Virginia can change her surname “Rallonza” to her middle name
“Remo” in her passport.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s
surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the cases
enumerated in section 5(d) of RA 8239. these instances are: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3)
annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. since petitioner’s marriage to her husband subsists, she may not

resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. otherwise stated, a married woman's reversion
to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage.
Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the civil code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a
special law specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of title xiii of
the civil code which is the general law on the use of surnames. a basic tenet in statutory construction
is that a special law prevails over a general law.
Wherefore, the court denied the petition andaffirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
USE OF SURNAME BY WOMEN, ARTICLES 370-373, CIVIL CODE
YASIN vs. JUDGE SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT

G.R. No. 94986 February 23, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Law of
the Philippines, filed a petition to the respondent court, a petition to resume the use of her maiden
name and surname. The petition was denied by the respondent court on the ground that the petition
is substantially for change of name and that compliance with the provisions of Rule 103 Rules of
Court on change of name is necessary if the position is to be granted as it would result in the
resumption of the use of petitioners maiden name and surname.
Issue:
Whether or not petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is also a petition for
change of name.
Ruling:
The court rules in the negative. Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on change of name should not
be applied to judicial conformation of the right of divorced woman to resume her maiden name and
surname. Wherefore the petition is granted.

USE OF SURNAME BY CHILDREN, ARTICLES 364-369, CIVIL CODE
IN RE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

G.R. No. 148311 March 31, 2005
Facts:
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his
minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein among others, that
Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994, that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has
been using her mother’s middle name and surname, and that she is now a widower and qualified to
be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia her
mother’s surname and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his Surname.
The trial court rendered the assailed decision granting the adoption, however, the trial Court
did not allow the use of her mother’s surname as her middle name. Thus, petitioner filed a motion for
clarification and reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her
natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name.
Issue:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother, as her middle name,
when she subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Ruling:
As correctly submitted by parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Notably,
the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. The Court ruled that since no
law granting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, as in this case, to use as middle name

the mother’s surname, the Court found no reason why Stephanie should not allowed to use her
mother’s surname Garcia as her middle name.
NAMES AND SURNAMES: USE OF SURNAME BY CHILDREN
IN RE JULIAN LIN WANG

GR.No.159966 March 30, 2005
Facts:
Petitioner Julian Lin Wang a minor represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang filed a petition
dated 19 September 2002 for change of name of entry in the civil registry of Julian Lin Wang.
Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop
his middle name as this would help him adjust more easily to integrate himself into Singaporean
society.
Issue:
Whether or not the law the law provides for his middle name to be changed.
Ruling:
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and reasonable cause
for which the change is sought. to justify a request for the change of name, the petitioner must show
not only some proper reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and
official name. Among the grounds for the change of name which have been held valid are:
a.) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce. b.)
When the change results as a legal consequence
c.) When the change will avoid confusion.
d.) When one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and
was not aware of the alien parentage.

e.) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name and
f.) When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change
of name was for a fraudulent purpose.

NAMES AND SURNAMES: USE OF SURNAME BY CHILDREN
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF MARIA

ESTRELLA VERONICA PRIMITIVA DUTERTE, ESTRELLA S. ALFON
G.R. No. L-51201 May 29, 1980
Facts:
This is verified petition filed on April 28, 1978 by petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva
Duterte through her counsel, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez, praying that her name be changed from Maria
Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon.
The notice setting the petition for hearing on December 14, 1978 at 8:30 o'clock in the
morning was published in the Times Journal in its issues of July 28, August 5 and 11, 1978 and a copy
thereof together with a copy of the petition was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (Exhibits
C, C-1, C-2 and C-3).
At the hearing of the petition on December 14, 1978, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez appeared for the
petitioner and Fiscal Donato Sor. Suyat, Jr. represented the office of the Solicitor General, Upon
motion of counsel for the petitioner, without objection on the part of Fiscal Suyat, the Deputy Clerk
of Court was appointed commissioner to receive the evidence and to submit the same for resolution
of the Court.
From the testimonial and document evidence presented, it appears that petitioner Maria
Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte was born on May 15, 1952 at the U.S.T. Hospital (Exhibit A). She
was registered at the local Civil Registrar's Office as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte On
June 15, 1952; she was baptized as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte at the St. Anthony de
Padua Church Singalong, Manila. Her parents are Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Veronica Primitiva
Duterte has been taken care of by Mr. and Mrs. Hector Alfon. Petitioner and her uncle, Hector Alfon,
have been residing at 728 J.R. Yulo Street corner Ideal Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila for twenty-
three (23) years. When petitioner started schooling, she used the name Estrella S. Alfon. She attended
her first grade up to fourth year high school at Stella Maris College using the name Estrella S. Alfon
(Exhibits E, E-1, E-2 and E-3). After graduating from high school she enrolled at the Arellano
University and finished Bachelor of Science in Nursing. Her scholastic records from elementary to
college show that she was registered by the name of Estrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has exercised her
right of suffrage under the same name. She has not committed any felony or misdemeanor.
Issue:
Whether or not she may be allowed for the change of name and her surname.
Ruling:
Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such order has been
published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall if proper and
reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner adjudge that such name be changed
in accordance with the prayer of the petition.
The evidence submitted shows that the change of name from Maria Estrella Veronica
Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon is not proper and reasonable with respect to the surname. The fact

that petitioner has been using a different surname and has become known with such surname does
not constitute proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize and change her surname to Alfon. The
birth certificate clearly shows that the father of petitioner is Filomeno Duterte. Petitioner likewise
admitted this fact in her testimony. To allow petitioner to change her surname from Duterte to Alfon
is equivalent to allowing her to use her mother's surname. Article 364 of the Civil Code provides:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. If another
purpose of the petitioner is to carry the surname of Alfon because her uncle who reared her since
childhood has the surname "Alfon" then the remedy is not a petition for change of name.
WHEREFORE, the petition insofar as the first name is granted but denied with respect to
the surname. Petitioner is authorized to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva
Duterte to Estrella Alfon Duterte.

NAMES AND SURNAMES: USE OF A DIFFERENT NAME
PEOPLE vs. ESTRADA

G.R. No. 164368 April 2, 2009
Facts:
December 27, 1994, at the St. John’s Cathedral, Dagupan City, while the sacrament of
confirmation was being performed by the Bishop, a man from the crowd walked towards the center
of the altar and sat on the Bishop’s chair. Crisanto Santillan, who was an assistant, saw this. He
requested the accused to vacate, but the latter refused. They called on the guard. Despite repeated
request, he did not move. As the guard was attempting to strike the victim with his nightstick to make
him leave accused-appellant drew a knife and stabbed Mararac. He repeated it a lot. After, he got up
and shouted via the mic; No one can beat me here! SPO1 Francisco saw a man, with red stains on his
shirt and a knife in one hand sitting on a chair. He advised him to drop the knife. Accused-appellant
obeyed, Mararac, the security guard, was brought to the hospital where he expired a few minutes upon
arrival.
Accused-appellant, filed a “Demurrer to Evidence” where he claims that: prosecution failed

to prove murder; that there was unlawful aggression by the victim; and that accused-appellant was of
unsound mind. Inspector Valdez (Jail warden) requested the court to allow accused-appellant, to be
treated at the Baguio General Hospital to determine whether he should remain in jail or be transferred
to some other institution. While motion for reconsideration was pending, counsel for accused-
appellant filed a “Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination.”
Appellant’s counsel informed the court that accused-appellant had been exhibiting abnormal behavior
for the past weeks. There were 2 letters of the warden requesting the same. The trial court denied
reconsideration of the order denying the “Demurrer to Evidence.” Dr. Maria Soledad Gawidan, a
resident physician in the Department of Psychiatry at the Baguio General Hospital, testified to the
accused being confined and diagnosed with “Schizophrenic Psychosis, Paranoid Type—
schizophrenia, paranoid, chronic, paranoid type.”
The trial court rendered a decision on June 23, 1997. It upheld the prosecution evidence and
found accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged and thereby sentenced him to death,
Issue:
Whether or not he was indeed insane
Ruling:
When a person commits a felonious act the act is presumed to have been done voluntarily. In
the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every person is of sound mind and that
all acts are voluntary. An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted during a
lucid interval. In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence
in committing the act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. Since
the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance
must prove it by clear and positive evidence. There are certain circumstances that should have placed
the trial court on notice that appellant may not have been in full possession of his mental faculties e.g.
when he attacked Mararac, then went up the microphone.

Accused-appellant’s history of mental illness was brought to the courts.
To test whether the accused would have a fair trial there are two distinct matters to be
determined (1) whether defendant is coherent to provide his counsel with information necessary (2)
whether he is able to comprehend the significance of the trial and his relation to it. To put a legally
incompetent person on trial or to convict and sentence him is a violation of the constitutional rights
to a fair trial. The determination of whether a sanity investigation or hearing should be ordered rests
generally in the discretion of the trial court. In the case at bar, when accused-appellant moved for
suspension of the arraignment on the ground of accused’s mental condition, the trial court denied the
motion after finding that the questions propounded on appellant were intelligently answered by him.
The fact that accused-appellant was able to answer the questions asked by the trial court is not
conclusive evidence that he was competent enough to stand trial and assist in his defense. The trial
court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of accused-appellant. The trial judge is not a
psychiatrist or psychologist or some other expert equipped with the specialized knowledge. If the
medical history was not enough to create a reasonable doubt in the judge’s mind of accused-appellant’s
competency to stand trial, subsequent events should have done so. One month after the prosecution
rested its case, there were letters requesting that accused be confined in hospital, as well as the
counsel’s filing of motion. And despite all the overwhelming indications of accused-appellant’s state
of mind, the judge persisted in his personal assessment and never even considered subjecting accused-
appellant to a medical examination. To top it all, the judge found appellant guilty and sentenced him
to death!
At this late hour, a medical finding alone may make it impossible for us to evaluate appellant’s
mental condition at the time of the crime’s commission for him to avail of the exempting circumstance
of insanity. Nonetheless, under the present circumstances, accused-appellant’s competence to stand
trial must be properly ascertained to enable him to participate in his trial meaningfully. Remanded to
the court a quo for the conduct of a proper mental examination on accused-appellant, a determination
of his competency to stand trial, and for further proceedings.

NAMES AND SURNAMES: USE OF A DIFFERENT NAME
URSUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 112170. April 10, 1996
Facts:
Petitioner wrote the name “Oscar Perez” in the visitor’s logbook and used the same in
receiving the copy of a complaint against him at the Office of the Ombudsman. This was discovered
and reported to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that the petitioner be accordingly
charged. Trial Court found the petitioner guilty of violating Sec.1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A.
No. 6085 otherwise known as ”An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases“. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the conviction with some modification of sentence.
Issue:
Whether or not the use of alias in isolated transaction falls within the prohibition of
Commonwealth Act No. 142.
Ruling:
No. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the RTC was reversed
and set aside and petitioner was acquitted of the crime charged.
An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and
habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth
or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A man’s name is
simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they
distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as
aliases. Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single
instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to
his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as
amended. This is so in the case at bench.
Time and again [courts] have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the
purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason
for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the
intended scope and purpose. The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a
literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of
the lawmakers.
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute
an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. Moreover,
as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the
accused. The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the
object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion
of the court limited.

AMENDMENTS/CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
REPUBLIC vs. COSETENG-MAGPAYO

G.R. No. 189476 February 2, 2012
Facts:
Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo
(respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who,
as respondent’s certificate of live birth shows, contracted marriage on March 26, 1972. Claiming,
however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on July 22, 2008 at the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez
Lim Coseteng. In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the National
Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique "does not appear in [its] National Indices of
Marriage.” Respondent also submitted his academic records from elementary up to college showing
that he carried the surname "Coseteng," and the birth certificate of his child where "Coseteng" appears
as his surname. In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent ran and was elected as Councilor
of Quezon City’s 3rd District using the name "JULIAN M.L. COSETENG."
On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC, respondent amended his petition by alleging
therein compliance with the 3-year residency requirement under Section 2, Rule 103] of the Rules of
Court. The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was published in the
newspaper Broadside in its issues of October 31-November 6, 2008, November 7-13, 2008, and
November 14-20, 2008. And a copy of the notice was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG).
No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default was entered by
the trial court which then allowed respondent to present evidence ex parte. By Decision of January 8,
2009, the trial court granted respondent’s petition. The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a
motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court by Order of July 2, 2009, hence, it, thru
the OSG, lodged the present petition for review to the Court on pure question of law.
Issue:
a) Whether or not the petition for change of name involving change of civil status should be
made through appropriate adversarial proceedings.
b) Whether or not the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it directed the deletion of the
name of respondent’s father from his birth certificate.
Ruling:
The petition is impressed with merit. A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103
(CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a
legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien
parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good
faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is
no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name

would prejudice public interest. Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be considered as
one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds, however.
The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines. In
Alfon, the Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the name that she had been
known since childhood in order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She
merely sought to use the surname of her mother which she had been using since childhood. Ruling in
her favor, the Court held that she was lawfully entitled to use her mother’s surname, adding that the
avoidance of confusion was justification enough to allow her to do so. In the present case, however,
respondent denies his legitimacy.
The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in
relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would
not suffice to grant respondent’s supplication. As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent
was filed not in Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-
mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of
Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto.
Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or correction
of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. Aside from improper venue, he failed to implead
the civil registrar of Makati and all affected parties as respondents in the case."A petition for a
substantial correction or change of entries in the civil registry should have as respondents the civil
registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be affected
thereby."
Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of notices to different "potential oppositors." The first
notice is that given to the "persons named in the petition" and the second (which is through
publication) is that given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be
considered interested or affected parties, such as creditors. That two sets of notices are mandated
under the above-quoted Section 4 is validated by the subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted, which
provides for two periods (for the two types of "potential oppositors") within which to file an
opposition (15 days from notice or from the last date of publication). The purpose precisely of Section
4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the
decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108 but
were inadvertently left out.

LEE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 118387 October 11, 2001
Facts:
On 15 November 1985, a complainant for sum of money was filed by the International
Corporate Bank, Inc. against Sacoba Manufacturing Corp., Pablo Gonzales Jr., and Tomas Gonzales
who, in turn, filed a third party complaint against Alfa Integrated Textile Mills (ALFA), Ramon C. Lee
(ALFA's president) and Antonio DM. Lacdao (ALFA's vice president) on 17 March 1986. On 17
September 1987, Lee and Lacdao filed a motion to dismiss the third party complaint which the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58 denied in an Order dated 27 June 1988. On 18 July 1988,
Lee and Lacdao filed their answer to the third party complaint. Meanwhile, on 12 July 1988, the trial
issued an order requiring the issuance of an alias summons upon ALFA through the DBP as a
consequence of Lee and Lacdao's letter informing the court that the summons for ALFA was
erroneously served upon them considering that the management of ALFA had been transferred to
the DBP. In a manifestation dated 22 July 1988, the DBP claimed that it was not authorized to receive
summons on behalf of ALFA since the DBP had not taken over the company which has a separate
and distinct corporate personality and existence. On 4 August 1988, the trial court issued an order
advising Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. to take the appropriate steps to serve the summons to ALFA.
On 16 August 1988, Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. filed a Manifestation and Motion for the Declaration
of Proper Service of Summons which the trial court granted on 17 August 1988.
On 12 September 1988, Lee and Lacdao filed a motion for reconsideration submitting that
the Rule 14, section 13 of the Revised Rules of Court is not applicable since they were no longer
officers of ALFA and Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. should have availed of another mode of service
under Rule 14, Section 16 of the said Rules, i.e., through publication to effect proper service upon
ALFA. On 2 January 1989, the trial court upheld the validity of the service of summons on ALFA
through Lee and Lacdao, thus, denying the latter's motion for reconsideration and requiring ALFA to
file its answer through Lee and Lacdao as its corporate officers. On 19 January 1989, a second motion
for reconsideration was filed by Lee and Lacdao reiterating their stand that by virtue of the voting
trust agreement they ceased to be officers and directors of ALFA, hence, they could no longer receive
summons or any court processes for or on behalf of ALFA. In support of their second motion for
reconsideration, Lee and Lacdao attached thereto a copy of the voting trust agreement between all the
stockholders of ALFA (Lee and Lacdao included), on the one hand, and the DBP, on the other hand,
whereby the management and control of ALFA became vested upon the DBP. On 25 April 1989, the
trial court reversed itself by setting aside its previous Order dated 2 January 1989 and declared that
service upon Lee and Lacdao who were no longer corporate officers of ALFA cannot be considered
as proper service of summons on ALFA. On 15 May 1989, Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. moved for
a reconsideration of the Order which was affirmed by the court in is Order dated 14 August 1989
denying Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al.'s motion for reconsideration.
On 18 September 1989, a petition for certiorari was belatedly submitted by Sacoba

Manufacturing, et. al. before the Court of Appeals which, nonetheless, resolved to give due course
thereto on 21 September 1989. On 17 October 1989, the trial court, not having been notified of the
pending petition for certiorari with the appellate court issued an Order declaring as final the Order
dated 25 April 1989. Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al. in the said Order were required to take positive
steps in prosecuting the third party complaint in order that the court would not be constrained to

dismiss the same for failure to prosecute. Subsequently, on 25 October 1989 Sacoba Manufacturing,
et. al. filed a motion for reconsideration on which the trial court took no further action. On 19 March
1990, after Lee and Lacdao filed their answer to Sacoba Manufacturing, et. al.'s petition for certiorari,
the appellate court rendered its decision, setting aside the orders of trial court judge dated 25 April
1989 and 14 August 1989. On 11 April 1990, Lee and Lacdao moved for a reconsideration of the
decision of the appellate court which resolved to deny the same on 10 May 1990. Lee and Lacdao filed
the petition for certiorari. In the meantime, the appellate court inadvertently made an entry of
judgment on 16 July 1990 erroneously applying the rule that the period during which a motion for
reconsideration has been pending must be deducted from the 15-day period to appeal. However, in
its Resolution dated 3 January 1991, the appellate court set aside the aforestated entry of judgment
after further considering that the rule it relied on applies to appeals from decisions of the Regional
Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals, not to appeals from its decision to the Supreme Court pursuant
to the Supreme Court's.
Issue:
a) Whether the execution of the voting trust agreement by Lee and Lacdao whereby all their
shares to the corporation have been transferred to the trustee deprives the stockholder of their
positions as directors of the corporation.
b) Whether the five-year period of the voting trust agreement in question had lapsed in 1986 so
that the legal title to the stocks covered by the said voting trust agreement ipso facto reverted
to Lee and Lacdao as beneficial owners pursuant to the 6th paragraph of section 59 of the
new Corporation Code.
c) Whether there was proper service of summons on ALFA through Lee and Lacdao, to bind
ALFA.
Ruling:
Lee and Lacdao, by virtue of the voting trust agreement executed in 1981 disposed of all their
shares through assignment and delivery in favor of the DBP, as trustee. Consequently, Lee and Lacdao
ceased to own at least one share standing in their names on the books of ALFA as required under
Section 23 of the new Corporation Code. They also ceased to have anything to do with the
management of the enterprise. Lee and Lacdao ceased to be directors. Hence, the transfer of their
shares to the DBP created vacancies in their respective positions as directors of ALFA. The transfer
of shares from the stockholders of ALFA to the DBP is the essence of the subject voting trust
agreement. Considering that the voting trust agreement between ALFA and the DBP transferred legal
ownership of the stocks covered by the agreement to the DBP as trustee, the latter because the
stockholder of record with respect to the said shares of stocks. In the absence of a showing that the
DBP had caused to be transferred in their names one share of stock for the purpose of qualifying as
directors of ALFA, Lee and Lacdao can no longer be deemed to have retained their status as officers
of ALFA which was the case before the execution of the subject voting trust agreement. There is no
dispute from the records that DBP has taken over full control and management of the firm.
The 6th paragraph of section 59 of the new Corporation Code reads that "Unless expressly
renewed, all rights granted in a voting trust agreement shall automatically expire at the end of the
agreed period, and the voting trust certificates as well as the certificates of stock in the name of the
trustee or trustees shall thereby be deemed cancelled and new certificates of stock shall be reissued in
the name of the transferors." However, it is manifestly clear from the terms of the voting trust

agreement between ALFA and the DBP that the duration of the agreement is contingent upon the
fulfillment of certain obligations of ALFA with the DBP. Had the five-year period of the voting trust
agreement expired in 1986, the DBP would not have transferred an its rights, titles and interests in
ALFA "effective June 30, 1986" to the national government through the Asset Privatization Trust
(APT) as attested to in a Certification dated 24 January 1989 of the Vice President of the DBP's Special
Accounts Department II. In the same certification, it is stated that the DBP, from 1987 until 1989,
had handled s account which included ALFA's assets pursuant to a management agreement by and
between the DBP and APT. Hence, there is evidence on record that at the time of the service of
summons on ALFA through Lee and Lacdao on 21 August 1987, the voting trust agreement in
question was not yet terminated so that the legal title to the stocks of ALFA, then, still belonged to
the DBP.
It is a basic principle in Corporation Law that a corporation has a personality separate and
distinct from the officers or members who compose it. Thus, the role on service of processes on a
corporation enumerates the representatives of a corporation who can validly receive court processes
on its behalf. Not every stockholder or officer can bind the corporation considering the existence of
a corporate entity separate from those who compose it. The rationale of the rule is that service must
be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation sued as to make it a priori supposable
that he will realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers served on
him. Herein, Lee and Lacdao do not fall under any of the enumerated officers. The service of
summons upon ALFA, through Lee and Lacdao, therefore, is not valid. To rule otherwise will
contravene the general principle that a corporation can only be bound by such acts which are within
the scope of the officer's or agent's authority.

IN RE CHARGE OF NAME OF JULIAN WANG
G.R. No. 159966 March 30, 2005
Facts:
Petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang,
filed a petition dated 19 September 2002 for change of name and/ or correction/ cancellation of entry
in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and
have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. Petitioner
theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle name as this would help him to
adjust easily to and integrate himself into Singaporean society.
Issue:
Whether or not the law allows one to drop the middle name from his registered name on the
cause mentioned.
Ruling:
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be ‘proper and reasonable
cause’ for which the change is sought. To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show
not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of
his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are:
a.) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable r extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
b.) When the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
c.) When the change will avoid confusion;
d.) When the one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name,
and was unaware of alien parentage;
e.) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith
and without prejudicing anybody; and
f.) When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of
name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
Facts:
Rommel Silverio filed a petition for the change of his gender and first name in his birth
certificate to facilitate his marriage with his fiancé. A year before, Silverio has underwent sex re-
assignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. In his petition, he wants to change his first name from
“Rommel” to “Mely.”
Issue:
Should the court allow the change of name?
Ruling:
No. The SC said that considering that there is no law recognizing sex re-assignment, the
determination of a person’s sex at the time of birth, if not attended by error, is immutable. It held that
“while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of
modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason.
There is no special law in the country governing sex reassignment and its effect. This is fatal to
petitioner’s cause.”
The Court said that the change in gender sought by petitioner “will have serious and wide-ranging
legal and public policy consequences,” i.e., substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on
marriage and family relations and substantially affect the public policy in relation to women in laws
such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the
Revised Penal Code, etc.
REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN

G.R. No. 166676 September 12, 2008
Facts:
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a petition for Correction of
Entries in Birth Certificate before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, of Siniloan, Laguna; such that,
her name be changed to “Jeff” and her gender to “male”.
She was born in January 13, 1981, and was registered as female, having the name “Jennifer
Cagandahan”. While growing up, she was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperpplasia (CAH),
a condition where the person thus afflicted possesses both male and female characteristics. She was
also diagnosed to have clitoral hypertrophy, small ovaries, no breast, and menstrual development. She
alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male
person.
Issue:
Whether or not the correction of entries in her birth certificate be granted.
Ruling:
Yes. The court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of
intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. The Court views that where a
person is biologically or naturally intersex, the determining factor in his gender classification would be
what the individual, having reached the age of maturity, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. The
respondent here thinks of himself as a male considering that his body produces high levels of male
hormones. There is preponderant biological support for considering him as a male.

MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA vs. THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
G.R. No. 181174 December 4, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner, Ma. Cristina’s husband, Pablo died on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in
Indonesia. During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines, respondent
Lucille Titular began introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her
and Pablo's son. Petitioner thereupon made inquiries with the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan
City, Negros Occidental. Onthe annotation of Patrick’s birth certificate reflects Patrick as having been
acknowledged by Pablo (or Pablito)as son on January 13, 1997, that he was legitimated by virtue of
subsequent marriage of his parents on April 22,1998 at Manila, and that he shall be known as Patrick
Titular Braza.Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and
Lucille were married on April 22, 1998, drawing her and her co-petitioners (her three legitimate
children with Pablo) to file on December 23, 2005 before the Regional Trial Court of Himalayan City,
Negros Occidental a petition to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil
Register.
Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between
Lucille andPablo, said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage
between Ma. Cristinaand Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1) thecorrection of the entriesin Patrick's birth
record with respect to hislegitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the use of
the last name "Braza"; 2) adirective to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of
the minor Patrick, tosubmit Patrick to DNA testingto determine his paternity and filiations; and 3)
the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this
purpose, thedeclaration of the marriage of Lucille andPablo as bigamous. TC dismissed the petition,
holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is notacting as a family
court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and
Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the
controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.MR was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the courtmay pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy
even in anaction to correct entries in the civil registrar.
Ruling:
No. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction
of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on
legitimacyand filiations.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Courtvis a visArticle 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by
which anentry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein
may generallybe used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the
civil registry. Aclerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an
error made by a clerk ora transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a
correction of name that isclearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent.
Substantial or contentiousalterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all

interested parties are impleaded anddue process is properly observed. The petitioners’ cause of action
is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage as void forbeing bigamous and
impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 butby A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively,hence,
the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code.It is well to emphasize
that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can bequestioned only in a
direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attacksuch as the petition
filed before the courta quo.

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Persons and

S.y 2013 -2014

Persons and Family Relation 1

Persons and Family Relation 2

Persons and Family Relation 3

Persons and Family Relation 4

Persons and Family Relation 5

Persons and Family Relation 6

Persons and Family Relation 7

Persons and Family Relation 8

Persons and Family Relation 9

Persons and Family Relation 10

Persons and Family Relation 11

Persons and Family Relation 12

Persons and Family Relation 13

Persons and Family Relation 14

Persons and Family Relation 15

Persons and Family Relation 16

Persons and Family Relation 17

Persons and Family Relation 18

Persons and Family Relation 19

LARA vs. DEL ROSARIO

Persons and Family Relation 20

LORENZO M. TAÑADA vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA

Persons and Family Relation 21

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION vs.HON. PRESIDING

Persons and Family Relation 22

NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION vs. VICTORIANO B.

Persons and Family Relation 23

JOAQUINA BASA, ET AL., vs. ATILANO G. MERCADO

Persons and Family Relation 24

ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN TAGALOG ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. vs.

Persons and Family Relation 25

Persons and Family Relation 26

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP,

Persons and Family Relation 27

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PAZ M. DEL ROSARIO

Persons and Family Relation 28

D.M. CONSUNJI, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO

Persons and Family Relation 29

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FLORENCIO GASACAO

Persons and Family Relation 30

YAO KEE vs. AIDA SY-GONZALES

Persons and Family Relation 31

LAUREANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Persons and Family Relation 32

PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION vs.

Persons and Family Relation 33

Persons and Family Relation 34

JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Persons and Family Relation 35

BERNABE vs. ALEJO

PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS

Persons and Family Relation 36

PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS

Persons and Family Relation 37

PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS

Persons and Family Relation 38

Persons and Family Relation 39

Persons and Family Relation 40

Persons and Family Relation 41

PEOPLE vs. MORIAL