LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

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METHODS OF ACQUIRING LAND OWNERSHIP

1) Jocson v. Soriano, G.R. L-20189, Oct. 31, 1923

FRIAR ESTATE LANDS; RIGHTS OF THE WIDOW OF THE PURCHASER AFTER THE
DEATH OF THE LATTER.—Under the provisions of section 16 of Act No. 1120, the widow of
a purchaser of a parcel of land belonging to the Friar Estate, purchased by the Government,
after the death of her husband (the purchaser), is entitled to have a patent issued to her for
the lands purchased, upon a proper showing that she has completed the payment of the
purchase price. The right granted to the original settlers of the Friar Estate lands to
purchase the parcel or parcels occupied by them at the time of the purchase by the
Government, is a right conceded by the Government, analogous to the homestead laws. A
homestead privilege does not terminate on the husband's death, but is transferred to his
widow and his family. A homestead selected by the husband in his lifetime vests absolutely in
his surviving wife, and her rights are governed by the law in force at the time of the death of
her husband. Neither does she lose said right 'by a second marriage upon the death of her
husband, the purchaser. She may continue to occupy the whole of the homestead.

2) Spouses Virgilio de Guzman, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 185757, March 2,
2016

Homestead Patents; Registration and issuance of certificate and owner’s duplicate certificate
of title; When land comes under operation of Act 496.—After the registration and issuance of
the certificate and owner’s duplicate certificate of title of a public land patent, the land
covered thereby automatically comes under the operation of Act 496 and subject to all the
safeguards provided therein (See El Hogar Filipino vs. Olviga, 60 Phil. 850; Manalo vs.
Lukban and Liwanag, 48 Phil. 973).

Same; When land ceases to be part of the public domain.—Well settled is the rule that once
the patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to
be part of the public domain and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands
has neither control nor jurisdiction (Sumail vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Cotabato, L-8287, April 30, 1955; Republic vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carle, L-12485, July 31, 1959).

Registration of land titles, raising of questions concerning validity of certificate of title; one-
year period prescribed by law begins from issuance of patent.—Section 38 of Act 496 prohibits
the raising of any question concerning the validity of a certificate of title after one year from
entry of the decree of registration. And the period of one year, in the case of a public land
grants, begins from the issuance of the patent (Sumail vs. Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Cotabato, supra; Nelayan vs. Nelayan, L-14518, August 29, 1960).

Public Lands; Reversion of fraudulently awarded lands of the public domain; Action to be
filed by Solicitor General.—Section 101 of Commonwealth Act 141 affords a remedy whereby
lands of the public domain fraudulently awarded may be recovered or reverted to its original
owner, the Government. But the provision requires that all such actions for reversion shall be
instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines.

3) Anastacio Tingalan v. Spouses Ronaldo Melliza, G.R. No. 195247, June 29, 2015

Civil Law; Land Registration; Public Land Act; The law is clear under Section 118 of the
Public Land Act, as amended, that unless made in favor of the government or any of its
branches, units or institutions, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall
not be subject to any form of encumbrance for a term of five (5) years from and after the date of
issuance of the patent or grant.—The law is clear under Section 118 of the Public Land Act, as
amended, that unless made in favor of the government or any of its branches, units or
institutions, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to
any form of encumbrance for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the
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patent or grant, viz.: SEC. 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches,
units, or institutions, or legally constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under free
patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the
date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of
issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt
contracted prior to the expiration of said period; but the improvements or crops on the land
may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations. No
alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years and before twenty-five
years after issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, which approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal
grounds.

Same; Same; Same; Homestead; A contract which purports to alienate, transfer, convey or
encumber any homestead within the prohibitory period is void from its execution.—Following
Section 118, the subject land could not have been validly alienated or encumbered on March
28, 1977 which was way within five years from the date of the issuance of the free patent
under the name of petitioner Anastacio on October 4, 1976. The legal consequences of such
sale — clearly made within the prohibitory period — are stated under Section 124 of
the Public Land Act, as amended, viz.: SEC. 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation,
transfer, or other contract made or executed in violation of any of the provisions of Sections
one hundred and eighteen, one hundred and twenty, one hundred and twenty-one, one
hundred and twenty-two, and one hundred and twenty-three of this Act shall beunlawful
and null and void from its execution and shall produce the effect of annulling and
cancelling the grant, title, patent, or permit originally issued, recognized or confirmed,
actually or presumptively, and cause the reversion of the property and its improvements to
the State. The foregoing provision of law unambiguously classifies the subject contract of sale
executed on March 28, 1977 as unlawful and null and void ab initio for being in violation
of Section 118, i.e., entered into within the five-year prohibitory period. This provision of law
is clear and explicit and a contract which purports to alienate, transfer, convey or encumber
any homestead within the prohibitory period is void from its execution. The Court has held in
a number of cases that such provision of law is mandatory with the purpose of promoting a
specific public policy to preserve and keep in the family of the patentee that portion of the
public land which the State has gratuitously given to them.

Same; Contracts; Void Contracts; A void contract produces no legal effect whatsoever in
accordance with the principle “quod nullum est nullum producit effectum.”—A void contract
produces no legal effect whatsoever in accordance with the principle “quod nullum est nullum
producit effectum.” It could not transfer title to the subject property and there could be no
basis for the issuance of a title from petitioner Anastacio’s name to the names of respondent-
spouses. It is not susceptible of ratification and the action for the declaration of its absolute
nullity is imprescriptible. It was therefore error for both courts a quo to rule that
“[p]etitioner’s failure to act on such considerable time has already barred him by estoppel and
laches.”

Same; Same; Contract of Sale; Following the declaration that the contract of sale over the
subject property is void for being in violation of Section 118 of the Public Land Act, as
amended, jurisprudence dictates that the subject land be returned to the heirs of petitioner
Anastacio.—The subject contract of sale, being null and void from inception, did not pass any
rights over the property from petitioner Anastacio to respondent-spouses. Since petitioner
Anastacio never lost ownership over the land in question, there was no need for him or his
heirs to repurchase the same from respondent-spouses. With nothing to repurchase, laches
could operate to bar petitioner and his heirs from asserting their rights to the property.
Following the declaration that the contract of sale over the subject property is void for being
in violation of Section 118 of the Public Land Act, as amended, jurisprudence dictates that
the subject land be returned to the heirs of petitioner Anastacio.

4) Director of Lands v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 68946, May 22, 1992

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Civil Law; Property; In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the
burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141,
as amended by Republic Act No. 1942.—This section is the law on judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles. By its very nature, the burden of proof is on the applicant to
show that he has an imperfect or incomplete title. Such is the duty of one who holds the
affirmative side of an issue. In Heirs of Jose Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, this
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., held: "In confirmation of
imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the
requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No.
1942.

Same; Same; Possession; Under the law, the only kind of interruption which does not affect
the continuity of possession is that caused by war or force majeure.—Under the law, the only
kind of interruption which does not affect the continuity of possession is that caused by war
or force majeure.

Same; Same; Same; While it is true that tax receipts and declarations are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder has a
claim of title over the property.—From the foregoing, serious doubts are cast on the claim of
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the predecessors-
in-interest of private respondent. As earlier stated, none of them even thought of declaring
their respective areas for taxation purposes. While it is true that tax receipts and
declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof
that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of
property for taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to obtain
title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other
interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government.
Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.

5) Numeriano Padilla v. Pablo Reyes, G.R. No. L-37435, November 28, 1934

TORRENS REGISTRATION ; REGISTRABLE TITLE.—In order that land may be

registered under the Torrens system, the applicant must show, even though there is no
opposition to his application, that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple, of such land, In
other words, the burden is upon him to show that he is the real and absolute owner, in fee
simple, of such land. (Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa vs. Municipality of Taal, 38 Phil., 367,
375, 376.)

ID. ; ID.—It is well-settled that no public land can be acquired by private persons without
any grant, express or implied, from the government. A grant is conclusively presumed by
law when the claimant, by himself or through his predecessors in interest, has occupied the
land openly, continuously, exclusively, and under a claim of title since July 26, 1894, or
prior thereto. (Ongsiaco vs.Magsilang, 50 Phil., 380.)

6) Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 179987,

September 3, 2013

Civil Law; Property; Public Dominion; Private Ownership; Land, which is an immovable
property, may be classified as either of public dominion or of private ownership.—Land,
which is an immovable property, may be classified as either of public dominion or of private
ownership. Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use;
or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth. Land belonging to the State that is
not of such character, or although of such character but no longer intended for public use or
for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State. Land that is other
than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of
private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
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Same; Same; Same; Regalian Doctrine; Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a
legal concept first introduced into the country from the West by Spain through the Laws of
the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, all lands of the public domain belong to the State.—
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the
country from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, all
lands of the public domain belong to the State. This means that the State is the source of
any asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such
patrimony. All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public
domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.

Same; Same; Same; Agricultural Lands; The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification
under the 1935 Constitution into agricul-tural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added
national parks; Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural
lands of the public domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.—
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the
classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution,
lands of the public domain were classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and
mineral. Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the public
domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential,
resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law
might provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification under
the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added national
parks. Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses to which
they may be devoted. The identification of lands according to their legal classification is
done exclusively by and through a positive act of the Executive Department. Based on the
foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be alienated.
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public
domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.

Same; Same; Alienable and Disposable Lands; Agricultural Lands; Alienable and
disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the
State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code,
without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by
the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural.—
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial
lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of
the Civil Code, without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as
provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be
agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks
are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural.
A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification, and the
exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive
Department, not in the courts. If, however, public land will be classified as neither
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, thereby
effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such
conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential
proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect. Thus,
until the Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or
until Congress or the President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be
used for public service or for the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is
applicable.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the
manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural
lands, can be disposed of.—Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the
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manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural
lands, can be disposed of, to wit: Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural
purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise: (1) For homestead
settlement; (2) By sale; (3) By lease; and (4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles; (a) By judicial legalization; or (b) By administrative legalization (free patent).

Same; Same; Same; Same; Absent proof that the land is already classified as agricultural
land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption
that the land is alienable and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act.—Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the
authority to classify lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in
relation to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the land
subject of the application for registration must have been already classified as agricultural
land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the
land is already classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine
applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable as laid
down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the
requirement that the classifica-tion required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
classification or reclassification of a public land as agricultural.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or
through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the
prescribed statutory period is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion
of the period.—An examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that
Congress prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the registration should have
been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicant’s
imperfect or incomplete title is derived only from possession and occupation since June 12,
1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the property subject of the application as
alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility for
land registration, not the ownership or title over it. Alienable public land held by a
possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously
and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted to private property by
the mere lapse or completion of the period. In fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations
may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were already converted
to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period of
possession prescribed by the Public Land Act. It is for this reason that the property subject
of the application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of
possession.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Rules Relative to the Disposition of Public Land or Lands of the
Public Domain.—We now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public
land or lands of the public domain, namely: (1) As a general rule and pursuant to the
Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and are inalienable.
Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the
State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed; (2) The following are excepted from
the general rule, to wit: (a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable
and disposable through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the
Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be
classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided the
applicant’s possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all the conditions
essential to a government grant arises, and the applicant becomes the owner of the land by
virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be
part of the public domain and has become private property. (b) Lands of the public domain
subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth are removed from the sphere of public dominion and are
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considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be
alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof
that the land has been already converted to private ownership prior to the requisite
acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article
1113, Civil Code) that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription.

7) Luzviminda Canlas v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 200894, November 10,
2014

Civil Law; Land Registration; In land registration cases, the applicants’ legal basis is
important in determining the required number of years or the reference point for possession or
prescription.—In land registration cases, the applicants’ legal basis is impor-tant in
determining the required number of years or the reference point for possession or
prescription. This court has delineated the differences in the modes of acquiring imperfect
titles under Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
Republic, 587 SCRA 172 (2009), extensively discussed the distinction between Section 14(1)
and Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529.

Same; Same; Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529); An applicant for land registration
or judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title under Section 14(1) of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1529 must prove the following requisites: “(1) that the subject land forms part
of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that [the applicant has]
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.”—An applicant for land
registration or judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 must prove the following requisites: “(1) that the subject land
forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that [the
applicant has] been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.”
Concomitantly, the burden to prove these requisites rests on the applicant.

Same; Tax Declarations; Ownership; It is settled that tax declarations are not conclusive
evidence of ownership.—It is settled that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of
ownership. Other evidence may be appreciated to determine actual possession and
occupation. Documentary evidence, such as tax declarations, when coupled with positive and
clear testimonies of the applicant and his or her witnesses, may be weighed in favor of the
applicant.

Same; Land Registration; To solely rely on tax declarations and payment of realty taxes would
mean that petitioner’s possession of the land should be reckoned from 1949 or the year the
earliest tax declaration was made.—To solely rely on tax declarations and payment of realty
taxes would mean that petitioner’s possession of the land should be reckoned from 1949 or
the year the earliest tax declaration was made. Such interpretation is untenable and goes
beyond the text of Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529. Moreover, as shown in the
records, petitioner, through her predecessors-in-interest, has been in possession of the land
since the early 1900s.

Remand of Cases; Generally, the remand of a case will not be permitted if “in the interest of
justice, the Supreme Court (SC) itself can resolve the dispute based on the records before it.”—
Generally, the remand of a case will not be permitted if “in the interest of justice, the
Supreme Court itself can resolve the dispute based on the records before it.” Thus, remand
may not be allowed in the following instances: “(a) where the ends of justice would not be
subserved by a remand; or (b) where public interest demands an early disposition of the case;
or (c) where the trial court had already received all the evidence presented by both parties,
and the Supreme Court is in a position, based upon said evidence, to decide the case on its
merits.” None of these are present in this case.
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8) Palomo v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 392

Natural Resources; Land Registration; Land Titles; Regalian Doctrine; Before the Treaty of
Paris on April 11, 1899, our lands, whether agricultural, mineral or forest were under the
exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown, hence, private ownership of land
could only be acquired through royal concessions.—The Philippines passed to the Spanish
Crown by discovery and conquest in the 16th century. Before the Treaty of Paris in April 11,
1899, our lands, whether agricultural, mineral or forest were under the exclusive patrimony
and dominion of the Spanish Crown. Hence, private ownership of land could only be acquired
through royal concessions which were documented in various forms, such as (1) Titulo Real or
Royal Grant,” (2) Concesion Especial or Special Grant, (3) Titulo de Compra or Title by
Purchase; and, (4) Informacion Posesoria or Possessory Information title obtained under the
Spanish Mortgage Law or under the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889.

Same; Same; Same; Laches; It is a trifle late at this point to argue that the government had no
right to include certain properties in a reservation for provincial park purposes when the
question should have been raised 83 years ago.—Moreover, despite claims by the petitioners
that their predecessors in interest were in open, adverse and continuous possession of the
lands for 20 to 50 years prior to their registration in 1916-1917, the lands were surveyed only
in December 1913, the very same year they were acquired by Diego Palomo. Curiously, in
February 1913 or 10 months before the lands were surveyed for Diego Palomo, the
government had already surveyed the area in preparation for its reservation for provincial
park purposes. If the petitioners’ predecessors in interest were indeed in possession of the
lands for a number of years prior to their registration in 1916-1917, they would have
undoubtedly known about the inclusion of these properties in the reservation in 1913. It
certainly is a trifle late at this point to argue that the government had no right to include
these properties in the reservation when the question should have been raised 83 years ago.

Same; Same; Same; Estoppel; The principle of estoppel does not operate against the
Government for the acts of its agents.—As regards the petitioners’ contention that inasmuch
as they obtained the titles without government opposition, the government is now estopped
from questioning the validity of the certificates of title which were granted. As correctly
pointed out by the respondent Court of Appeals, the principle of estoppel does not operate
against the Government for the act of its agents.

Same; Same; Same; The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in
confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain.—
Assuming that the decrees of the Court of First Instance were readily issued, the lands are
still not capable of appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of
title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public
domain.

Same; Same; Same; It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land
cannot be owned by private persons.—It is elementary in the law governing natural resources
that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registrable and possession
thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are
reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.

Same; Same; Same; Tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership in land
registration cases.—Neither do the tax receipts which were presented in evidence prove
ownership of the parcels of land inasmuch as the weight of authority is that tax declarations
are not conclusive proof of ownership in land registration cases.

Same; Same; Same; Petitioners are presumed to know the law and the failure of the
government to oppose the registration of the lands in question is no justification for petitioners
to plead good faith in introducing improvements on the lot.—Having disposed of the issue of
ownership, we now come to the matter regarding the forfeiture of improvements introduced
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on the subject lands. It bears emphasis that Executive Order No. 40 was already in force at
the time the lands in question were surveyed for Diego Palomo. Petitioners also apparently
knew that the subject lands were covered under the reservation when they filed a petition for
reconstitution of the lost original certificates of title inasmuch as the blueprint of Survey
Work Order Number 21781 of Plan II-9299 approved by the Chief of the Land Registration
Office Enrique Altavas in 1953 as a true and correct copy of the Original Plan No. II-9299
filed in the Bureau of Lands dated September 11, 1948 contains the following note, “in
conflict with provincial reservation.” In any case, petitioners are presumed to know the law
and the failure of the government to oppose the registration of the lands in question is no
justification for the petitioners to plead good faith in introducing improvements on the lots.

9) Atun v. Eusebio, 97 Phil. 762

LAND REGISTRATION LAW; TITLE TO REGISTERED LANDS CANNOT BE ACQUIRED

BY PRESCRIPTION OR ADVERSE POSSESSION; RlGHT TO RECOVER POSSESSION IS
EQUALLY IMPRESCRIPTIBLE; HEREDITARY SUCCESSORS OF REGISTERED OWNER
ENJOY THE SAME RIGHT.—Section 46 of Act 496 expressly provides that no title to
registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription
or adverse possession. This Court has repeatedly held that the right of the registered owner
to recover possession of the registered property is equally imprescriptible, since possession is
a mere consequence of ownership. (Manlapas vs. Llorente, 48 Phil., 298, 308;
Eugenio vs. Perdido, supra, p. 41; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., vs. Bolaños, 95 Phil., 106.) And if
prescription is unavailing against the registered owner, it must be equally unavailing against
the latter's hereditary successors, because they merely step into the shoes of the decedent by
operation of law (new Civil Code, Art. 777; Art. 657, old), the title or right undergoing no
change by its transmission mortis causa.

ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGAL HEIRS NEED NOT PROVE OWNERSHIP OF LAND.—The rule is
settled that the legal heirs of a deceased may file an action arising out of a right belonging to
their ancestor, without a separate judicial declaration of their status as such, provided there
is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate (Mendoza Vda. de
Bonnevie vs. Cecilia Vda. de Pardo, 59 Phil., 486; Gov't. of P. I. vs. Serafica, 61 Phil., 93; Uy
Coque vs. Sioca, 45 Phil., 430).

10) Heirs of Segunda Maningding v. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 601

Ownership; Prescription; Words and Phrases; Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring

(or losing) ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under
conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner,
public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse.—We agree with the Court of Appeals. Roque
Bauzon acquired ownership over the subject properties by acquisitive prescription.
Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring (or losing) ownership and other real rights
through the lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that
the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and
adverse. Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive
prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten (10) years. In
extraordinary prescription ownership and other real rights over immovable property are
acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty (30) years, without need
of title or of good faith.

Same; Same; Land Titles; Tax Declarations; While tax declarations and receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, yet, when coupled with proof of actual possession, they are
strong evidence of ownership.—The disputed lots are unregistered lands, both parcels being
covered only by tax declarations formerly in the name of Ramon Bauzon and now transferred
to Luis and Eriberta Bauzon. While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence
of ownership, yet, when coupled with proof of actual possession, as in the instant case, tax
declarations and receipts are strong evidence of ownership.
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
KMOC – 2BL5

Same; Same; Same; Donations; Donations Propter Nuptias;Even assuming that the donation
propter nuptias is void for failure to comply with formal requisites, it could still constitute a
legal basis for adverse possession.—Even assuming that the donation propter nuptias is void
for failure to comply with formal requisites, it could still constitute a legal basis for adverse
possession. With clear and convincing evidence of possession, a private document of donation
may serve as basis for a claim of ownership. In Pensader v. Pensader we ruled that while the
verbal donation under which the defendant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the lands in question is not effective as a transfer of title, still it is a
circumstance which may explain the adverse and exclusive character of the possession.

Same; Same; Co-Ownership; Prescription, as a rule, does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-
owner as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.—Prescription, as a
rule, does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership. Co-owners cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other
co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that title may prescribe in
favor of one of the co-owners, it must be clearly shown that he has repudiated the claims of
the others, and that they were apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership,
before the prescriptive period would begin to run. Mere refusal to accede to a partition,
without specifying the grounds for such refusal, cannot be considered as notice to the other
co-owners of the occupant’s claim of title in himself in repudiation of the co-ownership. The
evidence relative to the possession, as a fact upon which the alleged prescription is based,
must be clear, complete and conclusive in order to establish said prescription without any
shadow of doubt; and when upon trial it is not shown that the possession of the claimant has
been adverse and exclusive and opposed to the rights of the others, the case is not one of
ownership, and partition will lie.

Same; Same; Same; Same; While prescription among co-owners cannot take place when the
acts of ownership exercised are vague and uncertain, such prescription arises and produces all
its effects when the acts of ownership do not evince any doubt as to the ouster of the rights of
the other co-owners.—Therefore while prescription among co-owners cannot take place when
the acts of ownership exercised are vague and uncertain, such prescription arises and
produces all its effects when the acts of ownership do not evince any doubt as to the ouster of
the rights of the other co-owners. As disclosed by the records, Roque Bauzon and his heirs
possessed the property from 1948 to 1986 to the exclusion of petitioners who were never
given their shares of the fruits of the properties, for which reason they demanded an
accounting of the produce and the conveyance to them of their shares. Unfortunately they
slept on their rights and allowed almost thirty-six (36) years to lapse before attempting to
assert their right. Perforce, they must suffer the consequence of their inaction.

11) Hodges v. Garcia, August 22, 1960

ID.; ID.; RIPARIAN OWNER NOT PROTECTED BY REGISTRATION AGAINST

DIMINUTION OF HIS LAND.—The fact that the accretion to one's land used to pertain to
another's estate, which is covered by a Torrens certificate of title, cannot preclude the former
from being the owner thereof. Registration does not protect the riparian owner against the
diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining
stream. Accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the
current become the property of the owners of the banks. Such accretions are natural
incidents to land bordering on running streams and the provisions of the Civil Code in that
respect are not affected by the Registration Act.

12) Payatas Estate v. Tuason, March 23, 1929

RlPARIAN RlGHTS; ACCRETIONS; OWNERSHIP THEREOF; LAND REGISTRATION

LAWS.—Accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the
current become the property of the owners of the banks. Such accretions are natural
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
KMOC – 2BL5

incidents to land bordering on running streams, and the provisions of the Civil Code in that'
respect are not affected by the Land Registration Act.

LAND REGISTRATION ACT; RANGE OF SECTION 112 OF THE ACT.—The questions

raised in the present case were not improperly brought before the court under section 112 of
the Land Registration Act although they might also have been ventilated in a separate
action.

13) Chavez v. PEA (384 SCRA 152, 403 SCRA 1)

National Economy and Patrimony; Regalian Doctrine; Foreshore and Submerged

Areas; Reclamation Projects; Words and Phrases; The ownership of lands reclaimed from
foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine which holds that the State
owns all lands and waters of the public domain.—The ownership of lands reclaimed from
foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine which holds that the State
owns all lands and waters of the public domain. Upon the Spanish conquest of the
Philippines, ownership of all “lands, territories and possessions” in the Philippines passed to
the Spanish Crown. The King, as the sovereign ruler and representative of the people,
acquired and owned all lands and territories in the Philippines except those he disposed of by
grant or sale to private individuals.

Same; Same; Same; Same; After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed
and marshy disposable lands of the public domain continued to be only leased and not sold to
private parties. These lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain the government could not sell to private parties.—The State policy
prohibiting the sale to private parties of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
alienable lands of the public domain, first implemented in 1907 was thus reaffirmed in CA
No. 141 after the 1935 Consti-tution took effect. The prohibition on the sale of foreshore
lands, however, became a constitutional edict under the 1935 Constitution. Foreshore lands
became inalienable as natural resources of the State, unless reclaimed by the government
and classified as agricultural lands of the public domain, in which case they would fall under
the classification of government reclaimed lands. After the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution, government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain
continued to be only leased and not sold to private parties. These lands remained sui
generis, as the only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain the government could
not sell to private parties.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Until now, the only way the government can sell to private parties
government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain is for the legislature
to pass a law authorizing such sale.—Since then and until now, the only way the government
can sell to private parties government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public
domain is for the legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale. CA No. 141 does not
authorize the President to reclassify government reclaimed and marshy lands into other non-
agricultural lands under Section 59 (d). Lands classified under Section 59 (d) are the only
alienable or disposable lands for non-agricultural purposes that the government could sell to
private parties.

Same; Same; Same; Same; One reason for the congressional authority before lands under
Section 59 of CA No. 141 previously transferred to government units or entities could be sold to
private parties is that Section 60 of CA No. 141 exempted government units and entities from
the maximum area of public lands that could be acquired from the State.—One reason for the
congressional authority is that Section 60 of CA No. 141 exempted government units and
entities from the maximum area of public lands that could be acquired from the State. These
government units and entities should not just turn around and sell these lands to private
parties in violation of constitutional or statutory limitations. Otherwise, the transfer of lands
for non-agricultural purposes to government units and entities could be used to circumvent
constitutional limitations on ownership of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
KMOC – 2BL5

In the same manner, such transfers could also be used to evade the statutory prohibition in
CA No. 141 on the sale of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain to
private parties. Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes by operation of law a lien on these lands.

Same; Same; Same; Same; In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged
alienable lands of the public domain, there must be legislative authority empowering PEA to
sell these lands, though any legis-lative authority granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain would be subject to the constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain, such legislative authority
could only benefit private individuals.—In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and
submerged alienable lands of the public domain, there must be legislative authority
empowering PEA to sell these lands. This legislative authority is necessary in view of Section
60 of CA No. 141, which states—“Sec. 60. x x x; but the land so granted, donated or
transferred to a province, municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government shall not
be alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when
authorized by Congress; x x x.” (Emphasis supplied) Without such legislative authority, PEA
could not sell but only lease its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the
public domain. Nevertheless, any legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain would be subject to the constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain. Hence, such legislative
authority could only benefit private individuals.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The rationale behind the constitutional ban on corporations from
acquiring, except through lease, alienable lands of the public domain is not well understood;
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on
individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public
domain; The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer
ownership of only a limited area of alienable land of the public domain to a qualified
individual.—The rationale behind the constitutional ban on corporations from acquiring,
except through lease, alienable lands of the public domain is not well understood. * * * In
actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on
individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public
domain. Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area
of alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more
alienable public lands. An individual could own as many corporations as his means would
allow him. An individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his
nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to
circumvent the constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of
the public domain. The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to
transfer ownership of only a limited area of alienable land of the public domain to a qualified
individual. This constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision prohibiting corporations
from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the
constitutional intent is removed. The availablealienable public lands are gradually
decreasing in the face of an ever-growing population. The most effective way to insure
faithful adherence to this constitutional intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of the public
domain only to individuals. This, it would seem, is the practical benefit arising from the
constitutional ban.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The mere reclamation of certain areas by PEA does not convert
these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain—there must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession.—Under
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged areas of Manila
Bay are part of the “lands of the public domain, waters x x x and other natural resources” and
consequently “owned by the State.” As such, foreshore and submerged areas “shall not be
alienated,” unless they are classified as “agricultural lands” of the public domain. The mere
reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural resources of the
State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
KMOC – 2BL5

presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or

disposable and open to disposition or concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be
classified as alienable or disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi-
public use.

Same; Same; Same; Same; PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino’s actual issuance of a
special patent covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation
classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, open to
disposition or concession to qualified parties.—PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977,
authorized the issuance of special land patents for lands reclaimed by PEA from the
foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay. On January 19, 1988 then President Corazon C.
Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 in the name of PEA for the 157.84 hectares
comprising the partially reclaimed Freedom Islands. Subsequently, on April 9, 1999 the
Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paranaque issued TCT Nos. 7309, 7311 and 7312 in
the name of PEA pursuant to Section 103 of PD No. 1529 authorizing the issuance of
certificates of title corresponding to land patents. To this day, these certificates of title are
still in the name of PEA. PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino’s actual issuance of a
special patent covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation
classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. PD No.
1085 and President Aquino’s issuance of a land patent also constitute a declaration that the
Freedom Islands are no longer needed for public service. The Freedom Islands are thus
alienable ordisposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition or concession to
qualified parties.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Spanish Law of Waters of 1866; Under the Spanish Law of Waters,
a private person reclaiming from the sea without permission from the State could not acquire
ownership of the reclaimed land which would remain property of public dominion like the sea
it replaced.—Under Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, private parties could
reclaim from the sea only with “proper permission” from the State. Private parties could own
the reclaimed land only if not “otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority.”
This clearly meant that no one could reclaim from sea without permission from the State
because the sea is property of public dominion. It also meant that the State could grant or
withhold ownership of the reclaimed land because any reclaimed land, like the sea from
which it emerged, belonged to the State. Thus, a private person reclaiming from the sea
without permission from the State could not acquire ownership of the reclaimed land which
would remain property of public dominion like the sea it replaced. Article 5 of the Spanish
Law of Waters of 1866 adopted the time-honored principle of land ownership that “all lands
that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters must be read
together with laws subsequently enacted on the disposition of public lands.—Article 5 of the
Spanish Law of Waters must be read together with laws subsequently enacted on the
disposition of public lands. In particular, CA No. 141 requires that lands of the public domain
must first be classified as alienable or disposable before the government can alienate them.
These lands must not be reserved for public or quasi-public purposes. Moreover, the contract
between CDCP and the government was executed after the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution which barred private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain. This contract could not have converted the Freedom Islands into private
lands of a private corporation.

Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no legislative or Presidential act classifying the additional
592.15 hectares submerged areas under the Amended JVA as alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain open to disposition—these areas form part of the public domain, and in
their present state are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.—The Amended JVA
covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional 592.15 hectares which are still
submerged and forming part of Manila Bay. There is no legislative or Presidential act
classifying these submerged areas as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
KMOC – 2BL5

to disposi-tion. These submerged areas are not covered by any patent or certificate of title. There can be no
dispute that these submerged areas form part of the public domain, and in their present state are inalienable
and outside the commerce of man. Until reclaimed from the sea, these submerged areas are, under the
Constitution, “waters x x x owned by the State,” forming part of the public domain and consequently
inalienable. Only when actually reclaimed from the sea can these submerged areas be classified as public
agricultural lands, which under the Constitution are the only natural resources that the State may alienate.
Once reclaimed and transformed into public agricultural lands, the government may then officially classify
these lands as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition. Thereafter, the government may declare
these lands no longer needed for public service. Only then can these reclaimed lands be considered
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain and within the commerce of man.

Same: Same; Same; Same; Public Estates Authority; Under EO No. 525, in relation to PD No. 3-A and PD
No. 1084, PEA became the primary implementing agency of the National Government to reclaim foreshore
and submerged lands of the public domain.—Section 1 of Executive Order No. 525 provides that PEA
“shall be primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and
on behalf of the National Government.” The same section also states that “[A]ll reclamation projects shall
be approved by the President upon recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the PEA or
through a proper contract executed by it with any person or entity; x x x.” Thus, under EO No. 525, in
relation to PD No. 3-A and PD No. 1084, PEA became the primary implementing agency of the National
Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands of the public domain. EO No. 525 recognized PEA
as the government entity “to undertake the reclamation of lands and ensure their maximum utilization in
promoting public welfare and interests.” Since large portions of these reclaimed lands would obviously be
needed for public service, there must be a formal declaration segregating reclaimed lands no longer needed
for public service from those still needed for public service.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 3 of EO No. 525, by declaring that all lands
reclaimed by PEA “shall belong to or be owned by PEA could not automatically operate to
classify inalienable lands into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.—Section 3
of EO No. 525, by declaring that all lands reclaimed by PEA “shall belong to or be owned by
the PEA could not automatically operate to classify inalienable lands into alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain. Otherwise, reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands
of the public domain would automaticallybecome alienable once reclaimed by PEA, whether
or not classified as alienable or disposable.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Department of Environment and Natural Resources; As
manager, conservator and overseer of the natural resources of the State, DENR exercises
“supervision and control over alienable and disposable public lands.” PEA needs
authorization from DENR before PEA can undertake reclamation in Manila Bay, or in any
part of the country; DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas
under water, while PEA is vested with the power to undertake the physical reclamation of
areas under water, whether directly or through private contractors.—As manager, conservator
and overseer of the natural resources of the State, DENR exercises “supervision and control
over alienable and disposable public lands.” DENR also exercises “exclusive jurisdiction on
the management and disposition of all lands of the public domain.” Thus, DENR decides
whether areas under water, like foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay, should be
reclaimed or not. This means that PEA needs authorization from DENR before PEA can
undertake reclamation projects in Manila Bay, or in any part of the country. DENR also
exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of all lands of the public domain. Hence,
DENR decides whether reclaimed lands of PEA should be classified as alienable under
Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141. Once DENR decides that the reclaimed lands should be so
classified, it then recommends to the President the issuance of a proclamation classifying the
lands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition. We note that
then DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. countersigned Special Patent No. 3517 in
compliance with the Revised Administrative Code and Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141. In
short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas under water,
while PEA is vested with the power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas under
water, whether directly or through private contractors. DENR is also empowered to classify
lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands subject to the approval of the
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KMOC – 2BL5

President. On the other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed alienable
lands of the public domain.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Absent two official acts—a classification that these
lands are alienable or disposable and open to disposition and a declaration that these lands
are not needed for public service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of the
public domain.—The mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged
areas does not make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain,
much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer by the National
Government of lands of thepublic domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Absent two
official acts—a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and open to
disposition and a declaration that these lands are not needed for public service, lands
reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of the public domain. Only such an official
classification and formal declaration can convert reclaimed lands into alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain, open to disposition under the Constitution, Title I and Title III of
CA No. 141 and other applicable laws.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring alienable lands of the public domain does not apply to the sale of PEA’s patrimonial
lands; While PEA may sell its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private
individuals, it cannot sell any of its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to
private corporations.—PEA’s charter, however, expressly tasks PEA “to develop, improve,
acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose lease and sell any and all kinds of lands x x x
owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government.” (Emphasis supplied) There
is, therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or
alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may sell to private parties its patrimonial
properties in accordance with the PEA charter free from constitutional limitations. The
constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public
domain does not apply to the sale of PEA’s patrimonial lands. PEA may also sell its alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain to private individuals since, with the legislative
authority, there is no longer any statutory prohibition against such sales and the
constitutional ban does not apply to individuals. PEA, however, cannot sell any of its
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private corporations since Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits such sales. The legislative authority
benefits only individuals. Private corporations remain barred from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain, including government reclaimed lands.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The provision in PD No. 1085 stating that portions of the
reclaimed lands could be transferred by PEA to the “contractor or his assignees” would not
apply to private corporations but only to individuals because of the constitutional ban.—The
provision in PD No. 1085 stating that portions of the reclaimed lands could be transferred by
PEA to the “contractor or his assignees” (Emphasis supplied) would not apply to private
corporations but only to individuals because of the constitutional ban. Otherwise, the
provisions of PD No. 1085 would violate both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Bids and Bidding; EO No. 654, which authorized PEA “to
determine the kind and manner of payment for the transfer” of its assets and properties, does
not exempt PEA from the requirement of public auction, but merely authorizes PEA to decide
the mode of payment, whether in kind or in installment, but does not authorize PEA to
dispense with public auction.—Assuming the reclaimed lands of PEA are classified as
alienable or disposable lands open to disposition, and further declared no longer needed for
public service, PEA would have to conduct a public bidding in selling or leasing these lands.
PEA must observe the provisions of Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141 requiring public
auction, in the absence of a law exempting PEA from holding a public auction. Special Patent
No. 3517 expressly states that the patent is issued by authority of the Constitution and PD
No. 1084, “supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.” This is an
acknowledgment that the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the disposition of reclaimed
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
KMOC – 2BL5

alienable lands of the public domain unless otherwise provided by law. Executive Order No.
654, which authorizes PEA “to determine the kind and manner of payment for the transfer”
of its assets and properties, does not exempt PEA from the requirement of public auction. EO
No. 654 merely authorizes PEA to decide the mode of payment, whether in kind and in
installment, but does not authorize PEA to dispense with public auction.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; At the public auction sale, only Philippine citizens
are qualified to bid for PEA’s reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public
domain.—At the public auction sale, only Philippine citizens are qualified to bid for PEA’s
reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain. Private
corporations are barred from bidding at the auction sale of any kind of alienable land of the
public domain.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The failure of an earlier public bidding involving
only 407.84 hectares, is not a valid justification for a subsequent negotiated sale of 750
hectares, almost double the area publicly auctioned.—The original JVA dated April 25, 1995
covered not only the Freedom Islands and the additional 250 hectares still to be reclaimed, it
also granted an option to AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a
negotiated contract, enlarged the reclamation area to 750 hectares. The failure of public
bidding on December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84 hectares, is not a valid justification for a
negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double the area publicly auctioned. Besides, the
failure of public bidding happened on December 10, 1991, more than three years before the
signing of the original JVA on April 25, 1995. Theeconomic situation in the country had
greatly improved during the intervening period.

Same; Same; Same; Same; BOT Law (RA No. 6957); Local Government Code; Under either the
BOT Law or the Local Government Code, the contractor or developer, if a corporate entity, can
only be paid with lease-holds on portions of the reclaimed land, and if the contractor or
developer is an individual, portions of the reclaimed land, not exceeding 12 hectares of non-
agricultural lands, may be conveyed to him in ownership.—Under either the BOT Law or the
Local Government Code, the contractor or developer, if a corporate entity, can only be paid
with leaseholds on portions of the reclaimed land. If the contractor or developer is an
individual, portions of the reclaimed land, not exceeding 12 hectares of nonagricultural lands,
may be conveyed to him in ownership in view of the legislative authority allowing such
conveyance. This is the only way these provisions of the BOT Law and the Local Government
Code can avoid a direct collision with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Land Registration; Registration is not a mode of acquiring
ownership but is merely evidence of ownership previously conferred by any of the recognized
modes of acquiring ownership.—Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does
not vest in the registrant private or public ownership of the land. Registration is not a mode
of acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of ownership previously conferred by any of the
recognized modes of acquiring ownership. Registration does not give the registrant a better
right than what the registrant had prior to the registration. The registration of lands of the
public domain under the Torrens system, by itself, cannot convert public lands into private
lands.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or
issuance of the certificate of title the alienable land of the public domain automatically
becomes private land cannot apply to government units and entities like PEA.—Jurisprudence
holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of title the alienable
land of the public domain automatically becomes private land cannot apply to government
units and entities like PEA. The transfer of the Freedom Islands to PEA was made subject to
the provisions of CA No. 141 as expressly stated in Special Patent No. 3517 issued by then
President Aquino, to wit: “NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW YE, that by authority of the
Constitution of the Philippines and in conformity with the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 1084, supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, there are hereby
granted and conveyed unto the Public Estates Authority the aforesaid tracts of land
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
KMOC – 2BL5

containing a total area ofone million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety
four (1,915,894) square meters; the technical description of which are hereto attached and
made an integral part hereof.” (Emphasis supplied)

Same; Same; Same; Same; The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance
with Section 60 of CA No. 141 does not automatically convert alienable lands of the public
domain into private or patrimonial lands—the alienable lands of the public domain must be
transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities not tasked to dispose of
public lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial lands.—Alienable lands of
the public domain held by government entities under section 60 of CA No. 141 remain public
lands because they cannot be alienated or encumbered unless Congress passes a law
authorizing their disposition. Congress, however, cannot authorize the sale to private
corporations of reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain because of the constitutional
ban. Only individuals can benefit from such law. The grant of legislative authority to sell
public lands in accordance with Section 60 of CA No. 141 does not automatically convert
alienable lands of the public domain into private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of
the public domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities
not tasked to dispose of public lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial
lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will become illusory if Congress can declare lands of
the public domain as private or patrimonial lands in the hands of a government agency
tasked to dispose of public lands. This will allow private corporations to acquire directly from
government agencies limitless areas of lands which, prior to such law, are concededly public
lands.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Public Estates Authority; As the central implementing agency
tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide, with authority to sell reclaimed lands,
PEA took the place of DENR as the government agency charged with leasing or selling
reclaimed lands of the public domain.—As the central implementing agency tasked to
undertake reclamation projects nationwide, with authority to sell reclaimed lands, PEA took
the place of DENR as the government agency charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands
of the public domain. The reclaimed lands being leased or sold by PEA are not private lands,
in the same manner that DENR, when it disposes of other alienable lands, does not dispose of
private lands but alienable lands of the public domain. Only when qualified private parties
acquire these lands will the lands become private lands. In the hands of the government
agency tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable of disposable lands of the public domain,
these lands are still public, not private lands.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The mere fact that alienable lands of the public domain are
transferred to PEA and issued land patents or certificates of title in PEA’s name does not
automatically make such lands private—to allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public
domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the
constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain.—PEA’s charter expressly states that PEA “shall hold lands of the public
domain” as well as “any and all kinds of lands.” PEA can hold both lands of the public
domain and private lands. Thus, the mere fact that alienable lands of the public domain like
the Freedom Islands are transferred to PEA and issued land patents or certificates of title in
PEA’s name does not automatically make such lands private. To allow vast areas of
reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a
gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. PEA will simply turn around, as PEA has now done
under the Amended JVA, and transfer several hundreds of hectares of these reclaimed and
still to be reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in only one transaction. This scheme
will effectively nullify the constitutional ban in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which was intended to diffuse equitably the ownership of alienable lands of the public
domain among Filipinos, now numbering over 80 million strong.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Whether the Amended JVA is a sale or a joint venture, the
fact remains that the Amended JVA required PEA to “cause the issuance and delivery of the
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certificates of title conveying AMARI’s Land Share in the name of AMARI,” a stipulation
contravening Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution—the transfer of title and
ownership to AMARI clearly means that AMARI will “hold” the reclaimed lands other than by
lease, and the transfer of title and ownership is a “disposition” of the reclaimed lands, a
transaction considered a sale or alienation under CA No. 141, the Government Auditing Code,
and Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.—AMARI makes a parting shot that the
Amended JVA is not a sale to AMARI of the Freedom Islands or of the lands to be reclaimed
from submerged areas of Manila Bay. In the words of AMARI, the Amended JVA “is not a
sale but a joint venture with a stipulation for reimbursement of the original cost incurred by
PEA for the earlier reclamation and construction works performed by the CDCP under its
1973 contract with the Republic.” Whether the Amended JVA is a sale or a joint venture, the
fact remains that the Amended JVA requires PEA to “cause the issuance and delivery of the
certificates of title conveying AMARI’s Land Share in the name of AMARI.” This stipulation
still contravenes Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that private
corporations “shall not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease.” The
transfer of title and ownership to AMARI clearly means that AMARI will “hold” the
reclaimed lands other than by lease. The transfer of title and ownership is a “disposition” of
the reclaimed lands, a transaction considered a sale or alienation under CA No. 141, the
Government Auditing Code, and Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Historically, lands reclaimed by the government are sui generis,
not available for sale to private parties unlike other alienable public lands—reclaimed lands
retain their inherent potential as areas for public use or public service.—The Regalian
doctrine is deeply implanted in our legal system. Foreshore and submerged areas form part of
the public domain and are inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas
also form part of the public domain and are also inalienable, unless converted pursuant to
law into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Historically, lands reclaimed by
the government are sui generis, not available for sale to private parties unlike other alienable
public lands. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as areas for public use or public
service. Alienable lands of the public domain, increasingly becoming scarce natural resources,
are to be distributed equitably among our ever-growing population. To insure such equitable
distribution, the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions have barred private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Those who attempt to dispose of
inalienable natural resources of the State, or seek to circumvent the constitutional ban on
alienation of lands of the public domain to private corporations, do so at their own risk.

14) Spouses Abrigo v. Romana de Vera, G.R. No. 154409, June 21, 2004

Sales; Double Sales; Land Titles and Deeds; A double sale of immovables transfers ownership
to (1) the first registrant in good faith; (2) then, the first possessor in good faith; and (3)
finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title.—The law provides that a double
sale of immovables transfers ownership to (1) the first registrant in good faith; (2) then, the
first possessor in good faith; and (3) finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the oldest
title. There is no ambiguity in the application of this law with respect to lands registered
under the Torrens system. This principle is in full accord with Section 51 of PD 1529 which
provides that no deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument—except a will—
purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the
land until its registration. Thus, if the sale is not registered, it is binding only between the
seller and the buyer but it does not affect innocent third persons.

Same; Same; Same; A registration must be done in the proper registry in order to bind the
land—where the property in dispute is already registered under the Torrens system,
registration of the sale under Act 3344 is not effective for purposes of Article 1544 of the Civil
Code.—It is undisputed that Villafania had been issued a free patent registered as Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-30522. The OCT was later cancelled by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 212598, also in Villafania’s name. As a consequence of the sale, TCT No.
212598 was subsequently cancelled and TCT No. 22515 thereafter issued to
respondent. Soriano v. Heirs of Magali held that registration must be done in the proper
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registry in order to bind the land. Since the property in dispute in the present case was
already registered under the Torrens system, petitioners’ registration of the sale under Act
3344 was not effective for purposes of Article 1544 of the Civil Code.

Same; Same; Same; A Torrens title, once registered, serves as a notice, and no one can plead
ignorance of the registration.—Petitioners cannot validly argue that they were fraudulently
misled into believing that the property was unregistered. A Torrens title, once registered,
serves as a notice to the whole world. All persons must take notice, and no one can plead
ignorance of the registration.

Same; Same; Same; Article 1544 of the Civil Code requires the second buyer to acquire the
immovable in good faith and to register it in good faith.—We have consistently held that
Article 1544 requires the second buyer to acquire the immovable in good faith and to register
it in good faith. Mere registration of title is not enough; good faith must concur with the
registration. We explained the rationale in Uraca v. Court of Appeals, which we quote:
“Under the foregoing, the prior registration of the disputed property by the second buyer does
not by itself confer ownership or a better right over the property. Article 1544 requires that
such registration must be coupled with good faith. Jurisprudence teaches us that ‘(t)he
governing principle is primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge
gained by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer’s rights except where
the second buyer registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first, as provided by the
Civil Code. Such knowledge of the first buyer does not bar her from availing of her rights
under the law, among them, to register first her purchase as against the second buyer. But
in converso, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if
he is first to register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his prior registration with
bad faith. This is the price exacted by Article 1544 of the Civil Code for the second buyer
being able to displace the first buyer; that before the second buyer can obtain priority over
the first, he must show that he acted in good faith throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the first sale
and of the first buyer’s rights)—from the time of acquisition until the title is transferred to him
by registration, or failing registration, by delivery of possession.’ ” (Italics supplied)

Same; Same; Same; Under Section 44 of PD 1529, every registered owner receiving a
certificate of title pursuant to a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of
registered land taking such certificate for value and in good faith shall hold the same free
from all encumbrances, except those noted and enumerated in the certificate.—Equally
important, under Section 44 of PD 1529, every registered owner receiving a certificate of title
pursuant to a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land
taking such certificate for value and in good faith shall hold the same free from all
encumbrances, except those noted and enumerated in the certificate. Thus, a person dealing
with registered land is not required to go behind the registry to determine the condition of
the property, since such condition is noted on the face of the register or certificate of title.
Following this principle, this Court has consistently held as regards registered land that a
purchaser in good faith acquires a good title as against all the transferees thereof whose
rights are not recorded in the Registry of Deeds at the time of the sale.

Same; Same; Same; Constructive notice to the second buyer through registration under Act
3344 does not apply if the property is registered under the Torrens system.—Constructive
notice to the second buyer through registration under Act 3344 does not apply if the property
is registered under the Torrens system, as in this case. We quote below the additional
commentary of Justice Vitug, which was omitted in Santiago. This omission was evidently
the reason why petitioner misunderstood the context of the citation therein: “The registration
contemplated under Art. 1544 has been held to refer to registration under Act 496 Land
Registration Act (now PD 1529) which considers the act of registration as the operative act
that binds the land (see Mediante vs. Rosabal, 1 O.G. [12] 900, Garcia vs. Rosabal, 73 Phil.
694). On lands covered by the Torrens System, the purchaser acquires such rights and
interest as they appear in the certificate of title, unaffected by any prior lien or encumbrance
not noted therein. The purchaser is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens
title, upon its face, indicates. The only exception is where the purchaser has actual
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knowledge of a flaw or defect in the title of the seller or of such liens or encumbrances which,
as to him, is equivalent to registration (see Sec. 39, Act 496; Bernales vs. IAC, G.R. 75336, 18
October 1988; Hernandez vs. Sales, 69 Phil 744; Tajonera vs. Court of Appeals, L-26677, 27
March 1981).”

15) Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo (197 SCRA 245, 1991)

Sales; Double Sale; Land Titles and Deeds; A bona fide purchaser of a registered land at an
execution sale acquires a good title as against a prior transferee, if such transfer was
unrecorded.—There is no doubt that had the property in question been a registered land, this
case would have been decided in favor of petitioner since it was petitioner that had its claim
first recorded in the Registry of Deeds. For, as already mentioned earlier, it is the act of
registration that operates to convey and affect registered land. Therefore, a bona
fide purchaser of a registered land at an execution sale acquires a good title as against a prior
transferee, if such transfer was unrecorded.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Execution Sale; Art. 1544 does not apply to land not registered
under Act 496; The purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriffs’ execution sale only steps into
the shoes of the judgment debtor, and merely acquires the latter’s interest in the property sold
as of the time the property was levied upon.—Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments
affecting unregistered lands is “without prejudice to a third party with a better right”. The
aforequoted phrase has been held by this Court to mean that the mere registration of a sale
in one’s favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was not anymore the
owner of the land having previously sold the same to somebody else even if the earlier sale
was unrecorded. The case of Carumba vs. Court of Appeals is a case in point. It was held
therein that Article 1544 of the Civil Code has no application to land not registered under Act
No. 496. Like in the case at bar, Carumba dealt with a double sale of the same unregistered
land. The first sale was made by the original owners and was unrecorded while the second
was an execution sale that resulted from a complaint for a sum of money filed against the
said original owners. Applying Section 35, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court
held that Article 1544 of the Civil Code cannot be invoked to benefit the purchaser at the
execution sale though the latter was a buyer in good faith and even if this second sale was
registered. It was explained that this is because the purchaser of unregistered land at a
sheriff’s execution sale only steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor, and merely acquires
the latter’s interest in the property sold as of the time the property was levied upon.

16) Juanita Naval v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167412, February 22, 2006

Civil Law; Land Registration; Article 1544 of the Civil Code has no application to land not
registered under Torrens System.—While we agree with the appellate court that respondents
have superior right over the petitioner on the subject property, we find Article 1544
inapplicable to the case at bar since the subject land was unregistered at the time of the first
sale. The registration contemplated under this provision has been held to refer to registration
under the Torrens System, which considers the act of registration as the operative act that
binds the land. Thus, in Carumba v. Court of Appeals, we held that Article 1544 of the Civil
Code has no application to land not registered under Torrens System.

Same; Same; Double Sales; Act No. 3344; Under this law, registration by the first buyer is
constructive notice to the second buyer that can defeat his right as such buyer in good faith.—
The law applicable therefore is Act No. 3344, which provides for the registration of all
instruments on land neither covered by the Spanish Mortgage Law nor the Torrens System.
Under this law, registration by the first buyer is constructive notice to the second buyer that
can defeat his right as such buyer in good faith. Applying the law, we held in Bautista v.
Fule that the registration of an instrument involving unregistered land in the Registry of
Deeds creates constructive notice and binds third person who may subsequently deal with the
same property.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; The issue of good faith or bad faith of the buyer is relevant only
where the subject of the sale is registered land and the purchaser is buying the same from the
registered owner whose title to the land is clean.—Even if petitioner argues that she
purchased and registered the subject land in good faith and without knowledge of any
adverse claim thereto, respondents still have superior right over the disputed property. We
held in Rayos v. Reyes that: “[T]he issue of good faith or bad faith of the buyer is relevant only
where the subject of the sale is registered land and the purchaser is buying the same from the
registered owner whose title to the land is clean x x x in such case the purchaser who relies on
the clean title of the registered owner is protected if he is a purchaser in good faith for value.”
Since the properties in question are unregistered lands, petitioners as subsequent buyers
thereof did so at their peril. Their claim of having bought the land in good faith, i.e., without
notice that some other person has a right to or interest in the property, would not protect
them if it turns out, as it actually did in this case, that their seller did not own the property
at the time of the sale.

Same; Same; Same; One can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer
can acquire no more than what the seller can transfer legally.—It is an established principle
that no one can give what one does not have, nemo dat quod non habet. Accordingly, one can
sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more than what
the seller can transfer legally. In the case at bar, since Ildefonso no longer owned the subject
land at the time of the sale to the petitioner, he had nothing to sell and the latter did not
acquire any right to it.

Same; Same; Certificates of Title; What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title
and the title or ownership which is represented by such certificate; A certificate of title is
merely an evi-dence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein.—A
certificate of title, once registered, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed,
modified, enlarged or diminished except in a direct proceeding permitted by law. Moreover,
Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides that “[u]pon the expiration of said period
of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title shall become
incontrovertible.” However, it does not deprive an aggrieved party of a remedy in law. What
cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title or ownership which
is represented by such certificate. Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The fact
that petitioner was able to secure a title in her name did not operate to vest ownership upon
her of the subject land. Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not
create or vest title, because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is
merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. It
cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner; nor can it be used as a shield for the
commission of fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others. Its
issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the real
property may be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in
trust for another person by the registered owner.

Same; Same; Same; Reconveyance; In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is
respected as incontrovertible; What is sought instead is the transfer of the property or its title
which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name, to its rightful
or legal owner, or to the one with a better right.— As correctly held by the Court of Appeals,
notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the Torrens title, the registered owner may still be
compelled to reconvey the registered property to its true owners. The rationale for the rule is
that reconveyance does not set aside or re-subject to review the findings of fact of the Bureau
of Lands. In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as
incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property or its title which has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name, to its rightful or legal
owner, or to the one with a better right.

Same; Same; Same; Same; An action for reconveyance does not prescribe when the plaintiff is
in possession of the land to be reconveyed.—The Court of Appeals correctly held that an action
for reconveyance does not prescribe when the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be
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reconveyed, as in this case. Thus, in Leyson v. Bontuyan, 452 SCRA 94 (2005): x x x [T]his
Court declared that an action for reconveyance based on fraud is imprescriptible where the
plaintiff is in possession of the property subject of the acts.

17) Francisco Bayoca v. Gaudioso Nogales, G.R. No. 138201, September 12, 2000

Sales; Double Sales; Order of Preference.—Following Article 1544 of the Civil Code, in the
double sales of immovables, ownership is transferred in the order hereunder stated to—(a)
the first registrant in good faith; (b) the first in possession in good faith; and (c) the buyer
who presents the oldest title in good faith.

Same; Same; Land Titles; In cases of double sale of immovables, what finds relevance and
materiality is not whether or not the second buyer was a buyer in good faith but whether or not
said second buyer registers such second sale in good faith, that is, without knowledge of any
defect in the title of the property sold.—To merit protection under Article 1544, second
paragraph, of the Civil Code, the second buyer must act in good faith in registering the deed.
Thus, it has been held that in cases of double sale of immovables, what finds relevance and
materiality is not whether or not the second buyer was a buyer in good faith but whether or
not said second buyer registers such second sale in good faith, that is, without knowledge of
any defect in the title of the property sold.

Same; Same; Same; Registration by the first buyer under Act No. 3344 can have the effect of
constructive notice to the second buyer that can defeat his right as such buyer.—There is
absence of prior registration in good faith by petitioners of the second sale in their favor. As
stated in the Santiago case, registration by the first buyer under Act No. 3344 can have the
effect of constructive notice to the second buyer that can defeat his right as such buyer. On
account of the undisputed fact of registration under Act No. 3344 by respondent Nogales as
the first buyer, necessarily, there is absent good faith in the registration of the sale by the
petitioners Erwin Bayoca and the spouses Pio and Lourdes Dichoso for which they had been
issued certificates of title in their names. It follows that their title to the land cannot be
upheld. As for petitioners Francisco Bayoca and Nonito Dichoso, they failed to register the
portions of the property sold to them, and merely rely on the fact that they declared the same
in their name for taxation purposes. Suffice it to state that such fact, does not, by itself,
constitute evidence of ownership, and cannot likewise prevail over the title of respondent
Nogales.

Land Titles; Land Registration; The Torrens System is intended to guarantee the integrity and
conclusiveness of the certificate of registration but it cannot be used for the perpetration of
fraud against the real owner of the registered land.—It is worth mentioning that while the
certificates of title in the names of Erwin Bayoca and the spouses Pio and Lourdes Dichoso
are indefeasible, unassailable and binding against the whole world, including the government
itself, they do not create or vest title. They merely confirm or record title already existing and
vested. They cannot be used to prefect a usurper from the true owner, nor can they be used as
a shield for the commission of fraud; neither do they permit one to enrich himself at the
expense of others. The Torrens System is intended to guarantee the integrity and
conclusiveness of the certificate of registration but it cannot be used for the perpetration of
fraud against the real owner of the registered land.

Same; Free Patents; The prior grant of a free patent in favor of certain individuals removed or
segregated the property subject thereof from the mass of the public domain.—Petitioners’
argument that the subject property is a public agricultural land over which the Regional
Trial Court has no jurisdiction over is clearly untenable. The prior grant of a free patent in
favor of petitioners Erwin Bayoca and the spouses Pio and Dolores Dichoso removed or
segregated the property subject thereof from the mass of the public domain. So too,
respondent Nogales had already registered the entire property under Act. No. 3344. Indeed,
registration with the Register of Deeds of a parcel of land divests the government of title to
the land.
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THE TORRENS SYSTEM

18) Director of Lands v. Jugado, G.R. No. L-14702, May 21, 1961

Homestead Patents; Registration and issuance of certificate and owner’s duplicate certificate
of title; When land comes under operation of Act 496.—After the registration and issuance of
the certificate and owner’s duplicate certificate of title of a public land patent, the land
covered thereby automatically comes under the operation of Act 496 and subject to all the
safeguards provided therein (See El Hogar Filipino vs. Olviga, 60 Phil. 850; Manalo vs.
Lukban and Liwanag, 48 Phil. 973).

Same; When land ceases to be part of the public domain.—Well settled is the rule that once
the patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to
be part of the public domain and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands
has neither control nor jurisdiction (Sumail vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Cotabato, L-8287, April 30, 1955; Republic vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carle, L-12485, July 31, 1959).

Registration of land titles, raising of questions concerning validity of certificate of title; one-
year period prescribed by law begins from issuance of patent.—Section 38 of Act 496 prohibits
the raising of any question concerning the validity of a certificate of title after one year from
entry of the decree of registration. And the period of one year, in the case of a public land
grants, begins from the issuance of the patent (Sumail vs. Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Cotabato, supra; Nelayan vs. Nelayan, L-14518, August 29, 1960).

Public Lands; Reversion of fraudulently awarded lands of the public domain; Action to be
filed by Solicitor General.—Section 101 of Commonwealth Act 141 affords a remedy whereby
lands of the public domain fraudulently awarded may be recovered or reverted to its original
owner, the Government. But the provision requires that all such actions for reversion shall be
instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines.

19) Heir of Tengco v. Heirs of Aliwalas, G.R. No. 77541, November 29, 1988

Public Lands; Land Title; Rule is well-settled that an original certificate of title issued on the
strength of a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate of title issued in a
judicial proceeding.—Petitioners’ theory is not supported by the jurisprudence on the matter.
The rule is well-settled that an original certificate of title issued on the strength of a
homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate of title issued in a judicial
proceeding, as long as the land disposed of is really part of the disposable land of the public
domain, and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from
the date of the promulgation of the order of the Director of Lands for the issuance of the
patent. A homestead patent, once registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes as
indefeasible as a Torrens Title.

Same; Same; Same; Contention of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies already rejected

by the Court in earlier decisions.—The contention of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies, on the theory that the case should have been brought before the Director of Lands,
had already been rejected by the Court in earlier decisions. Thus, while the Director of Lands
has the power to review homestead patents, he may do so only so long as the land remains
part of the public domain and continues to be under his exclusive control; butonce the patent
is registered and a certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be a part of public domain
and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor
jurisdiction.

Same; Same; Same; Dr. Aliwalas’ title to the property having become incontrovertible such
may no longer be collaterally attached.—But, as correctly pointed out by the respondent
Court of Appeals, Dr. Aliwalas’ title to the property having become incontrovertible, such
may no longer be collaterally attacked. If indeed there had been any fraud or
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misrepresentation in obtaining the title, an action for reversion instituted by the Solicitor
General would be the proper remedy.

Same; Same; Prescription; Title acquired through a homestead patent registered under the
Land Registration Act is imprescriptible.—Finally, petitioners contend that private
respondents have lost their title to the property through laches and prescription. They assert
that private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have never actually possessed the
property while petitioners and their predecessor-in-interest have been in actual, open,
uninterrupted and adverse possession of the property since 1918. But as stated above, title
acquired through a homestead patent registered under the Land Registration Act is
imprescriptible. Thus, prescription cannot operate against the registered owner.

20) Legarda v. Saleeby (31 Phil. 590)

REGISTRATION OF LAND; REGISTRATION OF SAME LAND IN THE NAMES OF Two

DIFFERENT PERSONS.—L obtained a decree of registration of a parcel of land on the 25th
of October, 1906. S, on the 25th of March, 1912, obtained a certificate of registration for his
land which joined the land theretofore registered by L. The certificate of title issued to S
included a narrow strip of the land theretofore registered in the name of L. On the 13th of
December, 1912, L presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the adjustment
and correction of the error committed in the certificate issued to S, which included said
narrow strip of land. Held: That in a case where two certificates of title include or cover the
same land, the earlier in date must prevail as between the original parties, whether the land
comprised in the latter certificate be wholly or only in part comprised in the earlier
certificate. In successive registrations where more than one certificate is issued in respect of
a particular interest in land, the person holding under the prior certificate is entitled to the
land as against the person who obtained the second certificate. The decree of registration is
conclusive upon and against all persons.

ID.; PURPOSE OF THE TORRENS SYSTEM.—The real purpose of the torrens system of
land registration is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality
of the title, except claims which were noted, at the time of registration, in the certificate, or
which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that
once the title was registered, the owner might rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in
the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing
his land. The proceeding for the registration of land under the torrens system is a judicial
proceeding, but it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary action.

ID; ID.; EFFECT OF REGISTRATION AND CERTIFICATE OF TITLE.—The registration

under the torrens system and the issuance of a certificate of title do not give the owner any
better title than he had. He does not obtain title by virtue of the certificate. He secures his
certificate by virtue of the fact that he has a fee simple title. If he obtains a certificate of title,
by mistake, to more land than he really and in fact owns, the certificate should be corrected.
If he does not already have a perfect title, he cannot secure his certificate. Having a fee
simple title, and presenting sufficient proof of that fact, he is entitled to a certificate of
registration. The certificate of registration simply accumulates, in one document, a precise
and correct statement of the exact status of the fee simple title, which the owner, in fact, has.
The certificate, once issued, is the evidence of the title which the owner has. The certificate
should not be altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished, except to correct errors, in
some direct proceedings permitted by law. The title represented by the certificate cannot be
changed, altered, modified, enlarged or diminished in a collateral proceeding.

21) Spouses Alfonso Cusi v. Lilia Domingo, G.R. No. 195825, February 27, 2013

Civil Law; Land Registration; Torrens System; Under the Torrens system of land registration,
the State is required to maintain a register of landholdings that guarantees indefeasible title
to those included in the register.—Under the Torrens system of land registration, the State is
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required to maintain a register of landholdings that guarantees indefeasible title to those

included in the register. The system has been instituted to combat the problems of
uncertainty, complexity and cost associated with old title systems that depended upon proof
of an unbroken chain of title back to a good root of title. The State issues an official certificate
of title to attest to the fact that the person named is the owner of the property described
therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or what the law warrants
or reserves.

Same; Same; Same; Curtain Principle; One of the guiding tenets underlying the Torrens
system is the curtain principle, in that one does not need to go behind the certificate of title
because it contains all the information about the title of its holder.—One of the guiding tenets
underlying the Torrens system is the curtain principle, in that one does not need to go behind
the certificate of title because it contains all the information about the title of its holder. This
principle dispenses with the need of proving ownership by long complicated documents kept
by the registered owner, which may be necessary under a private conveyancing system, and
assures that all the necessary information regarding ownership is on the certificate of title.
Consequently, the avowed objective of the Torrens system is to obvi-ate possible conflicts of
title by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate and, as a
rule, to dispense with the necessity of inquiring further; on the part of the registered owner,
the system gives him complete peace of mind that he would be secured in his ownership as
long as he has not voluntarily disposed of any right over the covered land.

Same; Sales; Buyer in Good Faith; A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of
another without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and
pays full and fair price for the same.—Good faith is the honest intention to abstain from
taking unconscientious advantage of another. It means the “freedom from knowledge and
circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry.” Given this notion of good faith,
therefore, a purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice
that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays full and fair
price for the same. As an examination of the records shows, the petitioners were not innocent
purchasers in good faith and for value. Their failure to investigate Sy’s title despite the
nearly simultaneous transactions on the property that ought to have put them on inquiry
manifested their awareness of the flaw in Sy’s title. That they did not also appear to have
paid the full price for their share of the property evinced their not having paid true value.

22) Spouses Vera Cruz v. Lucy Calderon, G.R. No. 160748, July 14, 2004

Land Registration; A person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of
the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the
certificate to determine the condition of the property.—We have long settled the rule that an
innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another, without notice that
some other person has a right or interest in such property and pays the full price for the
same, at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some
other person in the property. A person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to
go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property.

Civil Law; Family Code; Contracts; Husband and Wife; Under Article 173 of the Civil Code,
an action for the annulment of any contract entered into by the husband without the wife’s
consent must be filed (1) during the marriage and (2) within ten years from the transaction
questioned; The civil case had already been barred by prescription, Case at Bar.—This case is
on all fours with the above-quoted Ayuste case. Under Article 173 of the Civil Code, an action
for the annulment of any contract entered into by the husband without the wife’s consent
must be filed (1) during the marriage; and (2) within ten years from the transaction
questioned. Where any one of these two conditions is lacking, the action will be considered as
having been filed out of time. In the case at bar, while respondent filed her complaint for
annulment of the deed of sale on July 8, 1994, i.e., within the ten-year period counted from
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the execution of the deed of sale of the property on June 3, 1986, the marriage between her
and Avelino had already been dissolved by the death of the latter on November 20, 1993. In
other words, her marriage to Avelino was no longer subsisting at the time she filed her
complaint. Therefore, the civil case had already been barred by prescription.

Same; Prescription; Actions prescribe by the mere lapse of time fixed by law.—Actions
prescribe by the mere lapse of time fixed by law. The registration of the deed of sale executed
by Avelino in favor of petitioners served as constructive notice thereof. As such, respondent is
chargeable with knowledge of the sale as to let the prescriptive period run against her. Her
complaint must, therefore, be ordered dismissed.

23) Delfin Voluntad et. al, v. Spouses Magtanggol Dizon, G.R. No. 132294, August 26,
1999

Land Titles; Sales; Actions; Lis Pendens; Judgments; An annotation in the title that the
property was involved in a suit should prompt the prudent purchaser to inquire and verify if
the suit was finally terminated and the property freed from any legal infirmity or judicial
inquiry, and although a notice of its lis pendens may have been cancelled pursuant to an order
of the trial court dismissing the civil action, a cancellation effected after barely four (4) days is
premature as the court order is not yet final.—From the attendant circumstances, it is crystal
clear that an examination of the certificate of title and the annotations therein would disclose
that a civil action was filed with the trial court involving the property described in the title.
The annotation in the title that the property was involved in a suit should have prompted the
prudent purchaser to inquire and verify if the suit was finally terminated and the property
freed from any legal infirmity or judicial inquiry. Although the notice of lis pendens was
cancelled pursuant to the order of the trial court dismissing the civil action, the cancellation
effected after barely four (4) days was premature because the court order was not yet final, as
petitioners still had the remaining period of eleven (11) days to appeal the order. In fact, a
mere inquiry with the trial court which issued the order of dismissal and the cancellation of
the lis pendens would reveal that petitioners timely appealed the dismissal to the Court of
Appeals.

Same; Same; Torrens System; Innocent Purchasers for Value;The general rule, that a person
dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the Torrens Certificate of Title without the
need of inquiring further cannot apply when the party has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the
purchaser has knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce
a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation.—
The general rule is that a person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the
Torrens Certificate of Title without the need of inquiring further. But this rule cannot apply
when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a
defect or lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to
inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation. Hence, when there is
something in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the
property or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is required to explore further than what
the Torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right which
may subsequently defeat his right thereto.

Same; Same; Same; Same; If circumstances exist that require a prudent man to investigate
and he does not, he is deemed to have acted in mala fide, and his mere refusal to believe that a
defect exists or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his
vendor’s title will not make him an innocent purchaser for value.—As a purchaser,
respondent-spouses Reyes should have examined the certificate of title and all factual
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circumstances necessary for them to determine whether or not flaws existed which might
invalidate their title. It is a settled rule that a purchaser of real estate with knowledge of any
defect or lack of title of the vendorcannot claim that he has acquired title thereto in good
faith as against the true owner of the land or interest therein. The same rule applies to one
with knowledge of facts which should have put him on inquiry and investigation as might be
necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor. If circumstances exist
that require a prudent man to investigate and he does not, he is deemed to have acted
in mala fide. A party’s mere refusal to believe that a defect exists or his willful closing of his
eyes to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendor’s title will not make him an
innocent purchaser for value if it afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective.
Similarly, a buyer of registered land who fails to act with the diligence of a prudent man
cannot be a purchaser in good faith. Therefore, given the facts of this case which are clearly
set forth in the records and established by the evidence, there is no need for petitioners to file
a separate action to enforce their right to repurchase the property as against the new
registered owners.

Same; Same; Same; Actions; Intervention; Lis Pendens; Parties; Judgments; Writs of
Execution; A writ of execution may be issued against a person not a party to the case where the
latter’s remedy which he did not avail of was to intervene in the case involving rights over the
same parcel of land of which he claims to be the vendee; A person who had purchased
registered land with full notice of the fact that it is in litigation between the vendor and a
third party stands in the place of his vendor and their title is subject to the incidents and
results of the pending litigation.—InLising v. Plan, this Court ruled that a writ of execution
may be issued against a person not a party to the case where the latter’s remedy which he did
not avail of was to intervene in the case involving rights over the same parcel of land of which
he claims to be the vendee. The cancellation of the lis pendens on the title of respondent-
spouses Dizon prior to the purchase by the respondent-spouses Reyes need not alter our
conclusion as the cancellation was prematurely done while the appeal in the case between
petitioners and respondent-spouses Dizon was still pending with the appellate court. Having
purchased registered land with full notice of the fact that it is in litigation between the
vendor and a third party, respondent-spouses Reyes stand in the place of their vendor and
their title is subject to the incidents and results of the pending litigation.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A transferee pendente lite stands
exactly in the shoes of the transferor and isbound by any judgment or decree which may be
rendered for or against the transferor.—Ought to have been aware of the pendency of the
case, respondent-spouses Reyes should have intervened in the suit for the protection of their
alleged rights. Having failed to do so, they are bound by the results. A transferee pendente
lite stands exactly in the shoes of the transferor and is bound by any judgment or decree
which may be rendered for or against the transferor. Petitioners can legally enforce the final
judgment of the trial court against respondent-spouses Eugenio and Vicenta Reyes with
respect to the petitioners’ right to repurchase the property from the Reyeses as
transferees pendente lite of respondent-spouses Magtanggol and Corazon Dizon.

24) Spouses Dominador Peralta v. Heirs of Bernardina Abalon, G.R. No. 183448,
June 30, 2014

Civil Law; Land Titles; Certificate of Title; It is well-settled that a certificate of title serves as
evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein.—It is well-settled that “a certificate of title serves as evidence of
an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name
appears therein. The real purpose of the Torrens system of land registration is to quiet title
to land and put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title.”
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Same; Same; Torrens System; The Torrens system was intended to guarantee the integrity and
conclusiveness of the certificate of registration, but the system cannot be used for the
perpetration of fraud against the real owner of the registered land.—The Torrens system was
intended to guarantee the integrity and conclusiveness of the certificate of registration, but
the system cannot be used for the perpetration of fraud against the real owner of the
registered land. The system merely confirms ownership and does not create it. It cannot be
used to divest lawful owners of their title for the purpose of transferring it to another one
who has not acquired it by any of the modes allowed or recognized by law. Thus, the Torrens
system cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner or to shield the commission
of fraud or to enrich oneself at the expense of another.

Same; Same; It is well-established in our laws and jurisprudence that a person who is dealing
with a registered parcel of land need not go beyond the face of the title; Exceptions.—It is well-
established in our laws and jurisprudence that a person who is dealing with a registered
parcel of land need not go beyond the face of the title. A person is only charged with notice of
the burdens and claims that are annotated on the title. This rule, however, admits of
exceptions, which we explained in Clemente v. Razo, 452 SCRA 769 (2005): Any buyer or
mortgagee of realty covered by a Torrens certificate of title, in the absence of any suspicion, is
not obligated to look beyond the certificate to investigate the titles of the seller appearing on
the face of the certificate. And, he is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as
are annotated on the title. We do acknowledge that the rule thus enunciated is not cast in
stone. For, indeed, there are exceptions thereto. Thus, in Sandoval vs. Court of Appeals, 260
SCRA 283 (1996), we made clear the following: The aforesaid principle admits of an
unchallenged exception: that a person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the
Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further except when the
party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably
cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the
lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire
into the status of the title of the property in litigation. The presence of anything which excites
or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and
investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. One who falls
within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a
purchaser in good faith; and hence does not merit the protection of the law.

Same; Sales; Innocent Purchaser for Value; Words and Phrases; Jurisprudence has defined an
innocent purchaser for value as one who buys the property of another without notice that some
other person has a right to or interest therein and who then pays a full and fair price for it at
the time of the purchase or before receiving a notice of the claim or interest of some other
persons in the property.—Jurisprudence has defined an innocent purchaser for value as one
who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or
interest therein and who then pays a full and fair price for it at the time of the purchase or
before receiving a notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. Buyers
in good faith buy a property with the belief that the person from whom they receive the thing
is the owner who can convey title to the property. Such buyers do not close their eyes to facts
that should put a reasonable person on guard and still claim that they are acting in good
faith.

Same; Same; Same; Land Registration; The established rule is that a forged deed is generally
null and cannot convey title, the exception thereto, pursuant to Section 55 of the Land
Registration Act (LRA), denotes the registration of titles from the forger to the innocent
purchaser for value.—The established rule is that a forged deed is generally null and cannot
convey title, the exception thereto, pursuant to Section 55 of the Land Registration Act,
denotes the registration of titles from the forger to the innocent purchaser for value. Thus,
the qualifying point here is that there must be a complete chain of registered titles. This
means that all the transfers starting from the original rightful owner to the innocent holder
for value — and that includes the transfer to the forger — must be duly registered, and the
title must be properly issued to the transferee.
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25) Islamic Directorate v. Court of Appeals (272 SCRA 454)

Land Titles; Under the Torrens System of Registration, the minimum requirement for one to
be a good faith buyer for value is that the vendee at least sees the owner’s duplicate copy of the
title and relies upon the same.—Furthermore, the Court observes that the INC bought the
questioned property from the Carpizo Group without even seeing the owner’s duplicate copy
of the titles covering the property. This is very strange considering that the subject lot is a
large piece of real property in Quezon City worth millions , and that under the Torrens
System of Registration, the minimum requirement for one to be a good faith buyer for value
is that the vendee at least sees the owner’s duplicate copy of the title and relies upon the
same. The private respondent, presumably knowledgeable on the aforesaid workings of the
Torrens System, did not take heed of this and nevertheless went through with the sale with
undue haste. The unexplained eagerness of INC to buy this valuable piece of land in Quezon
City without even being presented with the owner’s copy of the titles casts very serious doubt
on the rightfulness of its position as vendee in the transaction.

26) Liu v. Loy (July 3, 2003, 438 SCRA 244)

Land Registration Act; Property Registration Decree; Court Approval; Section 91 of Act No.
496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, and Section 88 of P.D. No. 1529, Property
Registration Decree, specifically require court approval for any sale of registered land by an
executor or administrator.—More importantly, Section 91 of Act No. 496 (Land Registration
Act) and Section 88 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree)
specifically requirecourt approval for any sale of registered land by an executor or
administrator. The laws, Rules of Court, jurisprudence and regulations explicitly require
court approval before any sale of estate property by an executor or administrator can take
effect. The purpose of requiring court approval is to protect creditors. In this case, Frank Liu
is a creditor, and he is the person the law seeks to protect.

Land Registration; Buyers and registrants not in good faith;The respondent buyers and
registrants are not in good faith considering that they bought from a seller who was not a
registered owner.— The Loys are not buyers and registrants in good faith considering that
they bought from a seller who was not a registered owner. Teodoro Vaño signed both
contracts of sale but the titles to the lots sold were in the name of “Estate of Jose Vaño.” And
since the titles to Lot Nos. 5 and 6 were in name of “Estate of Jose Vaño,” the Loys were on
notice that court approval was needed for the sale of estate property. The ex-parte motion for
the court approval of the sales filed by the Loys some seven or eight years after the sales
transaction reveals a less than honest actuation, prompting the administratrix to object to
the court’s approval.

27) Spouses Dimaculangan v. Romasanta, G.R. No. 147029, February 27, 2004

Well settled is the rule that all persons dealing with property covered by Torrens certificate
of title are not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title. When there is
nothing on the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the
property, or any encumbrance therein, the purchaser is not required to explore further than
what the Torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right
that may subsequently defeat his right thereto. (Underscoring supplied)

In the present case, although at the time of purchase by petitioners, the notice of lis
pendens annotated on the Liwanag groups title was already cancelled by a subsequent
annotation, they were put on notice of a litigation involving the land as the title of the
Liwanag group bore the said annotations as in fact they even imposed as a condition before
purchasing the property the cancellation thereof.
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Even if petitioners were issued the certification, they should have been put on guard as to the
possibility of the existence of any defect or flaw therein since it did not mention that the
judgment was entered in the book of entries of judgments as required by the Rules of
Court,[46] knowledge or awareness of which by petitioner Atty. Reyes, a member of the legal
profession, was expected. As held in Egao v. Court of Appeals:[47]

Where a purchaser neglects to make the necessary inquiries and closes his eyes to facts
which should put a reasonable man on his guard as to the possibility of the existence of a
defect in his vendors title, and relying on the belief that there was no defect in the title of the
vendor, purchases the property without making any further investigation, he cannot claim
that he is a purchaser in good faith for value.

28) Josephine Wee v. Felicidad Mardo, G.R. No. 202414, June 4, 2014

Civil Law; Land Registration; Property Registration Decree (Presidential Decree [P.D.] No.
1529); P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Decree, governs the original
registration proceedings of unregistered land.—P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property
Registration Decree, governs the original registration proceedings of unregistered land. The
subject application for original registration was filed pursuant to Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529,
which provides the condition necessary for registration. Thus: SEC. 14. Who may apply.—The
following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives: (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. (Emphasis supplied) Based on
these legal parameters, applicants for registration of title under Section 14(1) must
sufficiently establish: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable
lands of the public domain; (2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and (3)
that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Same; Same; In the case of Republic vs. Umali, 171 SCRA 647 (1989), the Supreme Court (SC)
ruled that once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the
land ceases to be part of public domain and becomes private property over which the Director
of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction.—In the case of Republic vs. Umali, 171 SCRA
647 (1989), this Court ruled that once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate
of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of public domain and becomesprivate property
over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction. A public land patent,
when registered in the corresponding Register of Deeds, is a veritable Torrens title, and
becomes as indefeasible upon the expiration of one (1) year from the date of issuance thereof.
Said title, like one issued pursuant to a judicial decree, is subject to review within one (1)
year from the date of the issuance of the patent. This rule is embodied in Section 103 of PD
1529, which provides that: Section103. Certificates of title pursuant to patents.—Whenever
public land is by the Government alienated, granted or conveyed to any person, the same
shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Decree. x x x After due registration
and issuance of the certificate of title, such land shall be deemed to be registered
land to all intents and purposes under this Decree.

Same; Same; Once a title is registered, as a consequence either of judicial or administrative

proceedings, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the
court sitting in the mirador de su casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land.—A land
registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed in the
name of another in an earlier land registration case. A second decree for the same land would
be null and void, since the principle behind the original registration is to register a parcel of
land only once. Verily, once a title is registered, as a consequence either of judicial or
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administrative proceedings, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in
the portals of the court sitting in the mirador de su casa to avoid the possibility of losing his
land. The certificate of title cannot be defeated by adverse, open and notorious possession.
Neither can it be defeated by prescription. As provided under Sec. 47 of PD 1529, no title to
registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession.

Same; Land Titles; Collateral Attack; It is settled in this jurisdiction that the issue of the
validity of title can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for such purpose. A
certificate of title cannot be attacked collaterally.—It is settled in this jurisdiction that the
issue of the validity of title can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for such
purpose. A certificate of title cannot be attacked collaterally. This rule is provided under
Section 48 of PD 1529 which states that: SEC. 48.Certificate not subject to
collateralattack.―A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
(Emphasis supplied) In Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals, 312 SCRA 298 (1999), it was stated that
it is a well-known doctrine that the issue as to whether title was procured by falsification or
fraud as advanced by petitioner can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for the
purpose. A Torrens title can be attacked only for fraud, within one year after the date of the
issuance of the decree of registration. Such attack must be direct, and not by a collateral
proceeding. The title represented by the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified,
enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding.

Same; Same; Same; In several cases, the Supreme Court (SC) has ruled that an attack is
indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment
or proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.—The issue of fraudulent alienation
raised in the second application for registration of the subject property is collateral attack
which should be directly raised in a separate proceeding filed for such purpose. It cannot be
entertained in this proceeding. In several cases, the Court has ruled that an attack is indirect
or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment or
proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.

Same; Same; Same; Principle of Indefeasibility of Torrens Title; It is settled that an

application for registration of a parcel of land already covered by a Torrens title is actually a
collateral attack, not permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title.—The
RTC was, thus, correct in denying petitioner’s “Motion for Leave to File Supplemental
Pleading and to Admit Attached Supplemental Complaint For Reconveyance.” Allowing it
would not have been permissible because the application for original registration of title over
a parcel of land already registered is a collateral attack itself. It is settled that an application
for registration of a parcel of land already covered by a Torrens title is actually a collateral
attack, not permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title.

Same; Land Registration; Ownership; Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens
System does not create or vest title, because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership.—
Registration, however, does not deprive an aggrieved party of a remedy in law. What cannot
be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title or ownership which is
represented by such certificate. Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The fact that
a person was able to secure a title in his name did not operate to vest ownership upon him of
the subject land. Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or
vest title, because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an
evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. It cannot be
used to protect a usurper from the true owner; nor can it be used as a shield for the
commission of fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others. Its
issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the real
property may be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in
trust for another person by the registered owner. The remedy of the petitioner is to file a
separate proceeding or action to protect her alleged interest. As she claimed that she bought
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the subject property for value from the respondent as evidenced by a deed of sale, she can file
an action for specific performance to compel the respondent to comply with her obligation in
the alleged deed of sale and/or an action for reconveyance of the property. She can also file an
action for rescission. Needless to state, petitioner must prove her entitlement because the
respondent claims that the sale was falsified.

Same; Reconveyance; Actions; Reconveyance is based on Section 55 of Act No. 496, as amended
by Act No. 3322, which states that in all cases of registration procured by fraud the owner may
pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud, without
prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title.—
Reconveyance is based on Section 55 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 3322, which
states that in all cases of registration procured by fraud the owner may pursue all his legal
and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the
rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title. It is an action in
personam available to a person whose property has been wrongfully registered under the
Torrens system in another’s name. It does not seek to set aside the decree but, respecting it
as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, seeks to transfer or reconvey the land from
the registered owner to the rightful owner. Reconveyance is always available as long as the
property has not passed to an innocent third person for value.

29) Paul Gabriel v. Carmeling Crisologo, G.R. No. 204626, June 9, 2014

Civil Law; Land Titles; Torrens Title; In Arambulo v. Gungab, 471 SCRA 640 (2005), the
Supreme Court (SC) declared that the “age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens title
over a land is entitled to possession thereof.”—It is settled that a Torrens title is evidence of
indefeasible title to property in favor of the person in whose name the title appears. It is
conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described therein. It is also
settled that the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership of the
property, including possession. Thus, in Arambulo v. Gungab, 471 SCRA 640 (2005), this
Court declared that the “age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is
entitled to possession thereof.”

Same; Same; Same; Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529); Collateral Attack; Section
48 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, provides that a certificate of title cannot be the subject of a collateral attack.—As a
holder of a Torrens certificate of title, the law protects Crisologo from a collateral attack on
the same. Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree,
provides that a certificate of title cannot be the subject of a collateral attack. Thus:
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.—A certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law. This rule has been applied in innumerable cases, one of
which was Francisco Madrid v. Spouses Mapoy, 596 SCRA 14 (2009), where it was written:
Registration of land under the Torrens system, aside from perfecting the title and rendering
it indefeasible after the lapse of the period allowed by law, also renders the title immune
from collateral attack. A collateral attack transpires when, in another action to obtain a
different relief and as an incident of the present action, an attack is made against the
judgment granting the title. This manner of attack is to be distinguished from a direct attack
against a judgment granting the title, through an action whose main objective is to annul, set
aside, or enjoin the enforcement of such judgment if not yet implemented, or to seek recovery
if the property titled under the judgment had been disposed of. To permit a collateral attack
on respondents-plaintiffs’ title is to water down the integrity and guaranteed legal
indefeasibility of a Torrens title. The petitioners-defendants’ attack on the validity of
respondents-plaintiffs’ title, by claiming that fraud attended its acquisition, is a collateral
attack on the title. It is an attack incidental to their quest to defend their possession
of the properties in an “accion publiciana,” not in a direct action whose main
objective is to impugn the validity of the judgment granting the title. This is the
attack that possession of a Torrens Title specifically guards against; hence, we cannot
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entertain, much less accord credit to, the petitioners-defendants’ claim of fraud to impugn the
validity of the respondents-plaintiffs’ title to their property.

30) Datu Kiram Sampaco v. Hadji Serad Mingca Lantud, G.R. No. 163551, July 18,
2011

Land Titles; An original certificate of title issued by the Register of Deeds under an
administrative proceeding is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under judicial
proceedings.—The Torrens title is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the
land described therein, and other matters which can be litigated and decided in land
registration proceedings. Tax declarations and tax receipts cannot prevail over a certificate of
title which is an incontrovertible proof of ownership. An original certificate of title issued by
the Register of Deeds under an administrative proceeding is as indefeasible as a certificate of
title issued under judicial proceedings. However, the Court has ruled that indefeasibility of
title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation.

Same; The trial court erred in concluding that there was fraud in the issuance of respondent’s
free patent title on the ground that it covered residential land based only on the
Complaint which stated that the property was residential land when it was not shown that it
was the President who classified the disputed property as residential; At present, not only
agricultural lands, but also residential lands, have been made available by recent legislation
for acquisition by free patent by any natural born Filipino citizen.—It should be pointed out
that the allegation in the Complaint that the land is residential was made only by
respondent, but the true classification of the disputed land as residential was not shown to
have been made by the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Environment
and Natural Resources, pursuant to Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise
known as The Public Land Act. Hence, the trial court erred in concluding that there was
fraud in the issuance of respondent’s free patent title on the ground that it covered
residential land based only on the Complaint which stated that the property was residential
land when it was not shown that it was the President who classified the disputed property as
residential, and OCT No. P-658 itself stated that the free patent title covered agricultural
land. It has been stated that at present, not only agricultural lands, but also residential
lands, have been made available by recent legislation for acquisition by free patent by any
natural born Filipino citizen. Nevertheless, the fact is that in this case, the free patent title
was granted over agricultural land as stated in OCT No. P-658.

Same; Fraud; Misrepresentation; Fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of

patent and annulment of title, should never be presumed, but must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence, mere preponderance of evidence not being adequate.—Moreover,
petitioner contends in his petition that the Certification dated July 24, 1987 issued by Datu
Samra I. Andam, A/Adm. Assistant II, Natural Resources District No. XII-3, Bureau of
Lands, Marawi City, certifying that the data contained in OCT No. P-658 in respondent’s
name had no records in the said office, showed that respondent’s Torrens title was spurious.
The Court holds that the certification, by itself, is insufficient to prove the alleged fraud.
Fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of patent and annulment of title,
should never be presumed, but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, mere
preponderance of evidence not being adequate. Fraud is a question of fact which must be
proved. The signatory of the certification, Datu Samra Andam, A/Adm. Assistant II, Natural
Resources District No. XII-3, Marawi City, was not presented in court to testify on the due
issuance of the certification, and to testify on the details of his certification, particularly the
reason why the said office had no records of the data contained in OCT No. P-658 or to testify
on the fact of fraud, if any.

Reconveyance; Requisites.—Under Article 434 of the Civil Code, to successfully maintain an

action to recover the ownership of a real property, the person who claims a better right to it
must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land claimed; and second, his title thereto.
In regard to the first requisite, in an accion reinvindicatoria, the person who claims that he
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has a better right to the property must first fix the identity of the land he is claiming by
describing the location, area and boundaries thereof.

Same; It is relatively easy to declare and claim that one owns and possesses public
agricultural land, but it is entirely a different matter to affirmatively declare and to prove
before a court of law thatone actually possessed and cultivated the entire area to the exclusion
of other claimants who stand on equal footing under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act
No. 141, as amended) as any other pioneering claimants.—The Court holds that petitioner
failed to prove the requisites of reconveyance as he failed to prove the identity of his larger
property in relation to the disputed property, and his claim of title by virtue of open, public
and continuous possession of the disputed property in the concept of owner is nebulous in the
light of a similar claim by respondent who holds a free patent title over the subject property.
As stated in Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 194 SCRA 743 (1991), it is
relatively easy to declare and claim that one owns and possesses public agricultural land, but
it is entirely a different matter to affirmatively declare and to prove before a court of law that
one actually possessed and cultivated the entire area to the exclusion of other claimants who
stand on equal footing under the Public Land Act(Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended)
as any other pioneering claimants.

Same; Counterclaims; Collateral Attacks; A counterclaim may be considered as a complaint or

an independent action and can be considered a direct attack on the title.—The case cited by
petitioner, Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano E. Santiago, declared that
the one-year prescriptive period does not apply when the party seeking annulment of title or
reconveyance is in possession of the lot, as well as distinguished a collateral attack under
Section 48 of PD No. 1529 from a direct attack, and held that a counterclaim may be
considered as a complaint or an independent action and can be considered a direct attack on
the title.

31) Heirs of Gregorio Tengco v. Heirs of Jose Aliwalas, 168 SCRA 198

Public Lands; Land Title; Rule is well-settled that an original certificate of title issued on the
strength of a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate of title issued in a
judicial proceeding.—Petitioners’ theory is not supported by the jurisprudence on the matter.
The rule is well-settled that an original certificate of title issued on the strength of a
homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate of title issued in a judicial
proceeding, as long as the land disposed of is really part of the disposable land of the public
domain, and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from
the date of the promulgation of the order of the Director of Lands for the issuance of the
patent. A homestead patent, once registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes as
indefeasible as a Torrens Title.

Same; Same; Same; Contention of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies already rejected

by the Court in earlier decisions.—The contention of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies, on the theory that the case should have been brought before the Director of Lands,
had already been rejected by the Court in earlier decisions. Thus, while the Director of Lands
has the power to review homestead patents, he may do so only so long as the land remains
part of the public domain and continues to be under his exclusive control; butonce the patent
is registered and a certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be a part of public domain
and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor
jurisdiction.

Same; Same; Same; Dr. Aliwalas’ title to the property having become incontrovertible such
may no longer be collaterally attached.—But, as correctly pointed out by the respondent
Court of Appeals, Dr. Aliwalas’ title to the property having become incontrovertible, such
may no longer be collaterally attacked. If indeed there had been any fraud or
misrepresentation in obtaining the title, an action for reversion instituted by the Solicitor
General would be the proper remedy.
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Same; Same; Prescription; Title acquired through a homestead patent registered under the
Land Registration Act is imprescriptible.—Finally, petitioners contend that private
respondents have lost their title to the property through laches and prescription. They assert
that private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have never actually possessed the
property while petitioners and their predecessor-in-interest have been in actual, open,
uninterrupted and adverse possession of the property since 1918. But as stated above, title
acquired through a homestead patent registered under the Land Registration Act is
imprescriptible. Thus, prescription cannot operate against the registered owner.

32) Baloloy v. Hular, September 9, 2004

Land Titles; Torrens System; A Torrens Certificate is evidence of an indefeasible title of

property in favor of the person in whose name appears therein—such holder is entitled to the
possession of the property until his title is nullified.—The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to
establish his case by the requisite quantum of evidence. If he claims a right granted as
created by law or under a contract of sale, he must prove his claim by competent evidence. He
must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness or absence of the
evidence of that of his opponent. He who claims a better right to real estate property must
prove not only his ownership of the same but also the identity thereof. In Huy v. Huy, we held
that where a property subject of controversy is duly registered under the Torrens system, the
presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given weight and in the absence of strong
and compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner
of the property until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action. A
Torrens Certificate is evidence of an indefeasible title to property in favor of the person in
whose name appears therein. Such holder is entitled to the possession of the property until
his title is nullified.

33) Mariflor Hortizuela v. Gregorio Tagufa, et al, (G.R. No. 205867, February 23,
2015)

Civil Law; Land Titles and Deeds; Principle of Indefeasibility of Titles; The Supreme Court
(SC) is not unmindful of the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title and Section 48 of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1528 where it is provided that a certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack.—The Court is not unmindful of theprinciple of indefeasibility of a
Torrens title and Section 48 of P.D. No. 1528 where it is provided that a certificate of title
shall not be subject to collateral attack. A Torrens title cannot be altered, modified or
cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. When the Court says direct
attack, it means that the object of an action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin
its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to
obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment or proceeding is nevertheless made as an
incident thereof.

Same; Same; Reconveyance; Reconveyance is always available as long as the property has not
passed to an innocent third person for value.—Contrary to the pronouncements of the MCTC
and the CA, however, the complaint of Hortizuela was not a collateral attack on the title
warranting dismissal. As a matter of fact, an action for reconveyance is a recognized remedy,
an action in personam, available to a person whose property has been wrongfully registered
under the Torrens system in another’s name. In an action for reconveyance, the decree is not
sought to be set aside. It does not seek to set aside the decree but, respecting it as
incontrovertible and no longer open to review, seeks to transfer or reconvey the land from the
registered owner to the rightful owner. Reconveyance is always available as long as the
property has not passed to an innocent third person for value.

Same; Same; Certificates of Title; Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System
does not create or vest title, because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership.—The fact that
Gregoria was able to secure a title in her name does not operate to vest ownership upon her
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of the subject land. “Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create
or vest title, because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an
evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. It cannot be
used to protect a usurper from the true owner; nor can it be used as a shield for the
commission of fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others. Its
issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the real
property may be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in
trust for another person by the registered owner.”

Same; Same; Reconveyance; The remedy of reconveyance, based on Section 53 of Presidential

Decree (PD) No. 1529 and Article 1456, prescribes in ten (10) years from the issuance of the
Torrens title over the property.—The remedy of reconveyance, based on Section 53 of P.D. No.
1529 and Article 1456, prescribes in ten (10) years from the issuance of the Torrens title over
the property.

Same; Same; Reversion; A fraudulently acquired free patent may only be assailed by the
government in an action for reversion pursuant to Section 101 of the Public Land Act.—The
Court is not unaware of the rule that a fraudulently acquired free patent may only be
assailed by the government in an action for reversion pursuant to Section 101 of the Public
Land Act. In Sherwill Development Corporation v. Sitio Sto. Niño Residents Association,
Inc., 461 SCRA 517 (2005), this Court pointed out that: x x x It is to the public interest that
one who succeeds in fraudulently acquiring title to a public land should not be allowed to
benefit therefrom, and the State should, therefore, have an even existing authority, thru its
duly-authorized officers, to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the issuance of any
such title, to the end that the Republic, thru the Solicitor General or any other officer who
may be authorized by law, may file the corresponding action for the reversion of the land
involved to the public domain, subject thereafter to disposal to other qualified persons in
accordance with law. In other words, the indefeasibility of a title over land previously public
is not a bar to an investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such title has been
acquired, if the purpose of such investigation is to determine whether or not fraud had been
committed in securing such title in order that the appropriate action for reversion may be
filed by the Government.

34) Apuyan v. Haldeman (438 SCRA 402)

Land Titles; Free Patents; Petitioner could not have qualified to apply for a free patent over
the subject property.—In this case, petitioner has not complied with the requirement of
continuous occupation and cultivation of the subject property since he admitted during the
trial and stated in his Memorandum that he transferred to Barangay Bato, Palauig,
Zambales and resided there in 1958, so that when he filed his application for free patent in
1985, he was no longer occupying the land he was applying for in Locloc, Palauig, Zambales.
In addition, respondents were then in possession of their respective portions of the property
in question. Hence, petitioner could not have qualified to apply for a free patent over the
subject property.

Same; Same; A certificate of title issued on the basis of a free patent, that is procured through
fraud or in violation of the law may be cancelled and indefeasibility of the title is no defense.—
It is, therefore, clear that a certificate of title, issued on the basis of a free patent, that is
procured through fraud or in violation of the law may be cancelled, and indefeasibility of the
title is no defense.

35) Sacdalan v. Court of Appeals (May 20, 2004)

Land Titles; Torrens Titles; The principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title does not apply
where fraud attended the issuance of the title—the Torrens Title does not furnish a shield for
fraud.—Petitioners also claim that their titles are unassailable having acquired the same
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pursuant to law. Again the Court does not agree. The principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens
Title does not apply where fraud attended the issuance of the title, as is conclusively
established in this case. The Torrens Title does not furnish a shield for fraud.

36) Heirs of Saludares v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 128254, January 16, 2004)

Remedial Law; Property; Reconveyance; In an action for reconveyance, the decree of

registration is respected as incontrovertible; What is sought instead is the transfer of the
property or its title which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s
name, to its rightful or legal owner or to the one with a better right.—Notwithstanding the
indefeasibility of the Torrens title, the registered owner may still be compelled to reconvey
the registered property to its true owner. The rationale for the rule is that reconveyance does
not set aside or re-subject to review the findings of fact of the Bureau of Lands. In an action
for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought
instead is the transfer of the property or its title which has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another person’s name, to its rightful or legal owner, or to the one with a better
right.

Same; Same; Same; Prescription; The right to seek reconveyance of registered property is not
absolute because it is subject to extinctive presription.—Nevertheless, the right to seek
reconveyance of registered property is not absolute because it is subject to extinctive
prescription.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Prescription cannot be invoked in an action for reconveyance when
the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed.—There is but one instance when
prescription cannot be invoked in an action for reconveyance, that is, when the plaintiff is in
possession of the land to be reconveyed.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Court has permitted the filing of an action for reconveyance despite
the lapse of ten years and declared that said action, when based on fraud, is imprescriptible as
long as the land has not passed to an innocent purchaser for value.—In a series of cases, this
Court permitted the filing of an action for reconveyance despite the lapse of ten years and
declared that said action, when based on fraud, is imprescriptible as long as the land has not
passed to an innocent purchaser for value. But in all those cases including Vital vs. Anore on
which the appellate court based its assailed decision, the common factual backdrop was that
the registered owners were never in possession of the disputed property. Instead, it was the
persons with the better right or the legal owners of the land who had always been in
possession of the same. Thus, the Court allowed the action for reconveyance to prosper in
those cases despite the lapse of more than ten years from the issuance of title to the land. The
exception was based on the theory that registration proceedings could not be used as a shield
for fraud or for enriching a person at the expense of another.

LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS

37) Balbin v. Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur, GR No. L-20611, May 8, 1969 (28 SCRA
12)

Land Registration Act; Voluntary registration; Where three co-owner's duplicate certificates of
title are issued.—Where three co-owner's duplicate certificates of title are issued under
Section 43 of Act 496, a voluntary instrument cannot be registered without surrendering all
the copies of the same title to the Register of Deeds so that every copy thereof would contain
identical entries of the transactions affecting the land covered by the title.

Same; Same; Same; Deed of donation signed by husband. disposing of conjugal property
cannot be registered.—Deed of donation of conjugal property executed by husband cannot be
registered because it bears on its face an infirmity, namely, the fact that the two-thirds
portion of said property which he donated is more than his one-half share, not to say more
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than what remained of such share after he had sold portions of the same land to three other
parties.

Suspension of action; When registration of voluntary instrument over a registered land may be
suspended.—The matter of registration of an instrument disposing of a registered land under
the Torrens system may be suspended to await the outcome of a suit to determine the
validity of the different conveyances executed by the person seeking the registration of the
voluntary instrument.

38) Republic v. CA and Naguit, GR No. 144057, Jan. 17, 2005 (448 SCRA 442)

Land Titles; Land Registration; Requisites for the filing of an application for registration of
title under Section 14(1).—There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application
for registration of title under Section 14(1)—that the property in question is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945 or earlier.

Same; Same; Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSG’s view,
that all lands of the public domain which are not declared alienable or disposable before June
12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of
unchallenged possession by the occupant.—We are mindful of the absurdity that would result
if we adopt petitioner’s position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting
the OSG’s view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or
disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter
the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders
paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from
giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and
disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that
before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.

Same; Same; The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the
property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the
application for registration of title is filed.—The more reasonable interpretation of Section
14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time
the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or
disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the
property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of
adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified
as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part
of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

Same; Same; There are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended; The subject lands
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree are of the same type.—There are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. True, the
Public Land Act does refer to “agricultural lands of the public domain,” while the Property
Registration Decree uses the term “alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.” It
must be noted though that the Constitution declares that “alienable lands of the public
domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.” Clearly, the subject lands under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are of the same
type.

Same; Same; Even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than
June 12, 1945, and such possession being open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor
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may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree.—Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. There
is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be
converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at
least thirty (30) years. With such conversion, such property may now fall within the
contemplation of “private lands” under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by
those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the
alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession
being open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the
land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

39) Kidpalos v. Baguio Gold Mining Company, GR No. L-19940, Aug. 14, 1965 (14
SCRA 913)

Facts: Petitioners sued the Baguio Gold Mining Company and the Director of Mines in the
Court of First Instance of Baguio City, seeking judgment declaring said plaintiffs to be the
owners of certain parcels of land situated in Sitio Binanga, Barrio of Tuding, Itogon, Benguet,
Mt. Province, to annul the declarations of location of certain mineral claims of the Baguio
Gold Mining Company, overlapping the parcels claimed by plaintiffs, and to recover damages
from the company. The complaint also sought to enjoin the Director of Mines from proceeding
with the lode patent applications of the Mining Company, and to have the mine buildings
erected on the land in question demolished at the latter’s expense. The defendant Baguio
Gold Mining Company, claiming title by virtue of valid locations of the claims since 1925 to
1930.

Issue: Whether or not an applicant who was previously denied claims of ownership in
reinvindicatory action cannot file for registration of the same land involved.

Ruling: If the record of the former trial shows that judgment could not have been rendered
without deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter as
to all future actions between the parties, and if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain
premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment itself.

Since there can be no registration of land without applicant being its owner, the final
judgment of the Court of Appeals in the previous litigation declaring that the mining
company’s title is superior to that of appellant’s should be conclusive on the question in the
present case.

40) Benin v. Tuason, GR No. L-26127, June 28, 1974 (57 SCRA 531)

Land registration; Amendment to application for registration need not be published anew if
the amendment merely excludes portions covered by the original application.—Under Section
23 of Act 496, the registration court may allow, or order an amendment of the application for
registration when it appears to the court that the amendment is necessary and proper. Under
Section 24 of the same act the court may at any time order an application to be amended by
striking out one or more parcels or by severance of the application. The amendment may be
made in the application or in the survey plan, or in both, since the application and the survey
plan go together. If the amendment consists in the inclusion in the application for
registration of an area or parcel of land not previously included in the original application, as
published, a new publication of the amended application must be made. But if the
amendment consists in the exclusion of a portion of the area covered by the original
application and the original plan as previously published, a new publication is not necessary.
In the latter case, the jurisdiction of the court over the remaining area is not affected by the
failure of a new publication.

Same; Slight increase in area registered over the area contained in the application is not fatal
to the decree of registration.—We believe that this very slight increase of 27.10 square meters
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would not justify the conclusion of the lower court that "the amended plan. . . included
additional lands which were not originally included in Parcel 1 as published in the Official
Gazette." It being undisputed that Parcel 1 has an area of more than 8,798,600 square
meters (or 879.86 hectares), We believe that this difference of 27.10 square meters, between
the computation of the area when the original plan was made and the computation of the
area when the amended plan was prepared, cannot be considered substantial as would affect
the identity of Parcel 1.

Same; Registration court has no jurisdiction only insofar as areas not covered by original
application are added.—The settled rule, further, is that once the registration court had
acquired jurisdiction over a certain parcel, or parcels, of land in the registration proceedings
in virtue of the publication of the application, that jurisdiction attaches to the land or lands
mentioned and described in the application. If it is later shown that the decree of registration
had included land or lands not included in the original application as published, then the
registration proceedings and decree of registration must be declared null and void insofar—
but only insofar—as the land not included in the publication is concerned.

Same; Error in the plans does not nullify the decree of registration.—We may further observe
that underlying the contention of plaintiffs is the idea that errors in the plans nullify the
decrees of registration. This is erroneous. It is the land and not the plan which is registered.
Prior to the enactment of Act No. 1875, practically all plans for land registration were
defective especially in regard to errors of closures and areas, but so far no such errors have
been permitted to affect the validity of the decrees. If the boundaries of the land registered
can be determined, the technical description in the certificate of title may be corrected
without cancelling the decree. Such corrections have been made in this case by approved
surveys which embrace all of the land here in question. To nullify and cancel final decrees
merely by reason of faulty technical descriptions would lead to chaos.

Same; Full transcription of the decree of registration in the Registration Book though made in
a disorderly manner is valid.—There is no showing that the manner of transcribing the
decree, as it appears on that photostat, was done for a fraudulent purpose, or was done in
order to mislead. Considering that the decree or registration is fully transcribed in the
Registration Book, and also copied in original Certificate of Title No. 735, the circumstance
that the beginning of the technical descriptions is not found on the face, or on the first page,
of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is not a ground to nullify the said certificate of title.
This defect should be considered as formal, and not substantial, defect.

Same; Purposes of the land Registration Law stated.—The purposes of the Land Registration
Law, in general, are: to ascertain once and for all the absolute title over a given landed
property; to make, so far as it is possible, a certificate of title issued by the court to the owner
of the land absolute proof of such title; to quiet title to land and to put a stop forever to any
question of legality of title; and to decree that land title shall be final, irrevocable and
undisputable.

Same; Remedies of party unlawfully deprived of property thru wrongful registration.—It is

settled rule that a party seeking the reconveyance to him of his land that he claims had been
wrongly registered in the name of another person must recognize the validity of the
certificate of title of the latter. It is also the rule that a reconveyance may only take place if
the land that is claimed to be wrongly registered is still registered in the name of the person
who procured the wrongful registration. No action for reconveyance can take place as against
a thirty party who had acquired title over the registered property in good faith and for value.
And if no reconveyance can be made, the value of the property registered may be demanded
only from the person (or persons) who procured the wrongful registration in his name.

Same; Effects of in rem proceedings in land registration.—The proceedings in LRC 7681

being in rem, the decree of registration issued pursuant to the decision rendered in said
registration case bound the lands covered by the decree and quieted title thereto, and is
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the government and all the branches
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thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice or citation, or included in the
general inscription "Two whom it may concern," and such decree will not be opened by reason
of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any
proceedings in any court for reversing judgment or decree. Such decree may only be reopened
if any person deprived of land or any estate or interest therein by decree or registration
obtained by fraud would file in the competent court of first instance a petition for review
within one year after entry of decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value had acquired
an interest on the land, and upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree, or the
certificate of title issued pursuant to the decree, is incontrovertible (Sec. 38, Act 496).

Same; Mere possession cannot defeat title issued under the Land Registration Act.—
The possession by the appellees, either by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest, if there was such possession at all, would be unavailing against the holder of a
Torrens certificate of title covering the parcels of lands now in question. From July 8, 1914,
when Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued, no .possession by any person of any
portion of the lands covered by said original certificate of title, or covered by a subsequent
transfer certificate of title derived from said original certificate of title, could defeat the title
of the registered owner of the lands covered by the certificate of title.

Same; Titles of purchasers in good faith for value cannot be annulled without due hearing.—
The buyers of the lots necessarily relied upon the certificate of title in the name of J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. and because they paid for the lots they certainly are purchasers in good
faith and for value. The purchasers of these lots have built thereon residential houses, office
buildings, shops, hospital, even churches. But the lower court, disregarding these
circumstances, declared null and void all transfer certificates of title that emanated, or that
were derived, from Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This is a grave error committed by
the lower court. To give effect to the decision of said court is. to deprive persons of their
property without due process of law. The decision of the lower court would set at naught the
settled doctrine that the holder of a certificate of title who acquired the property covered by
the title in good faith and for value can rest assured that his title is perfect and
incontrovertible.

41) Director of Lands v. IAC (209 SCRA 240) *dili ni sure though, kay wala’y mugawas
nga 209 SCRA 240* so nangita ko’g laing case pero same parties involved, ang case
kay140 SCRA 98…

Land Registration Act; Evidence; Discrepancies in the tax declarations submitted in evidence
as to who are the adjoining owners cast serious doubts on applicants' claim over the lots in
question.—ln 1949, Fausta de Jesus filed Tax Declaration No. 475 (Exh. M-7) which cancelled
Tax Declaration No. 5319 over the same parcel of land. A close examination, however, of Tax
Declaration No. 475 shows that the listing of the adjoining owners therein was at variance
with what was previously stated in Tax Declaration No. 5319.

Same; Same; Same.—This anomaly in the listing of adjoining owners in the two aforestated
tax declarations over the same parcel of land only reveals the flaw that apparently attended
the acquisition of the lots in question by respondent applicants and their predecessor-in-
interest.

Same; Same; Same.—Under Tax Declaration No. 5321 dated 1941 (Exh. 0-8), respondent
applicants' predecessor-in-interest, Fausta de Jesus, declared a parcel of land in her name
with an area of 88.0637 hectares. Later, in 1949, Fausta de Jesus filed Tax Declamtion No.
476 (Exh. 0-7) which cancelled Tax Declaration No. 5321 over the same parcel of land.
However, under Tax Declaration No. 476, the total area of the land declared was
only 85.0637 hectares(84.0637 as erroneously stated in Tax Declaration No. 476). Again, the
foregoing disparity in the size of the land as declared in the two tax declarations is a clear
indication that respondent applicants herein and their predecessor-in-interest were uncertain
and contradictory as to the exact or actual size of the land they purportedly possessed.
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Same; Same; It intrigues the mind that Fausta de Jesus managed to increase her
landholdings when her residence from 1949 to 1962 was in Manila.—Likewise, it is
noteworthy to mention that six years after Fausta de Jesus filed Tax Declaration No. 476 in
1949, Tax Declaration No. 2779 was filed—cancelling Tax Declaration No. 476—showing this
time a whopping land area of 119.1231 hectares. As to how Fausta de Jesus managed to
increase her landholdings in so short a span of time intrigues one no end, considering that
from 1949 up to her death in 1962, she listed Manila as her place of residence.

Same; Same; Non-payment or irregular payment of realty taxes cast doubt on applicants'
claim for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.—The record shows that even the taxes due
on the litigated lots were not paid regularly. As per certification of the municipal treasurer of
Buenavista, Marinduque, it was shown that the taxes due on the land registered in the name
of Fausta de Jesus were paid only from 1949 until 1957—an indication that respondent
applicants and their predecessor-in-interest did not pay taxes to the government from 1928 to
1940, and from 1958 until July 6, 1978 when the respondent applicants closed their
evidence—a total of 32 years. The respondent applicants presented their evidence on April
19, 1977, October 12, 1977, March 29, 1978 and July 6, 1978.

Same; Same; The testimonies of hired tenants and overseers of applicant for confirmation of
imperfect title, when favorable to the applicant should not be given weight and significance.—
The testimonies of respondent applicants' alleged overseers and hired tenants should not be
accorded weight and significance; because it is only natural f or the overseers and hired
tenants to testify as they did in respondent applicants' favor as they stand to benefit from a
decision favorable to their supposed landlords and benefactors.

Same; Same; It is strange that applicant for confirmation of imperfect title was able to plant
only 3,000 coconut trees when the land being applied for consists of 138 hectares.—But even
granting that the witnesses presented by herein respondent applicants were indeed bona
fide overseers and tenants or workers of the land in question, it appears rather strange why
only about 3,000 coconut trees and some fruit trees were planted (2,000 coconut trees on Lot
1 which is 119 hectares, and 1,000 coconut trees on Lot 2 which is 19 hectares) on the vast
tract of land subject of the instant petition. In a practical and scientific way of planting, a
one-hectare land can be planted to about 144 coconut trees. In the instant case, if the hired
tenants and workers of respondent applicants managed to plant only 3,000 coconut trees, it
could only mean that about only 25 hectares out of the 138 hectares claimed by herein
respondent applicants were planted, a coconut is left to grow and need not be tended or
watched This is not what the law considers as possession under claim o: ownership.

Same; Same; Casual cultivation of portions of land applied for not sufficient basis for grant of
land from the government.—On the contrary, it merely
showed casual or occasional cultivation of por tions of the land in question. In short,
possession is not exclusive not notorious, much less continuous, so as to give rise to a
presumptive grant from the government.

Same; Same; Applicants' for confirmation of imperfect title based on their being children of
their predecessor-in-interest must prove that they are the sole heirs of the latter.—Morever,
respondent applicants herein have not shown nor established clearly their right to inherit
from their predecessor-in-interest. The observation of the Solicitor General on this point is
thus well taken: "Even assuming that applicants' deceased mother acquired registerable title
over the parcels in question, applicants cannot be said to have acquired the same right proper
for registration. They have not presented any evidence of value to prove that they have the
right to inherit whatever portion of the properties left by Fausta de Jesus. They have first to
show their right to succeed Fausta, testate or intestate; to establish who Fausta's legal heirs
are or that applicants, and no other, are Fausta's sole heirs. But all these should be threshed
out in a proper proceeding, certainly not in a land registration case."

42) Director of Lands v. IAC and Acme, GR No. 73002, Dec. 29, 1986 (146 SCRA 509)
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Land Registration; A juridical confirmation proceeding should at most be limited to

ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time as
it is not so much one to confer title as it is to recognize a title already vested.—Nothing can
more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land
which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express
grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself that the possessor(s) "x x x shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title x x x." No proof being admissible to overcome a
conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a
formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the
required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but
simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land
from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation
of law from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As was so well
put in Cariño, "x x x (T)here are indications that registration was expected from all, but none
sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of
the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."’

Same; Constitutional Law; The 1973 Constitution cannot impair vested rights. Thus where
land was acquired in 1962 when corporations were allowed to acquire lands not beyond 1,024
hectares, the same may be registered in 1982 although under 1973 Constitution corporations
cannot acquire lands of the public domain.—Even on the proposition that the land remained
technically "public" land, despite immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors,
until title in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public
Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acme's right to acquire the land at the time it
did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit
corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had
already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation
then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in
excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings
were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from
owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came
into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already
held, in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.

Same; Same; Same.—The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted
by Acme in its own name must be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance,
productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and
merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no
doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in the light of the
undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had
title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law
would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which
violates no constitutional mandate.

Same; Same; The ruling in MERALCO vs. CASTROBARTOLOME (114 SCRA 799), that
public land ceases to be so only upon issuance of a certificate of title, is hereby reconsidered
and abandoned. Correct rule is that in Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil 424.—The Court, in the light of
the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling in Meralco must be
reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated
in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor,
personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for
the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is
converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.
Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal
was already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme
thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
KMOC – 2BL5

corporation's holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme
is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent
in Meralco.

Same; Same; Same; A corporation that acquired private land in 1962 may have it registered
in 1982 despite the prohibition in the 1973 Constitution which cannot be given retroactive
effect as to impair vested rights.—There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the
lands to the Infiels and the latter from themselves applying for confirmation of title and,
after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But
this would be merely indulging in empty charades, whereas the same result is more
efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of
the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.

Same; Same; Same; Same.—While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of
comparatively recent vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and
re-established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of which has passed the test of searching
examination and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority
opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad
Santos, in Meralcorested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical
person, was disqualified from applying for confirmation of an imperfect title to public land
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article
XIV, Section 11, was only tangential, limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and
may, in that context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no
constitutional question.

43) Mindanao v. Director of Lands, GR No. L-19535, July 10, 1967 (20 SCRA 641)

Public Lands, Torrens System; Judgments; Res judicata; Judicial confirmation of title.—A
judgment in a land registration proceeding, that a tract of land is public land, does not bar
other persons from filing a subsequent land registration proceeding for the judicial
confirmation of their title to the same land, under section 48 of the Public Land Law, on the
basis of a "composicion" title and continuous and adverse possession thereof for more than
thirty years. Their imperfect possessory title was not disturbed or foreclosed by the prior
judicial declaration that the land is public land since the proceeding under section 48
presupposes that the land is public.

Same; Basis of decree of judicial confirmation of title.— A decree under section 48 of the
Public Land Law is not based on the fact that the land is already privately owned and, hence,
no longer a part of the public domain; its basis is that, by reason of the applicant's possession
for thirty years or more, he is conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a government grant.

Same; Personality of oppositor.—Persons, who claim to be in possession of a tract of public

!and and who have applied to the Bureau of Lands for its purchase, may oppose its
registration under section 48 of the Public Land Law.

44) De Castro v. Marcos, GR No. L-26093, Jan. 27, 1969 (26 SCRA 644)

Cadastral law; Cadastral proceedings; Procedure for reopening; Publication not

required; Inclusion of additional territory in a plan; Effect of absence of new publication upon
jurisdiction of cadastral court.—The provision of Section 1 of Republic Act No. 931 (as
amended by Rep. Act No. .2061) establishes the procedure for reopening of cadastral
proceedings. Such procedure does not include publication. Neither is publication mentioned
in any of the other provisions of Republic Act 931. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 931 merely
states that "the competent Court of First Instance, upon receiving such petition, shall notify
the Government, through the Solicitor General". Under Republic Act 931 it is unnecessary to
furnish the Director of Forestry a copy of the reopening petition "inasmuch as said Act 931
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
KMOC – 2BL5

only required service thereof to the Solicitor General" (Republic v. Maglanoc, L-20397, April
29, 1966).

Jurisprudence informs us that "an order of court in a cadastral case amending the official
plan so as to make it include land not previously included therein is a nullity unless new
publication is made as a preliminary to such step" and that "additional territory cannot be
included by amendment of the plan without new publication" (Phil. Manufacturing
Co. v. Imperial, 49 Phil. 122. See also Escueta v.Director of Lands, 16 Phil. 482, 487;
Juan v. Ortiz Luis, 49 Phil. 252, 256; Lichauco v. Herederos de Corpus, 60 Phil. 211, 214).
Upon the other hand, the jurisdiction of a court to issue orders providing for exclusion of land
included in the original plan is not affected by failure to order a new publication (Bank of
P.I. v. Acuña, 59 Phil. 183, 186).

Same; Notice to the government of a reopening petition suffices; Reason; When petition for
reopening of cadastral proceding can successfully be blocked.—If a prospective intervenor
claims a piece of land by an alleged right that has accrued prior to the institution of the
original cadastral case, a proceeding in rem, he is, of course, to be deemed to have received
notice thru the publication therein made. If his rights are derived from the government after
the land has been declared part of the public domain by the cadastral court, then notice to
the government of a reopening petition as provided by law, should suffice. For, the
government is supposed to take up the cudgels for a public land grantee, or, at the very least
notifythe latter. It must be remembered that a petition for reopening under Republic Act 931
can successfully be blocked if it is shown that the land involved therein has already "been
alienated, reserved, leased, granted or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by
the Government".

Same; Basis of reopening of cadastral proceeding in Director of Lands v. Benitez, L-21368,

March 31, 1966; Explained; Offshore land could not be the subject of cadastral survey.—True,
Director of Lands. v.Benitez L-21368, March 31, 1966, ruled that the petition to reopen filed
in that case under Republic Act 931, must be published as required in Section 1 of the
Cadastral Act (Act 2259) because such case is still governed by the procedure laid down by
the latter law. The Benitez case, however, must be read in its factual context. There the
petition of the Benitez spouses for reopening the cadastral proceedings covering the entire
city of Tacloban, was based on the claim that "through oversight, inadvertence and excusable
neglect a portion of" 1,805 square meters of Lot 2157 of the land originally registered in the
name of petitioners therein "has not been included in the original survey." They prayed that
after appropriate proceedings, said portion (designated as Lot No. 1 of the subdivision plan)
be adjudicated to them pursuant to Republic Act 931. In fact, back of the Benitezdeclaration
that publication is necessary is jurisprudence heretofore stated (Philippine Manufacturing
Company v.Imperial, supra), that such publication is required when additional territory is
sought to be included in the original plan. Indeed, the record of Benitez in this Court shows
that the opposition to the reopening petition is predicated on the averment that the cadastral
court did not include the lots in controversy because those lots were "part of the offshore
land" and hence, of the public domain which could not be the subject of cadastral survey or of
the cadastral case.

Same; Legal standing or personality to sue in land registration or cadastral proceedings; Case
at bar.—In an early case (Roxas v. Cuevas, 8 Phil. 469, 475), this Court declared that mere
citizens could have no interest in public land. At about the same time, this Court also held
that to give a party standing in a court of land registration, he must make some claim to the
Cuevas, supra).Then, in Archbishop of Manila v.Barrio of Sto. Cristo (39 Phil. 1, 7), this
Court pronounced that although property (Couto v. Cortes, 8 Phil. 459,
461, citing Roxas v. an opponent in a land registration proceeding could not show title in
himself, he was not discapacitated from opposing the registration sought by another. Plain
was the statement there that "[a]ll that is necessary to enable anyone to exert thefaculty of
opposition is that he should appear to have an interest in the property". And so this Court
added, "it is immaterial whether this interest is in the character of legal owner or is of a
purely equitable nature as where he is the beneficiary in a trust". Later, this Court described
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
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a homesteader who had not yet been issued his title but who had fulfilled all the conditions
required by law as a person who should be regarded as an equitable owner of the land
(Balboa v.Farrales, 51 Phil. 498, 501-503). Similarly, a purchaser of friar land has an
equitable title to the land before the issuance of the patent (Annotation 17 SCRA 82, citing
Director of Lands v. Rizal, 37 Phil. 806; etc.). A bona fide applicant of public land may protect
his right of possession and sue for forcible entry or unlawful detainer or pursue any suitable
remedy provided by law (Pitargue v. Sorilla, 92 Phil. 5, 15). Indeed, an awardee in a sales
application is authorized to take possession of the land to enable him to comply with the
requirements of the award before title can be issued (Visayan Realty, Inc: v. Meer, 96 Phil.
515, 520). A homestead entry segregates the homestead from the public domain and divests
the Director of Lands of control and possession thereof except if the homestead application is
finally disapproved and the entry annulled or revoked.

Recently, we declared that persons who claim to be in possession of a tract of public land and
have applied with the Bureau of Lands for its purchase have the necessary personality to
oppose registration (Heirs of Pelagio Zara v.Director of Lands, L-19535, July 10, 1967). We
have held too that an award under a sales application has "the effect of withdrawing the
lands of the public domain that were 'disposable' by the Director of Lands" (Director of
Lands v. Court of Appeals, L-17696, May 19, 1966, citing cases).
Petitioner Virginia de Castro here, it must be recalled, is an awardee in the public bidding
held upon her own township sales application. Of course, the award up to now has not been
fully implemented because she has not yet complied with one condition imposed on her. But,
if the award is not a permanent disposition, it is at least a provisional one, enough to prevent
reopening by respondent Akia as to the land disputed.

45) Valisno v. Plan, GR No. L-55152, Aug. 19, 1986 (143 SCRA 502)

Land Registration; Actions; Practice & Pleadings; In land registration cases, an opposition
partakes of the nature of an answer with counterclaim and a motion to dismiss the opposition
is not unauthorized as Rules of Court are merely suppletory to such proceedings.—Verily, the
Land Registration Act [Act 4961 does not provide for a pleading similar or corresponding to a
motion to dismiss. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, however, allows the application of the rules
contained therein in land registration proceedings in a suppletory character or whenever
practicable and convenient.

Thus, for the expeditious termination of the land registration case, this Court in Duran v.
Oliva, 3 SCRA 154, sustained the dismissal of the application for registration of therein
appellants upon a motion to dismiss filed by five [5] oppositors, it having been indubitably
shown that the court a quo did not have jurisdiction over the res as the lands sought to be
registered in appellants’ name had previously been registered in the names of the oppositors.
To have allowed the registration proceeding to ran its usual course would have been a mere
exercise in futility. The same consideration applies to the case at bar.

Same; Same; Same; Same.—It must be noted that the opposition partakes of the nature of an
answer with a counterclaim. In ordinary civil cases, the counterclaim would be considered a
complaint, this time with the original defendant becoming the plaintiff. The original plaintiff,
who becomes defendant in the counterclaim may either then answer the counterclaim or be
declared in default, or may file a motion to dismiss the same. The latter choice was what
respondent Cayaba opted for. Although as We have earlier said, such situation rarely, if ever,
happens in land registration cases, the irregularity that petitioners complain of stems
basically from the infrequent use of a motion to dismiss in land registration cases, and not
from it being unauthorized.

Same; Same; Judgments; The doctrine in Abellera vs. Farol 74 Phil. 284, needs re-evaluation;
A final judgment in an ordinary civil case determining ownership of a certain land is res
judicata in the kind registration case where the parties and the property are identical
including the addition of a party in the registration case where he claims co-ownership.—
There is no doubt that the principle of res judicata operates in the case at bar. For said
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principle to apply: [a] the former judgment must be final, [b] it must have been rendered by a
court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, [c] it must be a judgment on
the merits and [d] there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, of
subject matter and of cause of action. [Carandang v. Venturanza, 133 SCRA 344] The
decision in C.A. G.R. No. 60142-R is a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court which
had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. There is, between the registration
case under consideration and the previous civil action for recovery of property, identity of
parties, subject matter and cause of action. The inclusion of private respondent Cayaba’s co-
owner, Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the application for registration does not result in a
difference in parties between the two cases. One right of a co-owner is to defend in court the
interests of the co-ownership. [Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Vol. II, 7th
Edition, p. 258] Thus, when private respondent Cayaba defended his ownership over the land
in question, he was doing so in behalf of the co-ownership. This is evident from the fact that
one of the evidence he presented to prove ownership was the deed of sale executed by the
heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano in his and Bienvenido Noriega’s favor. With respect to the
subject matter, there can be no question that the land sought to be recovered by petitioners
are the very same parcels of land being sought to be registered in Cayaba’s and Noriega’s
names.

Same; Same; Same, Caption of the complaint, as action to recover possession, does not control
where same is really an accion reinvidicatoria.—While the complaint in the first action is
captioned for recovery of possession, the allegations and the prayer for relief therein raise the
issue of ownership. In effect, it is in the nature of an accion reinvidicatoria. The second case
is for registration of title. Consequently, between the two cases there is identity of causes of
action because in accion reinvidicatoria, possession is sought on the basis of ownership and
the same is true in registration cases. Registration of title in one’s name is based on
ownership. In both cases, the plaintiff and the applicant seek to exclude other persons from
ownership of the land in question. The only difference is that in the former case, the
exclusion is directed against particular persons, while in the latter proceedings, the exclusion
is directed against the whole world. Nonetheless, the cause of action remains the same. In
fact, this Court held in Dais v. Court of First Instance of Capiz, [51 Phil. 896] that the
answers in a cadastral proceedings partake of an action to recover title, as real rights are
involved therein. It is only the form of action which is different. “But the employment of two
different forms of action, does not enable one to escape the operation of the principle that one
and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated.”

46) Director of Lands v. CA and Valeriano, GR No. 58867, June 22, 1984 (133 SCRA
701)

Public Lands Act; Land Registration; Forestal lands are not registerable, whether covered by a
Spanish title or a Torrens title.—Forestal land is not registerable. Its inclusion in a title,
whether the title be issued during the Spanish regime or under the Torrens system, nullifies
the title. (Director of Lands vs. Reyes, L-27594 and Alinsunurin vs. Director of Lands, L-
28144, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 177, 194-5; Li Seng Giap vs. Director of Lands, 55 Phil.
693; Director of Forestry vs. Muñoz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183; Dizon vs.
Rodriguez, and Republic vs. Court of Appeals. 121 Phil. 681; Adorable vs. Director of
Forestry, 107 Phil. 401).

Same; Same; Possession of forestal land cannot ripen into ownership.—Section 48(b) cannot
apply to forestal land before it is declassified to form part of disposable public agricultural
land (Heirs of Jose Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, L-27873, November 29, 1983, 126
SCRA 69, 75). A patent issued for forestal land is void. The State may sue for its reversion to
the public domain (Republic vs. Animas, L-37682, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 499). Possession
of forestal lands cannot ripen into private ownership (Director of Forestry vs. Muñoz, supra).

Same; Same; Evidence; Evidence shows in this case that there was an unwarranted
appropriation of public lands, a notorious practice in land registration cases.—It is
noteworthy that while the two parcels with a total area of 231 hectares have as natural
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boundaries the Cagbacong River and a brook, on the other hand, the five lots have as natural
boundaries not only the Cagbacong River but also the Kawilan Creek, Lonoy Creek and a
dried up creek (Exh. M). It was simply an unwarranted appropriation of the public domain, a
notorious practice in land registration cases.

Same; Same; Same; Tax declarations and receipts not conclusive evidence of ownership or
right of possession.—Anyway, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of
ownership or of the right to possess land when not supported by other evidence (Evangelista
vs. Tabayuyong, 7 Phil. 607; Casimiro vs. Fernandez, 9 Phil. 562; Elumbaring vs.
Elumbaring, 12 Phil. 384; Province of Camarines Sur. vs. Director of Lands. 64 Phil. 600;
Bañez vs. Court of Appeals, L-30351, September 11, 1974, 59 SCRA 15, 30).

Same; Same; Same; The evidence shows numerous other occupants of the land at bar.—Such
proofs are lacking in this case. The evidence shows that numerous persons are in possession
of portions of the disputed land. It results that the Salazars failed to prove that they are
entitled to register the 291-hectare land in question.

47) Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. v. CA, GR No. 50464, Jan. 29, 2009 (181 SCRA
443)

Land Registration; Public Lands; Land remains unclassified land until it is released
therefrom and rendered open to disposition.—If it is true that the lands are forest lands, then
all these proceedings become moot and academic. Land remains unclassified land until it is
released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. Our adherence to the Regalian doctrine
subjects all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands to the dominion of the State. Thus, before
any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the government.
Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land
classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.

48) International Hardwood and Veneer Co. v. UP, GR No. 521518, Aug. 13, 1991 (200
SCRA 554)

Public Lands; Forest Lands; Transfer of ownership; Effect on existing timber license
agreements.—When it ceded and transferred the property to UP, the Republic of the
Philippines completely removed it from the public domain and, more specifically, in respect to
the areas covered by the timber license of petitioner, removed and segregated it from a public
forest; it divested itself of its rights and title thereto and relinquished and conveyed the same
to the UP; and made the latter the absolute owner thereof, subject only to the existing
concession. x x x. The proviso regarding existing concessions refers to the timber license of
petitioner. All that it means, however, is that the right of petitioner as a timber licensee must
not be affected, impaired or diminished; it must be respected. But, insofar as the Republic of
the Philippines is concerned, all its rights as grantor of the license were effectively assigned,
ceded and conveyed to UP as a consequence of the above transfer of full ownership. This is
further borne out by Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990 which provides, inter alia, that “any
incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the University of
the Philippines.”

Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction of Bureau of Forestry.—Having been effectively segregated

and removed from the public domain or from a public forest and, in effect, converted into a
registered private woodland, the authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry over it
were likewise terminated. This is obvious from the fact that the condition in Proclamation
No. 971 to the effect that the disposition of timber shall be subject to forestry laws and
regulations is not reproduced in R.A. No. 3990. The latter does not likewise provide that it is
subject to the conditions set forth in the proclamation. An owner has the right to enjoy and
dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law.
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Same; Same; Same; Authority to collect forest charges.—As provided for in Article 441 of the
Civil Code, to the owner belongs the natural fruits, the industrial fruits and the civil fruits.
There are, however, exceptions to this rules, as where the property is subject to a usufruct, in
which case the usufructuary gets the fruits. In the instant case, that exception is made for
the petitioner as licensee or grantee of the concession, which has been given the license to
cut, collect, and remove timber from the area ceded and transferred to UP until 1 February
1985. However, it has the correlative duty and obligation to pay the forest charges, or
royalties, to the new owner, the UP, at the same rate as provided for in the Agreement. The
charges should not be paid anymore to the Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau of
Internal Revenue because of the very nature of the transfer as aforestated.

49) Republic v. CA (151 SCRA 746) *wala jud ko kabalo unsa ni nga case ay… wala’y mu-
appear kung ani iyang citation. Basig pwede ning 89 SCRA 648*

Land Registration; Reopening of decree of registration; Essential elements for reopening.—The

essential elements for the allowance of the reopening or review of a decree are: a) that the
petitioner has a real and dominical right; b) that he has been deprived thereof; c) through
fraud; d) that the petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the decree; and e) that
the property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser.

Same; Same; Same; Same; State should he afforded opportunity to present evidence of fraud
in grant of decree of registration.—We find reversible error. Although there was an
agreement by the parties to submit for resolution the Opposition to the Petition for Review,
which was treated as a motion to dismiss, the trial Court, in the exercise of sound judicial
discretion, should not have dismissed the Petition outright but should have afforded
petitioner an opportunity to present evidence in support of the facts alleged to constitute
actual and extrinsic fraud committed by private respondent. Thus, in the case of Republic vs.
Sioson, et al., it was held that “the action of the lower Court in denying the petition for
review of a decree of registration filed within one year from entry of the decree, without
hearing the evidence in support of the allegation and claim that actual and extrinsic fraud
upon which the petition is predicated, is held to be in error, because the lower Court should
have afforded the petitioner an opportunity to prove it.”

Same; Same; Fraud; Fraud required to justify review of registration decree; Extrinsic and
collateral fraud distinguished.—However, for fraud to justify the review of a decree, it must
be extrinsic or collateral and the facts upon which it is based have not been controverted or
resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. The following
ruling spells out the difference between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud; “Extrinsic or collateral
fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a
prevailing litigant “outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents,
attorneys for witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and
fairly his side of the case.” But intrinsic fraud takes the form of “acts of a party in a litigation
during the trial, such as the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony, which did not
affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just determination of the case.”
The fraud is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the Court.

Same; Same; Cadastral Proceedings; Republic Act 931; Land inside military reservation
cannot be the object of cadastral proceedings or reopening under Republic Act 931.—If the
allegation of petitioner that the land in question was inside the military reserva tion at the
time it was claimed is true, then, it cannot be the object of any cadastral proceeding nor can
it be the object of reopening under Republic Act No. 931.

Same; Same; No conversion of land into private property despite longer possession of
land; Reasons; Agency having jurisdiction to register under the Torrens System land forming
part of public forest.—Similarly, if the land in question, indeed, forms part of the public
forest, then, possession thereof, however long, cannot convert it into private property as it is
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
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within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and
jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens Systems.

Same; Same; Estoppel, not a case of; Inaction of Office of Solicitor General to oppose cadastral
proceedings not a bar to State’s recovery of public land; Reasons.—Even assuming that the
government agencies can be faulted for inaction and neglect (although the Solicitor General
claims that it received no notice), yet, the same cannot operate to bar action by the State as it
cannot be estopped by the mistake or error of its officials or agents. Further, we cannot lose
sight of the cardinal consideration that “State as a persona in law is the juridical entity,
which is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land” under basic Constitutional
precepts, and that it is moreover charged with the conservation of such patrimony.

50) Director of Lands v. CA and Valeriano, GR No. 58867, June 22, 1984 (129 SCRA
689)

Civil Law; Land Registration; Regalian Doctrine; Classification of public lands, an exclusive
prerogative of the Executive Department, not the courts; Absence of classification of land
renders the land as unclassified in consonance with the Regalian doctrine.—In effect, what
the Courts a quo have done is to release the subject property from the unclassified category,
which is beyond their competence and jurisdiction. The classification of public lands is an
exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government and not of the Courts.
In the absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is released
therefrom and rendered open to disposition. This should be so under time-honored
Constitutional precepts. This is also in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands
of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted
right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.

Same; Same; Estoppel by State; Non-presentation of evidence that property is within the
unclassified region, will not operate against the State under the rule that the State cannot be
estopped by omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents.—The recommendation of the
District Forester for release of subject property from the unclassified region is not the
ultimate word on the matter. And the fact that BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927
showing subject property to be within the unclassified region was not presented in evidence
will not operate against the State considering the stipulation between the parties and under
the well-settled rule that the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its
officials or agents, if omission there was, in fact.

Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Torrens System; Land within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Forest Development is beyond the jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the
Torrens System.—While it may be that the Municipality of Obando has been cadastrally
surveyed in 1961, it does not follow that all lands comprised therein are automatically
released as alienable. A survey made in a cadastral proceeding merely identifies each lot
preparatory to a judicial proceeding for adjudication of title to any of the lands upon claim of
interested parties. Besides, if land is within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest
Development, it would be beyond the jurisdiction of the Cadastral Court to register it under
the Torrens System.

Same; Same; Where property is still unclassified, possession of applicants, however long,
cannot ripen into private ownership.—Since the subject property is still unclassified,
whatever possession Applicants may have had, and, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership.

Same; Same; Conversion of property into fishpond or titling of properties around it, does not
automatically render the property as alienable and disposable; Remedy is the release of the
property from its being unclassified.—The conversion of subject property into a fishpond by
Applicants, or the alleged titling of properties around it, does not automatically render the
property as alienable and disposable. Applicants’ remedy lies in the release of the property
from its present classification. In fairness to Applicants, and it appearing that there are titled
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
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lands around the subject property, petitioners-officials should give serious consideration to
the matter of classification of the land in question.

51) Republic v. Bacus, GR No. 73621, Aug. 11, 1989 (176 SCRA 376)

Public Land Law; Forest Lands; Forest Lands are not alienable as such and can be the subject
of private appropriation only when they are declassified and declared as alienable.—There
should be no more question at this time that forest lands are not alienable as such and can be
the subject of private appropriation only when they are declassified and declared as
alienable. As long as they remain forest lands, no court has jurisdiction to order their
registration in the name of a private person.

Same; Same; Same; Unless and until the land is declassified the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply.—Unless and until the land classified as “forest” is released in an
official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural (or
commercial/residential) lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect
title do not apply.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Positive act of government needed to declassify land classified as
forest.—It bears emphasizing that a positive act of government is needed to declassify land
which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural
or other purposes.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Rule that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of
private appropriation and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private
property settled.—x x x It is already a settled rule that forest lands or forest reserves are not
capable of private appropriation and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them
into private property (Vano v. Government of Philippine Islands, 41 Phil. 11; Adorable v.
Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401; Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1182; Republic v.
De la Cruz, 67 SCRA 221; Director of Lands v. Reyes and Alinsunurin v. Director of Lands,
68 SCRA 177; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; and Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals, 133 SCRA 701) unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and
alienable by the Director of Forestry but even then, possession of the land prior to the
reclassification of the land as disposable and alienable cannot be credited as part of the
thirty-year requirement under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The law is clear on who may declassify forest lands and
declare them alienable and disposable.—The law is equally clear on who may declassify forest
lands and declare them alienable and disposable. Act No. 141 provides in no uncertain terms
that: Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into: (a)
Alienable or disposable, (b) Timber, and (c) Mineral lands, and may at any time and in a like
manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their
administration and disposition. Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition
of alienable or disposable lands, the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time declare what lands are open to
disposition or concession under this Act.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; No valid reason for respondent court to conclude that
the subject land was no longer forest land and could be the subject of private appropriation.—
The respondent court could not have been unaware of the above-quoted cases or of the cited
laws which were in force at the time it rendered its decision. There was therefore no valid
reason for it to conclude that the subject land was no longer forest land and could be the
subject of private appropriation. This ruling had no firmer basis than the certifications made
by minor functionaries who had no authority whatever in the classification of public lands.
Curiously, they were not even connected with the Bureau of Forest Development.

52) Director of Lands v. Reyes (68 SCRA 177)

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Appeals; Judgments; Service of record on appeal which contained the notice of appeal cures
defect in failure to serve notice of appeal to adverse party.—The failure of the appellants to
serve a copy of their notice of appeal to counsel for adjudicatee Roman C. Tamayo is not fatal
to the appeal because, admittedly, he was served with a copy of the original, as well as the
Amended Record on Appeal in both of which the Notice of Appeal is embodied. Hence, such
failure cannot impair the right of appeal.

Same; Same; Appeal from entire decision which is not severable affects the whole decision
such that one of the adverse parties cannot claim same became final as to him for failure to
serve notice of appeal.—What is more, the appeal taken by the Government was from the
entire decision, which is not severable. Thus, the affects the whole decision.

Same; Land registration law; Execution pending appeal is not applicable in land registration
proceeding.—We rule that execution pending appeal is not applicable in a land registration
proceeding. It is fraugh with dangerous consequences. Innocent purchasers may be misled
into purchasing real properties upon reliance on a judgment which may be reversed on
appeal.

Same; Same; Torrens title issued on basis of judgment that is not final is a nullity.—A
Torrens title issued on the basis of a judgment that is not final is a nullity, as it is violative of
the explicit provisions of the Land Registration Act which requires that a decree shall be
issued only after the decision adjudicating the title becomes final and executory.

Same; Same; Lis pendens; Notice of lis pendens cannot be cancelled until litigation finally
terminated.—Such entry of notice of lis pendens cannot be cancelled until the final
termination of the litigation. The notice of lis pendens must be carried over in all titles
subsequently issued, which will yield to the ultimate result of the appeal. x x x We find the
order to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151 and to issue subsequent titles free
from all liens and encumbrances to be void ab initio.

Same; Same; Same; Actions; Jurisdiction; An action to reconvey land involved in a pending
land registration case is barred by pendency of appeal in latter case such that trial court has
no jurisdiction to order Register of Deeds to cancel the original certificate of title subject of
pending dispute and order issuance of new titles free from all liens and encumbrances.—Civil
Case No. 4696 is an action in personam to which the appellants are not parties; its object was
to decree reconveyance to plaintiffs of a portion of the area adjudicated to the Parañaque
Investment and Development Corp. and Roman C. Tamayo in Land Registration Case No. N-
675, LRC Rec. No. N-25545, which is subject to the outcome of the appeal. In that case, the
court is without jurisdiction to order the Register of Deeds to cancel Original Certificate of
Title No. 0-3151 and to issue titles to transferees “free from all liens and encumbrances.” Nor
can such order be construed to authorize the Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis
pendens, which was not entered by virtue of the reconveyance case.

Same; Same; Administrative law; Criminal law; Register of Deeds who cancelled notice of lis
pendens in violation of his duty may be held criminally liable.—The Register of Deeds in
plain violation of his duty erased the notice of lis pendens in said titles; such act constitutes
misfeasance in the performance of his duties for which he may be held civilly and even
criminally liable for any prejudice caused to innocent third parties, but cannot affect the
petitioners-appellants who are protected by Our writ of injunction and the notice of lis
pendens inscribed in the original title. x x x In such case, subsequent transferees cannot be
considered innocent purchasers for value.

Same; Same; Lis pendens; Entity of notice of lis pendens in primary entry book is sufficient
notice to all persons.—At any rate, it is well-settled that entry of the notice of lis pendens in
the day book (primary entry book) is sufficient to constitute registration and such entry is
notice to all persons of such adverse claim.
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Same; Same; In application for judicial confirmation of titles, the submission of original
tracing cloth plan approved by the Director of Lands is mandatory.—The original tracing
cloth plan of the land applied for, which must be approved by the Director of Lands, was not
submitted in evidence. The submission of such plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory
character. Unless a plan and its technical description are duly approved by the Director of
Lands, the same are not of much value.

Same; Same; It is not function of the Land Registration Commission to check original survey
plans as it has no authority to approve original survey plans.—It is not the function of the
LRC to check the original survey plan as it has no authority to approve original survey plans.
If, for any reason, the original tracing cloth plan was forwarded there, the applicant may
easily retrieve the same therefrom and submit the same in evidence. This was not done.

Same; Same; Applicant is not relieved from duty of submitting in evidence the original tracing
cloth plan of land applied for even if a blue print copy of the plan was superimposed in the
military plan of the area declared as a reservation.—Obviously the superimposition of the
copy of the survey plan of land as surveyed for applicant in the military map of the area
under Proclamation No. 237 was for the sole purpose of showing that the land applied for is
situated within the area covered by the military reservation of Fort Magsaysay appropriately
indicated in the perimeter map of said reservation. But the applicant is not relieved from
submitting in evidence the original tracing cloth plan approved by the Director of Lands as
required by law. One of the distinguishing marks of the Torrens System is the absolute
certainty of the identity of a registered land. Consequently, the primary purpose of the
aforesaid requirement is to fix the exact or definite identity of the land as shown in the plain
and technical descriptions. Hence, the applicant is not relieved of his duty of submitting the
original tracing cloth of the survey plan of the land duly approved by the Director of Lands. It
will be noticed that the plan does not bear the approval of any officer authorized by law.
Same; Same; Surveyor’s certificate should be offered in evidence in registration proceeding.—
In similar manner, the surveyor’s certificate, also required in original land registration
proceedings, was not offered in evidence.

Same; Same; Claim that one is holder of informacion posesoria cannot succeed where alleged
holder does not appear in official list of holders of said titles.—Moreover, according to the
official records of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, on the basis of the “List of Possessory
Information Titles (Spanish Titles) of Nueva Ecija”, the corresponding supporting documents
of which are kept in the vault of said office, the name of Melecio Padilla does not appear
among those listed as holders of informacion posesoria titles as of the year 1898 covering
lands situated in Santor (now Laur), Nueva Ecija. x x x It is true that an alleged copy of an
informacion posesoria, in the name of Melecio Padilla, was recorded in the office of the
Register of Deeds on November 10, 1942 by one Rodolfo Baltazar, Register of Deeds, but the
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija could not certify to its veracity, as the supposed document
does not exist in their records.

Same; Same; Spanish Royal Decree of 1880 and 1881 prohibited grant of public land in excess
of one thousand hectares.—There is another factor which weighs heavily against the claim of
the applicant. The alleged informacion posesoria covers an area of “seis mil quiñones, poco
mas o menos” or an equivalent of 16,800 hectares, Under the Royal Decrees in force at the
time of the supposed acquisition, no one could acquire public land in excess of 1,000 hectares.
Thus, the Royal Decrees of November 25, 1880 and October 26, 1881, prohibited any grant of
public land in excess of one thousand (1,000) hectares.

Same; Same; Under Spanish Law, holder of informacion posesoria must prove compliance
with Art 398 of Spanish Mortgage Law for said informacion to be considered title of
ownership.—Under Spanish law, in order that an informacion posesoria may be considered as
title of ownership, it must be proven that the holder thereof has complied with the provisions
of Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law. x x x to wit, “that the applicant has been in open
possession of the land; that an application to this effect be filed after the expiration of 20
years from the date of such registration; that such conversion be announced by means of a
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
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proclamation in a proper official bulletin; that the Court order the conversion of the
registration of possession into a record of ownership; and that the Registrar make the proper
record thereof in the Registry.”

Same; Same; Right to perfect possessory information expired one year after promulgation of
Maura Law on April 17, 1895.—One year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or on
April 17, 1875, the right to perfect possessory information title under the law expired. After
that date, full property right of the land reverted to the government and the right of the
cultivator and possessor to obtain gratuitous title was extinguished.

Same; Same; Public Land Law; Casual cultivation of land and raising cattle thereon do not
constitute possession under claim of ownership.—A mere casual cultivation of portions of the
land by the claimant, and the raising thereon of cattle, do not constitute possession under
claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise
to a presumptive grant from the State, x x x The mere occupancy of land by grazing livestock
upon it, without substantial enclosures or other permanent improvements, is not sufficient to
support a claim of title thru acquisitive prescription.

Same; Same; Same; Possessor of public land must prove possession Under claim of ownership
for required number of years.—The possession of public land, however long the period may
have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of
limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant
can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required
number of years to constitute a grant from the State.

Same; Same; Same; Declaration of ownership for taxation purposes is proof that holder had a
claim of title.—It is true that tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes
are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, but they constitute at least proof that the
holder had a claim of title over the property.

Same; Same; Section £8 of Public Land Act (CA. 141) does not apply to forested areas.—
Section 48 (b) of CA. No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural land.
Forest lands or areas covered with forest are excluded. It is well-settled that forest land is
incapable of registration; and its inclusion in a title, whether such title be one issued during
the Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of registration, nullifies the
title.

Same; Same; Applicant in land registration proceeding must prove his acquisition by clear
and convincing evidence.—Unless the applicant has shown by clear and convincing evidence
that the property in question was ever acquired by the applicant or his ancestors either by
composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title, or any
other means for the acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be part of the
public domain.

53) Director of Lands v. CA (158 SCRA 556) *wala pud gud ni ay…samuka uy hahaha
naa’y 158 SCRA 568, try nato*

Land Registration; Evidence; Exhibit "O", the the true certified copy of the white paper plan
was sufficient for the purpose of identifying the land in question; Fact that the original survey
plan was recorded on white paper instead of a tracing cloth should not detract from the
probative value thereof.—We affirm. No reversible error was committed by the appellate court
in ruling that Exhibit "O", the true certified copy of the white paper plan, was sufficient for
the purpose of identifying the land in question. Exhibit "O" was found by the appellate court
to reflect the land as surveyed by a geodetic engineer. It bore the approval of the Land
Registration Commission, and was re-verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands on April
25, 1974 pursuant to the provisions of P.D. No, 239 withdrawing from the Land Registration
Commission the authority to approve original survey plans. It contained the following
material data: the barrio [poblacion], municipality [Amadeo] and province [Cavite] where the
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subject land is located, its area of 379 square meters, the land as plotted, its technical
descriptions and its natural boundaries. Exhibit "O" was further supported by the Technical
Descriptions signed by a geodetic surveyor and attested by the Land Registration
Commission. In fine, Exhibit "O" contained all the details and information necessary for a
proper and definite identification of the land sought to be registered, thereby serving the
purpose for which the original tracing cloth plan is required. The fact therefore that the
original survey plan was recorded on white paper instead of a tracing cloth should not detract
from the probative value thereof.

Same; Same; Public Land Act; Majority ruling in Meralco vs. Castro-Bartolome et al., 114
SCRA 799 is no longer deemed to be binding precedent; The correct rule x x x is that alienable
public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively for thirty (30) years is converted to private property by mere lapse
or completion of said period, ipso jure.—Since then, however, this Court had occasion to re-
examine the rulings in these cases vis-a-vis the earlier cases of Carino v. Insular
Government, 41 Phil. 935; Susi v. Razon, 48 Phil. 424 and Herico v. Dar, 95 SCRA 437,
among others, Thus, in the recent case of Director of Lands v, Intermediate Appellate Court,
146 SCRA 509, We categorically stated that the majority ruling in Meralco is "no longer
deemed to be binding precedent", and that "[T]he correct rule, x x x is that alienable public
land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period [30 years under the Public
Land Act, as amended] is converted to private property by mere lapse or completion of said
period, ipso jure." We further reiterated therein the time-honored principle of non-
impairment of vested rights.

54) Republic v. CA and Infante-Tayag, GR No. L-61462, July 31, 1984 (131 SCRA 140)

Civil Law; Land Registration; Failure of applicant to satisfy the requirements for judicial
confirmation of her alleged title, namely, to prove alleged 30 years’ possession in concept of
owner by applicant, her sister, mother and father, and paying taxes a few months prior to the
filing of the application; Case at bar; Land presumed to be still part of the public domain.—
After a study of the records, we find that contention to be meritorious. The testimonies of
Mrs. Tayag (who does not know the boundary owners and the area of the land) and
Morandarte, her overseer since 1973, are not sufficient to prove the alleged thirty years’
possession in the concept of owner by the applicant, her sister, mother and father. The taxes
for 31 years, 1946 to 1976, were paid only in 1976, a few months prior to the filing of the
application. The applicant failed to satisfy the requirements for judicial confirmation of her
alleged title (Maloles vs. Director of Lands, 25 Phil. 548). The said land must be presumed to
be still a part of the public domain (Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890).

55) Republic v. Sayo, GR No. 60413, Oct. 31, 1990 (191 SCRA 71)

Land Registration; Public Domain; All applicants in land registration proceedings have the
burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered belongs to the
public domain.—Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence it is that all applicants
in land registration proceedings have the burden of overcoming the presumption that the
land thus sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless the applicant
succeeds in showing by clear and convincing evidence that the property involved was
acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or
by possessory information title, or any other means for the proper acquisition of public lands,
the property must be held to be part of the public domain. The applicant must present
competent and persuasive proof to substantiate his claim; he may not rely on general
statements, or mere conclusions of law other than factual evidence of possession and title.

Same; Same; Solicitor General; Court orders and decisions sent to the fiscal, acting as agent of
the Solicitor General in land registration cases, are not binding until they are actually
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received by the Solicitor General.—Finally, it was error to disregard the Solicitor General in
the execution of the compromise agreement and its submission to the Court for approval. It
is, after all, the Solicitor General, who is the principal counsel of the Government; this is the
reason for our holding that “Court orders and decisions sent to the fiscal, acting as agent of
the Solicitor General in land registration cases, are not binding until they are actually
received by the Solicitor General.” It thus appears that the compromise agreement and the
judgment approving it must be, as they are hereby, declared null and void, and set aside.
Considerations of fairness however indicate the remand of the case to the Registration Court
so that the private parties may be afforded an opportunity to establish by competent evidence
their respective claims to the property.

56) (195 SCRA 568) - *atay wala’y ani nga case*

57) Javier v. Concepcion (94 SCRA 212)

Land Registration; Finding of Court of Appeals that no fraud attended the registration of title
affirmed.—In this connection, respondent Court of Appeals explicitly found that “after going
over the records, the pleadings and the evidence adduced, We found no trace of fraud and
misrepresentation in the procurement of the transfer certificate of title.” Fraud as a legal
basis for review of a decree means actual or positive fraud as distinguished from constructive
or legal fraud. Since the existence or attendance of actual or positive fraud is a question of
fact, and respondent Court having ruled out the same, We have no basis to sustain
defendants-petitioners’ contention that it attended the procurement of the title.

Same; Factual finding of Court of Appeals stands in the absence of weighty consideration to
warrant its reversal.—The lot in question, Lot No. 12, Plan PSU-16536-AMD was also found
to be “part and parcel of Lot No. 6” for which TCT No. 16817 of the Register of Deeds of
Quezon was issued on July 9, 1941 in the name of plaintiffs, now respondents. This factual
finding stands in the absence of weighty considerations to warrant its reversal.

Same; Prescription; One cannot acquire title to registered land by prescription.—Defendants’,

now petitioners’, position is untenable, the established rule being that one cannot acquire
title to a registered land by prescription or adverse possession.

Same; Same; Laches; Laches do not apply to this case as there were no intervening rights of
third persons who may be prejudiced by an order directing a return of the land to respondents
who did not take possession thereof for several years.—This circumstance obtaining in
the Mejia de Lucas case is not present in the case at bar. Here, there are no intervening
rights of third persons which may be affected or prejudiced by a decision directing the return
of Lot No. 12 to plaintiffs-respondents. Hence, the equitable defense of laches will not also
apply as against the registered owners in this case.

Same; Property; Rights and Obligations of possessor in good faith of a parcel of land.—
Petitioners should also be refunded the necessary and useful expenses, with the right to
retain the land until reimbursed of the same, pursuant to Article 546 of the Civil Code.
Under the said provision, respondents have the option to refund the amount of useful
expenses or to pay the increase in value which the land may have acquired by reason thereof.
In this connection, petitioners have placed the market value of improvements on the property
consisting of various fruit trees, bamboos, a house and camarin made of strong materials, at
P150,000.00 and this amount does not appear to be disputed. The average share of the owner
was likewise compromised at sixty (60) cavans per year, at an average price of seven pesos
(P7.00) per cavan as of the date of the hearing on September 23, 1960. In view of Article 544
of the Civil Code, supra, petitioners shall be accountable for the fruits of subject property
only after 1959, not from 1945.

58) Cimafranca v. Intermediate Appellate Court, GR No. L-68687, Jan. 31, 1987 (147
SCRA 611)
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CivilLaw; Property; Land Titles; Action for reconveyance of real property on ground of fraud
must be filed within 4 years from discovery of the fraud; When discovery deemed to have taken
place.—An action for reconveyance of real property on the ground of fraud must be filed
within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken
place from the issuance of the certificates of title (Baldin v. Medalla, 108 SCRA 666).
Respondents had only four years from October, 1958 or until 1962 to bring this action, which
respondents failed to do.

Same; Same; Same; Laches, elements of.—For laches to attach, the following elements must
be present: (1) Conduct on the part of the defendant or one under whom he claims, giving rise
to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the complainant seeks remedy; (2)
Delay in asserting the complainant’s right, the complainant having had knowledge or notice
of the defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3)
Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert
the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event
relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred (De Lucas v.
Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277; Abraham v. Recto-Kasten, 4 SCRA 298; Nielson & Co., Inc. v.
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Corp., 18 SCRA 1040; San Miguel Corporation v. Cruz, 31
SCRA 819; Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian, 42 SCRA 589; Perez v. Ong Chua, 116 SCRA 732;
Rafols v. Barba, 119 SCRA 146; Chacon Enterprises v. Court of Appeals, 124SCRA784).

Same; Same; Same; Same; Remedial Law; Special Proceedings;Partition; Estoppel by laches,
arises from negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time.—Respondents
have not taken any step to have the deed of extrajudicial partition corrected, if it is true as
they claim it is, that what had been sold to their father is 3/4 share of Lot 86 instead of 1/4
share. It is now both too late and bereft of basis to ask for the cancellation of TCT No. T-4569.
Inaction and neglect of a party to assert a right can convert a valid claim into a stale demand
(Perez v. OngChua, 116 SCRA 732 [1982]). An estoppel by laches arises from the negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it (Municipality of
Carcar v. CFI of Cebu, Barile Branch, 119 SCRA 392 [1982]; Gumpin v. Court of Appeals, 120
SCRA 687 [1983]; Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, 126 SCRA 109 [1983]; De Castro v. Tan, 129
SCRA 85 [1984]; Medija v. Patcho, 132 SCRA 540 [1984]; Burgos v. Chief of Staff of the Phil.,
133 SCRA 800 [1984]; Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541 [1985]; Tejido v. Zamacoma, 138 SCRA
78 [1985]).

Same; Same; Same; Prescription; Registered lands, not subject to prescription; Adverse,
notorious and continuous possession under a claim of ownership ineffective against a Torrens
title; Exceptions.—Unfortunately, as things turned out, the lower court found petitioners
guilty of laches as respondents had already been in possession of 3/4 portion of the lot for the
last fifty-four (54) years before they filed their complaint in 1971 (Rollo, p. 80) which
conclusion was sustained by respondent Appellate Court (Rollo, p. 46). Such conclusion is
untenable even for the sake of argument for Lot 86 is registered land and registered lands
are not subject to prescription. Adverse, notorious and continuous possession under a claim of
ownership for the period fixed by law is ineffective against a Torrens Title (Bolanos v. J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc., 37 SCRA 223 [1971]; Republic v. Lichauco, 46 SCRA 305 [1972]; Spouses
Co v. Serafin, 121 SCRA 61 [1982]; Mendiola v. Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA 130 [1981];
Umbay v. Alecha, 135 SCRA 427 [1985]). Unless there are intervening rights of third persons
which may be af fected or prejudiced by a decision directing the return of the lot to
petitioners, the equitable defense of laches will not apply as against the registered owners
(Urbano v. Concepcion, 94 SCRA 212 [1979]).

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A Torrens title cannot be attacked collaterally; Efficacy and
integrity of the Torrens system, how protected.—In fact, petitioners’ claim that it is private
respondents themselves who are in estoppel or are barred by prescription and laches from
questioning the validity and binding effect of TCT No. 4569 (Rollo, p. 17) is well taken under
the circumstances considering particularly the time that has elapsed since the issuance of the
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pertinent Torrens Title. Besides, a Torrens title cannot be attached collaterally. The issue on
its validity can be raised only in an action expressly instituted for that purpose (Magay v.
Estiandan, 69 SCRA 456 [1976]; Barrios v. Court of Appeals, 78 SCRA 427 [1977]). The
efficacy and integrity of the Torrens System must be protected (Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals, 102 SCRA 130 [1981]).

59) Sterling Investment Corporation v. Ruiz, GR No. L-30694, Oct. 31, 1969 (30 SCRA
318)

The subject matter of the controversy is a parcel of land originally owned by one Teodorico
Cabasbas, who obtained a homestead patent thereon on December 27, 1940. The deceased
was the father of respondent Alejandro Cabasbas. Petitioners Sterling Investment
Corporation, Pacific Equipment Corporation, Regional Investment Corporation and Golden
Hills Development Corporation, defendants in Civil Case No. 10603, started by alleging that
on February 18, 1958, respondent Alejandro Cabasbas filed a complaint in Branch VI of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 4870), against the spouses Jose A. de Kastro
and Estanislawa de Kastro, spouses Lutgardo Reyes and Elisa A. Reyes, and Demetrio de
Jesus, to recover the land originally owned by the late Teodorico Cabasbas, as evidenced by
Original Certificate of Title No. 815. On May 3, 1958, pursuant to a compromise agreement
entered into by the parties in the above-mentioned Civil Case No. 4870, the Honorable Judge
Andres Reyes of Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a decision in said
case. By virtue of the above-mentioned decision, the spouses Lutgardo Reyes and Elisa A.
Reyes, and Demetrio de Jesus were declared to be the registered owners of the western
portion of the land originally owned by the late Teodorico Cabasbas as per Original
Certificate of Title No. 615, subject matter of the above-mentioned litigation.1

Petitioners then specifically made mention of how subsequently they acquired ownership of
the above-mentioned property originally owned by the deceased Teodorico Cabasbas, by
virtue of the following transfers, namely: (a) Elisa A. Reyes, sold a portion of the land to the
spouses Demetrio de Jesus and Florencia Borja and the remaining portion to the spouses
Jose Rojas and Emiliana Mendoza; (b) subsequently, the spouses Jose Rojas and Emiliana
Mendoza acquired the whole lot by purchasing the portion belonging to the spouses Demetrio
de Jesus and Florencia Borja; (c) the spouses Jose Rojas and Emiliana Mendoza thereafter
sold one-half of the land to Natividad Araneta and the other half to the spouses Vincent
Recto and Ofelia Martinez; (d) the spouses Vincent Recto and Ofelia Martinez sold their one-
half interest to petitioner Regional Investment Corporation, while Natividad Araneta sold
her one-half share to Sterling Investment Corporation; (e) finally, Sterling Investment
Corporation sold the portion belonging to it to Pacific Equipment Corporation, which in turn
sold it to Golden Hills Development Corporation.2

Mention was then made that on October 24, 1968, respondent Alejandro Cabasbas filed his
second amended complaint, Civil Case No. 10603, praying that the decision in the previous
Civil Case No. 4870, based on a compromise agreement, be declared null and void with the
allegation that it was obtained through fraud as it was made to appear before the court of
first instance that the conveyance of title was made on February, 1946 when in fact it took
place on September 14, 1944, in violation of the Homestead Law. 3

In the answer of petitioners as defendants, there was a specific denial of the allegations that
the previous conveyances were made in bad faith or that they were null and void. In addition,
petitioners Sterling Investment Corporation and Pacific Equipment Corporation alleged as
affirmative and special defenses that the sale to them made on June 1, 1967 and November
14, 1967 were in good faith and for valuable consideration they being innocent purchasers for
value thus negating any cause of action against them. 4 Petitioners filed a motion to lift the
notice of lis pendens, previously issued on March 6, 1968, with the allegation that the suit
was filed by respondent Alejandro Cabasbas for harassment purposes only. They likewise
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asserted in such motion that petitioner Golden Hills Development Corporation had
subdivided the property and contracted to sell the portion thereof to over 100 buyers. They
affirmed their readiness and willingness to post a bond in favor of the plaintiff in that suit,
Alejandro Cabasbas.5

The plea of petitioners must be granted. There is merit in the petition.

1. The jurisdiction of respondent Judge is assailed on the ground that only the same branch
of the Court of first instance, which rendered a decision, possesses the competence to annul
it. Since it is admitted that the 1958 decision was rendered in the sala then presided by
Judge Andres Reyes, now Justice of the Court of Appeals, clearly respondent Judge who
presides in another and distinct branch is not vested with jurisdiction over Civil Case No.
10603. This contention has support in our decisions. Thus, in J. M. Tuason & Co. Inc. v.
Torres,7 cited in the petition, we explicitly held: "Petitioner's submission that only Branch IV
of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City can annul its own decision is well taken. It is
settled that the jurisdiction to annul a judgment of a branch of the Court of First Instance
belongs solely to the very same branch which rendered the judgment. Any other branch, even
if it be in the same judicial district — like those of the Courts of First Instance of Rizal,
sitting at Pasig and at Quezon City, which belong to the 7th Judicial District — that
attempts to do so either exceeds its jurisdiction, as We held in Cabigao v. Del Rosario, 44 Phil.
182, or acts with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, as We ruled
in P.N.B. v. Javellana, 92 Phil. 525. In either case, certiorari and prohibition would be proper
to prevent the attempting branch of the court from proceeding to nullify a final decision
rendered by a co-equal and coordinate branch. The two cases cited have only recently been
reaffirmed by Us in Mas v. Dumara-og, L-16252, Sept. 29, 1964." .

The success of the petition could thus be predicated on this ground alone, although it must be
admitted that at least two members of the Court feel the need for a re-examination of the
above doctrine.

2. Insofar, however, as the petition is predicated on an absence of a cause of action, the

ground relied upon to annul the 1958 decision based on a compromise agreement being
intrinsic and not extrinsic fraud, there is unanimity in the view entertained by the Court that
petitioners' stand must be sustained.

It suffices to refer to the leading case of De Almeda v. Cruz,8 a 1949 decision. As Justice
Tuason speaking for the Court made clear: "Fraud to be ground for nullity of a judgment
must be extrinsic to the litigation. Were not this the rule there would be no end to litigations,
perjury being of such common occurrence in trials. In fact, under the opposite rule, the losing
party could attack the judgment at any time by attributing imaginary falsehood to his
adversary's proofs. But the settled law is that judicial determination however erroneous of
matters brought within the court's jurisdiction cannot be invalidated in another proceeding.
It is the business of a party to meet and repel his opponent's perjured evidence."

As likewise aptly pointed out by him: "Under these circumstances, the most careful scrutiny
of the complaint should be made to see that it contains concrete and explicit charges and that
its allegations have the ring of probability. To write finis to litigations at the shortest possible
time is a cardinal policy in the administration of justice, and rules of procedure have been
adopted with this as one of their specific ends in view. One who assails the judgment of the
court whose machinery he himself had set in motion places upon himself greater burden than
is required in ordinary cases, to make in his complaint plausible showing that the court's and
the defendant's time, and expense will not again go to waste." The De Almeda decision has
been subsequently cited with approval in at least five cases. 9

The latest case in point, decided in 1968, this time in an opinion penned by Justice Zaldivar,
reiterates the above doctrine.10 Thus: "Not every kind of fraud, however, is sufficient ground
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
KMOC – 2BL5

to set aside a judgment. This Court has held that only extrinsic or collateral, as distinguished
from intrinsic, fraud is a ground for annulling a judgment. Extrinsic fraud refers to any
fraudulent act of the successful party in a litigation which is committed outside the trial of a
case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated
party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case. On the other hand,
intrinsic fraud refers to acts of a party in a litigation during the trial, such as the use of
forged instruments on perjured testimony, which did not affect the presentation of the case,
but did prevent a fair and just determination of the case."

3. In view of the above, there is no need to pass on the question of res judicata, which for
petitioners likewise constitutes a bar to the assumption of jurisdiction of respondent Judge.

60) Mindanao Development Authority v. CA, GR No. L-49087, April 5, 1982 (113 SCRA
429)

Trusts; Trusts, how created.—“Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are
created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties. Implied trusts come into being by
operation of law.” It is fundamental in the law of trusts that certain requirements must exist
before an express trust will be recognized. Basically, these elements include a competent
trustor and trustee, an ascertainable trust res, and sufficiently certain beneficiaries. Stilted
formalities are unnecessary, but nevertheless each of the above elements is required to be
established, and, if any one of them is missing, it is fatal to the trusts. Furthermore, there
must be a present and complete disposition of the trust property, notwithstanding that the
enjoyment in the beneficiary will take place in the future. It is essential, too, that the purpose
be an active one to prevent trust from being executed into a legal estate or interest, and one
that is not in contravention of some prohibition of statute or rule of public policy. There must
also be some power of administration other than a mere duty to perform a contract although
the contract is for a third-party beneficiary. A declaration of terms is essential, and these
must be stated with reasonable certainty in order that the trustee may administer, and that
the court, if called upon so to do, may enforce, the trust.

Same; Case at bar.—In this case, the herein petitioner relies mainly upon the following
stipulation in the deed of sale executed by Ang Bansing in favor of Juan Cruz to prove that
an express trust had been established with Ang Bansing as the settlor and trustee and Juan
Cruz as the cestui que trust or beneficiary: “That I hereby agree to work for the titling of the
entire area of my land under my own expenses and the expenses for the titling of the portion
sold to me shall be under the expenses of said Juan Cruz Yap Chuy.”

Same; Same.—The above-quoted stipulation, however, is nothing but a condition that Ang
Bansing shall pay the expenses for the registration of his land and for Juan Cruz to shoulder
the expenses for the registration of the land sold to him. The stipulation does not
categorically create an obligation on the part of Ang Bansing to hold the property in trust for
Juan Cruz. Hence, there is no express trust. It is essential to the creation of an express trust
that the settlor presently and unequivocally make a disposition of property and make himself
the trustee of the property for the benefit of another.

Same; No express trust is created where vendor merely agreed to work for the titling of land
sold at his expense.—While Ang Bansing had agreed in the deed of sale that he will work for
the titling of “the entire area of my land under my own expenses,” it is not clear therefrom
whether said statement refers to the 30-hectare parcel of land or to that portion left to him
after the sale. A failure on the part of the settlor definitely to describe the subject-matter of
the supposed trust or the beneficiaries or object thereof is strong evidence that he intended
no trust.

Same; Clear and unequivocal language is necessary to create a trust, not mere use of precatory
language.—Clear and unequivocal language is necessary to create a trust and mere precatory
language and statements of ambiguous nature, are not sufficient to establish a trust. As the
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Court stated in the case of De Leon vs. Packson, a trust must be proven by clear, satisfactory
and convincing evidence; it cannot rest on vague and uncertain evidence or on loose,
equivocal or indefinite declarations. Considering that the trust intent has not been expressed
with such clarity and definiteness, no express trust can be deduced from the stipulation
aforequoted.

Same; Even assuming that a trust was created, it had already been long repudiated by trustee
who had long ago refused to surrender petitioner’s predecessor’s title.—But, even granting,
arguendo, that an express trust had been established, as claimed by the herein petitioner, it
would appear that the trustee had repudiated the trust and the petitioner herein, the alleged
beneficiary to the trust, did not take any action therein until after the lapse of 23 years.
Thus, in its Reply to the Defendant’s Answer, filed on June 29, 1969, the herein petitioner
admitted that “after the last war the City Engineer’s Office of Davao City made repeated
demands on the defendants for the delivery and conveyance to the Commonwealth
Government, now the Republic of the Philippines, of the title of land in question, Lot 1846-C,
but the defendant ignored and evaded the same.” Considering that the demand was made in
behalf of the Commonwealth Government, it is obvious that the said demand was made
before July 4, 1946, when the Commonwealth Government was dismantled and the Republic
of the Philippines came into being. From 1946 to 1969, when the action for reconveyance was
filed with the court, 23 years had passed. For sure, the period for enforcing the rights of the
alleged beneficiary over the land in question after the repudiation of the trust by the trustee,
had already prescribed.

61) Republic v. CA (99 SCRA 743) *daghan kaayo siya, pero walay ani nga citation, try na
lang ning 392 SCRA 190*

Land Registration; Mere adverse possession in accordance with law for a period likewise
provided for by law does not automatically entitle the possessor to the right to register public
land in his name—he has to establish first the disposable and alienable character of the public
land.—Indeed, before one can be granted a confirmation of title to lands of the public domain,
the Public Land Act “requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable
public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in
the Public Land Act.” Only when these conditions are met may the possessor of the land
acquire, by operation of law, “a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of
a certificate of title being issued.” Conclusively, the Court of Appeals erred when it held that
mere adverse possession in accordance with law for a period likewise provided for by law
would automatically entitle the possessor to the right to register public land in his name. The
applicant has to establish first the disposable and alienable character of the public land.
Otherwise, all public lands, regardless of their classification, can be subject of registration of
private titles, as long as the applicant shows that he meets the required years of possession.

Same; To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation
reports of the Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or a statute; A certification
issued by a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources stating that the lots involved were found to be within the
alienable and disposable area is sufficient to show the real character of the land.—To prove
that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau
of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. In this case, private respondents
presented a certification dated November 25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that the lots involved were “found to be
within the alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per
map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980.” This is sufficient evidence to show the real
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
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character of the land subject of private respondents’ application. Further, the certification
enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence, which is true in
this case.

62) Tan v. Valdehueza, GR No. L-38745, August 6, 1975 (66 SCRA 61)

Judgment; Effect of; Res judicata; Identity of cause of action;Absence of inconsistency between
prior and subsequent judgments; Case at bar.—Applying the test of absence of inconsistency
between prior and subsequent judgments, the failure of Tan, in case 2002, to secure an
injunction against the Valdehuezas to prevent them from entering the land and gathering
nuts is not inconsistent with her being adjudged, in case 2574, as owner of the land with
right to recover possession thereof. Case 2002 involved only the possession of the land and
the fruits thereof, while case 2574 involves ownership of the land, with possession as a mere
attribute of ownership. The judgment in the first case could not and did not encompass the
judgment in the second, although the second judgment would encompass the first.

Contracts; Mortgage; Mortgage binding between parties even if instrument not recorded.—
Under article 1875 of the Civil Code of 1889, registration was a necessary requisite for the
validity of a mortgage even as between the parties, but under article 2125 of the new Civil
Code (in effect since August 30, 1950), this is no longer so. “if the instrument is not recorded,
the mortgage is nonetheless binding between the parties.”

Same; Sales; Equitable mortgage; Where vendor remains in possession of land and pays taxes
thereon, contract presumed as equitable mortgage.—The Valdehuezas having remained in
possession of the land and the realty taxes having been paid by them, the contracts which
purported to be pacto de retrotransactions are presumed to be equitable mortgages, whether
registered or not, there being no third parties involved.

Same; Interest; No interest due where not expressly stipulated in writing.—The imposition of
legal interest on the amounts subject of the equitable mortgages is without legal basis, for,
“no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing.”

Property; Quieting of title; Plaintiff need not be in possession of property.—The new Civil Code
provides that suitors in actions to quiet title “need not be in possession of said property.”

63) Paja v. CA (75 SCRA 541) *atay wala jud ni bai*

RECONSTITUTION

64) Republic v. Holazo (437 SCRA 345)

Land Titles; Reconstitution; Reconstitution of title or any document is to have the same
reproduced, after observing the procedure prescribed by law, in the same form they were when
the loss or destruction occurred.—A judicial reconstitution proceedings is one in rem. It
denotes a restoration of the instrument which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in
its original form or condition. The purpose of the reconstitution of title or any document is to
have the same reproduced, after observing the procedure prescribed by law, in the same form
they were when the loss or destruction occurred.

Same; Same; The petition for reconstitution is mandated to prove not only the loss or
destruction of the title sought to be reconstituted but also that at the time the said title was lost
or destroyed, petitioner was the registered owner thereof.—The petition for reconstitution is
mandated to prove not only the loss or destruction of the title sought to be reconstituted but
also that at the time the said title was lost or destroyed, he was the registered owner thereof.
The fact that no opposition is filed by a private party or by the Republic of the Philippines
will not relieve the petitioner of his burden. The Republic of the Philippines is not estopped
from assailing the decision granting the petition if, on the basis of the law and the evidence
on record, such petition has no merit.
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65) Serra v. Court of Appeals (195 SCRA 482)

Same; Same; Same; Purpose of Reconstitution of certificates of title.—The purpose of the

reconstitution of any document, book or record is to have the same reproduced, after
observing the procedure prescribed by law in the same form they were when the loss or
destruction occurred. The reconstitution of certificates of title should be made, as just stated,
in the same form and exactly as they were at the time they were lost or destroyed, x x x
(Gov’t. of the Philippine Islands v. Abada, 48 O.G., p. 1872, April 1952). A person who seeks a
reconstitution of a certificate of title over a property he does not actually possess cannot, by a
mere motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, which is summary in nature, deprive the
actual occupants of possession thereof. Possession and/or ownership of the property should be
threshed out in a separate proceeding.

66) Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court (157 SCRA 62)

Land Registration; Reconstitution of Title; Lack of notice of hearing confers no jurisdiction

upon the Court; Judicial reconstitution of title partakes of a land registration proceeding.—It
is not disputed, to begin with, that the notices (of hearing) were not posted on the main
entrances of the provincial and municipal halls of the locality in which the lands are located.
We have held that such a mode of publication is a jurisdictional requirement. The failure on
the part of the applicant to comply with it confers no jurisdiction upon the court. Neither is
there any showing that the adjacent owners or other interested parties were actually notified
of the pending application. This too taints the petition with a jurisdictional defect. It is not
enough that there is publication in the Official Gazette. Publication of the notice in the
Official Gazette is but one requirement. In addition, Republic Act No. 26 decrees that such a
notice be posted “on the main entrance” of the corresponding provincial Capitol and
municipal building, as well as served actually upon the owners of adjacent lands. Failure to
comply with such requisites will nullify the decree of reconstitution. It shall be noted that a
judicial reconstitution of title partakes of a land registration proceeding. Thus, notice of the
proceedings must be done in the manner set forth by the letter of the law.

Same; Same; Same; Presumption of “performance of duty” not applicable in the case at bar.—
It is futile for the private respondent, in connection with the charge that she failed to post the
notice at the main entrance of the municipal building, to invoke the fiction of “performance of
duty.” The question that remains unanswered is whether or not she had in fact complied with
the requirement. The Court notes that all she presented was a certificate of service prepared
by the sheriff, embodying an order addressed to the Station Commander of Panamao, Sulu, to
post the proper notices and a certificate of publication in the Official Gazette. The order,
however, of posting forwarded by the sheriff to the local Station Commander is not proof that
the Station Commander had in fact complied with such an order. The presumption of
“performance of duty” cannot therefore apply. Republic Act No. 26 itself specifically calls
upon the applicant to submit proof of that posting. He cannot rely on the presumption. In this
case, fiction must yield to fact.

Same; Evidence; Lack of opposition on the application by the Solicitor General not sufficient;
Court must convince itself that evidence is substantial enough to warrant reconstitution.—It is
not sufficient, as in the case at bar, that the Solicitor General failed to interpose an
opposition to the application. The court must nonetheless convince itself that the petitioner’s
evidence is substantial enough to warrant reconstitution. This Court agrees with the
Republic that the private respondent, based on the evidence, has not sufficiently shown her
right to a reconstitution. Neither Act No. 3430 nor Proclamation No. 1530 confers title to any
party over the properties mentioned therein. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 26 entitled,
“An Act Providing A Special Procedure For the Reconstitution Of Torrens Certificates Of
Title Lost Or Destroyed,” enumerates the sources on which the reconstitution certificates of
title may be based. It should be noted that both Sections 2 and 3 thereof list sources that
evidence title or transactions affecting title to property. When Republic Act No. 26 [Sec. 2(f)],
therefore speaks of “[a]ny other document, it must refer to similar documents previously
enumerated therein. The statutes relied upon by the private respondent, so we hold, are not
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ejusdem generis as the documents earlier referred to. Furthermore, they do not contain the
specifics required by Section 12(a) and (b) of the title reconstitution law.

Same; Same; Act No. 3430 and Proclamation No. 1530 not enough to support the petition at
bar.—We, therefore, hold that for reconstitution purposes, the two pieces of legislation earlier
adverted to, Act No. 3430 and Proclamation No. 1530, are not enough to support the petition
for reconstitution. The private respondent must have sufficient proof that her predecessor-in-
interest had in fact availed himself of the benefits of the land grant the twin statutes confer.
Proclamation No. 1530, moreover, does not specifically name Sultan Kiram as the owner of
the lands reserved for resettlement. While Act No. 3430 does, this measure was enacted as
far back as 1928. Since then, the properties could have undergone successive transfers. What
is more, there is no showing that the title certificate sought to be reconstituted, Original
Certificate of Title No. P-133, stands, in fact, in the name of Sultan Kiram. The fact therefore
that Act No. 3430 grants title to the Sultan (on the assumption that it does) does not yield
the presumption that Original Certificate of Title No. P-133 refers to one and the same
property.

67) Puzon v. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development (353 SCRA 699)

Land Registration; Land Titles; Republic Act No. 26; The requirements under Sections 12 and
13 do not apply to all petitions for judicial reconstitution, but only to those based on any of the
sources specified in Section 12.—The requirements under Sections 12 and 13 do not apply to
all petitions for judicial reconstitution, but only to those based on any of the sources specified
in Section 12; that is, “sources enumerated in Section 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e),
and/or 3(f) of this Act.”

Same; Same; Same; Requirement of notices to owners of adjoining lots found in Section 13
does not apply to petitions based on an existing owner’s duplicate Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT).—Nothing in the provision of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 26 requires that notices be
sent to owners of adjoining lots. Verily, that requirement is found in Section13, which does
not apply to petitions based on an existing owner’s duplicate TCT.

Same; Same; Same; In petitions for reconstitution falling under Sections 9 and 10 of RA 26
where the source is the owner’s duplicate copy, notices to adjoining owners and to actual
occupants of the land are not required.—There is no question that in such actions, notices to
adjoining owners and to the actual occupants of the land are mandatory and jurisdictional.
But in petitions for reconstitution falling under Sections 9 and 10 of RA 26 where, as in the
present case, the source is the owner’s duplicate copy, notices to adjoining owners and to
actual occupants of the land are not required. When the law is clear, the mandate of the
courts is simply to apply it, not to interpret or to speculate on it.

Same; Same; Same; The purpose of the reconstitution of title or any document is to have the
same reproduced, after proper proceedings in the same form they were when the loss or
destruction occurred.—The parties must not lose sight of the nature of judicial reconstitution
proceedings, which denote a “restoration of the instrument which is supposed to have been
lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. The purpose of the reconstitution of title
or any document is to have the same reproduced, after proper proceedings in the same form
they were when the loss or destruction occurred.” We emphasize that these actions do “not
pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. Possession of a lost
certificate of title is not necessarily equivalent to ownership of the land covered by it. The
certificate of title, by itself, does not vest ownership; it is merely an evidence of title over a
particular property.

Same; Same; NALTDRA Circular No. 91 (“Circular 91”), which is mentioned in Circular 7-96
and has the word “clearance” in its heading, deals with the subject of original land
registration cases, not reconstitution of titles.—None of the circulars mentioned in Supreme
Court Administrative Circular No. 7-96 (“Circular 7-96”) requires any clearance from the
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Land Registration Authority for the judicial reconstitution of certificates of title under Section
10 of RA 26. NALTDRA Circular No. 91 (“Circular 91”), which is mentioned in Circular 7-96
and has the word “clearance” in its heading, deals with the subject of original land
registration cases, not reconstitution of titles. Thus, Circular 91 is not applicable to this case.

68) Alabang Development Corporation v. Valenzuela (116 SCRA 261)

Land Registration, In a petition for reconstitution of a lost Torrens Title all the data required
by RA 26 must be included in the petition and the persons therein named must be given
notice.—Upon examination of the subject petition for reconstitution, the Court notes that
some essential data required in section 12 and section 13 of Republic Act 26 have been
omitted: the nature and description of the buildings or improvements, which do not belong to
the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or
improvements, and the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the
property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who may have any
interest in the property. Neither do these data appear in the Notice of Hearing, such that no
adjoining owner, occupant or possessor was ever served a copy thereof by registered mail or
otherwise.

Same, Same.—On these glaringly conspicuous omissions, the Court repeats its
pronouncement in the Bernal case, to wit. “And since the above data do not appear in the
Amended Petition, the same data do not also appear in the Notice of Hearing of the petition
published in the Official Gazette. Patently, the provisions of Section 12 which enumerates
mandatorily the contents of the Petition for Reconstitution and Section 13 which similarly
require the contents of the Notice have not been complied with. In view of these multiple
omissions which constitute non-compliance with the above-cited sections of the Act, We rule
that said defects have not invested the Court with the authority or jurisdiction to proceed with
the case because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the statute
which is mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering all proceedings utterly
null and void. We hold that the mere Notice that ‘all interested parties are hereby cited to
appear and show cause if any they have why said petition should not be granted’ is not
sufficient for the law must be interpreted strictly; it must be applied rigorously, with
exactness and precision. We agree with the ruling of the trial court granting the motion to
amend the original petition provided all the requisites for publication and posting of notices
be complied with, it appearing that the amendment is quite substantial in nature. As We
pointed above, respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal failed to comply with all the
requirements for publication and posting of notices, which failure is fatal to the jurisdiction of
the Court.

Same; Same; An examination of the non-veracity and falsity of the Survey Plan 11-4374 as in
the Bernal case is warranted.—After passing upon the jurisdiction issue, the Court cannot
just let go unmentioned its observation that the lots involved in this reconstitution case are
part of the survey (Plan II-4373) allegedly covering also Lots 1 and 3 which are involved in
the Bernal case. In other words, these lots are covered by the survey plan and they are
contiguous. As a matter of fact, “Annex-5-A” of respondents’ memorandum which they claim
to be a survey plan for their mother Manuela Aquial is actually entitled “Plan of Property of
Olimpia D. Sta. Maria.” Olimpia Sta. Maria is supposed to be the predecessor-in-interest of
petitioner Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal, the petitioner in the Bernal reconstitution
case involving Lots 1 and 3. Also, in each of the technical descriptions of Lots 1 and 3 of Plan
11-4374 embodied in the petition for reconstitution filed by Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de
Bernal Manuela Aquial consistently appears to be an adjoining owner. This remarkable
coincidence warrants a reproduction here of the Court’s findings as to the non-veracity and
falsity of the survey plan 11-4374 submitted in support of reconstitution in the Bernal case.

69) Tahanan Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals (118 SCRA 273)

Land Registration; Due Process; The notice and procedural requirements of Art. 26 on
reconstitution of titles are mandatory.—Republic Act No. 26 entitled “An act providing a
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special procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Title lost or destroyed”
approved on September 25, 1946 confers jurisdiction or authority to the Court of First
Instance to hear and decide petitions for judicial reconstitution. The Act specifically provides
the special requirements and mode of procedure that must be followed before the court can
properly act, assume and acquire jurisdiction or authority over the petition and grant the
reconstitution prayed for. These requirements and procedure are mandatory. The Petition for
Reconstitution must allege certain specific jurisdictional facts; the notice of hearing must be
published in the Official Gazette and posted in particular places and the same sent or
notified to specified persons. Sections 12 and 13 of the Act provide specifically the mandatory
requirements and procedure to be followed.

Same; Same; A petitioner for reconstitution of Title is duty-bound to know the adjacent
boundary owners or owners with claims overlapping the property covered by the title to be
reconstituted.—The Pascuals are duty-bound to know who are their actual adjacent boundary
owners on all sides and directions of their neighbors are in actual possession and occupancy
not only of portions of their own property. They are charged with the obligation to inquire
who their neighbors are in actual possession and occupancy not only of portions of their own
property but also of land adjacent thereto. This duty or obligation cannot be ignored or
simply brushed aside where the location or the properties involved is a prime site for land
development, expansion, suitable for residential, commercial and industrial purposes and
where every square inch of real estate becomes a valuable and profitable investment. It is of
public knowledge in the community of Parañaque that “Tahanan Village” is a privately
owned and occupied residential subdivision, plainly visible to the general public by reason of
the perimeter fence or wall separating it from adjacent estates, the roads and streets therein
and leading thereto, the numerous home constructions and buildings going on, the visible
electrical, lighting and water supply installations, the presence of private security guards
thereat and the numerous signs and billboards advertising the estate as a housing
development owned and/or managed by petitioner Tahanan. It is preposterous to claim that
the area is public land.

Same; Same; Posting of notice of reconstitution of title at the entrance of the CFI is not enough;
The notice of hearing must be posted also at the main entrance of the municipal building.—
We also find that the Notice of Hearing directed that copies thereof be posted only in the
bulletin board of the Court of First Instance of Pasay City and no more, whereas the law
specifically require that the notice of the petition shall be posted on the main entrance of the
municipality or city on which the land is situated, at the provincial building and at the
municipal building at least 30 days prior to the date of hearing. In the instant case as
certified to by Deputy Sheriff Arsenio C. de Guzman, the Notice of Hearing was posted on the
bulletin board of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch located at the Hall of
Justice, City Hall Building, Pasay City. Evidently, the Notice of Hearing was not posted at
the main entrance of the provincial building in Pasig, Rizal; it was not posted at the main
entrance of the municipal building of Muntinlupa where the land is now comprised in Barrio
Cupang, or at least in the municipal building of Parañaque where Barrio San Dionisio was
then embraced.

Same; Same; Effect of failure to notify one adjacent boundary owner and one post notice at the
entrance to the municipal building.—The failure or omission to notify Tahanan as the owner,
possessor or occupant of property adjacent to Lot 2 or as claimant or person having an
interest, title or claim to a substantial portion (about 9 hectares more or less) of Lot 2, as well
as the failure or omission to post copies of the Notice of Hearing on the main entrance of the
municipality on which the land is situated, at the provincial building and at the municipal
building thereat, are fatal to the acquisition and exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court.

Same; Same; Same.—Having resolved the fundamental issue that the trial court had not
properly acquired nor was it duly invested with jurisdiction to hear, determine and decide the
petition for reconstitution and accordingly all proceedings conducted thereon were rendered
null and void including the judgment issued granting the reconstitution, the resolution of the
corollary issues need no extended discussion but considering the obvious intent to circumvent
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the ruling of the Supreme Court laid down in the case of Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 93 SCRA 238, We find it imperative to make a reiteration of the pertinent
doctrines applicable to the case at bar.

Same; Action; Appeal; Intervention on appeal may be allowed in the interest of justice.—In the
above-cited case, We allowed the intervention of adjacent owners even during the pendency of
the appeal from the decision granting reconstitution, the appeal then in the Supreme Court,
in the paramount interest of justice and as an exception to Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of
Court. Petitioner Tahanan having sought to intervene in the court below and alleging
material and substantial interest in the property to which title is sought to be reconstituted,
in its Motion To Set Aside Decision and Re-Open Proceedings duly verified and attaching
therewith xerox copies of its transfer certificates of title of its properties adjoining and even
overlapped by that of the Pascuals to the extent of some 9 hectares in area, the trial court
ought to have admitted said motion. There was reversible error in refusing to do so.

70) Metropolitan Waterworks v. Sison (124 SCRA 394)

Land Registration, Notice of petition to reconstitute title must be published in the Official
Gazette and served to adjoining owners and actual occupants, otherwise, entire proceeding is
void ab initio.—The publication of the petition in two successive issues of the Official
Gazette, the service of the notice of hearing to the adjoining owners and actual occupants of
the land, as well as the posting of the notices in the main entrances of the provincial and
municipal buildings where the property lies at least 30 days prior to the date of the hearing,
as prescribed by Section 13 of the law, are mandatory and jurisdictional requisites. In Syjuco
vs. PNB, this Court ruled that “if an order of reconstitution is issued without any previous
publication, as required by law, particularly Section 13 of Rep. Act 26, such order of
reconstitution is null and void and of no effect and, naturally, anything done under said
order, is also void.”

Same; Courts; Statutes; R.A. 4269 on judicial notices cannot be made a substitute for R.A. 26
on publication requirements; Publication in newspaper of general publication not sufficient in
title reconstitution cases.—We cannot sustain private respondents’ view. Rep. Act 4269
applies only to judicial notices which the law requires to be published in a newspaper of
general circulation. Section 13 of Rep. Act 26 specifies that publication of the notice of
hearing in proceedings for judicial reconstitution of lost certificates of title should be made in
the Official Gazette. It does not provide for any alternative medium or manner of publication.

Same; Cadastral Act; Title reconstitution proceedings same nature as cadastral proceedings.
Publication in Official Gazette a must.—A proceeding for judicial reconstitution of lost
certificate of title partakes of the nature of a land registration and cadastral proceeding,
where publication of the notice of initial hearing in the Official Gazette is required. As
heretofore stated, the publication in the manner provided for by Section 13 of Rep. Act 26 is
compulsory and jurisdictional; and unless said law is amended, the same must be strictly
complied with.

Same; Judgment; A Judgment void ab initio is non-existent and cannot acquire finality.—
Private respondent further maintains that the order of September 4, 1974, having become
final and executory for failure of petitioners to appeal, can no longer be disturbed. As already
pointed out, the orders of September 6, 1970 and of September 4, 1974 are void orders. In
contemplation of law, they are non-existent. As aptly put in American Jurisprudence, “a void
judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment, but may be entirely
disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it.
It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding
effect or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair or create rights. It is
not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to those who seek to enforce. All
proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. In other
words, a void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be
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if there were no judgment. It, accordingly, leaves the parties litigants in the same position
they were in before the trial.

Same; An order of reconstitution of title is void where there are subsisting Torrens Titles on
the land in question held by other persons.—Considering that petitioners are holders of
subsisting certificates of title which have not been cancelled either by judicial or
administrative process, the questioned orders authorizing the issuance of reconstituted titles
over the same lands must be struck down. Needless to state, the anomalous situation where
two persons hold separate titles over the same lands cannot be countenanced.

Aquino, J., concurring:

Land Registration Act; A reconstitution of title cannot be authorized where title on the land
has not in fact been lost.—I concur. There can be no reconstitution of Torrens Titles that are
existing or are not lost. Here, the petition for reconstitution was filed in the Court of First
Instance at Pasig, instead of in the Court of First Instance of Caloocan City. The lots involved
are located in Caloocan City.

Same; Same.—If the registers of deeds of Caloocan City and Pasig were furnished with copies
of the petition and were called to testify at the hearing, they would have informed the Court
that the alleged lost titles are existing or intact. Either Register of Deeds could have
produced the titles in court. (See Director of Forestry vs. Munoz, L-24796, and
Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation vs. Peralta, L-25459, June 28, 1968, 23
SCRA 1183).