Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 16. All person shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

The constitutional right to a "speedy disposition of cases" is not limited to

the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases,
including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including
judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any
party to a case may demand expeditious action by all officials who are
tasked with the administration of justice.11

The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial,
is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of
the trial are asked for and secured; or even without cause or justifiable
motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having
his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine
whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a
speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both
the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the
length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to
assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.
The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily
be a flexible concept.12

G.R. No. 181851 March 9, 2010

CAPT. WILFREDO G. ROQUERO, Petitioner,

vs.
THE CHANCELLOR OF UP-MANILA; THE ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY
TRIBUNAL (ADT) OF UP-MANILA; ATTY. ZALDY B. DOCENA; EDEN
PERDIDO; ISABELLA LARA, IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS CHAIRMAN and
MEMBERS OF THE ADT; and IMELDA O. ABUTAL

The Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in the disposition

of cases was intended to stem the tide of disenchantment among the
people in the administration of justice by our judicial and quasi-judicial
tribunals.14 The adjudication of cases must not only be done in an orderly
manner that is in accord with the established rules of procedure but must
also be promptly decided to better serve the ends of justice. Excessive
delay in the disposition of cases renders the rights of the people
guaranteed by the Constitution and by various legislations inutile. 15

Same

***************************************

Article III of the Constitution provides that:

Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of
their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
bodies.

The constitutional right to a "speedy disposition of cases" is not limited to

the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases,
including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including
judicial and quasi-judicial hearings."9 Hence, under the Constitution, any
party to a case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are
tasked with the administration of justice.10

G.R. No. 140529 September 6, 2001

JOSE P. LOPEZ, JR., petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO and HON.
MARGARITO P. GERVACIO, JR. in their official capacities as Ombudsman
and Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, respectively, and the
Sandiganbayan,

******************************

Section 3, Rule 17 and Section 1, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which

respectively provide:

Section 3. Dismissal due to the fault of the plaintiff. – If, for no justifiable
cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his
evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of
the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or
upon the court’s own motion, without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate
action. This dismissal shall have the effect of adjudication upon the merits,
unless otherwise declared by the court.

***********************************

It bears stressing that the sanction of dismissal may be imposed even

absent any allegation and proof of the plaintiff's lack of interest to
prosecute the action, or of any prejudice to the defendant resulting from
the failure of the plaintiff to comply with the rules. The failure of the plaintiff
to prosecute the action without any justifiable cause within a reasonable
period of time will give rise to the presumption that he is no longer
interested in obtaining the relief prayed for. G.R. No. 175409
September 7, 2011

PHILIPPINE CHARTER INSURANCE CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
EXPLORER MARITIME CO., LTD., OWNER OF THE VESSEL M/V
"EXPLORER", WALLEM PHILS. SHIPPING, INC., ASIAN TERMINALS, INC.
AND FOREMOST INTERNATIONAL PORT SERVICES, INC.

***************************

Arguments :

In this case, there was no justifiable reason for petitioners' failure to file a
motion to set the case for pre-trial. Petitioners' stubborn insistence that the
case was not yet ripe for pre-trial is erroneous. Although petitioners state
that there are strong and compelling reasons justifying a liberal application
of the rule, the Court finds none in this case. The burden to show that there
are compelling reasons that would make a dismissal of the case unjustified
is on petitioners, and they have not adduced any such compelling reason. 9
(Emphases supplied.)

In the case at bar, the alleged Motion to Disclose was filed on November 19,
1997. Respondents filed the Motion to Dismiss on December 5, 2000. By
that time, PCIC’s inaction was thus already almost three years. There is
therefore no question that the failure to prosecute in the case at bar was for
an unreasonable length of time. Consequently, the Complaint may be
dismissed even absent any allegation and proof of the plaintiff's lack of
interest to prosecute the action, or of any prejudice to the defendant
resulting from the failure of the plaintiff to comply with the rules. The
burden is now on PCIC to show that there are compelling reasons that
would render the dismissal of the case unjustified.

************************

In every action, the plaintiffs are duty-bound to prosecute their case with
utmost diligence and with reasonable dispatch to enable them to obtain the
relief prayed for and, at the same time, to minimize the clogging of the
court dockets.19 Parallel to this is the defendants’ right to have a speedy
disposition of the case filed against them, essentially, to prevent their
defenses from being impaired.

G.R. No. 181020 November 25, 2009

JAZMIN L. ESPIRITU and PORFIRIO LAZARO, JR., Petitioners,

vs.
VLADIMIR G. LAZARO, MA. CORAZON S. LAZARO, MA. ESPERENZA S.
LAZARO, VLADI MIGUEL S. LAZARO, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION,
and WINIFRIDA B. SISON,

************************************

It bears stressing that the sanction of dismissal may be imposed even

absent any allegation and proof of the plaintiff’s lack of interest to
prosecute the action, or of any prejudice to the defendant resulting from
the failure of the plaintiff to comply with the rules.20 The failure of the
plaintiff to prosecute the action without any justifiable cause within a
reasonable period of time will give rise to the presumption that he is no
longer interested in obtaining the relief prayed for. 21

G.R. No. 181020 November 25, 2009

JAZMIN L. ESPIRITU and PORFIRIO LAZARO, JR., Petitioners,

vs.
VLADIMIR G. LAZARO, MA. CORAZON S. LAZARO, MA. ESPERENZA S.
LAZARO, VLADI MIGUEL S. LAZARO, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION,
and WINIFRIDA B. SISON,

The failure of a plaintiff to prosecute the action without any justifiable

cause within a reasonable period of time will give rise to the presumption
that he is no longer interested to obtain from the court the relief prayed for
in his complaint; hence, the court is authorized to order the dismissal of
the complaint on its own motion or on motion of the defendants. G.R. No.
141860 August 31, 2006
MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC., Petitioner,
vs.
IPIL INTERNATIONAL INC., ANCHOR ORIENT LINES-SINGAPORE, MED-
LINES PHILIPPINES, BALTMED SHIPPING CO., and OCEAN MARINE
MUTUAL PROTECTION & INDEMNITY ASSOCIATION, LTD., Respondents.

***************************

No less than the Constitution explicitly prohibits the violation of the right to
a speedy disposition of cases. Section 16, Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides that "[a]ll persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies."

The right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is
deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of
the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or unjustifiable
motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having
his case tried. In the determination of whether or not that right has been
violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are: the length of
the delay the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such
right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. [1] A mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be
sufficient. In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to
speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the
facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. [2]

In Dimayacyac vs. Court of Appeals,[3] the Supreme Court held that more in
point is Dela Peña vs. Sandiganbayan, [4] ruling that the petitioner therein,
for failing to assert their right to a speedy disposition of their cases, was
deemed to have waived such right and thus, not entitled to the "radical
relief" granted by the Court in the cases of Tatad and Angchangco. In Tatad
vs. Sandiganbayan,[5] was a hiatus in the proceedings between the
termination of the proceedings before the investigating fiscal on 25
October 1982 and its resolution on 17 April 1985. The Court found that
"political motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the
prosecutorial process" against then Secretary Francisco S. Tatad. In
Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman,[6] the criminal complaints remained
pending in the Office of the Ombudsman for more than six years despite
the respondent’s numerous motions for early resolution and the
respondent, who had been retired, was being unreasonably deprived of the
fruits of his retirement because of the still unresolved criminal complaints
against him. In both cases, we ruled that the period of time that elapsed for
the resolution of the cases against the petitioners therein was deemed a
violation of the accused’s right to a speedy disposition of cases against
them. In Dimayacyac, no proof was presented to show any persecution of
the accused, political or otherwise, unlike in the Tatad case. There is no
showing that petitioner was made to endure any vexatious process during
the two-year period before the filing of the proper informations, unlike in
the Angchangco case where petitioner therein was deprived of his
retirement benefits for an unreasonably long time. In Dimayacyac, there
was a delay of two years in the refiling of the proper informations. However,
the prosecution was never given the opportunity to explain the
circumstances that may have caused such delay precisely because
petitioner never raised the issue of the length of time it took the
prosecution to revive the case. There is nothing on record to show what
happened during the two-year lull before the filing of the proper
informations. Hence, it could not be ascertained that peculiar situations
existed to prove that the delay was vexatious, capricious and oppressive,
and therefore, a violation of petitioner’s constitutional right to speedy
disposition of cases. Moreover, petitioner never asserted his right to a
speedy disposition of his case. Petitioner himself did not really believe that
there was any violation of his right to a speedy disposition of the case
against him.

wiki.lawcenter.ph

References

1. ↑ Dimayacyac vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136264, 28 May 2004,

citing Ty-Dazo vs. Sandiganbayan, 424 Phil. 945, 950-951 (2002),
which in turn cited Binay vs. Sandiganbayan, 316 SCRA 65 (1999);
Gonzales vs. Sandiganbayan, 199 SCRA 298 (1991); and Blanco vs.
Sandiganbayan, 346 SCRA 108 (2000)
2. ↑ Dimayacyac vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136264, 28 May 2004,
citing Ty-Dazo vs. Sandiganbayan, 424 Phil. 945, 950-951 (2002),
which in turn cited Binay vs. Sandiganbayan, 316 SCRA 65 (1999);
Gonzales vs. Sandiganbayan, 199 SCRA 298 (1991); and Blanco vs.
Sandiganbayan, 346 SCRA 108 (2000)
3. ↑ G.R. No. 136264, 28 May 2004
4. ↑ 360 SCRA 478 (2001) citing Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan, 220 SCRA
55, 63 (1993); Dansal vs. Fernandez, 327 SCRA 145, 153 (2000);
Blanco vs. Sandiganbayan, 346 SCRA 108 (2000)
5. ↑ 159 SCRA 70 (1988)
6. ↑ 268 SCRA 301 (1997)

*****************************************************

It is trite to say that the wheels of justice in our country move so

exceedingly slow, or at snail's pace. Almost every litigant we know has
experienced delay in one form or another. As to how such incidents affect
the overall perception of the courts' functioning depends on the extent of
resources of the parties and length of time it took for their dispute to be
finally resolved. Delays in the justice system elicit a host of reactions, from
the humorous to traumatic. But in the same way that the public has come
to accept delay as deeply ingrained in our culture, protracted litigations are
viewed as simply normal. It cannot be gainsaid though that delay resulting
from collective inefficiency seriously erodes public trust in the courts.
Much as we deplore it, delay is seen as engendering case-fixing and other
corrupt practices that sadly taint the judiciary as a whole.

The Supreme Court has resolutely addressed the problem of clogged

dockets and worked incessantly to reduce and eliminate backlog of cases
especially in the lower courts. Under the Action Program for Judicial
Reform (APJR) supported with grants and loans from the US Agency for
International Development (USAID), World Bank, Asian Development Bank,
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Australian AID,
complementary projects are being implemented to improve case flow,
achieve zero backlog in the higher courts, promote alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) methods by institutionalizing mediation and
computerizing the internal processes of the judiciary and making them
more transparent.

In the Court of Appeals, we have made steady progress in the Zero Backlog
Project began from the time of former Presiding Justice now SC Associate
Justice Alicia Austria-Martinez and continued by her successors. Under
the dynamic and competent leadership of former PJ and presently SC
Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, in the one-year period between June
2005 and June 2006, the CA averaged a monthly disposal of 850 decisions,
or about 13 to 14 cases per Justice. About half of the number of Justices
accomplished more than the minimum requirement of 12 cases. From a
total of 11,343 cases submitted for decision in 2001, the CA has
considerably reduced its backlog to 9,387 cases as of August 31, 2007.

Aside from unclogging the CA docket, we are set to implement the

computerization of the Management Information System (MIS), which will
greatly facilitate tracking of cases from completion stage until final
disposition. Recently, we had ground-laying of the One Stop Processing
Center which is aimed at making follow-up and inquiries on status of cases
easier for litigants and their counsel. Evidently, the prevention of
unnecessary delays entails not just speeding up case disposition but
maintaining efficiency and diligence of all personnel involved in every step
of the appellate process.

The Judicial Records Division headed by Mr. Fernando C. Prieto, under the
Committee on Records Management and Information Services which is
presently chaired by yours truly, is continuously undertaking measures to
make JRD more service-oriented. Such current reforms ensure that the
Archives Section and Receiving Section are more accessible to the needs
of the general public. For obvious reasons, JRD being at the frontline of the
CA's public service, the problem of delay is a matter of continuing study for
our committee as we focus on all possible ways to further improve current
systems and procedures in receiving, docketing, records keeping and
archiving. We recall that the JRD has succeeded in updating its backlog of
cases pending for remand by the Archives Section. The JRD is determined
to continue devising means and mechanisms to enable it to (1) extend
services to the public without discrimination; (2) speed up remand of cases
to the court or agency of origin; (3) maintain the safety and integrity of case
records; and (4) observe courtesy and transparency at all times in dealing
with litigants and the public in general.

At this point, it must be mentioned that an important component of the

APJR is the development of a new Performance Evaluation System solely
for the judiciary, which was launched by the SC in September 2006. The
long-term objective of the Performance Management System for Court
Personnel (PMS-COUPER) is "the efficient and speedy delivery of justice in
the country." The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel equally emphasizes
efficiency, competence and integrity in carrying out duties and
responsibilities, pursuant to the constitutional mandate for government
employees to serve the people "with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty
[and] efficiency". Specifically for employees in the judiciary, we remind
ourselves as we go to work everyday that in doing our tasks well, there is
nothing which the public has to thank us for. WE, whose salaries, court
buildings and resources are funded by taxpayers' money, owe it rather to
these persons in fulfillment of their constitutional right to a speedy
disposition of their cases in all judicial bodies. Absolutely, there is no
excuse for laziness in the busy halls of justice.

Upon his assumption as the 22nd Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines, CJ Reynato S. Puno declared that he is "no less resolute in
addressing the perennial problem of delay in the resolution of cases and
case backlog through the Court's Action Program for Judicial Reform". The
Chief Justice has acted swiftly, sparing no one in this Court, as we already
know, to impose the ultimate penalty of dismissal to a Member and certain
employees found guilty of misconduct and inefficiency. It is also public
knowledge that he summoned CA chairpersons to "communicate to them
his deep concern on the alleged widespread corruption in the judiciary."
When asked during one of his inaugural interviews how he wishes to be
remembered as SC Chief Justice, CJ Puno made it clear he has no greater
ambition than that he has "contributed to the cleansing of the judiciary, in
the diminution of the backlog of court cases, in fostering a swifter and
more efficient justice, in cultivating more public confidence in the Supreme
Court." Agreeing that weeding out corruption is his biggest challenge as
Chief Justice, CJ Puno further said that if that is done, we "will have a
judiciary that will deserve the support and confidence of the people" and
"that is the only capital of the judiciary -- the integrity of the system. If you
lose this capital, you lose the system."

This rightful indignation and determination of the SC leadership to curb

corruption in the judiciary is truly a drastic response to the worsening
problem of government corruption in the Philippines. The SC as guardian
of civil liberties and protector of human rights is simply fulfilling its role in
helping combat corruption and abuse of power within its own ranks.
Current discourse on the crisis of corruption afflicting governments
underscore good governance as a human right. The most significant bases
for good governance are found in no less than the United Nations
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which in Article 21 (2) states that:
"Everyone has a right of equal access to public service in his country".
One of the primary characteristics of good governance is the rule of law.
"The rule of law requires that both the goals and the process of achieving
such goals be in accord with the law without sacrificing the rights of
others." This "human rights approach to corruption" thus recognizes the
imperative for analyzing the link between corruption and human rights in
the light of the principles of good democratic governance. For indeed,
"corruption undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads to violation of
human rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of life, and allows
organized crime, terrorism and other threats to human security to flourish".
Corrupt acts and practices are therefore tantamount to violations of basic
human rights. In the context of judicial proceedings, this would mean that
any attempt to favor a party to a suit, for considerations other than the
merits of his or her cause, constitutes in itself a human rights violation,
separate and distinct from the public servant's commission of such
criminal act or administrative offenses under certain laws and regulations.
Prejudice and injustice even to a winning party may also result from delay
as immortalized by the dictum: "Justice delayed is justice denied."

On a personal level, I could say that there is indeed much hope. I have
witnessed the sincerity and determination on the part of both Members and
employees of this Court to continuously improve the dispensation of
justice and prevent needless delays. In the words of former PJ Ruben T.
Reyes, the Zero Backlog for the CA is not an impossible dream, going by
the monthly reports of the Information and Statistics Division showing the
capacity of the Justices to decide in one year as many cases as are
submitted for decision. Above all, we are all guided by a shared
commitment to serve litigants with fairness that is the hallmark of due
process. As we unite efforts in heeding the call for judicial reforms, I
strongly believe the "culture of delay" visualized in the "slow as turtle"
image of the Philippine judiciary, will soon be a thing of the past.

*******************************

Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 16. All person shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

The constitutional right to a "speedy disposition of cases" is not limited to the accused in
criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and
administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial
hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious
action by all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.11 G.R. No.
181851 March 9, 2010

CAPT. WILFREDO G. ROQUERO, Petitioner,

vs.
THE CHANCELLOR OF UP-MANILA; THE ADMINISTRATIVE
DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL (ADT) OF UP-MANILA; ATTY. ZALDY B.
DOCENA; EDEN PERDIDO; ISABELLA LARA, IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS
CHAIRMAN and MEMBERS OF THE ADT; and IMELDA O. ABUTAL,

citing: Lopez, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, 417 Phil. 39, 49 (2001) citing Cadalin v.
POEA’s Administrator, G.R. No. 104776, 5 December 1994,

Xxx

The Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases was
intended to stem the tide of disenchantment among the people in the administration of
justice by our judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals.14 The adjudication of cases must not
only be done in an orderly manner that is in accord with the established rules of
procedure but must also be promptly decided to better serve the ends of justice. Excessive
delay in the disposition of cases renders the rights of the people guaranteed by the
Constitution and by various legislations inutile.15181851 March 9, 2010

CAPT. WILFREDO G. ROQUERO, Petitioner,

vs.
THE CHANCELLOR OF UP-MANILA; THE ADMINISTRATIVE
DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL (ADT) OF UP-MANILA; ATTY. ZALDY B.
DOCENA; EDEN PERDIDO; ISABELLA LARA, IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS
CHAIRMAN and MEMBERS OF THE ADT; and IMELDA O. ABUTAL

Citing: CRUZ, Constitutional Law, 2007 Ed., p. 295.

15
Matias v. Plan, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1159, 3 August 1998,

********************
The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases was
intended to stem the tide of disenchantment among the people in the administration of
justice by our judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals.28 The adjudication of cases must not
only be done in an orderly manner that is in accord with the established rules of
procedure, but must also be promptly decided to better serve the ends of justice.
Excessive delay in the disposition of cases renders the rights of the people guaranteed by
the Constitution and by various legislations inutile.29

G.R. Nos. 174902-06 February 15, 2008

ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ, GENER C. ENDONA, and RHANDOLFO B.

AMANSEC, petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN