G.R. No.

L-19650

Caltex Philippines, Inc., petitioner-appellee

Vs.

Enrico Palomar, in his capacity as The Postmaster General, respondent-appellant

FACTS:

In the year 1960, Caltex Philippines conceived and laid the ground work for a promotional scheme calculated
to drum up patronage for its oil products. The contest was entitled “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest”, which calls for
participants to estimate the actual number of liters as hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during
a specific period.

Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also
for the transmission of communications, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the
contest to be cleared in advance for mailing. This was formalized in a letter sent by Caltex to the Post master
General, dated October 31, 1960, in which Caltex, thru its counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and
endeavored to justify its position that the contest does not violate the “The Anti-Lottery Provisions of the Postal
Law”.

Unfortunately, the Palomar, the acting Postmaster General denied Caltex’s request stating that the contest
scheme falls within the purview of the Anti-lottery Provision and ultimately, declined Clatex’s request for clearance.

Caltex sought reconsideration, stressing that there being no consideration involved in part of the contestant,
the contest was not commendable as a lottery. However, the Postmaster General maintained his view that the
contest involves consideration, or even it does not involve any consideration it still falls as “Gift Enterprise”, which
was equally banned by the Postal Law.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief?

2. Whether or not the scheme proposed by Caltex the appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive
provisions of the Postal Law?

HELD:

I.

By express mandate of Section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court which deals with the applicability to invoke
declaratory relief which states: “Declaratory relief is available to person whose rights are affected by a statute, to
determine any question of construction or validity arising under the statute and for a declaration of rights thereunder.

In amplification, conformably established jurisprudence on the matter, laid down certain conditions:

1. There must be a justiciable controversy.

2. The controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse.

3. The party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy.

4. The issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.

With the appellee’s bent to hold the contest and the appellant’s threat to issue a fraud order if carried out, the
contenders are confronted by an ominous shadow of imminent and inevitable litigation unless their differences are
settled and stabilized by a declaration. And, contrary to the insinuation of the appellant, the time is long past when it
can rightly be said that merely the appellee’s “desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of others” —
which admittedly does not confer a cause of action. Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a justiciable
controversy when, as in the case at bar, it was translated into a positive claim of right which is actually contested.

Construction
– Is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with
respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the
fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.

It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have herein just reached is not without precedent.
In Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where a corporation engaged in promotional
advertising was advised by the county prosecutor that its proposed sales promotion plan had the characteristics of a
lottery, and that if such sales promotion were conducted, the corporation would be subject to criminal prosecution, it
was held that the corporation was entitled to maintain a declaratory relief action against the county prosecutor to
determine the legality of its sales promotion plan.

II.

Is the Contest Scheme a Lottery?

Lottery

– Extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance

e.g. policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles and fairs as well as various forms of gambling.

Three Essential Elements:

1. Consideration

2. Prize

3. 3. Chance

No, according to the Supreme Court, the contest scheme is not a lottery but it appears to be more of a
gratuitous distribution since nowhere in the rules is any requirements that any fee be paid, any merchandise be
bought, any services be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. Since, a
prospective contestant has to do is go to a Caltex Station, request for the entry form which is available on demand
and accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of the winner. Because of this, the contest fails to exhibit any
discernible consideration which would brand it as a lottery.

Moreover, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by chance, if no consideration is derived
directly or indirectly from the party receiving the chance, but it does condemn as criminal scheme in which a
valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize.

Is the scheme, as sales promotion which would benefit the sponsor in the way of increased patronage be
considered as a consideration and thus violates the Postal Law?

No, the required element of consideration does not consist of the benefit derived by the sponsors of the
contest. The true test lies on whether or not the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance of winning
and not whether or not those conducting the enterprise receiver something of value for the distribution of the prize.

Is the Contest Scheme a Gift Enterprise?

Even if the term Gift Enterprise is not yet defined explicitly, there appears to be a consensus among
lexicographers and standard authorities that the term is common applied to a sporting artifice of under which goods
are sold for their market value but by way of inducement to purchase the product, the purchaser is given a chance
to win a prize.

And thus, the term of gift enterprise cannot be established in the case at bar since there is not sale of
anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all
qualified contestant irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee’s products.

The lesson that we derive from this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is that every case must be resolved upon
the particular phraseology of the applicable statutory provision. It is only logical that the term under a
construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word
associated therewith.

In the end, the Supreme Court ruled out that under the prohibitive provision of the Postal Law, gift enterprise and
similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of
consideration. Finding non in the contest, it was ruled out that the appellee may not be denied the use of the mails
for the purpose thereof.
National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. Eisma

GR L-61236, 31 January 1984 (127 SCRA 419)En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 concur with comments, 1
took no part, 1 on leave

Facts:

On 5 March 1982, the National Federation of Labor filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment(Labor
Relations Division, Zamboanga City), a petition for direct certification as the sole exclusivecollective bargaining
representative of the monthly paid employees at the Lumbayao manufacturing plantof the Zamboanga Wood
Products, Inc. (Zambowood). On 17 April 1982, such employees charged the firmbefore the same office for
underpayment of monthly living allowances. On 3 May 1982, the union issued anotice of strike against the
firm, alleging illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of the said localunion; unfair labor practice;
nonpayment of living allowances; and “employment of oppressive alienmanagement personnel without proper
permit. The strike began on 23 May 1982.On 9 July 1982, Zambowood filed a complaint with the trial court
against the officers and members of theunion, for “damages for obstruction of private property with prayer
for preliminary injunction and/orrestraining order.” The union filed a motion for the dismissal and for the
dissolution of the restrainingorder, and opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction,
contending that the incidents of picketing are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter pursuant to
Batas Pambansa 227 (LaborCode, Article 217) and not to the Court of First Instance. The motion was denied.
Hence, the petition forcertiorari.

Issue:

Whether construction of the law is required to determine jurisdiction.

Held:

The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it
has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them. Jurisdiction over the
subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; and it
is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred bylaw in words that do not admit of
doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the statutes of the
forum, the issue should be resolved on the basis of the law or statute in force. Therefore, since (1) the
original wording of Article 217 vested the labor arbiters with jurisdiction; since (2) Presidential Decree 1691
reverted the jurisdiction with respect to money claims of workers or claims for damages arising
from employer-employee relations to the labor arbiters after Presidential Decree 1367 transferred such
jurisdiction to the ordinary courts, and since (3) Batas Pambansa 130 made no change with respect to the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with respect to money claims of workers or claims
for damages arising from employer-employee relations; Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The
exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided for explicitly. It means, it can only mean, that
a court of first instance judge then, a regional trial court judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope of the
authority conferred on him by law when he entertained the suit for damages, arising from picketing that
accompanied a strike. The Supreme Court, thus, granted the writ of certiorari, and nullified and set aside the
20 July 1982 order issued by the court a quo. It granted the writ of prohibition, and enjoined the Judge of said
court, or whoever acts in his behalf in the RTC to which this case is assigned, from taking any further action on
the civil case (Civil Case 716 [2751]), except for the purpose of dismissing it. It also made permanent there
straining order issued on 5 August 1982.
Leonardo Paat
vs
Court of Appeals, et. Al.
GR No. 111107, 10 January 1997
266 SCRA 167

Concept: Doctrine of Prior Resort

FACTS
The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR personnel while on its
way to Bulacan because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest product found
concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, CENRO ordered the confiscation of the truck and required
the owner to explain. Private respondents failed to submit required explanation. The DENR Regional Executive
Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained Layugan’s action for confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck.
Private respondents brought the case to the DENR Secretary. Pending appeal, private respondents filed a
replevin case before the RTC against petitioner Layugan and Baggayan. RTC granted the same. Petitioners
moved to dismiss the case contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied their motion. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari. Petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck
was under administrative seizure proceedings.

ISSUE
Whether or not the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine.

HELD
The Court held in the negative. The Court has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek
the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative
processed afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by
giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought. The
premature invocation of court’ intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action.

The doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the
factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is violation of due
process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently
illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppels on the part of the administrative
agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary
whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to
require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to nullification
of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not
provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency
of judicial intervention.

A suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained
by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Sections 68-A of OD 705, as amended.
Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents’ failure to exhaust
administrative remedies should have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming
jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck.
People,

plaintiff-appellee

v. Mapa

defendant-appellant GR L-22301, 30 August 1967 (20 SCRA 1164) En Banc, Fernando (p): 9
concur Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant and appellant. Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Asst.
Solicitor General F .R. Rosete and Solicitor O. C .Hernandez for plaintiff and appellee.

Facts:

Mario M. Mapa was charged for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in an information dated 14
August 1962 in violation of Section 878 of the Revise Administrative Code in connection with Section 2692 of
the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by CA 56 and as further amended by RA 4 (home-made
revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured
the necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities)Accused admits
to possession of firearm on ground of being a secret agent of Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. On 27
November 1963, the lower court rendered a decisionconvicting the accused of the crime andsentenced him to
imprisonment for one year andone day to two years. As the appeal involves a question of law, it was elevated
to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the governor is exempt from the
requirement of having a license of firearm

Held:

The law is explicit that it is unlawful for any person to possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or
ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture
of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition

(Sec 878 RA 4 of the RAC)

except when such firearms are in possession of such public officials and public servants for use in the
performance of their official duties; as those firearms andammunitions which are regularly and lawfullyissued to
officers, soldiers, sailors or marines, the Philippines Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of
Prisons,
municipalpolice, provincial governors, lieutenantgovernors, provincial treasurers, municipaltreasurers, municipa
l mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails

(Sec 879)

It is the first and fundamental duty of courts to apply the law; Construction and interpretation come onlyafter it
has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them. The law cannot be any
clearer, there being no provision made for a secret agent. Reliance in the decision in People v.
Macarandang is misplaced, and the case no longer speaks with authority to the extent that he present decision
conflicts with. It may be note that in People v. Macarandang, a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the
assumption that the appointment of the accusedas a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and
order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently put him within the category of a ‘peace officer’ equivalent
even to a memberof the municipal police expressly covered bysection 879, Thus, in the present case,therefore,
the conviction must stand. The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment.
Daoang v Municipal Judge
G.R. No. L-34568
28 March 1988

Facts:

Petitioners are grandchildren of private respondents Agonoy. Private respondents filed a petition before the MTC of
San Nicolas seeking adoption of two minors. Petitioners filed an opposition to the adoption invoking the provisions of the
Civil Code. That the respondents have a legitimate child, the mother of the petitioners, now deceased, as such they are
not qualified to adopt as per Article 335 of the aforesaid Code. The petition for adoption was granted. Hence, this
petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy are disqualified to adopt under
paragraph (1), Art. 335 of the Civil Code.

The pertinent provision of law reads, as follows:

Art. 335. The following cannot adopt:

(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction;

HELD:

The words in the paragraph (1) of the Article 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are
clear and unambiguous. When the New Civil Code was adopted, it changed the word “descendant”, found in the Spanish
Civil Code to which the New Civil Code was patterned, to “children”. The children thus mentioned have a clearly defined
meaning in law and do not include grandchildren. Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a
statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted. The rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or
doubtful meaning may be subjects of interpretation. In the present case, Roderick and Rommel Daoang , the
grandchildren of Antero and Amanda Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by the
Agonoys. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the judgement of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte, declaring that henceforth Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos be, to all legitimate intents and purposes, the
children by adoption of the joint petitioners Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy and that the former be freed from
legal obedience and maintenance by their respective parents, Miguel Bonilla and Laureana Agonoy for Quirino Bonilla
and Modesto Marcos and Benjamina Gonzales for Wilson Marcos and their family names ‘Bonilla’ and ‘Marcos’ be
changed with “Agonoy”, which is the family name of the petitioners, without pronouncements as to costs
DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Ponente: FRANCISCO

FACTS:

Petitioner was the incumbent Punong Barangay who won during the last regular barangay election. A petition for his
recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. At least 29.30% of the registered voters
signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition and set recall election date. To prevent the holding
of recall election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for injunction which was later dismissed.
Petitioner filed petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction, insisting that the recall election is barred by the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election under Sec. 74(b) of Local Government Code (LGC) which states that “no recall shall
take place within one (1) year from the date of the official’s assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a
regular local election“.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the prohibition on Sec.74(b) of the LGC may refer to SK elections, where the recall election is for
Barangay post.

HELD:

NO. But petition was dismissed for having become moot and academic.

RATIO:

Recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating additional
expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local
election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local elective official
concerned. The electorate could choose the official’s replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure
in office than a successor elected through a recall election.

It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local
election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be
contested and be filled by the electorate.

By the time of judgment, recall was no longer possible because of the limitation stated under the same Section 74(b)
now referred to as Barangay Elections.

CONCURRING OPINION:

DAVIDE:

A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an election participated in by those who possess the right
of suffrage, are not otherwise disqualified by law, and who are registered voters. One of the requirements for the
exercise of suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution is that the person must be at least 18 years of age, and
one requisite before he can vote is that he be a registered voter pursuant to the rules on registration prescribed in the
Omnibus Election Code (Section 113-118).

Under the law, the SK includes the youth with ages ranging from 15 to 21 (Sec. 424, Local Government Code of 1991).
Accordingly, they include many who are not qualified to vote in a regular election, viz., those from ages 15 to less than
18. In no manner then may SK elections be considered a regular election (whether national or local).
 BOLOS V. BOLOS - 634 SCRA 429, [October 20, 2010]
DOCTRINE:
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which the Court promulgated on
15 March 2003, extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which
took effect on 3 August 1988.
FACTS:
Petitioner Cynthia Bolos(Cynthia)filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to Respondent
Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code. After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition
for annulment. A copy of said decision was received by respondent Danilo and he thereafter timely filed the
Notice of Appeal.
The RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or
new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Thereafter, the RTC issued the order declaring its decision declaring the
marriage null and void as final and executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed
by Cynthia. Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the
orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction. Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to render the essential marital
obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home and their children.
The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC declaring the nullity of
marriage as final and executory. The appellate courtstated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration
as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage
between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized before the effectivity of
the Family Code. According to petitioner, the phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to
the word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages.” Such that petitions filed after the effectivity of the
Family Code are governed by the A.M. No. even if the marriage was solemnized before the same. Danilo, in
his Comment, counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable because his marriage with Cynthia was
solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before its effectivity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled “Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,” is applicable to the case at bench.
HELD:
No, it does not.
RATIO:
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as
contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope.
Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
“Section 1. Scope.—This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.”
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to
those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized
under the Civil Code.8 The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase
“under the Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions” rather than to
the word “marriages.”
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which denied due course to
respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration.

Request of Judge Tito G. Gustilo that the second 25% of the special allowance for judges be included
in the computation of his retirement benefits; Callejo Sr., J., AM No. RTJ-04-1868

I. The Facts:
In his letter dated May 26, 2004 addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Judge Tito G. Gustilo requested that,
considering his retirement is “barely one month from November 2004,” the second tranche of the Special Allowance
granted to judges under the Republic Act No. 9227 included in the computation of his retirement benefits. In support
thereof, Judge Gustilo points out that “in the past, Judges who retire in October are included in the grant of the
December 13th month pay, invoking the “liberal policy” of the Court in granting benefits to the underpaid Trial Court
Judges.”
To recall, Rep. Act No. 9227 granting additional compensation in the form of Special Allowance to judges took effect
in November 11, 2003. The special allowances shall be equivalent to 100% of the basic monthly salary specified for
their respective salary grades to be implemented uniformly in 4 years in such sums or amounts equivalent to 25% of
the basic salaries of the positions covered thereof. Subsequent implementation shall be in such sums and amounts and
up to the extent only that can be supported by the funding source specified in Section 3 thereof. It is likewise
reiterated that for purposes of computing the retirement benefits, only the special allowance actually received and that
which accrued at the time of retirement shall be included.

II. The Issue:

Whether or not the Court can adopt a liberal stance in interpreting the retirement laws in favor of retiree Judge
Gustilo.

III. The Ruling:

No. The court denied Judge Gustilo's request for the inclusion of the second 25% of the special allowance in the
computation of his retirement benefits because Sec 5 of Rep. Act No. 9227 is quite clear and unambiguous which, in
plain reading, shows that only the allowances “actually received” and the tranche or tranches “already received and
implemented,” upon date of retirement, shall be included in the computation of the retirement benefits. As such, there
is no room for interpretation but only simple application of the law.

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN v. CA, GR No. 125183, 1997-09-29

Facts:
On February 17, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1716 reserving for Municipal
Government Center Site Purposes certain parcels of land of the public domain located in the Municipality of San Juan,
Metro Manila.
Considering that the land covered by the above-mentioned proclamation was occupied by squatters, the Municipality of
San Juan purchased an 18-hectare land in Taytay, Rizal as resettlement center for the said squatters.
After hundreds of squatter families were resettled, the Municipality of San Juan started to develop its government center
On October 6, 1987, after Congress had already convened on July 26, 1987, former President Corazon Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 164, amending Proclamation No. 1716. Said amendatory proclamation pertinently reads as follows:...
together with other parcels of land not covered by Proclamation No. 1716 but nevertheless occupied for residential
purposes, open to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Act,... On June 1, 1988, the Corazon de Jesus
Homeowners Association, Inc., one of herein private respondents, filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region (Pasig, Branch 159) a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer for restraining order against... the
Municipal Mayor and Engineer of San Juan and the Curator of Pinaglabanan Shrine, to enjoin them from either removing
or demolishing the houses of the association members who were claiming that the lots they occupied have been
awarded to them by Proclamation No. 164.
the regional trial court dismissed the petition, ruling that the property in question is being utilized by the Municipality of
San Juan for government purposes and thus, the condition set forth in Proclamation No. 164 is absent.
The appeal before the Court of Appeals was dismissed
This decision became final and the said judgment was duly entered
Disregarding the ruling of the court in this final judgment, private respondents hired a private surveyor to make
consolidation-subdivision plans of the land in question
To prevent DENR from issuing any grant to private respondents, petitioner municipality filed a petition for prohibition
with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against respondent DENR and
private respondent Corazon de Jesus
Homeowners Association.
The regional trial court sustained petitioner municipality, enjoining the DENR from disposing and awarding the parcels of
land covered by Proclamation No. 164.
The Court of Appeals reversed,... Petitioner municipality assails the decision of the Court of Appeals by hammering on
the issue of res judicata in view of the fact that an earlier judgment, which had become final and executory, had already
settled the respective rights of the parties under
Proclamation No. 164.
Issues:
issue of res judicata insofar as the particular area covered by Proclamation No. 164, which was the subject matter of the
earlier case,... Proclamation No. 1716 was... a valid act of legislation
Proclamation No. 164 is... a valid act of legislation.
Ruling:
The existence of the first three elements can not be disputed. As to identity of parties, we have ruled that only
substantial identity is required and not absolute identity of parties
The addition of public... respondent DENR in the second case will thus be of no moment.
Likewise, there is identity of cause of action... all remain to be the same in both the first and the second actions despite
the fact that in the first action, private respondents were the plaintiff while in the second action, they were the
respondents.
reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals would be justified
Proclamation No. 1716 was issued by the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos on February 17, 1978 in the due exercise of
legislative power vested upon him by Amendment No. 6 introduced in 1976. Being a valid act of legislation, said
Proclamation may only be amended by an... equally valid act of legislation
Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid act of legislation.
President Corazon Aquino took the reigns of power under a revolutionary government. On March 24, 1986, she issued
her... historic Proclamation No. 3, promulgating the Provisional Constitution, or more popularly referred to as the
Freedom Constitution
Under Article II, Section 1 of the Freedom Constitution, the President shall continue to exercise legislative power until a
legislature is elected... and convened under a new constitution.
Then came the ratification of the draft constitution
When Congress was convened on July 26, 1987, President Aquino lost this legislative power under the Freedom
Constitution
Proclamation No.
164, amending Proclamation No. 1716 was issued on October 6, 1987 when legislative power was already solely on
Congress.
this unauthorized act by... the then president constitutes a direct derogation of the most basic principle in the separation
of powers... we cannot simply close our eyes and rely upon the principle of the presumption of validity of a... law.
We, therefore, hold that the issuance of Proclamation No. 164 was an invalid exercise of legislative power. Consequently,
said Proclamation is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE. Public respondent Department of
Environment and Natural Resources is hereby permanently ENJOINED from enforcing Proclamation No. 164.
Principles:
The basic elements of res judicata are: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) the court which rendered it had
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be
between the first and second actions... identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action
There is a long standing principle that every statute is presumed to be valid
However, this rests upon the premise that the statute was duly enacted by legislature. This... presumption cannot apply
when there is clear usurpation of legislative power by the executive branch.

BIRAOGO VS PTC

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010

LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAOGO
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x
G.R. No. 193036
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA,
SR.
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY
FLORENCIO B. ABAD

FACTS:

Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft
and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate,
arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and
assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power
to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such
facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They
argued that:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and
appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1
because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto
inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth Commission” with quasi-judicial
powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and
the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and
personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive power and power of control
necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in
any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and
settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere
allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a
fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s
jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable
purposes.

ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to
appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for
the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. To
the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right
to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in
their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind,
infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury
attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing is governed by
the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing an
allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek
judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief
as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the
petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are
constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents

The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not
limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant
to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to
ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies
to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and
guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There is no
usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the
amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for
the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated
to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function
of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of
the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to
investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties
relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of
the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights
conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the
previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own.
Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot
sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness
and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all
past administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to
the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is
violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution .

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner v GSIS, respondent (DIGEST)

G.R. No. 122156; February 3, 1997

TOPIC: Non-Self Executing v Self Executing Constitutional Provisions

FACTS:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the
issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC).

In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino corporation,
which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-
Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more
than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the execution of the contracts, the
MPHC matched the bid price in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent
letter, which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded
the tender of the matching bid, MPHC came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has
been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the
vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture.

Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of
principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s).

ISSUE:

Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.

RULING:

Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is
usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it
grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate,
the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions
are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.

In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

Floresca vs Philex

SC Cannot Legislate – Exception

Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philex),
who, while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of
the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of
government rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection
of the lives of its men working underground. Floresca et al moved to claim their benefits pursuant to the Workmen’s
Compensation Act before the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. They also petitioned before the regular courts and
sue Philex for additional damages. Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued because the petitioners have already
claimed benefits under the WCA.

ISSUE: Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at the same time sue.

HELD: Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for benefits under the WCA then they will be
estopped from proceeding with a civil case before the regular courts. Conversely, if they sued before the civil courts then
they would also be estopped from claiming benefits under the WCA. The SC however ruled that Floresca et al are
excused from this deficiency due to ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may have not availed
of such a remedy. However, if in case they’ll win in the lower court whatever award may be granted, the amount given to
them under the WCA should be deducted. The SC emphasized that if they would go strictly by the book in this case then
the purpose of the law may be defeated. Idolatrous reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The
spirit of the law insures man’s survival and ennobles him. As Shakespeare said, the letter of the law killeth but its spirit
giveth life.

Justice Gutierrez dissenting

No civil suit should prosper after claiming benefits under the WCA. If employers are already liable to pay benefits under
the WCA they should not be compelled to bear the cost of damage suits or get insurance for that purpose. The exclusion
provided by the WCA can only be properly removed by the legislature NOT the SC.

Republic of the Philippines v. CA and Molina

G.R. No. 108763February 13, 1997Panganiban, J.

FACTS

Respondent Roridel Molina married Reynaldo Molina on April 14, 1985. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs
of “immaturity and irresponsibility” as a husband and a father exhibited by his preference to spend time with friends,
squandering money, dependence on his parents and dishonesty involving finances. Inevitably, this resulted in quarrels
and by March 1987, Roridel quit her job and moved in with her parents in Baguio. Reynaldo left her and their child a few
weeks thereafter. On Aug. 16, 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the grounds
of psychological incapacity of the husband. The trial court declared the marriage void, which the CA affirmed in toto;
hence, the petition for certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether there is psychological incapacity

HELD

No. The case of Roridel and Reynaldo merely constituted incompatibility among the estranged spouses. The law intended
to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity only to the most serious cases of personality disorders that must have
existed at the time marriage is celebrated. Irreconcilable differences or conflicting personalities are not incapacities that
would hinder the fulfillment of the essential marital obligations of the parties. The characteristics of gravity, judicial
antecedence and incurability are not present in the case. Due to the improper interpretations and applications arrived at
by the lower courts on this particular issue, the SC found it wise to construe the law and lay down guidelines in
interpretation and application of Art. 36. Here, the SC sought the help of two amici curiae

considered an external aid in statutory construction. The guidelines set forth are thus: (1) the burden of proof belongs to
the plaintiff;(2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the
complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) the incapacity must be proven to be
existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough to disable fulfillment of essential marital obligations; (6) the essential
marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles
220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their children; (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church are to be given great weight; and (8) the fiscal and the Solicitor-General
must appear as counsel for the State.

Aisporna v Court of Appeals and the People of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-39419

12 April 1982

TOPIC: Statutory Construction, Doctrine of Associated Words (Noscitur a Sociis)

FACTS:

Petitioner Aisporna was charged for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act.

Petitioner’s husband, Rodolfo S. Aisporna (Rodolfo) was duly licensed by the Insurance Commission as agent to Perla
Compania de Seguros. Thru Rodolfo, a 12- month Personal Accident Policy was issued by Perla with beneficiary to Ana M.
Isidro for P50,000. The insured died by violence during lifetime of policy.

Subsequently, petitioner was charged because the aforementioned policy was issued with her active participation, which
is not allowed because she did not possess a certificate of authority to act as agent from the office of the Insurance
Commission.

Petitioner contended that being the wife of Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, and that the policy was merely
a renewal and was issued because her husband was not around when Isidro called by telephone. Instead, appellant left a
note on top of her husband’s desk.

The trial court found petitioner guilty as charged. On appeal, the trial court’s decisions was affirmed by respondent
appellate court, finding petitioner guilty of a violation of the first paragraph of Sec 189 of the insurance act.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a person can be convicted of having violated the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act
without reference to the second paragraph of the same section.

RULING:

The petition is meritorious. Petition appealed from is reversed, and accused is acquitted of the crime charged.

A perusal of the provision in question shows that the first paragraph thereof prohibits a person from acting as agent, sub-
agent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate of
authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner, while its second paragraph defines who an insurance agent is
within the intent of this section and, finally, the third paragraph thereof prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its
violation.

The definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph of Section 189 is intended to define the word
“agent” mentioned in the first and second paragraphs of the aforesaid section. More significantly, in its second
paragraph, it is explicitly provided that the definition of an insurance agent is within the intent of Section 189.

Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second paragraph to the agent mentioned in the first and second
paragraphs would give harmony to the aforesaid three paragraphs of Section 189. Legislative intent must be ascertained
from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning
of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give
effect to all its provisions whenever possible. More importantly the doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a
Sociis) provides that where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of
various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found or
with which it is associated.

Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph is also applicable to the agent
mentioned in the first paragraph, to receive compensation by the agent is an essential element for a violation of the first
paragraph of the aforesaid section.

In the case at bar, the information does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance contracts by the accused with
Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation. This allegation is essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the
accused could not be sustained. It is well-settled in Our jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of the
crime must be alleged and proved.

The accused did not violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
 China Bank v. Ortega (J)
GR L-34964, 31 January 1973 (49 SCRA 355)
Second Division, Makalintal (p): 7 concur, 2 took no part

Facts: On 17 December 1968, Vicente Acaban filed a complaint against B & B Forest Development Corporation
and Mariano Bautista for the collection of sum of money. The trial court declared the defendants in default for
failure to answer within the reglementary period, and rendered its decision on 20 January 1970.

To satisfy the judgment, Acaban sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of B & B Forest Development
Corporation with the China Bank. However, Tan Kim Liong, the bank’s cashier, disallowed the same invoking the
provisions of Republic Act 1405, which prohibit the disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits. On
4 March 1972, Tan Kim Lion was ordered to inform the Court if there is a deposit by B & B Forest Development
in the China Bank, and if there is, to hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order
from the Court. Tan Kim Liong moved to reconsider but was turned down. In the same order he was directed
to comply with the order of the Court, otherwise his arrest and confinement will be ordered. Resisting the 2
orders, the China Bank and Tan Kim Liong instituted the petition. Petitioners argue that the disclosure of the
information required by the court does not fall within any of the four (4) exceptions enumerated in Section 2
([1] upon written permission of the depositor, [2] or in cases of impeachment, [3] or upon order of a
competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, [4] or in cases where the money
deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation), and that if the questioned orders are complied
with Tan Kim Liong may be criminally liable under Section 5 and the bank exposed to a possible damage suit by
B & B Forest Development Corporation. Specifically referring to the case, the position of the petitioners is that
bank deposit of judgment debtor B and B Forest Development Corporation cannot be subject to garnishment
to satisfy a final judgment against it in view of the aforementioned provisions of law.

Issue: Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the
bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act 1405.

Held: From the discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses of Congress that the
prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its
being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed, there is no real inquiry in such a case, and if the
existence of the deposit is disclosed, the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process. Importantly, it
was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a
judgment. In the present case, the lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B
& B Forest Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform
the court whether B & B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only
for purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same intact and not allow any
withdrawal until further order.

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the lower court dated 4 and 27 March 1972, with costs against the
petitioners.

Board of Administrators of the PVA v. Bautista

GR L-37867, 22 February 1982 (112 SRCA 59)
First Division, Guerrero (p): 5 concurring

Facts: Calixto Gasilao was a veteran in good standing during the last World War that took active participation in
the liberation drive against the enemy, and due to his military service, he was rendered disabled. The
Philippine Veterans Administration, formerly the Philippine Veterans Board, (now Philippine Veterans Affairs
Office) is an agency of the Government charged with the administration of different laws giving various
benefits in favor of veterans and their orphans/or widows and parents. On July 23, 1955, Gasilao filed a claim
for disability pension under Section 9 of Republic Act 65, with the Philippine Veterans Board, alleging that he
was suffering from Pulmonary Tuberculosis (PTB), which he incurred in line of duty. Due to Gasilao’s failure to
complete his supporting papers and submit evidence to establish his service-connected illness, his claim was
disapproved by the Board on 18 December 1955. On 8 August 1968, Gasilao was able to complete his
supporting papers and, after due investigation and processing, the Board of Administrators found out that his
disability was 100% thus he was awarded the full benefits of section 9 of Republic Act 65.

Later on, Republic Act 5753 was approved on 22 June 1969, providing for an increase in the basic pension and
additional pension for the wife and each of the unmarried minor children. Gasilao’s monthly pension was,
however, increased only on 15 January 1971, and by 25% of the increases provided by law, due to the fact that
it was only on said date that funds were released for the purpose, and the amount so released was only
sufficient to pay only 25% of the increase. On 15 January 1972, more funds were released to implement fully
Republic Act 5753 and allow payment in full of the benefits thereunder from said date.

In 1973, Gasilao filed an action against the Board to recover the pension, which he claims he is entitled to,
from July 1955, when he first filed his application for pension, up to 1968 when his pension was finally
approved. The Board contends, however, based on Section 15 of Republic Act 65, that since the section
impliedly requires that the application filed should first be approved by the Board of Administrators before the
claimant could receive his pension, therefore, an award of pension benefits should commence from the date of
approval of the application.

Issue: Whether Gasilao is entitled to the pension from 1955 instead of from 1968.

Held: As it is generally known, the purpose of Congress in granting veteran pensions is to compensate a class
of men who suffered in the service for the hardships they endured and the dangers they encountered, and
more particularly, those who have become incapacitated for work owing to sickness, disease or injuries
sustained while in line of duty. A veteran pension law is, therefore, a governmental expression of gratitude to
and recognition of those who rendered service for the country, especially during times of war or revolution, by
extending to them regular monetary aid. For this reason, it is the general rule that a liberal construction is
given to pension statutes in favor of those entitled to pension. Courts tend to favor the pensioner, but such
constructional preference is to be considered with other guides to interpretation, and a construction of
pension laws must depend on its own particular language. In the present case, Republic Act 65 is a veteran
pension law which must be accorded a liberal construction and interpretation in order to favor those entitled
to rights, privileges, and benefits granted thereunder, among which are the right to resume old positions in
government, educational benefits, the privilege to take promotion examinations, a life pension for the
incapacited, pension for widow and children, and hospitalization and medical benefits. Upholding the Board
that the pension awards are made effective only upon approval of the application, this would be dependent
upon the discretion of the Board which had been abused in this case through inaction extending for 12 years.
Such stand, therefore does not appear to be, or simply is not, in consonance with the spirit and intent of the
law. Gasilao’s claim was sustained.

The Supreme Court modified the judgment of the court a quo, ordering the Board of Administrators of the
Philippine Veterans Administration (now the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office) to make Gasilao’s pension
effective 18 December 1955 at the rate of P50.00 per month plus P10.00 per month for each of his then
unmarried minor children below 18, and the former amount increased to P100.00 from 22 June 1957 to 7
August 1968; and declaring the differentials in pension to which said Gasilao, his wife and his unmarried minor
children below 18 are entitled for the period from 22 June 1969 to 14 January 1972 by virtue of Republic Act
5753 subject to the availability of Government funds appropriated for the purpose.