FRED (ghost fihter) to permanent, but not with respect to De Jesus on the ground that he has not met
anent, but not with respect to De Jesus on the ground that he has not met the
CASE NO. 1
ART IX-A, SEC 1: INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONS (w/o sub)
Macalintal vs. COMELEC
Facts: Romulo B. Macalintal filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking
a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Petitioner avers that Sections
19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 violate Article IX-A (Common Provisions) of the
Constitution as it allows the congress through the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189 to exercise the power to review,
revise, amend, and approve the IRR that the COMELEC shall promulgate.
Issue: W/N Section 19 and 25 of RA 9189 violates the constitution?
Ruling: Yes, Section 19 and 25 of RA 9189 whereby Congress, in both provisions,
arrogates unto itself a function not specifically vested by the Constitution, should be
stricken out of the subject statute for constitutional infirmity. Both provisions brazenly
violate the mandate on the independence of the COMELEC. Interpreting Section 1,
Article X of the 1935 Constitution providing that there shall be
an independent COMELEC, the Court has held that [w]hatever may be the nature of
the functions of the Commission on Elections, the fact is that the framers of the
Constitution wanted it to be independent from the other departments of the
Government.
Main Point: The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is
circumscribed by other constitutional provisions. One such provision is Section 1 of
Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution ordaining that constitutional commissions such
as the COMELEC shall be independent.
FRED (ghost fihter)
CASE NO. 2
ART IX-A, SEC 1: INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONS (w/o sub)
Ombudsman vs. CSC
Facts: Sometime on 2002, Carandang, Clemente and. de Jesus, Jr. were appointed
Graft Investigation Officers III of petitioner by the Ombudsman. The CSC approved
the appointments on the condition that they must obtain CES or Civil Service
Executive (CSE) eligibility which is governed by the CESB. Petitioner argued by
invoking a jurisprudence of CA which states that the letter and intent of the law is to
circumscribe the Career Executive Service (CES) to CES positions in the Executive
Branch of Government, and that the Judiciary, the Con Com, the Office of the
Ombudsman and the CHR are not covered by the CES governed by the CESB.
Subsequently, the CSC changed the status of Carandangs and Clementes appointments
eligibility requirements.
Issue: W/N the general power of CSC to administer the civil service can curtail the
specific discretionary power of appointment, including the grant of security of tenure,
by the ombudsman?
Ruling: No, CSC’s authority is limited only to [determine] whether or not
the appointees possess the legal qualifications and the appropriate eligibility,
nothing else. The CSC has the ministerial duty to grant the request of the
Ombudsman that appointment be made permanent. To refuse to heed the
request is a clear encroachment on the discretion vested solely on the
Ombudsman as appointing authority.
(Main Point in Bold)
FRED (ghost fihter)
CASE NO. 3
ART IX-A, SEC 1: INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONS (w/o sub)
CSC vs. DBM
Facts: The CSC via the present petition for mandamus seeks to compel the DBM to
release the balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. Respondent withheld the balance
to petitioners on the basis of its no report, no release policy whereby allocations for
agencies are withheld pending their submission of the documents. Petitioner contends
that the application of the policy upon independent constitutional bodies is a violation
of the principle of fiscal autonomy and, therefore, unconstitutional.
Issue: W/N the no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices
vested with fiscal autonomy?
Ruling: Yes, Enforcing such policy against offices possessing fiscal autonomy
violates Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution. Sec 5 provides “The
Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released”. By parity of construction, automatic release of
approved annual appropriations to petitioner, a constitutional commission which is
vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that no condition to
fund releases to it may be imposed.
Main Point: The agencies which the Constitution has vested with fiscal autonomy
should thus be given priority in the release of their approved appropriations over all
other agencies not similarly vested when there is a revenue shortfall.
FRED (ghost fihter)
CASE NO. 4
ART IX-A, SEC 1: INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONS (w/o sub)
Macalintal vs. COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner assails the creation of Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
with the power to review, revise, amend and approve the IRR promulgated by the
COMELEC, that R.A. No. 9189 intrudes into the independence of the COMELEC in
which the same should not be subject under the control of either the executive or
legislative departments of government. COMELEC joins the petitioner in asserting
that as an independent constitutional body, it may not be subject to interference by any
government instrumentality and that only this Court may review COMELEC rules and
only in cases of grave abuse of discretion.
Issue: W/N the creation of Joint Congressional Oversight Committee under RA
9189 intrudes the COMLEC’s rule making power?
Ruling: Yes. The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is
intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. In
the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that would
be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. It is not correct to
hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact election laws,
Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising
supervisory powers over its rule-making authority.
MAINPOINT: BOLD
5FRED (ghost fihter)
CASE NO. 5
ART IX-A, SEC 1: INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONS (w/o sub)
Sabili vs. COMELEC
Facts: COMELEC upon a petition of a private respondent, disqualified the petitioner
from running as Mayor of Lipa City, and cancelled his COC for not being a resident
of Lipa City and for his failure to meet the 1year residency requirement under the law.
In its Resolution the COMELEC en banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration of
petitioner. Although he was able to receive his copy of the Resolution, no prior notice
setting the date of promulgation of the said Resolution was received by him.
Meanwhile, Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 requires the parties to be
notified in advance of the date of the promulgation of the Resolution. Hence, petitioner
filed with this Court a seeking the annulment of the Resolutions of the COMELEC
Issue: Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it failed
to promulgate its Resolution in accordance with its own Rules of Procedure
Ruling: NO, the COMELEC validly exercised its constitutionally granted power to
make its own rules of procedure when it issued the Order suspending Section 6 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8696. Consequently, the second assailed Resolution of the
COMELEC cannot be set aside on the ground of COMELECs failure to issue to
petitioner a notice setting the date of the promulgation thereof. The additional rule
requiring notice to the parties prior to promulgation of a decision is not part of
the process of promulgation. Since lack of such notice does not prejudice the
rights of the parties, noncompliance with this rule is a procedural lapse that does
not vitiate the validity of the decision.
(MAIN POINT IN BOLD)
FRED (ghost fihter)
CASE NO. 6
ART IX-A, SEC 7: DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSIONS
REVIEW OF FINAL ORDERS, RESOLUTION, & DECISIONS (w/ sub)
FILIPINAS ENGINEERING vs. FERRER
FACTS: Respondent issued an invitation to bid for the manufacture and delivery of
11,000 units of voting booths for the coming 1969 elections in which bidders are
required to submit finished sample. Petitioner, Filipinas Engineering and Machine
Shop, (Filipinas) and the private respondent, Acme Steel Manufacturing Company,
(Acme) are among the 17 bidders who responded. COMELEC rejected Acme's bid
because its sample was poorly made and recommended that Filipinas be awarded the
contract to manufacture and supply the voting booths, but that an ocular inspection be
made by the Commission on all the samples before the final award be made.
After conducting ocular inspection, the COMELEC issued a Resolution
awarding the contract to Acme provided that it improves its samples i.e. rust proof or
rust resistant. COMELEC then issued purchase for the manufacture and supply of the
11,000 Units of voting booths in favour of Acme. Filipinas filed an Injunction suit
with the then Manila RTC against COMELEC and private respondent Acme.
Thereafter the public respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss. Acting on the motion (to
dismiss), the respondent Judge denied Filipinas' motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit
involving an order of the COMELEC dealing with an award of contract arising from
its invitation to bid?
RULING: Yes. What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and
decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as
provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC
and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial powers.
MAINPOINT: The COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme
was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its
inherent administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said
resolution may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by the
Supreme Court. Any question arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary
civil action before the trial courts.
FRED (ghost fihter)
CASE NO. 7
ART IX-A, SEC 7: DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSIONS
REVIEW OF FINAL ORDERS, RESOLUTION, & DECISIONS (w/ sub)
SALIGUMBA vs. COA
FACTS: Editha Saligumba, the COA instituted the administrative case against
Leonardo Estella, Auditing Examiner III, in the Auditor's Office of Misamis
Occidental. The charge was that the respondent raped petitioner on several occasions.
COA dismissed the complaint for being devoid of merit. Petitioner now wants to
review the COA decision. She insists that the decision of the COA is contrary to the
evidence.
ISSUE: W/N the case would prosper?
RULING & MAINPOINT:
No. SC power to review COA decisions refers to money matters and not to
administrative cases involving the discipline of its personnel. . Even assuming that
SC have jurisdiction to review decisions on administrative matters as mentioned
above, SC cannot do so on factual issues; SC’s power to review is limited to legal
issues.
FRED (ghost fihter)
CASE NO. 8
ART IX-A, SEC 7: DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSIONS
REVIEW OF FINAL ORDERS, RESOLUTION, & DECISIONS (w/ sub)
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE CORPORATION vs. COA
FACTS: Petitioner was granted under RA 4161, a franchise "to establish and operate
telecommunication systems throughout the Philippines which require petitioner to pay
a franchise tax of 1½% on all gross receipts from business transacted thereunder.
Later, Domestic Satellite Philippines, Inc. (DOMSAT for short) was granted by
PD 947 a franchise to operate "as a carrier's carrier, any and all types of
telecommunications services available through the use of space relay and repeater.
Under its franchise, DOMSAT is required to pay a franchise tax of only one-half
percent (½%) on all gross receipts from business transacted thereunder.
Subsequently, respondent found that PT & T had a franchise tax deficiency of
P387, 370.50 in 1979. This amount was computed at ½% of petitioner's gross receipts
from business transacted under its franchise. The Commission informed petitioner of
its liability for said amount. Petitioner took exception to the Commission's finding on
the ground that under RA 4161 it has clearly fully settled its franchise tax liability.
In a reply Commission reiterated its previous stand that petitioner's franchise tax
should be computed at the rate of 1½% finding petitioners contention meritless. Hence,
the instant petition which seeks the review of the letter dated June 4,1980 and the letter
dated August 26,1980 of respondent Commission.
ISSUE: W/N the letters of respondent Commission are proper subjects of appeal
and/or review by this Court?
RULING: No. A cursory examination of the two (2) letters in question shows that
the same are not a "final award, order or decision". Respondent Commission in the
said letters did not decide the issue. It did not render a decision, order or final award.
It merely expressed an opinion. Then too, respondent Commission cannot render a
"final order, decision or award" on the question of whether petitioner should
pay 1½% or ½% of franchise tax. This is not a matter falling under its jurisdiction.
Rather, it is a matter for resolution by the Bureau of Internal Revenue whose
decision may be appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals.
MAINPOINT:BOLD
FRED (ghost fihter)
CASE NO. 9
ART IX-A, SEC 7: DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSIONS
REVIEW OF FINAL ORDERS, RESOLUTION, & DECISIONS (w/ sub)
CUA vs. COMELEC
FACTS: The petitioner won the election but COMELEC suspended his proclamation
as winner in the lone congressional district of Quirino due to the lack of the unanimous
vote required by the procedural rules of COMELEC. Private respondent Puzon filed
a "motion for reconsiderationof the said decision with the COMELEC en banc, where
three members voted to sustain the First Division, with two dissenting and one
abstaining.
On the strength of 3-2 vote, Cua moved for his proclamation by the board of
canvassers and granted his motion. Cua took his oath the same day, but the next day
Puzon filed with the COMELEC an urgent motion to suspend Cua's proclamation or
to annul or suspend its effect if already made. COMELEC set the motion for hearing
and three days later it issued a restraining telegram enjoining Cua from assuming the
office of member of the House of Representatives. The petitioner then came to SC to
enjoin the COMELEC from acting on the said motion and enforcing its restraining
order.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 2-1 vote casted on Cua constituted the majority vote
defined by Article IX-A Sec 7?
RULING: Yes. After considering the issues and the arguments raised by the parties,
the Court holds that the 2-1 decision rendered by the First Division was a valid decision
under Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the three members
who voted to affirm the First Division constituted a majority of the five members
who deliberated and voted thereon en banc and their decision is also valid under
the aforecited constitutional provision. Hence, the proclamation of Cua on the basis
of the two aforecited decisions was a valid act that entitles him now to assume his seat
in the House of Representatives
MAINPOINT:BOLD
FRED (ghost fihter)
CASE NO. 10
ART IX-A, SEC 7: DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSIONS
REVIEW OF FINAL ORDERS, RESOLUTION, & DECISIONS (w/ sub)
ESTRELLA vs. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner Romeo M. Estrella sought the nullification Status Quo
Ante Order issued by (COMELEC) En Banc in . Estrella v. Salvador, directing the
parties to maintain the status quo ante order. In the issuance of the questioned
COMELEC En Banc Status Quo Ante Order, five (5) of the then incumbent seven (7)
members of the COMELEC participated
Later, Commissioner Lantion stated in his handwriting that he will not participate
in the Division deliberations but will vote when the case is elevated to en banc.
Commissioner Lantions voluntary piecemeal inhibition was not accepted.
Since Commissioner Lantion could not participate and vote, thus leaving three (3)
members concurring, the necessary votes of four (4) or majority of the members of the
COMELEC was not attained. The order thus failed to comply with the number of votes
necessary for the pronouncement of a decision or order, as required under Rule 3,
Section 5(a) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. In seeking a reconsideration of the
above-quoted Resolution, private respondent cites Cua v. Commission on Elections.
ISSUE: W/N the Court follows precisely the phrase “shall decide a case or matter
brought before it by a majority vote of all its members?
RULING: No. Had the framers intended that it should be the majority of the members
who participated or deliberated, it would have clearly phrased it that way as it did with
respect to the Supreme Court in Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution:
SECTION 4(2) x x x all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to
be heard en banc, x x x shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of
the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case
and voted thereon.
SC abandons the doctrine laid down in Cua and holds that the COMELEC En
Banc shall decide a case or matter brought before it by a majority vote of all its
members, and NOT majority of the members who deliberated and voted thereon.
MAINPOINT: IN BOLD RULING 2ND PARAGRAPH
CASE NO. 11
ART IX-A, SEC 7: DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSIONS
REVIEW OF FINAL ORDERS, RESOLUTION, & DECISIONS (w/ sub)
MISON vs. COA
FACTS: Commissioner of Customs rendered a decision declaring illegal the seizure
by elements of the Philippine Navy of the M/V "Hyojin Maru" a vessel of Japanese
registry, and ordered the release of the vessel, but failed because it sank while in the
custody of the BOC. Chan Chiu On and Cheung I then filed a claim with the COA
for the payment of the value of the vessel but denied by COA acting chariman
Espiritu and later the chairman of COA.
In a 4th Indorsement addressed "to the Auditor, Bureau of Customs,"
Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo, acting "for the commission," reconsidered decision
and declared that the Commission will interpose no objection to the instant claim,
subject to the usual auditing and accounting requirements.
Petitioner Mison sought clarification of "the legal implication of the 4th
Indorsement in two (2) letters. The response entitled "COA Decision No. 992,"
signed by "the full complement of three (3) members of the Commission on
Audit." Said COA Decision No. 992 pointed out that the earlier decision, No. 77-
142, was "open to question and cannot be recognized by the present Commission"
because signed merely by the then Manager of the Technical Service Office," who
evidently "was not acting for the Commission but only for the then Acting
Chairman." It therefore held that the 4th Indorsement should be "deemed for all legal
intents and purposes as the final decision on the matter.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by letter
signed by the Chairman and the two (2) Members of the Commission. Petitioner
seasonably filed a petition for certiorari to nullify said COA Decisions pursuant to
Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: W/N COA’s 1st decision, although signed only by the Manager, Technical
Service Office of the COA, was valid because it "was adopted in toto as a decision of
the COA?
RULING: No. Espiritu decision” was void ab initio. As manager of the COA
Technical Service Office, Mr. Espiritu obviously had no power whatever to render
and promulgate a decision of or for the Commission. Indeed, even the Chairman,
alone, had not that power. As clearly set out in the Constitution then in force, the
power was lodged in the Commission on Audit, “composed of a Chairman and
two Commissioners.” It was the Commission, as a collegial body, which then as
now, had the jurisdiction to decide any case brought before it within sixty days
from the date of its submission for resolution,” subject to review by the
Supreme Court on certiorari.
MAINPOINT: BOLD
Martin
CASE NO. 12
ART IX SEC 7: DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSIONS
Paredes v. COMELEC
Facts: On Jan. 25, 1980, a petition (petitioner is the Provincial Chairman of the
Kilusang Bagong Lipunan - KBL) was raised to disqualify — on the ground of
turncoatism (prohibited) which is a change of party affiliations by an elective official
during his term of office and by a candidate for such office within six months
immediately preceding or following an election — several candidates (private
respondents) for the positions of Mayor, Vice-Mayor and Members of Sangguniang
Bayan in the Municipality of Kiangan, Province of Ifugao. But before the resolution
thereof by COMELEC, the local election was held and the respondents were
proclaimed without prejudice to hearing and ruling thereafter. The petition for
review was filed because petitioner contends that the fact finding by the Commission
was arbitrary in character. The fact finding says that private respondents (members
of Nacionalista Party) testified that, although they admittedly attended certain
meetings of the KBL, they did so on the belief that these were intended for the
organization of civic committees that would disseminate information regarding
future plebiscites and elections. The COMELEC found the fact finding as decisive such
as the respondents did not take an oath of affiliation as members of the KBL; they
have been long standing NP members prior to said meetings, except respondent
Guyguyon who was not then a member of any political party.
Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court may review the findings of fact by the
COMELEC.
Ruling: No. The decision certainly was not tainted by arbitrariness. To that extent, it
is free from the infirmity of lack of due process. It was supported by substantial
evidence, hence its finding is entitled to be accorded full respect.
Main Point: Generally, the Court may not review the rulings or findings of fact by the
COMELEC; their rulings or findings are conclusive. The exception is when the facts
would show arbitrariness.
Martin
CASE NO. 13
ART IX SEC 7: DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSIONS
Ambil v. COMELEC
Facts: The case at bar is an election protest (challenging the results in a total of 201
precincts) filed by Ramirez (with second highest number of votes) involving the
position of Governor (Eastern Samar) for which Ambil was proclaimed the winner. On
Jan. 27, 2000, Commissioner Japal M. Guiani prepared and signed a proposed
resolution in the case. Then on Feb. 15, 2000, Guiani retired from service. A
resolution promulgated on February 14, 2000, signed by Commissioner Guiani,
revealed the result which was in favor of respondent Ramirez who was declared
winner. On June 15, 2000, the Comelec, First Division, through Commissioner Julio F.
Desamito, issued an order setting the promulgation of the resolution in the case on
June 20, 2000. On June 19, 2000, petitioner Ambil filed the instant petition that seeks
to annul the order dated June 15, 2000 and prohibiting the Comelec, First Division,
from promulgating the purported Guiani resolution. Respondent Ramirez admitted
that the proposed resolution of Commissioner Guiani was no longer valid after his
retirement on February 15, 2000.
Issue: Whether or not the Guiani resolution is considered a final decision.
Ruling: No. The so-called Guiani resolution is void. The Constitution provides that,
“any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof.” A final decision or resolution becomes binding only after it is promulgated
and not before. Guiani might have signed a draft ponencia prior to his retirement
from office, but when he vacated his office without the final decision or resolution
having been promulgated, his vote was automatically invalidated.
Main Point: There is no decision until the draft is signed and promulgated. If a
Commissioner signs a decision but retires before the decision is promulgated, his
vote does not count even if it was he who penned the decision.
Martin
CASE NO. 14
ART IX SEC 7: DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSIONS
Mateo v. CA
Facts: Petitioners, all Board Members of Morong Water District (quasi-public
corporation), conducted an investigation on private respondent Edgar Sta Maria
(then General Manager). He was placed under preventive suspension and Maximo
San Diego was designated in his place as Acting General Manager. Later on, he was
dismissed. Hence, private respondent filed a Special Civil Action for Quo Warranto
and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal,
challenging his dismissal by petitioners. The petitioners moved to dismiss the case as
the RTC had no jurisdiction over disciplinary actions of government employees which
is vested exclusively in the Civil Service Commission.
Issue: Whether or not CSC has jurisdiction over the case; and whether or not
decisions of CSC are reviewable only by the SC by certiorari under Rule 65.
Ruling: Yes. RTC have no jurisdiction to entertain cases involving dismissal of officers
and employees covered by the Civil Service Law. The established rule is that the hiring
and firing of employees of government-own and controlled corporations are
governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules and Regulations.
No. In Mancita v. Barcinas (old rule), the CSC, is the single arbiter of all
contests relating to the civil service and as such, its judgments are unappealable and
subject only to the SC's certiorari judgment (pursuant to Sec. 7, Art. IX). However, this
rule no longer governs for under the present rule (“Unless otherwise provided... by
law”), Revised Circular No. 1-91 as amended by Revised Administrative Circular No.
1-95 which took effect on June 1, 1995, final resolutions of the Civil Service
Commission shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals.
Main Point: Prior to June 1, 1995, decisions could be reviewed only by the Supreme
Court by certiorari under Rule 65. Now, however, judgments or final orders of quasi-
judicial agencies may be appealed to the Court of Appeals within fifteen days from
notice thereof.
Martin
CASE NO. 15
ART IX SEC 7: DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSIONS
Reyes v. Regional Trial Court
Facts: Petitioner Aquiles Reyes and private respondent Adolfo Comia were
candidates for the position of member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, Oriental
Mindoro in the synchronized elections. Private respondent moved for the exclusion
of certain election returns, on the ground of serious irregularity in counting in favor
of petitioner Aquiles Reyes votes cast for "Reyes" only, considering that there was
another candidate bearing the same surname. Petition for certiorari was filed seeking
the annulment of the decision of the COMELEC, dismissing the petitioner’s appeal
(on the ground that he had failed to pay the appeal fee within the prescribed period)
from the trial court's decision. The Solicitor General, in behalf of the COMELEC,
contends that the filing of the present petition, without petitioner first filing a motion
for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, violates Art. IX, Sec. 7 of the
Constitution because under this provision only decisions of the COMELEC en banc
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc is
necessary before filing a petition before the SC for certiorari.
Ruling: Yes. The petitioner's failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the decision
of the First Division of the COMELEC is fatal to his present action. It is now settled
that in providing that the decisions, orders and rulings of COMELEC "may be brought
to the Supreme Court on certiorari" as provided by Sec. 7, Art. IX of the Constitution.
And Rule 65 (1) says that certiorari may be resorted to when there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy. Hence, a case may be brought to the Supreme Court
only after reconsideration (a speedy and adequate remedy).
Main Point: In the case of the COMELEC, only decisions en banc may be brought to
the Supreme Court by certiorari since motions for reconsideration of decisions shall
be decided by the Commission en banc.
Martin
CASE NO. 16
ART IX SEC 7: DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSIONS
ABS-CBN v. COMELEC
Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution, 20
days before the said election, to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or
representatives from conducting exit survey/poll; an exit poll is an electoral survey
that gives an advance overview of how the electorate voted to the public. Herein
petitioner argues that the holding of exit polls and the nationwide reporting of their
results are valid exercises of the freedoms of speech and of the press hence the
petition for certiorari. On the other hand, the solicitor general contends that the
petition should be dismissed for petitioner's failure to exhaust available remedies
before the issuing forum, specifically the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not a motion for reconsideration should have been the adequate
remedy resorted to by ABS-CBN and not petition for certiorari.
Ruling: No. The instant petition assails a resolution issued by the Comelec only
twenty (20) days before the election itself. Besides, the petitioner got hold of a copy
thereof only on May 4, 1998. Under the circumstances, there was hardly enough
opportunity to move for a reconsideration and to obtain a swift resolution in time for
the May 11, 1998 elections. Moreover, not only is time of the essence; the Petition
involves transcendental constitutional issues. Direct resort to this Court through a
special civil action for certiorari is therefore justified. The SC has ruled in the past that
procedural requirement may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice,
when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the protection of labor, when
the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for
relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy Brgy. Dacanlao, Calaca, Batangas, pending the determination of civil case no. 3442 for the
available. annulment of ordinance no. 05, resolution no. 345 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2987.

Main Point: The general rule, a COMELEC case may be brought to the SC (through
certiorari) only after reconsideration. An exception is when the elections are already
RULING: YES. Section 7, Article IX A of the 1987 Constitution provides in part that: SEC. 7.
very close (urgent) and that there is no more time for another speedy remedy.
xxx. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or
Sheena
ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
Case 17 aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. The Court ruled that
“…What is contemplated by the term final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC
Art IX A Section 7 Decisions of the Commissions reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in
actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in
Salva v. Makalintal the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. Briefly, COMELEC Resolution
No. 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the
required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the COMELECs quasi-judicial
functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the
FACTS: Petitioners, as officials and residents of barangay San Rafael, Calaca, Batangas,
conduct of plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not be deemed as a final order
filed with the RTC a class suit against the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas,
reviewable by certiorari by this Court. Any question pertaining to the validity of
Sangguniang Pambayan of Calaca, Batangas, and the COMELEC for annulment of
said resolution may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345 both enacted by the Sangguniang Panglalawigan
of Batangas, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2987. Ordinance No. 05 declared the abolition
of Barangay San Rafael and its merger with Barangay Dacanlao, Municipality of Calaca,
Batangas and accordingly instructed the COMELEC to conduct the required plebiscite. MAIN POINT: What is contemplated by the term “final orders, rulings and decisions” of
Resolution No. 345 affirmed the effectivity of Ordinance No. 05, thereby overriding the the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those
veto exercised by the governor of Batangas. Ordinance No. 05 was vetoed by the Governor rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the
of Batangas for being ultra vires, particularly, as it was not shown that the essential said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory (or quasi-judicial) powers.
requirements regarding the attestations or certifications of several government agencies
were obtained. The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2987, providing for the rules
and regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite scheduled on February
28, 1998, to decide the issue of the abolition of barangay San Rafael and its merger with
barangay Dacanlao, Calaca, Batangas. The trial court denied the petition saying that any
Sheena
petition or action questioning an act, resolution or decision of the COMELEC must be
brought before SC. The petitioners contend that when the COMELEC exercises its quasi-
Case 18
judicial functions under Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code, its acts are subject to the
exclusive review by this Court; but when the COMELEC performs a purely ministerial duty, Art IX A Section 7 Decisions of the Commissions
such act is subject to scrutiny by the RTC. Petitioners submit that the conduct of a
plebiscite, pursuant to Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345, is not adjudicatory or Garces v. CA
quasi-judicial in nature but simply ministerial or administrative in nature and only in
obedience to the aforesaid Ordinance and Resolution.

ISSUE: W/N the respondent court has jurisdiction to enjoin the COMELEC from
implementing its Resolution No. 2987 which provided for the rules and regulations for the
conduct of the plebiscite to decide on the abolition of Brgy. San Rafael and its merger with
Facts: Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte on
July 27, 1986. She was to replace respondent Election Registrar Claudio Concepcion, who,
in turn, was transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte. Both appointments were to take
effect upon assumption of office. Concepcion, however, refused to transfer post as he did
not request for it. Garces was directed by the Office of Assistant Director for Operations to
assume the Gutalac post. But she was not able to do so because of a Memorandum issued
by respondent Provincial Election Supervisor Salvador Empeynado that prohibited her
from assuming office as the same is not vacant. Meanwhile, since Concepcion continued
occupying the Gutalac office, the COMELEC en banc cancelled his appointment to Liloy.
Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus with preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction and damages against Empeynado and Concepcion. The COMELEC
en banc resolved to recognize respondent Concepcion as the Election Registrar of Gutalac
and ordered that the appointments of Garces be cancelled. Empeynado moved to dismiss
the petition for mandamus alleging that the same was rendered moot and academic by the
said COMELEC Resolution, and that the case is cognizable only by the COMELEC under Sec.
7 Art. IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. Empeynado argues that the matter should be raised
only on certiorari before the Supreme Court and not before the RTC, else the latter court
becomes a reviewer of an en banc COMELEC resolution contrary to Sec. 7, Art. IX-A.
Issue: W/N the case is cognizable by the Supreme Court.
Ruling: No. The settled rule is that decision, rulings, order of the COMELEC that may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are those that relate to
the COMELECs exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers involving elective
regional, provincial and city officials. In this case, what is being assailed is the COMELECs
choice of an appointee to occupy the Gutalac Post which is an administrative duty done for
the operational set-up of an agency. The controversy involves an appointive, not an
elective, official. Hardly can this matter call for the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial administrative
questions that are best ventilated before the RTC, a court which the law vests with the
power to exercise original jurisdiction over all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction
of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Main Point: The “case” or “matter” referred to by the Constitution must be something
within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, i.e., it must pertain to an election dispute. The
settled rule is that “decision, rulings, order” of the COMELEC that may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari under Sec. 7, Art. IX-A are those that relate to the COMELEC’s
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers involving “elective regional,
provincial, and city officials.” In this case, what is being assailed is the COMELEC’s choice
of an appointee to occupy the Gutalac Post which is an administrative duty done for the
operational set-up of an agency.
Sheena
Case 19
Art IX A Section 7 Decisions of the Commissions
Dumayas vs COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner Dumayas and respondent Bernal were candidates for the position in
Mayor of Iloilo. During the canvassing by the Municipal Board of Canvassers, petitioner
sought the exclusion of election returns for 3 precincts for alleged acts of terrorism,
intimidation and coercion committed in said precincts during the casting and counting of
votes. The MBC denied petitioner’s objections. Petitioner appealed to the COMELEC
Second Division which excluded election returns from 3 precincts and directed the MBC
to reconvene and finish the canvass of the remaining or uncontested returns and then, to
proclaim the winning mayoralty candidate. Private respondent Bernal moved for
reconsideration of the decision of the Second Division with the COMELEC en banc. The
MBC proclaimed petitioner winner of the election. Private respondent Bernal filed an
urgent motion to declare void petitioner’s proclamation. The duly proclaimed Vice-Mayor
Betita, and private respondent Bernal filed an action for quo warranto against petitioner
before the RTC of Iloilo.
Petitioner filed with COMELEC en banc a motion to cancel Bernal’s motion for
reconsideration and motion to declare void petitioner’s proclamation on the ground that
respondent Bernal should be deemed to have abandoned said motion when he filed quo
warranto action. The COMELEC en banc reversed the decision of the Second Division,
annulled the petitioner Dumayas’ proclamation; and constituted a new MBC. 2
commissioners who participated in the consideration of the case retired before the
promulgation of the COMELEC decision but after they cast their vote. 4
commissioners were left. Respondent Bernal was proclaimed by the newly-constituted
MBC as the duly-elected Mayor of the Municipality. Petitioner Dumayas asked the Supreme
Court to set aside the COMELEC en banc resolution.
ISSUE: (1) W/N the votes of the retirees be counted.
(2) W/N the 3-1 vote of the remaining Commissioners a valid decision en banc.
RULING: (1) No. Their vote should be automatically withdrawn. There is no decision
until it is promulgated. (2) The remaining 4 commissioners constituted the total
membership and constituted a quorum. The vote of 3 is a majority vote of all.
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD – from Bernas book.
Sheena
Case 20
Art IX A Section 7 Decisions of the Commissions
Aguilar v. COMELEC
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari assailing COMELEC issuances. In 2007 barangay
elections, petitioner Aguilar (264 votes) won the chairmanship of a barangay in Lanao
del Norte, over private respondent Insoy (265 votes) by a margin of one vote. Insoy
instituted a protest MTC. MTC decided Insoy as the duly elected punong barangay. The
TC nullified the proclamation of Aguilar. Aguilar filed his notice of appeal and paid to the
trial court the appeal fee of P1,000.00 in accordance with Rule 14, Sections 8 and 9 of the
recently promulgated A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC or the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests
Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials. When the
COMELEC received the records elevated by the trial court, its First Division issued first
assailed Order dismissing the instant appeal for Aguilar’s failure to pay the appeal fee of
P3,000.00 as prescribed by the Comelec Rules of Procedure within the five-(5)-day
reglementary period. Aguilar moved for reconsideration, that the newly promulgated
A.M. only requires the payment of P1,000.00 as appeal fee. First Division denied. Aguilar
filed another motion for reconsideration, contending, among others, that the order was
null and void because it was issued in violation of the rule that motions for
reconsideration should be resolved by the COMELEC en banc. Division denied as its final
order.
ISSUE:
W/N COMELEC First Division gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order
dismissing petitioners appeal.
RULING:
YES. In this case, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing his
appeal was not resolved by the COMELEC en banc, but by the COMELEC First Division, in
obvious violation of the provisions of the Constitution and the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. The division, after dismissing petitioners appeal, arrogated unto itself the en
bancs function of resolving petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The rule that a
motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a COMELEC division,
except with regard to interlocutory orders, shall be elevated to the COMELEC en
banc. Here, there is no doubt that the order dismissing the appeal is not merely an
interlocutory, but a final order. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the Presiding
Commissioner of the COMELEC First Division to certify the case to the COMELEC en banc
within two days from notification of the filing of the motion.
MAIN POINT:
Where a division of the COMELEC decides a motion for reconsideration in violation of Art
IX C 3, the division’s ruling is a complete nullity and may be brought to the Court on
certiorari. (Bernas)
Sheena
Case 21
Art IX A Section 7 Decisions of the Commissions
Cayetano v. COMELEC
FACT: In 2010, petitioner Maria Laarni Cayetano and private respondent Dante O. Tinga
were candidates for the position of Mayor of Taguig City. Petitioner was proclaimed the
winner, 95,865 votes as against 93,445 votes received by private respondent. Private
respondent filed an Election Protest against petitioner before the COMELEC on the
ground of frauds and irregularities allegedly committed by petitioner. Petitioner raised
the affirmative defense of insufficiency in form and content of the Election Protest and
prayed for dismissal. COMELEC denied. Motion for reconsideration was filed but also
denied. Private respondent refutes the allegations of petitioner and raises the procedural
infirmity in the instant petition, i.e., the power of this Court to review decisions of the
COMELEC under Section 3, Article IX-C, pursuant to the leading case of Repol v.
COMELEC. Private respondent likewise counters that the petition fails to demonstrate
grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner insists that the case at bar differs from Repol since
the herein assailed Orders constituted a final order of the COMELEC (Second Division) on
that particular issue. Moreover, petitioner maintains that the COMELEC patently
committed grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: W/N the final order of the COMELEC (Second Division) denying the affirmative
defenses of petitioner can be questioned before this Court even via a petition for
certiorari.

RULING: No. The Court has no jurisdiction to review an order, whether final or
interlocutory, even a final resolution of a division of the COMELEC. Stated
otherwise, the Court can only review via certiorari a decision, order, or ruling of
the COMELEC en banc in accordance with Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution.
Petitioners assertion that circumstances prevailing herein are different from the factual
milieu attendant in Repol has no merit. As stated in Soriano, the general rule is that a
decision or an order of a COMELEC Division cannot be elevated directly to this
Court through a special civil action for certiorari. True, the aforestated rule admits of
exceptions as when the issuance of the assailed interlocutory order is a patent nullity
because of the absence of jurisdiction to issue the same. Unfortunately for petitioner,
none of the circumstances permitting an exception to the rule occurs in this instance.
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD
Additional Notes: The issuance of a special writ of certiorari has two prerequisites: (1) a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without
or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Case No. 22
Art IX: Section 7. Decisions of the Commissions
A. Common Provisions
Dela Llana v. The Chairperson, COA
Facts: Petitioner Dela Llana, as a taxpayer wrote to COA regarding the
recommendation of the Senate Committee on agriculture and food that the Dept
of agriculture (DA) set-up an internal pre-audit service. The COA replied to Dela
LLana informing him of the prior issuance of Circular 82-29 which provides
whenever the circumstances warrant, COA may reinstitute pre-audit or adopt
such other control measures as necessary and appropriate to protect the funds
and property of an agency.
Dela Llana filed a petition for alleging that the pre-audit duty onthe part
of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere circular, considering that the pre-audit is a
constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution
Issue: W/N the petitioner the petition for certiorari file by Dela Llana proper
Ruling: No. However the Petitioner is correct in that decisions and orders of the
COA are reviewable by the court via a petition for certiorari. However, these refer
to decisions and orders which were rendered by the COA in its quasi-judicial
capacity. Circular No. 89-299 was promulgated by the COA under its quasi-
legislative or rule-making powers. Hence, Circular No. 89-299 is not reviewable
by certiorari. Neither is a petition for prohibition appropriate in this case. A
petition for prohibition is filed against any tribunal, corporation, board, or
person—whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions—
who has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, and the petitioner prays that judgment be rendered, commanding the
respondent to desist from further proceeding in the action or matter specified in
the petition. However, prohibition only lies against judicial or ministerial
functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions.
Main Point: Decisions and orders of the Commission on Audit (COA) rendered in
its quasi-judicial capacity are reviewable by the court via a petition for certiorari
and not those promulgated under its quasi-legislative or rule-making powers.
Case No. 23
Art IX: Section 7. Decisions of the Commissions
A. Common Provisions
Cagas v. COMELEC
Facts: The petitioner Cagas and respondent Bautista contested the position of
Governor of the Province of Davao del Sur in the 2010 automated national and
local elections, wherein the petitioner won against the respondent. Alleging
fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of election laws, rules
and resolutions, Bautista filed an electoral protest.
The petitioner moved to reconsider on the ground that the order did not
discuss whether the protest specified the alleged irregularities in the conduct of
the elections. He prayed that the matter be certified to the COMELEC en
banc pursuant to Section 1, Section 5, and Section 6, all of Rule 20 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8804.
Issue: W/N COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN REFUSING TO DISMISS
THE PROTEST FOR INSUFFICIENCY IN FORM AND CONTENT
Ruling: No. The governing provision is Section 7, Article IX of the 1987
Constitution, which provides: Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a
majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty
days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is
deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading,
brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any
decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof. This provision, although it confers on the Court the power to review any
decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, limits such power to a final decision or
resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory
order issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no
power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution
issued by a Division of the COMELEC.
Main Point: The Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory
order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC.
LJ
Case No. 24
Art IX: Section 8. Other Functions
B. Civil Service Commission
Section 1. Composition; Qualifications; Term
Gaminde v. COA
FACTS: On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed petitioner
Thelma P. Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. She
assumed office on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. On September 07,
1993, the Commission on Appointment, Congress of the Philippines confirmed
the appointment. In her appointment paper the end of her term will be on Feb 2,
1999. However in 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the
President as to the expiry date of her term of office, In reply to her request, the
Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in a letter opined that petitioner’s term of
office would expire on February 02, 2000, not on February 02, 1999. She
continued to remain in office, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the
Office of the President as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her
request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in a letter dated April 07, 19982
opined that petitioner’s term of office would expire on February 02, 2000, not
on February 02, 1999. ISSUE: W/N the common starting point of the appointees
of the commission February 2, 1987
RULING: Yes. This is true even if Art XVIII, Sec 15 provided an extension of tenure
of the incumbents when the Constitution took effect, the said extension doesn’t
affect the term. The starting point shall be February 2 despite the appointee took
office after February 2, through this rotational system the staggering system is
preserved hence Gaminde’s expired on February 02, 1999. However, she served
as de facto officer in good faith until February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to
receive her salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered.
MAIN POINT: There is no need to expressly state the beginning of the term of
office as this is understood to coincide with the effectivity of the Constitution
upon its ratification.
LJ
Case No. 25
Art IX: Section 8. Other Functions
B. Civil Service Commission
Section 1. Composition; Qualifications; Term
Mathay Jr. v. CA
FACTS: During his term as Mayor of Quezon City, Mr. Brigido R. Simon appointed
private respondents to positions in the Civil Service Unit (“CSU”) of the local
government of Quezon City. Civil Service Units were created pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 51 which was allegedly signed into law on November 15
or 16, 1972. PD 51 created certain offices and they were promptly filled.
However in 1991, PD 51 was declared never published hence it never became a
law. On June 4, 1990, the Civil Service Commission issued Memorandum Circular
No. 30, directing all Civil Service Regional or Field Offices to recall, revoke and
disapprove within one year from issuance of the said Memorandum, all
appointments in CSUs created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 51 on the
ground that the same never became law. Among those affected by the revocation
of appointments are private respondents in these three petitions. The sanggunian
passed an ordinance declaring the “personnel” the private respondents absorbed
in the department of order and public safety. Due to the lack of vacancies Simon
made them contractual employees, When Matthay became mayor he renew all
contract but refused to renew the private respondents. The Civil Service
Commission then ordered to reinstate them in the ground that their appointment
is automatic.
ISSUE: W/N the Civil Service Commission erred in their decision in ordering the
reinstatement of the respondents based on the ground that the city had passed
an ordinance that provide for the “absorption” of specific persons to certain
positions.
RULING: Yes. the ordinance is invalid. The act of ordering the absorption is an act
of appointment, in which the city council has no power to appoint. It is axiomatic
that the right to hold public office is not a natural right. The right exists only by
virtue of a law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it. Since
Presidential Decree 51 creating the CSU never became law, it could not be a
source of rights. Neither could it impose duties. It could not afford any protection.
It did not create an office. It is as inoperative as though it was never passed. In
Debulgado vs. Civil Service Commission we held that “a void appointment cannot
give rise to security of tenure on the part of the holder of the appointment.”
MAIN POINT: The right to hold public office is not a natural right; It exists only
by virtue of a law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it; A void
appointment cannot give rise to security of tenure on the part of the holder of the
appointment.
LJ
Case No. 26
Art IX: Section 8. Other Functions
B. Civil Service Commission
Section 2: Scope of the System
Cuevas v. Bacal
FACTS: This case involves the appointment and transfer of career executive
service officers (CESOs). More specifically, it concerns the “appointment” of
respondent Josefina G. Bacal, who holds the rank of CESO III, to the position of
Chief Public Attorney in the Public Attorney’s Office, which has a Career Executive
Service (CES) Rank Level I, and her subsequent transfer, made without her
consent, to the Office of the Regional Director of the PAO because of the
appointment of Atty. Carina Demaisip to the position of Chief Public Defender
(formerly Chief Public Attorney). Atty. Bacal filed a petition for quo
warranto ruled in her favor by the Court of Appeals; Hence this petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N the respondent have the right to retain her position despite her lack
of qualification.
RULING: No. As respondent does not have the rank appropriate for the position
of Chief Public Attorney, her appointment to that position cannot be considered
permanent, and she can claim no security of tenure in respect of that position. As
held in Achacoso v. Macaraig: It is settled that a permanent appointment can be
issued only “to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which
he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed.” Achacoso
did not. At best, therefore, his appointment could be regarded only as temporary.
And being so, it could be withdrawn at will by the appointing authority and “at a
moment’s notice,” conformably to establish jurisprudence . . . The mere fact that
a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of
tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications.
Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn
depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite
qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only
as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in
the absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be
regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated. . . .
Main Point: Civil Service Commission; Respondent not having the rank
appropriate for the position of Chief Public Attorney, her appointment to that
position cannot be considered permanent and she can claim no security of tenure
in respect of that position.
Gomez
CASE NO. 27
ART IX B (CSC) SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PARAGRAPH 1
MWSS v. Hernandez
FACTS: A decision against the respondent, Metropolitan Waterworkds and
Sewerage System, was held by the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), for failure to pay wage differentials, allowances and other monetary
benefits to its 2500 contractual employees, and that jurisdiction falls over the
NLRC because the employees concerned are “Contractual Employees” and that
Civil Service’ jurisdiction are only over those regular employees employed by
GOCCs . Now a petition to review such said decision and order, filed by the
respondents, as NLRC has no jurisdiction over this case as jurisdiction falls within
the Civil Service not with NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not MWSS is a government owned corporation (GOCC) that is
under the jurisdiction of the civil service not by the labor code.
RULING: Yes. The Character of the MWSS as a GOCC is not contested. Regardless
of the status of the employment, The Civil Service covers service and non-service
employment, or regular and contractual employees.
MAIN POINT: Republic Act No. 6234 created it as a “government corporation
to be known as the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System.” As in
the case of the National Housing Authority, therefore, employment in the
MWSS is governed not by the Labor Code but by the civil service law, rules
and regulations; and controversies arising from or connected with that
employment are not cognizable by the National Labor Relations Commission.
Gomez
CASE NO. 28
ART IX B (CSC) SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PARAGRAPH 1
NSC v. NLRC
FACTS: Credo, an employee of National Service Commission (NASECO or NSC),
was charge administratively for non-compliance of certain entry procedures in
the company’s billing adjustment and was being considered for termination. The
case was raised by both parties before the NLRC which then ruled against the
petitioner and ordered for her reinstatement. Petitioners now contends that such
action by the NLRC is without jurisdiction as they are a government corporation
by virtue of its being a subsidiary of NIDC, that the case at bar is for the Civil
Service Commission to decide.
ISSUE: Whether or not the jurisprudence under NHC v. Juco, regarding
employees of government corporation falling under the Civil Service jurisdiction,
would prevail over the case.
RULING: No. Retroactive effect cannot be given to cases that arose before the
inception of the jurisprudence under NHC v. Juco which ruled that government
corporations are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service or before its date of
effectivity, January 17, 1985. Thus, the ruling of NLRC stands.
MAIN POINT: The civil service commission, as promulgated, governs all
employees falling under GOCCs. However, retroactive effect as to its jurisdiction
under the jurisprudence ruled in NHC v Juco cannot be made before its effectivity.
Thus, this case occurring before such effectivity falls under the Labor Code.
Gomez
CASE NO. 29
ART IX B (CSC) SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PARAGRAPH 1
UP v. Regino
FACTS: Private respondent, Angel Pamplina, a mimeograph operator of the UP
school of economics, was dismissed from service after having found guilty of
dishonesty and grave misconduct when she leaked examination questions in
Economics 106 under Prof. Salita Monsod. The Merit System Board (MSB),
decided on the case and ruled for the reinstatement of Private respondent. UP
then filed a motion to dismiss such decision for lack of jurisdiction of MSB on the
matter, that UP under the law, is a GOCC and that the Civil Service Commission
has jurisdiction over administrative matters involving GOCCs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service commission has jurisdiction over this
administrative case against private respondent.
RULING: Yes. Since private respondent is said to be employed by UP and acted
dishonestly as an employee thereof, then Civil Service will have appellate
jurisdiction over the case.
MAIN POINT: UP is therefore governed by PD 807 and administrative cases
involving the discipline of its employees come under the appellate jurisdiction of
the Civil Service Commission.
Gomez
CASE NO. 30
ART IX B (CSC) SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PARAGRAPH 1
Mateo v. CA
FACTS: A complaint was initiated by the petitioners against Edgar Sta. Maria
(Private Respondent), then general manager of Morong Water District
(MOWAD). Which then resulted to his suspension, in a decision made by the
Board of Directors of said institution. Private respondent filed a Special Civil
Action for Quo Warranto and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction before the
Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 78, challenging his dismissal by petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the courts had no jurisdiction to decide over the
disciplinary actions of government employees which is vested exclusively in the
Civil Service Commission.
RULING: Yes. the Court en banc ruled that employees of government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charter fall under the jurisdiction of the
Civil Service Commission.
MAIN POINT: MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 198, known as the Provincial Water Utilities Act of
1973, and as such its officers and employees are covered by the Civil Service Law.
Gomez
CASE NO. 31
ART IX B (CSC) SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PARAGRAPH 1
DOH v. NLRC
FACTS: A petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by the DOH in behalf of
Dr. Jose N. Reodriguez Memorial Hospital (DJRMH). Seeking to review the
resolution of the NLRC NCR CA No. 002864-92. It started when private
respondent, Ceferino Laur, was employed to DJRMH as a Patient-Assistant Police
Force and was later on charge for violating Code of Ethics of Policemen and
conduct of unbecoming a police officer. Private respondent then elevated the case
to the NLRC and asking for claims of his illegal dismissal from the said hospital.
The NLRC then ruled in favor of the private respondent. Now the petitioners are
questioning the jurisdiction of NLRC to rule over this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the DJRRMH is a government hospital whose employees
falls under the Civil Service Commission.
RULING: Yes. Any controversy concerning the relationship between the
employees on the one hand and the hospital’s administration on the other, as is
the case of private respondent, comes under the jurisdiction of the Merit Systems
Board and the Civil Service Commission.
MAIN POINT: The DJRMH falls well within the scope and/or coverage of the Civil
Service Law in accordance with paragraph 1, Section 2, Article IX B, 1987
Constitution and the provisions of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as
the Administrative Code of 1987 and Presidential Decree No. 807, otherwise
known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines.
AIRA
CASE NO. 32
ART IX CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION SECTION 2: UNDER CIVIL SERVICE
LAW (Paragraph 1)
Juco v. NLRC
FACTS: Benjamin C. Juco was hired as a project engineer of respondent National
Housing Corporation (NHC). On May 14, 1975, he was separated from the service
for having been implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public
funds. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal w/ the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) but his case was dismissed by the labor arbiter on the
ground that the NHC is a government-owned corporation and jurisdiction over
its employees is vested in the Civil Service Commission (CSC). On January 1989,
petitioner filed the case with the CSC but was again dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction, stating that NHC is not a GOCC with an original charter. On April
1989, petitioner filed again a complaint with National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) which was finally ruled in favor of petitioner. However,
respondent appealed on the matter, and it was again reversed in favor of said
respondent, NLRC stating that they had no jurisdiction on the matter.
ISSUE: Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding that petitioner is not governed by the Labor Code.
RULING: Yes. The NLRC erred in dismissing petitioner’s complaint for lack of
jurisdiction because the rule now is that the Civil Service covers only
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. Having
been incorporated under the Corporation Law, its relations with its personnel are
governed by the Labor Code and come under the jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Commission.
MAIN POINT: Constitution now provides: “The civil service embraces all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government owned or controlled corporations with original charter.”
Notwithstanding that the case arose at the time when the 1973 Constitution was
still in effect, the NLRC has jurisdiction over the employees on the ground that it
is the 1987 Constitution that governs because it is the Constitution in place at the
time of the decision.
AIRA
CASE NO. 33
 ART IX CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION SECTION 2: UNDER CIVIL SERVICE
LAW (Paragraph 1)
Feliciano v. Gison
FACTS: The Leyte Metropolitan Water District (LMWD), through General
Manager Ranulfo Feliciano, filed with the Department of Finance (DOF) a petition
requesting that certain water supply equipment and a motor vehicle, particularly
a Toyota Hi-Lux pick-up truck, be exempted from tax. These properties were
given to LMWD through a grant by the Japanese Government for the
rehabilitation of its typhoon-damaged water supply system. DOF granted the tax
exemption on the water supply equipment but assessed the corresponding tax
and duty on the Toyota HiLux pick-up truck. LMWD then moved to reconsider the
disallowance of the tax exemption on the subject vehicle. The DOF, through then
Undersecretary Cornelio C. Gison, denied LMWD’s request for reconsideration
because the tax exemption privileges of government agencies and government
owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) had already been withdrawn by
Executive Order No. 93.
ISSUE: Whether or not water districts are, by law, GOCCs with original charter.
RULING: Yes, water districts are GOCCs. Unlike private corporations that derive
their legal existence and power from the Corporation Code, water districts derive
their legal existence and power from the Provincial Water Utilities Act (P.D. No.
198). Water districts would not have corporate powers without P.D. No. 198.
MAIN POINT: A water district is a government-owned and controlled
corporation with a special charter since it is created pursuant to a special law,
P.D. No. 198.
KALMA, WALANG CASE 34. NAGKAMALI LANG AKO (AREEJ) SA COUNT.
NEXT CASE NA, BES.
AIRA
CASE NO. 35
ART IX CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION SECTION 2: UNDER CIVIL SERVICE
LAW (GOCCs under the Corporation Code)
Bliss Development Corp. Employees Union v. Hon. Calleja
FACTS: Petitioner, a duly registered labor union, filed with the Department of
Labor, a petition for certification election of private respondent Bliss
Development Corporation (BDC). Med-Arbiter Napoleon V. Fernando dismissed
the petition for lack of jurisdiction stating that the majority of BDC’s stocks are
owned by the Human Settlement Development Corporation (HSDC), a wholly-
owned government corporation. Therefore, BDC is subject to Civil Service law,
rules, and regulations. Petitioner then filed an appeal with the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR). At this time, President Corazon Aquino issued EO 180, extending
to government employees the right to organize and bargain collectively. Director
Pura Ferrer-Calleja of BLR issued an Order dismissing the appeal on the grounds
that it is a government corporation where workers are prohibited from
organizing and joining labor unions. With EO 180 however, BLR enjoins the
petitioner to register in accordance with the provisions in said executive order.
ISSUE: Whether or not BDC is a GOCC subject to Civil Service laws, rules, and
regulations. Corollary to this issue is whether or not petitioner is covered by EO
180 and must register as a precondition for filing a petition for certification
election.
RULING: No. BDC is a government-owned corporation created under the
Corporation Law. It is without a charter, governed by the Labor Code and not by
the Civil Service Law; hence, Executive Order No. 180 does not apply to it.
Consequently, public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
ordering petitioner to register under EO 180 as a precondition for filing a petition
for certification election.
MAIN POINT: BDC is created under the Corporation Law. It is without a charter;
hence, Executive Order No. 180 will not apply.
AIRA
CASE NO. 36
 ART IX CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION SECTION 2: UNDER CIVIL SERVICE
LAW (GOCCs under the Corporation Code)
Postigo v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc.
FACTS: Petitioners Dr. Perla A. Postigo, et al., were regular employees of the
respondent Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc. (PTSI). They retired on various
dates from 1996 to 1998. Upon retirement from service, some of the petitioners
who were compulsory members of the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) obtained retirement benefits from the GSIS. At the time the petitioners
retired, Article 287 of the Labor Code had been amended by Republic Act No.
7641 which granted retirement pay to qualified employees in the private sector,
in the absence of any retirement plan or agreement with the company. As the
respondent did not have a retirement plan for its employees, aside from its
contribution to the GSIS, petitioners claimed from the respondent their
retirement benefits under RA 7641. The respondent denied their claims on the
ground that the accommodation extended by the GSIS to the petitioners removed
them from the coverage of the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are employees in the private sector and are
therefore entitled to the benefits of RA 7641.
RULING: Yes, the petitioners are employees in the private sector; hence, entitled
to the benefits of RA 7641. Even assuming that by virtue of their compulsory
inclusion in the GSIS, the petitioners became employees in the public sector, they
are still entitled to the benefits of RA 7641 since they are not covered by the Civil
Service Law and its regulations.
MAIN POINT: Respondent is a private and not a governmental corporation. The
respondent was incorporated as a non-profit, benevolent and non-stock
corporation under the Corporation Code. Having been created under the general
corporation law instead of a special charter, we hold that the respondent is a
private and not a governmental corporation.
RYLE
Case No. 37
ART. IX-B (CSC) SEC. 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PAR. 1 - UNDER CIVIL SERVICE LAW
LRTA v. Venus
FACTS: LRTA entered into a 10-year Agreement with petitioner
METRO to provide the commuting public with an efficient and
dependable light rail transit system through the construction of a
LRT system from Monumento to Kalookan. Petitioner METRO hired
its own employees, including private respondents. METRO had a
collective bargaining agreement with the Pinag-isang Lakas ng
Manggagawa sa METRO, Inc. – National Federation of Labor
(PIGLAS-METRO, INC. – NFL – KMU). However, the Union filed a
Notice of Strike against METRO on account of a deadlock in the
collective bargaining negotiation. On the same day, the Union
struck, paralyzing the progress of the rails’ construction. This led to
an issuance of an assumption of jurisdiction order by DOLE
Secretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma directing all the striking
employees "to return to work immediately … and for the Company
to accept them back under the same terms and conditions of
employment prevailing prior to the strike."
Despite the issuance, posting, and publication of the assumption of
jurisdiction and return to work order, private respondent workers,
among others, failed to return to work. Thus, effective July 27, 2000,
private respondents Venus et al. were considered dismissed from
employment, which led them to file a complaint for illegal dismissal
before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and
impleaded both petitioners LRTA and METRO. This resulted to a
decision favoring the respondents. The decision was later repealed
through an appeal by the petitioners, but was reversed by the
Appellate Court, hence this case.
Petitioner LRTA argues that it has no employer-employee
relationship with private respondent workers as they were hired
by petitioner METRO alone, and that that it is a GOCC, and thus
under the exclusive jurisdiction only of the Civil Service
Commission, not the NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner LRTA is under the jurisdiction
of the Civil Service Commission.
RULING: Yes. Article IX-B, 1987 Constitution, expressly provides
that “the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters.” Corporations with original charters are those which have
been created by special law and not through the general
corporation law. Thus, it was held that “the test in determining
whether a GOCC is subject to the Civil Service Law is the manner of
its creation such that government corporations created by special
charter are subject to its provisions….” There should be no dispute
then that employment in petitioner LRTA should be governed only
by civil service rules, and not the Labor Code and beyond the reach
of the Department of Labor and Employment, since petitioner LRTA
is a government-owned and controlled corporation with an original
charter, Executive Order No. 603, Series of 1980, as amended.
MAIN POINT: Government-owned and controlled corporations
with original charter fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.
RYLE
Case No. 38
ART. IX-B (CSC) SEC. 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PAR. 2 – CLASSIFICATIONS AND APPOINTMENTS
HIGC v. CSC
FACTS: Daniel Cruz, the Vice President, Finance and Administrative
Group of the Home Financing Corporation, now known as the Home
Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC), was found to be
responsible by an investigating committee for simple neglect of
duty arising from his inefficient supervision over his subordinates
arising from the loss of six (6) Land Bank checks. He was also one
of those not reappointed when HIGC underwent a reorganization
which resulted among others in the reduction of the number of
Vice-President positions from 6 to 3. Cruz then invoked on appeal
his permanent appointment and insisted that the question of his
eligibility should be left for determination by the CSC. Cruz
attempted to avail his early retirement package but was denied of
the same. CSC issued a Resolution finding Cruz possessing eligibility
to serve as Vice President.
ISSUE: Whether or not CSC is correct in finding Daniel Cruz eligible
for reappointment as Vice President of HIGC.
RULING: No. It is not disputed that Cruz is without any civil service
eligibility as shown by his appointment papers. As such, he cannot
be legally conferred a permanent appointment for the law is clear
that career positions, particularly the first and second level
positions in the service, require civil service eligibility. Thus the
attestation by respondent CSC that respondent Cruz' appointment
is permanent must be struck down for being contrary to law. It has
been observed that "The permanent appointment of a non-civil
service eligible to a career position is, from a legal viewpoint, a
nullity. Not even the CSC can validate the error, as it cannot rise
higher than the law that created it—the same law that requires civil
service eligibility for a permanent appointment to any of the two
positions subject of the present petition." Consequently, his
appointment being merely temporary in the context of the Civil
Service Law, it follows that Cruz' appointment can be terminated at
the pleasure of the appointing power.
MAIN POINT: Civil Service Commission is not empowered to
determine the kind or nature of the appointment.
RYLE
Case No. 39
ART. IX-B (CSC) SEC. 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PAR. 2 – CLASSIFICATIONS AND APPOINTMENTS
Mauna v. Civil Service Commission
FACTS: On November 16, 1987, petitioner Mauna was appointed as
Chief Election Officer of the Precincts and Voting Centers Division
of the Election and Barangay Affairs Department (EBAD) of the
COMELEC. A month later, private respondent Cristeto J. Limbaco,
the incumbent Assistant Chief Election Officer filed a protest against
the petitioner's appointment before the COMELEC on the grounds
that (1) he is more qualified than petitioner; (2) he is next-in-rank
as Assistant Chief Election Officer; and (3) he is more senior than
petitioner, having been employed by the COMELEC since 1979. The
COMELEC en banc dismissed the private respondent's protest for
lack of merit. Private respondent filed an appeal on March 15, 1988
before the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) of respondent
Civil Service Commission reiterating the grounds earlier raised
before the COMELEC, which the latter found meritorious.
Petitioner tried to challenge the MSPB’s decision but was denied.
Petitioner takes the position that public respondent has no
authority to revoke his appointment as Chief Election Officer on the
ground that another person is more qualified and to direct the
appointment of a substitute of its choice.
ISSUE: Whether or not public respondent CSC’s MSPB has the
power to authority to revoke such an appointment on the
aforementioned ground.
RULING: No. It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified,
as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the
CSC has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service Laws. The Commission has no
authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another
person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no
authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To
do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the
appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the
discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law.”
MAIN POINT: The right of choice, having been exercised it, cannot
now be faulted on the ground that there is another better qualified.
RYLE
Case No. 40
ART. IX-B (CSC) SEC. 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PAR. 2 – CLASSIFICATIONS AND APPOINTMENTS
Rimonte v. CSC
FACTS: Petitioner was the incumbent Planning Officer III in the
Office of the Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez issued Office Order
No. 90-32 directing the implementation of the "performance
appraisal system" as a basis for evaluation of providing for the
"General Policy and Procedural Guidelines in the Placement of
Personnel for the New Staffing Pattern".
Petitioner applied to different positions including any of the
positions of Records Officer V of the Central Records Division.
Petitioner was appointed to the position of Associate Graft
Investigation Officer III while Henrietta F. Roque was appointed
Records Officer V.
Petitioner filed a protest on Roque's appointment to CSC and
assailed that he has the better qualifications than her. However, CSC
denied his protest, the same with his motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether the appointment made by the appointing authority
may be disregarded on the ground that someone has better
qualification than the appointed officer.
RULING: No. The power of appointment is essentially discretionary
provided the appointee is qualified. Even though someone is said to
be better or proved to have superior credentials, the head of the
agency who is the appointing power is the one most knowledgeable
to decide who can best perform the functions of the office.
MAIN POINT: The law limits the Commission's authority only to
whether or not the appointees possess the legal qualifications and
the appropriate civil service eligibility, nothing else. If they do then
the appointments are approved because the Commission cannot
exceed its power by substituting its will for that of the appointing
authority.
RYLE
Case No. 41
ART. IX-B (CSC) SEC. 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PAR. 2 – CLASSIFICATIONS AND APPOINTMENTS
Gloria v. De Guzman
FACTS: Private respondents were employees of the Philippine Air
Force College of Aeronautics (PAFCA) through temporary
appointments due to them not being eligible for civil service.
Rosario V. Cerillo, a private respondent, was issued a one-year
temporary appointment to the position of Board Secretary II of
PAFCA but was relieved as Board Secretary of the PAFCA by reason
of loss of confidence. However, she was designated as “Coordinator
for Extension Services.”
Private respondents filed a “Petition for Mandamus and
Reinstatement, with Back Wages and Damages,” when their
appointments expired. This has been done so that then DECS
Secretary Armand Fabella complete the filling up of positions for
Board of Trustees and order the Board of Trustees to reinstate the
respondents in the case at bench to their respective positions.
Respondent Judge De Guzman rendered a decision ordering the
reinstatement of Cerillo as Coordinator for Extension Services.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent Cerillo is entitled to
reinstatement to the position of Coordinator for Extension Services.
RULING: No. Private respondent Cerillo’s assignment as
“Coordinator for Extension Services” was a mere designation. Not
being a permanent appointment, the designation to the position
cannot be the subject of a case for reinstatement. The judgment of
respondent Judge is patently improper because it finds no support
as to facts and the law. Respondent Cerillo, although temporarily
extended an appointment as Board Secretary II, was dismissed
therefrom because of loss of confidence. There is no question,
therefore, that her dismissal as Board Secretary II could not have
been the subject of the petition for mandamus and reinstatement
filed before respondent Judge. The fact is that private respondent’s
assignment as “Coordinator for Extension Services” was a mere
designation. Not being a permanent appointment, the designation
to the position cannot be the subject of a case for reinstatement.
MAIN POINT: Compliance with the legal requirements for an
appointment to a civil service position is essential in order to make
it fully effective, and until an appointment has become a completed
act, it would precipitate to invoke the rule on security of tenure.
AREEJ
CASE NO. 42
ART IX-B (CSC) SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PARA 2. CLASSIFICATION AND APPOINTMENTS
Atty. Elias Omar A. Sana v. Career Executive Service Board
FACTS: Petitioner contends that EO 883, granting the rank of Career Executive
Service Officer (CESO) III or higher, by the President, to officers and employees
occupying legal positions in the government executive service who have obtained
certain graduate degrees such as in law, and the 13 appointments made pursuant
to it, were void for violating Art VII Sec 15 of the PH Constitution (the
constitutional ban on midnight appointment). Petitioner also submits that Career
Executive Service Board (CESB) Resolution No. 870, which found no legal
impediment to the vesting by the President of the CESO rank, circumvents Art VII
Sec 15 of the PH Constitution by distinguishing the terms appoint and
appointment.
CESB argues that the issue raised by the petition was rendered moot by the
issuance of President Ninoy Aquino of EO 3, which expressly revoked of E0
883, as it encroaches upon the power of the CESB to promulgate rules,
standards and procedures on the selection, classification, compensation
and career development of members of the CES vested by law with it. It
further opined that the appointment to a CESO rank is not equivalent to an
appointment to an office since the latter entails the conferment of an
authority to exercise the functions of an office whereas the former is merely
a completion of a previous appointment. The CESB also submits that the grant
of CESO rank III is not automatic because this needs prior guidelines from
the CESB. The CESB points out that President Arroyo did not confer CESO
rank to any official based on EO 883.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 883 and the 13 appointments were valid as the vesting
of the CESO rank does not contemplate any hiring or appointment since it
involves only the conferment of a rank rather than a selection for a position
RULING: PETITION WAS DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF MOOTNESS. At the
time this petition was filed, President Aquino had already issued EO 3 revoking
EO 883 expressly and CESB Resolution No. 870 impliedly.
MAIN POINT: The question whether an appointment to a CESO rank of an
executive official amounts to an appointment for purposes of the constitutional
ban on midnight appointment, while potentially recurring, holds no certainty of
evading judicial review as the question can be decided even beyond the
appointments-ban period under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution.
Petitioner has not suffered any violation of a right vested in him under EO 883.
AREEJ
CASE NO. 43
ART IX-C (CSC) SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PARA 2. COMPETITIVE
Samson v. CA
FACTS: Private respondent Feliciano Talens was appointed by former City Mayor
Asistio of Caloocan City as Assistant Secretary to the Mayor. However, petitioner
Mayor Marcial Samson, who succeeded Mayor Asistio, furnished private
respondent the questioned AO 3, which terminated the services of the private
respondent on the ground of “lack and loss of confidence”. Private respondent
contends Sec. 5(f) of RA 2260 (Civil Service Law) specifies as non-
competitive only the positions of "secretaries of provincial city and
municipal boards and councils." He submits that in accordance with Section
32 of the Civil Service Law, he can be removed only for cause and after due
process has been observed. Petitioners contend that the termination of private
respondent's services is authorized by Section 5(f) of RA 2260 and argued that
although the position of assistant secretary to the city mayor is not among
those expressly declared in Section 5 of RA 2260, as amended, to be within the
non-competitive service, petitioners argue that an assistant secretary is a
position inherently and primarily highly confidential in nature, and is also
a secretary, and thus comprised within the general term "secretaries" as
provided for in Section 5(f), and that the tenure of assistant secretary lasts
only as long as the Mayor's confidence in him remains.
ISSUE: Whether or not the position of Assistant Secretary to the City Mayor
should be considered as in the non-competitive service.
RULING: NO. Under a strict construction of R.A. 2260, the position of Assistant
Secretary to the Mayor is deemed to belong to the competitive service
inasmuch only secretaries to governors and mayors are expressly
enumerated as non-competitive. It is the nature of the position which
finally determines a position to be primarily confidential. While both
Secretary and Assistant Secretary may be called “secretary,” one is certainly of
higher category and rank than the other with the added distinction that a
Secretary must enjoy the confidence of the Mayor. However, the position of
Assistant Secretary being of a lower rank, need not carry the requisites attaching
to the primarily confidential position of the actual Secretary to the Mayor.
MAIN POINT: While duties possibly involving confidential matters are
sometimes handled by the Assistant Secretary to the Mayor, this does not
necessarily transform the nature of the position itself as one that is primarily and
highly confidential. It is the nature of the position which finally determines a
position to be primarily confidential.
AREEJ
CASE NO. 44
ART IX-C (CSC) SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PARA 2. NON-COMPETITIVE
Astraquillo v. Mangalupas
FACTS: Petitioner Astraquillo was appointed by the President as Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and Chief of Mission (II) to the United Arab
Emirates (UAE). After he had occupied the post for two years or so, a confidential
memorandum was filed with the Home Office by Atty. Roy Seneres, the Philippine
Labor Attache to the United Arab Emirates, accusing Astraquillo, his wife and
cousin-in-law of improper interference with his (Seneres') functions. Thereafter,
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs recommended to the President the termination
of Astraquillo's services as ambassador, which was approved by authority of the
President." Petitioner now argues that under the Foreign Service Code of 1983,
his removal could be predicated only upon good cause duly established at a
hearing of which he was entitled to notice and an opportunity to defend.
This decision deals with five cases that have been consolidated and jointly considered, all turning uponthe validity
of the termination, by authority of the President of the Philippines, of the petitioners' appointments as
"political" or "non-career" members of the country's Foreign Service.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s service as Philippine diplomats was under
the circumstances, at the pleasure of the president, terminable without cause or
need of investigation.
RULING & MAIN POINT (IN BOLD): YES. The Civil Service Law, Presidential
Decree No. 807, classifies employment in Government into "career" and "non-
career service." By these statutory standards, it seems plain that all three (3)
petitioners: Isabelo J. Astraquillo, Alunan C. Glang, and Alejandro Melchor, Jr.,
pertained to the Non-Career Service. Their appointments to the Foreign
Service were made on "bases other than those of the usual test of merit and
fitness utilized for the career service;" their entrance was not 'based on
merit and fitness determined by competitive examinations, or based on
highly technical qualifications." This being so, their "tenure was
coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his
pleasures.” The termination of their connection with the Foreign Service was not
dependent on proof of some legally recognized cause therefor, after due notice
and hearing — as in the case of career officers and employees — but lay entirely
within the will of the President, in the exercise of her discretion, and her
determination of the wisdom, necessity or convenience of such a step in the
national interest, actually a political decision.
AREEJ
CASE NO. 45
ART IX-C (CSC) SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PARA 2. NON-COMPETITIVE
Office of the President v. Buenaobra
FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman's Special Prosecution Officer filed an
information against respondent Buenaobra, Chairman of the Komisyon sa
Wikang Pilipino (KWP), with the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of
RA 3019 (anti-graft and corrupt practices act) for causing undue injury to the
government through gross inexcusable negligence in connection with the
unauthorized reprinting of the Diksyunaryo ng Wikang Pilipino. Pending
reinvestigation, the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) conducted a
parallel administrative investigation charging respondent with causing undue
injury to the government and giving unwarranted benefits to Merylvin Publishing
House, Inc., through gross inexcusable negligence in not taking legal action to
collect the 15% royalty fee of P3,366,250.00 approved by the KWF Board to be
levied against the publisher for its unauthorized reprinting and selling of the
dictionary. Respondent moved to dismiss the administrative case on grounds
of litis pendentia and forum shopping in view of the pending Sandiganbayan case,
which was denied by PAGC, who recommended respondent's dismissal from the
service which the petitioner subsequently adopted. The case was later elevated
to the SC which denied petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition where the petitioner argues that respondent
was a presidential appointee and a holder of a non-career service position.
Hence, she could be removed from the service at the pleasure of the
President.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was a presidential appointee and a holder of
a non-career service position, hence, she could be removed from the service at
the pleasure of the President.
RULING & MAIN POINT (IN BOLD): NO. Respondent who is the Chairman of
the KWP is a non-career service personnel whose tenure is limited to seven
years as provided under R.A. No. 7104 (an act creating the Commission on
the Filipino language). Section 4, Article IV, of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
807, or the Civil Service Decree, describes “non-career service personnel”
as one whose “tenure which is limited to a period specified by law”. Since
respondent’s tenure is fixed by law, her removal from office is not at the
pleasure of the appointing authority. It was consistently ruled that non-career
service personnel enjoy security of tenure. They may not be removed without just
cause and non-observance of due process. An employee who belongs to the
non-career service is protected from removal or suspension without just
cause and non-observance.
AREEJ
CASE NO. 46
ART IX-C (CSC) SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PARA 2. PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL
Borres v. CA
FACTS: Private respondents German Lumapac and Bartolome Elizondo were
appointed by then Mayor Cuision as Senior Security and Security Guard
respectively, in the Office of the Vice-Mayor. In the 1967 local elections, it was
Sergio Osmena Jr., and petitioner Eulogio Borres who won as Mayor and Vice-
mayor, respectively, of Cebu City. Upon assuming office, petitioner Borres
terminated the services of private respondents “due to lack of confidence”.
Private respondents contends that their removal be declared null and void. RTC
and CA ruled in favor of private respondents. It was ruled that an employee or
official in the Civil Service who is holding a position with a permanent status is
within the protection of Section 4, Article IX of the old Constitution which
provides that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed except
for cause as provided by law. In the present petition, petitioners interpose that
CA erred in finding the appointments of the private respondents as permanent
and in declaring that they were illegally dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents may be dismissed, without cause or
hearing, on the mere ground of lack of confidence.
RULING & MAIN POINT (IN BOLD): YES. There are two (2) instances when a
position may be considered primarily confidential: (1) when the President,
upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service, has declared
the position to be primarily confidential; or (2) in the absence of such
declaration, when by the nature of the functions of the office, there exists
close intimacy between the appointee and the appointing power, which
insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from
misgiving of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of
state. However, upon the enactment of the 1959 Civil Service Act (RA 2260),
it is the nature of the position which finally determines whether a position
is primarily confidential. Executive pronouncements can be no more
than initial determinations that are not conclusive in case of conflict. In the
instant case, the positions of Senior Security and Security Guard in the Office of
the Vice-Mayor of Cebu City, are primarily confidential in nature because of the
duties and functions attached to said positions. The tenure of personnel
holding primarily confidential positions, such as the respondents, ends
upon loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as
confidence in them endures, thus, their cessation involves no removal.
ANGELO
Case No. 47
ART IX-B CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PAR 2: PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL
Griño v Civil Service Commission
FACTS: On February 2, 1988, petitioner Simplicio Griño assumed office as the
newly elected governor of Iloilo. One month later, he informed respondent
Arandela and all the legal officers at the Provincial Attorney’s Office about his
decision to terminate their services. In his letter, petitioner made mention of an
article pertaining to the Iloilo office of the Provincial Attorney which appeared in
the Panay News and which “undermined that trust and confidence” that he
reposed on them. Petitioner Demaisip was reappointed by Governor Griño as the
Provincial Attorney. The latter, on the other hand, arranged the replacements of
the other legal officers. On March 15, 1988, petitioner Governor Griño formally
terminated the services of the respondents herein on the ground of loss of
trust and confidence. This action taken by the governor was appealed by
respondents to the Merit Systems Protection Board of the Civil Service
Commission. On March 9, 1989, the Merit Systems Board issued an Order
declaring the respondents’ termination illegal and ordering that they be
immediately restored to their positions with back salaries and other emoluments
due them. This was appealed by petitioner Griño to the Civil Service Commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not the position of a provincial attorney and those of his legal
subordinates are primarily confidential in nature so that the services of those
holding the said items can be terminated upon loss of confidence.
RULING: YES. The Court find as an undeniable fact that the position of a
provincial attorney and those of his legal subordinates are ‘primarily
confidential.’ The phrase ‘primarily confidential’ denotes not only
confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but
primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse, without
embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust
on confidential matters of state.
ANGELO
Case No. 48
ART IX-B CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PAR 2: PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL
Santos v Macaraig
FACTS: Petitioner Rosalinda de Perio-Santos was appointed by President
Corazon C. Aquino, to the position of Permanent Representative of the
Philippines to the Philippine Mission to the United Nations and other
International Organizations with station in Geneva, Switzerland. Petitioner
sought a leave of absence from the DFA to spend the Easter Holidays in New
York with her mother, brothers and sisters at no expense to the Government. She
bought two (2) non-transferable, non-refundable discounted tickets costing
SFr.1,597 for herself and her adopted daughter Pia. Before they could leave
Geneva, petitioner received instructions from the home office directing her to
proceed to Havana for a Preparatory Conference. For the official trip outside
her station, she was entitled, under the “Foreign Service Personnel Manual on
Travel, Per Diems, and Daily Allowance Abroad,” to SFr.2,996 for the cost of
economy roundtrip fare from Geneva-New York-Geneva portion of her Geneva-
New York-Havana-New York-Geneva trip. Instead of buying an economy
roundtrip ticket, she used for the Geneva-New York-Geneva portion of her
trip the two (2) discounted tickets costing only SFr.1,597 for herself and her
daughter Pia.
The DFA sent her a cable requesting clarification on “why Mission paid for plane
ticket of infant Pia de Perio-Santos (petitioner’s daughter) when she was not
authorized to accompany her adoptive mother at government expense.” The DFA
required her to refund the amount representing her daughter’s round-trip ticket.
President Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 122 finding petitioner guilty
of dishonesty instead of misconduct and imposed upon her the penalty of
reprimand, with recall to the home office.
ISSUE: Whether or not the loss of confidence entails removal or dismissal from
office.
RULING: NO. The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions ends
upon loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as
confidence in them endures. When that confidence is lost and the officer
holding the position is separated from the service, such cessation is not
removal from office but merely an expiration of his/her term. As holder of
a primarily confidential position, petitioner’s foreign assignment was at the
pleasure of the President. The recall order terminating her tour of duty in
Geneva and returning her to the home office was merely a change of post or
transfer of location of work. Petitioner may not justifiably assail the
appointment of Narcisa Escaler as her replacement in Geneva because the power
to appoint is essentially discretionary. The appointing power, the President,
has the right of choice which she may exercise freely, according to her best lights
MAIN POINT: An incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds office at
the pleasure of the appointing power. When the pleasure turns into displeasure,
the incumbent is not removed or dismissed from office—his term merely
expires
ANGELO
Case No. 49
ART IX-B CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PAR 2: PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL
Hilario v Civil Service Commission
FACTS: Respondent Vice Mayor Charito L. Planas of Quezon City filed a complaint
with the CSC against petitioner and a certain Jose L. Pecson praying that
respondents be found administratively liable for usurpation, grave misconduct,
being notoriously undesirable, gross insubordination, and conduct grossly
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The CSC issued Resolution No. 93-
4067, the dispositive portion of which states the Commission resolves to hold in
abeyance any administrative disciplinary action against Atty. Nescito C. Hilario.
However, Atty. Hilario should not be allowed to continue holding the
position of the Legal Officer (City Attorney) of Quezon City. The Commission
hereby orders the Cashier of the Quezon City government to stop payment of
salaries to Atty. Hilario, otherwise the former shall be personally liable for its
refund. Petitioner alleges that when he was appointed City Attorney, the
applicable law governing his appointment was Batas Pambansa Blg. 337
and, therefore, his position should not be considered confidential. He argues
that although the said position was considered confidential under Republic Act
No. 5185, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 impliedly repealed the confidential
nature of the position when it expanded the duties of City Attorney.
ISSUE: Whether or not BP 337 impliedly repealed the confidential nature of a city
attorney when it expanded its duties.
RULING: NO. An examination of the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337
reveals no intention by the legislature to remove the confidential nature of the
position of city legal officer. What it does, is to merely specify the various
qualifications, powers and duties of a city legal officer which were not
enumerated under Republic Act No. 5185. By virtue of Republic Act No. 5185,
both the provincial attorney and city legal officer serve as the legal adviser and
legal officer for the civil cases of the province and the city that they work for.
Their services are precisely categorized by law to be ‘trusted services’
ANGELO
Case No. 50
ART IX-B CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PAR 2: PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL
Rosete v CA
FACTS: Respondent Richard Gordon, then Olongapo City Mayor, filed a formal
charge against petitioner for grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best
interests of service, dishonesty, grave abuse of authority, violation of Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, neglect of duty and gross negligence. Invoking Sec. 40
of P.D. No. 807, the Mayor, found petitioner guilty as charged and summarily
dismissed him for being “notoriously undesirable.” Petitioner questioned his
dismissal for being allegedly made without due process. However, the case was
overtaken by the Edsa Revolution of February 1986 which saw respondent
Mayor ousted from office following a revamp of the entire government. In a
Memorandum, Atty. Teddy C. Macapagal, Olongapo OIC Mayor vice Gordon,
reversed the summary dismissal of petitioner and ordered him to resume
the performance of his duties as Chief of Hospital. Macapagal was succeeded
by Mr. Ildefonso Arriola as OIC of Olongapo City. Arriola forthwith issued a
directive to the petitioner to cease and desist from further executing the duties
and functions of Chief of Hospital.
ISSUE: Whether or not a government official that had been illegally dismissed,
and his reinstatement had later been ordered, is considered as not having left his
office.
RULING: YES. Petitioner’s dismissal prior to 1988 could not be invoked to justify
his second dismissal. First, respondent Mayor’s successor in office after the EDSA
Revolution, OIC Macapagal, reversed the first dismissal and manifested before us
that the charges against petitioner were unworthy of credence. Petitioner
resumed all the duties and responsibilities of the said office, as well as the rights
and privileges pertaining thereto. The Court dismissed the first petition for
being moot and academic. For all legal intents and purposes therefore, the
first summary dismissal had no legal force and effect: petitioner’s tenure of
office was never interrupted by respondent Mayor’s first order of dismissal.
MAIN POINT: When a government official or employee in the classified civil
service had been illegally suspended or illegally dismissed, and his reinstatement
had later been ordered, for all legal purposes he is considered as not having left
his office, so that he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that accrue to him
by virtue of the office that he held.
ANGELO
Case No. 51
ART IX-B CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PAR 2: PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL
Civil Service Commission v Salas
FACTS: Respondent Salas was appointed by the PAGCOR Chairman as Internal
Security Staff member and assigned to the casino at the Manila Pavilion Hotel.
However, his employment was terminated by the Board of Directors of
PAGCOR, allegedly for loss of confidence. The summary of intelligence
information claimed that respondent was allegedly engaged in proxy betting as
detailed in the affidavits purportedly executed by two customers of PAGCOR who
claimed that they were used as gunners on different occasions by respondent. He
appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which denied the appeal
on the ground that, as a confidential employee, respondent was not
dismissed from the service but his term of office merely expired. On appeal,
the CSC issued Resolution No. 92-1283 which affirmed the decision of the MSPB.
Respondent Salas initially went to this Court on a petition for certiorari assailing
the propriety of the questioned CSC resolution. However, the case was referred
to the CA. The CA rendered its questioned decision with the finding that herein
respondent Salas is not a confidential employee, hence he may not be
dismissed on the ground of loss of confidence. In so ruling, the appellate court
applied the “proximity rule”
According to petitioners, respondent Salas was not dismissed from the service
but, instead, his term of office had expired. They additionally contend that the
Court of Appeals erred in applying the “proximity rule” because even if Salas
occupied one of the lowest rungs in the organizational ladder of PAGCOR, he
performed the functions of one of the most sensitive positions in the corporation.
On the other hand, respondent Salas argues that it is the actual nature of an
employee’s functions, and not his designation or title, which determines whether
or not a position is primarily confidential.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Salas is a confidential employee.
RULING: NO. Prior to the passage of the aforestated Civil Service Act of 1959,
there were two recognized instances when a position may be considered
primarily confidential: Firstly, when the President, upon recommendation of
the Commissioner of Civil Service, has declared the position to be primarily
confidential; and, secondly, in the absence of such declaration, when by the
nature of the functions of the office there exists “close intimacy” between
the appointee and appointing power which insures freedom of intercourse
without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of
personal trust or confidential matters of state. Although appointed by the
Chairman, ISS members do not directly report to the Office of the Chairman in the
performance of their official duties. An ISS member is subject to the control and
supervision of an Area Supervisor who, in turn, only implements the directives of
the Branch Chief Security Officer. The latter is himself answerable to the
Chairman and the Board of Directors. Obviously, as the lowest in the chain of
command, private respondent does not enjoy that “primarily close intimacy”
which characterizes a confidential employee
MAIN POINT: It may be said that honesty and integrity are primary
considerations in his appointment as a member of the ISS, his position does not
involve “such close intimacy” between him and the appointing authority, that
is, the Chairman of PAGCOR, as would insure “freedom from misgivings of
betrayals of personal trust.”
Ayeh CASE NO. 52
ART. IX-B (CSC) SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PAR. 2: CLASSIFICATION AND APPOINTMENTS
NON-COMPETITIVE - PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL
Acahaso v. Macaraig
FACTS: Tomas D. Achacoso was appointed Administrator of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration. In compliance with a request addressed
by the President of the Philippines to "all Department Heads, Undersecretaries,
Assistant Secretaries, Bureau Heads," and other government officials, he filed a
courtesy resignation which was accepted by the President. Secretary of Labor
requested him to turn over his office to the Deputy Administrator as officer in-
charge. He protested his replacement and declared he was not surrendering his
office because his resignation was not voluntary but filed only in obedience to the
President's directive.
Acahacoso contends that he is a member of the Career Service of the Civil Service
and so enjoys security of tenure. Claiming to have the rank of undersecretary, he
says he comes under Article IV, Section 5 of P.D. 807, otherwise known as the Civil
Service Decree which includes Career Service Executives.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner who is a member of the Career Service of
the Civil Service is accorded security of tenure.
RULING: No. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as
permanent even if it may be so designated therefore not covered by the security
of tenure protection. The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to
prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official functions by authorizing a person to
discharge the same pending the selection of a permanent or another appointee.4
The person named in an acting capacity accepts the position under the condition
that he shall surrender the office once he is called upon to do so by the appointing
authority.
MAINPOINT: The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not
automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not
possess the required qualifications. Such right must depend on the nature of his
appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. In these
circumstances, the acting appointee is separated by a method of terminating
official relations known in the law of public officers as expiration of the term. His
term is understood at the outset as without any fixity and enduring at the
pleasure of the appointing authority making the nature of the position primarily
confidential.
Ayeh CASE NO. 53
ART. IX-B (CSC) SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PAR. 2: CLASSIFICATION AND APPOINTMENTS
NON-COMPETITIVE - PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL
Felix v. Buenaseda
FACTS: Petitioner Dr. Alfredo B. Felix passed the Physician's Licensure
Examinations and joined the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) as a
Resident Physician. He got promoted to the position of Medical Specialist I
(Temporary Status). Then DOH issued Department Order No. 347 which required
board certification as a prerequisite for renewal of specialist positions in various
medical centers, hospitals and agencies of the said department. After reviewing
petitioner's service record and performance, the Medical Credentials Committee
of the NCMH recommended non-renewal of his appointment as Medical Specialist
I.
Petitioner assails his dismissal as Medical Specialist I of the NCMH contending
that he has security of tenure. He filed a petition with the Merit System Protection
Board who later dismissed the case for lack of merit. Such decision was appealed
to the CSC who then affirmed the decision of MSPB. Hence, this petition to the
Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right of the petitioner to the constitutional provision
on security of tenure was violated by his removal.
RULING: NO. No security of tenure was violated as a residency or resident
physician position in a medical specialty is never a permanent one.
Residency connotes training and temporary status.
MAINPOINT: Every appointment implies confidence. The nature of the contracts
of resident physicians meet traditional tests for determining employer-employee
relationships, but because the focus of residency is training, they are neither here
nor there, and primarily confidential denotes not only confidence in aptitude of
the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy between
employee and the employer.
Ayeh CASE NO. 54
ART. IX-B (CSC) SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PAR. 2: CLASSIFICATION AND APPOINTMENTS
NON-COMPETITIVE - PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL
Pamantasan ng Maynila v. CSC
FACTS: This petition stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair
labor practice filed with public respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC) by
private respondents, through Pamantasan Ng Lungsod Ng Maynila Faculty
Organization (PLMFO), against petitioner Pamantasan Ng Lungsod Ng Maynila
(PLM) and its officers. Private respondents through PLMFO, alleged in its
complaint that their actions and determination to see changes in the
management of PLM angered PLM which prompted its decision to terminate the
services of the complainants.
ISSUE: Whether or not PLM illegally dismissed the private respondents to stop
its involvement in in the organization and its attempts to raise issues in the
institution.
RULING: YES. There is sufficient evidence to show that the management of PLM
is not particularly enthusiastic about faculty participation in the formulation of
policies concerning the University and the Faculty itself, as shown from the very
nature of most the complaints of the faculty against the administration and the
response/reaction of the management to earlier attempts by the faculty to bring
about changes. The facts on record show that management did not respond to
any of the faculty issues.
Had complainants not been among those active officers and/or members of the
PLMFO, and had their qualifications, training, experience and performance rating
not been impressive, the Commission would have agreed that the termination or
non-renewal of the contracts of complainants does not constitute unfair labor
practice. But the records reveal otherwise. Hence, there is indeed no reason for
PLM Management to terminate the services of these employees except to bust
their organization. The Commission finds no reason to disagree with the findings
of facts by the PSLMC that PLM Management committed an unfair labor practice.
MAINPOINT: Paragraph 5, Section 2 of Art. IX-B mandates that the right to
self-organization shall not be denied to gov’t employees. This constitutional
right of employees is superior to the right of management not to renew the
temporary appointment of its employees. When the exercise of discretion
by the management is calculated to bust the union as what PLM
Management had done, the Commission has no choice but to declare it as a
grave abuse of discretion. (this isn’t under the non-competitive positions but
still under the par. 2 of Sec. 2 of the article)
Ayeh CASE NO. 55
ART. IX-B (CSC) SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PAR. 2: CLASSIFICATION AND APPOINTMENTS
NON-COMPETITIVE - PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL
Province of Camarines Sur v. CA
FACTS: Private respondent Tito Dato was a temporary employee of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur. Later on, Governor Alfelor
approved the change in Dato's employment status from temporary to permanent
upon the latter's representation that he passed the civil service examination for
supervising security guards. Said change of status however, was not favorably
acted upon by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) reasoning that Tito Dato did
not possess the necessary civil service eligibility for the office he was appointed
to. His appointment therefore remained temporary to which it reversed 2 years
later making Dato now a permanent employee.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tito Dado is now having a status of a permanent
employee.
RULING: NO. passing the civil service exam does not ipso facto convert a
temporary appointment into a permanent one. In cases, such as in the case at bar,
what is required is a new appointment and not a continuation of the temporary
appointment. Furthermore, the CSC does not have the power to make the
appointment itself or to direct the appointing authority to change the
employment status of the employee—it can only inquire into the eligibility of the
person chosen to fill a position.
MAINPOINT: Lack of civil service eligibility makes an appointment temporary
without a fixed and definite term and dependent entirely upon the pleasure of
the appointing power. Appointments are always made with confidence and in
non-competitive positions, merit and fitness is highly required. Primarily
confidential positions denotes aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the
office.
Ayeh CASE NO. 56
ART. IX-B (CSC) SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PAR. 2: CLASSIFICATION AND APPOINTMENTS
NON-COMPETITIVE - PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL
PEZA v. Mercado
FACTS: Respondent was appointed as Group Manager for Policy and Planning of
PEZA on September 16, 1998. Her appointment was temporary in nature but was
promoted to the position of Deputy Director General for Policy and Planning. Her
appointment indicated the same as on permanent basis, but with the following
annotation: NO SECURITY OF TENURE UNLESS HE/SHE OBTAINS CESO OR CSEE
ELIGIBILITY. On June 2000, respondent was advised of the termination of her
appointment effective on the closing hours of the day. Respondent filed for a case
and alleged in her complaint that her degree in Master in National Security
Administration (MNSA) automatically conferred upon her Career Executive
Service (CES) eligibility; that Republic Act No. R.A. 8748 (PEZA Charter), did away
with the CES eligibility requirement for the position of Deputy Director General;
and that the termination of her appointment was actuated with bad faith to
entitle her to moral and exemplary damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner should’ve been accorded permanent
appointment after having her degree in Master in National Security
Administration which automatically conferred her CES eligibility under the PEZA
Charter.
RULING: NO. Firstly, not being a CES eligible, she had no security of tenure, hence,
the termination by the PEZA Board on June 2000 of her appointment, as well as
the appointment in her stead of CES eligible by another were not illegal.
Respondents subsequent passing on December 2000 of the CES
examinations did not retroact to consider her a CESO at the time her
appointment was terminated on June 2000.
MAINPOINT: The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not
automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant especially if he does not
possess the required qualifications. Furthermore, appointment to a CES rank is
made by the President upon the Board’s recommendation as classified
under non-competitive position under the Civil Service Act of 1959. As every
appointment requires confidence, the position having the nature of non-
permanence gives the appointing authority to exercise his discretion on the
tenure of the appointee.
RAIZA
CASE NO. 57
ART IX-B SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
NON-COMPETITIVE (Primarily Confidential)
Civil Service Commission vs. Court of Appeals
FACTS: This is a consolidated case seeking reconsideration of CSCFO-OP’s
disapproval on the temporary appointment of Ortega and Sarsonas as Assistant
Department II of the Planning and Production Department and Internal Audit
Department (IAD), respectively, by the PCSO Board of Directors. The CSC Field
Office-Office of the President disapproved the temporary appointment of Ortega
and Sarsonas on the ground of failure to meet the eligibility requirement for the
position. CSCFO-OP certified that there were qualified individuals who signified
their interest and further reasoned out that there were other qualified third-level
eligibles working in PCSO who were willing and available to be appointed to the
subject position. PCSO appealed to the CSC contending that Section 7(3), Title I,
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides an exclusive enumeration of
the specific positions covered by the Career Executive Service (CES), all of whom
are appointed by the President and are required to have Career Service Executive
(CSE) eligibility.
ISSUE: Whether or not the position of Assistant Department Manager II falls
under the Career Executive Service and requires third level eligibility pursuant
to the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.
RULING: NO. The Court is of the position that the CES covers presidential
appointees only. Corollarily, as the position of Assistant Department Manager II
does not require appointment by the President of the Philippines, it does not fall
under the CES. Therefore, the temporary appointments of Sarsonas and Ortega
as Assistant Department Manager II do not require third level eligibility pursuant
to the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.
MAIN POINT: In order for a position to be covered by the CES, two elements must
concur. First, the position must either be (1) a position enumerated under Book
V, Title I, Subsection A, Chapter 2, Section 7(3) of the Administrative Code of
1987, i.e. Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau
Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department
Service, or (2) a position of equal rank as those enumerated, and identified by the
Career Executive Service Board to be such position of equal rank. Second, the
holder of the position must be a presidential appointee. Failing in any of these
requirements, a position cannot be considered as one covered by the third-level
or CES.
RAIZA
CASE NO. 58
ART IX-B SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PERMANENT
Luego vs. CSC
FACTS: The petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer II, Office of the City
Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino Solon. The appointment was described as
“permanent” but the Civil Service Commission approved it as “temporary,”
subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and
another employee. The Civil Service Commission found the private respondent
better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and, appointed
Felicula Tuozo be appointed as Administrative Officer II in the Administrative
Division, in place of Felimon Luego whose appointment as Administrative Officer
II was revoked. The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment,
questioned the order.
ISSUE: W/N the Civil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a
permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified
than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the
latter
RULING: No. The SC ruled that the Civil Service Commission is not empowered
to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing
officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in
the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is
qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has
no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service
Laws. The appointing authority has discretion who to appoint even in the career
service of the Civil Service, where the appointee possesses the minimum
qualification requirements prescribed by law for the position.
MAIN POINT: A permanent appointment is protected by the Constitution. The
appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was
therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it
was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent
Civil Service Commission to reverse him and call it temporary.
Raiza
CASE NO. 59
ART IX-B SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
PERMANENT
Pangilinan vs. Maglaya
FACTS: Teodoro B. Pangilinan was appointed as agent in the National Bureau of
Investigation, a position for which he had the appropriate civil service eligibility.
He had risen to Supervising Agent when he resigned to accept appointment as
Executive Director of the Land Transportation Office. He was detailed to the
Manila International Airport Authority, where he served as Assistant General
Manager in charge of finance and administrative and also of security and general
services. Upon his return to the LTO, he was designated as Resident Ombudsman
in addition to his regular duties where he discovered the irregularities in the
purchase of motor vehicle license plates. He says he brought this matter to the
attention of Asst. Secretary Manuel Sabalza of the Department of Transportation
and Communications and later of Secretary Pete Prado. Neither of them took any
action. Then he called a press conference to expose what the media later
described as “the license plate mess.” The following day, he was relieved as Exec.
Dir. and was replaced with Maglaya. In this petition, Pangilinan prays for
reinstatement on the ground that no charge has been filed or proved against him
to justify his removal, citing different jurisprudence in which the security of
tenure of the dismissed employees was upheld.
ISSUE: W/N the appointment of the petitioner as the Executive Director of the
LTO is permanent and thus covered by the security of tenure
RULING: No. Pangilinan was only an acting appointee because he did not have
the requisite qualifications; as such, he could not claim security of tenure. This
Court has repeatedly held that this guaranty is available only to permanent
appointees. The fact that Pangilinan was qualified for his initial appointment as
agent in the NBI does not mean he was qualified for all other positions he might
later occupy in the civil service. The law does not prescribe uniform qualifications
for all public positions regardless of nature or degree.
MAIN POINT: A permanent appointment shall be issued to a person who meets
all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the
appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance with the provisions of law, rules
and standards promulgated in pursuance thereof.
Raiza
CASE NO. 60
ART IX-B SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
REORGANIZATION
Santiago vs SCS
FACTS: Santiago was appointed by Commissioner Tanada from Collector of
Customs I to Collector of Customs III. Jose petitions that he should be the next in
rank because he was Collector of Customs II. Respondent Commission ruled that
although both SANTIAGO and JOSE are qualified for the position of Customs
Collector III, respondent JOSE has far better qualifications. It added that the
Commission is empowered to administer and enforce the merit system as
mandated by the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and to approve all appointments,
whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service, subject to
specified exceptions, pursuant to paragraphs (a) and (h), Section 9 of the Civil
Service Law.
ISSUE: W/N Commission is empowered to administer and enforce the merit
system as mandated by the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and to approve all
appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service
RULING: YES, the SC held that the Commission is empowered to approve all
appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service
and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess the appropriate
eligibility or required qualification. HOWEVER, consistent with the ruling in
Luego vs. CSC, “all the commission is actually allowed to do is check whether or not
the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required
qualifications. If he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved. No
other criterion is permitted by law to be employed by the Commission when it acts
on, or as the decree says, “approves” or “disapproves” an appointment made by the
proper authorities. x x x To be sure, it has no authority to revoke the said
appointment simply because it believed that the private respondent was better
qualified for that would have constituted an encroachment on the discretion
vested solely (in the appointing authority).”
MAIN POINT: Commission has no authority to revoke the said appointment
simply because it believed that the private respondent was better qualified for
that would have constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested solely (in
the appointing authority)
Raiza
CASE NO. 60
ART IX-B SEC 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
REORGANIZATION
Montecillo vs SCS
FACTS: During the modification of the personnel structure of the Metropolitan
Cebu Water District (MCWD) to conform with position descriptions and
corresponding salary grades in the civil service, three of its employees, the
petitioners, applied for promotional appointment to the position of “Private
Secretary”. At the time of their application, petitioners had been occupying the
position of “Department Secretary” and were employed in the MCWD for six to
seven years. When their appointments were forwarded to the Civil Service
Commission Field Office, the latter refused to approve their appointments as
“permanent” on the ground that the position applied for was a “primarily
confidential” and “co-terminous” position. The CSC then issued Resolution No.
972512 based on the CSC Memorandum Circular No. 22, Series of 1991 which
classified the Private Secretary position as primarily confidential in nature.
Petitioners contend that respondent abused its power to promulgate rules and
regulations by issuing the challenged circular, because the grant of rule-making
power to respondent did not authorize it to amend the law by adding to the
statutory enumeration. Petitioners conclude that since said memorandum
circular was issued in excess of the powers granted to respondent, it is null and
void and consequently, the assailed CSC resolution has no leg to stand on.
ISSUE: W/N the CSC has gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
Memorandum Circular
RULING: No. The Supreme Court held that under the Administrative Code of
1987, the Civil Service Commission is expressly empowered to declare positions
in the Civil Service as primarily confidential. This signifies that the enumeration
in the Civil Service decree, is not an exclusive list. The Commission can
supplement this enumeration, as it did when it issued Memorandum Circular No.
22, s. 1991, specifying positions in the Civil Service which are considered
primarily confidential and, therefore, their occupants hold tenure co-terminus
with the officials they serve.
MAIN POINT: CSC was expressly empowered to declare positions in the Civil
Service as may properly be classified as primarily confidential under Section 12,
Chapter 3, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Who digested: COELI
Case no. 62
Article IX, COMELEC, Sec. 2, REORGANIZATION
Rudigario C. Gatmaitan v. Dr. Ricardo B. Gonzales| 492 SCRA 591
FACTS:
Petitioner Rudigario C. Gatmaitan avers that his reassignment to Operating
Room-Delivery Room (OR-DR) Complex changed his duties which violated his
constitutional rights to property protection, security of job tenure and the
demotion while there might had been no demotion in his salaries, it could not be
denied that there was a demotion in his status pointing to a clear case of illegal
reassignment which constitute grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming of an
officer.
Citing several cases, petitioner insists that his demotion is tantamount to a
constructive dismissal and it is only just and proper that he be given reparation
by reinstating him to his previous position as Head of the Hospital Housekeeping
Unit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reassignment from the lobby to the OR-DR ordered
by respondent was valid.
RULING: YES. There was no demotion involved in the transfer of petitioners
workstation since what transpired was merely a reassignment brought about by
the exigencies of the service. The law is clear on this point – a demotion would
entail the issuance of another appointment that would have given petitioner
diminution in duties, responsibilities, status or rank – yet no appointment to
this effect was ever issued.
MAIN POINT: An employee may be re-assigned from one organizational unit to
another in the same agency, provided, that such re-assignment shall not involve
a reduction in rank, status and salary; and does not require the issuance of an
appointment.
Reassignment is defined as the movement of an employee from one
organizational unit in the same department or agency which does not involve a
reduction in rank, status, or salary and does not require the issuance of an
appointment.
Demotion is a movement from one position to another involving the issuance of
an appointment with diminution in duties, responsibilities, status or rank which
may or may not involve reduction in salary.
Who digested: COELI
Case no. 63
Article IX, COMELEC, Sec. 2, REORGANIZATION
RUSSEL ULYSSES I. NIEVES v. JOCELYN LB. BLANCO | G.R. No. 190422, 19
FACTS: Russel Ulysses I. Nieves is a Trade and Industry Development Specialist of
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). Nieves was formerly assigned to the
DTI-Sorsogon but was reassigned by to DTI-Albay. A year after his reassignment
to DTI-Albay, Nieves requested DTI Regional Director Jocelyn Blanco for his
reassignment back to DTI-Sorsogon but this was denied. Nieves appealed his
reassignment to the CSC asserting he is a station-specific employee and is allowed
only to be reassigned for a maximum period of one year. CSC however pointed
out that Nieves’ appointment is not station-specific but this does not mean that
Nieves could be reassigned to DTI-Albay indefinitely. The CSC ruled that under
the Revised Rules on Reassignment, a reassignment outside the geographical
location, if without the consent of the employee concerned should not exceed the
maximum period of one year.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reassignment of Nieves is station-specific and subject
to the one-year period limitation.
RULING: No, Nieves’ appointment is not station-specific. Thus, the period of his
reassignment to DTI-Albay is indefinite, unless otherwise revoked or recalled by
the Head of the Agency, the CSC or a competent court. Further, since the
reassignment of Nieves was within the same regional office, i.e. from DTI-
Sorsogon to DTI-Albay, the one-year period limitation does not apply.
MAIN POINT: The reassignment of an employee with a station-specific place of
work indicated in their respective appointments is allowed provided that it
would not exceed a maximum period of one year. On the other hand, the
reassignment of an employee whose appointment is not station-specific has no
definite period unless otherwise revoked or recalled by the Head of the Agency,
the CSC or a competent court.
Who digested: COELI
Case no. 64
Article IX, COMELEC, Sec. 2, APPOINTMENT VS. DESIGNATION
BINAMIRA V. GARUCHO
FACTS: A memorandum designating Ramon Binamira as General Manager of
Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) was addressed and signed by the then
Minister of Tourism and the Ex-officio Chairman of PTA. The Minister sought the
approval of the delegation to the president and was granted. Since then Binamira
discharged duties as the PTA general manager and ex-officio vice chairman. Peter
Garrucho, as the newly appointed secretary of tourism demanded for Binamira's
resignation as he was not appointed by the president. When Binamira was
ousted, Garrucho took over his place as general manager. Binamira filed a
petition for quo warranto to question Garrucho's post and prayed for
reinstatement claiming unjust dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Binamira acquired the position by appointment
and shall be entitled to security of tenure.
RULING: NO. Petitioner Binamira never acquired a valid title to the disputed
position so he has no right to be reinstated; he shall hold the office only in a
temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In
this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary
appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named.
MAIN POINT: Where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the
implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may
be replaced at will by the appointing authority.
Appointment is defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power,
of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When
completed, the appointment results in security of tenure.
It is said that appointment is essentially executive.
Designation connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an
incumbent official and is legislative in nature.
Who digested: COELI
Case no. 65
Article IX, COMELEC, Sec. 2, LOSS CONFIDENCE
HERNANDEZ V. VILLEGAS
FACTS: Epifanio Villegas, a lawyer and civil service eligible, was appointed
Director for Security of the Bureau of Customs. He was sent to the United States
to study enforcement techniques and customs practices under the technical
assistance program of the National Economic Council and the International
Cooperation Administration. Villegas returned to the Philippines. Thereafter, he
was temporarily detailed to the Arrastre Service and, in his stead, James Keefe
was designated Acting Director for Security. Keefe was promoted to the position
of Director for Security and Villegas was demoted to the rank of Arrastre
Superintendent. Villegas filed this action for quo warranto in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, denied by both the CFI and Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not Villegas' termination of official relation was without cause
and illegal.
RULING: NO, officers occupying primarily confidential positions may not be
removed or suspended without cause. The termination of their official relation
can be justified on the ground of loss of confidence because in that case their
cessation from office involves no removal but merely the expiration of the term
of office. But the point is that as long as confidence in them endures — and it has
been shown that it has been lost in this case — the incumbent is entitled to
continue in office.
MAIN POINT: It is to be understood of course that officials and employees
holding primarily confidential positions continue only for so long as confidence
in them endures.
Who digested: COELI
Case no. 66
Article IX, COMELEC, Sec. 2, ABOLITION OF OFFICE
BRIONES V. OSMEÑA
FACTS:
Petitioners have served in the office of the Mayor of Cebu, since Commonwealth
days, before the war. Petitioner Concepcion G. Briones is a first grade civil service
eligible, appointed Clerk-Stenographer in the Office of the City Treasurer of Cebu
and she was transferred to the Office of the City Mayor with permanent status.
Petitioner Faustino O. Rosagaran, on the other hand, is a second grade civil
service eligible. He was employed in the Office of the City Mayor of Cebu and
promoted to Administrative Officer. Municipal Board approved Ordinance No.
192, abolishing 32 positions in both offices. Among the positions abolished in the
Office of the City Mayor were those occupied by petitioners. Petitioners filed the
instant petition for reinstatement, back salaries, moral damages and attorney’s
fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not the abolition of positions of the petitioners was invalid.
RULING: YES. A decent respect for the Civil Service provisions of our Constitution
dictates that civil service eligibles, like petitioners herein who have rendered long
and honorable service, should not be sacrificed in favor of non-eligibles given
positions of recent creation, nor should they be left at the mercy of political
changes.
MAIN POINT: No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law.
KARLY
CASE NO. 67
ART IX SEC 2, PAR. 2: APPOINTMENT V. DESIGNATION
 2. ABOLISH OF OFFICE
EUGENIO V. CSC, 243 SCRA 196 (1995)
FACTS: Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research
Institute. She applied for Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank
on August 2, 1993, she was given a CES eligibility. On September 15, 1993, she was
recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service
Board.
On October 1, 1993, respondent Civil Service Commission passed Resolution No. 93-
4359, which became an impediment to the appointment of petitioner as Civil Service
Officer, Rank IV.
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service
Board which recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished; petitioner filed
the petition at bench to annul, among others, resolution No. 93-4359.
ISSUE: WON CSC given the authority to abolish the office of the CESB
RULING: NO, the Career Executive Service Board was created in PD No. 1 on
September 1, 1974; it cannot be disputed that as the CESB was created by law, it can
only be abolished by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that
the creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function. The
essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to
respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the
control of respondent Commission.
Main Point: As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent
Commission’s power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control as enumerated
in Section 16.
CASE NO. 68
ART IX SEC 2, PAR. 2: APPOINTMENT V. DESIGNATION
3. REORGANIZATION
Romualdez-Yap v. CSC, 225 SCRA 285 (1993)
FACTS: Petitioner Conchita Romualdez-Yap started working with the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) on September 20, 1972. After several promotions, she was
appointed in 1983 as a Senior Vice President assigned to the Fund Transfer
Department. The case at bar is a special civil action for certiorari assailing Res. No.
92-201 of the respondent which upheld the petitioner’s separation from PNB in light
of EO 80 or the Revised Charter of PNB. Petitioner contends that there is an existence
of bad faith in its reorganization and that there is an erroneous application of the one
year prescriptive period for quo warranto proceedings in her case.
ISSUE: Is the reorganization of PNB, a government-owned or controlled corporation
performing ministrant functions, valid?
RULING: YES, Ministrant functions are those undertaken by way of advancing the
general interests of society and are merely optional. Commercial or universal banking
is, ideally, not a governmental but a private sector endeavor, an optional function of
the government. There are functions of the government which it may exercise to
promote merely the welfare, progress, and prosperity of the people. Thus,
reorganization of such corporations like PNB is valid so long as they are done in good
faith as prescribed in the Dario v. Mison doctrine. Accordingly, the reorganization of
PNB is found to be done in good faith by the Court.
CASE NO. 69
ART IX SEC 2, PAR. 2: APPOINTMENT V. DESIGNATION
 3. REORGANIZATION
FERNANDEZ V. STO. TOMAS 242 SCRA 192 1995
FACTS: Petitioners Salvador C. Fernandez and Anicia M. de Lima assail the validity
of Resolution No. 94-3710 to the extent it merged the OCSS [Office of Career Systems
and Standards], the OPIA [Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit] and the OPR
[Office of Personnel Relations], to form the RDO [Research and Development Office]
of the Civil Service Commission and the authority of the Commission to issue the
same.
Petitioner Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of Personnel Inspection and
Audit ("OPIA") while petitioner de Lima was serving as Director of the Office of the
Personnel Relations ("OPR"), both at the Central Office of the Civil Service
Commission in Quezon City, Metropolitan Manila.
Examination of Resolution No. 94-3710 shows that thereby the Commission re-
arranged some of the administrative units (i.e., Offices) within the Commission
and re-allocated certain functions moving some functions from one Office to
another; e.g., the information technology function of OPM (Office of Planning and
Management) was transferred to the newly named Management Information Office
(MIO). This re-allocation or re-assignment of some functions carried with it the
transfer of the budget earmarked for such function to the Office where the function
was transferred.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission had legal authority to issue
Resolution No. 94-3710.
RULING: YES, it did not constitute a violation of their constitutional right to security
of tenure.It follows that the reassignment of petitioners Fernandez and de Lima from
their previous positions in OPIA and OPR, respectively, to the Research and
Development Office (RDO) in the Central Office of the Commission in Metropolitan
Manila and their subsequent assignment from the RDO to the Commission's Regional
Offices in Regions V and III had been effected with express statutory authority and
did not constitute removals without lawful cause.
MAIN POINT: The above conclusion is compelled not only by the statutory
provisions relevant in the instant case, but also by a long line of cases decided by this
Court in respect of different agencies or offices of government.
CASE NO. 70
ART IX SEC 2, PAR. 2: APPOINTMENT V. DESIGNATION
3. REORGANIZATION
CHATO V. NATIVIDAD 244 SCRA 787 (1995)
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari to annul the order dated February 7, 1994 of
respondent judge of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga in Civil
Case No. 10066, enjoining petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue from
transferring respondent Nori B. Blas, as revenue district officer from San Fernando,
Pampanga to Tuguegarao, Cagayan.
Among those affected by the reassignment was private respondent Salvador Nori Blas,
who was ordered to report to Revenue District No. 14 in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. In
turn, petitioner Solon B. Alcantara was ordered to report to Blas' former post in San
Fernando, Pampanga, now known as Revenue District No. 21.
Petitioner argues, firstly, that private respondent did not have any vested right to his
station in San Fernando, Pampanga since he was only designated to the post and not
appointed thereto. Neither did private respondent show any right to be exempted from
the reorganization.
ISSUE: WON the reassignment is valid.
RULING: NO, Private respondent failed to show patent illegality in the action of the
Commissioner constituting violation of his right to security of tenure. To sustain his
contention that his transfer constitutes a demotion simply because the new assignment
is not to his liking would be to subordinate government projects, along with the great
resources and efforts they entail, to the individual preferences and opinions of civil
service employees. Such contention would negate the principle5 that a public office is
a public trust and that it is not the private preserve of any person. In granting an
injunction despite the absence of any legal right to be protected, respondent committed
a grave abuse of its discretion.
MAIN POINT: Any employee who questions the validity of his transfer should
appeal to the Civil Service Commission. Respondent judge should have dismissed the
action below for failure of private respondent to exhaust administrative remedies.
CASE NO. 71
ART IX SEC 2, PAR. 2: APPOINTMENT V. DESIGNATION
 3. REORGANIZATION
Divinagracia v. Sto. Tomas 244 SCRA 595 (1995)
FACTS: On 1 January 1985 the Joint Commission on Local Government Personnel
Administration approved the reorganization plan and staffing pattern of the
Municipality of Pili Private respondent Prescilla B. Nacario who was then the
Municipal Budget Officer was appointed MPDC on 10 June 1985 to take effect on 1
July 1985. Nacario was replaced by Digna Isidro as Municipal Budget Officer. Isidro
was succeeded a year later by Eleanor Villarico who served until 1990.
On 15 March 1993 Mayor Divinagracia wrote to CSC Chairperson Patricia A. Sto.
Tomas seeking a reconsideration of her opinion of 8 December 1992. Mayor
Divinagracia explained the factual circumstances behind the ouster of Mancita and the
resulting appointment of Nacario to the position of MPDC, arguing that San Luis was
validly appointed by the Secretary of the Budget and confirmed by the CSC, hence,
entitled to security of tenure.
Petitioners contend that Sec. 13, Rule VI, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Revised Administrative Code (E.O. 292) does not apply to the present case because
the rule covers only appointments in a chain of promotions and not where a public
officer was merely transferred to another position of the same rank, grade and level.
ISSUE: WON the transfer is valid
RULING: NO, Clearly then, the unconsented lateral transfer of Nacario from the
Budget Office to the Office of MPDC was arbitrary for it amounted to removal without
cause, hence, invalid as it is anathema to security of tenure. When Nacario was
extended a permanent appointment on 1 August 1980 and she assumed the position,
she acquired a legal, not merely an equitable, right to the position. Such right to
security of tenure is protected not only by statute, but also by the Constitution and
cannot be taken away from her either by removal, transfer or by revocation of
appointment, except for cause, and after prior notice.
MAIN POINT: A transfer requires a prior appointment and acceptance in order to
complete the appointment. No permanent transfer can take place unless the officer
or employee is first removed from the position held, and then appointed to another
position.
ARZHY
CASE NO. 72
ART IX SEC 2: CIVIL SERVICE; SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
SECURITY OF TENURE/CAUSE FOR REMOVAL: PAR 3; REORGANIZATION
Vinzons-Chato v. Zenarosa
FACTS: Private respondent, Estrella V. Martinez, was reassigned to Assistant
Division Chief, Collection Programs Division, National Office in Quezon City from
her previous position of Assistant Revenue District Officer of Revenue District
Office (RDO) No. 34 pursuant to the Revenue Travel Assignment Order (RTAO)
No. 8-95 issued by Petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Private
respondent alleged that her reassignment was tantamount to a demotion and
dislocation (i.e. reassignment to a position totally alien to her proven area of
expertise in assessment) and that the act of the petitioner in issuing the travel
order was made in bad faith intended to harass her. A writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining implementation of RTAO 8-95 was filed by private
respondent and granted by respondent Judge Zenarosa. Private respondent was
suspended for one month on the ground of gross insubordination in accordance
with Sec 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulation for her
failure to comply with the travel order. Petitioner contended that such
reassignment will not alter the appointment of private respondent as Chief
Revenue Officer II. Futhermore, reassignment was made for the prevention of
familiarity and patronage between BIR officers and taxpayers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of RTO No. 8-95 is violative of the security of
tenure granted by the Constitution as it constitutes a demotion on the part of
respondent
RULING: No, the reassignment of public respondent is not a demotion for there
is no diminution of rank, salary, status, and responsibility. Moreover, she is not
the only one assigned to a new post. Petitioner, Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, is authorized to assign or re-assign officers and employees of BIR as the
exigencies of the service may require, without demotion in rank and salary in
accordance with Civil Service Rules and Regulation.
MAIN POINT: Reassignment in good faith and in the interest of the government
service is permissible and valid. Mere reorganization of the agency does not
constitute removal from office nor demotion when such will not result to
diminution of rank, salary, status, and responsibility (in case of demotion).
ARZHY
CASE NO. 73
ART IX SEC 2: CIVIL SERVICE; SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
 SECURITY OF TENURE/CAUSE FOR REMOVAL: PAR 3; REORGANIZATION
De Guzman v. Comelec
FACTS: Petitioners assailed the validity of the provision found in Section 44 of
the The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996’ which provides for the prohibition on
election officers to hold office in a particular city or municipality for more than
four years and for the automatic reassignment of election officers who have
served for at least four years in a particular city or municipality to a new station
outside the original congressional district. Pursuant to this provision, COMELEC
issued several directives reassigning petitioners, who are either City or Municipal
Officers, to different stations.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 44 of Republic Act No. 8189 violates the
constitutional guarantee on security of tenure of Civil Servants
RULING: No, the rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema
(something that one vehemently dislikes) to security of tenure applies only to an
officer who is appointed-not merely assigned-to a particular station. Such rule
does not proscribe a transfer carried out under a specific statute that empowers
the head of an agency to periodically reassign the employees and officers in order
to improve the service of the agency. Furthermore, the guarantee of security of
tenure under the Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual employment. It only
means that an employee cannot be dismissed (or transferred) from the service
for causes other than those provided by law and only after due process has been
accorded to the employee. What it seeks to prevent is capricious exercise of the
power to dismiss. Where the law-making authority itself which furnishes the
ground for the transfer of a class of employees, no such capriciousness can be
raised as long as the remedy proposed to cure a perceived evil is germane to the
purposes of the law.
MAIN POINT: Reassignment of employees assigned to a particular station is not
violative of the Constitutional grant of security of tenure when such act is based
on pronouncements made by the law-making authority for purposes of curing a
perceived evil and for improvement of the service of the agency.
ARZHY
CASE NO. 74
ART IX SEC 2: CIVIL SERVICE; SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
SECURITY OF TENURE/CAUSE FOR REMOVAL: PAR 3; REORGANIZATION
Cuevas v. Bacal
FACTS: Respondent, Josefina G. Bacal, who holds the rank of Career Executive
Service Officer (CESO) III was appointed to the position of Chief Public Attorney
in the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) which has a Career Executive Service (CES)
Rank Level I. She was subsequently transferred, without her consent, to the Office
of the Regional Director of the PAO while petitioner Carina Demaisip was
appointed Chief Public Defender (formerly Chief Public Attorney) by Pres.
Estrada in her stead. Respondent filed a quo warranto before the CA questioning
her replacement for which the court ruled in her favor and held that such transfer
amounted to removal without cause. Petitioners contended that such
reassignment or transfer of respondent Bacal from Chief Public Attorney to
Regional Director is appropriate and did not result to her losing her rank as CESO
III and her right to receive the salary corresponding to her present rank.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent’s reassignment from Chief Public Attorney
to Regional Director constitutes a violation of security of tenure
RULING: No, respondent, not having the rank appropriate for the position of
Chief Public Attorney, her appointment to that position cannot be considered
permanent and cannot claim security of tenure in respect to such position. The
guarantee of security of tenure to members of the Career Executive Service (CES)
does not extend to the particular positions to which they may be appointed but
to the rank to which they are appointed by the President.
MAIN POINT: Appointment to a lower position does not violate the
Constitutional grant of security of tenure when such reassignment does not result
to diminution of rank and the right to receive salary corresponding to such rank.
ARZHY
CASE NO. 75
ART IX SEC 2: CIVIL SERVICE; SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
SECURITY OF TENURE/CAUSE FOR REMOVAL: PAR 3; QUALIFICATION FOR
ELIGIBILITY
 Mayor v. Macaraig
FACTS: Five special civil actions are jointly decided which assailed the
constitutionality of Section 35 of Republic Act No. 6715 which declares vacant all
positions of the Commissioners, Executive Labor Arbiters, and Labor Arbiters of
the National Labor Relations Commission and operates to remove the
incumbents upon the appointment and qualification of their successors.
Additional qualification requirement for Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor
Arbiters was added under RA 6715 which includes: a) must have been in the
practice of law in the Philippines for at least 7 years, with at least 3 years of
experience or exposure in the field of labor-management relations; b) must have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least 5 years for purposes of
reappointment for those incumbent Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 35 of Republic Act No. 6715 is violative of the
security of tenure granted by the Constitution
RULING: Yes, abolition by law as a result of reorganization is a recognized cause
for termination of a Government employee but abolition of an office is not the
same as the declaration that the office is vacant. There is no express or implied
abolition of the petitioners’ positions effected by RA 6715 (Bernas p. 381). While
it is undoubtedly a prerogative of the legislature to abolish certain offices, it
cannot be conceded the power to simply pronounce those offices vacant and
thereby effectively remove the occupants or holders thereof from the civil
service.
Their incumbents constitutionally granted security of tenure cannot be defeated
by the provision for higher or other qualifications than were prescribed under
the old law. Said provision can only operate prospectively and as to new
appointees to positions regularly vacated. There is also no showing that the
petitioners do not qualify under the new law.
MAIN POINT: Declaration of office as vacant is not the kind of abolition by law
contemplated in the Constitution as a valid termination of government employee.
ARZHY
CASE NO. 76
ART IX SEC 2: CIVIL SERVICE; SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
SECURITY OF TENURE/CAUSE FOR REMOVAL: PAR 3; ABANDONMENT:
ACCEPTANCE OF INCOMPATIBLE/OTHER EMPLOYMENT
Canonizado v. Aguirre
FACTS: Petitioner was removed from his office as NAPOLCOM Commissioner by
the enactment of RA 8551, otherwise known as the Philippine National Police
Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998, and was subsequently appointed as
Inspector General of Internal Affairs Services (IAS), pending appeal on his
removal as Commissioner. The Court ruled RA 8551 to be unconstitutional and
ordered for the reinstatement of petitioner and the payment of full backwages to
be computed from the date he was removed from office. Respondents claimed
that his acceptance of the position of Inspector General is deemed abandonment
of his claim for reinstatement to the NAPOLCOM since the offices of NAPOLCOM
Commissioner and Inspector General of IAS are incompatible.
ISSUE: Whether or not Canonizado’s appointment to and acceptance of the
position of Inspector General of IAS would result in the abandonment of his claim
for reinstatement to the NAPOLCOM due to incompatibility of duties
RULING: No, the rule on incompatibility of duties does not apply to the case at
bar. Canonizado did not discharge the functions of two offices simultaneously.
While he was appointed as Inspector General of IAS, which he sought during the
pendency of his appeal on his removal as Commissioner, he had ceased to
discharge his function as NAPOLCOM Commissioner. General rule: one, while
occupying one office, accepts another incompatible with the first, ipso facto
vacates the first and his title is thereby terminated without any other act or
proceeding.
MAIN POINT: While desiring and intending to hold the office, and with no willful
desire or intention to abandon it, the public officer vacates it in deference to the
requirements of a statute which is afterwards declared unconstitutional, such a
surrender will not be deemed an abandonment and the officer may recover the
office.
R. Rizon
CASE NO. 77
Article IX CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
 Abandonment, Acceptance of Incompatible/Other Employment
Salvador vs. CA
FACTS: Petitioner Conrado C. Salvador had been a permanent employee of
DENR since 1964. Petitioner, who prior to the reorganization of DENR
had held the position of Forestry Supervisor II for almost eight (8)
years. Because of the reorganization he accepted a coterminous
position and thereafter terminated. When petitioner applied for a
vacant position equivalent to his former position as Forestry
Supervisor II under the 1986 plantilla. Petitioner’s application was
ignored and instead one Sofio B. Quintana was appointed to the
position. Respondent court (CA) contented that the appointing
power of the DENR is discretionary and that petitioner was not
entitled to the position he applied for considering that he had no
vested right thereto.
ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner has a vested right to the position
considering he was already terminated from the service.
RULING: Yes, petitioner must be reinstated to his former or equivalent
positions in the DENR without loss of seniority and other benefits,
and be issued regular and permanent appointments to the positions
in the new 1986 plantilla. Petitioners application for and acceptance
of a lower position in the DENR, under the circumstances, was the
practical and responsible thing to do, and cannot be construed
against him.
MAIN POINT: The bare fact of accepting a position which was not only lower
but of a coterminous status due to reorganization does not affect his
right to reinstatement.
R. Rizon
CASE NO. 78
Article IX CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Due Process in Removal
Enrique vs. CA
FACTS: Petitioners were charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct, being
notoriously undesirable, receiving for personal use for a fee, gift or
other valuable things in the course of official duties for having
assisted examinees in answering examination questions for a
consideration of P500 to P1,000. CSC ordered for their preventive
suspension and denied petitioners request for a formal hearing as
well as the lifting of the suspension.
ISSUES: Whether or not petitioners were denied due process of law when
they were dismissed from the service through a summary
proceeding conducted by the CSC.
RULING: No, petitioners were informed of the charges levelled against them
and were given reasonable opportunity to present their defenses. As
a matter of fact, petitioners admitted that they filed their answer to
the formal charges against them and submitted additional evidence
when asked to do so.
MAIN POINT: Summary proceedings in the removal or dismissal of employees
are allowed so long as the respondents in the administrative case are
duly informed of the charges against them and given the opportunity
to present their side.
R. Rizon
CASE NO. 79
Article IX CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
 Due Process in Removal
CSC vs. Magnaye
FACTS: Magnaye was appointed as Utility Worker I and detailed at the
Municipal Planning and Development Office. Less than a month from
his appointment, the new mayor (Bendaa) served him a notice of
termination for unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity. Petitioner
argued that his termination was without basis and was politically
motivated.
ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner was denied due process.
RULING: Yes, petitioner acquires a legal, not merely equitable right (to the
position), which is protected not only by statute, but also by the
Constitution and cannot be taken away from him except for cause,
and with previous notice and hearing, regardless of whether he is
regular or probationary employee.
MAIN POINT: No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended
or dismissed except for cause as provided by law is a guaranty of both
procedural and substantive due process, regardless if he is a
probationary employee. Procedural due process requires that the
dismissal comes only after notice and hearing, while substantive due
process requires that the dismissal be for cause.
R. Rizon
CASE NO. 80
Article IX CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Due Process in Removal
Rubenecia vs CA
FACTS: Teachers of Catarman National High School in Catarman, Northern
Samar, filed before the MSPB an administrative complaint against
petitioner Rubenecia, the School Principal, for dishonesty, nepotism,
oppression and violation of Civil Service Rules. CSC found him guilty
and ordered his dismissal from the government service.
ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner was denied due process.
RULING: No, the formal charge prepared by the MSPB and given to petitioner
constituted sufficient notice which, in fact, had enabled him to
prepare his defense. Finally, the motion for reconsideration filed by
Rubenecia before the Commission cured whatever defect might have
existed in respect of alleged denial of procedural due process.
MAIN POINT: Motion for reconsideration filed before the Commission cured
whatever defect might have existed in respect of alleged denial of
procedural due process. Denial of due process cannot be successfully
invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his
motion for reconsideration.
R. Rizon
CASE NO. 81
Article IX CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
 Due Process in Removal
PCSO Directors vs. Marie Lapid
FACTS: Marie Jean C. Lapid, Casual Clerk (Acting Teller) of PCSO was found
her guilty by PCSO of Discourtesy in the Course of Official Duties and
Grave Misconduct and imposed on her the penalty of Dismissal from
the Service for confronting, badmouthing and shouting invectives at
Mr. Guemo, PCSO Chief Lottery Operations Officer of Bataan
Provincial District in the presence of other employees and clients.
Lapid claimed that the CSC erred in denying her appeal on the ground
that she was a casual employee who was without any security of
tenure and may be separated from service at any time.
ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner was denied due process.
RULING: Yes, casuals are entitled to due process especially if they are to be
removed for more serious causes or for causes other than (1) when
their services are no longer needed; (2) funds are no longer available;
(3) the project has already been completed/finished; or (4) their
performance are below par. Petitioner was not formally charged and
the charges were not substantiated.
MAIN RULING: No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended
or dismissed except for cause as provided by law after due process.
Even a casual or temporary employee enjoys security of tenure and
cannot be dismissed except for cause.
Digested by: FRANZ
CASE NO. 82
Article IX-B, Section 2(3): The Civil Service Commission: Security of Tenure
Chua v. CSC
FACTS: Petitioner believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the
Early Retirement Law (RA 6683), filed an application on 30 January 1989 with
respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the
same; instead, she was offered separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2)
month basic pay for every year of three (3) years period prior to retirement are
continuous and fulfill the service requirement for retirement.’ What substantial
differences exist, if any, between casual, emergency, seasonal, project, co-
terminus or contractual personnel? All are tenurial employees with no fixed term,
non-career, and temporary. CSC characterized that her employment with NIA is
contractual in nature, thus she is not benefited by the Early Retirement Law.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the benefits of the Early
Retirement Law.
RULING: Yes. Co-terminus or project personnel, who have rendered years of
continuous service, should be included in the coverage of the Early Retirement
Law, as long as they file their application prior to the expiration of their term, and
as long as they comply with CSC regulations promulgated for such purpose. In
this connection, Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1990 (5 March 1990)
implementing Rep. Act No. 6850, requires, as a condition to qualify for the grant
of eligibility, an aggregate or total of seven (7) years of government service which
need not be continuous, in the career or non-career service, whether benefits
authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and
emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of
two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation.
Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of
the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act.
MAIN POINT: Although no proof of the existence of a work pool can be assumed,
her service record cannot be disregarded.
CASE NO. 83
Article IX-B, Section 2(3): The Civil Service Commission: Security of Tenure
NLTD v. CSC
FACTS: Petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor of Laws graduate and a first grade civil
service eligible was appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII under permanent
status. Said position was later reclassified to Deputy Register of Deeds III
pursuant to PD 1529, to which position, petitioner was also appointed under
permanent status up to September 1984. By virtue of Executive Order No. 649
which authorized the restructuring of the Land Registration Commission to
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration and regionalizing the
Offices of the Registers therein, petitioner Garcia was issued an appointment as
Deputy Register of Deeds II on October 1, 1984, under temporary status, for not
being a member of the Philippine Bar. Resolution 2 dated June 30, 1988, the Civil
Service Commission directed that private respondent Garcia be restored to her
position as Deputy Register of Deeds II or its equivalent in the NALTDRA. It held
that "under the vested right theory the new requirement of BAR membership to
qualify for permanent appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II or higher as
mandated under said Executive Order, would not apply to her (private
respondent Garcia) but only to the filling up of vacant lawyer positions on or after
February 9, 1981, the date said Executive Order took effect." Petitioner NALTDRA
filed the present petition to assail the validity of the above Resolution of the Civil
Service Commission. It contends that Sections 8 and 10 of Executive Order No.
649 abolished all existing positions in the LRC and transferred their functions to
the appropriate new offices created by said Executive Order, which newly created
offices required the issuance of new appointments to qualified office holders.
Verily, Executive Order No. 649 applies to private respondent Garcia, and not
being a member of the Bar, she cannot be reinstated to her former position as
Deputy Register of Deeds II.
ISSUE: Whether or Not membership in the bar, which is the qualification
requirement prescribed for appointment to the position of Deputy Register of
Deeds under Section 4 of Executive Order No. 649 (LRC into NALTDRA) should
be required of and/or applied only to new applicants and not to those who were
already in the service of the LRC as deputy register of deeds at the time of the
issuance and implementation of the above said Executive Order.
RULING: Yes, however, does not mean removal. Abolition of a position does not
involve or mean removal for the reason that removal implies that the post
subsists and that one is merely separated there from. After abolition, there is
in law no occupant. Thus, there can be no tenure to speak of. It is in this sense
that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security
of tenure does not arise.
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD
CASE NO. 84
Article IX-B, Section 2(3): The Civil Service Commission: Security of Tenure
Cabagnot v. CSC
FACTS: CSC found petitioner to have violated the rule on preference for
appointment of permanent employees based on Sec. 4 of Rep. Act No3. . 6656,
Sec. 7 of Rules on Organization and Memorandum Circular No. 5, s. 1988 of the
CSC, the rule means that “old employees should be considered first” on the
assumption, though not absolutely true, that they have gained “not only superior
skills but also greater dedication to the public service.” This is not to say,
however, that they should be automatically appointed because “the law does not
preclude the infusion of new blood, younger dynamism, or necessary talents into
the government service” provided that the acts of the appointing power are
“bonafide for the best interest of the public service and the person chosen has the
needed qualifications.”
ISSUE: Whether or Not the security of tenure of the employees was impaired.
RULING: Yes. The CSC found that sixteen (16) of the seventeen (17) private
respondents were demoted because of the wide disparity between the former
positions held by them and the positions to which they were proposed by
petitioner.
MAIN POINT: Demotion of a government employee is an act of impairment of
security of tenure.
CASE NO. 85
Article IX-B, Section 2(3): The Civil Service Commission: Security of Tenure
Marohombsar v. CA
FACTS: Private respondent was first appointed as Technical Assistant. The
position was subsequently reclassified and retitled to Executive Assistant II.
Since the private respondent did not possess the appropriate civil service
eligibility required of the position, she was extended a temporary appointment
only. She was later extended a permanent appointment when she acquired a
Career Service Professional Eligibility. When petitioner became the President of
MSU, private respondent was later dismissed. Petitioner argues that the dismissal
was legal since the private respondent’s appointment lacks the requisite
confirmation by the Board of Regents.
ISSUE: Whether or Not private respondent is entitled to back wages from the
time of illegal dismissal up to the time of reinstatement.
RULING: Yes. Private respondent could not be removed or dismissed from the
service without just cause and without observing the requirements of due
process as what happened in the present case. Inescapable then is the conclusion
that private respondent was illegally dismissed when she was summarily
terminated from the service by mere letter on the alleged ground of "urgent need
to establish a new order and maintain the trust and confidence reposed upon the
Office of the President.
MAIN POINT: An illegally terminated civil service employee is entitled to back
salaries limited only to a maximum period of five (5) years and not full back
salaries from her illegal termination up to her reinstatement.
CASE NO. 86
Article IX-B, Section 2(3): The Civil Service Commission: Security of Tenure
Ong v. OP
FACTS: On February 22, 2005, Ong filed before the CA a petition for quo
warranto. He sought for the declaration as null and void of (a) his removal from
the position of NBI Director III; and (b) his replacement by respondent Victor
Bessat (Bessat). Ong likewise prayed for reinstatement and back wages. In the
career executive service, the acquisition of security of tenure presupposes a
permanent appointment. It is further alleged that it was erroneous for the CA to
equate an appointment co-terminus with the tenure of the appointing authority
with one that is at the pleasure of such appointing authority. The OSG points out
that the replacement of Ong by Bessat was fair and just in accordance to with
Sections 13 and 14 Rule V, Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolution No. 91-
1631 issued on December 27, 1991. Further, the OSG claims that when Ong
accepted promotional appointments in the Career Executive Service (CES) for
which he did not have the required eligibility, he became a temporary employee
and had impliedly abandoned his right to security of tenure.
ISSUE: Whether or Not petitioner has the right for security of tenure.
RULING: No, it is undisputed that the petitioner is a non-CESO eligible. At best,
therefore, his appointment could be regarded only as temporary and, hence, he
has no security of tenure. Such being the case, his appointment can be withdrawn
at will by the President, who is the appointing authority in this case, and at a
moment's notice.
MAIN POINT: Security of tenure in the career executive service, which
presupposes a permanent appointment, takes place upon passing the CES
examinations administered by the CES Board.
Rechine CASE NO. 87
ARTICLE IX-B (CSC), SEC. 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
ELECTIONEERING OR PARTISAN POLITICAL ACTIVITY
SANTOS v. YATCO
FACTS: Respondent Alejo Santos is a Secretary of National Defense and head
of the Department of National Defense, with power of control and
supervision over the armed forces. The position of Secretary of National
Defense is not embraced and included within the term "officers and
employees in the civil service" (as disclosed in the proceedings in the
Constitutional Convention wherein the attempt of Delegate Mumar to
include the heads of executive departments within the civil service was
rejected). Respondent is campaigning for Governor Tomas Martin,
candidate of the Nacionalista Party in the Province of Bulacan, was acting
as member of the Cabinet in discussing the issues before the electorate and
defending the actuations of the Administration to which he belongs.
ISSUE: Whether or not cabinet members may engage in partisan political
activities.
RULING: Yes. Cabinet Members are not covered by the Constitutional prohibition
against electioneering or partisan political activity because they hold political
offices. Cabinet Members serve at the behest and pleasure of the President. As
such, their positions are essentially political. The same proscription relating to civil
servants does not also extend to members of the Cabinet as their positions are
essentially political.
MAIN POINT: The Supreme Court is plain that “elective officials” are not covered by
the prohibition against engaging in electioneering or partisan political activities for
practical reasons and in view of the nature of positions and responsibility.
Rechine CASE NO. 88
ARTICLE IX-B (CSC), SEC. 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
ELECTIONEERING OR PARTISAN POLITICAL ACTIVITY
PEOPLE v. DE VENECIA
FACTS: Braulio de Venecia was prosecuted for electioneering, because according
to the information: “he did x x x wilfully x x x induce, influence, sway and make
the electors vote in favor of candidates for public office namely, Felipe Oda, NP
candidate for Municipal Mayor of Binalonan x x x by, then and there, distributing
and or causing to be distributed election handbills, a sample of which is attached
hereto as Annex “A” and made integral part hereof, which leaflets were
distributed and/or caused to be distributed by the accused to win votes for NP
candidates Felipe Oda x x x.” Upon a motion to quash, the court dismissed the
case, holding that sec. 54 of the Revised Election Code (upon which the
prosecution rested) had been repealed by sec. 29 of Republic Act 2260.
ISSUE: Whether or not the classified civil service employee of handbills urging
election of a particular candidate is a solicitation of the electors’ vote
RULING: Yes. The distribution by a classified civil service employee of handbills
urging election of a particular candidate is a solicitation of the electors’ vote
punishable by Section 54 of the Revised Election Code because he “aided a
candidate” and may not invoke the privilege reserved to him by sec. 29.
Distributing handbills is undoubtedly “aiding”. It is not merely mentioning the
candidate whom De Venecia supported, nor mere expression of his opinion on
current political problems. It is solicitation of the elector’s vote in favor of Oda. It
is an indorsement of the request for his support by gubernatorial candidate
Conrado F. Estrella.
MAIN POINT: Partisan political activity, which is the phrase used in
previous Constitutions, includes “every form of solicitation of the elector’s
vote in favor of” a specific candidate. It includes contribution of money for
election purposes and distribution of handbills. However, the provision does
not “prevent any officer or employee from expressing his views on current
political problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of candidates for
public office whom he supports.” Section 29, RA 2260.
Rechine CASE NO. 89
ARTICLE IX-B (CSC), SEC. 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION AND RIGHT TO STRIKE
SSS EMPLOYEE v. CA
FACTS: SSS filed a complaint alleging that the officers and members of SSSEA
staged an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building,
preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members
from transacting business with the SSS; the Public Sector Labor-Management
Council, the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work;
and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. It appears that the
Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) went on strike after the
SSS failed to act on the union’s demands. The CA held that since the employees of
the SSS, are government employees, they are not allowed to strike, and may be
enjoined by the Regional Trial Court, which had jurisdiction over the SSS’
complaint for damages, from continuing with their strike.
ISSUE: Whether or not employees of the Security System have the right to strike?
RULING: No. Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes
helpful in understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution
would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize,
the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or
associations only, without including the right to strike.
MAIN POINT: Resort to the intent of the framers point to the understanding that
the right to organize does not include the right to strike.
Rechine CASE NO. 90
ARTICLE IX-B (CSC), SEC. 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION AND RIGHT TO STRIKE
BALINGASAN v. CA
FACTS: Petitioners, except Rodolfo Mariano, were among the 800 public school
teachers who staged “mass actions” to dramatize their grievances concerning, in
the main, the alleged failure of the public authorities to implement in a just and
correct manner certain laws and measures intended for their material benefit.
The Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) issued
a Return-to-Work Order. Petitioners failed to comply with said order. They were
simultaneously placed under preventive suspension.
ISSUE: Whether or not employees in the public service may engage in strikes.
RULING: No. It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that employees in the public
service may not engage in strikes. While the Constitution recognizes the right of
government employees to organize, they are prohibited from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which
will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public services.
MAIN POINT: The right of government employees to organize is limited only to
the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike. The
ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. In the absence of
statute, public employees do not have the right to engage in concerted work
stoppages for any purpose.
Rechine CASE NO. 91
ARTICLE IX-B (CSC), SEC. 2: SCOPE OF THE SYSTEM
RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION AND RIGHT TO STRIKE
JACINTO v. CA
FACTS: Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in
Metropolitan Manila. They incurred unauthorized absences in connection with
the mass actions then staged; DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño immediately issued a
return-to-work order. Petitioners initially questioned the CSC resolutions.
Respondent Court found that the “petitioners absented themselves from their
classes in furtherance of or in connection with the ‘mass action’ for the purpose
of pressuring the government to grant their demands.
ISSUE: Whether or not public school teachers may strike against the government
RULING: No. The Civil Service Commission found them guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service for having absented themselves
without proper authority, from their schools during regular school days, in order
to participate in the mass protest, their absence ineluctably resulting in the non-
holding of classes and in the deprivation of students of education, for which they
were responsible. As it was, the temporary stoppage of classes resulting from
their activity necessarily disrupted public services, the very evil sought to
be forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by government workers.
Their act by its nature was enjoined by the Civil Service law, rules and
regulations, for which they must, therefore, be made answerable. It is also
settled in jurisprudence that, in general, workers in the public sector do not
enjoy the right to strike.
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD
Andalahao
CASE NO. 91
ART IX B: CSC SEC 2: Scope of the System
Right to Self-organization and right to strike
De la Cruz vs CA 305 SCRA 303
FACTS: Public school teachers were simultaneously charged, preventively
suspended, and eventually dismissed then Department of Education, Culture and
Sports Secretary Isidro D. Cariño based on the report submitted by their
respective school principals wherein it was alleged that the teachers participated
in the mass action/illegal strike and subsequently defied the return-to-work
order which acts constituted grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross
violation of Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations and reasonable office
regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and absence without official leave
(AWOL), in violation of Presidential Decree 807, otherwise known as the Civil
Service Decree of the Philippines.
Appeals were filed with the CSC Merit Systems Protection Board and CA but all
petitions were denied. Hence a petition for review on certiorari was filed in SC.
ISSUE: WON public school teachers can invoke the right to self-organization and
strike to avoid administrative sanctions.
RULING: NO. The Court stressed that the teachers were penalized not because
they exercised their right to peaceably assemble but because of the manner by
which such right was exercised i.e. going on unauthorized and unilateral
absences thus disrupting classes in various schools in Metro Manila which
produced adverse effects upon the students for whose education the teachers
were responsible.
MAIN POINT: The teachers were thereby denied their rights to peaceably
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances reasoning that
this constitutional liberty to be upheld, like any other liberty, must be exercised
within reasonable limits so as not to prejudice the public welfare. The public
school teachers’ mass actions were clearly exercised beyond their constitutional
rights. Had the teachers availed of their free time—recess, after classes,
weekends or holidays no one could have held them liable for their participation
in the mass actions.
Andalahao
CASE NO. 92
ART IX B: CSC SEC 2: Scope of the System
Right to Self-organization and right to strike
GSIS vs Kapisan 510 SCRA 622
FACTS: A four-day rally was staged by the Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa
GSIS (KMG) due to the management style of GSIS President & GM Garcia. Show
cause memorandum was issued by GSIS Investigating Unit ordering those who
joined the demonstration to show cause why they should not be administratively
charged for the participation in the said rally. But no explanation was made,
instead a reconsideration was sought contending that employees returned to
work in obedience to the return-to-work order issued. Administrative cases were
filed against those who joined the rally. But CA held that Garcia's "filing of
administrative charges against KMG members is tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion which may be the proper subject of the writ of prohibition.
Thus the petition is filed for review on certiorari to nullify CA's decision
ISSUE: WON KMG is within the bounds of exercising their rights to self-
organization and strike.
RULING: NO. The Court ruled that government employees may organize but shall
not engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts, and other forms of mass action that
will lead in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.
MAIN POINT: The Court ruled that government employees may organize but
shall not engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts, and other forms of mass action
that will lead in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. The right of
government employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or
associations only, without including the right to strike, adding that public
employees going on disruptive unauthorized absences to join concerted
mass actions may be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service.
The assailed decision and resolution, if allowed to remain undisturbed, would
likely pave the way to legitimization of mass actions undertaken by civil servants,
regardless of their deleterious effects on the interest of the public they have
sworn to serve with loyalty and efficiency.
Andalahao
CASE NO. 94
ART IX B: CSC SEC 2: Scope of the System
Temporary Employees
Gloria vs CA GR 119903, August 15 2000
FACTS: Secretary Gloria (DECS), recommended the reassignment of the
appointed Schools Division Superintendent, Divisions of City Schools, QC to MIST
( Marikina Institute of Science and Technology) to fill up the vacuum created by
a retirement of a Superintendent. The president approved the recommendation
of the Secretary and was then transmitted to the concerned Regional Director for
implementation which then informed the reassigned employee of the new
assignment. The petitioner requested for a reconsideration on the reassignment
but Secretary Gloria denied the request.
Court proceedings were sought to prevent the implementation of the
reassignment but the reassignment was implemented after the issuance of writ
of preliminary injunction of CA. Thus the matter goes to SC.
ISSUE: WON the reassignment violated the employee’s right to security of tenure
RULING: YES. The Court upholds the finding of the respondent court that the
reassignment of petitioner to MIST “appears to be indefinite” which then appears
to be more than temporary due to the description specified as to the fitness for
the (reassigned) job, being an expert in the field. The memorandum has nothing
to show that the reassignment is temporary or would only last until a permanent
replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed which fact evinces an
intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private respondent with no
definite period or duration. Such feature of the reassignment violates the security
of tenure of the private respondent.
MAIN POINT: Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally
guaranteed feature of our civil service. The mantle of its protection extends not
only to employees removed without cause but also to cases of unconsented
transfers which are tantamount to illegal removals. While a temporary transfer
or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employee’s
prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step
toward his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from his permanent
position, or designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his
resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which
safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service
Andalahao
CASE NO. 95
ART IX B: CSC SEC 2: Scope of the System
Lazo vs CSC 236 SCRA 469
FACTS: CSC received a letter alleging fraud in the acquisition of the CSC Sub-
professional eligibility of petitioner Dennis Lazo.
The Regional Office - Tugeugarao found the complaint fictitious and
recommended the dismissal of the case. But the review of the examination
answer sheets pushed through and disclosed that the petitioner's actual score
was 34.48% and charged the petitioner with dishonesty, grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service, and ordered the Regional
Office to a formal investigation; but recommended the dismissal of the case for
lack of evidence. But CSC revoked the eligibility for being null and void.
Petitioner asked for a reconsideration, alleging it violated of his right to due
process and that the CSC had found him to have failed the Civil Service
Examinations without evidence being presented to support the finding.
CSC affirmed its decision, hence the petition for certiorari was filed alleging that
the CSC acted with grave abuse of discretion and denied petitioner's right to due
process
ISSUE: WON CSC can revoke certificate of eligibility to government service
RULING: YES. The Civil Service Commission is the central personnel agency of
the government charged with the duty of determining questions of qualifications
of merit and fitness of those appointed to the civil service. Its power to issue a
certificate of eligibility carries with it the power to revoke a certificate for being
null and void.
MAIN POINT: Under the Constitution, the Civil Service Commission is the central
personnel agency of the government charged with the duty of determining
questions of qualifications of merit and fitness of those appointed to the civil
service. Its power to issue a certificate of eligibility carries with it the power to
revoke a certificate for being null and void.
Andalahao
CASE NO. 96
ART IX B SEC 6: Prohibition of Appointment of "Lame Ducks"
People vs Sandiganbayan GR 164185 July 23 2008
FACTS: During the May 11, 1998 elections, Villapando ran for Municipal Mayor
of San Vicente, Palawan. Orlando M. Tiape (now deceased), a relative of
Villapandos wife, ran for Municipal Mayor of Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte.
Villapando won while Tiape lost. On July 1, 1998, Villapando designated Tiape as
Municipal Administrator of the Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan.
Charges were filed against Villapando and Tiape in violation of Article 244 of the
Revised Penal COde before the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon alleging that
Mayor Villapando committed crime in relation to and taking advantage of his
official functions by appointing Tiape as Municipal Administrator in his town.
The information was docketed as a Criminal case and raffled to the 4th Division
of the Sandiganbayan. Villapando filed a Demurrer to evidence and was iven
merit by the Sandiganbayan which ruled the prosecution did not allege much less
prove that the appointed Municipal Administrator lacked any of the qualification
imposed by the law and that temporary prohibition is not synonymous with
absence or lack of legal qualification.
Hence the petition for certiorari was filed by the Ombudsman through the Office
of the Special Prosecutor assails the May 20, 2004 Decision of the Sandiganbayan,
Fourth Division, in Criminal Case No. 27465, granting private respondent
Alejandro A. Villapandos Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of the crime
of unlawful appointment under Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE: WON the appointment made by Mayor Villapando is valid
RULING: NO. The Court ruled that legal disqualification cannot be read as
excluding temporary disqualification to exempt therefrom the legal prohibitions
under the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991. Basic is the
rule in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts
should not distinguish. There should be no distinction in the application of a law
where none is indicated.
MAIN POINT: legal disqualification cannot be read as excluding temporary
disqualification to exempt therefrom the legal prohibitions under the 1987
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991. Hence an appointing officer
cannot appoint any public office any person lacking the legal qualifications.
Case No. 97
Art 9-B Sec 7: Prohibitions; Appointments; Office; Employment
Flores v. Drilon
FACTS: Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at the
Subic, Zambales, and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian Employees
Association in U.S. Facilities in the Philippines, questions the constitutionality of Sec.
13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), under
which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
(SBMA).
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 13, par. (d) of RA 7227 is unconstitutional in line with
Section 7 of Article 9-B.
RULING: Yes. Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 is declared unconstitutional. The phrase
"shall be appointed" unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts
appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City.
MAIN POINT: Section 7 expresses the policy against the concentration of several
public positions in one person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-
time with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services. Congress
may not create an exception to this rule.
NOTE: Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which states, "Provided, however, that for the
first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of
Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic
Authority,"
 Case No. 98
Art 9-B Sec 7: Prohibitions; Appointments; Office; Employment
In re Eduardo Escala
FACTS: Respondent, Eduardo V. Escala, was appointed as SC Chief Judicial Staff
Officer, Security Division, by the Office of Administrative Services (OAS)having
been employed as Chief Inspector of the PNP Aviation Security Group at the time of
his appointment in the Supreme Court. He was allowed to assume office and perform
his duties, for reasons of exigency in the service although he has yet to comply with
the submission of all the documentary requirements for his appointment. During the
course of his employment, an anonymous letter reached the OAS reporting that
respondent received salaries and other benefits from the Court and also from the PNP
which was confirmed by an active member in the PNP Aviation Security Group.
ISSUE: W/N respondent’s act of holding two positions in the government is
unconstitutional.
RULING: Yes. He admitted his fault and was cognizant of the consequences. The
court ruled that the respondent is guilty of gross dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service and ordered his dismissal.
MAIN POINT: It is clearly stated in Sec. 7, Art. 9-B that it is prohibited for an
appointive official to hold any other office or employment in the government, making
his act unconstitutional.
Case No. 99
Art 9-B Sec 7: Prohibitions; Appointments; Office; Employment
La Carlota City v. Rojo
FACTS: Atty. Rex Rojo resigned as a member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod
preceding the appointment, by Vice Mayor Jalandoon, as Sangguniang Panglungsod
on March 18, 2004. Petitioners alleged that respondent’s resignation as a Sangguniang
Panlungsod member was not accepted when it was presented on March 17, 2004
during the scheduled regular session of the SP of La Carlota City, Negros Occidental
for lack of quorum which makes him an incumbent regular SP member when then he
was appointed as SP Secretary, which contravenes Section 7, Article IX-B of the
Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or notthe appointment of respondent as sangguniang panlungsod
secretary is unconstitutional due to lack of Quorum.
RULING: No. Seven (7) members (including the presiding officer) were present on
the 17 March 2004 regular session of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, clearly there was
a quorum such that the irrevocable resignation of respondent was validly accepted.
MAIN POINT: The appointment of the respondent was not against Par. 1 of Sec. 7,
Art. 9-B because he was not holding any public office or position anymore when he
was appointed.
 Case No. 100
Art 9-B Sec 8: Prohibitions; Compensation; Foreign Gift/Office/Title
Sedusasta v. Municipality of Surigao
FACTS: Pursuant to the provisions of section 1916 of the Revised Administrative
Code, Zacarias D. Sadueste, as district engineer for the Province of Surigao, created
an additional compensation of not more than P60 a month payable from the income of
the waterworks system under his supervision which took effect on January 1, 1936.
Provincial board of Surigao, by resolution, approved the designation. From January 1,
1936 to March 30, 1939, plaintiff rendered services to the defendant municipality in
his capacity as sanitary and waterworks engineer. The municipal council of the
defendant municipality failed to provide the necessary appropriation for his services
in the sum of P2,338.06, plaintiff instituted an action for its recovery with claim for
damages in the amount of P300. Trial court dismissed the complaint holding that
section 1916 of the RAC has been repealed by section 17 of Act No. 4187(GAA 1936).
ISSUE: W/N the Sadueste can claim for damages from the designation made.
RULING: No. There being no law by which the appellant is specifically authorized
to receive additional compensation for his services as sanitary and waterworks
engineer, his claim therefor must fail.
MAIN POINT: The phrase “specifically authorized by law” was included in the
provision in Sec. 8, Art 9-B because of peculiar or exceptional reasons warranting the
payment of extra or additional compensation.
Case No. 101
Art 9-B Sec 8: Prohibitions; Compensation; Foreign Gift/Office/Title
Peralta v. Mathay
FACTS: A resolution duly passed, granted the petitioner an optional retirement
gratuity of P40,336.07. Of that amount, he was not able to collect the sum of
P7,032.26, covering P3,982.26 as cost of living allowance, P1,275.00 as incentive
bonus, and P1,775.00 as Christmas bonus. Such items were not passed in audit, the
view of respondent Auditor General being that they should be deducted from his
gratuity, although during petitioner's incumbency as Trustee, no question was raised
when he was paid such allowance and bonuses. Respondent Auditor General justified
his action on the ground that they "partake of the nature of additional compensation,"
a trustee's remuneration being fixed by law in the form of a per diem of P25.00 for
every board meeting of the GSIS attended. Respondent so ruled on June 28, 1966 and
maintained such a stand on September 1, 1966 when he denied a motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: W/N incentive bonus and Christmas bonus are additional compensation.
RULING: Yes. A trustee’s remuneration fixed by law is P25 per day. Incentive bonus
and Christmas Bonus are obviously additional compensation.
MAIN POINT: It is expressly provided in the Constitution: "No officer or employee
of the government shall receive additional or double compensation unless specifically
authorized by law." He is of course entitled to be rewarded for the performance of the
functions entrusted to him, but that should not be the overriding consideration.
CHAM
Case No. 102
Article IX Section 8: Prohibitions;Compensations; Foreign gift/office/title
Santos vs CA
FACTS
Upon retirement from the judiciary on 1 April 1992, petitioner was fully
paid of his retirement gratuity under RA 910, as amended, where he was
receiving a monthly pension for five years. He was then appointed Director III of
MMA(defunct, now called MMDA) under RA 7294
ISSUE/S
(1)Whether or not petitioner can continue to receive pension while receiving
salary as a director (2) whether or not, upon separation from MMA(MMDA), he
can include his separation pay under RA 7294 for his service in the judiciary
RULING
(1)Yes. The second paragraph of section 8 means he can still receive pension or
gratuity even if he accepts another position where another compensation is
attached (2) no. it would entail double compensation for the same service where
he was already paid. RA 7294 does not specifically authorize payment of
additional compensation for years of government service outside of MMA
MAIN POINT
In instances when holding another office, he can draw his salary
attached, provided that it is specifically authorized by the law
CHAM
Case No. 103
Article IX Section 8: Prohibitions;Compensations; Foreign gift/office/title
Cabili vs CSC
FACTS
The facts show that the Local Water Utilities Administration Employees
Association for Progress (LEAP), represented by its Chairman, Leonardo C. Cruz,
filed a complaint before the CSC against Camilo P. Cabili and Antonio R. De Vera,
Chairman of the Board of Trustees and Administrator, respectively, of the Local
Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). The complaint prayed for investigation
and opinion on the validity of the multiple directorship of LWUA Deputy
Administrator Rodolfo de Jesus and his entitlement to per diems, representation
and transportation allowance (RATA), discretionary fund, and other
extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses (EME) from the Olongapo City Water
District where he was designated as member of the board of directors. He
received these monetary benefits in addition to his compensation as Deputy
Administrator of LWUA.
ISSUE/S
Whether CHRISTMAS BONUS, CASH GIFT AND PRODUCTIVITY
INCENTIVE BONUS are in the nature or additional compensation, hence should
be disallowed
RULING
Yes. The prohibition cannot be any clearer. PD 198 states that each
director shall receive a per diem, to be determined by the board, for each meeting
of the board actually attended by him, but no director shall receive per diems in
any given month in excess of the equivalent of the total per diems of four meetings
in any given month. No director shall receive other compensation for services to the
district
MAIN POINT
Bonuses given to one whose compensation under the law is merely per
diem violates the rule against additional compensation
CHAM
Case No. 104
Article IX Section 8: Prohibitions;Compensations; Foreign gift/office/title
Benguet State University vs Colting
FACTS
Congress passed Republic Act No. 8292 entitled An Act Providing for the
Uniform Composition and Powers of the Governing Boards, the Manner of
Appointment and Term of Office of the President of Chartered State Universities and
Colleges, and for Other Purposes, granting rice subsidy and health care allowance
to BSUs employees. The grant of this rice subsidy and health care allowance in
the total amount of P4,350,000.00 was disallowed in audit under Notice of
Disallowance No. 99-001-STF (98), stating that R.A. No. 8292 does not provide
for the grant of said allowance to employees and officials of the university. BSU
requested the lifting of the disallowance with the COA Regional Office, but it was
denied, it held that a non-existent item, project, activity, purpose, or object of
expenditure cannot be funded by augmentation from savings or by the use of
appropriations. It further held that the grant of said allowances lacked statutory
basis, transgressed the constitutional proscription on additional, double, or
indirect compensation and ran counter to the provisions of the Salary
Standardization Law.
ISSUE/S
(1)Whether or not petitioner is authorized to grant Health Care
Allowance and Rice Subsidy to its employees (2) Whether or not the recipients
should reimburse the amounts received by them
RULING
(1)Yes. It argues that the said law vests state universities and colleges with fiscal
autonomy, and grants them ample leeway in the appropriation and disbursement
of their funds and it argues that the Salary Standardization Law does not
expressly prohibit the benefits, because the said allowances are in the nature of
a financial assistance and not an additional income where the SC agrees. (2) The
COA correctly ruled that the other programs/projects under R.A. No. 8292 and its
Implementing Rules should be of the same nature as instruction, research, and
extension. In BSU's case, the disbursements were for rice subsidy and health care
allowances which are, in no way, intended for academic programs similar to
instruction, research, or extension. However, no reimbursement was needed
MAIN POINT
When a law says that money generated by a school may be used for
“other programs/projects of the university or college”, such law is not an
authorization for giving additional or double compensation
CHAM
Case No. 105
Article IX Section 8: Prohibitions;Compensations; Foreign gift/office/title
Herrera et.al vs NPC
FACTS
On February 28, 2003, all NPC employees, including the petitioners, were
separated from the service. As a result, all the employees who held permanent positions
at the NPC as of June 26, 2001 opted for and were paid the corresponding separation pay
equivalent to one and a half months salary per year of service. Nonetheless, in addition to
the separation package mandated by the EPIRA, a number of NPC employees also claimed
retirement benefits under CA No. 186. Under these laws, government employees who
have rendered at least 20 years of service are entitled to a gratuity equivalent to one
month’s salary for every year of service for the first 20 years, one and a half months salary
for every year of service over 20 but below 30 years, and two months’ salary for every
year of service in excess of 30 years. The NPC, on the other hand, took the position that the
grant of retirement benefits to displaced employees in addition to separation pay was
inconsistent with the constitutional proscription on the grant of a double gratuity.
Respondents argue that the grant of both separation pay and retirement benefit amounts
to double gratuity in direct contravention of the Constitution and that no law authorizes
the payment of both separation pay and retirement benefits to petitioners.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not NPC employees who were separated from the service because of the
reorganization of the electric power industry and who received their separation pay
under RA No. 9136 are still entitled to receive retirement benefits under CA No. 186, as
amended.
RULING
No. Section 8 of Article IX(B) of the Constitution provides that no elective or
appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law. In prior decisions, we have ruled that
there must be a clear and unequivocal statutory provision to justify the grant of both
separation pay and retirement benefits to an employee. Here, absent an express provision
of law, the grant of both separation and retirement benefits would amount to double
compensation from one single act of separation from employment.
MAIN POINT
Absent clear and unequivocal statutory authority, the grant of both
separation pay and retirement benefits violate the constitutional proscription on
additional compensation.
CHAM
 Case No. 106
Article IX Section 8: Prohibitions;Compensations; Foreign gift/office/title
NEA vs CSC
FACTS
On November 16, 1988, public respondent Civil Service Commission
passed Resolution No. 88-830 regarding the issue raised by its Provincial
Extension Office, Naga City, on whether NEA officials and employees were
allowed to collect additional compensation or allowances from private entities
such as electric cooperatives. On August 10, 1989, the General Manager of
Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. (BENECO) requested a clarification, since the
basic issue raised on whether the NEA officials and employees were allowed to
collect additional compensation or allowance from private entities such as
electric cooperatives was not squarely resolved in CSC Resolution No. 88-830.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not NEA officials and employees are allowed to collect
additional compensation or allowances from private entities such as electric
cooperatives
RULING
No. SC agrees with the CA when it affirmed public respondent's finding
that payment to NEA personnel designated to cooperatives of allowances and
other benefits on top of their regular salaries from petitioner becomes violative
of their own charter which does not provide for such payment and, thus, inimical
to the best interest of public service. It also violates the first paragraph of Section
8, Article IX-B of the Constitution.
MAIN POINT
No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive
additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by
law.
Pastor
Case No. 107
Art IX-B Sec 8: Civil Service Commission;
Doctrine of Finality
YAP vs. COA
FACTS:
in the Course of the regular audit, the Corporate Auditor, MGC issued
notices of disallowances against Mr. Ramon R. Yap which were predicated on the
ground that appellants appointment to Manila Gas Corporation in addition to his
regular position as Department Manager of National Development Company
(NDC) and the subsequent receipt of the questioned allowances and
reimbursements from the former directly contravened the proscription
contained in Section 7 (2) and Section 8, Article IX-b of the Constitution.
COA denied petitioner’s appeal and upheld the decision of Corporate
Audit Office II (CAO II) that characterized the disallowed allowances and
reimbursements as prohibited by the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion when it used
as a basis the public purpose requirement in affirming the questioned
disallowance.
RULING: No.
Any disbursement of public funds which includes payment of salaries
and benefits to government employees and officials must (a) be authorized by
law, and (b) serve a public purpose.
MAIN POINT:
It is, in fact, an oft-repeated rule that findings of administrative agencies
are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are
not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of
discretion
Pastor
Note: Case 108 and 109 are related.
Case No. 108
Art IX-B Sec 8: Civil Service Commission;
Doctrine of Finality
Sergio I. Carbonilla, et al vs. Board of Airlines
FACTS:
Petitioners Carbonilla, et al. filed an Omnibus Motion to Intervene [in the
Case No. 109] before the Court of Appeals on the ground that as customs
personnel, they would be directly affected by the outcome of the case.
Court of Appeals denied Carbonilla, et al.’s motion for intervention in its
26 February 2009 Resolution on the ground that the case was for collection of
unpaid overtime services and thus should be pursued in a separate proceeding
against the proper respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in denying
the intervention of Carbonilla, et al.
RULING: No.
Rules of Court shows the intention to give the courts the full measure of
discretion in allowing or disallowing the intervention. The permissive tenor of
the Rules of Court shows the intention to give the courts the full measure of
discretion in allowing or disallowing the intervention.
MAIN POINT:
Once the courts have exercised this discretion, it could not be reviewed
by certiorari or controlled by mandamus unless it could be shown that the
discretion was exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
Motion for intervention - A person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or
is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of
court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or
not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights
of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully
protected in a separate proceeding.”
Pastor
Case No. 109
Art IX-B Sec 8: Civil Service Commission;
Doctrine of Finality
Office of the President vs. Board of Airlines Representatives
FACTS:
The Office of the President, et al. argued that the Court of Appeals should
have denied Board of Airlines Representatives’ (BAR) petition because it had no
jurisdiction over the issues raised, involving the validity and collection of money
charges (overtime payment of BOC’s employees) authorized by Customs Law
which are under the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals.
Also, The Office of the President, et al. alleged that the Court of Appeals
should have dismissed the petition because of BAR’s failure to comply fully with
the requirements of verification and certification of non-forum shopping.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over BAR’s petition.
2. Whether or not the CA should have dismissed the petition of BAR for
failure to comply with the requirements.
RULING:
1. Yes. CA has jurisdiction based on Section 3, Rule 43 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. BAR’s petition for review to the Court of
Appeals from the decision and resolution of the Office of the
President falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
2. No. As regards the certification of non-forum shopping, this Court
may relax the rigid application of the rules to afford the parties the
opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits.
MAIN POINT:
1. Appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or
authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial functions, which includes the Office of the President, may be
taken to the Court of Appeals.
2. Cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to
argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural
imperfections should not serve as basis of decisions and should
not be used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party.
Pastor
Case No. 110
Art IX-B Sec 8: Civil Service Commission;
Doctrine of Finality
PEZA vs. COA
FACTS:
On September 13, 2007, the PEZA Auditor Corazon V. Españo issued
Notice of Disallowances on payments of per diems to ex officio members of the
PEZA Board for the period 2001-2006. She stated that the PEZA Management
continued paying per diems even after they were duly notified through said NDs
that such was in violation of the Constitution as explained in the Civil Liberties
Union case here ex officio members in several government agencies were
prohibited from receiving additional compensation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PEZA have legal basis in granting per diems to the ex
officio members of its Board.
RULING: No.
The lack of legal basis to grant per diems to ex officio members of the
PEZA Board, including their representatives, has already been settled by no less
than the Court En Banc in the case of Bitonio, Jr., that the grant of per diems to
PEZA Board members as it was in conflict with the proscription laid down in the
1987 Constitution.
MAIN POINT:
Findings of administrative agencies, such as COA, are accorded not only
respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with
unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion
Pastor
Case No. 111
Art IX-B Sec 8: Civil Service Commission;
Doctrine of Finality
Dimagiba vs. Espartero
FACTS:
Ombudsman found respondents guilty of the charges (Gross Neglect of
Duty, Oppression, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service, Inefficiency
and Incompetence, and Violation of Section 5 (a), Republic Act No. 6713) filed
against them and imposed upon them the penalty of dismissal from the service.
Court of Appeals, however, reversed the decision of the Ombudsman.
Petitioners contended that the CA erred in acting on the petition which
was filed beyond the 10-day reglementary period for filing the same as provided
under Section 27 of RA 6770.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the honorable court of appeals erred when it gave due
course to respondents’ petition for review despite being filed beyond the
reglementary period of ten (10) days set by section 27 of republic act 6770.
RULING: No.
If only to assure the judicial mind that no injustice is allowed to take
place due to a blind adherence to rules of procedure, the dismissal on technicality
of respondents’ petition, which is aimed at establishing not just their innocence
but the truth, cannot stand.
MAIN POINT:
Dismissal of appeals on purely technical ground is frowned upon
especially if it will result to unfairness as in this case. Reasons or justifications to
resist the strict adherence to procedure, to wit:
(1) matters of life, liberty, honor and property;
(2) counsel’s negligence without the participatory negligence on the part
of the client;
(3) the existence of special or compelling circumstances;
(4) the merits of the case;
(5) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules; (6) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and
(7) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

AIMAR
CASE NO. 112
ART IX-C (COE) SEC 1: COMPOSITION; QUALIFICATION;TERM
QUALIICATION
Cayetano vs. Monsod
FACTS: Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Under his resume, he has
been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished
himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent does not possess the required
qualification.
RULING: NO. Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a
lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than
satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman.
MAIN POINT: Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience.
AIMAR
CASE NO. 113
ART IX-C (COE) SEC 1: COMPOSITION; QUALIFICATION;TERM
INDEPENDENCE
Brillantes vs. Yorac
FACTS: Hilario Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact-finding
commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d' etat attempt, has to vacate
his chairmanship over the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) . Haydee Yorac,
an associate commissioner in the COMELEC, was appointed by then President
Corazon Aquino as a temporary substitute, in short, she was appointed in an
acting capacity. Sixto Brillantes, Jr. then questioned such appointment urging that
under Art 10-C of the Constitution “in no case shall any member of the COMELEC
be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity”.
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation made by the president was
unconstitutional.
RULING: YES. The Supreme Court ruled that although all constitutional
commissions are essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control
of the president in the discharge of their functions. The choice of a temporary
Chairman is an internal matter which comes under the discretion of the
Commission as a body and that such discretion cannot be exercised for the
Commission by anybody else. This is to guarantee constitutional independence.
MAIN POINT: It is expressly in sec 1 (2) that no member can be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity. Which is a safeguard insuring the
independence of the Commissions
AIMAR
CASE NO. 114
ART IX-C (COE) SEC 1: COMPOSITION; QUALIFICATION;TERM
INDEPENDENCE
Matibag vs. Benipayo
FACTS: Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the Comelec’sEID by then
Comelec Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity. Benipayo was
appointed Comelec Chairman in an ad interim appointment, and in his capacity
as Chairman issued a Memorandum address transferring petitioner to the Law
Department. Petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the appointment
and the right to remain in office of Benipayo as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointment of Benipayo violates the
constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo on the basis of the
ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary
appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
RULING: NO. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it
takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once
the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character.
MAIN POINT: While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC “shall be
independent,” this provision should be harmonized with the President’s power
to extend ad interim appointments.

AIMAR
CASE NO. 115
ART IX-C (COE) SEC 1: COMPOSITION; QUALIFICATION;TERM
QUALIICATION
Hayudini vs. COMELEC
FACTS: Hayudini filed his Certifcate of Candidacy for the position of Municipal
Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi. Omar filed a petition to Cancel Hayudini’s CoC,
he asserted that Hayudini should be disqualified for making false representation
when Hayudini declared in his CoC that he is a resident of the Municipality of
South Ubian when, in fact, he resides in Zamboanga City, but COMELEC 1st
Division dismissed the case for lack of substantial evidence. When the RTC
decided in favor of Omar, Omar filed again before the COMELEC by Virtue of a
Supervening Event. Hayudini however, won the mayoralty race. Later on, the
COMELEC’s 2nd Division issued a resolution granting Omar’s second petition,
thus, Hayudini filed a Motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc,
arguing that its Second Division committed grave error when it gave due course
to a slowly filed petition and treated TC Decision as a supervening event. The
COMELEC En Banc denied Hayudini’s Motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit. But the COMELEC later on declared Omar as mayor.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in its
decision and proclaiming Omar as mayor.
RULING: NO. Generally the statutes providing for election contests are to be
freely interpreted in order that the will of the people in the choice of public
officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections. It is imperative that
his claim be immediately cleared, not only for the benefit of the winner but for
the sake of public interest, which can only be achieved by brushing aside
technicalities of procedure that protract and delay the trial of
MAIN POINT: In exercising its powers and jurisdiction, as defined by its mandate
to protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC must not be hindered by
procedural rules in resolving election disputes.
AIMAR
CASE NO. 116
ART IX-C (COE) SEC 1: COMPOSITION; QUALIFICATION;TERM
TERM
Naval vs. COMELEC
FACTS: From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Naval had been elected and had
served as a member of the Sanggunian, Second District, Province of Camarines
Sur. On October 12, 2009, the President approved Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9716,
which reapportioned the legislative districts in Camarines Sur leaving the 2nd
District two towns, Gainza and Milaor, merged with five towns from the old First
District. In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the members of
the Sanggunian, Third District. In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anew and was re-
elected. Julia a candidate in the 2013 elections filed before the COMELEC a
Verified Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel COC of Naval because he had
fully served for three consecutive and allowing Naval to run as a Sanggunian
member for the fourth time is violative of the inflexible three-term limit rule
enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC, which must be strictly construed.
COMELEC cancelled Naval's COC. Hence the petition, he contends that the 3 rd
District is a new constituent, consisting of new voters, residents and jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not Naval has the right to be elected as a member a
Sandiganbayan.
RULING: NO. The conditions for the application of the three-term limit rule are
present in the instant case as the records clearly establish that Naval is running
for the 4th time for the same government post. Under RA no. 9176 the Third
District is just renamed, and not a new set of constituents.
MAIN POINT: Provincial board member’s election to the same position for the
third and fourth time, but now in representation of the renamed district, is a
violation of the three-term limit rule.
Macy
CASE NO. 117
ART IX-C SEC I: Composition:Qualification:Term
Timbol v. COMELEC
FACTS: Timbol was declared a nuisance candidate and ordering the removal of
his name from the certified list of candidates for the position of Member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan City. He received a Subpoena from
COMELEC Election Officer Valencia, together with his counsel, to appear During
the clarificatory hearing, Timbol argued that he was not a nuisance candidate.
Election Officer Valencia recommended that Timbol's Certificate of Candidacy be
given due course. Despite favorable recommendation, Timbol's name was not
removed from the list of nuisance candidates posted in the COMELEC's website.
With the printing of ballots for the automated elections Timbol filed a Petition
praying that his name be included in the certified list of candidates. Comelec
denied the petition for being moot, considering that the printing of ballots had
already begun.
ISSUE: WON COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner
Timbol’s Petition for inclusion in the certified list of candidates.
RULING: Yes. Respondent declared petitioner a nuisance candidate without
giving him a chance to explain his bona fide intention to run for office, when
petitioner appeared in a clarificatory hearing, it was an ineffective opportunity to
be heard. First, he would not have to file the Petition had been given an
opportunity to be heard in the first place. Second, in the Minute Resolution,
respondent denied petitioner's Petition on the sole ground that the printing of
ballots had already begun
"to ensure that the electoral process is clean, honest, orderly, and peaceful" the
right to be heard of a candidate to explain his or her bona fide intention to run for
public office before he or she is declared a nuisance candidate.
MAIN POINT: The power of the COMELEC to restrict a citizen's right of suffrage
should not be arbitrarily exercised. The COMELEC cannot motu proprio deny due
course to or cancel an alleged nuisance candidate's certificate of candidacy
without providing the candidate his opportunity to be heard.
Macy
CASE NO. 118
ART IX-C SEC I: Composition:Qualification:Term
Jalover v. Osmena
FACTS: Osmeña filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of mayor,
Toledo City, Cebu. Soon thereafter, the petitioners filed before the COMELEC a
"Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to
Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification,"
because he allegedly failed to comply with the residency requirement. In support
of his allegations, Osmeña submitted pieces of evidence such as a certification
from the HOR that Osmeña was the duly elected representative of the 3rd District
of Cebu, Tax Declarations, Absolute Sale concerning the Ibo, Toledo City property,
photographs of the exterior and interior of the Ibo, Toledo City property, several
affidavits attesting to the fact that Osmeña resides and has profound socio-civic
and political linkages in Toledo City and many more.
ISSUE: WON COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction
RULING: No. petitioners have not presented a convincing case sufficient to show
that the COMELEC committed an error of jurisdiction in upholding the residency
of Osmena and the validity of his representation on this point in his COC.
Osmeña’s actual physical presence in Toledo City is established not only by the
presence of a place (Ibo, Toledo City, house and lot) he can actually live in, but
also the affidavits of various persons in Toledo City. Osmeña’s substantial and
real interest in establishing his domicile of choice in Toledo City is also
sufficiently shown not only by the acquisition of additional property in the area
and the transfer of his voter registration and headquarters, but also his
participation in the community’s socio-civic and political activities.
MAIN POINT: The minimum requirement under our Constitution and election
laws for the candidates' residency in the political unit they seek to represent
carries with it a very specific purpose: to prevent "stranger[s] or newcomer[s]
unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community" from seeking
elective offices in that community
Macy
CASE NO. 119
ART IX-C SEC II: Powers and Functions
Administrative Power
Alfiado v. COMELEC
FACTS: Joel Miranda became the substitute candidate for his father, Jose "Pempe"
Miranda, for the position of Mayor. When the ballots were counted, Joel emerged
as the winner over his opponent Antonio Abaya and he was later proclaimed.
Amelita S. Navarro also won and was proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Santiago
City. Abaya filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void Substitution which was later
amended. The amended petition sought the declaration of the certificate of
candidacy of Jose Miranda, the father of Joel, as null and void. The amended
petition’s decision ruled that since the certificate of candidacy of Jose Miranda
was not valid, he could not be validly substituted by his son, Joel Miranda, as a
mayoralty candidate in Santiago City. Hence, Vice-Mayor Amelita S. Navarro thus
became the new Mayor of Santiago City by virtue of the law on succession, but
she was brought forth the loss of confidence in her capacity and fitness to
discharge the duties and to perform the functions of her public office
ISSUE: WON an elective official who became City Mayor by legal succession can
be the subject of a recall election by virtue of a Preparatory Recall Assembly
Resolution which was passed or adopted when the said elective official was still
The Vice-Mayor
RULING: No, it is already moot and academic. The assumption by legal succession
of the petitioner as the new Mayor of Santiago City is a supervening event which
rendered the recall proceeding against her moot and academic.
A scrutiny of the said Resolution reveals that the person subject of the recall
process is a specific elective official in relation to her specific office. The said
resolution is supplied with statements, which leave no doubt that the purpose of
the assembly was to recall petitioner as Vice Mayor for her official acts as Vice
Mayor. The intent of the PRA as expressed in the said Resolution is to
remove the petitioner as Vice Mayor for they already lost their confidence
in her by reason of her official acts. To recall, then, the petitioner when she’s
already the incumbent City Mayor is to deviate from the expressed will of the
PRA.
MAIN POINT: The specific purpose of the preparatory recall assembly was to
revive the vice-mayor. However, the resolution does not apply to the vice-mayor
anymore, since she gave up the office of vice-mayor when she assumed the
position of mayor.
Macy
CASE NO. 120
ART IX-C SEC II: Powers and Functions
Administrative Power
Columbres v. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner Rolando Columbres and private respondent de Guzman, Jr.
were candidates for the position of Mayor of San Jacinto, Pangasinan. The
Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed De Guzman the winner. Petitioner
filed an election protest with the RTC contesting the 42 precincts and prayed for
the revision of ballots in the said precincts. Petitioner alleges that there were 124
ballots which were written by two (2) persons, and they should all be annulled.
Instead, the Commission (2nd division) annulled only 13 ballots while validating
111 ballots in favor of respondent Hilario de Guzman, Jr. Movant contends that
the 13 ballots commonly invalidated by both the COMELEC (Second Division) and
the trial court as having been written by two persons were no different from the
111 ballots validated by the Commission (Second Division) but invalidated by the
trial court.
ISSUE: WON the findings of fact of the COMELEC Division (especially in matters
of appreciation of ballots) is absolute and cannot be the subject to a Motion for
Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc;
RULING: No. The grounds of motion for reconsideration should consist of
insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision, order or ruling; or that the said
decision, order or ruling is contrary to law. Nowhere in the provision can finding
of fact be the subject of motion for reconsideration. The finding by the
Commission (Second Division) that the 111 questioned ballots were written by
the same person is a finding of fact that may not be the subject of a motion for
reconsideration. Movant protestant-appellee is not challenging the sufficiency of
the evidence in this instance but the appreciation by the Commission
MAIN POINT: To determine the winning candidate, the application of election
law and jurisprudence in appreciating the contested ballots, is essential. Any
question on the appreciation of the ballots would directly affect the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting the declared winner. Any question on the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting the assailed decision, order or ruling of a COMELEC
Division is also a proper subject of a motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC en banc. The legal presumption in validating ballots is that the sanctity
of the ballot has been protected and preserved. A ballot appearing to have been
written by two persons is presumed to have been cast "as is" during the voting,
and this presumption can only be overcome by showing that the ballot was
tampered with after it was deposited in the ballot box.
Macy
CASE NO. 121
ART IX-C SEC II: Powers and Functions
Administrative Power
Sahali v. COMELEC
FACTS: During the 2010 elections, Sahali and Matba were two of the four
candidates who ran for the position of governor in the Province of Tawi-Tawi
while Ruby and Usman ran for the position of Vice-Governor, The Provincial
Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioners Sadikul and Ruby as the duly elected
governor and vice-governor respectively. Matba and Usman filed a Manifestation
and Ex-Parte Motion requesting that they be allowed to secure photocopies of the
contested ballots. Further, they moved for a technical examination and the Book
of voters by comparing signatures and thumbmarks. Sadikul and Ruby jointly
filed the COMELEC 1st division a strong manifestation of grave concern and
motion for reconsideration. The COMELEC first division issued the assailed order
which denied the said motion for reconsideration filed by Sadikul and Ruby. They
filed instant petition asserting that the COMELEC first division committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: WON Sadikul and Ruby were denied due process when COMELEC granted
the motion for technical examination to Matba and Usman without giving them
opportunity to oppose the motion?
RULING: No. COMELEC in election disputes, is not duty-bound to notify and
direct a party to file an opposition to a Motion filed by the other party. It is
incumbent upon the party concerned, if he or she deems it necessary, to file an
opposition to a Motion within five days from receipt of a copy of the same without
waiting for the COMELEC’s directive to do so.
Further, this Court cannot see how due process was denied to the petitioners in
the issuance of the COMELEC First Division’s Order. The petitioners were able to
present their opposition to the said motion for technical examination in their
manifestation and motion for reconsideration which they filed with the
COMELEC First Division. Indeed, the petitioners’ objections to the technical
examination of the said election paraphernalia were exhaustively discussed by
the COMELEC First Division in its May 3, 2012 Resolution. Having filed a motion
for reconsideration of the COMELEC First Division Order, the petitioners’ claim
of denial of due process is clearly unfounded.
MAIN POINT: An election contest, unlike an ordinary civil action, is clothed with
a public interest. The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the
candidate proclaimed by the board of canvassers is the lawful choice of the
people.
Who digested: French
CASE NO. 122
ART IX SEC 2 COMMISSION ON ELECTION
ADMINISTRATIVE POWER
Claudio vs Comelec
Facts: Jovito O. Claudio, was the duly elected mayor of Pasay City who
assumed his office on July 1, 1998. On May 29, 1999, PRA adopted a
resolution entitled RESOLUTION TO INITIATE THE RECALL OF JOVITO O.
CLAUDIO AS MAYOR OF PASAY CITY FOR LOSS OF CONFIDENCE and made a
formal submission to the Office of the Election Officer on July 2, 1999 of the
petition for recall. Claudio contend that the convening of the PRA took place
within the one-year prohibited period which is violative of Sec 74 of the
Local Government Code (LCG) which provides: xxxx (b) No recall shall take
place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office
or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.
Issue: Whether the exercise of the power of recall was prohibitive of the
rule on the limitations on recall.
Ruling: No. The SC ruled that "recall" refers to the election itself by means
of which voters decide whether they should retain their local official or
elect his replacement. Thus, there may be several PRAs held or petitions for
recall filed with the COMELEC - there is no legal limit on the number of times
such processes may be resorted to. These are merely preliminary steps for
the purpose of initiating a recall.
Main point: The limitations in 74 apply only to the exercise of the power of
recall which is vested in the registered voters. It is this - and not merely, the
preliminary steps required to be taken to initiate a recall - which paragraph
(b) of 74 seeks to limit by providing that no recall shall take place within
one year from the date of assumption of office of an elective local official.
Who digested: FRENCH
CASE NO. 123
ART IX-C SEC 2. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE POWER
De Guzman v Comelec
FACTS: Petitioner is assailed the validity of Sec 44(4) of RA 8189 or the
voters registration act of 1996 for it undermines the constitutional
independence of the COMELEC and their authority to name, designate and
appoint and then reassign and transfer its very own officials and
employees.
ISSUE: W/N Sec 44 of RA 8189 is valid and constitutional?
RULING: YES. As stressed by the Sol Gen, sec 44 establishes a guideline for
the comelec to follow. Said section provides the criterion or basis for the
arraignment or transfer of an election officer and does not deprive the
COMELEC of its power to appoint and maintain its authority over its officials
and employees.
MAIN POINT: It is the power of the COMELEC to reassign and transfer its
officials and employees, but still bound to comply with the laws passed by
Congress.
Who digested: FRENCH
CASE NO. 124
ART IX-C SEC 2. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE POWER
Social Weather Station v COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner et.al wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the
period of the elections and release to the media the results of such survey
as well as publish them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction of the
publication of election survey by the COMELEC constitutes a prior restraint
on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger
to justify such restraint.
ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls
and exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media
constitutional?
RULING: NO. The Court held that Sec. 5(4) is unconstitutional because it
imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, a direct and total
suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is
only for a limited period, and the governmental interest sought to be
promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of
expression.
MAIN POINT: It is not an exercise by the COMELEC of its adjudicatory power
to settle the claims of parties.
Who digested: FRENCH
CASE NO. 125
ART IX-C SEC 2 COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE POWER
Information Technology Foundation v COMELEC
FACTS: The COMELEC awarded the Contract for the automation of the
counting and canvassing of the ballots in the 2004 elections to Mega Pacific
Consortium, an entity that had not participated in the bidding and the poll
body signed the actual automation contract with MP eSolutions, Inc., a
bidder but had not met eligibility requirements which the Petitioners
sought to declare null and void the aforementioned resolution of the
COMELEC.
ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion?
RULING: YES. The Court declared the assailed Resolution No. 6074 and
subject Contract void for illegal, imprudent and hasty actions of the
Commission have not desecrated legal and jurisprudential norms, but have
also cast serious doubt upon the poll body’s ability and capacity to conduct
automated elections.
MAIN POINT: The COMELEC placed the pith and soul of democracy which is
a credible, orderly, and peaceful elections in jeopardy by the illegal and
gravely abusive acts of the respondents.
Who digested: FRENCH
CASE NO. 126
ART IX-C SEC 2. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE POWER
Buac v COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner is assailing the COMELEC’s resolution which is the
regularization of the conduct of the conversion of the municipality of
Taguig into a highly urbanized city in the plebiscite conducted for the
purpose stating that it has no jurisdiction over plebiscite controversies.
COMELEC contends that the rules and regulations it has only covers election
protests. The quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the commission extends those
enumerated in Sec 2(2) of Art 9-C.
ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction over controversies involving the
conduct of plebiscite and the annulment of its result
RULING: YES. The COMELEC has jurisdiction over controversies involving
the conduct of plebiscites and not of regular courts. The case at bar does not
fit the kind of a case calling for the exercise of judicial power and does not
involve the violation of any legally demandable right and its enforcement.
MAIN POINT: There is no plaintiff or defendant for it merely involves the
ascertainment of the vote of the electorate of Taguig whether they approve
or disapprove the conversion.
Art 9-C Sec 2(2) “COMELEC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction
over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by the trial
courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction”
PEREZ, E.C.
CASE NO. 127
ART IX-C (COMELEC) SEC 2: POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
PAR.1: ADMINISTRATIVE POWER
Capalla v. Comelec
FACTS: The Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM entered into a Contract for the
Provision of an Automated Election System for the May 10, 2010 Synchronized
National and Local Elections (AES Contract) which is a Contract of Lease with
Option to Purchase (OTP) the goods listed therein consisting of the Precinct
Count Optical Scan (PCOS), both software and hardware. COMELEC issued a
Resolution resolving to accept Smartmatic-TIM’s offer to extend the period to
exercise the OTP. The agreement on the Extension of the OTP under the AES
Contract (Extension Agreement) was eventually signed. Finally, respondent
COMELEC issued a Resolution resolving to approve the Deed of Sale with
Smartmatic-TIM to purchase the latter’s PCOS machines to be used in the
upcoming 2013 elections. The Deed of Sale was forthwith executed. Petitioners
claim that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in contracting for the purchase of AES goods and services
from Smartmatic-TIM in spite of the below par performance of the latter’s PCOS
machines, CCS and other software and hardware in the May 2010 elections and
non-compliance with the minimum functional capabilities required by law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of sale entered into by the COMELEC was
constitutional.
RULING: Yes. As the Comelec is confronted with time and budget
constraints, and in view of the Comelecs mandate to ensure free, honest,
and credible elections, the acceptance of the extension of the option period,
the exercise of the option, and the execution of the Deed of Sale, are the
more prudent choices available to the Comelec for a successful 2013
automated elections. The alleged defects in the subject goods have been
determined and may be corrected as in fact fixes and enhancements had been
undertaken by Smartmatic-TIM. Petitioners could not even give a plausible
alternative to ensure the conduct of a successful 2013 automated elections, in the
event that the Court nullifies the Deed of Sale.
MAIN POINT IN BOLD.
PEREZ, E.C.
CASE NO. 128
ART IX-C (COMELEC) SEC 2: POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
PAR.2: ELECTION CONTESTS
Flores v. Comelec
FACTS: Facts: Petitioner Roque Flores was declared by the board of canvassers
as having the highest number of votes for kagawad in Barangay Poblacion, Abra,
and thus proclaimed punong barangay in accordance with Section 5 of R.A. 6679.
However, his election was protested by private respondent Rapisora, who placed
second. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum sustained Rapisora and
installed him as punong barangay in place of the petitioner. Flores appealed to
the RTC, which affirmed the challenged decision in totality. The petitioner went
to the COMELEC, which dismissed his appeal on the ground that it had no power
to review the decision of the RTC, based on Section 9 of R.A. 6679, that decisions
of the RTC in a protest appealed to it from the municipal trial court in barangay
elections “on questions of fact shall be final and non-appealable”. In his petition
for certiorari, the COMELEC is faulted for not taking cognizance of the petitioners
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679 is valid insofar as it makes
decisions of a municipal or metropolitan court in a barangay election appealable
to the trial court.
HELD: No, the decision rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, should
have been appealed directly to the COMELEC and not to the RTC. Accordingly,
Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679, insofar as it provides that the decision of the
municipal or metropolitan court in a barangay election case should be appealed
to the RTC, must be declared unconstitutional. Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the
Constitution, providing that the COMELEC shall “Exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications
of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction
over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of
general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial
courts of limited jurisdiction”. Municipal or Metropolitan Courts being courts
of limited jurisdiction, their decisions in barangay election contests are
subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC under the
afore-quoted section.
MAIN POINT IN BOLD.
PEREZ, E.C.
CASE NO. 129
ART IX-C (COMELEC) SEC 2: POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
PAR.2: ELECTION CONTESTS
Galido v. Comelec
FACTS: Petitioner Galido and private respondent Galeon were candidates during
the local elections for mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol. Petitioner was
proclaimed the duly-elected Mayor. Private respondent filed an election protest
before the RTC. After hearing, the said court upheld the proclamation of
petitioner. Private respondent appealed the RTC decision to the COMELEC. Its
First Division reversed the RTC decision and declared private respondent the
duly-elected mayor. After the COMELEC en banc denied the petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration and affirmed the decision of its First Division. Undaunted by
his previous failed actions, the petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari
and injunction before the Supreme Court and succeeded in getting a temporary
restraining order. In his comment to the petition, private respondent moved for
dismissal, citing Article IX (C), Section 2(2), paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution,
that “Final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in election contests
involving elective municipal offices are final and executory, and not appealable.
ISSUE: Whether or not a COMELEC decision may, if it sets aside the trial court’s
decision involving marked ballots, be brought to the Supreme Court by a petition
for certiorari by the aggrieved party.
RULING: Yes. The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the COMELEC
in contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices are final,
executory and not appealable, does not preclude a recourse to the Court by
way of a special civil action of certiorari. The court however believes that the
respondent COMELEC has not committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering the questioned decision. The COMELEC
has the inherent power to decide an election contest on physical evidence, equity,
law and justice, and apply established jurisprudence, in support of its findings
and conclusions; and that the extent to which such precedents apply rests on its
discretion, the exercise of which should not be controlled unless such discretion
has been abused to the prejudice of either party. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is
DIMISSSED.
MAIN POINT IN BOLD.
PEREZ, E.C.
CASE NO. 130
ART IX-C (COMELEC) SEC 2: POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
PAR.2: ELECTION CONTESTS
Mercado v. BES
FACTS: Petitioner Jose M. Mercado was proclaimed winner in the election for
chairman of the SK of Barangay Mabalor, Ibaan, Batangas over his rival, private
respondent Crisanto P. Pangilinan. Immediately after proclamation as the winner
by the BET (Board of Election Tellers), Pangilinan filed a formal protest with the
BES (Board of Election Supervisors) questioning the results of the election. The
BES ordered the reopening of the ballot box and the recount of the votes for SK
Chairman. The recount reversed in favor of Pangilinan. Petitioner questions the
constitutionality of Section 24, Resolution No. 2499 of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) creating, for purposes of the elections in the Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK), the BES and making it the final arbiter of all election protests.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 24 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2499 contravene Par.
2, Sec. 2 of Art. IX-C insofar as it mandates that the COMELEC shall have the
power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.
RULING: No. Sec. 24 of COMELEC Resolution 2499 placed the SK elections under
the direct control of the DILG (Department of Interior and Local Government).
Elections for SK officers are not subject to the supervision of the COMELEC
in the same way that contests involving elections of SK officials do not fall
within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
MAIN POINT IN BOLD.
PEREZ, E.C.
CASE NO. 131
ART IX-C (COMELEC) SEC 2: POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
PAR.2: ELECTION CONTESTS
Relampagos v. Cumba
FACTS: Petitioner Relampagos and private respondent Cumba were candidates
for Mayor of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. Cumba was proclaimed the winning
candidate. Unwilling to accept defeat, the petitioner filed an election protest with
the RTC which found the petitioner to have won with a margin of six votes over
the private respondent and rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. Private
respondent then appealed the decision to the COMELEC. The petitioner filed with
the trial court a motion for execution pending appeal, which the trial court
granted. The private respondent then filed with the respondent COMELEC a
petition for certiorari to annul the aforesaid order of the trial court granting the
motion for execution pending appeal and the writ of execution. The COMELEC
granted the petition ordering Cumba as restored to her position as Municipality
Mayor, upholding its exclusive authority to decide petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus where the COMELEC maintains that there is a special
law granting it such jurisdiction Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697, which remains in full
force as it was not expressly repealed by the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg.
881).
ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction
over petitions for, certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in election cases where
it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction.
RULING: Yes. The Court holds that the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg.
697 providing as follows: “The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive
authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
involving election cases” remains in full force and effect but only in such cases
where, under paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Simply put, the COMELEC has the authority to
issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
MAIN POINT: Since the COMELEC, in discharging its appellate jurisdiction
pursuant to Sec. 2 (2), Art. IX-C, acts as a court of justice performing judicial
power and said power includes the determination of whether or not there has
been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, it
necessarily follows that the COMELEC, by constitutional mandate, is vested with
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
AR
CASE NO. 132
ART IX-C (COMELEC) SEC 2: POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
ELECTION CONTESTS
People v. Delgado
FACTS: The authority of the RTC to review actions of the COMELEC in the
investigation and prosecution of election offenses filed in said court is being
questioned. Atty. Quilatan, Election Registrar, filed a complaint to COMELEC
against Hon. Delgado, RTC presiding Judge, and other private respondents, for
alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code [Sec 261 (2) makes any false or untruthful
statements in application for registration of voters, and (5) registers anew without application for cancellation of previous
registration]. The
Regional Election Director of R VII was designated by the COMELEC
to handle the prosecution, who eventually recommended the filing of information
against each private respondent. COMELEC en banc resolved it against the
respondents.
Private respondents assailed that no preliminary investigation was conducted.
Respondent court issued an order directing COMELEC to conduct reinvestigation
of said cases. COMELEC prosecutor opposed the order alleging that only the
Supreme Court may review the decisions, orders, rulings and resolutions of the
COMELEC. This was denied by the court. contending that since the cases were
filed in court by the COMELEC as a public prosecutor, and not in the exercise of
its power to decide election contests, the trial court has authority to order a
reinvestigation.
ISSUE: W/N in as much as the COMELEC is an independent constitutional body,
its actions on election matters may be reviewed only on certiorari by the SC.
RULING: NO! The refusal of COMELEC to comply is untenable. True that the
decisions of the COMELEC on election contests or administrative questions
brought before it are subject to judicial review only by SC. However, aside from
the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC to decide election
contests and administrative questions, it is also vested the power of a public
prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary
investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the
Code before the competent court.
MAIN POINT: When the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer,
conducts the preliminary investigation of an election offense and upon a prima
facie finding of a probable cause, files the information in the proper court, said
court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all the
subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the
court. The COMELEC cannot conduct a reinvestigation of the case without the
authority of the court or unless so ordered by the court.
AR
CASE NO. 133
ART IX-C (COMELEC) SEC 2: POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
ELECTION CONTESTS
Garces v. CA
FACTS: Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac, ZDN. She was to
replace respondent Election Registrar Concepcion who was transferred to Liloy,
ZDN. Concepcion refused to transfer post as he did not request for it. Garces was
prevented from assuming office by the order of the Provincial Election
Supervisor. Meanwhile, since Concepcion continued occupying the Gutalac office,
the COMELEC en banc cancelled his appointment to Liloy.
Garces filed before the RTC a petition of mandamus. Meanwhile, COMELEC en
banc issued a resolution recognizing Concepcion as Election Registrar of Gutalac,
and at the same time, cancelling the appointment of Garces. CA affirmed the RTC’s
dismissal of the case. Respondent questioned jurisdiction of RTC contending that
the COMELEC resolution should be raised only on certiorari before the Supreme
Court, and not before the RTC, else the latter court becomes a reviewer of an en
banc COMELEC resolution contrary to Sec. 7, Art. IX-A.
ISSUE: W/N the case is cognizable by the SC.
RULING: NO! Sec 7 Art IX-A which states that any decision or ruling of the
commission may be brought to the SC on certiorari is NOT applicable as there
was no case or matter filed before the COMELEC. The decisions, rulings, and
orders pertain to the COMELEC’s exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers involving elective official. In the case at bar, what is being assailed is the
COMELEC's choice of an appointee to occupy the Gutalac Post which is an
administrative duty done for the operational set-up of an agency. The
controversy involves an appointive, not an elective, official. Hence, the case is
cognizable by the RTC.
MAIN POINT: In the exercise of its functions over Election Contests, the
decisions, rulings and orders of the COMELEC must pertain only in its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers involving elective official, NOT
appointive official.
AR
CASE NO. 134
ART IX-C (COMELEC) SEC 2: POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
ELECTION CONTESTS
Zarate v. COMELEC and Lallave
FACTS: This is a case of certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion to
COMELEC for annulling the decision of MTC and declaring respondent Lallave as
SK Chairman of Brgy. Ican, Pangasinan.
Petitioner Zarate lost to Lallave in the 1996 SK Elections of Brgy Ican, Malasiqui,
Pangasinan. Zarate garnered 45 votes as against to Lallave who got 46 votes.
Zarate then filed an election protest before the Municipal Trial Court stating that
three or more votes that read “JL” should not have been credited in favor of
Lallave and must be considered as stray votes. The MTC rendered its decision in
favor of petitioner Zarate, declaring 8 of the original 46 votes invalid.
Lallave appealed to the Commission on Elections theorizing that the votes
reading “JL” should be credited in his favor considering that such initials
sufficiently identify him as the candidate. The appeal by Lallave was not referred
to a division of the Commission but was, instead, submitted to COMELEC en banc.
The COMELEC en banc annulled the decision of the Municipal Trial Court and
declared Lallave as the elected SK chairman.
ISSUE: W/N COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion for
rendering a decision even if the election case was not heard and decided by a
division.
RULING: YES! Election cases include pre-proclamation controversies, and all
such cases must first be heard and decided by a Division of the Commission. The
Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority to hear and decide the
same at the first instance. The Court ruled that COMELEC en banc transgressed
the requirement that all election cases shall be heard and decided in division,
provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc. The Court ordered COMELEC to assign the case to a Division
to resolve the same.
MAIN POINT: Election cases must first be heard and decided by a division of
the Commission on Elections—the Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the
authority to hear and decide the same at the first instance.
AR
CASE NO. 135
ART IX-C (COMELEC) SEC 2: POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
ELECTION CONTESTS
Regalado v. CA
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari on the decision of CA affirming
the ruling of RTC which found petitioner Regalado guilty of violating Section
261(h)Prohibition on transfer of officers and employees in the civil service of the Omnibus Election Code.
Barba was appointed nursing attendant in the Rural Health Office of Tanjay,
Negros Oriental by then OIC Mayor Rodolfo Navarro. As Navarro decided to run
for mayor, petitioner Regalado was appointed substitute OIC Mayor. While sitting
as OIC Mayor, he issued a memorandum to Barba transferring her work
assignment to a remote barangay without prior approval from COMELEC. She
then filed a complaint against petitioner for violation of the Omnibus Election
Code. The RTC rendered a decision against the petitioner. CA affirmed the
decision.
ISSUE: W/N the lower courts erred in their decision against petitioner for
violation of the requirement under Omnibus Code that there should be no
movement of personnel during elections, without prior approval of COMELEC.
RULING: NO! The Court ruled that petitioner violated the Omnibus Election Code,
and that his justification of that the appointment is in the exigency of public
service, is not tenable. Still, the petitioner should have acquired prior approval
from COMELEC before the transfer of the personnel.
MAIN POINT: Appointing authorities can transfer or detail personnel as the
exigencies of public service require. However, during election period, as such
personnel movement could be used for electioneering or even to harass
subordinates who are of different political persuasion, such is prohibited unless
approved by the COMELEC.
AR
CASE NO. 136
ART IX-C (COMELEC) SEC 2: POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
ELECTION CONTESTS
Faelnar v. People
FACTS: Petitioner Faelnar filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of Brgy.
Chairman of Brgy. Guadalupe, Cebu City in the 1997 barangay elections. A
basketball tournament, dubbed the "2nd JING-JING FAELNAR'S CUP," opened at
the Guadalupe Sports Complex. This gave rise to a complaint for electioneering
filed against petitioner by Antonio Luy. Complainant alleged that the basketball
tournament was actually a campaign gimmick staged outside the campaign
period in violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The complaint was investigated
by Atty. Edwin Cadungog, election officer of Cebu City, who later recommended
the dismissal of the charges against petitioner. On the other hand, the Law
Department of the COMELEC recommended the filing of a case against petitioner,
which was later dismissed by the COMELEC en banc. However, on motion of Luy,
the COMELEC reconsidered its action and ordered the filing of the necessary
Information against petitioner. They were formally charged in the RTC.
Petitioner moved to quash the information contending that the first resolution
which dismissed the complaint against him, was immediately executory and
could no longer be reconsidered. He avers that the MR is a prohibited pleading
since the resolution in question was immediately final and executory, hence, no
longer within the power of the COMELEC to reconsider.
ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC’s first resolution dismissing the case against
petitioner is final and executory and cannot be reconsidered.
RULING: NO! The Court ruled that under the 1993 Rules of Procedure (which
amended 1988’s), motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution or
decision is not allowed (except for election offenses). In the case at bar, what is
involved is a resolution of the COMELEC en banc in an election offense. Therefore,
the COMELEC may reconsider the case against the petitioner.
MAIN POINT: The COMELEC has the power and functions over Election Contests.
Under the 1993 Rules of Procedure, pleadings are allowed for cases decided by
COMELEC en banc, only if it involves an election offense.
WEE
CASE N0. 137
ART IX-C, SEC 2: POWERS AND FUNCTION;
(2) ELECTION CONTESTS
Tan v. COMELEC
FACTS: In GR No. 148575-76, petitioners filed with the COMELEC petition to
declare failure of elections, one after another. However, private respondents
were already proclaimed as the winning candidates. The petitioners therein filed
their Amended Petitions impleading for the first time the winning candidates.
Respondents filed their respective answers to the petitions questioning in the
main the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to act on the said amended petitions. The
COMELEC issued an order declaring that it had jurisdiction over the amended
petitions conformably with Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166; and denying the
omnibus motion of the respondents.
In GR No. 152882-83, private respondents are now herein petitioners, filed with
the Court a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction, praying for the nullification of the public respondents
Orders. Petitioners have already assumed and are already exercising their duties
and functions as elective provincial officials. Hence, the remedy of the losing
candidates is an election protest.
ISSUE: Whether or the COMELEC En Banc, now public respondent, is vested with
jurisdiction to take cognizance of and resolve the amended petitions before it?
RULING: YES. The amended petitions filed by the respondents herein are
election protest cases over which the public respondent has original exclusive
jurisdiction under Section 2(2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. The public
respondent assumed jurisdiction over the amended petitions in the exercise of
its quasi-judicial powers. In resolving the amended petitions, the public
respondent will have to rule on the validity of the proclamation of the petitioners
and their right to hold office and perform the duties appurtenant thereto. The
alleged fraud and irregularities, granting arguendo that they indeed marred the
elections, did not prevent or suspend the holding of the elections in the
aforementioned municipalities including the preparation and transmission of the
election returns.
MAIN POINT: In connection with Section 2(2) of Article IX-C, where, as in this
case, elections had been held and winners had been duly proclaimed, the proper
recourse should have been to file regular election protest cases to ventilate the
veracity of the alleged election fraud and irregularities of the election in the
subject precincts with the consequent determination and declaration of the real
winners in the elections.
WEE
CASE N0. 138
ART IX-C, SEC 2: POWERS AND FUNCTION;
(2) ELECTION CONTESTS
Alauya v. COMELEC
FACTS: There was a petition to declare a failure of election in Lumbatan and in
the 5 municipalities of the province of Lanao del Sur because of massive
substitute voting. Private respondent Tamano prayed for the suspension of
proclamation of the winning candidates. Alauya filed his Answer with Motion to
Dismiss. Sarangani filed his Answer and Opposition to the Suspension of
Proclamation. A special elections in Lumbatan proceeded and the Provincial
Board of Canvassers (PBC) canvassed the election returns. The results of the
canvass of Lumbatan and of the other 20 municipalities showed [The 2nd District
of the province of Lanao del Sur is composed of 21 municipalities] Menor as the
No. 1 winning candidate, followed by Sarangani (No. 2 spot) and Alauya (No. 3);
the COMELEC en banc issued the order directing the (PBC) NOT to proclaim the
alleged or supposed winners and to continue and complete the canvass of
election results in the 2nd District of Lanao del Sur. Alauya filed a Motion to Lift
Suspension of Proclamation with the COMELEC and subsequently filed a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in
assuming jurisdiction over said petitions, the pre-proclamation controversy?
RULING: NO. Petitioner erroneously considered the petitions as pre-
proclamation controversies when, in fact, these were filed under Section 6 of the
Omnibus Election Code for failure of election. These petitions clearly state their
nature XXX of the widespread, massive and rampant substitute voting and other
electoral fraud, anomalies and irregularities which prevented duly registered
voters from actually voting in the regional elections. As distinguished in the case
of Loong v. COMELEC, while, however, the COMELEC, is restricted in pre-
proclamation cases, to an examination of the election returns on their face and is
without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them and investigate election
irregularities, the COMELEC is duty bound to investigate allegations of fraud,
terrorism, violence and other analogous causes in actions for annulment of
election results or for declaration of failure of elections, as the Omnibus Election
Code denominates the same. XXX Needless to say, a pre-proclamation
controversy is not the same as an action for annulment of election results or
declaration of failure of elections.”
MAIN POINT: The COMELEC has the constitutional authority to declare a failure
of election pursuant to Article IX-C, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution and in
accordance with Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4 of R.A.
7166.
WEE
CASE N0. 139
ART IX-C, SEC 2: POWERS AND FUNCTION;
(4) DEPUTIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
 People v. Basilla the consent of the President, other law enforcement agencies. This the
COMELEC has done and the consent of the President was given in E.O. 134 [27
February 1987]. The acts of the delegated officers are in legal contemplation acts
of the COMELEC.
FACTS: As an aftermath of the May 1987 congressional elections in Masbate,
complaints for violations of Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg.
881) were filed with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Masbate against the
private respondents (violation for: vote-buying [2] and carrying of deadly MAIN POINT: IN BOLD.
weapon [1]). After preliminary investigation of the foregoing complaints, the
Provincial Fiscal of Masbate filed in the Regional Trial Court, Cataingan, Masbate.
However, respondent, Judge Basilla, dismissed motu proprio the information filed
WEE
by the Provincial Fiscal giving the following justification that the record shows
that the complainant filed the complaint with the fiscal and not with the CASE N0. 140
COMELEC and the COMELEC did not investigate the case. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration of respondent Judge's orders, without success. The instant ART IX-C, SEC 2: POWERS AND FUNCTION;
Petition for Review assails that the dismissal of the criminal information filed
against the private respondents, as constituting grave abuse of discretion (5) REGISTRATION OF PARTIES AND ORGANIZATIONS
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Petition argues principally that the
LDP v. COMELEC
COMELEC has authority to deputize the chief state prosecutors, provincial and
city fiscals and their assistants, under Sections 2 (4) and (8), Article IX-C of the
1987 Constitution, and that the COMELEC did deputize such prosecution officers
to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints for alleged violation of FACTS: Prior to the May 2004 elections, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
election laws and to institute criminal information therefor. (LDP) has been divided because of the struggle of authority between Party Chair
Edgardo Angara and Party Secretary General Agapito Aquino, both having
endorsed two different sets of candidates under the same party, LDP. The matter
was brought to the COMELEC. The COMELEC recognized that it has the authority
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge erred in dismissing the information
to act on matters pertaining to the ascertainment of the identity of [a] political
filed on the ground that prosecuting election offenses is within the exclusive
party and its legitimate officers. In the same breath, however, it held that internal
jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections?
party matters and wranglings [sic] are purely for the party members to settle
among themselves and any unsettled controversy should be brought to the
proper forum with jurisdiction. The Commission in its resolution, has recognized
RULING: YES. There is no dispute that the COMELEC is vested with power and the factions creating two sub-parties: LDP Angara wing and LDP Aquino. Sen.
authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable Angara thus filed the present petition for Certiorari assailing the COMELEC
under the Omnibus Election Code and to prosecute such offenses in court. This Resolution for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Code (Section 265) vests “exclusive power” XXX upon the COMELEC, it at the
same time authorizes the COMELEC to avail itself of the assistance of other
prosecuting arms of the Government. Section 2 of Article IX-C of the 1987
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC did commit grave abuse of discretion when
Constitution clearly envisage that the COMELEC would not be compelled to carry
it issued the resolution diving the LDP into wings, each of which nominate
out all its functions directly and by itself alone. Section 2(4) of Article IX-C of
candidates for every elective position and be entitled to representation?
the 1987 Constitution likewise authorizes the COMELEC to deputize, with

RULING: YES. The COMELEC, by dividing a political party into “wings,” effectively
diffused the party’s strength and undeniably emasculated its chance of obtaining
the Commission’s nod as the dominant minority party, and by allowing each wing
to nominate different candidates, the COMELEC planted the seeds of confusion
among the electorate, who are apt to be confounded by two candidates from a
single political party. As in the case of Recabo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, the
Court declared that the electoral process envisions one candidate from a political
party for each position, and disunity and discord amongst members of a political
party should not be allowed to create a mockery thereof. The admonition against
mocking the electoral process not only applies to political parties but with
greater force to the COMELEC. By according both wings representatives in the
election committees, the COMELEC has eroded the significance of political parties
and effectively divided the opposition.
MAIN POINT: In line with Section 2(5) of Article IX-C, registration, aside from
conferring juridical personality, serves other purposes as well. It informs the
people of the party's or organization's existence and of its ideals, and it identifies
the parties and its officers for purposes of regulation by the Commission on
Elections. Because of this last purpose, and as a corollary to the right to form
associations, every political party or organization should be allowed to register.
WEE
CASE N0. 141
ART IX-C, SEC 2: POWERS AND FUNCTION;
(5) REGISTRATION OF PARTIES AND ORGANIZATIONS
Atienza v. COMELEC
FACTS: Drilon, the former president of the Liberal Party (LP) announced that his
party withdrew support for the administration of former PGMA. However,
Atienza, LP Chairman, alleged that Drilon made the announcement without
consulting first the party. Atienza, then, hosted a party conference which
resulted to the election of new officers, with Atienza as LP president. Drilon
immediately filed a petition with the COMELEC to nullify the said election
claiming that it was illegal considering that the party’s electing bodies,
National Executive Council (NECO) and National Political Council
(NAPOLCO),were not properly convened. Moreover, Drilon claimed that under
the LP Constitution, there is a three-year term, meaning, his term has not
yet ended. However, Atienza contested that the election of new officers
could be likened to people power removing Drilon as president by direct action.
Also, Atienza alleged that the amendment to the LP Constitution providing the
three-term had not been properly ratified. The COMELEC held that the
election of Atienza and others was invalid since the electing assembly
did not convene in accordance with the LP Constitution. Subsequently, the LP
held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before respondent Drilon’s term
expired which resulted to the election of Roxas as the new LP president.
Now, petitioner, Atienza et al., sought to enjoin Roxas from assuming the
presidency of the LP questioning the validity of the quorum.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the intra-party
disputes?
RULING: YES. The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It
does not have blanket authority to resolve any and all controversies involving
political parties. Political parties are generally free to conduct their activities
without interference from the state. The COMELEC may intervene in disputes
internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its constitutional
functions. The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has
already been settled by the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on
Elections, that the COMELEC’s powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-
C of the Constitution, “include the ascertainment of the identity of the political
party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts.” The Court also
declared in another case that the COMELEC’s power to register political
parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act
on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute,
in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political
parties.

MAIN POINT: IN BOLD.
Ahmad
CASE NO. 142
ART-IX-C (COE) SEC. 2: Powers and Functions
Par 5: Registration of Parties and Organization
Lokin v. COMELEC
Facts: CIBAC party-list is a multi-sectoral party registered under Republic Act
No. (R.A.) 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. Herein the
petitioners assail the COMELEC’s resolution in favor of the private
respondents of their “Petition to Expunge from the Records and/or
Disqualification” nullifying their certificate “Manifestation of Intent to Participate
in the Party-list system of representation in the May 10, 2010 elections” filed
by a certain Derla.. In the same resolution the respondent’s faction was also
declared by the COMELEC as the true nominees of CIBAC. In a per curiam
resolution it also reiterated that Derla was unable to prove her identity to file
the said certificate, whereas respondents presented overwhelming evidence
that they were the deputized to submit the certificate of nomination pursuant
to CIBAC’s constitution and bylaws.
Issue: WON the COMELEC erred in granting the Petition for Disqualification
and recognizing respondents as the properly authorized nominees of CIBAC
party-list.
Ruling: NO, they submitted their Certificate of Nomination and Manifestation
of Intent to participate in the party-list elections. Precisely, petitioners were
seeking the COMELEC’s approval of their eligibility to participate in the
upcoming party-list elections. In effect, they invoke its authority under the
Party-List System Act. Contrary to their stance that the present dispute
stemmed from an intra-corporate matter, their submissions even recognize
the COMELEC’s constitutional power to enforce and administer all laws
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall. More specifically, as one of its constitutional functions, the COMELEC
is also tasked to “register, after sufficient publication, political parties,
organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must
present their platform or program of government.”
Main point: It is within the COMELEC’s power to register political parties
necessarily involved in the determination of the persons who must act on its
behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in
a proper case brought before it as an incident of its power to register political
parties.
Ahmad
CASE NO. 143
ART-IX-C (COE) SEC. 2: Powers and Functions
Par 6: Prosecution of Election Offenses
People v. Inting
Facts: Acting on the complaint of Editha Barbara against OIC-Mayor Dominador
Regalado for transferring her from the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very
remote Brgy. without obtaining the permission or clearance of the COMELEC as
required by law. COMELEC directed Atty. Gerardo Lituanas, Provincial Election
Supervisor of Dumaguete City: (1) to conduct the preliminary investigation of the
case; (2) to prepare and file the necessary information in court; (3) to handle the
prosecution if the evidence submitted shows a prima facie case and (4) to issue a
resolution of prosecution or dismissal as the case may be. After finding a prima
facie case a criminal case was filed against the OIC-Mayor and his arrest was
ordered, however before he could even be arrested the trial court set aside its
order on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to determined probable
cause, the court stated that it “will give due course to the information filed in this
case if the same has the written approval of the Provincial Fiscal after which the
prosecution of the case shall be under the supervision and control of the latter.”
Issue: WON a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election deputized as a Tanodbayan prosecutor has no authority to conduct preliminary
Supervisor involving election offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial investigations and prosecute offenses committed by COMELEC officials in
Fiscal now Provincial Prosecutor, before the Regional Trial Court may take relation to their office.
cognizance of the investigation and determine whether or not probable cause
exists? Issue: WON the Tanodbayan have the power to investigate, prosecute and try
election offenses committed by a public officer in relation to his office.
Ruling: No. Comelec is empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in
cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine Ruling: No. An examination of the provisions of the Constitution and the Election
probable cause and for filing an information in Court. In effect the 1987 Code of 1978 reveals the clear intention to place in the COMELEC exclusive
Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate but also to prosecute jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses committed by any
cases of violation of election laws. This means that the COMELEC is empowered person, whether private individual or public officer or employee, and in the latter
to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the instance, irrespective of whether the offense is committed in relation to his
purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an official duties or not.
information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC.
Main point: It is the nature of the offense and not the personality of the offender
Main point: The Provincial Fiscal, as such, assumes no role in the prosecution of that matters. As long as the offense is an election offense jurisdiction over the
election offenses. If the Fiscal or Prosecutor files an information charging an same rests exclusively with the COMELEC, in view of its all- embracing power
election offense or prosecutes a violation of election law, it is because he has been over the conduct of elections. The Tanodbayan cannot on its own prosecute
deputized by the COMELEC. He does not do so under the sole authority of his election offenses.
office.
Note: Tanodbayan = Ombudsman
Ahmad
Ahmad
CASE NO. 144
CASE NO. 145
ART-IX-C (COE) SEC. 2: Powers and Functions
ART-IX-C (COE) SEC. 2: Powers and Functions
Par 6: Prosecution of Election Offenses
Par 6: Prosecution of Election Offenses
Corpus v. Tanodbayan
Comelec v. Silva
Facts: Corpus et.al were members of the Citizens Election Committee of Caba La
Union Esteban Mangaser, an independent candidate for vice-mayor of the
Facts: Pursuant to its power under Art. IX-C (6) of the Constitution, the COMELEC
municipality of sent a letter to Pres. Marcos charging the petitioners with
charged private respondents with violations R.A. No. 6646, in twelve separate
violation of the 1978 Election Code, specifically for electioneering and/or
information filed with the RTC-Bataan. Tanciongco, who is provincial prosecutor
campaigning inside the voting centers during the election. On instruction from
of Bataan, was vice chairman, while Castillo, who is division superintendent of
the COMELEC the Regional Election Director conducted a formal investigation
schools, was secretary of the Provincial Board of Canvassers. Uy, who is assistant
and submitted his report recommending to the COMELEC the dismissal of the
regional director of elections, was chairman of the board, the three were accused
complaint, it did dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. However,
of having tampered, in conspiracy with one another, with the CO canvass by
it was refiled in the Tanodbayan. Subsequently the assistant provincial fiscal
increasing the votes received by then senatorial candidate Juan Ponce Enrile in
started a preliminary investigation of the same complaint filed by Mangaser with
certain municipalities of Bataan in the 1995 elections. The cases were raffled to
the Tanodbayan against the same parties previously dismissed by the COMELEC,
three branches of the court presided over by respondent judges, Hon. Silva and
the same moved for dismissal of the complaint but the motion was denied. The
Hon. Vianzon. In orders Judges Silva and Vianzon summarily dismissed the cases
Tanodbayan asserting exclusive authority to prosecute the case, stated in a letter
against private respondents. The COMELEC sought to appeal the dismissal of the
to the COMELEC Chairman that a lawyer of the COMELEC if not properly
cases to the Court of Appeals by filing notices but the judges denied due course
to its appeal. The sole basis for the denials was the fact that the prosecutor, whom
the COMELEC had deputized to prosecute the cases, had earlier taken a contrary
stand against the COMELEC. Hence this petition seeking the nullification of the
orders of the two judges, denying due course to their Notices of Appeal.
Issue: WON The authority to the dismissal of a criminal prosecution for an
election offense belongs to the COMELEC, not the designated prosecutor.
Ruling: Yes. Prosecutors designated by the COMELEC to prosecute the cases act
as its deputies. Consequently, it was beyond the power of Chief State Prosecutor
Zuñ o to oppose the appeal of the COMELEC. For that matter, it was beyond his
power, as COMELEC-designated prosecutor, to leave to the trial courts the
determination of whether there was probable cause for the filing of the cases and,
if it found none, whether the cases should be dismissed. Those cases were filed
by the COMELEC after appropriate preliminary investigation. If the Chief State
Prosecutor thought there was no probable cause for proceeding against private
respondents, he should have discussed the matter with the COMELEC and
awaited its instruction. If he disagreed with the COMELEC’s findings, he should
have sought permission to withdraw from the cases. But he could not leave the
determination of probable cause to the courts and agree in advance to the
dismissal of the cases should the courts find no probable cause for proceeding
with the trial of the accused.
Main point: The Prosecutors designated by the COMELEC derive their authority
from it and not from their offices. The authority to decide on the appeal the
dismissal belongs to the COMELEC. Art. IX-C, §2(6) of the Constitution expressly
vests in it the power and function to “investigate and, where appropriate,
prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.”
Ahmad
CASE NO. 146
ART-IX-C (COE) SEC. 2: Powers and Functions
Par 6: Prosecution of Election Offenses
Comelec v. Hon. Espanol
Facts: May 11, 1998, Florentino A. Bautista, Lakas candidate for Mayor of
Kawit, Cavite executed an Affidavit-Complaint charging the incumbent Municipal
Mayor Atty. Federico Poblete and other candidate of violation of the Omnibus
Election Code under paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 261 (vote buying) and filed
the same with the Law Department of the COMELEC. The commission’s Law
Department filed an Information against the respondents with the RTC-Cavite. In
the meantime, Gerardo Macapagal and Inocencio Rodelas filed a criminal
complaint for violation of Section 261(a) of the Omnibus Election Code (vote
selling) against Bautista. An information was filed before the RTC. COMELEC now
claims that it has the “exclusive power” to review, motu proprio or through an
appeal, the “recommendation or resolution of investigating officers” in the
preliminary investigation since it has “exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses and to prosecute the same” and to review the
recommendation or resolution of investigating officers.
Issue: WON the review of the Provincial Prosecutor's resolution by COMELEC
and the subsequent request for its nullification was proper.
Ruling: Yes. Under Article IX, Section 2(b) of the Constitution, the petitioner is
empowered to investigate and, when appropriate, prosecute election offenses.
The grant by the Constitution to the petitioner of the express power to investigate
and prosecute election offenses is intended to enable the petitioner to assure the
people of a fine, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible election. Under Section
265 of the Omnibus Election Code, the petitioner, through its duly authorized
legal officers, has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all
election offenses punishable under the Omnibus Election Code, and to prosecute
the same.
Main point: The petitioner may avail of the assistance of the prosecuting arms
of the government but as held in a previous case the continuing authority of the
Provincial or City Prosecutors stays until revoked or withdrawn any time by the
petitioner, either expressly or impliedly, when in its judgment such revocation or
withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the process to promote the
common good, or where it believes that successful prosecution of the case can be
done by the petitioner.

FRED (ghost fihter)
CASE NO. 147
ART IX-C, SEC 2: POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
PROSECUTION OF ELECTION OFFENSES (w/ sub)
Arroyo vs. Department of Justice
FACTS: Upon the discovery of 2004 and 2007 election fraud, the COMELEC
issued a resolution approving a committee joint with the (DOJ), to conduct
investigation on alleged offenses committed during 2004 and 2007 elections. Several
persons were recommended to be charged administratively, while others including
petitioner Arroyo, were recommended to be subjected to further investigation.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court prayer for issuance of TRO
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction assailing the creation of the Joint Panel.
ISSUE: W/N the creation of the joint committee, which fuses the commission on
elections - a constitutionally independent body - with the department of justice – a
political agent of the executive – demolishes the independence of the commission on
elections as provided in article ix(a), sections 1 and 2
RULING: No. The DOJ now conducts preliminary investigation of election offenses
concurrently with the Comelec and no longer as mere deputies.—The grant of
exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases of election offenses to the Comelec
was not by virtue of the Constitution but by the Omnibus Election Code which was
eventually amended by Section 43 of R.A. 9369. Thus, the DOJ now conducts
preliminary investigation of election offenses concurrently with the Comelec and
no longer as mere deputies.
(MAIN POINT in BOLD)
FRED (ghost fihter)
CASE NO. 148
ART IX-C, SEC 3: DECISIONS (w/o sub)
Pangilinan vs. COMELEC
FACTS: The petitioner Pangilinan and private respondent Belmonte, Jr. were
both candidates for congressman in the 4th legislative district of Quezon City in the
1992 elections. A petition for disqualification against the private respondent was filed
with the COMELEC for violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines (B. P. Blg. 881) for alleged anomalous acts which were later scrutinized.
During the canvassing, the petitioner objected to over 120 election returns being
canvassed on the ground that they were tampered, altered or spurious. The canvassers,
retorted that under Section 15 of R.A. No. 7166 and Section 23 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2413, entitled "General Instructions for the Provincial/City/District
and Municipal Board of Canvassers (BoC)" pre-proclamation controversies are not
allowed in the election of members of the HoR
Canvassing committees for canvassing of returns were created. The petitioner
objected to the creation of such because he was not given the opportunity to appoint
watchers and/or counsel to such. The BoC proceeded to canvass the returns. The
petitioner, therefore, filed a petition, claiming that public respondents acted with grave
abuse of discretion and argues that Section 15 of R.A. 7166 is unconstitutional, for it
disallows pre-proclamation controversies in the election of members of the HoR. The
petitioner claims that COMELEC has the power to hear and decide pre-proclamation
controversies without distinction as to whether the pre-proclamation controversy
involves the election of Members of the HoR/provincial/local elective officials.
ISSUE: W/N Section 15 of R.A. No. 7166 and Section 23 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2413 disallowing pre-proclamation controversies in the election of
members of the House of Representatives are unconstitutional.
RULING: No. The Constitution vests in the COMELEC “exclusive original
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
elective regional provincial and city officials.” It has no jurisdiction over contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of Members of the House of
Representatives.. Consequently, the phrase “including pre-proclamation
controversies” used in Sec 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution should be construed
as referring only to “pre-proclamation controversies” in election cases that fall
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC, i.e., election cases
pertaining to the election of regional, provincial and city officials.
(MAIN POINT in BOLD)
FRED (ghost fihter)
CASE NO. 149
ART IX-C, SEC 3: DECISIONS (w/o sub)
Sarmiento v. COMELEC
FACTS: The special civil actions for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, seek to set aside the Resolutions of respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in granting the appeal from the ruling of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Virac, Catanduanes which ordered the exclusion from the canvass of
one (1) election return;
Petitioners impugn the challenged resolutions above specified as having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion in that, inter alia, the Commission,
sitting en banc, took cognizance of and decided the appeals without first referring them
to any of its Divisions.
ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the abovementioned Special
Cases without first referring them to any of its Divisions?
RULING: Yes. It is clear from the provision of the 1987 Constitution that election
cases include pre-proclamation controversies, and all such cases must first be heard
and decided by a Division of the Commission.
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions,
and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election
cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be
heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions
shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
The Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority to hear and decide the
same at the first instance. In the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, pre-
proclamation cases are classified as Special Cases 1 and, in compliance with the
above provision of the Constitution, the two (2) Divisions of the Commission are
vested with the authority to hear and decide these Special Cases.
(MAIN POINT in BOLD)
FRED (ghost fihter)
CASE NO. 150
ART IX-C, SEC 3: DECISIONS (w/o sub)
Canicosa v. COMELEC
FACTS: DO "BOY" CANICOSA and SEVERINO LAJARA were candidates for
mayor in Calamba, Laguna, during the 1995 elections. After obtaining a majority
votes Lajara was proclaimed winner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. Later
Canicosa filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Declare Failure of Election and to
Declare Null and Void the Canvass and Proclamation because of alleged widespread
frauds and anomalies in casting and counting of votes, preparation of election returns,
violence, threats, intimidation, vote buying, unregistered voters voting, and delay in
the delivery of election documents and paraphernalia from the precincts to the Office
of the Municipal Treasurer. The COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition on the
ground that the allegations therein did not justify a declaration of failure of election.
Canicosa finally insists that the COMELEC sitting en banc erred in ruling on
his petition. He maintains that his petition should have first been heard by a division
of COMELEC and later by the COMELEC en banc upon motion for reconsideration,
pursuant to Sec. 3, Art. IX-C, of the Constitution.
ISSUE: W/N his petition should have first been heard by a division of COMELEC
and later by the COMELEC en banc upon motion for reconsideration, pursuant to Sec.
3, Art. IX-C, of the Constitution.?
RULING: NO. The provision applies only when the COMELEC acts in the exercise
of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions and not when it merely exercises purely
administrative functions.
The grounds cited by Canicosa in his petition require the exercise by the
COMELEC of its administrative functions. Section 2, Art. IX-C, of the 1987
Constitution grants extensive administrative powers to the COMELEC with regard to
the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of elections.
Main Point: Quite obviously, it is only in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial powers that the COMELEC is mandated to hear and decide cases first by
Division and then, upon motion for reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc. This
is when it is jurisdictional. In the instant case, as aforestated, the issues presented
demand only the exercise by the COMELEC of its administrative functions.
FRED (ghost fihter)
CASE NO. 151
ART IX-C, SEC 3: DECISIONS (w/o sub)
RAMAS v. COMELEC
FACTS: The petitioners and the private respondents were the official candidates of
rival party lists, for the elective municipal positions of Guipos, Zamboanga del Sur, in
the elections of 8 May 1995. After the canvassing of returns, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Guipos proclaimed the petitioners as the duly elected officials.
Private respondents, the losing candidates for mayor and vice mayor,
respectively, as well as, the 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th placers, respectively, for members
of the SB, filed separate election protests with the Pagadian RTC which ruled on their
favour.
Private respondents subsequently filed a Motion for Immediate Execution of
Decision Pending Appeal. On the contrary, the petitioners filed their Opposition to the
Motion but the trial court ruled again on the favour of private respondents.
The petitioners assailed the trial courts order contending that trial court acted
with grave abuse of discretion and filed a petition with the COMELEC. But respondent
COMELEC after scrutiny denied the petition on the ground that the ruling of the RTC
considers the near expiration of the term of office, public interest, the pendency of the
election contest for more than 3 years which, for them is justified
.
ISSUE: W/N COMELEC seriously erred in holding that petitioners failed to establish
a case of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.
RULING: NO, as to election cases involving regional, provincial, and city officials,
which fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC, Section 3 of
Article IX-C of the Constitution vests the COMELEC with the authority to promulgate
its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies.
MAIN POINT: To deprive trial courts of their discretion to grant execution pending
appeal would, bring back the ghost of the grab-the-proclamation-prolong the protest
techniques so often resorted to by devious politicians in the past in their efforts to
perpetuate their hold to an elective office. This would, as a consequence, lay to waste
the will of the electorate.
Martin
CASE NO. 152
ART IX SEC 3: DECISIONS
Garvida v. Sales
Facts: Petitioner Lynette G. Garvida seeks to annul and set aside the order dated May
2, 1996 of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc suspending her
proclamation as the duly elected Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay
San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The reason for the suspension of
her proclamation was her alleged illegibility on the ground that she had exceeded the
age limit for membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan as laid down in Section 3 [b]
of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc has the jurisdiction to act on the petition
to deny or cancel the petitioner’s certificate of candidacy.
Ruling: No. In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to any of
its Divisions upon receipt of the petition. The jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a
certificate of candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases
before a Division may only be entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the
required number of votes to reach a decision, resolution, order or ruling is not
obtained in the Division. Moreover, only motions to reconsider decisions,
resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in Division are resolved by the
COMELEC en banc. The COMELEC en banc therefore acted without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion
Main Point: It is the COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can hear and decide election
cases.
Martin
CASE NO. 153
ART IX SEC 3: DECISIONS
Velayo v. COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner Arthur V. Velayo and private respondent Ernesto Natividad were
among the candidates for mayor of Gapan, Nueva Ecija. Private respondent filed with
the COMELEC a petition seeking the exclusion of certain election returns on the
ground of incomplete and material defects, and for which the COMELEC en banc
issued (in favor of respondent) a resolution excluding such election returns and
annulling the proclamation of petitioner Velayo. Thus, the petitioner (and SolGen)
contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it did not
dismiss said pre-proclamation case for the reason that the grounds relied upon by
respondent Natividad are proper grounds for election protests.
Issue: Whether or not COMELEC should have dismissed the alleged pre-proclamation
case.
Ruling: Yes. RA No. 7166 provides for summary proceedings in pre-proclamation
cases and does not require a trial type hearing. Nevertheless, (1) summary
proceedings cannot be stretched to mean ex parte proceedings (an ex parte hearing
is one in which the court or tribunal hears only one side of the controversy), and (2) Main Point: A pre-proclamation controversy should be summarily decided.
pre-proclamation controversies on election returns or certificates of canvass must be
disposed of summarily on the basis of the records and evidence adduced in the Board
of Canvassers. In the case at bar, petitioner’s proclamation as mayor was summarily
annulled ex parte and there was no showing that the official records of the Board of
Canvassers were forwarded to the respondent COMELEC and were used to cancel
Velayos proclamation.
Martin
Main Point: All pre-proclamation controversies shall be heard summarily after due CASE NO. 155
notice provided that pre-proclamation controversies on election returns or ART IX SEC 3: DECISIONS
certificates of canvass shall, on the basis of the records and evidence to it by the Soller v. COMELEC
board of canvassers, be disposed of summarily by the Commission en banc within
seven (7) days from receipt thereof. Facts: Petitioner and private respondent were both electoral candidates for mayor
of the municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro. The municipal board of canvassers
proclaimed petitioner Ferdinand Thomas Soller duly elected mayor. Thus, private
Martin respondent filed with the RTC election protest against petitioner. Petitioner then
CASE NO. 154 moved to dismiss private respondent's protest on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
ART IX SEC 3: DECISIONS forum-shopping, and failure to state cause of action. Thereafter, the trial court
Sebastian v. COMELEC denied petitioner's motion to dismiss. Hence, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC
a petition for certiorari contending that respondent RTC acted without or in excess
Facts: Petitioners were electoral candidates of the Reporma Party in Sto. Tomas, of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing private
Davao del Norte. On election day, as the Municipal Board of Canvassers was respondent's election protest. Consequently, the COMELEC en banc dismissed
preparing to canvass the election returns, petitioners sought the exclusion from the petitioner's suit.
canvass of several election returns from certain precincts. Petitioners claimed that
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc acted within its jurisdiction in taking
the election returns from these areas were prepared under "extreme duress, threat,
cognizance of petitioner’s petition in the first instance.
intimidation and political pressure and influence." Petitioners also manifested that
four election returns were missing. The COMELEC pointed out that it could not
Ruling: No. Under Sec. 3, Art. IX of the Constitution, respondent COMELEC en banc
justifiably exclude from the canvass of votes, in a pre-proclamation controversy,
had no jurisdiction to affirm the refusal of respondent trial court to dismiss private
election returns that on their face appear regular. Where the issues raised would
respondent's election protest. The COMELEC, sitting en banc, does not have the
require the COMELEC to look beyond the face of the return, the proper remedy is a
requisite authority to hear and decide election cases including pre-proclamation
regular election protest. Nevertheless, the petitioners do not claim that the returns
controversies in the first instance. This power pertains to the divisions of the
themselves are not regular, genuine or authentic.
Commission. Any decision by the Commission en banc as regards election cases
decided by it in the first instance is null and void. As can be gleaned from the
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC should go beyond the face of the return and
proceedings aforestated, petitioner's petition with the COMELEC was not referred to
investigate election irregularities in a pre-proclamation controversy.
a division of that Commission but was, instead, submitted directly to the Commission
en banc. The authority to resolve petition for certiorari involving incidental issues of
Ruling: No. The petition stemmed from a pre-proclamation controversy. In a long line
election protest, like the questioned order of the trial court, falls within the division
of cases, the Court have consistently held that a pre-proclamation controversy is
of the COMELEC and not on the COMELEC en banc. Clearly, the COMELEC en
limited to an examination of the election returns on their face. The COMELEC as a
banc acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of petitioner's petition in the first
general rule need not go beyond the face of the returns and investigate alleged
instance
election irregularities. However, where the resolution of the issues raised would
require the COMELEC to "pierce the veil" of election returns that appear prima facie
regular, the remedy is a regular election protest. Main Point: See ruling, IN BOLD.
Martin
CASE NO. 156
ART IX SEC 3: DECISIONS
Barroso v. Ampig et al
Facts: Petitioner Claudius G. Barroso and private respondent Emerico V. Escobillo
were candidates for mayor of the municipality of Tampakan, Cotabato in the May 11,
1998 elections. Petitioner won the election. Private respondent filed several pre-
proclamation protests with the COMELEC and he likewise filed several election
offense cases before the trial courts. When SPC 98-009 (pre-proclamation case) was
dismissed, private respondent forthwith moved for reconsideration (later on denied
by COMELEC en banc). It was during the pendency of this motion that private
respondent filed E.C. Case No. 15-24 before the RTC contesting petitioner’s election.
The petitioner then filed a case to dismiss the election protest filed against him by
private respondents on the ground of the violation of the non-forum shopping rule
because the respondent failed to mention (in its certification against forum shopping)
the pendency of the above pre-proclamation case. Thus, this instant petition
questioning the non-dismissal of the election protest by respondent trial court on
such basis.
Issue: Whether or not the election contest should be dismissed for the strict
application of the non-forum shopping rule.
Ruling: No. The strict application of the non-forum shopping rule in the case at bar
would not work to the best interest of the parties and the electorate. An election
contest, unlike an ordinary civil action, is clothed with a public interest. The purpose
of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed by the board
of canvassers is the lawful choice of the people. Moreover, the Comelec Rules of
Procedure are subject to a liberal construction (election contests are subject to the
Comelec Rules of Procedure). This liberality is for the purpose of promoting the
effective and efficient implementation of the objectives of ensuring the holding of
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections and for achieving just,
expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and
proceeding brought before the Comelec.
Main Point: See ruling, IN BOLD.
Sheena
Case 157
Article IX C
Recommendatory Powers Section 3. Decisions
Maruhom v. Comelec
FACTS: A petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction
challenging the Resolution of the COMELEC dated July 6, 1999 dismissing
Comelec Case SPR No. 52-98.
Petitioner and private respondent were both candidates for Mayor in the
Municipality of Marogong, Lanao del Sur and voted as such in 1998. Petitioner is
a re-electionist and a veteran politician. Private respondent, knowing that he was
cheated and the true winner for Mayor, filed before this Honorable Commission
a petition to annul the proclamation of petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom as the
duly elected Mayor of Marogong, Lanao del Sur docketed as SPC No. 98-226.
Petitioner alleges that in dismissing the petition, the COMELEC acted in excess of,
or with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction in holding that
a motion to dismiss an election protest case filed in the RTC is a prohibited
pleading, holding that the motion to dismiss filed after the answer is not allowed
and failing to resolve the issues raised in SPR No. 52-98 which are sufficient legal
bases to dismiss Election Case No. 11-127. The COMELEC according to the
petitioner "abdicated its duty under its own rules of procedure and under the
Constitution and the election laws." Such abdication of duty, according to
petitioner, amounts to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: W/N a motion to dismiss, filed after an answer has been filed, is a
prohibited pleading in an election protest pending before the Regional Trial
Court.
RULING: NO. It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure is it provided that motions to dismiss and bill of particulars are not
allowed in election protests or quo warranto cases pending before regular courts.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the
filing of a certain pleading in the regular courts. The power to promulgate
rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested
in the Supreme Court. The foregoing pronouncement, however, will not
extricate petitioner from his predicament because the denial of petitioner's
motion to dismiss was based on the fact that the other grounds relied
therein was considered unmeritorious and not because the said motion is
a prohibited pleading in electoral protest cases. While the challenged
COMELEC Resolution may not have been entirely correct in dismissing the
petition in this regard, the soundness of its discretion to accord unto the trial
court the competence to resolve the factual issues raised in the controversy
cannot be doubted. Indeed, as reasoned by the COMELEC, the Commission
assumes the competence of the trial court to handle electoral protest and cannot
encroach on its original and exclusive jurisdiction on electoral protest cases
involving the contested mayoralty seat. To our mind, the trial court should be
allowed to resolve the case on the merits to be able to rule on the factual and legal
grounds raised by the petitioner as his defenses in his Answer. Should the
petitioner be dissatisfied with the outcome of the case in the lower court, he can
still appeal, as his relief, to this Commission within the reglementary period
provided by law.
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD.
Sheena
Case 158
 Article IX C
Recommendatory Powers Section 3. Decisions
Balindong v. Comelec
FACTS:
This is a petition where the petitioner, Anwar Balindong (Anwar), a candidate for
Mayor of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, seeks to set aside the Resolution of the
COMELEC en banc ordering the Municipal Board of Canvassers to immediately
reconvene, totally exclude from canvass the election return for a certain precinct
and count 88 votes in the election return for another precinct, not in favor of
Anwar but another mayoralty candidate by the name of Amir-Oden Balindong.
Petitioner, private respondent Aklima Jaafar Balindong, and Amir-Oden
Balindong are half brothers. They were 3 of the 9 candidates for the position of
Mayor.
Aklima filed an objection to the inclusion of the election return for Precinct
127A/128A due to fraud and irregularity in the conduct of election, being voted
upon by those who are not registered thereof and violence, threat and
intimidation against watchers of their party and the registered voters thereof.
MBC denied.
When the MBC reconvened, Aklima, filed an objection to the inclusion of all the
election returns, invoking as grounds the illegal proceedings of the Board of
Canvassers and violation of Section 25(l) of COMELEC Resolution No. 3848. MBC
denied and proceeded with the canvassing of returns. Aklima filed before the
COMELEC an Appeal, urging that the proceedings of the MBC be declared illegal
and a new board of canvassers constituted to canvass the election returns for the
various precincts of Malabang. This was docketed as SPC No. 01-063.
MBC proclaimed the winning municipal candidates, with Anwar winning as
Mayor by a margin of 52 votes over Aklima.
Aklima filed another Petition, praying that the MBC be ordered to reconvene and
re-canvass, this time, the election returns in 38 precincts only. The petition was
docketed as SPC No. 01-175. COMELEC ordered the MBC to reconvene, take into
account its directives with respect to the two (2) returns and thereafter proclaim
the winning mayoralty candidate.
Anwar filed the present petition. He faults the COMELEC for having acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in taking
cognizance of the consolidated cases in the first instance without referring them
to either one of its divisions, in violation of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
W/N the COMELEC en banc had jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies
at the first instance.
RULING:
No. This Court has consistently ruled that the requirement mandating the hearing
and decision of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, at the
first instance by a division of the COMELEC, and not by the poll body as a whole,
is mandatory and jurisdictional. It is imperative for this Court to enforce its
indelible import and spirit to the fullest, any decision, resolution or proceeding
of the COMELEC which runs counter to it notwithstanding. In the definitive case
of Sarmiento v. COMELEC, this Court explicitly held that the COMELEC en banc
does not have the requisite authority to hear and decide pre-proclamation
controversies at the first instance. SPC No. 01-063 and 01-175 are pre-
proclamation controversies, involving as they do the alleged illegality of the
canvassing proceedings and the purported tampering of certain election returns.
This is clear from the OEC.
MAIN POINT:
It is only in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers that the
COMELEC is mandated to hear and decide cases first by division and then, upon
motion for reconsideration by the COMELEC en banc. The conduct of a
preliminary investigation before the filing of an information in court does not
involve the exercise of adjudicatory function. (Bernas)
Sheena
Case 159
Article IX C
Recommendatory Powers Section 3. Decisions
Jaramilla v. Comelec
FACTS:
Respondent Antonio Suyat and petitioner Alberto J. Jaramilla both ran for the
position of Member of the Sangguniang Bayan in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz,
Ilocos Sur in 2001 elections. MBC proclaimed the winning candidates for the
offices of Mayor, Vice-Mayor and 8 members of the Sangguniang Bayan. Suyat
ranked 9. Upon review, he discovered that Jaramilla was credited with only 23
votes per Election Return. However, when the figures were forwarded to the
Statement of Votes by Precinct, Jaramilla was credited with 73 votes or 50 votes
more than what he actually obtained. Suyat filed before the COMELEC en banc an
Urgent Motion for Issuance of Order to Reconvene, which the latter treated as a
Petition for Correction of Manifest Error. Petitioner countered in his Answer that
said petition should be dismissed for having been filed out of time and for lack of
the required certification of non-forum shopping.
ISSUE:
W/N COMELEC en banc properly assumed original jurisdiction over a petition for
Correction of Manifest Errors.
RULING: YES. As stated in Sec 3 Art 9 C, election cases including pre-
proclamation controversies should first be heard and decided by a division of the
COMELEC, and then by the commission en banc if a motion for reconsideration of
the division is filed.
It must be noted however that this provision applies only in cases where the
COMELEC exercises its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, and not when
it merely exercises purely administrative functions. Accordingly, when the
case demands only the exercise by the COMELEC of its administrative
functions, such as the correction of a manifest mistake in the addition of
votes or an erroneous tabulation in the statement of votes, the COMELEC en
banc can directly act on it in the exercise of its constitutional function to
decide questions affecting elections.
The Petition for Correction of Manifest Errors in the case at bar alleges an
erroneous copying of figures from the election return to the Statement of Votes
by Precinct. Such an error in the tabulation of the results, which merely requires
a clerical correction without the necessity of opening ballot boxes or examining
ballots, demands only the exercise of the administrative power of the COMELEC.
Hence, the Commission en banc properly assumed original jurisdiction over the
aforesaid petition.
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD
Sheena
Case 160
Article IX C
Recommendatory Powers Section 3. Decisions
Bautista v. Comelec
FACTS:
Bautista filed his COC for Punong Barangay in Lumbangan for the 2002 barangay
elections. Election Officer Josefina P. Jareo refused to accept Bautistas COC
because he was not a registered voter in Lumbangan. Bautista filed an action for
mandamus against Election Officer Jareo with the RTC of Batangas. RTC ordered
Election Officer Jareo to accept Bautistas COC and to include his name in the
certified list of candidates for Punong Barangay. The trial court ruled that Section
7 (g) of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 mandates Election Officer Jareo to include
the name of Bautista in the certified list of candidates until the COMELEC directs
otherwise. In compliance with the trial courts order, Election Officer Jareo
included Bautista in the certified list of candidates for Punong Barangay. At the
same time, Election Officer Jareo referred the matter of Bautistas inclusion in the
certified list of candidates with the COMELEC Law Department. COMELEC Law
Department recommended the cancellation of Bautistas certificate of candidacy
since he was not registered as a voter in Lumbangan. The COMELEC en banc
failed to act on the COMELEC Law Departments recommendation before the
barangay elections.
Bautista and private respondent Divina Alcoreza were candidates for the position
of Punong Barangay in Lumbangan. Bautista obtained the highest number of
votes (719) while Alcoreza came in second with 522 votes, or a margin of 197
votes. Bautista was proclaimed as the elected Punong Barangay then took his
oath.
COMELEC issued Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584, canceling Bautista’s COC. The
COMELEC en banc directed the Election Officer to delete Bautistas name from the
official list of candidates. Bautista filed for reconsideration. While pending with
the COMELEC, Bautista filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
ISSUE:
W/N COMELEC en banc can act on the case without a prior action by a division.
RULING: NO. The COMELECs exercise of its quasi-judicial powers is subject to
Section 3 of Article IX-C which expressly requires that all election cases, including
pre-proclamation controversies, shall be decided by the COMELEC in division,
and the motion for reconsideration shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc.
COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first in division, and then upon motion for
reconsideration en banc, only when the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial
powers.
Under Section 3, Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a
petition for the denial or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy must be
heard summarily after due notice. It is thus clear that cancellation
proceedings involve the exercise of the quasi-judicial functions of the
COMELEC which the COMELEC in division should first decide. More so in this
case where the cancellation proceedings originated not from a petition but
from a report of the election officer regarding the lack of qualification of the
candidate in the barangay election. The COMELEC en banc cannot short cut the
proceedings by acting on the case without a prior action by a division because it
denies due process to the candidate.
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD
Sheena
Case 161
Article IX C
Recommendatory Powers Section 3. Decisions
De Llana v. Comelec
FACTS:
In 2001 elections, petitioner Loretta Dela Llana and respondent Rizalino Pablo,
Jr. were among the candidates for Provincial Board Member, First District of
Zambales. The First District, which comprised the municipalities of Subic,
Castillejos and San Marcelino, is allotted three (3) seats in the Provincial Board.
Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed the three (3) winning candidates.
Included was herein petitioner, being the third duly elected member of the
Provincial Board. Respondent ranked fourth obtaining 24 votes less than that
obtained by petitioner. Contesting the election and proclamation of petitioner,
respondent filed an election protest with the Electoral Contest Adjudication
Department of the COMELEC. Respondent alleged that there was an error in the
Statement of Votes cast in Precinct No. 92-A-1 at Castillejos, Zambales. Petitioner,
in her answer, filed a counter-protest.
The COMELEC First Division a) granted respondents petition for the correction
of manifest errors; b) directed the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Subic,
Zambales to reconvene and effect the necessary corrections in the Statement of
Votes by Precinct to reflect therein the actual number of votes obtained by
respondent in Precinct No. 29-A-1; c) annulled petitioners proclamation, being
based on an erroneous and/or incomplete canvass of election returns; and d)
ordered petitioner to immediately vacate her post as the third member of the
Provincial Board, First District of Zambales, and to cease and desist from
discharging the duties and functions of that office. In the same Resolution, the
First Division denied, for being premature.
Petitioner filed a motion for contending that the First Division has no
authority/jurisdiction to convert motu proprio respondents petition into one for
correction of manifest errors. She claimed that the First Division acted with grave
abuse of discretion.
Petitioner maintains that the COMELEC is without authority/jurisdiction to treat
respondent’s petition for election protest as a case for correction of manifest
errors and justify such act by suspending its own Rules of Procedure.
ISSUE: W/N COMELEC First Division committed grave abuse of discretion when
it entertained respondent’s petition by suspending its own Rules of Procedure.
RULING: No. This is clearly allowed under Section 4, Rule 1 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure, which provides:
Section 4. Suspension of the Rules. In the interest of justice and in order to obtain
speedy disposition of all matters pending before the Commission, these rules or any
portion thereof may be suspended by the Commission.
Certainly, such rule of suspension is in accordance with the spirit of Section 6,
Article IX-A and Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution which bestows upon
the COMELEC the power to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and
practice before it or before any of its offices to attain justice and the noble
purpose of determining the true will of the electorate.
It is significant to note that petitioner does not assail the factual findings of the
COMELEC that there was indeed manifest error in the copying of the figures from
the election returns to the Statement of Votes by Precinct. Clearly, the assailed
Resolution of the COMELEC ordering the necessary correction of the Statement
of Votes of Castillejos, Zambales, to reflect the true will of the people of that
municipality, is in order.
MAIN POINT:
The Constitution has vested to the COMELEC broad powers, involving not only
the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of elections, but also the resolution and determination of election
controversies. It also granted the COMELEC the power and authority to
promulgate its rules of procedure, with the primary objective of ensuring the
expeditious disposition of election cases.
LJ
Case No.162
Art IX, C. COMELEC Section 3. Decisions
Repol v. Comelec
Facts: Repol and private respondent Violeto Ceracas (“Ceracas”) were candidates
for Municipal Mayor of Pagsanghan, Samar in the 14 May 2001 elections. On 16
May 2001, Ceracas was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor with 66 votes more
than Repol. Repol filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of
Tarangnan, Samar. Claiming that fraud and other irregularities marred the
elections in Precincts 3A, 5A and 71, Repol prayed for revision of the ballots in
these precincts. This election protest was then dismissed and a petition for
certiorari is filed in here the decision was reversed and reinstated the protest.
On 30 December 2003, the trial court declared Ceracas’s proclamation
void and proclaimed Repol the duly elected mayor of Pagsanghan, Samar. Due to
some anomalies found such as the same writing of the some ballots and the
offering of free rides to the voting precincts. He took on Jan. 6, 2004. Ceracas
appealed the trial court’s judgment to the COMELEC. During the pendency of
Ceracas’s appeal with the COMELEC and without waiting for the trial court to
resolve his omnibus motion, Ceracas filed with the COMELEC a Petition for
Certiorari (with prayer for temporary restraining order, writ of preliminary
injunction and/or status quo ante) assailing the writ of execution.
Issue: W/N this Commission can resolve on the Application for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction1 despite the pendency of the said petition.
Ruling: NO. the issue of quo ante should be first be solved.Only final orders of the
COMELEC in Division may be raised before the COMELEC en banc. Section 3,
Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution mandates that only motions for
reconsideration of final decisions shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc.
Main Point: Commission on Elections (COMELEC); Only final orders of the
COMELEC in Division may be raised before the COMELEC en banc.
LJ
Case No.163
Art IX, C. COMELEC Section 3. Decisions
Pedragoza v. COMELEC
Facts: Artemio Pedragoza (“petitioner”) and Francisco Sumulong, Jr.
(“respondent”) were among the candidates for Punong Barangay of De La Paz,
Antipolo City in the Barangay elections. Petitioner was proclaimed winner by a
margin of 39 votes. Claiming that irregularities marred the elections, respondent
filed an election protest in the MTC (“trial court”). Respondent sought a recount
of ballots from 25 out of De La Paz’s 103 precincts.
In his Answer, petitioner denied respondent’s claim and filed a counter-
protest, contending that he was the one prejudiced by election irregularities.
Issue: Whether the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion in
affirming the First Division’s findings.
Ruling: No. we find no merit to this claim. In his petition, petitioner contented
himself with making the sweeping charge that the COMELEC En Banc’s ruling is
contrary to “law, x x x evidence and existing jurisprudence” without
substantiating his claim. Perhaps realizing this, petitioner, in his Reply to
respondent’s Comment, reproduced the grounds he raised in his motion for
reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc. This does not suffice to sustain his
claim of grave abuse of discretion. The office of a petition for certiorari is not to
1 who may grant. (a) A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an
action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party to an
administrative case or any third person to refrain from a particular act or acts.
correct simple errors of judgment but “capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction arbitrary and despotic exercise of
power because of passion or personal hostility.” We have gone over the grounds
petitioner raised in his motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc
and we find no such grave error tainting the Resolution of 30 September 2005.
Main Point: The office of a petition for certiorari is not to correct simple errors
of judgment but capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack
of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or
personal hostility.
LJ
Case No.164
Art IX, C. COMELEC Section 3. Decisions
Cayetano v. COMELEC
Facts: On April 25, 1998, the COMELEC conducted a plebiscite in Taguig, Metro
Manila on the conversion of this municipality into a highly urbanized city as
mandated by Republic Act No. 8487.2 The residents of Taguig were asked this
question: “Do you approve the conversion of the Municipality of Taguig, Metro
Manila into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Taguig. On April
26, 1998, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers (PBOC), without completing the
canvass of sixty-four (64) other election returns, declared that the “No” votes
won, indicating that the people rejected the conversion of Taguig into a city.
However, upon order of the COMELEC en banc, the PBOC reconvened
and completed the canvass of the plebiscite returns, eventually proclaiming that
the negative votes still prevailed. Alleging that fraud and irregularities attended
the casting and counting of votes, private respondents, filed with the COMELEC a
petition seeking the annulment of the announced results of the plebiscite with a
prayer for revision and recount of the ballots. Petitioner intervened in the case.
He then filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the COMELEC
has no jurisdiction over an action involving the conduct of a plebi-scite. He
alleged that a plebiscite cannot be the subject of an election protest.
Issue: W/N the COMELEC has the authority to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election
Ruling: Yes. The above factual findings of the COMELEC supported by evidence,
are accorded, not only respect, but finality. This is so because “the conduct of
plebiscite and determination of its result have always been the business of the
COMELEC and not the regular courts. Such a case involves the appreciation of
ballots which is best left to the COMELEC. As an independent constitutional body
exclusively charged with the power of enforcement and administration of all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall, the COMELEC has the indisputable expertise in the field
of election and related laws.” Its acts, therefore, enjoy the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties.
Main Point: Commission on Elections (COMELEC); As an independent
constitutional body exclusively charged with the power of enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall, the COMELEC has the indisputable
expertise in the field of election and related laws; Its acts, therefore, enjoy the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.
LJ
Case No.165
Art IX, C. COMELEC Section 3. Decisions
Munoz v. COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for mayor of Camalig,
Albay in the May 10, 2004 election.3 At 6:00 o’clock in the evening of May 10,
2004, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) convened and canvassed the
election returns (ER). On May 11, 2004, the lawyers of private respondent
objected to the inclusion of the 26 ERs from various precincts on various grounds.
The MBC denied the objections and ruled to include the objected ERs in the
canvass. Despite the pendency of the appeal, petitioner was proclaimed on May
19, 2004 by the MBC as the winning candidate for mayor of Camalig, Albay.
Private respondent filed with the COMELEC a petition to annul the proclamation
of the petitioner for being premature and illegal. First Division rendered a
Resolution granting the petition to annul the proclamation.
Issue: W/N THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
ISSUED THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE NEW MUNICIPAL BOARD
OF CANVASSERS OF CAMALIG, ALBAY, TO RECONVENE AND RE-CANVASS ALL
ELECTION RESULTS OF CAMALIG, ALBAY, FOR BEING CONTRARY TO LAW .
Ruling: Yes. we find that it exceeded its authority and thus gravely abused its
discretion when it ordered the new MBC to re-canvass all ERs even before its First
Division could decide on SPC No. 04-087 filed by private respondent assailing the
ruling of the MBC to include the 26 contested ERs in the canvass. In Sarmiento v.
Commission on Elections, 212 SCRA 307 (1992), and Zarate v. Commission on
Elections, 318 SCRA 608, 612 (1999), the Court similarly held that “election cases
must first be heard and decided by a Division of the Commission,” and that the
“Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority to hear and decide the
same at the first instance.” Thus, in Acosta v. Commission on Elections, 293 SCRA
578, 580 (1998), the Court held that the COMELEC En Banc violated the foregoing
Constitutional mandate when it affirmed the trial court’s decision that was not
the subject of the special civil action before it, but of the appeal filed by therein
petitioner, which was still undocketed at the time and the parties have not yet
submitted any evidence in relation thereto.
Main Point: election cases must first be heard and decided by a Division of the
COMELEC—the Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority to hear
and decide the same at the first instance.
LJ
Case No.166
Art IX, C. COMELEC Section 3. Decisions
Tan v. COMELEC
Facts: Petitioners Abdusakur M. Tan and Basaron Burahan were the
gubernatorial and vice-gubernatorial candidates, respectively, of Sulu Province
in the May 10, 2004 national and local elections. On May 17, 2004, petitioners,
together with other local candidates for congressman, mayor, and vice-mayor,
filed with the COMELEC four (4) Petitions for Declaration of Failure of Elections
in the towns of Maim-bung, Luuk, Tongkil, and Panamao, all of Sulu Province.
Petitioners Tan and Burahan alleged systematic fraud, terrorism, illegal
schemes, and machinations allegedly perpetrated by private respondents and
their supporters resulting in massive disenfranchisement of voters.
Meanwhile, the COMELEC Second Division, acting on the Petitions for
Declaration of Failure of Elections, issued its May 17, 2004 Order suspending the
proclamation of the winning gubernatorial candidate of Sulu,23 but lifted the
suspension three (3) days later. In the May 20, 2004 lifting Order, the COMELEC
Second Division directed the Sulu PBOC to complete the canvass of votes and “to
bring all canvass documents to Manila, and to proclaim the winning candidates
for Governor in Manila. Despite the suspension Benjamin Loong was proclaimed
winner of the election.
On October 18, 2004, the COMELEC en banc, through a Joint Resolution,29
dismissed the five (5) Petitions to Declare Failure of Elections in the towns of
Maimbung, Luuk, Tongkil, and Panamao, for lack of merit. The COMELEC en banc
ruled that there was no failure of election in the subject municipalities of Sulu.
Issue: W/N COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, in dismissing the consolidated petitions despite the evident
massive disenfranchisement of the voters.
Ruling: No. it may be considered that the dissenting opinion duly noted “to
follow” in the joint resolution is an extended reserved opinion. But such won’t
serve to help petitioners’ position. While we are sympathetic to the predicament
of petitioners, we however declare that Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 18, COMELEC
Rules of Procedure are unconstitutional and must perforce be struck down. The
1987 Constitution, under Article IX-A, Section 6 and Article IX-C, Section 3, grants
and authorizes the COMELEC to promulgate its own rules of procedures as long
as such rules concerning pleadings and practice do not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights; on the other hand, this Court has a rulemaking power
provided in Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph (5)—the constitutional prerogative
and authority to strike down and disapprove rules of procedure of special courts
and quasi-judicial bodies.
Main Point: Court declares that Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 18 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure are unconstitutional and must perforce be struck down.
Gomez
CASE NO. 167
ART IX-C (Comelec) SEC 3: Decision
Enriguel v. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner Sandra Enriguel and private respondent Ma. Theresa Dumpit
were mayoralty candidates of Agoo, La Union during the May 14, 2007 elections.
When the results came out, Enriguel was proclaimed to have received the highest
number of votes and therefore was elected as mayor. Later, the losing candidate,
Dumpit, filed an election protest before the RTC of Agoo, La Union. She alleges
that there were anomalies in the canvassing of votes. Which was then dismissed
by the court on the basis of failure to present how many votes were erroneously
applied to Enriguel. Now a motion for reconsideration was instituted by the same.
The case was later on directed to the special second division of COMELEC where
such division decided to inhibit a decision, which then instituted the elevation of
the case to the Commission (COMELEC) en banc.
CASE NO. 168
ART IX-C (Comelec) SEC 3: Decision
Mendoza v. COMELEC
FACTS: In 2007, petitioner Joselito Mendoza was proclaimed the winning
candidate for the position of Governor in the Province of Bulacan. Besting his
opponent Roberto Pagdangan, Private respondent. An election protest was then
filed by Pagdangan against petitioner, that the later has perpetrated electoral
fraud which led to his proclamation as governor. This case was then raffled to the
second division of the Commission on Election. A decision by division was
reached in favor of Pagdangan, which subsequently resulted to an action for a
motion for reconsideration by the petitioner. Comelec, sitting en banc, failed to
reach the required number of votes to conclude the case at bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC sitting en banc and failing to reach the
required number of votes, as provided by Section 6, rule 18 of COMELEC rules of
procedure, would invalidate such petition by the private respondent, Pagdangan.
RULING: Yes. Section 6, rule 18 of COMELEC rules of procedure provides that if
it fails to do so “the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally
commenced in the Commission.” Thus, the respondent’s petition cannot proceed
in this case.
MAIN POINT: When the Commission En Banc is equally divided in opinion, or
the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be re-heard, and if on re-
hearing, no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if
originally commenced in the Commission.
Gomez
CASE NO. 169
ART IX-C (Comelec) SEC 3: Decision
Maria Laarni L. Cayetano v. COMELEC

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a grave abuse of discretion on the part of

FACTS: Petitioner, Maria Laarni Cayetano, and private respondent, were running
COMELEC for failing to decide on the case in division.
for the mayoral position of Taguig City. Private respondent, after the
proclamation of Cayetano, filed a case against her for election fraud and
RULING: Yes. Automatic elevation of the appeal to the Commission en banc is
irregularities before the COMELEC, this was held in division. COMELEC in
invalid.
division, did not extinguish the protest filed by the private respondent thus a
petition for certiorari, before the Supreme Court, was filed by petitioner-
MAIN POINT: When the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is exercising its
Cayetano against COMELEC for grave abuse of discretion for its refusal to dismiss
quasi-judicial powers, the Commission is constitutionally mandated to decide the
private respondents protest.
case first in division, and en banc only upon motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme court can act on the petition for certiorari in
Gomez
relation to the decision made by the decision in division of COMELEC.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to review an order, whether
final or interlocutory, even a final resolution of a division of the COMELEC, the
Court can only review via certiorari a decision, order, or ruling of the COMELEC
en banc.
MAIN POINT: The decision must be a final decision or resolution of the
COMELEC en banc. The Supreme Court has no power to review via
certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the
COMELEC. Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground
for dismissal of the petition.
Gomez
CASE NO. 170
ART IX-C (Comelec) SEC 4: SUPERVISION/REGULATION OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES, MEDIA GRANTS, PRIVILEGES
Unido v. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner UNIDO, United Democratic Opposition, is invoking the
resolutions no. 1467, 1468, and 1469 issued by COMELEC regarding the equal
opportunity and equal time in on the use of broadcasting media on public
discussion and debates on the plebiscite. That the “YES” votes for the constitution
amendment, as announced by President Maros and will be broadcasted in the
media, should be given such equal opportunity, spearheaded by the Peititioners,
to broadcast the “NO” votes for such amendment. COMELEC denied petitioners
request as it is not applicable in the case at bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional mandate provided in Sec 4 of Art IX-C
of the 1987 constitution, the fair and equal usage provision of media during
election, applies to plebiscite.
RULING: Yes. The Court views the provision as applicable also to plebiscites,
particularly one relative to constitutional amendments.
MAIN POINT: Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the Court views the
provision as applicable also to plebiscites, particularly one relative to
constitutional amendments. Be it borne in mind that it has been one of the most
steadfast rulings of this Court in connection with such plebiscites that it is
indispensable that they be properly characterized to be “fair submission”—by
which is meant that the voters must of necessity have had adequate
opportunity, in the light of conventional wisdom, to cast their votes with
sufficient understanding of what they are voting on.
Gomez
CASE NO. 171
ART IX-C (Comelec) SEC 4: SUPERVISION/REGULATION OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES, MEDIA GRANTS, PRIVILEGES
Sanidad v. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner, Pablito Sanidad, assails the constitutionality of Resolution no.
2167, prohibiting the media from broadcasting or writing on the plebiscite day,
plebiscite for the “Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region”, their
opinion in favor or against the plebiscite issue. It is alleged by petitioner that said
provision is void and unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional
guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the
Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC Resolution no. 2167 is void and
unconstitutional.
RULING: Yes. Sec. 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 prohibiting columnists,
commentators or announcers from using their columns to campaign for or
against the plebiscite issues is a restriction of freedom of expression.
MAIN POINT: Sanidad is not a candidate and in fact in a plebiscite, there are no
candidates. Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and the people’s right
to be informed must be preserve. Moreover, the people’s choice of forum for
discussion should not be restricted.
AIRA
CASE NO. 172
ART IX COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SECTION 4:
SUPERVISION/REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES, MEDIA GRANTS,
PRIVILEGES
Osmena v. COMELEC
FACTS: On 1991, RA 7056, “An Act Providing for the National and Local Elections
in 1992, Pave the Way for Synchronized and Simultaneous Elections Beginning
1995, and Authorizing Appropriations Therefor.” Governor Osmena of Cebu filed
a petition against the COMELEC for the nullity of the said RA on the reason that
the said law was unconstitutional. Some provisions that were deemed by the
petitioners unconstitutional were that it violates the mandate of the Constitution
for the holding of synchronized national and local elections on the second
Monday of May 1992; that par. 2 of section 3 of the said RA provided that all
incumbent provincial, city and municipal officials shall hold over beyond June 30,
1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and
qualified violates Section 2, Article XVIII (Transitory Provision) of the
Constitution; the same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056, which in
effect, shortens the term or tenure of office of local officials to be elected on the
2nd Monday of November, 1992.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7056 is constitutional. Corollary to this is whether or
not COMELEC may still supervise or regulate public utilities, media grants, and
privileges with regard the upcoming elections.
RULING: No, RA 7056 is unconstitutional; hence, null and void. Further, with this
declaration, COMELEC may not supervise and regulate public utilities, media
grants, and privileges.
MAIN POINT: COMELEC may, during the election period, supervise or regulate
the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of
transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information,
all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any GOCCs.
AIRA
CASE NO. 173
ART IX COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SECTION 4:
SUPERVISION/REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES, MEDIA GRANTS,
PRIVILEGES
Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC
FACTS: Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No.
2772 which read in part that COMELEC shall procure free print space of not less
than one half (1/2) page in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every
province or city for use as ‘COMELEC Space’ from March 6, 1995 in the case of
candidates for senator and from March 21, 1995 until May 12, 1995. In the
absence of said newspaper, ‘COMELEC Space’ shall be obtained from any
magazine or periodical of said province or city. Petitioner, a non-profit
organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, questioned the
constitutionality of said resolution on the ground that it violates the prohibition
imposed by the Constitution upon the government against the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may require print media to allocate free
space for candidates.
RULING: No. SC ruled that print media may not be compelled to allocate free
space to the Commission. Such would amount to a prohibited taking of property
without just compensation.
MAIN POINT: To compel print media companies to donate “COMELEC space” of
the dimensions specified in Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, amounts to “taking”
of private personal property for public use or purposes. The taking of private
property for public use is authorized by the Constitution, but not without
payment of “just compensation.”
AIRA
CASE NO. 174
ART IX COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SECTION 4:
SUPERVISION/REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES, MEDIA GRANTS,
PRIVILEGES
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc., et.
al. v. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioners are challenging the validity of Sec. 92 of B.P. Blg. No. 881which
requires that radio and television time be given for free. Petitioner
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. is an
organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. They are
suing as citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters. The other petitioner, GMA
Network, Inc., operates radio and television broadcasting stations throughout the
Philippines under a franchise granted by Congress. Petitioners challenge the
validity of §92 on the ground that it is in excess of the power given to the
COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or
information during the period of election.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 92 of B.P. Blg. No. 881 is unconstitutional on the
ground that it gives excess power to COMELEC.
RULING: No, it is constitutional. §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 is part and parcel of a
regulatory scheme designed to equalize the opportunity of candidates in an
election in regard to the use of mass media for political campaigns. COMELEC
Time should “be considered as part of the public service time said stations are
required to furnish the Government for the dissemination of public information
and education under their respective franchises or permits.” There is no reason
to suppose that §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 considers the COMELEC Time therein
provided to be otherwise than as a public service which petitioner is required to
render under §4 of its charter (R.A. No. 7252). In sum, B.P. Blg. 881, §92 is not an
invalid amendment of petitioner’s franchise but the enforcement of a duty
voluntarily assumed by petitioner in accepting a public grant of privilege.
MAIN POINT: B.P. Blg. 881, §92 is not an invalid amendment of petitioner’s
franchise but the enforcement of a duty voluntarily assumed by petitioner in
accepting a public grant of privilege. Broadcast media can find their just and
highest reward in the fact that whatever altruistic service they may render in
connection with the holding of elections is for that common good.
AIRA
CASE NO. 175
ART IX COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SECTION 4:
SUPERVISION/REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES, MEDIA GRANTS,
PRIVILEGES
ABS-CBN v. COMELEC
FACTS: A petition for certiorari was raised by ABS-CBN under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court which assailed the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc
Resolution No. 98-14191. In the said Resolution, the poll body resolved to
approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups,
its agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey and to authorize
the Honorable Chairman to issue the same. The electoral body believed that such
project might conflict with the official COMELEC count, as well as the unofficial
quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL). It also
noted that it had not authorized or deputized petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake
the exit survey.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction when it approved the
issuance of a restraining order enjoining the petitioner or any other group, its
agents or representatives from conducting exit polls during the elections.
RULING: Yes. The absolute ban imposed by the COMELEC cannot be justified. It
does not leave open any alternative channel of communication to gather the type
of information obtained through exit polling.
MAIN POINT: An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified
individuals or groups of individuals for the purpose of determining the probable
result of an election by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they
have voted for, immediately after they have officially cast their ballots. The
results of the survey are announced to the public, usually through the mass
media, to give an advance overview of how, in the opinion of the polling
individuals or organizations, the electorate voted. The freedom of expression is a
means of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of attaining the truth, of securing
participation by the people in social and political decision-making, and of
maintaining the balance between stability and change.
AIRA
CASE NO. 176
ART IX COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SECTION 4:
SUPERVISION/REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES, MEDIA GRANTS,
PRIVILEGES
SWS v. COMELEC
FACTS: Social Weather Stations (SWS) is an institution conducting surveys
in various fields. Kamahalan Publishing Corp., on the other hand, publishes the
Manila Standard which is a newspaper of general circulation and features items
of information including election surveys. Both SWS and Kamahalan are
contesting the validity and enforcement of RA 9006 (Fair Election Act), especially
section 5(4) which provides that surveys affecting national candidates shall not
be published 15 days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates
shall not be published 7 days before election. Petitioner states that it wishes to
conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections and release to
the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioner
argues that the restriction on the publication of election survey results
constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any
clear and present danger to justify such restraint.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre- ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC’s grant of NP-NPC’s petition for
polls and exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media,
valid and constitutional.
registration as a coalition correct.

RULING: No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a RULING: No. The constitutional mandate that the COMELEC
prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total “register, after sufficient publication, political parties,
suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for
a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be
organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other
achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression. requirements, must present their platform or program of
It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters government….” is meant to insure free, orderly, honest, peaceful
of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal
activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so and credible elections. Worse still, the COMELEC betrayed its raison
vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.” d’être of ensuring “free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections” by undermining the constitutional policy of fostering
MAIN POINT: The prohibition against surveys within the specified period is a
prior and unreasonable restraint upon the freedom of expression which is not stable, party-based, program-driven electoral system. The early
reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose of clean, honest, orderly and screening of party or coalition registrants implements this policy.
peaceful elections.
Because the COMELEC ignored its self-imposed deadline, a dubious,
RYLE
hastily patched coalition has now belatedly entered the electoral
Case No. 177
system, flouting a constitutionally rooted policy.
ART. IX-C (COMELEC) SEC. 6: FREE AND OPEN PARTY SYSTEM
Liberal Party vs. COMELEC MAIN POINT: The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) should be
at its most strict in implementing and complying with the standards
FACTS: On July 14, 2009, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. and procedures the Constitution and our laws impose.
8646 setting August 17, 2009 as the last day for the filing of
petitions for registration of political parties. On January 21, 2010, RYLE
the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 8752 setting the
Case No. 178
deadline for filing of petitions for accreditation on February 12,
ART. IX-D (COA) SEC. 1: QUALIFICATIONS, TERMS
2010 and required that accreditation applicants be registered
Mison v. COA
political parties, organizations or coalitions. On February 12, 2010,
petitioner Liberal Party filed its petition for accreditation as a
FACTS: The seizure of M/V "Hyojin Maru" was deemed illegal and
dominant minority party. On the same date, the Nacionalista Party
that the vessel and its cargo be returned to the claimants. Return of
and the Nationalist People’s Coalition filed a petition for
the cargo was effected. Release of the vessel, however, was never
registration as a coalition and asked that it be recognized as the
effected; it sank while yet in the custody of the Bureau of Customs,
dominant minority party for purposes of the May 10, 2010
and requests by the Bureau to the Philippine Navy and the CADA to
elections. The case was docketed as an accreditation case. On April
refloat or salvage the ship could not be complied with for lack of
12, 2010, the en banc granted the NP-NPC’s petition for registration
funds. Chan Chiu On and Cheung I, the owners of the vessel, through
as a coalition through the Resolution assailed in the present case.
their counsel, filed a claim with the Commission on Audit for the
payment of the value of the vessel. Their attempts to claim were
denied on numerous occasions, with the first two attempts being
denied by Mr. Rogelio B. Espiritu, Manager, Technical Service Office
of the COA and Acting COA Chairman Francisco S. Tantuico, before
being decided upon by the COA Chairperson and Commissioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mr. Espiritu had the power to promulgate a
decision concerning the claims made by the owners of the M/V
Hyojin Maru, given that he acted “by authority of the Acting
Chairman."
RULING: No. As Manager of the COA Technical Service Office, Mr.
Espiritu obviously had no power whatever to render and
promulgate a decision of or for the commission. In the first place the
“Espiritu decision” was void ab initio. As manager of the COA
Technical Service Office, Mr. Espiritu obviously had no power
whatever to render and promulgate a decision of or for the
Commission. Indeed, even the Chairman, alone, had not that power.
MAIN POINT: As clearly set out in the Constitution then in force,
the power was lodged in the Commission on Audit, “composed of a
Chairman and two Commissioners.” It was the Commission, as a
collegial body, which then as now, had the jurisdiction to “decide
any case brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for resolution,” subject to review by the Supreme Court
on certiorari.
RYLE
Case No. 179
ART. IX-D (COA) SEC. 2: GENERAL FUNCTION, POWERS
EXAMINE AND AUDIT: GOV’T REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES
Blue Bar Coconut v. Tantuico, Jr.
FACTS: On January 8, 1975, the Governing Board of the PCA issued
Resolution No. 01-75 which reduced the rate of levy from P70.00 to
P40.00 per 100 kilograms of copra and P110.00 to P70.00 per
metric ton of husked nuts. The resolution was effective January 11,
1975. On January 29, 1975, the same Governing Board of the PCA
which issued the January 8, 1975 Resolution No. 01-75 issued
Resolution No. 018-75 which deferred collection of the CCSF levies
from the desiccated coconut industry for a period not exceeding six
(6) months.
Sometime in 1976, respondent Tantuico, Jr. initiated a special audit
of coconut end-user companies. He directed high-ranking officials
within the PCA to collect the short levies and overpaid subsidies,
and to apply subsidy claims to the settlement of short levies should
the petitioners fail to remit the amount due. Petitioners wrote on
March 8, 1977 a letter to the said Chairman requesting
reconsideration of his action, alleging that the supposed
overpayments and/or deficiencies in their remittances were due to
the Chairman’s refusal to recognize the validity of the resolution
passed in January 1975 by the then Governing Board of the PCA. On
September 5, 1977, the COA Chairman wrote the PCA
Administrator. In his letter, the COA Chairman enumerated several
conditions under which the bonds to be posted by the coconut end-
users companies would be accepted, hence this case. The
petitioners also question the respondents’ authority to audit them.
They contend that they are outside the ambit of respondents’
"audit" power which is confined to government-owned or
controlled corporations.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners Blue Bar Coconut Philippines, et
al, being all end-users and as such, are levy-collectors and remitters,
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.
RULING: Yes. Section 2 (1) of Article IX-D of the Constitution ISSUE: Whether or not COA is allowed to conduct post audit.
provides that "The Commission on Audit shall have the power,
RULING: Yes. DBP is no doubt a government corporation and the
authority and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts
question of whether COA Circular 86-299 was retroactively applied
pertaining to the revenues and receipts of, and expenditures or uses
to the subject transaction is thus of no moment. To begin with, there
of funds and property, owned or held in trust by or pertaining to,
was never any retroactive application of post-audit. Regardless of
the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
the result of the pre-audit, it cannot be denied that respondent COA
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
is so empowered to conduct a post-audit.
corporation with original charters, and on a post-audit basis . . . (d)
such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity directly MAIN POINT: Article IX-D, Section 2(1) of the Constitution
or indirectly from or through the Government which are required expressly grants the commission the power to conduct a post audit.
by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a
condition of subsidy or equity." RYLE
Case No. 181
MAIN POINT: The Constitution formally embodies the long ART. IX-D (COA) SEC. 2: GENERAL FUNCTION, POWERS
established rule that private entities who handle government funds EXAMINE AND AUDIT: GOV’T REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES
or subsidies in trust may be examined or audited in their handling Eslao v. COA
of said funds by government auditors.
FACTS: On 9 December 1988, PSU entered into a MOA with the
DENR for the evaluation of 11 government reforestation operations
RYLE in Pangasinan. On 16 January 1989, PSU Vice President for Research
and Extension and Assistant Project Director Victorino P. Espero
Case No. 180
requested the Office of the President, PSU, to have the University's
ART. IX-D (COA) SEC. 2: GENERAL FUNCTION, POWERS
Board of Regents confirm the appointments or designations of
EXAMINE AND AUDIT: GOV’T REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES
involved PSU personnel including the rates of honoraria and per
DBP vs. COA
diems corresponding to their specific roles and functions. The BOR
approved the MOA on 30 January 1989 and on 1 February 1989,
FACTS: DBP conducted a public bidding for one unit of
PSU issued Voucher No. 8902007 representing the amount of
uninterruptible power supply (UPS). Thereafter, DBP issued
P70,375 for payment of honoraria to PSU personnel engaged in the
Purchase Order No. 0137 to Voltronics for P1,436,539.25 inclusive
project. Later, however, the approved honoraria rates were found
of customs duties and taxes. COA sent a notice to the chairman of
to be somewhat higher than the rates provided for in the guidelines
DBP notifying him of the disallowance of the amount of
of National Compensation Circular No. 53. Accordingly, the
P246,539.25 representing customs duties and taxes and at the same
amounts were adjusted downwards to conform to NCC No. 53. On 6
time holding him, along with other petitioners, jointly and severally
July 1989, Bonifacio Icu, COA resident auditor at PSU, issued a
liable for the aforementioned sum.
"Notice of Disallowance" disallowing P64,925 from the amount of
P70,375 stated in Voucher No. 8902007. The resident auditor based
his action on the premise that Compensation Policy Guidelines No.
80-4, dated 7 August 1980, issued by the DBM which provided for
lower rates than NCC No. 53 dated 21 June 1988, also issued by the
Department of Budget and Management, was the schedule for
honoraria and per diems applicable to work done under the MOA of
9 December 1988 between the PSU and the DENR.
ISSUE: Whether or not the evaluation project is in fact a "special
project" and that there were excess of payments of honoraria.
RULING: The instant evaluation project being a Foreign-Assisted
Project, the PSU personnels involved in the project shall be paid
according to the Budget Estimate schedule of the MOA. COA, under
its constitutional mandate, is not authorized to substitute its own
judgment for any applicable law or administrative regulation with
the wisdom or propriety of which, however, it does not agree, at
least not before such law or regulation is set aside by the authorized
agency of government – i.e., the courts – as unconstitutional or
illegal and void.
MAIN POINT: The COA, like all other government agencies, must
respect the presumption of legality and constitutionality to which
statutes and administrative regulations are entitled until such
statute or regulation is repealed or amended, or until set aside in
appropriate case by a competent court and ultimately the Supreme
Court.
AREEJ
CASE NO. 182
ART IX-D (COA) SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS; POWERS
EXAMINE AND AUDIT: GOVT REVENUES AND GOVT EXPENDITURES
J.F.F. Manacop v. CA
FACTS: Petitioner constructed a perimeter fence along the MIA road, even though
the Notice to Proceed was not yet signed by the general manager of private
respondent, in order to prevent would be squatters from entering the area.
However, after the February 1986 revolution, the new general manager of private
respondent stopped the construction of the said fence. By that time 95% was
finished. For two years, petitioner made repeated demands for the payment of
what it has completed but private respondent ignored said demands. Petitioner
then brought the matter to court which ruled that for the services rendered by
the petitioner, it should be paid P238,501.48 based upon a quantum
meruit since there is an absence of a written contract between the parties. Said
amount is the latest evaluation of the work done which evaluation was made by
private respondent itself. On appeal, the private respondent assigned the error
that the trial court should have referred the computation of what should be paid
to petitioner to the COA. The petitioner refuted this assigned error by pointing
out that it is not one of the issues raised before the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the computation of the payment, based upon a quantum
meruit, due the petitioner should be referred to COA.
RULING & MAIN POINT (IN BOLD): NO. Quantum meruit allows recovery of the
reasonable value regardless of any agreement as to value. It entitles the party to
“as much as he reasonably deserves,” as distinguished from quantum valebant or
to “as much as what is reasonably worth.” Unliquidated claims present a
justiciable question ripe for judicial determination which is beyond the
powers of the COA to adjudicate. Recovery based on quantum meruit is in
the nature of such claim because its settlement requires the application of
judgment and discretion and cannot be adjusted by simple arithmetical
processes. As our courts are both courts of law and equity, they are not
powerless to determine a factual matter in accordance with both standards.
Quantum meruit: It entitles the party to “as much as he reasonably deserves,” as
distinguished from quantum valebant or to “as much as what is
reasonably worth.”
AREEJ
CASE NO. 183
ART IX-D (COA) SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS; POWERS
EXAMINE AND AUDIT: GOVT REVENUES AND GOVT EXPENDITURES
Polloso v. Gangan
FACTS: The National Power Corporation (NPC) entered into a service contract
with Atty. Benemerito A. Sattore. Under said contract, Satorre was to provide
services on administrative and legal matters. Unit Auditor Tan issued a Notice
of Disallowance for the payment of the services rendered by Sattore for the
reason that the contract for services did not have the written conformity
and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Corporate Counsel and
concurrence of the Commission on Audit as required under COA Circular
No. 86-255. Upon appeal, petitioner contends that the said Circular is
unconstitutional for being an invalid restriction to the law profession.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA Circular No. 86-255 operates to restrict the practice
of the law profession.
RULING and MAIN POINT (IN BOLD): NO. The questioned COA circular
simply sets forth the prerequisites for a government agency
instrumentality in hiring a private lawyer, which are reasonable safeguards
to prevent irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties.
AREEJ
CASE NO. 184
ART IX-D (COA) SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS; POWERS
EXAMINE AND AUDIT: GOVT REVENUES AND GOVT EXPENDITURES
Uy et. al. v. COA
FACTS: Petitioners were among the more than 60 permanent employees of the
Provincial Engineering Office, Province of Agusan del Sur, who were dismissed
from the service by then Governor Paredes when the latter assumed office to
scale down the operations of the said office. Petitioners sought for reinstatement
before the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which ruled that the
reduction in work force was not done in accordance with civil service rules and
regulations and directed the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur pay
petitioners their back salaries and other money benefits for the period that they
had been out of the service until their reinstatement. The Provincial
Administrator, for and in behalf of Governor Plaza, then wrote a letter to
respondent COA, which saw no further legal impediment to the payment of the
claims of petitioners, which has become the personal liability of former Governor
Paredes, it appearing that the illegal dismissal was done in bad faith as clearly
shown in the herein records. The Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur
refused to release petitioners’ remaining back salaries and other monetary
benefits. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by
respondent COA. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent COA, in the exercise of its power to audit, can
disallow the payment of back wages of illegally dismissed employees by the
Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur.
RULING: NO. In the case at bar, the action taken by COA in disallowing the further
payment by the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur of backwages due the
petitioners amended the final decision of the MSPB. The jurisdiction of the MSPB
to render said decision is unquestionable. This decision cannot be categorized as
void. Thus, we cannot allow the COA to set it aside in the exercise of its broad
powers of audit. The audit authority of COA is intended to prevent irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures, or
uses of government funds and properties. Payment of backwages to
illegally dismissed government employees can hardly be described as
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable.
MAIN POINT: COA cannot say that the responsibility belongs to the official who
made the illegal dismissal when such official has not been heard. Besides,
payment of backwages is not an irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant
expense.
AREEJ
 CASE NO. 185
ART IX-D (COA) SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS; POWERS
EXAMINE AND AUDIT: GOVT REVENUES AND GOVT EXPENDITURES
Aguinaldo v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS: Two cases of malversation of public funds were filed against herein
petitioner Provincial Governor of Cagayan, with regard to the his claims for
intelligence operations charged to the 20% Development Fund and which were
covered by disbursement vouchers with only reimbursement receipts to support
them. Petitioner failed to submit receipts evidencing disbursement for
intelligence activities required by COA Circular No. 77-17D. The Office of the
Ombudsman reinvestigated the case, and petitioner was allowed to submit
documents to prove his claim. The COA Special and Technical Audit Division,
through Provincial Auditor Teresita Rios, stated that the documents may be a
convincing proof that the questioned disbursements were disbursed according
to the intended purpose and not for private consumption. Sandiganbayan
deemed the COA statements to be lacking in definiteness and proceeded with the
trial of the petitioner. In the instant case, petitioner alleges that the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion by completely disregarding the COA
findings and post-audit clearances.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA’s finding, pursuant to its constitutional authority to
examine, audit and settle accounts pertaining to the expenditures of the funds in
question, is conclusive and mandatory and not reviewable except on certiorari
and only by the SC
RULING: NO. COA's approval of petitioner's disbursements only relates to the
administrative aspect of the matter of his accountability but it does not foreclose
the Ombudsman's authority to investigate and determine whether there is a
crime to be prosecuted for which petitioner is answerable. While the COA may
assist in gathering evidence to substantiate a charge of malversation, any
determination made by it will not be conclusive as to whether adequate cause
exists to prosecute a case. This is so because the Ombudsman is given the power
to investigate on its own an illegal act or omission of a public official.
MAIN POINT: The conclusive effect of the finality of the COA's decision on the
executive branch of the government relates solely to the administrative aspect of
the matter.
AREEJ
CASE NO. 186
ART IX-D (COA) SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS; POWERS
EXAMINE AND AUDIT: GOVT REVENUES AND GOVT EXPENDITURES
DBP v. COA
FACTS: The DBP Gratuity Plan authorized the setting up of a retirement fund to
cover the benefits due to DBP retiring officials and employees. The Bank later
established a Special Loan Program, pursuant to which, the DBP Trust Services
Department (DBP-TSD) paid to the investor-members net earnings of the
investments for the years 1991 and 1992 but the payments were disallowed
by the Auditor under Audit Observation Memorandum No. 93-2, on the
ground that the distribution of income of the Gratuity Plan Fund (GPF) to
future retirees of DBP is irregular and constituted the use of public funds
for private purposes which is specifically proscribed under Section 4 of P.D.
1445. Former DBP Chairman requested then COA Chairman to reconsider AOM
No. 93-2, and alleged that the express trust created under the Trust Agreement
gave the Fund a separate legal personality, and all earnings of the Fund
accrue only to the Fund. COA affirmed AOM No. 93-2. Hence, the instant
petition. The DBP reiterates that the income of the Fund should be treated and
recorded as separate from the income of DBP itself.
The OSG argued, citing Section 2, Article IX-D of the Constitution, that petitioner
may ask the lifting of the disallowance by COA, since COA had not yet made a
definitive and final ruling on the matter in issue. But after COA denied with
finality the motion for reconsideration of petitioner, petitioner, being a
government instrumentality, should accept COAs ruling and leave the matter of
questioning COAs decision with the concerned investor-members.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article IX-D of the Constitution bar government
instrumentalities from questioning decisions of the Commission on Audit.
RULING & MAIN POINT (IN BOLD): NO. Section 2, Article IX-D of the
Constitution does not bar government instrumentalities from questioning
decisions of the COA. Government agencies and government-owned and
controlled corporations have long resorted to petitions for certiorari to
question rulings of the COA. These government entities filed their petitions
with this Court pursuant to Section 7, Article IX of the Constitution, which
mandates that aggrieved parties may bring decisions of the COA to the
Court on certiorari. Likewise, the Government Auditing Code expressly
provides that a government agency aggrieved by a COA decision, order or ruling
may raise the controversy to the Supreme Court on certiorari in the manner
provided by law and the Rules of Court.
ANGELO
Case No. 187
ART IX-D COMMISSION OF AUDIT SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTION, POWERS
Examine and Audit: Government revenues and Government expenditures
Home Development Mutual Fund v COA
FACTS: Sec 3 of Republic Act No. 6971 (An Act to Encourage Productivity and
Maintain Industrial Peace by Providing Incentives to Both Labor and Capital)
states its coverage that it shall apply ”to all business enterprises with or without
existing and duly recognized or certified labor organizations, including
government-owned and controlled corporations performing proprietary
functions. It shall cover all employees and workers including casual, regular,
supervisory and managerial employees.” Petitioner HDMF granted Productivity
Incentive Bonus equivalent to one month salary plus allowance to all its
personnel despite the advice of Undersecretary of DBM to all GOCCs and
government financial institutions with original charters performing proprietary
functions to defer payment of the productivity incentive bonus to their
employees, pending the issuance of a definite ruling by the Office of the
President on the matter. The grant of productivity incentive bonus to the HDMF
personnel was disallowed in audit. The disallowance was based on COA Decision
No. 96-288, stating that Republic Act No. 6971 does not apply to government-
owned or controlled corporations or to government financial institutions
with original charters performing proprietary functions, such as the HDMF.
Petitioner contends that when it granted the productivity incentive bonus to its
personnel, no other rule but the Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 6971
dated was in existence.
ISSUE: Whether or not HDMF is excluded from the coverage of RA 6971.
RULING: YES. Petitioner is a government-owned and controlled corporation
performing proprietary functions with original charter or created by special law,
specifically Presidential Decree No. 1752, amending PD No. 1530. As such,
petitioner HDMF is covered by the Civil Service, and, therefore, excluded from the
coverage of Republic Act No. 6971. Even if petitioner HDMF granted the
Productivity Incentive Bonus before the Supplemental Rules were issued
clarifying that petitioner was excluded from the coverage of Republic Act No.
6971, the employees of HDMF did not acquire a vested right over said bonus
because they were not entitled to it under Republic Act No. 6971
MAIN POINT: Since Republic Act No. 6971 intended to cover only government-
owned and controlled corporations incorporated under the general corporation
law, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of the statute is necessarily limited to what is intended and
provided for in the legislative enactment. Hence, the Supplemental Rules
clarified that government-owned and controlled corporations performing
proprietary functions which are “created, maintained or acquired in pursuance
of a policy of the state, enunciated in the constitution or by law, and those whose
officers and employees are covered by the Civil Service” are excluded from the
coverage of Republic Act No. 6971.
ANGELO
Case No. 188
ART IX-D COMMISSION OF AUDIT SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTION, POWERS
Examine and Audit: Government revenues and Government expenditures
DBP v COA
FACTS: The petitioner purchased 5 Mitsubishi L-300 vans and 14 Mitsubishi
Lancer cars which amounted to P5,525,000.00 for its 5 regional offices and 14
branches pursuant to its modernization program. In its Annual Audit Report, the
respondent COA included these transactions among its adverse audit findings
alleging non-compliance by the petitioner with Letter of Instruction No. 667
and Letter of Implementation No. 29 which require Presidential approval for
purchase of transport. While the auditor at the time did not issue a Notice of
Disallowance on this audit finding, she, nonetheless, recommended the filing of
administrative charges against the responsible officers. The incumbent COA
Auditor issued a Notice of Disallowance. This impelled the petitioner to move for
the lifting of the disallowance of P5,525,000.00. According to her, petitioner’s
branches were in dire need of additional vehicles for improved mobility to
support its thrust of providing financial assistance to small and medium
enterprises. The incumbent COA Auditor issued a 4th indorsement letter which
disclosed that the COA suspended in audit the purchase of 2 Mitsubishi
Lancer cars amounting to P525,000.00 made by the DBP-Baguio Branch.
Respondent issued the assailed COA Decision No. 2001-151, which denied
petitioner’s motion for the lifting of the disallowance The Motion for
Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution of the COA. It was received, through
a certain Lolet Toledo. Upon verification, the petitioner learned that the said Lolet
Toledo is a personnel of its Resident Corporate Auditor and that no copy of
the resolution was served upon any of its departments.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not judgments, final orders, and resolution be delivered
personally; and (2) Whether or not the corporate auditor does come within the
definition of “clerk or person having charge” of the office who may be validly
served with a copy of the resolution of the Commission on Audit.
RULING: (1) YES. Judgments, final orders and resolutions are appealable. It is
necessary that they be served personally or, if not possible, by registered
mail accompanied by a written explanation why the service was not done
personally, in order that the period for taking an appeal may be computed.
As a rule, personal service of judgments is done by delivering them personally to
the party or his counsel, or when they are left in his office, with his clerk or with
a person having charge thereof. In case this is not possible, the copy of the
judgment may be left at the party’s or his counsel’s residence with a person of
sufficient age or discretion residing therein.
(2) NO. The Court agree with the petitioner that the resident corporate auditor
of the DBP is neither an official nor an employee of the DBP. He does not
come within the definition of “clerk or person having charge” of the office
who may be validly served with a copy of the resolution of the respondent as
contemplated by the Rules. In fact, the resident corporate auditor is an extension
of the respondent COA and no department of the petitioner was actually served
with a copy of the resolution.
ANGELO
Case No. 189
ART IX-D COMMISSION OF AUDIT SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTION, POWERS
Examine and Audit: Government revenues and Government expenditures
Nava v Pallatao
FACTS: The complaint involving the herein accused was initiated by the COA,
Region XI, Davao City, which resulted from an audit conducted by a team of the
9.36 million allotment which was released by the DECS to its Division Offices. In
the Audit Report, the amount of P603,265 was shown to have been released to
the DECS Division of Davao del Sur for distribution to the newly nationalized high
schools located within the region. The accused Venancio Nava, instead of
referring the allotment to the 155 heads of the nationalized high schools for
the improvement of their facilities, he succeeded in persuading only his 7
schools division superintendents to use the allotment for the purchase of
science education facilities. Evidence shows that accused Nava persuaded his
7 schools division superintendents to ignore the circular that the purchase of
the school materials shall be done through public bidding. The provision on
the conduct of a public bidding was not followed. Instead the purchase was
done through negotiation. The report concluded that the government lost
P380,013.60. After due trial, only petitioner was convicted, while all the other
accused were acquitted. Petitioner was found guilty of entering on behalf of the
government any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous
to the latter, whether or not the public officer profited or would profit thereby.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA’s findings are accorded finality.
RULING: YES. The principal evidence presented during trial was the COA Special
Audit Report. The COA is the agency specifically given the power, authority
and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue
and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of fond and property owned by or
pertaining to the government. It has the exclusive authority to define the
scope of its audit and examination and to establish the required techniques
and methods. Thus, COA’s findings are accorded not only respect but also
finality, when they are not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
An audit is conducted to determine whether the amounts allotted for certain
expenditures were spent wisely, in keeping with official guidelines and
regulations—it is not a witch hunt to terrorize accountable public officials.
ANGELO
Case No. 190
ART IX-D COMMISSION OF AUDIT SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTION, POWERS
Examine and Audit: Government revenues and Government expenditures
Gualberto De Llana v COA
FACTS: The COA issued a circular, lifting the system of pre-audit of
government financial transactions, albeit with certain exceptions. The
circular affirmed the state policy that all resources of the government shall be
managed, expended or utilized in accordance with law and regulations. After the
change in administration due to the February 1986 revolution, grave
irregularities and anomalies in the government’s financial transactions were
uncovered. Hence, the COA issued a circular, which reinstated the pre-audit
of selected government transactions. With the normalization of the political
system and the stabilization of government operations, the COA saw it fit to issue
a circular, which again lifted the pre-audit of government transactions of
national government agencies and government-owned or controlled
corporations. Concomitant to the lifting of the pre-audit of government
transactions of NGAs and GOCCs, the circular mandated the installation,
implementation and monitoring of an adequate internal control system,
which would be the direct responsibility of the government agency head. It
further provided that the pre-audit activities retained by the COA as therein
outlined shall no longer be a pre-requisite to the implementation or
prosecution of projects and the payment of claims. However, the circular did
not include the financial transactions of local government units in its coverage.
Petitioner alleges that the pre-audit duty on the part of the COA cannot be lifted
by a mere circular, considering that pre-audit is a constitutional mandate
enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conduct of pre-audit is mandatory.
RULING: NO. The conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that the Court
may compel the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line with the
constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to
define the scope of its audit and examination. When the language of the law is
clear and explicit, there is no room for interpretation, only application. Neither
can the scope of the provision be unduly enlarged by the Court.
MAIN POINT: The 1987 Constitution has made the COA the guardian of public
funds, vesting it with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government
revenues and expenditures and the use of public funds and property, including
the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination; to
establish the techniques and methods for the review.
ANGELO
Case No. 191
ART IX-D COMMISSION OF AUDIT SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTION, POWERS
Examine and Audit: Government revenues and Government expenditures
Candelario Versoza Jr v Guillermo Carague
FACTS: The petitioner, in his former capacity as Executive Director of the
Cooperative Development Authority purchased from Tetra Corporation a total of
46 units of computer equipment and peripherals in the total amount of
P2,285,279.00. Tetra was chosen from among three qualified bidders. In the
technical evaluation of the units to be supplied by the qualified bidders, CDA
engaged the services of the Development Academy of the Philippines-Technical
Evaluation Committee. The bidding was conducted in accordance with the
Approved Guidelines and Procedures of Public Bidding for Information
Technology Resources. The Resident Auditor sought the assistance of the
Technical Services Office, COA in the determination of the reasonableness of the
prices of the purchased computers. In its reply-letter, the TSO found that the
purchased computers were overpriced/excessive by a total of P881,819.00.
The Resident Auditor issued Notice of Disallowance for the amount of
P881,819.00. Respondent COA issued the assailed decision affirming the
disallowance. It held that whether or not the product is branded is irrelevant
in the determination of the reasonableness of the price since the brand was
not stated in the Call for Bids nor in the Purchase Order. Further, COA
declared that CDA should not have awarded the contract to Tetra but to the other
competing bidders, whose bid is more advantageous to the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA’s affirmation on the disallowance affected the same
rules it imposes on all public officer regarding the manner of conducting
canvasses.
RULING: YES. The COA cannot violate the same rules it imposes on all public
offices regarding the manner of conducting canvasses. These rules essentially
require that written canvasses be made of the same item from at least three
suppliers, using the proper canvass forms. The COA itself cannot violate
these rules by disallowing purchases merely on the basis of an alleged
overpricing. What is more apparent is that petitioner was merely exercising
ministerial functions with regard to the whole process. Thus, absent any evidence
showing that petitioner had any direct participation in the alleged fixing of the
price, or that he exerted undue influence over the PBAC and BOA, he should not
have been made liable under the circumstances. The conduct of public bidding in
this case was not made objectively with the end in view of purchasing quality
equipment at the least cost to the government.
MAIN POINT: COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent and
disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures of government funds.
Ayeh CASE NO. 192
ART. IX-C (COA) SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS; POWERS
EXAMINE AND AUDIT: GOV’T REVENUE AND GOV’T EXPENDITURES
PH Coconut v. Republic
FACTS: During martial law in 1972, there had been issuances of several
presidential decrees purportedly designed to improve the coconut industry
through the collection and use of the coconut levy fund. This is a consolidated
case of allegations about the alleged misuse of the coconut levy funds to buy out
the majority of the outstanding shares of stock of San Miguel Corporation.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA has jurisdiction over the said matter.
RULING: YES. Any property purchased by means of the coconut levy funds
should likewise be treated as public funds or public property, subject to the
burdens and restrictions attached by law to such property.
MAINPOINT: By the decision of the Court, it is fairly established that the coconut
levy funds are special public funds and subject to the burdens and restrictions
attached by law to such property. The Constitution by express provision, vests
the COA with the responsibility for State Audit. therefore, coconut levy funds
being public funds, falls under the jurisdiction of the COA.
“The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine,
audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or
pertaining to the Government xxx”

Ayeh CASE NO. 193
ART. IX-C (COA) SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS; POWERS
AUDIT JURISDICTION
Caltex v. COA
FACTS: Commission on Audit directed Caltex Philippines Inc. to remit its
collection to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF), not including the additional
taxes on petroleum products authorized under the PD 1956 (imposing ad
valorem tax on certain manufactured oils xxx) for the specified years of 1986 and
1988. Caltex submitted a proposal to COA for the payment and the recovery of
claims of which COA received and approved but prohibited the company from
offsetting remittances and reimbursements for the present and succeeding years.
Caltex filed for a reconsideration but was denied, hence, this petition to the Court.
ISSUE: WON COA acted with GAD and completely without jurisdiction in
declaring that petitioner cannot avail of the right to offset any amount that it may
be required under the law to remit to the OPSF against any amount that it may
receive by way of reimbursement therefrom.
RULING: NO. COA acted within the scope of its jurisdiction. Section 2, Subdivision
D, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides: Sec. 2(l). The
Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit,
and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or
pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations
with original charters, and on a post-audit basis those enumerated under this
provision.
MAINPOINT: The audit power of the Auditor General under the 1935
Constitution and the Commission on Audit under the 1973 Constitution
authorized them to disallow illegal expenditures of funds or uses of funds and
property. Our present Constitution retains that same power and authority,
further strengthened by the definition of the COA’s general jurisdiction in Section
26 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines and Administrative Code
of 1987.
Ayeh CASE NO. 194
ART. IX-C (COA) SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS; POWERS
AUDIT JURISDICTION
Mamaril v. Domingo
FACTS: Petitioner was formerly an Evaluator/Computer of the Land
Transportation Office (LTO) at its San Pablo City Branch. In the course of the
performance of his duties, he committed errors in his evaluation and
computation, resulting in the under collection of registration, license and other
miscellaneous fees and penalties. As a result of the decision of the COA, the
amount of P44,515.90 be withheld from petitioner’s terminal leave pay other
than his retirement gratuity he has not received in full the benefits due him from
his retirement.
Petitioner contended that he could not be held liable on the audit disallowances
because he was not an accountable officer within the meaning of Section 101 of
P.D. No. 1445 (1978) since: (a) his work was purely clerical; (b) he did not come
into possession of any money or property for which he is now asked to pay; and
(c) he did not act in bad faith or with gross negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is not an accountable officer and is
therefore not within the scope of the auditing power of COA.
RULING: No. The Commission has authority not just over accountable
officers but also over other officers who perform functions related to
accounting such verification of evaluations and computations of fees
collectible, and the adoption of internal rules of control. In the case at bar,
the Solicitor General and the petitioner overlooked that petitioner's duties as an
Evaluator/Computer constituted an indispensable part of the process of the
assessment and collection of motor vehicle registration fees and such nature falls
within the scope of the Commission’s jurisdiction.
MAINPOINT: State audit is not limited to the auditing of the accountable officers
and the settlement of accounts, but includes accounting functions and the
adoption in the audited agencies of internal controls to see to it, among other
matters, that the correct fees and penalties due the government are collected.
Ayeh CASE NO. 195
ART. IX-C (COA) SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS; POWERS
AUDIT JURISDICTION
Philippine Airlines v. COA
FACTS: Commission on Audit wrote PAL a letter advising it to desist from bidding
the company's fuel supply contracts, considering that existing regulations
require government-owned or controlled corporations and other agencies of
government to procure their petroleum product requirements from PETRON
Corporation. PAL sought reconsideration of such advise by the COA two times but
was not heeded. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA exceeded its jurisdiction in extending the application
of said department order to petitioner.
RULING: YES. As a business operation heavily dependent on fuel supply, for PAL
to rely solely on a single supplier would indeed be impracticable. To compel it to
do so would amount to a grave abuse of discretion on its part as this might well
lead to irregular, excessive or unconscionable expenditures, the very evil sought
to be avoided in the creation of the COA.
This, however, is so much water under the bridge. PAL's corporate complexion
having changed during the pendency of the instant petition from government-
controlled to private ownership, the Court dismissed the petition for being moot
and academic.
MAINPOINT: The authority granted under the constitution enables COA to adopt
as its own, simply by reiteration or by reference, without the necessity of
promulgation, already existing rules and regulations. It may also expand the
coverage thereof to agencies or instrumentalities under its audit jurisdiction. In
the case at bar, although COA was correct in ruling that Department Order No. 19
applied to PAL as a government agency at the time, it nonetheless gravely abused
its discretion in not exempting PAL therefrom.
However, PAL, having ceased to be a government-owned or controlled
corporation, is no longer under the audit jurisdiction of the COA. Accordingly, the
question raised in this petition has clearly become moot and academic.
Ayeh CASE NO. 196
ART. IX-C (COA) SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS; POWERS
AUDIT JURISDICTION
CIR v. COA
FACTS: Then BIR Commissioner recommended to the Minister of Finance
payment to private petitioner Savellano of an informer's reward for information
denouncing tax liabilities of several entities. Said recommendation having been
favorably passed upon by the Committee on Rewards of the Department of
Finance, the same was approved by then Deputy Minister of Finance Alfredo Pio
de Roda, Jr.; and Savellano was in due time paid the aforesaid amount when COA
disallowed it through a decision that lead the filing of this petition by the CIR.
Public petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue argues that: the approval by
the Department of Finance of the claim for informer's reward of petitioner
Savellano is conclusive upon the executive agencies concerned, respondent COA
included, as it constitutes the final determination of the proper administrative
authority under Section 90 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not the approval of DOF of the informer’s reward is conclusive
upon COA.
RULING: No. The final determination by the Department of Finance, through the
recommendation of the BIR of Savellano's entitlement to the informer's reward
under Section 90 is conclusive only upon the executive agencies concerned.
Respondent COA is not an executive agency but is one of the three (3)
independent constitutional commissions. Specifically, it is the constitutional
agency vested with the "power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle
all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses
of funds and property owned or held in trust by . . . the government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities".
MAINPOINT: The final determination made by the Finance Department cannot
bind respondent COA or foreclose its review thereof in the exercise of its
constitutional function and duty to ensure that public funds are expended and
used in conformity with law. To hold otherwise would be to ignore the clear
mandate and the equally clear implications of Section 3, Article IX (D)of the 1987
Constitution providing that:
No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the government of its subsidiary
in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of
the Commission on Audit.
RAIZA
CASE NO. 197
ART IX-D SEC 2: General Functions; Powers
Audit Jurisdiction
CSC vs. Pobre
FACTS: Respondent Hermogenes P. Pobre is a former government official who
retired from the government service three times. The first two times he retired,
respondent Pobre received his terminal leave pay amounting to P310,522.60 and
P55,000, respectively. On his third retirement, respondent Pobre claimed
payment of his terminal leave based on his highest monthly salary as PRC
chairman but to be reckoned from the date he first entered the government service
as budget examiner in the defunct Budget Commission in 1958. He invoked Section
13 of Commonwealth Act 186 which provides that the amount of annuity shall be
computed from the date of original employment. Petitioner CSC promulgated a
Resolution stating that all respondent Pobre was entitled to were his terminal
leave benefits based only on his accrued leave credits from the date of his
assumption to office as PRC chairman and not his total terminal leave credits,
including those earned in other government agencies from the beginning of his
government service. The Court of Appeals set aside the resolutions of petitioner
CSC and declared that it was the COA, not petitioner CSC, which had jurisdiction
to adjudicate respondent Pobre’s claim for terminal leave benefits. Thus this
petition.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioner CSC has an exclusive jurisdiction to pass upon the
validity of respondent’s claim for terminal leave
RULING: NO. The SC held that while the determination of leave benefits is within
the functions of the CSC as the central personnel agency of the government, the
duty to examine accounts and expenditures relating to such benefits properly
pertains to the COA. Where government expenditures or use of funds is involved,
the CSC cannot claim exclusive jurisdiction simply because leave matters are
involved. Thus, even as we recognize CSC’s jurisdiction in this case, its power is
not exclusive as it is shared with the COA.
MAIN POINT: While the determination of leave benefits is within the functions
of the CSC as the central personnel agency of the government, the duty to examine
accounts and expenditures relating to such benefits properly pertains to the COA;
Even as the Court recognizes CSC’s jurisdiction in this case, its power is not
exclusive as it is shared with the COA.
RAIZA
CASE NO. 198
ART IX-D SEC 2: General Functions; Powers
Audit Jurisdiction
Luciano Veloso (velos) vs COA
FACTS: On December 7, 2000, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No.
8040 entitled An Ordinance Authorizing the Conferment of Exemplary Public
Service Award to Elective Local Officials of Manila Who Have Been Elected for
Three (3) Consecutive Terms in the Same Position.
SEC. 2. The EPSA shall consist of a Plaque of Appreciation, retirement and
gratuity pay remuneration equivalent to the actual time served in the position for
three (3) consecutive terms, subject to the availability of funds as certified by the
City Treasurer. ….xxx…..
Pursuant to the ordinance, the City made partial payments to some former city
councilors including herein petitioners the total amount of P9,923,257.00.
The Director, Legal and Adjudication Office (LAO)-Local of the COA issued a
Notice of Disallowance. They opined that the monetary reward under the EPSA is
covered by the term “compensation.” Though it recognizes the local autonomy of
LGUs, it emphasized the limitations thereof set forth in the Salary Standardization
Law (SSL). It explained that the SSL does not authorize the grant of such
monetary reward or gratuity. Petitioners insist that the power and authority of
the COA to audit government funds and accounts does not carry with it in all
instances the power to disallow a particular disbursement.
ISSUE: W/N the power and authority of the COA to audit government funds and
accounts does not carry with it in all instances the power to disallow a particular
disbursement
RULING: No. The SC held that under the 1987 Constitution, the COA is vested
with the authority to determine whether government entities, including LGUs,
comply with laws and regulations in disbursing government funds, and to
disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of these funds.
MAIN POINT: COA has exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this
Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques
and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules
and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable
expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.”
Raiza
CASE NO. 199
ART IX-D SEC 2: General Functions; Powers
Audit Jurisdiction
Boy Scout of the Phil vs. COA
FACTS: COA issued a Resolution, with the subject “Defining the Commission’s
Policy with respect to the audit of the Boy Scout of the Philippines.” Contending
that the BSP was created as a public corporation, and that in BSP vs. NLRC, the
Supreme Court ruled that the BSP, as constituted under its charter, was a
Government Owned and Controlled Corporation within the meaning of Art. IX (B)
(2) (1) of the Constitution, and that the BSP is regarded as a government
instrumentality under the Administrative Code. For the purposes of audit
supervision, the BSP shall be classified among the government corporations to be
audited by employing the team audit approach. The BSP sought reconsideration
of the COA Resolution in a letter signed by then BSP National President Jejomar
C. Binay, saying that it is not subject to the COA’s jurisdiction.
ISSUE: W/N the BSP is a public corporation and thus subject to the audit
jurisdiction of COA.
RULING: YES. The SC held that after looking at the legislative history of its
amended charter and carefully studying the applicable laws and the arguments
of both parties, they find that the BSP is a public corporation and its funds are
subject to the COA’s audit jurisdiction. The BSP Charter (Commonwealth Act No.
111), entitled “An Act to Create a Public Corporation to be Known as the Boy
Scouts of the Philippines, and to Define its Powers and Purposes” created the BSP
as a “public corporation”. Several provisions of the all are also cited, asserting
that the BSP is a public instrumentalities and thus subject to the jurisdiction of
the COA.
MAIN POINT: Section 2 of Art IX-C provides that the Commission on Audit shall
have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts
pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and
property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of
its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned and
controlled corporations with original charters….x
Raiza
CASE NO. 200
ART IX-D SEC 2: General Functions; Powers
Audit Jurisdiction
Dela Lana vs COA
FACTS: Petitioner dela Llana (a taxpayer) wrote to the Commission on Audit
(COA) regarding the recommendation of the Senate Committee on Agriculture
and Food that the Department of Agriculture set up an internal pre-audit service.
The COA replied informing him of the prior issuance of Circular No. 89-299,
which provides that whenever the circumstances permits it, the COA may
reinstitute pre-audit or adopt such other control measures as necessary and
appropriate to protect the funds and property of an agency. The petitioner filed
the petition for Certiorari. He alleges that the pre-audit is a constitutional mandate
enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. He claimed that the
lack of pre-audit by COA, serious irregularities in government transactions have
been committed. Respondents, filed their Comment on the petition and argued
that the petition must be dismissed because it is not proper for a petition for
certiorari because: 1. there is no allegation showing that COA exercised judicial
or quasi- judicial functions when it promulgated Circular No. 89-299 2. there is no
convincing explanation showing the promulgation of the circular was done with
grave abuse of discretion. Respondents claim that the circular is valid, as COA has
the power under the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: W/N the duty to conduct pre-audit is included in the constitutional duty
of COA
RULING: NO. The SC held that there is nothing in Par 1. Section 2 of Article IX-D
of the 1987 Constitution that requires the COA to conduct a pre-audit of all
government transactions and for all government agencies. The only clear
reference to a pre-audit requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which
provides that a post-audit is mandated for certain government or private entities
with state subsidy or equity and only when the internal control system of an
audited entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may adopt measures,
including a temporary or special pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies.
MAIN POINT: The conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court
may compel the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line with the
constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to define
the scope of its audit and examination.
Raiza
CASE NO. 201
ART IX-D SEC 2: General Functions; Powers
Audit Jurisdiction
Philippine Operations Inc., vs Auditor-General
FACTS: POI entered into a barter agreement with the Bureau of Prisons whereby
it agreed to deliver to the Bureau a sawmill, complete, with a diesel fuel engine, a
stop saw edge and log turner, etc., and two LCMs in good turning condition, in
exchange for 350,000 board feet of sawed lumber. The receipt that an employee
of the Bureau of Prisons issued for the sawmill and its accessories discloses
following unsatisfactory conditions. The Attorney of POI claim with the Auditor
General demanding cash payment plus damaged incurred. The Auditor denied
the claim because the agreement entered into was one of barter and no money
consideration came to mind and that the Bureau of Prisons was willing to
perform its part of the obligation. The respondents contend that Commonwealth
Act No. 327, which imposes upon the Auditor General the duty of acting upon and
deciding "all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims…” does not
authorize or empower the Auditor General to pass upon the petitioner's claim,
because the term "claims" used in the said Act can refer to no other than
liquidated claims. Petitioner argues that under Commonwealth Act No. 3038,
Sections 1 and 2, the Auditor General has been granted the additional power upon
"any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied,
which could serve as a basis for civil action between private parties,".
ISSUE: W/N the Auditor General has jurisdiction over unliquidated claim
RULING: No. the SC held that he Auditor General has no jurisdiction or power to
take cognizance of claims for unliquidated damages. An examination of the
provisions of the Constitution fails to disclose any power vested in or granted to
the Auditor General to consider claims. All that is vested in the Auditor General is
the settlement of accounts. "Accounts," because of the absence of any reasons to
the contrary, must be deemed to have the same meaning as accounts under the
laws in force before the approval of the Constitution. The Constitution does not
grant the Auditor General the right to consider claims. After the promulgation of
the Constitution, the power was granted under the provisions of Commonwealth
Act No. 327.
MAIN POINT: All that is vested in the Auditor General is the settlement of
accounts. "Accounts," because of the absence of any reasons to the contrary, must
be deemed to have the same meaning as accounts under the laws in force before
the approval of the Constitution. The Constitution does not grant the Auditor
General the right to consider claims.
Who digested: COELI
Case no. 202
Article IX, COA, Sec. 3, AUDIT JURISDICTION
INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA (ICNA)
vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, UNITED
STATES LINES COMPANY and/or LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION
FACTS: ICNA filed, in the Court of First Instance of Manila, an action for the
recovery of P86,081.30, the insured value of a shipment of eighty-two (82)
cartons of goods, allegedly lost in the custody of the carrier, defendant United
States Lines, Co., or of the lighter operator, defendant Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation, or of the arrastre operator, defendant Bureau of Customs, an agency
of defendant Republic of the Philippines. The Republic of the Philippines and the
Bureau of Customs, moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming State immunity
from suit.
The court denied the Republic's and Bureau of Customs' motion to dismiss.
Subsequently, however, said court, taking notice of SC’s decision in Mobil
Philippines Exploration, Inc. vs. Bureau of Customs dismissed the case with respect
to the Republic of the Philippines and the Bureau of Customs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner should have filed through the Auditor
General, it being for money claims.
RULING: YES. In this case, the existence of a specific and fixed debt is the issue,
the Auditor General has power to act on the claim
However, when the existence and also the amount of an unfixed and
undetermined debt is involved, said official has no competence to consider such
a claim.
MAIN POINT: Auditor General is competent to consider money claims, but not
competent to decide money claims for damages.
Who digested: COELI
Case no. 203
Article IX, COA, Sec. 3, AUDIT JURISDICTION
DINGCONG vs GUINGONA
FACTS: Petitioner, Atty. Praxedio P. Dingcong, was the former Acting Regional
Director of Regional Office No. VI of the Bureau of Treasury in Iloilo City, until his
retirement. He contracted on an "emergency labor basis " the services of one
Rameses Layson, a private carpenter and electrician on "pakyao" basis for the
renovation and improvement of the Bureau of Treasury Office.
When petitioner retired, among the items disallowed by the Resident Auditor
was the amount of P6,574.00 from the labor contracts with Layson, by reducing
the latter's daily rate from P40.00 per day to P18.00 daily.
Petitioner appealed to the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, who affirmed
the disallowance as being "excessive and disadvantageous to the government,"
but increased Layson's daily rate to P25.00 thereby reducing the total amount
disallowed to P4,276.00. Despite petitioner's request for reconsideration,
respondent Commission remained unmoved, hence, the instant appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the disallowance made by COA was invalid for being a
usurpation of a management function and an impairment of contract.
RULING: NO. The disallowance made by COA is neither illegal nor a usurpation
of a management function. The authority of the petitioner, as agency head, to
enter into a contract is not being curtailed. What COA maintains is that the
"pakyao" contract has proved disadvantageous to the government.
MAIN POINT: COA determines whether or not: (a) the fiscal responsibility that
rests directly with the head of the government agency has been properly and
effectively discharged; and (b) there has been loss or wastage of government
resources.
Case no. 204
Article IX, COA, Sec. 3, AUDIT JURISDICTION
NHC vs. COA
FACTS: There are no uncertainties on the facts of the case. Our government
forged an agreement on financial cooperation with the Republic of Germany. The
agreement empowered the NHA (National Housing Authority) and the KFW
(Kreditanstalt Fur Weideraufbau) to be the lender or the project sponsor of the
Urban Housing Dagat Dagatan Project II.
However, despite all the negotiations and contracts, the project was not
completed as scheduled. Thus, an extension of the contracts was made since the
NHA did not appear to have much choice. Several extensions were made which
triggered the difficulties experienced by the NHA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COA has the authority to disallow a duly entered
contract and substitute its own judgment or disposition in lieu of the decision of
the management or governing body of the government entities.
RULING: YES. Since the COA is responsible for the enforcement of the rules and
regulations, it goes without saying that failure to comply with them is a ground
for disapproving the payment of the proposed expenditure.
MAIN POINT: Court recognized the authority of COA to disallow irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable (IUEEU) expenditures.
Case no. 205
Article IX, COA, Sec. 3, AUDIT JURISDICTION
Euro-Med v. Province of Batangas, 495 SCRA 30 [2006]
FACTS: Petitioner Euro-Med Laboratories, Phil., Inc. filed a complaint against
Province of Batangas for unpaid balance still due to the petitioner. Respondent
alleged that some payments it had already made were not reflected in the
computation set forth in the complaint and that it was continuously exerting
genuine and earnest efforts "to find out the true and actual amount owed."
At the conclusion of petitioner's presentation of evidence, respondent filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the primary jurisdiction over
petitioner's money claim was lodged with the COA. Respondent pointed out that
petitioner's claim, arising as it did from a series of procurement transactions with
the province, was governed by the Local Government Code provisions and COA
rules and regulations on supply and property management in local governments.
Respondent argued that the case called for a determination of whether these
provisions and rules were complied with, and that was within the exclusive
domain of COA to make.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA which has primary jurisdiction to pass upon
petitioner's money claim against the Province of Batangas.
RULING: YES. COA has the primary jurisdiction, and not the RTC. The
circumstances surrounding petitioner's claim brought it clearly within the ambit
of the COA's jurisdiction.
MAIN POINT: The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that
its determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of
an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative
proceeding before resort to the courts is had even if the matter may well be
within their proper jurisdiction.
Case no. 206
Article IX, COA, Sec. 3, DEFINE SCOPE AND TECHNIQUES OF AUDITING
PROCEDURES
Danville Maritime v. COA, 175 SCRA 701 [1989]
FACTS: Petitioner seeks to set aside the letter-directive of respondent COA for
disapproving the result of the public bidding held by the Philippine National Oil
Company (PNOC ) of the sale of its tanker-vessel "T/T Andres Bonifacio" on the
ground that only one bidder submitted a bid and to direct COA to approve the
said sale.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA committed a grave abuse of discretion when it ruled
that there was a failure of bidding when only one bid was submitted and
subsequently ordered a rebidding.
RULING: NO. It is provided in COA Circular No. 88-264 that there should at least
be two (2) bidders, otherwise there is a failure of bidding.
Negotiated sale may only be undertaken under the failure of the second bidding.
Only the SC can review the decisions made by COA.
MAIN POINT: No less than the Constitution has ordained that the COA shall have
exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the
techniques and methods required therefore, and promulgate accounting and
auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures, or use of government funds and properties.
KARLY
CASE NO. 207
ART IX SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS; POWERS
AUDIT JURISDICTION: PROMULGATE ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING RULES
Leycano v. COA
FACTS: The Commission on Audit (COA) Decision No. 2002-129 which denied
petitioner’s appeal of the Notices of Disallowance is being challenged in the
present Petition for Certiorari.
Petitioner Manuel Leycano, Jr. was the Provincial Treasurer of Oriental Mindoro
and at the same time a member of the Provincial School Board (PSB) of that
province. During his tenure, he was appointed by the PSB as a member of its
Inspectorate Team which, according to him, had the function of "monitoring the
progress of PSB projects.”
In the year 1995, several checks were issued to various private contractors in
connection with the repair, rehabilitation, and construction projects covered by
the Special Education Fund (SEF) of Oriental Mindoro in the several public
schools.
The Special Audit Team found deficiencies in the projects, hence, it issued the
questioned Notices of Disallowance holding petitioner, along with Sangguniang
Panlalawigan Member Remedios Marasigan and Schools Division Superintendent
Benjamin Cruz, liable for signing the Certificates of Inspection (the dates of which
have not been alleged by either party) relative to the projects and thereby falsely
attesting to their 100% completion.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is held accountable for the said project
RULING: YES, In this case, there was such irregularity when petitioner and other
members of the Team attested to the 100% completion of the projects
notwithstanding their undisputed deficiencies. Petitioner should have perceived
the anomaly in the existence of Acceptance Reports executed by DECS
officials prior to the Inspectorate Team’s assessment of the projects and its
issuance of a certificate of inspection. Strangely, rather than being alerted by this
circumstance, petitioner even claims that these Acceptance Reports were among
his bases for signing the Certificate of Inspection.
MAIN POINT: “In addition, the authority of the COA to hold petitioner liable is also
implied in its duty to "promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations,
including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government
funds and properties."
 CASE NO. 208
ART IX SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS; POWERS
AUDIT JURISDICTION: DECIDE ADMIN CASES INVOLVING EXPENDITURES OF
PUBLIC FUNDS
National Center for Mental Health Mngt v. COA, 265 SCRA 390
FACTS: An increase in its budgetary allocation of from P145 million in 1987 to P191
million in 1988 enabled petitioner NCMH, headed by Dr. Brigida Buenaseda, to
finally undertake the rehabilitation, apparently long overdue, of various facilities in
the NCMHM.
Soon after most of the work was accomplished, the NCMHM Nurses Association
lodged with the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint against petitioners for alleged
mismanagement of funds. At the same time, the group asked the COA to undertake an
audit of the NCMHM. Acting on the request, the COA directed an audit, covering the
transactions made in 1988 and the first four (4) months of 1989, to be conducted by a
Special Audit Team ("SAT"). On 27 July 1992, the SAT submitted its SAO (Special
Audit Office) report that states that a use of bulk of the budget was unnecessary,
extravagant and/or excessive. While the incurrence of these expenditures made the
physical surroundings pleasant, it left some basic hospital needs unattended to or given
minimal attention.
The SAO report and the evaluation report were brought to COA en banc for review
and were denied for alleging that there was an overpricing, splitting, violation of rues
of public bidding, and unlawful alterations of dates”. Hence, this petition alleged that
COA to have committed Grave Abuse of Discretion, that they denied due process and
that the findings found in the SAO report was not substantiated evidence but by
suspicion.
Issue: WON the expenditures were considered to be was unnecessary, extravagant
and/or excessive.
RULING: NO, Although NCMH management has the absolute and/or sole discretion
on matters affecting the use of its funds for a particular purpose, i.e., MOOE, as
specifically stated in its budget, this must yield to the constitutionally mandated power
of the Commission to prevent the incurrence of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable use of public funds. In the light of the operational
definition of these expenses and the standard or list of situational cases indicated in
COA Circular No. 85-55A.
MAIN POINT: The term extravagant expenditures signifies those incurred without
restraint, judiciousness and economy. Extravagant expenditures exceed the bounds of
propriety. These expenditures are immoderate, prodigal, lavish, luxurious, wasteful,
grossly excessive, and injudicious (COA Cir. 88-55A, supra),
CASE NO. 209
ART IX SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS; POWERS
AUDIT JURISDICTION: DECIDE ADMIN CASES INVOLVING EXPENDITURES OF
PUBLIC FUNDS
Ramos v. Aquino, 39 SCRA 256 [1971]
Facts: Appellants, assailed the jurisdiction of respondent Benjamin Aquino, then
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, to conduct the preliminary investigation of the alleged
commission of malversation through falsification of Public, official and
commercial documents imputed to them by the other respondent, then the
Commanding General, Philippine Army, Fort Bonifacio, Rizal, Romeo Espino.
The basis for such a petition was that under the Constitution, the Auditor General
is not only vested with the duty to examine or audit all expenditures of funds of
the Government, but also to audit or investigate and "bring to the attention of the
proper administrative officer expenditures of funds or property which in this
opinion are irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant." It is their
contention that under the above, it is incumbent on the Auditor General to
determine whether criminal responsibility for the anomaly discovered in the
course of his audit or examination of the accounts lies.
Issue: Won the investigation of the cases by the Provincial Fiscal encroached
upon the powers of the Auditor General.
RULING: NO, There is the explicit requirement then that there be no expenditure
of public funds except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Though the
power of the purse belongs to the legislative, they are not in a position to oversee
and supervise the actual release of each and every appropriation. That is where
the Auditor General comes in. He serves as the necessary check to make certain
that no department of the government exceeds the statutory limits of the
appropriation to which it is entitled.
MAIN POINT: The exclusive jurisdiction of the Auditor General refer to auditor
requirements and approval but not to the criminal liability, if any, of the persons
involved in an alleged irregular or anomalous disbursement of public funds. The
authority of the Fiscal to investigate whether a criminal act has been committed
or not in the disbursement of public funds is not included in the administrative
findings of the Auditor General.

CASE NO. 210
ART IX SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS; POWERS
AUDIT JURISDICTION: DECIDE ADMIN CASES INVOLVING EXPENDITURES OF
PUBLIC FUNDS
Salva v. Carague, 511 SCRA 258
Facts: Petitioner Dr. Teresita L. Salva, President of the Palawan State
University(formerly Palawan State College [PSC]), is being held personally liable
by the Commission on Audit (COA) for the disallowance made on the construction
of Phase II, Multi-Purpose Building of the PSC in the amount of P274,726.38
In 1992, the PSC and the Integrand Development Construction, Inc. (IDCI)entered
into a Construction Agreement for the construction of the PSC Multi-Purpose
Building (Phase II) for the price of P1,685,883.45.
When the COA-Technical Audit Specialist (COA-TAS) reviewed the contract, it
found excess amounts attributed to the costs of items of
mobilization/demobilization and earth fill and compaction.
In COA Decision No. 95-211 dated March 28, 1995, petitioner, together with
PSCVice-President Francisco M. Romantico and PSC Accountant Carolina S.
Baloran, were held jointly and severally liable for the amount of P274,726.38
which was the excess amount. The COA further affirmed said disallowance in COA
Decision No. 2000-273dated September 26, 2000, with the modification that
Romantico and Baloran were excused from any liability, while Engineers
Norberto S. Dela Cruz and Lucy JanetPasion, and the IDCI Manager, were included
as persons liable for the amount.
Issue:
WON petitioner should be held personally liable for the disallowed amount?
RULING: NO, the court found that her only participation is to approve the
Approved Agency Estimates (AAE) prepared by PSU Engineers Norberto S. dela
Cruz and Lucy Janet R. Pasion. She cannot be held personally liable for the
disallowance simply because she was the final approving authority of the
transaction in question. Also, being the president of PSU does not automatically
make her the party ultimately liable in case of disallowance of expenses for
questionable transactions of her agency.
MAIN POINT: An official or employee shall be personally liable for unauthorized
expenditures if the following requisites are present, to wit: (a) there must be an
expenditure of government funds or use of government property; (b) the
expenditure is in violation of law or regulation; and(c) the official is found
directly responsible.
CASE NO. 211
ART IX SEC 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS; POWERS
AUDIT JURISDICTION: DECIDE ADMIN CASES INVOLVING EXPENDITURES OF
PUBLIC FUNDS
City of Basilan v. Hechanova, 58 SCRA 711 [1974]
Facts: The City of Basilan, by ordinance created the position of Assistant City
Auditor in1954. Private respondent Miguel Antonio was appointed to this
position. In 1964, the city abolished the position by through another ordinance,
deleting the position from the plantilla and specifying no compensation for the
office. Respondents contested the authority of the City of Basilan to abolish the
position, hence Antonio continued to discharge the functions of his office.
Issue: WON the City of Basilan can dissolve the office of Assistant City Auditor by
ordinance
RULING: NO. The office of Assistant City Auditor is dissimilar from that of a city
employee. It comes within the purview of the Auditor General, a constitutionally
created position. It is a position primarily under the General Auditing Office.
Therefore, the City of Basilan does not have sole jurisdiction over the position,
much less the power to abolish it.
MAIN POINT: "As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not
amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be
valid, the abolition must be made in good faith. Where the abolition is made in
bad faith, for political or personal reasons, or in order to circumvent the
constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees, it is null and void ..."
ARZHY
CASE NO. 212
ART IX SEC 3: COMMISSION ON AUDIT
COA JURISDICTION
Luciano Veloso v. Commisssion on Audit
FACTS: COA disallowed the monetary reward as part of the Exemplary Public
Service Award (EPSA) to former three-term councilors of the City of Manila
authorized by City Ordinance No. 8040. Petitioners claimed that the power and
authority of COA to audit government funds and accounts does not carry with it
all instances the power to disallow a particular disbursement. COA’s remedy,
according to petitioner, is to bring to the attention of the proper administrative
officer such expenditures that, in its opinion, are irregular, unnecessary,
excessive or extravagant.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA has the authority to disallow the disbursement of
local government funds

RULING: Yes, COA is vested with the authority to determine whether government
entities, including Local Government Units (LGUs), comply with laws and
regulations in disbursing government funds, and to disallow illegal or irregular
disbursements of these funds. Previous ruling of the Court re bringing to the
attention of the proper administrative body any irregular, unnecessary, excessive
or extravagant expenditure of public funds as COA’s remedy has already been
overturned.

MAIN POINT: Pursuant to its mandate as the guardian of public funds, the COA
is vested with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenue
and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property. It is endowed with
enough latitude to determine, prevent, disallow irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds.