Historical Perspectives On Apollo

VOLUME 5 APRIL 1968 NUMBER 4
Historical Perspectives on Apollo

EUGENE M. EMME
NASA, Washington, D.C.
T HIS historical essay focuses upon the major elements cul-

minating in mid-1961 with a national decision to broaden
and to accelerate the American space program.* A review of
policies and research, but its first Langley Laboratory wind
tunnel did not begin operations until 1920. Only Britain
created an independent air service immediately after the
Downloaded by 123.2.138.201 on July 19, 2019 | http://arc.aiaa.org | DOI: 10.2514/3.29263
earlier events and national decisions influencing aerospace Armistice. As the "Cinderella" of the military services the
technology and of the evolution of the concept and com- Royal Air Force was an institutional response to the destruc-
ponents for a lunar landing mission will lend meaning and per- tion of England's insularity by the direct if modest challenge
spective to the known facts and circumstances of 1961. In of the Zeppelin and Gotha bombing attacks.4
turn, the historic lunar landing program decision of 1961 pro- 1926 was a pivotal year. Robert H. Goddard made the
vides perspective upon contemporary consideration of goals world's first but unpublicized liquid-fuel rocket demonstration
and means related to the space ventures that will follow at Auburn, Massachusetts, an innovative event not unlike the
Apollo. Kitty Hawk flights in 1903 by the Wright brothers.5 Ger-
many's commercial aviation, consolidated in Lufthansa,
dominated European airways despite the fact that Germany
Perspective on Turning Points had been denied an air force under the Versailles Treaty of
1919, and its aircraft industry had been bankrupted. It was a
From Kitty Hawk to Sputnik, and from Mercury toward year of national decision in the United States. The passage of
the landing of an Apollo crew on the surface of the Moon, the Air Commerce Act created an Assistant Secretary of
an ever-accelerating rate of technical change and its ever- Commerce for Air, and Assistant Secretaries for Air were
broadening impact upon society has come to characterize established in both the War and the Navy Departments.
the history of aeronautics and astronautics.1"3 An interest- The Morrow Board recommendations had laid out what be-
ing point in retrospect is that not one airplane of American de- came governmental policy, instituting both civil and military
sign and manufacture had been flown in combat during World aviation in the Federal structure. Billy Mitchell, who had
War I (a situation that would have ended had the war lasted a crusaded for the creation of a new Department of the Air, was
little longer). In 1915, NACA had been created to coordinate court-martialled for military insubordination.6"8
Eugene M. Emme was appointed Historian in NASA Headquarters on November 9, 1959.

He is responsible for the preservation and preparation of NASA's official history. He directs
an agency-wide historical program. He was founding chairman of the AIAA Technical Com-
mittee on the History of Aeronautics and Astronautics. Before coming to NASA, Dr. Emme
served nine years on the civilian staff and faculty of the Air University, Montgomery, Ala.,
and eighteen months as a project director in the Operations Research Office in the National
Headquarters of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, Battle Creek, Mich. He is a
graduate of Morningside College, Sioux City, Iowa, and received his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees
in history from the University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa. Dr. Emme is the author of numerous
official studies and publications, as well as The Impact of Air Power (1959), Aeronautics and
Astronautics, 1915-1960 (1961), The History of Rocket Technology (1964), and A History of
Space Flight (1965). He was founding chairman of the History Committee of the National
Space Club. He is a member of the Committee for the History of Rocketry and Astronautics
of the International Academy of Astronautics, the Journal Advisory Board of the British Inter-
planetary Society, Advisory Council of the Society for the History of Technology, Trustee of
the nongovernmental Air Force Historical Foundation, and a Fellow of the American Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Science.
Presented as Paper 67-839 at the AIAA Fourth Annual Meeting and Technical Display, Anaheim, Calif., October 23-27, 1967; sub-
mitted October 16, 1967; revision received January 17, 1967.
* This paper is as complete only as space, the recency of its subject, and documentary sensitivities will presently allow. Recorded
interviews in the Kennedy Library, forthcoming memoirs and studies, and continued research will be exploited by future historians. All
the contemporary historian submits (as is done herein) is that evidence and interpretation presented is the best available. Validation
by "history makers" is unavailable to the future scholar, and the author is modestly hopeful that this paper will stimulate additive re-
liable evidence and increase appreciation of history in-depth.
369
370 E. M. EMME J. SPACECRAFT
The nonstop flight to Paris in 1927 by Charles A. Lindbergh of NASA (1958) add to the historical backdrop for our main
dramatically sparked public awareness of aviation and the real subject here, the aerospace turning point in 1961.
takeoff of the air age in the United States. Subsequently, the
development of the cantilever-wing, monocoque-fuselage, all-
metal airplane revolutionized both commercial and military
aviation. American aeronautical technology was second to Perspective on the Lunar Mission
none in the early 1930's, although the attempt to fly the air
mail by the U.S. Army Air Service demonstrated in-being Jules Verne's classic satire, From the Earth to the Moon, ap-
deficiencies. peared in 1865.16 In 1920, Robert Goddard had gained the
In 1933 Adolf Hitler came to rule in Germany. In the label as the "moon-rocket man" in the American press; this
early months of the Third Reich a program was set in motion had come from his brief hypothesis in "A Method of Reaching
to revive Germany's military power with an accelerated air- Extreme Altitude," published by the Smithsonian, stating
craft construction program. As the late Hugh L. Dryden that a rocket could project a pay load of flashpowder to indi-
once said, "Germany set about to build a bigger and better cate its arrival on the surface of the moon.17 In 1928,
NACA and to a large extent they did," developing jet- Hermann Oberth constructed a rocket for the Ufa Film
propelled military aircraft and 5j-ton V-2 rockets.9 At the Company's production of "The Girl in the Moon." The pub-
Munich confrontation in September 1938, when war was lications of the rocket societies, first the Verein fur Raum-
avoided in Europe, the German Luftwaffe achieved its schiffahrt (Vfr.) in Germany, later the American and British
greatest strategic victory as Britain and France were collec- Interplanetary Societies, kept the vision of "space travel"
tively humbled because of their apparent deficiencies in mili- alive. The Reichswehr had taken our German rocketry by
tary air power. British and French orders for aircraft in the 1932, while all rocket experimentation in Soviet Russia was a
United States after Munich helped bring the American indus- governmental venture. In the United States, at the urging of
try out of the depression doldrums. General "Hap" Arnold, the first Federal grant for rocket de-
Then came the Battle of Britain, the first purely air cam- velopment went to the California Institute of Technology in
paign in military history. It was a contest for daylight air 1938 for a device to assist heavily loaded aircraft to get off
supremacy over Britain in the summer of 1940. Fighting the ground.
alone, Britain inflicted upon Nazi Germany its first military The technological jump represented by the German V-2
defeat. It was as much a consequence of the organic effi- ballistic rocket of World War II provided the first basis for
ciency of the radar-fighter aircraft operations in conjunction serious speculation about lunar flight. Although some 3000
with the other elements of British defenses as it was a product spectacular 5j-ton V-2's fired in anger may have been of in-
of German bungles. Many have already forgotten the decisive military effectiveness, they did demonstrate a ten-
Observer Corps which provided all inland tracking of the year lead in liquid-fuel propulsion and related technologies.18
German attacks, the role of Bomber and Coastal Commands, In 1945 this technological spoil of war became available for
and the pioneering weapons system analysis. Winston Russians and Americans alike. Developers of the V-2 had
Churchill's "never have so many owed so much to so few" was clearly envisioned the projection of their achievements to
an expression of appreciation for the entire Royal Air Force space travel. Wernher von Braun's "Survey of the Develop-
and not just the Fighter Command. Ironically, the German ment of Liquid Rockets and Their Future Prospects" in 1945
V-2 ballistic rocket, developed as an ersatz bomber force proposed "multi-stage piloted rockets," first as satellite "ob-
against which no defenses could be prepared, had limited mili- servation platforms," and then "stations" assembled in orbit.
tary effectiveness.10'11 "When the art of rockets is developed further," he said, "it
Three major decisions in 1940 were to influence fundamen- will be possible to go to other planets, first of all to the
tally the course of American aerospace technology. Immedi- moon."19
ately after the fall of France in May, President Franklin D. The U.S. Army began a V-2 launching program in 1946 at
Roosevelt decided that the United States would construct White Sands, New Mexico, inviting scientists to initiate
"50,000 airplanes." This fantastic target was manifoldly soundings of the upper atmosphere. The U.S. Air Force
achieved in the course of subsequent events.12 In June, the created Project Rand, later the RAND Corporation, to brain-
creation of the National Defense Research Committee, later storm the space potentials. Lunar missions were an intrinsic
the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) part of the gathering impetus for space flight.5'20-21 In 1948,
was approved. Headed by Dr. Vannevar Bush, and fash- Hubertus Strughold became head of the Department of Space
ioned after the NACA technical committee system, the OSRD Medicine at the U.S. Air Force School of Aviation Medicine,
was to mobilize civilian scientists effectively for support of the which later sponsored the first Symposium on the Physics and
American war effort.13 Finally, President Roosevelt made Medicine of Outer Space. In 1948, H. E. Ross of the British
the unpublicized decision to proceed with the development of Interplanetary Society presented a paper which described a
the atomic bomb.14 The Manhattan Project under the Army manned lunar landing mission requiring, because of limited
Engineers, shrouded in intense secrecy until Hiroshima, pro- rocket thrust, a combination of earth orbit and lunar orbit
duced one of the major technological innovations of the rendezvous techniques.22 On February 24, 1949, the two-
twentieth century.15 stage Army Bumper-Wac (V-2 and JPL Wac Corporal) was
The postwar world witnessed continued technological ad- launched from White Sands to an exciting record" altitude of
vances and their impact on global strategy as well as their 244 miles.
triggering of an affluent society. The creation of the Atomic The founding of the Department of Defense (DOD) Long
Energy Commission, supersonic flight with the X-l, the Range Proving Ground at Cape Canaveral, Florida, and con-
Strategic Air Command, and the rise of transoceanic commer- solidation of Army rocket development at Redstone Arsenal
cial air transportation came to symbolize new military and preceded the beginning of the Korean War in June 1950. In
commercial potentialities. President Harry S. Truman's de- January 1951, the Air Force re-established the Atlas missile
cisions on the Berlin Airlift (1948), the creation of the Na- project. The Navy's Viking and the Aerobee large sounding
tional Science Foundation (1949), the meeting of aggression in rockets had been developed for continuing the scientific probes
South Korea (1950), and the development of the fusion bomb begun with the German V-2's. Willy Ley published his in-
(after the first Russian atomic test) were turning points of influential book, Rockets, Missiles, and Space Travel in 1951, and
creased commitment to world realities and to the inevitable von Braun and others contributed a series of articles on "Man
demands of science and technology. Decisions by President Will Conquer Space Soon" in Colliers Magazine for March
Dwight D. Eisenhower on the ICBM program (1954), the 1952. In mid-1952, the Executive Committee of the NACA
I.G.Y. satellite program (1955), and the post-Sputnik creation authorized its Langley Laboratory to establish a study group
APRIL 1968 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON APOLLO 371
to examine the problems associated with manned and un- space were outlined as to their importance, urgency, and in-
manned flight at altitudes of 50 miles to infinity, and at speeds evitability in the classic report32 of his Science Advisory Com-
from Mach number 10 to the velocity of escape from the mittee. Four factors underwriting the national space pro-
earth's gravity.23 The International Geophysical Year to in- gram were man's thrust of curiosity, the defense objective,
clude an instrumented satellite was aborning at this time. national prestige, and the scientific opportunities to add to
Arthur C. Clarke's The Exploration of Space was a Book-of- knowledge of the earth, the solar system, and the universe.32
the-Month selection, and Walt Disney's "Man and Space" In the welter of American space affairs in early 1958, lunar
shortly thereafter infected the massive TV audience with the plans and potentials were part of the organic percolation and
space bug. evolving decision-making leading to the passage of the legisla-
In March 1955, the Rocketdyne Division of North Ameri- tive base of the U.S. space program, the National Aeronautics
can Aviation established the feasibility of a single-chamber, and Space Act of 1958.31'33~35 In January 1958, the Ad-
million-pound-thrust, liquid-fueled engine for the Air Force vanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) had been created
Ballistic Missile Division (AFBMD).24 In December, Secre- in the Department of Defense to initiate earth satellite and
tary of Defense Charles E. Wilson announced that the Ameri- lunar probes exploiting the ABMA-JPL Juno II and the
can defense budget for FY 1957 would have a record $1 billion AFBMD Thor-Able rocketry. (These "jury-rigged" proj-
for development and production of missiles. Accelerated ects were later inherited by the new NASA. Only limited
ICBM and IRBM programs, as well as the modest I.G.Y. "successes" were achieved with the lunar probes; in March
satellite project (Project Vanguard), brought conceptual 1959 Pioneer IV passed within 37,300 miles of the moon to
studies of lunar missions into modest but active status. In become the first U.S. solar satellite.36 The Russians had al-
early 1956, RAND completed a feasibility study on a lunar ready done this with Mechta, called Lunik I, in January. In
instrument carrier using the Atlas rocket. In November September, Lunik II struck the moon, and in November
1956, the DOD assigned the Air Force operational jurisdiction Lunik II made its crude picture of the backside of the moon.
over all military missiles possessing over a 200-mile range.25 Such events obviously resulted from much earlier Soviet deci-
This interservice defeat for the Army served to stimulate its sion ,and actions, including their willingness to use ballistic
Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA), actively upgrading the missiles for space missions from the start.37) In April 1958,
Redstone for a Jupiter IRBM, to stake out with technology a when the White House had requested the Congress to create
potential space mission. In April 1957, ABMA began de- NASA, the Air Force completed its first development plan for
tailed studies of the large clustered-engine to generate 1.5 a manned military space system program. The objective of
million Ib of thrust (Juno V), as one of a related family of space this plan, upon which it based its proposal to ARPA to
launch vehicles.26 manage the "Man-in-Space Soonest" (MISS) satellite pro-
On August 27, 1957, the Soviet News Agency, Tass, an- gram, was to "achieve an early capability to land a man on the
nounced in Moscow that Russia had successfully tested an in- moon and return him safely to earth."39 The Army and the
tercontinental-range ballistic missile. Six weeks later, the Navy also had man-in-space concepts and proposals.
ICBM crisis in the Pentagon was suddenly overshadowed The National Aeronautics and Space Act was signed into
when Sputnik I orbited the earth. The much heavier law on July 29,1958, creating a civilian agency to undertake to
Sputnik II in November, carrying the dog Laika, compounded explore and to exploit space for its own sake, leaving the DOD
the technological surprise. With regard to space, the immedi- responsible for potential defense applications.38 However, it
ate U.S. response was approval for ABMA to proceed with the did not specify whether NASA or DOD would be responsible
launching of an I.G.Y. satellite with a military rocket, result- for manned space flight. The Air Force awaited the go-head
ing in the successful launching of Explorer I on January 31,1958. on the first step of its man-in-space plan, the manned satellite
Ten days after Sputnik, the American Rocket Society called proposal. In August, the White House assigned NASA the
for the establishment of a national space program, one exclud- task of proceeding with the first manned satellite program,
ing weapon development and military operations. For- later called Mercury. There was neither a national goal of a
warded to the White House jointly with the Rocket and manned lunar landing nor a requirement for NASA to
Satellite Panel of the National Academy of Sciences in determine the feasibility of an orbital laboratory. NASA
January 1958, the American Rocket Society statement said was only to demonstrate, soon and safely, man's capacity for
that by 1959 the proposed national space establishment should space flight. August also saw ARPA approve the initiation
have achieved an unmanned hard landing on the moon, by of the ABMA Juno V booster "to serve as the first stage of a
1960 a soft landing with an instrumented spacecraft. multistage carrier vehicle capable of performing advanced
Manned circumvention of the moon and return to earth missions."30 It was clear to all that whatever the future in
should have been accomplished by 1965, and a manned lunar space might bring, the United States' deficiency in rocket
landing by 1968.27 On December 6, 1957, the Air Force thrust capability as compared to the U.S.S.R.'s had to be
Scientific Advisory Board's Ad Hoc Committee on Space overcome.
Technology recommended acceleration of specific military
projects and a vigorous space program with the immediate The NASA Thrust to the Moon
goal of landings on the moon because "Sputnik and the
Russian ICBM capability have created a national emer- From its first day, NASA set about piecing itself together
gency."28'29 That same week, ABMA completed and for- and doing what T. Keith Glennan, first Administrator, called
warded A National Integrated Missile and Space Vehicle "a truly national program of space exploration."40 It took
Development Program,™ which included a "shortcut devel- many some time to get used to this idea. The shock of
opment program" for large pay load capabilities and Sputnik and the ARPA integration of initial space projects
covered the clustered-engine booster of 1.5 million Ib of thrust of the military services had not prompted orderly transitions.
which could be operational in 1963. Such a Vehicle (later the NASA had to organize itself, recast the NACA program,
Saturn I) was considered "the key to space exploration," and follow through with the scientific earth satellite and lunar
larger follow-on boosters with greater thrust were described.30 probes inherited from ARPA, and integrate the Vanguard
While the ballistic missile crisis enforced priority attention, I.G.Y. satellite team from the Naval Research Laboratory.
President .Eisenhower laid down what became the national The Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences,
policy of the three space-age Presidents, that "outer space which had been created in June under the chairmanship of
should be used only for peaceful purposes." On March 5, the late Lloyd V. Berkner, pulled together the recommenda-
1958, he approved the recommendation that a civilian space tions of the scientific community for NASA to maintain the
agency be created, into which all nonmilitary activities would experimental and international momentum of the I.G.Y.
be integrated.31 Three weeks later, the national interests in Another task was Project Mercury, initiated in October under
Launching of the Saturn Program
On December 17, 1958, exactly 55 years after the first

flights at Kitty Hawk, representatives of ARPA, the military
services, and NASA met to determine national space booster
needs. The basic principle endorsed was that a small number
of versatile launch vehicle systems derived from the missile
program and of differing thrust capabilities should be devel-
Fig. 1 Proposed Saturn C-2 con- oped. High reliability, not evidenced in the space attempts
figuration, which was based on to date, was to be achieved by repeated usage by both DOD
"building-block" concept beyond the and NASA of standard boosters.44 During most of 1959, the
approved Saturn C-l. Capable of national booster program was under almost continuous review,
eircumlunar mission, it would have and a clear-cut NASA responsibility for lunar missions was
a new second-stage with Centaur evolving.45
as third stage. (ABMA, December In January 1959, NASA signed a formal contract with
1959$ see Ref. 48, Fig. 13, p. 8)
North American Aviation's Rocketdyne Division for develop-
ment of the single-chamber, million-pound-plus-thrust, liquid-
propellant rocket engine (F-l).46 NASA witnesses and others
before congressional committees had already pointed to a
manned eircumlunar flight within ten years and a lunar
landing shortly thereafter.47 In February the name Saturn
was approved by ARPA for the eight-engine Juno V.48 Army
Ordnance Missile Command (AOMC) submitted to ARPA
in March a "Saturn Systems Study," presenting fourteen

most promising designs from 1372 possible configurations
the Space Task Group at Langley. It had the urgent but utilizing clustered engines.49 By March, AOMC had also
singular goal of orbiting a test-pilot safely utilizing the Atlas formed a Project Horizon task force to develop a military
rocket, which was virtually a steel balloon that could not requirement for establishing a "lunar outpost" by the quickest
sustain its own weight without internal pressurization. means. In April, the Director of DOD Research and Engi-
NASA management also fell heir to the recommendations neering, Herbert York, made known that he had decided "to
of the Special Committee on Space Technology, formed early cancel the Saturn program on the grounds that there is no
in 1958 and chaired by H. Guyford Stever. Their report41 military justification."50 Coming when the first H-l, the
was submitted on October 28, 1958, along with the detailed Jupiter-Thor upgraded engine for the Saturn-clustered first
reports of working groups (with chairmen) as follows: Space stage, had just arrived at Huntsville, this statement caused
Research Objectives (James A. Van Alien); Vehicular Pro- great concern both in NASA and the Army.
gram (Wernher von Braun); Re-Entry (Milton U. Clauser); The first phase of the Project Horizon report was completed
Range, Launch, and Tracking Facilities (J. R. Dempsey); by AOMC in May. It proposed the goal of a manned lunar
Instrumentation (W. H. Pickering); Space Surveillance landing in 1965, followed in 1966 by an operational "lunar
(H. W. Bode); and Human Factors and Training (W. outpost." It would cost $667-million a year from FY 1960
Randolph Lovelace). The thrust of their report41 was ex- through FY 1968.51 Proposals and studies for use of the
pressed in its Introduction: Saturn for the Dyna-Soar, as a ballistic logistics vehicle, and
as a space booster for orbital stations were also re-reviewed
by various DOD panels. An ARPA-NASA Large Booster
Scientifically, we are at the beginning of a new era. More Review Committee, with Richard Canright of ARPA and
than two centuries between Newton and Einstein were occupied Milton W. Rosen of NASA as principals, again reviewed
by observations, experiments and thoughts that produced the presentations by Army, Air Force, and industry teams to
background for modern science. New scientific knowledge
indicates that we are already working in a similar period pre- determine the space role of the Saturn. By September it
ceding another long step forward in scientific theory. The was recommended that the clustered-engine Saturn offered the
information obtained from direct observation, in space, of en- United States the quickest and surest way to attain a large
vironment and of cosmological processes will probably be es- space booster capability in the million-pound thrust class.52
sential to, and will certainly assist in, the formulation of new
unifying theories. We can no more predict the results of this On November 8, 1959, NASA assumed technical direction of
work than Galileo could have predicted the industrial revolution
that resulted from Newtonian mechanics.
Pointing to the basic relationship of space flight capabilities

to future success in "direct observation of the nature and
effects of the space environment/' they recommended both
the development with existing engine technology of the
clustered-engine, million-pound-plus booster, and the develop-
ment of the single-barrel large engine for growth potential.
The Vehicular Program working group urged that large
booster development should permit a manned lunar landing
"within the next 10 years7'42; their final report (July 18)
stated43:
After careful consideration of the anticipated U.S. space

vehicle capability, it is believed that the U.S. will be capable of
performing this feat [manned lunar landing] not later than
August of 1966 with a back-up vehicle to insure maximum possible Fig. 2 Fifth-stage firing for return to earth. Drawing
human safety. There is a possibility that a manned lunar from direct-ascent lunar mission in an I.A.F. paper sub-
landing, on an emergency basis without a backup vehicle, could mitted on July 27,1959, by M. W. Rosen and F. C. Schwenk
be accomplished as early as July 1966. (Re£ 55; also in Ref. 5, Fig. 21, p. 323).
the Saturn project. President Eisenhower indicated his in- targets for feasibility of a lunar landing and return, delineating
tent to transfer the Saturn team at Huntsville under von tasks for the various NASA centers and the problems that
Braun to NASA, subject to the approval of the Congress, remained to be solved (e.g., re-entry at lunar return velocities,
in accord with the national policy of the scientific and peaceful guidance, etc.). The Committee saw that the Army lunar
uses of outer space.53 goal studies, as contained in Project Horizon and Stever
Injecting the Saturn configurations with advancing tech- Committee reports, may have been unrealistic as to funding
nology was, in the meantime, a consideration of an ARPA- estimates, program complexities and schedules, and the
NASA Saturn Vehicle Evaluation Committee, headed by booster-mission mode problem. The Goett Committee's
Abe Silverstein of NASA, which focused on the upper stages definitions and the resurrection of the Saturn program with
for the Saturn "superbooster." The liquid-hydrogen/liquid- the transfer of the von Braun group were two of the major
oxygen Centaur (first to be used with the Atlas) was considered taproots of what was to become the Apollo program. Regard-
for the upper stage of the Saturn C-l, whereas a new stage ing the Saturn and other vehicular studies, Major General
with a Centaur as a third stage was considered the Saturn Don R. Ostrander, U.S. Air Force, who was NASA Director
C-2 (Fig. 1). By the end of December 1959, NASA, now of Launch Vehicles in January 1960, has said: "The principal
responsible for the Saturn, accepted the Silverstein Committee mission which we have used as an objective in these planning
recommendations of the building-block Saturn vehicle devel- studies has been that of a manned landing on the moon and
opment. This was an historic decision; it not only approved return to earth."59
development of liquid-hydrogen-fueled upper stages (a new During 1959, NASA's Office of Program Planning and
technology), but in the process also gained approved procure- Evaluation, under Dr. Homer Joe Stewart, put together the
ment of ten C-l Saturn boosters. The Saturn was to get first NASA long-range plan setting forth the objectives of
highest national priority (DX rating) for critical resources both unmanned and manned exploration of outer space, the
in January I960.54 moon, and the planets. In January 1960, NASA outlined
Beyond the Saturn in launch vehicle planning was the Nova the goals and stepping stones of this plan to the Congress in
concept— a larger vehicle clustering the single-chamber F-l support of its authorizatiori request for FY 1961 of $802
engine, which was already under development by NASA. million.60 The basis of the plan was the National Launch
Studies then indicated three principal approaches to the Vehicle Program, worked out the year before, of which the
manned lunar mission: 1) earth rendezvous techniques using Saturn was the space workhorse of the future. It pointed to
later configurations of the Saturn; 2) brute thrust by direct the goal of circumlunar manned flight by 1970, and a manned
ascent flight from the surface of the earth using the NOVA lunar landing after 1970, along with a coherent plan for
(Fig. 2 shows the related lander and earth-return concepts)55; scientific satellites and probes, and application weather and
and 3) a possible approach using nuclear upper stages to communications satellites. NASA Administrator Glennan
reduce the size and weight of the over-all lunar vehicle.56 indicated that this plan would cost "at least $13 to $15 billion
The lunar orbital rendezvous mode was also under limited during the next decade." Deputy Administrator Hugh L.
study at Langley Research Center, but it did not surface in Dryden explained that the Atlas rocket, just becoming avail-
the deliberations until later. able for space missions, was initiated with highest priorities
five years before, and that a reliable Saturn would not be
Launching of Unmanned Lunar Explorations
available until after 5-10 development test flights had been
achieved. Associate Administrator Richard E. Horner ex-
During 1959, the scientific interest in the moon also evolved plained further that60
in NASA planning and programming beyond the early ARPA
unmanned probes. Interest in the moon as a "Rosetta Virtually all of our key programs presume a scheduled progress
stone" of the solar system had been considerably enhanced in launch vehicles and spacecraft development. These major
at the Lunar and Planetary Exploration Colloquium which developmental tasks frequently require time periods of 5 to 6
had been held at the California Institute of Technology's years for a completion and can be substantially longer under
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) on October 29, 1958. It given circumstances of technological progress and resource
availability.
featured presentations by Harold Urey, Harrison Brown, and Thus, although the usefulness of highly tentative plans might
others. Nobel Laureate Urey analyzed the value to science be questioned, long-term objectives, on the order of 10 years in
of hard data concerning the composition of the moon. He advance of today's program, are essential to keep our develop-
indicated that man himself would have to go to the moon ment activities properly focused.
to ascertain fully the geological answers contained on the
uneroded natural satellite of the earth.57 When JPL was Throughout its presentations to the Congress, to the Bureau
transferred from Army to NASA cognizance in December of the Budget and other White House advisors of the Presi-
1958, NASA planning of unmanned lunar exploration was dent, and to the public, NASA spokesmen consistently
undertaken by a series of working groups. On April 30, 1959, pointed to the Ten-Year Plan goal of a manned circumlumar
the working group on Lunar and Planetary Exploration sub- flight by 1970. The committed Mercury Program was only
mitted its plan for phased scientific exploration of the moon a first step, to be conducted by a Task Group with considerable
and the planets in a report edited by Albert Hibbs.58 Out of DOD support to orbit a man on the Air Force Atlas.
this came the Ranger program, approved in December 1959, The three spectacular Soviet "luniks" in 1959 stimulated
and the Surveyor program, approved in May 1960. much talk about an East-West "space race." NASA admin-
istrators emphasized before the Congress that the American
Post-Mercury Manned Space Flight Planning
space program was directed toward the development of
"olympic games" competency in space capabilities and not in
The Research Steering Committee on Manned Space Flight competing, event for event, with the Soviet Union.60 This
was created by J. W. Crowley, NASA Director of Research, view was consistent with President Eisenhower's firm view
in April 1959. Chaired by Harry J. Goett of Ames Research of orderly development of space competency.61 On February
Center, it included Milton Ames, De E. Beeler, Alfred J. 1, 1960, the White House approved and NASA requested
Eggers, Maxime A. Faget, Laurence K. Loftin, George M. authorization from the Congress for $113 million in supple-
Low, Bruce T. Lundin, and Harris M. Schurmeir. This mental funding for priority Saturn development during FY
"Goett Committee" focused on the goals of future programs, 1961. Ten days later, President Eisenhower made his first
with the manned lunar landing as the long-range objective visit to Cape Canaveral. The successful performances of
and with emphasis upon the intermediate steps after Mercury. Pioneer V in March and Tiros I in April—a most successful in-
Its work from May to December 1959 defined major research terplanetary probe and the first weather satellite, respectively,
'lABTH-ORBIW mtmmnm data capsule of the U.S. Air Force Discoverer XIII was re-
CENTER covered at sea. This was the first man-made space device
1ASINCH - recovered from orbital flight, and it was proudly carried to
— CONTROi •
the White House. On August 20, the Soviet Cosmic Ship II
was recovered after 17 orbits. It contained the first recovered
payload of a variety of biological specimens, including two
dogs. The portents of accomplishment of the first manned
C088KIIOHS ™~~
space flight by a Russian were rather clear. Mercury, at best,
imm —— - might orbit a man in 1961. Severe criticism of Mercury, in
the throes of development difficulties with man-rating the
.MISSION Atlas and even the Redstone, was evidenced throughout the
——— III! SUPPORT" —— - press; it likened Mercury to "plummeting the United States
' toward a new disaster in the East-West space race" and "a
IUNA&
latter day Vanguard."38-39
Fig. 3 Modular concept for Apollo. Basic concept of
In September, Soviet Chairman Khrushchev came to the
orbital and circumlunar flight components of prelanding United States to pound his shoe and await a space spectacular
Apollo mission, used in briefing by George Low to NASA- which did not happen. At the White House, approval was
Industry Conference, Washington, D.C., July 29, 1960. given for the creation of the NASA-DOD Aeronautics and
(NASA photo 60-480). Astronautics Coordinating Board (AACB) to avoid duplica-
tion and expedite all classes of space missions. President
Eisenhower was briefed on Saturn (Fig. 4). NASA Adminis-
—did not in May diminish the intensity of the U-2 crisis or trator Glennan spoke of our past space achievements as only
of the symbolic launching of Cosmic Ship I, a Soviet space-
craft announced as carrying a dummy cosmonaut. Although

the five-ton Cosmic Ship I was not successfully de-orbited,
the Soviet intention to maintain its space momentum was
clear enough to foment the potential "space race" issue as
the election year debate mounted.25
By May 1960, NASA's Space Task Group (STG) at
Langley had developed guidelines for the circumlunar as well
as 14-day orbital manned missions coherent with the goal of
a manned lunar landing mission. The name "Apollo" had
been tentatively selected in NASA Headquarters for the
follow-on manned program. A series of briefings was pro-
vided to other NASA centers so as to enlist research assistance
in spacecraft design and missions profiles. Robert Piland of
STG and George Low of Headquarters carried major co-
ordinated planning impetus.
On July 5, 1960, the House Committee on Science and
Astronautics released its report summarizing its digestion of
the authorization hearings, entitled "Space, Missiles, and the
Nation," and boldly offered the following guidance62:
A high priority program should be undertaken to place a

manned expedition on the moon in this decade. A firm plan
with this goal in view should be drawn up and submitted to the
Congress by NASA. Such a plan, however, should be com-
pletely integrated with other goals, to minimize total costs.
Particularly attention should be paid immediately to long lead-
time phases of such a program. . .
NASA's 10-year program is a good program, as far as it goes,
but it does not go far enough.
On July 29, 1960, George M. Low, Chief of Manned Space

Flight in NASA Headquarters, announced before 1300 par-
ticipants at the first NASA Industry Conference that the
advanced manned space flight program to follow Mercury
had been named "Apollo." Circumlunar flight and extended
earth orbital missions with three-man crews would be achieved
before 1970 (see Fig. 3, showing modular concepts), and this
program, exploiting modular hardware flight systems, would
eventually lead to a manned lunar landing and a permanent
manned space station.63 Increased industrial studies in sup-
port thereof, as well as budget requests to implement Apollo
and the Saturn C-2, were subsequently initiated.
The Dark Period: Late I960—Early 1961

It is difficult to recreate here the full crunch of U.S. and
Soviet space problems and achievements, the course of the
presidential campaign of 1960, the costly White House com- Fig. 4 President Eisenhower being briefed on the Saturn
mitment for the ICBM's deployed in hardened sites, and the I by Wernher von Braun at NASA Marshall Space Flight
NASA budgetary and planning efforts during the late summer Center, September 8, 1960. (NASA photo; left half of
and fall of 1960. On August 11, the de-orbited gold-plated aft-end mockup appears in background).
a "beginning toward achieving what we must have, across- PSAC Man-in-Space Panel study reportedly indicated that
the-board competence in the space field"64 and pointed to a the cost of a manned lunar landing program would range from
recent study by the Brookings Institution on implications of $20 to $40 billion.66 Apollo concepts had begun to take shape
the peaceful uses of outer space, which stated: (Fig. 5).
Meanwhile, on November 27, 1960, the report of President
The years ahead will face us with many sputniks and thereby Eisenhower's Commission on National Goals was released.
will require of our citizens stern, costly and imaginative par- It stated that the United States "should be highly selective in
ticipation in programs to meet and surmount the complex our space objectives and unexcelled in their pursuit. Prestige
challenges with which our growing technology confronts us.
To succeed in space and to succeed on Earth, we must somehow arises from sound accomplishment, not from the merely
learn to make the larger world of ideas, so brilliantly exemplified spectacular, and we must not be driven by nationalistic
by the satellites, the immediate environment of the individual. competition into programs so extravagant as to divert funds
There is a race to be run—the race for an enlightened and involved and talents from programs of equal or greater importance... "67
public.
In December, James R. Killian of Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT), first Science Advisor to the President,
Glennan pointed to an annual NASA budget of "approxi- warned against expenditures for space research, including
mately $2 billion" by the middle of the 1960's.64 manned space flight and large boosters, indicating the money
Budgetary support for Apollo funding for FY 1962, how- might better be spent on education.68
ever, was not forthcoming at the White House level. This Early in January 1961, NASA's newly-created Space
was a pivotal moment in NASA's well-studied and timely Exploration Program Council had received detailed presenta-
attempt to implement its long-range plan. One must be tions on a manned lunar landing program given by various
mindful here also of the 1959-60 recession, the commitment on Centers on the mission modes and program options. Discus-
priority defense needs, particularly on second-generation sion determined that planning should proceed "on a broad
ICBM's and the history of the American space venture to this base" rather than follow any of the specific mission profiles
time. Later, during the dark days of early 1964 when the presented. The guidance was also laid down by Glennan that
Soviet score for manned space flights far exceeded American planning should assume that a manned lunar landing should
achievements, Hugh Dryden said of this moment,65 be done, but that a White House level decision would have to
be made by the new Administration. A Manned Lunar
The present gap [February 1964] in manned space flight ac- Landing Task Group was directed to prepare a basic paper
tivity is a direct consequence of a postponment of the decision
to proceed beyond Project Mercury from September 1960, defining NASA's Manned Lunar Landing Program, including
until May 1961, when President Kennedy recommended the all known facts that would be needed to assist top-level
present manned lunar landing as a national goal. decision-making. This paper should clearly express that the
lunar landing was "a prime NASA goal" but not the only goal
The attempt by NASA to get on with the Saturn C-2 of the total NASA program.
configuration and the Apollo circumlunar mission, both major Then came the Wiesner Report.
long-lead-time components of the Ten-Year Plan, was success- On January 11, 1961, President-Elect Kennedy69-72 an-
ful only to the extent that detailed presentations on on-going nounced that Jerome B. Wiesner of MIT would become his
steps and problems leading to the lunar goal of manned flight Science Advisor and the next day released the report submitted
were given to the Man-in-Space Panel of the President's to him by the nine-member Ad Hoc Committee on Space,
Science Advisory Committee (PSAC). The necessity for any which had been chaired by Wiesner. The "Wiesner report"
manned space flight was being questioned by leading physical reviewed the entire U.S. space program, and its release,
scientists, including prominent members of PS AC. Mean- despite some partisan aspects, outwardly indicated that
while, the presidential campaign of 1960 was in high gear. Kennedy had approved the report. The President-Elect had
John F. Kennedy concurred that "we are in a strategic space indicated that Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson would serve
race with the Russians, and we have been losing. .. If man as Chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council
orbits earth this year his name will be Ivan." While stressing and would have the task of selecting a new Administrator for
potential military aspects of space, Kennedy also plugged his NASA.
major theme: "This is the new age of exploration; space is The Wiesner report stated that the U.S. space effort had
our great new frontier." Vice President Richard Nixon not progressed adequately because of "organization and man-
rejected the alleged charge of a "missile gap" and defended the agement deficiencies" and basic problems at the executive and
Eisenhower space program including a manned lunar landing other policy-making levels of Goverment," and within DOD
in 1971.32'39 and NASA. Considering the sweeping nature of the Wiesner
In September, Administrator Glennan ordered an acceler- report it is of historical interest to note that it was not widely
ated joint planning effort in Headquarters to determine published for public consumption, except in the New York
whether all aspects of the Saturn and Saturn-use programs Times™ It recommended five principal goals for the Ameri-
were effectively integrated. It was subsequently reported can space program, which differed in sequence from those
that the Saturn C-2 would support the circumlunar mission offered by PSAC in March 1958: 1) national prestige, 2)
without any requirements for technological breakthrough in national security, 3) opportunities for scientific observation
any areas. On October 17, George Low informed Abe Silver- and experiments, 4) practical nonmilitary applications, and
stein, Director of Space Flight Programs, that he had formed a 5) possibilities for international cooperation.74 The criticism
working group to formulate "a preliminary program for of the Department of Defense, contained in a classified annex,
manned lunar landings" to lend coherence to other planning for having a "fractionated" space program was subsequently
studies. "This group," Low said, "will endeavor to establish to be endorsed by the Kennedy Administration. Severe
ground rules for manned lunar landing missions; to determine criticism of NASA in the Wiesner report was specific. The
reasonable spacecraft weights; to specify launch vehicle recommendations were to be largely reversed with regard to
requirements; to prepare an integrated development plan, NASA.
including the spacecraft, lunar landing and takeoff system, The Wiesner report virtually challenged the very existence
and launch vehicle. This plan should include a time-phasing of the civilian space agency and seemed unmindful of planning
and funding picture. . ." The NASA Office of Program Plan- for Apollo and lunar landing mission.75 The report seemed
ning and Evaluation, under Abraham Hyatt, continued the satisfied only with the scientific portions of the NASA pro-
up-dating of the long-range plan. Further briefings on the gram. It recommended that NASA should have a "vigorous,
manned lunar landing mission were to be given at the White imaginative, and technically competent top management,"
House toward the end of the year. By the end of December, a implying that all including the departing T. Keith Glennan
Fig. 5 First engineering drawing of Apollo Command Module by Caldwell C. Johnson of NASA Space Task Group,
October 6, 1960. (NASA photo)
were less than competent. It urged more attention to post- year 1961. Further test and experimentation will be necessary
Saturn launch vehicles and challenged the Mercury program to establish if there are any valid scientific reasons for extending
manned space flight beyond the mercury program.
as "marginal." After January 20, the Wiesner report
indicated, President-Elect Kennedy should not allow "the
present Mercury program to continue unchanged for more In his Inaugural Address, President Kennedy said: "Let
than a very few months," and the new President should not both sides [in the cold war] seek to invoke the wonders of
"effectively endorse this program and take the blame for its science instead of its terrors. Together let us explore the
possible failures." It continued: stars, conquer the deserts, eradicate disease, tap the ocean
N. depths, and encourage the arts and commerce." However,
We should stop advertising Mercury as our major objective NASA remained without an Administrator. Dr. Glennan
in space activities. Indeed, we should make an effort to diminish left town without briefing a successor, since none had been
the significance of this program to its proper proportion before appointed. Deputy Administrator Dryden had also offered
the public, both at home and abroad. We should find effective his resignation, which had been neither accepted nor rejected.
means to make people appreciate the cultural, public service,
and military importance of space activities other than space When the upcoming suborbital Mercury flight with a chimp
travel. named "Ham" was scheduled for January 31, Dryden finally
called upon Wiesner on January 25, to inform the White
Although NASA's view of its future appeared very dark House of possible worldwide implications of this flight. That
indeed, it was difficult to argue in public with the President- same day in a press conference, President Kennedy indicated
Elect's Science Advisor that the recommended two-stage that the Vice President would shortly come up with a nomina-
Titan rocket had been examined and rejected for Mercury, tion for the Administrator for NASA. It was Wiesner who
that Mercury had a modest portion of the NASA budget and acted for the White House in calling James E. Webb to Wash-
its news coverage had exceeded expectations because of the ington.77'78 Webb said in assuming responsibility for NASA
fantastic public interest in the astronauts, or that the Wiesner he wanted to be free to recommend the best program in accord
Committee may have been partisan and perhaps not well- with the national interest. He was confirmed as Adminis-
informed about NASA's over-all program. The last budget trator by the Senate of February 9.79
of the Eisenhower Administration submitted to the Congress On January 31, "Ham" had a successful suborbital Mercury
four days after the Wiesner report requested only $115 million flight, but 42 miles higher and 125 miles further than the
for manned space flight including Mercury. Beyond this, Mercury-Redstone rocket had been programmed. In the
$584 million was included in the FY 1962 request for military meantime, NASA had completed studies of a manned lunar
astronautics within a $41.4 billion Department of Defense landing program. Studies considered both the direct ascent
budget.78 The message accompanying President Eisenhower's to the moon based on a large Nova-class launch vehicle, and
budget for FY 62 was clear on post-Mercury programs76: the rendezvous mode of earth orbit using a number of Saturn
C-2's.80 In his press conference on February 8, President
In the program of manned space flight, the reliability of com- Kennedy said that the United States was not going to risk a
plex booster capsule escape and life support components of the
Mercury system is now being tested to assure a safe manned Mercury astronaut to beat the Russians in placing a man in
ballistic flight, and hopefully a manned orbital flight in calendar space, and allowed that the Russians would continue their
tests for a manned space flight. PSAC began its detailed requested for FY 1962. Although this did not endorse the
review of the Mercury program as the Wiesner report had Apollo program per se, it permitted NASA to plan an accelera-
recommended.81 tion by funding the Saturn C-2 (a major pacing item), and
by altering the projected flight schedule to permit manned
Acceleration of the U.S. Space Program orbital Apollo flights to be moved up from 1967 to 1965, and
circumlunar flights from 1969 to 1967, with a target date for a
On February 14, the Soviet Union launched a Venus probe lunar landing in the 1969-70 time period. Dryden later
from a parking orbit. That same day, James E. Webb was testified before the House Space Committee that President
sworn in as NASA Administrator and Dryden as Deputy Kennedy had not ignored manned space flight but had "re-
Administrator. The next day, President Kennedy stated at served" making a decision on Apollo pending "further study
his press conference that the lead of the Russians in large within the executive branch."89 The same day of NASA's
boosters was "a matter of great concern/'82 session with the President, Kennedy nominated Edward C.
A major milestone in the Mercury program was achieved Welsh to be Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics
with the successful flight of the Mercury-Atlas (MA-2) on and Space Council (Ref. 32, pp. 188-189).
February 21, a severe test at the worst re-entry design condi- The following day, President Kennedy also responded to a
tions. The Space Task Group announced that astronauts previous questioning letter from Congressman Overton
Glenn, Grissom, or Shepard would make the first manned Brooks, Chairman of the House Committee on Science and
flight. As a result of NASA-DOD deliberations on mutual Astronautics, regarding the future of NASA. Publicly the
areas of concern to the U.S. space program, Administrator only statements of the Administration to date had been the
Webb and Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric critical Wiesner report to the President-Elect in January, the
signed a letter of understanding on February 23 confirming brief comments in the speeches of Administrator Webb on
the national launch vehicle program. It called for the inte- March 16 and 17, and the testimony of witnesses on Capitol
grated development and procurement of space boosters by Hill. To Congressman Brooks, President Kennedy said that
both agencies, and established that neither DOD nor NASA the revitalized Space Council would play a role in the de-
would initiate the development of a space booster without cisions on the national space program, and90
written acknowledgment of the other.83 On March 6, Secre-
tary Robert McNamara assigned all Research, development, It is not now nor has it ever been my intention to subordinate
test, and engineering of Department of Defense space develop- the activities [of NASA] to those of the Department of De-
fense . . . . [There are] legitimate missions in space and the ap-
ment projects to the Air Force.7784 plication of space technology to the conduct of peaceful activities,
On March 9,1961, the Soviet Union launched, orbited, and which should be carried forward by the civilian space agency....
recovered in a test of a 5-ton manned spacecraft with a dog
and other animals, a feat repeated on March 25. The clear Two days later, Cosmic Ship V, with a dog and several ex-
intent of the Soviet space program animated "space race" periments, was orbited and successfully recovered by the
commentary in the American news media. Soviet Union. At a press conference in Moscow, N. M.
NASA Administrator Webb's first public address was at the Sisakian announced that "our research on these animals had
annual Goddard Memorial Dinner in Washington, referring proved that no dangerous consequences to the functioning of
to Goddard as a "true pioneer on a new frontier."85'86 He their organs have stemmed from the space flight. This
said NASA "is hard at work" on on-going programs and was problem has an important bearing on our preparations for
man's orbiting."91 In the meantime, PSAC continued its
proceeding to a thorough examination of the present validity study of the Mercury program. Glenn, Grissom, and
of ten-year program worked out last year. . . [This evaluation]
will go forward without delay, and I feel very sure that the Shepard were shortly to be directed to take additional train-
President will submit any changes which he believes necessary ing on the Navy centrifuge at Johnsville, Pennsylvania.81
in time for consideration by the House Committee on Science On March 31, the Space Science Board of the National
and Astronautics during its present hearings on the Eisenhower
budget. Academy of Sciences submitted to President Kennedy its
recommendations, formulated on February 10 and 11. Their
The next day, before the American Astronautical Society report92 said:
meeting in Washington, Webb said: "Today in 1961 we stand
before the frontier of space. . . and I have been giving much Scientific exploration of the Moon and the planets should be
attention to the plans that should be made for continuing clearly stated as the ultimate objective of the U.S. space program
for the foreseeable future. This objective should be promptly
manned exploration of space beyond Project Mercury. We adopted as the official goal of the United States space program
are giving careful consideration to the rate at which we should and clearly announced, discussed, and supported. In addition,
proceed."87 Once the budgetary review was completed it should be stressed that the United States will continue to
within NASA, discussions ensued at the Bureau of the Budget press toward a thorough scientific understanding of space, of
solving problems of manned space exploration, and of develop-
(BOB) on the amount of the NASA supplemental to be added ment of application of space science for man's welfare...
to the Eisenhower budget. The cuts of NASA's asking of From a scientific standpoint, there seems little room for dissent
BOB, well-described by Holmes,88 brought strong arguments that man's participation in the exploration of the Moon and
from NASA spokesmen on "the chain of historical events" planets will be essential, if and when it becomes technologically
feasible to include him. . .
eventually forcing a decision on Apollo. A review of this . . .while the Board has here stressed the importance of this
matter by the President was requested. policy as a scientific goal, it is not unaware of the great importance
On the afternoon of March 22, Presideni Kennedy and of other factors associated with a United States man in space
Vice President Johnson met with NASA Administrators program. One of these factors is, of course, the sense of national
leadership emergent from bold and imaginative U.S. space
Webb, Dryden, and Seamans, and others, including Wiesner, activity. Second, the members of the Board as individuals
David Bell (BOB), and Glenn Seaborg (AEC). It was a two- regard man's exploration of the Moon and planets as potentially
hour discussion, mainly on the level of the NASA funding. the greatest inspirational venture of this century and one in
It included Dryden's presentation on the reasons for going to which the entire world can share; inherent here are great and
fundamental philosophical and spiritual values which find a
the moon and on the point that decisions regarding the readi- response of man's questioning spirit and his intellectual self-
ness of Mercury to conduct a manned flight were the re- realization. . .
sponsibility of the Mercury management closest to the pro-
gram.39 As it turned out, after subsequent White House Still, some influential scientists were voicing strong op-
discussions and decision, the formal NASA budget amend- position to any manned space exploration, and others favored
ment submitted to the Congress on March 28 amounted to turning over any post-Mercury manned flight role in the U.S.
$125,670,000, which was close to what NASA had originally space program to the Air Force.93*94
dent Kennedy's seasoned historical sense to the political

feasibility at this time of an augmented space effort to fore-
stall future Soviet space advantages. Numerous discussions
were held in the White House. On the evening of April 13,
almost while Yuri Gagarin was being wildly welcomed to Red
Square in Moscow, President Kennedy engaged in discussion
in the White House with NASA Administrators Webb and
Dryden, Science Advisor Wiesner, Special Assistant Theodore
Sorensen, and others, including one reporter.97 They ap-
parently reviewed the NASA plans for the Apollo lunar land-
ing, its rationale and cost, and its opportunities for meeting
the long-term Soviet competition in space. Exhibiting con-
cern, Kennedy was apparently unconvinced of what exactly
should be done. Dryden explained that a crash program
similar to the Manhattan Project might cost as much as $40
billion and even then it would not assure beating the Soviets.
He was advised by others that the cost was staggering, and it
would take three months to study.
At the conclusion of this White House meeting, at which a
reporter was present, President Kennedy "glanced from face
to face. Then he said quietly: 'There's nothing more im-
portant7." Six weeks later, he stood before the Congress
saying it was "time for a great new American enterprise—

Fig. 6 Astronaut Alan Shepard, pilot of the Freedom 7 time for this nation to take a clearly leading role in space
spacecraft, receives the NASA Distinguished Service Medal achievement, which in many ways may hold the key to our
from President John F. Kennedy in a ceremony at the future on earth."97
White House, May 8, 1961. (NASA Photo.) The Congress was concerned about "catching up with the
Russians." Before a special hearing of the House Space
"There's Nothing More Important"
Committee, Administrator Webb pointed out that the Presi-
dent had made the decision to go ahead with the Saturn
While the new single-chamber F-l engine was attaining rocket to carry Apollo into space, and it would be possible to
record tests of 1.6 million-pounds-thrust and NASA witnesses "proceed faster than the funds recommended by President
in Washington were testifying on Capitol Hill early in April Kennedy" now before the Committee for authorization.
1961, the triggering event in the American process of decision- Asked how the lunar landing program could be accelerated
making leading to acceleration of the American space program and what it might cost, Webb said that the question requiring
occurred. On April 12, Soviet Cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin decision was "whether we expect to proceed as we did in
circled the earth in Vostok I. Rumors of such an historical connection with the atomic bomb." Such a commitment of
event had flashed from the sidewalks of Moscow onto the resources on a crash basis would involve as high as $40 billion
front pages of American newspapers for several days. An- to land a man on the moon, while other people "say half
nouncement in Moscow of the successful recovery of Gagarin that amount."98
confirmed that the first human being had flown in space The next day, April 14, Associate Administrator Robert C.
around the world. President Kennedy released the White Seamans resumed testimony on the NASA authorization before
House statement on this "outstanding technical accomplish- the House Space Committee. He was pressed by questions
ment" and dispatched congratulations to the Kremlin. on budget details, schedules, and lunar mission target dates
In response to a question at his press conference that day, by each succeeding member of the Committee. Asked whethei
one based on the statement of a member of the Congress that additional money would get an American on the moon before
he was "tired of seeing the United States second to Russia in a Russian cosmonaut attained this goal in 1967, the fiftieth
the space field," President Kennedy said95: anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Seamans repeated
that the U.S. goal for a manned lunar landing was 1969 or 1970.
. . .no one is more tired than I am. . .the news will be worse How much additional money would enable the United States
before it is better. . . .We are, I hope, going to go in other areas
where we can be first, and which will bring perhaps more long- to avoid being second on the moon in 1967? To this Seamans,
range benefits to mankind. But we are behind. somewhat reluctantly, replied99:
There were other comments in Washington that it was the This is really a very major undertaking. To compress the
program by 3 years means that greatly increased funding would
luck of President Kennedy that the flight of Vostok I had oc- be required for the interval of time between now and 1967.
curred while the Congress was considering the $125 million I certainly cannot state that this is an impossible objective. . .
add-on to NASA FY 1962 budget. My estimate at this moment is that the goal may well be
NASA held an unprecedented news conference to satisfy achievable. . . [it was only an assumption] that the Russians
are proceeding toward this date. We have no detailed planning
hundreds of queries concerning the Soviet achievement. for this early date and I hope this committee understands that.
Most of the questions concerned details of the flight, many of However, I believe this is a date that could be considered from
which were not yet known. With regard to the possible im- a planning standpoint.
pact of Vostok I on the Mercury program, Dryden said that he When asked who would make the decision that was required
could not forecast what the ultimate reaction would be: "As "to put this man on the Moon," provided Congress supplied
you know, our programs are determined by the democratic double or treble funding, Seamans replied, "It is a decision to
process in this country in very many forums, including the be made at a higher level. . . I think it is a decision to be made
Executive Branch of the Government and the Congressional by the people of the United States. . through the Congress
Branch." Regarding its impact upon the Apollo program, and through the President."99
Administrator Webb said there was $28 million in the $125
million add-on approved by Kennedy for Apollo, and that "The Goal, Before This Decade Is Out"
planning was proceeding in NASA.96
The enormous reaction of the public and the press to the In mid-April 1961, it seemed clear to Theodore Sorensen,
Soviet man-in-space achievement undoubtedly alerted Presi- who was close to the President, that President Kennedy "was
more convinced than any of his advisers that a second-rate, initiation of a manned lunar landing program as the major
second-place space effort was inconsistent with this country's objective of an accelerated space program, with support also
security, with its role as a world leader and with the New for nuclear propulsion development and a communication
Frontier spirit of discovery." (Ref. 70, p. 525). It is ac- satellite program.
curate to observe, however, that NASA and USAF spokesmen If there had been any doubts in high echelons concerning
appear to have been as convinced as the President, not the wisdom of setting the goal of placing an American on the
to mention the Vice President and the Executive Secretary moon in this decade by accelerating the entire U.S. space pro-
of the Space Council, f gram (only varying degrees of enthusiasm for the major rea-
The House and the Senate passed on April 20 the legislation sons seeming to have prevailed), they were swept away in the
making the Vice President the Chairman of the Space Council great domestic and international impact of the first flight in
whose central purpose was to provide advice on space matters space by an American. Astronaut Alan Shepard's flight on
to the President. That same day, President Kennedy di- May 5,1961 also dissipated any doubts that may have existed
rected Vice President Johnson, as Chairman of the Space with regard to the future of man in space exploration or the
Council, to direct an over-all evaluation of just where the technical integrity of Project Mercury (Ref. 32, pp. 190-96;
United States stood in space, now and for the future. The Ref. 38, pp. 347-50).
President posed the type of questions for which he had been NASA and the Department of Defense had been directed to
seeking answers since the first man had flown in space on submit a final, consolidated recommendation on the ac-
April 12: Is there any space program which promises dramatic celerated space program for the Space Council before the
results as regards the Soviets and which the United States Shepard flight. On the weekend following, NASA and DOD
could win, and what would it cost? How can our existing leaders had completed the formal document of recommenda-
program be speeded up? Should emphasis be placed on de- tions submitted to Vice President Johnson on May 8. John-
veloping nuclear, chemical or liquid boosters, or a combina- son approved and gave it to President Kennedy that same
tion? (Ref. 88, pp. 198-99). day,101 which was also the day that the Mercury astronauts
In his press conference the next day, the President said: came to Washington with Alan Shepard (Fig. 6). Concensus
"We are attempting to make a determination as to which pro- among all principals interviewed by this author so far is that
gram offers the best hope before we embark on it, because you the President's informal approval had been clearly indicated
may commit a relatively small sum of money now for a result even before May 5. His formal request for Congressional
in 1967, or '68 or '69, which will cost you billions." Referring consideration of the national decision to place an American
to his assignment to the Vice President, Kennedy said that on the moon in this decade was included in his Second State
"we have to consider whether there is any program now, re- of the Union Message on May 25,1961:
gardless of its cost, which offers us hope of being pioneers in a This nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before
project. . . If we can get to the moon before the Russians, we this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon, and returning
should."100 him safely to earth.
Vice President Johnson, conversant in space matters since
Sputnik in October 1957, swung into action with a continuous Ranking with Churchill's "blood, sweat, and tears'' and
series of meetings involving the principal agencies concerned— Franklin Roosevelt's "day of infamy" addresses, Kennedy's
DOD, NASA, AEC—plus representatives from PSAC and challenge clearly qualified the next phase in the space venture
BOB. He established two advisory panels: one of aerospace as difficult, costly, and
development specialists (Wernher von Braun, General Ber- . . .in a very real sense, it will not be just one man going to the
nard Schriever, and Admiral John T. Hay ward); the other moon—it will be an entire nation. I am asking Congress and
of businessmen (Frank Stanton of CBS, Donald C. Cook of the country to accept a firm commitment to a new course of
American Electric Power Service Corp., and George R. Brown action—a course which will last for many years and carry very
heavy costs. . . If we were only to go half way, or reduce our
of Houston). Executive Secretary Welsh consulted the sights in the face of difficulty, it would be better not to go at all.
Chairmen of the Congressional space committees, Senator
Robert S. Kerr of Oklahoma and Representative Overton The Congress and the American people accepted this chal-
Brooks of Louisiana. It is reported (Ref. 88, pp. 199-202) lenging request in 1961. There was no national debate as
that each principal individual and agency submitted written President Kennedy had requested. The national commit-
analyses and recommendations to the Space Council Chair- ment was thus made.
man, most of which endorsed the immediate technical,
economic, and political feasibility and long-range implications In Retrospect
of a major national decision to accelerate the U.S. space pro-
gram, including the manned lunar landing. The outcome of From the perspectives of the major national decisions in
this process was general agreement on the timeliness of the American aerospace history, of the evolution of the idea and
of the capability for manned flight to the moon, and of the
t The Bay of Pigs fiasco, April 17-19, 1961, has recently been thrust of NASA to proceed with its mission beyond the
cited by critics as the catalyst for the decision of the Kennedy Mercury program, the decision in mid-1961 to accelerate the
Administration for accelerating the space program including the U.S. space program clearly emerges as a strategic decision.
manned lunar landing, an allegation which cannot be supported Not only did the basic technical prerequisites for such a de-
by any evidence known to the author. The over-all challenge cision exist before the flight of Vostok I on April 12, 1961, but
of the Soviet Union in space and other aspects of the cold war
seems clear enough. All participants interviewed to date in political feasibility for decision existed in the White House,
connection with the decision-making process remain unanimous the Congress, and among the general public immediately
that the Bay of Pigs was never mentioned in connection with thereafter. With a belief that something should be done in
space matters. It could have been another factor, subconscious space in mid-April, President Kennedy yet directed that a
or otherwise, prompting the need for initiative in the mind of full review be made by the Vice President, including joint
the late President, which may one day be documentable in the recommendations of the major agencies involved, before the
holdings of the Kennedy Library. But considering the per- commitment should be made. The request for the support
spectives on Apollo before the flight of Gagarin and immediately of the Congress and the American people on May 25, 1961
thereafter (i.e., before the Bay of Pigs), and the deliberations
and study involved in the recommendations for decision made was no Pearl Harbor or Soviet A-bomb demonstration re-
to the President, as well as the influential flight of May 5 of quiring an all-out "crash program" response.
Astronaut Alan Shepard, the Bay of Pigs does not emerge as In his classic speech declaring that the United States should
relevant in the appraisal of the strategic role of space in the "become the world's leading spacefaring nation" on Septem-
national interest. ber 12, 1962, President Kennedy said102:
Fig. 7 President Kennedy

addressing Manned Space-
craft Center personnel, in
front of Lunar Excursion

Module mockup, Houston,
Texas, September 12, 1962.
(NASA Photo)
The exploration of space will go ahead, whether we join it battle for men's minds, an open democratic society had the
or not. . .
We sail on this new sea because there is new knowledge to be advantage. No one wanted nuclear war, unless in retalia-
gained, and new rights to be won, and they must be won and tion, because everyone would lose. The President hoped
used for the progress of all people. . . that the Mercury men appreciated how important their con-
We choose to go to the moon. . .in this decade and do the tribution had been in support of this very basic matter.103
other things, not because they are easy, but because they are
hard, because that goal will serve to organize and measure the His Science Advisor, Jerome B. Wiesner, wrote104:
best of our energies and skills, because that challenge is one
that we are willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, During his administration, he [Kennedy] made persistent
and one which we intend to win, and the others, too. efforts to strengthen the U. S. space program. He saw in it
It is for these reasons that I regard the decision last year to the opportunity to serve many national needs. He was firmly
shift our efforts in space from low to high gear as among the convinced that Soviet space supremacy had greatly weakened
most important decisions that will be made during my incum- the United States in its foreign affairs. He saw military hazards
bency in the office of the President. . . in a lagging space capability. He saw the exploration of space
as one of the great human adventures of this century, and he
appreciated the important scientific possibilities of space ex-
He is shown addressing NASA personnel in front of a LEM ploration. He dedicated this nation to a massive space program
mockup in Fig. 7. with a firm target of a manned lunar landing in this decade.
Another insight to his views was provided by Walter C. This is a costly program and his decision to undertake it was not
Williams, Director of Operations for the Mercury Program. made lightly. He talked to hundreds of people in the process of
making his decision and he weighed the costs with real concern.
He and Astronaut Scott Carpenter, with their families, In the end he became convinced that the U.S. could not remain
visited President Kennedy in his White House office on June second in this important field. Despite continual review, he
5, 1962. After informal discussions on forthcoming Gemini remained convinced of the correctness of this course.
and Apollo missions, the President accompanied them to Yet with the closing of the gap between U.S. and U.S.S.R.
outer space capabilities, he followed through his Inaugural
their cars. In a discussion among the three men, the Presi- theme with the proposal for a joint moon venture.
dent stated that he believed that the United States could
successfully engage openly and peacefully the enemies of The imperative of the "deadline" or "planning date" of
freedom, and win, by utilizing fully scientific and technological the manned lunar landing by 1969 or 1970 was to be ques-
superiority in which the space frontier was a part. In the tioned after 1963. President Kennedy did not promise a
6
specific year, rather 1969-70, according to Theodore Sorensen Levine, I. D., Mitchell: Pioneer of Air Power, Duell,
(Ref. 70, p. 525). Concerning Congressional cuts of the Sloan, and Pearce, New York, 1942.
7
NASA budget requests in later years, NASA Administrator Hurley, A., Billy Mitchell, Watts, New York, 1964.
8
Emme, E. M., A History of Space Flight, Holt, Rinehardt,
Webb, who carried the major responsibility in carrying the and Winston, New York, 1965, pp. 51-54.
program forward, said105: 9
Dryden, H. L., Testimony in, "1965 NASA Authorization
The view President Kennedy had. . .was that he was setting a Hearings," Pt. I, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science
deadline by which he wanted this nation to get the job done, and Astronautics, Washington, D.C., Feb. 4, 5, 7,1964, pp. 16-20.
10
and he was providing resources for us to plan the flight in 1967, Irving, D., The Mare's Nest, Little, Brown, Boston, 1965.
11
or early 1968, giving some leeway for intractable technical McGovern, J., Crossbow and Overcast, Morrow, New York,
problems, for unknown and unforeseen things, and also to avoid 1964.
having to go into parallel development systems. . .but not to 12
Holley, I. B., Jr., Buying Aircraft, U.S. Army in World War
do so in such a way as to run this cost up from $20 billion to some- II Series, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1964,
thing much higher. So we were thinking of it pretty much of a
deadline. . . pp. 229-246.
13
Now, with the cuts last year [1963] of $600 million. . . I Baxter, J. P., Ill, Scientists Against Time, Science in World
think you've got to think of it somewhat differently. I think War II Series, Little, Brown, Boston, 1946, pp. 12-19.
14
the target date for the flights, which is a tight date but still Hewlett, R. C. and Anderson, O. E., The New World,
attainable, is mighty close to the January 1, 1970 period. . . History of A.E.G. Series, Vol. I, University of Pennsylvania
We do not have any leeway. . .we have lost that. . . Press, University Park, pp. 14-27.
15
Weinberg, A. M. and Young, G., "The Nuclear Energy
The accelerated space program after 1961 has emerged as Revolution—1966," Proceedings of the National Academy of
the largest single technological enterprise of a nonmilitary Sciences, Vol. 57, Jan. 15, 1967, pp. 1-15.
16
nature ever undertaken. Its impact goes beyond new scien- Nicolson, M., Voyages to the Moon, Macmillan, New York,
tific data, spacefaring mobility for man, and the utility on earth 1948, pp. 243-246.
17
of weather, communication, and military satellites and con- Lehman, M., This High Man, Farrar, Straus, New York,
sequent new technology of extraspace value. Its long-term 1965, pp. 34, 138.
18
influence upon society may be comparable to the 19th-century Dornberger, W., "The German V-2," The History, of Rocket
American policy innovations with the land grants for stimu- Technology, edited by E. M. Emme, Wayne State University
Press, Detroit, Mich., 1964, pp. 29-45.
lating railroad development across the continent and the 19
"Summary Report: Report on Certain Phases of War
advances in public education and agricultural science served Research in Germany," prepared by F. Zwicky, U.S. Air Force,
by the land-grant colleges.106 Moreover, all of the relevant Air Material Command, Dayton, Ohio, Jan. 1947, pp. 38-42.
20
factors that existed in 1961—including the strategic require- Hall, R. C., "Early U.S. Satellite Proposals," The History
ments of national security and world peace, of technological of Rocket Technology, edited by E. M. Emme, Wayne State Uni-
progress serving national welfare, and of the known unknowns versity Press, Detroit, Mich., 1964, pp. 67-93.
21
of possible cosmographical discoveries with fundamental new Malina, F. J. and Summerfield, M., "The Problem of Escape
knowledge—are still present.107'108 Confidence that science from the Earth by Rockets," Journal of the Institute of Aero-
and technology can be mobilized for virtually any national nautical Sciences, Vol. 14, Aug. 1947, p. 471.
22
Ross, H. E., "Orbital Bases," Journal of the British Inter-
problem on earth amenable to technical solution has been planetary Society, Aug. 1949, pp. 1-7.
greatly enhanced by our space progress.109 23
Grimwood, J. M., Project Mercury: A Chronology, NASA
One statement stands out from our historical vantage point SP-4001, 1963, pp. 5-6.
24
today. It is from an address by the late Hugh L. Dryden at "Skywriter," North American Aviation, May 20, 1960,
the Air Force Association meeting in Los Angeles on April 26, p. 1.
25
1958. Dr. Dryden was more than one of the major architects Emme, E. M., Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1915-1960,
of the U.S. space program; modest as he was, he was a broad- NASA, Government Printing Office, 1961, pp. 81-92.
26
gauge intellectual as well. At that time this statement was Koelle, H. H. et al., "Juno Space Vehicle Development
made, President Eisenhower had just requested the Congress Program—Phase I: Booster Feasibility Demonstration," U.S.
Army, Redstone Arsenal, Ala., Oct. 13, 1958, p. 1.
to create NASA and to legislate the national goals and the 27
"Compilation of Materials on Space and Aeronautics,
tasks of the American space program. Dryden said: No. 1," U.S. Congress, Senate Special Committee on Space and
We must understand that the kind and magnitude of space Aeronautics, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., Washington, D.C., 1959,
program that our national interest requires will cost hundreds of pp. 17-19.
28
millions of dollars each year for many years to come. I know "Chronology of Early USAF Man-in-Space Activity,
that some knowledgeable people fear that although we might be 1949-1958," Air Force Systems Command, Space Systems Div.,
willing to spend a couple of billions for space technology in 1965.
1958, because we still remember the humiliation of Sputnik 29
Sturm, T. A., The USAF Scientific Advisory Board,
last October, next year we will be so preoccupied by color tele- 1944-1965, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
vision, or new style cars, or the beginning of another national
election campaign that we'll be unwilling to pay another year's 1967, p. 8.
30
installment on our space conquest bill. For that to happen— Akens, D. S., "Historical Origins of Marshall Space Flight
well, I'd just as soon we didn't start. Center," NASA Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville,
Fortunately, for the sake of our children's future if not for the Ala., 1960, p. 58.
protection of our own skin, I don't think we are that grass- 31
Rosholt, R. L., An Administrative History of NASA,
hopper-minded. . . We can and we must succeed in finding 1958-1963, NASA SP-4101, 1966, pp. 3-17, 30-31, 185, 191.
our destiny in space. 32
"Introduction to Outer Space," White House, Scientific
Advisory Committee, Washington, D.C., 1958.
References 33
Griffith, E. A., The Genesis of the National Aeronautics
1 and Space Act, Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C., 1962.
Kranzberg, M. and Pursell, C. W., "The Importance of 34
Technology in Human Affairs/' Technology in Western Civiliza- A Historical Sketch of NASA, NASA EP-29, 1964, pp. 3-12.
35
tion, Vol. I, Oxford, New York, 1967, pp. 3-11. Schoettle, E. C. B., "The Establishment of NASA,"
2
Emme, E. M., The Impact of Air Power, D. Van Nostrand, Knowledge and Power, edited by S. A. Lakoff, The Free Press,
Princeton, N.J., 1959, pp. 7-12. New York, 1966, pp. 162-270.
3 36
Dupree, A. H., Science and the Federal Government, Harvard Tichter, H. L. et al., Instruments and Spacecraft, October
University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1957, pp. 302-23, 367-81. 1957-March 1965, NASA SP-3028, 1966, pp. 27-35.
4 37
Holley, I. B., Jr., Ideas and Weapons, Yale University Sheldon, C. S., II, "The Challenge of International Com-
Press, New Haven, Conn., 1953. petition," unpublished ms, Feb. 10, 1965, pp. 5-9.
5 38
Emme, E. M. et al., The History of Rocket Technology: Van Dyke, V., Pride and Power: Rationale of the U.S.
Essay on Research, Development, and Utility, Wayne State Space Program, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1963, pp.
University Press, Detroit, Mich., 1964. 5-38.
39 71
Swenson, L. S., Grimwood, J. M., and Alexander, C. C., Salinger, P., With Kennedy, Doubleday, Garden City,
This New Ocean: A History of Project Mercury, NASA Historical N.Y., 1966.
72
Series, SP-4201, 1966, pp. 77-106, 282-283, 349-350. Sidey, H., John F. Kennedy, President, Atheneum, New
40
Glennan, T. K, "Introductory Remarks," NASA-Industry York, 1963, pp. 111-123.
73
Program Plans Conference, July 28-29, I960, NASA, Washington, New York Times, Jan. 13, 1961, p. 14.
74
D.C., 1960, pp. 1-2. Golovin, N., "Events and Decisions," Aeronautics &
41
"Recommendations Regarding a National Civil Space Astronautics, Vol. 5, No. 11, Oct. 1967, pp. 50-60.
Program,'7 NACA/NASA Special Committee on Space Tech- 75
Dryden, H. L., "Eisenhower-Kennedy Transitions,"
nology, Oct. 28, 1958, p. 2. memo to NASA Historian, Sept. 27, 1965.
42 76
"Interim Report: National Integrated Missile and Space Public Papers of the Presidents, Dwight D. Eisenhower,
Vehicle Development Program," NAC A Special Committee 1960-61, Washington, D.C., 1961, p. 972.
77
on Space Technology, Working Group on Vehicular Program, Webb, J. E., speech at Brandeis University, Nov. 7, 1965,
April 1, 1958, p. 9. pp. 2-3.
43 78
"A National Integrated Missile and Space Vehicle Pro- Presidential Documents, White House, March 21, 1966,
gram," NAC A Special Committee on Space Technology, Working p. 399.
79
Group on Vehicular Program, July 18, 1958, p. 7. "Hearings. . .Discussion of Soviet Man-in-Space Shot,"
44
"The National Space Vehicle Program," NASA, Jan. 27, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science and Astronautics,
1959. April 13, 1961, p. 15.
45 80
Hyatt, A., "NASA Current Launch Vehicle Program," Dryden, H. L., speech, Dec. 29, 1961, p. 2.
81
NASA-Industry Program Plans Conference, NASA, Washington, Link, M. M., Space Medicine in Project Mercury, NASA
D.C., 1960, pp. 39-45. SP-4003, 1965, pp. 112-125.
82
46 "First Semi-Annual Report of the National Aeronautics Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy—1961,
and Space Administration," NASA, Washington, D.C., 1959, Washington, D.C., 1962, p. 95.
p. 27. ss "Aeronautical and Astronautical Events of 1961," NASA
47
"The Next Ten Years in Space," Staff Report, U.S. Con- Historical Report, House Committee on Science and Astro-
gress House Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Ex- nautics, Washington, 1962, p. 7.
84
ploration, Washington, 1959, pp. 96, 122, 211. DOD Directive 5106.32, March 6, 1961, U.S. Congress,
48
Falkowski, E., "Saturn Illustrated Chronology," NASA House Committee on Science and Astronautics; "Hearings. . .
Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Ala., 1965, pp. 4-8. Defense Space Interests," March 17, 1961.
49 85
"Manned Space Flight," Staff Report, U.S. Congress, Webb, J. E., "The West and the New Frontier," speech at
Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 1960, Colorado College, June 1957.
86
pp. 165-167. NASA Release, March 16, 1961.
50 87
"To Amend the National A eronautics and Space Act Hear- NASA Release, March 17, 1961.
88
ings," U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science and Astro- Holmes, J., America on the Moon, Lippencott, Phila-
nautics, 1960, pp. 408, 412-413. delphia, 1962, pp. 189-205.
89
51 "project Horizon," Evening Star, Washington, D.C., "1962 NASA Authorization Hearings," Pt. 3, U.S. Congress,
Sept. 17, 1962, p. A-8. House Committee on Science and Astronautics, March 1961,
52
"Missile Development and Space Science Hearings," p. 1037.
90
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Letter, President to Chairman of the House Committee
1959. pp. 346, 359. on Science and Astronautics, March 23, 1961.
53 91
New York Times, Oct. 22, 1959, p. 1. New York Times, March 29, 1961.
54 92
Letter, President to NASA Administrator, Jan. 14, 1960. "Man's Role in the National Space Program," NASA Re-
55
Rosen, M. W. and Schwenk, F. C., "A Rocket for Manned lease, Aug. 6, 1961, National Academy of Science, Space
Lunar Exploration," Proceedings of the Xth International Astro- Science Board.
93
nautical Congress, Springer Verlag, Vienna, 1960, pp. 311-326. "Military Astronautics—Preliminary Report," U.S. Con-
56
Ostrander, D. R., "Introduction to Launch Vehicle Pro- gress, House Committee on Science and Astronautics, May 4,
grams," NASA-Industry Program Plans Conference, NASA, 1961, pp. 9-11.
94
1960. pp. 37-38. "Defense Space Interests Hearings," U.S. Congress, House
57
Urey, H. C., "The Chemistry of the Moon,'' Proceedings of Committee on Science and Astronautics, March 1961.
95
the Lunar and Planetary Colloquium, Vol. I, North American Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy—1961,
Aviation-Jet Propulsion Lab., Oct. 29, 1958, pp. 1-9. Washington, 1962, pp. 262-263.
58 96
Hibbs, A. R. et al., "Exploration of the Moon, the Planets Transcript, NASA News Conference, April 12, 1961.
97
and Interplanetary Space," Rept. Np 30-1, April 30, 1959, Jet Sidey, H., Life, April 21, 1961, pp. 26-27.
98
Propulsion Lab., pp. 93-95, 98, 105. "Discussion of Soviet Man-in-Space Shot," U.S. Congress,
59
NASA-Industry Program Plans Conference, NASA, 1960, House Committee on Science and Astronautics, April 13, 1961,
pp. 37-38. pp. 1-5, 31.
60 99
"Review of the Space Program Hearings," U.S. Congress, "1962 NASA Authorization Hearings," Pt. 1, U.S. Congress,
House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Jan.-Feb. 1960, House Committee on Science and Astronautics, March 1961,
pp. 167-179. pp. 374-378.
100
61
Ostrander, D. R., "Rocket Power: Key to Space Suprem- Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy—1961,
acy," speech to the American Rocket Society, Los Angeles, Washington, 1962, pp. 309-310.
Calif., May 10, 1960. 101 Privileged interviews by the author and others.
102
62
"Space, Missiles, and the Nation Hearings," U.S. Congress, Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy—1962,
House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Washington, Washington, 1963, pp. 668-674.
1960, pp. 55-56. 103 Williams, W. C., Interview by the NASA Historian,
63 March 25, 1964, used with permission.
"Fact Sheet," NASA Office of Space Flight Programs, 104
April 1, 1960, p. 7.
Wiesner, J. B., Where Science and Politics Meet, McGraw-
64 Hill, New York, 1965, pp. 8-9.
Glennan, T. K., "A Report on Space," speech at San 105
Webb, J. E., "NASA Press Conference Remarks," Astro-
Antonio, Texas, Sept. 20, 1960. nautics and Aeronautics—1964, NASA SP-4005, 1965, p. 60.
65
Congressional Record, U.S. Congress, Feb. 5, 1964, pp. 106
Mazlish, B. et al., The Railroad and the Space Program:
A-548-A-550. An Exploration in Historical Analogy, Massachusetts Institute of
66
New York Times, Jan. 29, 1961. Technology Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1965.
67 107
New York Times, Nov. 28, 1960. Hyatt, A., "Beyond Apollo," International Science and
68
Killian, J. R., speech at Pasadena, Calif., Los Angeles Technology, March 1967, pp. 30-39.
108
Times, Dec. 2, 1960. Welsh, E. C., "Space Program Planning in Perspective,"
69
Schlesinger, A. M., Jr., A Thousand Days, Houghton Air Force/Space Digest, Nov. 1967, pp. 69-71.
Mifflin, Boston, 1965. 109
"The Space Program in the Post-Apollo Period," White
70
Sorensen, T. C., Kennedy, Harper & Row, New York, 1965, House, President's Science Advisory Committee, Washington,
pp. 523-529. 1967).

Historical Perspectives On Apollo

Diunggah oleh

Informasi Dokumen

Judul Asli

Hak Cipta

Format Tersedia

Bagikan dokumen Ini

Bagikan atau Tanam Dokumen

Opsi Berbagi

Apakah menurut Anda dokumen ini bermanfaat?

Apakah konten ini tidak pantas?

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

Historical Perspectives On Apollo

Diunggah oleh

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

VOLUME 5 APRIL 1968 NUMBER 4

Historical Perspectives on Apollo

T HIS historical essay focuses upon the major elements cul-

Eugene M. Emme was appointed Historian in NASA Headquarters on November 9, 1959.

Launching of the Saturn Program

On December 17, 1958, exactly 55 years after the first

in March a "Saturn Systems Study," presenting fourteen

Pointing to the basic relationship of space flight capabilities

After careful consideration of the anticipated U.S. space

craft announced as carrying a dummy cosmonaut. Although

A high priority program should be undertaken to place a

On July 29, 1960, George M. Low, Chief of Manned Space

The Dark Period: Late I960—Early 1961

dent Kennedy's seasoned historical sense to the political

saying it was "time for a great new American enterprise—

Fig. 7 President Kennedy

front of Lunar Excursion

Anda mungkin juga menyukai