In Re: Manzano

A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC

166 SCRA 246 [Oct 5, 1988]

Facts:

RTC Judge Manzano, was designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte

Provincial Committee on Justice pursuant to EO 856 as amended by EO on
examination of the foregoing presidential issuances, it was revealed that among
the functions of the Committee is to receive complaints against any
apprehending officer xxx who may be found to have committed abuses in the
discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper authority for appropriate
action. Another function is to recommend revision of any law or regulation which
is believed prejudicial to the proper administration of criminal justice.
Furthermore, the Committee was to be under the supervision of the Secretary of
Justice.

Issue.

May Judge Manzano accept his appointment to said Committee without

violating the doctrine of Separation of Powers?

Held:

No. It is evident from the herein stated functions of the Committee that it
performs administrative functions, which are defined as those which involve the
regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own
welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the
policy of the legislature xxx. Under Art VIII, Sec 12 of the Constitution, the
members of the xxx courts xxx shall not be designated to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative functions. While the doctrine of separation of
powers is xxx not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, xxx it cannot justify a
member of the judiciary being required to assume the position xxx non-judicial
in character xxx if he is to be expected to be confined to the task of adjudication.
xxx He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official. This does not
mean that RTC judges should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility. An
RTC judge should render assistance to said Committees xxx but only when it
may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties. Request to
be authorized to accept the appointment denied.

Members of the Judiciary cannot be required to assume a position

non-judicial in character. They shall not be designated to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Art VIII, Sec 12).
 Angara v. Electoral Commission
G.R. No. 45081, 63 Phil 139 [July 15, 1936]

Facts:
The Electoral Commission was created pursuant to Art VI sec 4 of the 1935
Constitution (now sec 17) which conferred to it the power to “be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly.”
The National Assembly (NA) passed a resolution confirming the election of
petitioner Angara as member of the NA on Dec 3, 1935. On Dec 9, 1935, the
respondent Electoral Commission formally organized for the first time and
resolved to fix the same date as the final day of filing of election protests. Ynsua,
a candidate vying for the Angara’s position, filed his election protest before the
Electoral Commission on the same date. Angara sought to prohibit the Electoral
Commission from taking further cognizance of the Ynsua’s motion
Angara argues: the Constitution excludes from the Commission’s jurisdiction
the power to regulate the proceedings of such election contests. Morever, the
Commission can regulate the proceedings of election protests only if the NA has
not availed of its primary power to so regulate such proceedings.
Issues:
Does the Electoral Commission have the constitutional power to promulgate
rules of procedure (such as fixing a deadline for filing election protests) relating
to election protests notwithstanding the lack of express conferment of such
power in the Constitution?
Does it have the power the promulgate such rules notwithstanding the
resolution of the NA?
Held:
Yes. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred
or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or
the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further
constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests
before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate
such rules necessary for the exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the
election must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the
Electoral Commission.
Yes. The purpose of the of the creation of the Electoral Commission was to
transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the Legislature in
matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and
impartial tribunal. The express lodging [in the now Art VI, sec 17] of that power in
the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the
NA. If the NA is permitted to claim the power to regulate proceedings of election
contests, then the grant of power to the Commission would be ineffective for such
power would be xxx subject at all times to the regulation of the NA. The purpose
of the framers of our Constitution would be frustrated.
 Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA
GR No. 76633 [Oct 18, 1988]

Facts:
POEA was created by EO 797 which mandated it to protect OFWs to "fair and
equitable employment practices.” Saco who was married to private respondent
was killed in an accident while employed as Chief Officer of the vessel owned by
petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines (ESL). Private respondent sued for damages.
ESL argued that the complaint was not cognizable by the POEA but by the SSS.
POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and ruled in favor of the private
respondent in accordance with POEA MC No. 2. MC No. 2 prescribed a standard
contract to be adopted by shipping companies. ESL went to this Court to move
for dismissal. It contests the validity of MC No. 2 stating that it is violative of the
principle of non-delegation of legislative powers, contending that it represents an
exercise of legislative discretion. It further avers that it has been denied due
process because the same POEA that issued MC No. 2 has also sustained and
applied it.
Issues:
Is MC No. 2 a violation of the principle of non-delegation of legislative powers?
Did MC No. 2 deny the petitioner of due process?
Held:
No. Because of the increasing complexity of the task of the govt and the
growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems
demanding its attention, specialization in legislation has become necessary and
thus delegation of legislative power is in many instances permitted. The “power of
subordinate legislation” or the authority to issue rules (supplementary
regulations) to carry out the general provisions of the statute given to
administrative bodies has become more and more necessary. MC No. 2 is one
such administrative regulation. There are two accepted tests to determine
whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test.50 The power of POEA in
requiring the contract prescribed by MC No. 2 is not unlimited as there is a
sufficient standard guiding the delegate (POEA) in the exercise of said authority.
That standard is discoverable in the EO itself which, in creating the POEA,
mandated it to protect the rights of OFWs to "fair and equitable employment
practices.”
No. Administrative agencies, such as POEA, are vested with two basic
powers, the quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial. The first enables them to
promulgate implementing rules and regulations, and the second enables them to
interpret and apply such regulations. Such an arrangement has been accepted
as a fact of life of modern governments and cannot be considered violative of due
process as long as the cardinal rights laid down by Justice Laurel in the
landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations are observed.
 Casibang v. Aquino
GR. No. L-38025, 92 SCRA 642 [Aug 20, 1979]

Facts:
Yu was proclaimed elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the 1971 local
elections. His rival, petitioner Casibang, filed an election protest with the CFI.
Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution was ratified. Yu moved to dismiss on the
ground that the CFI no longer had jurisdiction over the issue, that, in view of the
ratification of the 1973 Constitution, a political question outside the range of
judicial review has intervened. He relied on Sec 9 of Art XVII and Sec 2 of Art XI of
the new Constitution which granted incumbent officials of the govt a privilege to
continue in office at the pleasure of the incumbent President, and which
conferred unto the National Assembly (NA) the power to enact a local govt code.
This, he avers, states clearly the new form of govt that was to be enforced. CFI
ruled in favor of Yu hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the electoral protest filed by the petitioner remained a
justiciable question even after the 1973 Constitution was adopted, thus remains
to be under the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.
HELD:
The thrust of the aforesaid political question theory of respondent Yu is that
the 1973 Constitution, through Section 9 of Article XVII thereof, protected only
those incumbents, like him, at the time of its ratification and effectivity and are
the only ones authorized to continue in office and their term of office as extended
now depends on the pleasure of, as the same has been entrusted or committed
to, the incumbent President of the Philippines or the Legislative Department; and
that Section 2 of Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the
revamp of the entire local government structure by the enactment of a local
government code, thus presenting a question of policy, the necessity and
expediency of which are outside the range of judicial review. In short, for the
respondent Judge to still continue assuming jurisdiction over the pending
election protest of petitioner is for him to take cognizance of a question or policy
"in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislative or Executive branch of the government."
The electoral protest case herein involved has remained a justiciable
controversy. No political question has ever been interwoven into this case. Nor is
there any act of the incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be
indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the election
protest. The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which under
the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative
or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure" (Tañada vs. Cuenco,
L-1052, Feb. 28, 1957).
 BELGICA ET. AL. V. OCHOA ET. AL.
G.R. Nos. 208566, 208493 and 209251. NOVEMBER 19, 2013
FACTS:
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6)
whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had
swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using
dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other
lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are
some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other
officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the
NGOs set up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the
operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for
agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions
were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be
declared unconstitutional: G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition
seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of
prohibition be issued permanently; G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an
Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the
provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the
Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and
the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for
being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court
issue a TRO against respondents; UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the
PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued
restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and
Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress
ISSUE: WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel
Laws similar to it are unconstitutional considering that they violate the
principles of/constitutional provisions on separation of powers.
RULING:
YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded post-enactment
authority (a) to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various
Congressional Pork Barrel allocations; (b) and in the areas of fund release and
realignment. Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to
participate in “the various operational aspects of budgeting,” violating the
separation of powers principle. That the said authority is treated as merely
recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the
prohibition covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law.
Informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the
proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the
same unconstitutional treatment.
 SANIDAD V. COMELEC
G.R. NO. L-44640. OCTOBER 12, 1976

FACTS:
Pablito Sanidad, a newspaper columnist of “Overview,” a weekly newspaper
circulating in Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the Constitutionality of Sec 19
of the Comelec Resolution 2167 which provides that during the plebiscite
campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media
columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio
or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issue. Petitioner
contends that it violates the freedom of expression and of the press. Hence,
constitutes as a prior restraint in his constitutional right. Solicitor General
contends that it does not violate the Constitution for it is a valid implementation
of the power of Comelec to supervise and regulate media during election or
plebiscite period and can express his news through the Comelec space & airtime.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Comelec is granted the power to regulate mass media during
election or plebiscite period under Article 9C of the 19987 Constitution.

HELD:
It is given that what was granted to Comelec was the power to supervise and
regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits, or other grants issued for
the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media communication or
information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to
reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefore, for public information
campaign and forums among candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be
prevented is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue
advantage to a candidate.
Neither the Constitution nor RA 6646 can be construed to mean that the
Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by
media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite
periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during
plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact,
there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Comelec Resolution No 2167 has
no statutory basis.
 DAZA VS. SINGSON
180 SCRA 496, 1989

FACTS:
Petitioner was a member of the Commission on Appointments representing
the Liberal Party. With the organization of the LDP (Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino), some congressional members belonging to the Liberal Party resigned
from said party to join the LDP. When the Commission on Appointments were
reorganized, petitioner was replaced by an LDP representative.
Petitioner contends that the organization of the LDP cannot affect the
composition of the Commission on Appointments because LDP is not a registered
party and has not yet shown the stability of a party.

ISSUE:
Does the situation present a “political question”?

HELD:
The question is justiciable. The issue is one of legality not of wisdom. The
ascertainment of the manner of forming the Commission on Appointments is
distinct from the discretion of the parties to designate there representatives. And
even if the question were political in nature, it would still come under the
expanded power of review in Article VIII, Section 1.
What is involved is not a discretionary act of the House of Reps that may not
be reviewed by the Court because it is political in nature. What is involved here is
the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the Daza
from the CA. The issue presented is justiciable rather than political, involving as
it does the manner of filling the CA as prescribed in the Constitution [and not the
discretion of the House in the choice of its representatives]. Even if the question
were political in nature, it would still come within the powers of review of the
Court under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon it by Art VIII, Sec 1 of the
Constitution which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any
branch or instrumentality of the government.
 ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS PURISIMA
G.R. No. 166715
August 14, 2008
Facts:
Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing
Republic Act (RA) 9335. R.A. 9335 was enacted to optimize the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and
BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a
system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and
Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It
covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months
of service, regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging
the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by
establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law “transforms the officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters” as
they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of
rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally
mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the
ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative
function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and
approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee
permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the
law.
Issues:
Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the
creation of a congressional oversight committee.
Ruling:
YES. R.A. No. 9335 is constitutional, except for Section 12 of the law which
creates a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to review the law’s IRR. That
RA No. 9335 will turn BIR and BOC employees and officials into “bounty hunters
and mercenaries” is purely speculative as the law establishes safeguards by
imposing liabilities on officers and employees who are guilty of negligence,
abuses, malfeasance, etc. Neither is the equal protection clause violated since
the law recognizes a valid classification as only the BIR and BOC have the
common distinct primary function of revenue generation. There are sufficient
policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets as the
revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected
of the BIR and the BOC.
However, the creation of a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee for the
purpose of reviewing the IRR formulated by agencies of the executive branch
(DOF, DBM, NEDA, etc.) is unconstitutional since it violates the doctrine of
separation of powers since Congress arrogated judicial power upon itself.
 Garcia v. Executive Secretary

GR 101273, 211 SCRA 219

July 3, 1992

Facts:
The Tariff and Customs Code (TCC) states that in the interest of national
economy, general welfare and/or national security, the President, subject to
limitations therein provided, may increase xxx existing protective rates of import
duty xxx when necessary. Pursuant to the TCC, the President issued EO 475 and
478 imposing an additional duty of 9% ad valorem to imported crude oil and
other oil products, and a special duty of P0.95 per liter of imported crude oil and
P1.00 per liter of imported oil products.
Rep. Garcia contests the validity of the foregoing EOs averring that they are
violative of Sec 24, Art VI of the Constitution which provides: All revenue or tariff
bills shall originate in the House of Representatives.
He also argues that said EOs contravene the TCC because the latter
authorizes the President to, according to him, impose additional duties only
when necessary to protect local industries.
Issue:
Are said Executive Orders unconstitutional?

Held:
No. There is explicit Constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the
President to, “subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may
impose”, fix “within specific limits tariff rates xxx and other duties or imposts
xxx.”
Moreover, Garcia’s argument that the “protection of local industries” is the
only permissible objective that can be secured by the exercise of the delegated
authority—that which was provided in the TCC to be exercised by the President
in “the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national
security”—is a stiflingly narrow one. We believe, for instance, that the protection
of consumers is at the very least as important a dimension of the “the interest of
national economy, general welfare and national security” as the protection of
local industries. Congress does not unduly delegate power when it describes
what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority.
 PEOPLE V. VERA
G.R. NO. L-45685. NOVEMBER 16, 1937
FACTS:
Petitioners, the People of the Philippines and the Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation, are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and
the respondent herein Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in a criminal
case. Respondent Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of
the trial court who heard the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for
probation in the aforesaid criminal case.
The trial court rendered judgment, convicting Unjieng. The instant
proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by Unjieng before
the trial court, under the provisions of Act No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine
Legislature. Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the
crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he
would observe good conduct in the future. However, the Fiscal of the City of
Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to the Unjieng. The private
prosecution also filed an opposition, elaborating on the unconstitutionality of Act
No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of
several provinces. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which
reads as follows:
This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial
boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than
those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be
appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the
Probation Office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Act No. 4221 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power.
HELD:
Yes. As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it
does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative
officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers
delegated to it. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its
own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in
reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. In
other words, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for
themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at
all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in
the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have
the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the
needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. The plain language of the Act
is not susceptible of any other interpretation. This, to our minds, is a virtual
surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards.
We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and
unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for
this reason, unconstitutional and void.
 EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. POEA
G.R. NO. 76633. OCTOBER 18, 1988
FACTS:
The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of P192,000.00 by
the POEA for the death of her husband. The decision is challenged by the
petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the
case as the husband was not an overseas worker.
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was
killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan on March 15, 1985. His widow sued for
damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the
POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was
cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have
been filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed
jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor
of the complainant. The award consisted of P180,000.00 as death benefits and
P12,000.00 for burial expenses.
The petitioner does not contend that Saco was not its employee or that the
claim of his widow is not compensable. What it does urge is that he was not an
overseas worker but a 'domestic employee and consequently his widow's claim
should have been filed with Social Security System, subject to appeal to the
Employees Compensation Commission. Furthermore, the petitioner questions
the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of
non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given
the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization,
the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the
principle, is not subject to delegation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 2 is violative of the principle of
non-delegation of legislative power.
HELD: No. The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in
Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797, reading as follows: “... The governing
Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory
functions of the Administration (POEA). “ Legislative discretion as to the
substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is
the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall
be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This
prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model
contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the
cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it
the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as
there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said
authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in
creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to
protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment
practices."
 YNOT VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
148 SCRA 659, NO. L- 74457
MARCH 20, 1987
FACTS:
Executive Order 626-A prohibited the transport of the carabaos or carabao
meat across the provincial boundaries without government clearance, for the
purpose of preventing the indiscriminate slaughter of those animals.
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to
Iloilo when they were confiscated by the police station commander for violation of
EO 626-A. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner
and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The
petitioner claimed that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without
according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial cout as
guaranteed by due process. The petitioner challenges the constitutionality of the
said order and the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former
President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power in relation to the
disposal of the confiscated properties

HELD:
No. We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the
disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive
order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall “be distributed to
charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to
deserving farmers through dispersal ad the Director of the Animal Industry may
see fit, in the case of carabaos.” The phrase “may see fit” is an extremely
generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous
opportunities for partiality and abuse and even corruption, One searches in vain
for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the
limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution.
There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the
fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be
chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone
may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion.
 TABLARIN vs. GUTIERREZ
G.R. No. 78164
July 31, 1987
FACTS:
The petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National
Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one
of the public respondents, and administered by the private respondent, the
Center for Educational Measurement (CEM).
The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational
Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as
amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985 and from requiring the taking
and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for
admission and from administering the NMAT.
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as
the "Medical Act of 1959" with one of its basic objectives was to provide for the
standardization and regulation of medical education.
The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education with the
functions specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following:
To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized
college of medicine; To accept applications for certification for admission to a
medical school and keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect
from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to
the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education; To promulgate and
prescribe and enforce the necessary rules and regulations for the proper
implementation of the foregoing functions.
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical
schools and one of these is a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical
school from the Board of Medical Education.
ISSUE: Whether or not there exists a sufficient standard to be followed by the
Board
HELD: Yes. The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule
making authority by an administrative agency like the Board of Medical
Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract. As explained by then Mr.
Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta: The standard may be either expressed or
implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard
though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the
policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly
the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as in
Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads .
We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of
the 1959 Medical Act: "the standardization and regulation of medical education"
and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the statute itself, and that
these considered together are sufficient compliance with the requirements of the
non-delegation principle.
 BELGICA ET. AL. V. OCHOA ET. AL.
G.R. Nos. 208566, 208493 and 209251. NOVEMBER 19, 2013
FACTS: The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6)
whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had
swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using
dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other
lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from
royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province
intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO. Several
petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel
System" be declared unconstitutional: G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for
Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional,
and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently; G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al
filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The
Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in
the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the
Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and
the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for
being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court
issue a TRO against respondents; UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the
PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued
restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and
Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress
ISSUE: Whether or not the phrases under Section 8 of PD 910, relating to the
Malampaya Funds, and under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they
constitute undue delegations of legislative power.
RULING: Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as may
be hereafter directed by the President” constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to
adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the
purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President
wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct
and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the
purview of the law.” Section 12 of PD 1869 (b) "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects” was declared constitutional. It indicated
purpose adequately curtails the authority of the president to spend the
presidential social fund only for restoration purposes which arise from
calamities.(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities
due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the office of the
president of the philippines” was declared unconstitutional. It gives the
president carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure
project he may so determine as a ―priority‖ . verily, the law does not supply a
definition of ―priority infrastructure development projects‖ and hence, leaves
the president without any guideline to construe the same.
 PACIFIC STEAM LAUNDRY, INC. vs. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY
G. R. No. 165299. December 18, 2009
FACTS: Petitioner Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. (petitioner) is a company engaged
in the business of laundry services. On 22 June 2001, LLDA conducted an
investigation and found that untreated waste water generated from petitioner’s
laundry washing activities was discharged directly to the San Francisco Del
Monte River. Furthermore, the Investigation Report stated that petitioner’s plant
was operating without LLDA clearance, AC/PO-ESI, and Discharge Permit from
LLDA. The result of the laboratory analysis showed non-compliance with effluent
standards. Consequently, LLDA issued to petitioner a Notice of Violation. A
Pollution Control and Abatement case was filed against petitioner before the
LLDA. Petitioner requested another test. This time, it showed compliance.
Respondent prayed that the Notice of Violation issued on 30 October 2001 and
its corresponding daily penalty be set aside and that the imposable penalty be
reckoned from the date of actual hearing and not on 5 September 2001. It is
respondent’s position that the Notice of Violation and the imposition of the
penalty had no legal and factual basis because it had already installed the
necessary waste water treatment to abate the water pollution.This Public
Hearing Committee finds respondent’s arguments devoid of merit. Presidential
Decree No. 984 prohibits the discharge of pollutive waste water and any person
found in violation thereof shall pay a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos
(PhP5,000.00) [sic] for every day during which such violation continues. The
mere discharge of waste water not conforming with the effluent standard is the
violation referred to in PD No. 984.CA held that LLDA has the power to impose
fines.
ISSUE: WON LLDA have the implied power to impose fines as set forth in PD 984.
HELD: YES.Petitioner asserts that LLDA has no power to impose fines since
such power to impose penal sanctions, which was once lodged with the National
Pollution Control Commission (NPCC), is now assumed by the Pollution
Adjudication Board pursuant to Executive Order No. 192 (EO 192). SC disagree.
Presidential Decree No. 984 (PD 984) created and established the NPCC under
the Office of the President. EO 192, which reorganized the DENR, created the
Pollution Adjudication Board under the Office of the DENR Secretary which
assumed the powers and functions of the NPCC with respect to adjudication of
pollution cases.Under Executive Order No. 927 (EO 927), LLDA is granted
additional powers and functions to effectively perform its role and to enlarge its
prerogatives of monitoring,licensing and enforcement.Under Section 4(h) of EO
927, LLDA may "exercise such powers and perform such other functions as may
be necessary to carry out its duties and responsibilities." In Laguna Lake
Development Authority v. Court of Appeals, the Court upheld the power of LLDA
to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order even if such power is not expressly
conferred by law,holding that an administrative agency has also such powers as
are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. The Court ruled that
LLDA, in the exercise of its express powers under its charter, as a regulatory and
quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region,
has the implied authority to issue a "cease and desist order." In the same
manner, we hold that the LLDA has the power to impose fines in the exercise of
its function as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution
cases in the Laguna Lake region.