TO- Tone Clarke

DATE: Apnl 12,2003

SUBJECT:

Lets t h i a h a g some of the tote who did such a g o d job as i g ' b.

-
heads in after this thing is over.

Who else would there be besides Grange, Jacobs, McInemey, Allad? There were
three or four others that stood out. There was a major, Bevellequa, and several
others. /
Cellular

Email

Lieutenant General Daniel W. Chistman (USA, Retired)

President and Executive Director
Kirnsey Foundation
1700 Pennsylvania Avenue. NW. Suite 850

Brigadier General David Grange (USA, Retired)

ExecutiveVice President and Chief Executive Officer
McConnick Tribune Foundation
435 North Michigan Avenue, Suite Number770
Chicago, Illinois6061 1
Telephone ' '
Fax (312) 222 3523
Ernails .
General Montgomery Meigs (USA, Retired)
Visiting Tom Slick Professor ofworld Peace
Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs
University of Texas, Austin
-PM,
--.Office
-...-.- ...Y.
R"x
Austin, Texas 78713-8925
Telephone:
Fax:
.- (512) 232.5897
Email: ' '
General Joseph Ralston W A F , Retired)
Principal
The Cohen Group
600 13* Street. NW. Suite Number 400
Washington, DC 20036
Telephone:
(202) 689-7699
Email: .
AF, Retired)

Cellular
Emmi
 1 Page Denied in Full

FOIA Exemption (b)(5)

 April 24,2006

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Thoughts on Meetine with Militam Analvits --April 18.2006

. Focus on the Global War on Terror - not simply Iraq. The wider war -
long war. Iraq is a battlemund.
. Describe the nature of the threat - vicious, violent extremists; chop off
heads.
Let the public know there will be no terminal event - like the signing
ceremony on the USS MISSOURI. It will be a long war.
Set out the next benchmarks. We pointed to the January (2005) elections,
the constitution, the December (2005) election, and the formation of the
new government. Now we can look forward to the announcement of the
new cabinet, and continued transfer of responsibility to the Iraqi Security
Forces.
Describe the "dire consequences" if we toss in the towel. Explain what the
world would look like.
Link Iraa to Iran. Iran is the concern. If we fail in Iraq or Afghanistan, it
will help Iran.
"We fight there so we won't have to fight here at home."
. Go on the offense. Push back, rather than simply defending. We can't win
on defense.
We are at war. It is a test of wills. The center of gravity is in the US., not
in Iraq. Perseverance = Victory.
 1 Page Denied in Full

FOIA Exemption (b)(5)

. .
Ã
AffiMOJUtefref1-<Mn
April 25,2006

MEMORANDUM PORi COLONEL MIKEMEESK

DEPAKTMEKT BEAD. DEPARTMENT0 Ã SOCIAL SCIENCES
UNITED STATESMILITARYACADEMY
COLONEL CINDY JEBB
DEPUTY DEPARTMENTHEAD.DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCES
UNTIED STA1TSMILITARY ACADEMY

A f d d Report- Tnp to Ireq and Kuwait

Thmttay 13 April throughThunutay20 April 2006
q. Briefing:Multi-Ntnid Poroe-InqBMtkfidd Update.

r. BrkIlKf: MNF-1EBttt.dSyncliroinationBotrt.
I. DMÇI~¥~jrttfoStÇfrBricliT4'IiifimyDivi

t, DMÇIMBttlU SrlTBririllir 101*AWwme Division.

.
.. ~IiiteliyBriB^CcmiiMBdcT,~Ia&BbyDiviiloa.

~riefly~~&ghd~itiy-~omauod~^.4'biftotiy~lvli~0.

w.~riefly1afilll~y~<~1q>~1y6nBIlÈDld(^,4*1a&11l1~~ivi*ioa
'

& imcllaScalof:SoMlOTandJIBiOTNCOt,4*fatallyDMiiia.
. ~mmllbnilto;0taeid00ceiligil~1v~oo(>>llBlÇfil3<l<tmM~,101"AltamDiviita
f l k t e lllbiliy
~ ~~i~ c o n ~ ~ l1a0 ,1 ~ ~ ~ i o~m
i vel s t a ~

on ConBiBr-IEDCwiMloa.
~~BÈfc&i.!Mmç~EfftTO~ClÈçmçnita-(EnmicCT).101"<irtlolBcDfv
kBrieflç Avidon BrittleConn~ndtl.101"AMioneDivUm.

~BAllÈt:M>ncawBtttatkaCommudtfandCoillplnyCo.BçMliCT1.101'Aiit<xiltDiTiçi
dd.~ueh~nriiçSemlM:~viuion<^aq>a~~oa~nnderandLewlo^IOl~AirtonMDiririgo
ir Soldbsoiljunk.NCO.,101"AirtiomcDivlstaL
ft. Wt iidBridbw: fti2çdDetentionCoder and I n t d K i

if. VIA SpcdtJOpaidoa ImdligtiroFluion Ccner.

lANIghl-1: TolO1~Mmrme^l^Hndqouunf~pmWtmmai~~Combo~~
ComtxiAction Bedew. DifCttcfonwiA juajorfoldien.
 -
4. THE BOTTOM LINE OBSERVATIONS IKOM IRAQI FREEDOM, Anal.2006:

fielded. It was a redjoy and im honor to see thtrn firfl-hand.

embroiled in their ownpoieotidstruggle wilh theTurks.

with g~ that conflict with the Stm A& ofsouthernand central ims

be & essentialingredient to keeping haqmgHher. If Ac US.loses his leadershipin the comine year; *Ã
W i l d implode.
learns at U.S. tactical batttlim lev~to&&n the flmction of "evidentiary pckcgea"u weU u accompanying
pritooCT*totestily in court in B a w d .

Iran, Syria, Chinaagainst ~ a i < &V Cub*, and otherpotent)*!Oaahpo*~

BtnyRMcCriEty
General USA (Ret)
~PiotoorofhunaidAflUa
Uralcd State*Military Academy
W a t Pone. New Yort
 October 25,2005

TO: Eric Edelmim

GEN John Abizaid ^\
Larry DiRita

FROM:
SUBJECT: Letter from AlanHowell Parrot
Donald Rumfeld
^
Please talm a look at fileattachedletter sent to me by a military d y i t , and tell
me what you think of i t

Thanks.

..........,
louaStl3
DfflUl

a..........................................................m..

Please Respond ByNovember 08.2005

 The Union for the Conservation of Raptors
s, ,';;;',

best pikin lhe b= To* N- B retired from prarticin<clinic^ piiyefaoloty. But he

till p w d w valuable consulting tcn-ioet, while he confine* to dfvelop ku work fu beyond
conventi-I applicauo~m d m e i . H" number is 425-815-2286
Multiple fonm of aoalyua are invaluable for rcomprehending ¥borigina(i-c. Arab) people who
speak other (m-Engliih) languages, because Arabs still sbar; common archetynal body
languages with westernere, and- therefor be understood in a comrnoo context.
When the DOU asked me to I t s my Im- pioficiewei. it wasn't enough to lbl- et.d
hiher. today's NOC ageoo and other imclL- on&tya &odd be ideally optimized wfch
trainino b n d convciit~inalhmuw /Russian r-h- . include wide ~XrietVof
A n b i ~ I to

IF invited,I ' ~ ti lie this by"introducii the DOD to a whole new world of soft.
low-intensitycontent and communicationmalysu.

There is an clement of delusional religiousityin -awl's letter, most apparent in the bcginniw
of his letter. ~e is usina 'rclioid as a safctv mechanism,to cover his w h e M a aerial killer.
BIIIeven this demeanorfades~way as he advances deep& into a pychotic episode ofrentaig
against his adversaries. We saw the same features in Saddam Hussein during the first Gulf War.
when he publicly announced Out he is descended from the Muslim prophet Mohammed.
II is notable that in this letter, ??.qaw?s emotions are not consistent from beginning to end.
Zmqrnwi is easilyinfluenced by cxlenia)circumstances that are everts', cwble of
~tflrtiriad o n t i , emotionally-driven 'brush-fires'. A fanatically 'retctivc'w h o t i c who is in
the business of responding to external stimuli, ofieo mates titanic mi&&, sod Qrns ~ W U
compelled to problem-solve with overwhelming,brute force.
H n d l e n for OmÇt-Cantnd-

his wrath 7 m - q w h team is likely lo bo challenged by cnsç Jmidf 7,çrq~wi'organization,u

likely to ch& over ti&, to thedetrimentof &wi's&hl capacity

-
niicn as thov çr challancfld hv ihr cmililinn'x hunt for Tarowi. Thui 'damfe-coatrol' ratio 88
 The Union for the Conservation of Raptors

ThereforZarqawi (BCS religion(fa. control of God)and as strategic tools10 delay hil fltfe,
6at will inevitablybe caused by eoOTiieswithiin his oiguuzation,if not by te US.-kd oodldo^
Port-TmomiticStrew b Toxic, and EffectivelyKJ& An O r f f a a h :
S i i l y , Nfccolo MBchillL Adolpt Hitler lid Y- An&t ¥m ¥IindivKJuri.uBtebg
firon fragmented egos, who nevertheless continued public careen us functions]peyohotica.
Zarqawi belongs to the same club, but his M-life is over. The average lif- o f 10 overtly
active. public Mafia Don is about five years,and even Zaiqawi may be acutely aware flirt
be it
approaching payback time 5 ligbtnmg ¥peed This is also wise for aoibiçntreumntK strw.
which serves to shortenhis functional o .
Zarotwi suffers from severe onaoilm trumitic stress. Unable to ~ r o c w aiafonnitioB overiad,
view o f all &pk, beyond his immediatecircle of S-Mwlims. A pcreoo who u,W toxic,
cannot sleep and can't make lucidjudgro~~ta.Symptixni nuuufrit inhuextremelytoxic uulyris
ofthe Shiite. the Kurds.md othw, 7 q a w l is ab-e*d\overwhelmedby his own pnchosi*.
Note: aatea, "America will not leave (Iraq)no rootlet how numerous it'^ wounds
become and how much o f i f s blood it spilled". ITlia contradicts Zrqawi'a otriier pitton, hi
the American public wilt not countenance tuzh mortality -a US. troops. Previously, t h -
uttuig of Americans- a terror-tactk:,dçigne to ca&e a I&exodusif ~niericaos. Today,
U.S. troops an; viewed os currency for trading purposes, to secure the freedom of defined
terrorists. This means that PresidentBuih's edict thai"the U.S. will not backdown"b woriccd.
-
Zargawi admits here thai his tactics have changed, once again under duress, due to US.resolve.
Zaruwi is correct to c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e m imDatient tv bm4.&i~hm
His final paraeraoh isan asceodnut
dam-mate Iraq. at the expense of Kurds and s k i ~klims.
niter'smandJO^.couch^inttKsycophanticlanguageofanindi-otiiredservant.
Summary:
TherewenattyoutrighthistoricdistortionsandevidentnuccorsciesinmwTiteUw. Hil
disolxyfidcontempt for Shirtc Muslims exceeds his aaituzwa for& A whom he b e l k
to be two-dimensionaland of momentmy concern. ie. ~usiinu¥r the looa-tenn enemy,
i they çr held in contempt by all o f leaden. We- ÇnÈtv resolutely minuin
this difcnrd between Shi ie and S m i precludes wilt* collabontion, but the Koran c k d y
instructs Muslim enemtex to collaborate as allies, when thcv are lucked hv the tafir mfidds
i i . KOTOTC precepts mandate,in principle, that lisa accommodate UBL andal-Qaeda's leaders,
as a means for defeating western infidels and Christian/Jewishinvdcrs.
 The Union for the Conservation of Raptors
,;;;:

confrontational u exclamationpoinls.

..
 W y ? This ihouts thd Zmahm is obliged to protect Sliiitc M u s h Tlui new pol*
a
it untenable to al-Qaeda's leadership ... unless at-Zawahiri is guest,prisoner, or beneficHoyof
Iranian hospitality. Tlus paragraph supportsu.c.R's Iraniui sighting ofUBL lastNovember.

b p h s inthis letter, &ch& preceded by le& & numbers, signify i distinct chmge of
topic. BUI these five paragraphs are unusual,in *at they are all talking about the BODC subject.
Here,thelettersarenotusedtodenoteach-oftopic-rather,theyareusedto~lusizethe
samepolm (i.e.the S u d "collision" whh Shiii apostotca),like a fist banging on the Wfi
Somebodyha-i convinced Zawhirito protect die hated SbiiteMuslins- Is it theIranian Shi'ç /
Rdtttvc Silkri.g 0fRri-thf;

Reltiveto this. consider bow Zawatriri complainsabout his favorite wife,hk SOIL hu daaditer,
and three fanuliefsuffering from war. Yet then is no thought for the suffering of 100 pffaonerB.
Is dlls because al4aoda's 100 prisows in Iran, are not suffering at all, became ihey are guests
of Ahmcdiniyd?
CkJuly 31.2(1021~uaguestdtheSllldlFoic~MillinerPrinceSud¥l-i'BiddhkJeddd
palace. Thenext~heflewtoImtoreceivetwoal<çedatenoriiteb^mIr~~
and to escort them to Saudi Arabia, ifiIt's DO secret thai Iran holds saiioraKteeda ternmas.
 The Union for the Conservation of Raptors
B.PoI*ttitbeHot:

~arqawistates~raq,"hasnotmotnnainsinwhichwecantakerefugeandnofonartsinwbow
thicketswe can hide." But Zawahiri and UBL have found a third venue for hiding:the sovereign
staleofIran,whose borders- to be inipeoelrabte totheUS.-ledooalitioo-
MlwxUBneo~P o i B

support He tern Zarqnri to develop, "circlet of support, assistance,andcooperation,ad

through them to advance
'
until you become ...an organization." This is inipoasibb. became
Zaroawi'l is ¥Iread contracting, as described in lhn previous &is of bis *I.
Does %*%this tnesuia twice, bwusehe', aware Zaiqiwicwaiat maintoin his team?

-~ ~-
with a manual carriage return-"F+ both confiscated documents'- translated &lo ~nglish
and distniuted from the same computer. These two documents can be at
WJM.eIoha1- md
h r n J ~ . ~ O " i l e n eioI gM&f

 Winter ZWInOUZ: the UAEDqmy nine MillimTShukb SliçÃbit -4, a vthutlt U.CK
resource, revealedThai ban banned hunmg of Houbari by UAE taJconcn. Iran's state-sanctioned
policy is establishedso that UBL can hunt without enemy interference and interdiction;
 Febnury 06,2002: the ChristianSci- Monitor reports the UBL'i cook clumi ttm UBL E d
m Iran. The cook describes L'BI hunting *quail", while whcr"quri1 were brought ID by rotd
from Iran" Hen nm talking about qail He is talkmg about Houbux. (oticle eoclcaed. below)
November. 2004: UBL sigh% near Mashad, h by U.C.R rtafF. The detub were reportedto
Minor Oenftnl Paul Vallelv on Jiimurv31.2005. The FBI interviewed U.CR on SCBtembCT 02:k.C'
 Novembert2004: UBL sighting south oflhe Caspian, by Ken T i ' s source.This wfa an
independentsighting, unknown to both U.C.R. and General Vdkly, until Paul met Kon inNYC
on June 13, 2005. Timmmm met the FBI and abo reported the sighting details in his book,
p u n t d m To
.. SbwdQm w j .
102-t7a2544ÑVokÇ/ P l w f "bhoar wfbilli ¥
 The Union for the Conservation of Raptors
>, 48
,,;I
'
,

- - --
If Zawahiri's letter is a topographical map, then the density of question marks in one paragraph
may be viewed as a mountain refuge. They represent an anomaly in the topography of Zawahil's
communication.

that he stop the kijlinc of Shiite ~uslims.This is liketellineafemtto leave the chickens alone.'
So many questions in one paragraph, represent indirect communication: Zawahiri is afraid.
Zawahiri feels the ominous weight of responsibility, as he hanunere his point home. Vey likely.
he expects the killing of Shi'a will continue, if not by Zarqawi, then by his f o l k . This deep
forreaches to the subconsciousmind. Zawahii i s xfrud that Zarqawi will ignore him, and he i s
afraid of what he will do. i.c. Theconsea-
shall work to the detrimentofZawahiri & Iran.
. - -
ofZanrwi's o m k secTarum violence in haa.

In this critical panyrarii.Zawthiri aka confirms fte Koran's inaBdoc that Minlim enaniec
collaborate is friends, when attacked by ktffir infidels. Ho stetel,,'%& w and the Imdaoflneed
to refrain from banningeach other at This time in which the Amtreans are targeting us."
There is enough nuteriaL independently &td, to awai our claim that UBL resides iu
Iran. And U.CR has developed a tactid strategy t hereby he will be compelled to look for u ~ ,
rather dm the opposite. It is my hope that dl ofua together, stull have the opportuiuty t
o w
develop this project
 1 Page Denied in Full

FOIA Exemption (b)(5)

. ,

ASsHeiPnfmir'f-MUa
April 25,2006
MEMORANDUM FOR: COLONEL MIKE MCESE
DEPARTMENT HEAD. DEPARTMENT Of SOCIAL SCIENCES
UNITED STATESMILITARY ACADEMY
COLONEL CINDY JEBB
DEPUTY DEPARTMENTHEAD.DEPARTMENTW SOCIAL SCIENCES
UNITED STATESMILITARY ACADEMY

1.PURPOSE: Tto-iiTOvitefoltow^fcrib^retireeviltt13-20April2006toImdKrotit. Look

forw^m&ingafoculftçeniinÈwi&Dqiotme^ctfSocidScioK^uwwccrnveilie)^hkF~

I.SOURCES- IRAQ:

b. LTG PçltCM.rçlll,C.mmç><lcr,MiiM-N*lkl.Corp-hq (MNC-I); OllMXK.ieditCT-.md

briefings.

c. LTGM<nhDaDp_v,C-mder,MlttWmhmslSfe<lri<rTnmihll-! OllMXHirtelX-m
rnd b,i&,p.

d. B m t t t l i i à § t - à ˆ r & l K r r i L T G R à § l . ~ ( V K ~ > , I > t p " y l . G à § à ˆ " " l G . B T t t C " ' r . M Ã

F-1r.q (MNF-I); w e Briefioo.
t. -diÈMççim¥adhlrfi
AclltChlrf-tif-Mlnil).U.&Elçb..~,DCMD.l-ldSçtltrtlth

f. MGJlimn-CdmtJlnGçKrJ,4*~Bymri&-,M>M-N>lla>çIDIvU<lç-Bçel>
<MN1>-m: Occ-m-mSscussi001d briefbn.
. MG Tkoii Ti-, Coiun-
on-oneducuniciumdbriefings-Â
Gainl, l @ l a A kDb. MnM-Nftloul Dhhta-Nllia 0:
Ole-

L MGIUckLyiKt.Mri^NMlo^ F<ir^lrçi<MNr-IStr.ttlilt)!irtCTI;Onc-t~><llciliiaç..<BçdlÈicf
L wvm ~ n e t fd m
MG ~ ~ l l à § l l t y ~ <~;SMC,C~~~~.~WTM-U-N.IIOWF~~~~CT-~~.~:
brief.
1. MR.tackminoi.ChkrofIm#PolioTr.iJIIo.: DilutedIriffm.
. 3. SOURCES -KUWAIT:
>. Am-McUnlLeBaro,USA-l>çÈ.ilçrmKrer OfBctt^lBridhcunio.uwnilU.S.<-
Bri
m

t.. ~ ~ > f f ~ l k ( l w : - ~ c t m ~ b e f ~ f i t e a f ~ i f u n > ~ o c ' l à § " a o ' > - ~ u w < i t

-
c. ;
U S Embassy PolihcalOfficer
us a n b
a; l ~ y ~ ~ 0 - 1

MG J- Kdtey, A* Corn- General, CoaHtteBL u d C

1. FJI*Â¥ffBrfcfmtfu/ m s s \ f ~ L m d ~ C o n n i m i l ( C T L C O .
I. IHçntrDhCT.llli.:CFLCCGcilCTlOfficeiÈ.Cliitf<f-.lritCç.nilçml~M

-
4, THE BOTTOM U-il OBSERVATIONS FROM IRAQ1FREEDOM.- Mç<

l ~ . ~ ~ S , ~ ~ ~ ~ a n d h~ ~ d
~*i~~iiiç~çmonandiotefflrtron-~~~~wforweçkoeuandfoixidcç)ixç^,bdrf~the
co~fidenceiaifaefrfer~im iis~d~~offux^~undenii~~^dthe~

wereon
' '
creating an effectiveIraqi A m y and Police, mubafbed and a sense ofhumor. Nl oftime Boldios,NXh
and young officerswere volunteerstor combat- Many their fecood combatlour- ¥cvcrawereon liw ihtrf a
fourth cnmbal tour. Mmv tadmalisted to fv with their unit on itsreturoto a wcond InqdcploYinoa. May
ttic populttion safeinthe ~bscnccof~raqi power. I" addition,the shin werei^nnndeddm Iran ii B Persianpower
with gmIÃ that conflict with ibe Shtt Arabs ofaoutfacni and -1 Iraq
 --
hoeieOutonlytheClAandtheUS Armedbciroctare.~wu ThistitutKrendoatforremedy

l" Wefacea¥enomnrat&dilemm reu us commtroop*~rn.police¥ctKÈcovcroadbyQrole

Iraqilçw OiçretheyaCmlitwnUilitwyForctlopporong¥couinei-msir~eocycxmpu~~UamdoowKh
mfmsomwm-? l k ' . " " ~ - - m & - ~ l t b c ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~
effectively We -Uy have acellcin Tulett of (ROE)eovenunxtbewe of leduj force TbeKiulMÃ
now rooiphuy under theprefsuresorpoliticalieniinvit, a i d level

loonbebackinaction

~ - T t e s ~ a i & A r m y d ~ i r i ~ i e ~ o q w i w e & d ~ ---inigiaent^aaioCVnt^tbeIq-

^~csat,
iasuraencyand Iraqi trainingmission. In my jDdfimHiL CENTCOM mut COiUtnuiithe force leviel nibi =we riric
damaging our ground combat capability which ve will need in the ongoing deterrence of- from North K-
Iran, Syria, China against Taiwan, Venezuela,Cuba, and oAcrpotential flathpoinB.
 roMtrwboodo~~^~*~~pe~t$18babo.~~hç~~16bdL0~0foe~ftÈdÈçleft~tfac
T h e A J l ) ^ m - m " d â ‚ ¬ m S * TTtcy
~~iooccurtu~there^"teec<mom~rec~ven¥i^tfacHM~nci~US.nÈp(
will Â¥<FulfiU their plalaf. MmoffteirplriBf m 1- DO^ p à § ~ t

itwoo~be-~dedpol^to~toachieveo~p(çtiealob)octivciftersS400biBknwirbeoMKwe)çtee4
hbmy
i i l b e r e q u i ~ e m c x i t t o b a i l d a v ~ b ( ~ Ã § c o auo~aatoyi~eatbabiaeTa~~yitaeolheAIF.
oii~~~~
~tri~ewi~failto~clueveour~~liticalrnih~ob~inlhecoouot24coonthtIfmdo¥<X
ec<xiom~(upportoatbeorderofS5-10billi<xiperveç Thu~kbrlexthfUKeotoffldnini(facepeop1e.

I then-dear weapon purpose withins-10-'.'

5. SUMMARY:

~ ~ . ~ . w f f l r t i n . m m ~ i n i 0 ~ r i l i i t o 1 i ~ q d i t t o , l i l t ~ ~ i m i . ~~i~~kifc~~~tintu.s.<loni~il!n-ppon
z4ml.~tll>.
fmdie-,Â¥Uboo^IDmyviewtheAiDencaiipocpl~iBderatHidd^wemDBtMtMorweri&ateayewdHutero
forei* policy in Qic vital Oulf Oil Rwon. US.puteo opmionm y be- U K n w i idi^MW W hi?'- h
my sacri&x ontbeo-bdi^(huge pen^hges ofboth the Shb and Sumii p o p u l ~ t k H U ~ e v thAtheflCo^i&
e
f - ~ t h e ~ m ~ ~ I t o d ~ ~ ~ ~ b h t & v. ~ - ~
 5 . 3. on
UNDPR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
I MEMORANDUM rod- COLONELMIKE MEESE
DEPARTMENT HEAD.DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCEBNCKS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
COLONELCINDY JEBB
DEPUTY DEPARTMENTBXA~,JJEPABTMIHTOF SOCIAL SCIENdS
UMTED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
¥ BG Jriui C- (AwtnHMAiuTP MNF-I m o r n Briç

BCAle-InCçCTtÈta(IMlÑAi-rt-.CCTl.tKtl-UlKbttBAl
p - m ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ + ~ s
thnait-

q. Brieflar Mulb-NctioiMl Pace-Inq BtftlefioldUpWa

r. Briefiu- MNPIEficcudSynchrooizBtioaBd
% ~h~"&Mk~ufrBridlllf:4liilmoyIh-c.L
,. D M < t ~ t t ~ s l . u ~ l O I ~ A i r t ) < n l e D I v U r n
I
. Bridlllf:InailtiyBnfleCoaimmilEl,4*IliailliyDlvuioil.
v. ~rfeltaBAetmBhiftntiyBatldionCommuKla'.~hifiuitiyDivinoa.

w. ~~0~isamCavmyCcmiimd-.4~IntainDrvmoa.
I. l^h~Smlç:SçMiCTçlriiÈriçNCOç,4"ll>f.ntiyI>iv

,. ~ ~ l l l > . r ~ > l u i ~ r i o à § - - ~ f f i ~ t ~ l à § ^ ~ v ~ o i l ~ o i l ~ l ~ ~ d S C T t t à § K M . ( o i , l o l I
i. BriçBM-Il.fiitivBngdeCoinilçÈ<lir,101"AiAonieI>.vBi

..~~.,.-,r!&umpwb.-ddh-~), ~ o ~ ~ A i A o n i e m ~ m - - ~ ~
&Briefly Avutkmftigde Coouauider, IOlnAuboneDmsum.

~~itefl~:M.,.-,~tftet~~Cbmoiuidcrud~oimttiyCotuaudem.101"Aii^^~
~ ~ b ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ d - l o l - - -
~Sç.ritSt.&>.!SolA~and~lll~çNCOl.lOl"AlrtionÈD
çÃ

fI. V U l d B I f a b t l : B n i x f c D e t a i n m C m I a a n d I n t d l ~ g e n o e t s
~ gW
. udBriefliw SpecialOpentioBf IinellieaiceFiuioa Center
4. THE BOTTOM LINE - OBSERVATIONSfSWM IRAQI FREEDOM,AnUL ZOO&
swes - none ofwhich have provided si&ficant economic o r p o l i i assistance.
h o r . i n ~ " i ~ , ~ ~ e , T e t eW
-pim ~ e w~ ~ , ~ ~ .
twnrayt.~~~dM~~ite~ftifc^hM.wiiicanatiwalAniiy.~theAr~tpo^m~f~to
nation, and fa optimirtic that Ihdr life can be better in the coiningy-. Unlike ihe BtltanÈÑdfraqia wmt thià to
wmk TbeboinbingofibcSiuiiaireMosque~hcountiytotheedgeofaU-oolw. H-,ibcIraqiAnny-
&doo<crack,theoK>detçteiluld,Siscuicdtodforrennunt,theSmn^gotmchillofft^wcingwbtdd~
them~amiDontypopcladon,sadthe~oalioon~orce*çud(teth'were*ccocorrccayaanvitalforecttMtcouldkç~
the tion on mfc in the abscnoBofIraqi power. Inaddition, the Shin werereminded that Iran is a Pmimpower
4 t h ~oal*that conflict with the Shr Arabs 0fBouther-a and central Iraq.

very hkcv toprevent ibe teli'destniction of on h l l i a n i and effective U S Am- ^hnxyKhablzu) Çn
k the essential mgzdieni 10 kcepmg Iraq t o e I t the U S low hit IeadCTib m the coiainc yew, (fan d m #
could imptodi;
7- ~ W e f a c e . m o i ' i t T t t e p c d i l e i ~ n t Areus
. oont.t-operninflh.poUceictiOB~byfb>roled
Iru)ihd Ch> am they Â¥CoalmoUiIiuvyForce>i^)pon)^~coinia.hnqeo(^cMqium i a à § h w i t h a l m o
mftincI?oomginstitution*'/ ¥nxtinrtKximwremaintmtxeocn*ixiolthebarnaovemcteotNactuaUyt

now whingunder t h e m of political Bensirivily al tactical level

-
w survive in this war aonc. However, (belactealrule* ofengagement will need c o m b a t a k i w IO amimh
appropriatebalance.
 4<i not think,(hey cm handle politi&liyor militarily terrorist threat nested in dÈi domtttk Shia population*.

5. SUMMARY:
 Tltotheleçdmhmçadpawn
Itwuverycmcourmngfor~~to¥aetheprofireisachievedinIbeputyea
tKaificcofflichuodrcdtofihonw^ofinrodw~~cnoftheCENTCOMteamind~CIA-ibeAn^~~~
far aafer today than we were m the I8 month* foUow@ the initial -on.

=k%
~diunctProfesswofIoKniaionatAffidn
United State* MilitaryAcademy
West Point. New York
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

DATE 3/-~/07
MEMO FOR S>?c.<'<srw1-7 -A^ diCT^yficf-
 February 26,2007

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colond MIctrelM-

ProfcworandRead DeptofSocial Sriaice*

cc: C o k n d Ctody Jebb

R o f f l i g r m d Deputy B u d Dept otSod.1 Sdnco

SUBJECT: After Action ReponÑGeneraBany R McCaffrcy USA (Ret)

VISIT AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN 16-23 rdmlUY 2007

1 PURPOSE" This memo provides feedback on ttraiwc and -ioiuilassesunetRr>f securiiy or^miMs if
both Afahanii'm and Pakistan in sinport of US Centra) Commard Be @ad 10 provide Faculty
Seminar (LidCadel Cla-y,AAR o" Ihl; n-porl dumg this Smesier or ai >our convenience

2. SOURCES:

A. AfebmJitJi*:
1.) USAinbM>adçrRo N à § a u w DCM Ricbird& Norhd: Lunch/two hour diacwion.

2.) Gen Dan McNcill, CG NATO IS* Oir-on-oneOffice Call.

3.) G m BiMnnHib Klun. ChiefNghçAmy: Two Sessions.

4.) MG B i b hrbim USA slid BG BillCUmbtra USAr: Two Sesiions -CSTC-A.

5.) MG Dave Rodriguez CG RC-EAST. (JTF-76) (CG 8ZdAbn Div): OfficeCaHand Btttttc Siaff
Briefings.

6.) MG Steve LxvfieldUSA. NATO ISM. DCOM Security! OfficeCull.

l.)DR Zainxy Rauoul, Afghan Director ofNationai Security Cooidl(and StaB): Vis'W3riefines
8.) CG KMTC Tnimfatf Center: BGAmin Wxrdik. EX Doug Pritt.CG Talk FOKC
Pbwix:
VisiIBrieflngs Kabul Mil* Ihiining Center-KMTC.

Ceiiltr. BG Mike H*rrto>D USA

9.) A f r t m ComÈmdim GCTtrll:AHb.m N~ll~llçIMiIIrryComm.n
m d Menlor Tram; V ' l i i e f i n g s .

10.) VSEmbuMy-Co-~li~Team Briçflaz DCM,FWilinl Officer,EconomicCoun~ior,Politfe*L

Military Affair*Officer,US AID Director and Deputy, INL Director and Depçty

W S e d o r General Officer VSSOCOM sod OS. S p c c h i O f ~ n t l oBriefing.

~:
22.) S P A ~ U wvision and mttle tam visit. FOB Salem. ~rigadeCommander

23.) Mr. Edwari M. Smith, ChiefofSlaIt. Briefing Afghan¥RtcooKrucdoCrimp.

Border in,tiat,vc.

9.) US D-tbn uu)Senior PaUateiiiOfllchk -

Reception DCMResidence
10.) Commander SpecialTaik Force;Briefing.

11.) Gave OPD DM GWOT to Oflicen/NCWCivilisnsODRPaxd DAO.

2
3. GENERAL:

The War i n Afghanistan has been shamefully under-resourcedby DODthnxighouttheentire interven6min terms
ofinier-agencyinvolvement, US combat forces.political will, and ntion-building resources.

The situationis now tuminerapidl~fof the better

. Phoenix.
We expect the arrival this year ofthousandsofnew rniiiiary and civilian penonnet for AMP Potict Ref-
Menloring.
and

We have the begimingsof aserious drugeradication effort spuncd by Slate Dept 1 N l and reluctantlysupported
initially by DOD.
JTF-76now has onadditional US combat brigade (the courageous d d k ofthe 10* ~ountainDivision whose
I minute extensiongaveus theneededimmediate edge of combat power).
 The assumptionof command of ISAF by US Genera! Dan McNell, and the transferofftill b 5 t k res&T'dbflilYfor
the AORto NATO is a huge boost t o our capabilities.
 Finally, US Air Force, Navy, and Army Air Power have kept us afloat for the last year ofbitter fighting.

Weare now i n araceBgaingi time. We mustded wiA: t h c T a l i i (7Wincrease i n JWt--140 suicide ,

bombers last year); thecriminals who controlmuch ofthe ground level governance ofthe largest -meoperation in
the worid; foreign fighterswho now plot terrorismagainst both t h e ~ f ~ hG~o nm m m and the US --from s a n m k i n
Pakistan's uncontrolled border region u well as the souiticm and eastern regions ofAfghanistan: and finally fromThe
growing disaffectionofthe suffering people of Afghanistan who lack police, roads,electricity, security,jobs, and belief i n
their government.

We can,without question, achieveour US national objective ofa funclhine law-basedsiale witha-

performing, nondmg economy- which rejects sanctuary fin- terrorism. This isthecross-overyear. Theexecutiono f w ?
plan in thecoming24 months will dec~&theoutcomei n the wuncy. 90%ofthe Afahan people (to include the Pashhms)
rejectthe extremist ideologyofthe Taliban. They stronglyabhor the continuing violence. They are working frantically
h u g h o r n the country 10 re-build. They admire and tmsi their new Army. They nre incredibly eager 10 absorb new
lessons, new opportunities. They trust,admire,and p r a m their Embedded US Trainers. They will support security and
progress while remainingadccpiy Islamic state. In addition, the Pakistanisarc strongly supporriveofour goal of a strong,
stabilizedstare.

Rhetoricand political will cannot achieveour goals. Afghanistan needs strongus inter-agencyand
Congressionalsupport 10 providethe dollars, equipment, combat soldiers,ANA and AMPmentors, andvigorousNATO
and Afghan leadershiptopull this mission from the fire.

4. THE ANP m d the ANA:

A necessary but not sufficient mccondii ofUS success is the creation ofAfehan Security Forces t h a t c i

-
policeis currently grossly u&-resourced w i t h 7 6 US trainers(500Lk Police). In iraq we have 7000 US poltie
traiwre working on the Iraqi Police. In Kosovo we had 5000 police mentors for 6500 K m o Police.

3
 We have no real graspof what actual ANP presence exists 1the 355 Dinria level opemloni We have trained
60,000 Afghan polo-bm we have no idea vihm they are We do know thai 50% more Affhan police were K:A lut
year than ANA soldiers. PmoaDl) there are nm-mifonned, untrained, and lqe+ criminal elements in m q of the
-
DismciCapiiaH Therearc no real pis- or prosecutors -or JUNK'S or squad ctfs- l k 3 4 Pro, ncial level c a r i d s
actually do hsiea uniformed Policepcwcc with a function ngconnectionto national Policecommandauthority.'nie
A N me^ areassiii~i as ~ a b u i in&deauaie, but f i l i ~ ~ ~ n i rm
- zC-Tt is a m v ~ a i i o n aPol:-
l

Thetask ofcreating82.000 Afghan mlicemen(currently anotional62.000 force) is a ten yearjob that wemust
fidiy resource. We arenow imtiahng aPolice Reform Pmg~amwhich includes assessingthe15,000 officersofthe ANT -.
- -
and firing halfofthan. Without effective police there cannot begovernance. Without effective police therecannot
-
be sccun'ty and countcr.imrgmcy. Withwi ~ f f e c t i v e p d i ~ there will benoeconomic reconstruction. The Germans
had the lead on this effort. They have done an Inadequatejob. he German program consists ofa few senior German
police mentors(40+) ofenormous professionalismbut few resources.

The ANA is much belter postured. They have pride, embeddedUS trainers, a faonio?ingchaiwf-coninand,a
i c r b c o m b a t leader rGen Bismullah~ a h asCHoDt.
n and n i d i m e m muiomcnt Thev will fight. Thev art in good

The ANA has for all practicalpuiposc noair power-neither helicopternor fixed wing. We should i n my view
h a five year program to equip them with 100+ Blackhawks (some equippedas gun ships), 25+ Chinooks.and two
dozen C130's/AC130's.

They haveno high speed, wheeled, light annor. (They should have three battalionsofswkercombat vehicles.)
They have junk small amis and should beequipped with US Army modern automatic weapons, They lack body annor.
They lackdeployable,modem mortarsand light artillery. (This has beentheabsolutekey to keepingUS A m y combat
unitsalie along the eastern frontier.)

f ' e w m t t o beoutofAfghanistan In 15 y-weneedtospend 10BftliortdoilarsonANAandANP

equipment over thenext five years -and equip acapable, dominant battle forceand law enforcement capability.

5. NATO:

NATO presencein Afghanistan and their m o t responsibilityfor all ofthe national AOR isapolitical and
security triumph. (37nations and 36,000amps.-15.000 US) The brave C d a n s havedonewell in veiystiffcombat i n
KhandaharProvince. (We need to get their battalions10 the NTC or JRTC for pre-deploymenttraining). TheBrit'sareas
usual superband well equippedfighters. The Dutch have left the security of Kabul and are operating in Omzgan
Province. Some other Coalition elements have done excellent servic-.~. the FrenchS w i a l Forces Company,
Portuguese infantry Company, etc The US should he enormously gratefuilthal NATO Icg~imacybacks our national
strategy.

As ageneralstatement,however, theNATO fences are too weak on the ground, lackessentialsupporting

elements(heiicopters, engineers,logistics, intelligence), haveseverely restrictive mtes-of-engagcment,and may lack the
nationalpolitical will to fight when required. 1%Is possiblethai the Tallbanwill try to knock one or more oftheseNATO
nationsout of the war. A major blow to the Italians,ihc Canadians, the Dutch theSpanish, or the Germans milthishatter
their weak domestic political support

The gnqiest value ofNATO istheir Command and Control presence- the 1SAF Headquarters. Inmy view, i t is
essentialthat the US retain the Commanderposition.The US will continue to provide the bulk of theuseful ground
comb6 power, air power, economicreconstruction,and trainers forthe ANA and ANP. There i s long NATO tradition of
allowing the US 10 retain command where we provideessmml m u m .

General McNeil is tough, experienced, smm, andcancommandthe respect ofthe assignedmilitaryfarces. He

w has 19+NATO Generals-with more soon to arrive(a mlish three star is expected). A l l oftheseseniorofficeism
extremely talentedand dedicatedofficers. TheNATO Allies shouidromtc the Deputy and other positions~nmlhe
conunandtr.
SACEUR should coiuidndimnuting their inttrvening level ofNATO commandsupcivislon. There is liuk
value added.

6. PAKISTAN:

ThePakistanis arc i n avery difficult political and military situalion. Their domestkrepmat).m asan Anny for
professionalismnod valor isall that holdstogether the four nationsofPakistan under one weakstate. They have never
conirolied the FATA areas. The 80 000 m p s t h e v put into the FATA havesufferedhundred*! o f killed and wounded.
They arestill there. They have never controlJedBaluchistanoutsideofthe urban areas without concentratedmilitary
force. They are a poor countty with a very effective Amy- (Partially our military responsibility. We (to support than
with $100 million amonth. However, we need K> ~ ~ o v i d e t hsupport
e iwded to actuallycontrol their borders and the
chaos oftheir frontier regions).

I n my view, the Pakistanisare NOT actively supportingthe Taliban-nor do they have a strategic purpose 10 de-
stabilize Afghanistan. There is a history of support forthe Talibanamong the Pakistani Anny. The Talibanare inmany
-neither Afghans norpakistanis~theyarcpashluns wearingBlacktutbans and baggy p a n w i t h AK47'sand
with an aversion to foreigners (US or Pakistani Amy). 27 million Pashim live on both sides ofthe borderÑ6 Ink-
Ern i n desecrate novertv. 19% 1iternp.v thmr miilinn are Afphan refiiown;in PBhittan livino ripht a l w the fronlier. The
I X i r a n ~ i L d o enot
s existas a recognized poliiicai division the vi&ofihe many m i which dominatethe frontier
regions

'
them as a u&hg and siabillzina force i n the re&. '

Paknitanis in many retpectiourmost important ally in theglobal ~truggleafiinittenwifln. Theireconomy i s

homing, pow* is bring reduced, and the economy n tryingm divcnifr. ~rcsideicPhsharrafmust facemelectionin
2007 He i<the m i ~dpmrn-ratir
l IM-IITin PflLimn h i v m n e mnml oftht Anrv has been traditionallv the o w f m
of continued leeilimale wiilical w&i in Pakistan. The A m y isihe onlY insrituiion.The miiceare c-omipt.
The lower cot& arc intimidated.(The higher court system isvery capable).

The people trust and admire the A m y morethan any other institution. The IS1 is also essentially an extension of
the Anny. Some ofthcnaiional t w i n e s elitearc from the Amy. The political parties have been ineffectiveor
dm-,- (ncrsonalilv not oolicv hated.-unt. ex-= and incomoetent'l. Politics i n Pakistan until MusharafFhas
beenaboutpolitical famiiies and their st&= for power

The US will miss our brilliant US Ambassador Ryan Crockerduringthecomingcrucial24 months. Wemust
mtinue to strongly support democraticreform- bur not to forget the vital US national objectives at stake in Pakistanin
the immediate future.

The most important single factor i n Afghmistan-without whichnothing else is possible- isthe reality oftha
i s courage, aegressiveness, discipline, and flexibility ofUS combat forces. No one inside the Washington
'
Beltway actually understandsthe gravity ofthis findine. I t is assumedto he what happenswhen you reach for themilitary
tool. This is no accident. It is a timcnon of NCO and offer leadership-and the decade long exposure to combat find
stability operations of the Joint Forces team in the Balkans, Desert Siorm, Iraq IL Afghanistan, and the many other
thcmers i n which US air, sea, and land power operate.

These troops arc the ben corn% force we haw- fielded They >reptiyÈicttll findmentally tough Their
OPSEC is unhelievable(oneoflhonuior historicalwealL?essw ofthe USAmv) Mmy arcnow on their thidor evro
fourthcwn'Mi tour They know their businesscold They kmow mihother from r e p e a deployments mthc sameunits.
5
They have solved the h i n t i m m ~ b i i i t pmblcim
y with air -.artillcry, and logidca at a fctied level. The
mmanders ere incrediblyexperiencedat company, battalion, and brigade. The-1s pup together in combat and
trust each other. (Thecurrent AfghandeployedUS Army force is the paratrooper-light irrfanirycult. They are self-
actttfliizinc).

The Joint Force fhnriamentalcombat skill* areawesome, 1don't iMnk they understandhow @ thev are. 'nie
-
primary reason that US casualties number in the hundredskilled and maimed insteado f thethouwnds is the -
i s tactical skill ofthese battle farces. The can cmpioyali elements of combat p o w in asvneraistic manner. The
enormouslyresponsive and massively shaky logisticssystem actually works that operates thni the P o n d Karachi and
with the dedicatedsupport of US conuactots.

to every function ofground combat.

This is the worst flying weatherand environment on the face ofthe earth Air power is the key t o l a c r i d success
i" #,isopmid miment,

8. THE SOCOMSTRATEGIC CAPABILITY:

with killed, wounded, anil injured.

Mosi Importonily-these A 1 r - d . ~ ~ special operation* f o m COT locateandkill or cipiure l e d s l g r o q
operating<iÃcovert nrnnerin both h a n d rural terra n while minimising imnaa on innocent populations.These we
lhe moil dangerous people on the face of the earth

These SOCOM forces ore very difficult to rccmit, train, and ~fximiziefor a given operational area. We need to
signifiamly expand ,he strategic tool The SOCOM arpower elements aie incred bb costly to c-cate and i n lk
developmem01 Special Forcessround -O an:similar 10 the i me and m t o f a p r o p m to develop high

We need to lake a revolutionary look at the methods ofcreating lhex ¥Tie One" forces It will require a
tcparalciy funrid ret~ii~ingprofyam similir to W w i l OSS programs 10 identify colle~e~raduMes,with superb¥hkO
skills. ttho will volunteer foi a 24 month minine mmam do include to& urmers-on languaflc ~ t ' t i n f Ii D Arabic 01

9. ROADS AND NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION:

The central key to winning the war in AfghanisIan iseconomicreconstruction and employment. This requires
roadsto each Provincial capital, roads to eachDistrict capital, cross-bordereconomictransportation reads and rail,
electrical power, clean water, asimple but workable educationd system, arudimentaryhealth caresystem (preventive
health and healtheducation), and agriculturalreform.
6
 The current y<wm nu been badly organized. marked by US governmental turf battles, btlly fewurced, and has
poor o v e r a l l . Thcalliwprovide iradequaic help (The Saudis& Japanese are anexception). Theindimand Iranian
help is virued B iftnicwc threat miherthan an incorpomieilvalue added We do rwt exploit for 10 purposeithe
effwivenoti thai we have compleieil (Totalo f $;.Y* b i . i m of LS ~ r m Engineer
y work-44 50 billion total work).

-
Fortunately help is a.the way I f Congressacts -we should see $10 6 billion in economic and inilino aid
approvedfor the Afghans h he LU has pledged $780 million in aid for ~fghanistaiover the nnct four ycara.) We m u
ltwc ihe '"fcxpediiionar>"mmdwi Reconstr.iclionin this destroyedmion i s gong totake25 ycan. We should
c~iitol'tdmea'. reconstructonactivity (Stale. DOD. USAIO. PRT) mdcr a US Army h i y n w MajorCcwai Wth u>
. . . -
of mnnnous sen'siiivinÑbi only the Army Enmw Corps can
adeaiiale staff and c u m o r s u m r . Tins i s a urfiçii
marshal the managementexper& to wort in a dangerous security environment such as Afghanistan

10. THE DRUG ISSUE:

-
Afghanistan is nowa narco-riaie. The opium/?woin!al<eii $3.1 blllion whichh l n o f tbc GNP. The British
have the lead for the program and aie not adequately resourced for the effort. There is nosingle unifyingleaderehipfor
the US nor international effort. Prcsideni Karzai ecu no unified support from the internationalcommunityÑman urge
him to ignore the dnigeradicationprogram.

A m b i d o r Ann Pirerwn at State Depumior is trying valiantly toorganize our@vmmcnal effort wrth
suppon from a h c i departments We nave a roperb lMI Director m the ground m Afehanj~ian

A iI , e m s 1 There i s a b u n o n sized ~ f g h a n
EmdtcauoqF O ~ Wwh ch operate? with rudtroentft~quipnit Iu
n . "-t."&t frequenlfireanJ with w"i,r"!n&casJm"C,

my view, we must
1 the counter-drug effortas a key to achievingstablegovernment in Afghanistan.
This should he a 10,000 man ANT program -supported by a S250million INL program-with an in-country presenceof
200t DEA awn- with primary mining and operationalresponsibilityfor all law enforcement operations.

If w do notgete seriousand sustaihed effort on counter-drug-in my view we will Ail to achieve our
objectives in Afghansi !;

11. SUMMARY!

The Afghan economy is boominaat 12% lonwlh rate a "ear. $14 billion has been scent CM) aid since 2001. Six

dedicated Afghan resident i n office. .

" .
Afghanistan can be a~trategicvictoryi n the struggle against morism. Wearcnow on ttie right p h

en& USA ( ~ d j
Adjunci Professorof international Affairs
USMA, West PomNY
 1 Page Denied in Full

FOIA Exemption (b)(5)

 -
Mllllmrv Analvili G l h m Trio Wlnn-I&
(Media Coverage: June 24 -July 5)

Coverage of the military analyst visit to Guantanamo included 37 known articles or

interviewsacross television,print, online and radio outlets. Military analyst Lieutenant
Colonel Gordon Cucullu had the most coverage followed by Mapr General Shq@ md
then ColonelJacobs. Themes were consistentwith last week's topics as follows:

P r i s o n e r h r d Abuse
9 Most abuse is either towardU.S.military personnel andlor between prisoners
9 U S . military guards are regularly threatened by prisoners
> Some analysts statedthere may havebeen past abuses at Gitmo but not now
Prisoner Interrogations
> Interrogatorsare building relationshipswithprisoners;not torturing them
> We are stiU gainingvaluable information from prisoners
9 Interrogationsare veryprofessionallyrun
Quality ofPrisoner Care
> Soldiers go out of their way to accommod& Islamicpractices by providing
prayer rugs, Korans and directional arrows pointing toward Mecca
9 Dietary needs ofprisoners are taken into considerationand medicalcare if
provided
riasin* cisma
9 ~ i m exceeds
o Geneva Convectionrequirements
9 \\e should not close this facility and let dangerout terrorists out
Analyst I- e e d b d
9 Analms tell cnbcm of DoD is unfairand misguided
> Doll shou d have been more open about G i sooner
m
9 Aralvst l o x is"~ongoverdue" and there is "nothing 10beashamed of"
> Tclmsion media has outdated images of Ginno (1 e showed a rundown facility)

COVERAGEBY MEDIA OUTLET

 10

Amount of Coverace oer Analyst Po Kn- Pwt-Trim

P Colonel Tim 1. Ends

P Colonel Glenn Lackey
P Retired CIA- Wayne Simmons
(Quoted within a Gordon Cuccllu piece)
amwm

SUMMARY OF MEDIA COVERAGE

(^Indicates new media not covered in last report)

General Monteornew M*

9 General discussionof Gitmo stnicturalchanges. prisoner treatment and Red Cross

interviews of detainees. Also talked about whether Gitmo should continue to

MSNBC News Live

6/250005 11.20:12 AM
9 Discussed the quality of the facilities,prisoner interrogationsand Red Cmss
involvement. Also commented on the professionalism of the militarypersonnel at
Gitmo and believes DoD is doing the "right thing" at Gitmo.

OSD 2
Public Affairs Research and Analysis
 9 Spoke of the numerous changes at G i m . For example, building rapport with
prisoners,the high quality of food and facility improvements in comparison lo
past conditions.

Command Sereeant Maior Steven Grew

(Fox News interview on Saturday, June 25; not available)

--Fox and F"mds &day

6/26/2005 9:45:13 A M
>Â Emphasized thai interrogations are built onrapport rather than torture and that the
food quality is good. Also discussed the fact that prisoners attack military guards.

Maior General Donald W. Shcpoerd

(Radio interviews A B C Radio -NewYork and CNN Radio this Weekend:not available)

PrinUOnline;
Visit offers e l i m ~ s into
e Guantamamq
(Ch'N corn; online CNN article by General Donald Shepperd) - July 1
b Criticism of DoD is unfair and misjudged. Gitmo replicates militaryjustice
systems (i.e. military tribunals)and is modeled after U.S. prisons. "Certainly no
gulag "

Discussed guards' professionalism, the quality of facilities and interrogation

techniques (i.e. building relationshipswith prisoners).

Live from COT(

6/24/05 2 3 0 PM
Gmno i s a mod- prison system with dedicated guards and inteirogaiors who
knew what theyre doing Slated thai analysis had a c c m to multiple pans of the
facility despue die fact that is was a DoDsponsored mp

3 Military commissionsare going onright now. US. guards are angry thu Gimo
is being portrayed IQ a negative fashion in the media. Early abuses have been
"cleaned-un "

If -I Jack Jacob
(MSNBC interview- June 26; not available)
OSD
Public Affairs Research and Analysis
6/26/20(159:35:56AM
9 He did not get any sense of abusetaking place. Staled thai the DoD needs to be
more mactive about its Gitmo PR efforts. Valuable and actionable intellieence
is stilfbeii collected

6/26/2005 10:38:56AM
> DoD has been very accommodatingto Islamic practicesat the Gitmo facilities
(is. prayer rugs, ritually slaughtered meat, etc.) and conditions are changing for
thc k t e r ,

c%%S Il:4?4, AM
9 Observed "relationship building" between the detainees and guards and discussed
the high quality of the Gitmo facilities.
I

6/29/2005 3:32:44F'hi
9 Mentions there may have been abuse in the past but not now. Discussed the high
quality of the facility and the fact that there is sdll new i n f o d o n being
gathered. I

Colo~elGordon C u a l h
(Articles: TTieWalton Reponer -New York, Democracy Project;The Right Approach
-
Ridfa: WABC New York City, Demk Prtgcr - Loa Angela, KKLA Los Angeles. -
-
KABB Los Angeles, Greg Allen - Tampa, WMET - Washington, D.C.KFI - Los
Angeles, KTFK - S t Louis, Liberty Broadcasting -Nationally Syndicated, True North
Radio - Waterbury (VT), Greg Alien Show - Tampa- Not Available)

(The One Republic Journal; Gordon Cucullu) - July 5

> Observed interrogationswhile visiting Guantanamoand spoke of the importance
of building rapport with the detainees. New information continuesto be collected
from detainees. Was impressed by the professionalism of the facility personnel at
the camp.

Abuse at Guantanamo: Reportine 00 a visit to G i t n h *

(The One Republic Journal, Gordon Cucullu) - June 28
9 Attacks on American service members from prisoners are common- Inspection of
cells indicated'% far cry from the harshness of American maximum security
prisons." "Combatants are evil and dangerous."
OSD 4
Public AfTaira Researchand Analysis
 MotherineTerfrisu a t CltmÃ
(FromPawMagazme coin ;Gordon Cucullu) - June 28
'r Pnsonc's receive a 2.600-caloricdiet Facility personnel and inlands are regularly
attacked and gaining information continues to be a challenge. He commended
personnel at the Gitmo facility.

What I Saw at G i i
(FroatPageMagazine.com;GordonCucullu) - June 27
'r Observed inteiroeations and commented on the oualitv ofmedical care. He also
pointed out that the Korans handed out all have pro&ve cases

'r Iliscitssed die morale of prison guards despite public dtici'cn of how the Gitmo
facility is run. Continue to build relationships with prisonerstogain Actionable
miclli~encc.The campconcinucito serve its pufpow.

-
Fox News* Dayside with Linda Vester
6/29/2005 1-4206PM
'r Dangerous detainees regularly threaten guards and interrogations are necessary in
order to gain continued intelligence.

PrinWOnline
Model Gitmo: Very fir a m from anvthioe Amnentv claims*
^National Review:.Dana Dillmi-
- , Julv, 1
'r Detainees arc treated humanely and just. The Pentagon is holding U.S personnel
who have previously mistreated prisonersaccouinable. The detention operations
1 G~moplaya "vital ivk"in the war on terror.

Frim/Online
Cornmentaw & News Brief*
(Agape Press; Compiled by Jody Brown quoting Robert Maginnis on Gitmo) -June 27
P Observed the interrogationpmm and was impressed with the level of
professionalism at the camp. New intelligence is surfacing all the time.

OSD
Public Affiiire Research and Analysis
12 Pages Denied in Full

FOIA Exemption (b)(5)

1 December 12,2005

READ AHEAD FOR SECRETARYOF DEFENSE DONALD RUMSFELD

L W H E O N MEETING WITH TBE FORMERS

%ae.tmyof Defense Conference Wrn (3E729)

Q
a 2
Confirmed attendees are Frank Carhcci III, William Cohen, Robert McNamara, James c^i
Schlesinger,William Wehster and Jim Woolsey.
u
1 m:
You last met with roughly this same group July 28,2005,

. Meeting is closed to the media

Comment8 s h l d be m i d e r e dd- Howeve~.vou m v go o f f - t h e - 4 as

you see fit.

11:15 am. Welcome and Introduction

Allison Barter, Deputy Assistant Secretoryof Defense for Public Affairs

11:16 a m . Update on QuadrennialDefense Review

Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England

11:45 a m . Update on theGlobal War on Tenor (Military Op8)

General Peter Pace, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

12:15 p.m. Break (buffet lunch served in the Secretary'sdining room)

1230 p.m.

1 3 0 p.m.
Luncheon Discussion and Questions with SecretaryRumsfeld

Luncheon Meeting Concludes

-
Deputy Secretary England will update attendees on QuadrciiiiinlDefense Review (key
thernes/transformingglobal posture) issues.

General Pace will discuss progress m the global war on tenor (broadstrokes with the
mjonty of the time spent on fielding questions) osD 0 0 3 2 9 - 0 6
 Page Two of Two

After a brief break, you will join the group for lunch and open the floor to questions:

Potential Topics: --Iraqi elections

-Increased Sumi participationin the Iraqi election
-Troop levels
-Pessimism in the elite media

Luncheon meeting to conclude by 1:30 p.m.

Recent Media and Key Commentsto Date Tab A

COMMENTS TO DATE

FRANK CARUICCI
Co-authored a letter about Turkey on the right pa&" to the Washington Times on Oct. 4

Relevant Sections: As a Turk and an American. we join in seeking to straightenout the record
in the face of Frank Gaffoey's gratuitous and mischi&ous diatnbeagainst 'i'urkey (" 'No' to
Islamist Turkey," Commentary, SepL 27). ..,

Without attempting to correct every erroneous statement, we make a few points:

Turkey repeatedlyhas been a tarcet of "lslamofascist" terrorism in the past few Years. To
suggestthatit wouid knowingly tolerate "green"capital to fand this same terrorism is an
accusation that falls of its own weight. ...

* The state-controlled imam hatip schools were undersubscribedthis year because of changes
in the law that made it harder for graduates of those schools to continue to higher education.

* There is no way to tun a secular courtin Turkey into an instrument of "Shari'a" law any
more than it is possible for U S . courts to subvert the separationof church and state. Both
would need a constitutional change that is not being contemplated anywhere.

The Turkish media has never been as free as it is today. Turkey is (me of the very few
democracies in the Middle East.

Prime Minister R e c q Tayyip Erdogan is not pushing the media into anti-Americanism. ...
 WILLIAM COHEN
CNN, THE SITUATION ROOM 4:00 PM EST
Host: WolfBBtzer
December 5,2005 Monday

But docs the defense secretary have it right? Is the situation in Iraq much better than it would
seem?
Joining us now, our world affairs analyst, the former Defense Secretary himself Willlam
Cohen. He's chairman of CEO of the Cohcn Group here in Washington.

Are we getting an accurate picture of what's happening on the ground?

WILLIAM COHEN, CNN WORLD AFFAIRS ANALYST:Well, if6 h n d to say. It depends

on who you talk to.

11 1 think what Secretary Rumsfeld was saying is the old adage, if it bleeds, it leads. And that's
-.
SO~Cthingthat d i a will focus upon, that is, the the violent mgcdxsa d aRlictiona of
casualties upon the - American military.

1 On the other hand,then!tie some positive things taking place. And that is, Iraqi6 going to the
POIISonce again. They have mfimed their constitution, mitied it as such. And, SO, there arc
somepro&s -the& is progress being made.

But I think what any secretary likes to see. esuccially at a time of war, is lhç you gat a molt
complete picture, ;hich you kcessanly dm'i on a day-today basis. But,overall, 1thmk
what he's is asking for i s a link more perspective,a wider perspective But you cant discount
the fact that we re fiehnnc and d v n e on a daily basis. And that's something that's going to
continue to be in th;news, what&; the criticisms directed toward the media

1 BLITZER: In the past, whenwer gov-ent o f i d s , D e m d or Republi-, go a h

news media. it seems to sueecst. at least to a lot of observers, that it's not going well for them,
and they &just blaming the n&s media, which seems like appropriate ~ & 0 a t

COHEN: Well, th&'s some element to that. But, on the other hand...

BLITZER: Did you used to do that when you were defense secretary?

(LAUGHTER)

COHEN: Well. I didn't have the samesituation, certainly.

I But, during the Kosovo campaign, we had the -the same kind of criticism. What's happening?
Why aren't you progressing more rapidly? It's been going on 30 days, 40 days, 50 days. Where
is the victory in sieht? And. so. we had to contend with that as well And 1 think it's a normal
B u t again, you're not going to cut offthe stories about those violent images of tanks being
-
blown up and kids being killed and dismembered. So, it's it's going to be with us. And I think
what Secretary Rumsfeld is trying to get, a little more perspective, but it's going to be hard to
come by.

BLFTZER:How difficult of a mission does Condoleezza Rice. the secretary of state, have in
Europe right now,dealing with this war on terror?

COHEN: Well. she's got a difficult mission,

She's trying to establish better relations between the United States and Germany, with building
- -
a better support anchor with NATO to help us out in Iraq and elsewhere. And the the the
questions whether or not there have been renditions is going to continue to -to drag alongside
beside her.

- -
What she has tried to put that to to aside. I think it's going be difficult, because, number
-
one, we still have the Abu Ghraib scandal hanging over this issue, so and we still have the
White House refiising Senator McCain's legislation. And, so,that makes it much more difficult
for her.

But she has tried to - to deal with this as - a s straizhtforwd as she can. rccomiziw(hat she
or
cad1 really single out which countriesare helping which countries are not, because then it
becomes a question for their local constituency. Are you helping the United States? Arc you
not helping the United States? Very difficult for her to do that

BLITZER: Secretary Cohen, thanks for joining us...

COHEN: P l e a s u ~ ,

BLITZER: ...as usual.

 CNN, THE SITUATION ROOM 300 PM EST
Host Wolf Blitzcr
November 28,2005 Monday

Let's get some more now on air power, possibly a replacement for U.S. boots on the ground, as
they call it.

Let'sturn to a member of our CNN Security Council, the former Defense Secretary William
C o h n . He's chairman and CFO of The Cohen Group here in Washington.

--
You 1assume you have bid a chance to read the Seymour Huah article. When you were in
charge of the Pentagon, you used airpowcr very effectively in Bosnia and Kosovo, without
deploying huge numbers of American tumps. Is that a realistic option in Iraq against an
insurgency of this nature?

WILLIAM COHEN, CNN WORLD AFFAIRS ANALYST: No. Airpower in not m effective
use of power against an insurgency. You do need boots on the ground.

-
And the notion that somehow. it would be a substitution. I think, is s i m ~ l av a wrong choice
and one that I don'tthink the military will make. 1 think everybody ought to go back and read
H.R. McMaster's book about dereliction ofduty. In my iudement, were the military toagree to

tantamount toa dereliction of duty. - - -

substitute air power for boots on the around infi&tine& i&gency, that would be

I think that they proceeding apath that they have anticipatedthey are going to reduce the size
of the force by next spring and into the summer. There will still be a significant force left over,
but I don't thinkthat the military has ever planned to simply substitute air power and turn that
-
over, the oversight of the intelligence, to the - to the Iraqis. I think that would be a a fatal
mistake for us.

You cannot win the hearts andminds of the Iraqi people by driving precision-guidedsteel into
those hearts and minds.

1 -
BLnZER: The president is delivcrine another what what the White House calls major

1 speech on wednkday, in which he's going to be making the case thai things are moving in the
nght direction. How far does he need to go to convince the American public nght now that

1 things are moving ahead in a positive way?

1 COHEN: Well, I think he has to show that the elections arc &g to take place, Hut we ale
-
going to see a srike in the the number are of -s
that period oftime.
that are there to help provide security for

And then I think he has to go about, systematically,staying a course on which there is going to
-
be a reduction and a turning over of responsibilityin a large in a large factor to the Iraqi
people.

We're seeing more officers come into the - the armed forces now. The process of cleaning out
all the Baathists has now been reversed.So, they're bringing in young captains and - and
where into the force. So. more m-wer i s coming m. More rqxmsibilily will be turned
.
over.,over a ~eriodof time. And I think the meside& has to do that. also holdine onto a
coalition of Capitol Hill. He can't do this by fireside chats, as Jack was suggesting before,
commenting on - on Senator Warner.

He's got to have support of key members of Capitol Hill. He can still do that if he makes an
outreach to them.

BUTZER. He doesn't have the support of retired U.S Licutenimt General William Odom, who
was on "AMERICAN MORNING" earlier today with some very harsh w o k .

Listen to this.

COHEN:OK.
(BEGIN VIDEO CUP)

RETIRED LIEUTENANTGENERAL WILLIAM ODOM, HUDSON INSTITUTE:We're

cmusmg the civil war. We are slowly m m g the country over to the Shiites, which will become
- theykill turn the country into anlslamic&ublic, v& much as Iran.
(ENDVIDEO CLIP)
BLITZER: Now, that - dial's a pretty dire prediction, which a lot of people believe is possible.
But the president certainly doesn't.

COHEN There's always that possibility.

-
It's one of the treat fears. that we are s i m l v the United States is warine a war on behalf of
to
the Shia, who& gomg take over and continue that civil war. and thenbe in - work in
conjunction with an Iran that would be supporting hem. That'sa great fear.

We have got to try to continue to prevent that from taking place as best we can. No one can
predict the future with any certainty. But, hopefully, that will not occur.But the president, at
this point, has very limited options. He's got to, again, persuade the American people flint we
have to see this through, working with key members of Congress. You have Jack Murtha, Who
-
has set down a a - certainly, a marker, saying out in six months, or at least we move to
Kuwait in six months.

You have got John McCain saying, stay the course, put more troops in. The truth and the
reality is gong lo lie somewhere in between, where you will see a reduction ofthe troops and a
gradual reductionof American forces over a period of time.

BLITZER: WIDIam Cohen, as usual, thanks very much.

. . .... ..
1 ROBERTMCNAMARA

1 Urged End to nuclear weapons urged, asked wants churches to act (from an AP article of Nov.
12)

Calling the spread ofnuclear ims the -test threat to the world today, a fannerU.S.defense
secretary called on religious groups to lead the push for global nuclear disarmament. Robert
McNamara said the United States no longer needs its arsenal of thousands of nuclear weapons.

1 - . it's militarilv unnecessary. it's mrv. verv d a m u s in terms of

"It's immoral..it's illeml.

1 accidental wage," McNmmm told a i m m on nuiiear penis lain8gh-at the Cdtholic

Cathedral of the Assumption in downtown Louisville.

He said more religious groups need to do what the nation's Roman Catholic bishops did m
1983 - issue informed, urgent calls for nuclear disarmament.

Excerpt on the same topic from NPR's 'Talkof the Nation" on Nov. 8

Sometimes I'm asked to characterize US and NATO nuclear mlicies. weaoons de~lovments
and policies in one sentence, and this is the reply I give: ~heir ~olicies-US and NATO-arc
immoral, illegal, military unnecessary, very, very dangerous in t e r n of the risk of accidental
use. as somebody mentioned: it's even -ter risk in Russia than it is here. And they're
destructive to the non-proliferation regime. They make no sense whatsoever. And it's time to
change it.
JAMES SCHLESINGER

"None of the reviews found evidence that torture and abuse were part of any service wide
policy. Yd critics note that each of the reviews was initiated by the Pentagon, and they note
that certain questionable interrogationtechniques migrated from one detention facility to
another. The review by former Defense Secretary James Sdilftsingerconcluded that the
scandalwent bevond a few roeue soldiers: "Thereis both institutional and personal
responsibility at higher levels."

Christian Science Monitor. December 8.2005

How cftmmon is US abuseofdetainees?
By. Mark Sappenfield Stuffwriter of The Christian Science Monitor

James Schlesinger - who served as CIA director in the Nixon administration,defense secretary
in the Nixon and Ford administrations,and energy secretary in the Carter administration- said
the nation is already "plagued by energy insecurity."

In testimony this month before the Senate Foreim Relations Committee. ScMwinguureed
. -
lawmakers to begin preparing for declining supplies and increasing prices in the coming
decades. "We arc faced with the possibility of a m a p economic shock and the political mresl
that would ensue," he said,

Plain Dealer (Cleveland). November 27.2005

Chasmg efficiency. Clock is mhng on production pea*. experts say
Byline. John Funk and Chns Scpcr, Plain Dealer Reporters
WILLIAM WEBSTER
US.Newswire
October 18,2005 Tuesday 1135 AMEST

Judge William Webster, the only person to serve as director of the FBI and CIA, received the
William J. Donovan Award- named in honor ofthe founderof World War ll's Office of
StrategicServices, from he OSS Society at its (3rd anniversary dinner on October 15,2005
in Arlington, VA.

Previous recipients of the Donovan Award include former Presidents Bush and Reagan,
William Cascy, William Colby, M-I Thatcher, Ralph Bunche, and Admiral Lord
Mountbatten

The award is given to individuals who have made significantcontributions to the cause of
freedom and to the secuntv of the United Stalesexemnlified by M a w Ottiwal William "Wild
Bill" Donovm, the found" of ossand a world war i Medal of or winner.

The OSS Society celebrates the historic achievements of the Office of Strategic Services,
America's first central inlclhgence agency, and educates the public regardingthe importanceof
siralcgic intelligence to our national security.
JIM WOOLSEY
Interview by John Gibson on 'The Big Story" - Fox - Dec. 9

GIBSON: An a1 Oa& nriiMinerwho told E m t i a n intermt~itnniabout ties between I m and

the tenor networkel Qfieda reportedly sayshemade it up in order to avoid being roughed up.
The White House used his icsumony to help make its cane to go to war in Imq. So.how can
we rely on crucial evidence if it is g&ed from foreign interrogations, as this one was?

Let's ask former CIA director James Woolsey. So, Mr. Woolsey, with all good intentions, the
Americans said, 'Well, what did you get from your interrogation of this guy?" And I guess it
-
was the Egyptians right - mid, 'Well, we got X,Y, and Z." Should the Americans always
say, "You guys apply techniques that we would not, maybe even you hurt people or torture
them, we're not going to believe you"?

JAMES WOOLSEY, FORMER CIA DIRECTOR:Well, we .shouldn't turn people over for
torture,and it's my understanding from what Condi Rice has said that we don't

But this is a more complex story than that. Dong Jcil (ph) in a column this morning, the "New
York Times" story that went into this said that Mr. al-Libbi was questioned three times.
First of all, when we captured him and we questioned him, he said there was some connection
between Iraq and al Qacda. Then we gave him to the Egyptians apparently and with them he
said there were a lot of connectionsbetween Iraq and al Qaeda. And then the third time, now,
we've questioned him again and he says he made the whole thing up. So two of those three
times he was lying. I'm not sure anybody knows which two of the three were lies.

GIBSON: Well, what do you do about this? Especially if you have to rely on a foreign
intellieence service to auestion somebodv, at least somewhere alone the way. and we know
they wont adhere tostaiKtonfa demanded[bythe US. Congress. G ~ S O N Anal : 0ç"l
prisoner who told Egyptian interrogators about ties between Iraq and the terror network al
Qaeda reportedly says he made it up in order to avoid being roughed up.

The White House used his testimony to help make its case to go to war in Iraq.

So, how can we rely on crucial evidence if it is gained from foreign interrogations, as this one
WM?

Let'sask former CIA director James Woolsey.

So, Mr. Woolsey, with all good intentions, the Americans said, "Well, what did you get from
your interrogation of this guy?" And I guess it was the Egyptians -right - said, "Well, we got
x,Y. and Z."
Should the Americans always say, "You guys apply techniques that we would not, maybe even
you hurt people or torture them, we're not going to believe you"?
JAMES WOOLSEY,FORMER CIA DIRECTOR: Well, we shouldn'l turn people Over for
torture, and it's my understanding from what Condi Rice has said that we don't. .
But this is a more complex story than that.
Doug Jeil (ph) in a column this morning, the "New York Times" story that went into this said
that Mr. al-Libbi was questioned three times.

First of all, when we capturedhim sad we questioned him, he said there was some connection
between Iraq and al Qaeda. Then we cave him to the Egmhans w ~ m ~ ~and t l with
y them he
. .
said there w& a lot of connections between Irao and al0aeda. And then the third h e , now,
we've questioned him again and he says he made the whole thing up.

So two of those three times he was lying. I'm not eure anybody knowswhich two of the three
were lies.

GIBSON: Well, what do you do about this? Espccidly if you have to rely on a foreign
intelligence service to question somebody, at least somewherealong the way, and we know
they wont adhere lo standardsdemanded by the US. Congress So what do you do?

WOOLSEY: Well, we shouldn't turn people over to other countriesto question, to be tortured.

But under some circumstances it's reasonable to turn people back to their home countries,
particularly I think for questioning, and Coodi Rice has done a good job of explaining the
reasons for that in ~ u m &

I don'tthink there's anything really extraordinary about that

GBSON: Yes. hut as the CA I director. when vou were nresenteri with information that - let's
just say you w&e - from ttas kind of interro&tion, a &y ends up in the hands of a friendly
foreign service, he's intem~atcd,they come back and they give you raw information, do you
look at it with a high degreeof skeptidsm?

WOOLSEY: Well, this didn'thappen when I was there.

The only rendition we had was we caught Kami, who had killed two CIA officers outside our
gates, and thm was a cooperative deal between the FBI and the CIA and Pakistani intelligence.
&d we brought him back and had him prosecuted

-
So we this issue really'didn't arise when I was director and, frankly, I'm not sure of the
details of any regulations and so forth that may have been drafted up in the meantime.

GIBSON: But do you have a natural tendency to not believe stuff that comes from an
intelligence service that .-where you're not sure how they do handle interrogations?

WOOLSEY: Well, again, we ought not to give people over to be tortured.

But we rely on so-called intelligence liaison services,that is friendly and sometimes only a
little bit friendv imelliacnce services like. say. the Chinese, for a lot of informationallthe time
and they rely vs. -
And different countries rely on each other.

There's a huge traffic in information going back between intelligence services around the world
below the level of diolomatic exchanges and sometimes between countries that really are V e r y
much art odds diploiatically or strat&cally.

So, you know,I don't think there's a single rule about i t The policy ought to be we don't tum
people over to someone to be tortured.

But you have to make a judgment in individual cases based on triangulating from other things
that you hear about from other sources.

GIBSON: Lastly, Mr. Woolscy, just because Mr. Libhi says he Bed about connections between
Iraq and al Qaeda, does that mean there weren't any?

WOOLSEY: No. I mean,thafs the thud thing he said.

The first thing he told us was that there were connections. And then he told the Egyptiansthere
were a lot of connections. I don't know which of h s c times he was lying.

I personally believe there were some connectionsbetween Iraq and al Qaeda, quitepossihly
not involving 911 1.

But if6 a long and rother convoluted story. But 1don? think one shouldjump to the C O ~ C ~ U S ~ O ~
-
that there was no cooperation at all between Iraq and al Oaeda certainly there was between
Zarqawi of al Qaeda and Iraq under Saddam, and I think there were probably other
incidentsso what do you do?

WOOLSEY: Well, we shouldn't turn people over to other m t r i e s to question, to be tortured.

But under some circumstances it's reasonable to turn people back to their home countries,
particularly I think for questioning, and Condi Rice has done a good job of explaining the
reasons for that in Europe.

I don't think there's anything really extraordinary about that.

GIBSON: Yes, but as the CIA director, when you were presented with inftinnation that let's -
-
just say you were from this kind of interrogation,a guy ends up in the hands of a friendly
foreign service, he's interrogated, they conic back and they give youraw information, do you
look at it with a high degree of skepticism?

WOOLSEY: Well, this didn't happen when I was there.

The only rendition we had was we caught Kansi. who had killed two CIA officers outside our
gates, aid that was a cooperative deal between the FBI and the CIA and Pakistani intelligence.
And we brought him back and had him prosecuted.

So we - this issue really didnt arise when I was director and, frankly, I'mnot sure of the
details of any regulations and so forth that may have been draftedup in the meantime.

GIBSON But do you have a natural tendency to not believe staff that comes fmm an
-
intelligence service that where you're not sure bow they do handle inten-offations?

WOOLSEY: Well, again, we ought not to give people over to be tortured.

But we rely on so-called intelligence liaison services, that is friendly and sometimes only a
little bit friendly intelligence services like, say, the Chinese, for a lot of information all the rime
and they rely on us.

And different countries rely on each other.

There's a huge traffic in information goingback between intelligence services around the tvodd
below the level of diplomatic exchanges and sometimes between countries that really are very
much at odds diplomaticallyor strategically.

So, you know, I don't think there's a single rule about i t The policy ought to be we don't turn
people over to someone to be tortured.

But you have to make a judgment in individual cases based on triangulating from other things
that you hear about from other sources.

GIBSON: Lastly. Mr. Woohey, just because Mr. Libbi says he lied about connectiom between
Iraq and a1 Qacda, does that mean there weren't any9

WOOLSEY: No.

I mean,that's the third thing he said

The first thing he told us was that there were connections. And then he toldthe Egyptians &ere
were a lot of connections. 1don't know which of those times he was lying.

I personally believe there were some connections between Iraq and a1Qaeda, quitepossibly
not involving 9/11.

But it's a long and rather convoluted story. But I don't think one should jump to the conclusion
that there was no cooperationat all between Iraq and al Qaeda - certainly there was between
Zarqawi of al Qaeda and Iraq under Saddam, and I think there were probably other incidents.
0. St- Dapuly OPR OSR Dasaipllm
1-Dee-05 X USDIP) Stop-by US-Mongolia BilateralconsuftatiuttCowdmRichardLawless
I-Dec-05 X DBS D e t m a BusinessBoard
ASDIPAI CommunityGroup Outreach
CJCS s t w b y CJCS ~uncheonwith UK C W D
-0DR Budget Mçetç w/OSD. CJCW. Junta. Buikaw S m o o n M
USDIP) Protocol Meeting with Mneter Taro Aso. MoFA Japan
Pentagon Memorial Bfietin~
ASDIPAI Ramarks ('Future of Iraq') to John Hopkms. Paul H NHze. SAIS
USDIP) Senior Leva1 Revim Group ISLRG)
USDIPI Protocol Honor C o r m 6 Working Lunch w/His Excellency AveUm Cruz, Philippines
Protocol Dinner ,fro the Official 2005 SEDM Ministerial
USDIP1 Prolomi Honor Corddfi A Meetino wfh the Miraster of N a h d Defense. Wand
USDIPI Meeting with AMB ~urki-al-~asat, ~ d Arabiaa
USDIP) Protocol Meetmg wlh lha People Republicof China Executive Minister
ASDIW Cowressimal Engagement
USDIP) Mto w1CFC-A Commander Lieutenant GeneralKarl Eihanbenv
ASDILH MI~WI Senator Susan CoHins [R.ME)
Protocol Amw Hosted Weicomino Ceremonyfor Waller Reed PaUwnts
DPB ~ e f i n s POW
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USDIP) Senior Level Review GroupISLRG)
USDIPI HSC Exercise w/McHam 6 Haynes. EEOB
DS8 DSB Task Face on Nuclear Ca~abililiM-Outbrief
UWP) Protocol Meeting wlh Minister Oscar # # a k a .MoFA, Peru
USD(P6R) Mig wDr Louis Sullivan Chairman PresmenrsBoard of Advisors on HBCUs
ASD(PA) Luncheon Meetingwrth Ide Formers
ASDlLAl AThL Phone call wlh Senator Rich Samorum (R-PA)
Senior Readiness OversiahtCouncil ISROCI
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October 5,2005

The Honorable Gordon R Enidand

ActuiRDeputy Secretary
U.S. DepartmentofDefense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Room 3E944

1bare just from Iraq and the United Arab Emirates, a trip anasged by BnskUs
Executivesfor National Security (BENS)at the invitation of General 1 9 Abizaid. MY
fellow ~rarototwere General Wayne Downing. USA (BET), Jm Kinsey (foundine
chiirroanof AOL) and Joe Robert (Chaman and CEO.J. E.Robert Companies).
~ g trip, we met with most of the smior m i t i 9 and civilian leiderdup*
~ u n this
including Gcseral C q , Ambasmior Khdizill, Prime Mmista JMfaIi, and the down
Prince of Abu Dhabi, amma others, We also s i ~ c a n time
t "in Ole field." The
four of us want America lo succeed in this effort, rod we wouldlih TO shareOuipersona]
observationswith you, if possible.

Very little of your lime would be needed. If you agree, we will work with your schedulU
to find a time in the near ftcture 10 do so. Alternatively, your staff can C O W my
ascistamt, Linda Moseley, at 202-25SZll5 orku~de-.

We look forward to meetingwithyou

Charles G.Boyd
.1- USAP
Picndcnt and CEO
w.)
 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINSTON, D.C. 20301

Ç 14 2KB

Thank you for your recent letter to Secretary Rumsfeld. You

have raised important issues.

The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Jack Keane,

recently outlined unit rotation plans for the coming year in Iraq, and I
am enclosing a transcript of his remarks for your benefit.
I have also enclosed a transcriptof remarks by Colonel Robert
DeFraites, Office of the A m y Surgeon General, regarding recent
medical problems among service members in the Gulf.

We appreciate your concern and thank you for your service to

our nation.

The Special Assistant to the

Secretary of Defense 0
<^(

Enclosures
 United SUtef Depatmeniof Defenw

News Transcript
On the hHD-//wwwAfcn)tclink.niiVcBi-
web:
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Mediacontact:media@defensel,nk or+) (703)697-5131
mi1
Pubtx m n m htm / / w w w . d ~ , ~ a ~ ' \w+l(703) 4%0711

Presenter: Gen.John Kesme, Acting Chief of Suffof the Amy Wednesday,July 23,2003

Gen.Keane Press Briefingon Plans to Rotate Forces in Iraq

(Also Participatingwas Maj. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, ViceDirector for Operations,J-3, Joint
Staff. Slides of todays briefing are available at
) . -

Keane: Good afternoon

Listen, I want to say up front that our soldiers are doing a magnificentjobevery day, and we
should all be proud of them and grateful to them.We have over 368,000 soldieredeployed all
over the world. They are absolutely doing what their country needs fromthem to do. from the
Balkans, to Korea,to Afghanistan to Iraq. Many soldiers are in harm's way every day. For our
soldiers, the global war on terrorism is personal, it's often brutal, it's frequently terrorizing,it is
very demanding and death is always a silent companion. Yet day in and day out, they perform
the mission with extraordinary dedication and competence.

Yesterday's news in Iraq is yet one more testimony to just how well-trained,well-led and
motivated our soldim are. On my recent trip to Iraq, I was greatly impressed and proud of how
well our Army is performingunder difficult, demanding conditions. Morale is high, and soldiers
know what their missions are and they're performing them to our standards.

My purpose today is to present to you our rotation plan for Iraq. First, I want to give you a link
historical perspective. In the Army's distinguishedhistory, unit manning and unit muuons have
long been a challenge Dunng World War 11, troops were mobilized and dispatchedto the from
for the duration, meaning forthe duration of hostiiities or indefinitely. with the exceptionof air
crews that flew a set number of missions before rotating back to training assignments. In Korea,
the Army established a rotation policy of six months for combat units and 12 months for combat
support and combat service support units, and later went through a very complicated point
system forindividual soldiers. In Vietnam, soldiers rotated after 12 months in theater on an
individual basis. Subsequentrotation policies have varied in response to the combatant
commander's needs.

Since 1982, we've had a six-month unit rotation policy in the Sinai. In 1995,we began with a 12-
month unit rotation in the Balkans, and shortly thereafter,changed it t o a aix-month rotation
policy, which we are steady-staling today in Bosniaand Kosovo. Finally, our forces in
Afghanistan are currently on a six-month unit rotation policy.

Let me give you a snapshot of where our soldiers are today.

(To staff.) Chart.

As I mentioned,368,000 soldiers-plus, 120 countries. And here's where they are: South Korea,
30,000-plus; the Philippines, a thousand-plus. In the United States, 28,600 soldieis providing
forceshere for homeland security. In Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay, 1.500 s o l d i m In the
KFOR and SFOR - this is in the Balkans, as you know - 5,100 soldiers. The Imgat
commitment, obviously, is in Operation Iraqi Freedomand in the Southwest Asia CENTCOM
A 0 in support of that, 167.000 soldiers.Afghanistan is 9.600. and the MFO that I mentioned is

This is what it means to us down at unit level: 24ofthe 33 active component brigade combat
teams are deployed overseas during fiscal yca'03, or 73 percent. Of our National Guard
enhanced battalions, 15 of the 45, or 33 percent of them deployed overseas in 03.

So the 368,000 is what I mentioned, and this is how it's broken down: active. 232,000-plus;
Reserves, 61.000-plus: and National Guard, 74,000-plus.

Next chart

Let me show you what's happening in Iraq. I think you're mostly familiar with it, but thenumbers
you may not be as well familiar with. A hundredand fifty-six thousand troops: the vast majority
of those are Army - 133,000. You can see the Air Force,the Navy and the Marine Corps, And
our coalition forces, which are beginning to now at 12,400, to include the U.K.division. We
obviously have a lot of Army helicopters in the theater as well. We work up from the southeast,
from Kuwait, we have 34,000 troops. And the U.K., as you know, is in the southern sector, in
Basra. And beginning to sec the multinational forces coming; this is an Italian brigade, a
Netherlands battalion.

The 1st MEFis the southern sector. You heart Paul Wolfowitz talk about that. A Special Forces
group is in the Weft.In thecentral corridor, in Baghdad, we have the 1st AnnoredDivision, the
2nd Armored Cavalry Reeiment. and the 2nd Brigade from the 82nd Airborne Division was
working the central .ro& To the west of that,&t near Fallujah, is the 3rd Infantry Division.
And the enure western, going to the Syrian and Jordanian border, is ihe 3rd Annored Cavalry
Regiment.

North of Baghdad. in a very large area of operations,is the 4th Infantry Division, assisted by the
173rd Airborne Brigade, which is a pal of this organization And then upnonh there$ the lOlst
Airborne Division Air Assault, which goes to the Syrian and the Iruuan and Turkish borders

That will give you a sense of where we are in Iraq and what those numbers are.
DoD News: News Conference on Recent Cases of Pneumonia Among D q l o y d Service. .. P W 1 of 11

Presenter; David Tomberg, DASD (Clinical and ProgramPolicy) Tuesday,August 5,2003

News Conferenceon Recent Cases of Pneumonia Among Deployed Servicemembers

(NewsConference to discussthe recent cases ofnneumonia amone mi-mbers deployed to the
US.~ e n t r aCommand
l area of operations. ~ a r t i c i ~ a twere
i n ~ David omb berg, deputy aaaiWt
secretary of defense for clinical and program policy; Bryan Whitman, deputy assistant secretary of
defense for public affairs; and Army Col. Robert DcFraites, Officeof the A m y Surgeon General.)

Whitman: Good morning, and thank you forjoining us this moraine. There has been some inteicfl in
the last couple of days on some force health protection issues and somecases of pneumonia And so. I
thought that it might be useful to bring to you a couple of expertson this issue.

Today, we have Dr David Tomberg, who is the deputy asmsmt secretary of Defense for Clinical and
Program Policy, 03 well as Colonel Robert D e h i c s from the Office of the Army Surgeon General.
that have offeredto come down here and spend some time wilh you and answer your questions

So with that, kt's go ahead and get started.

Tomberg: Good morning. I'd like to thank you all for coming. The purpose, of c o w , of the briefing
today, as was indicated, is to update you and provide you with, hopefully, some comprehensive
information on the pneumonia cases that we have recently experienced.

The health, safety, well-being of our fighting men and women are of critical importance to us. They're
of utmost importance, and we'll spare nothing to safcguari their well-being. Military medicine, I'm
happy to say, is poised to provide the finest of care to our fighting men and women.

AS you know, there have been some cases of pneumonia and sadly, there have been two deaths. We're
deeply concerned about the deaths. We'd like acomprehensive understanding to be available to the
families. to the husbands. to the wives of our servicemenso ihev better underatand the nature of t b
conditions. And we'd like to assure you that we're sparing no effort to further analyze and diagnose the
nature of this condition.

The Anny has been uking the l e d in providing the health care KTViccd, and 11mvolved in the
epidemiological investigation of these conditions. I'm happy to have with us loday Colonel Bob
DcFrwto. chief of prevenuve medicine i n the Office of the Surgeon General of the Anny, who will
provide you more details on the nature of these conditions today

Thank you.
DoDNews: News Conference on Recent Cases of Pneumonia Among Deployed Service ... Page 2 of 11
Bob?

DeRnites:Thanks,Dr. Tomberg.

Good morning, everyone.

A primary mission of the Army Medical Department is to protect the health of the troops and to late
care of them and give them the best possible care, regardless of where they are deployed worldwide.
Whenever we send soldiers in harm's way, we're committed to bringing them back whole.

We're very saddened in the Medical Lkpaitment at the loss of life of any of our midiera. including the
two that have unfortunately lost their lives due to the pneumonia that they acquired while they were
deployed.

We offer our deepest sympathy to their families.

In response to this, (he Anny Surgeon General has ch- two epidcmiological consultation teams
to study the case of the pneumonia, to make sure we do evcrylhing possible to avoid new ones and
provide the best of care to those who become ill. Epidemiologicalconsultation is regular tool
available to the Army Surgeon General. He can charter a team xt any time to study any kind of
medical problem that occur* anywncrc in the Army. and he'schosen to do so in this snuation.

I want to go a little bit intosomeof the background informinon about what we know so far about
pneumoniain the Anny. Since the 1st of March, we have seen about a hundred cases of pneumonia
total in the troops that have been deployed in Southwest Asia in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom
and Enduring hrecdom Thai number of about a hundred is about given the population that's
deployed 13 about the amount thai one might expect in a population uf iroops deployed, basedon our
background information and experience that we have -- between 4(00) and 500 cases of pncumoma
= m y year in the Army wnrldwide That s fajrly ~tandard,and surprising it may seem that otherwise
young, healthy adults still do get pneumonia in the Army

Of the hundred cases since Much, 15 of them have beenscnous enough to w m t reipralor suppa
In other words. they needed 10 be put on a ventilator to help them breathe for a certain pcnodof time
Of those 15. two unfonunately have (bcd, one in June andone in July

The - what we know about these cases so far. the 15 cases - 14 of them are soldiers and one's a
M a w And they have occurred fairly -on a fairiy spread-out paticm in omc since March We hid
twocases in March, two in ApnI, one in Mty, six in June and four in July. The last confirmed case
that we have had occurred on the 30th of ~uly.

The other interesting thing about these 15 cases of more severe pneumonia is that they've occuned all
throughout the Southwest Asia region.Even though 10 of ihe 15occurred in Iraq - that's where the
majority of troops are, of course - they have occurredas far away as Uzbekistan and Qatar.

And also the fact that two have died, I think,is probably the one issue that has prompted the
-
commissioning of our epidemiology cpidcmiologic consultation.

Though death, unfortunately. just like pneumonia, occurs in the Army in this day and age, so does
death due to pneumonia. In the five years ending calendar year 2002, the Army Ion 17 soldiers due to
complications with pneumonia. So even in this day and age, we still, unfortunately, lose some soldiers
Do? News: News Conferenceon Recent Cases of Pneumonia Among Deployed Service... Page 3 Of 11

due to pneumonia.

The other usue with the 15 cases is that we have been able to identify streplcaxcd pneumonia. 'That's
-
 very common cause of pneumonia. It has been
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we've found that 10 be the case that we can annbutc
inve-<ucationconunues.The other thin*
that's true is that we've found noevidence of anthrax, smallpox or any other biological agent attributed
-that wecan attribute the pneumonia.

Now, 1 mentioned the epidenuological consultation teams, otherwise known as EPICON teams The
surgeon general has chartered two teams. One learn of two physicians is already been posted to
Landstuhl Rcciond Medical Center in Germany to assist the physicians there in reviewing the cases
Since most of the cases of the severe cases came 10 Landstuhl. that s a good place to do some record
review and also revie* the laboratory findings from these cases And so. we have Woof our doctors
-
assisting in the investigauon there at LandsNhl The other teamof six indnjduals four officers and
two enlisted personnel is no'* in the central region -they re in theater right now, and they'll be
moving into Iraq, and they'll be assisting with the investigation there in Iraq.

The teams consist of - both have infecuous disease, preventive medicine expertise. In addition, the
team that's going to I n q also h u laboratory officers and technicians that can assist with laboratory
evaluauon That includes patient specimens,and it also includes specimens from the environment.

Pneumonia is a very common condition in the United States in general. There are two basic types of
-
pneumonia: those that are pneumonia that's caused by infection and pneumonia that can be caused
by non-infectiouscauses.

Of the infectious causes, there's a long list of bacteria, viruses, parasites and fungi that can cause a
pneumonia. The most common cause of pneumoniain the United States is bacterial pneumonia, and1
already mentjoncd that two of our 15 cases we know already have that very common bacteria that
causes pneumonia worldwide.

-
Of thenon-infectious causes, there are that can be caused by cnviromneniaJconditions such as dusts
or metals or smoke, such as even exacerbated by tobacco smoke.
So the investigation is going to be focused on kind of the infectious conditions that I mentioned, some
of the non-infectiousconditions, and also look at some of the host factors of the patients or that
-
soldiers themselves of whether is anything in their makeup or their background that might explain
why they may have gotten severe pneumonia.

Agajn I want at reiterate that the deployment of these cpidciniologicalconsultation teams is a tool that
the surgeon general evokes on afairly regular basis Normally we have - n's hard to say on a yearly
basis, but about two to threeepidemiologicalconsultauonsevery year. and so this i s a fairly typical
tool that the surgeon general of the Army invokes to addressa condition like this

I think we are - we are sufficiently concernedabout especially the more severe pneumonia that the
epidemiological consultation was warranted. Additional study, anything that we can do to lean more
about the risk factors for theseconditions, these more serious illnesses, especially the two tragic
deaths, you know, we want to gain as much as we can; if nothing else, to learn better how to protect
soldiers acainst this oarticular tvoc of infection or..if it's- "on-infectious. whatever is causme the
pneumonia, and alsoto learn more so that if in no oinersmall way, perhaps this will offer some small
comfort 10 those who have lost some soldiers due to this condition.

W...8/12/2003
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DoDNews: News Conference on Recent Cases of Pneumonia Among Deployed Service ... Page 4 of 11

Thanks for your attention.

Q: Colonel?

Q: You talked about non-bacterial causes. How many cases do you have of non-bacterial causes of
pneumonia? And can you tell us what caused it?

DeFraites: Well, pneumonia typically in the United States and, really. around the wortd, the way
pneumonia presents itself is the patient comes in with typical symptoms of cough,fever. and then on
physical examination or x-ray, the doctor diagnoses pneumonia and usually just treats. The typical
approach is not really to try to find out what bacteria or virus might be causing it. And nine timesout
of 10. or 90 times out of 100, that's good enough. It's only when it gets more complicated does the
physician pursue a diagnosis more aggressively.

So in these cases we really have only identified the two infectious causes so far. There may be other
studies that we have done, as I mentioned, for smallpox and for anthrax so far have been negative. In
addition, we have looked for the bacteria that causes Legionnaires' Disease, and that doesn't seem to
be playing a factor. But the investigation's not completed yet, so 1really can't any more about what -
you know, it's not 100 percent - we haven't -

Q: You've actually identified a cause in twocases, the two cases -

DePraitcs: A positive cause that we could say, yes, this bacmum caused these guys to be sick with
pneumonia, in two cases, that's correct

Q: Arc you speculating out down ihe road about what camed any of the othercases you see?

DeFraites: No, not speculating about any of it.That's what the investigation is for. really.

Q: Are you seeing anything that was similar from the first Oulf War, or arc there any lessons leaned
that you took from the tint Gulf War, with pneumonia cases, that were given to the troops now?

-
I don't know whether there was all the oil smoke maybe caused more cases in the first Gulf War,
and there isn't as much oil smoke this time. Are there any similarities or differencesthat you may be
seeing between the two?

DeFraites: Well. we've taken this problem as it presenteditself, as apneunionia problem. And M such.
there really was no precedent in the Gulf War.

I would say, though, in general. I think we're better postured to recognize these problems earlier and
respond in a timely way. And in this case, this investigation really started probably about the same
time as the first soldier died. As I said, these cases have been kind of spread out over time and so
really didn't show a pattern. But then with the first death, it really lucked off the investigation. But we
think we're well on our way to understanding what's going on here.

Q: Have yon determined the cause of death for the two cases? And will you release their names?
DoDNews: News Conference on Recent Cases of Pneumonia Among Deployed Service... Page 5 of 11

DePraite: The cause of death of the two soldiers who have diedis still being studied. The pathology
report, the postmortem examination, is still not quite completed. We expect it to be done really within
the next week or 10 days. And we're factoring that into our investigation.

In interest of the privacy of the families and the patients, we're d l y not going to be releasing their
names.

Q: Colonel, I want to make sure I understood when you said at the beginning the hundred or so cases
generally - that would be the typical number of pneumoniafor a year?

-
DeFraites: No. What I meant by the hundredcases that I talked about is that's the that's all
pneumonias in Southwest Asia that have required at least treatment in a hospital, of which 15 of them
are more severe, needing the respirator.

That a hundred - again, I was using it as a benchmark in comparison with our worldwideexperience
every year of the4<00) to 500 soldiers who need to be admitted to a hospital somewhere around the
world - the Army's deployed all around the world - somewhere, for pneumonia And I use that in
perspective as saying: Are we seeing more cases in general than we might expect? Despite the harsh

environment, the answer is no, not totally. But again, we're still concerned about these- severe
ones,

Q: And the 15 that you sort of identified as the more severe ones -is that the focus of the
investigation right now? Are the other 85 or sonot really involved?

DeFraites: Well, they're all involved. Our priority is definitely on the 15, but the - we know who the
other hundred are. Fortunately, they all -

Q: Ycah.
DeFraiW: -you know. they all responded to treatment and are doing well. So -
-
0:And the last part I'm sorry - is the non-bacteria thing.
Diuing the Afghan war. where U S tn-innB m t in U-?Jvki~tnn.thmr was a lot of anecdotfll evidence
of troops becoming ill because they we; breathing in the dust that had been for years created with
chemicals and such like that Is this one of the things when you refer to "on- biological potenual
factory i s this somethmg youd be looking at7 Became you did say there was one in Uzbekistan.u
well

DeFraites: Yes, I did. Really, the focus of the investigation on the non-infectiouscauses includes any
of the environmental conditions like the dust or, you know, what the soldier might have been doing in
-
his occupation you know, it might give us some clues of an exposure he may have experiencedthat
-
might explain why he got pneumonia. So, the dust certainly everyone's seen the pictures, and
whoever has been there understands what -- that the dust is anissue. It's always been an issue. Why it
might be contributing to these cases is one of the focus of the investigation, if it does at all.

0:Could you state all thecountries in which the troops have g o m sick7Can you also at least give us
the ages and the (fendersof the two who died. and an range of the 15 involved? And just one last
 -

News: News Conference on Recent C a m of Pneumonia Among Deployed Service ... Page 6 of 11

thine. Is thereany evidenceof connection?I mean, arc these random cases, or do you see -
DeFraites: Well,I'm glad you brought the question up about the connection, because that really is
what an epidemiologistdoes, is look for these trends. And you know, we have an epidemiological
consultation learn. We have epidemiologistsinvolved, and so they're looking for these trends.

And I think what we have so far is lhat we've got, spread out in time. as I mentioned. you know, with
the twocases in March, the l ~ inoApnl. theone in May.the suun June and the fourin July - andall
-
of these I0 out of the 15 severe cases have occurred in Iraq. but of course, that's where most of the
troop? arc. But they vc been spread out - all of these countries in Southwest Asia I cant off the Iop of
my head remember what - how many arc spread out to these other countries,but 11includes Kuwait,
Qatar and Uzbekistan 1don1 know if there s any other country thai ..from which we have a case nght
now.

And I don't have the informationon the age ranges with me right now. We have that, but I just don't
have it with me.

Q: How about those two that died?

DeFraitca:But, I mean. theyh all activeduty military people. So, it falls in that age range. And I'm
-
not going to really, in the interest of the patients' family. I'm not going to talk about specifics about
those fatal cases.

There was somethingI wanted to finish saying,though, about your first question. Oh! In terms of the
trends of - and whether or not these are sporadic cases, the other thing that's key, other than being
-
spread out separated by space and time, is also that there's no evidence that - of any other kind of
individual relationship of one case to another to suggest that therecould be person--person spread.
There's no evidence that this is spread from one person to another.

It does seem to be sporadic in nature.

Q: Can you at least say if they're all men, the 15 -

DeFraites: Oh, I'm sorry. I can say that. Fourteen are m a and one is a woman.
Q: Colonel, could you also reiterate again the significflnce of this, that you're really moreconcerned
about the serious cases than on the particularnumber? And also, are you able to definitivelyrule out,
then. SARS or biological or chemical weapons attacks?

DeFraites:The - we do have data from several of thecases that have been negative for the SARS
virus, the conmavinis. So we don't think this has anything to do with SARS.

And again, SARS. if you remember, was very definitely spread fromperson to person. So we feel very
reassured,from the pattern of cases that we have, that this isn't acting at all like SARS, plus we have
the negative finding on several of the cases. So SARS was another went I should have mentioned that
we don't fee! is playing any role here.

Q: And biological or chemical -can you definitivelyrule out a possibilityof biological orchemical
weapons?
DoD News: News Conference on Recent Cases of Pneumonia Among Deployed Service... Page 7 of 11

DcFrailes: Based on all the infonnauon we have to date, there's been no positive finding* of any
-
anthrax or smallpoxor any other biological weapons So yeah, I've pretty close to ruling it out.

Q:And what ibout ..again, just to clarify, (he significance of this is that you're concerned about the
senow cases, not necessarily the number? Is that correct?

--
DcFraites: Well, we're concerned about both. I think if thenumber gets, you know starts increasing,
we're concerned about that. But really we're approachingthis from a prevention and a treatment focus,
to see - is there something we can intervene - some way we can intervene to protect the health of the
troops and then lo treat them better. And so that's why we're - that's the main reason we're studying
these more severe cases, because they've required more treatment And if Acre's some way wecan
-
intervene and learn more about living better or healthier in this particular very harsh

admittedly very harsh environment, that it'd be -- we think it would be a great benefit to thetroops

Q: This has gone up also to 102, right? So hive you had any increase recently or - 1had thought that
it had gone up from a hundred to 102.

DeFraJtes: We are getting a couple of more cases admitted to the hospitals. Of the not severe - the last
confirmed severe case we had was on the 30th of July - there have been several other soldiers with
pneumonia. Of this - that's why Fro saying it's about a hundred. I don't mean to imply that it's exactly
100. It's about a hundred. It could be 102 now. I haven't checked the list lately to see what it is.

Q:How many of the hundred were in Iraq? And also, two people have died. Is that unusual? I
understand the hundred - it's more or less what you would expect in a force of that size. But how
about the deaths?

DeFraites: Well, right now. to answer your first question, I'm not exactly sure how many of the
-
hundred are in what's the distribution of those hundred cases.

Again, the focus has been mainly on the 15.

In tenus of the deaths, from an epidemiological perspective it is very difficult to interpret the two
deaths in terms of whether that's something you expect. I mean,it's concerning enough that it's - it's
--
hard lo say. Like I said, in the Army we have, unfortunately, experienced about well, 17casesof
fatal pneumonia in the Army over a five-year period. So if you do the division, it conies out to about
three a year. So two occurring in one area of the world in about a month was enough to cause us
concern. I haven't --Idon't know statistically who that works out. but it was enough to cause us to be
concerned.

Q: Colonel -

DeFraitcs: (Actually we were.) though, already starting to be concerned with the frat death. We didnt
really wait for the second one.

Q: Colonel, can I follow on that question, because talking about the two that died, you said
epi&miologically statistically. But individually, have you tracked these individuals who died? Were
they treated early enough? Did they get the proper treatment? Were they moved forward? How have
you looked at those two individuals who died?
 DoD Newt: News Conference on Recent Caws o f h u m o n i a Among Deployed Setvice... P a s 8 of 11
, .

DePitites: I'm glad you brought that up. becauw that's exactly what the focus of the investigation of
those cases is. It includes their exposures, what might hivestarted their illnesi, mdalso how were
they treated once they got sick.

Q: And are you farenough along that you can draw any conclusions? Were they-

DcFraites: No. That requires the post-mortem examination and a full analylis of the tissues to know
what the cause of death was; then go back and see, you know, given that as acause of death,then how
did the treatment stack up compared to that.

Q: And youll come back and report that to us when you find that out?

DeRraites: That's all part of our investigation,yeah.

Q: Did it s u n in Kuwait, maybe? You saidit happenedmaybe in March. Did that start hi Kuwait and
maybe all of the soldiers belonged to some specific umt?

DePraites: Well. that's what -that's the other factor that inthe-lies- I'm gted you brought that up,
because I neglected to mention that all of these 15 severe cases arc all from different military units.
So, aside from the separation in time and space, it does look like they havedifferent umu.

You are correct the early cases, of course. before the outbreak of hostilities did occur in Kuwait;
-
however, that doesn't include the soldier who was in Uzbekistan,which really had nothing to do
with Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Q: Are there any s t e p underway now to prevent further infections or further spread?

DeFraites: Well, we've put some messages out to - the question was about preventive - what can you
do to prevent pneumonia. We have put messages out to the field in terms of trying to intervene. Not
knowing exactly, you know, what particular causative agent, there are still some prudent things that
can be done.

And so, we put messages to the field. We're very concerned about soldiere not becoming dehydrated
in this intense heat and dust that they'reexperiencing in the deployed environment. So, we're trying to
emphasize that they stay well-hydrated and that they also protect themselves against the dust as best
they can, using either their cravats or some type of dust mask. But of course, that's uncomfortable, and
it's hard to do 24 hours a day.

Also. when they're handling dust, if Ihey'rc in an area where they've got to do sweeping. we
recommend that they wet down the area first and do more like wet sweeping thçraising bigcloudsof
dust, juqt in case that's a factor

And finally, we all know that definitely.cigarette smoking is a risk factor for pneumonia, no matlei
what age, no matter what population. And so, you know, we're also putting that message out there
along. We emphasize that nonnally to the troops anyway. But this is even a more reason to avoid
cigarette smoking.

Q: The two confirmed bacteriacases, are they related in any way in space and time, as well? And did
they contribute toeither of the deaths?

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DoD News: News Conference on Recent Cases of Pneumonia Among Deployed Service ... Page 9 of 11
DeFraites: No, no. None of the - no two of the cases share any common unit or exact day or time.
Q: They'd; not the ones whodied?

DeFraites: The two known bacterial pneumonia cases arc not the ones who died. They both recovered.

Q: What did the two who died die from?

DeFraites: Well, that's what we're still studying - their deaths with the post-mortem.

mike.) - bacterial,or
Q: (Off -
Mraitcs: Right now, that's the focus of theinvestigation. Right

Q: Why is it taking so long to determine?

DeFraitcs: I think we're being very prudent and very careful, whenever we have a death that we
investigate,that we look at

all the tissues. There's much more - it's easy - actually, it's easy to make the diagnosis if a bacterial
grows out of a blood culture. That's easy. You've got i t If you don't get a positive blood culture, it gels
much tougher, because now you're looking at other - that non-bacterial could be rims, could be
fungus, could be a parasite or it could be one of these non-infectious causes.

Q: Can we assume that you don't have somethinggrowingout of a culture very quick and easy in the
case of the two who died?

Mraites: That's true. At this time. we don't

Toniberg: It could be mechanical in these two cases.

DeFraites: I don't want toengage in any --

Tomberg: (Off mike.) - and that's the purpose of the investigation. A forensic exam, however, and
that's what we're doing in the case of a death, extends for a significantperiod of time. You want to
have a conclusive diagnosis. And you have to consider all elements of information before you - you
don't want to hastily comeup with a theory.

Q:Wen;bothoftheseinIraq-bothofthedeathsinIraq?

DePraites:No.

Q: Were was the other one? Or what - can you tell us what countly?

DeFrsitcs: Well, r d rather not talk about specificsabout these - about the two cases.

-
Q: (Off mike.) if it's not Iraq, it's either Afghanistan or Uzbekistan or Qatar.

Toniberg: They were from - they were soldiers who served in Iraq.
Q: They were soldiers who had served in Iraq, but they were no longer in Iraq at the time of death?

Tomberg: One was and one was not.

Q: Okay. Can you tell us where the otherone was?

Tomberg: No, we cannot. We cannot. We're bying to accommodateyou and reasonably answer your
questions. But there are privacy (elements ?).

Q: Okay. (Offmite.) - tell me what you can.

Tomberg: Right.

Q: Colonel, you mentionedthat the six-person team is in the region, but not in Iraq yet. Is that - did1
understand you correciiy?

DeFraites:As of today, I don't believe they've made it intoIraq to date.

Q: Where arc they right now? And when do you -

DeFraites: I'd rather not say where a specific team - for security purposes. I'drather not say where
they me.

Q: Can you say when they're going to anive inside Iraq?

DeFraites: I believe they're supposed to be in Iraq tomonow -last I heard. It all depends on
transportationa lot in that theater. So it's hard to say for sure.

Whitman: There's time for onemore. if there is one.

Q: You had mentioned the 17 deaths over a five-year period from pneumonia in the Army, In this
calendar year, aside from those two cases, has the Army had any other cases?

DeFraites: No, I'm not aware of any other pneumonia deaths. Some of the deaths - deteiminalion,just
like in these two cases, takes a long time before the final diagnosiscan be made,based on pathology
-
examinations,toxicology. So right as of right now, I'm not aware of any otherpneumonia deaths in
the Anny.

Q: In the Army, or would that includeMarines? Would you -

IkFraites: No. just Army is what I can speak to. Just the Amy

Q: Are there other diseases which have claimed the lives of Amy soldiers in the Central Command
of Opcmtio"?

DeFraites: I don't have that information with me today. I can only address the ones that we're looking
at in terms of pneumonia.

Q: One more.I'm sony.ljust cut you off -

DoD News: News Conference cm Recent Cases of Pneumonia Among Deployed Servic... Page 11 of 11

Whitman: No, no -

Q: Okay. Okay. TTiank you very much.

Whitman: TTiank you.

DeFraites: Thank you.

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