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An Interbehavioral Analysis of Memory

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EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS 2010, 11, 53 - 68 NUMBER 1 (SUMMER 2010)
53

An Interbehavioral Analysis of Memory

Mitch J. Fryling and Linda J. Hayes
University of Nevada, Reno

Memory has long been an important topic within the domain of psychology. However, the area of
memory is largely guided by theories that embrace both dualistic and reductionistic foundations. The
current paper describes a thoroughly naturalistic alternative, whereby memory is conceptualized as a
wholly observable and current interaction. In illustrating this alternative, the philosophy of interbe-
haviorism and system of interbehavioral psychology are described, including a comprehensive review
of memory interactions of various sorts. Finally, the value of the interbehavioral approach to memory
for behavior analysis is considered.
Key words: interbehaviorism, interbehavioral psychology, memory, substitution, system building

Individual sciences develop through a con-
stant process of self-evaluation (Kantor, 1958, p.
3). Kantor suggested that sciences continuously
evolve in two general ways: a) discovering pre-
viously unknown events, and b) reinterpreting
already known events (1958, p. 3). In the dis-
cipline of psychology, where it is less common
to discover previously unknown events, it may
be argued that much progress is to be made by
improving our orientation toward already identi-
fied events. This is especially the case when we
consider complex behaviors such as perception,
memory, and thinking (Kantor, 1958). This
paper aims to conduct such work in the area of
memory in behavior science. While memory has
always been a topic central to behavior science,
approaches to memory have been lacking with
respect to their philosophical and conceptual
foundation and scope. Thus, our goal in this
paper is to add to the behavioral literature on
memory by describing an interbehavioral ap-
proach to this important area. To accomplish
this, we will first review J. R. Kantor’s philosophy
of interbehaviorism (e.g., Kantor, 1953, 1969)
Author note: Mitch Fryling, Department of Psychology/296,
University of Nevada, Reno; Linda Hayes, Department of Psy-
chology/296, University of Nevada, Reno.
Mitch Fryling is now at Department of Applied Behavior
Analysis, The Chicago School, Los Angeles. Correspondence
concerning this article should be addressed to Mitch Fryling,
The Chicago School, Los Angeles, 617 W. 7th St., 8th Floor, Los
Angeles, CA 90017. E-mail: mfryling@thechicagoschool.edu
53
and scientific system of interbehavioral psychol-
ogy (e.g., Kantor, 1924, 1926, 1958). In doing
so, the systemic values of validity, significance,
and comprehensiveness are reviewed, and an
approach to memory which embraces each of
these aims is described. This is accomplished by
first outlining some philosophical assumptions
pertaining to interbehaviorism and interbehav-
ioral psychology, and then addressing how they
pertain to memory interactions specifically.
Philosophical Foundation
All of our behavior seems to be impacted by
our experiences, and few would argue with this
fundamental observation. It is interesting, then,
that behavior science seems to have made little
progress in the critical area of memory. Indeed,
few, if any, scientific articulations of how our
experiences influence our day-to-day interactions
are available. Importantly, claims such as these
are always made from a particular perspective.
Thus, we must first acknowledge the philosophi-
cal foundation from which we are approaching
the topic of memory.
The observation that behavioral science has
made little progress in the area of memory is not
based on an independent examination of reality,
nor is it to be seen as more or less objective than
other observations (Hayes, 1993, 1997a, 1997b).
54 Mitch J. Fryling, and Linda J. Hayes
In other words, such a critique is unique to the
observer making the critique. All scientific work
is conducted by observers who cannot possibly
separate themselves from the act of observation,
scientific or otherwise. Thus, scientific work
cannot be evaluated on the extent to which it
provides a more or less valid understanding of
reality, as reality itself is a construct, determined
by one’s orientation to the world more generally.
In short, scientific work is always influenced by
the philosophical assumptions of its workers,
regardless of whether or not they are aware of
this influence (Kantor, 1953, p. 28). However,
such awareness does highlight the importance
of fully articulating and examining one’s own
philosophy with respect to events (see Kantor,
1958; Kantor & Smith, 1975). For this reason
interbehaviorists have suggested that an articu-
lation of philosophical assumptions is the goal
of all systemization in science (Clayton, Hayes,
& Swain, 2005; Kantor, 1958).
Given this perspective, an important first
step is to articulate our general assumptions
regarding the scientific domain and the science
of behavior in particular. Before doing so, we
must acknowledge the primary source of these
assumptions. They are based on J. R. Kantor’s
philosophy of interbehaviorism (e.g., Kantor,
1953, 1957, 1969) and system of interbehav-
ioral psychology (Kantor, 1924, 1926, 1942,
1958, 1982), as well as unique extensions
derived from this Kantor’s work (e.g., Hayes,
1992a, 1992b, 1994, 1998; Parrott, 1983a,
1983b, 1983c, 1986). As these assumptions are
relatively unconventional within the behavior-
analytic community, they are described briefly
below.
Interbehaviorism
From an interbehavioral perspective, the
natural world is viewed as an integrated field of
factors, all of which participate in the unfolding
of events (Kantor, 1953, 1958). This is to say,
the world is a multi-factored field (Kantor, 1958;
Smith, 2006b), with all of its factors being inter-
dependent, comprising one integrated whole. Of
course, the whole cannot actually be confronted
and studied.1 Accordingly, individual sciences
identify particular aspects of the whole for their
special study, these becoming the subject matters
of the individual scientific enterprises. Important-
ly, this perspective prevents hypothetical entities
from entering the scientific domain. Hypothetical
entities are, by definition, non-existent, and thus,
cannot be identified in the spatiotemporal event
matrix that is the natural world (Fryling & Hayes,
2009; Kantor, 1957; Smith, 2007). Given this,
all historical and current philosophies in which
hypothetical entities are implicated are dismissed
as lacking scientific merit. Events that cannot
be confronted cannot be investigated, whereby
nothing can be learned about them. Enterprises
that implicate non-events in their systems cannot
be considered scientific in nature.2
Other important features related to the sub-
ject matter selection must be considered. First, we
must acknowledge that the identification of the
subject matter of individual sciences is an arbi-
trary procedure. This means that “psychological”
events do not exist in the natural world. Instead,
a particular type of event is identified and called
“psychological.” While subject matter isolation
is indeed an arbitrary procedure, this does not
imply that a discipline’s focus on a specific type
of event may be altered for particular purposes.
The progress of individual scientific enterprises
depends upon the continued study of the same
type of events because overlooking their subject
matter boundary conditions undermines the
cumulative nature of scientific progress. This is
to say, the type of event identified as the subject
matter for a particular discipline must remain
constant if anything substantial is to be learned
about that type of event. In sum, the progress of
an individual science depends on its identification
of a distinct subject matter, such that all work
can relate to and build upon the work of others
in the enterprise (see Hayes & Fryling, 2009).
Of course, all sciences find themselves related
to one another, some more so than others (Ob-
server, 1968). The science of psychology finds
itself closely related to the sciences of biology
and sociology, for example. This is not surpris-
ing, as all sciences are derived from the same
1
See Hayes, 1993, 1997a, 1997b for related discussions.
2
This stance on hypothetical entities is similar to that of
radical behaviorism (e.g., Skinner, 1953, 1974), however, radi-
cal behaviorism does not make the explicit distinction between
constructs and events as is done within interbehaviorism.
 An Interbehavioral Analysis of Memory
natural world, the same multi-factor field of
natural events (Kantor, 1953). However, the
value of individual sciences depends upon their
identification and isolation of a unique aspect of
the natural world, such that they are contributing
to the more general understanding of its happen-
ings. For this reason, individual sciences must
pay close attention to the boundary conditions
between the various scientific enterprises. While
psychology may be closely related to biology
and sociology, its progress cannot be assured
if its subject matter is confused or blended to-
gether with those of these other sciences. When
boundary conditions are not clearly drawn or are
overlooked, one science often gets overshadowed
by the other. Most often, the science assumed to
be foundational to the other overshadows the
science assumed to have its basis within it. For
example, psychological events have been assumed
to be based on biological events, biological events
based upon chemical events, chemical events
upon physical events, and so on. The basis fal-
lacy, as it is called (Observer, 1969), is common
to reductionistic philosophies in science. We do
not embrace practices derived from this fallacy.
Our position is that psychological science,
while obviously related to other sciences, is
distinct from those sciences. Further, the value
of psychological science depends on a thorough
understanding of psychological events, without
embracing the events of other sciences for in-
vestigative or interpretive purposes. Specifically,
psychological happenings are not viewed as
caused by or based on biological happenings. In
other words, if psychological science developed
in an effort to understand a unique set of happen-
ings in the natural world, it must examine those
happenings, not the happenings already under
examination in other sciences. If this were not
the case, the rationale for a science of psychol-
ogy would be in question. Indeed, all forms of
reductionism3 are dismissed, and individual sci-
ences are viewed as authentic in their own right
(Kantor, 1958).
System Building
Thus far, we have articulated how our
philosophical assumptions have led to the
dismissal of both dualistic and reductionistic
55
philosophies, as well as all practices derived from
those philosophies. Still, individual sciences
are also evaluated in other ways. Toward this,
Kantor proposed an elaborate system building
procedure that provides specific guidelines for
the construction and evaluation of individual sci-
entific systems (Kantor, 1958; Kantor & Smith,
1975). We will now briefly outline some essential
features of system building and the evaluation of
scientific systems. First, scientific systems must
be valid (Kantor, 1958, p. 50). Kantor uses the
term valid to refer to internal consistency or a
lack of contradiction. For example, a system
which explains its subject matter by way of
behavioral events at some times and biological
events at other times may be said to lack validity.
Failing to appreciate the importance of validity
leads to incoherent efforts toward understand-
ing the subject matter, and threatens the value
and progress a scientific enterprise may achieve.
Beyond validity, scientific systems must also
strive towards significance within the larger
domain of the sciences (Kantor, 1958, p. 50).
Specifically, the term significance is used to
describe the relationship of an individual sci-
ence to other scientific enterprises. When an
individual scientific system shares the meta-
assumptions of other scientific enterprises it is
considered significant. For example, given that
the sciences do not explain natural events by
appeal to non-existent entities, the significance
of a psychological system that does so is severely
compromised. Many psychological systems em-
brace such hypothetical explanations, and it is
for this reason that many view psychology as a
pseudoscience. It is important to note that while
significance assumes validity, validity does not
assume significance. In other words, validity is
a pre-requisite for significant interactions with
other sciences, but validity itself does not assure
significance. Indeed, there are non-scientific
systems which may be considered valid, but lack
significance (e.g., psychoanalysis).
Sciences must also work toward comprehen-
siveness (Kantor, 1958, pp. 66-67). Scientific
systems that do not provide an adequate ac-
count of all of the events which fall within the
3
This includes meditational models—such as input – output
psychology.
56 Mitch J. Fryling, and Linda J. Hayes
purview of the discipline’s subject matter lack
comprehensiveness, and leave the door open for
non-scientific accounts of neglected events to
flourish. In psychology, behavioristic theories
have been criticized for failing to articulate an
adequate account of many complex behaviors
such as thinking and dreaming, for example
(Dixon & Hayes, 1999; Hayes, 1994; Kantor,
1970, 1976). Importantly, comprehensiveness
is only valued when it is construed within a
system that is both valid and significant. Thus,
scientific systems must aspire toward valid-
ity, significance, and comprehensiveness. It
is important to acknowledge that Kantor’s
philosophy is rather unique in this regard, in
that it explicitly articulates and fully appreci-
ates the importance of and relations between
these aims.
The concept of memory has important im-
plications for all workers in psychological sci-
ence. We have described the values embraced
by Kantor’s system building procedure, includ-
ing their importance toward the construction
and evaluation of scientific enterprises. In the
following sections we pursue system building
work in the area of memory, specifically as it
pertains to the construction of a thoroughly
naturalistic, behavioral approach.
An Interbehavioral Interpretation of
Memory
The Past
All learning processes involve historical
circumstances in which behavior that had
not been observed was then learned, as dem-
onstrated by its observation at a later time
(Catania, 2007; Pear, 2001). When relatively
stable changes in behavior are observed it is
said that the response is now a part of the or-
ganism’s behavioral repertoire. However, the
process by which such changes in observed
behavior occur, or, in other words, how histori-
cal experiences operate in the present moment
is not entirely clear. To the extent that the past
has passed, how the past operates in the present
remains to be addressed.
Traditional theories in psychology have at-
tempted to explain how the past operates in the
present with common cognitive and biological
perspectives. For example, common cognitive
language proposes that the past is brought into the
present by way of storage metaphors (short and
long term memory), whereby our experiences are
taken in (input), processed into memory (through
coding), and at a later time retrieved and influence
the present. Given our philosophical position
described earlier, cognitive theories relying on
hypothetical entities which cannot be observed
in the spatiotemporal matrix of the natural world
quickly fall short of our natural science goals (also
see Branch, 1977; Marr, 1983; Watkins, 1990).
Biological theories have followed a similar path.
Although biological events can be observed with
various instruments, they are never observed to
store the past, recall the past, remember, or engage
in any other behavior which typically falls under
the purview of memory (also see Kantor, 1947).
In other words, the activity of the brain, even
when observed, is never observed to be engag-
ing in memory behavior. Added to this, we have
suggested that psychological science should focus
exclusively on psychological events, rather than the
events of other sciences (e.g., biology), and thus,
biological theories of memory also fall short of our
goals for a natural science of psychology. Biologi-
cal theories of memory, while important, are not
psychological theories (included here are neurol-
ogy, neurobiology, and related non-psychological
enterprises). Moreover, contemporary theories of
memory often involve a hybrid of both cognitive
and biological theories (see Pear, 2007, p. 146
for discussion), but these hybrid theories also fall
short of our goals, as they embrace both dualistic
and reductionistic premises.4
As we have stated, a description of the process
by which our experiences operate in the present
event field is essential toward understanding our
subject matter. Furthermore, this description
must be thoroughly naturalistic. Fundamental
to such a description is the distinction between
constructs and events (Kantor, 1957; Smith,
2007). Oftentimes, we confuse our constructions
of events with events themselves, with problem-
atic consequences for scientific development.
4
It is not our goal to provide a thorough review of the
dualistic and reductionistic literature on memory. Our concerns
pertain to the philosophical foundation of this work.
 An Interbehavioral Analysis of Memory
This confusion is particularly prevalent in
behavior science, given the unique features of
its special subject matter (see Fryling & Hayes,
2009).
From this position the past is viewed as a
construct. As such, the past is not an actual
thing that currently exists in the natural world.
In other words, the past exists only as a con-
struction of the past – a present construction
(Hayes, 1992b). When we speak of the past, we
do so here, now, in the present, and the same can
be said of the future and of time more generally.
That is to say, the past is not an actual event that
exists as something distinct from the present,
and thus, we need not speculate as to its where-
abouts.5 Our experiences with the world are not
held within us, they are not somewhere else to
be found and brought out into the present. If
the past only exists as a present construction of
the past, our understanding of the past requires
a more thorough understanding of the present
psychological event and all of its complexity
(Hayes, 1992b).6
The following section outlines an interbe-
havioral approach to the area of memory, a
perspective which fully appreciates the afore-
mentioned goals of validity, significance, and
comprehensiveness. To accomplish this we
describe the psychological event (Kantor, 1958)
and its relevance to understanding memory,
provide a comprehensive review of common
memorial interactions (Kantor, 1922, 1926;
Kantor & Smith, 1975), and finally describe
some specific advantages of the interbehavioral
position with respect to memory.
The Psychological Event
From Kantor’s perspective, interbehavior is
a continuous stream of interaction, with each
point in that stream involving its entire history
up to that moment. Kantor’s construction of
this stream (unit of analysis) is the psychologi-
cal event, or the interbehavioral field (Kantor,
1958; Kantor & Smith, 1975; Smith, 2006b).
From this perspective the stimulus func-
tion (the stimulating action of an object) is
distinguished from the stimulus as an object
(the source of stimulation), and the response
function (the responding of the organism) is
57
distinguished from the organism (the locus
of the response). Furthermore, stimulus and
response functions are conceptualized as a single
interaction, with stimulation and responding
only being distinguished for analytical purposes.
Importantly, the stimulus function-response
function interaction (SfRf ) participates in
an interrelated, multi-factored field. Included
in this field are setting factors, media of con-
tact, the unique organization of all factors, and
the interactional history. All of these factors are
interdependent; they are one interbehavioral
field. Changing one factor changes the entire
field; and as such, no factor is viewed as having
independent, dependent, or causal status (Kantor,
1958).7 The psychological event is symbolized in
the following formula: PE=C(k, sf, rf, st, md, hi),
where PE symbolizes the psychological event, C
that all of the factors are interdependent, k the
unique configuration of all of the factors, sf the
stimulus function, rf the response function, st
setting factors, md the medium of contact, and
hi the historical interbehavior process (Kantor,
1958, p. 14).
Of particular relevance toward understanding
complex human behavior is Kantor’s explicit dis-
tinction between stimulus objects and stimulus
functions (Kantor, 1924, pp. 47-48; Parrott,
1983a, 1983b, 1983c, 1986), and the important
role of interbehavioral history. One important
implication of the distinction between stimulus
functions and stimulus objects is that present
stimulus objects may have the stimulus functions
of objects which are no longer physically present,
given a history of their occurring in relation to
one another in space and time, and an individual’s
responding with respect to that relation. Kantor
used the term “association conditions” to refer to
spatiotemporal relations among various factors,
5
This is not to say hat there wasn’t a past, but that the past
has passed, and now only exists as a present construction (see
Hayes, 1992b for a discussion).
6
While we are arguing that there is no distinction between
the past and the present, we continue to use the word “past” at
times to highlight how historical factors operate in the present
event field. This may seem unconventional to the reader given
that the past is distinguished from the present within the culture
at large. From our perspective this is a problematic confusion in
behavior science, and thus, it is important that we continue to
refer to the past in this unconventional manner.
7
The interdependency notion is not to be confused with
multiple dependency relations, as is more commonly understood
in behavior analysis (see Parrott, 1983b).
58 Mitch J. Fryling, and Linda J. Hayes
and acknowledged their importance by proposing
that they are fundamental psychological processes
(1921, 1924).8 While acknowledging that as-
sociation conditions are always complex and
involve a wide range of factors, Kantor (1921,
1924) described several simple associations,
including those involving stimuli and responses,
stimuli and stimuli, settings and stimuli, set-
tings and responses, settings and settings, and
responses and responses (overt, implicit, par-
tially implicit).9
Given an individual’s history of responding
with respect to spatiotemporal relations among
stimulus objects, stimulus objects may acquire
the psychological functions of other objects,
such that they may substitute for them in their
absence. When an individual responds with
respect to an absent stimulus object through
the stimulating action of some present stimulus
object, Kantor calls that stimulating action a
substitute stimulus function (Kantor, 1924,
pp. 50-52; Kantor & Smith, 1975, p. 43).
Thus, given an individual’s history of inter-
acting with A in relation to B, object A may
develop the functions of object B, even when
B is no longer physically present. A is physi-
cally here (the present) and B is physically gone
(the past); but, B is psychologically present to
the extent that A now has the stimulational
functions of B. B is the past, operating in the
present (A). B is A.10 Importantly, substitution
of this sort does not depend upon physical
similarities between objects A and B, however,
through generalization processes, stimuli that
are physically similar to A may also substitute
for B, and vice versa (i.e., generalization of
substitute stimulus functions).
For example, your history may have in-
volved a date with a friend for your birthday.
On this date, your friend (A) may have given
you a watch (B), at your favorite restaurant
(C), at which a jazz band had been playing
that evening (D). To be clear, this history
involves conditions whereby A, B, C, and D
participated in a spatiotemporal relation, and
you were interacting in and with an event field
that involved all of these factors. At a later time,
upon having dinner at your favorite restaurant
(C), you may see your friend (A), the watch
(B), and hear the jazz band (D), even though
none of these factors are physically present.
In other words, you may see and hear in the
absence of the thing seen and heard. Moreover,
this sort of substitution may also occur in restau-
rants which are physically similar to the origi-
nal restaurant, or when a watch which closely
resembles the gift that evening is seen (this is
generalization of substitute stimulus functions).
Here, the necessity of distinguishing between
stimulus functions and stimulus objects is high-
lighted. We are not responding in the absence of
stimulation in these circumstances. Rather, we
are interacting with stimulus objects involving
substitute stimulus functions, operating in the
current event field (Hayes, 1992b).
To summarize, we have suggested that
memory involves a present interaction with
present stimulus objects, the only stimuli we
can interact with. We cannot interact with
the past directly. We can never go backwards
to find or recover the past (see Hayes, 1998).
We always interact with current stimuli that
have current psychological functions, which
must be explicitly distinguished from stimulus
objects themselves. We only have the current
event field, full of presently operating histori-
cal factors.
As discussed earlier, comprehensiveness is
a critical aspect of all scientific systems. In its
absence, alternative theories will continue to
thrive – theories that embrace both dualistic
and reductionistic premises. Thus, a sound
foundation toward understanding psychologi-
cal events of the memorial type must involve
a comprehensive description of various sorts
of memory interactions. Most often, when we
speak of memory, we are interested in recalling
events of the past or remembering to complete
an act in the future. Three common memorial
interactions have been addressed within the
8
It is important to note that the term association is being
used here to refer to the co-occurrence of objects/events in space
and time, rather than a mental action of associating.
9
From this perspective, both operant and respondent con-
ditioning processes are conceptualized as types of association
conditions. Kantor uses the term implicit to describe responding
that is with respect to stimuli that are not physically present, that
is, responding with respect to substitute stimuli (Kantor, 1924,
pp. 68-69, 295).
10
This has also been conceptualized as A(B), specifically with
respect to equivalence relations (see Hayes, 1992a).
 An Interbehavioral Analysis of Memory
system of interbehavioral psychology, and will
now be reviewed and elaborated upon in the
context of our analysis thus far (Blewitt, 1983;
Kantor, 1922, 1926; Kantor & Smith, 1975).
Reminiscing
Reminiscing is described as a backward
looking interaction in Kantor’s system (Kantor,
1922, 1926; Kantor & Smith, 1975). Reminisc-
ing is described in this way due to its substitu-
tional nature, that is, it involves encountering
present events which have the psychological
functions of past events that are no longer physi-
cally present. These interactions involve what
Kantor refers to as the three general phases of
memory: (a) association conditions occur, (b)
a passage of time, and (c) a stimulus object that
has the functions of past objects is interacted
with, such that the past is psychologically pres-
ent (Hayes, 1992b). While reminiscing interac-
tions may occur with respect to an individual’s
history with present stimulus objects (e.g., you
see your friend and think about the last time
you saw her), it is often the case that individuals
interact with stimuli that substitute for absent
stimulus objects (e.g., you see your friend when
you hear her voice on the phone). A common
example of reminiscing occurs when individuals
see their old friends, think about the games they
played and more, while passing through their
childhood neighborhood. Here, the stimulus
functions of the setting substitute for factors
in the past.
Remembering
In contrast to reminiscing interactions,
Kantor describes remembering interactions as
forward looking (Kantor, 1922, 1926; Kantor
& Smith, 1975). Remembering interactions
are forward looking because they involve de-
scriptions of behavior to be completed at some
future time. This is to say, the initial association
conditions necessarily involve the construction
of an act and a specific time when that act is to
be completed. For example, association condi-
tions might involve “Call your friend Libby at
4 p.m.”. In this example, the construction of
an act (call your friend Libby) is associated in
the environment with a specific time when the
59
act is to be completed (4 p.m.), such that at a
later time the stimulus 4 p.m. might substitute
for the description of the act. Like reminiscing,
remembering involves the three general phases
of memory interbehavior: (a) association condi-
tions occur, (b) a passage of some time, and (c)
a substitute stimulus is interacted with and the
act is completed. Also of importance, in remem-
bering interactions the individual may or may
not actually complete the projected act. Thus,
to the extent that remembering also involves
completing the act, remembering necessarily
involves rule-following behavior (Parrott, 1987;
Skinner, 1969). Also, remembering interactions
often involve situations which are unique, those
which are non-repetitive in nature.11 For example,
you remember to show up for a dinner date only
once, and then the engagement is over. However,
other remembering interactions are relatively less
unique, but still considered remembering. Such
is the case when one remembers to take their
medications each day at 10 a.m. and 4 p.m. In
this circumstance, while each response is a unique
interaction with a substitute stimulus, it is one
that is encountered repeatedly, with the projected
response remaining the same.
To illustrate, we may make arrangements to
meet a friend for dinner on Wednesday evening
at 7 p.m., and record this meeting on our calen-
dar. During the time between the arrangement
and the dinner, we may or may not interact
with the recorded stimulus which substitutes
for the dinner plans. For example, we might
glance at our calendar before work, and this
may substitute for the original plans (e.g., we
might think “I have to meet Libby for dinner
on Wednesday night”). Other factors may also
serve as substitutes for the engagement. For
instance, we might pass by the restaurant on the
way to work and think about the dinner plans.
After the passage of some time, if a substitute
stimulus is contacted, the dinner engagement
is remembered; if not, it is forgotten. Whether
or not we actually go to the dinner involves
rule-following behavior. That is, we may inter-
act with substitute stimuli and engage in rule-
11
While it is true that all interactions are unique, here we are
making the distinction between repetitive acts (e.g., counting to
10 over and over) and relatively non-repetitive acts (e.g., showing
up for a dinner date).
60 Mitch J. Fryling, and Linda J. Hayes
stating behavior (e.g., think about the dinner),
but may or may not follow the stated rules.
Although remembering and reminiscing
have a number of features in common, they
also have unique features. First, in remember-
ing a specific act is described, as well as a future
time to complete the act. This means that
during the initial association conditions, a con-
struction of a specific act yet to be completed
is involved, such that at a later time it may be
carried out. This is not the case in reminiscing.
In reminiscing, the individual is simply inter-
acting with present stimulus objects that have
some functions of past stimulus objects. Also,
in remembering, a specific time at which the
act is to be completed is involved. The initial
association conditions involve a construction
of when the act is to be carried out, and this
necessarily involves a construction of the fu-
ture. Lastly, remembering explicitly involves
rule-governed behavior, whereas reminiscing
interactions do not. Generally, the construc-
tions of time and acts to be completed in the
future are necessarily verbal in nature, and
thus, are peculiar to verbal organisms. While
substitute stimuli are not necessarily verbal,
within the context of remembering they are
always substituting for verbal events, and thus,
must be verbal themselves.12
Memorizing
Memorizing also involves three phases: (a)
acquisition, (b) retention, and (c) recall. These
three phases artificially resemble the three
phases of other memory interactions (associa-
tion conditions, the passage of time, and finally
interacting with a substitute stimulus), and
perhaps for this reason memorizing interac-
tions may be assumed to be adequate models
of all memorial behavior (Kantor & Smith,
1975, p. 258). In addition to this, memorizing
is relatively easy to investigate, and thus, may
be examined in more detail for this reason as
well. However, a number of important differ-
ences between memorizing and the other more
common memorial interactions exist. Before
describing these differences, we consider the
nature of memorizing interactions in more
detail.
Memorizing involves the acquisition of a
new response, the expansion of the behavioral
repertoire. Something new is developed during
memorizing, as implied by the term acquisi-
tion. Importantly, the individual is interacting
with the same direct stimulus continuously
during memorizing interactions.13 Delays are
arranged between presentations of the direct
stimulus, and these are designed to test for the
acquisition of the response to be memorized.
Each interaction with the direct stimulus serves
as a means by which a response is acquired, and
also by which its acquisition is demonstrated. For
these reasons, memorizing may be considered a
repetitive act (Kantor & Smith, 1975, p. 258).
A number of important differences between
memorizing and the other two memorial interac-
tions need to be considered. First, in the other
interactions, the individual is not developing a
new response; no response is being added to their
repertoire. The stimulus functions, particularly
of the substitutive sort, are being developed in
reminiscing and remembering. In neither of
these interactions is one engaging in a response
that wasn’t in their repertoire, or that is not, as
Kantor would say, a part of their behavioral
equipment (Kantor, 1924; Kantor & Smith,
1975). Also, in reminiscing and remembering,
the individual is interacting with substitute
stimuli, whereas in memorizing, individuals
interact with the same direct stimulus. Further,
reminiscing and remembering are delayed
interactions that develop and evolve over the
course of some time. Alternatively, each time the
individual interacts with the direct stimulus in
memorizing interactions, he/she is completing
an instance of the act.
Given these differences, memorizing is a par-
ticularly poor model for studying all memorial
interactions. In particular, the role of substitute
stimulation in reminiscing and remember-
ing makes them entirely unlike memorizing
interactions.
12
We are using the term “verbal” in a general sense here, to
refer to the constructions of numbers (as in when to complete
a task) and words (descriptions of the task), rather than in the
Skinnerian (e.g., 1957) sense of the word.
13
Although the individual is interacting with the same direct
stimulus throughout, it is important to note that their history
with respect to that stimulus is evolving; thus, the word “same”
should be interpreted with caution.
 An Interbehavioral Analysis of Memory
Forgetting
The topic of memory cannot be covered with-
out addressing forgetting. Generally, forgetting
may be the result of: (1) deficient initial associa-
tion conditions, by which substitutional func-
tions of stimuli are developed, (2) the presence
of distracting, interfering, or otherwise disruptive
field factors at the time when the act would oth-
erwise be completed (Kantor & Smith, 1975, p.
257), or (3) the evolution of stimulus functions
(Kantor, 1924; Kantor & Smith, 1975). Thus,
it may be said that three general circumstances
contribute to forgetting. Of course, forgetting
often involves a unique combination of these fac-
tors, operating in a multi-factored field. We will
now address each of these factors in more detail.
1-Deficient association conditions.
Perhaps one of the most prominent factors
involved in forgetting is under-developed asso-
ciation conditions, which fail to fully cultivate
substitute stimulus functions. To explain this
issue in everyday terms, we cannot remember
something if we have nothing to “remind” us of
it. Furthermore, even when substitute stimulus
functions are partially cultivated, they may
not be sufficient in strength to substitute for
the whole initial association condition (e.g.,
we may remember that we have to attend a
meeting, but not remember exactly when it
is). This factor underscores the importance of
the first phase of remembering interactions.
Efforts to promote memorial interactions may
involve the arrangement of association condi-
tions whereby a number of substitute stimuli
are developed, increasing the likelihood of
interacting with at least one of them, thereby
reducing the probability of forgetting (Kantor
& Smith, 1975, p. 257). In other words, if only
one stimulus object is conditioned to have sub-
stitute stimulus functions, it is less likely that
we will interact with that one stimulus, and
thus more likely that forgetting will occur. In
remembering, for example, we might arrange
association conditions whereby a number of
substitute stimuli are created (e.g., notes, plan-
ners, pagers, alarms, asking friends to prompt
us), making the possibility of forgetting much
less likely.
61
Similarly, reminiscing is fostered by taking
pictures, writing in journals, talking about
our experiences often, and so on. These ef-
forts result in a number of substitute stimuli,
enhancing the likelihood of reminiscing. In
this case, forgetting occurs when substitute
stimuli are not developed, and thus, cannot
be contacted. For example, we are less likely
to reminisce about a recent vacation if we have
no pictures of it, have not talked about it, or
have not written about any of our experiences.
In the absence of stimuli that substitute for the
experience, we cannot interact with it, as it is
neither physically or psychologically present.
Forgetting may also occur when the clar-
ity or completeness in the original association
conditions is lacking. For example, if the act
to be completed in the future is not clearly
described (e.g., “Do the scholarly thing”),
remembering may be less likely to occur.
Similarly, when the exact time to complete the
act is not specified, completing the act at the
appropriate time is unlikely. For example, the
phrase “Meet with me sometime next week”
may increase the probability of forgetting.
Further, when the number of factors involved
in the initial association condition is high (as
in compound stimuli), the likelihood of forget-
ting may increase. Such is the case when we
must take medication every third Tuesday, only
if we have a certain blood pressure, and have
not recently seen the doctor for anything else.
This may be particularly so when aspects of
the association conditions are also involved in
other association conditions. In each of these
examples, the initial association conditions
may be considered deficient, such that forget-
ting is more likely to occur.
2-Participating field factors. Forgetting
may also occur when participating factors
prevent interactions with substitute stimuli, or
alter the nature of those interactions in some
way. For example, Kantor and Smith (1975,
p. 257) described how people may forget to
engage in some act when they are intensely
involved in some other activity. To illustrate,
when studying for an upcoming exam, a
student may not contact substitute stimuli
62 Mitch J. Fryling, and Linda J. Hayes
related to other activities, as they may be at-
tending only to materials which are relevant
to the task at hand. Even if substitute stimuli
are contacted, participating field factors may
participate as setting factors, which make rule-
following less likely (as when one remembers
that their favorite TV show is on at 7 p.m., but
doesn’t watch the show and studies instead).
Under these circumstances, substitute stimuli
are present in the environment, but some other
factor(s) alter their operation as substitute
stimuli, or decreases the likelihood of rule-
following when the substitute stimuli are con-
tacted. These factors may be conceptualized as
setting factors, which always participate in the
interdependency of factors comprising fields
of interaction (Kantor, 1958; Smith, 2006b).
Related to this, forgetting may also oc-
cur when we are no longer in the presence of
substitute stimuli (Kantor & Smith, 1975).
Environments with which we typically interact
are full of substitute stimuli. They are full of
our pasts with respect to those environments,
full of memories (Hayes, 1992b). However,
when we are on vacation, we may forget to
make a business call because we have moved
out of the range of so many substitute stimuli.
Similarly, we may be less likely to reminisce
when we are in environments that are very
dissimilar to environments with which we
have a history. For example, when visiting a
foreign country which is very dissimilar our
home country, few reminiscing interactions
may occur. Substitute stimuli cannot operate
if they are not contacted.
In efforts to prevent forgetting under these
circumstances, a number of interventions may
be pursued.14 For example, when intensely
involved in some other activity, memorial
interactions may be preserved by deliberately
reviewing various substitute stimuli in the
environment. Again, it is not that substitute
stimuli are not physically available, but rather,
that they are not operating in a psychologi-
cal sense. Here, one may be instructed to be
more attentive, and explicitly trained to do so.
14
Surely a number of these proposed interventions have
been examined; our goal in this paper is to describe a conceptual
foundation for understanding memory, rather than provide a
review of the applied literature pertaining to memory.
Related to this, one may be advised to develop
a number of substitute stimuli prior to leaving
for a vacation. In these situations, it is not just
the interaction with substitute stimuli that is im-
portant, but also assuring that substitute stimuli
are indeed present and available for interaction.
3-Evolution of stimulus function. Stimulus
functions are constantly evolving, as individual
histories with respect to them are constantly
changing. As such, the evolution of stimulus
function may be regarded as a condition of
forgetting. Given a new history of association
conditions, a particular stimulus object may be
less likely to substitute for a specific event, or may
do so only under more restricted conditions. For
example, our favorite restaurant may have sub-
stituted for the date with our friend, but given a
new history of association conditions involving
the restaurant (e.g., a recent debate with a col-
league) it may be less likely to do so. In other
words, the stimulational functions of the setting
may evolve, and substitute for other events.
In efforts to prevent forgetting, we may create
association conditions whereby specific factors
occur only in relation to the targeted factors for
remembering and reminiscing (e.g., we might
only use our pager for medication reminders). In
other words, we may prevent stimulus functions
from evolving in particular ways.
While the aim of intervention efforts is often
to preserve memorial interactions, this is not
always the case. Such is the case of reminiscing
interactions involving problematic histories (e.g.,
traumas of various sorts). In these situations, the
goal may be to alter the stimulus functions of
various objects, events, and conditions such that
forgetting is more likely. Understanding condi-
tions under which remembering interactions are
compromised is also of interest to the extent that we
may aim to prevent such conditions from develop-
ing. As we have mentioned, psychological stimulus
functions are historical and, as such, their histories
are always present (Hayes, 1992b, 1998). As with all
psychological events, these functions are actual-
ized under particular setting conditions. In efforts
to alter such functions, one may develop a new
history with respect to the stimulus event. Related
to this, if particular stimuli are not contacted
 An Interbehavioral Analysis of Memory
(i.e., avoided by the individual), the possibility
of their developing a new history is not permit-
ted, and thus, the stimulus is likely to sustain its
initial reminiscing functions. Given this, it is not
surprising that psychological therapists find it
particularly useful to use exposure techniques in
efforts to alter psychological distress.15 Here, the
relational histories of particular stimulus objects
may be targeted, such that the psychological
functions of those stimuli are altered.
Conclusion
J. R. Kantor’s philosophy of interbehaviorism
has historically provided a relatively small, inter-
pretive service to behavior analysis. On the one
hand, some may argue that there is little empirical
support for the interbehavioral position (but see
Ruben & Delprato, 1987; Smith, 2006a). On
the other hand, we argue that all investigations
may be interpreted within the interbehavioral
framework, and thus, that all investigations are
interbehavioral in nature (see Smith, 2006a, p.
111). Nevertheless, empirical evaluations of hy-
potheses directly derived from the interbehavioral
perspective would be a valuable contribution to
the literature. Beyond this, there are some specific
benefits of the interbehavioral perspective on
memory we have described herein. We will briefly
comment on these benefits within the context of
the aforementioned systemic values of validity,
significance, and comprehensiveness. Finally, the
value of the interbehavioral approach to memory
toward integrating and coordinating other work
in the area of memory is considered.
The Value of the Interbehavioral Position
Validity. Interbehaviorism and interbe-
havioral psychology are thoroughly consis-
tent; all of the components of the system
cohere with others. It is always the stimulus
function  response function interaction
which is the subject matter, and this interaction
is always participating in a multi-factored field.
To be clear, this is a purely psychological event,
and one that is always wholly observable.16 This
holds true for every aspect of the interbehavior-
al approach to memory as well. The validity of
this perspective differs from behavior analytic
63
perspectives which have interpreted memory
as a private event, rendering it a different type
of event than its public counterparts (e.g.,
Palmer, 1991).17 Further, the present analysis
of memory is not waiting for the physiologist
of the future (e.g., Skinner, 1974, p. 236-237)
to explain how past experiences influence the
present circumstances.18 Rather, the influence
of past experiences on present circumstances
is explained in a thoroughly naturalistic,
consistent and psychological manner by way
of understanding the full nature of the psy-
chological event, and in particular, stimulus
substitution. Finally, from the interbehavioral
perspective responding may never occur in the
absence of a stimulus (e.g., Skinner, 1953,
p. 107, 1974, p. 91). Again, it is always the
stimulus function  response function
interaction, which is always participating in
a multi-factored field.
Significance. The interbehavioral perspec-
tive is also significant, sharing important meta-
assumptions with the larger field of the sciences
(Kantor, 1958; Kantor & Smith, 1975). For
example, the subject matter is always concep-
tualized as a wholly observable and natural
event. Specifically, Kantor explains that “No
science is concerned with existences or processes
which transcend the boundaries of scientific
enterprises” (1958, p. 64). Furthermore, to the
extent that other sciences do not explain their
subject matter by referencing the subject mat-
ters of neighboring sciences, the interbehavioral
perspective maintains significance.
In reviewing the meta-postulates of inter-
behavioral psychology Kantor (1958, p. 66)
explains “Psychology has its own subject matter
and accumulation of facts and operations and
cannot therefore use as its data abstractions
borrowed from any other science.” Generally,
as validity is a pre-requisite toward significance,
15
Psychological therapists may or may not call this “forget-
ting”, however.
16
See Hayes and Fryling (in press) for a more thorough
critique of the public / private dichotomy in behavior analysis
17
Importantly, at times Palmer (1991) implied memory was
a private event, and at other times seemed to imply that it was
a public event.
18
Skinner was rather inconsistent regarding these issues
(see Delprato & Midgley, 1992), and this lack of consistency is
precisely the problem.
64 Mitch J. Fryling, and Linda J. Hayes
behavior analysis may not yet be in a position
where significance within the larger field of
the sciences is possible. At times the subject
matter of behavior analysis is private while
at other times public; sometimes thoroughly
behavioral, and other times biological. In
other words, there is a lack of clarity with
respect to fundamental issues pertaining to
the nature of the subject matter, which can
only threaten the validity of the enterprise,
whereby significance is prevented. Again,
the interbehavioral perspective is a unique
psychological perspective in that it maintains
and explicitly values significance within the
larger field of the sciences.
Comprehensiveness. The interbehavioral
perspective is notably comprehensive. It does
not apply only to certain types of events or sit-
uations. Moreover, its analysis remains entirely
consistent with respect to memorial events of
all types. Behavior analytic perspectives on
memory have focused on a relatively smaller
range of events (e.g., stimulus control and
problem solving), and when different types
of events have been addressed (e.g., seeing in
the absence of the thing seen), they have been
addressed in a relatively inconsistent manner
(e.g., Skinner, 1953, pp. 266-275, 1974, p.
91; see also Delprato & Midgley, 1992). The
interbehavioral position accounts for all types
of memory activity; at no point is a special
category needed (e.g., complex behaviors are
never thrown into a category called “private”;
perception, Skinner, 1953, pp. 266-282,
thinking, 1974, pp. 30-31), and never is there
a plea to other sciences to explain particular
aspects of the subject matter (e.g., waiting
for the physiologist to explain memory). In
other words, not only is the interbehavioral
perspective comprehensive, but it also sustains
its validity and significance in the context of
this comprehensiveness.
Integration. The interbehavioral approach
to memory is also valuable with respect to
integrating and coordinating other work that
has been conducted in the area of memory.
Behavior analysts have described and exam-
ined a number of phenomena related to the
topic of memory, including problem solving,
delayed matching to sample, and priming. We
will briefly comment on how these phenomena
can be conceptualized within the interbehav-
ioral perspective. Problem solving is common
within behavioral discussions of recall (see Del-
aney & Austin, 1998; Palmer, 1991; Skinner,
1953, p. 245, 1974, pp. 119-122). Examples of
problem solving often involve questions which
require one to engage in a response for which
the stimulus object is no longer physically pres-
ent. For example, we have all been asked “What
did you eat for lunch yesterday?” or similar
questions. When the stimulus object is missing
(our lunch is no longer in front of us) we might
engage in “problem solving” responses in efforts
to change our environment in a particular way,
such that it substitutes for the response being
requested. For example, we may interact with
the question “What did you eat for lunch yes-
terday?” by stating “yesterday….”, which might
substitute for “Tuesday….”, which might sub-
stitute for “I had the day off…..”, which might
substitute for “I went downtown….”, which
might substitute for “a falafel sandwich!”. In
other words, problem solving analyses are sub-
stitution analyses. When the original question
alone does not stimulate the answer through
processes of substitution, we need to alter our
environment so that it substitutes for particular
things. In this way we do not need to say that
one response “mediates” another, but rather,
that certain sources of verbal stimulation substi-
tute for others, which substitute for others, and
so on. There is no doubt that problem solving
activities are involved in many memory phe-
nomena, and these processes, when conceptual-
ized as naturalistic and thoroughly behavioral,
are consistent with the interbehavioral position
we have described thus far.
Delayed-matching to sample (DMTS) has
been associated with a rich history of research
in the experimental analysis of behavior. While
it is far beyond the scope of the current paper
to review all of the research in this area, we
will briefly review some findings and describe
how they can be integrated with the interbe-
havioral perspective. DMTS studies involve
presenting a sample stimulus, removing the
 An Interbehavioral Analysis of Memory
sample stimulus, and then after some delay
presenting comparison stimuli. An early study
by Blough (1959) found that pigeons contin-
ued to respond accurately after long delays
when they engaged in stereotyped responding
during the delay interval. In this way the ste-
reotyped responses can be said to substitute for
the original stimulus, such that at a later time,
when the comparison stimuli are available, the
correct response is more likely to occur. More
contemporary findings seem to support the role
of this sort of behavior serving as a substitute
for the past (e.g., Arntzen, 2006); and indeed,
the majority of acquisition and recall literature
can be interpreted within this framework (see
Delaney & Austin, 1998).
A second finding in the DMTS literature
is that as the discrimination becomes more
difficult (e.g., the delay between the offset of
the sample stimulus and the onset of the com-
parison stimuli becomes longer), responding
is influenced by the rate of reinforcement as-
sociated with each of the comparison stimuli
more and more (e.g., see Sargisson & White,
2007). This also seems to be consistent with
the interbehavioral approach to memory. In this
case, with short delays the stimulational proper-
ties of the stimulus objects themselves seem to
exert more influence over responding, however,
with increasing difficulty, substitutional factors
become increasingly relevant. Indeed, history
of reinforcement can serve as a specific type
of substitute stimulus function. That is to say,
stimulus objects substitute for the history of
reinforcement associated with them, and if
one stimulus object has a higher probability of
reinforcement, it is likely that this history will
influence responding more and more as the de-
lay increases. This is an interesting finding, and
indeed, one that is wholly consistent with the
interbehavioral analysis of stimulus substitution.
The priming literature is also relevant to
our discussion of memory (e.g., Catania, 2007,
Donohoe & Palmer, 2005). The interbehavioral
perspective again seems to provide us with a rather
straight forward, naturalistic, and parsimonious
explanation of this phenomena. Priming occurs
when the presentation of a priming stimulus (e.g.,
a card with the word “coffee” written on it) pre-
65
cedes the presentation of a target stimulus (e.g., a
card with the word “cream” written on it), and the
prior presentation of the priming stimulus alters
the target response in some way. For example,
the participant might state the word “cream”
more quickly after having been exposed to the
priming stimulus “coffee”. If this were observed
the priming stimulus would be said to prime the
target response. From our perspective, the stimuli
“coffee” and “cream” are likely to have had a long
history of occurring together in space and time,
and individuals are likely to have interacted with
this relationship on a number of occasions. Thus,
the stimulus “coffee” is likely to substitute for
“cream”, and vice versa. Importantly, a number
of factors have been found to facilitate or hinder
the probability of priming, and it is important to
be clear that stimulus functions (e.g., substitu-
tion) are always actualized or not actualized in a
particular interbehavioral field.
Clearly, we have not summarized all of the
literature in each of these areas. Our goal in com-
menting on these findings is to highlight how the
interbehavioral position might be useful towards
integrating and coordinating various lines of work
in the area of memory.
Conclusion. To summarize, we are suggest-
ing that the interbehavioral position is uniquely
valid, significant, and comprehensive in nature,
even when compared to radical behaviorism.
Furthermore, its utility toward integration and
coordination is particularly distinct. It is impor-
tant to mention, however, that interbehaviorism
is relatively close to radical behaviorism. Both
systems share concerns with mentalism, and both
assume that the world is a determined and orderly
place, with the behavior of organisms being no
exception to this. However, as radical behavior-
ism (and behavior analysis more generally) has
primarily focused on the goals of prediction and
control (Skinner, 1953), the value of interbe-
haviorism is yet to be fully appreciated, and for
this reason, the potential benefits it may offer
behavior analysis are almost entirely overlooked.
From Kantor’s perspective, the goals of science
are description and explanation (1953). The goals
of prediction and control are not irrelevant to
interbehaviorism, however, they pertain to the
66 Mitch J. Fryling, and Linda J. Hayes
specific subsystems of investigation and applica-
tion (Kantor, 1958). Description and explanation
are fundamental activities which identify events
to be investigated, and guide how we might go
about interpreting those investigations. Thus,
the interbehavioral approach to memory might
be beneficial to behavior analysts as it helps to
identify and clarify the subject matter, and guides
interpretations of it. Importantly, we mention
concerns with behavior analytic perspectives only
to highlight the value of interbehaviorism, rather
than to criticize radical behaviorism. As Kantor
(1953, p. 25) stated, “Science is perennially in a
formative stage.”, and behavior analysis should be
no different. Interbehaviorism may be particularly
useful to behavior analysis as the field continues
to approach more complex behavior, as the cur-
rent paper highlighted (also see Morris, Higgins,
& Bickel, 1982). It was our goal to describe how
an interbehavioral perspective might be useful
towards understanding complex behaviors of the
memorial sort. Behavior analysts who embrace
the systemic values of validity, significance, and
comprehensiveness should consider the interbe-
havioral position as they continue to develop a
natural science of behavior.
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