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San Miguel Corporation vs. Monasterio stipulation on venue is clear and unequivocal, thus it ought to be respected.

Facts: However, we note that the cause of action in the complaint filed by the
 The petitioner in this case, SMC, entered into an Exclusive respondent before the RTC of Naga was not based on the EWA, but concern
Warehouse Agreement5 (hereafter EWA for brevity) with SMB services not enumerated in the EWA. Records show also that previously,
Warehousing Services (SMB), represented by its manager, respondent received a separate consideration of P11,400 for the cashiering
respondent Troy Francis L. Monasterio. service he rendered to SMC. Moreover, in the amended complaint, the
 SMB undertook to provide land, physical structures, equipment respondent’s cause of action was specifically limited to the collection of the
and personnel for storage, warehousing and related services. sum owing to him for his cashiering service in favor of SMC. He already
 The agreement likewise contained a stipulation that in case an omitted petitioner’s non-payment of warehousing fees. As previously ruled,
action be brought in court to enforce the terms of the agreement, allegations in the complaint determines the cause of action or the nature of
it should be in Makati or Pasig, MM to the exclusion of the other the case. Thus, given the circumstances of this case now before us, we are
courts at the option of the COMPANY. constrained to hold that it would be erroneous to rule, as the CA did, that
 Subsequently, respondent Monasterio filed a complaint for the collection suit of the respondent did not pertain solely to the unpaid
collection of sum of money against petitioner before the Regional cashiering services but pertain likewise to the warehousing services.
Trial Court of Naga City claiming P900,600 for unpaid cashiering Since the present case for the collection of sum of money filed by herein
fees. respondent is a personal action, we find no compel ling reason why it could
 SMC filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue not be instituted in the RTC of Naga City, the place where plaintiff resides.
contending that respondent’s money claim for alleged unpaid
cashiering services arose from respondent’s function as warehouse
contractor thus the EWA should be followed and thus, the exclusive
venue of courts of Makati or Pasig, Metro Manila is the proper
venue. Respondent contended that the cashiering service he
rendered for the petitioner was separate and distinct from the
services under the EWA. Hence, the provision on venue in the EWA
was not applicable to said services. Hence, respondent insists that
in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court the
venue should be in Naga City, his place of residence.
 The RTC Naga denied the motion to dismiss. The CA, on the other
hand, found that respondent’s claim for cashiering services
inseparable from his claim for warehousing services, thus, the
venue stipulated in the EWA is the proper venue.
Issue: Did the RTC of Naga City err in denying the motion to dismiss filed by
SMC alleging improper venue?
Ruling:
NO. On disputes relating to the enforcement of the rights and duties of the
contracting parties, the venue stipulation in the EWA should be construed
as mandatory. Nothing therein being contrary to law, morals, good custom
or public policy, this provision is binding upon the parties. The EWA
Estate of Felomina G. Macadangdang vs. Gaviola it was governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure. The purpose
Facts: of the Rules on Summary Procedure is to prevent undue delays in
 Atty. Macadangdang, acting as administrator of the Estate of the disposition of cases and to achieve this, the filing of certain
Felomina G. Macadangdang (petitioner), filed an action for pleadings is prohibited,10 including the filing of a motion for
Unlawful Detainer with Damages against Lucia Gaviola, Agapito reconsideration. However, the motion for reconsideration that
Romero, Cristina Quiñones, Boy Laurente, Agustina Tuna, Sotero petitioners allege to be a prohibited pleading was filed before the
Tapon, Buenaventura Muring, Sr., Rogelio Pasaje, Fe Tuboro, RTC acting as an appellate court. The appeal before the RTC is no
Estanislao Pen, Pablo Navales, and Jose Dagatan longer covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure. The Rules on
(respondents).Respondents were occupying, by mere tolerance, Summary Procedure apply before the appeal to the RTC. Hence,
portions of four parcels of land in the name of the late Felomina G. respondents’ motion for reconsideration filed with the RTC is not a
Macadangdang prohibited pleading.
 In a Decision rendered by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)  The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even
Davao City, it ruled in favor of petitioner directing the respondents mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique.
to vacate the subject property. There are exceptions to this rule, such as when the reckless or
 The respondents appealed from said decision to the RTC. However, gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of
the RTC of Davao City dismissed the appeal for respondents’ failure law, or when the application of the general rule results in the
to file an appeal memorandum then remanded the case to MTCC outright deprivation of one’s property through a technicality.
for the execution of judgment.  We find no reason to exempt respondents from the general rule.
 Respondents filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals The cause of the delay in the filing of the appeal memorandum,
assailing the order made by the RTC.In its Decision the CA set aside as explained by respondents’ counsel, was not due to gross
the order and remanded the case to RTC on the ground that failure negligence. It could have been prevented by respondents’ counsel
to file the appeal memorandum within the period granted by the if he only acted with ordinary diligence and prudence in handling
appellate court would only result to abandonment of appeal, which the case. For a claim of gross negligence of counsel to prosper,
could lead to its dismissal upon failure to move for its nothing short of clear abandonment of the client’s cause must be
reconsideration. Thus, the RTC erred in denying respondents’ shown. In one case, the Court ruled that failure to file appellant’s
motion for reconsideration on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. brief can qualify as simple negligence but it does not amount to
 And ruled that while the negligence of counsel binds the client, the gross neglience to justify the annulment of the proceedings
rule is not without exceptions such as when its application would below.
result to outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property, or
when a client would suffer due to the counsel’s gross or palpable
mistake or negligence.
Issue: Whether Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC’s dismissal of
respondents’ appeal for failure to file an appeal memorandum.
Ruling: YES
 Jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases falls on
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities,
the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Munici pal Circuit Trial Courts.
Since the case before the the MTCC was an unlawful detainer case,
Republic of the Philippines and National Power Corporation vs. Sunvar as the action was supposed to an accion publiciana rather than
Realty Development Corporation one for unlawful detainer. The MeTC denied respondent’s
Facts: Motion to Dismiss and subsequent Motion for Reconsideration
 Petioners Republic and NAPOCOR are registered co-owners of and required Sunvar to submit their Answer.
a parcel of land which they leased to the Technology Resource  Despite filing an Answer, Sunvar still filed a Rule 65 Petition for
Center Foundation, Inc., (TRCFI) for a period of 25 years ending Certiorari with the RTC of Makati City to assail the denial by the
on December 31, 2002. The TRCFI was given the right to MeTC of respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. To answer this
sublease this land, which it did, to Sunvar, through sublease petition, petitioner’s questioned the RTC’s jurisdiction and
agreements with the common provision that their sublease prayed for the outright dismissal of the petition. The RTC
agreements were going to expire on December 31, 2002, the denied the motion for dismissal and granted the Rule 65
date that the TRCFI’s lease agreements with the petitioners Petition, directing the MeTC to dismiss the Complaint for
would expire. unlawful detainer for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the instant
 In 1987, when the government was reorganized, the TCFRI was petition.
replaced with the Philippine Development Alternatives
Foundation (PDAF). Before the expiration date, Sunvar wrote Issues:
to PDAF and expressed its desire to renew the sublease over  Did the RTC violate the Rules on Summary Procedure when it took
the subject property and proposed an increased rental rate cognizance and granted the certiorari petition filed by Sunvar?
and a renewal period of another 25 years. PDAF forwarded the  WON the petition on Rule 45 by the Petitioner is proper.
letter to petitioners. By June 25, 2002, PDAF had informed
Sunvar of petitioners’ decisions not to renew the lease. Ruling: YES
 When the lease contract and the sublease agreements expired,  The RTC should have dismissed Sunvar’s petition outright for being
petitioners recovered all the rights over the subject property. a prohibited pleading.
Nevertheless, respondent Sunvar continued to occupy the  Under the Rules on Summary Procedure, a certiorari petition under
property. Rule 65 against an interlocutory order issued by the court in a
 Six years after the expiry date, petitioner Republic, through the summary proceeding is a prohibited pleading.
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), advised respondent  According to former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban, the proper
Sunvar to vacate the subject property. Although Sunvar duly remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse
received the Notice, it did not vacate the property. Almost a judgment on the merits incorporating in said appeal the grounds
year after the first notice, respondent Sunvar received from for assailing the interlocutory order. Allowing appeals from
respondent OSG a final notice to vacate within 15 days. When interlocutory orders would result in the ‘sorry spectacle’ of a case
the period lapsed, respondent Sunvar again refused to vacate being subject of a counterproductive ping pong to and from the
the property. appellate court as often as a trial court is perceived to have made
 Petitioners then filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer with an error in any of its interlocutory rulings.
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City. Sunvar moved to  The Court mentioned only two cases in which they allowed
dismiss the complaint, questioning the jurisdiction of the MeTC exceptions to this rule1 and since Sunvar could not substantiate its
claims of extraordinary circumstances that would allow those same the correct application of the Rules on Summary Procedure; or,
exceptions to apply to his case, the petition for certiorari under more specifically, whether the RTC violated the Rules when it took
Rule 65 remains, for him, a prohibited pleading. cognizance and granted the certiorari petition against the denial by
 If the Court were to relax the interpretation of the prohibition the MeTC of the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondent Sunvar. This
against the filing of certiorari petitions under the Revised Rules on is clearly a question of law that involves the proper interpretation
Summary Procedure, the RTCs may be inundated with similar of the Rules on Summary Procedure. Therefore, the instant Rule 45
prayers from adversely affected parties questioning every order of Petition has been properly lodged with this Court.
the lower court and completely dispensing with the goal of
summary proceedings in forcible entry or unlawful detainer suits.

2. Yes.
 Respondent Sunvar argued that petitioners resort to a Rule 45
Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court is an improper
mode of review of the assailed RTC Decision. Allegedly, petitioners
should have availed themselves of a Rule 65 Petition instead, since
the RTC Decision was an order of dismissal of the Complaint, from
which no appeal can be taken except by a certiorari petition.
 The Court is unconvinced of the arguments of respondent Sunvar
and holds that the resort by petitioners to the present Rule 45
Petition is perfectly within the bounds of our procedural rules. As
respondent Sunvar explained, no appeal may be taken from an
order of the RTC dismissing an action without prejudice, but the
aggrieved party may file a certioraripetition under Rule 65.
Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from
filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case only questions of
law are raised or involved. This latter situation was one that
petitioners found themselves in when they filed the instant Petition
to raise only questions of law.
 There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented or of
the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt
concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the
matter. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law
provides on the given set of circumstances.
 In the instant case, petitioners raise only questions of law with
respect to the jurisdiction of the RTC to entertain
a certiorari petition filed against the interlocutory order of the
MeTC in an unlawful detainer suit. At issue in the present case is
 Under the Rules of Summary Procedure, the weight of evidence is
Fairland Knitcraft Corporation v. Arturo Loo Po not considered when a judgment is rendered based on the
Facts: complaint.
 Fairland alleged it was the owner of a condominium unit in Cedar  Section 6 of the Rules on Summary Procedure provide:
Mansion II in Pasig City. The said unit was leased by Fairland to Po Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. – Should the defendant fail
by verbal agreement, with a rental fee of P20, 000 a month. to answer the complaint within the period above provided, the court,
 Po continuously failed to pay rent. Thus, Fairland opted not to motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as
renew the lease agreement anymore. may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to
 Fairland sent a formal letter to Po demanding he pay P220, 000, what is prayed for therein.
representing the rental arrears, and that he vacate the leased  Section 6 is clear that in case the defendant failed to file his answer,
premises within 15 days from receipt of the letter. the court shall render judgment, either motu proprio or upon
 Despite receipt and the lapse of the said 15-day period, Po neither plaintiff’s motion, based solely on the facts alleged in the complaint
tendered payment nor vacated the premises. Thus, Fairland filed and limited to what is prayed for. The failure of the defendant to
the complaint for unlawful detainer before the MeTC. timely file his answer and to controvert the claim against him
 Po failed to file an answer within the reglementary period (within constitutes his acquiescence to every allegation stated in the
10 days from service of summons). Thus, Fairland filed a motion to complaint.
render judgment and the MeTC considered the case submitted for  Similarly, under Section 7, Rule 70, if the defendant fails to answer
decision. the complaint within the period provided, the court has no
 The MeTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit due to authority to declare the defendant in default. Instead, the court,
Fairland’s failure to prove its claim by preponderance of evidence. motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment
 Fairland appealed, claiming that an unlawful detainer case was a as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and
special civil action governed by summary procedure. Thus, in cases limited to what is prayed for.
where a defendant failed to file his answer, judgment should be  In this case, Po failed to file his answer to the complaint despite
based on the facts alleged in the complaint, and there was no proper service of summons. He also failed to provide a sufficient
requirement that judgment must be based on facts proved by justification to excuse his lapses. Thus, as no answer was filed,
preponderance of evidence. judgment must be rendered by the court as may be warranted by
 The RTC and CA affirmed. Hence, this petition the facts alleged in the complaint.
Issue: Whether or not the MeTC correctly rendered judgment, upon Po’s
failure to file an answer on time, based solely on the complaint without the
need to consider the weight of evidence
Ruling:
 Yes. UD and FE are summary proceedings designed to provide for
an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right
of possession of the property. Thus, as a consequence of
defendants failure to ans., the court is simply tasked to render
judgement as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the
complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein.
Soriente vs. Estate Arsenio Concepcion  Petitioner Soriente, as a defendant in the lower court, did not file a
Facts: separate Answer, but affixed her signature to the Answer filed by
 Respondent Nenita S. Concepcion established that she was the defendant Alfredo Caballero in another ejectment case, docketed
registered owner of the lot occupied by petitioner Angelina as Civil Case No. 17974, which was filed by respondent against
Soriente at No. 637 Cavo F. Sanchez Street, Mandaluyong City, Caballero. Hence, respondent, through counsel, filed a Motion to
Metro Manila. Render Judgment under Section 7, Rule 70 of the 1997 Revised
 During the lifetime of Arsenio E. Concepcion, who acquired the lot Rules of Civil Procedure for Soriente’s failure to file an Answer to
in 1978, he allowed and tolerated the occupancy of the lot by the Complaint. Petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion to
petitioner, who was already staying on the property. Petitioner was Render Judgment.
allowed to stay on the lot for free, but on a temporary basis until  The trial court denied the Motion to Render Judgment. It stated
such time that Concepcion and/or his family needed to develop the that the allegations of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 17973 and
lot. 17974 are similar, the only substantial difference being the time
 After Arsenio E. Concepcion died on December 27, 1989, his family when defendants occupied the subject property allegedly through
initiated steps to develop the lot, but petitioner’s occupancy of the the tolerance of Arsenio Concepcion. The trial court believed that
lot prevented them from pursuing their plan. in signing the Answer filed in Civil Case No. 17974, Soriente
 Elizabeth Concepcion-Dela Cruz, daughter of respondent, filed a intended to adopt the same as her own, as both defendants
complaint for conciliation proceedings before the barangay at the Caballero and Soriente had a common defense against plaintiff’s
instance of respondent. However, the parties did not reach a (respondent’s) separate claim against them. The trial court denied
settlement, which resulted in the issuance of a Certificate to File the Motion to Render Judgment in the interest of justice and
Action by the Barangay Captain. considered that the two cases, including Civil Case No. 17932
 Respondent sent petitioner a demand letter dated September 22, against Severina Sadol, had been consolidated.
2000 by registered mail, demanding that she peacefully surrender  Pursuant to Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
the property and extending financial assistance for her relocation. Procedure, the trial court set a preliminary conference on October
Despite receipt of the demand letter, petitioner did not vacate the 9, 2001 at 8:30 a.m. The preliminary conference was reset to
premises. November 15, 2001, and then to December 18, 2001 because the
 On April 27, 2001, respondent filed against petitioner a Motion to Render Judgment was still pending resolution. The
Complaint6 for unlawful detainer with the Metropolitan Trial Court preliminary conference was reset several times due to absences of
of Mandaluyong City, Branch 59 (trial court). the parties and their counsels.
 The Complaint alleged that respondent was the registered owner  In the scheduled preliminary conference held on February 18,
of the subject property, while petitioner had no title to the 2003, only plaintiff’s (respondent’s) counsel and defendants
property and her free occupancy thereof was merely tolerated by Severina Sadol and Alfredo Caballero were present.
respondent. Moreover, petitioner was occupying the premises In view of the absence of defendant Angelina Soriente or her authorized
together with her family, and she had maintained boarders for a representative, plaintiff’s (respondent’s) counsel moved that the case be
fee. Respondent prayed that petitioner be ordered to vacate the submitted for decision, and that he be given 15 days within which to submit
lot, surrender the possession thereof to respondent, pay monthly his position paper.
rent of ₱5,000.00 from June 2000 until she vacates the premises,  The trial court granted the motion of plaintiff’s (respondent’s)
and pay actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as litigation counsel and considered the case against defendant (petitioner)
expenses. Angelina Soriente submitted for decision in accordance with
Section 7 of the Rules on Summary Procedure. The judge ordered of justice, considered the Answer filed by Caballero in Civil Case No. 17974
the following to the petitioner: (i) vacate the subject premises and as the Answer also of petitioner since she affixed her signature thereto.
surrender the possession thereof to plaintiff; (ii) pay the amount of Considering that petitioner was sued in a separate case for ejectment from
PESOS: FIVE THOUSAND (₱5,000.00) per month as reasonable that of Caballero and Sadol, petitioner’s failure to appear in the preliminary
compensation for use and occupation of the premises as of June conference entitled respondent to the rendition of judgment by the trial
2000 until she finally vacates the subject premises; (iii) pay the court on the ejectment case filed against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case
amount [of] PESOS: THREE THOUSAND (₱3,000.00) as attorney’s No. 17973, in accordance with Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on
fees; and (iv) Pay the litigation expenses and cost of suit. Summary Procedure.
 Petitioner appealed to the RTC asserting that the lower court erred
in holding that this instant case subject of this appeal be decided in
accordance with Section 7 of the Rules on Summary Procedure.
 The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC.

Issue: Whether or not Section 7 of Rules on Summary Procedure shall be


applied in this case.

Ruling:
The Court notes that the ejectment case filed by respondent against
petitioner was docketed in the trial court as Civil Case No. 17973, the case
against Alfredo Caballero was docketed as Civil Case No. 17974, while the
case against Severina Sadol was docketed as Civil Case No. 17932. These
cases were consolidated by the trial court.
Under Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, if a sole
defendant shall fail to appear in the preliminary conference, the plaintiff
shall be entitled to judgment in accordance with Section 6 of the Rule, that
is, the court shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged
in the Complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein. However, "[t]his
Rule (Sec. 7) shall not apply where one of two or more defendants sued under
a common cause of action, who had pleaded a common defense, shall
appear at the preliminary conference." Petitioner claims that the preceding
provision applies to her as a defendant, since the ejectment cases were
consolidated by the trial court, and she and Caballero filed the same Answer
to the Complaint; hence, the trial court should not have rendered judgment
against her when she failed to appear in the preliminary conference.
The Court holds that the italicized provision above does not apply in the case
of petitioner, since she and Caballero were not co-defendants in the same
case. The ejectment case filed against petitioner was distinct from that of
Caballero, even if the trial court consolidated the cases and, in the interest
Sy Tiong vs. Sy Chim * Sy Chim vs. Sy Tiong complaint also prayed for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and
or preliminary injunction to restrain Sy Chim from calling a
Facts: stockholders' meeting on the ground of lack of authority.
 Juanita Tan, corporate treasurer of Sy Siy Ho & Sons, Inc. (the  The Spouses Sy averred that Sy Chim was a mere figurehead and
corporation), a family corporation doing business under the name Felicidad Chan Sy merely performed clerical functions, as it was Sy
and style Guan Yiac Hardware, submitted a letter to the Tiong Shiou and his spouse, Juanita Tan, who have been authorized
corporation’s Board of Directors (Board) statingthat Felicidad Chan by the corporation's by-laws to supervise, control and administer
Sy did not make cash deposits to any of the corporation’s banks corporate funds, and as such were the ones responsible for the
from 1 November 2001 to 31 January 2003, thus the total bank unaccounted funds. They assailed the meetings called by Sy Tiong
remittances for the past years were less than reflected in the Shiou on the grounds that the same were held without notice to
corporate financial statements, accounting books and records. them and without their participation, in violation of the by-laws.
Finally, Juanita Tan sought to be free from any responsibility over The Spouses Sy also pursued their counter-claim for moral and
all corporate funds. exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
 Consequently, the Board hired the accounting firm Banaria, Banaria  The Spouses Sy filed their Motion for Leave to File Third-Party
& Company. In its Report dated 5 April 2003, the accounting firm Complaint, praying that their attached Third Party Complaint be
attributed to the Spouses Sy P67,117,230.30 as unaccounted allowed and admitted against Sy Tiong Shiou and his spouse. In the
receipts and disbursements from 1994 to 2002. said third-party complaint, the Spouses Sy accused Sy Tiong Shiou
 A demand letter was subsequently served on the Spouses Sy on 15 and Juanita Tan as directly liable for the corporation's claim for
April 2003. On the same date, the children of the Spouses Sy misappropriating corporate funds.
allegedly stole from the corporation cash, postdated checks and  The trial court granted the motion for leave to file the third-party
other important documents. After the incident, the Spouses Sy complaint, and forthwith directed the issuance of summons against
allegedly transferred residence and ceased reporting to the Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan. Their counsel allegedly discovered
corporation. Thereupon, the corporation filed a criminal complaint that Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan were not furnished with the
for robbery against the Spouses Sy before the City Prosecutor's copies of several pleadings, as well as a court order, which resulted
Office of Manila. A search warrant was subsequently issued by the in their having been declared in default for failure to file their
Regional Trial Court. answer to the third-party complaint; thus, they opted not to file a
 Sy Tiong Shiou, corporate Vice President and General Manager, motion for reconsideration anymore and instead filed a petition
called a special meeting to fill up the positions vacated by the for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
Spouses Sy. Sy Tiong Shiou was subsequently elected as the new  Court of Appeals granted the petition of Sy Tion Shiou and Juanita
president and his wife, Juanita Tan, the new Vice President. Despite Tan and declared that a third party complaint is not allowed under
these developments, Sy Chim still caused the issuance of a Notice the Interim Rules of Procedure Covering Intra Corporate
of Stockholders meeting dated 11 June 2003 in his capacity as the Controversies under RA No. 8799 (Interim Rules), it not being
alleged corporate president. included in the exclusive enumeration of allowed pleadings under
 The corporation, through Romer S. Tan, filed its Amended Section 2, Rule 2 thereof.
Complaint for Accounting and Damages against the Spouses Sy
before the RTC Manila, praying for a complete and true accounting Issue: Whether or not third party complaint is authorized under Interim
of all the amounts paid to, received and earned by the company Rules
since 1993 and for the restitution of the said amount. The
Ruling: The allowance of third party complaint is warranted. liability of the third-party defendant to the plaintiff; or (c) the liability of the
third-party defendant to both the plaintiff and the defendant.
A statute, as in the rules in this case, must be read according to its spirit and On the other hand, in the third-party complaint, the Spouses Sy claim that it
intent. is Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan who had full and complete control of the
day-to day operations and complete control and custody of the funds of the
This spirit and intent can be gleaned from Sec. 3, Rule 1 of the Interim Rules, corporation, and hence they are the ones liable for any shortfall or
which reads: unaccounted difference of the corporation's cash account. Thus, Sy Tiong
Sec. 3. Construction. These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to Shiou and Juanita Tan should render a full, complete and true accounting of
promote their objective of securing a just, summary, speedy and all the amounts, proceeds, funds paid to, received and earned by the
inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. corporation since 1993, including the amount attributed to the Spouses Sy
Now, a third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with in the complaint for accounting and damages. In their prayer, the Spouses
leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action, called the third- Sy moved that Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan be declared as directly and
party defendant, for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other solely liable in respect of the corporation's claim for accounting and
relief, in respect of his opponent's claim. It is actually a complaint damages, and that in the event that they, the Spouses Sy, are adjudged liable
independent of, and separate and distinct from the plaintiff's complaint. In to the corporation, Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan be ordered to pay all
fact, were it not for Rule 6, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, such third-party amounts necessary to discharge their liability to the corporation by way of
complaint would have to be filed independently and separately from the indemnity or reimbursement.
original complaint by the defendant against the third-party defendant. The allegations in the third-party complaint impute direct liability on the
Jurisprudence is consistent in declaring that the purpose of a third-party part of Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan to the corporation for the very same
complaint is to avoid circuitry of action and unnecessary proliferation of law claims which the corporation interposed against the Spouses Sy. It is clear
suits and of disposing expeditiously in one litigation all the matters arising therefore that the Spouses Sy's third-party complaint is in respect of the
from one particular set of facts.70 plaintiff corporation's claims
It thus appears that the summary nature of the proceedings governed by
the Interim Rules, and the allowance of the filing of third-party complaints
is premised on one objective the expeditious disposition of cases. Moreover,
following the rule of liberal interpretation found in the Interim Rules, and
taking into consideration the suppletory application of the Rules of Court
under
Rule 1, Sec. of the Interim Rules, the Court finds that a third-party complaint
is not, and should not be prohibited in controversies governed by the
Interim Rules. The logic and justness of this conclusion are rendered beyond
question when it is considered that Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan are not
complete strangers to the litigation as in fact they are the moving spirit
behind the filing of the principal complaint for accounting and damages
against the Spouses Sy.
The defendant may implead another as third-party defendant: (a) on an
allegation of liability of the latter to the defendant for contribution,
indemnity, subrogation or any other relief; (b) on the ground of direct