[G.R. No. 135204. April 14, 2004.
] On February 11, 1993 at around 7:00 o’clock in the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
NARCISO RAMOS y MATIAS, RAMON SAN
ROQUE y DELA CRUZ, EULALIA SAN
ROQUE DE FRANCISCO y DELA CRUZ alias
LALING, WILLIAM RAMOS alias WILFREDO
RAMOS, (provisionally dismissed), and three (3)
other John Does, accused.
EULALIA SAN ROQUE DE FRANCISCO y
DELA CRUZ alias “LALING”, appellant.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J p:
Appeal by Eulalia San Roque de Francisco y dela
Cruz from the Decision 1 dated April 24, 1998 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 122, Caloocan
City, in Criminal Case No. C-46010, declaring her
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. She was also adjudged to pay
the heirs of the victim, P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity.
The Information 2 dated December 14, 1993 filed
against appellant and her co-accused Narciso
Ramos y Matias alias “Narcing”, Ramon San
Roque y dela Cruz, Wilfredo Ramos and three (3)
other John Does is quoted as follows:
“That on or about the 11th day of February 1993 in
Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused, with deliberate intent to kill,
conspiring together and mutually helping one
another, with treachery, evident premeditation and
abuse of superior strength, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously tie up on a
santol tree, stab, shoot and burn one WILLIAM
LOMIDA, resulting to the death of the latter.”
“CONTRARY TO LAW.”
Upon arraignment on December 15, 1994,
appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged.
The case against Wilfredo Ramos was
provisionally dismissed. The other accused,
Narciso Ramos and Ramon San Roque, have
remained at large.
During the trial, the prosecution presented the
following witnesses: Bernie Ambal, Saturnino
Rivera, Mariano Lomida and NBI Special
Investigator Laurence M. Nidera. Their
testimonies, woven together, established the
following facts:
evening, Bernie Ambal was standing outside his
store at 168 De Paro St., Caloocan City. Narciso
Ramos, Ramon San Roque and three (3) others
passed by. They proceeded to the house of William
Lomida and appellant, who were then live-in
partners. Narciso and Ramon stood by the door,
while one of their companions, holding an armalite,
positioned himself behind Narciso. Their other
companion, armed with a pistol, stayed on the
street, and the third one, also armed with a pistol,
went to the backyard. At a distance of ten (10)
meters away, Ambal saw Narciso pulling out his
.45 caliber pistol and knocking at the door.
Appellant then opened the door and Ramon went
inside.
Soon thereafter, William and appellant,
accompanied by Narciso, Ramon, and three (3)
others left the house. As they were passing by the
store, Ramon stopped and borrowed Ambal’s
jacket. At that instance, William suddenly held his
arm and whispered, “Samahan mo naman ako,
baka kung ano ang gawin sa akin ng mga ito, tutal
barkada mo naman si Ramon.” But Ambal was
scared and hesitant. William then requested him to
look for Saturnino Rivera.
The group headed to Narciso’s house, about ½
kilometer away from Ambal’s store. Unknown to
them, Ambal trailed behind. Hiding himself behind
a tree fifteen meters away, Ambal saw one of their
companions poking his armalite at William. Then,
they tied William to a santol tree. He was pleading
to appellant, but she simply turned her back.
Ramon stabbed William twice at the stomach with
a 29” bladed knife. Then Narciso shot William five
to seven times with his .45 caliber pistol. When
William was already dead, Ramon and Wilfredo
Ramos untied his body and brought it to a dumpsite
(of used tires) twenty five meters away. There they
placed William’s body atop a pile of rubber tires.
Ramon poured gasoline on his body and set it on
fire. Appellant and the others were closely
watching. After thirty minutes, appellant and the
men left. Ambal immediately reported the incident
to Saturnino Rivera. They proceeded to the
dumpsite where they saw the charred body.
According to Ambal, Ramon, appellant and
Narciso’s sister are brother and sisters.
Saturnino Rivera declared on the witness stand that
he considered William his best friend. William and
appellant frequently quarreled and sometimes, he
maltreated her. Saturnino corroborated Ambal’s
testimony that they went to the scene of the crime
and saw the charred body of William; and that they
reported the gruesome incident to the NBI.
TSacAE
Mariano Lomida testified that on February 19,
1993, or eight days after the incident, appellant
suddenly arrived in Atimonan, Quezon looking for
William. She told Mariano that William left their
house on February 9, 1993 without her knowledge.
She borrowed P3,000.00 from him (Mariano) with
a promise to pay on March 27, 1993. But since
then, he never saw her again. Mariano further
testified that due to the death of his son, he suffered
wounded feelings.
Special Investigator Laurence M. Nidera of the
NBI Anti-Organized Crime Division conducted the
investigation. He took the statements of Bernie
Ambal, Saturnino Rivera and Mariano Lomida.
Upon the arrest of appellant and Narciso Ramos by
the Capital Command (CAPCOM) of the
Philippine National Police, they were turned over
to the NBI.
After the prosecution rested its case, appellant filed
a demurrer to evidence but was denied. Meanwhile,
appellant jumped bail. On the basis of the evidence
presented by the prosecution, the case was
submitted for decision.
On April 24, 1998, the trial court rendered a
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered,
finding the accused Eulalia San Roque de
Francisco y dela Cruz alias ‘Laling’ GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as
charged in the Information and hereby sentences
her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
accessory penalties as provided by the law and to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of
P50,000.00.
“SO ORDERED.” 3
Appellant appeared during the promulgation of the
Decision.
In her brief, appellant raised the following
assignments of error:
“I
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE ACCUSED EULALIA SAN ROQUE
DE FRANCISCO Y DELA CRUZ alias LALING
CONSPIRED AND CONFEDERATED WITH
HER CO-ACCUSED IN PERPETRATING THE
CRIME OF MURDER, WHEN THE FACT OF
SUCH CONSPIRACY HAS NOT BEEN
SATISFACTORILY PROVEN TO EXIST
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT DURING
THE TRIAL OF THE CASE.
“II
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECIDING
THE CASE AGAINST THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT DESPITE THE WEAK
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION,
CONSIDERING THAT THE PROSECUTION
HAS FAILED TO PROVE ALL THE
NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME
AND THE CORPUS DELICTI.
“III
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF
MURDER BY THE MERE FACT THAT SHE
FAILED TO APPEAR AFTER THE CASE WAS
REVIVED SUCH FAILURE HAVING BEEN
APPRECIATED BY THE TRIAL COURT AS A
CLEAR INDICATION OF HER GUILT.
“IV
“THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN
ERROR IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY
OF THE CRIME OF MURDER ON THE BASIS
ALONE OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE SOLE
WITNESS IN THIS CASE, WITHOUT BEING
SUPPORTED THEREBY BY CONVINCING
EVIDENCE.”
We shall discuss the above assignments of error
jointly.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, provides:
“ART. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not
falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall
kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be
punished by reclusion temporal, 4 in its maximum
period to death, if committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior
strength, with the aim of armed men, or employing
means to weaken the defense or of means or
persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion,
shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or
assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by
means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any
other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated
in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake,
eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone,
epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly
augmenting the suffering of the victim, or
outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.”
In convicting the appellant of murder, the trial court
gave full faith and credence to the testimony of
prosecution lone eyewitness, Bernie Ambal. An
extract from his testimony is quoted hereunder:
“DIRECT EXAMINATION BY PROS.
MANANQUIL:
xxx xxx xxx
Q And in the evening of that date, could you recall
at about 7:00 in the evening of February 11, 1993,
if there was any unusual incident that happened?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please tell us what was that unusual
incident all about that you observed and noticed?
A Narciso Ramos, Ramon San Roque and three
men of Narciso Ramos got the victim and Eulalia
San Roque was also with the group.
Court:
Q Who was taken?
A The victim, your Honor.
Q What is the name of the victim?
A William Lomida was taken by these people.
Pros. Mananquil:
Q From where the accused picked up by these
people?
A Lomida was taken from the house where Eulalia
San Roque and William Lomida were living.
Q William Lomida is the victim in this case. Now,
how is he related to Eulalia San Roque?
A They are not married. They are live-in partners.
Q Now, how far from the store where this house of
William Lomida and Eulalia San Roque is located?
A More or less, ten meters away.
Q Is it located in front of the store, on the left side
or at the back of the store?
A The house of Eulalia is alongside of our house.
Q What part of your store where you were at the
time you saw these people picked up Lomida?
A I was outside the store standing.
Q After the accused picked up the victim, what
happened or where did they go?
A William Lomida, the victim, was brought to the
house of Narciso Ramos.
xxx xxx xxx
Court:
xxx xxx xxx
Q So the persons whom you saw got Lomida were
Narciso Ramos, Ramon San Roque, William
Ramos alias Wilfredo Ramos and three men of
Narciso Ramos and Eulalia San Roque?
A Yes, your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
Pros. Mananquil:
Q Now, you said that the accused brought William
Lomida to the house of Narciso Ramos. How far is
this house of Narciso Ramos located in relation to
the store, your store?
A About half kilometer away.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, when the victim was brought to the house
of Narciso Ramos, what happened next?
A The victim was tied to a santol tree.
Q Where is this santol tree where the victim
Lomida was tied? How far is this from the house of
Narciso Ramos?
Court:
Q Who tied the victim?
A Ramon San Roque, Wilfredo Ramos and the
three others unidentified men.
Pros. Mananquil:
Q After the accused tied William Lomida on a
santol tree, what happened next?
A Ramon San Roque stabbed William Lomida.
Q And with what kind of weapon was used by
Ramon San Roque?
A A bladed 29.
Q How long?
A I cannot say how long, sir.
Q How many times did you see Ramon San Roque
stabbed the victim with the 29?
A About two times, sir.
Q And did you see if Lomida was hit with that two
stab thrust?
A He was stabbed on the stomach.
Pros. Mananquil:
Q What happened after Ramon San Roque stabbed
the victim?
A The victim, William Lomida ‘nangisay’ and then
Narciso Ramos came near the victim and shot him.
Q How many times?
A About 5 to 7 shots.
Q And did you see if the victim was hit?
A It seems that the shots were directed to his face
because he was bloodied all over his face.
Q With what kind of firearm, if you remember?
A When the investigator showed me some guns, I
noticed that the one gun that Narciso Ramos used
was a .45 caliber.
Q Was it magazine or revolver?
A Magazine type.
Q After Narciso Ramos shot the victim 7 times on
the head, what happened next?
A When the group made sure that the victim was
dead already, they untied him and brought the body
where there was a pile of tires, piles of pieces of
rubber tires.
Q By the way, at the time when the victim was shot
by Narciso Ramos and stabbed by Ramon San
Roque, where was Willy Ramos, Narciso Ramos
and Eulalia San Roque?
A They were just there standing and afterwards,
turned their back around.
xxx xxx xxx
Prosecutor:
Q How far was Eulalia San Roque from Lomida
when Lomida was shot by Narciso Ramos and
stabbed by Ramon San Roque?
A This place up to that wall. Distance of about 8
meters.
Q And what was Eulalia doing at the time when the
victim was stabbed and shot?
A She turned her back and face the kitchen of the
house of Narciso Ramos.
Q Did she not try to intervene, this Eulalia, being
the live-in partner of William Lomida or did not
exert effort to pacify?
xxx xxx xxx
Prosecutor:
Q Just turning her back, what else that she did,
being live-in partner of William Lomida?
A She did not do anything anymore.
Q After the victim was stabbed and shot, he was
untied from the santol tree. Who untied him?
A It was Ramon San Roque, Willy Ramos and the
three others.
Q Willy refers to Wilfredo Ramos?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where was Eulalia at the time?
A She was still there standing.
Q Now, you said after the victim was untied from
the santol tree, he was brought to where pieces of
rubber tires were piled, recycled, how far is this
from the santol tree where the victim was tied?
A About 25 meters.
Q Now, after the accused brought the victim to the
piles of recycled tires, what happened next?
A Ramos San Roque got a can and poured
something on the body of the victim and then,
lighted it up.
Q What happened to the body of the victim,
William Lomida?
A The body was burned.
Q At the time when this Ramon San Roque poured
something on the body of the victim and then
lighted the same, where were Wilfredo Ramos,
Eulalia San Roque and Narciso Ramos and the
other unidentified persons?
A There were — They were there in front of the
burning body.
Q How long did the fire last?
A It took a long time, about more than one hour.
Q After one hour, what happened next?
A They left the place. The group left the place.
Court:
Q What happened to the tires?
A The tires also burned.
Q And where was the body of Lomida in relation
to the tires?
A The body of the victim was almost burned and
when we went back to the place, the shape of the
charred was still there. The same of human body.”
5
The foregoing testimony clearly shows that Ambal,
being then present at the locus of the crime, was
able to identify the appellant and the other accused
as the persons who killed William. Ambal narrated
the incidents leading to the victim's death with
clarity and lucidity that they could not have been
fabricated or concocted. The records show that
throughout the trial, he remained steadfast in his
testimony. There is thus no doubt in our minds that
this lone eyewitness is credible. While his
testimony is uncorroborated, still it sustains the
conviction of appellant. In People vs. Toyco, 6 we
held:
“It is axiomatic that truth is established not by the
number of witnesses but by the quality of their
testimonies. The testimony of a single witness if
positive and credible is sufficient to support a
conviction even in charge of murder.”
We are not persuaded by appellant’s contention
that the prosecution failed to adduce sufficient
evidence to establish the existence of conspiracy
among the accused. She vigorously contends that
she did not participate in the killing of the victim.
In determining the existence of conspiracy, it is not
necessary to show that all the conspirators actually
hit and killed the victim. 7 The presence of
conspiracy among the accused can be proven by
their conduct before, during or after the
commission of the crime showing that they acted in
unison with each other, evincing a common
purpose or design. There must be a showing that
appellant cooperated in the commission of the
offense, either morally, through advice,
encouragement or agreement or materially through
external acts indicating a manifest intent of
supplying aid in the perpetration of the crime in an
efficacious way. In such case, the act of one
becomes the act of all, and each of the accused will
thereby be deemed equally guilty of the crime
committed. 8
The series of events in this case convincingly show
that appellant and her co-accused acted in unison
and cooperated with each other in killing William
Lomida. Appellant was the one who opened the
door and allowed the other accused to enter the
house. She joined them in bringing the victim to the
residence of Narciso Ramos, her brother-in-law.
While her co-accused dragged the helpless victim,
tied him to a santol tree, stabbed him twice by a
bladed knife, and shot him 5 to 7 times, appellant
merely watched intensely. She even “turned her
back” as the lifeless body of the victim was being
burned. And after attaining their purpose, she fled
with the other accused.
The above circumstances clearly show the common
purpose and concerted efforts on the part of
appellant and her co-accused. We agree with the
trial court in concluding that their acts were
indications of a criminal conspiracy to commit the
crime of murder.
The only remaining question is whether the crime
was attended by aggravating circumstances.
The killing of the victim was attended by treachery.
Treachery exists “when the offender commits a
crime against persons, employing means, methods
or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specifically to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from any defense or
retaliatory act which the victim might make.” 9
Here, appellant and her co-accused tied William to
a santol tree before they stabbed and shot him to
death, thus, insuring the execution of the crime
without risk to themselves. Obviously, he could not
retaliate. This aggravating circumstance qualifies
the crime to murder.
However, we cannot sustain the trial court’s
appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of
superior strength as this is absorbed in treachery.
10
It bears stressing that this crime of murder was
committed on February 11, 1993. 11 The law
applicable is Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
then penalizing murder with reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to death. Under Article 64 (1)
of the Revised Penal Code, in cases in which the
penalties prescribed by law contain three periods,
whether it be a single divisible penalty or
composed of three different penalties, and there are
neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances
that attended the commission of the crime, the
penalty prescribed by law in its medium period
shall be imposed.
The range of the imposable penalty, i.e., reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, is 17
years, 4 months and 1 day to death. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance that
attended the commission of the crime, the
maximum period is the medium of the imposable
penalty, which is reclusion perpetua. The minimum
period is one degree lower, or prision mayor in its
maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
medium period, the range of which is 10 years and
1 day to 17 years and 4 months. The minimum
period of the penalty imposable is anywhere within
this range, or 10 years and 1 day. Hence, appellant
should be sentenced to 10 years and 1 day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to reclusion perpetua,
as maximum.
Regarding damages, the trial court correctly
awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the
victim’s heirs. When death occurs as a result of a
crime, appellant should be ordered to pay the heirs
of the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
without need of any evidence or proof of damages.
12
We likewise award temperate damages, in lieu of
actual damages. Here, the prosecution failed to
present any proof of the expenses incurred by the
victim’s heirs. However, as they actually incurred
funeral expenses, we award P25,000.00 by way of
temperate damages. 13
Anent moral damages, we award the victim’s heirs
the amount of P50,000.00. 14 For verily, moral
damages are not intended to enrich the victim’s
heirs; rather they are awarded to allow them to
obtain means for diversion that could serve to
alleviate their moral and psychological sufferings.
15 Mariano Lomida, victim’s father, equivocally
described how he suffered untold wounded feelings
for the loss of his son.
We also award the victim’s heirs P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages. This is pursuant to our ruling
in People vs. Catubig 16 that if a crime is
committed with an aggravating circumstance,
either qualifying or generic, an award of
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is justified.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated April
24, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 122,
Caloocan City, in Criminal Case No. C-46010, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the
sense that appellant EULALIA SAN ROQUE DE
FRANCISCO is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum,
to reclusion perpetua, as maximum. She is ordered
to pay the victim’s heirs (a) P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (b) P25,000.00 as temperate damages;
(c) P50,000.00 as moral damages and (d)
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED. AScTaD
||| (People v. De Francisco y Dela Cruz, G.R. No.
135204, [April 14, 2004], 471 PHIL 224-241)
[G.R. No. 157221. March 30, 2007.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
CESAR GALVEZ, appellant.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:
For review before this Court is the Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
18255 dated March 30, 2001, which affirmed the
Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Isabela, Basilan finding the accused-appellant
Cesar Galvez (Galvez), guilty of Murder, but
modifying the penalty of the RTC from a sentence
of "seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day as minimum to twenty (20) years as
maximum" to reclusion perpetua.
The facts are as follows:
At around 11 o'clock in the evening of July 27,
1991, Danilo Perez, Rosalio Enojarda, Noel Cugal,
Ricardo Francisco and Wilfredo Rellios, took a
break from making copra to eat leftover dinner
inside the copra kiln in the farm of Perez in
Matarling, Lantawan, Basilan. When Enojarda
stood up from the circle where they were eating to
drink water, shots rang out and Enojarda fell to the
ground shouting "Dan ya tupa comigo" (Dan, I am
hit). The rest of the group took cover, crawling to
different directions. After the attack, Rellios
reported the incident to the barangay captain and
they brought Enojarda's dead body to his family. 3
HcTEaA
On May 28, 1992, an Information was filed against
Cesar Galvez (Galvez), a member of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) for Murder, which reads:
That on or about the 27th day of July, 1991, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, viz.
at Matarling, Municipality of Lantawan, Province
of Basilan, Philippines, the above named accused,
armed with an M16 armalite rifle, with treachery
and evident premeditation, and with intent to kill,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and shoot one Rosalio
Enojarda with the said M16 armalite rifle, thereby
inflicting gunshot wound on the body of the latter
which caused his death. 4 DSATCI
The prosecution presented evidence showing that:
after Enojarda fell, the rest of the group took cover
and Rellios while in a crawling position, saw
Galvez about 5 meters away holding an armalite
rifle and firing at their direction; Rellios also saw
that Galvez had companions but did not recognize
them as well as the firearms they carried because
they were approximately nine meters away; 5
Perez, also crawled and hid in the bushes about 5
meters away; when the firing stopped, one of the
attackers passed by about two meters from where
Perez was hiding and because the moon was bright,
he recognized Galvez, his cousin, who was wearing
a fatigue uniform and armed with an armalite rifle;
he also saw that Galvez had three armed
companions but did not recognize them nor the
firearms they were carrying because they were
about nine meters from Galvez. 6
Galvez put up denial and alibi as his defenses. He
testified that he was staying at his father-in-law's
house on July 27, 1991 and drank tuba at around
10:30 p.m. at a nearby store. He went home and
slept with his wife soon after. 7 To corroborate his
testimony, he presented SPO2 Danilo Ramillano, a
visitor at his father-in-law's house and Wilhelmina
Espinosa, a sari-sari store owner. 8 He also
presented Athena Elisa Anderson, Document
Examiner and Forensic Analyst of the PNP Crime
Laboratory of Region 9, Zamboanga City, who
testified that the paraffin test conducted on both his
hands showed that there was no nitrate present; 9
and Police Inspector Lemuel Caser, Ballistic
Examiner, who testified that the shells found at the
scene of the crime were not fired from the firearm
issued to Galvez. 10 ESCTaA
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated
February 27, 1995 with the following findings:
From the foregoing facts as well as from the
records of this case, this Court finds the following
facts to be undisputable, to wit:
1) That at the late night of July 27, 1991, Rosalio
Enojarda, while making copra in the coconut land
of Danilo Perez at Matarling, Lantawan, Basilan,
was shot to death by one of the four (4) men. How
many gunshot wounds he suffered and what part of
his body was hit by the gunfire, the evidence is
found wanting.
2) That a day before the incident and on the date of
the incident which was July 27, 1991, the accused
Cesar Galvez has not fired any firearms.
xxx xxx xxx
3) That the five (5) empty shells of armalite rifle. .
. allegedly found by Barangay Captain Inocente
Manicap from the scene of the crime and later
turned over to PFC Samuel Omoso, the Police
Investigator of this case, did not come from the
M16 armalite rifle with Serial No. 117460, the gun
issued to the accused Cesar Galvez. (citations
omitted). 11 ETDHaC
Further, the trial court found that the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses, Rellios and Perez, were
credible and trustworthy as there was no motive to
perjure themselves; that the testimony of defense
witness SPO2 Ramillano was full of loopholes; and
that the testimony of the store owner was
insufficient to disprove the presence of the accused
at the scene of the crime. 12
The RTC concluded: ACcDEa
. . . since this accused, Cesar Galvez, has not fired
his M16 armalite rifle on that night of July 27,
1991, and those five (5) empty shells were not fired
from his armalite, then . . . the bullet that hit and
instantly killed Rosalio Enojarda on that night of
July 27, 1991 at the copra kiln of Danilo Perez
came from the gun fired by any of the three (3)
unidentified persons who were the companions of
the accused, Cesar Galvez at the night of the
incident . . . . 13 (emphasis supplied)
Despite the fact that the Information failed to allege
conspiracy and the aggravating circumstances of
nocturnity and armed band, the RTC still convicted
Galvez of murder based on conspiracy since
Galvez was seen by two witnesses at the scene of
the crime carrying a firearm together with his
unidentified armed companions. 14 The trial court
also held that the offer of Galvez to have the case
settled out of court is an indication of his guilt. 15
cTSDAH
The RTC then disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, all factual and circumstantial
matters surrounding the commission of the crime,
being carefully and meticulously examined and
studied, this Court finds the accused SPO2 Cesar
Galvez, a member of the Philippine National Police
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal in
committing the crime of Murder as alleged in the
Information and which crime is defined and
penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, but considering his good military records
after the commission of the crime, hereby
sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of
SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS
and ONE (1) DAY as minimum, to TWENTY (20)
YEARS as maximum, which is the minimum
period of Reclusion Temporal in its maximum
period to death. And to indemnify the heirs of the
late Rosalio Enojarda, the amount of P50,000.00 as
moral damages and to pay the Court the amount of
P500.00 as judicial costs and other accessory
penalties attached to the penalty of Reclusion
Temporal.
And further this accused is hereby stripped of all
the military ranks he now hold [sic] in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines.
And upon the promulgation of this decision, the
accused shall immediately be committed to the
Provincial Jail where the Provincial Warden is
directed to immediately transfer him to the
National Penitentiary at San Ramon Penal Colony
at Zamboanga City for commitment thereat.
And the property bail bond he has posted for his
provisional liberty is hereby ordered cancelled and
its pertinent papers returned, upon receipt to the
bondsman. 16 ECSHAD
Galvez appealed the case to the CA, docketed as
CA-G.R. CR No. 18255, which rendered its
Decision on March 30, 2001 affirming his guilt but
modifying the penalty to be imposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATION that
appellant CESAR GALVEZ is hereby sentenced to
reclusion perpetua, the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects. 17
DIEACH
The CA held that the RTC erred in holding Galvez
criminally liable based on conspiracy when such
fact was not alleged in the Information. However,
it still found Galvez guilty of Murder. 18 The CA
reasoned that: the negative results of the paraffin
and ballistic tests do not negate the possibility that
Galvez used another gun in shooting the victim; the
eyewitnesses of the prosecution identified Galvez
as the perpetrator if not one of the perpetrators of
the crime; alibi, which was offered by Galvez, is
the weakest of all defenses and cannot prevail over
positive identification; the offer of Galvez to the
wife of the victim to have the case settled is also a
strong indication of Galvez's culpability; and
treachery was adequately established as the attack
was sudden, unexpected and did not accord the
victim an opportunity to defend himself. 19 The
CA further held that since there was no mitigating
circumstance, the proper penalty should be
reclusion perpetua. 20
Galvez filed a Motion for Reconsideration 21
which the CA denied in its Resolution dated
August 21, 2001, stating that it was a mere rehash
of the arguments already addressed in the decision.
22 ITSaHC
The entire records of the case were forwarded to
this Court pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure. On April 8, 2003, the
Court issued a Resolution 23 accepting the case;
committing the accused to the Davao Prison and
Penal Farm; and informing the accused and the
Solicitor General that they may file additional
briefs with this Court. 24
In his Appellant's Brief, Galvez argued that the trial
court erred:
I THE INFORMATION, IN EFFECT DENYING
. . . IN HOLDING THAT (HE) THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT IS LIABLE FOR MURDER FOR
THE DEATH OF ROSALIO ENOJARDA ON
JULY 27, 1991 DESPITE ITS EXPRESS
FINDINGS THAT THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT DID NOT FIRE HIS RIFLE ON
THAT FATAL NIGHT AND THAT THE
BULLET THAT HIT AND KILLED ROSALIO
ENOJARDA COULD HAVE BEEN FIRED
FROM ANY OF THE GUNS OR RIFLES
BELONGING TO ANY OF THE THREE
UNIDENTIFIED PERSONS WHO WERE NOT
CHARGED NOR INDICTED TOGETHER WITH
THE ACCUSED IN THE SAME CRIMINAL
INFORMATION IN QUESTION. CSHcDT
II
. . . IN HOLDING THAT DANILO PEREZ AND
WILFREDO RELLIOS, WHILE IN CRAWLING
POSITION WHOSE CHESTS WERE ALMOST
TOUCHING THE GROUND AND UNDER
CONDITIONS DESCRIBED BY THEM, HAD
SEEN THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ARMED
WITH M16 ARMALITE RIFLE IN THE
NIGHTTIME, OF 27 JULY 1991 DESPITE
DANILO PEREZ' [sic] POSITIVE ASSERTION
THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE OF HIS (SIC) TO
IDENTIFY THE ACCUSED WHEN ASKED TO
DEMONSTRATE IN OPEN COURT IN THE
MANNER AND CIRCUMSTANCE
NARRATED BY HIM. 25
In his Supplemental Appellant's Brief, Galvez
further claims that it was seriously erroneous:
AEITDH
I.
. . . TO CONCLUDE THAT THERE WAS
CONSPIRACY BETWEEN ACCUSED-
APPELLANT AND THE OTHER
MALEFACTORS NOT INCLUDED IN THE
PRESENT CASE.
II.
. . . TO BE SELECTIVE IN APPRECIATING
MATTERS NOT INCLUDED IN THE
INFORMATION, MORE SO THE THEORY OF
CONSPIRACY AGAINST ACCUSED-
APPELLANT, THERE BEING NO OTHER
PERSONS CHARGED IN THE PRESENT CASE.
III.
. . . TO FIND THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY OF MURDER UNDER
CIRCUMSTANCES FAR DIFFERENT FROM
ACCUSED-APPELLANT [THE] RIGHT TO BE
INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE
OF ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM. cDHAES
IV.
. . . TO GIVE CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE TWO ALLEGED EYE
WITNESSES WHOSE DECLARATIONS WERE
CLEARLY BELIED DURING THEIR CROSS
EXAMINATION.
V.
. . . NOT TO CONSIDER THE DEFENSE OF
ALIBI OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
VI.
. . . TO MAKE UNSUBSTANTIATED,
BASELESS PRESUMPTIONS AND
CONCLUSIONS IN A CRIMINAL CASE
WHERE THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED
IS PRESUMED. 26
Galvez also filed an Addendum to Supplemental
Appellant's Brief adding that:
VII
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE
RESULTS OF THE PARAFFIN AND
BALLISTIC TESTS AND IN ASSUMING THAT
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT SHOT THE
DECEASED USING AN M16 RIFLE OTHER
THAN THE ONE ISSUED TO HIM. 27
Galvez contends that: the degree of proof required
in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt
because an accused is always presumed to be
innocent unless proven otherwise; 28 when
circumstances yield two or more inferences, one of
which is consistent with the presumption of
innocence and the other compatible with the
finding of guilt, the court must side with that which
will acquit the accused; in this case, the RTC found
undisputed the fact that he did not shoot the victim
on the night of July 27, 1991 and the firearm that
was used in killing the victim was owned and
possessed by another man, as shown by the
negative results of the paraffin and ballistic tests;
the statement of Danilo Perez that he saw the
accused on the night of July 27, 1991 is not credible
since Perez was in a crawling position with his
chest almost touching the ground at the time he
allegedly saw the accused; Judge Memoracion,
who penned the decision could not have assessed
the demeanor of the prosecution witnesses while
testifying as it was another judge who heard and
received their testimonies; 29 the two defense
witnesses, who corroborated his (Galvez's) alibi are
unbiased and unrelated to him; while alibi is the
weakest defense, it is the only defense if it is the
truth and it assumes importance where the
prosecution evidence is weak; the statement of the
trial court that the offer of the accused to have the
case extra-judicially settled is a tacit admission of
guilt is also unsubstantiated as there is nothing in
the records that shows that the accused made an
offer to settle the case out of court. 30
For the plaintiff-appellee, the Solicitor General
argued that: the paraffin test and the ballistic
examination are not conclusive proof that Galvez
did not fire a gun during the incident; in this case,
the paraffin test was conducted on Galvez two days
from the date of the incident; Galvez was also
positively identified by the prosecution witnesses
as one of four armed men who attacked them
during the incident; Perez clarified that while he
was in a crawling position, he was looking upward,
thus, he was able to identify Galvez; between
Galvez's alibi and the positive declarations of
witnesses whose testimonies have not been assailed
nor discredited by improper motive, the latter
deserves greater credence; the trial court correctly
convicted Galvez of murder as there was treachery
since the victim was not in a position to defend
himself from the attack of the accused; the proper
penalty should be reclusion perpetua under Art.
248 of the Revised Penal Code as there was no
mitigating circumstance; 31 Galvez is also liable
for temperate damages of P25,000.00 since
pecuniary loss has been suffered although its exact
amount could not be determined, and exemplary
damages of P25,000.00 due to the presence of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery; the amount
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity should also be
awarded to the heirs of the victim together with the
P50,000.00 awarded by the trial court for moral
damages. 32
After reviewing the entire records of the case, the
Court resolves to acquit Galvez.
Conspiracy must be alleged in the information in
order that an accused may be held liable for the acts
of his co-accused. In the absence of any averment
of conspiracy in the information, an accused can
only be made liable for the acts committed by him
alone and such criminal responsibility is individual
and not collective. 33
As explained in People v. Tampis, 34
The rule is that conspiracy must be alleged, not
merely inferred, in the information. Absence of a
particular statement in the accusatory portion of the
charge sheet concerning any definitive act
constituting conspiracy renders the indictment
insufficient to hold one accused liable for the
individual acts of his co-accused. Thus, each of
them would be held accountable only for their
respective participation in the commission of the
offense. 35
The rationale for this rule has long been settled. In
People v. Quitlong, the Court explained:
Overwhelming, such as it may have been thought
of by the trial court, evidence of conspiracy is not
enough for an accused to bear and respond to all its
grave legal consequences; it is equally essential
that such accused has been apprised when the
charge is made conformably with prevailing
substantive and procedural requirements. Article
III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution, in
particular, mandates that no person shall be held
answerable for a criminal offense without due
process of law and that in all criminal prosecutions
the accused shall first be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. The right to be
informed of any such indictment is likewise
explicit in procedural rules. . . . IDEScC
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital
of fact which, if not excepted from or objected to
during trial, may be corrected or supplied by
competent proof, an allegation, however, of
conspiracy, or one that would impute criminal
liability to an accused for the act of another or
others, is indispensable in order to hold such
person, regardless of the nature and extent of his
own participation, equally guilty with the other or
others in the commission of the crime. Where
conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated,
the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony
becomes of secondary importance, the act of one
being imputable to all the others. Verily, an
accused must know from the information whether
he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his
acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.
36
Since conspiracy was not alleged in the
Information in this case, it is imperative that the
prosecution prove Galvez's direct participation in
the killing of the victim. This, the prosecution
failed to do.
The CA, in holding Galvez guilty of Murder, gave
weight to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses Rellios and Perez that they saw Galvez
fire an armalite rifle in their direction on the night
in question. The positive identification of these
witnesses, the CA ruled, has more weight than the
negative results of the paraffin and ballistic tests.
37
We disagree.
The prosecution witnesses never actually saw
Galvez shoot the victim. While this Court does not
ordinarily interfere with the findings of the lower
courts on the trustworthiness of witnesses, when
there appears on the records, however, facts and
circumstances of real weight which might have
been overlooked or misapprehended, this Court
cannot shirk from its duty to render the law and
apply justice. 38
During his direct examination, Perez testified as
follows:
Q: While you were eating your merienda at about
11:00 o'clock in the evening on July 27, 1991 what
happened?
A: Suddenly we heard shots and we could not
determine where it came from and one of our
companion was hit. CETDHA
Q: Do you know who was that companion of yours
who was hit?
A: Yes, Rosalio Enojarda.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: After you heard the gun fire which hit your
companion Rosalio Enojarda, what did you do?
A: I dropped and crawled, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And then did the gunfire stop after you hid
yourself among the grasses?
A: Yes sir.
Q: What happened after the firings stopped, when
you were already hiding among the grasses?
A: I recognized the culprit sir because he passed by
where I was hiding about two meters from me.
Q: You said you recognized the culprit when he
passed by where you were hiding, who was that
culprit?
A: Cesar Galvez, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
After you heard the shots how long after you saw
him passed by?
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Was it 30 minutes after?
xxx xxx xxx
A: In my own estimate about 20 to 25 minutes.
Q: In other words more or less you saw him
(accused) passed by together with his companions
around 20 to 25 minutes after you heard the shots,
is that what you want to impress this Court?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Did you see him really shoot?
A: No, Your Honor. 39 (Emphasis supplied)
During his cross-examination, Perez further
testified:
Q: So, when you said the explosions came from
different directions, was not true?
A: We heard shots but we do not know where it
came from, what we did was to drop and crawl.
cHCIEA
COURT: (To the witness)
You did not see the one firing?
Yes, your Honor, because I crawled.
Q: And how many minutes after you heard firings
you saw this accused and companions pass by?
A: I am not sure Your Honor about the exact time
but I think it has about 20 to 25 minutes. 40
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Mr. Perez, you did not see the accused shot at
Mr. Enojarda?
A: No sir. 41 (Emphasis supplied).
Rellios also admitted during his cross-examination
the following:
Q: You did not actually see Mr. Galvez shoot at Mr.
Enojarda?
A: No sir. aTSEcA
COURT: (To the witness)
In other words you were only presuming that it was
him.
A: No, Your Honor, I saw him.
ATTY. MARTIN: (Continuing)
Did you understand the question when you were
asked by the Court. Since you did not actually see
Mr. Galvez shoot at the victim, and reportedly you
saw him only five minutes thereafter, you only
presume Mr. Galvez to have shoot Mr. Enojarda?
A: Yes sir. 42 (Emphasis supplied) CDAHaE
Based on the above testimonies, the following
circumstances appear to have been established: (1)
at around 11 p.m., Enojarda, Rellios, Perez, and
their two companions were eating merienda near
the copra kiln when they were sprayed with
gunfire; (2) Enojarda was fatally hit and fell on the
ground; (3) Rellios, Perez and their two
companions ducked and crawled to seek cover; (4)
about five minutes after the first burst of gunfire,
Galvez, armed with an M16 armalite rifle, was seen
firing at Rellios, Perez and their two companions as
well as in the direction of the copra kiln; and (5)
about 20 to 25 minutes after the first burst of
gunfire, Galvez was again seen clad in fatigue
uniform and carrying an M16 armalite rifle along
with three armed companions, after which, their
group left the scene of the crime.
However, these circumstances are not sufficient to
establish the guilt of Galvez beyond reasonable
doubt.
It is well to emphasize the four basic guidelines that
must be observed in assaying the probative value
of circumstantial evidence:
. . . (a) It should be acted upon with caution; (b) All
the essential facts must be consistent with the
hypothesis of guilt; (c) The facts must exclude
every other theory but that of guilt of the accused;
and, (d) The facts must establish with certainty the
guilt of the accused as to convince beyond
reasonable doubt that he was the perpetrator of the
offense. The peculiarity of circumstantial evidence
is that the series of events pointing to the
commission of a felony is appreciated not singly
but collectively. The guilt of the accused cannot be
deduced from scrutinizing just one (1) particular
piece of evidence. It is more like a puzzle which
when put together reveals a convincing picture
pointing to the conclusion that the accused is the
author of the crime. 43
as well as the doctrines enunciated by the Court that
the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable
doubt every circumstance essential to the guilt of
the accused; 44 and that every circumstance or
doubt favoring the innocence of the accused must
be duly taken into account. 45 CTcSAE
The "incriminating circumstances" enumerated
above are mainly based on the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses Perez and Rellios. A perusal
of said testimonies reveals, however, other
circumstances that should be appreciated in favor
of Galvez, to wit:
(a) Both Perez and Rellios testified that they saw
Galvez with three other armed companions minutes
after Enojarda was shot but they did not testify that
they saw him in the vicinity before the shooting of
Enojarda. 46
(b) Perez testified that only one shot hit Enojarda.
47
(c) Perez testified that he did not see Galvez shoot
at Enojarda and that he merely assumed that Galvez
was the one who shot the victim when the latter
passed by him. 48 Rellios testified that he only
presumed that Galvez shot at Enojarda. 49 DHIaTS
(d) Perez testified that he had no misunderstanding
with Galvez 50 and that he does not know any
motive why Enojarda was killed. 51
In considering both favorable and "incriminating"
circumstances for or against Galvez, the following
must always be borne in mind: that the Information
charged Galvez as the sole perpetrator of the crime
of Murder; that the three other armed men were not
included as John Does; and that there was no
allegation of conspiracy in the Information.
DAaIHT
Consequently, it was incumbent upon the
prosecution to prove that Galvez was the sole
author of the shot that killed Enojarda. The
"incriminating circumstances" do not point to
Galvez as the sole perpetrator of the crime. The
presence of the three armed men raises the
probability that any one of those men inflicted the
fatal shot. It must be stressed that the prosecution
witnesses merely presumed that it was Galvez who
shot Enojarda.
Moreover, the fact that Galvez was seen minutes
after Enojarda was shot does not sufficiently
establish that Galvez was the one who shot
Enojarda. There is no evidence that Galvez was
seen or was together with the three other armed
men when Enojarda was hit. There is a missing link
that precludes the Court from concluding that it
was Galvez who shot Enojarda. 52 It cannot be said
therefore that there was positive identification of
Galvez through circumstantial evidence. CaDATc
In People v. Comendador, 53 the Court held:
While no general rule can be laid down as to the
quantity of circumstantial evidence which will
suffice in a given case, all the circumstances proved
must be consistent with each other, consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the
same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he
is innocent, and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt. The circumstances
proved should constitute an unbroken chain which
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion which
points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others
as the guilty person. 54 (Emphasis supplied)
And in Dela Cruz v. People, 55 the Court stressed,
thus:
To emphasize, the foundation of the ruling of
acquittal is reasonable doubt, which simply means
that the prosecution's evidence was not sufficient to
sustain the guilt of the accused-petitioner beyond
the point of moral certainty — certainty that
convinces and satisfies the reason and the
conscience of those who are to act upon it. It is such
proof to the satisfaction of the court, keeping in
mind the presumption of innocence, as precludes
every reasonable hypothesis except that which it is
given to support it. An acquittal based on
reasonable doubt will prosper even though the
accused's innocence may be doubted, for a criminal
conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of
the prosecution and not on the weakness of the
defense. And, if the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent
with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the
test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to
support a conviction, and, thus, that which is
favorable to the accused should be considered. 56
(Emphasis supplied). IaEHSD
And when the evidence on the commission of the
crime is purely circumstantial or inconclusive,
motive is vital. As held in Crisostomo v.
Sandiganbayan, 57
Motive is generally held to be immaterial because
it is not an element of the crime. However, motive
becomes important when the evidence on the
commission of the crime is purely circumstantial or
inconclusive. Motive is thus vital in this case. 58
In this case, prosecution witness Perez testified that
he did not know of any motive on the part of Galvez
to kill Enojarda. 59 This is a circumstance that
should be taken in favor of Galvez.
In line with the ruling of the Court in Torralba v.
People, 60 to wit:
Time and again, this Court has faithfully observed
and given effect to the constitutional presumption
of innocence which can only be overcome by
contrary proof beyond reasonable doubt — one
which requires moral certainty, a certainty that
convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience
of those who are to act upon it. As we have so stated
in the past —
Accusation is not, according to the fundamental
law, synonymous with guilt, the prosecution must
overthrow the presumption of innocence with proof
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To meet this
standard, there is need for the most careful scrutiny
of the testimony of the State, both oral and
documentary, independently of whatever defense is
offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and
the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion
that the crime had been committed precisely by the
person on trial under such an exacting test should
the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus
required that every circumstance favoring
innocence be duly taken into account. The proof
against him must survive the test of reason; the
strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway
judgment. 61 (Emphasis supplied)
There could not be any doubt that the facts, as
established by the circumstantial evidence, failed
to exclude the possibility that another person shot
Enojarda. There were three other armed men, any
one of whom could be the culprit.
When a crime is committed, it is the duty of the
prosecution to prove the identity of the perpetrator
of the crime beyond reasonable doubt for there can
be no conviction even if the commission of the
crime is established. 62 Indeed, the State, aside
from showing the existence of a crime, has the
burden of correctly identifying the author of such
crime. 63 Both facts must be proved by the State
beyond reasonable doubt on the strength of its
evidence and without solace from the weakness of
the defense. 64 HASDcC
Galvez correctly pointed out in his supplemental
brief before this Court that it was erroneous for the
CA to have affirmed the RTC ruling that Galvez's
offer to the victim's wife to settle the case is a tacit
admission of guilt. 65
While the Court agrees that in criminal cases, an
offer of compromise by the accused may be
received in evidence as an implied admission of
guilt, 66 such principle is not applicable in this
case. DHCSTa
The only basis of the RTC in concluding that
Galvez made on offer of compromise, 67 is the
March 3, 1993 Order of the RTC which reads as
follows:
Considering that the accused as well as his
Counsel, Atty. Bienvenido G. Martin appeared in
Court together with Rosaflor Enojarda, the wife of
the victim, and manifested that there is a possibility
of understanding and settlement between the
parties, the above-entitled case is hereby reset for
new assignment. 68 aITECA
Galvez's supposed offer of compromise was not
formally offered and admitted as evidence during
the trial. The victim's widow or any prosecution
witness did not testify on any offer of compromise
made by Galvez. We have held that when the
evidence on the alleged offer of compromise is
amorphous, the same shall not benefit the
prosecution in its case against the accused. 69
The Court also recognizes that there may be
instances when an offer of compromise will not
amount to an admission of guilt. Thus, in People v.
Godoy, 70 the Court pronounced that: SDIACc
. . . In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is
generally admissible as evidence against the party
making it. It is a legal maxim, which assuredly
constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize,
that in the matter of public crimes which directly
affect the public interest, no compromise whatever
may be entered into as regards the penal action. It
has long been held, however, that in such cases the
accused is permitted to show that the offer was not
made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to
avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for
some other reason which would justify a claim by
the accused that the offer to compromise was not in
truth an admission of guilt or an attempt to avoid
the legal consequences which would ordinarily
ensue therefrom. 71 (Emphasis supplied).
As the alleged offer of compromise was not
presented in court, it was not shown that Galvez
indeed made such an offer under the consciousness
of guilt. Galvez was not given the opportunity to
explain that it was given for some other reason that
would justify a claim that it was not an admission
of guilt or an attempt to avoid its legal
consequences.
In this case, the presumption of innocence of
Galvez prevails over the alleged implied admission
of guilt. In Godoy, the Court, in acquitting the
accused, explained that:
It frequently happens that in a particular case two
or more presumptions are involved. Sometimes the
presumptions conflict, one tending to demonstrate
the guilt of the accused and the other his innocence.
In such case, it is necessary to examine the basis for
each presumption and determine what logical or
social basis exists for each presumption, and then
determine which should be regarded as the more
important and entitled to prevail over the other. It
must, however, be remembered that the existence
of a presumption indicating his guilt does not in
itself destroy the presumption against innocence
unless the inculpating presumption, together with
all the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or
explanation, is sufficient to overcome the
presumption of innocence by proving the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until
the defendant's guilt is shown in this manner, the
presumption of innocence continues. 72 HaIATC
xxx xxx xxx
The presumption of innocence, . . . is founded upon
the first principles of justice, and is not a mere form
but a substantial part of the law. It is not overcome
by mere suspicion or conjecture; a probability that
the defendant committed the crime; nor by the fact
that he had the opportunity to do so. Its purpose is
to balance the scales in what would otherwise be an
uneven contest between the lone individual pitted
against the People and all the resources at their
command. Its inexorable mandate is that, for all the
authority and influence of the prosecution, the
accused must be acquitted and set free if his guilt
cannot be proved beyond the whisper of a doubt.
This is in consonance with the rule that conflicts in
evidence must be resolved upon the theory of
innocence rather than upon a theory of guilt when
it is possible to do so. 73
Thus, taking into account all the circumstances in
favor of Galvez, there could not be a moral
certainty as to the guilt of Galvez. The prosecution
has not proven the guilt of Galvez beyond
reasonable doubt. CITSAc
It may be pointed out that the following
circumstances support the conviction of Galvez as
charged:
(a) the negative findings of the paraffin and
ballistic tests do not prove that Galvez did not fire
a gun;
(b) Galvez was a police officer who could have
justified his presence at the scene of the crime with
a lawful purpose, yet he put up alibi which is
inherently weak;
(c) Galvez did not present his wife and father-in-
law as witnesses to corroborate his story that he
was at their house on the night in question; and
(d) Galvez refused three times to give a statement
to the investigating police officer.
These circumstances do not help the prosecution in
the discharge of its duty to prove the guilt of Galvez
beyond reasonable doubt.
It is true that a negative finding in a paraffin test is
not a conclusive proof that one has not fired a gun,
as held by this Court in People v. Pagal 74 and
People v. Teehankee 75 which were cited by the
CA in its Decision, since it is possible for a person
to fire a gun and yet bear no traces of nitrate or
gunpowder as when the hands are bathed in
perspiration or washed afterwards. 76 Such
principle, however, has no bearing in the present
case. In the Pagal and Teehankee cases, the Court
concluded that a negative finding does not prove
that the accused therein had not fired a gun because
the accused were positively identified by witnesses
as having shot their victims, unlike in the case at
hand where Galvez is not positively identified by
direct or circumstantial evidence that he shot
Enojarda. If the principle should be given any
weight at all, it should be in favor of Galvez, that
is, considering that he is not positively identified,
then, the negative results of the paraffin test bolster
his claim that he did not shoot Enojarda, and not
the other way around.
The argument that the negative result of the
ballistic examination does not prove that Galvez
did not fire a gun during the incident as it was
possible that he used another gun, should also be
struck down. It is the prosecution which has the
burden of showing that Galvez used a firearm other
than the one issued to him and that such firearm,
which Galvez used, was the one that killed the
victim. It is not for Galvez to prove the opposite of
the possibility adverted to by the prosecution as it
is the prosecution which must prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and not for him to prove
his innocence.
Thus, while it is true that the negative results of the
paraffin and ballistic tests do not conclusively
prove that Galvez did not shoot the victim, the
same negative results cannot be used as
circumstantial evidence against Galvez to prove
that he shot Enojarda. To do otherwise would
violate the basic precepts of criminal law which
presumes the innocence of the accused. Every
circumstance favoring an accused's innocence must
be duly taken into account, the proof against him
must survive the test of reason, and the strongest
suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.
77 acTDCI
That Galvez was a police officer who could have
justified his presence at the scene of the crime with
a lawful purpose, yet he put up an alibi which is
inherently weak; and that Galvez did not present
his wife and father-in-law as witnesses to
corroborate his story that he was at their house on
the night in question, pertain to the weakness of
Galvez's alibi which may cast doubt on his
innocence. However, these circumstances do not
prove beyond reasonable doubt Galvez's guilt.
Although an accused must satisfactorily prove his
alibi, the burden in criminal cases still rests on the
prosecution to prove the accused's guilt. The
prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its own
weight and cannot draw strength from the
weakness of the defense. Unless the prosecution
overturns the constitutional presumption of
innocence of an accused by competent and credible
evidence proving his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, the presumption remains. 78 Courts must
judge the guilt or innocence of the accused based
on facts and not on mere conjectures,
presumptions, or suspicions. 79
That Galvez refused three times to give a statement
to the investigating police officer is a prerogative
given to the accused and should not be given
evidentiary value to establish his guilt. In People v.
Saavedra, 80 the Court held that an accused has the
right to remain silent and his silence should not be
construed as an admission of guilt. HTIEaS
Even if the defense of the appellant may be weak,
the same is inconsequential if, in the first place, the
prosecution failed to discharge the onus of his
identity and culpability. 81 Conviction must be
based on the strength of the prosecution and not on
the weakness of the defense, i.e., the obligation is
upon the shoulders of the prosecution to prove the
guilt of the accused and not the accused to prove
his innocence. 82 The prosecution's job is to prove
that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
83 Thus, when the evidence for the prosecution is
insufficient to sustain a conviction, it must be
rejected and the accused absolved and released at
once. 84
Time and again, the Court has pronounced that the
great goal of our criminal law and procedure is not
to send people to jail but to render justice. 85 Under
our criminal justice system, the overriding
consideration is not whether the court doubts the
innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains
reasonable doubt as to his guilt. 86 SDIaHE
It is indeed lamentable that because of the lapses of
the Prosecution, justice could not be rendered in
this case for the untimely death of Enojarda.
Justice, however, would also not be served with the
conviction of the herein accused. It is well to quote
Justice Josue N. Bellosillo:
In fine, we are not unmindful of the gravity of the
crime charged; but justice must be dispensed with
an even hand. Regardless of how much we want to
punish the perpetrators of this ghastly crime and
give justice to the victim and her family, the
protection provided by the Bill of Rights is
bestowed upon all individuals, without exception,
regardless of race, color, creed, gender or political
persuasion — whether privileged or less privileged
— to be invoked without fear or favor. Hence, the
accused deserves no less than an acquittal; ergo, he
is not called upon to disprove what the prosecution
has not proved. 87 (Emphasis supplied)
As the prosecution in this case failed to discharge
its burden of proving Galvez's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, the Court has no choice but to
acquit him.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Isabela, Basilan, Branch 1 in Criminal Case
No. 1816 dated February 2, 1995 and the Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 18255
dated March 30, 2001 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The accused-appellant Cesar Galvez is
hereby ACQUITTED on the ground that his guilt
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. The
Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to
cause the immediate release of Cesar Galvez unless
he is being lawfully held for another crime and to
inform this Court accordingly within ten (10) days
from notice.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Galvez, G.R. No. 157221, [March 30,
2007], 548 PHIL 436-489)
[G.R. No. 141066. February 17, 2005.]
EVANGELINE LADONGA, petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:
Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga seeks a review of
the Decision, 1 dated May 17, 1999, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443, affirming the
Decision dated August 24, 1996, of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Bohol, in Criminal
Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting her of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as The
Bouncing Checks Law.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On March 27, 1991, three Informations for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed with the RTC,
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 7068-7070. The
Information in Criminal Case No. 7068 alleges as
follows:
That, sometime in May or June 1990, in the City of
Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping
with one another, knowing fully well that they did
not have sufficient funds deposited with the United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Tagbilaran
Branch, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously, draw and issue UCPB Check No.
284743 postdated July 7, 1990 in the amount of
NINE THOUSAND SEVENTY-FIVE PESOS
AND FIFTY-FIVE CENTAVOS (P9,075.55),
payable to Alfredo Oculam, and thereafter, without
informing the latter that they did not have sufficient
funds deposited with the bank to cover up the
amount of the check, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously pass on, indorse, give
and deliver the said check to Alfredo Oculam by
way of rediscounting of the aforementioned
checks; however, upon presentation of the check to
the drawee bank for encashment, the same was
dishonored for the reason that the account of the
accused with the United Coconut Planters Bank,
Tagbilaran Branch, had already been closed, to the
damage and prejudice of the said Alfredo Oculam
in the aforestated amount. CETIDH
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22. 2
The accusatory portions of the Informations in
Criminal Case Nos. 7069 and 7070 are similarly
worded, except for the allegations concerning the
number, date and amount of each check, that is:
(a) Criminal Case No. 7069 — UCPB Check No.
284744 dated July 22, 1990 in the amount of
P12,730.00; 3
(b) Criminal Case No. 7070 — UCPB Check No.
106136 dated July 22, 1990 in the amount of
P8,496.55. 4
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried.
When arraigned on June 26, 1991, the two accused
pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. 5
The prosecution presented as its lone witness
complainant Alfredo Oculam. He testified that: in
1989, spouses Adronico 6 and Evangeline Ladonga
became his regular customers in his pawnshop
business in Tagbilaran City, Bohol; 7 sometime in
May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a
P9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No.
284743, post dated to dated July 7, 1990 issued by
Adronico; 8 sometime in the last week of April
1990 and during the first week of May 1990, the
Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of
P12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No.
284744, post dated to dated July 26, 1990 issued by
Adronico; 9 between May and June 1990, the
Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan in the
amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check
No. 106136, post dated to July 22, 1990 issued by
Adronico; 10 the three checks bounced upon
presentment for the reason "CLOSED
ACCOUNT"; 11 when the Ladonga spouses failed
to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, he
filed a criminal complaint against them. 12
While admitting that the checks issued by
Adronico bounced because there was no sufficient
deposit or the account was closed, the Ladonga
spouses claimed that the checks were issued only
to guarantee the obligation, with an agreement that
Oculam should not encash the checks when they
mature; 13 and, that petitioner is not a signatory of
the checks and had no participation in the issuance
thereof. 14
On August 24, 1996, the RTC rendered a joint
decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
Premises considered, this Court hereby renders
judgment finding accused Adronico Ladonga, alias
Ronie, and Evangeline Ladonga guilty beyond
reasonable doubt in the aforesaid three (3) criminal
cases, for which they stand charged before this
Court, and accordingly, sentences them to
imprisonment and fine, as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 7068, for (sic) an
imprisonment of one (1) year for each of them, and
a fine in the amount of P9,075.55, equivalent to the
amount of UCPB Check No. 284743;
2. In Criminal Case No. 7069, for (sic) an
imprisonment for each of them to one (1) year and
a fine of P12,730.00, equivalent to the amount of
UCPB Check No. 284744; and,
3. In Criminal Case No. 7070, with (sic) an
imprisonment of one year for each of them and a
fine of P8,496.55 equivalent to the amount of
UCPB Check No. 106136;
4. That both accused are further ordered to jointly
and solidarily pay and reimburse the complainant,
Mr. Alfredo Oculam, the sum of P15,000.00
representing actual expenses incurred in
prosecuting the instant cases; P10,000.00 as
attorney's fee; and the amount of P30,302.10 which
is the total value of the three (3) subject checks
which bounced; but without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. jur2005cd
With Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED. 15
Adronico applied for probation which was granted.
16 On the other hand, petitioner brought the case to
the Court of Appeals, arguing that the RTC erred in
finding her criminally liable for conspiring with her
husband as the principle of conspiracy is
inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which is a special law;
moreover, she is not a signatory of the checks and
had no participation in the issuance thereof. 17
On May 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the conviction of petitioner. 18 It held that the
provisions of the penal code were made applicable
to special penal laws in the decisions of this Court
in People vs. Parel, 19 U.S. vs. Ponte, 20 and U.S.
vs. Bruhez. 21 It noted that Article 10 of the
Revised Penal Code itself provides that its
provisions shall be supplementary to special laws
unless the latter provide the contrary. The Court of
Appeals stressed that since B.P. Blg. 22 does not
prohibit the applicability in a suppletory character
of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
the principle of conspiracy may be applied to cases
involving violations of B.P. Blg. 22. Lastly, it ruled
that the fact that petitioner did not make and issue
or sign the checks did not exculpate her from
criminal liability as it is not indispensable that a co-
conspirator takes a direct part in every act and
knows the part which everyone performed. The
Court of Appeals underscored that in conspiracy
the act of one conspirator could be held to be the
act of the other. CHcETA
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision
but the Court of Appeals denied the same in a
Resolution dated November 16, 1999. 22
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner presents to the Court the following issues
for resolution:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER
WHO WAS NOT THE DRAWER OR ISSUER
OF THE THREE CHECKS THAT BOUNCED
BUT HER CO-ACCUSED HUSBAND UNDER
THE LATTER'S ACCOUNT COULD BE HELD
LIABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF BATAS
PAMBANSA BILANG 22 AS CONSPIRATOR.
2. ANCILLARY TO THE MAIN ISSUE ARE
THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:
A. WHETHER OR NOT CONSPIRACY IS
APPLICABLE IN VIOLATIONS OF BATAS
PAMBANSA BILANG 22 BY INVOKING THE
LAST SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE WHICH STATES:
Art. 10. Offenses not subject of the provisions of
this Code. — Offenses which are or in the future
may be punished under special laws are not subject
to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the latter
should specially provide the contrary.
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASES CITED BY
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN
AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE CONVICTION OF
PETITIONER AS CONSPIRATOR APPLYING
THE SUPPLETORY CHARACTER OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE TO SPECIAL LAWS
LIKE B.P. BLG. 22 IS APPLICABLE. 23
Petitioner staunchly insists that she cannot be held
criminally liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
because she had no participation in the drawing and
issuance of the three checks subject of the three
criminal cases, a fact proven by the checks
themselves. She contends that the Court of Appeals
gravely erred in applying the principle of
conspiracy, as defined under the RPC, to violations
of B.P. Blg. 22. She posits that the application of
the principle of conspiracy would enlarge the scope
of the statute and include situations not provided
for or intended by the lawmakers, such as
penalizing a person, like petitioner, who had no
participation in the drawing or issuance of checks.
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with
petitioner and echoes the declaration of the Court
of Appeals that some provisions of the Revised
Penal Code, especially with the addition of the
second sentence in Article 10, are applicable to
special laws. It submits that B.P. Blg. 22 does not
provide any prohibition regarding the applicability
in a suppletory character of the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code to it.
Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of
this Code. — Offenses which are or in the future
may be punishable under special laws are not
subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code
shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the
latter should specially provide the contrary.
The article is composed of two clauses. The first
provides that offenses which in the future are made
punishable under special laws are not subject to the
provisions of the RPC, while the second makes the
RPC supplementary to such laws. While it seems
that the two clauses are contradictory, a sensible
interpretation will show that they can perfectly be
reconciled. cHATSI

The first clause should be understood to mean only
that the special penal laws are controlling with
regard to offenses therein specifically punished.
Said clause only restates the elemental rule of
statutory construction that special legal provisions
prevail over general ones. 24 Lex specialis
derogant generali. In fact, the clause can be
considered as a superfluity, and could have been
eliminated altogether. The second clause contains
the soul of the article. The main idea and purpose
of the article is embodied in the provision that the
"code shall be supplementary" to special laws,
unless the latter should specifically provide the
contrary.
The appellate court's reliance on the cases of
People vs. Parel, 25 U.S. vs. Ponte, 26 and U.S. vs.
Bruhez 27 rests on a firm basis. These cases
involved the suppletory application of principles
under the then Penal Code to special laws. People
vs. Parel is concerned with the application of
Article 22 28 of the Code to violations of Act No.
3030, the Election Law, with reference to the
retroactive effect of penal laws if they favor the
accused. U.S. vs. Ponte involved the application of
Article 17 29 of the same Penal Code, with
reference to the participation of principals in the
commission of the crime of misappropriation of
public funds as defined and penalized by Act No.
1740. U.S. vs. Bruhez covered Article 45 30 of the
same Code, with reference to the confiscation of
the instruments used in violation of Act No. 1461,
the Opium Law.
B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the
suppletory application of the provisions of the
RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in
B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of the RPC
which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable,
may be applied suppletorily. Indeed, in the recent
case of Yu vs. People, 31 the Court applied
suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment under Article 39 32 of the RPC to
B.P. Blg. 22.
The suppletory application of the principle of
conspiracy in this case is analogous to the
application of the provision on principals under
Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once conspiracy or
action in concert to achieve a criminal design is
shown, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of
participation of each of them becomes secondary,
since all the conspirators are principals. 33
All these notwithstanding, the conviction of the
petitioner must be set aside.
Article 8 of the RPC provides that "a conspiracy
exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it." To be held guilty as a co-
principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must
be shown to have performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. 34 The
overt act or acts of the accused may consist of
active participation in the actual commission of the
crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to
his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or
implement the criminal plan. 35
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove
that petitioner performed any overt act in
furtherance of the alleged, conspiracy. As testified
to by the lone prosecution witness, complainant
Alfredo Oculam, petitioner was merely present
when her husband, Adronico, signed the check
subject of Criminal Case No. 7068. 36 With respect
to Criminal Case Nos. 7069-7070, Oculam also did
not describe the details of petitioner's participation.
He did not specify the nature of petitioner's
involvement in the commission of the crime, either
by a direct act of participation, a direct inducement
of her co-conspirator, or cooperating in the
commission of the offense by another act without
which it would not have been accomplished.
Apparently, the only semblance of overt act that
may be attributed to petitioner is that she was
present when the first check was issued. However,
this inference cannot be stretched to mean
concurrence with the criminal design. HEDSCc
Conspiracy must be established, not by
conjectures, but by positive and conclusive
evidence. 37 Conspiracy transcends mere
companionship and mere presence at the scene of
the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy.
38 Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement
to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a
party to a conspiracy, absent any active
participation in the commission of the crime with a
view to the furtherance of the common design and
purpose. 39
As the Court eloquently pronounced in a case of
recent vintage, People vs. Mandao: 40
To be sure, conspiracy is not a harmless innuendo
to be taken lightly or accepted at every turn. It is a
legal concept that imputes culpability under
specific circumstances; as such, it must be
established as clearly as any element of the crime.
Evidence to prove it must be positive and
convincing, considering that it is a convenient and
simplistic device by which the accused may be
ensnared and kept within the penal fold.
Criminal liability cannot be based on a general
allegation of conspiracy, and a judgment of
conviction must always be founded on the strength
of the prosecution's evidence. The Court ruled thus
in People v. Legaspi, from which we quote:
At most, the prosecution, realizing the weakness of
its evidence against accused-appellant Franco,
merely relied and pegged the latter's criminal
liability on its sweeping theory of conspiracy,
which to us, was not attendant in the commission
of the crime.
The rule is firmly entrenched that a judgment of
conviction must be predicated on the strength of the
evidence for the prosecution and not on the
weakness of the evidence for the defense. The
proof against him must survive the test of reason;
the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to
sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied
that on the defense could be laid the responsibility
for the offense charged; that not only did he
perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime.
What is required then is moral certainty.
Verily, it is the role of the prosecution to prove the
guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt in
order to overcome the constitutional presumption
of innocence.
In sum, conviction must rest on hard evidence
showing that the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. In criminal
cases, moral certainty — not mere possibility —
determines the guilt or the innocence of the
accused. Even when the evidence for the defense is
weak, the accused must be acquitted when the
prosecution has not proven guilt with the requisite
quantum of proof required in all criminal cases.
(Citations omitted) 41
All told, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt
of the petitioner with moral certainty. Its evidence
falls short of the quantum of proof required for
conviction. Accordingly, the constitutional
presumption of the petitioner's innocence must be
upheld and she must be acquitted.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
The assailed Decision, dated May 17, 1999, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443
affirming the Decision, dated August 24, 1996, of
the Regional Trial Court (Branch 3), Bohol, in
Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070
convicting the petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg.
22 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga is ACQUITTED of
the charges against her under B.P. Blg. 22 for
failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.
DaEATc
SO ORDERED.
||| (Ladonga v. People, G.R. No. 141066, [February
17, 2005], 492 PHIL 60-73)
[G.R. No. 132028. April 19, 2002.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. EUSEBIO ENFECTANA, alias
"Toytoy", and ERWIN ENFECTANA, accused-
appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Celestino Sabate for accused-appellants.
SYNOPSIS
Appellant appealed their conviction for the murder
of Leo, based on the following grounds: appellant
Eusebio admitted he killed Leo but insisted that he
acted in self-defense; even if self-defense could not
be appreciated, the crime committed was homicide
and only Eusebio should be held liable therefor.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of
appellants on appeal, ruling: that testimonies of
prosecution witnesses who saw appellants kill the
victim were positive and categorical as when and
how appellants committed the crime, hence,
deserving of full faith and credence; the version of
appellant that it was victim Leo who initiated the
attacks and that notwithstanding the fact that
appellants were both caught unaware, they
managed to escape unscathed is quite incredible;
that if it were true that they were innocent, there
was no reason for co-accused Efren to flee and
hide; that the burden of evidence imposed by law is
on the party invoking self-defense, but appellants
failed to prove unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim; and that treachery is present in this case
because the victim and his wife were suddenly
attacked as they were coming down from a jeepney.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE;
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; FINDINGS OF
THE TRIAL COURT THEREON WILL
GENERALLY NOT BE DISTURBED ON
APPEAL; EXCEPTIONS; CASE AT BAR. —
The conviction of the Enfectanas was primarily
based on the testimonial accounts of Adelaida
Boco and Dominador Dialino which was found by
the trial court to be more credible than the version
of the appellants. It is doctrinally settled that when
the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate
courts will generally not disturb the findings of the
trial court, considering that the latter is in a better
position to decide the issue, having heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during trial.
This rule admits of exceptions, such as when the
evaluation was reached arbitrarily or when the trial
court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied
some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance which could affect the result of the case.
Unfortunately for appellants, none of these
exceptions is present in this case.
2. ID.; ID.; PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT; POSITIVE AND CATEGORICAL
TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION
WITNESSES SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISH
GUILT OF ACCUSED IN CASE AT BAR. — The
testimonies of prosecution witnesses Adelaida
Boco and Dominador Dialino were both positive
and categorical. The assertion of appellants that
they contradicted each other has no support in the
records. Moreover, even if we were to agree with
appellants that there were inconsistencies in their
testimonies, they refer only to trivial and
immaterial details. Thus, assuming these
inconsistencies to be present, they tend to show that
the witnesses were being spontaneous and were not
coached or rehearsed. Settled is the rule that minor
inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of a
witness. On the contrary, they may be considered
badges of veracity or manifestations of truthfulness
on material points and they may even heighten the
credibility of the witness. The records of this case
show that the prosecution witnesses were
consistent in their narration as to WHO committed
the crime, WHEN and HOW it was committed.
These are the material facts in this case which had
been sufficiently and convincingly established by
the prosecution. Compared with the allegation of
the appellants, the prosecution's version is more
believable and in accord with reality, hence
deserving full faith and credence. cDECIA
3. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES;
EVIDENCE TO BE BELIEVED MUST BE
CREDIBLE IN ITSELF; CASE AT BAR. —
Appellants would want us to believe that it was the
victim, Leo Boco, who initiated the attacks, first
against Erwin Enfectana and then against Eusebio
Enfectana, and that notwithstanding the fact that
said Erwin and Eusebio were both caught unaware
and unarmed by the sudden attacks of Leo Boco,
they managed to evade him and escape unscathed.
This is highly suspect and in our view, quite
incredible. Evidence to be believed must not only
come from the mouth of a credible witness but must
itself be credible. It is very unlikely that Leo Boco,
if the version of the appellants were true, would fail
to land even a single hit upon the body of either
appellants. Yet neither Erwin nor Eusebio
Enfectana showed such injury.
4. ID.; ID.; FLIGHT IS INDICATIVE OF GUILT;
CASE AT BAR. — The version of the appellants
would not explain why co-accused Efren Enfectana
suddenly disappeared after the incident. If it was
true that they were innocent, then there is no reason
for Efren-Enfectana to flee and hide. Flight is an
indication of guilt and lends credence to the version
of the prosecution in this case. acCITS
5. CRIMINAL LAW; JUSTIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES; SELF-DEFENSE;
ELEMENTS THEREOF; UNLAWFUL
AGGRESSION ON THE PART OF THE VICTIM
AGAINST THE PERSON DEFENDING
HIMSELF IS A SINE QUA NON CONDITION;
CASE AT BAR. — As for the issue of self-defense,
it is an established principle that once this
justifying circumstance is raised, the burden of
proving the elements of the claim shifts to him who
invokes it. The elements of self-defense are: (1)
that the victim has committed unlawful aggression
amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life
and limb of the person claiming self-defense; (2)
that there be reasonable necessity in the means
employed to prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression; and (3) that there be lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person claiming self-
defense or, at least, that any provocation executed
by the person claiming self-defense be not the
proximate and immediate cause of the victim's
aggression. The condition of unlawful aggression
is a sine qua non; otherwise stated, there can be no
self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the
victim has committed unlawful aggression against
the person defending himself. Given the fact that
the relationship between the parties had been
marred by ill will and animosities, and pursuant to
the rule on the burden of evidence imposed by law
on the party invoking self-defense, the admission
of appellant Eusebio Enfectana that he killed Leo
Boco made it incumbent upon appellant to
convincingly prove that there was unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim which
necessitated the use of deadly force by appellant.
Unfortunately, appellant miserably failed to prove
the existence of unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim.
6. ID.; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES;
TREACHERY PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. —
Anent the third issue, we also agree with the trial
court that treachery is present in this case. The
victim and his wife were suddenly attacked as they
were coming down from a jeepney. They had no
idea that they were going to be assaulted. The
manner by which the appellants commenced and
perpetrated their assault, (1) by trying to bump Leo
and Adelaida Boco, making the former lose his
balance and more susceptible to an attack, and (2)
by simultaneously attacking Leo Boco, hence
preventing him from putting up any semblance of
defense, shows beyond any doubt that there was
alevosia in this case. Settled is the rule that an
unexpected and sudden attack under circumstances
that render the victim unable and unprepared to
defend himself constitutes alevosia.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J p:
Before us on appeal is the decision 1 dated June 24,
1997 of the Regional Trial Court, Borongan,
Eastern Samar, Branch 1, in Criminal Case No.
10582, finding appellants guilty of murder and
sentencing them to suffer the imprisonment of
reclusion perpetua.
Appellants herein were indicted in an Information
2 as follows:
That on November 2, 1994, at about 11:00 o'clock
in the morning, at the National Highway, Barangay
Cabay, Balangkayan, Eastern Samar, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, with intent
to kill and with evident premeditation and
treachery and without justifiable cause, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
bumped Leo Boco and the complainant Adelaida
Boco with the trycicle (sic) of the accused, when
the victim has just alighted from a passenger
jeepney, then attacked, assaulted, hacked, stabbed
and wounded Leo Boco with the use of sharp
bladed weapons, which the accused provided
themselves for the purpose, thereby inflicting
injuries upon Leo Boco, which injuries caused the
instantaneous death of Leo Boco, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of the victim, in such
amount as may be awarded to them under the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines and
other related laws and caused injuries on the
complainant, Adelaida Boco, when she was
bumped by the trycicle (sic) named "Pepit" owned
and operated by the herein accused and driven by
co-accused Erwin Enfectana.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the attendance of the
aggravating circumstances of: Evident
premeditation, Conspiracy, Treachery and
advantage taken due to superior strength or means
employed to weaken the defense of the victim.
Upon arraignment, appellants pleaded "not guilty"
to the charge. Thereafter trial ensued.
The first witness for the prosecution was
ADELAIDA BOCO, widow of the victim, Leo
Boco. She testified that on November 2, 1994, at
around 11:00 A.M., while she and her husband
were on their way home, they were sideswiped by
a tricycle driven by appellant Erwin Enfectana with
Efren Enfectana as passenger. As a result, her
husband fell in a crouching position. When he was
about to get up, appellant Eusebio Enfectana came
from behind to stab him. Then appellant Erwin
Enfectana and accused Efren Enfectana took turns
stabbing Leo Boco, causing his death. 3
DOMINADOR DIALINO, a 52-year-old farmer,
testified that he saw appellants and co-accused kill
the victim. According to the witness, he was at the
store of one Olivo Contado, at around 11:00 A.M.
of November 2, 1994. From there, he saw Leo and
Adelaida Boco alight from a jeepney. He also saw
a fast running tricycle which bumped the vehicle of
the Boco spouses. The tricycle was being driven by
Erwin Enfectana who was with Efren Enfectana.
They missed the Boco spouses who jumped away.
Erwin and Efren Enfectana alighted from the
tricycle and walked towards Leo Boco, who had
fallen down. They were carrying short bladed
weapons known as "depang". 4 Dominador Dialino
tried to stop them by going between them and the
Boco spouses, to no avail. He heard Efren
Enfectana shout, "bon-a na Tatay " (Father, stab
him). He then saw Eusebio Enfectana stab Leo
Boco. After Leo Boco fell, Erwin and Efren also
stabbed him. 5
BARTOLOME BAHASAN, a 54-year-old
resident of Bgy. Cabay, Balangkayan, Eastern
Samar, testified that sometime in 1985, the family
of Eusebio Enfectana tried to move into the
residence of Leo and Adelaida Boco but they were
prevented by Leo. He also alleged that sometime in
1985, Leo Boco was waylaid by the Enfectanas
(Eusebio, Erwin and Efren) but he was able to
escape by swimming across the river. From then
on, Leo Boco always tried to evade the Enfectanas.
6 attacking him until he was able to get hold of a bolo
Dr. MICHAEL TAN, the Municipal Health Officer
of Balangkayan, Eastern Samar, testified that he
was the one who conducted the post-mortem
examination on the cadaver of Leo Boco.
According to him, the deceased suffered six stab
wounds, and that the probable cause of death was
the stab wound at the back that caused hemorrhage.
He opined that in all probability, based on the sizes
and nature of the wounds, not less than two
weapons were used against the victim. 7
On June 15, 1995, ADELAIDA BOCO was
recalled to the witness stand to testify on the
damages she and her family suffered and the
expenses they incurred as a result of Leo Boco's
death. According to her, Leo Boco was a
businessman who earns at least P20,000 a month
by selling automotive parts in Cebu. She said that
she incurred P50,000 in funeral expenses. She also
spent for legal fees because she engaged a lawyer
for the fee of P500 per appearance in court. Aside
from these, she also alleged that since her
husband's death, she became the sole breadwinner
of her family and the main source of livelihood for
her five children. 8
For its part, the defense presented DARIO D.
ALDE, municipal treasurer of Balangkayan,
Eastern Samar, as its first witness. He testified that
there is no record of Leo Boco as businessman in
the Municipality of Balangkayan. 9
Next witness for the defense was Mrs. MANUELA
CONTADO DIALINO. She testified that on
November 2, 1994, she went to the cemetery of
Balangkayan where she stayed from 8:30-9:30
A.M. She then proceeded to the waiting shed where
she waited for a ride home. She was able to ride a
tricycle at around 11:00 A.M. She alleged that
Dominador Dialino was with her in the tricycle and
that they arrived in Cabay at around 12:00 noon.
Upon arriving home, they were informed that Leo
Boco had been killed. 10
Appellant EUSEBIO ENFECTANA testified that
on November 2, 1994, at around 11:00 A.M., while
he was at home, someone arrived and informed him
that his tricycle was involved in an accident. He
went to the place and saw his tricycle turned upside
down with its windshield broken. Suddenly, he saw
Leo Boco running towards him with a "dipang" (a
small bolo). He evaded the attacks of Leo Boco and
managed to get hold of a piece of wood which he
used to defend himself. Still, Leo Boco persisted in
which he used in stabbing Leo. According to him,
he was able to stab Leo in the right hand and chest.
Aside from this he was also able to hack him in the
neck. As Leo fell down from these counter-attacks,
according to appellant, he took Leo's bolo and used
this to stab him. He was then chased by the sons
and the cousin of Leo Boco up to his house which
they pelted with stones. After they stopped,
Eusebio decided to call the authorities to surrender
himself. 11
Appellant ERWIN ENFECTANA testified that he
is 24 years old, married, and a resident of Cabay,
Balangkayan, Eastern Samar. According to him, at
around 11:00 A.M. of November 2, 1994, while he
was waiting for passengers in Bgy. Cabay,
Balangkayan, he saw Leo Boco running toward
him with a small bolo. In his effort to escape, he
accidentally bumped his tricycle on a fence. He fell
down because of the impact but he immediately
stood up and ran away because Leo Boco was still
chasing him with a bolo. In order to escape, he hid
in the house of Osias Montes where he learned that
his father, Eusebio Enfectana, and Leo Boco had a
quarrel. 12
FE ANDALIZA GLINO testified that on the
morning of November 2, 1994, while she was
ironing clothes in the house of Nestor Borja, she
heard a tricycle crashing into a wooden fence.
When she looked out the window, she saw
appellant Erwin Enfectana sprawled on the ground
trying to get up. She also saw Leo Boco with a
"dipang" approaching Erwin and trying to stab him.
Erwin got up and ran away. She returned to her
chores but after a while, she heard a woman shout,
"Leo, ayaw kamo pag-igi, ayaw hito" (Leo, do not
quarrel, not here.) She looked out the window and
saw Leo Boco advancing, this time towards
appellant Eusebio Enfectana. Leo was trying to
stab Eusebio Enfectana while the latter parried the
blows with a piece of wood. When Eusebio
Enfectana was cornered against a banana store,
witness Fe Glino said, she looked away until she
heard somebody shouting, "Patay na si Leo Boco"
(Leo Boco is already dead). 13
Defense witness NENITA ALDE testified that she
was the one who took the pictures of the appellants'
house, which show shattered windows and the
stones allegedly used in breaking these windows.
14
Another defense witness, EDDIE AMBAL,
testified that on November 2, 1994, while he was
on his way home from his aunt's house, he saw a
tilted tricycle. He also saw appellant Eusebio
Enfectana being attacked by Leo Boco with a
"dipang". According to him, Eusebio Enfectana
managed to parry these blows with a piece of wood
until he reached a banana store where he was able
to get hold of a bolo. This he used to stab and hack
the victim, Leo Boco. 15
Witness MARCOS LADIAO testified that on
November 2, 1994, at around 11:00 A.M., while he
was on his way to the house of a certain Romulo
Elpedes, he noticed a tilted tricycle by the side of
the road. He saw appellant Eusebio Enfectana
standing near the said tricycle. He also saw Leo
Boco with a small bolo approaching Eusebio
Enfectana from the direction of the seashore. He
heard Leo Boco shout, "kay waray ko man kamatay
an anak, it amay it ak papatayon" (Because I failed
to kill the son, I will kill the father). With these
words, Leo Boco bumped Eusebio Enfectana and
tried to stab him with the "dipang". But Eusebio
Enfectana managed to evade the thrust of Leo
Boco's weapon. Eusebio Enfectana was able to pick
a piece of wood which he used to parry the blows
of Leo Boco, at the same time backpedalling across
the street where he (Eusebio Enfectana) was
eventually cornered against the banana store of
Contado. At said store, Eusebio Enfectana
managed to get hold of a long bolo which he used
to stab Leo Boco. When the victim fell down,
appellant Eusebio Enfectana ran and jumped over
the fence. 16
Later, the prosecution recalled ADELAIDA BOCO
as its rebuttal witness to disprove the allegations of
Eddie Ambal that he (Ambal) actually saw the
killing of Leo Boco. 17
On June 24, 1997, the trial court rendered its
decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing facts and
circumstances, EUSEBIO ENFECTANA and
ERWIN ENFECTANA are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as co-principals of the crime of
MURDER, defined and penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
further amended by R.A. 7659, section 6, which
provide the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua to Death.
Accordingly, Eusebio Enfectana and Erwin
Enfectana are hereby sentenced to serve the
indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay the
cost and to indemnify the heirs of Leo Boco in the
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
pursuant to a recent ruling of the Supreme Court
(citing People vs. Chica, G.R. No. 117732, 1995.
PP. vs. Sison, 159 SCRA 645). Records show,
Eusebio Enfectana and Erwin Enfectana are out on
bail, the same is hereby ordered cancelled pursuant
to Supreme Court Circular No. 2-92. As far as
accused Efren Enfectana is concerned, he is still at
large to date.
SO ORDERED. 18
Aggrieved, appellants filed this appeal alleging that
the trial court erred:
I
. . . IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT
APPELLANT EUSEBIO ENFECTANA ACTED
IN SELF-DEFENSE.
II
. . . [IN] FINDING BOTH APPELLANTS
GUILTY OF MURDER.
III
. . . IN CONVICTING APPELLANTS.
In essence, the issues here are (1) whether the trial
court properly gave credence to the version of the
prosecution while disbelieving that of the defense;
(2) whether there is self defense on the part of
Eusebio Enfectana; and, (3) whether the
circumstance of treachery should be appreciated to
qualify the offense to murder. Likewise, we must
further inquire into the propriety of the civil
indemnity and damages awarded by the trial court.
Appellant Eusebio Enfectana admits that he killed
Leo Boco. He, however, alleges that he acted in
self-defense. According to him, he was attacked
first and he had no option but to kill the aggressor.
On the other hand, appellant Erwin denies any
participation in the killing and alleges that he was
nowhere near the place where the incident
transpired. Both appellants assail the finding of the
trial court that they are liable for the death of Leo
Boco. According to them, it was the victim, Leo
Boco, who had the motive to commence the assault
upon Eusebio Enfectana because of Boco's
conviction resulting from a complaint lodged
against him by the Enfectanas. They add that Boco
also lost in a civil case involving his house.
Appellants also assail the inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
particularly those of Adelaida Boco and
Dominador Dialino. Lastly, appellants contend that
even if self-defense could not be appreciated, the
crime committed was merely homicide and that
only Eusebio should be held liable therefor. 19
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the
appellee, avers that the trial court committed no
error in convicting appellants Eusebio and Erwin
Enfectana for murder. The OSG contends that the
failure of appellants to submit any counter-affidavit
immediately after the complaint was filed against
them is an indication that their version was no
longer spontaneous nor truthful. According to the
OSG, the claim that it was the victim who had the
motive to commence the assault against the
Enfectanas is unrealistic, since it is also true that
the Enfectanas harbored ill feelings towards Leo
Boco. The OSG stresses that the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, as a whole, show no real
discrepancy and that the inconsistencies pointed
out by appellants refer only to minor and trivial
matters.
Considering the evidence presented and the
arguments adduced by appellants and appellee, we
are unable to find merit in the present appeal.
The conviction of the Enfectanas was primarily
based on the testimonial accounts of Adelaida
Boco and Dominador Dialino which was found by
the trial court to be more credible than the version
of the appellants. It is doctrinally settled that when
the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate
courts will generally not disturb the findings of the
trial court, considering that the latter is in a better
position to decide the issue, having heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during trial.
This rule admits of exceptions, such as when the
evaluation was reached arbitrarily or when the trial
court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied
some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance which could affect the result of the case.
20 Unfortunately for appellants, none of these
exceptions is present in this case.
The testimonies of prosecution witnesses Adelaida
Boco and Dominador Dialino were both positive
and categorical. The assertion of appellants that
they contradicted each other has no support in the
records. Moreover, even if we were to agree with
appellants that there were inconsistencies in their
testimonies, they refer only to trivial and
immaterial details. Thus, assuming these
inconsistencies to be present, they tend to show that
the witnesses were being spontaneous and were not
coached or rehearsed. Settled is the rule that minor
inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of a
witness. On the contrary, they may be considered
badges of veracity or manifestations of truthfulness
on material points and they may even heighten the
credibility of the witness. 21
The records of this case show that the prosecution
witnesses were consistent in their narration as to
WHO committed the crime, WHEN and HOW it
was committed. These are the material facts in this
case which had been sufficiently and convincingly
established by the prosecution. Compared with the
allegation of the appellants, the prosecution's
version is more believable and in accord with
reality, hence deserving full faith and credence.
Appellants would want us to believe that it was the
victim, Leo Boco, who initiated the attacks, first
against Erwin Enfectana and then against Eusebio
Enfectana, and that notwithstanding the fact that
said Erwin and Eusebio were both caught unaware
and unarmed by the sudden attacks of Leo Boco,
they managed to evade him and escape unscathed.
This is highly suspect and in our view, quite
incredible. Evidence to be believed must not only
come from the mouth of a credible witness but must
itself be credible. 22 It is very unlikely that Leo
Boco, if the version of the appellants were true,
would fail to land even a single hit upon the body
of either appellants. Yet neither Erwin nor Eusebio
Enfectana showed such injury. The version of the
appellants would not explain why co-accused Efren
Enfectana suddenly disappeared after the incident.
If it was true that they were innocent, then there is
no reason for Efren Enfectana to flee and hide.
Flight is an indication of guilt 23 and lends
credence to the version of the prosecution in this
case.
As for the issue of self-defense, it is an established
principle that once this justifying circumstance is
raised, the burden of proving the elements of the
claim shifts to him who invokes it. 24 The elements
of self-defense are: (1) that the victim has
committed unlawful aggression amounting to
actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the
person claiming self-defense; (2) that there be
reasonable necessity in the means employed to
prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3)
that there be lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person claiming self-defense or, at least,
that any provocation executed by the person
claiming self-defense be not the proximate and
immediate cause of the victim's aggression. 25 The
condition of unlawful aggression is a sine qua non;
otherwise stated, there can be no self-defense,
complete or incomplete, unless the victim has
committed unlawful aggression against the person
defending himself. 26
Given the fact that the relationship between the
parties had been marred by ill will and animosities,
and pursuant to the rule on the burden of evidence
imposed by law on the party invoking self-defense,
the admission of appellant Eusebio Enfectana that
he killed Leo Boco made it incumbent upon
appellant to convincingly prove that there was
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim which
necessitated the use of deadly force by appellant.
Unfortunately, appellant miserably failed to prove
the existence of unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim. As found by the trial court:
. . . The version of the accused [appellant] that it
was Leo Boco who was the unlawful aggressor and
that Leo Boco attacked and stabbed him while he
was inspecting his tilted tricycle on the highway
cannot be given faith and credit it being an
afterthought, self-serving and expert invention
and/or imagination sans truth. 27
Weighing the conflicting versions of the
prosecution and the defense, we agree with the trial
court's conclusion that the prosecution's version is
more in accord with the natural course of things,
hence more credible. ITAaHc
Anent the third issue, we also agree with the trial
court that treachery is present in this case. The
victim and his wife were suddenly attacked as they
were coming down from a jeepney. They had no
idea that they were going to be assaulted. The
manner by which the appellants commenced and
perpetrated their assault, (1) by trying to bump Leo
and Adelaida Boco, making the former lose his
balance and more susceptible to an attack, and (2)
by simultaneously attacking Leo Boco, hence
preventing him from putting up any semblance of
defense, shows beyond any doubt that there was
alevosia in this case. Settled is the rule that an
unexpected and sudden attack under circumstances
that render the victim unable and unprepared to
defend himself constitutes alevosia. 28
As to damages, there is no dispute as to the
propriety of P50,000 as civil indemnity for the
death of Leo Boco. There being uncontradicted
testimony regarding the funeral expenses and legal
fees paid by the widow, Adelaida Boco, at least
P50,500 should be awarded to her as actual
damages.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of Branch 1
of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern
Samar, in Criminal Case No. 10582, finding the
appellants Eusebio Enfectana and Erwin Enfectana
guilty of murder, is AFFIRMED. Each of them is
sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua as
well as to pay the heirs of the victim Leo Boco
P50,000 as civil indemnity. In addition, appellants
are hereby ordered jointly and severally to pay
P50,500 as actual damages to the widow, Adelaida
Boco. Lastly, let a copy of this decision be
furnished to the National Bureau of Investigation
and the Philippine National Police so that co-
accused Efren Enfectana be apprehended promptly
and brought to the bar of justice.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Enfectana, G.R. No. 132028, [April
19, 2002], 431 PHIL 64-79)
[G.R. No. 150723. July 11, 2006.]
RAMONITO MANABAN, petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
This is a petition for review 1 of the Decision 2
dated 21 May 2001 and the Resolution 3 dated 8
November 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 23790. In its 21 May 2001 Decision,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 219
("trial court"), finding Ramonito Manaban
("Manaban") guilty of the crime of homicide. In its
8 November 2001 Resolution, the Court of Appeals
modified its Decision by reducing the award for
loss of earning capacity.
The Facts
The facts as narrated by the trial court are as
follows:
On October 11, 1996, at around 1:25 o'clock in the
morning, Joselito Bautista, a father and a member
of the UP Police Force, took his daughter, Frinzi,
who complained of difficulty in breathing, to the
UP Health Center. There, the doctors prescribed
certain medicines to be purchased. Needing money
therefore, Joselito Bautista, who had taken
alcoholic drinks earlier, proceeded to the BPI
Kalayaan Branch to withdraw some money from its
Automated Teller Machine (ATM).
Upon arrival at the bank, Bautista proceeded to the
ATM booth but because he could not effectively
withdraw money, he started kicking and pounding
on the machine. For said reason, the bank security
guard, Ramonito Manaban, approached and asked
him what the problem was. Bautista complained
that his ATM was retrieved by the machine and that
no money came out of it. After Manaban had
checked the receipt, he informed Bautista that the
Personal Identification Number (PIN) entered was
wrong and advised him to just return the next
morning. This angered Bautista all the more and
resumed pounding on the machine. Manaban then
urged him to calm down and referred him to their
customer service over the phone. Still not
mollified, Bautista continued raging and striking
the machine. When Manaban could no longer
pacify him, he fired a warning shot. That diverted
the attention of Bautista. Instead of venting his ire
against the machine, he confronted Manaban. After
some exchange of words, a shot rang out fatally
hitting Bautista. 4
On 24 October 1996, Manaban was charged with
the crime of murder. The Information states:
That on or about the 11th day of October 1996, in
Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, armed with a gun, and with intent to kill,
qualified by treachery, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
employ personal violence upon the person of one
JOSELITO BAUTISTA, by then and there,
shooting him at the back portion of his body,
thereby inflicting upon said JOSELITO
BAUTISTA mortal wounds which were the direct
and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said
JOSELITO BAUTISTA. 5
When arraigned on 4 December 1996, 6 Manaban
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Trial then
followed.
The Trial
The Prosecution's Version
The prosecution presented six witnesses: (1)
Faustino Delariarte ("Delariarte"); (2) SPO1
Dominador Salvador ("SPO1 Salvador"); (3)
Rodolfo Bilgera ("Bilgera"); (4) Celedonia H. Tan
("Tan"); (5) Dr. Eduardo T. Vargas ("Dr. Vargas");
and (6) Editha Bautista ("Editha"). AEIHaS
Delariarte was a security guard who was employed
by the same security agency as Manaban.
Delariarte testified that in the early morning of 11
October 1996, their duty officer, Diosdado Morga,
called him and informed him that one of the guards
stationed at the BPI Kalayaan Branch ("BPI
Kalayaan") was involved in a shooting incident.
When he arrived at the bank, Delariarte saw
Manaban inside the bank using the phone. He also
saw Joselito Bautista ("Bautista") lying on the
ground but still alive. He then told their company
driver, Virgilio Cancisio ("Cancisio"), to take
Bautista to the hospital but to be careful since there
was a gun tucked in Bautista's waist. Bautista
allegedly reeked of alcohol. Delariarte further
testified that when Manaban came out of the bank,
Manaban admitted to Delariarte that he shot
Bautista. 7
SPO1 Salvador was a police investigator assigned
at Station 10, Philippine National Police-Central
Police District Command (PNP-CPDC) of Quezon
City. SPO1 Salvador testified that on 11 October
1996, about 2:05 a.m., the duty desk officer SPO2
Redemption Negre sent him, SPO1 Jerry Abad and
SPO1 Ruben Reyes to BPI Kalayaan to investigate
an alleged shooting incident. SPO1 Salvador
testified that when they arrived at BPI Kalayaan,
they were met by Delariarte and Cancisio.
Manaban then approached them and surrendered
his service firearm, a .38 caliber revolver, to SPO1
Salvador. Manaban allegedly admitted shooting
Bautista. SPO1 Salvador and his team investigated
the crime scene. According to SPO1 Salvador, he
saw Bautista lying on his back near the Automated
Teller Machine ("ATM"). A .38 caliber revolver
inside a locked holster was tucked in Bautista's
right waist. SPO1 Salvador noticed that Bautista,
who was still breathing, had been shot in the back.
They brought Bautista to the East Avenue Medical
Center where Bautista later died. Thereafter, they
proceeded to the police station and turned over
Manaban to their desk officer for proper
disposition and investigation. 8
Dr. Vargas, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
Medico-Legal Officer, conducted an autopsy on
Bautista's cadaver. Dr. Vargas testified that
Bautista died of a gunshot wound. According to
him, the point of entry of the bullet was at the back,
on the right side of the body and there was no exit
point. He stated that he was able to recover the slug
from the left anterior portion of the victim's body
and that he later submitted the slug to the NBI
Ballistics Division. Dr. Vargas further stated that
the bullet wound was fatal because the bullet hit the
right lung and lacerated parts of the liver, stomach
and the pancreas. Based on the location of the
gunshot wound, Dr. Vargas deduced that the
assailant must have been behind the victim, on the
right side, when he shot the victim. 9 Dr. Vargas
also testified that the absence of signs of near-fire
indicates that the distance between the muzzle of
the gun and the point of entry was more than 24
inches. During cross-examination, Dr. Vargas
testified that he was able to take blood samples
from the victim which, based on the NBI Chemistry
Division analysis, tested positive for alcohol. 10
Dr. Vargas issued a certificate of post-mortem
examination 11 and an autopsy report. 12
Bilgera was a ballistician at the Firearms
Investigation Division (FID) of the NBI. Bilgera
testified that upon receiving a letter-request dated
11 October 1996 from PNP Police Inspector
Percival Fontanilla, he conducted a ballistic
examination on the following specimens submitted
to him:
1. One (1) ARMSCOR 2015, Caliber .38 Revolver,
SN-28909 marked "DBS";
2. One (1) ARMSCOR 200, Caliber .38 Revolver,
SN-P03471 marked "DBS";
3. One (1) Caliber .38 one badly deformed copper
coated lead bullet marked "RM";
4. Two (2) Caliber .38 empty shells marked "RM-
1" and "RM-2";
5. One (1) Caliber .38 misfired ammunition
marked "RM-3";
6. Nine (9) Caliber .38 ammunition marked "RM-
4", "RM-5", "RM-6" and "JB-1" to "JB-6"; and
7. One (1) Caliber .38 deformed copper coated lead
bullet marked "JB". (Re-FID No. 606-14-1096 [N-
96-2047]). 13
Based on the examination, Bilgera concluded that
the bullet which was extracted from Bautista's body
by the medico-legal officer was fired from the
ARMSCOR 2015 .38 Caliber revolver with Serial
No. 28909 14 and that the empty shells also came
from the same gun. Bilgera submitted a written
report 15 on the result of his examination.
Editha, the widow of Joselito Bautista, testified that
she was married to Bautista on 22 December 1993
in civil rites and that they have four children, the
eldest of whom was 13 years old. Editha stated that
her husband, who was a member of the University
of the Philippines Police Force ("UP Police Force")
since 1985, was receiving a monthly salary of
P5,050 at the time of his death. She narrated that on
11 October 1996, about 1:25 a.m., her husband
brought their daughter Frinzi who had an asthma
attack to the UP Health Center where she was
confined for three days. According to Editha, her
husband then left to withdraw money at BPI
Kalayaan for the purchase of medicines. Later, she
was fetched by members of the UP Police Force
who informed her that her husband had been shot.
Editha claimed that as a consequence of her
husband's death, she spent more than P111,000 16
for the nine-day wake, embalmment and funeral
services. 17
The prosecution and the defense agreed to dispense
with the testimony of Tan, the Assistant Manager
of BPI Kalayaan. Instead, they just agreed to
stipulate that on 11 October 1996, about 7:45 a.m.,
Tan and BPI Custodian Elma R. Piñano retrieved
BPI Express Teller Card No. 3085-2616-21 issued
to Bautista which was captured by the ATM
because a wrong Personal Identification Number
(PIN) was entered. 18
The Defense's Version
The defense presented four witnesses: (1)
Manaban; (2) Renz Javelona ("Javelona"); (3) Tan;
and (4) Patrick Peralta ("Peralta").
Manaban, the accused, testified that he was
employed by Eagle Star Security Agency as a
security guard and was assigned at BPI Kalayaan.
On 10 October 1996, he was on duty from 7:00
p.m. until 7:00 a.m. the following day.
Manaban narrated that on 11 October 1996, about
1:40 a.m., Bautista tried to withdraw money from
the ATM. Manaban then saw Bautista pounding
and kicking the ATM. When Manaban asked
Bautista what was the problem, Bautista replied
that no money came out from the machine.
According to Manaban, Bautista appeared to be
intoxicated.
Manaban looked at the receipt issued to Bautista
and saw that the receipt indicated that a wrong PIN
was entered. Manaban informed Bautista that the
ATM captured Bautista's ATM card because he
entered the wrong PIN. He then advised Bautista to
return the following day when the staff in charge of
servicing the ATM would be around.
Bautista replied that he needed the money very
badly and then resumed pounding on the ATM.
Manaban tried to stop Bautista and called by
telephone the ATM service personnel to pacify
Bautista. Bautista talked to the ATM service
personnel and Manaban heard him shouting
invectives and saw him pounding and kicking the
ATM again.
When Manaban failed to pacify Bautista, Manaban
fired a warning shot in the air. Bautista then faced
him and told him not to block his way because he
needed the money very badly. Bautista allegedly
raised his shirt and showed his gun which was
tucked in his waist. Manaban stepped back and told
Bautista not to draw his gun, otherwise he would
shoot.
However, Bautista allegedly kept on moving
toward Manaban, who again warned Bautista not to
come near him or he would be forced to shoot him.
Bautista suddenly turned his back and was
allegedly about to draw his gun. Fearing that he
would be shot first, Manaban pulled the trigger and
shot Bautista. cEITCA
Manaban recounted that he then went inside the
bank and called the police and his agency to report
the incident. While he was inside the bank, a fellow
security guard arrived and asked what happened.
Manaban answered, "wala yan, lasing."
Later, a mobile patrol car arrived. Manaban related
the incident to the police officer and informed him
that Bautista was still alive and had a gun. Manaban
then surrendered his service firearm to the police
officer. According to Manaban, he fired his gun
twice — once in the air as a warning shot and the
second time at Bautista who was about four meters
from him. 19
On cross-examination, Manaban further explained
that after he fired the warning shot, Bautista kept
coming toward him. Manaban pointed his gun at
Bautista and warned him not to come closer. When
Bautista turned his back, Manaban thought
Bautista was about to draw his gun when he placed
his right hand on his waist. Fearing for his life, he
pulled the trigger and shot Manaban. According to
Manaban, "[n]oong makita ko siya na pabalikwas
siya, na sadya bubunot ng baril, sa takot ko na baka
maunahan niya ako at mapatay, doon ko na rin
nakalabit yung gatilyo ng baril." Manaban declared
that it did not occur to him to simply disable the
victim for fear that Bautista would shoot him first.
20
Javelona was an ATM Service Assistant of BPI.
Javelona testified that on 11 October 1996,
between 1:30 a.m. and 2:00 a.m., she received a
call from a client at BPI Kalayaan. The client, who
was later identified as Bautista, complained:
"Nagwi-withdraw ako dito sa ATM Kalayaan. Mali
daw yung PIN ko, alam ko tama yung PIN ko. Ilang
beses ko nang ginamit, mali pa rin. Kailangan kong
mag-withdraw."
Javelona tried to placate Bautista and advised him
not to insert his card anymore because it might be
captured by the machine and to try again later in the
morning. Bautista allegedly answered angrily: "Na
capture na nga, eh! Tama na nga yung PIN number
[sic]. Hindi ako pwedeng hindi makakuha ng pera.
Kailangan kong bumili ng gamot para sa anak ko.
Hindi ko naman kasalanan ito." Javelona replied:
"Sir, hindi ho natin makukuha ang card ninyo
ngayon kasi ang makaka-open lang ho ng ATM
machine ay ang officer ng Kalayaan Branch. Even
if makuha natin ang card ninyo ngayon, hindi pa
ninyo magagamit ngayon. Magagamit lang ninyo
as soon as mag-pa-encode kayo ng PIN number
[sic]."
Bautista then reiterated angrily his dire need to
withdraw money for the medicine of his daughter.
Javelona apologized to Bautista and informed him
that there was really nothing she could do at that
time. She also advised Bautista to go back to the
bank at 9:00 a.m. to get his ATM card and also to
withdraw money over the counter. Bautista refused
to be pacified and started cursing so Javelona
decided to hang up the phone. 21
Tan, the Assistant Manager of BPI Kalayaan,
testified that when she reported for work in the
morning of 11 October 1996, she discovered that
the ATM was out of order. According to Tan, the
ATM keyboard was not properly mounted and the
keys were damaged. Also, the telephone beside the
ATM was hung up. Tan then called Peralta, the
technician, to have the ATM repaired. When
Peralta opened the ATM, they found Bautista's
ATM card which was captured by the machine. 22
Peralta, a Customer Engineer Specialist, testified
that on 11 October 1996, BPI Kalayaan sought his
assistance regarding their ATM. When Peralta
arrived at BPI Kalayaan, he talked to Tan and then
proceeded to the ATM to assess the damage.
According to Peralta, the ATM keyboard was
damaged and mis-aligned. 23
The Trial Court's Ruling
On 14 April 1999, the trial court rendered
judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, the
Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4)
YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision
Correccional, as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of Pris[i]on Mayor, as
maximum; to pay indemnity to the heirs of Joselito
Bautista for his death in the amount of P75,000.00;
and actual damages in the amount of P111,324.00
for the nine-day wake, embalm[ing] and funeral
services, and P1,418,040.00 for the loss of
Bautista's earning capacity, the last to be paid by
installment at least P3,030.00 a month until fully
paid with the balance earning interest at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 24
The trial court held that the defense failed to
establish self-defense as a justifying circumstance.
According to the trial court, unlawful aggression,
which is the most essential element to support the
theory of self-defense, was lacking in this case. The
trial court found that, contrary to Manaban's claim,
Bautista was not about to draw his gun to shoot
Manaban. Evidence show that Bautista's gun was
still tucked in his waist inside a locked holster.
Furthermore, the trial court held that Bautista could
not have surprised Manaban with a preemptive
attack because Manaban himself testified that he
already had his gun pointed at Bautista when they
were facing each other. The trial court likewise
rejected Manaban's claim of exemption from
criminal liability because he acted under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or
greater injury. The trial court held that the
requisites for the exempting circumstance of
uncontrollable fear under paragraph 6, Article 12
of the Revised Penal Code are not present in this
case. However, the trial court credited Manaban
with two mitigating circumstances: voluntary
surrender and obfuscation.
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision. The Court of Appeals later
reconsidered and modified its decision with respect
only to the award of loss of earning capacity. Using
the formula 2/3 [80 — age at the time of death] x
[gross annual income — 80% gross annual
income], the Court of Appeals recomputed the
award for loss of earning capacity. In its Resolution
dated 8 November 2001, the Court of Appeals
reduced the award for the loss of the victim's
earning capacity from P1,418,040 to P436,320.
The Issues
In his petition for review, Manaban submits that:
1. The Respondent Court gravely erred in affirming
the erroneous factual appreciation and
interpretation by the trial court a quo in practically
affirming the decision of the latter court which are
based on a clear misappreciation of facts and
findings grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures "in a way probably not in
accord with law or with the applicable
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court."
2. The Respondent Court gravely erred in ignoring
petitioner's self-defense on the sole fact that the
entrance of the deceased victim's wound was from
the back.
3. The Respondent Court gravely erred in
concluding that petitioner failed to establish
unlawful aggression just because the holster of the
victim was still in a lock position.
4. Granting arguendo that petitioner made a
mistake in his appreciation that there was an
attempt on the part of the deceased victim to draw
his gun who executed "bumalikwas," such mistake
of fact is deemed justified.
5. Finally, the Respondent Court gravely erred in
awarding exorbitant and baseless award of
damages to the heirs of deceased victim. 25
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious. AacSTE
An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case
for review. The reviewing tribunal can correct
errors though unassigned in the appeal, or reverse
the lower court's decision on grounds other than
those the parties raised as errors. 26
Unlawful Aggression is an Indispensable Requisite
of Self-Defense
When the accused invokes self-defense, he in effect
admits killing the victim and the burden is shifted
to him to prove that he killed the victim to save his
life. 27 The accused must establish by clear and
convincing evidence that all the requisites of self-
defense are present. 28
Under paragraph 1, Article 11 of the Revised Penal
Code, the three requisites to prove self-defense as
a justifying circumstance which may exempt an
accused from criminal liability are: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the accused or the person
defending himself. 29 Unlawful aggression is an
indispensable requisite of self-defense. 30 Self-
defense is founded on the necessity on the part of
the person being attacked to prevent or repel the
unlawful aggression. 31 Thus, without prior
unlawful and unprovoked attack by the victim,
there can be no complete or incomplete self-
defense. 32
Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault or
at least a threat to attack or inflict physical injury
upon a person. 33 A mere threatening or
intimidating attitude is not considered unlawful
aggression, 34 unless the threat is offensive and
menacing, manifestly showing the wrongful intent
to cause injury. 35 There must be an actual, sudden,
unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof,
which puts the defendant's life in real peril. 36
In this case, there was no unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim. First, Bautista was shot at the
back as evidenced by the point of entry of the
bullet. Second, when Bautista was shot, his gun
was still inside a locked holster and tucked in his
right waist. Third, when Bautista turned his back at
Manaban, Manaban was already pointing his
service firearm at Bautista. These circumstances
clearly belie Manaban's claim of unlawful
aggression on Bautista's part. Manaban testified:
ATTY. ANCANAN
Q: You said the victim showed his gun by raising
his shirt?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: The victim never drew his gun?
A: He was about to draw the gun when he turned
around.
Q: My question is when the victim was facing you,
the victim never drew his gun?
A: Not yet, sir.
Q: And when you told the victim not to come close,
he did not come closer anymore?
A: He walked towards me, sir.
Q: For how many steps?
A: I cannot remember how many steps.
Q: And according to you, while he was facing you
and walking towards you he suddenly turned his
back to you, is that correct?
A: Bumalikwas po at parang bubunot ng baril.
Q: Let us get the meaning of "bumalikwas",
tumalikod sa iyo?
A: Bumalikwas po (witness demonstrating).
Q: Will you please demonstrate to us how the
victim "bumalikwas"?
A: When he was facing me and I told him, "Sir, you
just be there otherwise I am going to take the gun"
and at that moment, he, the victim turned his back
and simultaneously drew the gun.
Q: When he was facing you, the victim never drew
his gun, is that correct?
A: Not yet, sir.
Q: And according to you, it was at that point when
he turned his back on you that he tried to draw his
gun?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You said that he tried to draw, but the fact is he
merely placed his hand on his waist?
A: No, sir, when I saw him, when he was hit, I saw
him, the hand was already on the gun but still
tucked on his waist (witness places his hand on his
right waist with fingers open).
Q: And it was at that precise moment while the
victim's back was turned on you that you fired your
shot?
A: When he was about to turn his back and it seems
about to take his gun, that is the time I shot him
because of my fear that he would be ahead in
pulling his gun and he might kill me.
Q: When you said, when you fired your shot, the
victim's gun was still tucked in his right waist, is
that correct?
A: Yes, sir, his hand was on his waist.
Q: You just answer the question. Was the victim's
gun still tucked on his waistline?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And his hand was merely placed on his hips.
The victim's right hand was merely placed on his
right hip?
ATTY. CARAANG
I object. The witness testified that he was about to
draw his gun.
COURT
He is asking the question so he has to answer.
A: No, sir, the gun was on his waist. CADHcI
ATTY. ANCANAN
Q: At the precise time that you fired your second
shot, you could have aimed your gun at the
extremities of the victim, meaning legs or arms, is
that correct?
A: When I saw him that he was about to draw his
gun because of my fear that he would get ahead of
me and he would kill me, I did not mind anymore,
I just inunahan ko siya.
ATTY. CARAANG
May I request that the answer of the witness be
quoted as is?
A: Noong makita ko siya na pabalikwas siya, na
sabay bubunot ng baril, sa takot ko na baka
maunahan niya ako at mapatay, doon ko na rin
nakalabit yung gatilyo ng baril ko.
ATTY. ANCANAN
Q: Mr. Witness, how long have you been a security
guard before this incident?
A: Around 7 months, sir.
Q: Now, before you were employed as security
guard by the Eagle Star Security Agency, did you
undergo any training as a security guard?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where?
A: Camp Crame, sir.
Q: For how long?
A: Three (3) days, sir.
Q: And what did you learn from those 3 days
training as security guard?
A: Our duties as security guard were lectured to us,
sir.
Q: Now, were you not taught during the training
that in any given situation, your first duty is to
disable first an aggressor?
ATTY. CARAANG
Objection, your Honor, I think that is no longer
material besides, that is not part of my direct
examination.
COURT
Witness may answer.
A: It was taught to us, sir, but it depends on my
situation. If the person kept on doing what I told
him not to do and it would reach a point that it
would endanger my life, of course even if you were
in my place, you would do the same thing, so
nakipagsabayan na ako, sir.
Q: But in this particular case when you fired your
second shot, the victim's back was towards you, is
that not correct?
ATTY. CARAANG
Objection, already answered, your Honor.
COURT
Witness may answer.
A: No, sir, I shot him only once, not twice.
Q: Please answer the question. When you fired
your second shot . . .
A: Bumalikwas ho 'yon eh.
Q: Please answer the question.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And because his back was towards you, you
could have easily disabled him by firing at his leg
or at his arms, is that not correct?
ATTY. CARAANG
I object, your Honor, it was already answered. He
said he was not given the opportunity to have a
second thought and at that moment he was able to
pull the trigger of his gun.
ATTY. ANCANAN
The witness already admitted that when he fired his
gun, the victim's back was towards the witness, so
my last question is just a follow-up.
ATTY. CARAANG
But the witness testified that he was not given the
opportunity to have a second thought, that is why
right then and there, he pulled the trigger of his gun.
COURT
Objection noted, witness may answer.
A: What I was thinking at that time, was just to
disarm him but when he turned, bumalikwas, and I
saw that he was going to draw a firearm and that
was when I decided to "makipagsabayan."
xxx xxx xxx
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION
ATTY. CARAANG
Q: Mr. Witness, when you and the victim were
facing each other, the gun was already pointed to
him, is it not? Your gun?
A: Yes, sir, I pointed my gun at him. 37
The allegation of Manaban that Bautista was about
to draw his gun when he turned his back at
Manaban is mere speculation. Besides, Manaban
was already aiming his loaded firearm at Bautista
when the latter turned his back. In that situation, it
was Bautista whose life was in danger considering
that Manaban, who had already fired a warning
shot, was pointing his firearm at Bautista. Bautista,
who was a policeman, would have realized this
danger to his life and would not have attempted to
draw his gun which was still inside a locked holster
tucked in his waist. Furthermore, if Manaban really
feared that Bautista was about to draw his gun to
shoot him, Manaban could have easily disabled
Bautista by shooting his arm or leg considering that
Manaban's firearm was already aimed at Bautista.
HITAEC
Aggression presupposes that the person attacked
must face a real threat to his life and the peril
sought to be avoided is imminent and actual, not
imaginary. 38 Absent such actual or imminent peril
to one's life or limb, there is nothing to repel and
there is no justification for taking the life or
inflicting injuries on another. 39
Voluntary Surrender and Obfuscation
The trial court credited Manaban with two
mitigating circumstances: voluntary surrender and
obfuscation.
It is undisputed that Manaban called the police to
report the shooting incident. When the police
arrived, Manaban surrendered his service firearm
and voluntarily went with the police to the police
station for investigation. Thus, Manaban is entitled
to the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender.
On obfuscation, we find that the facts of the case
do not entitle Manaban to such mitigating
circumstance. Under paragraph 6, Article 13 of the
Revised Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance
of passion and obfuscation is appreciated where the
accused acted upon an impulse so powerful as
naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation.
The requisites of the mitigating circumstance of
passion or obfuscation are: (1) that there should be
an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such
condition of mind; and (2) that the act which
produced the obfuscation was not far removed
from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the
perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.
40
In his testimony, Manaban admitted shooting
Bautista because Bautista turned around and was
allegedly about to draw his gun to shoot Manaban.
The act of Bautista in turning around is not
unlawful and sufficient cause for Manaban to lose
his reason and shoot Bautista. That Manaban
interpreted such act of Bautista as preparatory to
drawing his gun to shoot Manaban does not make
Bautista's act unlawful. The threat was only in the
mind of Manaban and is mere speculation which is
not sufficient to produce obfuscation which is
mitigating. 41 Besides, the threat or danger was not
grave or serious considering that Manaban had the
advantage over Bautista because Manaban was
already pointing his firearm at Bautista when the
latter turned his back. The defense failed to
establish by clear and convincing evidence the
cause that allegedly produced obfuscation.
Award of Damages
The records 42 reveal that Bautista was 36 years
old at the time of his death and not 26 years old as
stated by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
43 Moreover, the annual salary of Bautista at the
time of his death was already P60,864 and not
P60,600. 44 We likewise modify the formula
applied by the Court of Appeals in the computation
of the award for loss of earning capacity. In
accordance with current jurisprudence, 45 the
formula for the indemnification for loss of earning
capacity is:
Net Earning = Life Expectancy x [Gross Annual —
Living Expenses] Capacity Income (GAI)
= 2/3(80 – age of deceased) x (GAI – 50% of GAI)
Using this formula, the indemnification for loss of
earning capacity should be:
Net Earning Capacity = 2/3 (80 – 36) x [P60,864 –
(50% x P60,864)]
= 29.33 x P30,432
= P892,570.56
With regard to actual damages, the records show
that not all the expenses that the Bautista family
allegedly incurred were supported by competent
evidence. Editha failed to present receipts or any
other competent proof for food expenses and rental
fee for jeeps for the funeral. Editha merely
submitted a typewritten "Summary of Food
Expenses & Others." 46 A mere list of expenses,
without any official receipts or any other evidence
obtainable, does not to prove actual expenses
incurred. 47 Competent proof of the actual
expenses must be presented to justify an award for
actual damages. 48 In this case, only the following
expenses were duly supported by official receipts
and other proof:
1 Embalming fee 49
2 Bronze Casket 50
 3 Cadillac Hearse fee 51
4 Funeral Services 52
Total
Thus, we reduce the actual damages granted from
P111,324 to P69,500.
We likewise reduce the indemnity for death from
P75,000 to P50,000 in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence. 53
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM with
MODIFICATION the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 21 May 2001 and its Resolution
dated 8 November 2001. We find petitioner
Ramonito Manaban guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Homicide. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law and taking into
account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, Ramonito Manaban is hereby sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from six
years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to
12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Ramonito Manaban is ordered to pay
the heirs of Joselito Bautista: P892,570.56 as
indemnity for loss of earning capacity; P69,500 as
actual damages; and P50,000 as indemnity for
death.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Manaban v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150723,
[July 11, 2006], 527 PHIL 84-108)
[G.R. No. 156786. June 3, 2004.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
SUSANO PATEO y GARCIA alias "Sanok" and
VICENTE BATUTO y JAPAY, appellants.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
Appellants Susano Pateo y Garcia alias "Sanok"
and Vicente Batuto y Japay were charged with the
crime of murder in an information 1 which reads:
That on or about the 01st day of October 2000, at
Sitio Picas, Brgy. Caraycaray, Naval, Biliran
Province, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, said accused, with malice
aforethought, and with deliberate intent to take the
life of ANTONIO SILVANO, conspiring with,
confederating and mutually helping one another,
did then and there willfully, 3,500unlawfully and
feloniously and treacherously attack the former,
30,000Vicente Batuto
first, from behind by co-accused
who hid behind the flowering———–plants in front of the
store of Susano Pateo alias Sanok, and thereafter,
by Susano Pateo who wentP69,500 out of his store and
strike (sic) the head of Antonio Silvano with the use
of a lead pipe, and later, to (sic) the other parts of
the victim's body, and while accused Vicente
Batuto and victim Antonio Silvano grappled for the
possession of the short knife, co-accused Susano
Pateo continuously hack (sic) said Antonio Silvano
hitting him to (sic) the different parts of his body
which caused his direct and immediate death
thereafter.
Appellants pleaded "not guilty." Trial on the merits
thereafter ensued.
At around 6:30 in the evening of October 1, 2000,
appellants Susano Pateo and Vicente Batuto were
having a drinking binge together with Olimpio
Narrido and Zosimo Paculan at the yard near
Susano's store located at Sitio Picas, Brgy.
Caraycaray, Naval, Biliran. When they were
inebriated, they began to talk loudly and became
unruly. Their neighbor, Antonio Silvano, could not
sleep due to the noise. He and his wife sent their
daughter, Ana Marie, to ask the group twice to tone
down their voices, but the request was ignored.
A short while later, Antonio went out of his house
to buy candies from Susano's store with Ana Marie
in tow. He brought with him a knife hidden behind
his waist. When he saw Antonio approaching,
Susano handed a bolo to Vicente, who then hid
behind some shrubs near the store.
After Antonio got his candies, Vicente suddenly
emerged from his hiding place and hacked the
former at the back of his head. Immediately
thereafter, Vicente successively hacked Antonio on
different parts of his body. Antonio fought for
possession of the bolo from Vicente. He was able
to draw his knife and stab Vicente on the abdomen,
chest and left arm.
Seeing the tide shifting in Antonio's favor, Susano
ran out of his store and repeatedly struck Antonio
on different parts of his body with a blunt
instrument, forcing the latter to release his hold on
Vicente and drop his knife. Antonio ran towards his
mother's house while Vicente pursued him. Vicente
caught up with him and repeatedly hacked him on
different parts of his body with the bolo.
After Antonio fell to the ground, Susano went back
to his house. Vicente, however, who had a grudge
against Antonio, tauntingly asked, "Are you still
alive?" He then delivered the coup de grace and
thrust his bolo into Antonio's body, which caused
his death.
Dr. Salvacion Salas, Municipal Health Officer of
Naval, Biliran, examined Antonio's cadaver and
came up with the following findings:
1. Hacking wound at the occipital region of the
head which measures to 7 cm. width respectively,
involving only the skin.
2. Hacking wound at the frontal area of the head
involving the skin exposing the bone. The wound
measures L-9 cm. & w-2 cm. respectively. No brain
tissues noted.
3. Hacking wound at the left portion of the face
involving at the upper left eyebrow passing thru the
left ear involving the left portion of the neck. It
involved the skin up to the bone of the skull but no
brain tissues noted. The wound measures L-19 cm.
& W-3 cm.
4. Hacking wound at the right portion of the right
ear through the right side of the forehead. It
measures L-6.5 cm. & W-2 cm. Involving only the
skin and Muscle. ASTcaE
5. Lacerated wound at the back of the right ear
measuring 3 cm. in length; and 1 cm. in width.
6. Wound at the back portion of the head; just
adjacent to the 1st wound, involving only the skin.
It measures L-6 cm.; W-1 cm.
7. Lacerated wound at the left cheek bone area with
a Measurement L-2.5 cm; W-0.5 cm.
8. Lacerated wound at the right face — measuring
L-11 cm. & W-6.5 cm. respectively.
9. Lacerated wound at the chain just below the
lower lip Measuring 4 cm. in length; and 2 cm.
wide.
10. Lacerated wound at the left arm just below the
right axilla measuring 2 cm. long; and 1 cm. wide.
11. Stab wound at the left chest — 5 cm. from the
left nipple. The wound measures 3 cm. long; 0.7
cm. wide; and 24 cm. deep directing downward
penetrating the chest cavity.
12. Stab wound at the abdomen just 3.5 cm. from
umbilicus. The wound measures 2 cm. length; 0.5
cm. wide & 3.5 cm. deep involving the skin up to
muscle.
13. Lacerated wound at the back of the right thigh
measuring to 3 cm. long; 2 cm. wide & 6 cm. deep.
14. Lacerated wound at the back of the right leg just
below the knee joint measuring to 5 cm. long; 1 cm.
wide & 5 cm. deep involving the skin up to the
muscle.
15. Lacerated wound at the right hand measuring 1
cm. long & 4 cm. wide.
Cause of Death: Cardiac Respiratory Arrest due to
Severe Internal & External hemorrhage secondary
to Multiple Hacking and Stab wounds. 2
Appellant Vicente interposed self-defense. He
alleged that a drunk and armed Antonio went to
Susano's store looking for him. When Antonio
found him outside the store, he stabbed the latter
with the knife. Vicente fought back with his bolo.
In the ensuing struggle, Antonio fell and died of his
wounds.
For his part, Susano denied striking Antonio with a
lead pipe. He claimed that he just stayed in his store
during the fight and took no part in the fighting.
The trial court gave credence to the prosecution's
evidence and rendered a decision, 3 the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
considerations, this Court finds the accused
SUSANO PATEO Y GARCIA alias "Sanok" and
VICENTE BATUTO Y JAPAY GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, hereby
imposing upon them the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and with all the necessary penalties
provided by law.
Both accused shall solidarily pay the legal heirs an
indemnity on the life of the deceased Antonio
Silvano in the amount of P50,000.00. With costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this appeal based on the following
assignment of errors:
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF
PROSECUTION WITNESSES ANA MARIE
SILVANO, ERIC SILVANO, AND TERESA
MALLEN INSPITE OF THEIR GROSSLY
INCONSISTENT AND CONTRADICTORY
STATEMENTS.
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
CONVICTING ACCUSED SUSANO PATEO OF
THE CRIME CHARGED.
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
APPRECIATING INCOMPLETE SELF-
DEFENSE IN FAVOR OF VICENTE BATUTO.
4
In particular, appellants point out that Ana Marie
failed to expressly mention that Susano struck her
father with a lead pipe. Also, she could not have
witnessed the incident as she testified that she went
to sleep after she returned from the store. These are
all contrary to Eric Silvano's and Teresa Mallen's
testimonies. In addition, Ana Marie candidly
admitted that she was coached by her lawyer as to
what she will do during the trial.
Witnesses cannot be expected to give a flawless
testimony all the time. Although there may be
inconsistencies in minor details, the same do not
impair the credibility of the witnesses, where, as in
this case, there is no inconsistency in relating the
principal occurrence and the positive identification
of the assailant. Minor discrepancies do not
damage the essential integrity of the evidence in its
material whole nor reflect adversely on the
witnesses' credibility. We have previously held in
fact that minor inconsistencies, far from detracting
from the veracity of the testimony, even enhance
the credibility of the witnesses, for they remove any
suspicion that the testimony was contrived or
rehearsed. 5 In this case, all three prosecution
witnesses identified appellants as the perpetrators
of the crime. Not only were they identified, the
witnesses also testified as to their roles and their
specific deeds in the killing.
It has been held that a witness testifying about the
same nerve-wracking event can hardly be expected
to be correct in every detail and consistent with
other witnesses in every respect, considering the
inevitability of differences in perception,
recollection, viewpoint or impressions, as well as
in their physical, mental, emotional and
psychological states at the time of the reception and
recall of such impressions. After all, no two
persons are alike in powers of observation and
recall. Total recall or perfect symmetry is not
required as long as witnesses concur on material
points. 6
As to allegations that Ana Marie's lawyer coached
her to cry, it should be noted that she was only nine
years old when she testified. Even without the
lawyer coaching her, she was the daughter of the
victim and she personally witnessed how her father
was killed. She would naturally cry if forced to
remember how her father died. In any case, we
deem this episode too immaterial to affect her
credibility.
It is well-settled doctrine that findings of trial
courts on the credibility of witnesses deserve a high
degree of respect. Having observed the deportment
of witnesses during the trial, the trial judge is in a
better position to determine the issue of credibility;
thus, his findings will not be disturbed on appeal in
the absence of any clear showing that he
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance that
could have altered the conviction of appellants. 7
The circumstances pointed out by appellants are
too trivial to affect the assessment and the eventual
findings of the trial court that appellant committed
the crime.
Moreover, when the accused invokes self-defense,
it becomes incumbent upon him to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in
defense of himself. Self-defense as a justifying
circumstance is present when the following concur:
(1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity
of the means employed to repel or prevent it; and
(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself. 8 Unlawful aggression is
a condition sine qua non for the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. It contemplates an
actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or imminent
danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or
intimidating attitude. The person defending himself
must have been attacked with actual physical force
or with actual use of weapon. Of all the elements,
unlawful aggression, i.e., the sudden unprovoked
attack on the person defending himself, is
indispensable. 9 A threat, even if made with a
weapon, or the belief that a person was about to be
attacked, is not sufficient. It is necessary that the
intent be ostensibly revealed by an act of
aggression or by some external acts showing the
commencement of actual and material aggression.
10
In the case at bar, the trial court found that Vicente
came out of his hiding place and hacked the
unsuspecting Antonio on the head. Antonio could
not have been the aggressor.
Moreover, the nature, number and location of the
wounds sustained by the victim belie the assertion
of self-defense since the gravity of said wounds is
indicative of a determined effort to kill and not just
to defend. 11 The number of wounds was
established by the physical evidence, which is a
mute manifestation of truth and ranks high in the
hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. 12 In this case,
Antonio sustained fifteen hack and stab wounds.
These wounds more than belie Vicente's assertion
that he was defending himself.
Besides, the trial court also found that when
Antonio was already down, Vicente asked, "Are
you still alive?" After taunting him, Vicente
delivered the coup de grace by thrusting his bolo
into his sprawled body. A person making a defense
has no more right to attack an aggressor when the
unlawful aggression has ceased. 13
As to Susano's denial that he participated in the
killing, the trial court observed that "plainly, if
Susano Pateo was not a participant, no witness
would point to him." 14 In fact, their other two
drinking companions were not pointed to as
perpetrators and impleaded as accused. Moreover,
the trial court found that the fifteen wounds
sustained by Antonio were apparently caused by
two instruments: a sharp and a blunt instrument. 15
The defense of denial, like alibi, is considered with
suspicion and is always received with caution, not
only because it is inherently weak and unreliable,
but also because it can be fabricated easily.
Furthermore, all three of the prosecution witnesses
pointed to him as one of the perpetrators and in fact
narrated in detail his participation in the killing of
Antonio. CTEaDc
The trial court correctly found that there was
conspiracy. Conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. In
the absence of direct proof of conspiracy, it may be
deduced from the mode, method and manner by
which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from
the acts of the accused themselves when such acts
point to a joint purpose and design, concerted
action and community of interest. 16 In this case,
Vicente admitted the killing. Susano's participation
in the killing was proven by his acts of handing the
bolo to Vicente and beating Antonio up with a blunt
instrument.
The trial court also correctly held that treachery
attended the killing of Antonio. There is treachery
when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means and method or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and especially to ensure its execution, without risk
to the offender, arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. The essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack
without the slightest provocation on the part of the
person attacked. 17 As observed by the trial court,
"consciously, Vicente Batuto hid in the 'San
Francisco' plants and shrubs near the store to create
an ambush on the presence of Antonio Silvano." 18
The fact that he hid behind the plants showed his
intention to surprise Antonio and ensure that he
would be able to successfully deliver the first blow.
We, therefore, affirm appellants' conviction for the
crime of murder.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death.
The two penalties being both indivisible, and there
being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance
in this case, the lesser of the two penalties, which
is reclusion perpetua, should be imposed pursuant
to the second paragraph of Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code. 19
The trial court correctly awarded civil indemnity in
the amount of P50,000.00 20 which is awarded
without need of proof.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naval,
Biliran, Branch 16, in Criminal Case No. N-2093,
finding appellants, Susano Pateo y Garcia @
"Sanok" and Vicente Batuto y Japay, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder,
sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordering them, jointly and severally,
to pay the heirs of the deceased Antonio Silvano,
civil indemnity, in the amount of P50,000.00, is
AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Pateo y Garcia, G.R. No. 156786,
[June 3, 2004], 474 PHIL 691-702)
[G.R. No. 148724. October 15, 2002.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. DOMINGO ARNANTE y
DACPANO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
Appellant was found guilty by the trial court of the
crime of parricide for killing his father. On appeal,
appellant contended that the trial court erred in
convicting him despite the fact that he acted in
legitimate self-defense.
In order that the plea of self-defense can prevail,
three basic conditions must concur: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim, (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful
aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and
unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life
and limb of a person defending himself and not
merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. The
aggression must be real and not just imaginary. In
the case at bar, there was nothing in the testimony
of appellant which would suggest the attendance of
a kind of unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim that can justify appellant's claim of self-
defense. A mere perception of an impending attack
is not sufficient to constitute unlawful aggression,
and neither is an intimidating or threatening
attitude. The conviction of appellant was affirmed.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; BURDEN OF
PROOF; RESTS ON ACCUSED WHO
INVOKES SELF-DEFENSE. — When an accused
admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense
to escape criminal liability, he assumes the burden
to establish his plea by credible, clear and
convincing evidence. SaIACT
2. CRIMINAL LAW; JUSTIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES; SELF-DEFENSE;
ELEMENTS. — In order that the plea of self-
defense can prevail, three basic conditions must
concur, i.e., (1) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim, (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; UNLAWFUL
AGGRESSION; AGGRESSION MUST BE
REAL AND NOT JUST IMAGINARY. —
Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden
and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the
life and limb of a person defending himself and not
merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. The
aggression must be real and not just imaginary. . . .
A mere perception of an impending attack is not
sufficient to constitute unlawful aggression, and
neither is an intimidating or threatening attitude.
4. ID.; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES;
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER; JUSTIFIES THE
IMPOSITION OF RECLUSION PERPETUA
FOR THE CRIME OF PARRICIDE; CASE AT
BAR. — [A]ppellant voluntarily surrendered
himself to the authorities shortly after the shooting
incident. Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, prescribes the
penalty of reclusion perpetuato death for the crime
of parricide. The attendance of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender justifies the
imposition of the lesser penalty.
DECISION
VITUG, J p:
On 16 July 2000, Valentin Arnante, his son
Domingo Arnante, and other relatives were
celebrating the birth anniversary of Christopher
Arnante, another son of Valentin and brother of
Domingo, at their residence in Sto. Domingo, Iriga
City. Shortly after lunch, the group started having
drinks in the living room of the Arnante residence.
At around six o'clock in the evening, Valentin and
his son Domingo, by then already both drunk, came
to a heated argument. Domingo told his father to
stop embarrassing him in front of guests but the
latter still went on berating his son. Feeling
ignored, Domingo stood up, proceeded to his room,
followed by his brother Christopher, and took hold
of a handgun. Domingo fired the gun towards the
ground scaring the people in the house and
prompting them to rush out through the front door.
Domingo went out of the house through the kitchen
door. His father Valentin followed until he was
fired at and shot twice by Domingo. The victim was
not able to make it to the hospital.
Domingo Arnante y Dacpano was indicted for
parricide in an information that read —
"That at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of July
16, 2000 at their residence at Zone 5, Mabunga St.,
Sto. Domingo, Iriga City, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill,
shoot his own father, Valentin Arnante y Tabayag
twice with a handgun hitting his stomach and left
arm which directly caused his instantaneous death"
1—
to which charge he pleaded "not guilty" when
arraigned.
Elena Arnante, the wife of the victim and mother
of Domingo, testified that she was in the living
room when she heard two gunshots. She dashed out
from the room and she saw near the kitchen her
husband down on the floor with gunshot wounds
and her son Domingo standing by the kitchen door
still holding the handgun. She immediately called
for help and brought Valentin to the Our Lady of
Mediatrix Hospital where her husband was
declared "dead on arrival."
Christopher Arnante stated that he tried to caution
his brother Domingo when the latter got hold of the
handgun but his brother would not hear of it.
Domingo went out of the house through the kitchen
door. Valentin followed. Christopher then heard
two gunshots. He did not see where the first shot
was directed at but he saw the second shot being
aimed at his father. Entering the house, he saw his
father bleeding and about to fall to the ground.
When he tried to assist his father, Domingo also
fired at him but missed. Christopher hurriedly went
to the house of a neighbor to call for help. Failing
to contact any police officer, he personally went to
the police station where, not long after, he was
informed that his father was dead on arrival at the
hospital.
Dr. Pablo Filio, Jr., the Assistant City Health
Officer of Iriga City, conducted a postmortem
examination on the cadaver of Valentin Arnante
about six hours after the latter's death. The
physician's postmortem report indicated that the
victim suffered two (2) gunshot wounds — one on
the left arm which penetrated 2 inches below the
armpit and another gunshot wound on the umbilical
region, 3 inches below the umbilicus — the second
wound being fatal and the immediate cause of
death of the victim. He also testified that from the
entry and direction of the wound, it would appear
that the assailant was in front of the victim.
Domingo Arnante admitted having shot his own
father twice but sought to justify his misdeed. He
said that during the celebration of his brother's
birthday, his father, without any apparent reason,
got mad at him and started scolding him. He told
his father to stop humiliating him in front of all the
guests but the victim persisted. He left the group
and went to his room to get his gun. He fired the
gun downwards to make his father stop censuring
him. He then went out of the house through the
kitchen door but his father still followed and
threatened to hack him with a bolo. He was so
embarrassed that he lost control of himself and shot
his father twice. He promptly left the scene but
soon thereafter surrendered to the police
authorities.
The Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 35,
which had tried the case, rendered a decision, on 09
February 2001, rejecting the plea of self-defense
and convicting Domingo Arnante; it held:
'WHEREFORE, finding the accused DOMINGO
ARNANTE guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of parricide defined and penalized under
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, he is
sentenced to a penalty of reclusion perpetua, pay
the indemnity of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs."
2
In its brief for appellant, the defense raised a lone
assignment of error to the effect that the "the trial
court erred in convicting accused-appellant despite
the fact that he (had) acted in legitimate self-
defense." 3
The claim of self-defense is untenable. When an
accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-
defense to escape criminal liability, he assumes the
burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and
convincing evidence. 4 In order that the plea of
self-defense can prevail, three basic conditions
must concur, i.e., (1) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim, (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack
of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. 5 Unlawful aggression
presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected
attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a
person defending himself 6 and not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude. The aggression
must be real and not just imaginary. 7
The testimony of appellant himself easily negates
any showing of unlawful aggression on the part of
his father. Observe his testimony —
"Q. On July 16, 2000 at or about 6:00 o'clock in the
evening at Sto. Domingo, Iriga City while you were
at your house together with your father what
happened if any?
"A. Now, there was a birthday celebration in
connection of the birthday of my brother and a
drinking spree was held.
"Q. What is the name of your brother?
"A. Christopher.
"Q. What happened between you and your father at
around 6:00 o'clock in the evening on said date and
time and year and place?
"A. We had an altercation.
"Q. And what is that altercation about between you
and your father?
"A. I cannot understand sir. He suddenly got mad
at me.
"Q. And what happened when your father suddenly
got mad at you?
"A. I told my father not to scold me anymore as
there were very many people there it was shameful
on my part.
"Q. Then what happened when you told that to your
father?
"A. He continued scolding me.
"Q. By the way you mentioned 'papa,' is that the
way you call your father?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. So, what happened when your papa continued
to scold you?
"A. I left.
"Q. Where did you proceed?
"A. I entered my room to put a stop to his scolding.
"Q. And after you entered your room what
happened next?
"A. He continued scolding me so what I did was I
took my gun and then fired downward.
"Q. Why did you fire your gun downward?
"A. In order for my father to stop scolding me as
there were so many people I was getting
embarrassed.
"Q. After firing your gun downward what
happened next?
"A. I went out of the house through the kitchen.
"Q. Why did you went out the house through the
kitchen Mr. Witness?
"A. So I could leave the place.
"Q. Were you able to leave the house through the
kitchen?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And what happened when you were able to go
out the house?
"A. Now I went out of the house so I could leave
the place but after I went out of the house I saw my
father followed me closely.
"Q. And what happened when your father followed
you closely?
"A. He was still scolding me and he was carrying a
bolo.
"Q. What happened when you noticed that your
father followed you closely and he had a bolo?
"A. He was about to hack me I told him not to do it
because I was going to leave.
"PROS. TAGUM:
Your Honor, we will object to the testimony of this
witness because it is not one of those purposes for
which this witness is being offered in evidence.
"ATTY. CABALTERA:
That is precisely Your Honor part of the mitigating
circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on
the part of the offended party that immediately
preceded the act.
"COURT:
Let him answer.
"ATTY. CABALTERA:
Okay.
"Q. What happened next after that?
"A. He was still scolding me. He threatened to hack
me.
"Q. After he threatened to hack you what did you
do next if any?
"A. Now as he was still scolding me and I was
getting so much embarrassed now I saw something
dark and I shot my father. My vision darkened and
I was able to shoot my father.
"Q. For how many times did you shoot your father?
"A. Two (2) times.
"Q. Why two (2) shots?
"A. I was not able to control myself." 8
Nothing in the testimony would suggest the
attendance of a kind of unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim that can justify appellant's claim
of self-defense. A mere perception of an impending
attack is not sufficient to constitute unlawful
aggression, and neither is an intimidating or
threatening attitude. 9
The trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. Verily,
appellant voluntarily surrendered himself to the
authorities shortly after the shooting incident.
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659, prescribes the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of
parricide. The attendance of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender justifies the
imposition of the lesser penalty. 10
In addition to the civil liability of P50,000.00,
appellant must also be made to account for
P50,000.00 moral damages for wounded feelings
and moral shock suffered by the heirs of the victim
and P25,000.00 exemplary damages on account of
relationship, a qualifying circumstance, which was
alleged and proved, to the crime of parricide.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Iriga City, Branch 35, in Criminal Case
No. IR-5300, finding DOMINGO ARNANTE y
DACPANO guilty of the crime of parricide and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, as well as to pay P50,000.00 civil
indemnity, is AFFIRMED with modification in
that appellant is likewise hereby ordered to pay
P50,000.00 moral damages and P25,000.00
exemplary damages to the heirs of the victim. Costs
against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Arnante y Dacpano, G.R. No. 148724,
[October 15, 2002], 439 PHIL 754-762)
[G.R. No. 103613. February 23, 2001.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and ELADIO
C. TANGAN, respondents.
[G.R. No. 105830. February 23, 2001.]
ELADIO C. TANGAN, petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
At around 11:30 p.m. of December 1, 1984, Navy
Captain Eladio C. Tangan was driving alone on
Roxas Boulevard heading south. He had just come
from Buendia Avenue on an intelligence operation.
At the same time, Generoso Miranda, a 29-year old
optometrist, was driving his car in the same
direction along Roxas Boulevard with his uncle,
Manuel Miranda, after coming from the Ramada
Hotel. Generoso was moving ahead of Tangan.
Suddenly, firecrackers were thrown in Generoso's
way, causing him to swerve to the right and cut
Tangan's path. Tangan blew his horn several times.
Generoso slowed down to let Tangan pass. Tangan
accelerated and overtook Generoso, but when he
got in front, Tangan reduced speed. Generoso tried
four or five times to overtake on the right lane but
Tangan kept blocking his lane. As he approached
Airport Road, Tangan slowed down to make a U-
turn. Generoso passed him, pulled over and got out
of the car with his uncle. Tangan also stopped his
car and got out. As the Mirandas got near Tangan's
car, Generoso loudly retorted, "Putang ina mo,
bakit mo ginigitgit ang sasakyan ko?" Generoso
and Tangan then exchanged expletives. Tangan
pointed his hand to Generoso and the latter slapped
it, saying, "Huwag mo akong dinuduro! Sino ka ba,
ano ba ang pinagmamalaki mo?" Tangan
countered, "Ikaw, ano ang gusto mo?" With this,
Tangan went to his car and got his .38 caliber
handgun on the front seat. The subsequent events
per account of the parties' respective witnesses
were conflicting: aATHIE
According to the prosecution witnesses,
particularly, Mary Ann Borromeo, Rosalia Cruz
and Manuel Miranda, the accused pointed his gun
at Generoso Miranda and when Manuel Miranda
tried to intervene, the accused pointed his gun at
Manuel Miranda, and after that the accused pointed
again the gun to Generoso Miranda, the accused
shot Generoso Miranda at a distance of about a
meter but because the arm of the accused was
extended, the muzzle of the gun reached to about
more or less one foot away from the body of
Generoso Miranda. The shot hit the stomach of
Generoso Miranda causing the latter to fall and
while still conscious, Generoso Miranda told
Manuel Miranda, his uncle, to get the gun. Manuel
Miranda grappled for the possession of the gun and
during their grappling, Rosalia Cruz intervened and
took hold of the gun and after Rosalia Cruz has
taken hold of the gun, a man wearing a red T-shirt
took the gun from her. The man in T-shirt was
chased by Manuel Miranda who was able to get the
gun where the man in red T-shirt placed it.
On the other hand, the defense, particularly the
accused and his witness by the name of Nelson
Pante claimed that after the gun was taken by the
accused from inside his car, the Mirandas started to
grapple for possession of the gun and during the
grappling, and while the two Mirandas were trying
to wrest away the gun from the accused, they fell
down at the back of the car of the accused.
According to the accused, he lost the possession of
the gun after falling at the back of his car and as
soon as they hit the ground, the gun fell, and it
exploded hitting Generoso Miranda. 1
After the gun went off, Tangan ran away.
Meanwhile, Generoso lay on the ground bloodied.
His uncle, Manuel, looked for the gun and ran after
Tangan, joining the mob that had already pursued
him. Tangan found a policeman who allowed him
to enter his patrol car. Manuel arrived and told the
policeman that Tangan had just shot his nephew.
Then he went back to where Generoso lay and there
found two ladies, later identified as Mary Ann
Borromeo and Rosalina Cruz, helping his nephew
board a taxi. Manuel suggested that Generoso be
brought to the hospital in his car. He was rushed to
the Philippine General Hospital but he expired on
the way.
Tangan was charged with the crime of murder with
the use of an unlicensed firearm. 2 After a
reinvestigation, however, the information was
amended to homicide with the use of a licensed
firearm, 3 and he was separately charged with
illegal possession of unlicensed firearm. 4 On
arraignment, Tangan entered a plea of not guilty in
the homicide case, but moved to quash the
information for illegal possession of unlicensed
firearm on various grounds. The motion to quash
was denied, whereupon he filed a petition for
certiorari with this Court. 5 On November 5, 1987,
said petition was dismissed and the joint trial of the
two cases was ordered. 6
During the trial, the prosecution and the defense
stipulated on the following: that the amount of
P126,000.00 was incurred for the funeral and burial
expenses of the victim; 7 that P74,625.00 was
incurred for attorneys fees; and that the heirs of
Generoso suffered moral damages, the amount of
which is left for the courts to determine. After trial,
the lower court acquitted Tangan of illegal
possession of firearm, but convicted him of
homicide. The privileged mitigating circumstance
of incomplete self-defense and the ordinary
mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation
on the part of the offended party and of passion and
obfuscation were appreciated in his favor;
consequently, the trial court ordered him to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of two (2) months of
arresto mayor,as minimum, to two (2) years and
four (4) months of prision correccional,as
maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim.
8 Tangan was released from detention after the
promulgation of judgment 9 and was allowed bail
in the homicide case. ASEIDH
Private complainants, the heirs of Generoso
Miranda, filed a petition for review with this Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 102677, challenging the civil
aspect of the court a quo's decision, but the same
was dismissed for being premature. On the other
hand, Tangan appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the judgment of the trial court but
increased the award of civil indemnity to
P50,000.00. 10 His subsequent motion for
reconsideration and a motion to cite the Solicitor
General in contempt were denied by the Court of
Appeals. 11
The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of the
prosecution, alleging grave abuse of discretion,
filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
docketed as G.R. No. 103613, naming as
respondents the Court of Appeals and Tangan,
where it prayed that the appellate court's judgment
be modified by convicting accused-appellant of
homicide without appreciating in his favor any
mitigating circumstance. 12 Subsequently, the
Office of the Solicitor General, this time acting for
public respondent Court of Appeals, filed a motion
for extension to file comment to its own petition for
certiorari. 13 Discovering its glaring error, the
Office of the Solicitor General later withdrew its
motion for extension of time. 14 Tangan filed a
Reply asking that the case be submitted for
decision. 15
Meanwhile, Tangan filed a separate petition for
review under Rule 45, docketed as G.R. No.
105830. 16 Since the petition for certiorari filed by
the Solicitor General remained unresolved, the two
cases were consolidated. 17 The Office of the
Solicitor General filed a manifestation in G.R. No.
105830, asking that it be excused from filing a
comment to Tangan's petition for review, in order
to avoid taking contradictory positions. 18
In the recent case of People v.Velasco and Galvez,
19 we held that the prosecution cannot avail of the
remedies of special civil action on certiorari,
petition for review on certiorari, or appeal in
criminal cases. Previous to that, we categorically
ruled that the writ of certiorari cannot be used by
the State in a criminal case to collect a lower court's
factual findings or evaluation of the evidence. 20
Rule 117, Section 7, of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, is clear:
Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.—
When an accused has been convicted or acquitted,
or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court
of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint
or information or other formal charge sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction and after
the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof,
or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the
former complaint or information.
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be
a bar to another prosecution for an offense which
necessarily includes the offense charged in the
former complaint or information under any of the
following instances:
(a) the graver offense developed due to
supervening facts arising from the same act or
omission constituting the former charge;
(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became
known or were discovered only after a plea was
entered in the former complaint or information; or
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made
without the consent of the fiscal and of the offended
party, except as provided in section 1 (f) of Rule
116.
In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused
satisfies or serves in whole or in part the judgment,
he shall be credited with the same in the event of
conviction for the graver offense. DACTSH
Based on the foregoing, the Solicitor General's
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, praying that
no mitigating circumstance be appreciated in favor
of accused-appellant and that the penalty imposed
on him be correspondingly increased, constitutes a
violation of Tangan's right against double jeopardy
and should be dismissed.
We now come to the petition for review filed by
Tangan. It is noteworthy that during the trial,
petitioner Tangan did not invoke self-defense but
claimed that Generoso was accidentally shot. As
such, the burden of proving self-defense, 21 which
normally would have belonged to Tangan, did not
come into play. Although Tangan must prove his
defense of accidental firing by clear and convincing
evidence, 22 the burden of proving the commission
of the crime remained in the prosecution.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
appreciated in favor of Tangan the privileged
mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense
under Article 13 (1),in relation to Article 11 (1),of
the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
ARTICLE 11. Justifying circumstances.— The
following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or
rights, provided that the following circumstances
concur:
First.Unlawful aggression.
Second.Reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it.
Third.Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself.
xxx xxx xxx
ARTICLE 13. Mitigating Circumstances.— The
following are mitigating circumstances:
1. Those mentioned in the preceding Chapter,
when all the requisites necessary to justify the act
or to exempt from criminal liability in the
respective cases are not attendant.
Incomplete self-defense is not considered as a
justifying act, but merely a mitigating
circumstance; hence, the burden of proving the
crime charged in the information is not shifted to
the accused. 23 In order that it may be successfully
appreciated, however, it is necessary that a majority
of the requirements of self-defense be present,
particularly the requisite of unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim. 24 Unlawful aggression by
itself or in combination with either of the other two
requisite suffices to establish incomplete self-
defense. Absent the unlawful aggression, there can
never be self-defense, complete or incomplete, 25
because if there is nothing to prevent or repel, the
other two requisites of defense will have no basis.
26
There is no question that the bullet which hit the
victim was fired from the caliber .38, which was
issued to Tangan by the Philippine Navy. The cause
of death was severe hemorrhage secondary to
gunshot wound of the abdomen, caused by the
bullet fired from a gun of the said caliber. The
prosecution claimed that Tangan shot the victim
point-blank in the stomach at a distance of about
one foot. On the other hand, Tangan alleged that
when he grappled with Generoso and Manuel
Miranda for possession of the gun, it fell to the
ground and accidentally fired, hitting the victim.
IaEACT
When the testimonies of witnesses in open court
are conflicting in substantial points, the calibration
of the records on appeal becomes difficult. It is the
word of one party against the word of the other. The
reviewing tribunal relies on the cold and mute
pages of the records, unlike the trial court which
had the unique opportunity of observing first-hand
that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the
witness' deportment on the stand while testifying.
27 The trial court's assessments of the credibility of
witnesses is accorded great weight and respect on
appeal and is binding on this Court, 28 particularly
when it has not been adequately demonstrated that
significant facts and circumstances were shown to
have been overlooked or disregarded by the court
below which, if considered, might affect the
outcome hereof. 29 The rationale for this has been
adequately explained in that,
The trial court has the advantage of observing the
witnesses through the different indicators of
truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of
an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a
discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant
answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply; or the
furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the
hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering
tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the
candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of
the solemnity of an oath, and carriage and mien. 30
Equally, when a person fabricates a story, he
usually adopts a simple account because a complex
one might lead to entanglement from which he may
find it hard to extricate himself. Along the same
line, the experience of the courts and the general
observations of humanity teach us that the natural
limitations of our inventive faculties are such that
if a witness delivers in court a false narrative
containing numerous details, he is almost certain to
fall into fatal inconsistencies, to make statements
which can be readily refuted, or to expose in his
demeanor the falsity of his message. 31 Aside from
this, it is not also unusual that the witness may have
been coached before he is called to the stand to
testify.
Somewhere along the painstaking review of the
evidence on record, one version rings the
semblance of truth, not necessarily because it is the
absolute truth, but simply because it is the best
approximation of the truth based on the
declarations of witnesses as corroborated by
material evidence. Perforce, the other version must
be rejected. Truth and falsehood, it has been well
said, are not always opposed to each other like
black and white, but oftentimes, and by design, are
made to resemble each other so as to be hardly
distinguishable. 32 Thus, after analyzing the
conflicting testimonies of the witnesses, the trial
court found that:
When the accused took the gun from his car and
when he tried to get out of the car and the two
Mirandas saw the accused already holding the gun,
they started to grapple for the possession of the gun
that it went off hitting Generoso Miranda at the
stomach. The court believes that contrary to the
testimony of the accused, he never lost possession
of the gun for if he did and when the gun fell to the
ground, it will not first explode or if it did,
somebody is not holding the same, the trajectory of
the bullet would not be perpendicular or horizontal.
33
The Court of Appeals agreed —
The finding of the lower court that Generoso
Miranda III was shot while the accused and the
Mirandas were grappling for the possession of the
gun immediately after the accused had taken his
gun from inside his car and before the three
allegedly fell to the ground behind the car of the
accused is borne out by the record. The court also
agrees with the court below that it was the accused-
appellant who shot and killed Generoso Miranda
III. If the accused-appellant did not shoot Generoso
III during the scuffle, he would have claimed
accidental killing by alleging that his gun exploded
during the scuffle instead of falsely testifying that
he and the Mirandas fell to the ground behind his
car and the gun exploded in the possession of
Manuel Miranda. The theory of the prosecution
that the shooting took place while the three were
grappling for the possession of the gun beside the
car of appellant is completely in harmony with the
findings and testimony of Dr. Ibarrola regarding
the relative position of the three and the precarious
nearness of the victim when accused-appellant
pulled the trigger of his gun. Dr. Ibarrola explained
that the gun was about two (2) inches from the
entrance wound and that its position was almost
perpendicular when it was fired. It was in fact the
closeness of the Mirandas vis-a-vis appellant
during the scuffle for the gun that the accused-
appellant was compelled to pull the trigger in
answer to the instinct of self-preservation. 34
No convincing reason appears for the Court to
depart from these factual findings, the same being
ably supported by the evidence on record. In
violent deaths caused by gunshot wounds, the
medical report or the autopsy on the cadaver of the
victim must as much as possible narrate the
observations on the wounds examined. It is
material in determining the truthfulness of the
events narrated by the witnesses presented. It is not
enough that the witness looks credible and assumes
that he indeed witnessed the criminal act. His
narration must be substantiated by the physical
evidence available to the court. SIcEHD
The medical examiner testified that the distance
between the muzzle of the gun and the target was
about 2 inches but definitely not more than 3
inches. Based on the point of exit and the trajectory
transit of the wound, the victim and the alleged
assailant were facing each other when the shot was
made and the position of the gun was almost
perpendicular when fired. 35 These findings
disprove Tangan's claim of accidental shooting. A
revolver is not prone to accidental firing because of
the nature of its mechanism, unless it was already
first cocked and pressure was exerted on the
trigger. If it were uncocked, then considerable
pressure had to be applied on the trigger to fire the
revolver. 36
Having established that the shooting was not
accidental, the next issue to be resolved is whether
Tangan acted in incomplete self-defense. The
element of unlawful aggression in self-defense
must not come from the person defending himself
but from the victim.
A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not
sufficient. 37 Likewise, the exchange of insulting
words and invectives between Tangan and
Generoso Miranda, no matter how objectionable,
could not be considered as unlawful aggression,
except when coupled with physical assault. 38
There being no lawful aggression on the part of
either antagonists, the claim of incomplete self-
defense falls. Tangan undoubtedly had possession
of the gun, but the Mirandas tried to wrestle the gun
from him. It may be said that the former had no
intention of killing the victim but simply to retain
possession of his gun. However, the fact that the
victim subsequently died as a result of the gunshot
wound, though the shooter may not have the
intention to kill, does not absolve him from
culpability. Having caused the fatal wound, Tangan
is responsible for all the consequences of his
felonious act. He brought out the gun, wrestled
with the Mirandas but anticipating that the gun may
be taken from him, he fired and fled.
The third requisite of lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the person defending himself is not
supported by evidence. By repeatedly blocking the
path of the Mirandas for almost five times, Tangan
was in effect the one who provoked the former. The
repeated blowing of horns, assuming it was done
by Generoso, may be irritating to an impatient
driver but it certainly could not be considered as
creating so powerful an inducement as to incite
provocation for the other party to act violently.
The appreciation of the ordinary mitigating
circumstances of sufficient provocation and
passion and obfuscation under Article 13,
paragraphs 4 and 6, 39 have no factual basis.
Sufficient provocation as a requisite of incomplete
self-defense is different from sufficient
provocation as a mitigating circumstance. As an
element of self-defense, it pertains to its absence on
the part of the person defending himself; while as a
mitigating circumstance, it pertains to its presence
on the part of the offended party. Besides, only one
mitigating circumstance can arise out of one and
the same act. 40 Assuming for the sake of argument
that the blowing of horns, cutting of lanes or
overtaking can be considered as acts of
provocation, the same were not sufficient. The
word "sufficient" means adequate to excite a
person to commit a wrong and must accordingly be
proportionate to its gravity. 41 Moreover,
Generoso's act of asking for an explanation from
Tangan was not sufficient provocation for him to
claim that he was provoked to kill or injure
Generoso. 42
For the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation to be appreciated, it is required that (1)
there be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to
produce such a condition of mind; and (2) said act
which produced the obfuscation was not far
removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the
perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.
43
In the case at bar, Tangan could not have possibly
acted upon an impulse for there was no sudden and
unexpected occurrence which would have created
such condition in his mind to shoot the victim.
Assuming that his path was suddenly blocked by
Generoso Miranda due to the firecrackers, it can no
longer be treated as a startling occurrence,
precisely because he had already passed them and
was already the one blocking their path. Tangan's
acts were done in the spirit of revenge and
lawlessness, for which no mitigating circumstance
of passion or obfuscation can arise. ECISAD
With respect to the penalty, under the laws then
existing, homicide was penalized with reclusion
temporal, 44 but if the homicide was committed
with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty
shall be death. 45 The death penalty, however,
cannot be imposed on Tangan because in the
meantime, the 1987 Constitution proscribed the
imposition of death penalty; and although it was
later restored in 1994, the retroactive application of
the death penalty is unfavorable to him. Previously,
the accused may be prosecuted for two crimes: (1)
homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code
and (2) illegal possession of firearm in its
aggravated form under P.D. 1866. 46
P.D. 1866 was amended by R.A. No. 8294, 47
which provides that if an unlicensed firearm is used
in murder or homicide, such use of unlicensed
firearm shall be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance and no longer considered as a
separate offense, 48 which means that only one
offense shall be punished — murder or homicide.
However, this law cannot apply retroactively
because it will result in the imposition on Tangan
of the maximum period of the penalty. Moreover,
under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, 49 the aggravating
circumstance must be alleged in the information.
Being favorable, this new rule can be given
retroactive effect as they are applicable to pending
cases. 50 In any case, Tangan was acquitted of the
illegal possession case.
Consequently, Tangan should be sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal.Pursuant to
Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, if the
prescribed penalty is composed of three periods,
and there is neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance, the medium period shall be applied.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence law, the
maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be that
which, in view of the attendant circumstances, may
be properly imposed, which in this case is reclusion
temporal medium with an imprisonment range of
from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.
The minimum of the indeterminate sentence shall
be the next lower degree which is prision mayor
with a range of from six (6) years and one (1) day
to twelve (12) years. 51 Hence, petitioner Tangan
is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor,as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,as maximum.
AaIDCS
The death indemnity of P30,000.00 was correctly
increased by the appellate court to P50,000.00 in
line with jurisprudence. 52 Moral damages are
awarded in criminal cases involving injuries if
supported by evidence on record, 53 but the
stipulation of the parties in this case substitutes for
the necessity of evidence in support thereof.
Though not awarded below, the victim's heirs are
entitled to moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 which is considered reasonable
considering the pain and anguish brought by his
death. 54
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 103613 is
DISMISSED. The appealed decision subject of
G.R. No. 105830 is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
(1) Tangan is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor,as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,as
maximum, with all the accessory penalties.
(2) Tangan is ordered to pay the victim's heirs
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P42,000.00 as
funeral and burial expenses, P5,000.00 as
attorney's fees, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 103613
& 105830, [February 23, 2001], 405 PHIL 247-
270)
[G.R. No. 144505. August 6, 2002.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. ERNESTO SAN JUAN Y DELA
PEÑA, accused-appellant.
Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
Information for murder was filed against the
accused San Juan. During trial, Chief Barangay
Tanod Socorro took the witness stand and related
that he was among those who took the victim,
Bernardo Cortez, to the hospital. While on the way
to the hospital, the victim Cortez told him that he
was stabbed by the accused. Later, the victim
expired in the hospital. For his part, the accused
claimed that he killed Cortez in self-defense. He
told the court that he stabbed the victim in
retaliation for boxing him earlier on the forehead.
The trial court convicted the accused and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
accused appealed to the Supreme Court. But,
before filing his brief, his lawyer filed a motion to
remand his case to the court a quo because a
medical certificate that diagnosed the accused of
having "R/O Schizophrenia" was discovered.
The motion to remand the case to the trial court was
denied. The Court ruled that even if the medical
certificate was presented on trial, what it might
prove was the mental condition of the accused on
the date of the certificate and not at the time of the
commission of the crime, which was one year prior
to the issuance of the said medical certificate. The
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the
accused but only of homicide. According to the
Court, the accused admitted the killing and failed
to establish unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim to substantiate self-defense. In the absence
of any aggravating circumstance to qualify the
killing to murder, the Court resolved to lower the
crime committed to homicide. SHTEaA
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; EXEMPTING
CIRCUMSTANCES; INSANITY; EVIDENCE
THEREOF MUST RELATE TO THE TIME
PRECEDING OR COETANEOUS WITH THE
COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE. — In People
v. Madarang, we held that the evidence of insanity
must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous
with the commission of the offense with which he
is charged. Although the accused is diagnosed with
schizophrenia a few months after the stabbing
incident, the evidence of insanity after the
commission of the offense may be accorded weight
only if there is also proof of abnormal behavior
immediately before or simultaneous to the
commission of the crime.
2. ID.; JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; SELF-
DEFENSE; CLAIM THEREOF PRECLUDES
ACCUSED TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF
INSUFFICIENCY IN THE IDENTIFICATION
OF THE ASSAILANT; CASE AT BAR. — The
accused asserts in his first assignment of error that
the prosecution's evidence to establish that he was
Cortez' assailant is insufficient. The accused,
however, must not forget that in his testimony, he
admitted that he stabbed the victim, but invoked
self-defense. Thus, he cannot now raise the issue of
identity which he has already admitted. When the
accused theorized self-defense, he, in effect,
assumed the onus probandi to substantiate the
same. It became his inescapable burden to prove
clearly and convincingly the elements of self-
defense provided in Article 11, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION;
INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT THEREOF. —
Unlawful aggression is an indispensable element of
self-defense, whether complete or incomplete
under Articles 11 or 13, respectively. Unlawful
aggression refers to an actually materialized attack
or at the very least, a clearly imminent attack.
When an unlawful aggression has ceased to exist,
the one making a defense has no right to kill or
injure the former aggressor.
4. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES;
TREACHERY; TO BE APPRECIATED, THE
MANNER OF ATTACK MUST BE PROVED. —
For treachery to be appreciated, the manner of
attack must be proved. Without any particulars on
the manner in which the aggression commenced or
how the act which resulted in the victim's death
unfolded, treachery cannot be appreciated.
Circumstances qualifying criminal responsibility
cannot rest on mere conjectures, no matter how
reasonable or probable, but must be based on facts
of unquestionable existence. In the case at bar, no
evidence was presented that the victim was
sleeping when the accused stabbed him.
5. ID.; ID.; EVIDENT PREMEDITATION;
ELEMENTS. — The following are the elements of
evident premeditation: (1) the time when the
accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt
act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his
determination; (3) sufficient lapse of time between
decision and execution to allow the accused to
reflect upon the consequences of his act. There is a
dearth of evidence with respect to these elements.
TIDaCE
DECISION
PUNO, J p:
It came from the mouth of the accused San Juan
himself that the blood of the victim Cortez is on his
hands. He claims that he killed his prey to defend
himself, but the Court is not persuaded.
On January 17, 1996, an information was filed
against the accused San Juan, viz:
"The undersigned accuses ERNESTO SAN JUAN
Y DELA PEÑA alias NESTOR BUWANG of the
crime of Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about (the) 13th day of January 1996, in
the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery
and evident premeditation, attack, assault and use
personal violence upon one BERNARDO
CORTEZ Y CEZAR, by then and there stabbing
the latter with a bladed weapon once in the body
thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of
his/her death thereafter.
Contrary to law." 1
The accused pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
Valentino Socorro, Chief Barangay Tanod, took
the witness stand. He knew the victim Cortez
because the latter always loitered at the corner of
Salvador Street, Paco, Manila, where the barangay
hall was located. At around 2:30 a.m. on January
13, 1996, Socorro was at the door of the barangay
hall. He was then on duty. He saw Cortez running
to the hall and asking for help as he had a stab
wound below his left breast. Socorro also saw the
accused running from Salvador Street to Trece de
Agosto Street. He knew the accused and saw him
always drinking with the victim and a group of men
on Salvador Street. Socorro and another person
known as Tikoy brought Cortez to the hospital on
a pedicab. Tikoy drove while Socorro and the
victim occupied the sidecar.
On the way to the hospital, Socorro asked Cortez
who stabbed him and he answered that it was
Ernesto Buwang. Cortez uttered, "Tulungan ninyo
ako at sinaksak ako ni Ernesto Buwang." 2
According to Socorro, Cortez' condition was "fifty-
fifty" at the time he said this. It took the group 30
minutes to reach the Philippine General Hospital.
The victim was still alive when they arrived. When
the doctors were already attending to Cortez,
Socorro fetched the victim's parents. The latter
immediately went to the hospital. The following
day, Cortez' parents told Socorro that their son had
expired. Socorro executed a Sworn Statement
regarding the stabbing incident. Later, Barangay
Kagawad Cesar Lopez informed Socorro that he
apprehended the accused.
Socorro identified the accused during his
testimony. According to him, the accused was
called "Ernesto Buwang" in their neighborhood. 3
Barangay Chairman Cesar Lopez testified. On
January 13, 1996, at about 1:30 a.m., he was at
Leroy Street, Barangay 679, Zone 74, District 5,
Paco, Manila. He was then peeling squash. All of a
sudden, there was a commotion and when he
looked around, he saw a person stab another. He
was about eight meters away. The place where the
stabbing took place was well-lighted. The back of
the assailant was towards him. The culprit
immediately ran away after stabbing the victim.
Being a barangay official, Lopez approached the
victim and recognized him as Cortez. The latter
told him that he was stabbed by Totoy Buwang.
Cortez looked like he was dying. He was weak and
very pale. He, along with two barangay tanods,
brought the victim to the Philippine General
Hospital, but the victim was already dead when
they arrived there. He and two policemen then
looked for the victim's assailant. Two to three days
after the stabbing incident, between 2:00 a.m. to
3:00 a.m., they found the accused at the corner of
Paz and Trece de Agosto Streets. They
apprehended him and brought him to the police
headquarters.
Lopez identified the accused in court. He also said
that the accused is the only person known as "Totoy
Buwang" in their barangay. He executed a Sworn
Statement regarding the stabbing incident. 4
The accused took the witness stand. On January 13,
1996, he was in his house near the Paco Church.
Cortez went to his house. They talked and later on
had a heated exchange of words regarding the job
that he (the accused) gave Cortez. The latter boxed
him on the forehead. When he testified, he showed
the court his scarred forehead.
On cross-examination, the accused added that
Cortez also had a fan knife at the time he boxed
him. Aside from boxing him, he claims that Cortez
also stabbed him with a fan knife on the left side of
his face. 5
After one week, the accused retaliated. In another
part of his testimony, he stated that he retaliated on
the same day that Cortez boxed him. He was very
angry. He stabbed the victim Cortez with a knife
and hit him on the left side. That same day, he
learned that Cortez died. He then surrendered to his
parents and the Manila Police. He told the police
that he killed Cortez in self-defense. ICAcTa
The trial court convicted the accused San Juan, viz:
"The accused admitted stabbing the victim, but
asserted that he did it in retaliation for earlier being
boxed on the forehead by the victim. The previous
act of the victim in hitting with his fist the forehead
of the accused, could not justify the felony
committed by the accused, given the fact that at the
time the victim was stabbed he was sleeping so,
there was no unlawful aggression on his part.
Neither could such act of the victim be considered
as a mitigating circumstance since the boxing
incident did not immediately precede the stabbing
incident (Arts. 11 & 13, Revised Penal Code).
WHEREFORE, the accused, Ernesto San Juan, is
hereby convicted of the crime of murder and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided
by law and to pay the costs.
On the civil liability of the accused, he is ordered
to pay the legal heirs of the victim moral and
nominal damages in the sum of P200,000.00 and
P100,000.00, respectively, and compensation for
the loss of the life of the victim in the amount of
P50,000.00 with interest at the legal rate of 6% per
annum from this date until fully paid." 6
The accused appealed the decision to this Court.
But before filing his Brief, he filed a "Motion to
Remand Case to the Court a Quo for Further
Reception of Defense Evidence." The PAO
lawyers handling his case on appeal averred that
while studying the case, they discovered that a
Medical Certificate dated October 6, 1997 and
prepared by Senior Inspector and Medical Officer
Arthur G. Lorenzo of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology was attached to the
case records. It stated that accused San Juan was
diagnosed to have "R/O Schizophrenia." The
medical certificate was not, however, formally
offered by the last PAO lawyer who handled the
case in the lower court. Neither was Dr. Lorenzo
presented in court. Invoking substantial justice, the
accused's new PAO lawyers prayed for the remand
of the case to the court a quo for further reception
of evidence of the accused's insanity at the time of
the commission of the crime as his mental state
would exempt him from liability. 7
The Solicitor General filed an Opposition to the
Motion to Remand, pointing out that the medical
certificate, even if admitted, would only prove the
accused's insanity when he was diagnosed on
October 6, 1997, and not at the time the crime was
committed on January 13, 1996. The Solicitor
General argues that, in fact, the accused
"consciously admitted in court that he stabbed
Bernardo Cortez with a knife on the date in issue
allegedly in retaliation for hitting (punching) him
on his forehead . . . Such admission indicates in
clear terms that appellant understood the nature of
his act and the consequences thereof. In short, the
act was willfully, voluntarily and knowingly
executed." 8 Finally, the Solicitor General avers
that the Motion to Remand is procedurally flawed
as it aims to reopen the case, but a motion to reopen
a case is proper only after either or both parties
have formally offered and closed their evidence,
but before judgment. 9
The parties then filed their respective Briefs. The
accused makes the following assignment of errors:
"I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME OF MURDER DESPITE
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE FOR THE
PROSECUTION.
II.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO, THAT ACCUSED-
APPELLANT IS GUILTY, THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES WHICH
ARE NOT ONLY EXCESSIVE BUT ARE
BEREFT OF ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL
BASIS." 10
The Solicitor General correctly points out that even
assuming that the October 6, 1997 medical
certificate were admitted in evidence, it would only
prove the mental condition of the accused on that
date, and not at the time of the commission of the
crime on January 13, 1996, over a year prior to the
issuance of the medical certificate. In People v.
Madarang, 11 we held that the evidence of insanity
must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous
with the commission of the offense with which he
is charged. Although the accused is diagnosed with
schizophrenia a few months after the stabbing
incident, the evidence of insanity after the
commission of the offense may be accorded weight
only if there is also proof of abnormal behavior
immediately before or simultaneous to the
commission of the crime. 12 The Motion to
Remand is thus denied.
The accused asserts in his first assignment of error
that the prosecution's evidence to establish that he
was Cortez' assailant is insufficient. The accused,
however, must not forget that in his testimony, he
admitted that he stabbed the victim, but invoked
self-defense. Thus, he cannot now raise the issue of
identity which he has already admitted. When the
accused theorized self-defense, he, in effect,
assumed the onus probandi to substantiate the
same. It became his inescapable burden to prove
clearly and convincingly the elements of self-
defense provided in Article 11, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code. 13
The Revised Penal Code provides in Article 11,
par. 1, viz:
"Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The
following do not incur criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or
rights, provided that the following circumstances
occur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself."
The Code also provides in Article 13, par. 1, viz:
"Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. — the
following are mitigating circumstances:
1. Those mentioned in the preceding chapter, when
all the requisites necessary to justify the act or to
exempt from criminal liability in the respective
cases are not attendant."
Unlawful aggression is an indispensable element of
self-defense, whether complete or incomplete
under Articles 11 or 13, respectively. 14 Unlawful
aggression refers to an actually materialized attack
or at the very least, a clearly imminent attack. 15
When an unlawful aggression has ceased to exist,
the one making a defense has no right to kill or
injure the former aggressor. 16
The accused testified, viz:
"Q: Mr. Witness, you are being accused of killing
of (sic) one Bernardo Cortez on January 13, 1996.
What can you say about this accusation?
A: They hurt me and I hit them back.
xxx xxx xxx
THE COURT:
Q: Who hurt you on your forehead?
A: Bernardo Cortez.
Q: What was used by Bernardo Cortez in (sic) your
head?
A: He just boxed me.
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, that happened on that same
day, January 13, 1996?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What time?
A: Noontime, sir.
Q: Prior to that fist blows (sic) by Bernardo Cortez
what were you doing, Mr. Witness?
A: I was in my house and he went there.
Q: Where is your house, Mr. Witness?
A: Near the Paco Church.
Q: When the victim went to your house what
happened?
A: We talked.
THE COURT:
Q: Then what happened?
A: We have (sic) a heated exchange of words.
Q: What were you arguing about? EcICSA
A: Concerning our work. The work that I was able
to give him.
Q: What happened after that heated argument?
A: He was the first one to hit me. He hit me in (sic)
the forehead.
Q: After you were hit by Bernardo Cortez what did
you do, Mr. Witness?
A: I went home and I retaliate (sic) when I came
back.
Q: How long did it take for you to go back to
retaliate?
A: After one week.
Q: On January 13, 1996, you said that the victim
went to your house and then boxed you in (sic) the
forehead?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When he boxed you, what did you do?
A: I got hold of the knife and stabbed him.
Q: What part of the body were you able to hit him?
A: (Witness pointing to the left rear side of his
body)
Q: What was the position of the victim when you
hit him?
A: He was standing facing me.
Q: What happened after you were able to hit him
with a knife?
A: I just stayed there at the house.
Q: Did you know what happened to Bernardo
Cortez?
A: He died, sir.
Q: When did you come to know that Bernardo
Cortez died?
A: That same day.
Q: What did you do, Mr. Witness, after you learned
that he died?
A: I surrendered to my parents and also to the
Manila Police.
Q: When you brought (sic) to the Manila Police did
you tell them that you killed Bernardo Cortez for
self-defense?
A: Yes, sir." 17 (Italics supplied)
The accused's testimony is uncorroborated. But
even assuming arguendo that Cortez boxed the
accused, thus committing an unlawful aggression
against him, the accused failed to establish that the
aggression had not ceased at the time he stabbed
Cortez. In one part of his testimony, the accused
said that Cortez boxed him on January 13, 1996 and
he stabbed Cortez on the same day, without
indicating the interval between the boxing and the
stabbing. In another part of his testimony, he stated
that it was a week after. Cortez boxed him that he
retaliated and stabbed Cortez. In the absence of
proof that there was continued unlawful aggression
on the part of Cortez, the accused's theory of self-
defense cannot benefit him whether as a justifying
circumstance or a mitigating circumstance under
Articles 11 or 13 of the Revised Penal Code,
respectively.
We come now to the aggravating circumstances.
The trial court found the accused guilty of murder
qualified by treachery and evident premeditation,
viz:
"And since the victim was sleeping when the
accused repeatedly stabbed him, thereby making it
impossible for him to defend himself, the crime
committed is murder qualified by treachery and
premeditation under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code." 18
The trial court was in error in appreciating the
aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation. For treachery to be appreciated, the
manner of attack must be proved. Without any
particulars on the manner in which the aggression
commenced or how the act which resulted in the
victim's death unfolded, treachery cannot be
appreciated. 19 Circumstances qualifying criminal
responsibility cannot rest on mere conjectures, no
matter how reasonable or probable, but must be
based on facts of unquestionable existence. 20 In
the case at bar, no evidence was presented that the
victim was sleeping when the accused stabbed him.
Neither can we appreciate evident premeditation.
The following are the elements of evident
premeditation: (1) the time when the accused
decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act
manifestly indicating that he has clung to his
determination; (3) sufficient lapse of time between
decision and execution to allow the accused to
reflect upon the consequences of his act. 21 There
is a dearth of evidence with respect to these
elements. cCTESa
In the absence of any aggravating circumstance to
qualify the killing to murder, we adopt the
recommendation of the Solicitor General to lower
the crime to homicide.
Anent the damages, the trial court was correct in
ordering the accused to pay civil indemnity of
P50,000.00. We reduce, however, the grant of
moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00 to
P50,000.00 in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence. 22 With respect to nominal
damages, we cannot sustain the Solicitor General's
prayer for the deletion of the award of nominal
damages on the ground that ". . . the trial court had
already awarded civil indemnity and moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and
P200,000.00, respectively. 23 Nominal damages
are awarded so that a right which has been violated
may be recognized or vindicated, and not for the
purpose of indemnification. The award of civil
indemnity and moral damages do not preclude the
recovery of nominal damages. We, however,
reduce the amount of nominal damages from
P100,000.00 to P10,000.00. 24
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the impugned decision is
MODIFIED. The accused-appellant is found guilty
of Homicide and sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate sentence of six (6) years, eight (8)
months and ten (10) days of prision mayor
minimum as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, ten
(10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion
temporal medium as maximum, 25 and to pay the
heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P10,000.00 as
nominal damages. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. San Juan y Dela Peña, G.R. No.
144505, [August 6, 2002], 435 PHIL 427-440)
[G.R. No. 135050. April 19, 2002.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. EFREN TEJERO, LUCIO PORTON,
CESAR TEJERO and ARNEL TEJERO, accused-
appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Jose F. Falcotelo for accused-appellants.
SYNOPSIS
Appellants were convicted of murder for the killing
of Alfredo. On appeal, they claimed that the trial
court erred: in convicting them on the basis of
conspiracy; in not giving credence to the self-
defense of Efren; and in not acquitting the other
appellants on reasonable doubt.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of
appellants on appeal, ruling: conspiracy was
established when appellants acted in concert at the
time of the commission of the offense; elements to
prove that appellant Efren acted in self-defense
were lacking; findings of the trial court on
credibility deserved great weight on appeal; and
alibi and denial cannot prevail over positive
testimony of witnesses; and that treachery qualified
the killing to murder due to the suddenness of the
attack on the victim.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; PRESENT
WHEN ACCUSED ACTED IN CONCERT AT
THE TIME OF COMMISSION OF THE
OFFENSE; CASE AT BAR. — Article 8,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that "conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it." It is a well-
settled rule that conspiracy need not be established
by direct evidence of a prior agreement. It is
sufficient that the accused acted in concert at the
time of the commission of the offense, that they had
the same purpose or common design, and that they
were united in its execution. In this case, the
accused's synchronous presence at the crime scene
was not a mere coincidence but was part of a design
to kill Alfredo Balase. As the trial court observed,
appellant Efren Tejero had to call the other
appellants to help him kill Alfredo to preempt the
latter's threat to liquidate their whole family. All
the appellants waited for the opportune time for
them to carry out their plan. It is noteworthy also
that appellants are related to each other: Efren
Tejero is the uncle of brothers Arnel and Cesar
Tejero, While Lucio Porton is the brother-in-law of
Efren. Additionally, the evidence on record shows
that (1) appellant Efren Tejero suddenly stabbed
the victim while the latter was resting his head on
his arms at the table; (2) when the victim ran to the
gate to escape, the other appellants were waiting for
him. Appellant Cesar Tejero held the victim's head
while appellant Lucio Porton held the victim's arm
to render him immobile and preclude any potential
resistance from him, thus enabling appellant Arnel
Tejero to consummate their dastardly act; and (3)
while this was all happening, Efren acted as a look-
out to insure the success of their criminal act. All
four appellants appear to have acted in concert
during the fatal attack against the victim. Each
performed specific acts with such close
coordination as to indicate beyond doubt a
common criminal design or purpose. As
conspirators, they are liable as co-principals
regardless of the manner and extent of their
participation since, in point of law, the act of one
would be the act of all. STHDAc
2. ID.; JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; SELF-
DEFENSE; REQUISITES; NOT PRESENT IN
CASE AT BAR. — As already stated, Efren claims
that he acted in self-defense. Thus, he has the
burden of proving: (a) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack
of sufficient provocation on his part. Efren testified
that when Alfredo was about to stab him after a
brief chase, Alfredo stumbled, releasing his hold of
the bolo. Efren picked up the bolo, it was then that
he stabbed Alfredo. Assuming arguendo that this
version were true, unlawful aggression, assuming it
was initially present, had already ceased the
moment Efren had possession of the weapon and
he no longer had any right to attack his alleged
offender. With the absence of the primordial
element of unlawful aggression, the other requisite
of self-defense would have no leg to stand on.
Moreover, it is worth noting that appellant himself
admitted that when he faced Alfredo at the center
of the auditorium, he remembered that he had his
own bolo, drew it and stabbed Alfredo several
times. He could not even remember how many
times he did. Clearly, even if we follow Efren's
version, there was no reasonable necessity of the
means employed by him to prevent or repel the
alleged attack. The gravity of the wounds inflicted
on the victim is indicative of a determined effort to
kill and not just to defend.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE;
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; FINDINGS OF
THE TRIAL COURT THEREON DESERVE
GREAT WEIGHT ON APPEAL. — Needless to
say, findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses deserve great weight, given the clear
advantage of a trial judge in the appreciation of
testimonial evidence. For indeed the trial court is in
a better position to decide the question of
credibility, having heard the witnesses and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during the trial.
4. ID.; ID.; ALIBI; CANNOT PREVAIL OVER
POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF
APPELLANTS BY PROSECUTION
WITNESSES; CASE AT BAR. — It is settled that
for alibi to prosper as a defense, the accused must
show that they were so far away that they could not
have been physically present at the place of the
crime at the time of its commission and their
presence elsewhere renders it impossible for them
to be the guilty parties. In this case, the trial court
estimated the distance of Cesar's house from the
auditorium to be a mere 20 meters, and that of
Lucio to be a mere 50 meters. Given the relative
proximity of the locus criminis established by the
trial court, the appellants' defense of alibi must
necessarily fail. Moreover, alibi and denial cannot
prevail over the positive testimony of the
appellants by the prosecution witnesses, Balase and
Quiling, concerning appellants' actual participation
and identification. Although it may be conceded
that their testimonies differ in some respects (e.g.
to which gate of the auditorium did Alfredo go and
the supposed parts of Alfredo's body hit by the
blows), yet these differences do not refer to the
crux of the matter, which is their presence at the
scene and their participation in the commission of
the crime. Besides, witnesses are not expected to
remember every single detail of an incident with
perfect or total recall.
5. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; PRESENT
IN CASE AT BAR — The essence of treachery is
the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor
without the slightest provocation on the part of the
victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to
defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission
without risk to the aggressor. In this case, treachery
was already present when Efren, armed with a bolo,
approached Alfredo and suddenly stabbed him.
Alfredo did not have the faintest idea that he was
vulnerable to an attack, considering that he was
resting his head on his arms at the table oblivious
of the sinister intent of Efren. Due to the
suddenness of the attack, witness Quiling who was
just beside Alfredo was not able to help him. He
had no inkling whatsoever that Efren would stab
Alfredo since the former did not carry his weapon
openly. Only when Efren got near the victim did he
immediately draw his weapon. While Efren may
not have succeeded in his initial thrusts, as in fact,
Alfredo was able to parry his first blow, this
nonetheless is quite insignificant because the
existence or non-existence of treachery is not
dependent on the success of the assault. The fact
that Alfredo was facing Efren at the same moment
as the latter's attack did not erase its treacherous
nature. Even if the assault were frontal, there was
treachery if it was so sudden and unexpected that
the victim had no time to prepare for his defense.
DAaHET
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J p:
On appeal is the decision 1 dated July 3, 1998, in
Criminal Case No. C-2163, of the Regional Trial
Court of Catarman, Northern Samar, Branch 20,
finding appellants Efren, Cesar and Arnel, all
surnamed Tejero, and Lucio Porton guilty of
murder and sentencing each to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, to jointly and severally pay the
heirs of Alfredo Balase the sum of P50,000, and to
pay the costs.
Appellants were charged with murder under the
following Information:
That on or about the 18th day of June, 1995, at
about 1:00 o'clock in the morning, inside the
auditorium of Barangay San Pedro, Municipality of
Biri, Province of Northern Samar, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused armed with a bladed weapon
and a stick locally called "Tadlok", with deliberate
intent to kill thru treachery and evident
premeditation, conspiring with, confederating
together and mutually helping one another did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab and/or pierce ALFREDO
BALASE with the use of said weapons which the
accused had provided themselves for the purpose,
thereby inflicting upon said Alfredo Balase
multiple stabbed wounds which caused the death of
said victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
When arraigned, Efren Tejero, Lucio Porton, Cesar
Tejero and Arnel Tejero with the assistance of
counsel de oficio, entered pleas of not guilty to the
charge. 3
At the trial, the prosecution presented four
witnesses, namely: Dr. Ma. Sylvia M. Agudo,
Romeo Balase, Henry Quiling and Visitacion
Balase.
DR. MA. SYLVIA M. AGUDO, the municipal
health officer of Biri, Northern Samar, testified that
she conducted the autopsy on the body of the
victim, Alfredo Balase. She prepared an autopsy
report that contained these findings:
1. Stab wound, 1 cm involving muscles at
supraclavicular area, left
2. Stab wound, 1 cm involving muscles at
supraclavicular area, right
3. Stab wound, 1 cm midsternal line at level of 4th
intercostal space
4. Stab wound, 1 cm midclavicular line, level of 6th
intercostal space, right
5. Stab wound, 3cm anterior axillary line at level of
7th intercostal space, right
6. Lacerated wound, 9cm upper extremity
involving muscles of middle third, lateral forearm,
right
— HEMOTHORAX
CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage, severe
secondary to wounds at midclavicular line, level of
6th intercostal space, right, anterior axillary line at
level of 7th intercostal space, right. 4
ROMEO BALASE, the brother of the victim
Alfredo Balase, testified that on June 17, 1995 at
around 9:00 P.M., he entered the auditorium of
Brgy. San Pedro, Biri, Northern Samar where a
dance was being held in celebration of the barangay
fiesta. He and his two other companions occupied
a table about two meters apart from that occupied
by Alfredo. He recounted that Alfredo was
drinking "Red Horse beer" together with Henry
Quiling, Boboy Albario, Manolo Tejero and Danilo
Tejero. Past midnight, or about 1:00 A.M. of June
18, 1995, witness Romeo Balase saw his brother
Alfredo, who had consumed about four bottles of
beer, resting his head propped up by his hand on
the table he (Alfredo) and his companions were
occupying. 5 Suddenly, appellant Efren Tejero,
coming from the gate, approached Alfredo and
stabbed the latter with a small bolo locally known
as "dipang", hitting Alfredo on the right armpit.
Efren immediately delivered a second blow but
Alfredo parried it with his arm and ran towards the
main gate of the auditorium. When Alfredo reached
the gate, Lucio Porton hit him with a club. Alfredo
parried the swing of the club. Then, according to
Romeo, Cesar Tejero came to the scene of the fight
and held the head of Alfredo with his two hands.
While Alfredo tried to free himself from the grasp
of Cesar, Lucio Porton held Alfredo's right arm.
Then appellant Arnel Tejero approached Alfredo
and also stabbed him twice with a small pointed
bolo on the chest. Not contented, Arnel stabbed
him again on the left and right sides of his
shoulders. Witness Romeo Balase said he saw all
these details because the scene of the incident was
illuminated with several fluorescent lights. 6
HENRY QUILING, corroborating the testimony of
Romeo Balase, testified that on June 17, 1995 at
around 9:00 P.M., he arrived at the auditorium and
occupied a table with the victim, Alfredo Balase,
and three others. He narrated that past midnight, at
around 1:00 A.M. of June 18, while Alfredo rested
his head upon his arm on the table, Efren Tejero
approached the former and immediately thrust his
bolo on the right side of Alfredo's body. He
delivered another thrust using the same weapon
and hit the victim on his right forearm. The witness
said he was only two meters away when Efren
stabbed the victim twice. Alfredo ran and was
chased by Efren towards the gate. Alfredo was then
accosted by appellant Lucio Porton who struck him
with a "tadlok", but Alfredo was able to parry the
blow. Then Cesar held both hands of Alfredo,
while Lucio also held only the right hand of
Alfredo. Meanwhile, appellant Arnel Tejero came
upon Alfredo and also stabbed him on the chest
with a bolo. After stabbing him, Lucio and Cesar
released their hold on Alfredo causing the victim to
squat on the ground and support his body with his
hands. Immediately thereafter, Arnel stabbed him
again on the left and right sides of his neck. While
this was all happening, Efren served as a look-out.
7
On cross-examination, witness Henry Quiling
stated that he was not alarmed when Efren
approached Alfredo because he did not expect that
Efren intended to kill Alfredo. 8
The last prosecution witness, VISITACION
BALASE, was the mother of the victim. She
testified that she incurred P5,000 for the victim's
coffin and niche, and other miscellaneous
expenses. 9
In their defense, appellants testified together with
witness Blas Docena.
Appellant EFREN TEJERO admitted the killing,
but asserted that it was in self-defense. He testified
that on June 17, 1995 at about 10:00 P.M., he went
to the auditorium to attend the dance that was held
as part of the fiesta celebration. According to Efren,
at about 1:00 A.M. the following day or on June 18,
he went outside the gate of the auditorium to
answer the call of nature. While he was urinating,
Alfredo asked him if he was Efren, the brother of
Ramon. When he answered in the affirmative,
Alfredo immediately drew his small bolo from the
right side of his waist. Thinking that he might be
stabbed by Alfredo, Efren ran towards the main
gate to escape. Alfredo overtook him and as he was
about to stab Efren, the former stumbled down,
releasing his hold of the bolo. Efren picked up the
bolo and when Alfredo was about to stand, Efren
stabbed him on the right side of his body. They ran
to the center of the auditorium, Efren recounted that
he took away Alfredo's bolo and, remembering that
he has his own bolo, he drew it and stabbed Alfredo
several times that he could no longer remember
how many. Afterwards, he left Alfredo at the center
of the auditorium and went home. 10
In the early morning of June 18, 1995, he and the
three appellants were arrested and held at the
Municipal Hall of Biri as suspects in the killing of
Alfredo, but were released afterwards since no case
was filed against them. 11
BLAS DOCENA corroborated appellant Efren
Tejero's story. He narrated that on June 17, 1995,
he went to San Pedro, Biri, Northern Samar to
witness the dance being held there. At around 11:00
P.M., he saw Efren chased by Alfredo towards the
gate of the auditorium. When Alfredo was already
near the table of Efren, he delivered a thrust at
Efren, but he did not hit Efren as the former lost his
balance and fell causing his bolo to be thrown
away. Efren picked up the bolo and with it stabbed
Alfredo who was hit at the right side of his body.
Afterwards, Alfredo grappled for the possession of
the bolo but to no avail. After stabbing Alfredo,
Efren ran away leaving Alfredo in the middle of the
dance hall. 12
Appellants Arnel Tejero, Cesar Tejero and Lucio
Porton disavowed any complicity in the killing of
Alfredo Balase, claiming that they were in their
respective houses at the time of the incident. In
effect, they interposed denial and alibi as their
defense.
Appellant ARNEL TEJERO testified that at about
1:00 A.M. of June 18, 1995, he was at home asleep.
At the same hour, however, he was awakened by
his wife due to the commotion at the auditorium.
After informing him of the stabbing incident, his
wife fainted. He attended to his wife until she
regained consciousness, then he went back to sleep.
13 He denied ever going to the auditorium.
Appellant LUCIO PORTON testified that he was
at home on the evening of June 17, 1995. He went
to the auditorium to take a peek at the celebration.
At about 10:00 P.M. he was asked by his wife to go
home. 14 According to Lucio, the following day,
he was brought to the Chief of Police of Biri and
was detained in jail for a day and a half. On
February 7, 1996, while he was in Cabuyao,
Laguna where he was working as a construction
worker with Efren Tejero, he was arrested by some
NBI agents who, according to him, shot him on the
left side of his back after one Renato Balase pointed
to him and identified him as Lucio Porton. 15
Appellant CESAR TEJERO testified that he did
not attend the dance since he was busy attending to
his visitors at his home. 16 According to him,
witnesses Henry Quiling and Romeo Balase
testified against him because the two got mad at
him when he refused to testify as a witness for
Renato Balase, the brother of Romeo Balase, who
was accused of killing a Salvador Galo.
On July 3, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision
rejecting the defense's theory of self-defense as
well as alibi and gave full credence to the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses who
positively identified appellants as the culprits. The
dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
finds the accused EFREN TEJERO, LUCIO
PORTON, ARNEL TEJERO and CESAR
TEJERO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
sentences them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs jointly and
severally the amount of P50,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 17
Hence, this appeal.
The Court issued a resolution on November 24,
1999 18 dismissing appellant Arnel Tejero's appeal
pursuant to Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of
Court, 19 after it was proven during the pendency
of this appeal that he escaped from the provincial
jail at Dancalan, Bobon, Northern Samar on July
12, 1998. We reiterated the dismissal in another
resolution dated September 6, 2000. 20 Thus, as for
Arnel Tejero, his conviction for the killing of
Alfredo Balase is deemed affirmed and had become
final and executory. As for the remaining three
appellants, their appeal stands, which we will now
resolve.
Accused-appellants contend that:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING
ALL THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF
MURDER ON THE BASIS OF THE THEORY
OF CONSPIRACY WHICH IS BUT A
SPECULATION AND NOT A FACT.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING
CREDENCE TO THE SELF-DEFENSE OR
INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE OF EFREN
TEJERO AND IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
OTHER APPELLANTS LUCIO PORTON,
CESAR TEJERO AND ARNEL TEJERO, ON
REASONABLE DOUBT.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT TREACHERY ATTENDED THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME. 21
In sum, the issues for our resolution are: (1)
whether the trial court correctly held appellants
equally liable for the death of the victim on the
basis of conspiracy, and (2) whether treachery was
sufficiently proven to sustain appellants' conviction
for murder.
Appellants contend that the trial court's finding of
conspiracy rests merely on speculation and not on
fact. They claim that there was no evidence to
prove that appellant Efren Tejero met with the
other appellants and that together they planned the
killing of Alfredo. Appellants argue that their mere
presence at the gate of the auditorium did not prove
conspiracy, since their presence and that of others
at the dance was not unusual or unexpected. 22
After examining carefully the testimonies of
witnesses for the prosecution as well as the defense,
the trial court's finding of the existence of a
conspiracy to kill the victim is well-taken. It must
be noted that Article 8, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that "conspiracy exists when
two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it." It is a well-settled rule that
conspiracy need not be established by direct
evidence of a prior agreement. It is sufficient that
the accused acted in concert at the time of the
commission of the offense, that they had the same
purpose or common design, and that they were
united in its execution. 23
In this case, the accused's synchronous presence at
the crime scene was not a mere coincidence 24 but
was part of a design to kill Alfredo Balase. As the
trial court observed, appellant Efren Tejero had to
call the other appellants to help him kill Alfredo to
preempt the latter's threat to liquidate their whole
family. All the appellants waited for the opportune
time for them to carry out their plan. It is
noteworthy also that appellants are related to each
other: Efren Tejero is the uncle of brothers Arnel
and Cesar Tejero, while Lucio Porton is the
brother-in-law of Efren. 25
Additionally, the evidence on record shows that (1)
appellant Efren Tejero suddenly stabbed the victim
while the latter was resting his head on his arms at
the table; (2) when the victim ran to the gate to
escape, the other appellants were waiting for him.
Appellant Cesar Tejero held the victim's head
while appellant Lucio Porton held the victim's arm
to render him immobile and preclude any potential
resistance from him, thus enabling appellant Arnel
Tejero to consummate their dastardly act; and (3)
while this was all happening, Efren acted as a look-
out to insure the success of their criminal act. All
four appellants appear to have acted in concert
during the fatal attack against the victim. Each
performed specific acts with such close
coordination as to indicate beyond doubt a
common criminal design or purpose. As
conspirators, they are liable as co-principals
regardless of the manner and extent of their
participation since, in point of law, the act of one
would be the act of all. 26
As already stated, Efren claims that he acted in self-
defense. Thus, he has the burden of proving: (a)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient
provocation on his part. 27 Efren testified that
when Alfredo was about to stab him after a brief
chase, Alfredo stumbled, releasing his hold of the
bolo. Efren picked up the bolo, it was then that he
stabbed Alfredo. Assuming arguendo that this
version were true, unlawful aggression, assuming it
was initially present, had already ceased the
moment Efren had possession of the weapon and
he no longer had any right to attack his alleged
offender. With the absence of the primordial
element of unlawful aggression, the other requisite
of self-defense would have no leg to stand on. 28
Moreover, it is worth noting that appellant himself
admitted that when he faced Alfredo at the center
of the auditorium, he remembered that he had his
own bolo, drew it and stabbed Alfredo several
times. He could not even remember how many
times he did. Clearly, even if we follow Efren's
version, there was no reasonable necessity of the
means employed by him to prevent or repel the
alleged attack. The gravity of the wounds inflicted
on the victim is indicative of a determined effort to
kill and not just to defend. 29
Also, the testimony of defense witness Docena, in
an attempt to corroborate Efren's theory of self-
defense, fails to impress us. As pointed out by the
trial court, he is a biased witness since during his
stay in Brgy. San Pedro, he was a helper of Pedro
Tejero, a close relative of Efren. Also, according to
the trial court, he was fidgety in his seat while
testifying and would smile every time he answered
the questions propounded to him.
Needless to say, findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses deserve great weight, given
the clear advantage of a trial judge in the
appreciation of testimonial evidence. 30 For indeed
the trial court is in a better position to decide the
question of credibility, having heard the witnesses
and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial. 31
We now come to the defense of alibi and denial
raised by the two remaining appellants, namely
Cesar Tejero and Lucio Porton. It is settled that for
alibi to prosper as a defense, the accused must show
that they were so far away that they could not have
been physically present at the place of the crime at
the time of its commission and their presence
elsewhere renders it impossible for them to be the
guilty parties. 32 In this case, the trial court
estimated the distance of Cesar's house from the
auditorium to be a mere 20 meters, and that of
Lucio to be a mere 50 meters. 33 Given the relative
proximity of the locus criminis established by the
trial court, the appellants' defense of alibi must
necessarily fail.
Moreover, alibi and denial cannot prevail over the
positive testimony of the appellants by the
prosecution witnesses, Balase and Quiling, 34
concerning appellants' actual participation and
identification. Although it may be conceded that
their testimonies differ in some respects (e.g. to
which gate of the auditorium did Alfredo go and
the supposed parts of Alfredo's body hit by the
blows), yet these differences do not refer to the
crux of the matter, which is their presence at the
scene and their participation in the commission of
the crime. Besides, witnesses are not expected to
remember every single detail of an incident with
perfect or total recall. 35
Finally, appellants contend that assuming Efren
may be held liable for the killing of Alfredo Balase,
it cannot be murder for the following reasons: (a)
the killing of the victim was not attended by the
qualifying circumstance of treachery; and (b) the
attack on the victim was not so sudden and
unexpected since they were facing each other when
the stabbing took place.
This contention is devoid of merit. The essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by
an aggressor without the slightest provocation on
the part of the victim, depriving the latter of any
real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its
commission without risk to the aggressor. In this
case, treachery was already present when Efren,
armed with a bolo, approached Alfredo and
suddenly stabbed him. Alfredo did not have the
faintest idea that he was vulnerable to an attack,
considering that he was resting his head on his arms
at the table oblivious of the sinister intent of Efren.
Due to the suddenness of the attack, witness
Quiling who was just beside Alfredo was not able
to help him. He had no inkling whatsoever that
Efren would stab Alfredo since the former did not
carry his weapon openly. Only when Efren got near
the victim did he immediately draw his weapon. 36
While Efren may not have succeeded in his initial
thrusts, as in fact, Alfredo was able to parry his first
blow, this nonetheless is quite insignificant
because the existence or non-existence of treachery
is not dependent on the success of the assault. 37
The fact that Alfredo was facing Efren at the same
moment as the latter's attack did not erase its
treacherous nature. Even if the assault were frontal,
there was treachery if it was so sudden and
unexpected that the victim had no time to prepare
for his defense. 38
In fine, the trial court correctly considered the
killing of Alfredo Balase as murder qualified by
treachery. There being no aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance attending the killing, the
applicable penalty would thus be reclusion
perpetua. 39 The award of P50,000 as death
indemnity to the victim's heirs is likewise affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The
decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting
appellants Efren Tejero, Cesar Tejero and Lucio
Porton of the crime of murder and sentencing them
to reclusion perpetua, and to jointly and severally
pay the heirs of Alfredo Balase P50,000 as civil
indemnity as well as the costs is AFFIRMED.
With regard to appellant Arnel Tejero who is at
large, his conviction by the trial court for the killing
of Alfredo Balase is deemed affirmed and had by
now become final and executory. The court a quo
is directed to order the immediate arrest and
commitment of appellant Arnel Tejero to the New
Bilibid Prison for service of his sentence. IEAacT
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Tejero, G.R. No. 135050, [April 19,
2002], 431 PHIL 91-106)