Non-Impairment Clause
Section 10.​ No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
RUTTER VS. ESTEBAN [93 PHIL 68; NO.L-3708; 18 MAY 1953]
Facts: ​On August 20,1941 Rutter sold to Esteban two parcels of land situated in the
Manila for P9,600 of which P4,800 were paid outright, and the balance was made
payable as follows: P2,400 on or before August 7, 1942, and P2,400 on or before
August 27, 1943, with interest at the rate of 7 percent per annum. To secure the
payment of said balance of P4,800, a first mortgage has been constituted in favor
of the plaintiff. Esteban failed to pay the two installments as agreed upon, as well
as the interest that had accrued and so Rutter instituted an action to recover the
balance due, the interest due and the attorney's fees. The complaint also contains
a prayer for sale of the properties mortgaged in accordance with law. Esteban
claims that this is a prewar obligation contracted and that he is a war sufferer,
having filed his claim with the Philippine War Damage Commission for the losses he
had suffered as a consequence of the last war; and that under section 2 of RA
342(moratorium law), payment of his obligation cannot be enforced until after the
lapse of eight years. The complaint was dismissed. A motion for recon was made
which assails the constitutionality of RA 342.
Issue: ​Whether or Not RA 342 unconstitutional on non-impairment clause grounds.
Held: ​Yes. The moratorium is postponement of fulfillment of obligations decreed
by the state through the medium of the courts or the legislature. Its essence is the
application of police power. The economic interests of the State may justify the
exercise of its continuing and dominant protective power notwithstanding
interference with contracts. The question is not whether the legislative action
affects contracts incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but whether the legislation is
addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and
appropriate to that end.
However based on the President’s general SONA and consistent with what the
Court believes to be as the only course dictated by justice, fairness and
righteousness, declared that the continued operation and enforcement of RA 342
at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged
should be declared null and void and without effect. This holds true as regards
Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32, with greater force and reason considering that
said Orders contain no limitation whatsoever in point of time as regards the
suspension of the enforcement and effectivity of monetary obligations.
ORTIGAS VS. FEATI BANK [94 SCRA 533; NO.L-24670; 14 DEC 1979]
Facts: ​Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to the
public, particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along EDSA. On March 4, 1952,
plaintiff, as vendor, and Augusto Padilla and Natividad Angeles, as vendees,
entered into separate agreements of sale on installments over two parcels of land
of the Subdivision. On July 19, 1962, the said vendees transferred their rights and
interests over the aforesaid lots in favor of one Emma Chavez. Upon completion of
payment of the purchase price, the plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of
sale in favor of Emma Chavez. Both the agreements (of sale on installment) and the
deeds of sale contained the stipulations or restrictions that:
1. The parcel of land shall be used exclusively for residential purposes, and she shall
not be entitled to take or remove soil, stones or gravel from it or any other lots
belonging to the Seller.
2. All buildings and other improvements (except the fence) which may be
constructed at any time in said lot must be, (a) of strong materials and properly
painted, (b) provided with modern sanitary installations connected either to the
public sewer or to an approved septic tank, and (c) shall not be at a distance of less
than two (2) meters from its boundary lines.
Eventually said lots were bought by defendant. Lot 5 directly from Chavez and Lot 6
from Republic Flour Mills by deed of exchange, with same restrictions. Plaintiff
claims that restriction is for the beautification of the subdivision. Defendant
claimed of the commercialization of western part of EDSA. Defendant began
constructing a commercial bank building. Plaintiff demand to stop it, which forced
him to file a case, which was later dismissed, upholding police power. Motion for
recon was denied, hence the appeal.
Issue: ​Whether or Not non-impairment clause violated.
Held: ​No. Resolution is a valid exercise of police power. EDSA, a main traffic artery
which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area,
supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution
are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route.
Health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality
are justifications for this. It should be stressed, that while non-impairment of
contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power.
Lozano vs Martinez
Facts:
Petitioners were charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing
Check Law). They moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that
the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional.
The motions were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one case,
wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case.
The parties adversely affected thus appealed.
Issue:
1. Whether or not BP 22 is violative of the constitutional provision on
non-imprisonment due to debt
2. Whether it impairs freedom of contract
3. Whether it contravenes the equal protection clause
Held:
1.​ The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not
repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The
gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It
is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not
intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to
prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting
them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against
property, but an offense against public order.
Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of
money. It is an order addressed to a bank and partakes of a representation that the
drawer has funds on deposit against which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure
payment upon its presentation to the bank. There is therefore an element of
certainty or assurance that the instrument will be paid upon presentation. For this
reason, checks have become widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and
commerce. Although not legal tender, checks have come to be perceived as
convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and financial transactions. The
basis or foundation of such perception is confidence. If such confidence is shaken,
the usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or
may become nil. Any practice therefore tending to destroy that confidence should
be deterred for the proliferation of worthless checks can only create havoc in trade
circles and the banking community.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of
the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute
the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually
hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.
2.​ The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter
into “lawful” contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful.
Besides, we must bear in mind that checks can not be categorized as mere
contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has
become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and
therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.
3.​ There is no substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal
protection of the laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the
check, but not the payee. It is contended that the payee is just as responsible for
the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation
of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This
argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should
punish both the swindler and the swindled. The petitioners’ posture ignores the
well-accepted meaning of the clause “equal protection of the laws.” The
clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded
different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable
or arbitrary. ​(Lozano vs Martinez, G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986)
The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant
to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or
a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the
non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or
designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against
public order. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the
making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. An act may not be
considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of
the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally
punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police
power.
Ganzon v Inserto;
FACTS:
Petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon executed a deed of absolute sale of a parcel of land in
favor of private respondents. Several months later, a deed of real estate mortgage
was executed between the same parties to secure the payment by the private
respondents of a promissory not in favor of petitioner. Private respondents filed a
civil action against petitioners after Ganzon initiated extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings in accordance with the terms and conditions of the said mortgage.
Respondent judge ordered the substitution of the mortgage lien with a surety
bond.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the order of respondent judge violates the non-impairment clause
of the Constitution.
RULING:
YES. Substitution of the mortgage with a surety bond to ensure the payment of a
loan would in effect change the terms and conditions of the mortgage contract.
Even before trial on the very issues affecting the contract, the respondent court has
directed a deviation from its terms, diminished its efficiency and dispensed with a
primary condition.
NDC v Agrix G.R. Nos. 84132-33 December 10, 1990
J. Cruz
Facts:
Pres. Decree No. 1717, which ordered the rehabilitation of the Agrix Group of
Companies to be administered mainly by the National Development Company,
outlined the procedure for filing claims against the Agrix companies and created a
Claims Committee to process these claims.
Especially relevant to this case is Sec. 4(1) thereof providing that "all mortgages and
other liens presently attaching to any of the assets of the dissolved corporations
are hereby extinguished."
Before this, the Agrix Marketing had executed in favor of petitioner Philippine
Veterans Bank a real estate mortgage dated July 7, 1978, over three (3) parcels of
land situated in Los Baños, Laguna. During the existence of the mortgage, AGRIX
went bankrupt. It was for the expressed purpose of salvaging this and the other
Agrix companies that the aforementioned decree was issued by President Marcos.
Petitioner filed a claim with the AGRIX Claims Committee for the payment of its
loan credit. In the meantime, the New Agrix, Inc. and the National Development
Company, invoking Sec. 4 (1) of the decree, filed a petition with the Regional Trial
Court of Calamba, Laguna, for the cancellation of the mortgage lien in favor of
Philippine Veterans.
For its part, the Philippine Veterans took steps to extrajudicially foreclose the
mortgage, prompting Agrix to file a second case with the same court to stop the
foreclosure.
In the trial court, the judge annulled not only the challenged provision of Sec. 4 (1),
but the entire Pres. Decree No. 1717 on the grounds that: (1) the presidential
exercise of legislative power was a violation of the principle of separation of
powers; (2) the law impaired the obligation of contracts; and (3) the decree
violated the equal protection clause.
The motion for reconsideration of this decision having been denied, the present
petition was filed in the Supreme Court.
The petitioners contend that the private respondent is now estopped from
contesting the validity of the decree. They cited Mendoza v. Agrix Marketing, Inc.,1
where the constitutionality of Pres. Decree No. 1717 was also raised but not
resolved.
Moreover the claims committee dismissed the filing of the petition by Philippine
Veterans on the ground of the aforementioned estoppel.
The petitioners stress that in that the private respondent also invoked the
provisions of Pres. Decree No. 1717 by filing a claim with the AGRIX Claims
Committee. Failing to get results, it sought to foreclose the real estate mortgage
executed by AGRIX in its favor, which had been extinguished by the decree. It was
only when the petitioners challenged the foreclosure on the basis of Sec. 4 (1) of
the decree, that the private respondent attacked the validity of the provision. At
that stage, however, consistent with Mendoza, the petitioners alleged that private
respondent was already estopped from questioning the constitutionality of the
decree.
Issues:
1. Is estoppel applicable?
2. Is PD 1717 constitutional?
Held:​ No. Yes. petition dismissed
Ratio:
1. To rule now that the private respondent is estopped for having abided with the
decree instead of boldly assailing it is to close our eyes to a cynical fact of life
during the Marcos time.
This case must be distinguished from Mendoza, where the petitioners, after filing
their claims with the AGRIX Claims Committee, received in settlement shares of
stock valued at P40,000.00 without protest or reservation.
The private respondent has not been paid a single centavo on its claim, which was
kept pending for more than seven years for alleged lack of supporting papers.
Significantly, the validity of that claim was not questioned by the petitioner when it
sought to restrain the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage by the private
respondent. The petitioner limited itself to the argument that the private
respondent was estopped from questioning the decree because of its earlier
compliance with its provisions.
2. The Court is especially disturbed by Section 4(1) of the decree, quoted above,
extinguishing all mortgages and other liens attaching to the assets of AGRIX. It also
notes, the restriction in Subsection (ii) thereof that all "unsecured obligations shall
not bear interest" and in Subsection (iii) that "all accrued interests, penalties or
charges as of date hereof pertaining to the obligations, whether secured or
unsecured, shall not be recognized."
These provisions must be read with the Bill of Rights, where it is clearly provided in
Section 1 that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
course of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law" and
in Section 10 that "no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
Petitioners argue that property rights, like all rights, are subject to regulation under
the police power for the promotion of the common welfare. Hence justification of
the provision.
Court- The police power is not a panacea for all constitutional maladies. Neither
does its mere invocation conjure an instant and automatic justification for every
act of the government depriving a person of his life, liberty or property.
A legislative act based on the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful
subject and a lawful method. In more familiar words, a) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, should justify the
interference of the state; and b) the means employed are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals
The case is not applicable to these requirements because the interests of the public
are not sufficiently involved to warrant the interference of the government with
the private contracts of AGRIX. The decree speaks vaguely of the "public,
particularly the small investors," who would be prejudiced if the corporation were
not to be assisted. There was no record of these investors. Also, there was no
public interest to be protected. The decree was to the benefit of an exclusive set of
investors.
The oppressiveness is patent on the face of the decree to rehabilitate Agrix. No
consideration is paid for the extinction of the mortgage rights. The accrued
interests and other charges are simply rejected by the decree.
A mortgage lien is a property right derived from contract and so comes under the
protection of the Bill of Rights. Private property cannot simply be taken by law from
one person and given to another without compensation and any known public
purpose. This is plain arbitrariness and is not permitted under the Constitution.
And not only is there arbitrary taking, there is discrimination as well. In
extinguishing the mortgage and other liens, the decree lumps the secured creditors
with the unsecured creditors and places them on the same level in the prosecution
of their respective claims.
Under the equal protection clause, all persons or things similarly situated must be
treated alike, both in the privileges conferred and the obligations imposed.
Conversely, all persons or things differently situated should be treated differently.
In the case at bar, persons differently situated are similarly treated, in disregard of
the principle that there should be equality only among equals.
One may also well wonder why AGRIX was singled out for government help, among
other corporations where the stockholders or investors were also swindled. It is not
clear why other companies entitled to similar concern were not similarly treated.
On top of all this, New Agrix, Inc. was created by special decree notwithstanding
the provision of Article XIV, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution, then in force, that:
SEC. 4. The Batasang Pambansa shall not, except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such
corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof.
The new corporation is neither owned nor controlled by the government.
The Court also feels that the decree impairs the obligation of the contract
between AGRIX and the private respondent without justification.​ While it is true
that the police power is superior to the impairment clause, the principle will apply
only where the contract is so related to the public welfare that it will be considered
congenitally susceptible to change by the legislature in the interest of the greater
number.
It can be seen that the contracts of loan and mortgage executed by AGRIX are
purely private transactions and have not been shown to be affected with public
interest.
BPI vs. SEC G.R. No. 164641 December 20, 2007 Dacion en Pago, Non Impairment
of Contracts
FACTS:
The Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), through its predecessor-in- interest, Far
East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC), extended credit accommodations to the ASB
Group with an outstanding aggregate principal amount of P86,800,000.00, secured
by a real estate mortgage over two (2) properties located in Greenhills, San Juan.
On 2 May 2000, the ASB Group filed a petition for rehabilitation and suspension of
payments before the SEC.
Thereafter, on 18 August 2000, the interim receiver submitted its Proposed
Rehabilitation Plan for the ASB Group. The Rehabilitation Plan provides, among
​ y the ASB Group to BPI of one of the properties
others, a ​dacion en pago b
mortgaged to the latter at the ASB Group as selling value of P84,000,000.00 against
the total amount of the ASB Group’s exposure to the bank. In turn, ASB Group
would require the release of the other property mortgaged to BPI, to be thereafter
placed in the asset pool.
ISSUE:
Does the requirement for SEC approval of the Rehabilitation Plan impair the
obligations of contract?
​RULING:
NO. The Court reiterates that the SEC’s approval of the Rehabilitation Plan did not
impair BPI’s right to contract. As correctly contended by private respondents, the
non-impairment clause is a limit on the exercise of legislative power and not of
judicial or quasi-judicial power. The SEC, through the hearing panel that heard the
petition for approval of the Rehabilitation Plan, was acting as a quasi-judicial body
and thus, its order approving the plan cannot constitute an impairment of the right
and the freedom to contract.
Besides, the mere fact that the Rehabilitation Plan proposes a ​dacion en
pago​ approach does not render it defective on the ground of impairment of the
right to contract. ​Dacion en pago​ is a special mode of payment where the debtor
offers another thing to the creditor who accepts it as equivalent of payment of an
outstanding debt. The undertaking really partakes in a sense of the nature of sale,
that is, the creditor is really buying the thing or property of the debtor, the
payment for which is to be charged against the debtor’s debt. As such, the essential
elements of a contract of sale, namely; consent, object certain, and cause or
consideration must be present. Being a form of contract, the ​dacion en
pago​ agreement cannot be perfected without the consent of the parties involved.
Section 12: Custodial Investigation

Title of the Case Facts Issue Held Ruling

Gamboa vs. Cruz ● On July 19, 1979, at WoN petitioner’s constitutional No. Police line- up was not part of
(1988) about 7:00 o’clock in rights to counsel and to due the custodial inquest, hence,
the morning, process were violated during petitioner was not yet entitled
petitioner the conduct of police line-up at such stage to counsel. When
Christopher Gamboa the process had not yet shifted
was ​arrested for from the investigatory to the
vagrancy, without accusatory as when police
warrant of arrest, by investigation does not elicit a
Patrolman Arturo confession the accused may not
Palencia yet avail of the services of his
● July 20, 1979: during lawyer. Since petitioner in the
the line up of 5 course of his identification in
detainees including the police line- up had not yet
petitioner Gamboa been held to answer for a
who was identified by criminal offense, he was,
complainant ​Erlinda therefore, not deprived of his
B. Bernal as one of right to be assisted by counsel
the companions in because the accusatory process
the commission of had not yet set in. The police
the crime of robbery could not have violated
● On July 23, 1979: an petitioner’s right to counsel
information for and due process as the
robbery was filed confrontation between the
against him State and him had not begun.
● On August 22, 1979:
he was arraigned The right to counsel
● On August 13, 1980: attaches upon the start of an
petitioner filed a investigation. At such point or
Motion to Aquit stage, the person being
predicated on the interrogated must be assisted
ground that the by counsel to avoid the
conduct of the pernicious practice of extorting
line-up, without false or coerced admissions or
notice to, and in the confessions from the lips of the
absence of, his person undergoing
counsel violated his
 constitutional rights
to counsel and to due
process
● October 23, 1980: the
lower court denied
the Motion to Acquit,
hence, the instant
petition for certiorari
and prohibition
On August 18, 1987, aboard a
People vs. Macam tricycle, Eduardo Macam,
(1994) Antonio Cedro, Eugenio
Cawilan, Jr., Danilo Roque and
Ernesto Roque went to the house
of Benito Macam located at 43
Fema Road, Quezon City. Upon
arrival, Eduardo Macam who is a
nephew of Benito Macam talked
to the latter. After which,
Eduardo was invited to eat lunch
at Benito’s house. The former
then told the latter that he has
company waiting outside. Benito
then ordered his maid to let
Eduardo’s company in and
likewise invited them for lunch.
The group ate their lunch except
for Ernesto Roque who refused
the invitation and preferred to
Whether or not the police lineup
was in the absence of their
counsel was violtive of their
constitutional rights under Sec.
12, Art.3 of the Constitution.
interrogation, for the
commission of an offense.
On the right to due
process, the Court finds that
petitioner was not, in any way,
deprived of the substantive and
constitutional right, as he was
duly represented by a member
of the Bar. He was accorded all
the opportunities to be heard
and to present evidence to
substantiate his defense; only
that he chose not to, and
instead opted to file a Motion
to Acquit after the prosecution
had rested its case. What due
process abhors is the absolute
lack of opportunity to be
heard.The petition is
dismissed. The temporary
restraining order issued is
lifted.
After the start of the custodial
investigation, any identification
of an uncounseled accused made
in a police line-up is
inadmissible. This is particularly
true in the case at bench where
the police officers first talked to
the victims before the
confrontation was held. The
circumstances were such as to
impart improper suggestions on
the minds of the victims that may
lead to a mistaken identification.
Appellants were handcuffed and
had contusions on their faces.
However, in this case, the
prosecution did not present
evidence regarding appellant's
identification at the police
line-up. ​Hence, the exclusionary
wait outside in his tricycle. After sanctions against the admission
eating, Eduardo suddenly in evidence of custodial
grabbed the clutch bag that identification of an uncounseled
Benito was holding and pulled accused cannot be applied.
out the gun therein and
announced a hold up. The group On the other hand, appellants
started ransacking the house and did not object to the in-court
searched for valuables. Benito identification made by the
and his household were tied up. prosecution witnesses. The
His wife Leticia was killed and prosecution witnesses, who made
the rest of them were stabbed by the identification of appellants at
Eduardo’s group. The value of the police line-up at the hospital,
the items taken amounted to P again identified appellants in
P536,700.00. open court. Appellants did not
object to the in-court
Upon police investigation,
identification as being tainted by
Ernesto and Danilo Roque denied
the illegal line-up. In the absence
participation of the crime. They
of such objection, the
were then brought to Quezon
prosecution need not show that
City Gen. Hospital where Benito
said identifications were of
Macam and 2 of his household
independent origin
members were confined and
treated for the injuries they
sustained during the robbery.
They were made to pinpoint their
perpetrators as Ernesto and
Danilo were made to line up
together with several policemen
in civilian clothes.
The RTC of Quezon City
convicted the five accused of the
crime of Robbery with Homcide
and sentenced each of them to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua. It is with this decision
that Ernesto and Danilo are
appealing from. ​One of their
contention is that their
uncounseled identification by
the prosecution witnesses
during the police line-up at the
hospital are violative of their
constitutional rights under
 Section 12, Article 3 of the
Constitution

People vs. Judge Ayson ● Felipe Ramos was a 1.) WoN all the statements 1.) No. First Issue:
(1989) ticket freight clerk made to the police by a person In Miranda, Chief Justice
of the Philippine involved in a crime is within Warren summarized the
Airlines, ​assigned at the scope of the constitutional procedural safeguards laid
its Baguio City Station right in custodial investigation down for a person in police
● It was alleged that ​he custody, "in-custody
was involved in 2.) WoN the exhibits should be interrogation" being regarded
irregularities in the excluded in evidence on the as the commencement of an
sales of plane ground that the Miranda Rights adversary proceeding against
tickets was not accorded to the the suspect.
● The PAL management accused
notified him ​of an He must be warned prior to
investigation was any questioning that he has the
scheduled in right to remain silent, that
accordance with anything he says can be used
PAL’s Code of against him in a court of law,
Conduct and that he has the right to the
Discipline, and the presence of an attorney, and
CBA signed by it that if he cannot afford an
with the PALEA to attorney one will be appointed
which Ramos for him prior to any
pertained questioning if he so desires.
● A letter was sent by Opportunity to exercise those
Ramos ​stating his rights must be afforded to him
willingness to settle throughout the interrogation.
the amount of After such warnings have been
P76,000 given, such opportunity
● The findings of the afforded him, the individual
audit team were may knowingly and
given to him, and he intelligently waive these rights
refuted that he and agree to answer or make a
misused proceeds of statement. But unless and until
tickets also stating such warnings and waivers are
that he was demonstrated by the
prevented from prosecution at the trial, no
settling said evidence obtained as a result of
amounts interrogation can be used
against him.
● He proffered a The objective is to prohibit
compromise but it did "incommunicado interrogation
not ensue of individuals in a
● Two months ​after a police-dominated atmosphere,
crime of estafa was resulting in self-incriminating
charted against statement without full
Ramos; he pleaded warnings of constitutional
not guilty rights."
● Evidence by the
prosecution Not every statement made to
contained Ramos’ the police by a person involved
written admission in some crime is within the
and statement, to scope of the constitutional
which defendants protection. If not made "under
argued that ​the custodial interrogation," or
confession was "under investigation for the
taken without the commission of an offense," the
accused being statement is not protected.
represented by a
lawyer Second Issue:
● Respondent Judge ​did It should by now be abundantly
NOT admit those apparent that respondent
stating that accused Judge has misapprehended the
was NOT reminded nature and import of the
of his constitutional disparate rights set forth in
rights to remain Section 20, Article IV of the
silent and to have 1973 Constitution.
counsel
● An MR filed by the He has taken them as applying
prosecutor was to the same juridical situation,
denied, hence this equating one with the other. In
appeal so doing, he has grossly erred.

To be sure, His Honor sought to

substantiate his thesis by
arguments he took to be cogent
and logical. The thesis was
however so far divorced from
the actual and correct state of
the constitutional and legal
principles involved as to make
application of said thesis to the
case before him tantamount to
totally unfounded, whimsical
or capricious exercise of
power. His Orders were thus
rendered with grave abuse of
discretion. They should be as
they are hereby, annulled and
set aside.

It is clear from the undisputed

facts of this case that Felipe
Ramos was ​not in any sense
under custodial
interrogation,​ as the term
should be properly understood,
prior to and during the
administrative inquiry into the
discovered irregularities in
ticket sales in which he
appeared to have had a hand.
The constitutional rights of a
person under custodial
interrogation under Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973
Constitution did not therefore
come into play, were of no
relevance to the inquiry. It is
also clear, too, that Ramos had
voluntarily answered questions
posed to him on the first day of
the administrative
investigation, February 9, 1986
and agreed that the
proceedings should be
recorded, the record having
thereafter been marked during
the trial of the criminal action
subsequently filed against him
as Exhibit A, just as it is
obvious that the note (later
marked as Exhibit K) that he
sent to his superiors on
February 8,1986, the day
before the investigation,
offering to compromise his
liability in the alleged
 irregularities, was a free and
even spontaneous act on his
part. They may not be excluded
on the ground that the
so-called "Miranda rights" had
not been accorded to Ramos.

People vs. Pinlac ● Accused Ronilo Pinlac WoN the constitutional right of No. The right must be presumed to
(1988) y Libao as ​charged in the accused Pinlac under contemplate the transmission
two (2) separate custodial investigation to be of meaningful information
informations informed of his right to remain rather than just the ceremonial
● The RTC found the silent and to counsel complied and perfunctory recitation of
accused guilty, hence with an abstract constitutional
the automatic review principle.
● According to Pinlac, at
about 2:00pm on As a rule, therefore, ​it would
April 8, 1986, ​3 not be sufficient for a police
policemen came to officer just to repeat to the
his house in Taguig person under investigation
and arrested the the provisions of the
accused for robbing Constitution. The police must
Mr. Sato and for also explain their effects in
killing Mr. Osamu, practical terms.
without any warrant
of arrest shown to The right of a person under
him despite his interrogation “to be informed”
demand implies a ​correlative
● Before he was obligation on the part of the
brought first to the police investigator to
houses of Mr. Sato explain, and contemplates an
and Mr. Osamu, they effective communication that
walked him around results in understanding
and showed him the what is conveyed.
destroyed window;
and thereafter Short of this, ​there is a denial
brought him inside of the right, as it cannot truly
the house be said that the person has
● In short, he was been “informed” of his rights.
ordered to re-enact
according to what Furthermore, the accused was
the police theorized not assisted by counsel and
his alleged waiver was made
 how the crime was without the assistance of
committed counsel. ​The record of the case
● It was at this moment is also replete with evidence
that ​the prints of the which was not satisfactorily
sole of accused’s rebutted by the prosecution,
shoes were all over that the accused was
the premises of maltreated and tortured for 7
Osamu and Sato’s solid hours before he signed
houses theprepared extra-judicial
● That during the confession.
investigation at the
Police HQ, ​he was
tortured and forced
to admit the crimes
charged

People vs. Bolanos Oscar Pagdalian was murdered WoN accused-appellant was Yes. Yes. Being already under
(1992) in Marble Supply, Balagtas deprived of his constitutional custodial investigation while
Bulacan. According to Pat. right to counsel on board the police patrol jeep
Rolando Alcantara and on the way to the Police Station
Francisco Dayao, deceased was where formal investigation
with two companions on the may have been conducted,
previous night, one of whom appellant should have been
the accused who had a drinking informed of his Constitutional
spree with the deceased. When rights under Article III, Section
they apprehended the accused 12 of the 1987 Constitution,
they found the firearm of the more particularly par. 1 and
deceased on the chair where par. 3.
the accused was allegedly
seated. They boarded accused
along with Magtibay, other
accused on the police vehicle
and brought them to the police
station. While in the vehicle
Bolanos admitted that he killed
the deceased. RTC convicted
him hence the appeal.

People vs. Andan Pablito Andan alias "Bobby" WoN the appellant’s confession No. Under these
(1997) was accused of the crime of not being assisted by a counsel circumstances, it cannot be
rape with homicide. The is in violation of the successfully claimed that
offense was committed on
February 19, 1994 in Baliuag,
Bulacan; the victim being
Marianne Guevarra, 22 and a
2nd year student at the Fatima
School of Nursing.
On said day, victim left her
home for her school dormitory
in Valenzuela. While on her
way, appellant invited her to
his house. He used the pretext
that the blood pressure of his
wife's grandmother should be
taken. Marianne agreed to do
so as the old woman was her
distant relative. She did not
know that nobody was inside
the house.
Appellant then punched her in
the abdomen, brought her to
the kitchen and raped her. By
night time, Marianne, who was
still unconscious, was dragged
by appellant to their backyard
that was adjacent to a vacant
lot.
Appellant was to transfer
Marianne to the vacant lot
when she moved, prompting
appellant to hit her head with a
piece of concrete block. No
longer moving, he dragged her
to the lot and abandoned her.
At 11am her body was
discovered. The autopsy
revealed that she died of
"traumatic injuries."
Marianne's gruesome death
drew public attention and
prompted Baliuag Mayor
Cornelio Trinidad to form an
constitution, and is therefore
inadmissible as evidence
against him
appellant's confession before
the mayor is inadmissible. It is
true that a municipal mayor
has "operational supervision
and control" over the local
police and may arguably be
deemed a law enforcement
officer for purposes of applying
Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article
III of the Constitution.
However, appellant's
confession to the mayor was
not made in response to any
interrogation by the latter. In
fact, the mayor did not
question appellant at all. No
police authority ordered
appellant to talk to the mayor.
It was appellant himself who
spontaneously, freely and
voluntarily sought the mayor
for a private meeting. The
mayor did not know that
appellant was going to confess
his guilt to him. When
appellant talked with the
mayor as a confidant and not as
a law enforcement officer, his
uncounseled confession to him
did not violate his
constitutional rights. Thus, it
has been held that the
constitutional procedures on
custodial investigation do not
apply to a spontaneous
statement, not elicited through
questioning by the authorities,
but given in an ordinary
manner whereby appellant
orally admitted having
committed the crime. What the
Constitution bars is the
compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or
investigation team. The
investigation pointed to the
appellant. Appellant's nearby
house was searched but he was
not there. On February 24, a
police team led by Mayor
Trinidad traced appellant in his
parents' house. They took him
and brought him to the police
headquarters where he was
interrogated. Initially, he
denied any knowledge of
Marianne's death. However,
when the police confronted
him with evidence, appellant
relented but implicated two of
his neighbours, and that he was
merely a lookout. Larin and
Dizon were likewise brought
there by the police. The
following day a physical
examination conducted on the
suspects revealed that
appellant has multiple
scratches on the neck, chest
and back.
By that time, people
and media representatives
were already at the police
headquarters awaiting the
results of the investigation.
Mayor Trinidad arrived. Upon
seeing the mayor, appellant
approached him and
whispered that they talk
privately. The mayor led him
to the office of the Chief of
Police and there, he broke
down and said "Mayor,
patawarin mo ako! I will tell
you the truth. I am the one
who killed Marianne." The
mayor opened the door of the
confessions. The rights under
Section 12 are guaranteed to
preclude the slightest use of
coercion by the state as would
lead the accused to admit
something false, not to prevent
him from freely and voluntarily
telling the truth. Hence we
hold that appellant's
confession to the mayor was
correctly admitted by the trial
court.
Appellant's
confessions to the media were
likewise properly admitted.
The confessions were made in
response to questions by news
reporters, not by the police or
any other investigating officer.
We have held that statements
spontaneously made by a
suspect to news reporters on a
televised interview are deemed
voluntary and are admissible in
evidence.
The Court therefore
held accused-appellant Pablito
Andan guilty of the special
complex crime of rape with
homicide.
room to let the public and
media representatives witness
the confession. Since no
lawyer was available he
ordered the proceedings
photographed and videotaped.
In the presence of the mayor,
the police, representatives of
the media and appellant's own
wife and son, appellant
confessed his guilt. He asked
for forgiveness from Larin and
Dizon whom he falsely
implicated saying he did it
because of ill-feelings against
them. He also said that the
devil entered his mind because
of the pornographic magazines
and tabloid he read almost
everyday. After his confession,
appellant hugged his wife and
son and asked the mayor to
help him. His confession was
captured on videotape and
covered by the media
nationwide.
On arraignment,
however, appellant entered a
plea of "not guilty." He testified
that on said date he was at his
parent's house for the birthday
party of his nephew. He, his
wife and son went home after
5pm, slept at 8pm, and woke
up at 6am the next day.
Appellant claimed that after he
was picked up by the police on
February 24, he was coerced to
confess that he raped and
killed Marianne. Fearing for
his life, appellant did as he was
told.
The trial court
convicted the appellant and
 sentenced him to death. He
was found guilty of the crime
charged in the Information
(Rape with Homicide) and
penalized accordingly. Hence,
the automatic review.

Navallo vs. Sandiganbayan Accused was the Collecting and WoN the constitutional right No. No. Appellant is not in
(1994) Disbursing Officer of the against custodial investigations custodial investigation. A
Numancia National Vocational in favour of the accused has person under a normal audit
School, which school is also been violated examination is not under
located at del Carmen, Surigao custodial investigation. An
del Norte. His duties included audit examiner himself can
the collection of tuition fees, hardly be deemed to be the law
preparation of vouchers for enforcement officer
salaries of teachers and contemplated in the above rule.
employees, and remittance of In any case, the allegation of his
collections exceeding P500.00 having been "pressured" to
to the National Treasury. An sign the Examination Report
information for malversation of prepared by Dulguime
public funds was filed. A (examined cash, as ordered by
warrant of arrest was issued, Espino, the provincial auditor)
but accused-petitioner could appears to be belied by his own
not be found. on 10 December testimony.
1978, Presidential Decree No.
1606 took effect creating the
Sandiganbayan and conferring
on it original and exclusive
jurisdiction over crimes
committed by public officers
embraced in Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code. On 15
November 1984, Navallo was
finally arrested. He was
released on provisional liberty
upon the approval of his
property bail bond. When
arraigned by the RTC on 18
July 1985, he pleaded not
guilty. Upon motion of the
prosecution, the RTC
 transferred the case and
transmitted its records to the
Sandiganbayan. Special
Prosecutor Luz L.
Quiñones-Marcos opined that
since Navallo had already been
arraigned before the case was
transferred to the
Sandiganbayan, the RTC should
continue taking cognizance of
the case. The matter was
referred to the Office of the
Ombudsman which held
otherwise.

The information was then

docketed with the
Sandiganbayan. A new order
for Navallo's arrest was issued
by the Sandiganbayan. The
warrant was returned with a
certification by the RTC Clerk
of Court that the accused had
posted a bail bond. Navallo
filed a motion to quash,
contending (1) that the
Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over the offense
and the person of the accused
and (2) that since the accused
had already been arraigned by
the RTC, the attempt to
prosecute him before the
Sandiganbayan would
constitute double jeopardy.
However this was denied and
trial ensued and he was found
guilty.

People vs. Dy
(1988)
*​Res Gestae (things done):
the events, circumstances,
Accused is the owner of
Benny’s Bar at Boracay Island
and was sentenced with
murder before the RTC for
WoN the evidence presented
by the prosecution be
admissible to warrant guilt of
the accused.
Yes. Because the accused made
the confession voluntarily. He
was not under interrogation
when he made such confession
Yes. In view of the
documentary evidence on
record the defense lost its
credibility before the court. An
oral confession made by the
remarks, etc. which relate to a
particular case, especially as
constituting admissible
evidence in a court of law.
People vs. Alicando
(1995)
shooting a Swiss national in his
bar.
The accused contends that the
court erred in ​admitting the
presentation of the
prosecution of evidence that
he came to a police officer
and made a confession on the
crime and informed said
officer where to find the gun
he used, ​a statement that the
accused denied to have done.
They assail its admissibility to
the court on the grounds that
such statement was NOT
made in writing and is in
violation of the due process
required in custodial
investigation.
Appellant was charged with the
crime of rape with homicide of
Khazie Mae Penecilla, a minor,
four years of age, choking her
with his right hand. The
incident happened after
appellant drank liquor. A
neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago
found the victim’s body and the
parents and police were
informed. Appellant was living
in his uncle's house some five
WoN the the process of
arraignment and plea was done
correctly
to the police regarding the .38
caliber gun used.
No.
accused to the officer and
telling him the gun is in his bar
which he wants to surrender
can be held admissible in court
as evidence against him. This is
because such confession was
made unsolicited by the police
officer and the accused was not
under investigation when he
made the oral confession.
Therefore there is no need to
invoke compliance of the
proper procedure in a custodial
investigation at the case at bar.
The rule on RES GESTAE is
applicable where a witness
who heard the confession is
competent to satisfy the
substance of what he heard if
he heard and understood it. An
oral confession need not be
repeated verbatim, but in such
a case it must be given in
substance. Thus the oral
confession made by the
accused outside the ambit of
custodial investigation can be
admissible in court and was
given due credence to warrant
the judgment of the accused
being guilty of the crime.
The records do not reveal that
the Information against the
appellant was read in the
language or dialect known to
him. The Information against
the appellant is written in the
English language. It is
unknown whether the
appellant knows the English
language. Neither is it known
what dialect is understood by
the appellant. Nor is there any
arm's length from Penecilla's
house. Appellant was arrested
and interrogated by PO3 Danilo
Tan. He verbally confessed his
guilt without the assistance of
counsel. On the basis of his
uncounselled verbal confession
and follow up interrogations,
the police came to know and
recovered from appellant's
house, Khazie Mae's green
slippers, a pair of gold earrings,
a buri mat, a stained pillow and
a stained T-shirt all of which
were presented as evidence for
the prosecution. He was
arraigned with the assistance
of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of
the PAO. Appellant pleaded
guilty. The RTC convicted him.
Hence an automatic review for
the imposition of death
penalty.
showing that the Information
couched in English was
translated to the appellant in
his own dialect before his plea
of guilt. The RTC violated
section 1(a) of Rule 116, the
rule implementing the
constitutional right of the
appellant to be informed of the
nature and cause of the
accusation against him. It also
denied appellant his
constitutional right to due
process of law. It is urged that
we must presume that the
arraignment of the appellant
was regularly conducted. When
life is at stake, we cannot lean
on this rebuttable
presumption. There could be
no presumption. The court
must be sure.
The trial court violated section
3 of Rule 116 when it accepted
the plea of guilt of the
appellant. Said section requires
that the court shall conduct a
searching inquiry the
voluntariness and full
comprehension of the
consequences of his plea and
require the prosecution to
prove his guilt and the precise
degree of culpability. The
accused may also present
evidence in his behalf. The trial
court simply inquired if
appellant had physical marks
of maltreatment. It did not ask
the appellant when he was
arrested, who arrested him,
how and where he was
interrogated, whether he was
medically examined before and
after his interrogation, etc. It
limited its efforts trying to
discover late body marks of
maltreatment as if
involuntariness is caused by
physical abuse alone.

Further, there are physical

evidence to prove Khazie was
raped. These consists of a
pillow with bloodstains in its
center 14 and the T-shirt 15 of
the accused colored white with
bloodstains on its bottom.
These physical evidence are
evidence of the highest order.
They strongly corroborate the
testimony of Luisa Rebada that
the victim was raped.These are
inadmissible evidence for they
were gathered by PO3 Danilo
Tan of the Iloilo City PNP as a
result of custodial
interrogation where appellant
verbally confessed to the crime
without the benefit of counsel.
Section 13: Right to Bail
Title of the Case Facts
Basco vs. Rapatalo Petitioner filed a case for
(1997) murder against Roger Morente.
The accused filed a petition for
bail. The hearing for bail was
repeatedly rescheduled and it
was discovered later on that the
accused was already granted to
post bail. Thereafter, petitioner
filed a complaint against the
respondent judge Rapatalo with
gross ignorance or willful
disregard of established rule of
law for granting bail to an
accused in a murder case
without receiving evidence and
conducting a hearing.
Respondent judge, in his
comment, alleged that he
granted the petition based on
the prosecutor's option not to
oppose the petition as well as
the latter's recommendation
setting the bailbond in the
amount of P80,000.00. He
averred that when the
prosecution chose not to oppose
the petition for bail, he had the
discretion on whether to
approve it or not. He further
declared that when he approved
the petition, he had a right to
presume that the prosecutor
knew what he was doing since
he was more familiar with the
case, having conducted the
preliminary investigation.
Furthermore, the private
prosecutor was not around at
Issue
WON respondent judge
gravely abused his discretion
granting bail to an accused in
a murder case.
Held Ruling
Yes. An evaluation of the records in the
case at bar reveals that respondent
Judge granted bail to the accused
without first conducting a hearing
to prove that the guilt of the
accused is strong despite his
knowledge that the offense
charged is a capital offense in
disregard of the procedure laid
down in Section 8, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court as amended by
Administrative Circular No. 12-94.
Respondent judge admittedly
granted the petition for bail based
on the prosecution's declaration
not to oppose the petition.
Respondent's assertion, however,
that he has a right to presume that
the prosecutor knows what he is
doing on account of the latter's
familiarity with the case due to his
having conducted the preliminary
investigation is faulty. Said
reasoning is tantamount to ceding
to the prosecutor the duty of
exercising judicial discretion to
determine whether the guilt of the
accused is strong. Judicial
discretion is the domain of the
judge before whom the petition for
provisional liberty will be decided.
The mandated duty to exercise
discretion has never been reposed
upon the prosecutor.
The absence of objection from the
prosecution is never a basis for
granting bail to the accused. It is
 the time the public prosecutor
recommended bail.
Respondent Judge stated that in
any case, the bailbond posted by
accused was cancelled and a
warrant for his arrest was issued
on account of complainant's
motion for reconsideration. The
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
apparently conformed to and
approved the motion for
reconsideration.
People vs. Judge Donato Private respondent and his
(1991) co-accused were charged of
rebellion on October 2,
1986 for acts committed
before and after February
1986. Private respondent
filed with a Motion to
Quash alleging that: (a)
the facts alleged do not
constitute an offense; (b)
the Court has
no jurisdiction over the
offense charged; (c) the
Court has
no jurisdiction over the
WoN the private respondent Yes.
has the right to bail
the court's determination after a
hearing that the guilt of the
accused is not strong that forms
the basis for granting bail.
Respondent Judge should not have
relied solely on the
recommendation made by the
prosecutor but should have
ascertained personally whether the
evidence of guilt is strong. After all,
the judge is not bound by the
prosecutor's recommendation.
Moreover, there will be a violation
of due process if the respondent
Judge grants the application for
bail without hearing since Section
8 of Rule 114 provides that
whatever evidence presented for
or against the accused's
provisional release will be
determined at the hearing.
Wherefore, respondent judge was
reprimanded by the SC with the
WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future
will be dealt with more severely.
Yes. Bail in the instant case is
a matter of right. It is
absolute since the crime is
not a capital offense,
therefore prosecution has no
right to present evidence. It
is only when it is a capital
offense that the right
becomes discretionary.
However it was wrong for the
Judge to change the amount
of bail from 30K to 50K
without hearing the
prosecution.
persons of the defendants;
and (d) the criminal action
or liability has been
extinguished. This was
denied. May 9, 1987
Respondent filed a petition
forbail, which was opposed
that the respondent is not
entitled to bail anymore
since rebellion became a
capital offense under PD
1996, 942 and 1834
amending ART. 135 of RPC.
On 5 June 1987 the
President issued Executive
Order No. 187 repealing,
among others, P.D. Nos.
1996, 942 and 1834 and
restoring to full force and
effect Article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code as it
existed before the
amendatory decrees.
Judge Donatonow granted
the bail, which was fixed at
P30,000.00 and imposed a
condition that he shall
report to the court once
every two months within
the first ten days of every
period thereof. Petitioner
filed a supplemental motion
for reconsideration
indirectly asking the court
to deny bail to and to allow
it to present evidence in
support thereof considering
the "inevitable probability
that the accused will
not comply with this main
condition of his bail. It was
contended that:
1. The accused has evaded
Republic Act No. 6968
approved on 24 October
1990, providing a penalty of
reclusion perpetua to the
crime of rebellion, is not
applicable to the accused as
it is not favorable to him.
Accused validly waived his
right to bail in another
case(petition for
habeascorpus). Agreements
were made therein: accused
to remain under custody,
whereas his
co-detainees Josefina Cruz
and Jose Milo Concepcion will
be released immediately, with
a condition that they will
submit themselves in
the jurisdiction of the court.
Said petition for HC was
dismissed. Bail is the security
given for the release of a
person in custody of the law.
Ergo, there was a waiver. We
hereby rule that the right
to bailis another of the
constitutional rights which
can be waived. It is a right
which is personal to the
accused and whose waiver
would not be contrary to law,
public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs, or
prejudicial to a third person
with a right recognized by
law. 
 the authorities for thirteen
years and was an escapee
from detention when
arrested; (Chairman of
CPP-NPA)
2. He was not arrested at
his residence as he had no
known address;
3. He was using the false
name "Manuel
Mercado Castro" at the
time of his arrest and
presented a Driver's
License to substantiate his
false identity;
4. The address he gave
"Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite,"
turned out to be also a
false address;
5. He and his companions
were on board a private
vehicle with a declared
owner whose identity and
address were also found to
be false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry
Order No. 1-A dated 11
January 1982 , a reward of
P250,000.00 was offered
and paid for his arrest.

This however was denied.

Hence the appeal.

People vs. Fortes Agripino Gine of Barangay
(1993) Naburacan, Municipality of
Matnog, Province of Sorsogon,
accompanied his 13-year old
daughter, Merelyn, ​to the police
station of the said
WoN the accused’s right to No. It is clear from Section 13, Article 3
bail violated of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Court, as amended, that
before conviction bail is either a
matter of right or of discretion. It is
 municipality to report a rape
committed against the latter
by the accused.
Following this, the accused was
apprehended and charged. A
bond of P25,000 was granted for
accused’s provisional release.
The MCTC found him builty. An
appeal to the RTC was filed, the
request for the fixing of bond
was denied.
Now accused assails denial of
bail on the ground that the same
amounted to an undue denial of
his constitutional right to bail.
Comendador vs. De Villa The petitioners in two criminal
(1991) case who are officers of the AFP
were directed to appear in
person before the Pre-Trial
Investigating Officers for the
alleged participation the failed
coup on December 1 to 9, 1989.
Petitioners now claim that there
was no pre-trial investigation
of the charges as mandated
Article of War 71.
A motion for dismissal was
denied. Now, their motion for
reconsideration. Alleging denial
of due process.
In GR No. 95020, Ltc. Jacinto
Ligot ​applied for bail on June
Whether or not there No.
was a violation of the
accused right to bail.  opportunities to present their side
a matter of right when the offense
charged is punishable by any
penalty lower than reclusion
perpetua. To that extent the right is
absolute. If the offense charged is
punishable by reclusion perpetua
bail becomes a matter of
discretion. It shall be denied if the
evidence of guilt is strong. The
court's discretion is limited to
determining whether or not
evidence of guilt is strong. But once
it is determined that the evidence
of guilt is not strong, bail also
becomes a matter of right. If an
accused who is charged with a
crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua is convicted by the trial
court and sentenced to suffer such
a penalty, bail is neither a matter of
right on the part of the accused nor
of discretion on the part of the
court.
NO denial of due process.
Petitioners were given several
at the pre-trial investigation, first
at the scheduled hearing of
February 12, 1990, and then again
after the denial of their motion of
February 21, 1990, when they
were given until March 7, 1990, to
submit their counter-affidavits. On
that date, they filed instead a
verbal motion for reconsideration
which they were again asked to
submit in writing. They had been
expressly warned in the subpoena
that "failure to submit
counter-affidavits on the date
specified shall be deemed a waiver
of their right to submit
controverting evidence."
5, 1990, but the application
was denied by GCM No. 14.
He filed with the RTC a petition
for certiorari and mandamus
with prayer for provisional
liberty and a writ of preliminary
injunction.
Judge of GCM then ​granted the
provisional liberty. ​However
he was not released
immediately. The RTC now
declared that even military men
facing court martial proceedings
can avail the right to bail.
The private respondents in G.R.
No. 97454 filed with SC a
petition for habeas corpus on
the ground that they were being
detained in Camp Crame without
charges. The petition was
referred to RTC. Finding after
hearing that no formal charges
had been filed against the
petitioners after more than a
year after their arrest, the trial
court ordered their release.
Petitioners have a right to
pre-emptory challenge. (Right to
challenge validity of members of
G/SCM)
It is argued that since the private
respondents are officers of the
Armed Forces accused of violations
of the Articles of War, the
respondent courts have no
authority to order their release and
otherwise interfere with the
court-martial proceedings. This is
without merit. * The Regional Trial
Court has concurrent jurisdiction
with the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus against inferior courts
and other bodies and on petitions
for habeas corpus and quo
warranto.
The right to bail invoked by the
private respondents has
traditionally not been recognized
and is not available in the military,
as an exception to the general rule
embodied in the Bill of Rights. The
right to a speedy trial is given more
emphasis in the military where the
right to bail does not exist.
On the contention that they had not
been charged after more than one
year from their arrest, there was
substantial compliance with the
requirements of due process and
the right to a speedy trial. The AFP
Special Investigating Committee
was able to complete the
pre-charge investigation only after
one year because hundreds of
officers and thousands of enlisted
 men were involved in the failed
coup.

Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the

petition is dismissed for lack of
merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the
petition is granted, and the
respondents are directed to allow
the petitioners to exercise the right
of peremptory challenge under
article 18 of the articles of war. In
G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the
petitions are also granted, and the
orders of the respondent courts for
the release of the private
respondents are hereby reversed
and set aside. No costs.

Baylon vs. Judge Sison ● Respondent judge is WoN the respondent judge Yes. The Supreme Court held that there
(1995) accused for exercised grave abuse of was abuse in the discretion of the
malfeasance in discretion in the grant of bail judge in granting bail to the
granting bail to the to the accused accused considering that the
accused charged with motion for bail was filed on a
double murder Saturday and the hearing was
● Prosecution was not immediately conducted on Monday
given notice of at least thereby depriving the prosecution
3 days before the to make an opposition thereto and
scheduled hearing for violating the 3-day notice rule
bail in ​violation of embodied in Rule 15, Sec. 4 of
Rule 15, Section 4 of Rules of Court. It is a well
the Rules of Court established rule of law that bail is
and the filing of not a matter of right and requires a
petition for bail has hearing where the accused is
only 2 non-working charged with an offense which is
day interval from the punishable by death, reclusion
schedule perpetua or life imprisonment.
● The prosecution also Respondent judge should have
assails that they ​were carefully scrutinized the validity of
not given the chance petition for bail before making an
to present evidence outright grant of this motion.
that strongly prove
the guilt of the A guided legal principle in the right
accused to bail includes:
 ● Respondent judge
justifies NOT having
committed grave abuse
of discretion since the
prosecution did not
interpose objection
with his orders and the
lack of previous notice
was cured with the
filing of MR
Manotoc vs. CA Petitioner was charged with
(1986) estafa and he posted bail.
Petitioner then filed before each
of the RTCs a motion entitled
“motion for permission to leave
the country,” stating as ground
therefor his desire to go to the
US, “relative to his business
transactions and opportunities.”
The prosecution ​opposed the
said motion ​and after due
hearing, ​both RTC judges
denied the same.
Petitioner thus filed a petition
for certiorari and mandamus
before the then CA seeking to
annul the orders dated March
9 and 26 of 1982, of Judges
Camilon and Pronove,
respectively, as well as the
communication-request of the
SEC, denying his leave to
travel abroad.
WoN his constitutional right
to travel has been violated
. . The prosecution must first be
accorded an opportunity to present
evidence because by the very
nature of deciding applications for
bail, it is on the basis of such
evidence that judicial discretion is
weighed against in determining
whether the guilt of the accused is
strong. In other words, discretion
must be exercised regularly, legally
and within the confines of
procedural due process, that is,
after evaluation of the evidence
submitted by the prosecution. Any
order issued in the absence thereof
is not a product of sound judicial
discretion but of whim and caprice
and outright arbitrariness.
No. A court has the power to prohibit a
person admitted to bail from
leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the
nature and function of a bail bond.
The condition imposed upon
petitioner to make himself
available at all times whenever the
court requires his presence
operates as a valid restriction on
his right to travel. Indeed, if the
accused were allowed to leave the
Philippines without sufficient
reason, he may be placed beyond
the reach of the courts. Petitioner
has not shown the necessity for his
travel abroad. There is no
indication that the business
transactions cannot be undertaken
by any other person in his behalf.
 He likewise prayed for the
issuance of the appropriate writ
commanding the Immigration
Commissioner and the Chief of
the Aviation Security Command
(AVSECOM) to clear him for
departure. The Court of Appeals
denied the petition.

Petitioner contends that having

been admitted to bail as a matter
of right, neither the courts which
granted him bail nor the
Securities and Exchange
Commission which has no
jurisdiction over his liberty
could prevent him from
exercising his constitutional
right to travel.

Government of the US vs. Petition is a sequel to the case
Judge Puruganan “Sec. of Justice v. Hon.
(2002) Lantion”. The Secretary was
ordered to furnish Mr. Jimenez
copies of the extradition
request and its supporting
papers and to grant the latter a
reasonable period within which
to file a comment and
supporting evidence. But, on
motion for reconsideration by
the Sec. of Justice, it reversed
its decision but held that the
Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the
right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of
the extradition process. On
May 18, 2001, the Government
of the USA, represented by the
Philippine Department of
Justice, filed with the RTC, the
Petition for Extradition praying
for the issuance of an order for
1.) WoN Hon. Puruganan
acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in adopting a
procedure of first hearing a
potential extradite before
issuing an arrest warrant
under Section 6 of PD No.
1069
2.) WoN Hon. Puruganan
acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in granting the
prayer for bail
3.) WoN there is a violation
of due process
1.) Yes. i. YES.
2.) Yes.
3.) No. By using the phrase “if it
appears,” the law further conveys
Held: that accuracy is not as
Petition is granted. Bail bond important as speed at such early
posted is cancelled. RTC is stage. From the knowledge and
directed to conduct the the material then available to it,
extradition proceedings the court is expected merely to
before it. get a good first impression or a
prima facie finding sufficient to
make a speedy initial
determination as regards the
arrest and detention of the
accused. The prima facie
existence of probable cause for
hearing the petition and, a priori,
for issuing an arrest warrant was
already evident from the Petition
itself and its supporting
documents. Hence, after having
already determined therefrom that
a prima facie finding did exist,
his “immediate arrest” pursuant
to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to
prevent the flight of Jimenez.
Before the RTC could act on
the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed
before it an “Urgent
Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion”
praying for his application for
an arrest warrant be set for
hearing. After the hearing, as
required by the court, Mr.
Jimenez submitted his
Memorandum. Therein
seeking an alternative prayer
that in case a warrant should
issue, he be allowed to post
bail in the amount of
P100,000. The court ordered
the issuance of a warrant for
his arrest and fixing bail for his
temporary liberty at P1M in
cash. After he had surrendered
his passport and posted the
required cash bond, Jimenez
was granted provisional
liberty.
Government of the USA filed
a petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
set aside the order for the
issuance of a warrant for his
arrest and fixing bail for his
temporary liberty at P1M in
cash which the court deems
best to take cognizance as
there is still no local
jurisprudence to guide lower
court.  documents, the judge must study
respondent judge gravely abused
his discretion when he set the
matter for hearing upon motion of
Jimenez. The silence of the Law
and the Treaty leans to the more
reasonable interpretation that
there is no intention to punctuate
with a hearing every little step in
the entire proceedings. It also
bears emphasizing at this point
that extradition proceedings are
summary in nature. Sending to
persons sought to be extradited a
notice of the request for their
arrest and setting it for hearing at
some future date would give them
ample opportunity to prepare and
execute an escape which neither
the Treaty nor the Law could have
intended.
Even Section 2 of Article III of
our Constitution, which is invoked
by Jimenez, does not require a
notice or a hearing before the
issuance of a warrant of arrest.
To determine probable cause for
the issuance of arrest warrants,
the Constitution itself requires
only the examination under oath
or affirmation of complainants and
the witnesses they may produce.
The Proper Procedure to “Best
Serve The Ends Of Justice” In
Extradition Cases
Upon receipt of a petition for
extradition and its supporting
them and make, as soon as
possible, a prima facie finding
whether
a) they are sufficient in form and
substance
b) they show compliance with
the Extradition Treaty and Law
c) the person sought is
extraditable

At his discretion, the judge may

require the submission of further
documentation or may personally
examine the affiants and
witnesses of the petitioner. If, in
spite of this study and
examination, no prima facie
finding is possible, the petition
may be dismissed at the
discretion of the judge. On the
other hand, if the presence of a
prima facie case is determined,
then the magistrate must
immediately issue a warrant for
the arrest of the extraditee, who is
at the same time summoned to
answer the petition and to appear
at scheduled summary hearings.
Prior to the issuance of the
warrant, the judge must not
inform or notify the potential
extraditee of the pendency of the
petition, lest the latter be given
the opportunity to escape and
frustrate the proceedings.

ii. Yes.

The constitutional provision on

bail on Article III, Section 13 of
the Constitution, as well
as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court, applies only when
a person has been arrested and
detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws. It does not apply to
extradition proceedings, because
extradition courts do not render
judgments of conviction or
acquittal. Moreover, the
constitutional right to bail “flows
from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be
subjected to the loss of freedom
as thereafter he would be entitled
to acquittal, unless his guilt be
proved beyond reasonable
doubt. In extradition, the
presumption of innocence is not
at issue. The provision in the
Constitution stating that the “right
to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended”
finds application “only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in or directly
connected with invasion.”

That the offenses for which

Jimenez is sought to be
extradited are bailable in the
United States is not an argument
to grant him one in the present
case. Extradition proceedings are
separate and distinct from the trial
for the offenses for which he is
charged. He should apply for bail
before the courts trying the
criminal cases against him, not
before the extradition court.

Exceptions to the “No Bail” Rule

Bail is not a matter of right in
extradition cases. It is subject to
judicial discretion in the context of
the peculiar facts of each case.
Bail may be applied for and
granted as an exception, only
upon a clear and convincing
showing
1) that, once granted bail, the
applicant will not be a flight risk or
a danger to the community; and
2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling
circumstances including, as a
matter of reciprocity, those cited
by the highest court in the
requesting state when it grants
provisional liberty in extradition
cases therein

Since this exception has no

express or specific statutory
basis, and since it is derived
essentially from general principles
of justice and fairness, the
applicant bears the burden of
proving the above two-tiered
requirement with clarity, precision
and emphatic forcefulness.

It must be noted that even

before private respondent ran for
and won a congressional seat in
Manila, it was already of public
knowledge that the United States
was requesting his extradition.
Therefore, his constituents were
or should have been prepared for
the consequences of the
extradition case. Thus, the court
ruled against his claim that his
election to public office is by itself
a compelling reason to grant him
bail.

Giving premium to delay by

considering it as a special
circumstance for the grant of bail
would be tantamount to giving
him the power to grant bail to
himself. It would also encourage
him to stretch out and
unreasonably delay the
extradition proceedings even
more. Extradition proceedings
should be conducted with all
deliberate speed to determine
compliance with the Extradition
Treaty and Law; and, while
safeguarding basic individual
rights, to avoid the legalistic
contortions, delays and
technicalities that may negate that
purpose.

That he has not yet fled from

the Philippines cannot be taken to
mean that he will stand his
ground and still be within reach of
our government if and when it
matters; that is, upon the
resolution of the Petition for
Extradition.

iii. NO.

Potential extraditees are

entitled to the rights to due
process and to fundamental
fairness. The doctrine of right to
due process and fundamental
fairness does not always call for a
prior opportunity to be heard. A
subsequent opportunity to be
heard is enough. He will be given
full opportunity to be heard
subsequently, when the
extradition court hears the
Petition for Extradition. Indeed,
available during the hearings on
the petition and the answer is the
full chance to be heard and to
enjoy fundamental fairness that is
compatible with the summary
nature of extradition.

It is also worth noting that

before the US government
requested the extradition of
respondent, proceedings had
already been conducted in that
country. He already had that
opportunity in the requesting
state; yet, instead of taking it, he
ran away.

Other Doctrines:

Five Postulates of Extradition

1) Extradition Is a Major
Instrument for the Suppression of
Crime

In this era of globalization, easier

and faster international travel, and
an expanding ring of
international crimes and criminals,
we cannot afford to be an
isolationist state. We need to
cooperate with other states in
order to improve our chances of
suppressing crime in our own
country.

2) The Requesting State Will

Accord Due Process to the
Accused

By entering into an extradition

treaty, the Philippines is deemed
to have reposed its trust
in the reliability or soundness of
the legal and judicial system of its
treaty partner, as well as in the
ability and the willingness of the
latter to grant basic rights to the
accused in the pending criminal
case therein.

3) The Proceedings Are Sui

Generis
An extradition proceeding is sui
generis:
a) It is not a criminal proceeding
which will call into operation all
the rights of an accused as
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
It does not involve the
determination of the guilt or
innocence of an accused. His
guilt or innocence will be
adjudged in the court of the state
where he will be extradited.
b) An extradition proceeding is
summary in nature while criminal
proceedings involve a full-blown
trial.
c) In terms of the quantum of
evidence to be satisfied, a
criminal case requires proof
“beyond reasonable doubt” for
conviction while a fugitive may be
ordered extradited “upon showing
of the existence of a prima facie
case”
d) Unlike in a criminal case
where judgment becomes
executory upon being rendered
final, in an extradition proceeding,
our courts may adjudge an
individual extraditable but the
President has the final discretion
to extradite him.

Extradition is merely a measure of

international judicial assistance
through which a person charged
with or convicted of a crime is
restored to a jurisdiction with the
best claim to try that person. The
ultimate purpose of extradition
proceedings in court is only to
determine whether the extradition
request complies with the
Extradition Treaty, and whether
the person sought is extraditable.

4) Compliance Shall Be in Good

Faith.

We are bound by pacta sunt

servanda to comply in good faith
with our obligations
under the Treaty. Accordingly,
the Philippines must be ready and
in a position to deliver the
accused, should it be found
proper

5) There Is an Underlying Risk

of Flight

Indeed, extradition hearings

would not even begin, if only the
accused were
willing to submit to trial in the
requesting country. Prior acts of
herein respondent:
a) leaving the requesting state
right before the conclusion of his
indictment proceedings there;
and
b) remaining in the requested
state despite learning that the
requesting state is seeking his
return and that the crimes he is
charged with are bailable

Extradition is Essentially
Executive
Extradition is essentially an
executive, not a judicial,
responsibility arising out of the
presidential power to conduct
foreign relations and to implement
treaties. Thus, the Executive
Department of government has

Government of HK vs. Olalia
(2007)
Private respondent Muñoz was
charged before Hong Kong
Court. Warrants of arrest were
issued and by virtue of a final
decree the validity of the Order
of Arrest was upheld. The
petitioner Hong Kong
Administrative Region filed a
petition for the extradition of the
private respondent. In the same
case, a petition for bail was filed
by the private respondent.
The petition for bail was denied
by reason that there was no
Philippine law granting the same
in extradition cases and that the
respondent was a high “flight
risk”. Private respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration and
was granted by the respondent
judge subject to the following
conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in
cash with the condition that
accused hereby undertakes that
he will appear and answer the
issues raised in these
proceedings and will at all times
hold himself amenable to orders
and processes of this Court, will
further appear for judgment. If
accused fails in this undertaking,
the cash bond will be forfeited in
favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his
valid passport to this Court;
WoN a potential extradite is
entitled to post bail
Yes. A potential extradite is
entitled to bail.
broad discretion in its duty and
power of implementation. 
Petitioner alleged that the trial
court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in admitting
private respondent to bail; that
there is nothing in the Constitution
or statutory law providing that a
potential extraditee has a right to
bail, the right being limited solely
to criminal proceedings.
On the other hand, private
respondent maintained that the
right to bail guaranteed under the
Bill of Rights extends to a
prospective extraditee; and that
extradition is a harsh process
resulting in a prolonged
deprivation of one’s liberty.
In this case, the Court reviewed
what was held in Government of
United States of America v. Hon.
Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding
Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42,
and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario
Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675
April 2007, that the constitutional
provision on bail does not apply to
extradition proceedings, the same
being available only in criminal
proceedings. The Court took
cognizance of the following trends
in international law:
(1) the growing importance of the
individual person in public
international;
 3. The Department of Justice is
given immediate notice and
discretion of filing its own
motion for hold departure order
before this Court even in
extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report
to the government prosecutors
handling this case or if they so
desire to the nearest office, at
any time and day of the week;
and if they further desire,
manifest before this Court to
require that all the assets of
accused, real and personal, be
filed with this Court soonest,
with the condition that if the
accused flees from his
undertaking, said assets be
forfeited in favor of the
government and that the
corresponding lien/annotation
be noted therein accordingly.
Petitioner filed a motion to
vacate the said order but was
denied by the respondent judge.
Hence, this instant petition.
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan • On June 5, 2014, the
(2015) Office of the Ombudsman
charged petitioner Enrile and
several others with plunder in
the Sandiganbayan on the basis
of their purported involvement
in the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the
Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF).
• On June 10, 2014 and
June 16, 2014, petitioner filed
his Omnibus Motion and
1.) Whether bail may be
granted as a matter of right
or of discretion
2.) WoN petitioner is bailable
since he is not flight risk
1.) The right to bail is
expressly afforded by Section
13, Article 3 of the
Constitution
2.) Yes.
(2) the higher value now being
given to human rights;
(3) the corresponding duty of
countries to observe these
universal human rights in fulfilling
their treaty obligations; and
(4) the duty of this Court to balance
the rights of the individual under
our fundamental law, on one hand,
and the law on extradition, on the
other.
In light of the recent developments
in international law, where
emphasis is given to the worth of
the individual and the sanctity of
human rights, the Court departed
from the ruling in Purganan, and
held that an extraditee may be
allowed to post bail.
The right to bail is expressly
afforded by Section 13, Article III
(Bill of Rights) of the Constitution,
viz.:
x x x All persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released
on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail
shall not be impaired even when
Supplemental Opposition
praying, among others, that he
be allowed to post bail should
probable cause be found against
him.
• On July 3, 2014, after
the motions were heard,
Sandiganbayan issued its
resolution denying Enrile’s
motion, particularly on the
matter of bail, on the ground of
its prematurity considering that
Enrile had not yet then
voluntarily surrendered or been
placed under the custody of the
law.
• On the same day that
the warrant for his arrest was
issued, Enrile voluntarily
surrendered to Director
Benjamin Magalong of the
Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp
Crame, Quezon City, and was
later on confined at the
Philippine National Police (PNP)
General Hospital following his
medical examination.
• Thereafter, Enrile filed
his Motion for Detention at the
PNP General Hospital, and his
Motion to Fix Bail, both dated
July 7, 2014, which were heard
by the Sandiganbayan on July 8,
2014. In support of the motions,
Enrile argued that he should be
allowed to post bail because: (a)
the Prosecution had not yet
established that the evidence of
his guilt was strong; (b)
although he was charged with
the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required.
This constitutional provision is
repeated in Section 7, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court, as follows:
Section 7. Capital offense or an
offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. — No person charged
with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment,
shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution.
A capital offense in the context of
the rule refers to an offense that,
under the law existing at the time
of its commission and the
application for admission to bail,
may be punished with death.
The general rule is, therefore, that
any person, before being
convicted of any criminal offense,
shall be bailable, unless he is
charged with a capital offense, or
with an offense punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence
of his guilt is strong. Hence, from
the moment he is placed under
arrest, or is detained or restrained
by the officers of the law, he can
claim the guarantee of his
provisional liberty under the Bill of
Rights, and he retains his right to
bail unless he is charged with a
capital offense, or with an offense
plunder, the penalty as to him
would only be reclusion
temporal, not reclusion
perpetua; and (c) he was not a
flight risk, and his age and
physical condition must further
be seriously considered.
• Sandiganbayan issued
two resolutions denying
petitioner’s Motion to Fix Bail
and Motion for Reconsideration
dated July 14, 2014 and August
8, 2014, respectively.
• Petitioner then filed a
Petition for Certiorari to assail
and annul the resolutions issued
by the Sandiganbayan before the
Supreme Court.
• Enrile claims that
before judgment of conviction,
an accused is entitled to bail as
matter of right; that it is the duty
and burden of the Prosecution to
show clearly and conclusively
that Enrile comes under the
exception and cannot be
excluded from enjoying the right
to bail; that the Prosecution has
failed to establish that Enrile, if
convicted of plunder, is
punishable by reclusion
perpetua considering the
presence of two mitigating
circumstances – his age and his
voluntary surrender; that the
Prosecution has not come
forward with proof showing that
his guilt for the crime of plunder
is strong; and that he should not
be considered a flight risk taking
into account that he is already
punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment,
and the evidence of his guilt is
strong. Once it has been
established that the evidence of
guilt is strong, no right to bail shall
be recognized.
As a result, all criminal cases
within the competence of the
Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal
Circuit Trial Court are bailable as
matter of right because these
courts have no jurisdiction to try
capital offenses, or offenses
punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment.
Likewise, bail is a matter of right
prior to conviction by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) for any offense
not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua , or life
imprisonment, or even prior to
conviction for an offense
punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment
when evidence of guilt is not
strong.
On the other hand, the granting of
bail is discretionary: (1) upon
conviction by the RTC of an
offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC
has imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding six
years, provided none of the
circumstances enumerated under
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule
114 is present, as follows:
over the age of 90, his medical (a) That he is a
condition, and his social recidivist,
standing. quasi-recidivist, or
habitual delinquent, or
has committed the crime
aggravated by the
circumstance of
reiteration;
(b) That he has
previously escaped from
legal confinement,
evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of
his bail without valid
justification;
(c) That he committed
the offense while under
probation, parole, or
conditional pardon;
(d) That the
circumstances of hi s
case indicate the
probability of flight if
released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue
risk that he may commit
another crime during the
pendency of the appeal
The Court is further mindful of the
Philippines’ responsibility in the
international community arising
from the national commitment
under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights to:
x x x uphold the fundamental
human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person.
This commitment is enshrined in
Section II, Article II of our
Constitution which provides: "The
State values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights." The
Philippines, therefore, has the
responsibility of protecting and
promoting the right of every
person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or
arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to
enable it to decide without delay
on the legality of the detention
and order their release if justified.
In other words, the Philippine
authorities are under obligation to
make available to every person
under detention such remedies
which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty. These
remedies include the right to be
admitted to bail.
This national commitment to
uphold the fundamental human
rights as well as value the worth
and dignity of every person has
authorized the grant of bail not
only to those charged in criminal
proceedings but also to
extraditees upon a clear and
convincing showing: (1 ) that the
detainee will not be a flight risk or
a danger to the community; and
(2 ) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling
circumstances.
In our view, his social and political
standing and his having
immediately surrendered to the
authorities upon his being
charged in court indicate that the
risk of his flight or escape from
this jurisdiction is highly unlikely.
His personal disposition from the
onset of his indictment for
plunder, formal or otherwise, has
demonstrated his utter respect for
the legal processes of this
country. We also do not ignore
that at an earlier time many years
ago when he had been charged
with rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder, he
already evinced a similar personal
disposition of respect for the legal
processes, and was granted bail
during the pendency of his trial
because he was not seen as a
flight risk. With his solid reputation
in both his public and his private
lives, his long years of public
service, and history’s judgment of
him being at stake, he should be
granted bail.
The currently fragile state of
Enrile’s health presents another
compelling justification for his
admission to bail, but which the
Sandiganbayan did not recognize.