EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT (SECTION VII)

SECTION 1
1. MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS
G.R. No. 88211; September 15 1989

FACTS:

After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family fled to Hawaii.
Now in his deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to order the respondents to issue their travel
documents and enjoin the implementation of the President’s decision to bar their return to the
Philippines. Petitioners contend under the provision of the Bill of Rights that the President is
without power to impair their liberty of abode because only a court may do so “within the limits
prescribed by law.” Nor, according to the petitioners, may the President impair their right to
travel because no law has authorized her to do so.

ISSUE:

Whether or not in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

HELD:

Yes. According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does not define what is meant
by executive power although the same article tackles on exercises of certain powers by the
President such as appointing power during recess of the Congress (S.16), control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices (Section 17), power to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment
(Section 19), treaty making power (Section 21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power
(Section 22), informing power (Section 23).

The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be limited only to
the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government
that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
2. SOLIVEN VS. MAKASIAR
167 SCRA 393

FACTS:

Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran Petitioner Beltran argues
that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative
disability to file suit". He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's
filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution,
bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way
defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be
exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under theConstitution, may initiate criminal
proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit. If she may initiate,
what are the repercussions of such initiation to her executive immunity?

HELD:

Yes. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to
assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction,
considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring
all of the office-holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
3. REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES VS EDUARDO ERMITA
April 2, 2009

FACTS:

There was a report that handwritten copies of two sets of 2006 Nursing Board examination were
circulated during the examination period among examinees reviewing at the R.A. Gapuz Review
Center and Inress Review Center. The examinees were provided with a list of 500 questions and
answers in two of the examinations’ five subjects, particularly Tests III (Psychiatric Nursing) and
V (Medical-Surgical Nursing). The PRC later admitted the leakage and traced it to two Board of
Nursing members. Exam results came out but Court of Appeals restrained the PRC from
proceeding with the oath-taking of the successful examinees. President GMA ordered for a re-
examination and issued EO 566 which authorized the CHED to supervise the establishment and
operation of all review centers and similar entities in the Philippines. CHED Chairman Puno
approved CHED Memorandum Order No. 49 series of 2006 (Implementing Rules and
Regulations).

Review Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner), an organization of independent review

centers, asked the CHED to "amend, if not withdraw" the IRR arguing, among other things, that
giving permits to operate a review center to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of
HEIs and professional organizations will effectively abolish independent review centers. CHED
Chairman Puno however believed that suspending the implementation of the IRR would be
inconsistent with the mandate of EO 566.

A dialogue between the petitioner and CHED took place. Revised IRR was approved. Petitioner
filed before the CHED a Petition to Clarify/Amend RIRR praying to exclude independent review
center from the coverage of the CHED; to clarify the meaning of the requirement for existing
review centers to tie-up with HEIs; to revise the rules to make it conform with RA 7722 limiting
the CHED’s coverage to public and private institutions of higher.

In 2007, then CHED Chairman Neri responded to the petitioner that: to exclude the operation of
independent review centers from the coverage of CHED would clearly contradict the intention of
the said Executive Order No. 566; As to the request to clarify what is meant by tie-up/be
integrated with an HEI, tie-up/be integrated simply means, to be in partner with an HEI.
Petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before this Court praying for the
annulment of the RIRR, the declaration of EO 566 as invalid and unconstitutional exercise of
legislative power, and the prohibition against CHED from implementing the RIRR. Motion to
intervene filed by other organizations/institutions were granted by the Court. On 21 May 2008,
CHED issued CHED Memorandum Order No. 21, Series of 2008 (CMO 21, s. 2008) extending
the deadline for six months from 27 May 2008 for all existing independent review centers to tie-
up or be integrated with HEIs in accordance with the RIRR. On 25 November 2008 Resolution,
SC resolved to require the parties to observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of EO
566, the RIRR, and CMO 21, s. 2008.

ISSUES:
1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative power as it
expands the CHED’s jurisdiction.
2. Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executive’s rule-making power.

HELD:
1. Yes, it expands CHED’s jurisdiction, hence unconsititutional.
The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly expand the CHED’s coverage under RA 7722. The
CHED’s coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and private institutions of higher education
and degree-granting programs in all public and private post-secondary educational institutions.
EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a framework for the regulation of review centers and
similar entities. The definition of a review center under EO 566 shows that it refers to one which
offers "a program or course of study that is intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge or
competencies and skills of reviewees obtained in the formal school setting in preparation for the
licensure examinations" given by the PRC. It does not offer a degree-granting program that
would put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED. A review course is only intended to "refresh and
enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees." Thus, programs given by
review centers could not be considered "programs x xx of higher learning" that would put them
under the jurisdiction of the CHED. "Higher education," is defined as "education beyond the
secondary level” or "education provided by a college or university." Further, the "similar entities"
in EO 566 cover centers providing "review or tutorial services" in areas not covered by licensure
examinations given by the PRC, which include, although not limited to, college entrance
examinations, Civil Services examinations, and tutorial services. These review and tutorial
services hardly qualify as programs of higher learning.

2. Yes, it is invalid. The exercise of the President’s residual powers under Section 20, Title I of
Book III of EO (invoked by the OSG to justify GMA’s action) requires legislation; as the
provision clearly states that the exercise of the President’s other powers and functions has to be
"provided for under the law." There is no law granting the President the power to amend the
functions of the CHED. The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend
the functions of the CHED under RA 7722. The line that delineates Legislative and Executive
power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws,
and to alter and repeal them." The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original,
sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. Any
power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress,
unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.

The President has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. Meaning, he has
the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or
interfere with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, he is granted
administrative power. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and
enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a
uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this
end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.An administrative order is an
ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation
of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of
implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.

Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power, the RIRR is also an invalid exercise of
the CHED’s quasi-legislative power. Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or
rule-making power through the promulgation of rules and regulations. The CHED may only
exercise its rule-making power within the confines of its jurisdiction under RA 7722. But The
RIRR covers review centers and similar entities.

4. PROVINCE OF COTABATO VS. GRP PEACE PANEL

G.R. No. 183591; October 14 2008

FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral
Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to
compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD
and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon.
They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO
enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
would be binding itself:

a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a
juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral
domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS
ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

HELD:

a.) Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in
the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having
an “associative” relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers
that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It
also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does
not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it
provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for
independence. The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in
the Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship
with the national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed,
BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to
enter into relations with other states. Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not
necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it – which has betrayed
itself by its use of the concept of association – runs counter to the national sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE
being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific
provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the
Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even
assuming that it is covered by the term “autonomous region” in the constitutional provision just
quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.

b.) The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the
existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact
and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying an amendment of
the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the
MILF the amendment of the Constitution .
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to
preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to
allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or
revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper
procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be
construed as an unconstitutional act.

The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.
Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments, she
cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place,
nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as
recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.

c.) This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous
peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines
“Bangsamoro people” as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands
including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their
descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.

Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only
“Moros” as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao
and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples
shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The
MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the “Bangsamoro homeland,” the ownership of which is vested
exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties
to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain.

Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut
procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other
things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department
or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by
mere agreement or compromise. Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of
1991 requires all national offices to conduct consultations beforeany project or program critical
to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a
particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one
peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the
Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or
displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when
he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic
Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was
designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a
whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross
evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined. The MOA-AD cannot
be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very
concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and
the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and
implies that the same is on its way to independence.
5. BIRAOGOVS PHIL. TRUTH COMMISSION

When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in
an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. --- Justice
Jose P. Laurel

FACT:

E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by President
Aquino. The said PTC is a mere branch formed under the Office of the President tasked to
investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration
and submit their findings and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or
render awards in disputes between parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and asses evidences
gathered and make recommendations. It has subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people
in contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine for such facts if probable cause exist as to warrant
the filing of an information in our courts of law. Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the
E.O. on the grounds that: 1.)It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of
Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation; 2.) The provisions of
Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No.
1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the
President to achieve economy, simplicity, and efficiency does not include the power to create an
entirely new office was inexistent like the Truth Commission; 3.) The E.O illegally amended the
Constitution when it made the Truth Commission and vesting it the power duplicating and even
exceeding those of the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ. 4.) It violates the equal protection
clause.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said E.O is unconstitutional.

HELD:
Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause. The Chief
Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been
constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong,
the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully
comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained.
Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same
composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the
inquiry.

SECTION 13
6. DENNIS FUNA VS AGRA
February 19, 2013

FACTS:
Agra was then the Government Corporate Counsel when Pres Arroyo designated him as the
Acting Solicitor General in place of former Sol Gen Devanadera, who has been appointed as the
Secretary of Justice. Again, Agra was designated as the Acting Secretary in place of Secretary
Devanadera when the latter resigned. Agra then relinquished his position as Corporate Counsel
and continued to perform the duties of an Acting Solicitor General.

Funa, a concerned citizen, questioned his appointment. Agra argued that his concurrent
designations were merely in a temporary capacity. Even assuming that he was holding multiple
offices at the same time, his designation as an Acting Sol Gen is merely akin to a hold-over, so
that he never received salaries and emoluments for being the Acting Sol Gen when he was
appointed as the Acting Secretary of Justice.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not Agra’s designation as Acting Secretary of Justice is valid.
2) Whether or not Agra may concurrently hold the positions by virtue of the “hold-over
principle”
3) Whether or not the offices of the Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice is in an ex
officio capacity in relation to the other.

HELD:

1. No. The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of
Acting Solicitor General violates the constitutional prohibition under Article VII, Section 13 of
the 1987 Constitution. It is immaterial that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary
capacity. Section 13 plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution is to
impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the Cabinet Members in so far as holding other
offices or employments in the Government or in GOCCs is concerned. The prohibition against
dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all
appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, because the objective of
Section 13 is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials,
specifically the President, the Vice-President, the Cabinet Members and their deputies and
assistants.

2. No. Agra’s designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice was not in an ex officio capacity, by
which he would have been validly authorized to concurrently hold the two positions due to the
holding of one office being the consequence of holding the other. Being included in the stricter
prohibition embodied in Section 13, Agra cannot liberally apply in his favor the broad exceptions
provided in Article IX-B, Sec 7 (2) of the Constitution to justify his designation as Acting
Secretary of Justice concurrently with his designation as Acting Solicitor General, or vice versa.
It is not sufficient for Agra to show that his holding of the other office was “allowed by law or
the primary functions of his position.” To claim the exemption of his concurrent designations
from the coverage of the stricter prohibition under Section 13, he needed to establish that his
concurrent designation was expressly allowed by the Constitution.

3. No. The powers and functions of the Solicitor General are neither required by the primary
functions nor included in the powers of the DOJ, and vice versa. The OSG, while attached to the
DOJ, is not a constituent of the latter, as in fact, the Administrative Code of 1987 decrees that the
OSG is independent and autonomous. With the enactment of RA 9417, the Solicitor General is
now vested with a cabinet rank, and has the same qualifications for appointment, rank,
prerogatives, allowances, benefits and privileges as those of Presiding Judges of the Court of
Appeals.

7. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

194 SCRA 317

FACTS:
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed
members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government
offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The
Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The
constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds
exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides: “The President, Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They
shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in
any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special
privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the
President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or
heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries.” CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution“, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in
Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be
appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of
Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.

HELD:

No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President,
Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their
tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the
Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples
during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials
should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitution’s
manifest intent and the people’s understanding thereof. In the light of the construction given to
Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is
unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members,
undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not
more than 2 positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows
them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of
Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided
in the 1987 Constitution itself.

8. DENNIS FUNA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 192935; December 7, 2010

When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in
an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. --- Justice
Jose P. Laurel

FACTS:

On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T.

Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator,
MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.

On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and
lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s
appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President,
the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any other office or
employment.

Petitioner argues that Bautista’s concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA
OIC is in violation of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as interpreted and
explained by this Court in Civil Liberties

Issue:

Whether or not there is violation of art 7, section 13 of 1987 constitution.

Held: Yes. Undersecretary Bautista’s designation as MARINA OIC falls under the stricter
prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice
any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with,
or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered by
the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and consequently she cannot invoke the
exception provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding another office is
allowed by law or the primary functions of the position. Neither was she designated OIC of
MARINA in an ex-officio capacity, which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties Union.

SECTION 15
9. AYTONA VS CASTILLO
4 SCRA 1

FACTS:
On December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner Dominador
Aytona as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took the corresponding oath. On the
same day, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on the next day, he
issued administrative order no. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim
appointments made by former President Garcia. There were all-in all, 350 midnight or last
minute appointments made by the former President Garcia. On January 1, President Macapagal
appointed Andres Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona instituted a case
(quo warranto) against Castillo, contending that he was validly appointed, thus the subsequent
appointment to Castillo by the new President, should be considered void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the 350 midnight appointments of former President Garcia were valid.

HELD:

No. After the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, previous President Garcia
administration was no more than a care-taker administration. He was duty bound to prepare for
the orderly transfer of authority the incoming President, and he should not do acts which he
ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. It was not for him to
use powers as incumbent President to continue the political warfare that had ended or to avail
himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filling up vacancies in
important positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some assurance of deliberate action and
careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may
undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and planned
induction of almost all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may,
with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken
being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other
conditions, and thereby deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the
corresponding appointments.

10. IN RE APPOINTMENTS DATED MARCH 30, 1998 OF HON. M.A. VALENZUELA

AND HON. P.B. VILLARTA AS RTC JUDGES; 298 SCRA 408

FACTS:
Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the President dated March 30,
1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago City and
Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments appear prima facie, at least, to be expressly
prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution. The said constitutional provision prohibits the
President from making any appointments two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudicepublic service or endanger public safety.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of
Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Art. VIII

HELD:

During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution “two months immediately before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term” the President is neither required to
make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII
simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames
provided therein unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments
comes into effect once every 6 years.

The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably madeduring the period of the
ban. They come within the operation of the prohibition relating to appointments. While the
filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in
this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of
the ban.

11. ARTURO DE CASTRO VS JBC AND GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO

March 7, 2010

FACTS:
This is a consolidated case which assails the constitutionality of the action of former President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo by appointing a Chief Justice 7 days after the Presidential election in
2010. After the compulsory retirement of former Chief Justice Reynato Puno, the position of
Chief Justice was left vacant. Section 4 (1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII of the
Constitution states that, "vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from occurrence thereof,"
from a, "List of nominees prepared by the Judicial Bar Council for every vacancy" furthermore,
Section 15, Article VII was also taken into consideration which prohibits the President or the
Acting President from making appointments within two (2) months immediately before the next
Presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.

The JBC agreed that the vacant position must be filled and there were five (5) candidates for the
position from the most senior of the Associates of the court and one of them is Associate Justice
Reynato C. Corona who was chosen by the President and was appointed for the position of Chief
Justice.

Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the incumbent President may appoint the
next Chief Justice since the Constitution do not apply to the Supreme Court. If the framers of the
Constitution intended the prohibition to apply in the Supreme Court then it should have expressly
stated it in the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the President can appoint the successor of the Chief Justice..

HELD:

Yes, the President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice as the prohibitions in the
Constitution. If the framers of the Constitution intends that the prohibition shall apply to the
appointment of Chief Justice, then they should have expressly stated it in the Constitution under
Section 15 (THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT), Article VII and Section 4 (1), Article VIII
(JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT).

Section 14, Section 15 and Section 16 refers only to the appointments made in the Executive
Department.

SECTION 16
12. SARMIENTO VS MISON
156 SCRA 549

FACTS:
Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the
Secretary of the Department of Budget, without the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments. Sarmiento assailed the appointments as unconstitutional by reason of its not
having been confirmed by COA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointment is valid.

RULING:

Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing Salvador
Mison, without submitting his nomination to the CoA for confirmation. He is thus entitled to
exercise the full authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and
emoluments pertaining thereto.

Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the
President shall appoint:

1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors, other public
ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and
other officers with the consent and confirmation of the CoA.
2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law;
3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;
4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.

First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.

2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By following the accepted
rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes
others not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated
in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not
one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on
Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of "heads of
bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.

13. BAUTISTA VS SALONGA

172 SCRA 160

FACTS:
The President appointed Mary Concepcion Bautista as the Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights pursuant to the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, without the confirmation
of the COA because they are among the officers of government "whom he (the President) may be
authorized by law to appoint." Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, authorizes the President to
appoint the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights. COA disapproved
Bautista's alleged ad interim appointment as Chairperson of the CHR in view of her refusal to
submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to COA's confirmation.

2. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is an ad interim appointment.

RULING:

1. No. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first
sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7 of the Constitution, which provides that the appointments which are to
be made with the confirmation of COA. Rather, it is within the authority of President, vested
upon her by Constitution (2nd sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7), that she appoint executive officials
without confirmation of COA.

The Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its constitutionally delimited power
to review presidential appointments, cannot create power to confirm appointments that the
Constitution has reserved to the President alone.

2. Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely
for the President to make. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987
Constitution, extend only to appointments where the review of the Commission on Appointments
is needed. That is why ad interim appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress; but appointments that
are for the President solely to make, that is, without the participation of the Commission on
Appointments, cannot be ad interim appointments.

14. QUINTOS DELES VS COA

177 SCRA 259

FACTS:
On April 6, 1988, petitioner and three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the
President pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the
Constitution. In the May 12, 1988 meeting of the Committee on Appointments ruled against the
position of petitioner Deles. Petitioner Teresita Quintos-Deles contends that her appointment as
Sectoral Representative for Women by the President does not require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments to qualify her to take her seat in the House of Representatives.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House
of Representatives to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments

HELD:

The first group of people that may be appointed by the president, as previously stated in the
Sarmiento v. Mison case, are “the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.” Since the seats
reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by
appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it
is indubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are among the “other
officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution,” referred to in the
first sentence of Section 16, Article VII (or the first group of people who may be appointed)
whose appointments are subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

15. CALDERO VS CARALE

208 SCRA 254

FACTS:
In 1989, RA 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the Labor Code. RA 6715 provides
that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners [of the
NLRC] shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the COA.
Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which nominated the
predecessor. Pursuant to the law, Cory assigned Carale et al as the Chairman and the
Commissioners respectively of the NLRC, the appointment was not submitted to the COA for its
confirmation. Calderon questioned the appointment saying that w/o the confirmation by the
COA, such an appointment is in violation of RA 6715. Calderon asserted that RA 6715 is not an
encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained in Sec16, Art. 7, of the
Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of other officers appointed by the President additional to those mentioned in the
first sentence of Sec 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the COA of appointments
extended by the President to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the
first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by
the COA.

RULING:

The SC agreed with the Sol-Gen, confirmation by the COA is required exclusively for the heads
of executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
the President by the Constitution, such as the members of the various Constitutional
Commissions. With respect to the other officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by the law and to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, no
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required.

Jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16, Art 7 of the Constitution

1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees

mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose
appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral
representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil
Service and Election).

2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized
by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights).

16. TARROSA VS SINGSON

232 SCRA 553

FACTS:
Gabriel C. Singson was appointed Governor of the BangkoSentral by President Fidel V. Ramos
in 1993. Jesus Armando Tarrosa, as a "taxpayer", filed a petition for prohibition questioning the
appointment of Singson for not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments as
required by the provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653, which established the BangkoSentral
as the Central Monetary Authority of the Philippines. The Secretary of Budget and Management
was impleaded for disbursing public funds in payment of the salaries and emoluments of
respondent Singson. In their comment, respondents claim that Congress exceeded its legislative
powers in requiring the confirmation by the CA of the appointment of the Governor of the
BangkoSentral. They contend that an appointment to the said position is not among the
appointments which have to be confirmed by the CA, citing Section 16 of Article VI of the
Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Governor of the BSP is subject to COA’s confirmation.

HELD:

No. Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by the COA of the
appointment of the Governor of the BSP. An appointment to the said position is not among the
appointments which have to be confirmed by the COA under Section 16 of Article 7 of the
Constitution. Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of the Commission on
Appointments and require confirmation of appointment of other government officials not
expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.

17. ROBERTO A. FLORES, DANIEL Y. FIGUEROA, ROGELIO T. PALO, DOMINGO

A. JADLOC, CARLITO T. CRUZ and MANUEL P. REYES vs. HON. FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, Executive Secretary, and RICHARD J. GORDON
223 SCRA 568; June 22, 1993
FACTS:

Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge the constitutionality of
Sec. 13 (d) of the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which directs the President to
appoint a professional manager as administrator of the SBMA…provided that “for the 1st year of
its operations, the mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as the chairman
and the CEO of the Subic Authority.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President.

HELD:
YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of
SBMA, he really has no choice but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. The power of choice
is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to
appoint. Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it
cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Such enactment
effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an
irregular restriction on the power of appointment. While it may be viewed that the proviso
merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he
must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to
prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Since the ineligibility of an
elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he
may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached
disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment. Consequently, as long as he is
an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for appointment to another public office.

18. FELIMON LUEGO vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and FELICULA TUOZO
G.R. NO. L-69137 August 5, 1986

FACTS:

The petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer 11, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by
Mayor Florentino Solon on February 18, 1983. 1 The appointment was described as permanent"
but the Civil Service Commission approved it as "temporary," subject to the final action taken in
the protest filed by the private respondent and another employee, and provided "there (was) no
pending administrative case against the appointee, no pending protest against the appointment
nor any decision by competent authority that will adversely affect the approval of the
appointment."

On March 22, 1984, Civil Service Commission found the private respondent better qualified than
the petitioner for the contested position and, accordingly, directed "that FeliculaTuozo be
appointed to the position of Administrative Officer 11 in the Administrative Division, Cebu City,
in place of FelimonLuego whose appointment as Administrative Officer II is hereby revoked."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment
on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this
finding, order his replacement by the latter?

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or
nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to
approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law.
When the appointee is qualified and the other legal requirements are satisfied, the CSC has no
choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. Hence, the
CSC’s resolution is set aside.

19. HERMOGENES P. POBRE VS. MARIANO E. MENDIETA AND HON. CORONA

IBAY-SOMERA IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 26,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA
G.R. No. 106677; July 23, 1993

FACTS:
On February 15, 1992, President Corazon C. Aquino appointed Pobre, then an Associate
Commissioner, as the PRC Commissioner/ Chairman. Even before Commissioner Pobre's
appointment, the private respondent, Mariano A. Mendieta, as the Senior Associate
Commissioner, filed a petition for declaratory relief against Commissioner Pobre, Executive
Secretary Drilon, and Acting Secretary of Justice Eduardo Montenegro, praying that they be
enjoined from appointing, or recommending the appointment of Associate Commissioner Pobre
as Chairman of the PRC because under Section 2 of P.D. No. 223, he (Mendieta), as the senior
Associate Commissioner, was legally entitled to succeed Francia as Chairman of the PRC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointment of Pobre is valid under the Constitution.

HELD:

Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, empowers the President to appoint "those whom
he may be authorized by law to appoint." The law that authorizes him to appoint the PRC
Commissioner and Associate Commissioners, is P.D. 223, Section 2, which provides that the
Commissioner and Associate Commissioners of the PRC are "all to be appointed by the
President for a term of nine (9) years, without reappointment, to start from the time they assume
office . . . .

The Court finds unacceptable the view that every vacancy in the Commission (except the
position of "junior" Associate Commissioner) shall be filled by "succession" or by "operation of
law" for that would deprive the President of his power to appoint a new PRC Commissioner and
Associate Commissioners — "all to be appointed by the President" under P.D. No. 223. The
absurd result would be that the only occasion for the President to exercise his appointing power
would be when the position of junior (or second) Associate Commissioner becomes vacant. We
may not presume that when the President issued P.D. No. 223, he deliberately clipped his
prerogative to choose and appoint the head of the PRC and limited himself to the selection and
appointment of only the associate commissioner occupying the lowest rung of the ladder in that
agency. Since such an absurdity may not be presumed, the Court should so construe the law as to
avoid it.

Since the appointment of the petitioner as PRC Chairman/Commissioner to succeed Julio B.

Francia, Jr. at the expiration of his term did not violate any provision of P.D. No. 223 and in fact
conforms with the Chief Executive's interpretation and implementation of the law, the legality of
said appointment should be upheld.

20. ARTURO M. DE CASTRO VS. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL - ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002; April 20, 2010

FACTS:
 These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the
presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that
Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or
Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.

The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because
the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to
appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be
filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court
appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains
why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article
VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample
restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to appoint members of the Supreme Court
to ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political
pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the
specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.

ISSUE:
Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his
retirement.

HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in
the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary. Had the framers intended to
extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of
the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4
(1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term
does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect
the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also
applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that
every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part
must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of
the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15
between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of
presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the
Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar
prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
SECTION 17
21. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS.
MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE-MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, CITY TREASURER
ANTHONY ACEVEDO, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNSOD AND THE CITY OF
MANILA
 G.R. No. 112497; August 4, 1994

FACTS:

The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared
Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with the
procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to
law and public policy. The RTC revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the ordinance.
It declared Sec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the power of
control over LGUs in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution.
The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural
requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had
indeed not been observed.

Issue:

Whether or not the Secretary of Justice has the power of control over LGU’s under the
constitution.

Held:

Yes.An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he
may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide
to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent
merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor
does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order
the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his
own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that
the rules are followed. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no
more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision.

22. JOSE D. VILLENA VS.THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

67 PHIL 451

FACTS:
Division of Investigation of the DOJ, upon the request of the Secretary of the Interior, conducted
an inquiry into the conduct of the Villena, mayor of Makati, Rizal, as a result of which the latter
was found to have committed bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of authority ad unauthorized
practice of the law profession. The respondent recommended the suspension of Villena to the
President of the Philippines, in which it was verbally granted. The Secretary then suspended
Villena from office. Villena filed a petition for preliminary injunction against the Sec. to restrain
him and his agents from proceeding with the investigation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Secretary of the Interior has jurisdiction or authority to suspend and order
investigation over Villena.

HELD:

The Secretary of Interior has the power to order investigation and to suspend Mayor Villena. As
to the power to order investigation, it was provided in Section 79 (C) of RAC that Department of
Interior was given the authority to supervise bureaus and offices under its jurisdiction. This was
interpreted in relation to Section 86 of the same Code which granted the said Department of
executive supervision over administration of provinces, municipalities and other political
subdivisions. This supervision covers the power to order investigation because supervision
“implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render power real and
effective.”However, unlike this power to order investigation, the power to suspend a mayor was
not provided in any law. There was no express grant of authority to the Secretary of Interior to
suspend a Mayor. Nevertheless, Section 2188 of the Administrative Code granted the provincial
governor the power of suspension. Yet this did not mean that the grant precluded the Secretary of
Interior.

The Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency which provides that “the acts of the department
secretaries, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved
or reprobated by the President, presumptively the acts of the President.” The power to suspend
may be exercised by the President. It follows that the heads of the Department under her may
also exercise the same, unless the law required the President to act personally or that situation
demanded him so, because the heads of the departments are assistants and agents of the
President.

23. LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC. VS JOSE PAÑO, HON. JUAN PAJO, in his
capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. JUAN DE G. RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity
as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
G.R. No. L-27811; November 17, 1967
FACTS:

Jose Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in Davao. The said land
was a forest zone which was later declared as an agricultural zone. Magallanes then ceded his
rights to Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. (LMC) of which he is a co-owner.

Jose Paño was a farmer who asserted his claim over the same piece of land. The Director of
Lands denied Paño’s request. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied his petition hence it
was elevated to the Office of the President.

Executive Secretary Juan Pajo ruled in favor of Paño. LMC averred that the earlier decision of
the Secretary of Agriculture is already conclusive hence beyond appeal. He also averred that the
decision of the Executive Secretary is an undue delegation of power. The Constitution, LMC
asserts, does not contain any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be
delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President
to act personally upon the matter.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary.

HELD:

Yes. It is true that as a rule, the President must exercise his constitutional powers in person.
However, the president may delegate certain powers to the Executive Secretary at his discretion.
The president may delegate powers which are not required by the Constitution for him to
perform personally. The reason for this allowance is the fact that the resident is not expected to
perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The office of the
Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus
gained recognition is that “under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for
and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify,
or even reverse any order” that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the
Director of Lands, may issue.

The act of the Executive Secretary, acting as the alter ego of the President, shall remain valid
until reversed, disapproved, or reprobated by the President. In this case, no reprobation was made
hence the decision granting the land to Paño cannot be reversed.

24. CITY OF ILIGAN VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, THE DISTRICT LAND OFFICER
OF LANAO DEL NORTE, and MARCELO STEEL CORPORATION
G.R. No. L-30852; February 26, 1988

FACTS:
On August 9, 1952 the President of the Philippines issued a Proclamation withdrawing from sale
or settlement and reserved for the use of the National Power Corporation (NPC) certain parcels
of the public domain situated at Iligan City.

On October 5, 1965, the President of the Philippines donated the said land to the City of Iligan.
On August 25, 1966, President Ferdinand Marcos issued a Proclamation declaring the land open
to disposition under the provisions of public Land Act.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the President has the authority to grant a portion of public domain to any
government like the City of Iligan.

HELD:

The President of the Philippines may execute contracts in favor of any province, municipality or
other branch or subdivision of the government who shall need any portion of the land of the
public domain open to concession for educational, charitable or other similar purposes, in the
form of donation, sale, lease, exchange, or any other form.

Having found that the President of the Philippines has the authority to donate or grant lands of
the public domain for residential, commercial or industrial purposes or other similar purposes,
Proclamation No. 469, donating the parcels of lands in question to the plaintiff is thus valid and
binding. Indeed what the records show is that the Mayor of the City of Iligan upon said
proclamation immediately had the lots surveyed and entered into negotiation with the National
Investment & Development Corporation and those interested in promoting a coco-chemical plant
in Iligan City with the end in view of accelerating the economic expansion of the City.

It is only Congress not the President of the Philippines that may authorize the alienation,
encumbrance or disposition of such land already donated to a province, municipality or branch or
subdivision of the government.

25. GASCON VS. ARROYO

G.R. No. 78389 October 16, 1989

FACTS:
Petitioners seek to annul and set aside the “Agreement to Arbitrate” entered into by and between
the Republic of the Philippines, represented by Executive Secretary Joker T. Arroyo, and ABS-
CBN Broadcasting Corporation, represented by its President, Eugenio Lopez, Jr., dated 6 January
1987, to settle the claims of ABS-CBN for the return of radio and television stations (TV Station
Channel 4), and to enjoin the Arbitration Committee created under the aforesaid agreement from
adjudicating the claims of ABS-CBN.

ISSUE:

Whether the Executive Secretary had the power and authority to enter into the “Agreement to
Arbitrate” with the ABS- CBN Broadcasting Corporation

HELD:

Yes. Under the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines also known as the
Freedom Constitution), which was in force and effect when the “Agreement to Arbitrate” was
signed by the parties thereto on 6 January 1987, the President exercised both the legislative and
executive powers of the Government. As Chief Executive, the President was (and even now)
“assisted by a Cabinet” composed of Ministers (now Secretaries), who were appointed by and
accountable to the President. In other words, the Members of the cabinet, as heads of the various
departments, are the assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person, or where the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the heads of such departments performed in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of
the Chief Executive.

Respondent Executive Secretary had, therefore, the power and authority to enter into the
“Agreement to Arbitrate” with the ABS- CBN Broadcasting Corporation, as he acted for and in
behalf of the President when he signed it; hence, the aforesaid agreement is valid and binding
upon the Republic of the Philippines, as a party thereto.

26. KILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MGA MAGTITINDA NG BAGONG

PAMILIHANG BAYAN NG MUNTINLUPA, INC. VS. DOMINGUEZ
G.R. No. 85439 January 13, 1992

FACTS:
Petitioners questopn the validity of the order of then Secretary of Agriculture Hon. Carlos G.
Dominguez which ordered: (1) the take-over by the Department of Agriculture of the
management of the petitioner Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod Ng Mga Magtitinda ng Bagong
Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntilupa, Inc. (KBMBPM) pursuant to the Department’s regulatory and
supervisory powers under Section 8 of P.D. No. 175, as amended, and Section 4 of Executive
Order No. 13, (2) the creation of a Management Committee which shall assume the management
of KBMBPM upon receipt of the order, (3) the disbandment of the Board of Directors, and (4)
the turn over of all assets, properties and records of the KBMBPM the Management Committee.

The exordium of said Order unerringly indicates that its basis is the alleged petition of the
general membership of the KBMBPM requesting the Department for assistance in the removal of
the members of the Board of Directors who were not elected by the general membership” of the
cooperative and that the ongoing financial and management audit of the Department of
Agriculture auditors shows that the management of the KBMBPM is not operating that
cooperative in accordance with P.D. 175, LOI 23, the Circulars issued by DA/BACOD and the
provisions and by-laws of KBMBPM. It is also professed therein that the Order was issued by
the Department “in the exercise of its regulatory and supervisory powers under Section 8 of P.D.
175, as amended, and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 113.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Order issued by the Secretary of Agriculture is illegal

HELD:

Regulation 34 of Letter of Implementation No. 23 (implementing P.D. No. 175) provides the
procedure for the removal of directors or officers of cooperatives, thus: An elected officer,
director or committee member may be removed by a vote of majority of the members entitled to
vote at an annual or special general assembly. The person involved shall have an opportunity to
be heard. A substantially identical provision, found in Section 17, Article III of the KBMBPM’s
by-laws, reads:
Sec. 17. Removal of Directors and Committee Members. — Any elected director or
committee member may be removed from office for cause by a majority vote of the members in
good standing present at the annual or special general assembly called for the purpose after
having been given the opportunity to be heard at the assembly.

Under the same article are found the requirements for the holding of both the annual general
assembly and a special general assembly. Indubitably then, there is an established procedure for
the removal of directors and officers of cooperatives. It is likewise manifest that the right to due
process is respected by the express provision on the opportunity to be heard. But even without
said provision, petitioners cannot be deprived of that right.

The procedure was not followed in this case. Respondent Secretary of Agriculture arrogated unto
himself the power of the members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove the
petitioning directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under Section 8 of P.D. No. 175 which
grants him authority to supervise and regulate all cooperatives. This section does not give him
that right.

An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those
necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. These powers should not be extended by implication
beyond what may to necessary for their just and reasonable execution. Supervision and control
include only the authority to: (a) act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or
regulation to a subordinate; (b) direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts;
(c) review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; (d)
determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs; and (e) prescribe standards,
guidelines, plans and programs. Specifically, administrative supervision is limited to the
authority of the department or its equivalent to: (1) generally oversee the operations of such
agencies and insure that they are managed effectively, efficiently and economically but without
interference with day-to-day activities; (2) require the submission of reports and cause the
conduct of management audit, performance evaluation and inspection to determine compliance
with policies, standards and guidelines of the department; (3) take such action as may be
necessary for the proper performance of official functions, including rectification of violations,
abuses and other forms of mal-administration; (4) review and pass upon budget proposals of such
agencies but may not increase or add to them.

The power to summarily disband the board of directors may not be inferred from any of the
foregoing as both P.D. No. 175 and the by-laws of the KBMBPM explicitly mandate the manner
by which directors and officers are to be removed. The Secretary should have known better than
to disregard these procedures and rely on a mere petition by the general membership of the
KBMBPM and an on-going audit by Department of Agriculture auditors in exercising a power
which he does not have, expressly or impliedly. We cannot concede to the proposition of the
Office of the Solicitor General that the Secretary’s power under paragraph (d), Section 8 of P.D.
No. 175 above quoted to suspend the operation or cancel the registration of any cooperative
includes the “milder authority of suspending officers and calling for the election of new
officers.” Firstly, neither suspension nor cancellation includes the take-over and ouster of
incumbent directors and officers, otherwise the law itself would have expressly so stated.
Secondly, even granting that the law intended such as postulated, there is the requirement of a
hearing. None was conducted.

SECTION 18
27. IBP VS ZAMORA
G.R. No. 141284; August 15 2000
[Judicial Review; Civilian supremacy clause]
FACTS:

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,
President Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to
coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period only.
The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the
PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed
forces is subject to judicial review.

2. Whether or not the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.

RULING:

1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of
judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an
actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity;
and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause.
The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian
law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is
appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the
Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render
logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that
military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to
assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount
to an “insidious incursion” of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section
5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.

28. OLAGUER ETAL. V. MILITARY COMMISSION

G.R. No. L-54558, May 22, 1987

FACTS:
Petitioners, as civilians, have been charged the crime of subversion. Consequently, the Chief-of-
Staff of the AFP created a military tribunal, named Military Commission No. 34, to try criminal
case against petitioners. Petitioners were then convicted and have been imposed a penalty of
death penalty. Thereafter, petitioners filed a petition to enjoin the military tribunal from taking
further action on their case for the tribunal should be considered null and void. Respondents
invoked that the creation of Military Commission is constitutional as ruled upon in a previous
case – Aquino v. Military Commission No. 2.- as decided upon by the Supreme Court. However,
petitioners contend that such ruling must be overturned because the ruling is now inapplicable
since Martial Law has already been lifted.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the ruling in Aquino vs. Military Commission be abandoned and/or modified
in so far as the case at bar is concerned?
2. Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted.
3. Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are
open and functioning.

HELD:

1. Yes. First, the Court considered that since the martial law has been lifted during the case is still
pending, military tribunals, which were created for the purpose of martial law, shall be held void
already since the law itself is lifted. Second, the Court relied on the dissenting views of some
justices in Aquino v. Mil Comm, stating that ‘…Civilians like the petitioner placed on trial for
civil offenses under general law are entitled o trial by judicial process, not by executive or
military process…xxx..Judicial power exist only in courts’. Moreover, the Court emphasized that
“Reverence for precedent, simply as precedent, cannot prevail when constitutionalism and the
public interest demand otherwise. Thus, a doctrine which should be abandoned or modified
should be abandoned or modified accordingly. after all, more important than anything else is that
this Court should be right.’

2. The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic because by the time the case
reached the SC Olaguer and his companions were already released from military confinement.
“When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was
filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. 18
Inasmuch as the herein petitioners have been released from their confinement in military
detention centers, the instant Petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus should be
dismissed for having become moot and academic.” But the military court created to try the case
of Olaguer (and the decision it rendered) still continues to subsist.

3. The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all decisions rendered by the military courts or
tribunals during the period of martial law in all cases involving civilian defendants. A military
commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of martial
law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are open
and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and
void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned.

29. SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

421 SCRA 656 or G.R. No. 159085; February 3, 2004

FACTS:
During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of
the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have
seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP
and declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the
President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article
134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4,
the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the
officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the
Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation
of the State of Rebellion was issued.

In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG
MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article
VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP,
and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon.
Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the
report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a
report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend
that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as
Congress has not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President
Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was
usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4)
Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the
door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?
2. Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?

HELD:

1. The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion.
The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution
executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the
armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may
examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting
grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their
assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the
report is of no merit as there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts
or that military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation
of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state
of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the
President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers
contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since
any person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable
under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present.

2. Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental
act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS
Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen.
Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained
its decision in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of
Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

30. B/GEN. (RET.) FRANCISCO V. GUDANI, et al. Vs . LT./GEN. GENEROSO S.

SENGA, et al.
G.R. No. 170165; August 15, 2006

A most dangerous general proposition is foisted on the Court – that soldiers who defy orders of
their superior officers are exempt from the strictures of military law and discipline if such
defiance is predicated on an act otherwise valid under civilian law. Obedience and deference to
the military chain of command and the President as commander-in- chief are the cornerstones of
a professional military in the firm cusp of civilian control. These values of obedience and
deference expected of military officers are content-neutral, beyond the sway of the officer’s own
sense of what is prudent and ash, or more elementally, of right or wrong. A self-righteous
military invites itself as the scoundrel’s activist solution to the “ills” of participatory democracy.

FACTS:

On September 22, 2005, Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP to
appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security
scheduled on September 28, 2005. The hearing was scheduled after topics concerning the
conduct of the 2004 elections emerged in the public eye, particularly allegations of massive
cheating and the surfacing of copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation
between President Arroyo and an official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano. Gen. Francisco Gudani and Col. Alexander Balutan, who
were designated as commander and member, respectively, of the “Joint Task Force Ranao” by
the AFP Southern Command in the provinces of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur, tasked with
the maintenance of peace and order during the 2004 elections, received invitations to attend the
said Senate hearing. In the evening of September 27, a message was transmitted from the office
of AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Generoso Senga, stating that: “per instruction of her excellency
PGMA, no AFP personnel shall appear before any congressional or Senate hearing without her
approval. Inform BGen Francisco F Gudani AFP and LTC Alexander Balutan PA (GSC)
accordingly.”

On the day of the hearing, President Arroyo issued Executive Order 464 (E.O. 464) which
enjoined officials of the executive department including the military establishment from
appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval. Despite E.O. 464 and despite the order
from Gen. Senga, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan appeared and testified during the Senate
hearing. The Office of the Provost Marshall General (OPMG) recommended that Gen. Gudani
and Col. Balutan be charged with violation of Article of War 65, for willfully disobeying a
superior officer, in relation to Article of War 97, for conduct prejudicial to the good order and
military discipline. The day after Gen Gudani and Col. Balutan were required to appear before
the OPMG, Gen. Gudani was compulsorily retired from service.

Thereafter, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan filed a petition forcertiorari and injunction, claiming
that E.O. 464 is unconstitutional and seeking that the charges against them be quashed.
Furthermore, it is stressed that Gen. Gudani was no longer subject to military jurisdiction on
account of his compulsory retirement.

ISSUES:

1.) Whether or not the violation of directive of the President could lead to any investigation for
court-martial of Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan

2.) Whether or not the court martial has jurisdiction over Gen. Gudani in view of his compulsory
retirement

HELD:

The petition is DISMISSED.

A most dangerous general proposition is foisted on the Court – that soldiers who defy orders of
their superior officers are exempt from the strictures of military law and discipline if such
defiance is predicated on an act otherwise valid under civilian law. Obedience and deference to
the military chain of command and the President as commander-in-chief are the cornerstones of a
professional military in the firm cusp of civilian control. These values of obedience and
deference expected of military officers are content-neutral, beyond the sway of the officer’s own
sense of what is prudent and ash, or more elementally, of right or wrong. A self-righteous
military invites itself as the scoundrel’s activist solution to the “ills” of participatory democracy.
The ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior consent before appearing
before Congress pertains to the commander-in-chief powers of the President.

The Constitution reposes final authority, control and supervision of the AFP to the President, a
civilian who is not a member of the armed forces, and whose duties as commander-in-chief
represent only a part of the organic duties imposed upon the office, the other functions being
clearly civil in nature. The commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as commander-in-
chief, absolute authority over the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces. Such
authority includes the ability of the President to restrict the travel, movement and speech of
military officers, activities which may otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law. By tradition
and jurisprudence, the commander-in-chief powers of the President are not encumbered by the
same degree of restriction as that which may attach to executive privilege or executive control.

Any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the
consent of the President has adequate remedies under the law to compel such attendance. Any
military officer whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the
President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order
to compel the attendance of the military officer. It is only the courts that can compel, with
conclusiveness, the attendance or non-attendance in legislative inquiries.

The Court has already declared that an officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers
cannot be considered to be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice
proceedings were initiated against him before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction
has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated. Thus, military
jurisdiction has fully attached to Gen. Gudani inasmuch as both the acts complained of and the
initiation of the proceedings against him occurred before he compulsorily retired.

31. DAVID VS MACAPAGAL - ARROYO

G.R. No. 171396; May 3 2006

FACTS:

On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of emergency,
thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines
and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue
of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states
that: The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to
prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and [power to take over] as
provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.

On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the members of the
AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to
suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence."

David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of
Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of
martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech
and of assembly. They alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful
search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.

During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have
factual basis, and contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers
to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. The petitioners did
not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.

RULING:

The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:
First provision: “by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII … do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or
rebellion”

Second provision: “and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;”
Third provision: “as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a
State of National Emergency.” PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first
provision of the decree.

First Provision: Calling Out Power.

The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes
necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion.” (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or
condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of
the Revised Administration Code. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless,
without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In
declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s
extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public
interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such
Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless. To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial
Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to
assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.

Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.

The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo
the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the
Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative power shall be vested
in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

Third Provision: The Power to Take Over

Distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare “a state of national
emergency” and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the
President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the
second, manifold constitutional issues arise.

Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of
Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a
body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave
emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers,
the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to
the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:

(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.

Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The
taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency
powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the “the State may,
during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or
direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise
such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law
prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.

Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing
PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest without authority from Congress.

Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency,
however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional
circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out
the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the
President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17,
Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.

As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP
should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to
suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.” Considering that “acts of terrorism” have not yet
been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared
unconstitutional.

32. SALVIAR M. KULAT ET. AL. VS. GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN, ET. AL.
GR. No. 187298
33. WILFREDO TORRES Y SUMULONG vs. HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, THE
CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE, and THE DIRECTOR,
BUREAU OF PRISONS
152 SCRA 272 (1987)

FACTS:
Wilfredo S. Torres was confined at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. He was convicted of
estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president w/ the condition that he shall not violate any
penal laws again. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner
prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released
from confinement. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, Gonzales
petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon.
Torres appealed the issue before the SC averring that the Exec Dep’t erred in convicting him for
violating the conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges against him were not yet final
and executory as they were still on appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional
pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.

HELD:

Yes. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional
pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny The clear and well
understood rules and doctrine on this matter are:

1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon
are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.

2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper
consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial
scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act
consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the
Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary,
much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.

3. Because due process is not semper et ubique* judicial process, and because the conditionally
pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for
the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.

34. SALVACION A. MONSANTO VS. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR.

170 SCRA 190 (1989)

Facts:

The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of

Calbayog City) of the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. She was
sentenced to jail and to indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50. The SC affirmed the
decision. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was
extended by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted (at that time, the rule
was that clemency could be given even before conviction). By reason of said pardon, petitioner
wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant
city treasurer since the same was still vacant. Her letter was referred to the Minister of Finance
who ruled that she may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment
not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon.

Issues:

Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive, entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment?

Held:

While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the
eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not
operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt.
Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction
thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no
relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any
obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has been established
by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is
presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be
required.” This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive
backpay for lost earnings and benefits.

The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding
public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city
treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists
notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon,
amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the
same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of
the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.

Pardon may remit all the penal consequences of a criminal indictment if only to give meaning to
the fiat that a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative
action, we do not subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon blots out the guilt of an individual
and that once he is absolved, he should be treated as if he were innocent. For whatever may have
been the judicial dicta in the past, we cannot perceive how pardon can produce such "moral
changes" as to equate a pardoned convict in character and conduct with one who has constantly
maintained the mark of a good, law-abiding citizen.

35. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FRANCISCO SALLE, JR., Y GERCILLA AND
RICKY MENGOTE Y CUNTADO
250 SRCA 581 (1995)

FACTS:

On November 1991, Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were convicted of the compound
crime of murder and destructive arson before the RTC of Quezon City. Salle and Mengote filed
their Notice of Appeal which was accepted by the Supreme Court on March 24, 1993. In 1994,
Salle filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. The Court required Salle's counsel, Atty. Ida
May La'o of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) to verify the voluntariness of the motion.
Atty. La'o manifested that Salle signed the motion without the assistance of counsel on his
misimpression that the motion was necessary for his early release from the New Bilibid Prison
following the grant of a conditional pardon by the President on December 9, 1993. She also
stated that Mengote was also granted conditional pardon and that he immediately left for his
province without consulting her. She prayed that the Court grant Salle's motion to withdraw his
appeal. Xxx.

ISSUE:

Whether a pardon granted to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from a judgment of
conviction by the trial court is enforceable.

HELD:

No. Section 19, Article VII thereof reads as follows: “Except in cases of impeachment, or as
otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have
the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress.” Xxx.

A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal is seasonably perfected, (b) when
the accused commences to serve the sentence, (c) when the right to appeal is expressly waived in
writing, except where the death penalty was imposed by the trial court, and (d) when the accused
applies for probation, thereby waiving his right to appeal. Where the judgment of conviction is
still pending appeal and has not yet therefore attained finality, as in the instant case, executive
clemency may not yet be granted to the appellant. Xxx. The acceptance of the pardon shall not
operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an accused by virtue of a
pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render those
responsible therefore administratively liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the accused must
not solely rely on the pardon as a basis for the release of the accused from confinement.

WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant Ricky Mengote y Cuntado is hereby given thirty
(30) days from notice hereof within which to secure from the latter the withdrawal of his appeal
and to submit it to this Court. The conditional pardon granted the said appellant shall be deemed
to take effect only upon the grant of such withdrawal. In case of non-compliance with this
Resolution, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections must exert every possible effort to take
back into his custody the said appellant, for which purpose he may seek the assistance of the
Philippine National Police or the National Bureau of Investigation.

36. VICENTE GARCIA VS. THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON

AUDIT, THE HONORABLE MINISTER, LAND TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, TELECOM REGIONAL
OFFICE NO. IV
226 SCRA 356, (1993)

FACTS:
Petitioner was a Supervising Lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of
Telecommunications in Lucena City. On 1 April 1975, petitioner was summarily dismissed from
the service on the ground of dishonesty in accordance with the decision of the then Ministry of
Public Works, Transportation and Communications in Adm. Case No. 975 for the loss of several
telegraph poles which were located at the Sariaya-Lucena City and Mauban-Sampaloc, Quezon,
telecom lines. Petitioner did not appeal from the decision. Based on the same facts obtaining in
the administrative action, a criminal case for qualified theft was filed against petitioner with the
then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Quezon. On 23 January 1980, the trial
court rendered its decision acquitting petitioner of the offense charged.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated pursuant
to the grant of executive clemency.
HELD:
The petition is meritorious. If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms
this innocence and makes him a new man and as innocent; as if he had not been found guilty of
the offense charged. When a person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the offense,
the pardon relieves the party from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring
to him his clean name, good reputation and unstained character prior to the finding of guilt.

In the case at bar, petitioner was found administratively liable for dishonesty and consequently
dismissed from the service. However, he was later acquitted by the trial court of the charge of
qualified theft based on the very same acts for which he was dismissed. The acquittal of
petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the
fact that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to him. Aside from finding him innocent
of the charge, the trial court commended petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public
servant. Verily, petitioner's innocence is the primary reason behind the grant of executive
clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable recommendations for his reinstatement by the
Ministry of Transportation and Communications and the Civil Service Commission.

The bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect completely obliterated the adverse
effects of the administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his
separation from the service. This can be inferred from the executive clemency itself exculpating
petitioner from the administrative charge and thereby directing his reinstatement, which is
rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon. This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply
to be reinstated to his former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the
issuance of the clemency.
Petitioner's automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back wages. This is
meant to afford relief to petitioner who is innocent from the start and to make reparation for what
he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the service. To rule otherwise would
defeat the very intention of the executive clemency, i.e., to give justice to petitioner. Moreover,
the right to back wages is afforded to those with have been illegally dismissed and were thus
ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charges against them. There is no doubt
that petitioner's case falls within the situations aforementioned to entitle him to back wages.

37. RODOLFO D. LLAMAS vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR ORBOS and

MARIANO UN OCAMPO III
202 SCRA 844 (1991)

FACTS:

Governor Mariano Un Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas, together with
some other complainants, filed an administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts
constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was found guilty. He was suspended for office for
90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed office. In not less than 30 days however,
Ocampo III returned with an Administrative Order (AO) showing that he was pardoned hence he
can resume office without completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him.
ISSUE:

Whether pardon is applicable to administrative cases.

HELD:

The SC held that pardon is applicable to Administrative cases. The SC does not clearly see any
valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in
administrative cases. It is a considered view that if the President can grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more
reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious
than criminal offenses.

38. EDUARDO E. KAPUNAN, JR., VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. Nos. 148213-17; March 13, 2009

Facts:

Petitioners face criminal charges in connection with the 1986 killing of Kilusang Mayo Uno
(KMU) Chairman Rolando Olalia and his driver, Leonor Alay-ay. Olalia and Alay-ay were both
found dead with their bodies riddled with bullets on 13 November 1986. The double murders
stirred considerable public anger, given Olalia’s high profile as Chairman of the KMU. On 12
January 1998, private respondents Feliciana C. Olalia and Perolina G. Alay-ay filed a letter-
complaint before the Department of Justice (DOJ) charging petitioner Eduardo E. Kapunan, Jr.
(Kapunan, Jr.), petitioner Oscar E. Legaspi (Legaspi), and other officers and men of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) for the complex crime
of kidnapping with murder of Alay-ay and Olalia. Then Secretary of Justice Serafin R. Cuevas
created a panel of investigators (Panel) who were tasked to conduct the preliminary investigation
on the complaint. Bueno and especially Barreto provided the crux of the factual allegations
against petitioners. Legaspi filed a motion to dismiss alleging that his criminal liability had been
totally extinguished by the amnesty granted to him under Proclamation No. 347, entitled
"Granting Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have or May Have
Committed Crimes Against Public Order, Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance of Political
Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and Creating a National Amnesty Commission." The
DOJ Prosecutor refused to rule on the motions to dismiss and instead treated them as their
counter-affidavits.

Issue:

Whether petitioners are immune from prosecution for the Alay-ay/Olalia slayings by reason of a
general grant of amnesty issued by President Fidel V. Ramos to rebels, insurgents and other
persons who had committed crimes in furtherance of political ends as covered by Proclamation
No. 347 or No. 348.

Held:

No.The determination of the above issues as to which proclamation covers petitioners is crucial
considering that the crimes that are not covered by the amnesty under said Proclamations are
different. Under Proclamation No. 347, all persons, more particularly, rebels and insurgents, who
committed "crimes against chastity and other crimes committed for personal ends" cannot avail
of amnesty; while under Proclamation No. 348, all personnel of the AFP and PNP who
committed crimes which "constitute serious human rights violations, such as acts of torture,
extra-legal execution, arson, massacre, rape, other crimes against chastity, or robbery of any
form" are not entitled to amnesty.

Thus, it must be established first by competent evidence whether petitioners are rebels or
insurgents covered by Proclamation No. 347 or members of the AFP covered by Proclamation
No. 348. If petitioners are rebels or insurgents, then they may invoke the amnesty granted to
them under Proclamation No. 347 at any stage of the criminal proceedings before the RTC of
Antipolo XXX.

Clearly from the foregoing, Proclamation No. 347 or Proclamation No. 348 could not be applied
automatically in favor of petitioners and they are not entitled to instant exoneration from criminal
prosecution without first proving in court that the amnesty granted to them is not within the
exceptions provided for in the Proclamations. The Court is satisfied that there is prima facie
evidence for the prosecution of the petitioners for the murders of Rolando Olalia and Leonor
Alay-ay. The arguments that petitioners are exempt from prosecution on account of the grants of
amnesty they had received are ultimately without merit, on account of the specified limitations in
the said grant of amnesty.

39. THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS AND THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS VS.

EASTERN SEA TRADING
3 SCRA 351 (1961)

FACTS:

EST was a shipping company charged in the importation from Japan of onion and garlic into the
Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the
import goods because EST was not able to comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The
said circulars were pursuant to EO 328 w/c sought to regulate the importation of such non-dollar
goods from Japan (as there was a Trade and Financial Agreement b/n the Philippines and Japan
then). EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the said EO was never concurred
upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in
favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the EO is subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the Senate.

HELD:

No, executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of at least
2/3 of the members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of
treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in our
scheme of government than are the more formal instruments — treaties and conventions. They
sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal documents
denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’. The point where ordinary correspondence between this
and other governments ends and agreements — whether denominated executive agreements or
exchanges of notes or otherwise — begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It
would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such,
concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into
under the trade- agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . .

It would seem to be sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934
are not anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent
in our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive
without the approval of the Senate. They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels,
navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters,
and commercial relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration of trade-
marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by specific congressional
authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the
general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with respect to the
settlement of claims against foreign governments, were concluded independently of any
legislation.

40. LOURDES D. RUBRICO, JEAN RUBRICO APRUEBO, and MARY JOY RUBRICO
CARBONEL vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 183871; February 18, 2010

FACTS:

Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by armed men belonging to the
301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron, based at the Philippine Air Force Field Station at
Fernando Air Base in Lipa City, Batangas. During her detention, the petitioner added, her
daughters Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel and Jean Rubrico Apruebo were harassed by Senior Insp.
Arsenio Gomez and that there were also armed men following them. The petitioners prayed that
a writ of amparo be issued, ordering the individual respondents to desist from performing any
threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman
(OMB) to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating
circumstance of gender of the offended party. It also prayed for damages and for respondents to
produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes. The respondents then filed
a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material inculpatory averments against them.
Respondents interposed the defense that the President may not be sued during her incumbency.
Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the President, et al.
xxx.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition and dropping
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.

HELD:

The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit
not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the
1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the President
may not be sued during his or her tenure. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his
tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is
no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office
of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as
such. Xxx.

The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of
laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its
simplest terms, means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate
members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or
domestic conflict."In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal
complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility,
foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities
committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then
formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal liability,"
whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to
prevent or punish the perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered). The doctrine has recently
been codified in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to which the
Philippines is signatory. Sec. 28 of the Statute imposes individual responsibility on military
commanders for crimes committed by forces under their control. The country is, however, not
yet formally bound by the terms and provisions embodied in this treaty-statute, since the Senate
has yet to extend concurrence in its ratification. While there are several pending bills on
command responsibility, there is still no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under
that doctrine.