Chess and Philosophy: a rational conversation

Giangiuseppe Pili. Ph. Student in Philosophy

San Raffaele Univeristy, Milan

Abstract
Chess and philosophy are two different ways to speak a common language. Both bring to a
rational confrontation, although they follow a different pace with different means. Nevertheless,
we can see how much philosophy and chess are just two shapes of the Western Spirit, which
grows through different types of rational confrontations and rational conversations.

Key words
Chess, Philosophy, Rational Conversation, Rational Confrontation, Emanuel Lasker.

Introduction
Philosophers use chess for their theories in many ways; in particular, they involve chess in order
to make examples. I found sixty-five documents with the word “chess” on the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. A similar outcome (45 results) I catch in the Internet Encyclopedia
of Philosophy. There are many papers, which consider chess as a good way for clarifying a
particular theoretical position. It is true, Bertrand Russell did not love chess and he did not
deserve good words for chess players. Nevertheless, Russell had considered chess. Even
Wittgenstein considered chess as a congenial picture in order to explain some philosophical
ideas:

Does the comparison with chess mean that Wittgenstein believes that mathematics is
(merely) a game? Note that for Wittgenstein reflection on games occupies a central place in
his philosophical methodology, and that chess is his favorite object of comparison (it
appears in many contexts; to mention only the PI, see §31, §33, §136, and so forth). 1

It is not here the place to consider the history of the use of chess in order to formulate useful
examples (for this see Pili (2012), chap.12). In addition, philosophers are not the only ones that
appreciate chess for their exemplification. Nevertheless, it is interesting to observe that there are
so many examples, which involved chess; but there are few philosophical inquiring on the
relationships between chess and philosophy (for an analysis of this fact Pili (2012, 2014 cap.7)).
It is quite strange for many reasons, the first of whose consists in the fact that many different
disciplines had investigated chess and these disciplines are close to philosophy and in many
ways philosophy overlaps them: formal logic, artificial intelligence, mathematics, cognitive
psychology and neuroscience. Just for one remarkable example, one of the first Turing’s
abstract program was a chess one and Turing used it in a well-known game.2 Turing often dealt
with chess (for example, Turing (1994)). The cognitive science has considered chess many
times in order to analyze the way through which chess player compute moves and variants (for
this, see Vezzani (2011)). The philosophical inattention to chess is so huge that nobody knows
Emanuel Lasker (1886-1941) as a philosopher (for this, see Pili (2014b)). He was a brilliant
world champion and he was a good mathematician (there is at least one important theorem

1 Bangu S., “Ludwig Wittgenstein: Later Philosophy of Mathematics”, Internet Encyclopedia of

philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/wittmath/
2 Turing A., Glennie Al., Manchester, 0-1. 1.e4 e52.Nc3 Nf6 3.d4 Bb4 4.Nf3 d6 5.Bd2 Nc6 6.d5 Nd4

7.h4 Bg4 8.a4 Nxf3+ 9.gxf3 Bh5 10.Bb5+ c6 11.dxc6 O-O 12.cxb7 Rb8 13.Ba6 Qa5 14.Qe2 Nd7 15.Rg1
Nc5 16.Rg5 Bg6 17.Bb5 Nxb7 18.O-O-O Nc5 19.Bc6 Rfc8 20.Bd5 Bxc3 21.Bxc3 Qxa4 22.Kd2 Ne6
23.Rg4 Nd4 24.Qd3 Nb5 25.Bb3 Qa6 26.Bc4 Bh5 27.Rg3 Qa4 28.Bxb5 Qxb5 29.Qxd6 Rd8 0-1 For
some notes about this game: http://www.chessgames.com/perl/chessgame?gid=1356927. Turing had to
make the calculations.
demonstrated by him). Finally, Lasker wrote some philosophical essays (Lasker (1907)).
However, this is one of the few occasions in which we find a clear analytical connection
between philosophy and chess. It is not here the place to analyze the reasons for this strange
“philosophical inattention”. Thus, the connections between chess and philosophy are so clear
and so easy to find that I will take it for granted.
Thus, I want to present a philosophical analysis of chess and philosophy. Especially, I want to
underline their common ground and their differences. Finally, I will consider them as two sides
of the same coin: the Western way of confrontation as a rational conversation. In order to do
that, I will start from a simple question: are two different things like chess and philosophy
comparable? Is this comparison justified?

Part I
Chess Language and Philosophy
I want to start from the two basic questions: How many chess moves are possible? Moreover, is
it possible to speak about philosophical moves in philosophy? The chess move set is a finite
one, although it is very big: it is plausible to assume that there are 3380 possible semi-moves, a
number of 120 digits. 3 It is sufficiently big for being computationally intractable. In other
words, we cannot complete chess, because we have not sufficient memory in order to conserve
all the moves calculated.
What about philosophical moves? Indeed, there are just two possibilities: (1) there are some
philosophical moves and they are comparable, if not similar, to the chess moves or (2) there are
not any. A philosophical analysis rather than a philosophical discussion always takes the form
of a language, most of the times a natural one. Two alternative strategies are possible. (a) We
can think a philosophical problem as a chess one or a chess position. Thus, we can think of
philosophy as a particular chess game. (b) We can think about chess moves as a statement of a
language. If chess is a language, than we can compare chess and philosophy as two different
languages. Indeed, we can make a meaningful comparison between chess and philosophy just in
the case that they share some feature or if they have a common ground. Thus, we have to search
the best way to find out this common ground. It will turn out that the (a) strategy is quite
implausible.
Indeed, I do not see a good way to reduce philosophy to a set of chess positions, because
philosophy is grounded on natural language and natural language allows infinite possible
formulations, i.e. we can make infinite statements or think infinite propositions (for the
relationship between infinite possible propositions and natural language see Chomsky (1998)).
In addition, a chess problem is quite similar to a mathematical test: there are few good moves
(at least one at most four-five) and these moves should be calculated in advance. A great deal of
chess players rely on the calculation training (there are many books just for this goal4), whatever
it is their understanding of the game. Finally, chess problems always have a solution. On the
contrary, philosophical questions have not, at least, not always. In addition, philosophical
answers are always problematic. I do not see the way for thinking about philosophy as a set of
chess positions, therefore I turn to the (b) strategy.
We cannot think about philosophy as a special chess game. What about the contrary? Can we
think about chess as a particular language? The answer to this question is the crux, because if
there is not any possibility to reduce chess to a language, then it is impossible to make a fruitful
comparison between chess and philosophy: they should be considered as two different things,
and that’s all. Nevertheless, we can think about chess as a particular language, specifically a
formal one. Even weak chess players have to learn to manipulate chess language for two
reasons: some books are written in that language and chess players have to write their game in

3
For an analysis on this problems and on the problem of artificial intelligence applied to chess:
Ciancarini (1991, 2005).
4
For example, Nejstadt (1997).
official tournaments. Thus, chess language exists, it has at least one hundred years and it is used
ordinarily.5 But what kind of language is it?
Chess language is a formal language because we have just some symbols and some few rules of
formulation. For example: “12.Ng6≠” stands for “At the twelfth move White plays the knight
on g6 square and he wins for checkmate”. A proposition of a chess language has three parts: (1)
the number of the moves (12 in the example); (2) the piece moved (N, in the ordinary form
used in tournament we use the letter “N” for knight instead the symbol N); (3) the square in
which the piece was placed. The square is expressed through its Cartesian coordinates.
Sometimes there are also other symbols, for example “≠”, which stands for “checkmate”; and
“+” stands for “check”. A proposition is well formed just in the case that the order is correct.
For example, this is not a chess proposition: g6N12. We can draw a general chess form for
chess propositions:

N.Ps

Where “N” is the number of the move; P stands for the piece and s stands for the square. I use
the dot “.” instead the bracket “)” as an empty symbols, which could be omitted, but it is useful
for graphic reason. There are also more rules, but they are not interesting here. The point is that
now we have a formal chess language in order to speak about chess. What can we say with this
language?
We can speak about facts. Indeed, this language allows us to write what happens on the
chessboard. There is not negation and there are not quantifiers. The meaning of the propositions
is set up by some simple rules of interpretation that are so clear that they do not deserve to be
explained here. In addition, a proposition is true, if it is the case in the chessboard and it is false
otherwise. For example, 12.Ng6≠ is true if at the twelfth move Withe won for checkmate and
it is false if he does not. Thus, it is a very simple language. Finally, there is a finite set of
propositions, even if it is a big set. Indeed, the domain of interpretation of the chess language
contains just a finite number of possible moves.
What can we say about philosophy? If we think to a philosophical move as a statement, than we
can compare the number of possibilities available to a philosopher. I think this is a good way for
making a preliminary comparison between chess and philosophy. A philosopher thinks in a
natural language and he writes his papers in a natural language. In addition, natural language
does not have a finite domain of interpretation; it does not have a finite set of propositions. For
this reason, from a linguistic point of view, a philosopher has an open-ended range of possible
propositions in order to do his philosophical moves. This is not true for a chess player. Even if
we can consider that a philosopher can say one proposition at a time (fortunately!), the range of
possibility of his choice is not fixed in advance. On the contrary, a chess player knows that he
has just few possible moves to play. Nevertheless, we have found something in common:
philosophy and chess can be thought as two different languages.

Part II
Strategic Moves
If this is true for simple statements, what about strategic moves? Indeed, we are not so much
interested in all possible moves as chess players. We are not so much interested in all possible
assertions in philosophy. Indeed, in the first part I have just considered pure facts expressed
through a language. It turns out that philosophy can “say more” because have more possible
choice. But is this true also when we speak about “strategic moves”?
First, above all, we need definitions for “strategic moves” in chess and in philosophy. Let’s start
with strategic moves in chess: P is a strategic move just in the case that it produces the

5
See the official FIDE regulations “Laws of Chess: For competitions starting before 1 July 2014”
art. 8.
checkmate or it brings close to it.6 Now a definition for “strategic philosophical move”: Q is a
strategic move just in the case that Q leads to a coherent theory through which we can explain or
understand something of the world. It is clear that a strategic philosophical move is a figurative
form for thinking about philosophical inquiring. It is true, we can define “strategic philosophical
moves” in many ways, for example we can say that Q is a strategic move just in the case that it
is true and coherent with a theory. Nevertheless, I prefer the first formulation because in the
Western tradition coherence and the formulation of a theory are two basic values of all
philosophers from Plato and Aristotle to Russell’s Principia Mathematica. Moreover, it is not so
easy to say when a “philosophical proposition” is true. For example the Wittgenstein’s
Tractatus tell us that the philosophical propositions are just a nonsense because they are not a
picture of the world. A similar position could be found in Kant’s first critic (Kant (1789)). I do
not want to go further in this quagmire, and I take for granted the first definition with the caveat
of the case.
Nevertheless, there is something in common here. A philosopher has to be rational (trivial!) in
order to formulate a theory, because he has to choose just strategic philosophical moves. A
chess player has to be rational too, because he wants to win the game. In philosophy, reason is
not just a matter of choice, it is necessary in many senses. This is true also in chess: if I want to
decrease the risks of loss, I have to choose the moves that minimize the risks and maximize the
utility. In other words, I have to choose just the strategic moves.7
This brings us to another question: can we compare strategic thoughts in chess and in
philosophy? The answer is: definitely yes, we can. There are common laws that can be applied
to chess and philosophy as well. This rules tell us how and how much it is possible to make
good strategies, they are what I have called the “pure laws of strategy” (Pili (2015) chap. 11). I
want to report some of them:

1. Our goals have to be reasonable, i.e. they have to be accomplished in finite time, with finite
information and with proper means.
2. Intermediate goals have to reasonable too (as (1)).
3. If there are some alternative strategic plans, we must choose the most reasonable; i.e. the one
that requires few time and few means.

(1) says to us that there are some limits to the rationality of goals; primarily, a goal is reasonable
if we can reach it. If we cannot, than it has not reason to be. (2) is a law that constraints chains
of goals. Indeed, if just one goal is not reasonable, then the all chain of goals is not. Finally, (3)
is a principle of choice. It’s clear that if p and q are two equally reasonable plans, than they are
indifferent: a subject is rational in both his possible choices. I think that these three laws of
strategy are common to chess as much as to philosophy. Indeed, it is easy to see their rightness
in chess. May be it is not so clear in philosophy.
Nevertheless, if a philosopher has to make a theory, than he has to take some choices. First, he
has to formulate some premises. After the choice of the premises, he has to fix some
intermediate points in order to develop his theory. Finally, I think that one important aspect

6
This is an application of the laws of strategy to single moves. For an analysis of this: Pili (2014
cap.2 and cap.3).
7
On this theme, I warmly suggest the fun interview between Garry Kasparov and Fabio Fazio. Garry
Kasparov is one of the most brilliant chess player of all time (fifteen years as world champion). Fazio
asked to Kasparov if it would be possible for him to win playing random moves. Kasparov just said:
“This is a nonsense!” Laughs “Without any strategy you lose for sure” (my translation from Italian). This
answer is fun as much as interesting, because Kasparov seemed incapable to understand the irony (and for
a non-chess player is not trivial the possibility to win playing random moves). Indeed, the point is that for
a chess player is quite near to be impossible to think about chess without strategical planning and tactical
calculation. In a word, it is impossible not use the reason.
http://www.rai.tv/dl/RaiTV/programmi/media/ContentItem-55040d57-a28f-4004-a9a0-
478a3e362166.html
from Ockham to our day is to try to do the most with the least. This is true in science and it is
true in philosophy too. Ockham was not the only one that stressed this crucial point, as I think it
is. René Descartes (1637) in his On method specifies the necessity to find out the simple basis
of a problem in order to solve it. More recently, Russell (1912) spoke about something similar.
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (Wittgenstein (1921)) also consider the notion of simplicity. When
Turing defined his machine (Turing Machine), he analyzed the calculation as an abstract system
of computation grounded on the idea that there are some basic steps, some basilar elements (the
part of the machine) and some basic rules (see Palladino, Frixione (2011)). These steps and
these rules are simple, in the sense that we cannot divide them more. Descartes, Russell and
Wittgenstein are just three of the most brilliant philosophers of our tradition and I do not think
that there are many philosophers who disagree with this ideal of simplicity.
It is important to remark the presence of “means”. If I want to go up the roof, then I need a
ladder. If I do not have a ladder, than I cannot reach my goal. If I want to do a sum, then I need
some numbers and some rules in order to calculate it. Thus, in general, for any goal there is just
a fixed combination of means, through which I can reach it. Different types of goals require
different types of means. Thus, the difference between a strategic chess move and a strategic
philosophical move is that both try to maximize utility, which is not the same. A chess player
tries to answer to his opponent as the philosopher tries to answer to the critics of other scholars.
However, they differ in means: a philosopher has to show some strategic moves to build up his
theory and to defend it from critics; a chess player has to play some strategic moves in order to
win, i.e. to make checkmate or to take a so massive psychological advantage that the opponent
resigns.
Nevertheless, the presence of different means imply different strategical thinking. A chess
player has to avoid errors as first, and he has to make strategic moves. A philosopher has to
avoid errors too, but he has to fix some constraints to his analysis. Indeed, a philosopher has to
know what type of truth, belief, picture of the world he wants to find out. Therefore, the first
step of a philosopher is to understand his field of research (epistemology, metaphysics etc.) and
what kind of analysis it requests. A philosopher and a chess player share a strategical thinking
and they know that the possible moves are quite more than the good ones (for a demonstration
of this fact Pili (2014) chap. 4). Nevertheless, a chess player have to choice just what kind of
means he needs (the order of moves or the choice between two or more alternative variants). He
is not involved in problem such as petitio principii and the definition of premises and terms. A
chess player has a fixed language to use: he cannot break the rules, change the laws of the game.
The philosopher has to find new rules, he has to understand the older ones and justify both of
them on the light of his theory. In addition, his theory has to be coherent and sufficiently
powerful to have reason to exist. The balance of efforts is not equally distributed among chess
and philosophy.
Thus, we can conclude that chess and philosophy have a common strategic ground, but they are
different. Philosophy is much more complex than chess, also from a strategic point of view,
even if chess requests a specific training in order to increase the accuracy and reliability of the
calculation and the specific abilities in each part of the game.

Part III
Chess and Philosophy as a Rational Conversation
In the first part, we have find out that chess and philosophy are two different languages. In the
second part, I have considered the fact that chess and philosophy are two rational activities and
they are constrained to the pure laws of strategy. Indeed, a chess player and a philosopher have
to be rational in order to reach their goals. Nevertheless, there are many distinctions between
chess and philosophy, because they request different means. Thus, it seems that they are more
different as far as they are similar.
If chess and philosophy are two languages, if a language can be used in order to communicate
something, than it is plausible to think that chess and philosophy are involved in a
communicative activity. Indeed, a chess game can be seen as a particular form of conversation,
in which a player replies to the other with a move. In the first part, I showed the reason for
thinking about moves as statements. Emanuel Lasker shares with many chess players this idea.
Lasker (1907) analyzed chess as a particular form of conversation. Thus, I take this idea for
granted. What about philosophy?
Since Plato, philosophy took the form of conversation or dialogue many times. In particular,
Hegel (1807) elaborated an entire system on the basic idea that there is a rational confrontation
between two sides, the thesis and the antithesis. In addition, the analytic way of philosophy can
be seen as a perpetual conversation among philosophers, who are involved to critic each other.
Thus, I can draw the conclusion that chess and philosophy are two types of rational
conversation, because they are, basically, a form of confrontation.
A chess game represents a conversation between two sides. These two sides try to be more as
much rational as possible to win the game. This rational discussion has two possible outcomes:

A. One participant wins the game.

B. None wins the game.

A philosophical analysis always can be seen as a particular conversation. Indeed, a philosopher

should think about critics and objections in advance. A chess player always tries to see the
possible countermoves that can thwart his plans. In a similar way, a philosopher has to think
about critics before they come (and they inevitably come!). When he published something, than
the countermoves arrive suddenly. Thus, even if philosophy does not take the form of a dialogue
in a platonic fashion, it is in some sense a conversation. In addition, it has to be rational,
because it has to shape a theory, which has to be coherent and powerful. Finally, I never find a
philosopher closed in his ivory tower. Indeed, if he was in there, I could not find him by
definition!
A chess game starts in an ordered position, than it increases its complexity. Finally, the game
tends to get to a simplification.

Chess Complexity

Open Middlegame Endgame

Complexity

A philosophical inquiring increases steady its complexity.

Philosophical Complexity
10

0
Theory Reply 1 Reply 2

Complexity
These two diagrams are a plausible simplification of the dynamic of degrees of complexity in a
chess game and in a philosophical confrontation. Thus, we can see clearly that chess tends to
simplify the situation; on the contrary, philosophy tends to increase the complexity of
discussion. And what about machines?
A computer is very similar to an autistic child because it does not understand the meanings of
chess propositions and the conversational nature of chess. Indeed, a chess calculator
manipulates symbols, but it cannot associate to them any meaning. Thus, in this sense we can
say that a computer is not a real player (for this see Pili (2012), chap. 9). It exhibits the
superficial appearance of a chess player. However, it cannot participate in the rational
conversation. It shows just the fact that something could be set in order to speak alone.
However, speaking alone is not being part of a conversation. Thus, for this reasons a computer
is not and it cannot be a fair part of rational conversation. This is true in chess and in philosophy
in the same proportion, because both request a rational subject for a fair rational confrontation.
In addition, both request meanings and interpretations (for this crucial point Pili (2014), chap.
7).
Chess and philosophy are two different ways to speak a common language. Both bring to a
rational confrontation, although they follow different paces with different means. Nevertheless,
we can see how much philosophy and chess are just two shapes of the Western Spirit, which
grows through different types of rational confrontations and rational conversations. Either we
play or we think, we like a rational discussion and let’s win the most rational. We see something
meaningful in this type of confrontation because chess and philosophy are just two sides of the
same coin: the Western Culture.

Acknowledgments
I want to thank professor Giuseppe Varnier. He was one of the few men who believed (at least)
in one of his students, i.e. a student so crazy to think seriously about the relations between chess
and philosophy.
Finally, I want to thank to a friend of mine, Francesco Marigo, who read this paper and
suggested me many ways in order to improve it.

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