11. Tenchavez v.

Escano
FACTS: 27 year old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948
with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a
culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their
match-maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where
she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicenta’s
parents. However after translating the said letter to Vicenta’s dad, he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with
her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.
Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for the United States and
filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of
Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an
American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against
Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escaño is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the charges against Vicenta Escaño’s parents were sufficient in form.
RULING:
1. No. Vicenta Escaño and Pastor Tenchavez’ marriage remain existent and undissolved under the Philippine Law. Escaño’s divorce
and second marriage cannot be deemed valid under the Philippine Law to which Escaño was bound since in the time the divorce
decree was issued, Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. The acts of the wife in not complying with her wifely duties,
deserting her husband without any justifiable cause, leaving for the United States in order to secure a decree of absolute divorce,
and finally getting married again are acts which constitute a willful infliction of injury upon the husband’s feelings in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, thus entitling Tenchavez to a decree of legal separation under our law on the basis
of adultery.

2. No. Tenchavez’ charge against Vicenta’s parents are not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Tenchavez about the
Escaño’s animosity toward him strikes the court to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and were belied by Tenchavez’ own
letters written before the suit had begun. An action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the
absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and with having exerted efforts and
pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages.

12. Republic vs. Cipriano Orbecio III, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005
FACTS: Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis
City, on May 24, 1981. They were blessed with a with a son and a daughter. Lady Myros left for the United States bringing along their
son Kristoffer in 1986. After few years, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree sometime in 2000 and then married a certain Innocent
Stanley and lived in California. Thereafter, he filed a petition for authority to remarry with the trial court invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of
the Family Code. Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur granted the petition of the
respondent and allowed him to remarry. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied. Orbecido filed a petition for review of certiorari on the Decision of the
RTC.
ISSUE: Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains
a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
HELD: Yes. The Court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code be interpreted as allowing a
Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under
Philippine law.
“Art. 26 (2) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
the Philippine laws.”
The article should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them became naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtained a divorce decree.
The instant case was one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the
wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed,
she remarried an American citizen while residing in the US. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the
other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
We state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: 1. There is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In
this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this
case. Thus Cipriano, the “divorced” Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
However, since Orbecido was not able to prove as fact his wife’s naturalization, he was still barred from remarrying. Respondent
Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit competent evidence showing his allegations that his naturalized
American wife had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried. Therefore, the Petition of the Republic of the Philippines is
GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the RTC Br. 32 of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur is hereby SET ASIDE.
LWV CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. MARCELO B. DUPO, RESPONDENT.

FACTS: Petitioner, a domestic corporation which recruits Filipino workers, hired respondent as Civil Structural Superintendent to
work in Saudi Arabia for its principal, Mohammad Al-Mojil Group/Establishment (MMG). On February 26, 1992, respondent
signed his first overseas employment contract, renewable after one year. It was renewed five times on the following dates: May
10, 1993, November 16, 1994, January 22, 1996, April 14, 1997, and March 26, 1998. All were fixed-period contracts for one
year. The sixth and last contract stated that respondent's employment starts upon reporting to work and ends when he leaves
the work site. Respondent left Saudi Arabia on April 30, 1999 and arrived in the Philippines on May 1, 1999.

On May 28, 1999, respondent informed MMG, through the petitioner, that he needs to extend his vacation because his son was
hospitalized. He also sought a promotion with salary adjustment. [3] In reply, MMG informed respondent that his promotion is
subject to management's review; that his services are still needed; that he was issued a plane ticket for his return flight to Saudi
Arabia on May 31, 1999; and that his decision regarding his employment must be made within seven days, otherwise, MMG
"will be compelled to cancel [his] slot." On July 6, 1999, respondent resigned. Under the Law of Saudi Arabia, an employee who
rendered at least five (5) years in a company within the jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia, is entitled to the so-called long service
award which is known to others as longevity pay of at least one half month pay for every year of service. In excess of five years
an employee is entitled to one month pay for every year of service. In both cases inclusive of all benefits and allowances.

ISSUE: WON respondent is entitled to a service award or longevity pay of US$12,640.33 under the provisions of the Saudi Labor
Law; and
 WON prescription barred respondent's claim for service award as the complaint was filed one year and seven months
after the sixth contract ended.

RULING: 1. Yes. Respondent's service award under Article 87 of the Saudi Labor Law has already been paid.
Article 87 clearly grants a service award. It reads: Where the term of a labor contract concluded for a specified period comes to
an end or where the employer cancels a contract of unspecified period, the employer shall pay to the workman an award for
the period of his service to be computed on the basis of half a month's pay for each of the first five years and one month's pay
for each of the subsequent years. The last rate of pay shall be taken as basis for the computation of the award. For fractions of a
year, the workman shall be entitled to an award which is proportionate to his service period during that year. Furthermore, the
workman shall be entitled to the service award provided for at the beginning of this article in the following cases:

A. If he is called to military service.

B. If a workman resigns because of marriage or childbirth.

C. If the workman is leaving the work as a result of a force majeure beyond his control.(Emphasis supplied.)

2. NO. On the matter of prescription, however, we cannot agree with petitioner that respondent's action has
prescribed under Article 13 of the Saudi Labor Law. What applies is Article 291 of our Labor Code which reads: ART. 291. Money
claims. -- All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed
within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred.

In Cadalin v. POEA's Administrator,[27] we held that Article 291 covers all money claims from employer-employee relationship
and is broader in scope than claims arising from a specific law. It is not limited to money claims recoverable under the Labor
Code, but applies also to claims of overseas contract workers.
Thus, in our considered view, respondent's complaint was filed well within the three-year prescriptive period under Article 291
of our Labor Code. This point, however, has already been mooted by our finding that respondent's service award had been paid,
albeit the payroll termed such payment as severance pay.

As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. Procedural matters, such as service of process,
joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of the forum. This is true even if the
action is based upon a foreign substantive law.

A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or
substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law.

However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum
has a "borrowing statute." Said statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance
(Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, 152-153 [1938]). A "borrowing statute" directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute
of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law (Siegel, Conflicts, 183 [1975]). While there are several kinds of
"borrowing statutes," one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where it accrued, will not be enforced in the
forum even though the local statute has not run against it (Goodrich and Scoles, Conflict of Laws, 152-153 [1938]). Section 48 of
our Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides:

"If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippine
Islands."