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CASE PRINCIPLES IN CIVIL LAW

BOOK 1 – PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

Part 1 - Persons

While the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it
does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die—one
need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Continental Steel
Manufacturing Corporation vs. Montaño, 603 SCRA 621, G.R. No. 182836 October 13,
2009

Article 40 of the Civil Code prescribed that “the conceived child shall be considered born for
all purposes that are favorable to it” and adds further “provided it be born later with the
conditions specified in the following article (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is
completely delivered from the mother’s womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition
precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would
become entirely useless and ineffective. Quimiguing vs. Icao, 34 SCRA 132, No. 26795
July 31, 1970

Any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition, it is in itself a
voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Verceles
vs. Posada, 522 SCRA 518, G.R. No. 159785 April 27, 2007

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains
primarily to the injured, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to the parents or heirs
of an unborn child. Geluz vs. Court of Appeals, 2 SCRA 801, No. L-16439 July 20, 1961

A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s
legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides: ART.
413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special
laws. But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its
effects. Silverio vs. Republic, 537 SCRA 373, G.R. No. 174689 October 19, 2007

To the person with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) belongs the human right to the
pursuit of happiness and of health, and to him should belong the primordial choice of what
courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. Republic
vs. Cagandahan, 565 SCRA 72, G.R. No. 166676 September 12, 2008

In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the donor’s capacity to give
consent at the time of the donation. Certainly, there lies no doubt in the fact that insanity

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impinges on consent freely given. However, the burden of proving such incapacity rests upon
the person who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be
presumed. A person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence
to intelligently dispose his property. Catalan vs. Basa, 528 SCRA 645, G.R. No. 159567 July
31, 2007

Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity
where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional
prohibition. Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to
recovery of funds is a futile exercise on respondent’s part. To allow reimbursement would in
effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own.
Muller vs. Muller, 500 SCRA 65, G.R. No. 149615 August 29, 2006

The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private
lands in the Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized exceptions. There is no rule
more settled than this constitutional prohibition, as more and more aliens attempt to
circumvent the provision by trying to own lands through another. In a long line of cases, we
have settled issues that directly or indirectly involve the above constitutional provision.
Matthews vs. Taylor, 590 SCRA 394, G.R. No. 164584 June 22, 2009

As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do
equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Conversely stated, he
who has done inequity shall not be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a
court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or
fraudulent, or deceitful. Beumer vs. Amores, 686 SCRA 770, G.R. No. 195670 December 3,
2012

In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to
petitioner given that he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of
its unconstitutional purchase. It is well-established that equity as a rule will follow the law and
will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done
directly. Beumer vs. Amores, 686 SCRA 770, G.R. No. 195670 December 3, 2012

As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935
Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which
would definitely exclude foundlings either. It is also a generally accepted principle of
international law to presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in
which the foundling is found. Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections, 786 SCRA
1, G.R. No. 221697, G.R. Nos. 221698-700 March 8, 2016

Fact that a Presidential Decree or LOI states its date of effectivity does not preclude their
publication in the Official Gazette as they constitute important legislative acts, particularly in
the present situation where the President may on his own issue laws. However, administrative
and executive orders and those which affect only a particular class of persons need not be

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published. It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances “of a public
nature” or “of general applicability” is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that
before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents. The non-publication of the Presidential decrees and issuances of general
application shall have no force and effect of law. Tañada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, No. L-
63915 April 24, 1985

For purposes of the prior publication requirement for effectivity, the term "laws" refer not only
to those of general application, but also to laws of local application, private laws;
administrative rules enforcing a statute; city charters. Central Bank circulars to "fill-in the
details of the Central Bank Act; but not mere interpretative rules regulating and providing
guidelines for purposes of internal operations only. Tañada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446, No.
L-63915 December 29, 1986

It bears noting that there is nothing in E.O. No. 200 that prevents a law from taking effect on a
date other than—even before—the 15-day period after its publication. Where a law provides
for its own date of effectivity, such date prevails over that prescribed by E.O. No. 200. Indeed,
this is the very essence, of the phrase “unless it is otherwise provided” in Section 1 thereof.
Section 1, E.O. No. 200, therefore, applies only when a statute does not provide for its own
date of effectivity. What is mandatory under E.O. No. 200, and what due process requires, as
this Court held in Tañada v. Tuvera, is the publication of the law for without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia legis
n[eminem] excusat.” It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen
for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one. La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos, 421 SCRA 148, G.R. No.
127882 January 27, 2004

Finally, the “Effectivity” clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it “shall
take effect immediately upon its approval,” is defective. However, the same does not render
the entire law invalid. In Tañada v. Tuvera, this Court laid down the rule: . . . the clause “unless
it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. Fariñas vs. The Executive
Secretary, 417 SCRA 503, G.R. No. 147387, G.R. No. 152161 December 10, 2003

The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws. This may be deduced
from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a person’s ignorance, does not
excuse his or her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent
a choice of remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof
cannot be held against her. DM. Consunji, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 357 SCRA 249, G.R.
No. 137873 April 20, 2001

Property relations between spouses are governed principally by the national law of the
spouses. However, the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of
proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact to be properly pleaded and

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proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only
domestic or the law of the forum. The International Law doctrine of presumed-identity
approach or processual presumption comes into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not pleaded
or, even if pleaded, is not proven, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as
Philippine Law. Orion Savings Bank vs. Suzuki, 740 SCRA 345, G.R. No. 205487
November 12, 2014

Waiver is defined as “a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known

existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver the
party would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a
right known by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and such
person forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference of the
relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it.”
F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. vs. HR Construction Corp., 668 SCRA 302, G.R. No. 187521 March
14, 2012

Custom has been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly
observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory. Courts take no judicial
notice of custom. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. A
local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such
custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other fact. We find such proof
of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute the same,
wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does not mean that
Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom. Juridical
custom must be differentiated from social custom. The former can supplement statutory law or
be applied in the absence of such statute. In the Matter of the Petition for Authority To
Continue use of the Firm name “Ozaeta, Romulo, etc., 92 SCRA 1, July 30, 1979

Article 26(1) of the Civil Code protects an individual’s right to privacy and provides a legal
remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by other individuals; This
provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be
denied or even restricted by others. Hing vs. Choachuy, Sr., 699 SCRA 667, G.R. No.
179736 June 26, 2013

The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Ardiente vs. Pastorfide, 701
SCRA 389, G.R. No. 161921 July 17, 2013

Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philippines, this Court ruled in De Jesus
vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that "the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in
the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced * * * upon the faith of
such promise". The breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. Hermosisima vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., 109 Phil. 629, No. L-14628 September 30, 1960

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The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that
would have made it so. Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof
that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle
scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent
to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of
such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to
her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury
should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 115, G.R. No. 97336 February
19, 1993

Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a
wedding and go through all the necessary preparations and publicity, only to walk out of it
when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs, for which the erring promissor must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of the New Civil Code. Wassmer vs.
Velez, 12 SCRA 648, No. L-20089 December 26, 1964

Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits from the efforts or
obligations of others, but instead it must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the
sense that the term unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully. Shinryo (Philippines)
Company, Inc. vs. RRN Incorporated, 634 SCRA 123, G.R. No. 172525 October 20, 2010

In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements must be present: (1)
that the defendant has been enriched, (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3) that the
enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no
other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict. An accion in rem verso is
considered merely an auxiliary action, available only when there is no other remedy on
contract, quasi-contract, crime, and quasi-delict. If there is an obtainable action under any
other institution of positive law, that action must be resorted to, and the principle of accion in
rem verso will not lie.” Shinryo (Philippines) Company, Inc. vs. RRN Incorporated, 634
SCRA 123, G.R. No. 172525 October 20, 2010

Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in the
exercise of legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acted in bad
faith, with intent to prejudice another. Good faith refers to the state of mind which is
manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from
taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. Malice or bad faith, on the
other hand, implies a conscious and in-tentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest

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purpose or moral obliquity. California Clothing, Inc. vs. Quiñones, 708 SCRA 420, G.R. No.
175822 October 23, 2013

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Part 2 - Family Relations

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact
of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence,
even a0 person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage
between his parents. Añonuevo vs. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, 636 SCRA
420, G.R. No. 178221 December 1, 2010

In the case of Parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused
and the deceased would be the marriage certificate. In this case, the testimony of the
accused that he was married to the victim, in itself, is ample proof of such relationship as the
testimony can be taken as an admission against penal interest. Clearly, then, it was
established that Victoriano and Anna were husband and wife. People vs. Dela Cruz, 612
SCRA 364, G.R. No. 187683 February 11, 2010

Should the Court prohibit and punish her conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise
Clause, the Court’s action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious
freedom. We cannot therefore simply take a passing look at respondent’s claim of religious
freedom, but must instead apply the “compelling state interest” test. Estrada vs. Escritor,
408 SCRA 1, A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003

The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms—including
religious freedom—may be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom,
however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state
interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric
of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that such state
interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite. Estrada vs. Escritor, 492
SCRA 1, A.M. No. P-02-1651 June 22, 2006

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact
of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence,
even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage
between his parents. Macua Vda. de Avenido vs. Avenido, 714 SCRA 447, G.R. No. 53851
January 22, 2014

It is well-settled that other proofs can be offered to establish the fact of a solemnized
marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant
evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be
recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents. Calimag vs. Heirs
of Silvestra N. Macapaz, 791 SCRA 620, G.R. No. 191936 June 1, 2016

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Mere sexual relations between two unmarried and consenting adults are not enough to
warrant administrative sanction for illicit behavior. The Court has repeatedly held that
voluntary intimacy between a man and a woman who are not married, where both are not
under any impediment to marry and where no deceit exists, is neither a criminal nor an
unprincipled act that would warrant disbarment or disciplinary action. Abanag vs. Mabute,
647 SCRA 1, A.M. No. P-11-2922 April 4, 2011

This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without
judicial approval is void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the
disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and
extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what Omaña did in this
case. Espinosa vs. Omaña, 659 SCRA 1, A.C. No. 9081 October 12, 2011

As correctly ruled by the appellate court, the preponderance of evidence points to the fact that
Wenifreda is the legitimate spouse of Adriano. Documentary evidence — among others, the
parties’ respective marriage contracts, which, together with marriage certificates, are
considered the primary evidence of a marital union46 — indicates that Adriano was married to
Wenifreda, while Banguis was married to Nolasco — and both marriages were subsisting at
the time of the acquisition of the subject property and issuance of the certificate of title
thereto. Thus, it cannot be said that Adriano and Banguis were husband and wife to each
other; it cannot even be said that they have a common-law relationship at all. Consequently,
Banguis cannot be included or named in TCT T-145321 as Adriano’s spouse; the right and
privilege belonged to Wenifreda alone. Banguis-Tambuyat vs. Balcom-Tambuyat, 754
SCRA 165, G.R. No. 202805 March 23, 2015

The Supreme Court (SC) has long settled in Republic v. Olaybar, 715 SCRA 605 (2014), that
as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 were observed, substantial corrections
and changes in the civil registry, such as those involving the entries on sex and date of birth,
may already be effected. Republic vs. Tipay, 855 SCRA 419, G.R. No. 209527 February 14,
2018

The issue of ownership or co-ownership, to be more precise, must first be resolved in order to
effect a partition of properties. Heirs of Jose Sy Bang vs. Sy, 603 SCRA 534, G.R. No.
114217 October 13, 2009

Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside the court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. Except in
cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the
authority to solemnize a marriage. Arañes vs. Occiano, 380 SCRA 402, A.M. No. MTJ-02-
1390 April 11, 2002

A marriage can be held outside the judge’s chambers or courtroom only in the following
instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in remote places in accordance with Article 29; or 3.]

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upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. If at all, the
reasons proffered by respondent Judge to justify his hurried solemnization of the marriage in
this case only tend to degrade the revered position enjoyed by marriage in the hierarchy of
social institutions in the country. They also betray respondent’s cavalier proclivity on its
significance in our culture which is more disposed towards an extended period of engagement
prior to marriage and frowns upon hasty, ill-advised and ill-timed marital unions. Beso vs.
Daguman, 323 SCRA 566, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211 January 28, 2000

The term “psychological incapacity” to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
Perez-Ferraris vs. Ferraris, 495 SCRA 396, G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006

Jurisprudence has recognized that psychological incapacity “is a malady so grave and
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.” A person unable to distinguish between fantasy
and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond,
much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage,
including parenting. The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined
without expert opinion. Antonio vs. Reyes, 484 SCRA 353, G.R. No. 155800 March 10,
2006

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological incapacity, the Court is
not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage,
because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot
comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond.
Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te, 579 SCRA 193, G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug,
ruled that “psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity x x x and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated.” Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug wrote that “the psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.”
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198, G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable, it is terminated by final
judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either
of the spouses in the subsequent marriage. Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to

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annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. x x x The termination of the subsequent marriage

by affidavit provided by the above-quoted provision of the Family Code does not preclude the
filing of an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration
of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage. Social Security System vs. Jarque
Vda. de Bailon, 485 SCRA 376, G.R. No. 165545 March 24, 2006

A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to give
rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law prescribes
the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested according to the
law in force at the time the marriage is contracted. As a general rule, the nature of the
marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the
governing law. Ablaza vs. Republic, 628 SCRA 27, G.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010

The four requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under the Family Code are as
follows: 1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the
circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code; 2. That the present spouse wishes to
remarry; 3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee. Republic vs. Granada, 672 SCRA 432, G.R. No. 187512 June 13,
2012

He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. Capili vs. People, 700 SCRA 443, G.R.
No. 183805 July 3, 2013

One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “to procreate children based
on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage.” Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 324, G.R. No. 119190
January 16, 1997

The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished
memories that last during one’s lifetime. It is the dwelling house where husband and wife, or
by an unmarried head of a family, reside, including the land on which it is situated. It is
constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family. The family
home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time
of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family
home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except
as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. Patricio vs. Dario III,
507 SCRA 438, G.R. No. 170829 November 20, 2006

To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among
the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home;

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and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family. Patricio vs. Dario
III, 507 SCRA 438, G.R. No. 170829 November 20, 2006

One significant innovation introduced by The Family Code is the automatic constitution of the
family home from the time of its occupation as a family residence without need anymore for
the judicial or extrajudicial processes provided under the defunct Articles 224 to 251 of the
Civil Code and Rule 106 of the Rules of Court. Arriola vs. Arriola, 542 SCRA 666, G.R. No.
177703 January 28, 2008

Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such nature that its
allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire period that a needy party is entitled
to support, his or her alimony may be modified or altered, in accordance with his increased or
decreased needs, and with the means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final
determination. Lam vs. Chua, 426 SCRA 29, G.R. No. 131286 March 18, 2004

Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines mandates that illegitimate filiation may be
established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Montefalcon
vs. Vasquez, 554 SCRA 513, G.R. No. 165016 June 17, 2008

When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when
urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual,
with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support, and contextually, the
resulting juridical relationship is a quasi-contract, an equitable principle enjoining one from
unjustly enriching at the expense of another. Lacson vs. Lacson, 499 SCRA 677, G.R. No.
150644 August 28, 2006

Art. 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired during the marriage
are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband, or to the wife–as long as the properties were acquired by the
parties during the marriage, they are presumed to be conjugal in nature. Ching vs. Court of
Appeals, 423 SCRA 356, G.R. No. 124642 February 23, 2004

Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the
law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. Ayala Investment & Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA
272, G.R. No. 118305 February 12, 1998

In the case of Cariño v. Cariño, following the case of Republic, it was held that the certification
of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate
to prove the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cariño further held that the presumed
validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of
the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required
marriage license had been secured. Abbas vs. Abbas, 689 SCRA 646, G.R. No. 183896
January 30, 2013

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Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is
void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27
to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code. Abbas vs. Abbas, 689 SCRA 646, G.R. No.
183896 January 30, 2013

The certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a
marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys probative
value, being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to
the issuance of a marriage license. Go-Bangayan vs. Bangayan, Jr., 700 SCRA 702, G.R.
No. 201061 July 3, 2013

For Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each
other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without
the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. All these elements are present in the case at
bar. Mercado-Fehr vs., 414 SCRA 288, G.R. No. 152716 October 23, 2003

As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are
not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband
and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their
respective contributions. Atienza vs. De Castro, 508 SCRA 593, G.R. No. 169698
November 29, 2006

The registration of the trade name in the name of one person—a woman—does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that the trade name as a property is hers alone, particularly
when the woman is married. By law, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the
acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both
spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. Navarro vs. Escobido,
606 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 153788 November 27, 2009

The conjugal partnership is governed by the rules on the contract of partnership in all that is
not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this chapter or by spouses in their
marriage settlement. In other words, the property relations of the husband and wife shall be
governed primarily by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and,
suppletorily, by the spouses’ marriage settlement and by the rules on partnership under the
Civil Code. Navarro vs. Escobido, 606 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 153788 November 27, 2009

In a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the
period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such
as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court. Diño vs. Diño, 640 SCRA 178,
G.R. No. 178044 January 19, 2011

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For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present: (1) The
man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) They live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife; and (3) Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or
their marriage is void. Diño vs. Diño, 640 SCRA 178, G.R. No. 178044 January 19, 2011

Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio
under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the
liquidation of the properties of the parties. Diño vs. Diño, 640 SCRA 178, G.R. No. 178044
January 19, 2011

As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears
to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is
presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved—where it is proven that one spouse
inherited the residential lot from a parent, the same sufficiently rebuts the presumption of
conjugal ownership; Pursuant to Articles 92 and 109 of the Family Code, properties acquired
by gratuitous title by either spouse, during the marriage, shall be excluded from the
community property and be the exclusive property of each spouse. Muñoz, Jr. vs. Ramirez,
629 SCRA 38, G.R. No. 156125 August 25, 2010

The status and filiation of the child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family Code is
clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate.
Concepcion vs. Court of Appeals, 468 SCRA 438, G.R. No. 123450 August 31, 2005

The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. We
explained the rationale of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals: The
presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on
the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is grounded on
the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. Concepcion vs.
Court of Appeals, 468 SCRA 438, G.R. No. 123450 August 31, 2005

An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a
child born or conceived within a valid marriage. Concepcion vs. Court of Appeals, 468
SCRA 438, G.R. No. 123450 August 31, 2005

Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code do contemplate a situation where a child is
alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these
articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife.
Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by
proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife
within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2)
that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in
case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or
ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or

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undue influence. Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 468, G.R. No. 105625
January 24, 1994

Proof of legitimacy under Article 172, or illegitimacy under Article 175, should only be raised in
a direct and separate action instituted to prove the filiation of a child. Geronimo vs. Santos,
771 SCRA 508, G.R. No. 197099 September 28, 2015

There was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date
of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of
the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first
marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married. Morigo vs. People,
422 SCRA 376, G.R. No. 145226 February 6, 2004

Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall
perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows:
(1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage
ceremony. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a
marriage. Hence, the only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged “blessing” by the
petitioner is tantamount to the performance of an “illegal marriage ceremony” which is
punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. Ronulo vs. People, 728 SCRA 675,
G.R. No. 182438 July 2, 2014

A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997
(Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is
located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient
of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry. Republic vs. Olaybar, 715 SCRA 605,
G.R. No. 189538 February 10, 2014

Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of
the same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage
void ab initio. Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2)
made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A “freely given” consent requires that the
contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage Republic vs. Albios, 707
SCRA 584, G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013

A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no
real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that
the parties would not be bound; Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective,
or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. Republic vs. Albios, 707
SCRA 584, G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013

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Before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of
birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason
which may justify such change. In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction of
Entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, 454 SCRA 155, G.R. No.
159966 March 30, 2005

The main issue in determining the validity of the sale of the property by Rosca alone is
anchored on whether Uy and Rosca had a valid marriage. There is a presumption established
in our Rules “that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage.” Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume
marriage. However, this presumption may be contradicted by a party and overcome by other
evidence. Uy vs. Lacsamana, 767 SCRA 672, G.R. No. 206220 August 19, 2015

Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he was legally married to Rosca, their property
relations would be governed by Article 147 of the Family Code which applies when a couple
living together were not incapacitated from getting married. The provision states that
properties acquired during cohabitation are presumed co-owned unless there is proof to the
contrary. Uy vs. Lacsamana, 767 SCRA 672, G.R. No. 206220 August 19, 2015

It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already
remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We
have no other recourse but to affirm the trial court’s decision denying the petitions for
adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads: SEC. 7.
Who May Adopt.—The following may adopt: x x x Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except
in the following cases: x x x The use of the word “shall” in the above-quoted provision means
that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the
concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be
adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to
adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. The law is clear. There is
no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were
filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself,
without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for
adoption on this ground. Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions
enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of
petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of
petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other. In Re:
Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, Monina P. Lim, 588 SCRA 98, G.R. Nos. 168992-
93 May 21, 2009

Even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate
child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child. In Re: Petition for Adoption of
Michelle P. Lim, Monina P. Lim, 588 SCRA 98, G.R. Nos. 168992-93 May 21, 2009

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In a petition for habeas corpus, the child’s welfare is the supreme consideration. The Child
and Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care and
custody, among others, of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
Salientes vs. Abanilla, 500 SCRA 128, G.R. No. 162734 August 29, 2006

The so-called “tenderage presumption” under Article 213 of the Family Code may be
overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness. The mother is declared
unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following instances: neglect,
abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity, or affliction with a communicable disease. Here, the
mother was not shown to be unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring for her minor child. All
told, no compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the child from the mother’s custody.
Gamboa-Hirsch vs. Court of Appeals, 527 SCRA 380, G.R. No. 174485 July 11, 2007

Illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of the mother, regardless of whether
the father admits paternity. The recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could be a
ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody of the child. Briones vs.
Miguel, 440 SCRA 455, G.R. No. 156343 October 18, 2004

The award of temporary custody is provisional and subject to change as circumstances may
warrant—even the award of child custody after a judgment on a marriage annulment is not
permanent as it may be reexamined and adjusted if and when the parent who was given
custody becomes unfit. The general rule that children under seven years of age shall not be
separated from their mother finds its raison d’être in the basic need of minor children for their
mother’s loving care. Pablo-Gualberto vs. Gualberto V, 461 SCRA 450, G.R. No. 154994,
G.R. No. 156254 June 28, 2005

Sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence—to
deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have
had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending spouse from
exercising proper parental care. It is not enough for a father to show merely that a mother is a
lesbian—he must also demonstrate that she carried on her purported relationship with a
person of the same sex in the presence of their son or under circumstances not conducive to
the child’s proper moral development. Pablo-Gualberto vs. Gualberto V, 461 SCRA 450,
G.R. No. 154994, G.R. No. 156254 June 28, 2005

In all cases involving the care, custody and control of minor children, the sole and foremost
consideration is the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the child concerned,
taking into account the respective resources as well as social and moral situations of the
opposing parents; In the continual evolution of legal-institutions, the patria potestas has been
transformed from the jus vitae ac necis (right of life and death) of the Roman law, under which
the offspring was virtually a chattel of his parents, into a radically different institution, due to
the influence of Christian faith and doctrines. Laxamana vs. Laxamana, 388 SCRA 296,
G.R. No. 144763 September 3, 2002

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The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The
exception provided by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly
recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence,
respondent’s prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother,
then custody over the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.
Grande vs. Antonio, 716 SCRA 698, G.R. No. 206248 February 18, 2014

Valentin’s long possessed status as a legitimate child and thus, heir of Severo, need no
longer be the subject of a special proceeding for declaration of heirship. Heirs of Valentin
Basbas vs. Basbas, 734 SCRA 625, G.R. No. 188773 September 10, 2014

Nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that “legitimate parents” pertain to those who
exercise parental authority over the employee enrolled under the Employees’ Compensation
Program (ECP). Moreover, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of
succession to the estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. Bartolome vs. Social
Security System, 740 SCRA 78, G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014

Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption as the lower courts did with respect
to the property regime of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter
because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines.
Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally
married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.
Noveras vs. Noveras, 733 SCRA 528, G.R. No. 188289 August 20, 2014

TN: In Noveras Case, the Supreme Court awarded presumptive legitimes to the
children of the parties even if it is for legal separation case.

Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, “(t)he legitime of legitimate children
and descendants consists of one-half or the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.”
The children are therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in the net assets of the
absolute community, which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the same, as
well as to their respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale ofthe Sampaloc property
including the receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of P410,000.00. Consequently,
David and Leticia should each pay them the amount of P520,000.00 as their presumptive
legitimes therefrom. Noveras vs. Noveras, 733 SCRA 528, G.R. No. 188289 August 20,
2014

Since at the time of the exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of the
Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the
property relations between the petitioner and the respondent is the system of relative

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community or conjugal partnership of gains. Quiao vs. Quiao, 675 SCRA 642, G.R. No.
176556 July 4, 2012

Since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent’s marriage the
operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the
applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is
concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
The latter provision is applicable because according to Article 256 of the Family Code “[t]his
Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other law.” Quiao vs. Quiao, 675 SCRA 642, G.R.
No. 176556 July 4, 2012

When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife
becomes joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse
brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded
under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple’s properties. Quiao
vs. Quiao, 675 SCRA 642, G.R. No. 176556 July 4, 2012

In this provision, net profits “shall be the increase in value between the market value of the
community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the
time of its dissolution.”72 Thus, without any iota of doubt, Article 102(4) applies to both the
dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and to the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code. Quiao
vs. Quiao, 675 SCRA 642, G.R. No. 176556 July 4, 2012

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