You will even see pleadings like “Answer Ad Cautelam” or a “Manifestation Ad Cautelam.

” What are these

things? It just means that your lawyers are filing something “for caution” so as not to forestall something
for you. For example, an “Answer Ad Cautelam” may be filed if your lawyer thinks his motion for extension
of time may be arbitrarily denied or if he is still questioning the jurisdiction of the court, but does not want
you to be defaulted for failing to file an answer within the time allowed. Strictly speaking, such pleadings
are not expressly provided for in the Rules.

The Latin term “ad cautelam” can be translated into English as “for security,” “as a
precaution,” or “to be on the safe side.” The phrase “ex abundanti ad cautela” means “with
extreme caution.”

The Revised Rules of Court do not have a specific provision on ad cautelam. But lawyers
have used it in at least two ways:

[1] To question a court’s jurisdiction and at the same time be able to file pleadings, lawyers can
caption their pleadings as “ad cautelam.” In court hearings, lawyers must inform the judge that they
are questioning the court’s jurisdiction;

[2] As a precautionary measure to preserve a party’s remedies.

Using ad cautelam to file pleadings or ask for reliefs while questioning a

court’s jurisdiction
[1] GMA’s electoral sabotage case before the Pasay City RTCLawyers for former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) have been filing pleadings captioned “ad cautelam” with the Pasay
City Regional Trial Court. They are questioning before the Supreme Court the RTC’s jurisdiction
over the electoral sabotage case filed by the COMELEC against the former president. But at the
same time, they have been asking the RTC for certain reliefs for GMA like hospital arrest, the use of
a cellphone and laptop, etc. By captioning their pleadings with ad cautelam, these lawyers are
reminding the RTC that they are not accepting its jurisdiction over the case.

[2] Does a rehabilitation court have jurisdiction over a partially executed NLRC decision?

Many years ago, I represented a former hotel chef. He had won his NLRC case for back wages
against the hotel, and the decision had been partially executed. But the hotel filed for corporate
rehabilitation with the Regional Trial Court in Manila, and the judge ordered all parties with money
claims against the hotel to file their Answer. Parties who failed to file their Answer could no longer
pursue their claims.

If I had filed an Answer for my client, it would have meant that I was accepting the court’s
jurisdiction. My theory was that the NLRC had jurisdiction because it was a labor case and its
decision had been partially executed. But as a precaution, I filed with the Manila RTC a pleading
captioned “Manifestation/Motion ex abundanti ad cautelam”. In the pleading, I stated that while my
client was complying with the court’s order, he was questioning its jurisdiction. In layman’s terms, it
was better safe than sorry.

Using ad cautelam as a precautionary measure

[1] Aguedo F. Agbayani, petitioner, vs. The Commission On Elections And Rafael M. Colet,
respondents. G.R. No. 87440-42 June 13, 1990
Agbayani, a Pangasinan gubernatorial candidate, filed pre-proclamation protest cases against his
political rival Colet. When Colet was proclaimed as governor, Agbayani filed an election protest.
Because of his pending pre-proclamation cases, he captioned his election protest ex abundante ad
cautelam. The Comelec, acting on the election protest, required Colet to file a responsive answer.
Agbayani then filed a reply, which he also captioned ad cautelam.

The Comelec dismissed Agbayani’s pre-proclamation cases and his motion for reconsideration. It
said that the pre-proclamation controversy became moot and academic when Agbayani filed the
election protest and his reply, even if they were both captioned ad cautelam.

Agbayani appealed to the Supreme Court. Ruling in his favor, the Court noted that Agbayani filed the
election protest ad cautelam (or “for safety’s sake) just in case the Comelec dismissed his pre-
proclamation cases. For the upcoming barangay elections, a Comelec resolution provided that all
ballot boxes would be used for the barangay elections, unless they were not involved in any pre-
proclamation-controversy, election protest, or official investigation. Agbayani thus wanted to
preserve all the ballot boxes and their contents so that he could file an election protest later on. The
Court said:

As the above-mentioned cases involved only nine precincts, it was only prudent for the petitioner to
file his protest ad cautelam in case the pre-proclamation controversy was ultimately dismissed and it
became necessary for him to activate his protest. The protest would involve all the precincts in the
province. If he had not taken this precaution, an the other ballot boxes would have been emptied and
their contents would have been burned and forever lost.
As to Agbayani’s filing of a reply, the Court said:

It was not the fault of the petitioner if the COMELEC decided to give due course to the protest right
away even if it was ad cautelam. The protest was at that time only tentative, awaiting the disposition
of the pre-proclamation controversy. The petitioner did file a reply to the private respondent’s answer
with counter-protest, but it was only to prevent any declaration that he had by his inaction waived,
the right to file responsive pleadings. Such a reply did not make the pre-proclamation controversy
moot and academic.

Most indicative of the petitioner’s intention is the express reservation he made in the protest ad
cautelam itself, where he clearly stated:
As additional precautionary measure, the protestant herein is filing this protest and cautela(m),
without withdrawing his petitions in said pre-proclamation controversy, in order to exempt from the
provisions of Section 1 of Resolution No. 2035 the precincts hereinafter specified. (Emphasis
supplied)
[2] Francisco I. Chavez, Petitioner, versus Commission On Elections, Respondent. G. R. No.
105323, July 3, 1992. G. R. No. 105323, July 3, 1992

Former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez, a senatorial candidate in the 1992 elections, alleged
that he lost at least 1.7 million votes because of a nuisance candidate with the same surname as his.
On May 23, 1992, he filed an urgent petition before the Comelec asking it to [1] implement its May
12, 1992 resolution with costs de oficio; [2] to re-open the ballot boxes in 13 provinces including the
National Capital Region involving some 80,348 precincts and to scan for the “Chavez” votes for
purposes of crediting the same in his favor; [3] make the appropriate entries in the election
returns/certificates of canvass; and [4] to suspend the proclamation of the 24 winning candidates.

Dissatisfied with the failure of the Comelec to act on his petition, Chavez filed with the
Supreme Court an urgent Petition Ad Cautelamfor prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order, enjoining the Comelec from proclaiming the 24th
highest senatorial candidate, without first implementing respondent Comelec’s resolution of May 12,
1992 and acting upon petitioner’s letter/complaint dated May 14, 1992 and urgent petition dated May
22, 1992.

On June 4, 1992, the Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the Comelec
from proclaiming the 24th winning senatorial candidate and setting the case for hearing on June 9,
1992. On the same day, Chavez filed a manifestation stating that on May 30, 1992, his urgent
petition dated May 22, 1992 was dismissed by the Comelec. He also prayed that the Petition Ad
Cautelam be considered a regular petition.

On June 8, 1992, Senator Agapito Aquino (the 24th ranked senator) filed a Motion for Leave to
Intervene with Comment in Intervention praying for the dismissal of Chavez’s petition. Sen. Aquino
argued that the petition was in the nature of a pre-proclamation controversy, which was not allowed
in elections involving senators.

The Supreme Court ruled in Sen. Aquino’s favor, stating that Chavez’s proper recourse is to file a
regular election protest which, under the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, exclusively
pertains to the Senate Electoral Tribunal.

[3] Hongkong And Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited, petitioner, vs. Cecilia Diez Catalan,
respondent. G.R. No. 159590, October 18, 2004, and HSBC International Trustee Limited,
petitioner, vs. Cecilia Diez Catalan, respondent. G.R. No. 15959, October 18, 2004

Sometime in March 1997, Frederick Arthur Thomson (Thomson) issued five HSBANK checks
amounting to HK$3,200,000.00, payable to Cecilia Diez Catalan (Catalan). When the checks were
deposited, HSBANK returned them purportedly for reason of “payment stopped” pending
confirmation, despite the fact that the checks were duly funded.

In January 2001, Catalan filed before the RTC a complaint for a sum of money with damages
against HSBANK due to its alleged refusal to pay her the value of the checks issued by Thomson.

In September 2001, Catalan filed an Amended Complaint impleading petitioner HSBC TRUSTEE as
co-defendant and invoking Article 19 of the Civil Code as basis for her cause of action. Catalan
prayed that HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE be ordered to pay Php 20,864,000.00 representing the
value of the five checks at the rate of Php 6.52 per HK$1 as of January 29, 2001 for the acts of
HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE in refusing to pay the amount justly due her, in addition to moral and
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

HSBANK filed a motion for extension of time to file an Answer or a motion to dismiss. On October 2,
2001, HSBANK filed a Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint alleging, among other grounds, that it
did not submit to the jurisdiction of the RTC when it filed its motion for extension of time.

On the other hand, HSBC TRUSTEE, without submitting itself to the jurisdiction of the RTC, filed a
Special Appearance for Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, questioning the jurisdiction of the
RTC over it. HSBC TRUSTEE alleged that tender of summons through HSBANK Makati did not
confer upon the RTC jurisdiction over it.

On May 15, 2002, the RTC issued an Order denying the two motions to dismiss. HSBANK and
HSBC TRUSTEE filed separate motions for reconsideration but both were denied by the RTC in an
Order dated December 20, 2002.

On February 21, 2003, Catalan moved to declare HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE in default for
failure to file their Answer to the amended complaint.
On March 5, 2003, HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE filed separate “petitions for certiorari and/or
prohibition” with the Court of Appeals (CA).

Subsequently, HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE filed before the RTC separate Answers ad
cautelam, both dated March 18, 2003, as a “precaution against being declared in default and
without prejudice to the separate petitions for certiorari and/or prohibition then pending with
the CA”.

Among several grounds for their appeals, HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE alleged that the Court of
Appeals committed serious error by holding that they had submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial
court by filing an Answer to the Amended Complaint.

Issue: Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE when they filed
their respective Answers ad cautelam?

The Supreme Court ruled:

Against HSBANK In favor of HSBC TRUSTEE

The Rules of Court provides that a In contrast, the filing by HSBC

court generally acquires
jurisdiction over a person through
either a valid service of summons
in the manner required by law or
the person’s voluntary appearance
in court.
HSBANK initially filed a Motion for
Extension of Time to File Answer
or Motion to Dismiss.
HSBANK already invoked the
RTC’s jurisdiction over it by
praying that its motion for
extension of time to file answer or
a motion to dismiss be granted.
The Court has held that the filing of
motions seeking affirmative relief,
such as, to admit answer, for
additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default
judgment, and to lift order of
default with motion for
reconsideration, are considered
voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court.
Consequently, HSBANK’s
expressed reservation in its
Answer ad cautelam that it filed the
same “as a mere precaution
against being declared in default,
and without prejudice to the
Petition for Certiorari and/or
TRUSTEE of a motion to
dismiss cannot be considered a
voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the RTC. It was a
conditional appearance,
entered precisely to question
the regularity of the service of
summons. It is settled that a
party who makes a special
appearance in court
challenging the jurisdiction of
said court, e.g., invalidity of the
service of summons, cannot be
considered to have submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the
court. HSBC TRUSTEE has
been consistent in all its
pleadings in assailing the
service of summons and the
jurisdiction of the RTC over it.
Thus, HSBC TRUSTEE cannot
be declared in estoppel when it
filed an Answer ad cautelam
before the RTC while its
petition for certiorari was
pending before the CA. Such
answer did not render the
petition for certiorari before the
CA moot and academic. The
Answer of HSBC TRUSTEE
was only filed to prevent any
 Prohibition xxx now pending before declaration that it had by its
the Court of Appeals” to assail the inaction waived the right to file
jurisdiction of the RTC over it is of responsive pleadings.
no moment. Having earlier invoked
the jurisdiction of the RTC to
secure affirmative relief in its
motion for additional time to file
answer or motion to dismiss,
HSBANK, effectively submitted
voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the
RTC and is thereby estopped from
asserting otherwise, even before
this Court.

More to come. For now, let me leave you with this quote from Congressman Ronnie Zamora.
During the 2005 impeachment deliberations against GMA, Congressman Zamora said that his father
told him: “Keep away from lawyers who start their sentences with ex abundanti ad cautela.”