Ethics Inf Technol (2010) 12:313–325
DOI 10.1007/s10676-010-9227-5
‘‘But the data is already public’’: on the ethics of research
in Facebook
Michael Zimmer
Published online: 4 June 2010
 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010
Abstract In 2008, a group of researchers publicly
released profile data collected from the Facebook accounts
of an entire cohort of college students from a US univer-
sity. While good-faith attempts were made to hide the
identity of the institution and protect the privacy of the data
subjects, the source of the data was quickly identified,
placing the privacy of the students at risk. Using this
incident as a case study, this paper articulates a set of
ethical concerns that must be addressed before embarking
on future research in social networking sites, including the
nature of consent, properly identifying and respecting
expectations of privacy on social network sites, strategies
for data anonymization prior to public release, and the
relative expertise of institutional review boards when
confronted with research projects based on data gleaned
from social media.
Keywords Research ethics
Social networks

Facebook
Privacy
Anonymity
Introduction
In September 2008, a group of researchers publicly
released data collected from the Facebook accounts of an
entire cohort of college students. Titled ‘‘Tastes, Ties, and
Time’’ (T3), the announcement accompanying the release
noted the uniqueness of the data:
M. Zimmer (&)
School of Information Studies, University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee, 656 Bolton Hall, 3210 N. Maryland Ave,
Milwaukee, WI 53211, USA
e-mail: zimmerm@uwm.edu
The dataset comprises machine-readable files of vir-
tually all the information posted on approximately
1,700 [Facebook] profiles by an entire cohort of
students at an anonymous, northeastern American
university. Profiles were sampled at 1-year intervals,
beginning in 2006. This first wave covers first-year
profiles, and three additional waves of data will be
added over time, one for each year of the cohort’s
college career.
Though friendships outside the cohort are not part of
the data, this snapshot of an entire class over its
4 years in college, including supplementary infor-
mation about where students lived on campus, makes
it possible to pose diverse questions about the rela-
tionships between social networks, online and offline.
(N.A. 2008)
Recognizing the privacy concerns inherent with the
collection and release of social networking data, the T3
research team took various steps in an attempt to protect
the identity of the subjects, including the removal of stu-
dent names and identification numbers from the dataset, a
delay in the release of the cultural interests of the subjects,
and requiring other researchers to agree to a ‘‘terms and
conditions for use,’’ prohibiting various uses of the data
that might compromise student privacy, and undergoing
review by their institutional review board (Lewis 2008, pp.
28–29).
Despite these steps, and claims by the T3 researchers
that ‘‘all identifying information was deleted or encoded’’
(Lewis 2008, p. 30), the identity of the source of the dataset
was quickly discovered. Using only the publicly available
codebook for the dataset and other public comments made
about the research project, the identity of the ‘‘anonymous,
northeastern American university’’ from which the data
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was drawn was quickly narrowed down to 13 possible
universities (Zimmer 2008b), and then surmised to be
Harvard College (Zimmer 2008a). Reminiscent of the ease
at which AOL users were re-identified when the search
engine thought the release of individuals’ search history
data was sufficiently anonymized (see Barbaro and Zeller
Jr 2006), this re-identification of the source institution of
the T3 dataset reveals the fragility of the presumed privacy
of the subjects under study.1
Using the T3 data release and its aftermath as a case
study, this paper will reveal numerous conceptual gaps in
the researchers’ understanding of the privacy risks related
to their project, and will articulate a set of ethical concerns
that must be addressed before embarking on future research
similarly utilizing social network data. These include
challenges to the traditional nature of consent, properly
identifying and respecting expectations of privacy on social
network sites, developing sufficient strategies for data
anonymization prior to the public release of personal data,
and the relative expertise of institutional review boards
when confronted with research projects based on data
gleaned from social media.
The ‘‘Tastes, Ties, and Time’’ project
Research in social networks has spanned decades, from
Georg Simmel’s foundational work in sociology (Simmel
and Wolff 1964), to Barry Wellman’s analyses of social
networks in the emerging networked society of the late
twentieth century (Wellman and Berkowitz 1988), to the
deep ethnographies of contemporary online social networks
by boyd (2008b). Indeed, the explosive popularity of online
social networking sites such as MySpace, Twitter, and
Facebook has attracted attention from a variety of
researchers and disciplines (see boyd and Ellison 2008).2 A
primary challenge to fully understanding the nature and
dynamic of social networks is obtaining sufficient data.
Most existing studies rely on external surveys of social
networking participants, ethnographies of smaller subsets
of subjects, or the analysis of limited profile information
extracted from what subjects chose to make visible. As a
result, the available data can often be tainted due to self-
reporting biases and errors, have minimal representative-
ness of the entire population, or fail to reflect the true depth
and complexity of the information users submit (and cre-
ate) on social networking sites.
1
While no individuals within the T3 dataset were positively
identified (indeed, the author did not attempt to re-identify individ-
uals), discovering the source institution makes individual re-identi-
fication much easier, perhaps even trivial, as discussed below.
2
See also bibliography maintained by danah boyd at http://www.
danah.org/SNSResearch.html.
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M. Zimmer
Recognizing the data limitations faced by typical
sociological studies of online social network dynamics, a
group of researchers from Harvard University and the
University of California—Los Angeles set out to construct
a more robust dataset that would fully leverage the rich
data available on social networking websites.3 Given its
popularity, the researchers chose the social network site
Facebook as their data source, and located a university that
allowed them to download the Facebook profiles of every
member of the freshman class:
With permission from Facebook and the university in
question, we first accessed Facebook on March 10
and 11, 2006 and downloaded the profile and network
data provided by one cohort of college students. This
population, the freshman class of 2009 at a diverse
private college in the Northeast U.S., has an excep-
tionally high participation rate on Facebook: of the
1640 freshmen students enrolled at the college,
97.4% maintained Facebook profiles at the time of
download and 59.2% of these students had last
updated their profile within 5 days. (Lewis et al.
2008, p. 331)
This first wave of data collection took place in 2006,
during the spring of the cohort’s freshman year, and data
collection was repeated annually until 2009, when the vast
majority of the study population will have graduated,
providing 4 years of data about this collegiate social net-
work. Each student’s official housing records were also
obtained from the university, allowing the researchers to
‘‘connect Internet space to real space’’ (Kaufman 2008a).
The uniqueness of this dataset is of obvious value for
sociologists and Internet researchers. The data was
extracted directly from Facebook without direct interaction
with the subjects or reliance on self-reporting instruments,
either of which could taint the data collected. The dataset
includes demographic, relational, and cultural information
on each subject, allowing broad analyses beyond more
simple profile scraping methods. The inclusion of housing
data for each of the 4 years of the study for analysis of any
connection between ‘‘physical proximity, emerging room-
mate and friendship groups in the real world and the
presence of these two types of relationships in their Face-
book space’’ (Kaufman 2008a). Most importantly, the
dataset represents nearly a complete cohort of college
students, allowing the unique analysis of ‘‘complete social
universe’’ (Kaufman 2008a), and it is longitudinal,
3
The research team includes Harvard University professors Jason
Kaufman and Nicholas Christakis, UCLA professor Andreas Wim-
mer, and Harvard sociology graduate students Kevin Lewis and
Marco Gonzalez.
On the ethics of research in Facebook
providing the ability to study how the social network
changes over time.
As a result of its uniqueness, the dataset can be
employed for a number of research projects that have
heretofore been difficult or impossible to pursue. As one of
the ‘‘Tastes, Ties, and Time’’ researchers noted, ‘‘We’re on
the cusp of a new way of doing social science… Our
predecessors could only dream of the kind of data we now
have’’ (Nicholas Christakis, qtd in Rosenbloom 2007).
The dataset release
The ‘‘Tastes, Ties, and Time’’ project has been funded, in
part, by a grant from the National Science Foundation,4
who mandates certain levels of data sharing as a condition
of its grants.5 As a result, the Facebook dataset is being
made available for public use in phases, roughly matching
the annual frequency of data collection: wave 1 in Sep-
tember 2008, wave 2 in the fall of 2009, wave 3 in the fall
of 2010, and wave 4 in the fall of 2011 (Lewis 2008, p. 3).
The first wave of data, comprising of ‘‘machine-readable
files of virtually all the information posted on approxi-
mately 1700 FB profiles by an entire cohort of students at
an anonymous, northeastern American university,’’ was
publicly released on September 25, 2008 (N.A. 2008).6
Prospective users of the dataset are required to submit a
brief statement detailing how the data will be used, and
access is granted at the discretion of the T3 research team.
Researchers are also required to agree to a ‘‘Terms and
Conditions of Use’’ statement in order to gain access to the
dataset, consenting to various licensing, use, and attribution
provisions.
A comprehensive codebook was downloadable without
the need to submit an application, which included detailed
descriptions and frequencies of the various data elements
(see Lewis 2008), including gender, race, ethnicity, home
state, political views, and college major. For example, the
codebook revealed that the dataset included 819 male and
821 female subjects, and that there were 1 self-identified
Albanian, 2 Armenians, 3 Bulgarians, 9 Canadians, and so
on.
4
See ‘‘Social Networks and Online Spaces: A Cohort Study of
American College Students’’, Award #0819400, http://www.nsf.gov/
awardsearch/showAward.do?AwardNumber=0819400.
5
See relevant National Science Foundation Grant General Condi-
tions (GC-1), section 38. Sharing of Findings, Data, and Other
Research Products (http://www.nsf.gov/publications/pub_summ.jsp?
ods_key=gc109).
6
The dataset is archived at the IQSS Dataverse Network at Harvard
University (http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/).
315
The codebook also included an account of the steps
taken by the T3 researchers in an attempt to protect subject
privacy:
All data were collected with the permission of the
college being studied, the college’s Committee on the
Use of Human Subjects, as well as Facebook.com.
Pursuant to the authors’ agreement with the Committee
on the Use of Human Subjects, a number of precau-
tionary steps were taken to ensure that the identity and
privacy of students in this study remain protected. Only
those data that were accessible by default by each RA
were collected, and no students were contacted for
additional information. All identifying information
was deleted or encoded immediately after the data were
downloaded. The roster of student names and identi-
fication numbers is maintained on a secure local server
accessible only by the authors of this study. This roster
will be destroyed immediately after the last wave of
data is processed. The complete set of cultural taste
labels provides a kind of ‘‘cultural fingerprint’’ for
many students, and so these labels will be released only
after a substantial delay in order to ensure that students’
identities remain anonymous. Finally, in order to
access any part of the dataset, prospective users must
read and electronically sign [a] user agreement…
(Lewis 2008, p. 29)
These steps taken by the T3 researchers to remove
identifying information reveal an acknowledgment of—and
sensitivity to—the privacy concerns that will necessarily
arise given the public release of such a rich and complete
set of Facebook data. Their intent, as expressed by the
project’s principle investigator, Jason Kaufman, was to
ensure that ‘‘all the data is cleaned so you can not connect
anyone to an identity’’ (Kaufman 2008a). Unfortunately,
the T3 researchers were overly optimistic.
Partial re-identification and withdrawal of dataset
Cognizant of the privacy concerns related to collecting and
releasing detailed Facebook profile data from a cohort of
college students, the T3 research team—in good faith—
took a number of steps in an attempt to protect subject
privacy, including review by their institutional review
board, the removal of student names and identification
numbers from the dataset, a delay in the release of the
cultural interests of the subjects, and requiring other
researchers to agree to a ‘‘terms and conditions for use’’
that prohibited any attempts to re-identify subjects, to
disclose any identities that might be inadvertently re-
identified, or otherwise to compromise the privacy of the
subjects.
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However, despite these efforts, the team’s desire to
ensure ‘‘all the data is cleaned so you can not connect
anyone to an identity’’ fell short. On September 29, 2008,
only 4 days after the initial data release, Fred Stutzman, a
Ph.D. student at the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill’s School of Information and Library Science, ques-
tioned the T3 researchers’ faith in the non-identifiability of
the dataset:
The ‘‘non-identifiability’’ of such a dataset is up for
debate. A friend network can be thought of as a fin-
gerprint; it is likely that no two networks will be exactly
similar, meaning individuals may be able to be iden-
tified in the dataset post-hoc… Further, the authors of
the dataset plan to release student ‘‘Favorite’’ data in
2011, which will provide further information that may
lead to identification. (Stutzman 2008)
Commenting on Stutzman’s blog post on the subject,
Eszter Hargittai, an Associate Professor of Communication
Studies at Northwestern University, sounded similar
concerns:
I think it’s hard to imagine that some of this ano-
nymity wouldn’t be breached with some of the par-
ticipants in the sample. For one thing, some
nationalities are only represented by one person.
Another issue is that the particular list of majors
makes it quite easy to guess which specific school
was used to draw the sample. Put those two pieces of
information together and I can imagine all sorts of
identities becoming rather obvious to at least some
people. (Hargittai 2008)
Stutzman and Hargittai share a fear of the possible re-
identification of the presumed anonymous Facebook data-
set that has been made available to the public. Stutzman’s
concern over the ability to exploit the uniqueness of one’s
social graph to identify an individual within a large dataset
has proven true in numerous cases (see, for example, Na-
rayanan and Shmatikov 2008, 2009). Hargittai suggests
that the uniqueness of the some of the data elements makes
identifying the source of the data—and therefore some of
the individual subjects—quite trivial. Hargittai’s fears were
correct.
Partial re-identification
Within days of its public release, the source of the T3
dataset was identified as Harvard College (see Zimmer
2008a, b). Most striking about this revelation was that the
identification of the source of the Facebook data did not
require access to the full dataset itself.
Using only the freely available codebook and referenc-
ing various public comments about the research, the source
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M. Zimmer
of the data was quickly narrowed down from over 2000
possible colleges and universities to a list of only seven
(Zimmer 2008b). An examination of the codebook revealed
the source was a private, co-educational institution, whose
class of 2009 initially had 1640 students in it. Elsewhere,
the source was identified as a ‘‘New England’’ school. A
search through an online college database7 revealed only
seven private, co-ed colleges in New England states (CT,
ME, MA, NH, RI, VT) with total undergraduate popula-
tions between 5000 and 7500 students (a likely range if
there were 1640 in the 2006 freshman class): Tufts Uni-
versity, Suffolk University, Yale University, University of
Hartford, Quinnipiac University, Brown University, and
Harvard College.
Upon the public announcement of this initial discovery,
and general criticism of the research team’s attempts to
protect the privacy of the subjects, Jason Kaufman, the
principle investigator of the T3 research project, was quick
to react, noting that, perhaps in justification for the amount
of details released in the dataset, ‘‘We’re sociologists, not
technologists, so a lot of this is new to us’’ and ‘‘Sociolo-
gists generally want to know as much as possible about
research subjects’’ (Kaufman 2008b). He then attempts to
diffuse some of the implicit privacy concerns with the
following comment:
What might hackers want to do with this information,
assuming they could crack the data and ‘see’ these
people’s Facebook info? Couldn’t they do this just as
easily via Facebook itself?
Our dataset contains almost no information that isn’t
on Facebook. (Privacy filters obviously aren’t much
of an obstacle to those who want to get around them.)
(Kaufman 2008b)
And then:
We have not accessed any information not otherwise
available on Facebook. We have not interviewed
anyone, nor asked them for any information, nor
made information about them public (unless, as you
all point out, someone goes to the extreme effort of
cracking our dataset, which we hope it will be hard to
do). (Kaufman 2008c)
However, little ‘‘extreme effort’’ was needed to further
‘‘crack’’ the dataset; it was accomplished a day later, again
without ever looking at the data itself (Zimmer 2008a). As
Hargittai recognized, the unique majors listed in the
codebook allowed for the ultimate identification of the
source university. Only Harvard College offers the specific
variety of the subjects’ majors that are listed in the code-
book, such as Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations,
7
College Board, http://www.collegeboard.com.
On the ethics of research in Facebook
Studies of Women, Gender and Sexuality, and Organismic
and Evolutionary Biology. The identification of Harvard
College was further confirmed after analysis of a June 2008
video presentation by Kaufman, where he noted that
‘‘midway through the freshman year, students have to pick
between 1 and 7 best friends’’ that they will essentially live
with for the rest of their undergraduate career (Kaufman
2008a). This describes the unique method for determining
undergraduate housing at Harvard: all freshman who
complete the fall term enter into a lottery, where they can
designate a ‘‘blocking group’’ of between 2 and 8 students
with whom they would like be housed in close proximity.8
In summary, the source of the T3 dataset was estab-
lished with reasonable certainly in a relatively short period
of time, without needing to download or access the dataset
itself. While individual subjects were not identified in this
process, the ease of identification of the source places their
privacy in jeopardy given that the dataset contains a rela-
tively small population with many unique individuals. The
hopes by the T3 research team that ‘‘extreme effort’’ would
be necessary to ‘‘crack’’ the dataset were, unfortunately,
overly optimistic.
Withdrawal of the dataset
The announcement of this likely identification of the source
of the Facebook dataset did not prompt a public reply by
the T3 research team, but within 1 week of the discovery,
the access page for the ‘‘Tastes, Ties, and Time’’ dataset
displayed the following message, indicating that the dataset
was, at least for the moment, no longer publicly available:
Note: As of 10/8/08, prospective users may still
submit requests and research statements, but the
approval process will be delayed until further notice.
We apologize for the inconvenience, and thank you
for your patience.9
Then, in March 2009, the page was updated with a new
message acknowledging the removal was in response to
concerns over student privacy:
UPDATE (3/19/09): Internal revisions are almost
complete, and we expect to begin distributing again
in the next 2–3 weeks. In the meantime, please DO
NOT submit new dataset requests; but please check
back frequently at this website for a final release
notice. We again apologize for any inconvenience,
and thank you for your patience and understanding as
8
This process is described at the Harvard College Office of
Residential Life website: http://www.orl.fas.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?
keyword=k11447&tabgroupid=icb.tabgroup17715.
9
Screenshot of http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/t3 taken on October
22, 2008, on file with author.
317
we work to ensure that our dataset maintains the
highest standards for protecting student privacy.10
A full year after the initial release, the dataset remains
unavailable, with the following message greeting interested
researchers:
UPDATE (10/2/09): The T3 dataset is still offline as
we take further steps to ensure the privacy of students
in the dataset. Please check back later at this site for
additional updates- a notice will be posted when the
distribution process has resumed.11
These messages noting the restricted access to the
Facebook dataset to ‘‘ensure that our dataset maintains the
highest standards for protecting student privacy’’ suggest
that the re-identification of the source as Harvard College
was correct, and that the T3 research team is re-evaluating
their processes and procedures in reaction.
The insufficiency of privacy protections
in the T3 project
The changing nature—and expectations—of privacy in
online social networks are being increasingly debated and
explored (see, for example, Gross and Acquisti 2005;
Barnes 2006; Lenhart and Madden 2007; Nussbaum 2007;
Solove 2007; Albrechtslund 2008; Grimmelmann 2009).
The events surrounding the release of the Facebook data in
the ‘‘Tastes, Ties, and Time’’ reveals many of the fault
lines within these debates. Critically examining the meth-
ods of the T3 research project, and the public release of the
dataset, reveals numerous conceptual gaps in the under-
standing the nature of privacy and anonymity in the context
of social networking sites.
The primary steps taken by the T3 research team to
protect subject privacy (quoted above), can be summarized
as follows:
1. Only those data that were accessible by default by each
RA were collected, and no students were contacted for
additional information.
2. All identifying information was deleted or encoded
immediately after the data were downloaded.
3. The complete set of cultural taste labels provides a
kind of ‘‘cultural fingerprint’’ for many students, and
so these labels will be released only after a substantial
10
Screenshot of http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/t3 taken on March
27, 2009, on file with author. Webpage remains unchanged as of April
29, 2009.
11
Screenshot of http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/t3 taken on
November 1, 2009, on file with author. As of May 29, 2010, this
message remains in place.
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delay in order to ensure that students’ identities remain
anonymous.
4. In order to access any part of the dataset, prospective
researchers must agree to a ‘‘terms and conditions for
use’’ that prohibits any attempts to re-identify subjects,
to disclose any identities that might be inadvertently
re-identified, or otherwise to compromise the privacy
of the subjects.
5. The entire research project, including the above steps,
were reviewed and approved by Harvard’s Committee
on the Use of Human Subjects.
While each of these steps reveal good-faith efforts to
protect the privacy of the subjects, each has serious limi-
tations that expose a failures by the researchers to fully
understand the nature of privacy in online social network
spaces, and to design their research methodology accord-
ingly. Each will be considered below, followed by a brief
discussion of some of the public comments made by the T3
research team in defense of their methods and the public
release of the dataset.
Use of in-network RAs to access subject data
In his defense of releasing subjects’ Facebook profile data,
Jason Kaufmann, the principle investigator of the T3 pro-
ject, has stated that ‘‘our dataset contains almost no
information that isn’t on Facebook’’ and that ‘‘We have not
accessed any information not otherwise available on
Facebook’’ (Kaufman 2008c). Access to this information
was granted by Facebook, but only through a manual
process. Thus, research assistants (RA) from the source
institution (presumably Harvard) were employed to per-
form the labor-intensive task of search for each first year
student’s Facebook page and saving the profile informa-
tion. The dataset’s codebook confirms that ‘‘Only those
data that were accessible by default by each RA were
collected, and no students were contacted for additional
information’’ (Lewis 2008, p. 29).
The T3 codebook notes that of the 1,640 students in the
cohort, 1,446 were found on Facebook with viewable
profiles, 152 had a Facebook profile that was discoverable
but not viewable by the RA, and 42 were undiscoverable
(either not on Facebook or invisible to those not within
their ‘‘friend’’ network) (Lewis 2008, p. 6).12 Importantly,
the codebook notes a peculiarity inherent with using in-
network RAs to access the Facebook profile data:
12
Facebook allows users to control access to their profiles based on
variables such as ‘‘Friends only’’, or those in their ‘‘Network’’ (such
as the Harvard network), or to ‘‘Everyone’’. Thus, a profile might not
be discoverable or viewable to someone outside the boundaries of the
access setting.
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M. Zimmer
It is important to note that both undergraduate and
graduate student RAs were employed for download-
ing data, and that each type of RA may have had a
different level of default access based on individual
students’ privacy settings. In other words, a given
student’s information should not be considered
objectively ‘‘public’’ or ‘‘private’’ (or even ‘‘not on
Facebook’’)—it should be considered ‘‘public’’ or
‘‘private’’ (or ‘‘not on Facebook’’) from the perspec-
tive of the particular RA that downloaded the given
student’s data. (Lewis 2008, p. 6)
The T3 researchers concede that one RA might have
different access to a student’s profile than a different RA,
and being ‘‘public’’ or ‘‘private’’ on Facebook is merely
relative to that particular RAs level of access.
What appears to be lost on the researchers is that a
subject might have set her privacy settings to be viewable
to only to other users within her network, but to be inac-
cessible to those outside that sphere. For example, a
Facebook user might decide to share her profile informa-
tion only with other Harvard students, but wants to remain
private to the rest of the world. The RAs employed for the
project, being from the same network as the subject, would
be able to view and download a subject’s profile data that
was otherwise restricted from outside view. Thus, her
profile data—originally meant for only those within the
Harvard network—is now included in a dataset released to
the public. As a result, it is likely that profile information
that a subject explicitly restricted to only ‘‘in network’’
participants in Facebook has been accessed from within
that network, but then extracted and shared outside those
explicit boundaries.
Given this likelihood, the justification that ‘‘we have not
accessed any information not otherwise available on
Facebook’’ is true only to a point. While the information
was indeed available to the RA, it might have been
accessible only due to the fact that the RA was within the
same ‘‘network’’ as the subject, and that a privacy setting
was explicitly set with the intent to keep that data within
the boundaries of that network. Instead, it was included in a
dataset released to the general public. This gap in the
project’s fundamental methodology reveals a troublesome
lack of understanding of how users might be using the
privacy settings within Facebook to control the flow of
their personal information across different spheres, and
puts the privacy of those subjects at risk.
Removal or encoding of ‘‘identifying’’ information
In an effort to protect the identity of the subjects, researchers
note that ‘‘All identifying information was deleted or
encoded immediately after the data were downloaded’’
On the ethics of research in Facebook
(Lewis 2008, p. 29), and that ‘‘all the data is cleaned so you
can not connect anyone to an identity’’ (Kaufman 2008a).
Student names were replaced by ‘‘unique identification
numbers’’ and any e-mail addresses or phone numbers that
appeared in the Facebook profile data were excluded from the
published dataset.
Yet, as the AOL search data release revealed, even if
one feels that ‘‘all identifying information’’ has been
removed from a dataset, it is often trivial to piece together
random bits of information to deduce one’s identity (Bar-
baro and Zeller Jr 2006). The fact that the dataset includes
each subjects’ gender, race, ethnicity, hometown state, and
major makes it increasingly possible that individuals could
be identified, especially those with a unique set of char-
acteristics. Repeating Hargittai’s concern: ‘‘I think it’s hard
to imagine that some of this anonymity would not be
breached with some of the participants in the sample’’
(Hargittai 2008).
For example, the codebook reveals that each of these
states has only a single student represented in the dataset:
Delaware, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, and Wyoming.
Similarly, there are only single instances of students
identified as Albanian, Hungarian, Iranian, Malaysian,
Nepali, Philippino, and Romanian. Their uniqueness very
well might have resulted in publicity: it is possible that
local media featured their enrollment at Harvard, or that the
local alumni organization listed their name in a publicly-
accessible newsletter, and so on. If such unique individuals
can be personally identified using external sources, and
then located within the dataset, one might also learn his/her
stated political views or sexual preference, resulting in a
significant privacy breach.
This reveals that even when researchers believe they
have removed or encoded ‘‘all identifying information,’’
there often remains information that could just as easily be
used to re-identify individuals.13 The T3 researchers’ belief
that stripping names alone is sufficient resembles the typ-
ical definition of ‘‘personally identifiable information’’
(PII) within the United States legal framework. As defined
in California law, for example, PII is typically limited to an
individual’s name or other personally identifiable elements
such as a social security number, a driver’s license number,
or a credit card number.14 So long as these identifiers are
removed from a dataset, it is presumed to be sufficiently
anonymous.
13
Simply stripping names from records is rarely a sufficient means to
keep a dataset anonymous. For example, Latanya Sweeny has shown
that 87 percent of Americans could be identified by records listing
solely their birth date, gender and ZIP code (Sweeney 2002).
14
See, for example, the California Senate Bill 1386, http://info.sen.
ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/sen/sb_1351-1400/sb_1386_bill_20020926_
chaptered.html.
319
However, others take a much broader stance in what
constitutes personally identifiable information. The Euro-
pean Union, for example, defines PII much more broadly to
include:
[A]ny information relating to an identified or identi-
fiable natural person…; an identifiable person is one
who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in par-
ticular by reference to an identification number or to
one or more factors specific to his physical, physio-
logical, mental, economic, cultural or social
identity.15
Thus, while the T3 researchers might have felt simply
removing or coding the subjects’ names or other specific
identifiers from the dataset was sufficient, had they fol-
lowed the European Union’s guidance, they would have
recognized that many of the subjects’ ‘‘physical, physio-
logical, mental, economic, cultural or social identity’’
could also be used for re-identification. Even after
removing the names of the subjects, since the dataset still
includes race, ethnicity, and geographic data, re-identifi-
cation of individual subjects remains a real possibility.
Delay in release of cultural taste data
Despite the apparent lack of use of the EU’s more stringent
definition of ‘‘personally identifiable information,’’ the T3
researchers do recognize the unique nature of the cultural
taste labels they have collected, referring to them as a kind
of ‘‘cultural fingerprint’’. To protect subject privacy, the
cultural tastes identified by the researchers have been
assigned a unique number, and only the numbers will be
associated with students for the initial data releases. The
entire set of the actual taste labels will only be released in
the fall of 2011, corresponding with the release of the wave
4 data.
The T3 researchers are right to recognize how a person’s
unique set of cultural tastes could easily identify her. Yet,
merely instituting a ‘‘substantial delay’’ before releasing
this personal data does little to mitigate the privacy fears.
Rather, it only delays them, and only by 3 years.
Researchers routinely rely on datasets for years after their
initial collection: some influential studies of search engine
behavior rely on nearly 10-year-old data (see, for example,
Jansen and Resnick 2005; Jansen and Spink 2005), and
these subjects’ privacy needs do not suddenly disappear
when they graduate from college in 2011.
Most surprisingly, despite the T3 researchers’ recogni-
tion of the sensitive nature of the cultural data, they will
15
European Union Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:
EN:HTML.
123
320
provide immediate access to it on a case-by case basis. As
the codebook reveals:
In the meantime, if prospective users wish to access
some subset of the taste labels, special arrangements
may be made on a case-by-case basis at the discretion
of the authors (send request and detailed justification
to t3dataset@gmail.com). (Lewis 2008, p. 20)
No further guidance is provided as to what kinds of
arrangements are made and what justifications are needed
to make such an exception. If the T3 research team felt
strongly enough that it was necessary to encode and delay
the release of the subjects’ ‘‘cultural fingerprints’’, it does
not seem appropriate to announce that exceptions can be
made for its release to selected researchers prior to the 3-
year delay. If it is potentially privacy invading content, it
simply should not be released.
Terms of use statement
Researchers wanting access to the T3 dataset must (elec-
tronically) sign a Terms and Conditions of Use statement.
The statement includes various covenants related to pro-
tecting the privacy of the subjects in the dataset, including
(as numbered in the original):
3. I will use the dataset solely for statistical analysis and
reporting of aggregated information, and not for
investigation of specific individuals or organizations,
except when identification is authorized in writing by
the Authors.
4. I will produce no links among the Authors datasets or
among the Authors data and other datasets that could
identify individuals or organizations.
5. I represent that neither I, nor anyone I know, has any
prior knowledge of the possible identities of any study
participants in any dataset that I am being licensed to
use.
6. I will not knowingly divulge any information that
could be used to identify individual participants in the
study, nor will I attempt to identify or contact any
study participant, and I agree to use any precautions
necessary to prevent such identification.
7. I will make no use of the identity of any person or
establishment discovered inadvertently. If I suspect
that I might recognize or know a study participant, I
will immediately inform the Authors, and I will not use
or retain a copy of data regarding that study partici-
pant. If these measures to resolve an identity disclosure
are not sufficient, the Authors may terminate my use of
the dataset. (reproduced at Lewis 2008, p. 30)
The language within this statement clearly acknowl-
edges the privacy implications of the T3 dataset, and might
123
M. Zimmer
prove effective in raising awareness among potential
researchers. However, studies have shown that users fre-
quently simply ‘‘click through’’ such agreements without
fully reading them or recognizing they are entering into a
legally binding contract (Gatt 2002), and it is unclear how
the T3 researchers specifically intend to monitor or enforce
compliance with these terms. While requiring a terms of
use is certainly a positive step, without enforcement it
might have limited success in deterring any potential pri-
vacy-invasive use of the data.
IRB approval
As required of any research project involving human
interaction, clearance for the research project and data
release was provided by Harvard’s intuitional review board
(IRB), known as the Committee on the Use of Human
Subjects in Research.16 As Kaufman commented: ‘‘Our
IRB helped quite a bit as well. It is their job to insure that
subjects’ rights are respected, and we think we have
accomplished this’’ (Kaufman 2008c). Elsewhere he has
noted that ‘‘The university in question allowed us to do this
and Harvard was on board because we don’t actually talk to
students, we just accessed their Facebook information’’
(Kaufman 2008a).
Just as we can question whether the T3 researchers full
understood the privacy implications of the research, we
must critically examine whether Harvard’s IRB—a panel
of experts in research ethics—also sufficiently understood
how the privacy of the subjects in the dataset could be
compromised. For example, did the IRB recognize, as
noted above, that using an in-network research assistant to
pull data could circumvent privacy settings intended to
keep that data visible to only other people at Harvard? Or
did the IRB understand that individuals with unique char-
acteristics could easily be extracted from the dataset, and
perhaps identified? It is unclear whether these concerns
were considered and discarded, or whether the IRB did not
fully comprehend the complex privacy implications of this
particular research project.17 In either case, the potential
privacy-invading consequences of the T3 data release
suggest a possible lapse of oversight at some point of the
IRB review process.
Other public comments
Beyond the shortcomings of the documented efforts to
protect the privacy of the T3 dataset subjects, the
researchers have made various public comments that reveal
16
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/*research/hum_sub/.
17
Attempts to obtain information about the IRB deliberations with
regard to the T3 project have been unsuccessful.
On the ethics of research in Facebook 321

additional conceptual gaps in their understanding of the On the issue of the ethics of this kind of research—
privacy implications of the T3 research project.18 Would you require that someone sitting in a public
For example, when confronted with the potential re- square, observing individuals and taking notes on
identifiability of the dataset, Kaufman responded by pon- their behavior, would have to ask those individuals’
dering ‘‘What might hackers want to do with this infor- consent in advance? We have not accessed any
mation, assuming they could crack the data and ‘see’ these information not otherwise available on Facebook. We
people’s Facebook info?’’ and later acknowledging have not interviewed anyone, nor asked them for any
‘‘Nonetheless, seeing your thought process—how you information, nor made information about them pub-
would attack this dataset—is extremely useful to us’’ lic… (Kaufman 2008c)
(Kaufman 2008b). Kaufman’s mention of ‘‘hackers’’,
This justification presents a false comparison. The
‘‘attacking’’ the dataset, and focusing on what someone
‘‘public square’’ example depends on random encounters of
might ‘‘do’’ with this information exposes a harm-based
people who happen to be in the square at the precise time
theory of privacy protection. Such a position supposes that
as the researcher. Further, the researchers cannot observe
so long as the data can be protected from attack by hackers
everyone simultaneously, and instead must select which
or others wishing to ‘‘do’’ something harmful once gaining
individuals to focus their attention, leaving some subjects
access, the privacy of the subjects can be maintained. Such
out of the dataset. Finally, the data gathered is imprecise,
a position ignores the broader dignity-based theory of pri-
and limited to the researchers ability to discern gender, age,
vacy (Bloustein 1964). Such a stance recognizes that one
ethnicity, and other physically-observable characteristics.
does not need to be a victim of hacking, or have a tangible
By contrast, the T3 researchers utilized an in-network
harm take place, in order for there to be concerns over the
research assistant to systematically access and download an
privacy of one’s personal information. Rather, merely
entire cohort of college students’ Facebook profile pages,
having one’s personal information stripped from the
each year for 4 years. They successfully targeted a specific
intended sphere of the social networking profile, and
and known group of students, obtaining a list of names and
amassed into a database for external review becomes an
e-mail addresses of the students from the source university
affront to the subjects’ human dignity and their ability to
to improve their ability to gather data on the entire popu-
control the flow of their personal information.
lation. The data acquired included not only the subjects’
The distinction between harm- and dignity-based theo-
self-reported gender and ethnicity, but also their home
ries of privacy are understood—and often debated—among
state, nation of origin, political views, sexual interests,
privacy scholars, but when asked if they conferred with
college major, relational data, and cultural interests—data
privacy experts over the course of the research and data
which would be considerably more difficult to obtain
release, Kaufman admits that ‘‘we did not consult [with]
through observations in a public square. Suggesting that the
privacy experts on how to do this, but we did think long
two projects are similar and carry similar (and minimal)
and hard about what and how this should be done’’ (Ka-
ethical dilemmas reveals a worrisome gap in the T3
ufman 2008c). Given the apparent focus on data security as
research team’s understanding of the privacy and ethical
a solution to privacy, it appears the T3 research team would
implications of their project.
have benefited from broader discussions on the nature of
privacy in these environments.19
The T3 researchers also claim that there should be little
The ethics of the ‘‘Tastes, Ties, and Time’’ project
concern over the ethics of this research since the Facebook
data gathered was already publicly available. As Kaufman
The above discussion of the unsatisfactory attempts by the
argues:
T3 researchers to protect subject privacy illuminates two
central ethical concerns with the ‘‘Tastes, Ties, and Time’’
18
project: the failure to properly mitigate what amounts to
This section is intended as an informal analysis of the discourse
used when talking about the T3 project. It is meant to reveal gaps in violations of the subjects’ privacy, and, thus, the failure to
broader understanding of the issues at hand, and not necessarily adhere to ethical research standards.
directed against a particular speaker.
19
After the T3 research project was funded and well underway, Privacy violations
Kaufman became a fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet &
Society at Harvard University, an organization dedicated to studying a
number of Internet-related issues, including privacy. While Kaufman The proceeding discussion notes numerous failures of the
presented preliminary results of his research to the Berkman T3 researchers to properly understand the privacy impli-
community prior to joining the center (Kaufman 2008a), there is no cations of the research study. To help concretize these
evidence that others at Berkman were consulted prior to the release of concerns, we can gather them into the following four
the T3 dataset.

123
322
salient dimensions of privacy violations, as organized by
Smith et al. (1996) and based on thorough review of pri-
vacy literature: the amount of personal information col-
lected, improper access to personal information,
unauthorized secondary use of personal information, and
errors in personal information.20 Viewing the circum-
stances of the T3 data release through the lens of this
privacy violation framework helps to focus the ethical
deficiencies of the overall project.
Amount of personal information collected
Privacy violations can occur when ‘‘extensive amounts of
personally identifiable data are being collected and stored
in databases’’ Smith et al. (1996, p. 172). Notably, the
‘‘Tastes, Ties, and Time’’ project’s very existence is
dependent on the extensive collection of personal data. The
T3 project systematically, and regularly over a 4-year
period, collected a vast amount of personal information on
over 1,500 college students. Individual bits of data that
might have been added and modified on a subject’s Face-
book profile page over time were harvested and aggregated
into a single database, co-mingled with housing data from
an outside source, and then compared across datafiles.
Improper access to personal information
Privacy violations might occur when information about
individuals might be readily available to persons not
properly or specifically authorized to have access the data.
As described above, subjects within the T3 dataset might
have used technological means to restrict access to their
profile information to only members of the Harvard com-
munity, thus making their data inaccessible to the rest of
the world. By using research assistants from within the
Harvard community, the T3 researchers—whether inten-
tional or not—would be able to circumvent those access
controls, thereby including these subjects’ information
among those with more liberal restrictions.
Further, no specific consent was sought or received from
the subjects in the study; their profile information was
simply considered freely accessible for collection and
research, regardless of what the subject might have inten-
ded or desired regarding its accessibility to be harvested for
research purposes. Combined, these two factors reveal how
a privacy violation based on improper access has occurred
due to the T3 project.
20
I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this organizing
framework.
123
M. Zimmer
Unauthorized secondary use
Unauthorized secondary use of personal information is the
concern that information collected from individuals for one
purpose might be used for another secondary purpose
without authorization form the individual, thus the subject
loses control over their information. Within Smith et al.’s.
(1996) framework, this loss of control over one’s personal
information is considered a privacy violation. At least two
incidences of unauthorized secondary use of personal
information can be identified in the T3 project. First, the
students’ housing information and personal email addresses
were provided to the T3 researchers to aid in their data
collection and processing. These pieces of information
were initially collected by the university to facilitate vari-
ous administrative functions, and not for secondary use to
assist researchers looking for students’ profiles on Face-
book. Second, the very nature of collecting Facebook
profile information, aggregating it, and releasing it for
others to download invites a multitude of secondary uses of
the data not authorized by the students. The data was made
available on Facebook for the purpose of social networking
among friends and colleagues, not to be used as fodder for
academic research. Without specific consent, the collection
and release of Facebook data invariably brings about
unauthorized secondary uses.
Errors in personal information
Finally, privacy concerns arise due to the impact of pos-
sible errors within datasets, which has lead to various
policies ensuring individuals are granted the ability to view
and edit data collected about them to minimize any
potential privacy violations.21 In the T3 project, subjects
were not aware of the data collection nor provided any
access to view the data to correct for errors or unwanted
information.
Ethical research standards
Viewing the privacy concerns of the T3 data release
through the lens of Smith et al.’s (1996) privacy violation
framework helps to focus the ethical deficiencies of the
overall project. In turn, our critique of the T3 project
exposes various breeches in ethical research standards that,
if followed, might have mitigated many of the privacy
threats.
21
See, for example, the United States Federal Trade Commission’s
Fair Information Practice Principles (http://www.ftc.gov/reports/
privacy3/fairinfo.shtm), which include ‘‘Access’’ as a key provision,
providing data subjects the ability to view and contesting inaccurate
or incomplete data.
On the ethics of research in Facebook
Ethical issues in human subjects research receive con-
siderable attention, culminating in the scrutiny of research
projects by Institutional Review Boards for the Protection
of Human Subjects (IRB’s) to review research according to
federal regulations.22 These regulations focus on research
ethics issues such as subject safety, informed consent, and
privacy and confidentiality. Others have then these broad
standards and applied them specifically to Internet-based
research and data collection. For example, the Association
of Internet Researchers have issued a set of recommenda-
tions for engaging in ethical research online (see Ess and
AoIR ethics working committee 2002), which places con-
siderable focus on informed consent and respecting the
ethical expectations within the venue under study.
As noted above, the T3 researchers did not obtain any
informed consent by the subjects within the dataset (nor
were they asked to do so by their Institutional Review
Board). Further, as described in detail, the researchers
failed to respect the expectations likely held by the subjects
regarding the relative accessibility and purpose of their
Facebook profile information. By failing to recognize that
users might maintain strong expectations that information
shared on Facebook is meant to stay on Facebook, or that
only members of the Harvard network would ever have
access to the data, the T3 researchers have failed in their
duty to engage in ethically-based research.
Conclusion
The events surrounding the release of the Facebook data in
the ‘‘Tastes, Ties, and Time’’ project –including its meth-
odology, its IRB approval, the way in which the data was
released, and the viewpoints publicly expressed by the
researchers—reveals considerable conceptual gaps in the
understanding of the privacy implications of research in
social networking spaces. As a result, threats to the privacy
of the subjects under study persist, despite the good faith
efforts of the T3 research team.
The purpose of this critical analysis of the T3 project is
not to place blame or single out these researchers for
condemnation, but to use it as a case study to help expose
the emerging challenges of engaging in research within
online social network settings. These include challenges to
the traditional nature of consent, properly identifying and
respecting expectations of privacy on social network sites,
developing sufficient strategies for data anonymization
prior to the public release of personal data, and the relative
expertise of institutional review boards when confronted
22
See Part 46 Protection of Human Subjects of Title 45 Public
Welfare of the Code of Federal Regulations at http://www.hhs.gov/
ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/45cfr46.htm.
323
with research projects based on data gleaned from social
media.
As made apparent to the position of some of the T3
research team that their data collection methods were
unproblematic since the ‘‘information was already on
Facebook’’, future researchers must gain a better under-
standing of the contextual nature of privacy in these
spheres (Nissenbaum 1998, 2004, 2009), recognizing that
just because personal information is made available in
some fashion on a social network, does not mean it is fair
game for capture and release to all (see, generally, Stutz-
man 2006; Zimmer 2006; McGeveran 2007; boyd 2008a).
Similarly, the notion of what constitutes ‘‘consent’’ within
the context of divulging personal information in social
networking spaces must be further explored, especially in
light of this contextual understanding of norms of infor-
mation flow within specific spheres. The case of the T3
data release also reveals that we still have not learned the
lessons of the AOL data release and similar instances
where presumed anonymous datasets have been re-identi-
fied. Perhaps most significantly, this case study has
uncovered possible shortcomings in the oversight functions
of institutional review boards, the very bodies bestowed
with the responsibility of protecting the rights of data
subjects.
Overcoming these challenges and conceptual muddles is
no easy task, but three steps can be taken immediately to
guide future research in social media spaces. One, scholars
engaging in research similar to the T3 project must rec-
ognize their own gaps in understanding the changing nature
of privacy and the challenges of anonymizing datasets, and
should strive to bring together an interdisciplinary team of
collaborators to help ensure the shortcomings of the T3
data release are not repeated. Two, we must evaluate and
educate IRBs and related policy makers as to the com-
plexities of engaging in research on social networks.23 And
three, we must ensure that our research methods courses,
codes of best practices, and research protocols recognize
the unique challenges of engaging in research on Internet
and social media spaces.24
The ‘‘Tastes, Ties, and Time’’ research project might
very well be ushering in ‘‘a new way of doing social
23
See, for example, the ‘‘Internet Research Ethics: Discourse,
Inquiry, and Policy’’ research project directed by Elizabeth Buchanan
and Charles Ess (http://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward.do?
AwardNumber=0646591).
24
An important movement in this direction is the recently funded
‘‘Internet Research and Ethics 2.0: The Internet Research Ethics
Digital Library, Interactive Resource Center, and Online Ethics
Advisory Board’’ project, also directly by Elizabeth Buchanan and
Charles Ess (http://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward.do?Award
Number=0924604 and http://www.internetresearchethics.org/).
123
324
science’’, but it is our responsibility scholars to ensure our
research methods and processes remain rooted in long-
standing ethical practices. Concerns over consent, privacy
and anonymity do not disappear simply because subjects
participate in online social networks; rather, they become
even more important.
Acknowledgments The author thanks the participants at the Inter-
national Conference of Computer Ethics: Philosophical Enquiry in
Corfu, Greece, as well as the Internet Research 10: Internet Critical
conference in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for their helpful comments and
feedback. Additional thanks to Elizabeth Buchanan, Charles Ess,
Alex Halavais, Anthony Hoffmann, Jon Pincus, Adam Shostack, and
Fred Stutzman for their valuable insights and conversations, both
online and off. The author also thanks the anonymous reviewers for
their helpful suggestions and criticisms. This article would not have
been possible without the research assistance of Wyatt Ditzler and
Renea Drews. Finally, I would like to thank Jason Kaufman and Colin
McKay at the Berkman Center for Internet & Society, for their valued
and continued feedback regarding this work.
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