1. Duero vs. CA GABRIEL L. DUERO vs. HON.COURT at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal.

Even if
OF APPEALS, and BERNARDO A. ERADEL G.R. No. private respondent actively participated in the proceedings
131282. January 4, 2002 before said court, the doctrine of estoppel cannot still be
properly invoked against him because the question of lack of
FACTS: jurisdiction may be raised at any time and at any stage of
the action. As a general rule, the jurisdiction of a court is not
On June 16, 1995, petitioner filed before the RTC a
a question of acquiescence as a matter of fact, but an issue
complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership with
of conferment as a matter of law. Also, neither waiver nor
Damages and Attorney's Fees against private respondent
estoppel shall apply to confer jurisdiction upon a court,
and two others, namely, Apolinario and Inocencio Ruena.
barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances.
Herein private respondent Eradel was declared in default for
Thus, in Javier vs. Court of Appeals: x x x The point
failure to file his answer to the complaint. Thus, petitioner
simply is that when a party commits error in filing his suit or
presented his evidence ex parte and a judgment was
proceeding in a court that lacks jurisdiction to take
rendered in his favor.
cognizance of the same, such act may not at once be
deemed sufficient basis of estoppel. It could have been the
On June 10, 1996, private respondent filed a Motion for
result of an honest mistake, or of divergent interpretations of
New Trial, alleging that he has been occupying the land
as a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr., since 1958. He doubtful legal provisions.
explained that he turned over the complaint and summons
If any fault is to be imputed to a party taking such
to Laurente in the honest belief that as landlord, the latter
course of action, part of the blame should be placed on the
had a better right to the land and was responsible to defend
court which shall entertain the suit, thereby
any adverse claim on it.
lulling the parties into believing that they pursued
However, the trial court denied the motion for new trial.
their remedies in the correct forum. Under the rules, it is the
Meanwhile, RED Conflict Case No.1029, an administrative
duty of the court to dismiss an action 'whenever it appears
case between petitioner and applicant-contestants Romeo,
that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
Artemio and Jury Laurente, remained pending with the
matter.' (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court) Should the Court
Office of the Regional Director of the Department of
render a judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment may
Environment and Natural Resources in Davao City.
be impeached or annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30,
On July 24, 1996, private respondent filed before the RTC a Rule 132, Ibid), within ten (10) years from the finality of the
same.
Petition for Relief from Judgment, reiterating the same
allegation in his Motion for New Trial. He averred among
The doctrine of estoppel must be applied only in
others that unless there is a determination on who owned
exceptional cases, as its misapplication could result in a
the land, he could not be made to vacate the land.
miscarriage of justice. Furthermore, if the RTC's order were
to be sustained, private respondent would be evicted from
On October 8, 1996, the trial court issued an order denying
the Petition for Relief from Judgment. In a Motion for the land prematurely, while RED Conflict Case No.1029
would remain unresolved. Such eviction on a technicality if
Reconsideration of said order, private respondent alleged
allowed could result in an injustice, if it is later found that he
that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case, as it was
under the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. The motion has a legal right to till the land he now occupies as tenant-
lessee.
for reconsideration was denied by the RTC. On January 22,
1997, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution, which the RTC
granted. On March 12, 1997, private respondent filed his
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The Court 2. ANTONIO T. DONATO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
of Appeals gave due course to the petition, maintaining that G.R. No. 129638. December 8, 2003
private respondent is not estopped from assailing the
jurisdiction of the RTC. FACTS:

ISSUE: Petitioner Antonio T. Donato is the registered owner of a real

property located at Ciriaco Tuason Street, San Andres,
WON private respondent is estopped from assailing the Manila. On June 7, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint before
jurisdiction of the RTC. the MeTC of Manila for forcible entry and unlawful detainer
against 43 named defendants and all unknown occupants of
RULING:
the subject property.
NO. Private respondent was not estopped from questioning
Of the 43 named defendants, only 20 filed a consolidated
the jurisdiction of the RTC. The fundamental rule is that, the
Answer wherein they contended that they cannot be evicted
lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be
because the Urban Land Reform Law guarantees security of
waived by the parties, or even cured by their silence,
tenure and priority right to purchase the subject property
acquiescence or even by their express consent. Further, a
among others. Following trial under the Rule on Summary
party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action
Procedure, the MeTC rendered judgment on September 19,
1994 against the 23 non-answering defendants. As to the 20
private respondents, the MeTC issued a separate judgment
sustaining their rights under the Land Reform Law, declaring
petitioners cause of action as not duly warranted by the facts
and circumstances of the case and dismissing the case
without prejudice. Petitioner appealed to the RTC which
sustained the decision of the MeTC. Undaunted, petitioner
filed a petition for review with the CA. The CA dismissed the
petition on two grounds: (a) the certification of non-forum
shopping was signed by petitioners counsel and not by
petitioner himself, in violation of Revised Circular No. 28-91;
and, (b) the only annex to the petition is a certified copy of
the questioned decision but copies of the pleadings and
other material portions of the record as would support the
allegations of the petition are not annexed, contrary to
Section 3, paragraph b, Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules
of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA). Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and his Supplement to his motion for
reconsideration submitting the duly authenticated original of
the certification of non-forum shopping signed by petitioner
himself and the relevant records of the MeTC and the RTC.
H o w e ve r, t h e C A d e n i e d p e t i t i o n e r s m o t i o n fo r
reconsideration and its supplement, ruling that petitioner’s
subsequent compliance did not cure the defect.
ISSUES:
1. WON the subsequent compliance of the petitioner cured
the defect.
2. WON Petition for Review under Rule 45 is the proper
remedy.
RULINGS:
1. YES. The rules on forum shopping, which were precisely
designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration
of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute
literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate
objective which is simply to prohibit and penalize the evils of
forum-shopping. The subsequent filing of the certification
duly signed by the petitioner himself should thus be deemed
substantial compliance, pro hac vice. Further, petitioner has
adequately explained his failure to personally sign the
certification which justifies relaxation of the rule. It was
physically impossible for the petition to have been prepared
and sent to the petitioner in the United States, for him to
travel from Virginia, U.S.A. to the nearest Philippine
Consulate in Washington, D.C., U.S.A., in order to sign the
certification before the Philippine Consul, and for him to send
back the petition to the Philippines within the 15-day
reglementary period. A litigation is not a game of
technicalities. When technicality deserts its function of being
an aid to justice, the Court is justified in exempting from its
operations a particular case. Technical rules of procedure
should be used to promote, not frustrate justice. While the
swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective,
granting substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal.
The Courts pronouncement in Republic vs. Court of Appeals
is worth echoing: cases should be determined on the merits,
after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their
causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some
procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice
would be better served. 2. NO. The proper recourse of an
aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
However, if the error, subject of the recourse, is one of
jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a
court with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the
aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the said Rules. It is necessary to draw a line between an
error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction. An error of
judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise
of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an
appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one
where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer
or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack
or in excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctible only by
the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Inasmuch as the present
petition principally assails the dismissal of the petition on
ground of procedural flaws involving the jurisdiction of the
court a quo to entertain the petition, it falls within the ambit
of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
3. SPOUSES GONZAGA VS CA
Facts:
In 1970, spouses Gonzaga bought a parcel of land from
Lucky Home Inc. Said lot was specifically denominated as
Lot No. 19 and which the spouses mortgaged to the Social
Security Commission as a security for their housing loan.
Meanwhile, the spouses started to construct their house on
Lot No. 18, and not on Lot No. 19. They mistakenly identified
Lot No. 18 as Lot No. 19. Lucky Homes then informed them
of such mistake but the spouses instead offered to buy Lot
No. 18 to widen their premises, thus they continued building
their house thereon. However for failure on the part of the
spouses to pay their obligation to the SSS, Lot No. 19 was
consequently foreclosed. The title thereto was cancelled and
a new one was issued in the name of SSS. After such
foreclosure, the spouses offered to swap Lot Nos.18 and 19
and demanded from lucky homes to reform their contract.
Lucky home however refused. This prompted the spouses to
file an action for reformation of contract with damages
before the RTC. The RTC however dismissed the action for
lack of merit and awarded lucky homes moral damages and
attorney’s fees. Subsequently then, a writ of execution was
issued. Spouses urgently filed a motion to recall such writ,
questioning now the jurisdiction of the RTC on the ground
that the case falls within the jurisdiction of the Housing and
land use regulatory board. Subsequently, the spouses went
to the CA to annul RTC’s decision. CA dismissed the petition
on the ground that the spouses were estopped from
question RTC’s jurisdiction pursuant to the case of Tijam..
On the other hand spouses contended that the doctrine in
Tijam case has been abandoned.

Issue:
Whether the spouses Gonzaga is estopped from questioning
the jurisdiction of the trial court?
Held:
Yes. Petitioners claim that the recent decisions of this Court
have already abandoned the doctrine laid down in Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy. We do not agree. In countless decisions, this
Court has consistently held that, while an order or decision
rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be
assailed at any stage, active participation in the proceedings
in the court which rendered the order or decision will bar
such party from attacking its jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, it was petitioners themselves who invoked
the jurisdiction of the court a quo by instituting an action for
reformation of contract against private respondents. It
appears that, in the proceedings before the trial court,
petitioners vigorously asserted their cause from start to
finish. Not even once did petitioners ever raise the issue of
the courts jurisdiction during the entire proceedings which
lasted for two years. It was only after the trial court
rendered its decision and issued a writ of execution against
them in 1998 did petitioners first raise the issue of
jurisdiction ─ and it was only because said decision was
unfavorable to them. Petitioners thus effectively waived their
right to question the courts jurisdiction over the case they
themselves filed.
4. ESCOBAL VS GARCHITORENA
Facts:
Escobal was a member of the of Armed Forces of
the Philippines and the Philippine Constabulary. On March
16, 1990, Escobal was conducting surveillance operations on
drug trafficking at the Sa Harong Café Bar and Restaurant
located along Barlin St., Naga City.
He somehow got involved in a shooting incident,
resulting in the death of one Rodney Rafael N. Nueca. On
February 6, 1991, an amended Information was filed against
him with the RTC of Naga City. Initially he filed a motion to
quash the info, questioning the RTC’s jurisdiction,
contending, among others, that as a PNP member, his case
should have been filed with the court martial.
His motion was denied. Trial then proceeded. After
the prosecution has rested its case, Escobal again filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over him and the case, arguing that since he
committed the crime in the performance of his duties, It is
the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the case. RTC
then conducted a preliminary hearing as to whether Escobal
committed the crime charged in the performance of his
duties.
Upon finding that Escobal was in the performance
of his duties when the crime was committed, RTC ordered
the public prosecutor to file a Re-Amended Information and
to allege that the offense charged was committed by the
petitioner in the performance of his duties/functions or in
relation to his office; and, conformably to R.A. No. 7975, to
thereafter transmit the same, as well as the complete
records with the stenographic notes, to the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan however remanded the case to the RTC,
saying that under P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No.
7975, the RTC retained jurisdiction over the case,
considering that Escobal had a salary grade of 23. Upon the
remand of the records, the RTC set the case for trial, for
Escobal to continue presenting his evidence. Instead of
adducing his evidence, he filed a petition for certiorari,
assailing the Order of the Presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan remanding the records of the case to the
RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan
committed a grave abuse of his discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the remand of the
case to the RTC.
Held:
No. For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction
under the said law over crimes committed by public officers
in relation to their office, it is essential that the facts showing
the intimate relation between the office of the offender and
the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the
Information. It is not enough to merely allege in the
Information that the crime charged was committed by the
offender in relation to his office because that would be a
conclusion of law. The amended Information filed with the
RTC against the petitioner does not contain any allegation
showing the intimate relation between his office and the
discharge of his duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over
the offense charged when on November 24, 1995, it ordered
the re-amendment of the Information to include therein an
allegation that the petitioner committed the crime in relation
to office. The trial court erred when it ordered the elevation
of the records to the Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that
R.A. No. 7975 amending P.D. No. 1606 was already in effect
and under Section 2 of the law:
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying
positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers
occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their
equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in
the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the
case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
5. Agan, Jr. vs. Phil International Air Terminal
Facts:
The contract for the construction and operation for the NAIA
IPT III was to PIATCO. Petitioners, who are employees of
service providers at the MIAA and NAIA Terminal I and II,
and service providers themselves, assails the following:
a) The provisions in the 1997 Concession Agreement
and the ARCA which grants PIATCO the exclusive
right to operate a commercial international
passenger terminal within the island of Luzon;
b) The contracts further provide that upon the
commencement of operations at the NAIA IPT III,
the Government shall cause the closure of Ninoy
Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminals I
and II as international passenger terminals;
c) With respect to existing concession agreements
between MIAA and international airport service
providers regarding certain services or operations,
the 1997 Concession Agreement and the ARCA
uniformly provide that such services or operations
will not be carried over to the NAIA IPT III and
PIATCO is under no obligation to permit carry over
except through a separate agreement duly entered
into with PIATCO;
d) With respect to the petitioning service providers
and their employees, upon the commencement of
operations of the NAIA IPT III, they alleged that
will be effectiviely barred from providing
international airport services at the NAIA Terminals
I and 2 as all international airlines and passengers
will be diverted to the NAIA IPT III. The petitioning
service providers will thus be compelled to contract
with PIATCO alone for such services, with no
assurance that subsisting contracts with MIAA and
other international airlines will be respected.
PIATCO alleges that the submission of this controversy to the
Supreme Court at the first instance is a violation of the Rule
on Hierarchy of Courts. They contend that trial courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court with respect
to a special civil action for prohibition and hence, resort must
first be had at the trial court.
Issue:
Whether direct resort to the Supreme Court was a proper
rememdy?
Held:
YES.The rule on Hierarchy of courts will not prevent this
court from assuming jurisdiction over the case at bar. The
said rule may be relaxed when redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify the availment of a remedy
within and calling for the exercise of this court’s primary
jurisdiction. It is easy to discern that exceptional
circumstances exist in the cases at bar that call for the
relaxation of the rule. The present case is of transcendental
importance as it involves the the construction and operation
of the country’s premier international airport.
6. Liga ng mga Barangay vs Atienza
Facts:
Liga is the national organization of all the barangays in the
Philippines, which pursuant to Section 492 of RA No. 7160
(LGC), constitutes the duly elected presidents of highly-
urbanized cities, provincial chapters, the metropolitan Manila
Chapter, and metropolitan political subdivision chapters.
Section 493 of that law provides that “the liga at the
municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political subdivision,
and national levels directly elect a president, a vice-
president, and 5 members of the board of directors.” All
other matters not provided for in the law affecting the
internal organization of the leagues of LGUs shall be
governed by their respective constitution and by-laws, which
must always conform to the provisions of the Constitution
and existing laws. Liga adopted and ratified its own
Constitution and By-laws to govern its internal organization.
Liga adopted and ratified its own Election Code. Liga came
out with its Calendar of Activities and Guidelines in the
Implementation of the Liga Election Code of 2002, setting
the synchronized elections for highly urbanized city chapters,
such as the Liga Chapter of Manila, together with
independent component city, provincial, and metropolitan
chapters.
Respondent City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No.
8039, Series of 2002, providing for the election of
representatives of the District Chapters in the City Chapter of
Manila and setting the elections for both chapters 30 days
after the barangay elections. Liga sent respondent Mayor of
Manila a letter requesting him that said ordinance be vetoed
considering that it encroached upon, or even assumed, the
functions of the Liga through legislation, a function which
was clearly beyond the ambit of the powers of the City
Council. Mayor signed and approved the city ordinance.
Issue:
Whether or not the Liga properly filed the case directly with
the Supreme Court.
Held:
No. Even granting arguendo that the present petition is ripe
for the extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is here a clear
disregard of the hierarchy of courts. No special and
important reason or exceptional and compelling
circumstance has been adduced by the petitioner or the
intervenor why direct recourse to this Court should be
allowed.
This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari
(as well as of prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction) is not exclusive, but is concurrent
with the RTC and CA in certain cases.
SC will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress
desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the
availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari,
calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. Petitioner’s
reliance on Pimentel v. Aguirre is misplaced because the
non-observance of the hierarchy-of-courts rule was
7. Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation vs.
Eddy Ng Kok
Facts: Eddy Ng Kok is a Singaporean businessman who
purchased a Condominium Unit located at Valle Verde
Terraces from the Petitioner. Kok paid the reservation fee
then later on, paid 90% of the purchase price. Petitioner
through its president executed a Contract to sell in favor of
Kok which states that the Condominium will be completed
and delivered to the Respondent within 15 months from
February 1989 or on May 8, 1990. In April 1990 Kok went
back to the Philippines for the Unit only to find out that the
turnover was reset to May 31, 1990. In July of the same
year, Kok again went back to the Philippines but the Unit was
still uninhabitable for lack of electricity and water facilities,
that the petitioner informed Kok that he will move in on
August 1990. Again, Kok went back on October 1990 and
learned that the unit was still unlovable.
Kok sent the petitioner a demand letter for damages he
incurred which the latter ignored. This prompted Kok to file a
complaint for specific performance and damages before the
RTC of Makati.
Nevertheless, during the pendency of the action, Kok
occupied the Unit, thus his cause of action was limited for
damages.
Judgment was rendered by the RTC in favor of Kok, which
was affirmed by the CA. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied by the appellate
court, hence a petition for review on certiorari with the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the RTC of Makati has Jurisdiction over the
case.
Held:On petitioner’s contention that the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the instant case, Section 1 (c) of
Presidential Decree No. 1344, as amended, it is the HLURB
which has jurisdiction over the instant case. The complaints
for specific performance with damages by a lot or
condominium unit buyer against the owner or developer falls
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.
While it may be true that the trial court is without
jurisdiction over the case, petitioners active
participation in the proceedings estopped it from
assailing such lack of it. We have held that it is an
undesirable practice of a party participating in the
proceedings and submitting its case for decision and
then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
Here, petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction
before the trial court and the Appellate Court. In effect,
petitioner confirmed and ratified the trial courts jurisdiction
over this case. Certainly, it is now in estoppel and can no
longer question the trial courts jurisdiction.
8. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Sardillo
9. KATON vs. PALANCA
G.R. No. 151149
September 7, 2004
DISMISSAL; MOTU PROPRIO; RESIDUAL
JURISDICTION; RESIDUAL PREROGATIVE
FACTS:
On August 2, 1963, herein petitioner George Katon
filed a request with the District Office of the Bureau of
Forestry in Puerto Princesa, Palawan, for the re-classification
of a piece of real property known as Sombrero Island,
located in Tagpait, Aborlan, Palawan for the purpose of
eventual conversion or reclassification from forest to
agricultural land, and thereafter for Katon to apply for
homestead patent.
Then, in 1965, the Director of Forestry informed the
Director of Lands, that since the subject land was no longer
needed for forest purposes, the same is therefore certified
and released as agricultural land for disposition under the
Public Land Act.
However, there were also several favorable
endorsements that were made to survey the island under
the request of herein respondents. Then, the records show
that, on November 8, 1996, one of the respondents Juan
Fresnillo filed a homestead patent application for the portion
of the island consisiting of 8.5 hectares and the respondent
Jesus Gapilango filed a homestead application on June 8,
1972. The respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued a
Homestead Patent No. 14527 and OCT No. G-7098 on March
3, 1875 with an area of 6.84 hectares of Sombrero Island.
Petitioner assails the validity of the homestead
patents and original certificates of title covering certain
portions of Sombrero Island issued in favor of respondents
on the ground that the same were obtained through fraud.
Petitioner prays for the reconveyance of the whole island in
his favor.
The petitioner seeks to nullify the homestead
patents and original certificates of title issued in favor of the
respondents covering certain portions of the Sombrero
Island as well as the reconveyance of the whole island in his
favor. The petitioner claims that he has the exclusive right to
file an application for homestead patent over the whole
island since it was he who requested for its conversion from
forest land to agricultural land.
Respondents aver that they are all bona fide and
lawful possessors of their respective portions and have
declared said portions for taxation purposes and that they
have been faithfully paying taxes thereon for twenty years.
Respondents contend that the petitioner has no
legal capacity to sue insofar as the island is concerned
because an action for reconveyance can only be brought by
the owner and not a mere homestead applicant and that
petitioner is guilty of estoppel by laches for his failure to
assert his right over the land for an unreasonable and
unexplained period of time.
Respondents filed their Answer with Special and/or
Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim in due time. On June
30, 1999, they also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
of the alleged defiance by petitioner of the trial court’s Order
to amend his Complaint so he could thus effect a
substitution by the legal heirs of the deceased, Respondent
Gapilango.The Motion to Dismiss was granted by the RTC in
its Order dated July 29, 1999.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the July
29, 1999 Order was denied by the trial court in its Resolution
dated December 17, 1999, for being a third and prohibited
motion. In his Petition for Certiorari before the CA,
petitioner charged the trial court with grave abuse of
discretion on the ground that the denied Motion was his first
and only Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order.
Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint because
of prescription invoking residual prerogative.

ISSUE:
 Is the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its
alleged ‘residual prerogative’ under Section 1, Rule 9 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in resolving the Petition on an
issue not raised in the Petition?"
HELD:
Yes. Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived,
except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
(2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4) prescription are
evident from the pleadings or the evidence on record.
In the four excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio
dismiss the claim or action. In Gumabon v. Larin11 we
explained thus:
"x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was
traditionally limited to instances when the court
clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter
and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial,
failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable
length of time or neglected to comply with the
rules or with any order of the court. Outside of
these instances, any motu proprio dismissal would
amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to
be heard. Except for qualifying and expanding
Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the
Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical
change. Under the new rules, a court may motu
proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the
pleadings or evidence on record that it has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is
another cause of action pending between the
same parties for the same cause, or where the
action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute
of limitations. x x x."12 (Italics supplied)
On the other hand, "residual jurisdiction" is embodied in
Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, as follows:
"SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. – A
party’s appeal by notice of appeal is deemed
perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of
appeal in due time.
"A party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed
perfected as to him with respect to the subject
matter thereof upon the approval of the record on
appeal filed in due time.
"In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses
jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the
appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the
time to appeal of the other parties.
"In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses
jurisdiction only over the subject matter thereof
upon the approval of the records on appeal filed in
due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of
the other parties.
"In either case, prior to the transmittal of the
original record or the record on appeal, the court
may issue orders for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties which do
not involve any matter litigated by the appeal,
approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent
litigants, order execution pending appeal in
accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow
withdrawal of the appeal." (Italics supplied)
The "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts is available
at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost
jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in
the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the
appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records
on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records
or the records on appeal. In either instance, the trial court
still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue
protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of
indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow
the withdrawal of the appeal.
The CA’s motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s
Complaint could not have been based, therefore, on residual
jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably, such order of
dismissal was not one for the protection and preservation of
the rights of the parties, pending the disposition of the case
on appeal. What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives
were the general residual powers of the courts to dismiss an
action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section
1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and under authority of
Section 2 of Rule 1 of the same rules.
To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances in
mind when it dismissed the Complaint motu proprio "on
more fundamental grounds directly bearing on the lower
court’s lack of jurisdiction" and for prescription of the action.
Indeed, when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action.
10. FIGUEROA vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 147406
July 14, 2008
ESTOPPEL;
FACTS:
On July 8, 1994, an information for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide was filed against the petitioner before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 18. The
merits ensued and on August 19, 1998, the trial court
convicted the petitioner as charged. In his appeal before the
CA, the petitioner questioned, among others, for the first
time, the trial court’s jurisdiction.
The appellate court, however, in the challenged decision,
considered the petitioner to have actively participated in the
trial and to have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of the
RTC; thus, he was already estopped by laches from asserting
the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the active participation of the Figueroa in
the trial of the case, which was initiated not by him but the
public prosecutor constitutes laches in relation to the
doctrine laid down in Tijam vs. Sabonghanoy?
HELD:
No. In applying the doctrine of Sabonghanoy, the
petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the
jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack
thereof in his appeal before the appellate court.
At that time, no considerable period had yet
elapsed for laches to attach. True, delay alone, though
unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of "estoppel by
laches" unless it further appears that the party, knowing his
rights, has not sought to enforce them until the condition of
the party pleading laches has in good faith become so
changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if
the rights be then enforced, due to loss of evidence, change
of title, intervention of equities, and other causes. In
applying the principle of estoppel by laches in the
exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein
considered the patent and revolting inequity and unfairness
of having the judgment creditors go up their Calvary once
more after more or less 15 years. The same, however, does
not obtain in the instant case.
We note at this point that estoppel, being in the
nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be
applied rarely—only from necessity, and only in extraordinary
circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with great care
and the equity must be strong in its favor. When misapplied,
the doctrine of estoppel may be a most effective weapon for
the accomplishment of injustice. Moreover, a judgment
rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void.
Hence, the Revised Rules of Court provides for remedies in
attacking judgments rendered by courts or tribunals that
have no jurisdiction over the concerned cases. No laches will
even attach when the judgment is null and void for want of
jurisdiction.
Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is
not affected by the defenses or theories set up by the
defendant or respondent in his answer or motion to dismiss.
Jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only
the status or the relationship of the parties but also the
nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of the
controversy. The proceedings before a court or tribunal
without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void,
hence, susceptible to direct and collateral attacks.
11. Hannah Serana vs Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, a high-ranking public
officer, being then the Student Regent of the University of
the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, with her brother, JADE
IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, were charged with
estafa before thr Sandiganbayan for alleged misappropriation
of public funds Amounting to Php 15 Million issued by the
Office of the President, for their personal use and benefit,
and despite repeated demands.
Said funds were for the renovation of the Vinzons
Hall of the University of the Philippines which will be
renamed as "President Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall.
However, the said project did not materialize prompting the
succeeding student regent to file a case against her.
Petitioner moved to quash the information.
She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have
any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person,
in her capacity as UP student regent. She posited that as a
student regent, she was not a public officer since she merely
represented her peers. She added that she was a simple
student and did not receive any salary as a student regent
nor does she fall under Salary Grade 27.
ISSUE:
WON the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case?
HELD:
Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their
office. Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 provides: B. Other
offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their
office.
Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The
jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that
(a) the offense is committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation
to their office. It is not only the salary grade that determines
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan
also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D.
No. 1606.
In Geduspan v. People, We held that while the first
part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade
27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other
executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary
Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law
placed under the jurisdiction of the said court.
Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of
law. Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. Petitioner falls under this category.
As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR
performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of
a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law,
petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D.
No. 1606.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the
averments in the information. More than that, jurisdiction is
not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant
or respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion
to quash. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent
almost entirely upon the whims of defendant or respondent.
The Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over estafa was
reiterated with greater firmness in Bondoc v. Sandiganbayan.
Pertinent parts of the Court’s ruling in Bondoc read: xxxthe
inability of the Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of
Bondoc’s cases and those of the government employees
separately charged for the same crimes, has not altered the
nature of the offenses charged, as estafa thru falsification
punishable by penalties higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment of six years, or a fine of P6,000.00, committed
by government employees in conspiracy with private
persons, including Bondoc. These crimes are within the
exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They
simply cannot be taken cognizance of by the regular courts,
apart from the fact that even if the cases could be so
transferred, a joint trial would nonetheless not be possible.
12. Pat-og Sr. vs Civil Service Commission
FACTS:
Robert Bang-on (Bang-on), then a 14-year old
second year high school student of the Antadao National
High School in Sagada, Mountain Province, filed an affidavit-
complaint against Pat-og, a third year high school teacher of
the same school, before the Civil Service Commission-
Cordillera Administrative Region (CSC-CAR) for misconduct
and a criminal case against Pat-og for the crime of Less
Serious Physical Injury with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bontoc, Mountain Province. Ruling of the CSC-CAR: In its
Decision, dated September 19, 2006, the CSC-CAR found
Pat-og guilty of Simple Misconduct.
On December 11, 2006, the motion for
reconsideration filed by Pat-og was denied for lack of merit.
The Ruling of the CSC: In its Resolution, dated April
11, 2007, the CSC dismissed Pat-og’s appeal and affirmed
with modification the decision of the CSC-CAR and adjudged
Pat-og guilty of grave misconduct. Pat-og filed a motion for
reconsideration, questioning for the first time the jurisdiction
of CSC over the case. He contended that administrative
charges against a public school teacher should have been
initially heard by a committee to be constituted pursuant to
the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. CA affirmed the
resolutions of the CSC. It agreed that Pat-og was estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC as the records
clearly showed that he actively participated in the
proceedings.
CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
Pat-og. Hence, the present petition with the following
ISSUE:
WON CSC has jurisdiction over the administrative case filed
against Pat-og?
HELD:
In Puse v. Santos-Puse, it was held that the CSC,
the Department of Education (DepEd) and the Board of
Professional Teachers-Professional Regulatory Commission
(PRC) have concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases
against public school teachers. Under Article IX-B of the
1987 Constitution, the CSC is the body charged with the
establishment and administration of a career civil service
which embraces all branches and agencies of the
government. Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (the
Administrative Code of 1987)12 and Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 807 (the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines)
expressly provide that the CSC has the power to hear and
decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted with it or
brought to it on appeal.
Thus, the CSC, as the central personnel agency of
the government, has the inherent power to supervise and
discipline all members of the civil service, including public
school teachers.
Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed
over the same parties or subject matter at the same time by
two or more separate tribunals. When the law bestows upon
a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such
jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body
is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case,
both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.
Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the
body that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.
13. BOSTON EQUITY vs. CA
G.R. No. 173946 
June 19, 2013
699 SCRA 16
FACTS:
On 24 December 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for
sum of money with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment against the spouses Manuel and
Lolita Toledo. The respondent Lolita Toledo filed an Answer
dated 19 March 1998 but on 7 May 1998, she filed a Motion
for Leave to Admit Amended Answer in which she alleged,
among others, that her husband and co-defendant, Manuel
Toledo (Manuel), is already dead. The death certificate of
Manuel states “13 July 1995” as the date of death.
As a result, petitioner filed a motion, dated 5 August
1999, to require respondent to disclose the heirs of Manuel.
In compliance with the verbal order of the court during the
11 October 1999 hearing of the case, respondent submitted
the required names and addresses of the heirs. Petitioner
then filed a Motion for Substitution, dated 18 January 2000,
praying that Manuel be substituted by his children as party-
defendants. It appears that this motion was granted by the
trial court in an Order dated 9 October 2000.
Pre-trial thereafter ensued and on 18 July 2001, the trial
court issued its pre-trial order containing, among others, the
dates of hearing of the case. The trial of the case then
proceeded. Herein petitioner, as plaintiff, presented its
evidence and its exhibits were thereafter admitted. On 26
May 2004, the reception of evidence for herein respondent
was cancelled upon agreement of the parties.
On 24 September 2004, counsel for herein respondent
was given a period of fifteen days within which to file a
demurrer to evidence. However, on 7 October 2004,
respondent instead filed a motion to dismiss the complaint,
citing the following as grounds: (1) that the complaint failed
to implead an indispensable party or a real party in interest;
hence, the case must be dismissed for failure to state a
cause of action; (2) that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of Manuel pursuant to Section 5,
Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court; (3) that the trial court
erred in ordering the substitution of the deceased Manuel by
his heirs; and (4) that the court must also dismiss the case
against Lolita Toledo in accordance with Section 6, Rule 86
of the Rules of Court.
 The trial court, in an Order dated 8 November 2004,
denied the motion to dismiss for having been filed out of
time, citing Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Court
which states that: “[W]ithin the time for but before filing the
answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a
motion to dismiss may be made.”
Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the order of
denial was likewise denied on the ground that “defendants’
attack on the jurisdiction of this Court is now barred by
estoppel by laches” since respondent failed to raise the issue
despite several chances to do so.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court seriously
erred and gravely abused its discretion in denying her
motion to dismiss despite discovery, during the trial of the
case, of evidence that would constitute a ground for
dismissal of the case.
The Court of Appeals granted the petition on the ground
that when Boston filed the complaint, defendant Manuel S.
Toledo was already dead. Such being the case, the court a
quo could not have acquired jurisdiction over the person of
defendant Manuel S. Toledo. Thus, the court’s denial of the
motion to dismiss as based on the attack on the jurisdiction
of the court.
The CA also held that the attack on the jurisdiction of
the court is not barred by laches, despite her active
participation on the proceedings. It is well-settled that issue
on jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding,
even for the first time on appeal. By timely raising the issue
on jurisdiction in her motion to dismiss is not estopped from
raising the question on jurisdiction. Moreover, when issue on
jurisdiction was raised by respondent, the court a quo had
not yet decided the case, hence, there is no basis for the
court a quo to invoke estoppel to justify its denial of the
motion for reconsideration.
It should be stressed that when the complaint was filed,
defendant Manuel S. Toledo was already dead. The
complaint should have impleaded the estate of Manuel S.
Toledo as defendant, not only the wife, considering that the
estate of Manuel S. Toledo is an indispensable party, which
stands to be benefited or be injured in the outcome of the
case.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Lolita Toledo is already estopped
from questioning the trial court’s jurisdiction?
2. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over
Manuel Toledo?
3. Whether or not the estate of Manuel Toledo is an
indispensible party?
4. Whether or not the inclusion of Manuel as party-
defendant is a mere misjoinder of party not warranting
the dismissal of the case before the lower court?
HELD:
1. No.
Petitioner’s argument that respondent’s motion to
dismiss questioning the trial court’s jurisdiction was filed
more than six years after her amended answer was filed.
Further, respondent had several opportunities, at various
stages of the proceedings, to assail the trial court’s
jurisdiction but never did so for six straight years. This
argument is misplaced because it failed to consider that
jurisdiction has several aspects. The aspect of jurisdiction
which may be barred from being assailed as a result of
estoppel by laches is jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The aspect of jurisdiction which may be barred
from being assailed as a result of estoppel by laches is
jurisdiction over the subject matter. In Tijam, the case relied
upon by petitioner, the issue involved was the authority of
the then Court of First Instance to hear a case for the
collection of a sum of money in the amount of P1,908.00
which amount was, at that time, within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the municipal courts. In subsequent cases
citing the ruling of the Court in Tijam, what was likewise at
issue was the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject
matter of the case.
Accordingly, in Spouses Gonzaga v. Court of
Appeals, 394 SCRA 472 (2002), the issue for consideration
was the authority of the regional trial court to hear and
decide an action for reformation of contract and damages
involving a subdivision lot, it being argued therein that
jurisdiction is vested in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board pursuant to PD 957 (The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers Protective Decree). In Lee v. Presiding
Judge, MTC, Legaspi City, 145 SCRA 408 (1986), petitioners
argued that the respondent municipal trial court had no
jurisdiction over the complaint for ejectment because the
issue of ownership was raised in the pleadings.
Finally, in People v. Casuga, 53 SCRA 278 (1973),
accused-appellant claimed that the crime of grave slander, of
which she was charged, falls within the concurrent
jurisdiction of municipal courts or city courts and the then
courts of first instance, and that the judgment of the court of
first instance, to which she had appealed the municipal
court’s conviction, should be deemed null and void for want
of jurisdiction as her appeal should have been filed with the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.
In all of these cases, the Supreme Court barred the
attack on the jurisdiction of the respective courts concerned
over the subject matter of the case based on estoppel by
laches, declaring that parties cannot be allowed to belatedly
adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of
a court to which they submitted their cause voluntarily.
 Here, what respondent was questioning in her
motion to dismiss before the trial court was that court’s
jurisdiction over the person of defendant Manuel. Thus, the
principle of estoppel by laches finds no application in this
case. Instead, the principles relating to jurisdiction over the
person of the parties are pertinent herein.
If the objection to the jurisdiction is not raised
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, the objection
to the jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff or the
defendant is deemed waived. Since the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of a party to a case is not one of
those defenses which are not deemed waived under Section
1 of Rule 9, such defense must be invoked when an answer
or a motion to dismiss is filed in order to prevent a waiver of
the defense. If the objection is not raised either in a motion
to dismiss or in the answer, the objection to the jurisdiction
over the person of the plaintiff or the defendant is deemed
waived by virtue of the first sentence of the above-quoted
Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
2. No.
The jurisdiction over the person of Manuel was
never acquired by the trial court. A defendant is informed of
a case against him when he receives summons. “Summons
is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action
brought against him. Service of such writ is the means by
which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person.”
In the case at bar, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of Manuel since there was no
valid service of summons upon him, precisely because he
was already dead even before the complaint against him and
his wife was filed in the trial court.
3. No.
An indispensable party is one who has such an
interest in the controversy or subject matter of a case that a
final adjudication cannot be made in his or her absence,
without injuring or affecting that interest. He or she is a
party who has not only an interest in the subject matter of
the controversy, but “an interest of such nature that a final
decree cannot be made without affecting [that] interest or
leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final
determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and
good conscience. It has also been considered that an
indispensable party is a person in whose absence there
cannot be a determination between the parties already
before the court which is effective, complete or equitable.”
Further, an indispensable party is one who must be included
in an action before it may properly proceed.
On the other hand, a “person is not an
indispensable party if his interest in the controversy or
subject matter is separable from the interest of the other
parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or injuriously
affected by a decree which does complete justice between
them. Also, a person is not an indispensable party if his
presence would merely permit complete relief between him
or her and those already parties to the action, or if he or she
has no interest in the subject matter of the action.” It is not
a sufficient reason to declare a person to be an
indispensable party simply because his or her presence will
avoid multiple litigations.
Applying the foregoing pronouncements to the case
at bar, it is clear that the estate of Manuel is not an
indispensable party to the collection case, for the simple
reason that the obligation of Manuel and his wife,
respondent herein, is solidary. Based on the provisions and
stipulations of the contract were then followed by the
respective signatures of respondent as “MAKER” and her
husband as “CO-MAKER.” Thus, pursuant to Article 1216 of
the Civil Code, petitioner may collect the entire amount of
the obligation from respondent only. The aforementioned
provision states: “The creditor may proceed against any one
of the solidary debtors or some or all of them
simultaneously. The demand made against one of them shall
not be an obstacle to those which may subsequently be
directed against the others, so long as the debt has not been
fully collected.”
In other words, the collection case can proceed and
the demands of petitioner can be satisfied by respondent
only, even without impleading the estate of Manuel.
Consequently, the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable
party to petitioner’s complaint for sum of money.
Based on the foregoing, the estate of Manuel is not
an indispensable party and the case can proceed as against
respondent only. That petitioner opted to collect from
respondent and not from the estate of Manuel is evidenced
by its opposition to respondent’s motion to dismiss asserting
that the case, as against her, should be dismissed so that
petitioner can proceed against the estate of Manuel.
4. No.
Under Section 11 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
states that “[n]either misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is
ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or
added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its
own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms
as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be
severed and proceeded with separately.” Based on the last
sentence of the afore-quoted provision of law, a misjoined
party must have the capacity to sue or be sued in the event
that the claim by or against the misjoined party is pursued in
a separate case. In this case, therefore, the inclusion of
Manuel in the complaint cannot be considered a misjoinder,
as in fact, the action would have proceeded against him had
he been alive at the time the collection case was filed by
petitioner. This being the case, the remedy provided by
Section 11 of Rule 3 does not obtain here. The name of
Manuel as party-defendant cannot simply be dropped from
the case. Instead, the procedure taken by the Court in
Sarsaba v. Vda. de Te, 594 SCRA 410 (2009), whose facts,
as mentioned earlier, resemble those of this case, should be
followed herein. As a result, the case, as against Manuel,
must be dismissed.
 In addition, the dismissal of the case against
Manuel is further warranted by Section 1 of Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, which states that: only natural or juridical
persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a
civil action.”
Where the defendant is neither a natural nor a
juridical person or an entity authorized by law, the complaint
may be dismissed on the ground that the pleading asserting
the claim states no cause of action or for failure to state a
cause of action pursuant to Section 1(g) of Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court, because a complaint cannot possibly state a
cause of action against one who cannot be a party to a civil
action. Since the proper course of action against the
wrongful inclusion of Manuel as party-defendant is the
dismissal of the case as against him, thus did the trial court
err when it ordered the substitution of Manuel by his heirs.
Substitution is proper only where the party to be substituted
died during the pendency of the case, as expressly provided
for by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Since Manuel
was already dead at the time of the filing of the complaint,
the court never acquired jurisdiction over his person and, in
effect, there was no party to be substituted.
14. People vs. Henry T. Go
FACTS:
A certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint
with the Office of the Ombudsman against several
individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019 (anti-graft).
Among those charged was herein Henry T. Go, who
was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having
supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile
in entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
found probable cause to indict, among others, herein Henry
T. Go for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there
was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary
Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he died prior to
the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.
Thus an information was filed against Henry before
the Sandiganbayan. Sandiganbayan however ordered the
prosecutor to show cause why this case should not be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused considering that the accused is a private person and
the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is
already deceased, and not an accused in this case.
On the other hand, Henry filed a Motion to Quash
the Information filed against him on the ground that the
operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense
under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
, citing the show cause order of the SB, also
contended that, independently of the deceased Secretary
Enrile, the public officer with whom he was alleged to have
conspired, Henry, who is not a public officer nor was
capacitated by any official authority as a government agent,
may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019.
The prosecution however argued that the SB has
exclusive jurisdiction over Henry’s case, even if he is a
private person, because he was alleged to have conspired
with a public officer.SB granted Henry’s motion to quash.
ISSUE:
Whether Henry,, a private person, may be indicted for
conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the
public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired,
has died prior to the filing of the Information.
HELD:
Yes. It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's
death, there is no longer any public officer with whom
respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It
does not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy
between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged
conspiracy is already expunged.
The only thing extinguished by the death of
Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not
extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the
charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent.
Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not
mean that there was no public officer who allegedly violated
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict
Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of
R.A. 3019.14 Were it not for his death, he should have been
charged.
The requirement before a private person may be
indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among
others, is that such private person must be alleged to have
acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however,
does not require that such person must, in all instances, be
indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances
exist where the public officer may no longer be charged in
court, as in the present case where the public officer has
already died, the private person may be indicted alone.
15. City of Manila vs Judge Cuerdo
FACTS:
Petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer,
assessed taxes against private respondents SM Mart, Inc.,
SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star Appliances Center, Supervalue,
Inc., Ace Hardware Philippines, Inc., Watsons Personal Care
Stores Phils., Inc., Jollimart Philippines Corp., Surplus
Marketing Corp. and Signature Lines. Said assessment
covered the local business taxes petitioners were authorized
to collect under Section 21 of the same Code.
 Because payment of the taxes assessed was a
precondition for the issuance of their business permits,
private respondents were constrained to pay the
P19,316,458.77 assessment under protest. On January 24,
2004, private respondents filed [with the Regional Trial Court
of Pasay City] the complaint denominated as one for “Refund
or Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously-Collected Local
Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ
of Preliminary Injunction” before public respondent’s sala [at
Branch 112]. In its Order dated July 9, 2004, the RTC
granted private respondents’ application for a writ of
preliminary injunction. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the RTC denied it in its Order dated
October 15, 2004. Petitioners then filed a special civil action
for certiorari with the CA assailing the July 9, 2004 and
October 15, 2004 Orders of the RTC. CA dismissed
petitioners’ petition for certiorari holding that it has no
jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled that since
appellate jurisdiction over private respondents’ complaint for
tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested in the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded
jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it follows
that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an
interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise,
be filed with the CTA.
ISSUE:
WON the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for
certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC
in a local tax case?
HELD:
While it is clearly stated that the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts
(RTCs) in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by
them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction,
there is no categorical statement under RA 1125 as well as
the amendatory RA 9282, which provides that the Court of
Tax Appeals has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari
assailing interlocutory orders issued by the Regional Trial
Court in local tax cases filed before it; The prevailing
doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari
involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be
expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot
be implied from the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction.
It can be fairly interpreted that the power of the
CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has
been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an
interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the tax court.
It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional
mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari in these cases. Indeed, in order for any appellate
court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must
have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of
certiorari.
In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed
tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the
law intended to transfer also such power as is deemed
necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate
jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer
should only be considered as partial, not total. Furthermore,
Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court provides
that when by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court or
judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such
court or officer.
The Supreme Court agrees with the ruling of the
Court of Appeals (CA) that since appellate jurisdiction over
private respondents’ complaint for tax refund is vested in the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), it follows that a petition for
certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued
in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the same
court.—If this Court were to sustain petitioners’ contention
that jurisdiction over their certiorari petition lies with the CA,
this Court would be confirming the exercise by two judicial
bodies, the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over basically the
same subject matter — precisely the split — jurisdiction
situation which is anathema to the orderly administration of
justice.

While there is no express grant of the power to

issue writ of certiorari, with respect to the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA), Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall
be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law and that judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.