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DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR


DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN MALAYSIA
(BAHAGIAN KELUARGA)
[PETISYEN PERCERAIAN NO: 33-799-2011]

DI ANTARA

SAO CHOO JIT @ SAO CHOO PEIR … PLAINTIF


(NO K/P: 710614-02-5293)

DAN

WONG LEE YEE … DEFENDAN


(NO K/P: 720217-08-5128)

JUDGMENT
(Enclosures 59 and 68)

There are 2 applications in this case. Respondent wife (RW) is


applying to amend or vary the decree nisi dated 1.10.2013. (See Enclosure
59). Reproduced below are the prayers prayed for by Respondent wife at
Enclosure 59:-

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(a) Bahawa Responden dibenarkan meminda Decree Nisi bertarikh


1.10.2013 yang telah dikeluarkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi
Malaya Kuala Lumpur seperti dinyatakan dalam “Decree Nisi
(Penceraian)” (yang dicadangkan) yang dilampirkan bersama-
sama permohonan ini di bawah Aturan 42 Kaedah 13 Kaedah-
Kaedah Mahkamah 2012;

(b) Kos permohonan ini dijadikan kos dalam kausa; dan

(c) Lain-lain relif yang dianggap sesuai serta manafaat oleh


Mahkamah yang Mulia ini.

The Petitioner husband (PH) is applying via Enclosure 68 to set aside the
decree nisi. Reproduced are the prayers for Enclosure 68 -

(a) Bahawa Pempetisyen dibenarkan menfailkan permohonan ini;

(b) Bahawa perintah yang dibuat dalam Dekri Nisi bertarikh


1/10/2013 dan Perintah Selepas Membuat Dekri Nisi 1/10/2013
diketepikan;

(c) Bahawa Pindaan Petisyen Penceraian bertarikh 5/2/2013


didengar semula atas alasan bahawa terma-terma yang
dinyatakan dalam Dekri Nisi bertarikh 1/10/2013 dan Perintah
Selepas Membuat Dekri Nisi bertarikh 1/10/2013 tidak dapat
diikuti dan dilaksanakan;

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(d) Kos permohonan ini dijadikan kos dalam kausa; dan

(e) Lain-lain perintah serta relif yang difikirkan wajar dan sesuai
oleh Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini.

I shall deal with the application by the respondent wife at


Enclosure 59.

Having heard the submission of both counsels for the petitioner


and respondent based on their written submissions, I am dismissing the
claim for the following reasons -

(a) Both parties had negotiated for a settlement which was then
recorded. Both were represented by their counsels during the
negotiation. From the Court’s record, it was at 6 pm that parties
recorded a consent judgment as in Enclosure 57. Both
counsels confirmed that their clients had agreed and had
signed Enclosure 51. I then asked both parties and both said
they agreed to the terms after which I recorded the consent
judgment at Enclosure 57. So, all appeared to be regular at the
proceeding to record consent judgment.

(b) Secondly, although counsel for the respondent wife cited the
case of Chew Hon Keong v. Betterproducts Industries Sdn
Bhd & Ors [2013] 7 MLJ 196 it is a High Court decision. It is
therefore not binding on this Court because this Court is bound
by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Visia Finance Bhd v.

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Expert Credit and Leasing Sdn Bhd and Ors [1998] 2 CLJ
845 where His Lordship Mahadev Shanker JCA said -

Here both counsel had consented to proceed in a


particular way. An order made by consent in the
absence of fraud, can only be varied by consent. It
would be a denial of justice to permit a party to
resile from what his counsel decided for him merely
because he lost.

In our case parties had consented to record the consent order


and there is no allegation of fraud. Hence, on this alone, the respondent
wife’s application can be dismissed.

This Court had also considered the case cited by counsel for
the respondent wife in asking that the decree nisi be amended. I had read
and considered the case ie, Gee Siew Yee v. Ann Wam Tiang [2008] 1
MLJ 754. It is true that it is a Court of Appeal decision but that is a case
about interlocutory application. It was held (dismissing the appeal) as
follows -

The court was of the view that the consent order


was in the nature of an interlocutory order as it did
not finally determine the dispute between the parties
in respect of the subject matter in the suit. The

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court had always had control over interlocutory


orders. It may, in its discretion, vary or alter them
even though made originally by consent (see Ooi
Siew Yook v. Lim Bar Kee [1987] 2 MLJ 267;
Purcell v. FC Trigell L t d [ 1 9 7 1 ] 1 Q B 3 5 8 ) . I n
exceptional cases, even a consent order which was
final and had been perfected, could be set aside in
the same action, (see Marsden v. Marsden [1972] 2
AII ER 1162; Khaw Poh Chuan v. Ng Gaik Peng
[1996] 1 MLJ 761) (see para 14).

This was a case where the subject matter to the


consent order was no longer in existence. …

So that case is not a good precedent to rely on by the


respondent wife. Please note the reason for the dismissal of the appeal ie,
the subject matter to the consent order was no longer in existence.

(c) The amendment as prayed for by the respondent wife are at


paragraphs 10, 12 and 14. For the purpose of this judgment, I
am only reproducing paragraph 10 because paragraphs 12 and
14 are related to paragraph 10.

Paragraph 10 reads as follows -

Premis yang dikenali sebagai Block C-03A-03,


Angkasa Condominium No. 5, Jalan Puncak

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Gading, Taman Connaught, Cheras, 56000 Kuala


Lumpur diperintahkan supaya dijualkan pada atau
sebelum 31/8/2014 pada harga jualan
RM330,000.00 atau lebih dan hasil jualan bersih
premis tersebut selepas menjelaskan hutang
perumahan untuk Block C-03A-03 Angkasa
Condominium No.5, Jalan Puncak Gading, Taman
Connaught, Cheras, 56000 Kuala Lumpur dan No.
44, Jalan 9/154, Taman Anggerik, Cheras, 56000
Kuala Lumpur dimasukkan ke dalam satu akaun
amanah Pempetisyen dan Responden yang
diuruskan oleh peguamcara Pempetisyen Tetuan
Tan Chia Min & Partners dan peguamcara
Responden Tetuan Oh Teik Keng & Partners
secara bersama bagi manfaat Responden, Sao
Chyi (P) (No. Sijil Kelahiran: D 816678), Joshua
Sao Jian (No. Sijil Kelahiran: BC 94373) dan Sao
Herng Jonathan (No. Sijil Kelahiran: E 534635).

The Court had to compare the relevant paragraph in the decree


nisi and the above proposed amendment to paragraph 10. Paragraph 10
of the decree nisi provide -

Premis yang dikenali sebagai Block C-03A-03,


Angkasa Condominium No.5, Jalan Puncak Gading,

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Taman Connaught, Cheras, 55000 Kuala Lumpur


diperintahkan supaya dijual dan hasil jualan bersih
premis tersebut dimasukkan ke dalam satu akaun
amanah Pempetisyen dan Responden yang
diuruskan oleh peguamcara Pempetisyen Tetuan
Tan Chia Min & Partners dan peguamcara
Responden Tetuan Oh Teik Keng & Partners
secara bersama bagi manafaat Responden, Sao
Chyi (P) (No. Sijil Kelahiran; D 816678), Joshua
Sao Jian (No. Sijil Kelahiran; BC 94373) dan Sao
Herng Jonathan (No. Sijil Kelahiran: E534635).

A close perusal at both paragraph 10 of the decree nisi and


intended amendment of that paragraph 10 would show that what is
intended is to vary the decree nisi as regards property. In the Federal
Court case of Manokaram Subramaniam v. Ranjid Kaur Nata Singh
[2008] 6 CLJ 209, Zaki Tun Azmi PCA (as he then was) said -

… In this case the words used in s.76(1) and 76(3) are


clear ie, an order for division of matrimonial asset is
limited to the time when granting a decree of
divorce or judicial separation and not at a later
stage. I am very sure that this is the interpretation
that is t o b e g i v e n t o s . 7 6

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In conclusion, I have this to say. I sympathise with


the respondent but the law is the law. In Chai Sau
Yin v. Kok Seng Fatt [1966] 1 LNS 25 Thompson LP
said “This, however, is a court of law and not a court
of morals and it is on that basis that the case must
be decided.”

In the same case, Arifin Zakaria FCJ (as he then was) said -

The power of the court to order division of


matrimonial assets is governed by s.76 of the Act.
Subsection (1) of s.76 relates to assets acquired
during the marriage by their joint effort, while
subsection (3) relates to assets acquired during the
marriage by the sole effort of one party to the
marriage. In both instances it is p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e
court shall have power to make such order “when
granting a decree of divorce”, that is, on the date
when the decree nisi made absolute.

This is not so in the case of division of matrimonial


assets. In s.76 it is clearly provided that the power
of the court to make an order for the division of
matrimonial assets can only be exercised when
granting decree of divorce and at no later stage.

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This seems to be the ratio decided in Chew Ling


Hang, a decision of the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that the Act and the rules
were advisedly so worded that the decree absolute
should as far as is humanly possible, leave each
spouse free to make a new life for himself or herself
without being unjustly harassed by fresh claims
from a disgruntled ex-spouse which should have
been ventilated at the time the decree was being
made. This i s e s s e n t i a l l y t h e “ c l e a n b r e a k ”
principle, which is intended at encouraging the
parties to put the past behind them and to begin a
new life without being overshadowed by the
relationship that had broken down.

Further, it is amply clear that the court’s power under


s . 76(1) and (3) is indeed intended to be final. As rightly stated
by Haidar J (as he then was) in Soo Lina v. Ngu Chu Chiong
[1999] 2 MLJ 870 at p.877:

In the circumstances, I am of the opinion that when


property adjustment order is made, be it in a judicial
separation or divorce proceedings, Section 76(1) of
the Act is intended to make it final.

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This is consistent with the “clean break” principle, as stated


earlier so that the parties can move forward and start a new life without the
fear claim being made by the other party hanging over his or her head.

Therefore based on the above case, the division of property is


to be “when” granting a decree nisi and which was so done in our case.
The proposed amendment quite apart from the decision in Manokaram’s
case, was to change entirely paragraph 10 of the decree nisi and indeed
the objective would be changed as well. And that the Court has no power
to change unless it is so done according to the principle laid down in the
Visia Finance case (supra)

I also considered the respondent counsel’s submission that the


amendment could be done by way of the slip rule as is provided under
Order 20 rule 11 of the Rules of Court 2012. Reproduced is Order 20 rule
11 as follows -

Amendment of judgment and orders (O. 20, r. 11)

Clerical mistakes in judgment or orders, or errors


arising therein from any accidental slip or omission,
may at any time be corrected by the Court by a
notice of application without an appeal.

Even by any stretch of imagination, the amendments proposed


cannot be considered as a “slip rule”. The amendments proposed are not

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clerical mistakes. It is far reaching and changes the original term of the
decree nisi. Hence, on this too, the respondent wife fail.

Based on the above reasons I am dismissing respondent wife’s


application with costs of RM8000/-

I will now deal with the petitioner husband’s application at


Enclosure 68 as reproduced earlier. I am dismissing the application to set
aside the decree nisi for the following reasons -

a) A consent order can only be amended or varied by a


consent order unless there is fraud.

It is trite law that a consent order cannot be varied unless it is


also by way of a consent order. In the Court of Appeal case of Visia
Finance Bhd, v. Expert Credit & Leasing Sdn. Bhd [1998] 2 CLJ 845
Mahadev Shankar JCA said -

“Here both counsels had consented to proceed in a


particular way. An order made by consent in the
absence of fraud, can only be varied by consent. It
would be a denial of justice to resile from what his
counsel decided for him merely because he lost”.

In the Federal Court case of Hock Hua Bank Bhd v. Sahari bin
Murid [1981] I MLJ 143 it was held -

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Held: (1) the learned judge was functus officio;

2. The court had no power under any application


in the same action to alter vary or set aside a
judgment regularly obtained after it had been
entered or an order after it has been drawn
up, except under the slip rule, so far as is
necessary to correct errors in expressing the
intention of the court, unless it is a judgment
by default or made in the absence of a party
at a trial or hearing;

3. If a judgment or order has been obtained by


fraud or where further evidence which could
not possibly have been adduced at the
original hearing is forthcoming, a fresh action
will lie to impeach the original judgment;

4. In this case the learned judge had no


jurisdiction to set aside his own order and the
original order must be restored, leaving it to
the respondent to take out a fresh action to
set aside the order on the ground of fraud.

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In his judgment, Chang Min Tat FJ said -

Clearly the court has no power under any


application in the same action to alter vary or set
aside a judgment regularly obtained after it has
been entered or an order after it is drawn up, except
under the slip rule in Order 28 rule 11 Rules of the
Supreme Court 1957 (Order 20 rule 11 R u l e s o f t h e
High Court 1980) so far as is necessary to correct
errors in expressing the intention of the court.

This decision was later discussed with approval in another


Federal Court case of Badiaddin bin Mohd Mahidin & Anor v. Arab
Malaysian Finance Bhd [1998] 1 MLJ 393 where Peh Swee Chin FCJ
said -

Reverting to the point relied on by the Court of


Appeal, that of the perfected order not being capable of being
amended or altered except for certain exceptions as stated in
Hock Hua Bank (at p 144), a passage therefrom as quoted by
the Court of Appeal is set out as follows [1996] 3 MLJ 621 at p
622):

Clearly, the court has no power under any


application in the same action to alter, vary or set
aside a judgment regularly obtained after it has
been entered or an order after it is drawn up except
under the slip rule in O 28 r 11 of the Rules of

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Supreme Court 1957 (O 20 r 11 of the Rules of High


Court 1980) so far as necessary to correct errors in
expressing the intention of the court: Re St Nazaire
Co (1879-80) 12 Ch D 88; Kelsey v. Doune [1912] 2
KB 482; Hession v. Jones [1914] 2 KB 482, unless it
is a judgment by default or made in the absence of
a party at the trial or hearing. But if a judgment or
order has been obtained by fraud or where further
evidence which could not possibly have been
adduced at the original hearing is forthcoming, a
fresh action will lie to impeach the original judgment:
Hip Foong Hong v. Neotia & Co [1918] and Jonesco
v. Bard [1930] AC 298. The hearing of the action will
in a proper case be expedited: Smith v. Peizer 65 SJ
607.

When a judgment in the High Court has been perfected in


the manner described in the above passage, a party to the
judgment generally and subject to the same passage, or any
other written law, and apart from any appeal, cannot reopen the
matter finalized in the judgment by seeking to alter it or amend
it for the court would be functus officio by virtue of the ratio of
Hock Hua Bank v. Sahari bin Murid. Once perfected, a
judgment of the High Court is also entitled to the obedience and
respect from the parties to it on the basis of a command from a
superior court of unlimited civil jurisdiction in the course of

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contentious litigation (see Issac v. Robertson [1985] AC 97;


Pembenaan KSY Sdn Bhd v. Lian Seng Properties Sdn
Bhd [1991] I MLJ 100; Puah Bee Hong & Anor v.
pentadbir Tanah Daerah Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala
L u m p u r & A n o r ( T e o K e n g T u a n R o b e r t , I n t e r v e ne r ) a n d
a n o t h e r a p p e a l [ 1 9 9 4] 2 M L J 6 0 1 ) .

In the High Court case of Kattayat Mohandas S/O


C.P.Narayana Menon v. Mangalam A/P Sinniah & Anor [2011] MLJU
453, a consent judgment was recorded. The Respondent Wife
subsequently filed an application to set aside the decree nisi that was
entered by consent and alternatively that the decree nisi that was entered
by consent be varied. The Court held that a Consent Judgment is a final
Order and such Decree Nisi cannot be set aside in the same action.
Further, the Court held that:-

“…since the Consent Decree Nisi is a final Order


granted with the intention to bring finality and
closure to the matter, this Court is therefore functus
officio, and cannot allow the Respondent Wife’s
application to set it aside,”

The Court also held that the Consent Decree Nisi is final and
conclusive and for all intents and purposes, it disposes of all issues
between the parties and parties are therefore not allowed to blow hot and
cold.

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(b) Estoppel

A Consent Judgment operates as an estoppel and can only be


set aside if the Judgment has been obtained: (i) fraudulently or (ii) by
reason of mutual mistake of a material fact.

The Court of Appeal Perspective Management Services Sdn


Bhd v. Seganom Sdn. Bhd [2004] 4 CLJ 466, held -

The consent order constituted a compromise


between the parties. It followed that the claims and
relief in the first suit which were not stated therein
must be deemed to have been abandoned. This
meant that, if a certain issue or claim or relief had
been reserved for future litigation by the parties, as
the respondent maintained, such reservation ought
to be clearly shown in the order. There was no
such reservation being spelt out in the order in
respect of the claims against the appellant. Res
Judicata and issue estoppels, hence, must apply to
the present suit.

Mokhtar Sidin JCA, delivering the judgment of the Court said the following
-

… In our view, when the respondent entered into a


consent order with the defendants (including the

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appellant in the present suit), the parties came to a


compromise whereby amongst others the
respondent was declared to be the beneficial owner
of those shares and the appellant was given 48
hours to split up those shares and deliver the scripts
to the respondent. Further, we are of the view that
since the consent order was a compromise, those
claims and relief in the first suit not stated in that
order, are deemed to have been abandoned. If any
issue or claim or relief was reserved to be litigated
later, it must be clearly shown in the order such as
the parties be given liberty to do so. We could not
find any reservation or liberty in respect of those
claims against the appellant being given in that
consent order. For that reason, we are of the view
that res judicata and estoppels applies to the
present suit. …

In Lau Hui Sing v. Wong Chuo Yong [2008] 5 MLJ 846, the
High Court held, inter alia at 853 that:-

“As a general rule, consent order cannot be set


aside, varied or discharged. Though, there are
statutory exceptions to this rule in matrimonial
matters, it is incumbent on the Court as a matter of
public policy to ensure that the issues are not re-
litigated again and again and in this case less than

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2 years after the consented divorce petition was


allowed. This is in line with the concept of “clean
break” principles advocated in a number of cases
(see Minton v. Minton [1979] 1 All ER 79)”

Further, at 855, His Lordship held that:-

“As a general rule, consent order even in a divorce


matter must be rarely disturbed unless there are
exceptional circumstances…”

c) Consent order is a contract between parties.

A Consent Order is a contract between the Plaintiff and


Respondent wife and is binding on both parties to the Order. In
Ganapathy Chettiar v. Lum Kum Chun & Ors [1981] 2 MLJ 45, the
Federal Court held at page 146 that an order by consent is evidence of a
contract between the parties and is binding on all parties to the order, all
the more so where there is not the slightest question of any mistake as to
facts or law.

Raja Azlan CJ (as His Highness then was) said -

The answer to the question is obvious and, with


respect, is so clearly stated in paragraph 2011 of
Volume 2 of either the 1976 or the 1979 Supreme
Court Practice that we will merely content ourselves

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with repeating that an order by consent is evidence


of the contract between the parties and is binding
on estoppels: Kinch v. Walcott. All the more so, in
our view, since there is not the slightest question of
any mistake as to facts or law.

Similarly, in Gai Hin Refrigeration Sdn. Bhd. v. Kamanis


Holdings Sdn. Bhd [2004] 4 CLJ 232, the defendant applied to set aside
the consent judgment. It was dismissed by the Learned judge but the
Learned judge went on to vary the consent judgment. Plaintiff appealed
against the decision. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and held at
237 and 238 that:-

“The defendant was not under any misapprehension


or confusion with respect to the terms of the
settlement which were recorded under the consent
judgment. The defendant was represented
throughout the negotiations, and the draft consent
judgment was explained to the said representative
who had then accepted it as correct. The defendant
was not misled and it would be against the weight of
the evidence to conclude that it had misunderstood
the terms of the settlement as embodied in the
consent judgment.

The Learned judge was functus officio after having


dismissed the defendant’s application to set aside

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the consent judgment. In the circumstances, the


Learned judge would have no jurisdiction to alter or
vary the consent judgment except under the slip
rule as set out in O. 20 r. 11 of the Rules of the High
Court, 1980 (O).

It is to be noted that an order by consent is


evidence of the contract between the parties and is
binding on all the parties to the order. Therefore the
defendant and the plaintiff in this case are bound by
the consent judgment. The Court of Appeal ordered
that the consent judgment recorded be restored”

Further, in Osman Daud (Trading under the name an style of


RSZ Trading) v. Asal bina Sdn Bhd [2010] 9 MLJ 840, the High Court
held at pages 850-851 that:

“The terms of the consent judgment must be read


and understood as it stands and the plaintiff ought
not to be allowed to add words or vary the terms of
the said consent judgment. It is trite law that a
consent order is evidence of the contract between
the parties and is binding on all the parties to the
order.”

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In Geh Thuan Hooi (h) v. Serene Lim Paid Yan (w) [2010] 4
MLJ 673, the appellant husband consented before the Learned judge to
make payment of RM14,000.00 per month of the respondent wife as
maintenance for their two children who were minors. Later, the appellant
husband filed an application to seek for reduction of the monthly
maintenance payment from RM14,000.00 to RM2,500.00 on the ground
that it was an unintentional mistake as the appellant husband thought that
this amount was for his own monthly expenditure/responsibility. The High
Court dismissed his application and at page 681-682 was of the view that
at that time, the judge would never have recorded a consent judgment
without the full consent of both parties. It was highly improbable that there
was misrepresentation or mistake of fact. Furthermore, the appellant
husband, being educated and holding a high position, could not be
permitted to approbate and reprobate after agreeing to pay the amount.
Further, the fact that the application was made 12 months after the decree
nisi was granted clearly showed that the plea of misrepresentation and/or
mistake of fact was a mere afterthought.

In the Federal Court case of Chee Kuan Cheng v. Chuo


Kong Kah [1967] 2 MLJ 74, in a partnership action, a settlement was
reached between counsel on terms agreed to by both parties. Later, the
plaintiff made an application to set aside the order contending that he had
given his consent under misapprehension. The Federal Court held at
pages 75 and 76 that as the plaintiff fully understood the terms of the
settlement and agreed thereto and neither the plaintiff nor his counsel was
under any misapprehension as to any of the terms agreed upon which were

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embodied in the consent order, the consent was not given under a
misapprehension or from a misstatement or for want of materials.

Further, in another Federal Court case of Tong Lee Hwa &


Anor v. Chin Ah Kwi, Tong Chong Fah v. Chin Ah Kwi [1971] 2 MLJ 75,
the Federal Court held at 79 that after a judgment by consent has been
passed and entered, it cannot afterwards be varied on the ground of
mistake, except for reasons sufficient to set aside an agreement. The
general rule is that after a judgment has been passed and entered, even
where it has been taken by consent and under a mistake, the Court cannot
set it aside otherwise than in a fresh action brought for the purpose unless;
(a) there has been a clerical slip or omission, or (b) the judgment as drawn
up does not correctly state what the Court actually decided and intended to
decide. Gill FJ, in his judgment said -

“After a judgment by consent has been passed and


entered, it cannot afterwards be varied on the
ground of mistake, except for reasons sufficient to
set aside an agreement (see Attorney-General v.
Tom-line). The general rule is that after a judgment
has been passed and entered, even where it has
been taken by consent and under a mistake, the
court cannot set it aside otherwise than in a fresh
action brought for the purpose unless (a) there has
been a clerical mis-omission, or (b) the judgment as
drawn up does not correctly state what the court
actually decided and intended to decide, ….

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In Phuah Beng Chooi @ Koh Kim Kee (P) & Ors. v. Koh Heng
Jin @ Koh Heng Leong & Ors [2007] 2 MLJ 458, the parties recorded
consent order. The terms include that Henry Butcher Malaysia Sdn. Bhd, is
to determine the valuation of the oil palm estates and based on the
valuation, KPMG will determine the respective amount due to each of the
vendors (referring to the plaintiffs, the 5th and 7th defendants) which amount
shall constitute the “respective purchase price” payable by the 2 nd
defendant as the purchaser. The Learned counsel for the plaintiffs was not
happy with the valuation report of Henry Butcher and the accountant’s
report of KPMG as there was a disparity of RM16million between the
valuation report of Henry Butcher and Colliers Jordan. The vendors filed a
summons in chambers to vary or set aside the consent order because of
the disparity between the reports of the 2 valuers. Abdul Malik Ishak J. (as
he then was) held at 458-459 that:

“The Consent Order drawn up by the parties and


agreed to by the parties is binding and it serves as
an estoppel. The Court will not permit the person
making a representation to go back on his word or
allege a particular situation different from that which
he represented.

The Court further held at 466 that:

“It is significant to note that the parties deliberately


chose to crystallize their agreement in the form of a
consent order and not in the form of a settlement

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agreement. This reflects the solemn intention of the


parties to have the terms of the settlement to be
communicated to the Court and for the Court to
pronounce it as a consent so that it carries the
judicial force and efficacy of a Court order. In short,
the consent order sets out the entire agreement of
the parties. It is a settled principle of construction
that the intention of the parties is to be ascertained
from the words used by the parties. So the duty of
the Court is to construe the words and expressions
used by the parties and to give effect to them
accordingly. Nothing less and nothing more”.

Based on all the reasons above, I am dismissing the petitioner


husband’s application with costs of RM8000/-.

(NORAINI ABDUL RAHMAN)


Hakim
Mahkamah Tinggi Keluarga
Kuala Lumpur

Dated: 11 JULY 2014

Legislation referred to:

Rules of Court 2012, O. 20 r. 11, O. 42 r. 13

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