G.R. No.
91307 January 24, 1991 DOLE "only shows the weakness of petitioner's stand" and was "for the
SINGER SEWING MACHINE COMPANY, petitioner
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, MED-ARBITER FELIX B. CHAGUILE,
JR., and SINGER MACHINE COLLECTORS UNION-BAGUIO
(SIMACUB), respondents.
Facts : On February 15, 1989, the respondent union filed a petition for direct
certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all collectors of the
Singer Sewing Machine Company, Baguio City branch. The Company
opposed the petition mainly on the ground that the union members are actually
not employees but are independent contractors as evidenced by the collection
agency agreement which they signed.The respondent Med-Arbiter, finding
that there exists an employer-employee relationship between the union
members and the Company, granted the petition for certification election. On
appeal, Secretary of Labor Franklin M. Drilon affirmed it. The motion for
reconsideration of the Secretary's resolution was denied. Hence, this petition
in which the Company alleges that public respondents acted in excess of
jurisdiction and/or committed grave abuse of discretion in that:
a) the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) has no jurisdiction over
the case since the existence of employer-employee relationship is at issue;
b) the right of petitioner to due process was denied when the evidence of the
union members' being commission agents was disregarded by the Labor
Secretary;
c) the public respondents patently erred in finding that there exists an
employer-employee relationship;
d) the public respondents whimsically disregarded the well-settled rule that
commission agents are not employees but are independent contractors.
The respondents, on the other hand, insist that the provisions of the Collection
Agency Agreement belie the Company's position that the union members are
independent contractors. To prove that union members are employees, it is
asserted that they "perform the most desirable and necessary activities for the
continuous and effective operations of the business of the petitioner Company"
(citing Article 280 of the Labor Code). They add that the termination of the
agreement by the petitioner pending the resolution of the case before the
purpose of frustrating the constitutionally mandated rights of the members of
private respondent union to self-organization and collective organization."
They also contend that under Section 8, Rule 8, Book No. III of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code, which defines job-contracting, they
cannot legally qualify as independent contractors who must be free from
control of the alleged employer, who carry independent businesses and who
have substantial capital or investment in the form of equipment, tools, and the
like necessary in the conduct of the business.
Issue : WON the respondents are regular or casual employees of the company
Ruling : The Court finds the contention of the respondents that the union
members are employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code to have no basis.
The definition that regular employees are those who perform activities which
are desirable and necessary for the business of the employer is not
determinative in this case. Any agreement may provide that one party shall
render services for and in behalf of another for a consideration (no matter how
necessary for the latter's business) even without being hired as an employee.
This is precisely true in the case of an independent contractorship as well as in
an agency agreement. The Court agrees with the petitioner's argument that
Article 280 is not the yardstick for determining the existence of an employment
relationship because it merely distinguishes between two kinds of
employees, i.e., regular employees and casual employees, for purposes of
determining the right of an employee to certain benefits, to join or form a
union, or to security of tenure. Article 280 does not apply where the existence
of an employment relationship is in dispute. Even Section 8, Rule 8, Book III
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code does not apply to this
case.Respondents assert that the said provision on job contracting requires that
for one to be considered an independent contractor, he must have "substantial
capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work
premises, and other materials which are necessary in the conduct of his
business." There is no showing that a collection agent needs tools and
machineries.
G.R. No. 148492 May 9, 2003
BUENAVENTURA C. MAGSALIN & COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS.,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF WORKING MEN (N.O.W.M)
Facts : Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., herein petitioner, engaged the services
of respondent workers as "sales route helpers" for a limited period of five
months. After five months, respondent workers were employed by petitioner
company on a day-to-day basis. According to petitioner company, respondent
workers were hired to substitute for regular sales route helpers whenever the
latter would be unavailable or when there would be an unexpected shortage of
manpower in any of its work places or an unusually high volume of work. The
practice was for the workers to wait every morning outside the gates of the
sales office of petitioner company. If thus hired, the workers would then be
paid their wages at the end of the day. Ultimately, respondent workers asked
petitioner company to extend to them regular appointments. Petitioner
company refused. On 07 November 1997, twenty-three (23) of the
"temporary" workers (herein respondents) filed with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint for the regularization of their
employment with petitioner company. The complaint was amended a number
of times to include other complainants that ultimately totaled fifty-eight (58)
workers. Claiming that petitioner company meanwhile terminated their
services, respondent workers filed a notice of strike and a complaint for illegal
dismissal and unfair labor practice with the NLRC. On 01 April 1998, the
parties agreed to submit the controversy, including the issue raised in the
complaint for regularization of employment, for voluntary arbitration. On 18
May 1998, the voluntary arbitrator rendered a decision dismissing the
complaint on the thesis that respondents (then complainants) were not regular
employees of petitioner company. Respondent workers filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
assailing the decision of the voluntary arbitrator.
Issue : WON the nature of work of respondents in the company is of such
nature as to be deemed necessary and desirable in the usual business or trade
of petitioner that could qualify them to be regular employees
Ruling : The basic law on the case is Article 280 of the Labor Code. Its
pertinent provisions read:"Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. – The
provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless
of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be
regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer,
except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the
time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be
performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the
season."An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by
the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at
least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall
be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is
employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists."Coca-
Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., is one of the leading and largest manufacturers of
softdrinks in the country. Respondent workers have long been in the service of
petitioner company. Respondent workers, when hired, would go with route
salesmen on board delivery trucks and undertake the laborious task of loading
and unloading softdrink products of petitioner company to its various delivery
points.Even while the language of law might have been more definitive, the
clarity of its spirit and intent, i.e., to ensure a "regular" worker's security of
tenure, however, can hardly be doubted. In determining whether an
employment should be considered regular or non-regular, the applicable test is
the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the
employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer. The
standard, supplied by the law itself, is whether the work undertaken is
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, a fact that
can be assessed by looking into the nature of the services rendered and its
relation to the general scheme under which the business or trade is pursued in
the usual course. It is distinguished from a specific undertaking that is divorced
from the normal activities required in carrying on the particular business or
trade. But, although the work to be performed is only for a specific project or
seasonal, where a person thus engaged has been performing the job for at least
one year, even if the performance is not continuous or is merely intermittent,
the law deems the repeated and continuing need for its performance as being
sufficient to indicate the necessity or desirability of that activity to the business
or trade of the employer. The employment of such person is also then deemed
to be regular with respect to such activity and while such activity exists.
G.R. No. L-48494 February 5, 1990
BRENT SCHOOL, INC., and REV. GABRIEL DIMACHE, petitioners,
vs.
RONALDO ZAMORA, the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, Office
of the President, and DOROTEO R. ALEGRE, respondents.
Facts : Doroteo R. Alegre was engaged as athletic director by Brent School,
Inc. at a yearly compensation of P20,000.00. The contract fixed a specific term
for its existence, five (5) years, i.e., from July 18, 1971, the date of execution
of the agreement, to July 17, 1976. Subsequent subsidiary agreements dated
March 15, 1973, August 28, 1973, and September 14, 1974 reiterated the same
terms and conditions, including the expiry date, as those contained in the
original contract of July 18, 1971. Some three months before the expiration of
the stipulated period, or more precisely on April 20,1976, Alegre was given a
copy of the report filed by Brent School with the Department of Labor advising
of the termination of his services effective on July 16, 1976. The stated ground
for the termination was "completion of contract, expiration of the definite
period of employment." And a month or so later, on May 26, 1976, Alegre
accepted the amount of P3,177.71, and signed a receipt therefor containing the
phrase, "in full payment of services for the period May 16, to July 17, 1976 as
full payment of contract."However, at the investigation conducted by a Labor
Conciliator of said report of termination of his services, Alegre protested the
announced termination of his employment. He argued that although his
contract did stipulate that the same would terminate on July 17, 1976, since his
services were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his employer,
and his employment had lasted for five years, he had acquired the status of a
regular employee and could not be removed except for valid cause. The
Regional Director considered Brent School's report as an application for
clearance to terminate employment (not a report of termination), and accepting
the recommendation of the Labor Conciliator, refused to give such clearance
and instead required the reinstatement of Alegre, as a "permanent employee,"
to his former position without loss of seniority rights and with full back wages.
The Director pronounced "the ground relied upon by the respondent (Brent) in
terminating the services of the complainant (Alegre) . . . (as) not sanctioned by
P.D. 442," and, quite oddly, as prohibited by Circular No. 8, series of 1969, of
the Bureau of Private Schools.
Issue : WON the provisions of the Labor Code, as amended, have
anathematized "fixed period employment" or employment for a term
Ruling : The entire purpose behind the development of legislation culminating
in the present Article 280 of the Labor Code clearly appears to have been, as
already observed, to prevent circumvention of the employee's right to be secure
in his tenure, the clause in said article indiscriminately and completely ruling
out all written or oral agreements conflicting with the concept of regular
employment as defined therein should be construed to refer to the substantive
evil that the Code itself has singled out: agreements entered into precisely to
circumvent security of tenure. It should have no application to instances where
a fixed period of employment was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by
the parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure being brought to
bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his
consent, or where it satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee
dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance
whatever being exercised by the former over the latter. Unless thus limited in
its purview, the law would be made to apply to purposes other than those
explicitly stated by its framers; it thus becomes pointless and arbitrary, unjust
in its effects and apt to lead to absurd and unintended consequences. Alegre's
employment was terminated upon the expiration of his last contract with Brent
School on July 16, 1976 without the necessity of any notice. The advance
written advice given the Department of Labor with copy to said petitioner was
a mere reminder of the impending expiration of his contract, not a letter of
termination, nor an application for clearance to terminate which needed the
approval of the Department of Labor to make the termination of his services
effective. In any case, such clearance should properly have been given, not
denied. Alegre's contract of employment with Brent School having lawfully
terminated with and by reason of the expiration of the agreed term of period
thereof, he is declared not entitled to reinstatement and the other relief awarded
and confirmed on appeal in the proceedings below.