ARTICLE IN PRESS

International Journal of
Educational Research 45 (2006) 57–70
www.elsevier.com/locate/ijedures

Epistemic dimensions of students’

mathematics-related belief systems
Peter Op ’t Eynde, Erik De Corte, Lieven Verschaffel
Department of Educational Sciences, Center for Instructional Psychology and Technology,
University of Leuven, Vesaliusstraat 2, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium

Abstract

Over the years, research on students’ epistemological beliefs has resulted in a growing common
understanding but there are still some major points of discussion. Especially, the lack of consensus on
the context-general and/or context-specific nature of epistemological beliefs deserves our attention.
We argue that research in the field today is mainly characterized by a top-down approach that
investigates students’ domain-specific beliefs from a general epistemological perspective. Alter-
natively, we report on one of our studies as well as some other research that takes a bottom-up
approach starting from students’ domain-specific belief systems and analyzing their epistemic
dimensions. Results of these studies point to the highly domain-specific nature of students’ beliefs
about knowledge and knowing. Therefore, a conceptual distinction between students’ general
epistemological beliefs and the epistemic dimensions of domain-related belief systems is
recommended as a more appropriate way to address the context-general–context-specific discussion
on epistemological beliefs.
r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Mathematics; Epistemological beliefs; Learning; Problem solving

1. Introduction

During the last 15 years, the study of students’ epistemological beliefs has become a
prominent research topic in educational psychology. Originally going back to Perry’s work
in the 1970s (see e.g., Perry, 1970), a growing number of scholars engaged in the study of
Corresponding author. Tel.: +32 16 326248; fax: +32 16 326274.
E-mail address: Peter.OptEynde@ped.kuleuven.be (P. Op ’t Eynde).

0883-0355/$ - see front matter r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ijer.2006.08.004
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students’ beliefs about knowledge and knowing and started to investigate their internal
structure and influence on students’ learning (for a review see e.g., Buehl & Alexander,
2001; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). A state-of-the-art of the field has been recently presented in
edited books (see e.g., Hofer & Pintrich, 2002) and several special issues of journals (see
e.g., Hofer, 2004; Schraw & Sinatra, 2004).
It is not our intention in this contribution to repeat the work done by those
authors. They have extensively discussed the nature and structure of epistemological
beliefs and/or presented comprehensive reviews of studies that illustrated the relevance of
these beliefs for learning and problem solving. Although testifying a growing common
understanding of students’ epistemological beliefs and their role in the learning process,
these publications also identified some major points of divergence and discussion. In this
article we want to analyze and clarify one of those issues on which a consensus in the field
is lacking, i.e., the context-general and/or the context-specific nature of epistemological
beliefs.
Starting from an overview of studies that specifically address the context generality
versus specificity discussion, we will identify some matters that are in need of
further clarification. Especially the lack of consensus on the dimensional structure
that characterizes students’ domain-specific epistemological belief systems as well
as the relation of those beliefs with more general epistemological beliefs deserve our
attention.
It will be argued that most of the research in the field today is characterized by a top-
down approach that investigates students’ domain-specific beliefs from a general
epistemological perspective and does not really take the subject domain seriously.
Alternatively, we will report one of our studies as well as some other research that takes a
bottom-up approach starting from students’ domain-specific belief systems and analyzing
their epistemic dimensions. A discussion of the results of these studies points to the highly
domain-specific nature of students’ beliefs about knowledge and knowing which might call
for a re-conceptualization of general- and domain-specific aspects of personal epistemol-
ogy. In that respect, a conceptual distinction between students’ general epistemological
beliefs and the epistemic dimensions of domain-related belief systems will be recom-
mended.

2. Points of divergence

Although most scholars agree that beliefs about the structure, the certainty and the
source of knowledge are at the heart of students’ personal epistemology (see e.g., Hofer,
2000; Schommer, 1990), there is still no consensus on the different categories of beliefs that
are considered to constitute students’ epistemological belief systems. Indeed, next to the
beliefs mentioned above, such systems can include depending on the theory, for example,
beliefs about the ability to learn (e.g., Jehng, Johnson, & Anderson, 1993) and/or beliefs
about justification for knowing (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). More than just representing the
different outcomes of factor analyses performed in various studies, this divergence usually
goes back to a disagreement on fundamental conceptual and methodological issues that
from a certain perspective might even be labeled ‘‘paradigmatic’’ (see e.g., Hofer, 2004).
One of the more fundamental points that is highly debated today is concerned with the
adequateness of the concept of decontextualized beliefs as such to frame the role of
personal epistemology in students’ learning. Typically, epistemological beliefs have been
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considered general in nature rather than context-specific. The term referred to students’
general beliefs about knowledge, knowing and in some cases learning, with no need for
differentiation by non-academic and academic situations, by subject domain, or classroom
context.
Nowadays, more and more scholars start to question the general nature of
epistemological beliefs and have engaged in research to clarify the context generality
versus specificity discussion. In the next section, we will present an overview of this work
and discuss some major findings.

3. Context generality versus context specificity

The stage models on epistemological development that dominated the early research
defended a general view on epistemological beliefs (see e.g., Baxter Magolda, 1992; Kuhn,
1991). Students were thought to have universal beliefs about knowledge and knowing
independent of specific domains or contexts which gradually evolve from unsophisticated
to sophisticated beliefs through a sequence of stages. Students holding different beliefs
about knowledge and knowing with respect to distinct subject-matter domains (e.g.,
chemistry and English) were viewed as having an immature epistemological belief system
that was not yet very stable.
Gradually, however, the possible domain specificity of epistemological beliefs became a
topic of interest. Based on the recognition (a) that academic domains differ on several
dimensions that fundamentally determine the nature of the problem-solving activities and
the knowledge in these respective domains (see e.g., Alexander, 1992; Biglan, 1973), and (b)
that the curriculum in schools typically consists of discrete subjects with their own content
and methods that mirror these disciplinary differences, it became more and more plausible
that also students’ beliefs about knowledge and knowing might vary according to those
domains (see Buehl et al., 2002). Distinguishing between domains on dimensions like ill-
structured versus well-structured, hard versus soft; pure versus applied, scholars set up
studies to compare students’ epistemological beliefs in history (ill-structured) versus
mathematics (well-structured); in social sciences (pure-soft) versus mathematics (pure-
hard) as well as in other subjects. Some used a within-subject design (see e.g., Buehl et al.,
2002; Hofer, 2000; Schommer & Walker, 1995; Schommer-Aikins, Duell, & Barker, 2001;
Stodolsky, Salk, & Glaessner, 1991), others a between-subject design (see e.g., Jehng et al.,
1993; Paulsen & Wells, 1998). The results of these studies are rather inconclusive.
Depending on the approach taken and the instruments used, scholars report either that
students’ epistemological beliefs are (moderately) domain general or that they do evidence
domain specificity.
Using a domain-specific version of Schommer’s Epistemological Belief Questionnaire
(SEQ), Schommer and her colleagues (Schommer-Aikins et al., 2001; Schommer &
Walker, 1995) consistently found that epistemological beliefs tend to be moderately
domain general. They point out that (Schommer-Aikins et al., 2001, p. 7):

By moderate, domain generality, we mean that an individual who tends to believe in

simple, certain knowledge in one domain, will tend to have similar beliefs in other
domains. Yet, the epistemological beliefs will not be exactly the same. They may still
believe in simple, certain knowledge in mathematics, more than in social sciences.
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Table 1
Epistemological dimensions distinguished in domain-specific epistemological research

Schommer- Hofer (2000) Buehl, Alexander, and Murphy (2002)

Aikins et al.
(2001)

Simple Certainty/simplicity Integration of information and problem solving

knowledge in mathematics
Certain Source of knowing: authority Integration of information and problem solving
knowledge in history
Innate ability Justification of knowing: personal Need for effort in mathematics
Quick learning Attainment of truth Need for effort in history

Others, like Hofer (2000) and Buehl et al. (2002), using their own developed domain-specific
belief questionnaires,1 found evidence that students’ beliefs about academic knowledge and
knowing differed according to the domain. When comparing students’ beliefs about
knowledge and knowing in science and psychology, Hofer (2000) discovered that the same
dimensional structure was underlying students’ epistemological beliefs about the two domains
but that students had different epistemological perceptions of the two disciplines. For example,
students saw knowledge in science as more certain and unchanging than in psychology.
Comparing students’ epistemological beliefs in mathematics and history Buehl et al.
(2002) came to similar conclusions favoring domain specificity. However, the shared
epistemological structure constituting students’ belief systems about those two subjects was
different from Hofer’s (see, Table 1). Although different, both studies refer to a common
general structure underlying the beliefs in the two investigated disciplines, pointing to some
kind of general factor. A conjecture that is confirmed by the positive correlations that
Buehl et al. (2002) reported between their domain-specific factors and the more general
factors of Schommer’s Epistemological Belief Questionnaire.
In sum, these two studies, as well as others (see e.g., Paulsen & Wells, 1998; Stodolsky et
al., 1991), present data that make a good case for the domain specificity of students’
epistemological beliefs. Although not denying the existence of more general epistemolo-
gical beliefs, a domain-specific approach is found to have more explanatory power. Buehl
et al. (2002, p. 444), for example, point out:
This investigation also tested a hypothesized domain-specific factor structure against
competing models. As a result, we were able to disconfirm the plausibility of a
domain-general epistemological belief structure, lending greater credibility to the
domain specificity of epistemological beliefs.

Taking into account the present state-of-the-art of the related research, one could
defend, in line with Buehl and Alexander (2001), a multidimensional and a multilayered
account of students’ epistemological beliefs, acknowledging three levels nested within each
other: (1) domain-specific beliefs, (2) academic epistemological beliefs; (3) general
epistemological beliefs. Depending on the level of specificity/generality of the items/
questions presented to students, scholars are then addressing in their study one of these
levels of epistemological beliefs.
1
Respectively, Hofer’s Discipline-Focused Epistemological Beliefs Questionnaire (DEBQ) and the Domain-
Specific Beliefs Questionnaire of Buehl et al. (DSBQ).
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4. Discussion

The context generality–context specificity discussion is thus clearly not closed yet. For
one, the conflicting results presented by Schommer-Aikins et al. (2001), on the one hand,
and Buehl et al. (2002), and Hofer (2000), on the other hand, need further clarification.
Also, the possibly unifying framework characterized by a multidimensional and
multilayered account of students’ epistemological beliefs raises further questions.
The difference between the research findings of Schommer-Aikins et al. (2001) and those
from other studies discussed above, is usually explained by referring to the instruments
used. Schommer-Aikins presented her students the domain-specific version of the SEQ.
This is originally an instrument developed to measure students’ general epistemological
beliefs. It has a four-factor structure: (1) innate ability, (2) simple knowledge, (3) quick
learning, and (4) certain knowledge. The modifications made in the domain-specific version
are that students are asked to keep a specific discipline in mind when filling in the
questionnaire, and that in some items the discipline is explicitly mentioned. The SEQ has
been the object of some criticism over the years on conceptual as well as on psychometrical
grounds (see e.g., Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Especially, the domain-specific version has been
questioned for not being domain-specific enough (see e.g., Buehl et al., 2002; Hofer, 2000).
Adaptations as ‘‘keeping the discipline in mind’’ and ‘‘explicitly mentioning the discipline
in some items’’ were thought not to address the domain-specific structure of a discipline.
The moderate domain generality found then might be a result of the ‘‘moderate domain-
general’’ instrument used, rather than reflecting actual commonalities between students’
epistemological beliefs about different disciplines.
To avoid this instrumental bias, Hofer (2000) as well as Buehl et al. (2002) have
developed their own domain-specific epistemological belief questionnaire, respectively the
DEBQ and the DSBQ (see footnote 1). Hofer’s DEBQ took the different (general)
epistemological dimensions identified by Hofer and Pintrich (1997) as theoretical starting
point, i.e., (1) certainty of knowledge, (2) simplicity of knowledge, (3) source of knowledge
(4) justification for knowing. Next, taking into account the overall structure as well as
concrete items of other similar instruments, a questionnaire was constructed that focuses
on disciplinary knowledge and consists of items that explicitly use the field or subject
matter as the frame of reference (e.g., ‘‘Truth is unchanging in this subject’’). Buehl et al.
(2002) took Schommer’s four dimensions as their theoretical framework and in a first
phase tried to construct items that were a domain-specific translation related to the specific
subjects under investigation (i.e., mathematics and history). For example, a number of
Schommer’s items relate to the use of learning strategies. Buehl et al. generated items that
specifically focus on the use of learning strategies in, respectively, mathematics and history.
However, in the second developmental phase of the questionnaire, items that were too
domain-specific were eliminated. Buehl et al. (2002, p. 423) pointed out that to enhance
comparability and to reduce error variance:

‘‘y all items were rewritten so that each item could apply to either domain with the
change of a single word. For example, the item, ‘‘Mathematics relates to day to day
life’’, was rewritten as ‘‘History relates to day to day life’’. This process resulted in the
elimination of several items that could not easily be applied to both domains (e.g.,
‘‘In a math class, all you really need to know is how to use the formulas’’).
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Using these domain-specific questionnaires, both Hofer (2000) as well as Buehl et al.
(2002) reported domain-specific differences in epistemological beliefs. But at the same time
both studies showed that students’ beliefs in the compared subject domains could be
structured along the same epistemological dimensions. Unfortunately, however, there is a
considerable variety in the nature of the dimensions found within each of the studies. A
comparison with the epistemological factors identified in Schommer-Aikins’ domain-
specific approach highlights this lack of consensus even more (see Table 1).
There are some similarities between the dimensions found in the different studies: for
example, Schommer-Aikins’ et al. simple and certain knowledge corresponds to Hofer’s
certainty and simplicity dimension. However, the diversity of the reported dimensions raises
questions about a multidimensional and multilayered account of epistemological beliefs.
Indeed, one cannot disregard the fact that although all these scholars claim to measure
domain-specific epistemological beliefs, they do not do this in the same way or to the same
degree. On one end of the spectrum there is Schommer-Aikins’ et al. approach, which has
been criticized for not being domain-specific enough (see above). On the other end, there are
Buehl’s et al. (2002) efforts to construct specific items that are aimed to be domain-specific
translations of dimensions of general epistemological beliefs, with Hofer’s (2000) approach
somewhat in between. According to one viewpoint, the variety in dimensions found in the
respective studies can be considered as supportive for the multilayered nature of students’
personal epistemology indicating, however, that further sub-levels need to be distinguished
within the domain-specific layer. According to an alternative viewpoint, which we tend to
adhere, this variety shows that at this stage researchers are still struggling to adequately
grasp the domain-specific nature of epistemological beliefs and the instruments needed to
measure it. Indeed, till now the specificity of the domain has after all hardly been taken
seriously in epistemological research. Most of the studies are characterized by a top-down
approach. Starting from known dimensions of general epistemological beliefs, scholars
develop each in their own way a domain-specific instrument to investigate the domain
generality–domain specificity discussion. The general perspective, however, stays promi-
nently present in the developed domain-specific instruments. Even Buehl et al. (2002) who
appeared to be the most inclined to acknowledge the specific structure and nature of the
domain, eliminated exactly those items that were highly domain-specific when developing
their DSBQ (see above). A bottom-up approach that takes students’ domain-specific belief
systems as a starting point and analyzes students’ beliefs about knowledge and knowing
within that domain, might shed another light on the domain-specific nature of personal
epistemology. In one of our studies we have exactly tried to do this for students’ beliefs
about knowledge and knowing in the domain of mathematics. Starting from an analysis of
students’ mathematics-related belief systems, we took a closer look at the nature and
structure of students’ beliefs about knowledge and knowing in mathematics in school.

5. Students’ mathematics-related belief systems: a questionnaire study

5.1. Theoretical framework

In his pioneering work on students’ mathematics beliefs, Schoenfeld (1985) pointed out that
Belief systems are one’s mathematical world view, the perspective with which one
approaches mathematics and mathematical tasks. (p. 45)
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In both mathematical and epistemological research, students’ different beliefs typically

have been studied in an isolated way. Rarely scholars have investigated those beliefs in
relation to each other, i.e., analyzing the functioning of students’ belief systems in context
rather than just one specific category of beliefs. Based on a review of the relevant research
literature, we have developed a framework of students’ mathematics-related belief systems
(see Op ’t Eynde, De Corte, & Verschaffel, 2002) that identifies the different relevant belief
categories and defines students’ belief systems as the implicitly or explicitly held subjective
conceptions students hold to be true about (1) mathematics education, (2) about
themselves as mathematicians, and (3) about the mathematics class context. These beliefs
determine in close interaction with each other and with students’ prior knowledge their
mathematical learning and problem-solving activities in class.
The available empirical studies done on each of these three categories separately learns
that within those categories useful distinctions can be made between different
subcategories (see e.g., de Abreu, Bishop, & Pompeu, 1997; Lampert, 1990; Seegers &
Boekaerts, 1993). Table 2 schematically represents the framework including all the
different categories and their respective subcategories:
When looking at students’ mathematics-related beliefs from an epistemological
perspective, especially the beliefs about mathematics education are of interest. They
represent students’ conceptions about the nature and the structure of knowledge and
knowing in school mathematics. Indeed, in line with Schoenfeld’s (1985) definition,
students’ beliefs about mathematics education reflect their view on what mathematics is
like. ‘What is mathematics’ is a question often asked throughout history and the answers
given differed over time (De Corte, Greer, & Verschaffel, 1996). Since the last decades, the
view of mathematics as a body of absolute facts and procedures, dealing with quantities
and forms, with certain knowledge, is under attack. Several authors (e.g., Ernest, 1991;
Schoenfeld, 1992) have advocated a conceptualization of mathematics as an activity
grounded in human practices, a science of patterns with problem solving at the heart of it.
Such fundamental issues are captured by students’ beliefs about mathematics (1.1).

Table 2
A framework of students’ mathematics-related belief system

1. Beliefs about mathematics education

1.1 Beliefs about mathematics
1.2 Beliefs about mathematical learning and problem solving
1.3 Beliefs about mathematics teaching

2. Beliefs about the self as a mathematician

2.1 Intrinsic goal orientation beliefs
2.2 Extrinsic goal orientation beliefs
2.3 Task-value beliefs
2.4 Control beliefs
2.5 Self-efficacy beliefs

3. Beliefs about the mathematics class context

3.1 Beliefs about the role and the functioning of their teacher
3.2 Beliefs about the role and the functioning of the students in their class
3.3 Beliefs about the socio-mathematical norms in their own class
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Furthermore, what students fundamentally think about mathematics and mathematical

knowledge is closely related to what they think mathematics learning (1.2), on the one
hand, and mathematics teaching (1.3), on the other, are like (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997).
Therefore, these three kinds of beliefs tend to be closely related, clustered so as to say; they
seem to constitute three inter-related subsets of beliefs about mathematics.

5.2. Research question

Although our framework for mathematics-related belief systems is in accordance with

much of the empirical evidence provided by the vast majority of studies wherein students’
mathematics-related beliefs are investigated in isolation, the lack of empirical research that
focuses on belief systems as a whole rather than on its constituents separately, seriously
questions the validity of the model. Therefore, our main research question for this study
was double:

Can we find empirical evidence supporting the validity of the structure of mathematics-
related belief systems as represented in our theoretical framework?

Where exactly do epistemological beliefs fit in students’ mathematics-related belief
systems?

5.3. Design

5.3.1. Instruments
To be able to test the validity of the presented framework we constructed a mathematics-
related beliefs questionnaire (MRBQ) consisting of several scales and subscales based on
the different categories and subcategories constituting our model. Starting from existing
questionnaires which usually measure only one kind of beliefs (e.g., either beliefs about
math, or beliefs about the self), we developed an integrated instrument that asked students
about their beliefs about mathematics education, about the self in relation to mathematics
and about the social context in their specific class. As already mentioned, students’ beliefs
on mathematics education (Category 1) touch on a number of relevant epistemological
themes in relation to mathematics learning. Items operationalizing this category (ordered
by subcategories) are for example:

Beliefs about mathematics (1.1): e.g., ‘‘Formal mathematics has little or nothing to do
with real thinking or problem solving’’.

Beliefs about mathematical learning and problem solving (1.2): e.g., ‘‘Mathematics
learning is memorizing’’.

Beliefs about mathematics teaching (1.3): e.g., ‘‘A good teacher first explains the theory
and gives an example of an exercise before he asks to solve mathematical problems’’.

Since beliefs about the social context have been rarely studied using a questionnaire, we
limited our operationalization of this concept in our questionnaire to one component, i.e.,
students’ beliefs about the role and the functioning of their teacher (3.1). This subcategory
includes items that measure students’ beliefs about how their teachers organize instruction
in class, how motivating they are, and how empathic and sensitive they are to students’
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needs. This resulted in the experimental version of the MRBQ containing 58 items that are
scored on a 6-point Likert-scale, from 0 (I completely disagree) to 5 (I totally agree).

5.3.2. Procedure and subjects

The data were gathered from a sample of 365 Flemish junior high students (age 14). The
experimental version of the MRBQ was administered once during the spring of 1999.
Twenty-one classrooms were sampled spanning the different tracks Flemish students can
follow in the second year of secondary education. Although the core subject-matter
domains, including mathematics, are the same for everyone, students choose optional
subjects that can be either vocational oriented (technical courses), humanities oriented
(courses in humanities) and/or classical oriented (Latin/Greek courses). Generally
speaking, the choice of these optional subjects is not neutral, but related to the intellectual
level of the students. Moreover, the optional subjects taken by the students are used in
most schools as a grouping criterion for classes, resulting in relatively homogeneous class
groups. In our sample, 109 students were vocational oriented (lowest intellectual level), 119
students took humanities courses as optional subjects (moderate intellectual level) and 137
students were classical oriented (highest intellectual level).

5.4. Data analysis

A principal component analysis was performed on all the items. The number and
meaning of the principal components derived from this analysis can provide clarification
concerning the question: Which belief categories and subcategories have empirical
grounds? Our decision to choose this type of analysis, rather than for instance a
confirmatory factor analysis, was based on the exploratory nature of the study. After all,
we did not know of any study so far that investigated the validity of the different categories
of students’ mathematics-related beliefs in relation to each other.

5.5. Results

An analysis of the scree plot revealed that not more than six factors should be extracted
(all with eigenvalues 41). A four-factor solution accounting for 38.3% of the variance
allowed for the best interpretation of the major common factors. We identified four major
categories of students’ beliefs that constitute their mathematics-related belief system:

(1) beliefs about the role and the functioning of their own teacher,
(2) beliefs about the significance of and their own competence in mathematics,
(3) mathematics as a social activity,
(4) mathematics as a domain of excellence.

This four-factor model shows that there is some empirical ground for the proposed
structure of students’ mathematics-related belief systems.2 The three main categories
differentiated in our theoretical framework can be identified in the four-factor model.
Factor 1 refers to beliefs about the social context, Factor 2 to beliefs about the self, and
2
For a more detailed discussion of these factors and the items loading on them see Op ‘t Eynde and De Corte
(2003).
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Factors 3 and 4 to beliefs about mathematics education (although not entirely). However,
most of these empirically derived factors are not exactly constituted as theoretically
expected, and many of the hypothesized subcategories are not validated as distinct
categories. We will not get into a discussion of all the results here, but will focus on Factors
3 and 4 which from an epistemological perspective and are the most relevant.
Perceiving mathematics as a social activity includes a strong belief that mathematics is
useful in real life and, more generally, that mathematics is grounded in human practices
and is a dynamic discipline. Illustrative items for this factor referring to such a socio-
constructivist view of mathematics are: ‘‘Mathematics enables man to better understand
the world he lives in’’ and ‘‘Mathematics is continuously evolving, new things are still
discovered’’ (see also Ernest, 1991). Also loading high on this factor are items like, for
instance: ‘‘Anyone can learn mathematics’’ and ‘‘There are several ways to find the correct
solution of a mathematics problem’’. The latter items are representative for the socio-
constructivist perspective on (mathematics) learning and problem solving.
Students who see mathematics as a domain of excellence are convinced that in
mathematics they can show their capacities and prove that they are better than others.
Moreover, they seem to have a more absolutist view of mathematical learning and problem
solving. The following items are loading high on this factor: ‘‘By doing the best I can in
mathematics I want to show the teacher that I’m better than most of the other students’’
(extrinsic goal orientation) and ‘‘There is only one way to find the correct answer on a
mathematics problem’’ (absolutist view on mathematical problem solving). Overall, these
items deal with the importance to excel in mathematics and specific characteristics of the
(problem-solving) process related to it.
When we look at all the four categories of beliefs constituting students’ mathematics-
related belief systems, we find them to be closely related in different ways. The correlations
between the different factors indicate that students holding a more social, dynamic view of
mathematics attach more value to mathematics and have more confidence in their
mathematical capacities ðr ¼ :48Þ. They also tend to have more positive beliefs about the
teacher and his functioning in class ðr ¼ :41Þ. Moreover, we found that irrespective of the
fact that they have a socio-constructivist or absolutist view of mathematics, students
holding positive beliefs about their teacher in general consider mathematics more valuable
and feel more confident about it ðr ¼ :38Þ.
Rather surprising was the correlation—albeit low—that we found between Factors 3
and 4 ðr ¼ :21Þ. Since both views incorporate opposite epistemological stances, one would
have expected them to be negatively correlated as the opposite poles of one dimension.
This is apparently not the case, which is puzzling and demands further analysis.
Students’ beliefs about mathematics seem thus to split up in two weakly related
dimensions. On the one hand, students perceive mathematics as a social activity, or not
(Factor 3). On the other hand, they view it as a domain of excellence, or not (Factor 4).
The socio-constructivist view of mathematics is clearly present in Factor 3. Items related to
an absolutist view of mathematics do not load on this category at all. Some of those items,
that refer to an absolutist view on mathematical learning and problem solving load on
Factor 4. This might indicate that these two theoretically and epistemologically ‘‘opposite’’
positions towards mathematics and mathematics learning may not be all that contra-
dictory in the mathematics classroom. But, from an epistemological perspective these
findings are difficult to understand. There seem to be at least two plausible lines of
reasoning that could explain these results.
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First, starting from the premise that students’ epistemological beliefs, i.e., their beliefs
about the nature of knowledge and the processes of knowing, are very fundamental and
general in nature (Hofer and Pintrich, 1997), our findings could indicate that at a general
level students can hold contradictory epistemological beliefs that underlie contradictory
domain-specific epistemological beliefs.
Alternatively, our data could show that students’ beliefs about knowledge and knowing
within a specific domain and context follow their own context-specific rationality and,
consequently, cannot be linked in a straightforward way to students’ more general
epistemological beliefs.
Since we lack specific data about students’ general epistemological beliefs, we cannot
provide any hard evidence supporting either of the two hypotheses. However, our data as
well as findings from other research tend to favor the second explanation.
For one, several scholars have pointed out that students’ mathematics-related belief
systems appear to have a quasi-logical structure that might not be in accordance with or
even contradict an epistemo-logic(al) one (see e.g., Ruthven & Coe, 1994). Snow, Corno,
and Jackson (1996) rightfully acknowledge that

Human beings in general show tendencies to form and hold beliefs that serve their
own needs, desires and goals; these beliefs serve ego-enhancement, self-protective,
and personal and social control purposes and cause biases in perception and
judgment in social situations as a result. (p. 292)

The subjective rationale underlying the organization of mathematics-related belief

systems is rarely consciously known by students. Rather, it reveals itself in the way they
actually perceive specific mathematical problems, and how they solve them. Students’
beliefs direct their activities and interactions in the mathematics classroom, but they are
also determined by the classroom interactions and the norms governing it (see Yackel &
Cobb, 1996). Students develop their sense of what it means to do mathematics and what
they and the others are expected to do in mathematics lessons from their actual experiences
and interactions during the classroom activities in which they engage (Henningsen & Stein,
1997). Thus, beliefs about the nature of mathematics education, about oneself as a learner
of mathematics, and about the class context are constructed in an attempt to make sense of
classroom life during mathematics instruction.
The contradictory domain-specific manifestations of epistemological beliefs we found
(Factor 3 and 4) might thus be perceived as a way to make sense of classroom life. Indeed,
although a view of mathematics as a social activity might be contradictory to a view of
mathematics as a domain of excellence from an epistemological perspective, this does not
have to be necessarily the case when one takes into account the culture and rationale
characterizing life in the mathematics classroom. In fact, the orientation toward
achievement and grading that up to a certain point always characterizes a mathematical
classroom, might account for the presence and acceptance of certain absolutist
characteristics. For example, on most items of a traditional mathematics test there usually
is only one correct answer. These grading-related aspects of mathematics in school can be
perceived by students quite independently of what one thinks mathematics and
mathematical learning and problem solving should really be about, accounting for the
presence of two different factors.
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5.6. General conclusion and discussion

The results of our study as well as those of others (see Gfeller, Niess, & Lederman, 2000;
Ruthven & Coe, 1994) suggest that students’ beliefs about knowledge and knowing in a
specific domain, i.e., classroom mathematics, are highly domain and context specific.
Situated within a specific domain-related belief system (i.e. mathematics-related belief
system), these beliefs get a specific content and are in a specific way related to other
relevant beliefs.
Gfeller et al. (2000), for example, when investigating high-school students’ beliefs about
mathematical ways of knowing, reported a variety of epistemological beliefs related to
mathematics that all seemed to be closely linked to specific mathematical concepts and
understandings. For instance, they showed how many students seemed to restrict their
view of the justification of new mathematical knowledge to inductive reasoning rather than
deductive logical proof, illustrating a typical understanding of the nature of proof in
mathematics. Ruthven and Coe (1994) investigated the relation between students’
epistemological beliefs and their beliefs about the teaching and learning of mathematics.
Contrary to what could be logically expected, they did not find strong associations between
high-school students’ epistemological beliefs and their beliefs about learning and teaching.
Again, as in our study, the logic behind the relations between different students’
mathematics-related beliefs seems to be of a more complex, personal and context-specific
nature than is generally thought.
Students’ beliefs about knowledge and knowing in classroom mathematics seem to be
very much the exponents of interactions between the individual and the context, rather
than the logical consequence of the epistemological beliefs students hold at a more general
level. Of course, these more general epistemological beliefs still influence students’
perception and behavior (as an individual characteristic), but it surely is not the only and
maybe not even the most dominant determinant. To understand students’ functioning and
learning, to understand students’ mathematics-related beliefs, a complex whole of
individual and context characteristics has to be considered. Taking into account the
present state-of-the-art of the research relating to mathematics education, there seems to
be a priority of the more concrete level over the more general one.
The link between this concrete level and the more general one remains unclear. If we
conceive epistemological beliefs, i.e., beliefs about the nature of knowledge and the
processes of knowing, as being essentially very fundamental and general in nature (Hofer
and Pintrich, 1997), then mathematics-related beliefs about knowledge and knowing can
never be considered epistemological beliefs as such. These mathematics-related beliefs tend
to function within a different system and hardly share a common dimensional structure
with the more general epistemological beliefs.
In our study of mathematics-related beliefs as well as in, for example Ruthven and Coe’s
study (1994), still other dimensions come to the foreground compared to the already
varying dimensions identified in the domain-specific epistemological studies discussed in
Table 1. One possible explanation for this diversity is the fact that the studies and
instruments differ in the degree to which they really are domain-specific (see above). It is
not surprising to see then that in those studies that were perceived the least domain-
specific; the dimensions found are very similar to the dimensions found in studies on
general epistemological beliefs. This is, however, far less the case in Buehl’s et al’s study
(2002) and in studies in the field of mathematics education. Maybe the differences found
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there point to a more fundamental difference, i.e., that epistemological beliefs at a general
level have a different nature and structure compared to domain-specific beliefs about
mathematical knowledge and knowing.
Research today tends to indicate that students’ general epistemological beliefs are
structured and function in a different way than students’ domain and even context-specific
beliefs about knowledge and knowing (see also Louca, Elby, Hammer, & Kagey, 2004).
For the sake of conceptual clarity we think that different concepts might be in place here to
label these different phenomena. Therefore, we would propose to reserve the term
epistemological beliefs for the general beliefs about knowledge and knowing and to refer to
students’ domain-specific beliefs about knowledge and knowing with the term epistemic
dimensions. A clear conceptual distinction between both might stimulate researchers to
further unravel the epistemic dimensions of different domains and contexts on its own
right and analyze closely their relation with epistemological beliefs, on the one hand, and
learning and problem solving, on the other.

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