A New Analysis of Quasi Analysis

A New Analysis of Quasianalysis
Author(s): Hannes Leitgeb

Source: Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Apr., 2007), pp. 181-226
Published by: Springer
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Journal of Philosophical Logic (2007) 36: 181-226 a Springer 2006
DOI 10.1007/s 10992-006-9033-z
HANNES LEITGEB
A NEW ANALYSIS OF QUASIANALYSIS
Received 28 December 2005
ABSTRACT. We investigate the conditions under which quasianalysis, i.e.,

Carnap's method of abstraction in his AuJbau, yields adequate results. In
particular, we state both necessary and sufficient conditions for the so-called
faithfulness and fullness of quasianalysis, and analyze adequacy as the
conjunction of faithfulness and fullness. It is shown that there is no method
of (re-)constructing properties from similarity that delivers adequate results in
all possible cases, if the same set of individuals is presupposed for properties and
for similarity, and if similarity is a relation of finite arity. The theory is applied
to various examples, including Russell's construction of temporal instants and
Carnap's constitution of the phenomenal counterparts to quality spheres. Our
results explain why the former is adequate while the latter is bound to fail.
KEY WORDS: abstraction, Aufbau, Carnap, quasianalysis, similarity
1. INTRODUCTION
In his Der Logische Aufbau der Welt [4] - from now on briefly: Aufbau -
and in unpublished manuscripts before the Aufbau (see R. Carnap,
unpublished manuscript RC-081-05-01 [1922]; RC-081-04-01 [1923]),
Rudolf Carnap introduced the so-called method of quasianalysis as an
extension of Frege's and Russell's method of abstracting mathematical
entities from equivalence relations.' Since the empirical domain seemed
to demand descriptions in terms of similarity relations rather than in
terms of the more restrictive equivalence relations, the standard method
of abstraction had to be adapted in order to enable also the logical
(re-)construction of empirical entities.
Several years later Nelson Goodman criticized Carnap's quasianalysis
for not delivering the right distribution of qualities from a similarity
relation under certain conditions (see Section V.3-V.5 in [11], p. 557 of
[12], and [13]): Sometimes qualities are not introduced by quasianalysis,
since they cannot be separated with respect to the similarities that they
induce ('companionship difficulty'), or they are introduced unjustifiably
because several individuals are mutually similar without sharing a single
quality ('difficulty of imperfect community'). Subsequent papers on this
topic strengthened and elaborated Goodman's criticism in terms of further
examples and observations (see e.g., Eberle [8], Kleinknecht [19]). In
182 H. LEITGEB
fact, Carnap already anticip

unpublished "Die Quasizerle
RC-081-04-01 [1923]) and al
Goodman. However, the con
not characterized by Carnap
in such form since then.2 Th
thus also to describe in a pr
quasianalysis indeed succeeds.
sufficient, and even both nec
can be found. Moreover, th
sense explain why Carnap's ap
the Aufbau is bound to fail
method in Our Knowledge o
method in his The Analysis o
to be abandoned generally a
class of properties or qualitie
to reflect has to be of a par
yield faithful and full result
of constituting properties
conditions, as long as the und
the same as for similarity, an
arity. Our results vindicate th
Rodriguez-Pereyra [45], Ha
support the positive assess
Mormann ([32-36]; see also
thesis [1995]). However, con
our analysis also shows clea
applied as intended by Carn
constitutional system in the
phenomenal counterparts to
Thus our findings ultimately
although it takes an elaborate
and not just a set of example
2. SIMILARITY AND PROPE
In the subsequent section w

Aufbau version of quasianal
as a formal procedure by w
generated from similarity str
essary terminology that is
A NEW ANALYSIS OF QUASIANALYSIS 183
typical examples of quasianalysis are instances of the more general t

that we are going to develop.
According to the Aufbau, p. 35, a similarity relation is character
formally as a binary reflexive and symmetric relation. The paradig
example that Carnap thinks of is metrical similarity: If x is simila
and y is similar to z in the sense that their respective distances d(x,
d(y, z) as being given by a metric d are less than or equal to some
boundary E > 0, it is not necessarily the case that also x and z are
according to this metrical notion of similarity since distances mig
up in a way such that d(x, z) > E. Therefore, similarity need
transitive, although reflexivity (since d(x, x) =- 0 < ) and symmetr
d(x,y) <- , then also d(y,x) < E) hold unrestrictedly. We follow
terminology of Mormann [32] when we define:
DEFINITION 1. (Similarity Structure) A pair (S, ) is a simi

structure on S if
1. S is a non-empty set,
2. , C S x S is a reflexive and symmetric relation on S.
If (S, a-) is a similarity structure, the members of S will be

'individuals.' In case that x - y we say that x and y are si
(according to (S, -)). Since reflexivity and symmetry are presup
we can always 'depict' similarity structures in a unique way by
underlying (undirected) graphs G, = (S, { {x,y} Ix r y, x #: y}). In m
cases S will be assumed finite.3
Let us now contrast similarity structures with structures of a diff
kind, i.e., property structures:
DEFINITION 2. (Property Structure) A pair (S, P) is a property

ture set on S if
I. S is a non-empty set,
2. P is a set of subsets of S, 0 0 P, and for every x E S there
X E P, such that x E X.
If (S, P) is a property structure, we call the members of S a
'individuals,' while the members of P are called 'properties' (acc
to (S, P)). Note that the latter are properties in the extensional sen
sets.4 For reasons of convenience, we assume that there is no 'e
property which does not apply to any individual, and we take for gr
that every individual in S has at least one of the properties in P. A
are going to see later, the empty set could not be constructed by m
quasianalysis, so if the empty set were included as a property, the n
of adequacy that we are interested in would have to be restricted t
184 H. LEITGEB
quacy with respect to non-

such as Carnap's applica
psychological'
section of th
the members of P 'qualitie
a more general viewpoint o
3. QUASIANALYSIS
Once the classes of similar

been introduced, the nex
correspondence can be est
going to consider how simil
structures and how prope
similarity structures. We are
of these two directions of
preferred one', for whatev
thatGoodman regarded qua
always takes the determinatio
for granted while the determ
reconstruction. Proust [
Mormann, unpublished hab
closer to Carnap's earlier
unpublished manuscript
where similarity relations -
to be prior to properties or
determination of property
reconstruction at all but
Construction of properties
a given similarity relation
standpoint that would allow
constructed from similarit
relation itself. As we are
the Aufbau is sophisticated
interpretations: While sim
level of the phenomenalist
are prior to similarity on t
of the phenomenalistic con
intended results of quasi
from unintended ones th
stances, he takes the extr
going to present quasianaly
from a similarity relation
structure. The notions of faithfulness, fullness, and adequacy that we

introduce in Section 5 are motivated by this latter point of view
However, our results will be of relevance for discussions of quasianaly
in general, independent of how the method is interpreted or what its
are understood to be. In Section 5 we will also consider cases in which a
property structure is determined by a given initial similarity structure.
It is easy to see in what sense a given property structure may be said to
determine a similarity structure. The idea can already be found in some of
Leibniz's handwritings (see [21], A64 107/P 13): As Leibniz's remarks
(this is our translation), "Peter is similar to Paul" reduces to "Peter is A
now and Paul is A now." If we disregard the indexical 'now' and if we
make the hidden existential quantifier explicit, we have in fact set up our
intended correspondence principle: Two individuals are similar iff they
share a common property. The same idea may of course also be found in
much older literature (e.g., Bonaventura [3], p. 35) and in much more
recent literature (cf. Goodman [13], pp. 441-442). Similarity in this sense
is dual to identity which satisfies Leibniz's principium identitatis indis-
cernibilium: Two individuals are identical iff they share every property.
Put formally, this account of determining similarity from properties
amounts to:5
DEFINITION 3. (Determined Similarity Structure) (S, ~) is deter-

mined by (S, P) if
for all x,y E S: x JP y iff there is an X E P, such that x,y E X.
Instead of '(S, r') is determined by (S, P),' we also say '(S, P)
determines (S, P).' Obviously, every property structure on S deter-
mines a unique similarity structure on S. Thus, we are entitled to refer to
the similarity structure determined by (S, P).
Let us take a look at a simple example:
EXAMPLE 1. We consider a property structure (Si, P1) (Figure 1) with

just four individuals and two properties: S = {f1,2, 3, 4}, P1 =
( {1,2, 3 }, {3,4} }. Graphically.
C .2
oL 5/
Figure 1. Property structure (SI, PI)
186 H. LEITGEB
The similarity structure (

is in this case given by.
S= {1,2, 3,4},
p I= {(1, 1), (2, 2), (3, 3), (4, 4), (1, 2), (2, 1), (1, 3), (3, 1), (2, 3), (3, 2), (3,1 4), (4, 3)},
i.e., depicted as a graph:
3 -4
Figure 2. Similarity structure (SI, , )
(From now on we will always specify similarity s

their underlying graphs.)
Note that every similarity structure (s, ~) on S can

least one property structure on S in the manner ofdefin
the (trivial) property structure in which unordered
properties if and only if x r y (and x # y) (cf. Mor
Under certain conditions there is a particularly n
of (s,~P) as follows: Replace each individual x
properties in P that include x as a member; define
to be similar if and only if they have non-empty in
one ends up with a similarity structure of t
S' = {AI3x ES with A = {X E Px E X1}}, A ,-' B iff
of s' might be regarded as the individual con
individuals in S (relative to the properties of the giv
(s,P)). It is easy to see that if for every two me
property in P which applies to the one but not
isomorphic to (s',~') (i.e., there is a bijective ma
that for all x,y E S: x ~P y ifff(x) ~' f(y)). The grap
similarity structures such as (s', ~') are called 'inter
graph-theoretic literature (see McKee and M
introduction); the nodes of intersection graphs are
are given by non-empty intersection. It is well known that every gra

up to isomorphism, an intersection graph. There are also intere
results concerning parsimonious set representations: Define the inte
tion number i(G) of a graph G to be the minimum cardinality of a
such that G is (isomorphic to) an intersection graph of a family of su
of S. Let O(G) be the minimum cardinality of a family {G,, G2,..., G
complete subgraphs of G such that every edge in G is included in at
one of GI,G2,...,Gk. As P. Erdds, A.W. Goodman, L. P6sa hav
served, for every graph G it holds that i(G) = O(G) (see [31], p. 10).
results are particularly relevant for quasianalysis in the version
Carnap, unpublished manuscript RC-081-04-01 [1923]) (see Sectio
Mormann has studied intersection graphs intensively, though not by
name (see also Brockhaus's uniqueness result of (K. Brockha
unpublished doctoral dissertation [1963]) which is further analyz
Mormann; cf. [32]. See p. 977 of Rodriguez-Pereyra [46] for an
instance of an intersection graph).
Let us now turn to the other direction: In what sense may a similar
structure be said to determine a property structure? That is w
quasianalysis enters the picture. We need some further formal term
ogy in order to describe the method:
* x C s is called a clique of (s, ) iff for all x,y e X: x ~ y.

* x C s is a maximal clique of (S, ~) iff X is a clique of (s, -) and
is no Y c s, such that Xc Y and Y is a clique of (S, ,) as well.6
The main idea of quasianalysis can be explained easily in terms of

informal example: Think of a room with coloured objects, where sh
a colour is used as a similarity relation. Each colour may be supposed
embrace a certain range of hue, brightness, and intensity, and colour
permitted to 'overlap.' A set x of individuals which are brown (parti
or completely) will then certainly be a clique with respect to similar
since every two members of x share a colour. In order to turn from
such as X to the set of brown individuals in this room, and accordin
for the other colours, one might take maximal cliques rather than j
cliques simpliciter in order to constitute the colour properties. That
essentially the core of the method of quasianalysis, a procedure by w
Carnap's so-called 'similarity circles' (see AuJbau, Sections a70-
80-81, 97, 104), i.e., our maximal cliques, are constituted. In
context, instead of 'similarity circles,' we might call these set-theor
constructs 'quasiproperties' (cf. R. Carnap, unpublished manuscript R
081-04-01 [1923]): Properties as being given by quasianalysis
indicated above, we take a point of view according to w
188 H. LEITGEB
quasianalysis in the AuJb

unpublished manuscript R
those properties that have
structure from which they
definition is as follows:
DEFINITION 4. (Determin
(s,P-) is determined by (S,
P = {x c SJX is a maximal
In this way every similar

property structure (s, P-) (w
to: (S,Pr) is determined by (S
of the property structure de
later, not every property str
structure on S in the manner of definition of 4.
Definition 4 stipulates what it means to say that a property is
determined by a similarity structure. But from time to time we will
refer to definition 4 also as explaining the method or procedure of
quasianalysis, although taken strictly no particular method has been
outlined. In such a case consider any constructive way of generating all
maximal cliques in a given similarity relation as 'the' method in question.8
In AuJbau terminology: Definition 4 allows several interpretations or
manners of being read, one of which is as a method of 'fictive
construction' (cf. Aufbau, p. 152).
In order to give an example of quasianalysis we may again turn to
(SI,P1) and (si,~i) of example 1:
EXAMPLE 2. Ifwe consider (Sl, ) now as a given similarity structure,

it is easy to see that (SI, P1) = (Si , P-,) is its determined property structure,
so quasianalysis leads us back from Figure 2 to Figure 1.
We can also make use of maximal cliques in order to derive a further

representation result for similarity structures in terms of intersection graphs:
Let (S, ~) be given; this time replace each individual x in s by the class of
those maximal cliques (not properties as we did above) of (s, -) that include
x as a member; define these 'new' individuals to be similar again if and
only if they have non-empty intersection. This gives us another similarity
structure (s", ~") of intersection graph form, and if no two members of s are
similar to precisely the same individuals in s, (S, ~) may as well be proved
isomorphic to (s", ~"). Therefore, if (s, ~)= (s, ~P) is at the same time
determined by (s,P), the intersection similarity structure (s', ~') from above
must be isomorphic to the intersection similarity structure (S", ~") that we
have just introduced. We will see in Section 5 that these two isomorph
structures can be - but by no means need to be - equal, because P need
be identical to the set of maximal cliques of (s, ~).
4. OTHER VERSIONS OF QUASIANALYSIS
We have already pointed out that there is not just one version
quasianalysis in the AuJbau but actually two: Quasianalysis of the firs
kind (1) and quasianalysis of the second kind (II). But historically
Carnap's first outline of quasianalysis in his unpublished (R. Carn
unpublished manuscript RC-081-04-01 [1923]) was neither quasianal
I according to definition 4 nor quasianalysis II: Rather he sugges
more elaborate version of quasianalysis I in which not every maxim
clique necessarily counts as a quasiproperty but where additio
maxims of 'parsimony' with respect to the number and structure
quasiproperties are adopted. Mormann gives an excellent survey
analysis of the formal properties and the philosophical interpretation
this original method of quasianalysis (see his papers in our referen
(T. Mormann, unpublished habilitation thesis [1995]) and Morman
unpublished manuscript "Camap's Quasi-analysis Revisited" conta
extensive material on the formal applications of the method). We
nevertheless going to concentrate on quasianalysis I as developed in th
Aujbau since it is simpler to analyze, historically more influential, an
always yields unique results (which the version in (R. Carna
unpublished manuscript RC-081-04-01 [1923]) does not do necessari
In spite of these differences between the two versions of quasianalysi
the first kind, we can see that a version of quasianalysis I had alre
been considered by Carnap before he later added quasianalysis II a
further procedure of logical construction.
Let us turn now to the differences between quasianalysis I and
quasianalysis II (in the Aujbau). The typical AuJbau set s of individ
would be a set of so-called elementary experiences, i.e., total momenta
slices through a subject's stream of experience in a specified interval o
time. Carnap's primary application instance of quasianalysis I is the ca
of a similarity relation which holds between two elementary experien
if and only if they realize a common quality point in a common qualit
space, like e.g., one spot in the visual field in the one elementary
experience having the same color and location as a spot in the visual f
in the other experience. In such a case, Carnap would call the similarit
relation a relation of part identity (see Aufbau, 976). Quasianalysis of
second kind is to be applied if the given similarity relation is on
of part similarity (see Aufbau, 977): Two elementary experiences a
190 H. LEITGEB
(part-)similar if and only if

quality space such that the p
is associated with the space, i
quality space is less than or
red spot to lie in the upper
elementary experience and a
of the visual field in the othe
in the visual quality space w
colour and the elementary ex
(we return to this in more f
Carnap suggests that quasian
our definition 4, is appropria
more complex procedure, i.e
used in the case of part simila
to outline why we will still f
only sketching briefly the ch
kind.
First of all, despite of Carnap's considerations on the distinctive
features of part identity and part similarity, both part identity and part
similarity relations may be subsumed under the scheme of definition 3 if
only the determining properties are selected accordingly:
Let S be the set of elementary experiences of a particular subject at a
particular interval of time: If P is 'induced' by quality points in the sense
that for every property x in P there is a point p in one of the quality spaces
(visual, auditory,), such that x is the set of elementary experiences which
realize p, then the determined similarity relation is one of part identity;
call the corresponding properties 'pointlike.'
But if P is not 'induced' by quality points but rather by closed quality
spheres of fixed radius " in the sense that for every property X in P there
is a sphere Sph of radius - in one of the metric quality spaces such that x
is the set of elementary experiences which realize at least one point in
Sph, then the determined similarity relation is one of part similarity: For
let x and y be elementary experiences in S; it follows that
x -'P y iff 3X E P, s.t. x,y E X (def. 3)

iff 3 quality points p, q, s.t.
x realizes p, y realizes q, and
3 sphere Sph of radius E, s.t. p, q E Sph (choice of P)
iff 3 quality points p, q, s.t.
x realizes p, y realizes q, and d(p, q) < e (def. of spheres of radius )
In this latter case where properties correspond to spheres let us cal

respective properties spherical: So if we employ 'spherical' prop
instead of 'pointlike' ones, we automatically end up with what C
calls a relation of 'part similarity.' We find that both the relation of
identity and of part similarity can be subsumed under the similarity
tures of definition 1 which may in either case be determined by pro
structures in the manner of definition 3. The study of part similarity
tions does therefore not by itself exceed the formal framework th
introduced above.
Accordingly, Carnap's method of quasianalysis of the second kind
starts with applying quasianalysis of the first kind as its first step, even
though the similarity relation in question is one of part similarity. Hence
quasianalysis II presupposes quasianalysis I and our aim of finding
necessary and sufficient conditions under which quasianalysis of the first
kind delivers the right set of (e.g., 'spherical') properties is thus
important for the study of quasianalysis of both kinds. This warrants
giving quasianalysis I priority treatment.
What distinguishes quasianalysis II from quasianalysis I is in the end
just that its final output ought not to be the 'spherical' properties that
determine the underlying relation of part similarity on the basis of defi-
nition 3, but rather the additional pointlike properties: Therefore, quasian-
alysis of the second kind combines quasianalysis according to our
definition 4 with an additional mechanism that tries to recover the
'pointlike' properties from the similarity circles that have already been
constituted. In very restricted but still important cases, this second step
of quasianalysis II can in fact be regarded as another application of
quasianalysis I but now applied to a similarity relation that differs from
the given one (see Section 8). However, in the general case, the second
phase of quasianalysis II is somewhat more complicated.
Before we turn to this further complication, let us assume for simplicity
that quasianalysis of the first kind has indeed delivered all and only the
'spherical' properties from the given relation of part similarity: Whether
or not the 'pointlike' properties can now be reconstructed from the
'spherical' ones is therefore only dependent on the original underlying
system of 'pointlike' and 'spherical' properties. The part similarity re-
lation itself does not play a role anymore since it has already enabled us to
determine the spherical properties correctly and that is everything which is
necessary to let the second phase of quasianalysis II begin. Since we are
interested in the general question of when properties may be reconstructed
from similarity adequately, and since similarity does not really play a role
in the second step of quasianalysis II if quasianalysis I has delivered the
192 H. LEITGEB
intended results, this give

quasianalysis of the first k
coincide with maximal non-
then the second step in qua
maximal non-empty interse
Unfortunately, as far as th
the Aufbau is concerned
'pointlike'-properties will
empty intersections of simi
the original 'pointlike' pr
'accidental intersection' (se
difficulty he includes a qua
to this: Look for maximal
intersections in a step-by-s
step if the settheoretic o
previously generated inter
number of elements of the
is the core idea of the pro
made precise and expressed
but the details are not rele
Goodman and others ha
Kleinknecht [19]), even th
Aufbau still does not avoi
always give the intended
method see Moulines [37,
check that is included in
transparent analysis in term
success rather unlikely. Th
deal with this method i
quasianalysis II becomes e
not assumed to give us the
It might still be the case th
II somehow 'compensates'
the 'pointlike' properties
manner of operating intend
the second part of quasia
what the underlying 'sphe
also on the given similarit
criteria, necessary or suffi
stances in which quasianal
output while the intermedi
5. A NOTION OF ADEQUACY FOR SIMILARITY STRUCTURES
So let us concentrate just on quasianalysis as being given by defin

In particular, we want to examine the cases where (s, JP) is determ
a given property structure (S, P) and where in turn a structure (s,
quasiproperties is determined by (s, ~P). Our aim is to find out ho
sianalysis performs in reconstructing the properties in P fr
similarity relation ,P.
Kleinknecht [19], p. 27, who regards properties or qualities as in
sional entities while only considering the constructed quasipropert
sets, calls a property represented by a quasiproperty if and only i
latter is the extension of the former. Furthermore, he defines (w
call) a determined similarity structure to be adequate with respect
property structure by which it is determined iff all and only the
mining properties are represented as quasiproperties within the sim
structure. The adequacy of a similarity structure with respect to its
mining property structure is thus equivalent to quasianalysis' y
precisely the intended result.
In order to get a more fine-grained picture of the possible meri
deficits of quasianalysis, we suggest to split up this notion of adeq
for determined similarity structures into two further notions: Faith
and fullness (and of course we presuppose extensional properties ag
A similarity structure is faithful if and only if all quasiproperties
determines are among the original properties by which
determined. Thus in the case of faithfulness, quasianalysis does no
any 'improper' properties. A similarity structure is full if and only
properties by which it was determined are among the quasiproperti
it determines. So given fullness, quasianalysis does not omit any o
'actual' properties. Adequacy is just the conjunction of faithfulnes
fullness. Here is the precise definition:
DEFINITION 5. (Faithfulness; fullness; adequacy) Let (S, P) be a
erty structure on S, let (S, .P) be determined by (S, P), and let (S,P
determined by (S, )P):
1. (S, ~P) is faithful with respect to (, P) if P ~ p.9

2. (S, ~P) is full with respect to (S,P) if P P c
3. (S,'P) is adequate with respect to (S,P) if P- = P. O
Kleinknecht [19] (following Eberle [8]) considers a third pos

deficiency of a determined similarity structure: Cases where a
property represents more than just one property. This kind of failu
194 H. LEITGEB
occur only if properties ar

affect quasianalysis within
nology, we could e.g., con
individual in s has a if and o
be identical to each other
qualities are subsets of S
representation at all, it
Carnap's extensionalist acc
rather than as a difficulty
Rodriguez-Pereyra [45], cha
All possible combinations o
non-fullness can actually be
found in the relevant litera
Our subsequent three exam
in several of the papers tha
quoting them separately in
(SI,~ ) in example 1 prov
Here are three examples of
EXAMPLE 3. (Faithful, b
{1,2,3}, {3,4}}.
*2
C93.a
Figure 3. Property structure (S2, P2)
(S2, P2) is simply (S1, PI) from example 1 plus the additional property
{1,2} (Figure 3). On the other hand, the similarity structure (S2, 2)=
(S2,7P2) which is determined by (S2,P2) is indeed identical to (Si,~-). But
since, as we have seen, (SI,PI) = (S2,P-2) is determined by (S21, 2) and
P1 5 P2, it follows that (S2, `2) is faithful but not full with respect to (S2, P2).
EXAMPLE 4. (Not faithful, but full) Let S3 = {1,2,3,4,5,6}

{{1, 2,4}, {2, 3, 5}, {4,5, 6 }:
1 2 3
Figure 4. Property s
The graph that corr

(S3,P,3) as determined
G,3 = (S3,{{1,2},{1,4
i.e.,:
45
1 2 3
Figure 5. Similarity stru
Hence (S3,PP~3) with P-3

mined by (S3, `3) (Figure 5
is a maximal clique, P3 S P~
with respect to (S3,P3).
196 H. LEITGEB
EXAMPLE 5. (Neither fai

{1,3}, {2,3}}.
73
1 2
Figure 6. Property
The similarity struc

(Figure 6) is of cours
i.e.,:
1 2
Figure 7. S
(S4,"4) is n
(S4, P'4) con
member of
In example
Goodman
exemplifies
2,4,5 are mu
the simplest
Let us cons
the most ex
the largest s
is equal to
every two members of s share a property, the determined sim

structure is simply given by the complete graph on S which in
determines a single quasiproperty: s. The similarity structure is fa
but lacks fullness to the greatest possible extent.
Beside his well-known attack on quasianalysis, Goodman [13
this simple fact as an additional argument against the respectabilit
the notion of similarity in general. This is certainly unjustified: Th
only shows that in order to determine a non-trivial similarity relat
determining property structure has to be non-trivial, too (cf. Leitg
23]). Speaking metaphysically: An account of similarity as the
developed above only makes sense if the properties in questio
sparse or natural (cf. Quine [42], Lewis [27], Dunn [7], Hirsch
Gairdenfors [10]) rather than abundant; not every set of individuals
count as an (extensional) property. So while perhaps 'red' expre
property in this sense, 'not red' and 'red or green' presumably do no
might even be another aspect in which the analysis of similarity is c
the analysis of identity: As Mates [29] argues, according to Leibniz
intentions, the principle of the identity of indiscemibles ought
understood as referring to natural properties as well, since Leib
not regard it as merely trivially true but as having proper content.
In view of Carnap's discussion of similarity circles and qu
spheres in the Aufbau, the following example of inadequacy i
ticularly interesting:
EXAMPLE 6. (Carnap's spherical properties) Let V = R" be t

dimensional Euclidean space with Euclidean metric d, such that n >
E> O is a real number, Sph(x,) {y E Vd(x,y)< } is the closed -sp
around x E V (we say 'sphere' independently of whether v is t
dimensional or of any higher dimension). Now let E > 0 be fixed, S
The similarity structure (SS,5) = (S5,~P5) that is determined by (S5,
with P5 = {Sph(x,-)lx E Ss1, is not faithful, but full.
1. Consider three points x,y, z E Ss which are the vertices of

equilateral triangle T, such that d(x,y) = d(x, z) = d(y, z) = E: Obvio
ly, every two points contained in the triangle are members of a
sphere in P5 and thus are similar according to -5; in particul
follows that x -5 y, y -5 z, x -5 z. However, there is no single me
of P5 which includes x,y,z as members: The only eligible candida
the circumcircle of the triangle, but the latter has radius -- >
we find that T is not a subset of any property in Ps. By the lemm
Zorn, T can be extended to a maximal subset T' of Ss, such that
all a, bE T': d(a,b) < E.1 For that reason, T is a maximal cliqu
198 H. LEITGEB
(SS,~S), but because of w

member of P5. Hence, (S5,
2. Let Sph(x, ) be an arbit
Sph (x, ) h:ave a distance 2
are -5-related. For every p
there are two points a, b E
section points of the strai
the boundary of Sph(x, ), s
closer to y, and b is the an
that entails that d(y, b) > c
of Sph(x,f). So we see th
(S5,~5). (S5,~s) is therefore
1 of example 6 proves Carn

Aufbau:
The largest possible parts of the color solid, which contain nothing
but colors that are similar to one another, are spheres which partially
overlap each other, and whose diameter is the arbitrarily fixed max-
imal distance of similarity.
T' in 1 of example 6 is a counterexample to this claim.

Summing up, we have found that if we start with a given property
structure, if we let the property structure determine a similarity structure,
and if this similarity structure determines a property structure by means of
quasianalysis, the initial property structure does not necessarily coincide
with the final one; there are more or less illustrative counterexamples. But
what if we begin such a determination chain with a similarity structure?
The subsequent observation shows that the result is quite a different one:
OBSERVATION 6. (From similarity to adequacy) Let (S,~) be a sim-

ilarity structure on S, let (S,P-) be determined by (S, ~), and let (S, a)
be determined by (s,P7):
1. (s,-) is identical to (S,~-).
2. (s, ~) is adequate with respect to (S,P}).
Proof
1. For all x,y e S, we have:
xNP'-y iff EX E Pr, s.t. x,y E X (def. 3)

iff (def. 4)
3 maximal clique X of (S, ,), s.t. x,y E X
iff xNy
The last equivalence holds because: (-=) If x and y are members of

common clique of (s, -), they are similar according to '. (=) If x
then x and y are members of at least one common clique of (S, _), i.e
{x,y}. But every clique can be extended to a maximal one.
2. Obvious. o
In a nutshell: If
are determined
yield adequate r
that if similarity
determination ch
priority order
results. 12
Note that observation 6 implies that no two distinct similarity

structures can determine the same property structure. On the other hand,
two distinct property structures might determine the same similarity
structure (just reconsider example 3).
The final example of this section shows that quasianalysis is indeed a
generalization of the well-known method of abstracting equivalence
classes from equivalence relations (cf. a73 of the Aufbau):
EXAMPLE 7. (Equivalence relations) Let S be a non-empty set and let

P be a partition on S, i.e: (i) For all X, Y E P: X n Y = 0; (ii) for all x E S
there is an X e P, such that x E x.
Then (S, P) is a property structure on S, the similarity structure (S, JP)
that is determined by (S, P) is clearly adequate with respect to (S, P), and
~P is an equivalence relation on S.
Given that a method of abstraction for similarity structures is aimed to

be a generalization of the method of generating equivalence classes from
equivalence relations, we see that several possible alternatives of
quasianalysis are ruled out: E.g., if such a method did not only determine
maximal cliques as 'quasiproperties' but rather all sets that can be
generated from maximal cliques according to some fixed scheme of
determination (like open sets can generated from unions of open
neighbourhoods), this method would still have to determine just the
maximal cliques in the case of a given equivalence relation. Further-
more, if we took e.g., all cliques - not only the maximal ones - as the
output of our intended abstraction method, the application of this method
to an equivalence relation would yield more than just its equivalence
200 H. LEITGEB
classes and would thus fail t

of abstraction for equivalenc
6. WHY INADEQUACY A
We have seen that many det

faithful, or not full, or neith
which they are determined.
adequate with respect to the
It might seem now that qua
as Carnap and others hav
construction that works one
of subtle suggestions of how
the second kind (see e.g.
Kleinknecht [19], Moulines [3
to exemplifications of in
section. However, there are g
itself inadequate. It is not
rather the hope that every p
could be represented adequat
same set of individuals at all.
The point is that for a given set S the number of property structures on
s is much larger - in fact, exponentially larger - than the number of
similarity structures on s (we think primarily of finite sets s but the same
holds for infinite S). Therefore, since every similarity structure
determines a unique property structure, not every property structure on
S can be determined by a similarity structure on s (whereas, as we have
seen, the converse does hold). Consider one of those property structures
(S,P) which are not determined by any similarity structure: (S,P)
determines a similarity structure (s, rP) which thus does not determine
(S,P). In other words: (s,JP), which is determined by (s,P), is not
adequate with respect to (s, P). This general fact does not depend on the
manner of determination - of property structures by similarity structures
or vice versa - but only presupposes (a) our definitions of 'property
structure' and 'similarity structure' (on the same set of individuals), and
(b) that 'determines' expresses the graph of a function, in particular, that
every similarity structure determines a unique property structure (as it is
indeed the case if quasianalysis is the method in question). Put
differently: While, as we have concluded from observation 6, determi-
nation by a similarity structure is a one-to-one mapping from similarity
structures to property structures, determination ofa similarity struc

not a one-to-one function from property structures to similarity stru
and cannot be so plainly for cardinality reasons. Let us strengthen
point by some further quantitative considerations. We might e.g
What is the proportion of property structures (S, p) that determ
similarity structure which is adequate with respect to (S, P), among
totality of property structures (for a fixed finite set S of individual
following observation gives the answer:
OBSERVATION 7. (Proportion of success) Let S = {1,... ,n} be a f

set of individuals (so the cardinality card(S) of S is n):
1. Let cardndeq be the number of property structures (S, P) on S w

determine a similarity structure that is adequate with respec
(S, P). It follows that cardadeq = 2(,2)
2. Let cardProp be the number of property structures on S. It follow
cardr,op122"- -I
3. The proportion c converges to o0for n --+ oa.
Proof
1. Let padeq be the set of property structures (S, P) on S which determine
a similarity structure that is adequate with respect to (S,P). We
already know that no similarity structure determines two distinct
property structures, let alone two different members of padeq, and no
two distinct similarity structures determine one and the same property
structure, let alone one and the same member of padeq. We have also
seen that every similarity structure determines a property structure
by which it is itself determined and with respect to which it is ade-
quate, i.e.,: Every similarity structure determines a member of padeq.
Finally, every member of padeq is determined by some similarity
structure, by definition of'pdeq.' It follows thatf, where f : { I is a
reflexive and symmetric relation on S} -4 padeq with f(,) = (S,P) iff
(s,P) is determined by (SI,), is a one-to-one and onto mapping.
cardadeq, the cardinality of pdeq, is therefore identical to the cardinality
of the class of similarity structures on S. But the number of similarity
structures on S of course equals the cardinality ofthe class ofundirected
graphs having S as their set of vertices. This latter cardinality is just
2( 2, as () = (n n "("n-)is the number of 'potential' edges which
might be contained in the set of edges of such a graph.
2. By standard combinatorial arguments, the number of sets P- of
subsets of {1,...,n - 1}, such that 0 P-, is just 22 '- '; every such set
P- can be extended to the property set P- u {s} on S (and if P a
202 H. LEITGEB
then P- u {S} #: Pi u {S}). T

even strict for n > 1).
3. As we have seen, 22 gr
22"-'-1 grows exponentia
is zero in the limit. E
If we identified limit proporti

with probabilities - which is
probability that quasianalysis i
of individuals is 0. 'Almost' n
similarity structure which is a
So the main reason for quasian
method but rather that the c
property structure simply ca
same set of individuals in ea
used instead a ternary, quatern
since analogous cardinality
without consequences: E.g., in
ties, Eberle [8] introduced a p
might be expressed in the form
neither similar to x nor to y.'
also Goodman-type examples
analysis as adopted for his s
erations from above explain wh
as Eberle's basic relation is
comparative concept of simil
than to z' (as used by Lewis [
91, and various others) and t
similarity relation (cf. William
Of course, this is not to say t
similarity is impossibleper se. I
which is both 'contrastive' and
the domains of similarity stru
original domain of individuals
of similarity is used, a substitu
always adequate. The first op
second by Rodriguez-Pereyra
this problem, but they always
paper, however, we are going to
the lines of Carnap's Aufbau. A
possible response to the proble
possible property structures be determined by quasianalysis but o

those that can themselves be determined by similarity.
7. ADEQUACY CRITERIA
We have seen that quasianalysis - as any other possible method o

reconstructing similarity structures from property structures on the sa
set of individuals - is bound to fail in the vast majority of cases.
there are still infinitely many property structures that in fact do determin
similarity structures which are adequate relative to them. What do th
look like?
Obviously, if one property is a proper superset of another one, the
latter cannot be recovered anymore from the determined similarity
structure. This is just Goodman's companionship problem again; it gives
us a trivial necessary condition for fullness and thus for adequacy: For all
distinct x, Y e P, X 9 Y.
Hazen and Humberstone [15] (see pp. 29-32) have joined this
condition with a more interesting one and prove that the two together
are both necessary and sufficient for adequacy (this is of course stated in
a different terminology): For all Y c s, if for all x,y E Y there is an x E P
such that x,y E X, then there is an x E P such that Y c x. As Hazen and
Humberstone note, Schreider [51] has given a similar characterization of
adequacy.
While this latter condition is already nice and useful, it is still rel-
atively close to the original definition of adequacy. But there is a
theorem in the literature on hypergraph theory which states a simpler,
and thus more surprising, necessary and sufficient condition for
adequacy. Correspondingly, the proof of the theorem needs induction
over the cardinality of s rather than just direct argumentation. According
to Berge [2], Section 1.7, 1 and 3 of theorem 8 below were first proved
by Gilmore (but Berge's reference to the original paper remains unclear).
A proof of Gilmore's theorem - actually a generalization thereof - can
be found in Berge [2], pp. 22-31, and in much more condensed form in
Berge [1], pp. 396f. We have added the straight-forward (and less
interesting) item 2 for fullness. Here is the theorem:
THEOREM 8. (Criteria; Gilmore) Let (s, -) be determined by (S, P),

and let S be finite:
1. (S, ~P) is faithful with respect to (S,P) iff

for all A, B, C E P there is an x E P, such that
(A NB) U (An C) U (B n C) C X
204 H. LEITGEB
2. (S, ~P) is full with respec

there are no x e P,x E S wi
a Y EP with x,y E Y
3. (S, ~P) is adequate with r
conditions is satisfied:
(a) for all A, B, C E P there
(An B) u (A n C) u (B n C) c X
(b) there are no X, Y E P, s
A B
X
C
Figure 8. Faithfulness criterion
Note that (A n B) u (A n C) U (B n C) in 3a is identical to (A u B) n (A u c)n

(B U C) by distributivity.
3 of theorem 8 proves Goodman correct in focusing on the difficulties
of imperfect community and of companionship; 3a deals with the former,
while 3b obviously deals with the latter. Figure 8 is a graphical sketch of
what the faithfulness criterion amounts to: X 'glues' A, B, C together and
thereby guarantees that the difficulty of imperfect community does not
arise. If the right sides of the equivalences in 1 and 2 were joined by
conjunction, they would of course yield a necessary and sufficient
condition for adequacy as well. But the weaker necessary condition 3b
for fullness suffices if joined with the condition in 1. This is the case
essentially because faithfulness implies that every maximal clique of
(S,~P) is not only a property in P but even a maximal property with
respect to settheoretic inclusion.
By 1 of theorem 8, every set P of properties (on s) can be extended to a
set P', such that the similarity structure as being given by P1 is faithful
with respect to (S, P'): Just close P under the operation m: (A, B, C)F
(A n B) U (A n C) u (B n C). However, the members of P' are no longer
guaranteed to be 'natural properties' in the sense of being members of P,
and the members of P are not necessarily represented within

similarity structure determined by (s,P') even if they were represe
within the similarity structure determined by (s,P). In the literatu
convex structures, the operation m is called a 'median operation
every set closed under such an m a 'median algebra' (see e.g., Van de
[54]).
The adequacy or indequacy of many of the determined similarity
structures that we referred to in our examples above could easily be shown
by applying theorem 8, but, as we have seen, such simple instances may
also be checked 'directly' without much effort. The subsequent example
demonstrates the merits of theorem 8 more clearly:
EXAMPLE 8. (Carnap's spherical properties revisited) Let S6 be a

finite subset of the two-dimensional Euclidean space R2 with Euclidean
metric, E > 0, and let P6 = (UkCZ P~) \ {0 } where: For every even integer k,
PI = {S6 nSph(x,) Ix = (xl,x2)

2 with x2
= m,x2 = k-,2
for even m E Z)
for every odd
P, 2=2 {S6
2' nSph(
(for Sph(x,f) as
a fragment of t
Figure 9. Prope
For every A,B,CEP6 it holds that (AnB)u(AnC)u(B n C) is a

(whether empty or non-empty) subset of either A or B or C: In each
case, there is an X E P6, such that (An B) u (An C) U (B n C) C X and by
theorem 8 the similarity structure (S6, -6) = (S6, 1P6) that is determined by
(S6,P6) must be faithful with respect to (S6,P6). Iffurthermore no member
206 H. LEITGEB
of P6 is a proper superset
adequate with respect to (S6
It follows that if Carnap
structure of spherical prop
would have been adequate w
the similarity relation wou
the strict sense: If x were s
each other, but the other d
There are several variat
similarity structures, too: E
an arbitrary manner as l
A,B, CEP the set (AnB) u
Moreover, according to J
circles of the same radius in
the circles intersect in som
pairwise intersection alwa
may be used in order to c
satisfy the desired conditio
be replaced by E-spheres acc
The subsequent example
theorem 8 to a particular p
contemplates the possibility
theorem 8 in metaphysics,
space-time individuals:
EXAMPLE 9. (An applicati

formulate an axiomatic syst
* (Axl) For all properties A
(A n B) U (A n C) U (B n C)
* (Ax2) There are no proper

* (Ax3) All properties are
for every individual x ther
as our basic ontological ax

* (Def) For all individuals x
x,y EX.
as a definition of similarity, we would be able to derive the adequacy of

quasianalysis as a corollary along the lines of theorem 8 (given some
additional formal background theory that is needed to derive theorem 8).
REMARK 9. Ought we adopt Ax] and Ax2 (plus Ax3) as p

axioms for natural properties? No. There does not seem to
compelling argument for Axl; indeed, why should it always be p
to combine similarities given by two out of three 'natural' respec
joint 'natural' similarity respect x? Assuming Ax2 would
disastrous: No natural property could be a subproperty of anoth
law-like sentence of the form Vx(A(x) -+ B(x)) where A and B
natural properties would be a law. 14
Another characterization of faithfulness can be given in term

dual property structure of a given property structure (s, P) (act
just translate notions of hypergraph theory such as 'dual hypergr
our context and we apply some results which are well-known th
Berge [2], p. 2 and p. 30). While this criterion is technically
complicated, it will be particularly useful in Section 8 wher
going to apply it in order to warrant Russell's logical constru
time instants. But first some definitions:
DEFINITION 10. (Dual property structure) A pair (S*, P*) is the dual
property structure of (S, P) if
1. S*= P,
2. P* = { g P13x E S:4 = {X ePix E X}}.
So the dual property structure of a property structure (S, P) takes the

members of P as its new 'individuals', while its new 'properties' are just
maximal collections of 'old properties' that share a common member of
s (this type of construction also plays a role in Mormann's account of
quasianalysis; see e.g., [32]). Every such dual property structure is again
a property structure according to definition 2. It is easy to see that if for
every x,y E S there is an x E P, such that x E X but y ' X, the dual property
structure (s**,P**) of the dual property structure (S*,P*) of (s,P) is
isomorphic to (S, P) again (i.e., there is a bijective mapping f : S -- s**,
such that for all x C s: X E P ifff(X) E P**), where f(X) = {y lx E X, s.t.
f(x) = y}). This last point is particularly interesting since it implies that
property structures (s, P), with s being a set of concrete spatially or
temporally bounded particulars, have as their duals property structures
(s*,P*) where S* is now a set of nonconcrete qualitative elements, and -
though only up to isomorphism - vice versa. In Goodman's terminology:
The duality operator turns 'particularistic systems' into 'realistic
systems' and the other way round (cf. Goodman [Il], p. 142).
The notion of k-Helly applies to a property structure if its properties
show a particular pattern of intersection. We are going to apply the
208 H. LEITGEB
notion just to dual property

but the definition holds for
p. 22 for the hypergraph co
DEFINITION 11. (k-Helly) (

the following two condition
1.
2.for
n4all0.
T c_ D with card(%)<.k: fn o # 0,
Here we presuppose the convention that the intersection n 4I of a set ID

is just the intersection of all members of 4 (accordingly for '"t'). 2 of
definition 11 obviously entails 1, so the crucial direction is the other one.
Note that the property of being k-Helly is preserved under isomorphism
of property structures.
The faithfulness of a similarity structure with respect to a determining
property structure (s, P) can be proved to be equivalent to the 2-Hellyness
of the dual property structure (S*, P*) of (S, P). The proof is by Berge and
is to be found in [2], p. 30:
THEOREM 12. (Faithfulness and duality; Berge) Let (S,~P) be

determined by (S, P):
(S, ~P) is faithful with respect to (S, P) iff
the dual property structure (S*,P*) of (S,P) is 2-Helly, i.e., for every
v* c P* the following two conditions are equivalent:
* for all X, Y E *: Xn Y #0,

* n**# 0.
Our final criterion states a necessary condition for fullness. We
already know that the representation capacity of similarity structures is
restricted compared to that of property structures. How many properties
at most can be represented fully by a similarity structure s with n
members? The following observation which is a consequence of
Sperner's classic combinatorial theorem gives the answer:
THEOREM 13. (Representation capacity; Sperner) Let S be a set of n

individuals:
If P is a set of properties on S with card(P) > (Lnn2J)' then the similarity

structure determined by (s,P) is not full.15
Proof By 2 of theorem 8, every set P of properties of a property

structure that determines a similarity structure which is full with respect
to it satisfies the constraint that there are no x, Y E P, such that x 5 Y. Put
differently, every such set P is a so-called antichain, i.e., the members

P are pairwise set-theoretically incomparable. According to the cla
theorem of Sperner [52] (see also Berge [ 2], p. 6, where a different pro
than Sperner's is to be found), the maximal cardinality of an antichain P
a set s with n members is just (L,j ). O
E.g., assume that S has four members: If P contains more than
(L42) = 6 properties (out of 24- 1 = 15 possible), the similarity structure
that is determined by (s,P) is not full.
8. A NOTE ON RUSSELL'S CONSTRUCTION OF TEMPORAL INSTANTS

IN OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD
Carnap counts B. Russell's Our Knowledge of the External World ([47])

among the exemplary predecessors of his Aufbau (see Aufbau, a3). In
this section we are going to show that Russell's [47] method of
constituting temporal points from extended events on the basis of a
relation of overlapping or compresence is an instance of adequate
quasianalysis; in order to do so we will make use of the framework and
the results of the previous sections. Kleinknecht [20], p. 63, already
noted that Russell's method is formally analogous to quasianalysis.
Russell's construction of time instants is only a minor part of his
constitution of temporal entities, properties and relationships - see e.g.,
Thomason [53], Kleinknecht [20], Liick [28], for detailed reconstructions
and improvements of Russell's efforts on this topic (the original sources
being [47], but also [48] and [49]). Now and in the sequel we refer to
Russell's first method of constructing points of time on p. 124 of Our
Knowledge of the External World, not to the second one on p. 127 which
is an instance of Whitehead's method of extensive abstraction.16
Russell's idea is to reconstruct time instants logically as maximal sets
of mutually overlapping events. However, Russell does not prove that
this logical construction is adequate. In filling this gap we make use of
the following abbreviations: Let s, be the set of time instants in the usual
sense of physicists: So we may simply identify s, with R, i.e., with the set
of points of the real 'time' axis. Let P, be the set of formal counterparts
to what Russell calls 'events': For convenience, we identify P, with the
set of (a) bounded, (b) open or left- or right-open or closed intervals of
positive length ('duration') in IR. This is presumably not precisely what
Russell meant by 'event,' but it is a plausible mathematical model of
what he could have had in mind when he set up his constructional
definition of time instants. We might exclude events the duration of
210 H. LEITGEB
which is 'too short,' in fa

accessible without furthe
Furthermore, Russell would
there are as an empirical qu
be the case when we identi
issues reasonably simple.
possible model of Russell's
constituting points of time
Let us now consider the du
the
We similarity
find: structure (S,
* s* = P, is the set of eve

overlapping or compresen
and only if they have non
that Russell presupposes in
* (s*, ~,) is adequate with r
of (s*,P*) is isomorphic to
theorem in Convex Ge
Matousek [30], p. 10);17
and by theorem 12 (s*,~,
no member of P,* is a pro
that (st, ~,) is adequate wi
* P* is Russell's set of 'cons
P* is the class of maxi

quasianalysis in order to
structure (S,*,P*) from th
* Since the dual property
(S,*,P*) is, up to isomorp
members of st are not str
can play the same scientif
predicates are translated t
Thus, Russell's application

Although the intended i
overlapping, Russell's const
the External World can
quasianalysis. Moreover, (s*
In this case, taking maxima

taking maximal non-emp
particular application of the
of quasianalysis I but also
We could just as well have used theorem 8 in order to prove the a

adequacy result. But in this particular context, the faithfulness crit
in terms of 2-Hellyness is more illuminating since it enables u
understand the contrast between Russell's construction of points of
in Our Knowledge of the External World and his constitution of poin
four-dimensional space-time in his Analysis of Matter (see [48], cha
XXVIII): Curiously, he does not use the same method as above in
to construct points of space-time and he also presupposes a new quin
basic relation of compresence or 'copunctuality' of events. Why
difference in method and framework? Russell simply notes that tak
groups of events, such that any two members of a group are compr
and no event outside the group is compresent with every member o
group, does not work in four dimensions: "When we pass beyond
dimension, this method is no longer applicable." ([48], p. 295). R
justifies this claim by stating some examples. But we can also ex
these findings by means of the theory developed above:
Let s,, now be the set of points of R4, let Ps, be the set of bound
convex space-time regions which are spatially spherical ('space-
events'; see [48], p. 295); then it follows that a construction analo
to the one above does not go through because the dual property struc
(S*,P,*) of (S,,,Ps,,) is not 2-Helly anymore but rather 5-Helly, as ca
proved by another application ofHelly' s theorem. That is why Russell
presuppose a quintary relation of copunctuality between space-time e
in The Analysis of Matter; the method he uses may in fact be pr
adequate by the theorem of Helly, but since it is not really quasiana
that is at work here we refrain from pointing out the details.18
9. DIscussioN: RECONSIDERING QUASIANALYSIS IN THE AUFBAU
Now that we have a theory of quasianalysis at hand, it is tim

reconsider the application of quasianalysis (of the first kind) i
phenomenalistic constitutional system of the AuJbau.
In order to get a clear picture of what is going on there, we have
find a way of dealing with quasianalysis that explains how Carnap ca
the one hand regard the so-called recollection of similarity relati
basic and primitive in the AuJbau, but on the other hand explicates
relation informally in terms of sensory fields, distances, quality sp
and the like. How can he say that quality spheres are to be consti
from similarity by quasianalysis while at the same time referrin
quality spheres in order to explain the meaning of his basic pred
Accordingly: Carnap claims that elementary experiences have no par
212 H. LEITGEB
such that there is no analy

of them but only a quasian
ponents from a given binar
of part-identical or -simila
component, or which have
each other with respect t
[19], pp. 33f, for similar w
In fact, there is no real ci
problem dissolves once on
could not have used at the
between object- and meta
comes rather close to this d
of the 'language of the
'psychological language' b
respectively. Although Ca
language in the Aujbau - l
vocabulary and its formatio
it as helpful to do so in ord
sketched above. Furthermor
when we take this 'Tarskian' move towards his AuJbau. Transitions
between object level and metalevel may indeed sometimes be subject to
curious twists: It is possible that, say, a predicate A is defined in terms of
predicates B, C, D on the metalevel, although B, C, D are defined on the
basis of A on the object level. These different manners of defining terms
might correspond to different aims of the two theories on the object and
on the metalanguage level: E.g., the object theory might be phenome-
nalistic and A is regarded 'epistemically prior' to B, C, D, while the
metatheory is realistic and B, C, D are regarded 'ontically prior' to A. A
procedure that is described to be 'analyzing' by the metatheory might
have an inverse procedure that is described to be 'quasianalyzing' by the
object theory; and so forth. Our suggestion is that something like this is
going on in the corresponding sections of the Aujbau and that any
confusion about these object-/metalevel distinctions ought to be avoided
or the proper assessment of quasianalysis will be hampered.
So let us reconsider quasianalysis now on both language levels.
Although the core of the Aufbau metatheory is open to various kinds of
constitutional object languages - phenomenalistic, physicalistic, and so
forth (cf. chapters III.B and III.C of the AuJbau) - we are going to
concentrate just on the phenomenalistic object language that is also used
by Carnap as his main example. Our reconstruction will of course be
close to the relevant passages of the Aufbau, but not too close - we take
the freedom to put them into a contemporary context: E.g., we do n

simple type theory but rather modem set theory (some version of
extended by urelements). Finally, we try to avoid getting too much
details that would distract us from the topic of quasianalysis itself
counterparts to our Subsection 9.1 in the Aufbau are essential
formal parts of a 106-a 111 of chapter IV; the parts which correspo
our Subsection 9.2 are a67-a80 of chapter III and the informal pa
a 106-a111 of chapter IV. We use more or less the original Auf
symbols at the object level and partly also on the metaleve
metatheory can be regarded as a kind of model theory of
constitutional system on the object level.
The final aim of the following two subsections is to specify - and
to distinguish - clearly (i) which sets of elementary experienc
quasianalytically defined as similarity circles, i.e., as the members o
extension of the predicate aehnl, and (ii) which sets of elemen
experiences are the intended members of the extension of the pred
aehnl. We are going to denote the former set by '3(aehnl),' the latter
'P'; the set of basic elements, i.e., the set of elementary experiences
given agent, will be denoted by 'erl,' the relation of qualitative sim
of elementary experiences by '~.' Since we will finally concentra
on the visual experiences of the agent in question, the similarity str
(erl, -) will actually be the phenomenalistic approximation of its
space counterpart (Qualvis,~viS), where 'Qualvis' denotes the set of v
quality points and where '~a,' denotes the metrical similarity relation on
the agent's visual space; (Qualis, -~vs) = (Qualvis, ~Pvis) is determined by the
property structure (Qualvis, Pis) where 'Pvis' denotes the set of visual
quality spheres with a fixed small diameter. As we are going to show,
3(aehnl) is identical to Pvis according to the intended model of Carnap's
constitutional system if and only if the similarity structure (erl,,-) is
adequate with respect to (erl, Pvis), which in turn depends on the structural
similarity between (erl,--) and (Qualvis, is).
Each of the terms that we have just referred to will be dealt with
thoroughly in Sections 9.1 and 9.2. Those readers for whom these terms
are already sufficiently clear might consider turning directly to
Subsection 9.3.
9.1. Object Language and Object Theory
Object language OiZ: First-order language with two primitive binary

predicates: Er ('...is recollected to be similar to...') and e ('...is a member
of...')."9 There are many further symbols which are introduced by
definition on basis of Er and E (see below).We do not consider these
214 H. LEITGEB
definitions as metalinguistic
are members of the vocab
taken to be an individual con
Object theory OT: First-o
urelements, where the fiel
(actually we do not need set
weak fragment of it); moreo
E, starting with definitions
('the part-similarity relation
('the set of similarity ci
definitions, the last of whic
erl = {xl3y(xEry(1) VyErx))
Ae = (2)
{(x,y)IxEryVyErx V
(i)Vx,y EX: xAey
aehnl = X ()Vz:
if Vx E XxAez,
(3)
then z E X
9.2. Metalanguage and Metatheory
Metalanguage MLa: First-order language with a primitive binary

predicate E ('...is a member of...') and a number of further descriptive
predicates for '...is a quality space,' '...is the visual quality space of...,'
'...is a quality point of...,' 'the distance of... from... in... is...,' '...is a
quality sphere in...,' '...is the set of elementary experiences of... in time
interval...,' '...is before...,' '...realizes...,' and so forth. Not all of these
syntactic items need to be primitive. Indeed, there are many further
metalinguistic symbols which are introduced by definition, including
'...is recollected to be similar to...' and '...is similar to....' Additionally,
the metalanguage has various syntactic resources by which the items of
the object language can be referred to, i.e., names for object language
expressions, predicates expressing the syntactic categories of o02 as well
as the way its members are syntactically composed of others, etc.
Finally, the metalanguage includes semantic predicates for the object
language, in particular the (defined) relative-truth predicate '...is true
in...' and related expressions. These semantic terms are needed in order
to determine the intended model of the constitutional object theory
precisely; Carnap himself describes this intended model only informally
when he justifies the choice of his basic elements and his basic relation
and when he explains how the method of quasianalysis is to proceed.
Note that we are going to employ sans serif notation if we want

clear that we are using metalinguistic terminology.
Metatheory MT: First-order theory, including: Some version
theory that extends the set theory on the object languag
additionally, a number of eigenaxioms and definitions, where the
may be of general conceptual or empirical nature or may just be
descriptions of a particular cognitive agent. The Aujbau met
includes the somewhat idealized description of a concrete cog
agent, say, Ag, and its corresponding (finite) set erl of elem
experiences in a fixed interval of time; furthermore the descript
finite family C = (Qi),,, of quality spaces Qi = (Quali,Stri,Pi)
conceptual space C in the sense of Gairdenfors [10]) given by
Quali of quality points, (ii) a formal structure Stri (order, topology,
norm,...) on Quali, (iii) a set Nati c p(Qual1) of'natural regions' ofth
(which might satisfy certain formal constraints, like being bounded
convex, extended, spherical, and the like). Axiomatically, each
space Qi is associated with a particular manner of experiencing
agent Ag (visual, auditory, tactile,...). In particular, one of the
spaces is a 5-dimensional visual space, where three dimensions are r
for colour parameters (hue, brightness, saturation) and two dimens
place parameters (x,y-coordinates in Ag's two-dimensional visual f
Let Qvis = (Qualis, Strvis, Pvis) be this visual space: Qualvis is a spe
subset of R., Strvi, is the metric space structure on Qualvi, as bein
by the Euclidean metric d, and Pvi = {Sph(q, e)fq E Qualvis} for fixe
where Sph(q, E) ={p E Qualvisld(p, q) e}.
The axioms on the metalevel tell us that each of Ag's eleme
experiences in erl realizes certain quality points in the quality spa
C. We concentrate on the realization of visual quality poin
Real c Erl x Qualvis be the realization relation between experiences
and quality points in Qualvs. E.g., if x is a member of Erl, and if p e
corresponds to a light-red colour point in the left-upper corner in
visual field of Ag, then Real(x, p) if and only if Ag experiences in x
red colour point in the left-upper comer of his visual field.
Moreover, the set erl of Ag's elementary experiences is assumed
ordered by a strict total order < according to temporal predecesso
The quality points in p E Qualvis are endowed axiomatically
proximity notion ,vi, of similarity as explained in example 6 of Sec
Two quality points are similar according to ~vi iff they are close t
other (with respect to a given threshold value). As we have seen, w
consider this similarity structure (Qualis, ~vs) as being determined
property structure (Qualvis, Pvis) in which quality spheres figure
corresponding 'spherical' properties.
216 H. LEITGEB
However, the similarity st

phenomenalistic one that
elementary experiences are (p
that are realized by one exper
that are realized by the o
concentrate again just on the
structure (ed, ) = (ed,,.-P) a
(erl, P) the properties of whi
for every property X in P th
of elementary experiences w
in Sph. (ed,~-) and (erl, P
(QualIs, -~s) and (QualIs, Pvs
via the realization relation
Now we are finally in the
our object theory OT7. O
structure for the language
cumulative hierarchy ba
ordinal; we suppose that th
theory at the object level
language membership pred
interpretation 3(Er) of the
similarity be defined by: 3
to be understood in the wa
experience as being simil
qualitatively similar and th
obviously assuming Ag to h
this idealization just for
idealizing assumptions 'fict
interpretation of the basic
by Carnap. In order to sati
simply need to determin
accordingly. This yields for
3 (erl) = {xl3y(x(4) 3(Er)y v
3 (Ae) = {(x, y)lx(5) 3(Er)y V
(i) Vx, y E X: x 3(Ae)y

(ii) Vz :
(6)
3(aehnl) = X ) ' if Vx E X x 3(Ae)z,
then z E X
The first-order structure (D, 3) is now the intended model of our object
theory OT. It is intended in so far as its domain is chosen just as
described in the AuJbau, the interpretations of the primitive term

membership and recollection of similarity are selected accordingly,
the structure as a whole satisfies OT, in particular, the definitions o
However, it is not so clear that the interpretations of the defined
are thereby assigned intended interpretations as well. After all,
terms are interpreted in a - in fact uniquely determined - manner
ensures that the definitions of OT are satisfied, but that does not e
that their extensions in (D,3) conform to what their definition
intended to be definitions of.
E.g.,: 3(erl) was set to {xI3y(x 3(Er)y V y 3(Er)x)} in order to satisfy
erl = {x 3y(x Er y V yErx)}. But the intended interpretation of the object
language term erl is, according to what Carnap says in the AuJbau, erl.
Thus, 3(erl) is intended if and only if {xl3y(x 3(Er)y v y3(Er)x)} = erl. Is
that the case? Not necessarily. Assume that there is an elementary
experience of the cognitive agent Ag, i.e., a member of erl, such that this
elementary experience is dissimilar to all other members of erl (with
respect to -). This is certainly not impossible: Ag might at one time have
experienced one and the same colour at all places of his visual field, but
never again have experienced that colour or a similar colour at any place
of his visual field. In such a case the elementary experience in question is
not included in the field of 3(Er) and therefore it is also not a member of
3(erl). Thus, under certain conditions, 3(erl) is not as intended. Whether
these conditions do arise, is an empirical matter.
Since we are only interested in quasianalysis, let us nevertheless
assume now that the interpretations of erl and especially of Ae are indeed
equal to their intended interpretations, i.e., 3(erl) = erl and 3(Ae)= :
What can we say then about the interpretation of aehnl? Carnap tells us
that the intended interpretation of aehnl is just the set P of spherical
properties from above (cf. a80, 72); indeed, many OT-definitions on
higher levels of the constitutional system presuppose that the interpre-
tation of aehnl is this intended one. Since (3(erl), 3(aehnl)) = (erl, 3(aehnl))
is simply the (quasi)property structure that is determined by (erl, , and
since (erl,~) is determined by (erl, P) as explained above, we conclude
that 3(aehnl) = P if and only if (erl, ,) is adequate with respect to (erl, P).
So whether 3(aehnl) is intended or not is finally a matter of whether a
particular similarity structure is adequate with respect to a particular
determining property structure.
9.3. Quasianalysis and the Intended Model
Is (erl, ) adequate with respect to (erl, P)? This is again not to be settled a
priori - it is an empirical question the answer to which depends on
218 H. LEITGEB
what experiences the co

we turn to our theory of
meltalevel, we can at least
adequacy.
Let us focus on the visual quality space again. There are two possible
cases: Either (ed,~) is some coarse-grained, finite, phenomenalistic
approximation of its conceptual space counterpart (Qualvis,, -s) or it is
not. In the latter case, it is more or less unpredictable what - looks like
and therefore one cannot seriously judge its representational adequacy.
In the former case - which is the one that is expected by Carnap - we
may suppose that (e,rl,) inherits the merits or defects of (Qualvis,-,vis)
whatever they may be. In fact, we know what they are: As we have
shown in example 6, (Qualvi, -vis) is not faithful though full with respect
to (Qualvis, Pvis). Thus we may expect (erl, ~) to be in this case not faithful
but full with respect to (erl, P).
We may also argue more directly: Theorem 8 characterizes faithfulness
in the way that for all triples of properties in P there would have to be a
further property which covered the union of each pairwise intersection of
the three, therefore whenever two of three properties were realized
together, this further property would have to be realized accordingly. This
implies that (i) the faithfulness of (erl, r) would presuppose an overly high
degree of variation of quality points realized within each member of erl,
while simultaneously (ii) peculiar law-like relationships between the
members of P would have to hold. We illustrate this by an example: Let
A be a property in P and let SphA be a sphere in Pvis, such that A is the set
of elementary experiences which stand in relation Real to at least one
point in SphA; accordingly for B and SphB, C and Sphc. E.g., SphA might
be a red colour sphere in the left-upper quarter of the visual field, SphB
an orange colour sphere in the right-upper quarter, and Sphc a violet
colour sphere in the left-lower quarter. If there is no X e P, such that
(An B) u (An C) U (B n C) C X, then (An B) u (An C) u (B n C) can be ex-
tended to a maximal clique of (erl,sim) that is not identical to any
member of P and therefore (erl, sim) is not faithful. If there is such an X,
there must be some colour sphere, say, blue, at some part of the agent's
visual field, say, its right-lower part, such that whenever the agent
experiences some quality points in SphA and SphB, or in SphA and Sphc,
or in SphB and Sphc, he also experiences a quality point that is blue and
that is located in the right-lower section of his visual field. Every
elementary experience which realizes this particular pattern of quality
spheres SphA, SphB, Sphc also has to realize at least one point of Sphx;
these experiences must therefore realize at least three different quality
spheres, and the same holds of course for all other triples of properties in
P if faithfulness is to prevail. This seems to be a severe constraint

not likely to be satisfied. Why should Ag experience a blue quality
in the right-lower section of his visual field whenever he exper
either something red in the left-upper quarter and something orange
right-upper quarter, or something red in the left-upper quarte
something violet in the left-lower quarter, or something orange in
right-upper quarter and something violet in the left-lower quarter
should corresponding statements be true of all further triples of c
spheres? In particular: Why should cases be excluded in which
experiences something red in the left-upper quarter and some
orange in the right-upper quarter but has no experience whatsoe
something blue in the right-lower quarter of his visual field (accor
for all other colour- and-place combinations)? Neither the struct
our human cognitive system nor the structure of the physical
seems to satisfy the strange law-like relationships between the mem
of P which would be entailed if quasianalysis in the Aufbau
faithful.
Fullness, on the other hand, would only presuppose (a) a high de-
gree of discriminability of realized quality spheres in terms of members
of erl (2 of theorem 8) together with (b) the absence of phenomenal
'laws' of a particular form. E.g., for every pair of properties in P there
would have to be an elementary experience in erl which realizes the one
but not the other, i.e., at least at one point of time, Ag should experience
something red in the left-upper quarter of the visual field but not
anything orange in the right-upper quarter, while at another time he
should experience something orange in the right-upper quarter of the
visual field though not anything red in the left-upper quarter. Since
neither the structure of our human cognitive system nor the structure of
the physical worlds seems to satisfy law-like entailment relations
between the members of P, fullness is relatively easy to satisfy and it
is certainly much more likely to be satisfied than faithfulness. While the
lack of simple phenomenal 'laws' concerning the occurrence of colour
qualities speaks, on the one hand, in favour of non-faithfulness, it speaks
on the other hand in favour of fullness. In both cases our conclusions
seem to be robust if we consider 'approximate' faithfulness and
'approximate' fullness rather than faithfulness and fullness simpliciter,
i.e., if we focus on the overlapping patterns of 'most' triples of properties
and 'most' pairs of properties, respectively. Note that observation 7
certainly does not raise the chances of approximate adequacy, although it
has to be kept in mind that this result is particularly problematic with
respect to drawing any real-world conclusions from it because it
concerns a proportion 'in the limit.'
220 H: LEITGEB
Moulines [38], pp. 281-28

assumptions' are satisfi
expected to hold. In our
correspond to the antecede
'if..., then (erl,~) is (appro
these implications would h
on the basis of the axiom
some empirical hypothese
to be of special importance
million), whereas the car
several thousand; cf. M
Section 7 adds some suppor
the satisfaction of fullness
faithfulness, let alone adeq
points in Qualvi, are real
periences; so our agent's
possible combinations of
exclude - at least to a high
one stated above for the qu
it would certainly be highly probable that each pair out of
SphA, SphB, Sphc is realized together with many of the other few thousand
quality spheres, but it would not likely be the case that there is a
particular quality sphere Sphx, such that every experience of some
quality points in SphA and SphB, or SphA and Sphc, or SphB and Sphc, is at
the same time an experience of a quality point in Sphx.
Whether (ed, ~) is approximately adequate with respect to (erl, P), and
whether the extension of aehnl in Carnap's intended model of his
phenomenalistic constitutional system is therefore approximately the
intended one or not, is in the end an empirical matter. Our theoretical
results indicate that there are good chances for (erl, ) being approxi-
mately full with respect to (erl, P); however, (erl,-) is likely to be not
even approximately faithful.
As we have already pointed out earlier, Mormann O(just as Proust)
defends quasianalysis as a general structural method of constitution
rather than as a particular means of constructing the phenomenalistic
counterparts to quality spheres. Indeed, as Friedman [9], Richardson
[44], Moulines [38], and others have shown, there is ample historical
evidence that Carnap's Aufbau is not primarily the upshot of the
traditional programme of phenomenalism or empiricism but has much
more general aims. Furthermore, or so Mormann argues, Goodman's so-
called 'failures of quasianalysis' might be interpreted as cases of
empirical underdetermination: Similarity is epistemically prior to
properties but at the same time our theoretical knowledge of proper

underdetermined by our empirical data, so it is no wonder that a g
similarity structure does not uniquely determine a correspond
property structure. Our criticism of quasianalysis in this sectio
solely devoted to Carnap's application of the method in Section a 11
his constitutional system. As far as this particular instance of q
analysis is concerned, it does not lead to the results that were intend
Carnap.
10. CONCLUSIONS
We are left with a mixed assessment of the method of quasianalysis.

First of all, it is definitely wrong to say that quasianalysis does not
work as such: Indeed it yields adequate results under certain conditions
while it does not do so if these particular conditions are not satisfied. The
necessary and sufficient conditions for adequacy have been described in
theorem 8 and other necessary or sufficient conditions have been stated
in Section 7. The corresponding notion of adequacy can be defined and
analyzed thoroughly (cf. Section 5).
Secondly, it is wrong to say that the inadequacy of quasianalysis
under certain conditions is due to a flaw that affects the details of the
method and that could and should be 'repaired.' As we have seen in
Section 6, quasianalysis is bound to fail in the majority of cases for
simple cardinality reasons and that the same is true of any other method
of constructing properties from a similarity relation on the same set of
individuals as long as the similarity relation has a fixed finite arity. Given
this unavoidable constraint, quasianalysis actually does rather fine. It is a
natural extension of the abstraction of equivalence classes (example 7), it
is adequate if similarity is in some sense prior to properties (observation
6) and it is also adequate in the case of abstracting points of time from
the overlapping of events (Section 8). Where quasianalysis is inadequate
(example 6) there is sometimes a reasonably close setting on which it is
adequate again (example 8). But quasianalysis fails - at least partially -
in the field that it was to be applied to within Carnap's phenomenalistic
constitutional system of the Aufbau (our Section 9).
Quasianalysis is definitely to remain in the philosopher's - and
perhaps also the scientist's - toolbox; if so, future applications in se-
mantics, epistemology, or metaphysics may be expected not to be a long
time in coming. As every other tool it is not good or bad by itself, but its
qualities depend on what it is used for.
222 H. LEITGEB
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This paper was supported by the Erwin-Schr6dinger Fellowship J2344-

G03, Austrian Research Fund FWF. Drafts were discussed in seminars in
Salzburg, Munich, Leuven, Berkeley, and Stanford; we want to thank the
participants for several helpful suggestions. We are particularly grateful
to Reinhard Kleinknecht, Leon Horsten, Michael Friedman, Ed Zalta,
Thomas Mormann, Uwe Liick, Simon Huttegger, Hans Rott, Ronald
Ortner, and an anonymous referee.
NOTES
It is an interesting historical question how this development of methods of

abstraction actually took place (see e.g., Moulines [39] for some historical references).
In particular, the additional impact of Whitehead's method of extensive abstraction must
not be neglected (see Griinbaum [14] for the collected references to Whitehead's work).
Russell was obviously influenced by Whitehead and the same is likely to hold - whether
directly or indirectly - for Carnap. Whitehead intended extensive abstraction to apply to
non-symmetrical part-of relations. However, it is easy to see that if the method of
extensive abstraction is applied to a reflexive and symmetric relation, its results
correspond to the outputs of Carnap's so-called quasianalysis of the first kind.
2 Hazen and Humberstone [15] are exceptional in stating some results in that
direction; Mormann, who proves various important results on quasianalysis, concentrates
on a version of quasianalysis that is different from the one in the Aufbau and does not
subscribe to Goodman's way of presenting quasianalysis; compare our discussions at the
beginnings of Sections 4 and 3, respectively.
3 The set S of elementary experiences, i.e., the set of basic elements according to
the phenomenalistic constitution system in the Aujbau, is considered to be finite by
Carnap; cf. a 180 of the Aufbau.
4 Formally, a property structure (S, P) is a so-called hypergraph (see Berge [2] for
the standard reference on hypergraphs). Hypergraph theory can be employed successfully
as a means of investigating Carnap's method of quasianalysis. Unfortunately, quasianal-
ysis seems to have passed unnoticed by hypergraph theorists and the same holds vice versa.
As far as the usefulness of graph-theoretical results for the study of quasianalysis is
concerned, we regard this paper as an example of the surprising benefit that one may get
from applying mathematical methods and results in a strictly philosophical context.
s In what follows, expressions such as '(S,r,,)' and '(S,,,.P)' denote similarity
structures on the set of individuals denoted by 'S,' and expressions such as '(S, P)' and
'(S, P-)' denote property structures on the same set of individuals.
6 What we call a 'maximal clique' is simply called a 'clique' in part of the
literature on graph theory. We follow the terminology that is used e.g., by Berge [2].
7 Actually we should distinguish 'determined' according to definition 3 and
'determined' according to definition 4 syntactically, e.g., by defining 'determinedrop'
and 'determinedsim' instead. However, it will always be clear from the context whether a
similarity structure is to be determined by a property structure or the other way round.
8 Note that there is no efficient construction procedure for maximal cliques: in fact,
the problem of finding out whether there is a clique of cardinality k in a given graph is
well-known to be NP-complete.
9 What we call 'faithful' is termed 'conformal' in hypergraph theory, in partic

in Berge [1, 2]. Conformal hypergraphs have recently been studied in other field
including so-called guarded logics (see e.g., Hodkinson & Otto [17]).
10 Our definitions of 'faithful,' 'full,' and 'adequate' are conditional definiti
Since every property structure determines a unique similarity structure which
determines a unique (quasi-)property structure, we could have used uncondi
definitions instead which would define 'faithful,' 'full,' and 'adequate' as u
predicates that apply simply to property structures. However, the motivation fo
definitions seems to be clearer if we say that a determined similarity structure is f
or full or adequate with respect to the determining property structure rather than
that the determining property structure is itself faithful or full or adequate.
" Every clique X in a graph can be extended to a maximal clique X' such
X C X': this is trivial in the case where S is finite; in the infinite case it follows
straight-forward application of Zorn's lemma. We omit any details; see e.g.,
[50], pp. 124f, or Hazen and Humberstone [15], p. 29, for the proof).
12 We might even give this a Kantian twist: if properties are derived by
structure of our understanding and if the mechanism of our understandi
quasianalysis, then we can come to know a priori that the world can never h
property structure that determines a similarity structure that is inadequate with res
the former. We owe this way of looking at observation 6 to Leon Horsten.
13 Quine [42], p. 118, notes this problematic consequence.
14 We thank Gerhard Schurz for bringing our attention to this consequence.
15 For real x, [xJ is the largest integer less than or equal to x.
16 We thank Thomas Ryckman for pointing this out to us.
17 The theorem applies since events in our sense are convex subsets of R. A s
X of aR" is called convex if and only if for every x,y E X, the straight line seg
between x and y is included in X, i.e., for all A E [0, 1] : Ax + (1 - A)y E X. In ou
n = 1, and obviously every real interval is convex.
18 Russell does not prove his method of constructing points of space-time adequ
He only derives from the well-ordering theorem that every copunctual group of
can be extended to a maximal such group. Nowadays it is surely Zorn's lemm
would be put to use here.
19 We are going to employ 'E' both when we use and when we mention
membership symbol. For all other symbols we will distinguish occurrences in th
language from those in the metalanguage syntactically.
20 For our current purposes we might simply consider the cumulative hierarchy
to the first infinite ordinal w. Whence all urelements would be members of D, but
sets of finite rank that can be built up from urelements cumulatively would be mem
FURTHER READING
Brockhaus, K., Untersuchungen zu Carnaps Logischem Aufbau der Welt,

Mnster: unpublished doctoral dissertation at the Universit6t Mnster,
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Departments of Philosophy
University of Bristol,
9 Woodland Road, Bristol
E-mail: Hannes.Leitgeb@b

A New Analysis of Quasi Analysis

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A New Analysis of Quasi Analysis

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A New Analysis of Quasianalysis

Author(s): Hannes Leitgeb

A NEW ANALYSIS OF QUASIANALYSIS

Received 28 December 2005

ABSTRACT. We investigate the conditions under which quasianalysis, i.e.,

KEY WORDS: abstraction, Aufbau, Carnap, quasianalysis, similarity

fact, Carnap already anticip

2. SIMILARITY AND PROPE

In the subsequent section w

typical examples of quasianalysis are instances of the more general t

DEFINITION 1. (Similarity Structure) A pair (S, ) is a simi

If (S, a-) is a similarity structure, the members of S will be

DEFINITION 2. (Property Structure) A pair (S, P) is a property

quacy with respect to non-

Once the classes of similar

structure. The notions of faithfulness, fullness, and adequacy that we

DEFINITION 3. (Determined Similarity Structure) (S, ~) is deter-

EXAMPLE 1. We consider a property structure (Si, P1) (Figure 1) with

The similarity structure (

i.e., depicted as a graph:

Figure 2. Similarity structure (SI, , )

(From now on we will always specify similarity s

Note that every similarity structure (s, ~) on S can

are given by non-empty intersection. It is well known that every gra

* x C s is called a clique of (s, ) iff for all x,y e X: x ~ y.

The main idea of quasianalysis can be explained easily in terms of

quasianalysis in the AuJb

In this way every similar

EXAMPLE 2. Ifwe consider (Sl, ) now as a given similarity structure,

We can also make use of maximal cliques in order to derive a further

4. OTHER VERSIONS OF QUASIANALYSIS

(part-)similar if and only if

x -'P y iff 3X E P, s.t. x,y E X (def. 3)

In this latter case where properties correspond to spheres let us cal

intended results, this give

5. A NOTION OF ADEQUACY FOR SIMILARITY STRUCTURES

So let us concentrate just on quasianalysis as being given by defin

DEFINITION 5. (Faithfulness; fullness; adequacy) Let (S, P) be a

1. (S, ~P) is faithful with respect to (, P) if P ~ p.9

Kleinknecht [19] (following Eberle [8]) considers a third pos

occur only if properties ar

Figure 3. Property structure (S2, P2)

EXAMPLE 4. (Not faithful, but full) Let S3 = {1,2,3,4,5,6}

The graph that corr

Figure 5. Similarity stru

Hence (S3,PP~3) with P-3

EXAMPLE 5. (Neither fai

The similarity struc

every two members of s share a property, the determined sim

EXAMPLE 6. (Carnap's spherical properties) Let V = R" be t

1. Consider three points x,y, z E Ss which are the vertices of

(SS,~S), but because of w

1 of example 6 proves Carn

T' in 1 of example 6 is a counterexample to this claim.

OBSERVATION 6. (From similarity to adequacy) Let (S,~) be a sim-

xNP'-y iff EX E Pr, s.t. x,y E X (def. 3)

The last equivalence holds because: (-=) If x and y are members of

Note that observation 6 implies that no two distinct similarity

EXAMPLE 7. (Equivalence relations) Let S be a non-empty set and let

Given that a method of abstraction for similarity structures is aimed to

classes and would thus fail t

We have seen that many det

structures to property structures, determination ofa similarity struc

OBSERVATION 7. (Proportion of success) Let S = {1,... ,n} be a f