No. 103119 October 21, 1992 attempted murder. Petitioner seeks from this Court a possible.
tioner seeks from this Court a possible. So long as these conditions were not
SULPICIO INTOD vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals 1 affirming in toto the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV,
Oroquieta City, finding him guilty of the crime of attempted
murder.
From the records, we gathered the following facts.
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge
Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to
Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena,
Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with them to the
house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya
and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting
with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted
Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute
between them and that Mandaya should accompany the
four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day,
Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all
armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house in
Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the
instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location
of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner,
Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned
out, however, that Palangpangan was in another City and
her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his
family. No one was in the room when the accused fired
the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire.
Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by
witnesses. One witness testified that before the five men
left the premises, they shouted: "We will kill you (the
witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we
will come back if (sic) you were not injured". 2
After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of
attempted murder. The court (RTC), as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, holding that Petitioner was guilty of
modification of the judgment by holding him liable only for
an impossible crime, citingArticle 4(2) of the Revised
Penal Code which provides:
Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal
Responsibility shall be incurred:
2. By any person performing an act which would be
an offense against persons or property, were it not
for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the employment
of inadequate or ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence
from her room on the night he and his companions
riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently
impossible.
On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines
argues that the crime was not impossible. Instead, the
facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to
convict Intod for attempted murder. Respondent alleged
that there was intent. Further, in its Comment to the
Petition, respondent pointed out that:
. . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not
because of the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment (Art. 4(2), Revised Penal Code), but
due to a cause or accident other than petitioner's and
his accused's own spontaneous desistance (Art.
3., Ibid.) Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at
that time. Had it not been for this fact, the crime is
possible, not impossible. 3
Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the Revised
Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the void in the Old
Penal Code where:
. . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has
been commenced, that the person conceiving the
1
idea should have set about doing the deed,
employing appropriate means in order that his intent
Page
might become a reality, and finally, that the result or
end contemplated shall have been physically
present, the law and the courts did not hold him
criminally liable. 5
This legal doctrine left social interests entirely
unprotected. 6 The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the
Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his
formidability, 7 and now penalizes an act which were it not
aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with
means which prove inadequate, would constitute a felony
against person or against property. 8 The rationale of
Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies. 9
Under this article, the act performed by the offender
cannot produce an offense against person or property
because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment: or (2) the means employed
is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. 10
That the offense cannot be produced because the
commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be
impossible under this clause, the act intended by the
offender must be by its nature one impossible of
accomplishment. 11 There must be either impossibility of
accomplishing the intended act 12 in order to qualify the
act an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if
completed, would not amount to a crime. 13 Thus:
Legal impossibility would apply to those
circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and
expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law;
(2) there is intention to perform the physical act; (3)
there is a performance of the intended physical act;
and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended
act does not amount to a crime. 14The impossibility
of killing a person already dead 15 falls in this
category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when
extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or
beyond his control prevent the consummation of the
intended crime. 16 One example is the man who puts his
hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to
steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty. 17
The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots
the place where he thought his victim would be, although
in reality, the victim was not present in said place and
thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.
One American case had facts almost exactly the same as
this one. In People vs. Lee Kong, 18 the accused, with
intent to kill, aimed and fired at the spot where he thought
the police officer would be. It turned out, however, that the
latter was in a different place. The accused failed to hit
him and to achieve his intent. The Court convicted the
accused of an attempt to kill. It held that:
The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the
attacking party imagined where he was, and where
the bullet pierced the roof, renders it no less an
attempt to kill. It is well settled principle of criminal law
in this country that where the criminal result of an
attempt is not accomplished simply because of an
obstruction in the way of the thing to be operated
upon, and these facts are unknown to the aggressor
at the time, the criminal attempt is committed.
In the case of Strokes vs. State, 19 where the accused
failed to accomplish his intent to kill the victim because the
latter did not pass by the place where he was lying-in wait,
the court held him liable for attempted murder. The court
explained that:
It was no fault of Strokes that the crime was not
committed. . . . It only became impossible by reason
of the extraneous circumstance that Lane did not go
that way; and further, that he was arrested and
prevented from committing the murder. This rule of
the law has application only where it is inherently
impossible to commit the crime. It has no application
to a case where it becomes impossible for the crime
to be committed, either by outside interference or
because of miscalculation as to a supposed
opportunity to commit the crime which fails to
materialize; in short it has no application to the case
when the impossibility grows out of extraneous acts
not within the control of the party.
In the case of Clark vs. State, 20 the court held defendant
liable for attempted robbery even if there was nothing to
rob. In disposing of the case, the court quoted Mr. Justice
Bishop, to wit:
It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves
punishment by reason of his criminal intent, no one
can seriously doubt that the protection of the public
requires the punishment to be administered, equally
whether in the unseen depths of the pocket, etc.,
what was supposed to exist was really present or not.
The community suffers from the mere alarm of crime.
Again: Where the thing intended (attempted) as a
crime and what is done is a sort to create alarm, in
other words, excite apprehension that the evil;
intention will be carried out, the incipient act which the
law of attempt takes cognizance of is in reason
committed.
In State vs. Mitchell, 21 defendant, with intent to kill, fired
at the window of victim's room thinking that the latter was
inside. However, at that moment, the victim was in another
part of the house. The court convicted the accused of
attempted murder.
The aforecited cases are the same cases which have
been relied upon by Respondent to make this Court
sustain the judgment of attempted murder against
Petitioner. However, we cannot rely upon these decisions
to resolve the issue at hand. There is a difference
between the Philippine and the American laws regarding
the concept and appreciation of impossible crimes.
In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2),
expressly provided for impossible crimes and made the
punishable. Whereas, in the United States, the Code of
Crimes and Criminal Procedure is silent regarding this
matter. What it provided for were attempts of the crimes
enumerated in the said Code. Furthermore, in said
jurisdiction, the impossibility of committing the offense is
merely a defense to an attempt charge. In this regard,
commentators and the cases generally divide the
impossibility defense into two categories: legal versus
factual impossibility. 22 In U.S. vs. Wilson 23 the Court
2
held that:
Page
. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the
crime is not a defense. If the crime could have been
committed had the circumstances been as the
defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that in
reality the crime was impossible of commission.
Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which
can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt.
In U.S. vs. Berrigan, 24 the accused was indicated for
attempting to smuggle letters into and out of prison. The
law governing the matter made the act criminal if done
without knowledge and consent of the warden. In this
case, the offender intended to send a letter without the
latter's knowledge and consent and the act was
performed. However, unknown to him, the transmittal was
achieved with the warden's knowledge and consent. The
lower court held the accused liable for attempt but the
appellate court reversed. It held unacceptable the
contention of the state that "elimination of impossibility as
a defense to a charge of criminal attempt, as suggested
by the Model Penal Code and the proposed federal
legislation, is consistent with the overwhelming modern
view". In disposing of this contention, the Court held that
the federal statutes did not contain such provision, and
thus, following the principle of legality, no person could be
criminally liable for an act which was not made criminal by
law. Further, it said:
Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that
intent plus act plus conduct constitutes the offense of
attempt irrespective of legal impossibility until such time
as such legislative changes in the law take place, this
court will not fashion a new non-statutory law of criminal
attempt.
To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought
to be committed is factually impossible or
accomplishment, the offender cannot escape criminal
liability. He can be convicted of an attempt to commit the
substantive crime where the elements of attempt are
satisfied. It appears, therefore, that the act is penalized,
not as an impossible crime, but as an attempt to commit a
crime. On the other hand, where the offense is legally
impossible of accomplishment, the actor cannot be held
liable for any crime — neither for an attempt not for an
impossible crime. The only reason for this is that in
American law, there is no such thing as an impossible
crime. Instead, it only recognizes impossibility as a
defense to a crime charge — that is, attempt.
This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction,
impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of
accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense,
but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase
"inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the
Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual
or physical impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex
non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical
impossibility which rendered the intended crime
impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient
to make the act an impossible crime.
To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense
was Attempted Murder because the absence of
Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of
the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article
4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act "which
would be an offense against persons or property, were it
not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances which
prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated
as an accident independent of the actor's will which is an
element of attempted and frustrated felonies.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is
hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of
Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is
hereby MODIFIED. We hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an
impossible crime as defined and penalized in Articles 4,
paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code,
respectively. Having in mind the social danger and degree
of criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court sentences
him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by
the law, and to pay the costs.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 95322 March 1, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PABLITO
DOMASIAN AND DR. SAMSON TAN
The boy was detained for only about three hours and was
released even before his parents received the ransom
note. But it spawned a protracted trial spanning all of 8
years and led to the conviction of the two accused.1
The victim was Enrico Paulo Agra, who was 8 years old at
the time of the incident in question. The accused were
Pablito Domasian and Samson Tan, the latter then a
resident physician in the hospital owned by Enrico's
parents. They were represented by separate lawyers at
the trial and filed separate briefs in this appeal.
The evidence of the prosecution showed that in the
morning of March 11, 1982, while Enrico was walking with
a classmate along Roque street in the poblacion of Lopez,
Quezon, he was approached by a man who requested his
assistance in getting his father's signature on a medical
certificate. Enrico agreed to help and rode with the man in
a tricycle to Calantipayan, where he waited outside while
the man went into a building to get the certificate. Enrico
became apprehensive and started to cry when, instead of
taking him to the hospital, the man flagged a minibus and
forced him inside, holding him firmly all the while. The
man told him to stop crying or he would not be returned to
his father. When they alighted at Gumaca, they took
another tricycle, this time bound for the municipal building
from where they walked to the market. Here the man
talked to a jeepney driver and handed him an envelope
addressed to Dr. Enrique Agra, the boy's father. The two
then boarded a tricycle headed for San Vicente, with the
man still firmly holding Enrico, who continued crying. This
aroused the suspicion of the driver, Alexander Grate, who
asked the man about his relationship with the boy. The
man said he and the boy were brothers, making Grate
3
doubly suspicious because of the physical differences
between the two and the wide gap between their ages.
Page
Grate immediately reported the matter to two
barangay tanods when his passengers alighted from the
tricycle. Grate and the tanods went after the two and saw
the man dragging the boy. Noticing that they were being
pursued, the man told Enrico to run fast as their pursuers
might behead them. Somehow, the man managed to
escape, leaving Enrico behind. Enrico was on his way
home in a passenger jeep when he met his parents, who
were riding in the hospital ambulance and already looking
for him.2
At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after
Enrico's return, Agra received an envelope containing a
ransom note. The note demanded P1 million for the
release of Enrico and warned that otherwise the boy
would be killed. Agra thought the handwriting in the note
was familiar. After comparing it with some records in the
hospital, he gave the note to the police, which referred it
to the NBI for examination.3
The test showed that it bad been written by Dr. Samson
Tan.4 On the other hand, Enrico was shown a folder of
pictures in the police station so be could identify the man
who had detained him, and he pointed to the picture of
Pablito Domasian.5 Domasian and Tan were subsequently
charged with the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal
detention in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon.6
The defense of both accused was denial and alibi.
Domasian claimed that at the time of the incident he was
watching a mahjong game in a friend's house and later
went to an optical clinic with his wife for the refraction of
his eyeglasses.7 Dr. Tan for his part said he was in
Manila.8
After trial Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas found both accused
guilty as charged and sentenced them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and all accessory penalties.
They were also required to pay P200,000.00 to Dr. and
Mrs. Enrique Agra as actual and moral damages and
attorney's fees.
In the present appeal, the accused-appellants reiterate
their denial of any participation in the incident in question.
They belittle the credibility of the prosecution witnesses
and submit that their own witnesses are more believable.
Tan specifically challenges the findings of the NBI and
offers anew the opposite findings of the PC/INP showing
that he was not the writer of the ransom note. He
maintains that in any case, the crime alleged is not
kidnapping with serious illegal detention as no detention in
an enclosure was involved. If at all, it should be
denominated and punished only as grave coercion.
Finally, both Domasian and Tan insist that there is no
basis for the finding of a conspiracy between them to
make them criminally liable in equal degree.
First, on the credibility of the witnesses. This is assessed
in the first instance by the trial judge, whose finding in this
regard is received with much respect by the appellate
court because of his opportunity to directly observe the
demeanor of the witnesses on the stand.
In the case at bar, Judge Lanzanas relied heavily on the
testimony of the victim himself, who positively identified
Domasian as the person who detained him for three
hours. The trial court observed that the boy was "straight-
forward, natural and consistent" in the narration of his
detention. The boy's naivete made him even more
believable. Tirso Ferreras, Enrico's classmate and also his
age, pointed to Domasian with equal certainty, as the man
who approached Enrico when they were walking together
that morning of March 11, 1982. Grate, the tricycle driver
who suspected Enrico's companion and later chased him,
was also positive in identifying Domasian. All these three
witnesses did not know Domasian until that same morning
and could have no ill motive in testifying against him. By
contrast, Eugenia Agtay, who testified for the defense, can
hardly be considered a disinterested witness because she
admitted she had known Domasian for 3 years.
The defense asks why Domasian openly took Enrico to
several public places if the intention was to kidnap and
detain him. That is for Domasian himself to answer. We do
no have to probe the reasons for the irrational conduct of
an accused. The more important question, as we see it, is
why Domasian detained Enrico in the first place after
pretending he needed the boy's help. That is also for
Domasian to explain. As for Enrico's alleged willingness to
go with Domasian, this was manifested only at the
beginning, when he believed the man sincerely needed
his assistance. But he was soon disabused. His initial
confidence gave way to fear when Domasian, after taking
him so far away from the hospital where he was going,
restrained and threatened him if he did not stop crying.
Domasian's alibi cannot stand against his positive
identification by Enrico, Grate and Ferreras, let alone the
contradictions made by his corroborating witness, Dr.
Irene Argosino, regarding the time he was in the optical
clinic and the manner of his payment for the
refraction.9 Tan's alibi is not convincing either. The
circumstance that he may have been in Manila at the time
of the incident does not prove that he could not have
written the ransom note except at that time.
Concerning the note, Rule 132, Section 22, of the Rules of
Court provides as follows:
The handwriting of a person may be proved by any
witness who believes it to be the handwriting of
such person and has seen the person write, or has
seen writing purporting to be his upon which the
witness has acted or been charged and has thus
acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such
person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may
also be given by a comparison, made by the
witness or the court with writings admitted or
treated as genuine by the party against whom the
evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge.
Two expert witnesses were presented in the case at bar,
one from the NBI, 10 who opined that the ransom note and
the standard documents were written by one and the
same person, and another from the PC/INP 11 who
expressed a contrary conclusion. The trial court chose to
believe the NBI expert because his examination and
analysis "was more comprehensive than the one
conducted by the PC/INP handwriting expert, who virtually
limited his reliance on the perceived similarities and
dissimilarities in the pattern and style of the writing,
thereby disregarding the basic principle in handwriting
identification that it is not the form alone nor anyone
feature but rather a combination of all the qualities that
identify."
We have held that the value of the opinion of a
handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements
of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the
4
assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing
Page
marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between
genuine and false specimens of writing which would
ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed
observer. 12 The test of genuineness ought to be the
resemblance, not the formation of letters in some other
specimens but to the general character of writing, which is
impressed on it as the involuntary and unconscious result
of constitution, habit or other permanent course, and is,
therefore itself permanent. 13
Presented with the conflicting opinions of the witnesses in
the case at bar, the Court feels that the scales should tilt
in favor of the prosecution. Significantly, the NBI opinion
was bolstered by the testimony of Agra, who believed that
the ransom note was written by Tan, with whose
handwriting he was familiar because they had been
working in the hospital for four years and he had seen that
handwriting every day in Tan's prescriptions and daily
reports. 14
Cesar v. Sandiganbayan 15 is not applicable because that
case involved a forgery or the deliberate imitation of
another person's signature. In the case before us, there
was in fact an effort to disguise the ransom note writer's
penmanship to prevent his discovery.
As for the nature of the crime committed, Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. —
Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain
another, or in any manner deprive him of his liberty,
shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted
more than five days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public
authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; of if
threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a
minor, female or a public officer.
 The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or
detention was committed for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the victim or any other person; even if
none of the circumstances above-mentioned were
present in the commission of the offense.
Contrary to Tan's submission, this crime may consist not
only in placing a person in an enclosure but also in
detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his
liberty. 16 In the case at bar, it is noted that although the
victim was not confined in an enclosure, he was deprived
of his liberty when Domasian restrained him from going
home and dragged him first into the minibus that took
them to the municipal building in Gumaca, thence to the
market and then into the tricycle bound for San Vicente.
The detention was committed by Domasian, who was a
private individual, and Enrico was a minor at that time.
The crime clearly comes under Par. 4 of the above-quoted
article.
Tan claims that the lower court erred in not finding that the
sending of the ransom note was an impossible crime
which he says is not punishable. His reason is that the
second paragraph of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that criminal liability shall be incurred "by any
person performing an act which would be an offense
against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means." As the
crime alleged is not against persons or property but
against liberty, he argues that it is not covered by the said
provision.
Tan conveniently forgets the first paragraphs of the same
article, which clearly applies to him, thus:
Art. 4. Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be
incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.
Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of
kidnapping with serious illegal detention had already been
committed. The act cannot be considered an impossible
crime because there was no inherent improbability of its
accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or of People vs. Andre Marti, 20 that the Bill of Rights cannot
ineffective means. The delivery of the ransom note after be invoked against acts of private individuals, being
the rescue of the victim did not extinguish the offense, directed only against the government and its law-
which had already been consummated when Domasian enforcement agencies and limitation on official action.
deprived Enrico of his liberty. The sending of the ransom
note would have had the effect only of increasing the We are satisfied that Tan and Domasian, in conspiracy
penalty to death under the last paragraph of Article 267 with each other, committed the crime of kidnapping as
although this too would not have been possible under the defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised
new Constitution. Penal Code and so deserve the penalty imposed upon
them by the trial court.
On the issue of conspiracy, we note first that it exists when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, with
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it, costs against the accused-appellants.
whether they act through physical volition of one or all,
proceeding severally or collectively. 17
Let a copy of this decision be sent to the Commission on
Human Rights for investigation of the alleged violation of
It is settled that conspiracy can be inferred from and the constitutional rights of Pablito Domasian.
proven by the acts of the accused themselves when said
acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action
and community of interests. 18 In the instant case, the trial SO ORDERED.
court correctly held that conspiracy was proved by the act
of Domasian in detaining Enrico; the writing of the ransom
note by Tan; and its delivery by Domasian to Agra. These
acts were complementary to each other and geared
toward the attainment of the common ultimate
objective, viz., to extort the ransom of P1 million in
exchange for Enrico's life.
The motive for the offense is not difficult to discover.
According to Agra, Tan approached him six days before
the incident happened and requested a loan of at least
P15,000.00. Agra said he had no funds at that moment
and Tan did not believe him, angrily saying that Agra could
even raise a million pesos if he really wanted to
help. 19 The refusal obviously triggered the plan to kidnap
Enrico and demand P1 million for his release.
The constitutional issues raised by Domasian do not affect
the decision in this case. His claim that he was arrested
without warrant and then tortured and
held incommunicado to extort a confession from him does
not vitiate his conviction. He never gave any confession.
As for the allegation that the seizure of the documents
used for comparison with the ransom note was made
5
without a search warrant, it suffices to say that such
Page
documents were taken by Agra himself and not by the NBI
agents or other police authorities. We held in the case
[ GR No. 102596, Dec 17, 1999 ]
PEOPLE v. NICASIO ENOJA
This is an appeal from the decision dated October 31,
1990, of the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, Branch 26, in
Criminal Case No. 31550, convicting accused-appellants
Nicasio Enoja @ "Nick", Jose Enoja @ "Moros", Antonio
Galupar @ "Tony", Ronnie Enoja @ Bud-oy", and Yolly
Armada of the crime of murder, and sentencing them as
follows:
"...Nicasio Enoja @ Nick, Jose Enoja @ "Moros", and
Antonio Galupar alias "Tony", each to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua; Yolly Armada to suffer an
indeterminate prison sentence ranging from ten (10) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to eighteen
(18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum, and Ronnie Enoja alias "Bud-oy"
to suffer indeterminate prison sentence ranging from six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum and all the said accused, to pay, jointly and
severally, the heirs of the deceased Siegfred Insular the
sum of P30,000.00 for his death and P19,200.00 as actual
damages representing expenses, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency together with all the
accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay the
costs."[1]
The five appellants, all farmers and residents of Barangay
Caraudan, Janiuay, Iloilo, are related to each other. Jose
Enoja @ "Moros", Ronnie Enoja @ "Bud-oy", and Yolly
Armada, are the brother, son and first cousin, respectively,
of appellant Nicasio Enoja, while Antonio Galupar is a
"kumpadre." Three other accused, Joel Enoja @ "Mike",
Melvin Castor, and Antonio Enoja, remain at-large.
The victim, Siegfred G. Insular, was a suspected
commander of the "New People's Army" (NPA). A day
before the incident, the house of Romulo Enoja, brother of
the Enojas, was allegedly sprayed with bullets by the
NPA, killing Romulo's daughter and son. Before that, the
house of Catelina Enoja, mother of the Enojas, at
Barangay Caraudan, was allegedly burned by the NPA.
The facts are not in dispute. In their consolidated brief,
appellants adopted the factual findings of the trial court, as
follows:[2]
"x x x [I]n the afternoon of July 2, 1987, at around 4:30
o'clock, while Siegfred Insular and his wife, Paterna, were
on their way home from the market walking along the
ricefield at Barangay Caraudan, Janiuay, Iloilo, they saw
Yolly Armada with a long firearm in hand, walking on the
other side of the field towards the same direction where
the couple were going.
Paterna did not at first recognize Yolly Armada as the man
on the other side of the ricefield, and so, she called the
attention of her husband saying that the man was carrying
a firearm. Recognizing the man, however, Siegfred told
his wife: "never mind, he is Yolly Armada". The spouses
Insular and Yolly Armada continued walking until they met
ways in front of the ricemill of Teodoro Salamanca near
the chapel. Siegfred greeted Armada by nodding his head
to which Armada responded by also nodding his head.
Siegfred then said "We will leave" but as he and his wife
were about to proceed on their way, Armada blocked the
couple and pointed his firearm to Siegfred with the barrel
of the gun touching the left side of the body of the latter.
Suddenly, Armada fired his gun and as Siegfred turned his
back to run, Armada fired successive shots at him causing
him to fall to the ground, wounded.
Almost simultaneously, several armed men appeared and
took turns in firing at Siegfred. Among these armed men
were Nicasio Enoja alias "Nick," Jose Enoja alias "Moros",
Antonio Galupar alias "Tony," and Ronnie Enoja alias
"Bud-oy." The body of the victim jerked as the accused
took turns in shooting him.
After shooting Siegfred Insular, the accused turned to his
wife, Paterna, and attempted to shoot her but Paterna
Insular hugged Teodoro Salamanca who was then and
there present, thus prompting the latter to shout to the
accused: "do not include the girl." The accused heeded
the plea of Teodoro Salamanca and refrained from
shooting Paterna Insular.
Jose Enoja then turned to his brother Antonio Enoja and
fired at the latter hitting him on the thigh. Thereafter, Jose
6
Enoja approached Siegfred Insular who was then lying on
Page
the ground and placed the gun he used in shooting his
brother, Antonio, near the hand of Siegfred Insular. Then
Jose Enoja placed some live bullets into the pocket of
Siegfred Insular. Jose Enoja called for a hammock and, in
no time at all, there was a hammock brought to the place
where Antonio Enoja was loaded and, thereafter, brought
to the hospital. The body of Siegfred Insular was,
however, left lying on the ground at the scene of the
incident.
Nicasio Enoja announced that they would bring Paterna
Insular and Teodoro Salamanca to the ricefield where they
would be made to spend the night but Paterna pleaded to
Nicasio Enoja to just bring them to the house of Patria
Alcantara about five meters away from the scene of the
incident. The accused granted the request of Paterna and
brought her and Teodoro Salamanca to the house of
Patria Alcantara where they were told to stay with the
warning not to get out or they would be shot. It was only
the following morning, after policemen and PC soldiers
had arrived that Paterna and Salamanca were able to go
out of the house of Alcantara.
The shooting incident reached the police station of
Janiuay, Iloilo upon the report of one Alfredo Galupar, and
so, a joint PC-INP team under P.C. Lt. Pangina and police
station commander, Sgt. Reynaldo Soroñgon went to
Barangay Caraudan and conducted investigation of the
incident. That was already around 8:00 o'clock in the
morning of July 3, 1987. The policemen were able to
recovery several empty shells of different caliber of
firearms from the crime scene. One short homemade
firearm caliber .30, with one empty shell inside the
chamber was likewise found and recovered from the
ground near the left arm of the victim."
On March 11, 1988, Provincial Fiscal Vicente E. Aragona
filed an Information[3] for murder against appellants and
their three companions who were still at-large. The
Information alleged:
"The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses NICASIO
ENOJA alias "Nick", JOSE ENOJA alias "Moros",
ANTONIO GALUPAR alias "Tony", RONNIE ENOJA alias
"Bud-oy" and YOLLY ARMADA of the crime of Murder
committed as follows:
That on or about July 2, 1987, in the Municipality of
Janiuay, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another with JOEL ENOJA alias "Mike", MELVIN
CASTOR and ANTONIO ENOJA, who are still at large,
armed with firearms and taking advantage of superior
strength to better realize their purpose, with treachery and
evident premeditation and with intent to kill, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and shoot one SIEGFRED INSULAR with said weapon
with which they were then provided, thereby inflicting upon
the latter gunshot wounds on the vital parts of his body
which caused his death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
On August 5, 1988, appellants were arraigned and
entered their respective pleas of not guilty.
During trial, the prosecution presented the following
witnesses: Teodoro Salamanca, an eyewitness to the
shooting; Paterna Insular, widow of Siegred; Dr. Tito D.
Doromal, medico-legal officer who did the autopsy; Pfc.
Juan O. Gañon, and Pfc. Moises C. Reiteracion,
Integrated National Police officers who responded to the
shooting incident.
Dr. Doromal testified that the victim suffered five (5)
gunshot wounds in the head and neck area, six (6)
gunshot wounds in the thoraco-abdominal regions, and
two (2) gunshot wounds in the extremities. The cause of
death was maceration of the brain, secondary to gunshot
wounds.[4]
Pfc. Juan O. Gañon stated that he entered the incident in
the police blotter.[5] Pfc. Moises C. Reiteracion said he was
part of the team which responded to the report of the
shooting incident. The team found the body of the victim
still lying on the same spot the following morning. They
recovered empty shells of different calibers and a
homemade short firearm near the left arm of the victim.
[6]
Pfc. Reiteracion and two companions brought the body
of the victim to the funeral home.[7]
For the defense, appellants presented Atty. David
Tubongbanua, 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo,
who recommended the dismissal of the case but was
overturned by the Provincial Fiscal. Appellants
themselves testified and, except for Armada, interposed
the defense of denial and alibi.
Appellant Armada pleaded self-defense in shooting
Siegfred. He claimed that while he was on his way from
Barangay Quipot to Caraudan, to attend the wake of his
niece and nephew, he heard gunshots near the chapel.
When he went to the place, he saw Galupar lying
wounded on the ground, shot by Siegfred. Siegfred then
attempted to shoot Armada, but the latter beat him to the
draw. Armada fired successive shots at Insular with his
M-2 automatic carbine. He did not see Paterna in the
vicinity. After the shooting, Salamanca, Nicasio and
Arnold came out of the rice mill. Salamanca asked what
happened and Armada answered that Siegfred shot
Antonio and so, he shot Siegfred. Armada then left and
surrendered to the PC station at Jibolo, Janiuay, Iloilo City.
[8]
The other appellants admitted being in the vicinity of the
crime, but categorically denied any participation in the
shooting.
Nicasio claimed that he was with his son, Arnold, and
Salamanca inside the latter's ricemill, milling palay when
the shooting occurred.[9]However, Salamanca testified that
at the time of the incident, there was no palay milling
going on.[10]
Ronnie testified that he was doing household chores in
their house at Barangay Caraudan, where his brother
Rowel and sister Annelyn were lying in state, when he
heard explosions coming from the direction of the ricemill.
[11]
Shortly thereafter, Arnold arrived and told them that
Antonio was shot by Siegfred and requested that a
hammock be brought to the scene so that Antonio could
be brought to the hospital. Ronnie, Jose, and Jonathan
Lazo, Ronnie's first cousin, immediately brought the
hammock to the scene of the incident.[12] Ronnie
thereafter saw Paterna arrive and cry upon seeing her
slain husband. Ronnie and his companions placed
Antonio in the hammock, boarded him in a tricycle, and
rushed him to the hospital.[13] On the way, Ronnie heard
explosions and when he looked back, he saw his uncle
Joel Enoja alias "Mike" and his friend, Melvin, shooting the
prostrate body of Siegfred.[14]
Jose testified that he was at his house, about 300 meters
from the scene of the crime. He was weeding in his yard
when he heard gunfire. After a short while, Arnold arrived
7
and asked him to bring a hammock to the scene of the
incident.[15]
Page
Galupar related that he had just finished plowing his farm
and was resting in his house in Barangay Caraudan when
he heard explosions. He remained at home the whole
night and only learned of the death of Siegfred the
following morning. He claimed that he was implicated in
the case because he refused to act as witness for the
prosecution.[16]
On October 31, 1990, the trial court rendered a
decision[17] finding appellants guilty as charged. The trial
court did not give credence to Armada's claim of self-
defense inasmuch as policemen recovered several empty
bullet shells from firearms of different calibers at the scene
of the crime. The short homemade firearm found near the
left arm of the victim could not have been used by the
victim since it only had one empty shell in its chamber, not
to mention that the victim was right-handed. Lastly, the
trial court found it highly suspicious that Antonio, who was
allegedly shot by the victim and who could have
corroborated Armada's story of self-defense, went into
hiding and had not surfaced up to the present.
In this appeal, in their joint brief,[18] appellants raise the
following errors:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING
CONSPIRACY;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY;
III. ASSUMING THEM GUILTY, THE LOWER COURT
ERRED, EXCEPT FOR APPELLANT YOLLY ARMADA, IN
NOT FINDING THAT THE OFFENSE COMMITTED WAS
ONLY AN IMPOSSIBLE CRIME.
The records show that appellant Antonio Galupar died
pending appeal. Pursuant to our ruling in People v.
Bayotas, 236 SCRA 239, the death of appellant Galupar
pending appeal extinguished his criminal liability as well
as his civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.
Appellant Yolly Armada escaped from the New Bilibid
Prison on September 25, 1996.[19] As a result, his appeal
was dismissed and the judgment against him became final
and executory. Entry of judgment was made on January
9, 1997.[20]
In the meantime, appellant Jose Enoja jumped bail, which

also resulted in the dismissal of his appeal. Judgment
against him became final and executory, and entry of
judgment was made on March 21, 1997.[21] An appellant
who escapes or refuses to surrender to the proper
authorities is deemed to have abandoned his appeal,
[22]
hence, the judgment against him becomes a final and
executory. Nonetheless, the appeal proceeds as to the
remaining appellants, Nicasio Enoja and Ronnie Enoja,
who are now detained at the New Bilibid Prison,
Muntinlupa City. Our present review, therefore, concerns
only these two appellants.
Appellants assail the trial court's finding of conspiracy by
pointing out alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses Salamanca and Paterna.
Appellants contend that while Salamanca testified that it
was only after Armada shot the victim that the other
appellants came "one after the other" and fired at the
victim, Paterna testified that appellants
fired successive shots at the victim, implying that all
appellants were already in the crime scene when Armada
fired at Siegfred. However, close perusal of the pertinent
transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) shows no
inconsistencies in the two testimonies. Paterna actually
testified that after Armada fired at her husband, the other
appellants arrived one after the other ("nag-arabot abot"),
[23]
and continued to fire at the prostrate body of her
husband. The two testimonies constitute cumulative
evidence on who participated in the shooting of Siegfred.
Both witnesses pointed to all five accused-appellants.
On the matter of conspiracy, we have consistently held
that conspiracy need not be shown by direct proof of an
agreement by the parties to commit the crime. The
conduct of the malefactors before, during or after the
commission of the crime is sufficient to prove their
conspiracy. Once proved, the act of one becomes the act
of all. All shall be answerable as co-principals regardless
of the extent or degree of their participation.[24] In this
case, circumstances indubitably show that appellants
acted concertedly to kill Siegfred. First, after appellant
Armada fired at the victim incapacitating the latter, the
other accused arrived "almost simultaneously" and took
turns in shooting the victim. The successive shots riddled
the victim's body with bullets. Several empty cartridges
from guns of different calibers found in the scene and the
numerous wounds of the victim indicate plurality of
assailants.[25] Second, appellant Jose Enoja thereafter
fired a shot at the thigh of his brother Antonio to make it
appear that the shooting was in self-defense. Third, Jose
planted a short firearm near the body of the victim and
placed bullets in the pocket of the victim. Fourth,
strangely after Antonio was brought to the hospital, he
conveniently disappeared and could no longer be located
by the authorities. The aforementioned acts of the
appellants clearly point to their common purpose, concert
of action, and community of interest.[26]
Appellants suggest that since Paterna was crying at the
time of the shooting, she could not have clearly witnessed
the commission of the crime. This contention is
disingenuous, to say the least. Paterna's crying does not
impair her credibility. Witnesses of startling occurrences
react differently depending upon their situation and state
of mind, and there is no standard form of human
behavioral response when one is confronted with a
strange, startling or frightful experience. [27] Her powers of
observation could even be heightened by the startling
event to imprint the details in her memory. We have gone
over the records and find her testimony clear, credible and
consistent with the testimony of Salamanca.
Appellants further insist that the trial court erred in finding
that treachery accompanied the killing, considering that
the victim was already forewarned of the impending
danger when he saw appellant Armada carrying a firearm.
Appellants contend that for treachery to exist, the
offended party is completely denied of the opportunity to
defend himself, but it is not so in this case.
As the Solicitor General correctly pointed out, there was
nothing in the behavior of Armada that could have
forewarned the victim of an impending danger. Both the
victim and Armada knew each other. Armada even
acknowledged the greeting of the victim. The latter was
walking along the ricefield with his wife[28] when he was
suddenly gunned down by the appellants. The victim
8
gave no provocation for the attack. The essence of
Page
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the
slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked.
[29]
Clearly, the qualifying circumstance of treachery is
present in this case.
Considering the number of the armed assailants against
the lone unarmed victim, there was also abuse of superior
strength. Since treachery absorbs the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength this
aggravating circumstance need not be appreciated
separately.[30]
As an alternative defense, appellants present the theory
that even assuming they participated in the killing of
Siegfred, they should only be held liable for the
commission of an impossible crime under Article 4, Par. 2
of the Revised Penal Code, penalized under Article 59
thereof.[31] Appellants theorize that the shots fired by
Armada already resulted in the death of the victim, and
hence, their subsequent shooting of the victim merely
constitutes the impossible crime of killing an already dead
person. The proposition not only completely contradicts
their defense of alibi and denial, it is also speculative as to
cause of death. The defense of impossible crime is
irreconcilable with alibi.
Appellants Nicasio and Ronnie Enoja claim that they were
elsewhere during the offense. For alibi to prosper as a
defense, the accused must show that he was so far away
that he could not have been physically present at the
place of the crime, or its immediate vicinity at the time of
its commission[32] and that his presence elsewhere renders
it impossible for him to be the guilty party.[33] In this case,
Nicasio admitted he was within the vicinity of the crime but
presented the lame excuse that he was inside
Salamanca's rice mill at the time of the shooting. His son,
Arnold, corroborated this testimony. But it was put in
doubt by the testimony of Salamanca, who stated that no
milling of palay in his ricemill was going on at the time of
the shooting. Alibi, especially when it is corroborated
mainly by relatives and friends of the accused, is held by
this Court with extreme suspicion for alibi is easy to
fabricate and concoct. [34]
Both Paterna and Salamanca positively identified Nicasio
Enoja as one of those who took part in the shooting
incident. Paterna categorically pointed to Ronnie Enoja
as the person who shot her husband in the right eye.
[35]
Appellants could not attribute any motive against these
witnesses to falsely testify against them. In the light of
positive identification by witnesses who have no motive to
falsely testify, the feeble defense of alibi cannot prevail
over the clear and positive identification of the accused as
the perpetrators of the crime.[36]
At the time of the commission of the crime, on July 2,
1987, the penalty for murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code was reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death.[37]
There being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance,
with respect to Nicasio Enoja's culpability, the trial court
correctly imposed the penalty for murder in its medium
period,[38] which is reclusion perpetua.
With respect to appellant Ronnie Enoja, who was born on
February 21, 1970, and was below 18 at the time of the
commission of the crime, the trial court correctly
appreciated the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority. Thus, the penalty next lower in degree was
imposed on him in its proper period pursuant to Article 68,
second paragraph of the Revised Penal Code, which
is prision mayormaximum to reclusion temporal medium.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum
penalty to be imposed upon appellant Ronnie Enoja shall
be taken from the medium period of the imposable
penalty, which is reclusion temporal minimum or twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months, while the minimum shall be taken from
the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor medium or four
(4) years and two (2) months to ten (10) years.
Consequently, the trial court correctly imposed upon
Ronnie Enoja the indeterminate sentence of six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve
(12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, the award of
P30,000.00 as indemnity should be increased to
P50,000.00. However, the award of actual damages in
the amount of P19,000.00 should be deleted. Credence
can only be given to claims, which are duly supported by
receipts.[39] The testimony alone of the widow, that her
sister-in-law incurred about P20,000.00 expenses in
connection with the death of the victim, is insufficient basis
to award actual damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City, Branch 26, in Criminal Case No. 31550,
convicting accused-appellants Nicasio Enoja @ " Nick"
and Ronnie Enoja @ "Bud-oy" of the crime of Murder is
hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
accused-appellants are ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim, jointly and severally, the amount of P50,000.00 as
indemnity. The award of P19,200.00 as actual damages
is deleted. Costs against appellants.
9
Page
G.R. No. 162540 July 13, 2009
GEMMA T. JACINTO vs. PEOPLE
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by
petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto seeking the reversal of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
23761 dated December 16, 2003, affirming petitioner's
conviction of the crime of Qualified Theft, and its
Resolution2 dated March 5, 2004 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner, along with two other women, namely, Anita
Busog de Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle, was
charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City, Branch 131, with the crime of Qualified
Theft, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about and sometime in the month of July 1997,
in Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring together and mutually helping one another,
being then all employees of MEGA FOAM
INTERNATIONAL INC., herein represented by JOSEPH
DYHENGCO Y CO, and as such had free access inside
the aforesaid establishment, with grave abuse of trust and
confidence reposed upon them with intent to gain and
without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal and deposited in their own account, Banco De Oro
Check No. 0132649 dated July 14, 1997 in the sum of
₱10,000.00, representing payment made by customer
Baby Aquino to the Mega Foam Int'l. Inc. to the damage
and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid stated amount
of ₱10,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The prosecution's evidence, which both the RTC and the
CA found to be more credible, reveals the events that
transpired to be as follows.
In the month of June 1997, Isabelita Aquino Milabo, also
known as Baby Aquino, handed petitioner Banco De Oro
(BDO) Check Number 0132649 postdated July 14, 1997
in the amount of ₱10,000.00. The check was payment for
Baby Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and
petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam.
Somehow, the check was deposited in the Land Bank
account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline
Capitle; the latter is the sister of petitioner and the former
pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam.
Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of
Mega Foam, received a phone call sometime in the
middle of July from one of their customers, Jennifer
Sanalila. The customer wanted to know if she could issue
checks payable to the account of Mega Foam, instead of
issuing the checks payable to CASH. Said customer had
apparently been instructed by Jacqueline Capitle to make
check payments to Mega Foam payable to CASH. Around
that time, Ricablanca also received a phone call from an
employee of Land Bank, Valenzuela Branch, who was
looking for Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was
to inform Capitle that the subject BDO check deposited in
his account had been dishonored.
Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia, a former
employee/collector of Mega Foam, asking the latter to
inform Jacqueline Capitle about the phone call from Land
Bank regarding the bounced check. Ricablanca explained
that she had to call and relay the message through
Valencia, because the Capitles did not have a phone; but
they could be reached through Valencia, a neighbor and
former co-employee of Jacqueline Capitle at Mega Foam.
Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from
Baby Aquino, and instructed Ricablanca to ask Baby
Aquino to replace the check with cash. Valencia also told
Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and divide it equally
into four: for herself, Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and
Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega
Foam's accountant, reported the matter to the owner of
Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.
Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and
was able to confirm that the latter indeed handed
petitioner a BDO check for ₱10,000.00 sometime in June
1997 as payment for her purchases from Mega
Foam.4 Baby Aquino further testified that, sometime in
July 1997, petitioner also called her on the phone to tell
her that the BDO check bounced.5 Verification from
company records showed that petitioner never remitted
the subject check to Mega Foam. However, Baby Aquino
said that she had already paid Mega Foam ₱10,000.00
cash in August 1997 as replacement for the dishonored
check.6
Generoso Capitle, presented as a hostile witness,
admitted depositing the subject BDO check in his bank
account, but explained that the check came into his
possession when some unknown woman arrived at his
house around the first week of July 1997 to have the
check rediscounted. He parted with his cash in exchange
for the check without even bothering to inquire into the
identity of the woman or her address. When he was
informed by the bank that the check bounced, he merely
disregarded it as he didn’t know where to find the woman
who rediscounted the check.
Meanwhile, Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an
entrapment operation with its agents. Ten pieces of
₱1,000.00 bills provided by Dyhengco were marked and
dusted with fluorescent powder by the NBI. Thereafter, the
bills were given to Ricablanca, who was tasked to pretend
that she was going along with Valencia's plan.
On August 15, 2007, Ricablanca and petitioner met at the
latter's house. Petitioner, who was then holding the
bounced BDO check, handed over said check to
Ricablanca. They originally intended to proceed to Baby
Aquino's place to have the check replaced with cash, but
the plan did not push through. However, they agreed to
meet again on August 21, 2007.
On the agreed date, Ricablanca again went to petitioner’s
house, where she met petitioner and Jacqueline Capitle.
Petitioner, her husband, and Ricablanca went to the
house of Anita Valencia; Jacqueline Capitle decided not to
go with the group because she decided to go shopping. It
was only petitioner, her husband, Ricablanca and Valencia
who then boarded petitioner's jeep and went on to Baby
Aquino's factory. Only Ricablanca alighted from the jeep
and entered the premises of Baby Aquino, pretending that
she was getting cash from Baby Aquino. However, the
cash she actually brought out from the premises was the
₱10,000.00 marked money previously given to her by
10
Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the money and upon
returning to the jeep, gave ₱5,000.00 each to Valencia
Page
and petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were
arrested by NBI agents, who had been watching the whole
time.
Petitioner and Valencia were brought to the NBI office
where the Forensic Chemist found fluorescent powder on
the palmar and dorsal aspects of both of their hands. This
showed that petitioner and Valencia handled the marked
money. The NBI filed a criminal case for qualified theft
against the two and one Jane Doe who was later identified
as Jacqueline Capitle, the wife of Generoso Capitle.
The defense, on the other hand, denied having taken the
subject check and presented the following scenario.
Petitioner admitted that she was a collector for Mega
Foam until she resigned on June 30, 1997, but claimed
that she had stopped collecting payments from Baby
Aquino for quite some time before her resignation from the
company. She further testified that, on the day of the
arrest, Ricablanca came to her mother’s house, where
she was staying at that time, and asked that she
accompany her (Ricablanca) to Baby Aquino's house.
Since petitioner was going for a pre-natal check-up at the
Chinese General Hospital, Ricablanca decided to hitch a
ride with the former and her husband in their jeep going to
Baby Aquino's place in Caloocan City. She allegedly had
no idea why Ricablanca asked them to wait in their jeep,
which they parked outside the house of Baby Aquino, and
was very surprised when Ricablanca placed the money on
her lap and the NBI agents arrested them.
Anita Valencia also admitted that she was the cashier of
Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30, 1997. It was
never part of her job to collect payments from customers.
According to her, on the morning of August 21, 1997,
Ricablanca called her up on the phone, asking if she
(Valencia) could accompany her (Ricablanca) to the house
of Baby Aquino. Valencia claims that she agreed to do so,
despite her admission during cross-examination that she
did not know where Baby Aquino resided, as she had
never been to said house. They then met at the house of
petitioner's mother, rode the jeep of petitioner and her
husband, and proceeded to Baby Aquino's place. When
they arrived at said place, Ricablanca alighted, but
requested them to wait for her in the jeep. After ten
minutes, Ricablanca came out and, to her surprise,
Ricablanca gave her money and so she even asked,
"What is this?" Then, the NBI agents arrested them.
The trial of the three accused went its usual course and,
on October 4, 1999, the RTC rendered its Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds
accused Gemma Tubale De Jacinto y Latosa, Anita
Busog De Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline
Capitle GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of QUALIFIED THEFT and each of them is hereby
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of FIVE (5) YEARS,
FIVE (5) MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS, as
minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND
TWENTY (20) DAYS, as maximum.
SO ORDERED. 7 to gain – this is presumed from the act of unlawful taking
The three appealed to the CA and, on December 16,
2003, a Decision was promulgated, the dispositive portion
of which reads, thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial
court is MODIFIED, in that:
(a) the sentence against accused Gemma
Jacinto stands;
(b) the sentence against accused Anita Valencia
is reduced to 4 months arresto mayor medium.
(c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted.
SO ORDERED.
A Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing CA
Decision was filed only for petitioner Gemma Tubale
Jacinto, but the same was denied per Resolution dated
March 5, 2004.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari filed
by petitioner alone, assailing the Decision and Resolution
of the CA. The issues raised in the petition are as follows:
1. Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of a
crime not charged in the information;
2. Whether or not a worthless check can be the
object of theft; and
3. Whether or not the prosecution has proved
petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.8
The petition deserves considerable thought.
The prosecution tried to establish the following pieces of
evidence to constitute the elements of the crime of
qualified theft defined under Article 308, in relation to
Article 310, both of the Revised Penal Code: (1) the taking
of personal property - as shown by the fact that petitioner,
as collector for Mega Foam, did not remit the customer's
check payment to her employer and, instead, appropriated
it for herself; (2) said property belonged to another − the
check belonged to Baby Aquino, as it was her payment for
purchases she made; (3) the taking was done with intent
and further shown by the fact that the check was
deposited to the bank account of petitioner's brother-in-
law; (4) it was done without the owner’s consent –
petitioner hid the fact that she had received the check
payment from her employer's customer by not remitting
the check to the company; (5) it was accomplished without
the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of
force upon things – the check was voluntarily handed to
petitioner by the customer, as she was known to be a
collector for the company; and (6) it was done with grave
abuse of confidence – petitioner is admittedly entrusted
with the collection of payments from customers.
However, as may be gleaned from the aforementioned
Articles of the Revised Penal Code, the personal
property subject of the theft must have some value,
as the intention of the accused is to gain from the
thing stolen.This is further bolstered by Article 309,
where the law provides that the penalty to be imposed on
the accused is dependent on the value of the thing stolen.
In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check
belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was apparently
without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus,
the question arises on whether the crime of qualified theft
11
was actually produced.
Page
The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.
Intod v. Court of Appeals9 is highly instructive and
applicable to the present case. In Intod, the accused,
intending to kill a person, peppered the latter’s bedroom
with bullets, but since the intended victim was not home at
the time, no harm came to him. The trial court and the CA
held Intod guilty of attempted murder. But upon review by
this Court, he was adjudged guilty only of an impossible
crime as defined and penalized in paragraph 2, Article 4,
in relation to Article 59, both of the Revised Penal Code,
because of the factual impossibility of producing the
crime. Pertinent portions of said provisions read as
follows:
Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. - Criminal
responsibility shall be incurred:
xxxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an
offense against persons or property, were it not for
the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate to ineffectual
means. (emphasis supplied)
Article 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to
commit the crime because the means employed or the
aims sought are impossible. - When the person intending
to commit an offense has already performed the acts for
the execution of the same but nevertheless the crime was
not produced by reason of the fact that the act intended
was by its nature one of impossible accomplishment or
because the means employed by such person are
essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by
him, the court, having in mind the social danger and the
degree of criminality shown by the offender, shall impose
upon him the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine ranging
from 200 to 500 pesos.
Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that
the act performed would be an offense against persons or
property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3)
that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the
means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual.
The aspect of the inherent impossibility of accomplishing
the intended crime under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal
Code was further explained by the Court in Intod10 in this
wise:
Under this article, the act performed by the offender
cannot produce an offense against persons or property
because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means employed
is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.
That the offense cannot be produced because the
commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be
impossible under this clause, the act intended by the
offender must be by its nature one impossible of
accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal
impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing
the intended act in order to qualify the act as an
impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if
completed, would not amount to a crime.
xxxx
The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in
this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when
extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or
beyond his control prevent the consummation of the
intended crime. x x x 11
In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an
offense that involved factual impossibility, i.e., a man puts
his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to
steal the latter's wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket
is empty.
Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above
example of factual impossibility given in Intod. In this
case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the
crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against property.
Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act
of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam
showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it
not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have
received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully
hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous
circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact
unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime
from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by
petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless, because
the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam
had received the cash to replace the value of said
dishonored check.1avvphi1
The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the
₱5,000.00 marked money, which she thought was the
cash replacement for the dishonored check, is of no
moment. The Court held in Valenzuela v. People12 that
under the definition of theft in Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code, "there is only one operative act of execution
by the actor involved in theft ─ the taking of personal
property of another." Elucidating further, the Court held,
thus:
x x x Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under
Article 308, there is one apparent answer provided in the
language of the law — that theft is already "produced"
upon the "tak[ing of] personal property of another without
the latter’s consent."
x x x when is the crime of theft produced? There would be
all but certain unanimity in the position that theft is
produced when there is deprivation of personal property
due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from
that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the
felony that the offender, once having committed all the
acts of execution for theft, is able or unable to freely
dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from
the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of
execution. x x x
x x x we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or
apoderamiento, is deemed complete from the moment the
offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no
opportunity to dispose of the same. x x x
x x x Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of one’s
personal property, is the element which produces the
felony in its consummated stage. x x x 13
12
From the above discussion, there can be no question
that as of the time that petitioner took possession of
Page
the check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed
all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it
not been impossible of accomplishment in this
case. The circumstance of petitioner receiving the
₱5,000.00 cash as supposed replacement for the
dishonored check was no longer necessary for the
consummation of the crime of qualified theft. Obviously,
the plan to convince Baby Aquino to give cash as
replacement for the check was hatched only after the
check had been dishonored by the drawee bank. Since
the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner's
act of receiving the cash replacement should not be
considered as a continuation of the theft. At most, the fact
that petitioner was caught receiving the marked money
was merely corroborating evidence to strengthen proof of
her intent to gain.
Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to have
the dishonored check replaced with cash by its issuer is a
different and separate fraudulent scheme. Unfortunately,
since said scheme was not included or covered by the
allegations in the Information, the Court cannot pronounce
judgment on the accused; otherwise, it would violate the
due process clause of the Constitution. If at all, that
fraudulent scheme could have been another possible
source of criminal liability.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition
is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
December 16, 2003, and its Resolution dated March 5,
2004, are MODIFIED. Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is
found GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME as defined and
penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the
Revised Penal Code, respectively. Petitioner is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arrresto mayor,
and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED
[ GR Nos. 136592-93, Nov 27, 2003 ]
PEOPLE v. MANOLITO PANCHO
This is an appeal from the Joint Decision[1] dated June 19,
1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Malolos,
Bulacan, finding appellant Manolito Pancho guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape in Criminal Case No. 837-M-96
and attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 838-M-96. In
Criminal Case No. 837-M-96, the trial court sentenced him
to suffer reclusion perpetua, while in Criminal Case No.
838-M-96, the penalty of 10 years and 1 day, as minimum,
to 12 years, as maximum of prision mayor, was imposed
upon him.
The Informations in both Criminal Case Nos. 837-M-96
and 838-M-96 read:
For Criminal Case No. 837-M-96 (For Rape):
"That in or about the month of August, 1994, in the
municipality of Malolos, province of Bulacan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, threats and
intimidation and with lewd designs, have carnal
knowledge of said Michelle L. dela Torre, 11 years of age,
against her will and without her consent.
"Contrary to law."
For Criminal Case No. 838-M-96 (For Attempted Rape):
"That in or about the month of December, 1995, in the
municipality of Malolos, province of Bulacan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, threats and
intimidation and with lewd designs, have carnal
knowledge of said Michelle L. dela Torre, 11 years of age,
against her will and without her consent.
"Contrary to law."
Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel,
pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.
Thereafter, trial ensued. The evidence for the prosecution
shows that complainant Michelle dela Torre was born on
April 2, 1984[2] to spouses Exequiela Lacanilao and
Eduardo dela Torre. After Michelle's father passed away,
her mother contracted a second marriage with appellant.
Michelle and her two (2) brothers live with the couple at
Look First, Malolos, Bulacan.
On August 1, 1994, at around 6:00 o'clock in the morning,
Michelle, who was then only ten years old, went home
after spending the night at her aunt's house. While she
was about to undress, appellant suddenly dragged her
and forced her to lie down on the floor. Although
frightened, she struggled by kicking and boxing him.
However, he forcibly removed her clothes and underwear.
Then he took off his clothing. Appellant started kissing and
holding her breast and eventually had carnal knowledge of
her. She felt pain when he inserted his organ into her
vagina which bled. She tried to resist but he held her both
arms. He was on top of her making push and pull
movements for four (4) minutes. Then he dressed up,
threatening to kill her should she complain or tell anyone
about the incident.
Sometime in December, 1995 at the family's new
residence at Bayugo, Meycauayan, Bulacan, appellant
arrived from work. When Michelle opened the door and
saw him, she got scared. While he was approaching her,
she managed to hit him. Then she attempted to jump out
of the window, but he dragged her by her feet. At that
instance, her uncle (Tito Onio) suddenly
arrived. [3] Immediately, appellant stopped, thus thwarting
his bestial desire.
After sometime, Michelle mustered enough courage to
report the incidents to her mother, but the latter casually
ignored her. So, she turned to her grandmother Natividad
Lacanilao, who brought her, sometime in February, 1996,
to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for
examination by a medico-legal officer.[4] Thereafter, they
proceeded to the Malolos Police Station where she
executed a sworn statement.[5]
Dr. Ida P. Daniel, a Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI,
13
testified that she conducted a medico-genital examination
of Michelle dela Torre. Her findings,[6] which she confirmed
on the witness stand, are as follows:
Page
"GENERAL PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:
Height: 132.0 cms
Weight: 78.0 cms
Normally developed, fairly nourished, conscious,
coherent, cooperative, ambulatory subject.
Breasts, developing, conical, firm. Areolae, brown, 2.5
cms in diameter. Nipples, brown, protruding, 0.5 cm in
diameter.
No sign of extragenital physical injury noted.
"GENETAL EXAMINATION:
Pubic hair, fine, scanty. Labia majora and minora,
coaptated. Fourchette, tense. Vestibular mucosa, pinkish.
Hymen, moderately tall, moderately thick, intact. Hymenal
orifice, annular, admits a tube 2.0 cms in diameter with
moderate resistance. Vaginal walls, tight. Rugosities,
prominent.
"CONCLUSIONS:
1. No evident sign of extragenital physical injury
noted on the body of the subject at the time of
examination.
2. Hymen, intact and its orifice small (2.0 cms in
diameter) as to preclude complete penetration by
an average sized adult Filipino male organ in full
erection without producing any genital injury."
For his part, appellant strongly denied the charges,
contending that it was impossible for him to commit the
crimes considering that during the incidents, his wife and
her two sons were also inside the house.[7] Moreover, the
charge of rape is totally belied by the finding of the NBI
Medico-Legal Officer that Michelle's hymen has remained
intact with no sign of extra-genital or genital injuries.
After trial, the lower court rendered a Joint Decision dated
June 19, 1998, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"In view of all the foregoing and by proof beyond
reasonable doubt, the Court hereby renders judgment as
follows:
 1. With respect to Criminal Case No. 837-M-96, the
Court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged and
hereby sentences accused MANOLITO PANCHO
to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA.
2. With respect to Criminal Case No. 838-M-96, the
Court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted
Rape, and hereby sentences accused
MANOLITO PANCHO to suffer an imprisonment
of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to
TWELVE (12) YEARS.
3. To indemnify the victim Michelle dela Torre the
amount of P20,000.00 - each case.
"The period of the accused's detention is credited in his
favor.
"SO ORDERED."
In this appeal, appellant ascribes to the trial court the
following errors:
"I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
OF THE CRIMES OF RAPE AND ATTEMPTED RAPE,
DESPITE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
"II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE
DEFENSE PUT UP BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT."
As alleged in the Informations, the crimes charged were
committed sometime in August, 1994 and December,
1995. Thus, the governing law is Article 335[8] of the
Revised Penal Code which, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659 (The Death Penalty Law),[9] provides:
"ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; and
3.When the woman is under twelve years of age or
is demented.
"The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.
"The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime or
rape is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of
age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity
or affinity within the third civil degree or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
A. - G.R. No. 136592 for rape:
Rape under the above provisions is either simple or
qualified. It is qualified when the age of the victim (below
18) and her relationship with the appellant are both
alleged in the Information and proved.[10] In this case, the
prosecution failed to allege in the Information the
qualifying circumstance that appellant is the victim's step-
parent. Thus, he may only be convicted of simple rape.
Simple rape is committed under any of the following
circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age
(statutory rape) or is demented.
In the Information, appellant is being charged of statutory
rape considering that Michelle was then below 12 years
old.
The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape is carnal
knowledge of a woman below twelve (12) years old. [11] In
statutory rape, force, intimidation or physical evidence of
injury is immaterial.[12] Where the girl is below 12 years of
age, violence or intimidation is not required, and the only
subject of inquiry is whether carnal knowledge took place.
14
[13]
As shown by her Certificate of Live Birth,[14] Michelle was
Page
born on April 2, 1984. Thus, on August 1, 1994 when the
incident took place, she was only 10 years and 3 months
old.
Michelle identified appellant in open court as the culprit
who raped her. She testified as follows:
"FISCAL:
Ms. Witness, you claim in your testimony that you
were raped by your step father Manolito Pancho last
Q:
August 1, 1994, will you please tell this Honorable
Court how Manolito Pancho raped you?
A: About 6:00 o'clock in the morning I went home, sir.
Q: And where is your home located?
A: I went home at Look First, Malolos, Bulacan.
And what happened when you went home at Look,
Q:
Malolos, Bulacan?
Manolito Pancho dragged me and forced me to lie
A:
on the floor.
And what happened when after Manolito Pancho lay
Q:
you on the floor?
A: He took off all my clothes.
And what clothes you are wearing at that time, Ms.
Q:
witness?
A: I was wearing a t-shirt and short, sir.
Q: What else Manolito Pancho removed?
A: My clothes, short and panty, sir.
And what was your appearance after these clothes
Q:
were removed by Manolito Pancho?
A: I was naked, sir.
How about Manolito Pancho, what did he do after he
Q:
removed your dress?
A: He also took-off his clothes, sir.
Q: What clothes did he remove?
A: His t-shirt, short and brief, sir.
After Manolito removed all these: his short, brief and
Q:
t-shirt, what did he do?
A: He placed himself on top of me.
And what happened after he placed himself on top
Q:
of you?
A: He inserted his penis on my vagina.
Were you able to see his organ when he inserted it
Q:
on your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.
What happened when he inserted his organ on your
Q:
vagina?
A: He was kissing me and touching my body, sir.
What particular parts of your body did Manolito
Q:
Pancho kiss and touch, Ms. witness?
 A: My both breasts, sir.
And what did you feel when Manolito Pancho
Q:
inserted his organ on your vagina?
A: It hurts, sir.
What motion did he do if you can still remember
Q:
when Manolito Pancho was on top of you?
He was kissing me, touching me and then I tried to
A: struggle against him but he was holding my both
hands so that I could not struggle.
And what happened to your vagina after he inserted
Q:
his penis?
A: It bled, sir.
Q: How long did Manolito Pancho stay on top of you?
A: Four (4) minutes, sir.
And after four (4) minutes, what did Manolito
Q:
Pancho do?
I already dressed up because he already dressed-
A:
up, sir.
Q: And what did Manolito Pancho tell you, if any?
He said, do not complain because if you do so, I am
A:
going to kill you.
How are you related with Manolito Pancho, Ms.
Q:
witness?
A: My step father, sir.
At the time you claimed that you were raped by
Q: Manolito Pancho, will you please tell this Honorable
Court, how young were you then?
A: Ten (10) years old, sir.
Do you have evidence to show Ms. witness that you
Q:
are ten (10) years old at that time?
A: My birth certificate, sir.
Q: Do you have with you your birth certificate?
Yes, sir. (The grandmother is producing the Live
A: Birth Certificate of the complainant Michelle dela
Torre.)
Will you please tell this Honorable Court what is
Q:
your date of birth, Ms. witness?
A: April 2, 1984.
And you claimed that you were 10 years old when
Q:
you were raped by Manolito Pancho?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx."[15]
Michelle's testimony is straightforward, unflawed by
significant inconsistency, and unshaken by rigid cross-
examination. It deserves full faith and credence. In rape
cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the
testimony of the rape victim if her testimony is credible,
natural, and convincing.[16]
When a woman says she was raped, she says in effect all
that is necessary to show that rape had been committed,
and if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the
accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.[17] It bears
stressing that Michelle, a girl of tender years, innocent and
guileless, cannot be expected to brazenly impute a crime
so serious as rape to her step-father if it were not true.
Appellant vigorously denied the charge, contending that
per the Medical Report of Dr. Ida Daniel, Michelle's hymen
has remained intact.[18]
We are not persuaded.
[19]
Appellant heavily relies on the virgo intacta theory. He
disregards Dr. Daniel's testimony that there are two types
of hymen: (1) one that remains intact even though there is
penetration; (2) the other is lacerated after penetration.
[20]
We have ruled that in rape cases the absence of fresh
lacerations does not preclude the finding of
rape, [21] especially when the victim is of tender age.
[22]
Moreover, laceration of the hymen is not an element of
the crime of rape.[23] Hymenal rupture or any indication of
vaginal laceration or genital injury is not necessary for the
consummation of rape.[24] Its absence does not negate a
finding of forced sexual coitus.[25] For the rule is well
settled that rape is consummated by the slightest penile
penetration of the labia majora or pudendum of the female
organ.[26]Indeed, the evidentiary weight of the medical
examination of the victim, as well as the medical
certificate, is merely corroborative in character and is not
an indispensable element for conviction for rape.[27]
Appellant's denial is an inherently weak defense. It has
always been viewed upon with disfavor by the courts due
to the ease with which it can be concocted.[28] Inherently
weak, denial as a defense crumbles in the light of positive
identification of the accused, as in this case. The defense
of denial assumes significance only when the
prosecution's evidence is such that it does not prove guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.[29] Verily, mere denial,
15
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is
negative self-serving evidence which cannot be given
greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of the
Page
complaining witness who testified on affirmative
matters. [30]
B. - G.R. No. 136593 for attempted rape:
Appellant also contends that his conviction of attempted
rape in Criminal Case No. 838-M-96 is not supported by
evidence.
Michelle testified that when appellant "was coming near
me, I hit him and I saw that our door was opened. I tried to
jump and that was the time he dragged and he held my
feet." [31] Appellant and Michelle were in this snap situation
when his Tito Onio arrived.[32] Her testimony regarding this
incident is quoted as follows:
"FISCAL:
xxx
And what happened in that place at Bayugo,
Q:
Meycauayan, Bulacan?
When the door opened I thought it was my mother
A:
and when I saw him I was scared, sir.
And what happened when you saw Manolito
Q:
Pancho?
A: I closed the door, sir.
Q: Thereafter, what happened?
When he was coming near me, I hit him and I saw
A: that our door was opened. I tried to jump and that
was the time he dragged and he held my feet.
And what happened after Manolito Pancho held your
Q:
feet?
When he was holding my feet I was not able to jump
from the window and that's the time the door opened
A:
and then I saw my uncle that is why the rape was
not committed.
xxx."[33]
Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal
Code, rape is attempted when the offender commences
the commission of rape directly by overt acts, but does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance. [34]
In this second case, the prosecution failed to prove that
appellant started to rape the victim and had commenced
the performance of acts of carnal knowledge. He did not
force her to lie down or remove her garment. In short,
there was no showing that he did commence at all the
performance of any act indicative of an intent or attempt to
rape the victim. What he did was to "drag" her and hold
her feet. At this juncture, we can not safely conclude that
he was attempting to rape her.
In People vs. Campuhan,[35] we held that the thin line that
separates attempted rape from consummated rape is the
entrance of the male organ into the labial threshold of the
female genitalia. In that case, the accused was caught by
the mother of the victim kneeling on top of her. The victim
testified that the accused's organ merely touched but did
not penetrate her vagina. We held that he could not be
convicted of statutory rape but only attempted rape.
In the instant case, appellant was merely holding
complainant's feet when her Tito Onio arrived at the
alleged locus criminis. Thus, it would be stretching to the
extreme our credulity if we were to conclude that mere
holding of the feet is attempted rape.
Anent the award of damages in G.R. No. 136592, we
observed that the trial court only awarded the victim civil
indemnity in the amount of P20,000.00. This must be
corrected. We have consistently ruled that upon a finding
of the fact of rape, the award of civil indemnity is
mandatory. If the death penalty is imposed, the
indemnity ex delicto should be P75,000.00. Where, as
here, the death penalty is not decreed, the victim should
be entitled to P50,000.00 only.[36]
In line with current jurisprudence, we also award the victim
moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 without need
of pleading or proof of the basis thereof.[37] The anguish
and pain she has endured are evident.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated June 19, 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Malolos, Bulacan, in
Criminal Case No. 837-M-96, convicting appellant
Manolito Pancho of rape and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED, with the
modification that he is ordered to pay the victim, Michelle
dela Torre, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00
as moral damages.
In Criminal Case No. 838-M-96, the trial court's judgment
convicting the appellant of attempted rape is REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE and a new one is entered ACQUITTING
him of the crime charged.
G.R. No. L-43530 August 3, 1935
THE PEOPLE vs. AURELIO LAMAHANG
The defendant Aurelio Lamahang is before this court on
appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo, finding him guilty of attempted robbery and
sentencing him to suffer two years and four months
of prision correccional and to an additional penalty of ten
years and one day of prision mayor for being an habitual
delinquent, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to
pay the costs of the proceeding.
At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose
Tomambing, who was patrolling his beat on Delgado and
C.R. Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caught the
accused in the act of making an opening with an iron bar
on the wall of a store of cheap goods located on the last
named street. At that time the owner of the store, Tan Yu,
was sleeping inside with another Chinaman. The accused
had only succeeded in breaking one board and in
unfastening another from the wall, when the policeman
showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed him
under custody.
The fact above stated was considered and declared
unanimously by the provincial fiscal of Iloilo, the trial judge
and the Solicitor-General, as constituting attempted
robbery, which we think is erroneous.
It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense
which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical
relation to a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the
beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of
the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and
consummation. The attempt to commit an indeterminate
offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation to its objective
16
is ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of
the Penal Code. There is no doubt that in the case at bar
Page
it was the intention of the accused to enter Tan Yu's store
by means of violence, passing through the opening which
he had started to make on the wall, in order to commit an
offense which, due to the timely arrival of policeman
Tomambing, did not develop beyond the first steps of its
execution. But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of
imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively performed
constitute a mere beginning of execution; it is necessary
to establish its unavoidable connection, like the logical
and natural relation of the cause and its effect, with the
deed which, upon its consummation, will develop into one
of the offenses defined and punished by the Code; it is
necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if
carried to its complete termination following its natural
course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor
by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically
and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. Thus, in
case of robbery, in order that the simple act of entering by
means of force or violence another person's dwelling may
be considered an attempt to commit this offense, it must
be shown that the offender clearly intended to take
possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal
property belonging to another. In the instant case, there is
nothing in the record from which such purpose of the
accused may reasonably be inferred. From the fact
established and stated in the decision, that the accused
on the day in question was making an opening by means
of an iron bar on the wall of Tan Yu's store, it may only be
inferred as a logical conclusion that his evident intention
was to enter by means of force said store against the will
of its owner. That his final objective, once he succeeded in
entering the store, was to rob, to cause physical injury to
the inmates, or to commit any other offense, there is
nothing in the record to justify a concrete
finding.1avvphil.ñet
It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in
offenses not consummated, as the material damage is
wanting, the nature of the action intended (accion fin)
cannot exactly be ascertained, but the same must be
inferred from the nature of the acts executed (accion
medio). Hence, the necessity that these acts be such
that by their very nature, by the facts to which they are
related, by the circumstances of the persons performing
the same, and by the things connected therewith, they
must show without any doubt, that they are aimed at the
consummation of a crime. Acts susceptible of double
interpretation , that is, in favor as well as against the
culprit, and which show an innocent as well as a
punishable act, must not and can not furnish grounds by
themselves for attempted nor frustrated crimes. The
 relation existing between the facts submitted for
appreciation and the offense which said facts are
supposed to produce must be direct; the intention must
be ascertained from the facts and therefore it is
necessary, in order to avoid regrettable instances of
injustice, that the mind be able to directly infer from
them the intention of the perpetrator to cause a
particular injury. This must have been the intention of
the legislator in requiring that in order for an attempt to
exist, the offender must commence the commission of
the felony directly by overt acts, that is to say, that the
acts performed must be such that, without the intent to
commit an offense, they would be meaningless.
Viada (Vol. I, p. 47) holds the same opinion when he says
that "the overt acts leading to the commission of the
offense, are not punished except when they are aimed
directly to its execution, and therefore they must have an
immediate and necessary relation to the offense."
Considering — says the Supreme Court of Spain in its
decision of March 21, 1892 — that in order to declare
that such and such overt acts constitute an attempted
offense it is necessary that their objective be known and
established, or that said acts be of such nature that they
themselves should obviously disclose the criminal
objective necessarily intended, said objective and
finality to serve as ground for the designation of the
offense: . . . .
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion, and so
hold that the fact under consideration does not constitute
attempted robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling
(People vs. Tayag and Morales, 59 Phil., 606, and
decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain therein cited).
Under article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, this offense
is committed when a private person shall enter the
dwelling of another against the latter's will. The accused
may be convicted and sentenced for an attempt to commit
this offense in accordance with the evidence and the
following allegation contained in the information: "... the
accused armed with an iron bar forced the wall of said
store by breaking a board and unfastening another for the
purpose of entering said store ... and that the accused did
not succeed in entering the store due to the presence of
the policeman on beat Jose Tomambing, who upon
hearing the noise produced by the breaking of the wall,
promptly approached the accused ... ." Under the
circumstances of this case the prohibition of the owner or
inmate is presumed. (U.S. vs. Ostrea, 2 Phil., 93; U.S. vs.
Silvano, 31 Phil., 509' U.S. vs. Ticson, 25 Phil., 67;
U.S. vs. Mesina, 21 Phil., 615; U.S. vs. Villanueva, 18
Phil., 215; U.S. vs. Panes, 25 Phil., 292.) Against the
accused must be taken into consideration the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and former convictions, —
inasmuch as the record shows that several final
judgments for robbery and theft have been rendered
against him — and in his favor, the mitigating
circumstance of lack of instruction. The breaking of the
wall should not be taken into consideration as an
aggravating circumstance inasmuch as this is the very fact
which in this case constitutes the offense of attempted
trespass to dwelling.
The penalty provided by the Revised Penal Code for the
consummated offense of trespass to dwelling, if
committed with force, is prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding P1,000
(art. 280, par. 2); therefore the penalty corresponding to
attempted trespass to dwelling is to degrees lower (art.
51), or, arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods.
Because of the presence of two aggravating
circumstances and one mitigating circumstance the
penalty must be imposed in its maximum period. Pursuant
to article 29 of the same Code, the accused is not entitled
to credit for one-half of his preventive imprisonment.
Wherefore, the sentence appealed from is revoked and
the accused is hereby held guilty of attempted trespass to
dwelling, committed by means of force, with the aforesaid
aggravating and mitigating circumstances and sentenced
to three months and one day of arresto mayor, with the
accessory penalties thereof and to pay the costs.
G. R. No. 160188 June 21, 2007
ARISTOTEL VALENZUELA y NATIVIDAD vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. COURT OF
APPEALS NACHURA,
17
This case aims for prime space in the firmament of our
criminal law jurisprudence. Petitioner effectively concedes
having performed the felonious acts imputed against him,
Page
but instead insists that as a result, he should be adjudged
guilty of frustrated theft only, not the felony in its
consummated stage of which he was convicted. The
proposition rests on a common theory expounded in two
well-known decisions1 rendered decades ago by the Court
of Appeals, upholding the existence of frustrated theft of
which the accused in both cases were found guilty.
However, the rationale behind the rulings has never been
affirmed by this Court.
As far as can be told,2 the last time this Court extensively
considered whether an accused was guilty of frustrated or
consummated theft was in 1918, in People v. Adiao.3 A
more cursory
treatment of the question was followed in 1929, in People
v. Sobrevilla,4 and in 1984, in Empelis v. IAC.5 This petition
now gives occasion for us to finally and fully measure if or
how frustrated theft is susceptible to commission under
the Revised Penal Code.
I.
The basic facts are no longer disputed before us. The
case stems from an Information6 charging petitioner
Aristotel Valenzuela (petitioner) and Jovy Calderon
(Calderon) with the crime of theft. On 19 May 1994, at
around 4:30 p.m., petitioner and Calderon were sighted
outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the
ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lorenzo
Lago (Lago), a security guard who was then manning his
post at the open parking area of the supermarket. Lago
saw petitioner, who was wearing an identification card with
the mark "Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU)," hauling a
push cart with cases of detergent of the well-known "Tide"
brand. Petitioner unloaded these cases in an open parking
space, where Calderon was waiting. Petitioner then
returned inside the supermarket, and after five (5)
minutes, emerged with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic
and again unloaded these boxes to the same area in the
open parking space.7
Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and haled a
taxi. He boarded the cab and directed it towards the
parking space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon
loaded the cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi, then
boarded the vehicle. All these acts were eyed by Lago,
who proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open
parking area. When Lago asked petitioner for a receipt of
the merchandise, petitioner and Calderon reacted by
fleeing on foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his
fellow security guards of the incident. Petitioner and
Calderon were apprehended at the scene, and the stolen
merchandise recovered.8 The filched items seized from
the duo were four (4) cases of Tide Ultramatic, one (1)
case of Ultra 25 grams, and three (3) additional cases of
detergent, the goods with an aggregate value of
₱12,090.00.9
Petitioner and Calderon were first brought to the SM
security office before they were transferred on the same
day to the Baler Station II of the Philippine National Police,
Quezon City, for investigation. It appears from the police
investigation records that apart from petitioner and
Calderon, four (4) other persons were apprehended by the
security guards at the scene and delivered to police
custody at the Baler PNP Station in connection with the
incident. However, after the matter was referred to the
Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor, only petitioner and
Calderon were charged with theft by the Assistant City
Prosecutor, in Informations prepared on 20 May 1994, the
day after the incident.10
After pleading not guilty on arraignment, at the trial,
petitioner and Calderon both claimed having been
innocent bystanders within the vicinity of the Super Sale
Club on the afternoon of 19 May 1994 when they were
haled by Lago and his fellow security guards after a
commotion and brought to the Baler PNP Station.
Calderon alleged that on the afternoon of the incident, he
was at the Super Sale Club to withdraw from his ATM
account, accompanied by his neighbor, Leoncio
Rosulada.11 As the queue for the ATM was long, Calderon
and Rosulada decided to buy snacks inside the
supermarket. It was while they were eating that they heard
the gunshot fired by Lago, leading them to head out of the
building to check what was
transpiring. As they were outside, they were suddenly
"grabbed" by a security guard, thus commencing their
detention.12 Meanwhile, petitioner testified during trial that
he and his cousin, a Gregorio Valenzuela,13 had been at
the parking lot, walking beside the nearby BLISS complex
and headed to ride a tricycle going to Pag-asa, when they
saw the security guard Lago fire a shot. The gunshot
caused him and the other people at the scene to start
running, at which point he was apprehended by Lago and
brought to the security office. Petitioner claimed he was
detained at the security office until around 9:00 p.m., at
which time he and the others were brought to the Baler
Police Station. At the station, petitioner denied having
stolen the cartons of detergent, but he was detained
overnight, and eventually brought to the prosecutor’s
office where he was charged with theft.14 During
petitioner’s cross-examination, he admitted that he had
been employed as a "bundler" of GMS Marketing,
"assigned at the supermarket" though not at SM.15
In a Decision16 promulgated on 1 February 2000, the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 90,
convicted both petitioner and Calderon of the crime of
consummated theft. They were sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of two (2) years of prision
correccional as minimum to seven (7) years of prision
mayor as maximum.17 The RTC found credible the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and established
the convictions on the positive identification of the
accused as perpetrators of the crime.
Both accused filed their respective Notices of
Appeal,18 but only petitioner filed a brief19 with the Court of
Appeals, causing the appellate court to deem Calderon’s
appeal as abandoned and consequently dismissed.
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner argued that he
should only be convicted of frustrated theft since at the
time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a
position to freely dispose of the articles stolen.20 However,
in its Decision dated 19 June 2003,21 the Court of Appeals
rejected this contention and affirmed petitioner’s
conviction.22 Hence the present Petition for
Review,23 which expressly seeks that petitioner’s
conviction "be modified to only of Frustrated Theft."24
Even in his appeal before the Court of Appeals, petitioner
effectively conceded both his felonious intent and his
actual participation in the theft of several cases of
detergent with a total value of ₱12,090.00 of which he was
charged.25 As such, there is no cause for the Court to
consider a factual scenario other than that presented by
the prosecution, as affirmed by the RTC and the Court of
18
Appeals. The only question to consider is whether under
the given facts, the theft should be deemed as
consummated or merely frustrated.
Page
II.
In arguing that he should only be convicted of frustrated
theft, petitioner cites26 two decisions rendered many years
ago by the Court of Appeals: People v. Diño27 and People
v. Flores.28 Both decisions elicit the interest of this Court,
as they modified trial court convictions from consummated
to frustrated theft and involve a factual milieu that bears
similarity to the present case. Petitioner invoked the same
rulings in his appeal to the Court of Appeals, yet the
appellate court did not expressly consider the import of
the rulings when it affirmed the conviction.
It is not necessary to fault the Court of Appeals for giving
short shrift to the Diño and Flores rulings since they have
not yet been expressly adopted as precedents by this
Court. For whatever reasons,
the occasion to define or debunk the crime of frustrated
theft has not come to pass before us. Yet despite the
silence on our part, Diño and Flores have attained a level
of renown reached by very few other appellate court
rulings. They are comprehensively discussed in the most
popular of our criminal law annotations,29 and studied in
criminal law classes as textbook examples of frustrated
crimes or even as definitive of frustrated theft.
More critically, the factual milieu in those cases is hardly
akin to the fanciful scenarios that populate criminal law
exams more than they actually occur in real life. Indeed, if
we finally say that Diño and Flores are doctrinal, such
conclusion could profoundly influence a multitude of
routine theft prosecutions, including commonplace
shoplifting. Any scenario that involves the thief having to
exit with the stolen property through a supervised egress,
such as a supermarket checkout counter or a parking area
pay booth, may easily call for the application of Diño and
Flores. The fact that lower courts have not hesitated to lay
down convictions for frustrated theft further validates that
Diño and Flores and the theories offered therein on
frustrated theft have borne some weight in our
jurisprudential system. The time is thus ripe for us to
examine whether those theories are correct and should
continue to influence prosecutors and judges in the future.
III.
To delve into any extended analysis of Diño and Flores, as
well as the specific issues relative to "frustrated theft," it is
necessary to first refer to the basic rules on the three
stages of crimes under our Revised Penal Code.30
Article 6 defines those three stages, namely the
consummated, frustrated and attempted felonies. A felony
is consummated "when all the elements necessary for its
execution and accomplishment are present." It is
frustrated "when the offender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it
by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator." Finally, it is attempted "when the offender
commences the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance."
Each felony under the Revised Penal Code has a
"subjective phase," or that portion of the acts constituting
the crime included between the act which begins the
commission of the crime and the last act performed by the
offender which, with prior acts, should result in the
consummated crime.31 After that point has been breached,
the subjective phase ends and the objective phase
begins.32 It has been held that if the offender never passes
the subjective phase of the offense, the crime is merely
attempted.33 On the other hand, the subjective phase is
completely passed in case of frustrated crimes, for in such
instances, "[s]ubjectively the crime is complete."34
Truly, an easy distinction lies between consummated and
frustrated felonies on one hand, and attempted felonies on
the other. So long as the offender fails to complete all the
acts of execution despite commencing the commission of
a felony, the crime is undoubtedly in the attempted stage.
Since the specific acts of execution that define each crime
under the Revised Penal Code are generally enumerated
in the code itself, the task of ascertaining whether a crime
is attempted only would need to compare the acts actually
performed by the accused as against the acts that
constitute the felony under the Revised Penal Code.
In contrast, the determination of whether a crime is
frustrated or consummated necessitates an initial
concession that all of the acts of execution have been
performed by the offender. The critical distinction instead
is whether the felony itself was actually produced by the
acts of execution. The determination of whether the felony
was "produced" after all the acts of execution had been
performed hinges on the particular statutory definition of
the felony. It is the statutory definition that generally
furnishes the elements of each crime under the Revised
Penal Code, while the elements in turn unravel the
particular requisite acts of execution and accompanying
criminal intent.
The long-standing Latin maxim "actus non facit reum, nisi
mens sit rea" supplies an important characteristic of a
crime, that "ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an
unlawful act for there to be a crime," and accordingly,
there can be no crime when the criminal mind is
wanting.35 Accepted in this jurisdiction as material in
crimes mala in se,36mens rea has been defined before as
"a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal
intent,"37 and "essential for criminal liability."38 It follows
that the statutory definition of our mala in se crimes must
be able to supply what the mens rea of the crime is, and
indeed the U.S. Supreme Court has comfortably held that
"a criminal law that contains no mens rea requirement
infringes on constitutionally protected rights."39 The
criminal statute must also provide for the overt acts that
constitute the crime. For a crime to exist in our legal law, it
is not enough that mens rea be shown; there must also be
an actus reus.40
It is from the actus reus and the mens rea, as they find
expression in the criminal statute, that the felony is
produced. As a postulate in the craftsmanship of
constitutionally sound laws, it is extremely preferable that
the language of the law expressly provide when the felony
is produced. Without such provision, disputes would
inevitably ensue on the elemental question whether or not
a crime was committed, thereby presaging the
undesirable and legally dubious set-up under which the
judiciary is assigned the legislative role of defining crimes.
Fortunately, our Revised Penal Code does not suffer from
such infirmity. From the statutory definition of any felony, a
decisive passage or term is embedded which attests when
19
the felony is produced by the acts of execution. For
example, the statutory definition of murder or homicide
expressly uses the phrase "shall kill another," thus making
Page
it clear that the felony is produced by the death of the
victim, and conversely, it is not produced if the victim
survives.
We next turn to the statutory definition of theft. Under
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, its elements are
spelled out as follows:
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.— Theft is committed by
any person who, with intent to gain but without violence
against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things,
shall take personal property of another without the latter’s
consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to
deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the
property of another, shall remove or make use of the fruits
or object of the damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a field
where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another
and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish
upon the same or shall gather cereals, or other forest or
farm products.
Article 308 provides for a general definition of theft, and
three alternative and highly idiosyncratic means by which
theft may be committed.41 In the present discussion, we
need to concern ourselves only with the general definition
since it was under it that the prosecution of the accused
was undertaken and sustained. On the face of the
definition, there is only one operative act of execution by
the actor involved in theft ─ the taking of personal property
of another. It is also clear from the provision that in order
that such taking may be qualified as theft, there must
further be present the descriptive circumstances that the
taking was with intent to gain; without force upon things or
violence against or intimidation of persons; and it was
without the consent of the owner of the property.
Indeed, we have long recognized the following elements
of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code, namely: (1) that there be taking of personal
property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that
the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking
be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the
taking be accomplished without the use of violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.42
In his commentaries, Judge Guevarra traces the history of
the definition of theft, which under early Roman law as
defined by Gaius, was so broad enough as to encompass
"any kind of physical handling of property belonging to
another against the will of the owner,"43 a definition similar
to that by Paulus that a thief "handles (touches, moves)
the property of another."44 However, with the Institutes of
Justinian, the idea had taken hold that more than mere
physical handling, there must further be an intent of
acquiring gain from the object, thus: "[f]urtum est
contrectatio rei fraudulosa, lucri faciendi causa vel ipsius
rei, vel etiam usus ejus possessinisve."45 This requirement
of animo lucrandi, or intent to gain, was maintained in both
the Spanish and Filipino penal laws, even as it has since
been abandoned in Great Britain.46
In Spanish law, animo lucrandi was compounded with
apoderamiento, or "unlawful taking," to characterize theft.
Justice Regalado notes that the concept of apoderamiento
once had a controversial interpretation and application.
Spanish law had already discounted the belief that mere
physical taking was constitutive of apoderamiento, finding
that it had to be coupled with "the intent to appropriate the
object in order to constitute apoderamiento; and to
appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the
thing."47 However, a conflicting line of cases decided by
the Court of Appeals ruled, alternatively, that there must
be permanency in the taking48 or an intent to permanently
deprive the owner of the stolen property;49 or that there
was no need for permanency in the taking or in its intent,
as the mere temporary possession by the offender or
disturbance of the proprietary rights of the owner already
constituted apoderamiento.50 Ultimately, as Justice
Regalado notes, the Court adopted the latter thought that
there was no need of an intent to permanently deprive the
owner of his property to constitute an unlawful taking.51
So long as the "descriptive" circumstances that qualify the
taking are present, including animo lucrandi and
apoderamiento, the completion of the operative act that is
the taking of personal property of another establishes, at
least, that the transgression went beyond the attempted
stage. As applied to the present case, the moment
petitioner obtained physical possession of the cases of
detergent and loaded them in the pushcart, such seizure
motivated by intent to gain, completed without need to
inflict violence or intimidation against persons nor force
upon things, and accomplished without the consent of the
SM Super Sales Club, petitioner forfeited the extenuating
benefit a conviction for only attempted theft would have
afforded him.
On the critical question of whether it was consummated or
frustrated theft, we are obliged to apply Article 6 of the
Revised Penal Code to ascertain the answer. Following
that provision, the theft would have been frustrated only,
once the acts committed by petitioner, if ordinarily
sufficient to produce theft as a consequence, "do not
produce [such theft] by reason of causes independent of
the will of the perpetrator." There are clearly two
determinative factors to consider: that the felony is not
"produced," and that such failure is due to causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator. The second
factor ultimately depends on the evidence at hand in each
particular case. The first, however, relies primarily on a
doctrinal definition attaching to the individual felonies in
the Revised Penal Code52 as to when a particular felony is
"not produced," despite the commission of all the acts of
execution.
So, in order to ascertain whether the theft is
consummated or frustrated, it is necessary to inquire as to
how exactly is the felony of theft "produced." Parsing
through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308,
there is one apparent answer provided in the language of
the law — that theft is already "produced" upon the
"tak[ing of] personal property of another without the
latter’s consent."
U.S. v. Adiao53 apparently supports that notion. Therein, a
customs inspector was charged with theft after he
abstracted a leather belt from the baggage of a foreign
national and secreted the item in his desk at the Custom
House. At no time was the accused able to "get the
merchandise out of the Custom House," and it appears
20
that he "was under observation during the entire
transaction."54 Based apparently on those two
circumstances, the trial court had found him guilty,
Page
instead, of frustrated theft. The Court reversed, saying
that neither circumstance was decisive, and holding
instead that the accused was guilty of consummated theft,
finding that "all the elements of the completed crime of
theft are present."55 In support of its conclusion that the
theft was consummated, the Court cited three (3)
decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the discussion
of which we replicate below:
The defendant was charged with the theft of some fruit
from the land of another. As he was in the act of taking the
fruit[,] he was seen by a policeman, yet it did not appear
that he was at that moment caught by the policeman but
sometime later. The court said: "[x x x] The trial court did
not err [x x x ] in considering the crime as that of
consummated theft instead of frustrated theft inasmuch as
nothing appears in the record showing that the policemen
who saw the accused take the fruit from the adjoining land
arrested him in the act and thus prevented him from taking
full possession of the thing stolen and even its utilization
by him for an interval of time." (Decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain, October 14, 1898.)
Defendant picked the pocket of the offended party while
the latter was hearing mass in a church. The latter on
account of the solemnity of the act, although noticing the
theft, did not do anything to prevent it. Subsequently,
however, while the defendant was still inside the church,
the offended party got back the money from the
defendant. The court said that the defendant had
performed all the acts of execution and considered the
theft as consummated. (Decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain, December 1, 1897.)
The defendant penetrated into a room of a certain house
and by means of a key opened up a case, and from the
case took a small box, which was also opened with a key,
from which in turn he took a purse containing 461 reales
and 20 centimos, and then he placed the money over the
cover of the case; just at this moment he was caught by
two guards who were stationed in another room near-by.
The court considered this as consummated robbery, and
said: "[x x x] The accused [x x x] having materially taken
possession of the money from the moment he took it from
the place where it had been, and having taken it with his
hands with intent to appropriate the same, he executed all
the acts necessary to constitute the crime which was
thereby produced; only the act of making use of the thing
having been frustrated, which, however, does not go to
make the elements of the consummated crime." (Decision
of the Supreme Court of Spain, June 13, 1882.)56
It is clear from the facts of Adiao itself, and the three (3)
Spanish decisions cited therein, that the criminal actors in
all these cases had been able to obtain full possession of
the personal property prior to their apprehension. The
interval between the commission of the acts of theft and
the apprehension of the thieves did vary, from "sometime
later" in the 1898 decision; to the very moment the thief
had just extracted the money in a purse which had been
stored as it was in the 1882 decision; and before the thief
had been able to spirit the item stolen from the building
where the theft took place, as had happened in Adiao and
the 1897 decision. Still, such intervals proved of no
consequence in those cases, as it was ruled that the
thefts in each of those cases was consummated by the
actual possession of the property belonging to another.
In 1929, the Court was again confronted by a claim that
an accused was guilty only of frustrated rather than
consummated theft. The case is People v.
Sobrevilla,57 where the accused, while in the midst of a
crowd in a public market, was already able to abstract a
pocketbook from the trousers of the victim when the latter,
perceiving the theft, "caught hold of the [accused]’s shirt-
front, at the same time shouting for a policeman; after a
struggle, he recovered his pocket-book and let go of the
defendant, who was afterwards caught by a
policeman."58 In rejecting the contention that only
frustrated theft was established, the Court simply said,
without further comment or elaboration:
We believe that such a contention is groundless. The
[accused] succeeded in taking the pocket-book, and that
determines the crime of theft. If the pocket-book was
afterwards recovered, such recovery does not affect the
[accused’s] criminal liability, which arose from the
[accused] having succeeded in taking the pocket-book.59
If anything, Sobrevilla is consistent with Adiao and the
Spanish Supreme Court cases cited in the latter, in that
the fact that the offender was able to succeed in obtaining
physical possession of the stolen item, no matter how
momentary, was able to consummate the theft.
Adiao, Sobrevilla and the Spanish Supreme Court
decisions cited therein contradict the position of petitioner
in this case. Yet to simply affirm without further comment
would be disingenuous, as there is another school of
thought on when theft is consummated, as reflected in the
Diño and Flores decisions.
Diño was decided by the Court of Appeals in 1949, some
31 years after Adiao and 15 years before Flores. The
accused therein, a driver employed by the United States
Army, had driven his truck into the port area of the South
Harbor, to unload a truckload of materials to waiting U.S.
Army personnel. After he had finished unloading, accused
drove away his truck from the Port, but as he was
approaching a checkpoint of the Military Police, he was
stopped by an M.P. who inspected the truck and found
therein three boxes of army rifles. The accused later
contended that he had been stopped by four men who
had loaded the boxes with the agreement that they were
to meet him and retrieve the rifles after he had passed the
checkpoint. The trial court convicted accused of
consummated theft, but the Court of Appeals modified the
conviction, holding instead that only frustrated theft had
been committed.
In doing so, the appellate court pointed out that the
evident intent of the accused was to let the boxes of rifles
"pass through the checkpoint, perhaps in the belief that as
the truck had already unloaded its cargo inside the depot,
it would be allowed to pass through the check point
without further investigation or checking."60 This point was
deemed material and indicative that the theft had not been
fully produced, for the Court of Appeals pronounced that
"the fact determinative of consummation is the ability of
the thief to dispose freely of the articles stolen, even if it
were more or less momentary."61 Support for this
proposition was drawn from a decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain dated 24 January 1888 (1888 decision),
which was quoted as follows:
Integrating these considerations, the Court of Appeals
then concluded:
21
This court is of the opinion that in the case at bar, in order
to make the booty subject to the control and disposal of
Page
the culprits, the articles stolen must first be passed
through the M.P. check point, but since the offense was
opportunely discovered and the articles seized after all the
acts of execution had been performed, but before the loot
came under the final control and disposal of the looters,
the offense can not be said to have been fully
consummated, as it was frustrated by the timely
intervention of the guard. The offense committed,
therefore, is that of frustrated theft.63
Diño thus laid down the theory that the ability of the actor
to freely dispose of the items stolen at the time of
apprehension is determinative as to whether the theft is
consummated or frustrated. This theory was applied again
by the Court of Appeals some 15 years later, in Flores, a
case which according to the division of the court that
decided it, bore "no substantial variance between the
circumstances [herein] and in [Diño]."64 Such conclusion is
borne out by the facts in Flores. The accused therein, a
checker employed by the Luzon Stevedoring Company,
issued a delivery receipt for one empty sea van to the
truck driver who had loaded the purportedly empty sea
van onto his truck at the terminal of the stevedoring
company. The truck driver proceeded to show the delivery
receipt to the guard on duty at the gate of the terminal.
However, the guards insisted on inspecting the van, and
discovered that the "empty" sea van had actually
contained other merchandise as well.65 The accused was
prosecuted for theft qualified by abuse of confidence, and
found himself convicted of the consummated crime.
Before the Court of Appeals, accused argued in the
alternative that he was guilty only of attempted theft, but
the appellate court pointed out that there was no
intervening act of spontaneous desistance on the part of
the accused that "literally frustrated the theft." However,
the Court of Appeals, explicitly relying on Diño, did find
that the accused was guilty only of frustrated, and not
consummated, theft.
As noted earlier, the appellate court admitted it found "no
substantial variance" between Diño and Flores then
before it. The prosecution in Flores had sought to
distinguish that case from Diño, citing a "traditional ruling"
which unfortunately was not identified in the decision
itself. However, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the
said "traditional ruling" was qualified by the words "is
placed in a situation where [the actor] could dispose of its
contents at once."66 Pouncing on this qualification, the
appellate court noted that "[o]bviously, while the truck and
the van were still within the compound, the petitioner
could not have disposed of the goods ‘at once’." At the
same time, the Court of Appeals conceded that "[t]his is
entirely different from the case where a much less bulk
and more common thing as money was the object of the
crime, where freedom to dispose of or make use of it is
palpably less restricted,"67 though no further qualification
was offered what the effect would have been had that
alternative circumstance been present instead.
Synthesis of the Diño and Flores rulings is in order. The
determinative characteristic as to whether the crime of
theft was produced is the ability of the actor "to freely
dispose of the articles stolen, even if it were only
momentary." Such conclusion was drawn from an 1888
decision of the Supreme Court of Spain which had
pronounced that in determining whether theft had been
consummated, "es preciso que so haga en circunstancias
tales que permitan al sustractor de aquella, siquiera sea
mas o menos momentaneamente." The qualifier "siquiera
sea mas o menos momentaneamente" proves another
important consideration, as it implies that if the actor was
in a capacity to freely dispose of the stolen items before
apprehension, then the theft could be deemed
consummated. Such circumstance was not present in
either Diño or Flores, as the stolen items in both cases
were retrieved from the actor before they could be
physically extracted from the guarded compounds from
which the items were filched. However, as implied in
Flores, the character of the item stolen could lead to a
different conclusion as to whether there could have been
"free disposition," as in the case where the chattel
involved was of "much less bulk and more common x x x,
[such] as money x x x."68
In his commentaries, Chief Justice Aquino makes the
following pointed observation on the import of the Diño
ruling:
There is a ruling of the Court of Appeals that theft is
consummated when the thief is able to freely dispose of
the stolen articles even if it were more or less momentary.
Or as stated in another case[69 ], theft is consummated
upon the voluntary and malicious taking of property
belonging to another which is realized by the material
occupation of the thing whereby the thief places it under
his control and in such a situation that he could dispose of
it at once. This ruling seems to have been based on
Viada’s opinion that in order the theft may be
consummated, "es preciso que se haga en
circumstancias x x x [70 ]"71
In the same commentaries, Chief Justice Aquino,
concluding from Adiao and other cases, also states that
"[i]n theft or robbery the crime is consummated after the
accused had material possession of the thing with intent
to appropriate the same, although his act of making use of
the thing was frustrated."72
There are at least two other Court of Appeals rulings that
are at seeming variance with the Diño and Flores rulings.
People v. Batoon73 involved an accused who filled a
container with gasoline from a petrol pump within view of
a police detective, who followed the accused onto a
passenger truck where the arrest was made. While the
trial court found the accused guilty of frustrated qualified
theft, the Court of Appeals held that the accused was
guilty of consummated qualified theft, finding that "[t]he
facts of the cases of U.S. [v.] Adiao x x x and U.S. v.
Sobrevilla x x x indicate that actual taking with intent to
gain is enough to consummate the crime of theft."74
In People v. Espiritu,75 the accused had removed nine
pieces of hospital linen from a supply depot and loaded
them onto a truck. However, as the truck passed through
the checkpoint, the stolen items were discovered by the
Military Police running the checkpoint. Even though those
facts clearly admit to similarity with those in Diño, the
Court of Appeals held that the accused were guilty of
consummated theft, as the accused "were able to take or
get hold of the hospital linen and that the only thing that
was frustrated, which does not constitute any element of
theft, is the use or benefit that the thieves expected from
the commission of the offense."76
In pointing out the distinction between Diño and Espiritu,
Reyes wryly observes that "[w]hen the meaning of an
element of a felony is controversial, there is bound to arise
different rulings as to the stage of execution of that
felony."77 Indeed, we can discern from this survey of
jurisprudence that the state of the law insofar as frustrated
theft is concerned is muddled. It fact, given the disputed
22
foundational basis of the concept of frustrated theft itself,
the question can even be asked whether there is really
Page
such a crime in the first place.
IV.
The Court in 1984 did finally rule directly that an accused
was guilty of frustrated, and not consummated, theft. As
we undertake this inquiry, we have to reckon with the
import of this Court’s 1984 decision in Empelis v. IAC.78
As narrated in Empelis, the owner of a coconut plantation
had espied four (4) persons in the premises of his
plantation, in the act of gathering and tying some
coconuts. The accused were surprised by the owner
within the plantation as they were carrying with them the
coconuts they had gathered. The accused fled the scene,
dropping the coconuts they had seized, and were
subsequently arrested after the owner reported the
incident to the police. After trial, the accused were
convicted of qualified theft, and the issue they raised on
appeal was that they were guilty only of simple theft. The
Court affirmed that the theft was qualified, following Article
310 of the Revised Penal Code,79 but further held that the
accused were guilty only of frustrated qualified theft.
It does not appear from the Empelis decision that the
issue of whether the theft was consummated or frustrated
was raised by any of the parties. What does appear,
though, is that the disposition of that issue was contained
in only two sentences, which we reproduce in full:
However, the crime committed is only frustrated qualified
theft because petitioners were not able to perform all the
acts of execution which should have produced the felony
as a consequence. They were not able to carry the
coconuts away from the plantation due to the timely arrival
of the owner.80
No legal reference or citation was offered for this
averment, whether Diño, Flores or the Spanish authorities
who may have bolstered the conclusion. There are indeed
evident problems with this formulation in Empelis.
Empelis held that the crime was only frustrated because
the actors "were not able to perform all the acts of
execution which should have produced the felon as a
consequence."81 However, per Article 6 of the Revised
Penal Code, the crime is frustrated "when the offender
performs all the acts of execution," though not producing
the felony as a result. If the offender was not able to
perform all the acts of execution, the crime is attempted,
provided that the non-performance was by reason of
some cause or accident other than spontaneous
desistance. Empelis concludes that the crime was
frustrated because not all of the acts of execution were
performed due to the timely arrival of the owner. However,
following Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, these facts
should elicit the conclusion that the crime was only
attempted, especially given that the acts were not
performed because of the timely arrival of the owner, and
not because of spontaneous desistance by the offenders.
For these reasons, we cannot attribute weight to Empelis
as we consider the present petition. Even if the two
sentences we had cited actually aligned with the
definitions provided in Article 6 of the Revised Penal
Code, such passage bears no reflection that it is the
product of the considered evaluation of the relevant legal
or jurisprudential thought. Instead, the passage is offered
as if it were sourced from an indubitable legal premise so
settled it required no further explication.
Notably, Empelis has not since been reaffirmed by the
Court, or even cited as authority on theft. Indeed, we
cannot see how Empelis can contribute to our present
debate, except for the bare fact that it proves that the
Court had once deliberately found an accused guilty of
frustrated theft. Even if Empelis were considered as a
precedent for frustrated theft, its doctrinal value is
extremely compromised by the erroneous legal premises
that inform it, and also by the fact that it has not been
entrenched by subsequent reliance.
Thus, Empelis does not compel us that it is an
insurmountable given that frustrated theft is viable in this
jurisdiction. Considering the flawed reasoning behind its
conclusion of frustrated theft, it cannot present any
efficacious argument to persuade us in this case. Insofar
as Empelis may imply that convictions for frustrated theft
are beyond cavil in this jurisdiction, that decision is subject
to reassessment.
V.
At the time our Revised Penal Code was enacted in 1930,
the 1870 Codigo Penal de España was then in place. The
definition of the crime of theft, as provided then, read as
follows:
It was under the ambit of the 1870 Codigo Penal that the
aforecited Spanish Supreme Court decisions were handed
down. However, the said code would be revised again in
1932, and several times thereafter. In fact, under the
Codigo Penal Español de 1995, the crime of theft is now
simply defined as "[e]l que, con ánimo de lucro,
tomare las cosas muebles ajenas sin la voluntad de su
dueño será castigado"82
Notice that in the 1870 and 1995 definition of theft in the
penal code of Spain, "la libre disposicion" of the property
is not an element or a statutory characteristic of the crime.
It does appear that the principle originated and perhaps
was fostered in the realm of Spanish jurisprudence.
The oft-cited Salvador Viada adopted a question-answer
form in his 1926 commentaries on the 1870 Codigo Penal
de España. Therein, he raised at least three questions for
the reader whether the crime of frustrated or
consummated theft had occurred. The passage cited in
Diño was actually utilized by Viada to answer the question
whether frustrated or consummated theft was committed
83
Even as the answer was as stated in Diño, and was
indeed derived from the 1888 decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain, that decision’s factual predicate
occasioning the statement was apparently very different
from Diño, for it appears that the 1888 decision involved
an accused who was surprised by the employees of a
haberdashery as he was abstracting a layer of clothing off
a mannequin, and who then proceeded to throw away the
garment as he fled.84
Nonetheless, Viada does not contest the notion of
frustrated theft, and willingly recites decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain that have held to that effect.85 A
few decades later, the esteemed Eugenio Cuello Calón
pointed out the inconsistent application by the Spanish
Supreme Court with respect to frustrated theft.
23
Ultimately, Cuello Calón attacked the very idea that
frustrated theft is actually possible:
Page
Cuello Calón’s submissions cannot be lightly ignored.
Unlike Viada, who was content with replicating the
Spanish Supreme Court decisions on the matter, Cuello
Calón actually set forth his own thought that questioned
whether theft could truly be frustrated, since "pues es muy
dificil que el que hace cuanto es necesario para la
consumación del hurto no lo consume efectivamente."
Otherwise put, it would be difficult to foresee how the
execution of all the acts necessary for the completion of
the crime would not produce the effect of theft.
This divergence of opinion convinces us, at least, that
there is no weighted force in scholarly thought that obliges
us to accept frustrated theft, as proposed
in Diño and Flores. A final ruling by the Court that there is
no crime of frustrated theft in this jurisdiction will not lead
to scholastic pariah, for such a submission is hardly
heretical in light of Cuello Calón’s position.
Accordingly, it would not be intellectually disingenuous for
the Court to look at the question from a fresh perspective,
as we are not bound by the opinions of the respected
Spanish commentators, conflicting as they are, to accept
that theft is capable of commission in its frustrated stage.
Further, if we ask the question whether there is a mandate
of statute or precedent that must compel us to adopt the
Diño and Flores doctrines, the answer has to be in the
negative. If we did so, it would arise not out of obeisance
to an inexorably higher command, but from the exercise of
the function of statutory interpretation that comes as part
and parcel of judicial review, and a function that allows
breathing room for a variety of theorems in competition
until one is ultimately adopted by this Court.
V.
The foremost predicate that guides us as we explore the
matter is that it lies in the province of the legislature,
through statute, to define what constitutes a particular
crime in this jurisdiction. It is the legislature, as
representatives of the sovereign people, which determines
which acts or combination of acts are criminal in nature.
Judicial interpretation of penal laws should be aligned with
what was the evident legislative intent, as expressed
primarily in the language of the law as it defines the crime.
It is Congress, not the courts, which is to define a crime,
and ordain its punishment.88 The courts cannot arrogate
the power to introduce a new element of a crime which
was unintended by the legislature, or redefine a crime in a
manner that does not hew to the statutory language. Due
respect for the prerogative of Congress in defining
crimes/felonies constrains the Court to refrain from a
broad interpretation of penal laws where a "narrow
interpretation" is appropriate. "The Court must take heed
of language, legislative history and purpose, in order to
strictly determine the wrath and breath of the conduct the
law forbids."89
With that in mind, a problem clearly emerges with
the Diño/Flores dictum. The ability of the offender to freely
dispose of the property stolen is not a constitutive element
of the crime of theft. It finds no support or extension in
Article 308, whether as a descriptive or operative element
of theft or as the mens rea or actus reus of the felony. To
restate what this Court has repeatedly held: the elements
of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking of
personal property; (2) that said property belongs to
another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4)
that the taking be done without the consent of the owner;
and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things.90
Such factor runs immaterial to the statutory definition of
theft, which is the taking, with intent to gain, of personal
property of another without the latter’s consent. While
the Diño/Flores dictum is considerate to the mindset of the
offender, the statutory definition of theft considers only the
perspective of intent to gain on the part of the offender,
compounded by the deprivation of property on the part of
the victim.
For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is
susceptible of commission in the frustrated stage, the
question is again, when is the crime of theft produced?
There would be all but certain unanimity in the position
that theft is produced when there is deprivation of
personal property due to its taking by one with intent to
gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the
product of the felony that the offender, once having
committed all the acts of execution for theft, is able or
unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the
deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from
such acts of execution. This conclusion is reflected in
Chief Justice Aquino’s commentaries, as earlier cited, that
"[i]n theft or robbery the crime is consummated after the
accused had material possession of the thing with intent
to appropriate the same, although his act of making use of
the thing was frustrated."91
It might be argued, that the ability of the offender to freely
dispose of the property stolen delves into the concept of
"taking" itself, in that there could be no true taking until the
actor obtains such degree of control over the stolen item.
But even if this were correct, the effect would be to
downgrade the crime to its attempted, and not frustrated
stage, for it would mean that not all the acts of execution
have not been completed, the "taking not having been
accomplished." Perhaps this point could serve as fertile
ground for future discussion, but our concern now is
whether there is indeed a crime of frustrated theft, and
such consideration proves ultimately immaterial to that
question. Moreover, such issue will not apply to the facts
of this particular case. We are satisfied beyond
reasonable doubt that the taking by the petitioner was
completed in this case. With intent to gain, he acquired
physical possession of the stolen cases of detergent for a
considerable period of time that he was able to drop these
off at a spot in the parking lot, and long enough to load
these onto a taxicab.
Indeed, we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or
apoderamiento, is deemed complete from the moment the
offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no
opportunity to dispose of the same.92 And long ago, we
asserted in People v. Avila:93
x x x [T]he most fundamental notion in the crime of theft is
the taking of the thing to be appropriated into the physical
power of the thief, which idea is qualified by other
conditions, such as that the taking must be effected animo
lucrandi and without the consent of the owner; and it will
be here noted that the definition does not require that the
taking should be effected against the will of the owner but
merely that it should be without his consent, a distinction
of no slight importance.94
24
Insofar as we consider the present question, "unlawful
taking" is most material in this respect. Unlawful taking,
Page
which is the deprivation of one’s personal property, is the
element which produces the felony in its consummated
stage. At the same time, without unlawful taking as an act
of execution, the offense could only be attempted theft, if
at all.
With these considerations, we can only conclude that
under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot
have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or
consummated.
Neither Diño nor Flores can convince us otherwise. Both
fail to consider that once the offenders therein obtained
possession over the stolen items, the effect of the felony
has been produced as there has been deprivation of
property. The presumed inability of the offenders to freely
dispose of the stolen property does not negate the fact
that the owners have already been deprived of their right
to possession upon the completion of the taking.
Moreover, as is evident in this case, the adoption of the
rule —that the inability of the offender to freely dispose of
the stolen property frustrates the theft — would introduce
a convenient defense for the accused which does not
reflect any legislated intent,95 since the Court would have
carved a viable means for offenders to seek a mitigated
penalty under applied circumstances that do not admit of
easy classification. It is difficult to formulate definite
standards as to when a stolen item is susceptible to free
disposal by the thief. Would this depend on the
psychological belief of the offender at the time of the
commission of the crime, as implied in Diño?
Or, more likely, the appreciation of several classes of
factual circumstances such as the size and weight of the
property, the location of the property, the number and
identity of people present at the scene of the crime, the
number and identity of people whom the offender is
expected to encounter upon fleeing with the stolen
property, the manner in which the stolen item had been
housed or stored; and quite frankly, a whole lot more.
Even the fungibility or edibility of the stolen item would
come into account, relevant as that would be on whether
such property is capable of free disposal at any stage,
even after the taking has been consummated.
All these complications will make us lose sight of the fact
that beneath all the colorful detail, the owner was indeed
deprived of property by one who intended to produce such

deprivation for reasons of gain. For such will remain the
presumed fact if frustrated theft were recognized, for
therein, all of the acts of execution, including the taking,
have been completed. If the facts establish the non-
completion of the taking due to these peculiar
circumstances, the effect could be to downgrade the crime
to the attempted stage, as not all of the acts of execution
have been performed. But once all these acts have been
executed, the taking has been completed, causing the
unlawful deprivation of property, and ultimately the
consummation of the theft.
Maybe the Diño/Flores rulings are, in some degree,
grounded in common sense. Yet they do not align with the
legislated framework of the crime of theft. The Revised
Penal Code provisions on theft have not been designed in
such fashion as to accommodate said rulings. Again, there
is no language in Article 308 that expressly or impliedly
allows that the "free disposition of the items stolen" is in
any way determinative of whether the crime of theft has
been produced. Diño itself did not rely on Philippine laws
or jurisprudence to bolster its conclusion, and the later
Flores was ultimately content in relying on Diño alone for
legal support. These cases do not enjoy the weight of
stare decisis, and even if they did, their erroneous
appreciation of our law on theft leave them susceptible to
reversal. The same holds true of Empilis, a regrettably
stray decision which has not since found favor from this
Court.
We thus conclude that under the Revised Penal Code,
there is no crime of frustrated theft. As petitioner has
latched the success of his appeal on our acceptance of
the Diño and Flores rulings, his petition must be denied,
for we decline to adopt said rulings in our jurisdiction. That
it has taken all these years for us to recognize that there
can be no frustrated theft under the Revised Penal Code
does not detract from the correctness of this conclusion. It
will take considerable amendments to our Revised Penal
Code in order that frustrated theft may be recognized. Our
deference to Viada yields to the higher reverence for
legislative intent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
2
Not accounting for those unpublished or unreported
decisions, in the one hundred year history of this Court,
which could no longer be retrieved from the Philippine
Reports or other secondary sources, due to their
wholesale destruction during the Second World War or for
other reasons.
3
See People v. Adiao, infra. There have been a few cases
wherein the Court let stand a conviction for frustrated
theft, yet in none of those cases was the issue squarely
presented that theft could be committed at its frustrated
stage. See People v. Abuyen, 52 Phil. 722 (1929); People
v. Flores, 63 Phil. 443 (1936); and People v. Tapang, 88
Phil. 721 (1951). In People v. Argel G.R. No. L-45975, 25
May 1981, 192 SCRA 21, the Court did tacitly accept the
viability of a conviction for frustrated theft, though the
issue expounded on by the Court pertained to the proper
appellate jurisdiction over such conviction.
It would indeed be error to perceive that convictions for
frustrated theft are traditionally unconventional in this
jurisdiction, as such have routinely been handed down by
lower courts, as a survey of jurisprudence would reveal.
Still, the plain fact remains that this Court , since Adiao in
1918, has yet to directly rule on the legal foundation of
frustrated theft, or even discuss such scenario by way of
dicta.
In passing, we take note of a recent decision of the Court
of Appeals in People v. Concepcion, C.A. G.R. CR No.
28280, 11 July 2005 (See at http://ca.supremecourt.gov.ph
/cardis/CR28280.pdf), where the appellate court affirmed
a conviction for frustrated theft, the accused therein
having been caught inside Meralco property before he
could flee with some copper electrical wire. However, in
the said decision, the accused was charged at the onset
with frustrated theft, and the Court of Appeals did not
inquire why the crime committed was only frustrated theft.
Moreover, the charge for theft was not under the Revised
Penal Code, but under Rep. Act No. 7832, a special law.
10
See Records, pp. 7-14. A brief comment is warranted
regarding these four (4) other apparent suspects. The
25
affidavits and sworn statements that were executed during
the police investigation by security guards Lago and
Page
Vivencio Yanson, by SM employee Adelio Nakar, and by
the taxi driver whose cab had been hailed to transport the
accused, commonly point to all six as co-participants in
the theft of the detergents. It is not explained in the record
why no charges were brought against the four (4) other
suspects, and the prosecution’s case before the trial court
did not attempt to draw in any other suspects other than
petitioner and Calderon. On the other hand, both
petitioner and Calderon claimed during trial that they were
innocent bystanders who happened to be in the vicinity of
the Super Sale Club at the time of the incident when they
were haled in, along with the four (4) other suspects by
the security guards in the resulting confusion. See infra.
However, both petitioner and Calderon made no move to
demonstrate that the non-filing of the charges against the
four (4) other suspects somehow bolstered their plea of
innocence.
In any event, from the time this case had been elevated
on appeal to the Court of Appeals, no question was
anymore raised on the version of facts presented by the
prosecution. Thus, any issue relative to these four (4)
other suspects should bear no effect in the present
consideration of the case.
11
Also identified in the case record as "Rosalada" or
"Rosullado." He happened to be among the four (4) other
suspects also apprehended at the scene and brought for
investigation to the Baler PNP Station. See id. Rosulada
also testified in court in behalf of Calderon. See Records,
pp. 357-390.
22
A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was
denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated 1
October 2003.
41
See also Revised Penal Code, Art. 310, which qualifies
theft with a penalty two degrees higher "if committed by a
domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if
the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large
cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of
the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if
property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake,
typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity,
vehicular accident or civil disturbance."
46
Section 1(2) of the Theft Act of 1968 states: "It is
immaterial whether the appropriation is made with a view
to gain, or is made for the thief’s own benefit." Sir John
 85
Smith provides a sensible rationalization for this doctrine: The other examples cited by Viada of frustrated theft are
"Thus, to take examples from the old law, if D takes P’s in the case where the offender was caught stealing
letters and puts them down on a lavatory or backs P’s potatoes off a field by storing them in his coat, before he
horse down a mine shaft, he is guilty of theft could leave the field where the potatoes were taken, see
notwithstanding the fact that he intends only loss to P and Viada (supra note 83, at 103), where the offender was
no gain to himself or anyone else. It might be thought that surprised at the meadow from where he was stealing
firewood, id.
these instances could safely and more appropriately have
been left to other branches of the criminal law—that of
criminal damage to property for instance. But there are
cases where there is no such damage or destruction of
the thing as would found a charge under another Act. For
example, D takes P’s diamond and flings it into a deep
pond. The diamond lies unharmed in the pond and a
prosecution for criminal damage would fail. It seems
clearly right that D should be guilty of theft." J. Smith,
Smith & Hogan Criminal Law (9th ed., 1999), at 534.

79
"Revised Penal Code, Art. 310 states that the crime of
theft shall "be punished by the penalties next higher by
two degrees than those respectively expressed in the next
preceding article x x x if the property stolen x x x consists
of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, x x
x." Thus, the stealing of coconuts when they are still in the
tree or deposited on the ground within the premises is
qualified theft. When the coconuts are stolen in any other
place, it is simple theft. Stated differently, if the coconuts
were taken in front of a house along the highway outside
the coconut plantation, it would be simple theft only.

[In the case at bar, petitioners were seen carrying away

fifty coconuts while they were still in the premises of the
plantation. They would therefore come within the definition
of qualified theft because the property stolen consists of
coconuts "taken from the premises of a plantation."]
Empelis v. IAC, supra note 5, at 379, 380.

By way of contrast, the Theft Act 1968 of Great Britain

defines theft in the following manner: "A person is guilty of
theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to
another with the intention of permanently depriving the
other of it; and ‘thief’ and ‘steal’ shall be construed
accordingly." See Section 1(1), Theft Act 1968 (Great
26

Britain). The most notable difference between the modern

British and Spanish laws on theft is the absence in the
Page

former of the element of animo lucrandi. See note 42.

G.R. No. 206442 July 1, 2015
JOVITO CANCERAN vs. PEOPLE
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse
and set aside the August 10, 2012 Decision1 and the
March 7, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in
CA-G.R. CR No. 00559, which affirmed and modified the
September 20, 2007 Judgment3 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 39, Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City
(RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2003-141, convicting
petitioner Jovito Canceran (Canceran) for consummated
Theft.
The records disclose that Canceran, together with
Frederick Vequizo and Marcial Diaz, Jr., was charged with
"Frustrated Theft." The Information reads:
That on or about October 6, 2002, at more or less 12:00
noon, at Ororama Mega Center Grocery Department,
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, Jovito Canceran, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping one another with his co-
accused Frederick Vequizo, URC Merchandiser, and
Marcial Diaz, Jr., a Unilever Philippines merchandiser both
of Ororama Mega Center, with intent to gain and without
the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal
and carry away 14 cartons of Ponds White Beauty Cream
valued at ₱28,627,20, belonging to Ororama Mega
Center, represented by William Michael N. Arcenio, thus,
performing all the acts of execution which would produce
the crime of theft as a consequence but, nevertheless, did
not produce it by reason of some cause independent of
accused’s will, that is, they were discovered by the
employees of Ororama Mega Center who prevented them
from further carrying away said 14 cartons of Ponds White
Beauty Cream, to the damage and prejudice of the
Ororama Mega Center.
Article 308 in relation to Article 309, and 6 of the Revised
Penal Code.4
Version of the Prosecution
To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution
presented Damalito Ompoc (Ompoc),a security guard;
and William Michael N. Arcenio (Arcenio), the Customer
Relation Officer of Ororama Mega Center (Ororama),as its
witnesses. Through their testimonies, the prosecution
established that on or about October 6, 2002, Ompoc saw
Canceran approach one of the counters in Ororama; that
Canceran was pushing a cart which contained two boxes
of Magic Flakes for which he paid ₱1,423.00; that Ompoc
went to the packer and asked if the boxes had been
checked; that upon inspection by Ompoc and the packer,
they found out that the contents of the two boxes were not
Magic Flakes biscuits, but 14 smaller boxes of Ponds
White Beauty Cream worth ₱28,627.20; that Canceran
hurriedly left and a chase ensued; that upon reaching the
Don Mariano gate, Canceran stumbled as he attempted to
ride a jeepney; that after being questioned, he tried to
settle with the guards and even offered his personal
effects to pay for the items he tried to take; that Arcenio
refused to settle; and that his personal belongings were
deposited in the office of Arcenio.5
Version of the Defense
Canceran vehemently denied the charges against him. He
claimed that he was a promo merchandiser of La
Tondeña, Inc. and that on October 6, 2002, he was in
Ororama to buy medicinefor his wife. On his way out, after
buying medicine and mineral water, a male person
ofaround 20 years of age requested him to pay for the
items in his cart at the cashier; that he did not know the
name of this man who gavehim ₱1,440.00 for payment of
two boxes labelled Magic Flakes; that he obliged with the
request of the unnamed person because he was struck by
his conscience; that he denied knowing the contents of
the said two boxes; that after paying at the cashier, he
went out of Ororama towards Limketkai to take a jeepney;
that three persons ran after him, and he was caught; that
he was brought to the 4th floor of Ororama, where he was
mauled and kicked by one of those who chased him; that
they took his Nokia 5110 cellular phone and cash
amounting to ₱2,500.00; and that Ompoc took his Seiko
27
watch and ring, while a certain Amion took his necklace.6
Page
Canceran further claimed that an earlier Information for
theft was already filed on October 9,2002 which was
eventually dismissed. In January 2003, a second
Information was filed for the same offense over the same
incident and became the subject of the present case.7
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Judgment, dated September 20, 2007, the RTC
found Canceran guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
consummated Theft in line with the ruling of the Court in
Valenzuela v. People8 that under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC),there is no crime of
"Frustrated Theft." Canceran was sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from ten (10) years
and one (1) day to ten (10) years, eight (8) months of
prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.9
The RTC wrote that Canceran’s denial deserved scant
consideration because it was not supported by sufficient
and convincing evidence and no disinterested witness
was presented to corroborate his claims. As such, his
denial was considered self-serving and deserved no
weight. The trial court was also of the view that his
defense, that the complaint for theft filed against him
before the sala of Judge Maximo Paderanga was already
dismissed, was not persuasive. The dismissal was merely
a release order signed by the Clerk of Court because he
had posted bail.10
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Aggrieved, Canceran filed an appeal where he raised the
issue of double jeopardy for the first time. The CA held
that there could be no double jeopardy because he never
entered a valid plea and so the first jeopardy never
attached.11
The CA also debunked Canceran’s contention that there
was no taking because he merely pushed the cart loaded
with goods to the cashier’s booth for payment and
stopped there. The appellate court held that unlawful
taking was deemed complete from the moment the
offender gained possession of the thing, even if he had no
opportunity to dispose of the same.12
The CA affirmed with modification the September 20,
2007 judgment of the RTC, reducing the penalty ranging
from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum. Canceran moved for the reconsideration of the
said decision, but his motion was denied by the CA in its
March 7, 2013 resolution.
Hence, this petition.
As can be synthesized from the petition and other
pleadings, the following are the issues: 1] whether
Canceran should be acquitted in the crime of theft as it
was not charged in the information; and 2] whether there
was double jeopardy.
Canceran argues that the CA erred in affirming his
conviction. He insists that there was already double
jeopardy as the first criminal case for theft was already
dismissed and yet he was convicted in the second case.
Canceran also contends that there was no taking of the
Ponds cream considering that "the information in Criminal
Case No. 2003-141 admits the act of the petitioner did not
produce the crime of theft."13 Thus, absent the element of
taking, the felony of theft was never proved.
In its Comment,14 the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG)contended that there was no double jeopardy as
the first jeopardy never attached. The trial court dismissed
the case even before Canceran could enter a plea during
the scheduled arraignment for the first case. Further, the
prosecution proved that all the elements of theft were
present in this case.
15
In his Reply, Canceran averred that when the
arraignment of the first case was scheduled, he was
already bonded and ready to enter a plea. It was the RTC
who decided that the evidence was insufficient or the
evidence lacked the element to constitute the crime of
theft. He also stressed that there was no unlawful taking
as the items were assessed and paid for.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds the petition partially meritorious.
Constitutional Right of the Accused to be Informed of the
Nature and Cause of Accusation against Him.
No less than the Constitution guarantees the right of every
person accused in a criminal prosecution to be informed
of the nature and cause of accusation against him.16 It is
fundamental that every element of which the offense is
composed must be alleged in the complaint or
information. The main purpose of requiring the various
elements of a crime to be set out in the information is to
enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts
that constitute the offense.17
Under Article 308 of the RPC, the essential elements of
theft are (1) the taking of personal property; (2) the
property belongs to another; (3) the taking away was done
with intent of gain; (4) the taking away was done without
the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking away is
accomplished without violence or intimidation against
person or force upon things. "Unlawful taking, which is the
deprivation of one’s personal property, is the element
which produces the felony in its consummated stage. At
the same time, without unlawful taking as an act of
execution, the offense could only be attempted theft, if at
all."18
"It might be argued, that the ability of the offender to freely
dispose of the property stolen delves into the concept of
‘taking’ itself, in that there could be no true taking until the
actor obtains such degree of control over the stolen item.
But even if this were correct, the effect would be to
downgrade the crime to its attempted, and not frustrated
stage, for it would mean that not all the acts of execution
have not been completed, the "taking not having been
accomplished."19
A careful reading of the allegations in the Information
would show that Canceran was charged with "Frustrated
Theft" only. Pertinent parts of the Information read:
x x x did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
28
take, steal and carry away 14 cartons of Ponds White
Beauty Cream valued at ₱28,627,20, belonging to
Ororama Mega Center, represented by William Michael N.
Page
Arcenio, thus performing all the acts of execution which
would produce the crime of theft as a consequence, but
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of some cause
independent of accused’s will x x x.
[Emphasis and Underscoring Supplied]
As stated earlier, there is no crime of Frustrated Theft. The
Information can never be read to charge Canceran of
consummated Theft because the indictment itself stated
that the crime was never produced. Instead, the
Information should be construed to mean that Canceran
was being charged with theft in its attempted stage only.
Necessarily, Canceran may only be convicted of the lesser
crime of Attempted Theft.
"[A]n accused cannot be convicted of a higher offense
than that with which he was charged in the complaint or
information and on which he was tried. It matters not how
conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be,
an accused cannot be convicted in the courts of any
offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or
information on which he is tried, or necessarily included
therein. He has a right to be informed as to the nature of
the offense with which he is charged before he is put on
trial, and to convict him of an offense higher than that
charged in the complaint or information on which he is
tried would be an unauthorized denial of that
right."20 Indeed, an accused cannot be convicted of a
crime, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or
necessarily included in the information filed against
him.21 An offense charged necessarily includes the
offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter.22
The crime of theft in its consummated stage undoubtedly
includes the crime in its attempted stage. In this case,
although the evidence presented during the trial prove the
crime of consummated Theft, he could be convicted of
Attempted Theft only. Regardless of the overwhelming
evidence to convict him for consummated Theft, because
the Information did not charge him with consummated
Theft, the Court cannot do so as the same would violate
his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
allegations against him, as he so protests.
The Court is not unmindful of the rule that "the real nature
of the criminal charge is determined, not from the caption
or preamble of the information nor from the specification
of the law alleged to have been violated – these being
conclusions of law – but by the actual recital of facts in the
complaint or information."23 In the case of Domingo v.
Rayala,24 it was written:
What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the
designation of the offense charged or the particular law or
part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere
conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the
description of the crime charged and the particular facts
therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must
be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person
of common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime
will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege
the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the
offense must be stated in the information. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be included therein must
be determined by reference to the definitions and
essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of
alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to
inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against
him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense.25
In the subject information, the designation of the
prosecutor of the offense, which was "Frustrated Theft,"
may be just his conclusion. Nevertheless, the fact remains
that the charge was qualified by the additional allegation,
"but, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of some
cause independent of accused’s will, that is, they were
discovered by the employees of Ororama Mega Center
who prevented them from further carrying away said 14
cartons of Ponds White Beauty Cream, x x x.26 This
averment, which could also be deemed by some as a
mere conclusion, rendered the charge nebulous. There
being an uncertainty, the Court resolves the doubt in favor
of the accused, Canceran, and holds that he was not
properly informed that the charge against him was
consummated theft.
No double jeopardy when the first jeopardy never
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for punishment
for the same offense. The rule of double jeopardy has a
settled meaning in this jurisdiction. It means that when a
person is charged with an offense and the case is
terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other
manner without the consent of the accused, the latter
cannot again be charged with the same or identical
offense. This principle is founded upon the law of reason,
justice and conscience.27
Canceran argues that double jeopardy exists as the first
case was scheduled for arraignment and he, already
bonded, was ready to enter a plea. It was the RTC who
decided that there was insufficient evidence to constitute
the crime of theft.
To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites
must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached
prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been
validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be
for the same offense as that in the first. Legal jeopardy
attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a
competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea
having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused.28
Here, the CA correctly observed that Canceran never
raised the issue of double jeopardy before the
RTC.1âwphi1 Even assuming that he was able to raise
the issue of double jeopardy earlier, the same must still
fail because legal jeopardy did not attach. First, he never
entered a valid plea. He himself admitted that he was just
about to enter a plea, but the first case was dismissed
even before he was able to do so. Second, there was no
unconditional dismissal of the complaint. The case was
not terminated by reason of acquittal nor conviction but
simply because he posted bail. Absent these two
elements, there can be no double jeopardy.
Penalty of Attempted Theft
29
two degrees is the penalty prescribed by law for the
consummated crime. Also, when the offenses defined in
the RPC are punished with a penalty composed of two
periods, like in the crime of theft, the penalty lower by one
degree is formed by two periods to be taken from the
same penalty prescribed.31
Here, the products stolen were worth ₱28,627.20.
Following Article 309 par. 1 of the RPC, the penalty shall
be the maximum period of the penalty prescribed in. the
same paragraph, because the value of the things stolen
exceeded ₱22,000.00. In other words, a special
aggravating circumstance shall affect the imposable
penalty.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum
penalty should be within the range of Arresto Mayor
Minimum to Arresto Mayor Medium. In view of the special
aggravating circumstance under Article 309 (1), the
maximum penalty should be Arresto Mayor Maximum to
Prision Correccional Minimum in its maximum period.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
August 10, 2012 Decision and the March 7, 2013
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
00559 are hereby MODIFIED, in that, the Court finds
accused Jovito Canceran guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Attempted Theft.
Accordingly, the Court sentences the accused to suffer the indeterminate
prison term ranging from Four (4) Months of Arresto Mayor, as minimum, to
Two (2) Years, Four (4) Months of Prision Correccional, as maximum. SO
ORDERED.

attached The penalty for consummated theft is prision mayor in its

minimum and medium periods.29 The penalty lower by two
degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated
Page

Anent the issue of double jeopardy, the Court finds no felony shall be imposed upon principals in an attempt to
reason to deviate from the ruling of the CA. commit a felony.30 The basis for reduction of penalty by

G.R. No. L-26298 January 20, 1927
THE PEOPLE vs. JULIAN ERINIA Y VINOLLA
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Manila finding the defendant guilty of the crime
of consummated rape and sentencing him to suffer
seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion
temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by law
and to pay the costs.
The victim of the crime was a child of 3 years and 11
months old and the evidence is conclusive that the
defendant endeavored to have carnal intercourse with her,
but there may be some doubt whether he succeeded in
penetrating the vagina before being disturbed by the
timely intervention of the mother and the sister of the
child. The physician who examined the genital organ of
the child a few hours after the commission of the crime
found a slight inflammation of the exterior parts of the
organ, indicating that an effort had been made to enter the
vagina, but in testifying before the court he expressed
doubts as to whether the entry had been effected. The
mother of the child testified that she found its genital
organ covered with a sticky substance, but that cannot be
considered conclusive evidence of penetration.
It has been suggested that the child was of such tender
age that penetration was impossible; that the crime of
rape consequently was impossible of consummation; and
that, therefore, the offense committed should be treated
only as abusos deshonestos. We do not think so. It is
probably true that a complete penetration was impossible,
but such penetration is not essential to the commission of
the crime; it is sufficient if there is a penetration of the
labia. In the case of Kenny vs. State ([Tex. Crim. App.], 79
S. W., 817; 65 L. R. A., 316) where the offended party was
a child of the age of 3 years and 8 months the testimony
of several physicians was to the effect that her labia of the
privates of a child of that age can be entered by a man's
male organ to the hymen and the defendant was found
guilty of the consummated crime rape.
There being no conclusive evidence of penetration of the
genital organ of the offended party, the defendant is
entitled to the benefit of the doubt and can only be found
guilty of frustrated rape, but in view of the fact that he was
living in the house of the parents of the child as their
guest, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
confidence existed and the penalty must therefore be
imposed in its maximum degree.
The judgment appealed from is modified and the
defendant-appellant is hereby found guilty of the crime of
frustrated rape and is sentenced to suffer twelve years
of prision mayor, with the accessory penalties prescribed
by law, and with the costs in both instances. So ordered.
Johnson, Street, Villamor, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., dissenting:
In my opinion, the accused is guilty of raping a child 3
years and 11 months of age. It is consummated rape
according to the evidence of record, the findings of the
trial judge, and our decisions. (People vs. Hernandez
[1925], 49 Phil., 980; People vs. Oscar [1925], 48 Phil.,
527.) The instant case is on all fours with the case
of Kenney vs. State (65 L. R. A., 316), cited in the majority
decision. In the Kenny case, the penalty was death, and
here for this horrible crime, should be placed in the
maximum degree or seventeen years, four months, and
one day imprisonment, as imposed by the trial court.
Accordingly, my vote is for affirmance of the judgment.
30
Page
G.R. No. 88724 April 3, 1990
THE PEOPLE vs. CEILITO ORITA alias "Lito,"
The accused, Ceilito Orita alias Lito, was charged with the
crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 83-031-B before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch II, Borongan, Eastern Samar.
The information filed in the said case reads as follows (p.
47, Rollo):
The undersigned Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal
upon prior complaint under oath by the offended party,
accuses CEILITO ORITA alias LITO of the crime of
Rape committed as follows:
That on March 20, 1983, at about 1:30 o'clock in the
morning inside a boarding house at Victoria St.,
Poblacion, Borongan, Eastern Samar, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above
named accused with lewd designs and by the use of a
Batangas knife he conveniently provided himself for
the purpose and with threats and intimidation, did, then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lay with
and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with
Cristina S. Abayan against her will and without her
consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon being arraigned, the accused entered the plea of not
guilty to the offense charged. After the witnesses for the
People testified and the exhibits were formally offered and
admitted, the prosecution rested its case. Thereafter, the
defense opted not to present any exculpatory evidence
and instead filed a Motion to Dismiss. On August 5, 1985,
the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads (pp. 59-60, Rollo):
WHEREFORE. the Court being morally certain of the
guilt of accused CEILITO ORITA @ LITO, of the crime
of Frustrated Rape (Art. 335, RPC), beyond reasonable
doubt, with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling
and nightime (sic) with no mitigating circumstance to
offset the same, and considering the provisions of the
 Indeterminate Sentence Law, imposes on accused an
imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY,PRISION MAYOR, as minimum to TWELVE (12)
YEARS PRISION MAYOR, maximum; to indemnify
CRISTINA S. ABAYAN, the amount of Four Thousand
(P4,000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay costs.
SO ORDERED.
Not satisfied with the decision, the accused appealed to
the Court of Appeals. On December 29, 1988, the Court of
Appeals rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads (p. 102, Rollo):
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is hereby
MODIFIED, and the appellant found guilty of the crime
of rape, and consequently, sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify
the victim in the amount of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
On January 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals issued a
resolution setting aside its December 29, 1988 decision
and forwarded the case to this Court, considering the
provision of Section 9, paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 in conjunction with Section 17, paragraph 3,
subparagraph 1 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The antecedent facts as summarized in the People's brief
are as follows (pp. 71-75, Rollo):
Complainant Cristina S. Abayan was a 19-year old
freshman student at the St. Joseph's College at
Borongan, Eastern Samar. Appellant was a Philippine
Constabulary (PC) soldier.
In the early morning of March 20, 1983, complainant
arrived at her boarding house. Her classmates had just
brought her home from a party (p. 44, tsn, May 23,
1984). Shortly after her classmates had left, she
knocked at the door of her boarding house (p. 5, ibid).
All of a sudden, somebody held her and poked a knife
to her neck. She then recognized appellant who was a
frequent visitor of another boarder (pp. 8-9, ibid).
She pleaded with him to release her, but he ordered her
to go upstairs with him. Since the door which led to the
first floor was locked from the inside, appellant forced
complainant to use the back door leading to the second
floor (p. 77, ibid). With his left arm wrapped around her
neck and his right hand poking a "balisong" to her neck,
appellant dragged complainant up the stairs (p.
14, ibid). When they reached the second floor, he
commanded her to look for a room. With the Batangas
knife still poked to her neck, they entered complainant's
room.
Upon entering the room, appellant pushed complainant
who hit her head on the wall. With one hand holding the
knife, appellant undressed himself. He then ordered
complainant to take off her clothes. Scared, she took off
her T-shirt. Then he pulled off her bra, pants and panty
(p. 20, ibid).
He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then
mounted her. He made her hold his penis and insert it in
her vagina. She followed his order as he continued to
poke the knife to her. At said position, however,
appellant could not fully penetrate her. Only a portion of
his penis entered her as she kept on moving (p.
23, ibid).
Appellant then lay down on his back and commanded
her to mount him. In this position, only a small part
again of his penis was inserted into her vagina. At this
stage, appellant had both his hands flat on the floor.
Complainant thought of escaping (p. 20, ibid).
She dashed out to the next room and locked herself in.
Appellant pursued her and climbed the partition. When
she saw him inside the room, she ran to another room.
Appellant again chased her. She fled to another room
and jumped out through a window (p. 27, ibid).
Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, which
was about eighteen meters in front of the boarding
house, and knocked on the door. When there was no
31
answer, she ran around the building and knocked on the
back door. When the policemen who were inside the
building opened the door, they found complainant naked
Page
sitting on the stairs crying. Pat. Donceras, the first
policeman to see her, took off his jacket and wrapped it
around her. When they discovered what happened, Pat.
Donceras and two other policemen rushed to the
boarding house. They heard a sound at the second floor
and saw somebody running away. Due to darkness,
they failed to apprehend appellant.
Meanwhile, the policemen brought complainant to the
Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital where she was
physically examined.
Dr. Ma. Luisa Abude, the resident physician who
examined complainant, issued a Medical Certificate
(Exhibit "A") which states:
Physical Examination — Patient is fairly built, came
in with loose clothing with no under-clothes; appears
in state of shock, per unambulatory.
PE Findings — Pertinent Findings only.
Neck- — Circumscribed hematoma at Ant. neck.
Breast — Well developed, conical in shape with
prominent nipples; linear abrasions below (L) breast.
Back — Multiple pinpoint marks.
Extremities — Abrasions at (R) and (L) knees.
Vulva — No visible abrasions or marks at the
perineal area or over the
vulva, errythematous (sic) areas noted surrounding
vaginal orifice, tender, hymen intact; no laceration
fresh and old noted; examining finger can barely
enter and with difficulty; vaginal canal tight; no
discharges noted.
As aforementioned, the trial court convicted the accused
of frustrated rape.
In this appeal, the accused assigns the following errors:
1) The trial court erred in disregarding the substantial
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses; and
2) The trial court erred in declaring that the crime of
frustrated rape was committed by the accused.
The accused assails the testimonies of the victim and Pat.
Donceras because they "show remarkable and vital
inconsistencies and its incredibility amounting to
fabrication and therefore casted doubt to its candor, truth
and validity." (p. 33, Rollo)
A close scrutiny of the alleged inconsistencies revealed
that they refer to trivial inconsistencies which are not
sufficient to blur or cast doubt on the witnesses'
straightforward attestations. Far from being badges of
fabrication, the inconsistencies in their testimonies may in
fact be justifiably considered as manifestations of
truthfulness on material points. These little deviations also
confirm that the witnesses had not been rehearsed. The
most candid witnesses may make mistakes sometimes
but such honest lapses do not necessarily impair their
intrinsic credibility (People v. Cabato, G.R. No. L-37400,
April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 98). Rather than discredit the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, discrepancies
on minor details must be viewed as adding credence and
veracity to such spontaneous testimonies (Aportadera et
al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-41358, March 16,
1988, 158 SCRA 695). As a matter of fact, complete
uniformity in details would be a strong indication of
untruthfulness and lack of spontaneity (People v. Bazar,
G.R. No. L-41829, June 27, 1988, 162 SCRA 609).
However, one of the alleged inconsistencies deserves a
little discussion which is, the testimony of the victim that
the accused asked her to hold and guide his penis in
order to have carnal knowledge of her. According to the
accused, this is strange because "this is the only case
where an aggressor's advances is being helped-out by the
victim in order that there will be a consumation of the act."
(p. 34, Rollo). The allegation would have been meritorious
had the testimony of the victim ended there. The victim
testified further that the accused was holding a Batangas
knife during the aggression. This is a material part of the
victim's testimony which the accused conveniently
deleted.
We find no cogent reason to depart from the well-settled
rule that the findings of fact of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses should be accorded the highest
respect because it has the advantage of observing the
demeanor of witnesses and can discern if a witness is
telling the truth (People v. Samson, G.R. No. 55520,
August 25, 1989). We quote with favor the trial court's
finding regarding the testimony of the victim (p 56, Rollo):
As correctly pointed out in the memorandum for the
People, there is not much to be desired as to the
sincerity of the offended party in her testimony before
the court. Her answer to every question profounded
(sic), under all circumstances, are plain and
straightforward. To the Court she was a picture of
supplication hungry and thirsty for the immediate
vindication of the affront to her honor. It is inculcated
into the mind of the Court that the accused had
wronged her; had traversed illegally her honor.
When a woman testifies that she has been raped, she
says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was
committed provided her testimony is clear and free from
contradiction and her sincerity and candor, free from
suspicion (People v Alfonso, G.R. No. 72573, August 31,
1987, 153 SCRA 487; People v. Alcid, G.R. Nos. 66387-
88, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 280; People v. Soterol
G.R. No. 53498, December 16, 1985, 140 SCRA 400).
The victim in this case did not only state that she was
raped but she testified convincingly on how the rape was
committed. The victim's testimony from the time she
knocked on the door of the municipal building up to the
time she was brought to the hospital was corroborated by
Pat. Donceras. Interpreting the findings as indicated in the
medical certificate, Dr. Reinerio Zamora (who was
presented in view of the unavailability of Dr. Abude)
declared that the abrasions in the left and right knees,
linear abrasions below the left breast, multiple pinpoint
marks, circumscribed hematoma at the anterior neck,
erythematous area surrounding the vaginal orifice and
tender vulva, are conclusive proof of struggle against
force and violence exerted on the victim (pp. 52-
53, Rollo). The trial court even inspected the boarding
house and was fully satisfied that the narration of the
scene of the incident and the conditions therein is true (p.
54, Rollo):
. . . The staircase leading to the first floor is in such a
condition safe enough to carry the weight of both
accused and offended party without the slightest
difficulty, even in the manner as narrated. The
partitions of every room were of strong materials,
securedly nailed, and would not give way even by
hastily scaling the same.
A little insight into human nature is of utmost value in
judging rape complaints (People v. Torio, et al., G.R. No.
L-48731, December 21, 1983, 126 SCRA 265). Thus, the
trial court added (p. 55, Rollo):
32
. . . And the jump executed by the offended party from
Page
that balcony (opening) to the ground which was
correctly estimated to be less than eight (8) meters,
will perhaps occasion no injury to a frightened
individual being pursued. Common experience will tell
us that in occasion of conflagration especially occuring
(sic) in high buildings, many have been saved by
jumping from some considerable heights without being
injured. How much more for a frightened barrio girl, like
the offended party to whom honor appears to be more
valuable than her life or limbs? Besides, the exposure
of her private parts when she sought assistance from
authorities, as corroborated, is enough indication that
something not ordinary happened to her unless she is
mentally deranged. Sadly, nothing was adduced to
show that she was out of her mind.
In a similar case (People v. Sambili G.R. No. L-44408,
September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 312), We ruled that:
What particularly imprints the badge of truth on her
story is her having been rendered entirely naked by
appellant and that even in her nudity, she had to run
away from the latter and managed to gain sanctuary in
a house owned by spouses hardly known to her. All
these acts she would not have done nor would these
facts have occurred unless she was sexually assaulted
in the manner she narrated.
The accused questions also the failure of the prosecution
to present other witnesses to corroborate the allegations
in the complaint and the non-presentation of the medico-
legal officer who actually examined the victim. Suffice it to
say that it is up to the prosecution to determine who
should be presented as witnesses on the basis of its own
assessment of their necessity (Tugbang v. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 56679, June 29, 1989; People v.
Somera, G.R. No. 65589, May 31, 1989). As for the non-
presentation of the medico-legal officer who actually
examined the victim, the trial court stated that it was by
agreement of the parties that another physician testified
inasmuch as the medico-legal officer was no longer
available. The accused did not bother to contradict this
statement.
Summing up, the arguments raised by the accused as
regards the first assignment of error fall flat on its face.
Some were not even substantiated and do not, therefore,
merit consideration. We are convinced that the accused is
guilty of rape. However, We believe the subject matter that
really calls for discussion, is whether or not the accused's
conviction for frustrated rape is proper. The trial court was
of the belief that there is no conclusive evidence of
penetration of the genital organ of the victim and thus
convicted the accused of frustrated rape only.
The accused contends that there is no crime of frustrated
rape. The Solicitor General shares the same view.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code defines and
enumerates the elements of the crime of rape:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even
though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the
two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man in having
sexual bodily connections with a woman (Black's Law
Dictionary. Fifth Edition, p. 193).
On the other hand, Article 6 of the same Code provides:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted
felonies. — Consummated felonies as well as those
which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements
necessary for its execution and accomplishment are
present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs
all the acts of execution which would produce the felony
as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will
of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does
not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
Correlating these two provisions, there is no debate that
the attempted and consummated stages apply to the
crime of rape.1âwphi1 Our concern now is whether or not
the frustrated stage applies to the crime of rape.
The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that the
offender has performed all the acts of execution which
would produce the felony and (2) that the felony is not
produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's
will. In the leading case of United States v. Eduave, 36
Phil. 209, 212, Justice Moreland set a distinction between
attempted and frustrated felonies which is readily
understood even by law students:
. . . A crime cannot be held to be attempted unless the
offender, after beginning the commission of the crime
by overt acts, is prevented, against his will, by some
outside cause from performing all of the acts which
should produce the crime. In other words, to be an
attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be
thwarted by a foreign force or agency which intervenes
and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he
has performed all of the acts which should produce the
crime as a consequence, which acts it is his intention
to perform. If he has performed all of the acts which
should result in the consummation of the crime and
voluntarily desists from proceeding further, it can not
be an attempt. The essential element which
distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony is that,
in the latter, there is no intervention of a foreign or
extraneous cause or agency between the beginning of
the commission of the crime and the moment when all
of the acts have been performed which should result in
the consummated crime; while in the former there is
such intervention and the offender does not arrive at
the point of performing all of the acts which should
produce the crime. He is stopped short of that point by
some cause apart from his voluntary desistance.
Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the
offender has carnal knowledge of his victim he actually
attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the
essential elements of the offense have been
accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the
offender, because he has performed the last act
33
necessary to produce the crime.Thus, the felony is
consummated. In a long line of cases (People v. Oscar, 48
Phil. 527; People v. Hernandez, 49 Phil. 980; People v.
Page
Royeras, G.R. No. L-31886, April 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 666;
People v. Amores, G.R. No. L-32996, August 21, 1974, 58
SCRA 505), We have set the uniform rule that for the
consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not
essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male
organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female
organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the
vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily,
rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female
organ (People v. Tayaba, 62 Phil. 559 People v. Rabadan
et al., 53 Phil. 694; United States v. Garcia: 9 Phil.
434) because not all acts of execution was
performed. The offender merely commenced the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking into
account the nature, elements and manner of execution of
the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is
hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can
ever be committed.
Of course, We are aware of our earlier pronouncement in
the case of People v. Eriña 50 Phil. 998 [1927] where We
found the offender guilty of frustrated rape there being no
conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of
the offended party. However, it appears that this is a
"stray" decision inasmuch as it has not been reiterated in
Our subsequent decisions. Likewise, We are aware of
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 2632 (dated September 12, 1960) and
Republic Act No. 4111 (dated March 29, 1965) which
provides, in its penultimate paragraph, for the penalty of
death when the rape is attempted or frustrated and a
homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
thereof. We are of the opinion that this particular provision
on frustrated rape is a dead provision. The Eriña
case, supra, might have prompted the law-making body to
include the crime of frustrated rape in the amendments
introduced by said laws.
In concluding that there is no conclusive evidence of
penetration of the genital organ of the victim, the trial court
relied on the testimony of Dr. Zamora when he
"categorically declared that the findings in the vulva does
not give a concrete disclosure of penetration. As a matter
of fact, he tossed back to the offended party the answer
as to whether or not there actually was penetration." (p.
53, Rollo) Furthermore, the trial court stated (p. 57, Rollo):
. . . It cannot be insensible to the findings in the
medical certificate (Exhibit "A") as interpreted by
Dr. Reinerio Zamora and the equivocal
 declaration of the latter of uncertainty whether
there was penetration or not. It is true, and the
Court is not oblivious, that conviction for rape
could proceed from the uncorroborated testimony
of the offended party and that a medical
certificate is not necessary (People v. Royeras
People v. Orteza, 6 SCRA 109, 113). But the
citations the people relied upon cannot be
applicable to the instant case. The testimony of
the offended party is at variance with the medical
certificate. As such, a very disturbing doubt has
surfaced in the mind of the court. It should be
stressed that in cases of rape where there is a
positive testimony and a medical certificate, both
should in all respect, compliment each other, for
otherwise to rely on the testimony alone in utter
disregard of the manifest variance in the medical
certificate, would be productive of mischievous
results.
The alleged variance between the testimony of the victim
and the medical certificate does not exist. On the contrary,
it is stated in the medical certificate that the vulva was
erythematous (which means marked by abnormal redness
of the skin due to capillary congestion, as in inflammation)
and tender. It bears emphasis that Dr. Zamora did not rule
out penetration of the genital organ of the victim. He
merely testified that there was uncertainty whether or not
there was penetration. Anent this testimony, the victim
positively testified that there was penetration, even if only
partially (pp. 302, 304, t.s.n., May 23, 1984):
Q Was the penis inserted on your vagina?
A It entered but only a portion of it.
Q What do you mean when you said comply, or what
act do you referred (sic) to, when you said comply?
A I inserted his penis into my vagina.
Q And was it inserted?
A Yes only a little.
The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may
be convicted even on the sole basis of the victim's
testimony if credible (People v. Tabago, G.R. No. 69778,
November 8, 1988, 167 SCRA 65; People v. Aragona,
G.R. No. L-43752, September 19, 1985, 138 SCRA 569;
People v. Taduyo, G.R. Nos. L-37928-29, September 29,
1987, 154 SCRA 349). Moreover, Dr. Zamora's testimony
is merely corroborative and is not an indispensable
element in the prosecution of this case (People v.
Alfonso, supra).
Although the second assignment of error is meritorious, it
will not tilt the scale in favor of the accused because after
a thorough review of the records, We find the evidence
sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of consummated rape.
Article 335, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code
provides that whenever the crime of rape is committed
with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court appreciated
the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime.
Thus, the proper imposable penalty is death. In view,
however, of Article 111, Section 19(1) of the 1987
Constitution and Our ruling in People v. Millora, et al.,
G.R. Nos. L-38968-70, February 9, 1989, that the cited
Constitutional provision did not declare the abolition of the
death penalty but merely prohibits the imposition of the
death penalty, the Court has since February 2, 1987 not
imposed the death penalty whenever it was called for
under the Revised Penal Code but instead reduced the
same to reclusion perpetua (People v. Solis, et al., G.R.
Nos. 78732-33, February 14, 1990). Reclusion perpetua,
being a single indivisible penalty under Article 335,
paragraph 3, is imposed regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances (in relation to Article 63,
paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code; see People v. Arizala,
G.R. No. 59713, March 15, 1982, 112 SCRA 615; People
v. Manzano, G.R. No. L38449, November 25, 1982, 118
SCRA 705; People v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 70744, May 31,
1985, 136 SCRA 702).
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Regional Trial Court
is hereby MODIFIED. The accused Ceilito Orita is hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
and sentenced to reclusion perpetua as well as to
indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
34
Page
G.R. No. 202867 July 15, 2013
PEOPLE vs.REGIE LABIAGA
The Case - Before the Court is an appeal assailing the
Decision1 dated 18 October 2011 of the Court of Appeals-
Cebu (CA-Cebu) in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 01000. The
CA-Cebu affirmed with modification the Joint
Decision2 dated 10 March 2008 of the Regional Trial Court
of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, Branch 66 (RTC), in Criminal Case
No. 2001-155) convicting Regie Labiaga alias "Banok"
(appellant) of murder and Criminal Case No. 2002-1777
convicting appellant of frustrated murder.
The Facts - In Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, appellant,
together with a certain Alias Balatong Barcenas and Cristy
Demapanag (Demapanag), was charged with Murder with
the Use of Unlicensed Firearm under an
Information3 which reads:
That on or about December 23, 2000 in the Municipality of
Ajuy, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one
another, armed with unlicensed firearm, with deliberate
intent and decided purpose to kill, by means of treachery
and with evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot JUDY
CONDE alias ‘JOJO’ with said unlicensed firearm, hitting
her and inflicting gunshot wounds on the different parts of
her breast which caused her death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The same individuals were charged with Frustrated
Murder with the Use of Unlicensed Firearm in Criminal
Case No. 2002-1777, under an Information4 which states:
That on or about December 23, 2000 in the Municipality of
Ajuy, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one
another, armed with unlicensed firearm, with deliberate
intent and decided purpose to kill, by means of treachery
and with evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
Gregorio Conde with said unlicensed firearm, hitting him
on the posterior aspect, middle third right forearm 1 cm. In
diameter; thereby performing all the acts of execution
which would produce the crime of Murder as a
consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the will of the accused;
that is by the timely and able medical assistance rendered
to said Gregorio Conde which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Alias Balatong Barcenas remained at large. Both
appellant and Demapanag pled not guilty in both cases
and joint trial ensued thereafter. The prosecution
presented four witnesses: Gregorio Conde, the victim in
Criminal Case No. 2002-1777; Glenelyn Conde, his
daughter; and Dr. Jeremiah Obañana and Dr. Edwin Jose
Figura, the physicians at the Sara District Hospital where
the victims were admitted. The defense, on the other
hand, presented appellant, Demapanag, and the latter’s
brother, Frederick.
Version of the prosecution - The prosecution’s version of
the facts is as follows: At around 7:00 p.m. on 23
December 2000, Gregorio Conde, and his two daughters,
Judy and Glenelyn Conde, were in their home at
Barangay Malayu-an, Ajuy, Iloilo. Thereafter, Gregorio
stepped outside. Glenelyn was in their store, which was
part of their house.
Shortly thereafter, appellant, who was approximately five
meters away from Gregorio, shot the latter. Gregorio
called Judy for help. When Judy and Glenelyn rushed to
Gregorio’s aid, appellant shot Judy in the abdomen. The
two other accused were standing behind the appellant.
Appellant said, "she is already dead," and the three fled
the crime scene.
Gregorio and Judy were rushed to the Sara District
Hospital. Judy was pronounced dead on arrival while
Gregorio made a full recovery after treatment of his
gunshot wound.
35
Dr. Jeremiah Obañana conducted the autopsy of Judy. His
report stated that her death was caused by
Page
"cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to Cardiac Tamponade
due to gunshot wound."5
Dr. Jose Edwin Figura, on the other hand, examined
Gregorio after the incident. He found that Gregorio
sustained a gunshot wound measuring one centimeter in
diameter in his right forearm and "abrasion wounds
hematoma formation" in his right shoulder.6
Version of the defense - Appellant admitted that he was
present during the shooting incident on 23 December
2000. He claimed, however, that he acted in self-defense.
Gregorio, armed with a shotgun, challenged him to a fight.
He attempted to shoot appellant, but the shotgun jammed.
Appellant tried to wrest the shotgun from Gregorio, and
during the struggle, the shotgun fired. He claimed that he
did not know if anyone was hit by that gunshot.
Demapanag claimed that at the time of the shooting, he
was in D&D Ricemill, which is approximately 14 kilometers
away from the crime scene. This was corroborated by
Frederick, Demapanag’s brother.
The Ruling of the RTC - In its Joint Decision, the RTC
acquitted Demapanag due to insufficiency of evidence.
Appellant, however, was convicted of murder and
frustrated murder. The dispositive portion of the Joint
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the court hereby
finds the accused Regie Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the Crime of Murder in Crim.
Case No. 2001-1555 and hereby sentences the said
accused to reclusion perpetua together with accessory
penalty provided by law, to pay the heirs of Judy Conde
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
In Crim. Case No. 2002-1777, the court finds accused
Regie Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder and hereby
sentences the said accused to a prison term ranging from
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum
to ten (10) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum, together with the necessary penalty provided
by law and without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs.
Accused’s entire period of detention shall be deducted
from the penalty herein imposed when the accused serves
his sentence.
For lack of sufficient evidence, accused Cristy
Demapanag is acquitted of the crimes charged in both
cases. The Provincial Warden, Iloilo Rehabilitation Center,
Pototan, Iloilo is hereby directed to release accused Cristy
Demapanag from custody unless he is being held for
some other valid or lawful cause.SO ORDERED.7
The Ruling of the CA-Cebu - Appellant impugned the
RTC’s Joint Decision, claiming that "the RTC gravely erred
in convicting the appellant of the crime charged despite
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt."8 The CA-Cebu, however, upheld the
conviction for murder and frustrated murder.
The CA-Cebu also modified the Joint Decision by
imposing the payment of moral and exemplary damages
in both criminal cases. The CA-Cebu made a distinction
between the civil indemnity awarded by the RTC in
Criminal Case No. 2001-1555 and the moral damages.
The CA-Cebu pointed out that:
The trial court granted the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity in Criminal Case No. 2001-1555. It did not
award moral damages. Nonetheless, the trial court should
have awarded both, considering that they are two different
kinds of damages. For death indemnity, the amount of
₱50,000.00 is fixed "pursuant to the current judicial policy
on the matter, without need of any evidence or proof of
damages. Likewise, the mental anguish of the surviving
family should be assuaged by the award of appropriate
and reasonable moral damages."9
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the CA-Cebu
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is
DENIED. The Joint Decision dated March 10, 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, in Barotac Viejo, Iloilo is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The dispositive portion
of the said Joint Decision should now read as follows:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the court hereby
finds the accused Regie Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder in Crim.
Case No. 2001-1555 and hereby sentences the said
accused to reclusion perpetua together with the accessory
penalty provided by law, to pay the heirs of Judy Conde
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay
the costs.
In Crim. Case No. 2002-1777 the court finds accused
Regie Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder and hereby
sentences the said accused to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together with
the accessory penalty provided by law, to pay Gregorio
Conde ₱25,000.00 as moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as
exemplary damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs Accused(’s) entire
period of detention shall be deducted from the penalty
herein imposed when the accused serves his sentence.
For lack of sufficient evidence, accused Cristy
Demapanag is acquitted of the crime(s) charged in both
cases. The Provincial Warden, Iloilo Rehabilitation Center,
Pototan, Iloilo is hereby directed to release accused Cristy
Demapanag from custody unless he is being held for
some other valid or lawful cause. SO ORDERED.
Hence, this appeal.
The Ruling of the Court - Our review of the records of
Criminal Case No. 2002-1777 convinces us that appellant
is guilty of attempted murder and not frustrated murder.
We uphold appellant’s conviction in Criminal Case No.
2001-1555 for murder, but modify the civil indemnity
awarded in Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, as well as the
award of moral and exemplary damages in both cases.
36
Justifying circumstance of self-defense
Appellant’s feeble attempt to invoke self-defense in both
Page
cases was correctly rejected by the RTC and the CA-
Cebu. This Court, in People v. Damitan,11 explained that:
When the accused admits killing a person but pleads self-
defense, the burden of evidence shifts to him to prove by
clear and convincing evidence the elements of his
defense. However, appellant’s version of the incident was
uncorroborated. His bare and self-serving assertions
cannot prevail over the positive identification of the two (2)
principal witnesses of the prosecution.12
Appellant’s failure to present any other eyewitness to
corroborate his testimony and his unconvincing
demonstration of the struggle between him and Gregorio
before the RTC lead us to reject his claim of self-defense.
Also, as correctly pointed out by the CA-Cebu, appellant’s
theory of self-defense is belied by the fact that:
The appellant did not even bother to report to the police
Gregorio’s alleged unlawful aggression and that it was
Gregorio who owned the gun, as appellant claimed. And,
when appellant was arrested the following morning, he did
not also inform the police that what happened to Gregorio
was merely accidental.
Appellant’s claim that he did not know whether Gregorio
was hit when the shotgun accidentally fired is also
implausible.
In contrast, we find that the Condes’ account of the
incident is persuasive. Both the CA-Cebu and the RTC
found that the testimonies of the Condes were credible
and presented in a clear and convincing manner. This
Court has consistently put much weight on the trial court’s
assessment of the credibility of witnesses, especially
when affirmed by the appellate court.14 In People v.
Mangune,15 we stated that:
It is well settled that the evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best
undertaken by the trial court because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and to
note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling
examination. These are important in determining the
truthfulness of witnesses and in unearthing the truth,
especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. For,
indeed, the emphasis, gesture, and inflection of the voice
are potent aids in ascertaining the witness’ credibility, and
the trial court has the opportunity to take advantage of
these aids.16
Since the conclusions made by the RTC regarding the
credibility of the witnesses were not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight or misapprehension of relevant
facts, the same must be sustained by this Court.
Attempted and Frustrated Murder
Treachery was correctly appreciated by the RTC and CA-
Cebu. A treacherous attack is one in which the victim was
not afforded any opportunity to defend himself or resist the
attack.17 The existence of treachery is not solely
determined by the type of weapon used. If it appears that
the weapon was deliberately chosen to insure the
execution of the crime, and to render the victim
defenseless, then treachery may be properly appreciated
against the accused.18
In the instant case, the Condes were unarmed when they
were shot by appellant. The use of a 12-gauge shotgun
against two unarmed victims is undoubtedly treacherous,
as it denies the victims the chance to fend off the offender.
We note, however, that appellant should be convicted of
attempted murder, and not frustrated murder in Criminal
Case No. 2002-1777.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines the stages in
the commission of felonies:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies.
— Consummated felonies as well as those which are
frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements
necessary for its execution and accomplishment are
present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all
the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it
by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does
not perform all the acts of execution which should produce
In Serrano v. People,19 we distinguished a frustrated
felony from an attempted felony in this manner:
1.) In a frustrated felony, the offender has performed
all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony as a consequence; whereas in an attempted
felony, the offender merely commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does
not perform all the acts of execution.
2.) In a frustrated felony, the reason for the non-
accomplishment of the crime is some cause
independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other
hand, in an attempted felony, the reason for the non-
fulfillment of the crime is a cause or accident other
than the offender’s own spontaneous desistance.20
In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that
the wound would have been fatal were it not for timely
medical intervention.21 If the evidence fails to convince the
court that the wound sustained would have caused the
victim’s death without timely medical attention, the
accused should be convicted of attempted murder and not
frustrated murder.
In the instant case, it does not appear that the wound
sustained by Gregorio Conde was mortal. This was
admitted by Dr. Edwin Figura, who examined Gregorio
after the shooting incident:
Prosecutor Con-El:
Q: When you examined the person of Gregorio Conde,
can you tell the court what was the situation of the patient
when you examined him?
A: He has a gunshot wound, but the patient was actually
ambulatory and not in distress.
Court (to the witness)
Q: The nature of these injuries, not serious?
A: Yes, Your Honor, not serious. He has also abrasion
wounds hematoma formation at the anterior aspect right
shoulder.22
Since Gregorio’s gunshot wound was not mortal, we hold
that appellant should be convicted of attempted murder
and not frustrated murder. Under Article 51 of the Revised
Penal Code, the corresponding penalty for attempted
37
x x x the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall
be that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised
Penal Code, and the minimum which shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Code for the offense.1âwphi1
Thus, appellant should serve an indeterminate sentence
ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional in its medium period to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium
period.
Award of damages
In light of recent jurisprudence, we deem it proper to
increase the amount of damages imposed by the lower
court in both cases. In Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, this
Court hereby awards ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity23 and
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.24 The award of
₱50,000.00 as moral damages in the foregoing case is
sustained. Appellant is also liable to pay ₱40,000.00 as
moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages,
in relation to Criminal Case No. 2002-1777.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 18 October 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals-
Cebu in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 01000 with MODIFICATIONS. In Criminal Case No.
2002-1777, we find that appellant Regie Labiaga is GUILTY of Attempted Murder and
shall suffer an indeterminate sentence ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as maximum, and pay ₱40,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages. In Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, appellant shall pay ₱75,000.00
as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages. SO ORDERED.

the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than murder shall be two degrees lower than that prescribed for
his own spontaneous desistance. consummated murder under Article 248, that is, prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
Page

medium period. Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence

Law provides:
G.R. No. 145927 August 24, 2007
SIMON FERNAN, JR. and EXPEDITO TORREVILAS, vs.
PEOPLE
The instant petition under Rule 45 originated from 119
criminal cases2 filed with the Sandiganbayan (SB)
involving no less than 36 former officials and employees
of the then Ministry of Public Highways (MPH) and several
suppliers of construction materials for defalcation of public
funds arising from numerous transactions in the Cebu
First Highway Engineering District in 1977. Because of the
sheer magnitude of the illegal transactions, the number of
people involved, and the ingenious scheme employed in
defrauding the government, this infamous 86 million
highway scam has few parallels in the annals of crime in
the country.
The Case
Petitioners Simon Fernan, Jr. and Expedito Torrevillas
seek the reversal of the December 4, 1997 Decision3 of
the SB in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos. xxx all
entitled People of the Philippines v. Rocilo Neis, et al.,
finding them guilty of multiple instances of estafa through
falsification of public documents;5 and the subsequent
August 29, 2000 SB Resolution which denied their
separate pleas for reconsideration.
Petitioner Fernan, Jr. disputes the adverse judgment in
only six (6) cases, namely: 2879, 2880, 2881, 2885, 2914,
and 2918; while petitioner Torrevillas seeks exoneration in
nine (9) cases, namely: 2855, 2856, 2858, 2859, 2909,
2910, 2914, 2919, and 2932.
Both petitioners assert their strong belief that their guilt
has not been established beyond reasonable doubt and,
hence, exculpation is in order.
The Facts
6
The SB culled the facts this way:
On June 21, 1978, COA Regional Director Sofronio Flores
Jr. of COA Regional Office No. 7, directed auditors Victoria
C. Quejada and Ruth I. Paredes to verify and submit a
report on sub-allotment advises issued to various highway
engineering districts in Cebu, particularly, the Cebu City,
Cebu 1st, Cebu 2nd and the Mandaue City Highway
Engineering Districts. Complying with the directive, they
conducted an investigation and in due course submitted
their findings. Their report (Exhibit C) confirmed the
issuance of fake Letters of Advice of Allotments (LAAs) in
the districts mentioned. They discovered that two sets of
LAAs were received by the districts. One set consists of
regular LAAs which clearly indicated the covering sub-
allotment advices and were duly signed by Mrs. Angelina
Escaño, Finance Officer of the MPH Regional Office. The
LAAs were numbered in proper sequence and duly
recorded in the logbook of the Accounting, Budget and
Finance Division. The other set consists of fake LAAs
which do not indicate the covering sub-allotment advice
and were signed by Chief Accountant Rolando Mangubat
and Engr. Jose Bagasao, instead of the Finance Officer.
These fake LAAs were not numbered in proper sequence;
they were mostly undated and were sometimes
duplicated. They could not be traced to the files and
records of the Accounting, Budget and Finance Division.
The accounting entry for the disbursements made on the
fake LAAs was debited to the Accounts-Payable
Unliquidated Obligations (8-81-400) and credited to the
Checking Account with the Bureau of Treasury (8-70-790).
Nevertheless, the expenditures were taken from
obligations of the current year (1978) because all the
supporting papers of the payment vouchers were dated in
that year. The entries in the journal vouchers filed with the
MPH Regional Office were adjusted every month to 8-81-
400 (unliquidated or prior years obligation), 8-83-000
(liquidated or current year obligations) and 8-70-700
(Treasury/Agency Account). All of these were approved for
the Finance Officer by Chief Accountant Rolando
Mangubat. Mangubat, however, had no authority to
approve them because since October 1977, he had
already been detailed to the MPH Central Office. There
were indications that the practice had been going on for
years.
38
Due to these serious irregularities, then President Marcos
Page
created a Special Cabinet Committee on MPH Region VII
"Ghost Projects Anomalies" which in turn organized a
Special Task Force composed of representatives from the
Finance Ministry Intelligence Bureau (FMIB), National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Bureau of Treasury and
the Commission on Audit. The mission of the task force
was to conduct a wider and more extended investigation
in all the fifteen (15) highway engineering districts of MPH
Region VII, including the Cebu First Highway Engineering
District, the 1977 questionable disbursements of which
are the subject matter of these cases.
xxxx
For a better understanding of these highways cases, the
flow in the release of funds to the various agencies of the
government and the control devices set up for
disbursement and accounting of public funds should first
be explained. A chart (Exhibit B) graphically shows the
flow of allotments from the Ministry down to the district
level.
On the basis of appropriation laws and upon request
made by heads of agencies, the then Ministry of Budget
released funds to the various agencies of the government
by means of an Advice of Allotment (AA) and a Cash
Disbursement Ceiling (CDC). The Advice of Allotment is
an authority for the agency to incur obligations within a
specified amount in accordance with approved programs
and projects. The Cash Disbursement Ceiling is an
authority to pay. Upon receipt of the AA and CDC from the
Budget, the Central Office of the agency prepares the
Sub-Advice of Allotment (SAA) and the Advice of Cash
Disbursement Ceiling (ACDC) for each region, in
accordance with the disbursement allotment. These are
sent to the Regional Office. Upon receipt, the Budget
Officer of the region prepares the corresponding Letters of
Advice of Allotment (LAA) which are forwarded to the
various districts of the region (The amount that goes to
each district is already indicated in the Advice of
Allotment). Only upon receipt of the LAA is the district
office authorized to incur obligations.
Now, how are funds released by the Regional Office to the
different districts and ultimately paid out to contractors, the
District Engineer submits to the Regional Director a
request for allotment in accordance with the program of
work prepared by the former. This procedure starts with
the preparation of a Requisition for Supplies and
Equipment (RSE) in the District Office by the Senior Civil
Engineer, approved by the District Engineer, and signed
by the Chief Accountant of the Highway Engineering
District, who certifies as to the availability of funds. The
RSE is then submitted to the Regional Director for
approval. Once it is approved, a Request for Obligation of
Allotment (ROA) is prepared by the Chief Accountant of
the district Senior Civil Engineer. The ROA signifies that a
certain amount of district funds has been set aside or
earmarked for the particular expenditures stated in the
RSE. On the basis of the ROA, the District Office puts up
advertisements, [conducts] biddings, makes awards and
prepares purchase orders which are served on the
winning bidder. The District Office also prepares a
summary of deliveries with the corresponding delivery
receipts and tally sheets, conducts inspection and
prepares the General Voucher for the payment of
deliveries. Once the General Voucher (GV) has been
prepared, the corresponding check in the form of a
Treasury Check Account for Agency (TCAA) is drawn by
the Disbursing Officer and finally released to the
contractor.
At the end of every month, the Report of Checks Issued
by Deputized Disbursing Officer (RCIDD) is prepared,
listing all the checks issued during that period. The
RCIDDO is submitted to the accounting division of the
region. Upon receipt of the RCIDDO, the Regional Office
draws a journal voucher, debiting the account obligation
(liquidated or unliquidated obligation, whichever is
applicable), and crediting the account Treasury Check
Account for Agency (TCAA). The RCIDDO is recorded in
the Journal of Checks Issued by Deputized Disbursing
Officers (JCIDDO) and posted in the general ledger at the
end of each month.
Simultaneous with the flow of the RCIDDO, the ROAs are
summarized in the Reports of Obligations Incurred (ROI)
in the District Office, once or twice a month, depending
upon the volume of transactions. The ROI is then
submitted to the Regional Office. Upon receipt of the ROI,
the accountant of the Regional Office draws a journal
voucher taking up the following entry: debiting the
appropriation allotted (0-90-000) and crediting the
obligation incurred (0-82-000). This is recorded in the
general voucher and posted to the general ledger at the
end of each month. The journal voucher is prepared,
closing the account 8-70-709 to 8-71-100-199 at the end
of each month. It is also recorded and posted to the
general ledger. At the end of the month, the balances of
each account shown in the general ledger are
summarized in a statement called the trial balance. The
trial balance is submitted to the MPH Central Office in
Manila where it is consolidated with other trial balances
submitted by other regional offices.
The elaborate accounting procedure described above with
its system of controls was set up obviously to make sure
that government funds are properly released, disbursed
and accounted for. In the hands of untrustworthy
guardians of the public purse, however, it proved to be
inadequate. There were loopholes which an unscrupulous
person adroit in government accounting could take
advantage of to surreptitiously draw enormous sums of
money from the government.
Sometime in February, 1977, accused Rolando Mangubat
(Chief Accountant), Delia Preagido (Accountant III), Jose
Sayson (Budget Examiner), and Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II),
all of MPH Region VII, met at the Town and Country
Restaurant in Cebu City and hatched an ingenious plan to
siphon off large sums of money from government coffers.
Mangubat had found a way to withdraw government
money through the use of fake LAAs, vouchers and other
documents and to conceal traces thereof with the
connivance of other government officials and employees.
In fine, the fraudulent scheme involved the splitting of
LAAs and RSEs so that the amount covered by each
general voucher is less than P50,000.00 to do away with
the approval of the Regional Auditor; the charging of
disbursements to unliquidated obligations due the
previous year to provide the supposed source of funds;
and the manipulation of the books of account by negation
or adjustment, i.e., the cancellation of checks through
journal vouchers to conceal disbursements in excess of
the cash disbursement ceiling (CDC), so as not to reflect
such disbursements in the trial balances submitted to the
Regional Office.
Mangubat enticed Preagido, Cruz and Sayson to join him.
39
All three agreed to help him carry out his plan. They typed
the fake LAAs during Saturdays. Cruz and Sayson also
took charge of negotiating or selling the fake LAAs to
Page
contractors at 26% of the gross amount. Preagido on her
part manipulated the General Ledger, Journal Vouchers
and General Journal thru negative entries to conceal the
illegal disbursements. Thus, in the initial report of the
auditors (Exhibit D), it was discovered that the doubtful
allotments and other anomalies escaped notice due to the
following manipulations:
"The letter-advices covering such allotments (LAA) were
generally not signed by the Finance Officer nor recorded
in the books of accounts. Disbursements made on the
basis of these fake LAAs were charged to the unliquidated
Obligations (Account 8-81-400), although the obligations
being paid were not among those certified to the
unliquidated obligations (Account 8-81-400) at the end of
the preceding year. To conceal the overcharges to
authorized allotments, account 8-81-400 and the excess
of checks issued over authorized cash disbursements
ceiling, adjustments were prepared monthly through
journal vouchers to take up the negative debit to Account
8-81-400 and a negative credit to the Treasury Checking
Account for Agencies Account 8-70-790. These journal
vouchers in effect cancelled the previous entry to record
the disbursements made on the basis of the fake LAAs.
Thus, the affected accounts (Accounts 8-81-400 and 8-70-
790), as appearing in the trial balance would not show the
irregularity. The checks, however, were actually issued."
The four formed the nucleus of the nefarious conspiracy.
Other government employees, tempted by the prospect of
earning big money, allowed their names to be used and
signed spurious documents.
Although the anomalies had been going on for sometime
(February 1977 to June 1978), the PNB and Bureau of
Treasury had no inkling about it until the NBI busted the
illegal operations. (Some of the recipients of the stolen
funds spent lavishly and bought two cars at a time). The
reason for this is that, at that time, the PNB and Bureau of
Treasury were not furnished copy of the mother CDC and
the local branch of the PNB did not receive independent
advice from the PNB head office in Manila. There were no
deposits of money made with the PNB from which
withdrawals could be charged. Only CDCs were
presented to it, and not knowing that some of the CDCs
were fake, the PNB branch paid out the checks drawn
against them. The bank had also no way of knowing what
amount was appropriated for the district; consequently, it
did not know if the limit had already been exceeded. Only
an insider steep in government accounting, auditing and
banking procedures, particularly their flaws and loopholes,
could have pulled off such an ingenious and audacious
plan.
Focusing our attention now on the anomalies committed in
the Cebu First District Engineering District, hereinafter
referred to as the Cebu First HED for brevity, the Court
finds that the same pattern of fraud employed in the other
highway engineering districts in MPH Region VII was
followed. The Cebu First HED received from Region VII
thirty-four Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAAs) in the total
sum of P4,734,336.50 and twenty-nine (29) corresponding
Sub-Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (SACDCs),
amounting to P5,160,677.04 for the period January 1,
1977 to December 31, 1977. But apart from this, the Cebu
First HED appears to have also received for the same
period another set of eighty-four (84) LAAs amounting to
P4,680,694.76 which however, could not be traced to any
Sub-Advice of Allotment (SAA) or matched to the Advices
of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (ACDCs) received from the
MPH and Regional Office. This is highly irregular and not
in consonance with accounting procedures.
It was also made to appear that the payments were made
for alleged prior year’s obligations and chargeable to
Account 8-81-400, obviously because, they were not
properly funded. Furthermore, the list of projects in Region
VII for 1977 showed that Cebu First HED completed
rehabilitation and/or improvement of roads and bridges in
its districts from February to May 1977, with expenditures
amounting to P613,812.00. On the other hand, the
expenditures for barangay roads in the same district in
1977 amounted to P140,692.00, and these were all
completed within the period from November to December,
1977. These completed projects were properly funded by
legitimate LAAs and CDCs in the total amount of only
P754,504.00. However, an additional amount of
P3,839,810.74 was spent by the Cebu First HED for
maintenance of roads and bridges for the same year
(1977) but the same could not be traced to any
authoritative document coming from the MPH.
A total of 132 General Vouchers, emanating from fake
LAAs and ACDCs, were traced back to Rolando
Mangubat, Regional Accountant of Region VII and
Adventor Fernandez, Regional Highway Engineer, also of
Region VII. Those LAAs and ACDCs became the vehicles
in the disbursement of funds amounting to P3,839,810.74,
through the vouchers purportedly issued for the purchase
and delivery of the aforementioned materials allegedly
used for the maintenance and repair of the national
highways within the Cebu First HED. Despite the
enormous additional expenditure of P3,839,810.74, the
roads and bridges in the district, as found out by the NBI,
did not show any improvement. As testified to by several
barangay captains, the road maintenance consisted
merely of spreading anapog or limestone on potholes of
the national highway.
Obviously, the vouchers for payments of alleged
maintenance of roads and bridges in the additional
amount of P3,839,810.74 were prepared for no other
purpose than to siphon the said amount from the
government coffer into the pockets of some officials and
employees of Region VII and the Cebu First HED, as well
as the suppliers and contractors who conspired and
confederated with them.
The nuclei of this massive conspiracy, namely: Rolando
Mangubat, Jose Sayson, and Edgardo Cruz, all of MPH
Region VII, were found guilty in all 119 counts and were
accordingly sentenced by the SB. The other conniver,
Delia Preagido, after being found guilty in some of the
cases, became a state witness in the remainder. On the
basis of her testimony and pertinent documents,
Informations were filed, convictions were obtained, and
criminal penalties were imposed on the rest of the
accused.
On the other hand, petitioners were both Civil Engineers
of the MPH assigned to the Cebu First Highway
Engineering District. Petitioner Fernan, Jr. was included
among the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 2879, 2880,
2881, 2885, 2914, and 2918 allegedly for having signed
six (6) tally sheets or statements of deliveries of materials,
used as bases for the preparation of the corresponding
number of general vouchers. Fund releases were made to
the suppliers, contractors, and payees based on these
general vouchers.
The Information against Fernan, Jr. in SB Criminal Case
40
No. 2879 reads as follows:
Page
The undersigned accuses Rocilo Neis, Rolando
Mangubat, Adventor Fernandez, Angelina Escaño, Delia
Preagido, Camilo de Letran, Manuel de Veyra, Heracleo
Faelnar, Basilisa Galvan, Matilde Jabalde, Josefina Luna,
Jose Sayson, Edgardo Cruz, Leonila del Rosario,
Engracia Escobar, Abelardo Cardona, Leonardo
Tordecilla, Agripino Pagdanganan, Ramon Quirante,
Mariano Montera, Mariano Jarina, Leo Villagonzalo,
Asterio Buqueron, Zosimo Mendez, Simon Fernan, Jr. and
Juliana de los Angeles for estafa thru falsification of public
and commercial documents, committed as follows:
That on, about and during the period from December 1,
1976 up to January 31, 1977, both dates inclusive, in the
City of Cebu and in Cebu Province, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Rocilo
Neis, Assistant District Engineer of Cebu HED I; Rolando
Mangubat, the Chief Accountant of Region VII of the
Ministry of Public Highways and Adventor Fernandez,
Regional Highway Engineer of same Regional Office,
conniving with each other to defraud the Philippine
Government with the indispensable cooperation and
assistance of Angelina Escaño, Finance Officer of Region
VII of the Ministry of Public Highways; Delia Preagido,
Assistant Chief Accountant of same Regional Office;
Camilo de Letran, Chief Accountant of Cebu I HED;
Manuel de Veyra, Regional Director, MPH, Region VII;
Heracleo Faelnar, then Assistant Director MPH Region
VII; Basilisa Galvan, Budget Officer, MPH, Region VII;
Matilde Jabalde, Supervising Accounting Clerk, MPH,
Region VII; Josefina Luna, Accountant II, MPH, Region
VII; Jose Sayson, Budget Examiner, MPH, Region VII,
Edgardo Cruz, Accountant I, MPH, Region VII; Leonila del
Rosario, Chief Finance and Management Service, MPH,
Central Office; Engracia Escobar, Chief Accountant, MPH,
Central Office; Abelardo Cardona, Assistant Chief
Accountant, MPH, Central Office; Leonardo Tordecilla,
Supervising Accountant, MPH, Central Office; Agripino
Pagdanganan, Budget Officer III, MPH, Central Office;
Ramon Quirante, Property Custodian of Cebu I HED;
Mariano Montera, Senior Civil Engineer Engineer of Cebu
I HED; Mariano Jarina, Clerk in the Property Division of
Cebu I HED; Leo Villagonzalo, Auditor’s Aide of Cebu I
HED; Zosimo Mendez, Auditor of Cebu I HED; Asterio
Buqueron, Administrative Officer of Cebu I HED; Simon
Fernan, Jr., Civil Engineer of Cebu I HED and Juliana de
los Angeles, an alleged supplier, all of whom took
advantage of their official positions, with the exception of
Juliana de los Angeles, mutually helping each other did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify
and/or cause the falsification of the following documents,
to wit:
1. Request for Allocation of Allotment
2. Letter of Advice of Allotment
3. Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling
4. General Voucher No. B-15
5. Check No. 9933064
6. Abstract of Bids
7. Purchase Order
8. Statement of Delivery
9. Report of Inspection
10. Requisition for Supplies or Equipment
11. Trial Balance
by making it appear that Regional Office No. VII of the
Ministry of Public Highways regularly issued an advice of
cash disbursement ceiling (ACDC) and the corresponding
letter of advice of allotment (LAA) to cover the purchase of
1,400 cu. m. of item 1087 for use in the repair of the Cebu
Hagnaya Wharf road from Km. 50.30 to Km. 60.00, when
in truth and in fact, as all the accused knew, the same
were not true and correct; by making it appear in the
voucher that funds were available and that there were
appropriate requests for allotments (ROA) to pay the
aforesaid purchase; that a requisition for said item was
made and approved; that a regular bidding was held; that
a corresponding purchase order was issued in favor of the
winning bidder; that the road construction materials were
delivered, inspected and used in the supposed project and
that the alleged supplier was entitled to payment when in
truth and in fact, as all the accused know, all of the
foregoing were false and incorrect and because of the
foregoing falsifications, the above-named accused were
able to collect from the Cebu I HED the total amount of
TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P28,000.00),
Philippine Currency, in payment of the non-existing
deliveries; that the said amount of P28,000.00 was not
reflected in the monthly trial balance submitted to the
Central Office by Region VII showing its financial condition
as the same was negated thru the journal voucher, as a
designed means to cover-up the fraud; and the accused,
once in possession of the said amount, misappropriated,
converted and misapplied the same for their personal
needs, to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine
Government in the total amount of TWENTY EIGHT
THOUSAND PESOS (P28,000.00), Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The Informations in the six (6) cases involving Fernan, Jr.
were essentially identical save for the details as
highlighted in boldface above. For ease of reference,
Fernan, Jr.’s criminal cases are detailed below:…
On the other hand, petitioner Torrevillas was one of the
accused in Criminal Case Nos. 2855, 2856, 2858, 2859,
2909, 2910, 2914, 2919, and 2932.
The Information against Torrevillas in SB Criminal Case
No. 2855 reads as follows:
The undersigned accuses Rocilo Neis, Rolando
Mangubat, Adventor Fernandez, Angelina Escaño, Delia
Preagido, Camilo de Letran, Manuel de Veyra, Heracleo
Faelnar, Basilisa Galvan, Matilde Jabalde, Josefina Luna,
Jose Sayson, Edgardo Cruz, Leonila del Rosario,
Engracia Escobar, Abelardo Cardona, Leonardo
Tordecilla, Agripino Pagdanganan, Ramon Quirante, Jorge
de la Peña, Leo Villagonzalo, Asterio Buqueron, Expedito
Torrevillas, Mariano Montera and Rufino V. Nuñez for
estafa thru falsification of public and commercial
documents, committed as follows:
That on, about and during the period from June 1, 1977
up to June 30, 1977, both dates inclusive, in the City of
Cebu and in Cebu Province, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the accused Rocilo Neis, Assistant
District Engineer of Cebu HED I; Rolando Mangubat, the
Chief Accountant of Region VII of the Ministry of Public
Highways and Adventor Fernandez, Regional Highway
Engineer of same Regional Office, conniving with each
other to defraud the Philippine Government with the
indispensable cooperation and assistance of Angelina
Escaño, Finance Officer of Region VII of the Ministry of
Public Highways; Delia Preagido, Assistant Chief
Accountant of same Regional Office; Camilo de Letran,
Chief Accountant of Cebu I HED; Manuel de Veyra,
Regional Director, MPH, Region VII; Heracleo Faelnar,
then Assistant Director MPH Region VII; Basilisa Galvan,
Budget Officer, MPH, Region VII; Matilde Jabalde,
Supervising Accounting Clerk, MPH, Region VII; Josefina
Luna, Accountant II, MPH, Region VII; Jose Sayson,
41
Budget Examiner, MPH, Region VII, Edgardo Cruz,
Accountant I, MPH, Region VII; Leonila del Rosario, Chief
Page
Finance and Management Service, MPH, Central Office;
Engracia Escobar, Chief Accountant, MPH, Central Office;
Abelardo Cardona, Assistant Chief Accountant, MPH,
Central Office; Leonardo Tordecilla, Supervising
Accountant, MPH, Central Office; Agripino Pagdanganan,
Budget Officer III, MPH, Central Office; Ramon Quirante,
Property Custodian of Cebu I HED; Jorge de la Peña,
Auditor of Cebu I HED; Leo Villagonzalo, Auditor’s Aide of
Cebu I HED; Asterio Buqueron, Administrative Officer of
Cebu I HED; Expedito Torrevillas, representative of the
Engineer’s Office, Cebu I HED; Mariano Montera, Senior
Civil Engineer Engineer of Cebu I HED; and Rufino V.
Nuñez, an alleged supplier, all of whom took advantage of
their official positions, with the exception of Rufino V.
Nuñez, mutually helping each other did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify and/or cause the
falsification of the following documents, to wit:
1. Request for Allocation of Allotment –2. Letter of
Advice of Allotment
3. Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling
4. General Voucher No. B-613
5. Check No. 9403099
6. Abstract of Bids
7. Purchase Order
8. Statement of Delivery
9. Report of Inspection
10. Requisition for Supplies or Equipment
11. Trial Balance
by making it appear that Regional Office No. VII of the
Ministry of Public Highways regularly issued an advice of
cash disbursement ceiling (ACDC) and the corresponding
letter of advice of allotment (LAA) to cover the purchase of
153.63 m. t. of item 3108 for use in asphalting of the
Toledo-Tabuelan road at Km. 108.34 to Km. 109.52, when
in truth and in fact, as all the accused knew, the same
were not true and correct; by making it appear in the
voucher that funds were available and that there were
appropriate requests for allotments (ROA) to pay the
aforesaid purchase; that a requisition for said item was
made and approved; that a regular bidding was held; that
a corresponding purchase order was issued in favor of the
winning bidder; that the road construction materials were
delivered, inspected and used in the supposed project and
that the alleged supplier was entitled to payment when in
truth and in fact, as all the accused know, all of the
foregoing were false and incorrect and because of the
foregoing falsifications, the above-named accused were
able to collect from the Cebu I HED the total amount of
FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY
ONE PESOS & 85/100 (P48,431.85), Philippine Currency,
in payment of the non-existing deliveries; that the said
amount of P48,431.85 was not reflected in the monthly
trial balance submitted to the Central Office by Region VII
showing its financial condition as the same was negated
thru the journal voucher, as a designed means to cover-up
the fraud; and the accused, once in possession of the said
amount, misappropriated, converted and misapplied the
same for their personal needs, to the damage and
prejudice of the Philippine Government in the total amount
of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY
ONE PESOS & 85/100 (P48,431.85), Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The Torrevillas cases were substantially the same save for
the details highlighted in the aforequoted typical
accusatory pleading. For ease of reference, Torrevillas’
criminal cases are particularized as follows:
The Sandiganbayan’s Ruling
The anti-graft court was fully convinced of the guilt of
petitioner Fernan, Jr.; and in its December 4, 1997
Decision, it found him criminally liable in the six (6) cases
against him, thus:
In Criminal Case No. 2879, the Court finds accused JOSE
SAYSON, RAMON QUIRANTE, MARIANO MONTERA,
ZOSIMO MENDEZ, MARIANO JARINA and SIMON
FERNAN, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-
principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public
Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and
171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
and there being no modifying circumstances in
attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum,
with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine
of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to
indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the
Philippines in the amount of Twenty Eight Thousand
Pesos (P 28,000.00); and, to pay their proportionate share
of the costs.9 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Criminal Case No. 2880, the Court finds accused
CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON
QUIRANTE, MARIANO MONTERA, ZOSIMO MENDEZ,
and SIMON FERNAN, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru
falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized
in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of
them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6)
years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by
law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the
Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Twenty Eight
Thousand Pesos (P 28,000.00); and, to pay their
proportionate share of the costs.10 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Criminal Case No. 2881, the Court finds accused
CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON
QUIRANTE, ZOSIMO MENDEZ and SIMON FERNAN,
Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in
the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents
as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in
relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there
being no modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby
sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory
penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand
Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and
severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of
Thirty One Thousand Pesos (P 31,000.00); and, to pay
their proportionate share of the costs.11 (Emphasis
supplied.)
In Criminal Case No. 2885, the Court finds accused
CAMILO DE LETRAN JOSE SAYSON, RAMON
QUIRANTE, ZOSIMO MENDEZ and SIMON FERNAN,
Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in
the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public Documents
42
as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in
relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there
being no modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby
Page
sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory
penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand
Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and
severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P 30,000.00); and, to pay their
proportionate share of the costs.12 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Criminal Case No. 2914, the Court finds accused
CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON
QUIRANTE, EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS and SIMON
FERNAN, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-
principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public
Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and
171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
and there being no modifying circumstances in
attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum,
with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine
of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to
indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the
Philippines in the amount of Twenty Seven Thousand
Pesos (P 27,000.00); and, to pay their proportionate share
of the costs.13 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Criminal Case No. 2918, the Court finds accused
CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON
QUIRANTE, ZOSIMO MENDEZ, SIMON FERNAN,
Jr. and ISMAEL SABIO, Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa thru
falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized
in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of
them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6)
years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by
law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the
Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P 30,000.00); and, to pay their
proportionate share of the costs.14 (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner Torrevillas suffered the same fate and was
convicted in the nine (9) criminal cases, to wit:
In Criminal Case No. 2855, the Court finds accused
CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON
QUIRANTE, MARIANO MONTERA, and EXPEDITO
TORREVILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-
principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public
Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and
171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
and there being no modifying circumstances in
attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum,
with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine
of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to
indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the
Philippines in the amount of Forty Eight Thousand Four
Hundred Thirty One Pesos and 85/100 (P 48,431.85);
and, to pay their proportionate share of the
costs.15 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Criminal Case No. 2856, the Court finds accused
CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON
QUIRANTE, MARIANO MONTERA and EXPEDITO
TORREVILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-
principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public
Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and
171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
and there being no modifying circumstances in
attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum,
with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine
of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to
indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the
Philippines in the amount of Forty Eight Thousand Four
Hundred Seventy Two Pesos and 84/100 (P 48,472.84);
and, to pay their proportionate share of the
costs.16 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Criminal Case No. 2858, the Court finds accused
CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON
QUIRANTE, MARIANO MONTERA and EXPEDITO
TOREVILLAS, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-
principals in the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public
Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and
171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal relation
to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being
no modifying circumstances in attendance, hereby
sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory
penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand
Five Hundred Pesos (P3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and
severally the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of
Forty Seven Thousand Seven Hundred Thirteen Pesos
and 9/100 (P47,713.09); and, to pay their proportionate
share of the costs.
In Criminal Case No. 2859, the Court finds accused
CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON
QUIRANTE, MARIANO MONTERA and EXPEDITO
TOREVILLAS, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-
principals in the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public
Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and
171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
and there being no modifying circumstances in
attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum,
with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine
of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P3,500.00); to
indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the
Philippines in the amount of Thirty Four Thousand Six
Hundred Eighty pesos and 65/100 (P34,680.65); and , to
pay their proportionate share of the costs.17
In Criminal Case No. 2909, the Court finds accused
CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON
QUIRANTE, FLORO JAYME and EXPEDITO
TORREVILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-
principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public
Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and
171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
and there being no modifying circumstances in
attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum,
43
with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine
of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to
indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the
Page
Philippines in the amount of Twenty Seven Thousand Nine
Hundred Pesos (P 27,900.00); and, to pay their
proportionate share of the costs.18 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Criminal Case No. 2910, the Court finds accused
CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON
QUIRANTE, FLORO JAYME and EXPEDITO
TORREVILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-
principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public
Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and
171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
and there being no modifying circumstances in
attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum,
with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine
of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to
indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the
Philippines in the amount of Twenty Seven Thousand Nine
Hundred Pesos (P 27,900.00); and, to pay their
proportionate share of the costs.19 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Criminal Case No. 2914, the Court finds accused
CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON
QUIRANTE, EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS and SIMON
FERNAN, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-
principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public
Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and
171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
and there being no modifying circumstances in
attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum,
with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine
of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to
indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the
Philippines in the amount of Twenty Seven Thousand
Pesos (P 27,000.00); and, to pay their proportionate share
of the costs. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Criminal Case No. 2919, the Court finds accused
CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON
QUIRANTE, MARIANO MONTERA, ZOSIMO
MENDEZ, EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS and ISMAEL
SABIO, Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-
principals in the crime of Estafa thru falsification of Public
Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318 and
171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
and there being no modifying circumstances in
attendance, hereby sentences each of them to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum,
with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine
of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P 3,500.00); to
indemnify, jointly and severally the Republic of the
Philippines in the amount of Thirty One Thousand Pesos
(P 31,000.00); and, to pay their proportionate share of the
costs.20 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Criminal Case No. 2932, the Court finds accused
CAMILO DE LETRAN, JOSE SAYSON, RAMON
QUIRANTE, MARIANO MONTERA, PEDRITO SEVILLE
and EXPEDITO TORREVILLAS GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as co-principals in the crime of Estafa
thru falsification of Public Documents as defined and
penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstances in attendance, hereby sentences each of
them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6)
years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by
law, to pay a fine of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P 3,500.00); to indemnify, jointly and severally the
Republic of the Philippines in the amount of Forty Four
Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty Two Pesos and 58/100 (P
44,762.58); and, to pay their proportionate share of the
costs.21 (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners made the supplication before the court a quo
to recall the adverse judgments against them which was
declined by the August 29, 2000 SB Resolution.
Firm in their belief that they were innocent of any
wrongdoing, they now interpose the instant petition to
clear their names.
The Issues
Petitioners put forward two (2) issues, viz:
I a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding,
The honorable Sandiganbayan totally ignored
petitioners constitutional right to be presumed innocent
when it ruled that the burden of convincing the hon.
Court that the deliveries of the road materials attested
to have been received by them were not ghost
deliveries rests with the accused and not with the
prosecution.
II
The honorable sandiganbayan erred in convicting
petitioners as co-conspirators despite the
prosecution’s failure to specifically prove beyond
reasonable doubt the facts and circumstances that
would implicate them as co-conspirators and justify
their conviction.
The Court’s Ruling
We are not persuaded to nullify the verdict.
Petitioners’ guilt was established beyond reasonable
doubt
Petitioners mainly asseverate that their guilt was not
shown beyond a peradventure of doubt and the State was
unable to show that government funds were illegally
released based on alleged ghost deliveries in conjunction
with false or fake tally sheets and other documents which
they admittedly signed.
We are not convinced.
Our Constitution unequivocally guarantees that in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved.22 This sacred task
unqualifiedly means proving the guilt of the accused
beyond a reasonable doubt. Definitely, "reasonable doubt"
is not mere guesswork whether or not the accused is
guilty, but such uncertainty that "a reasonable man may
entertain after a fair review and consideration of the
evidence." Reasonable doubt is present when
after the entire comparison and consideration of all the
evidences, leaves the minds of the [judges] in that
44
condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding
conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge;
Page
and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are
bound to act conscientiously upon it.23
A thorough scrutiny of the records is imperative to
determine whether or not reasonable doubt exists as to
the guilt of accused Fernan, Jr. and Torrevillas.
Petitioners were charged with the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public documents as defined and
penalized under Articles 318 and 171 in relation to Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
ART. 318. Other deceits. – The penalty of arresto mayor
and a fine of not less than the amount of the damage
caused and not more than twice such amount shall be
imposed upon any person who shall defraud or damage
another by any deceit not mentioned in the preceding
articles of this chapter.
ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee; or
notary or ecclesiastical minister. – The penalty of prision
mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be
imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who,
taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a
document by committing any of the following acts:
xxxx
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
The complex crime is pruned into the following essential
elements:
For estafa
1. Deceit: Deceit is a specie of fraud. It is actual
fraud, and consists in any false representation or
contrivance whereby one person overreaches
and misleads another, to his hurt. There is deceit
when one is misled, either by guile or trickery or
by other means, to believe to be true what is
really false.24
 2. Damage: Damage may consist in the offended
party being deprived of his money or property as
a result of the defraudation, disturbance in
property right, or temporary prejudice.25
For falsification
1. That the offender is a public officer, employee,
or notary public;
2. That he takes advantage of his official position;
3. That he falsifies a document by committing
any of the acts defined under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code.26
Before the SB, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
dated September 1, 1988 was entered into between the
State and the accused with the following stipulations and
admissions:
(1) To expedite the early termination of the
instant cases and abbreviate the testimony of
Mrs. Delia Preagido, the prosecution and the
accused have agreed to reproduce and adopt as
the testimony of Preagido in the instant cases,
her previous testimonies in Criminal Cases Nos.
889, etc. (Mandaue City HED ’78 cases), on May
18 and 19, 1982 and in Criminal Cases Nos.
1446-1789, etc. (Danao City HED ’77 cases) on
November 10, 1987 and March 14, 1988, both on
direct and cross examination x x x without
prejudice to whatever direct and/or cross
examination question, that may be propounded
by the Prosecution and the accused on said
State witness, which questions will only be
limited to the fake or irregular LAA’s and
SACDC’s issued to Cebu I HED in 1977, the sale
of such fake or irregular LAA’s and SACDC’s
issued to Cebu I HED in 1977, the sale of such
fake or irregular LAA’s and SACDC’s in said
engineering district in the said year and the
participation of the accused thereon;
(2) That in the event Mrs. Delia Preagido is
presented to testify as a State witness in the
instant cases without reproducing and adopting
her previous testimonies in the Mandaue City
HED ’78 and the Danao City HED ’77 cases, she
will identify documents and exhibits which have
been previously marked and identified by other
prosecution witness x x x.
(3) That in the previous testimonies of Mrs. Delia
Preagido in the Mandaue City HED ’78 and the
Danao City HED ’77 cases, she identified twenty-
six separate lists containing names of officials
and employees of MPH, Regional Office No. VII,
of the various Highways Engineering Districts in
MPH, Region VII, and the MPH Central Office
who have allegedly received money or various
sums from 1977 to 1978 out of the proceeds or
sales of fake LAA’s in 1977 and 1978 and,
therefore, to obviate Mrs. Preagido’s previous
testimony of these lists, the Prosecution hereby
reproduces and adopts specifically such
testimony and the markings of the lists, i.e.,
Exhibits ‘KKK’, ‘KKK-1’ to ‘KKK-25’ in the
Mandaue City HED ’78 cases and Exhibits
‘0000’, ‘0000-1’ to ‘0000-25’ in the Danao City
HED ’77 cases, substituted or re-marked
accordingly as ‘Exhibits ‘LL’, ‘LL-1’ to ‘LL-25’ in
the instant cases.27
As a result of this MOA, the testimony of state witness
Preagido on the modus operandi of the conspirators, or
the unique and distinct method of procedure by which the
malversation of public funds in Region VII of the MPH was
perpetrated and accomplished, dealt a major blow to the
defenses raised by petitioners. Preagido’s vital testimony,
wherein she identified the methods, documents, exhibits,
and other pertinent papers that led to the crafting of fake
Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAAs),28 general vouchers,
disbursement of funds for non-existent projects, general
vouchers, and other documents, was not even
successfully refuted or overturned by petitioners.
Preagido confirmed and admitted under oath that the
illegal disbursement of public funds pertained to non-
45
existent projects and was supported by fake LAAs, fake
general vouchers, and other pertinent papers that were
also falsified. The fake LAAs and general vouchers were,
Page
in turn, supported by signed tally sheets that pertained to
alleged ghost deliveries of road construction materials for
non-existent or illegal projects.
The fake tally sheets, delivery receipts, reports of
inspection, requests for supplies and materials, and other
related documents signed on separate occasions by
petitioners, which were attached as supporting documents
to corresponding general vouchers; the alleged amounts
and quantities of road construction materials delivered;
and the specific fake general vouchers, checks, and other
pertinent documents issued which led to the illegal
disbursement of funds are summarized as follows:
Petitioner Fernan, Jr.
Petitioner Torrevillas
On the part of petitioners, they readily admitted that they
either signed the tally sheets and/or delivery receipts,
reports of inspection, requests for supplies and materials,
and other related documents which became part of the
supporting documents that led to the issuance of general
vouchers and eventually the disbursement of public
funds.29 The tally sheets are statements of delivery that
purportedly indicated the specified quantities of materials
for the construction and maintenance of roads that have
been delivered on supposed project sites on given dates
at specific places.
As a result of petitioners’ signatures in the tally sheets
and/or delivery receipts, reports of inspection, requests for
supplies and materials, and other supporting documents—
which became the basis for payment to suppliers—public
funds were released via general vouchers and checks to
the said suppliers despite the fact that the latter did not
make any deliveries in accordance with projects allegedly
funded by mostly fake LAAs.
The accusation that there were no actual deliveries of
road construction and maintenance materials in support of
projects or otherwise funded by LAAs was proven true by
the testimonies of the various barangay captains and
residents of the barangay who were supposed to be
benefited by the construction and repair activities of the
Cebu First Highway Engineering District. The testimonies
of these barangay captains and residents are summarized
as follows:30
1. MACARIO LIMALIMA, Barangay Captain of Barangay
Antipolo, Medellin, Cebu, testified that his barangay is
traversed by the national highway stretching to a distance
of 2 kilometers and 750 meters (Km. 122; Km. 123 to
125). He described the road as full of potholes. Except for
filling up these potholes with "anapog" or crushed
limestone, no major repairs were undertaken on the said
road in 1978 or in previous years. (TSN., pp. 6-14, June 5,
1986).31
2. FELOMINO ORBISO, Barangay Captain of Cawit,
Medellin, Cebu, from 1972 to 1981, testified that his
barangay is traversed by the national highway, stretching
from Km. 125 to Km. 127.9. He described the road as a
rough or dirt road. No improvement was ever made on this
road whether during the year when he gave his statement
to the NBI (1978) or in previous years. The road remained
in bad shape, with numerous potholes which the
camineros merely filled up with limestone. (TSN., pp.14-
19, June 5, 1986).32
3. TIMOTEO ANCAJAS, Barangay Captain of Paypay,
Daan Bantayan, Cebu, from 1972 to 1982, testified that
his barangay is traversed by the national highway,
stretching from Km. 132 to Km. 134 ½, or a distance of 2
½ kilometers. He described the portion of the highway as
a rough road with potholes. He stated that the only
improvement done on this road was the filling up of the
potholes with "anapog" or crushed limestone and this was
done only once in 1977. It even took the camineros three
months from the time the limestones were delivered to
start working on the road. (TSN., pp. 20-26, June 5,
1986).33
4. LUCIA PEÑAFLOR, Barangay Captain of Don Pedro,
Bogo, Cebu, from 1966 to 1982, testified that her
barangay is traversed by the national highway, stretching
from Km. 103 to Km. 105 ½, up to the boundary of San
Remigio, and from the boundary to Daan Bantayan, a
distance of more than 3 kilometers. It was only in 1984 or
1985 when this portion of the national highway was
asphalted. Prior to that, the road was maintained by filling
up the potholes with crushed limestone or "anapog."
These potholes started to appear between January and
June of 1977. However, as alleged by her in her affidavit
(Exh. II-1-d), these potholes were filled up only from
January to June, 1978. (TSN., pp. 28-46, June 5, 1986).34
5. MARCELO CONEJOS, Barangay Captain of Tapilon,
Daan Bantayan, from 1972 to 1982, testified that his
barangay is traversed by the national highway, stretching
from Km. 130 to Km. 134, or a distance of 4 kilometers. In
1977, said portion of the national highway was in bad
condition and that nothing was done to improve it until
1982, except for the time when the potholes were filled up
with crushed limestones. (TSN., pp. 48-56, June 5,
1986).35
6. REMEDIOS FELICANO, Barangay Captain of Looc,
San Remigio, Cebu from 1977 to 1982, testified that her
barangay is traversed by the national highway, stretching
form Km. 109 to Km. 110. She described said portion of
the national highway as "stoney." The only maintenance
work undertaken to improve the road was the filling up of
potholes with crushed limestone which camineros
gathered from the roadside. (TSN., pp.57-67, June 5,
1986).36
7. ALBERTO BRANSUELA, a resident of Barangay San
Jose, Catmon, Cebu, from 1974 to 1978, testified that
barangay San Jose is traversed by the national highway
(Km. 58), covering a distance of ½ kilometer more or less.
He stated that while this portion of the national highway
was already asphalted as of 1977, there were potholes
which the camineros filled up with anapog taken from the
roadside. (TSN., pp. 69-80), June 5, 1986).37
8. CARIDAD PUNLA, Acting Barangay Captain of
Barangay Corazon, Catmon, Cebu, from 1977 to 1982,
testified that the Poblacion of Catmon is traversed by the
national highway, stretching from Km. 57 to Km. 58. In
1977, only more than ½ of this portion of the national
highway was cemented while the remaining portion was
asphalted. While said portion of the national highway
already had cracks and potholes as of 1977, the real
problem was the uneven elevation of the surface of the
shoulder of the road. No general repair was undertaken by
the authorities to correct the uneven elevation, except for
the work done by the camineros who covered up the
potholes. (TSN., pp. 81-89, June 5, 1986).38
46
9. FELIPE MOLIT, Barangay Captain of Bao, Sugud,
Cebu, from 1975 to 1982, testified that barangay Bao was
Page
traversed by the national highway, stretching from Km. 59
to Km. 60 1/2. He described said portion of the national
highway as a gravel road surfaced with anapog. In 1977,
the said road already had potholes which maintenance
men filled up with anapog beginning in March, 1977. The
anapog was hauled in from Km. 64, the usual excavation
place of anapog. It took only 3 truckloads of anapog to
cover the entire length of the 1 ½ kilometers traversing
their barangay. (TSN., pp. 90-99, June 5, 1986).39
10. LEONARDO PINOTE, Barangay Captain of Barangay
Argawanon, San Remigio, Cebu, from 1972 to 1980,
testified that his barangay is traversed by the national
highway covering a distance of ½ kilometers more or less.
In 1977, this portion of the national highway was a rough
road with potholes. In the same year, camineros worked
on the road, using wheelbarrows, shovels and rakes,
pitching up the potholes with anapog. (TSN., pp. 29-35,
June 6, 1986).40
11. PEDRO ORSAL, Barangay Captain of Poblacion, San
Remigio, Cebu, from January 1972 to 1980, testified that
his barangay is traversed by the national highway, from
Km. 107 to Km. 110, or a distance of three kilometers
more or less. In 1977, the road from Km. 107 to Km. 108
was a gravel road. It was properly maintained by the
highways people, and every time potholes appeared on
the road, they would be filled-up with anapog. This
material was dumped along the road by trucks of the
Bureau of Public Highways. On the other hand, the road
leading to the heart of the poblacion was asphalted, but
with potholes. In 1977, the potholes were filled up by
camineros with gravel delivered by dump trucks of the
Bureau of Public Highways. It was only in 1978 when the
road was re-asphalted and extended from the junction of
the poblacion to the adjacent barrio of Looc. x x x (TSN.,
pp.36-45, June 6, 1986).41
The inescapable conclusion from the aforementioned
testimonies of the barangay captains and residents of
Cebu whose respective barangay are traversed by the
national highway is that there were no actual major repair
works undertaken on the national highway except the
filling of potholes by crushed limestone (anapog). Clearly,
there were no deliveries of supplies and materials for
asphalting and repair of roads described in the tally sheets
and other supporting documents signed by petitioners.
While petitioner Torrevillas presented Vice-Mayor Emigdio
Tudlasan of Tabuclan, Cebu, who testified that he saw the
asphalting of the Tabuclan Road from kilometers 18 to 19,
said testimony is not conclusive on the actual delivery of
the supplies indicated in the tally sheets, as Tudlasan was
not present at the time of alleged delivery. Moreover, his
testimony runs counter to the testimonies of Barangay
Captain Remedios Feliciano of Looc, San Remigio, Cebu
and Barangay Captain Pedro Orsal of Poblacion, San
Remigio, Cebu. Feliciano testified that she was Barangay
Captain of Looc, San Remigio, Cebu from 1977 to 1982;
that her barangay is traversed by the national highway,
stretching from km. 109 to km. 110; and that the only work
undertaken to improve the road was the filling up of
potholes with crushed limestone which camineros
gathered from the roadside. On the other hand, Orsal
testified that he was Barangay Captain of Poblacion, San
Remigio, Cebu, from January 1972 to 1980; that his
barangay is traversed by the national highway, from km.
107 to km. 110; that in 1977, the road from km. 107 to km.
108 was a gravel road maintained by the highways
people, and every time potholes appeared on the road,
they would be filled-up with anapog, which was dumped
along the road by the Bureau of Public Highways; and that
it was only in 1978 when the road was re-asphalted and
extended from the junction of the poblacion to the
adjacent barrio of Looc.
Compared to the testimony of Vice-Mayor Tudlasan, the
testimonies of Barangay Captains Feliciano and Orsal are
entitled to more weight and credit, and are more credible
considering the fact that they are residents of the area
where the road supposedly to be repaired is located plus
the fact that they saw only limestone, not asphalt, that was
used in the repair of the road in 1977. The testimonies of
Feliciano and Orsal are further buttressed by the findings
and statements of government witnesses, namely––Ruth
Inting Paredes, Supervising Commission on Audit (COA)
Auditor assigned to Region VII; Felicitas Cruz Ona,
Supervising COA Auditor assigned to the main COA office;
Federico A. Malvar, Senior National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Agent of the Anti-Graft Section and
member of the COA NBI team assigned to investigate the
anomalies; Rogelio C. Mamaril, Supervising NBI Agent of
the Anti-Fraud and Action Section; and Delia Comahig
Preagido, Accountant III, MPH, Region VII––to the effect
that the general vouchers and LAAs that corresponded to
the aforementioned tally sheets signed by petitioner
Torrevillas were fake or falsified. Undeniably, the
government witnesses have no motive to testify falsely
against petitioner Torrevillas and, hence, credible. We
conclude that there were no actual deliveries of supplies
for asphalting of road and repair on kilometers 108 and
109, which were the subjects of Criminal Case Nos. 2855,
2856, 2858, and 2859.
Glaring is the finding of the SB that the Cebu First
Highway Engineering District, to which petitioners were
assigned, had fake LAAs totaling to PhP 4,924,366.50,
while the fake Cash Disbursement Ceilings issued
amounted to PhP 6,271,150.42 The Cebu First Highway
Engineering District had also issued checks per
unrecorded reports in the total sum of PhP
1,135,176.82.43 Therefore, the total illegal disbursements
in the Cebu First Highway Engineering District alone were
a staggering PhP 12,330,693.32 circa 1977.
Of this total, petitioner Fernan, Jr. freely admitted signing
tally sheets which pertained to non-existent deliveries of
road construction supplies and materials totaling PhP
146,000,44 including PhP 27,000 in Criminal Case No.
2914 where petitioner Torrevillas was among the co-
accused.45 These tally sheets were attached as the
supporting papers to fake general vouchers which
facilitated the release of check payments to suppliers.
These checks were allegedly paid to suppliers Juliana de
los Angeles (Criminal Case Nos. 2879, 2880, 2881, 2885,
and 2914) and Ismael Sabio, Jr. (Criminal Case No.
2918).46
On his part, petitioner Torrevillas voluntarily admitted to
signing tally sheets, reports of inspection, requisitions of
supplies and equipment, and other pertinent documents
totaling an even greater amount of PhP
337,861.01,47including PhP 27,000 in Criminal Case No.
2914 where petitioner Fernan, Jr. was among the co-
accused.48 These documents signed by petitioner
Torrevillas were likewise attached as supporting papers to
fake general vouchers which facilitated the release of
check payments to suppliers.
47
These checks were allegedly paid to suppliers Rufino V.
Page
Nuñez (Criminal Case Nos. 2855, 2856, 2858, and 2859),
Juliana de los Angeles (Criminal Case Nos. 2909, 2910,
and 2914), Ismael Sabio, Jr. (Criminal Case No. 2919),
and Manuel Mascardo (Criminal Case No. 2932).49
These general vouchers and checks could not be traced
to genuine LAAs. Ergo, there were no actual deliveries of
supplies and materials for the road repair and
rehabilitation in Region VII, which were the subjects of the
criminal cases where petitioners were charged.
We find no reason to disturb the findings of the court a
quo that all the essential elements of the crime of estafa
through falsification of public documents were present.
There is no question that petitioners, at the time of the
commission of the crime, were public officers—civil
engineers—assigned to the MPH. Their signing of tally
sheets and related documents pertaining to the alleged
deliveries of supplies for road repair and construction
constitutes intervention and/or taking advantage of their
official positions, especially considering that they had the
duty to inspect the purported deliveries and ascertain the
veracity of the documents and the statements contained in
them.
The tally sheets bearing their signatures contained false
recitals of material facts which the petitioners had the duty
to verify and confirm. These tally sheets were attached as
supporting documents to fake LAAs and subsequently
became the bases for the disbursement of public funds to
the damage and prejudice of the government. Indubitably,
there exists not even an iota of doubt as to petitioners’
guilt.
The essential elements of estafa through falsification of
public documents are present in the cases against
petitioners, as follows:
1. Deceit: Petitioners Fernan, Jr. and Torrevillas made it
appear that supplies for road construction and
maintenance were delivered by suppliers allegedly in
furtherance of alleged lawful projects when in fact said
supplies were not delivered and no actual asphalting or
repair of road was implemented. In doing so, petitioners:
1.1. Were public officers or employees at the time of the
commission of the offenses;
1.2. Took advantage of their official position as highway
engineers; and
1.3. Made untruthful statements in several narrations of
fact.
2. Damage: The government disbursed PhP 146,000 in
the case of Fernan, Jr. and PhP 337,861.01 in the case of
Torrevillas, as payments to various suppliers for the
delivery of non-existent supplies.
By way of defense, petitioners posit that the tally sheets
and other documents could in fact be traced to genuine
LAAs that were in the custody of the NBI. Unfortunately,
these genuine LAAs were not introduced in evidence. It is
an age-old axiom that s/he who alleges something must
prove it. Petitioners’ assertion that the documents they
signed were all genuine and duly covered by genuine
LAAs was substantiated only by their own self-serving and
uncorroborated testimonies. We hesitate to give much
weight and credit to their bare testimonies in the face of
clear, convincing, overwhelming, and hard evidence
adduced by the State.
If the genuine LAAs were vital to their defense, and they
firmly believed that the documents were indeed in the
custody of the NBI, then petitioners could have easily
procured the compulsory process to compel the
production of said documents. However, petitioners
miserably failed to avail of subpoena duces tecum which
the court a quo could have readily granted. The inability to
produce such important and exculpatory pieces of
evidence proved disastrous to petitioners’ cause. Their
conviction was indeed supported by proof beyond
reasonable doubt which was not overturned by defense
evidence.
Petitioners acted in conspiracy with one another
Petitioners vigorously claim error on the part of the lower
court when it made the finding that they were co-
conspirators with the other parties accused despite the
dearth of evidence to amply demonstrate complicity.
We are not convinced by petitioners’ postulation.
Indeed, the burden of proving the allegation of conspiracy
falls to the shoulders of the prosecution. Considering,
however, the difficulty in establishing the existence of
conspiracy, settled jurisprudence finds no need to prove it
by direct evidence. In People v. Pagalasan, the Court
explicated why direct proof of prior agreement is not
necessary:
After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features
of a successful conspiracy. Conspiracies are clandestine
in nature. It may be inferred from the conduct of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the
crime, showing that they had acted with a common
purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is
proved that two or more persons aimed their acts towards
the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each
doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent of each other, were in fact,
connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of
personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. To
hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of
conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt
act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There
must be intentional participation in the transaction with a
view to the furtherance of the common design and
purpose.50
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, we categorized two (2)
structures of multiple conspiracies, namely: (1) the so-
called "wheel" or "circle" conspiracy, in which there is a
single person or group (the "hub") dealing individually with
two or more other persons or groups (the "spokes"); and
(2) the "chain" conspiracy, usually involving the distribution
of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is
successive communication and cooperation in much the
same way as with legitimate business operations between
manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and
retailer, and then retailer and consumer.51
We find that the conspiracy in the instant cases resembles
the "wheel" conspiracy. The 36 disparate persons who
constituted the massive conspiracy to defraud the
government were controlled by a single hub, namely:
48
Rolando Mangubat (Chief Accountant), Delia Preagido
(Accountant III), Jose Sayson (Budget Examiner), and
Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II), who controlled the separate
Page
"spokes" of the conspiracy. Petitioners were among the
many spokes of the wheel.
We recall the painstaking efforts of the SB through
Associate Justice Cipriano A. Del Rosario, Chairperson of
the Third Division, in elaborating the intricate web of
conspiracy among the accused, thus:
Mangubat enticed Preagido, Cruz and Sayson to join him.
All three agreed to help him carry out his plan. They typed
fake LAAs during Saturdays. Cruz and Sayson also took
charge of negotiating or selling fake LAAs to contractors
at 26% of the gross amount. Preagido manipulated the
general ledger, journal vouchers and general journal
through negative entries to conceal the illegal
disbursements. In the initial report of COA auditors
Victoria C. Quejada and Ruth I. Paredes it was discovered
that the doubtful allotments and other anomalies escaped
notice due to the following manipulations:
"The letter-advices covering such allotments (LAA) were
not signed by the Finance Officer nor (sic) recorded in the
books of accounts. Disbursements made on the basis of
these fake LAAs were charged to the unliquidated
obligations (Account 8-81-400), although the obligations
being paid were not among those certified to the
unliquidated obligations (Account 8-81-400) at the end of
the preceding year. To conceal the overcharges to
authorized allotments, account 8-81-400 (sic) and the
excess of checks issued over authorized cash
disbursements ceiling, adjustments were prepared
monthly through journal vouchers to take up the negative
debit to Account 8-81-400 and a negative credit to the
Treasury Checking Account for Agencies Account 8-70-
790. These journal vouchers in effect cancelled the
previous entry to record the disbursements made on the
basis of fake LAAs. Thus the affected accounts (Accounts
8-81-400 and 8-70-790), as appearing in the trial balance,
would not show the irregularity. The checks, however,
were actually issued."52
The four formed the nucleus of the nefarious conspiracy.
Other government employees, tempted by the prospect of
earning big money, allowed their names to be used and
signed spurious documents.
xxxx
3. Cebu First Highway Engineering District Anomalies
Focusing our attention now on the anomalies committed in
the Cebu First District Engineering District, hereinafter
referred to as the Cebu First HED for brevity, the Court
finds that the same pattern of fraud employed in the other
highway engineering districts in MPH Region VII was
followed. The Cebu First HED received from Region VII
thirty-four Letters of Advice of Allotment (LAAs) in the total
sum of P4,734,336.50 and twenty-nine (29) corresponding
Sub-Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (SACDCs),
amounting to P5,160,677.04 for the period January 1,
1977 to December 31, 1977. But apart from this, the Cebu
First HED appears to have also received for the same
period another set of eighty-four (84) LAAs amounting to
P4,680,694.76 which however, could not be traced to any
Sub-Advice of Allotment (SAA) OR MATCHED TO THE
Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (ACDCs) received
from the MPH and Regional Office. This is highly irregular
and not in consonance with accounting procedures.
It was also made to appear that the payments were made
for alleged prior year’s obligations and chargeable to
Account 81-400, obviously because, they were not
properly funded. Furthermore, the list of projects in Region
VII for 1977 showed that Cebu first HED completed
rehabilitation and/or improvement of roads and bridges in
its districts from February to May, 1977, with expenditures
amounting to P613,812.00. On the other hand, the
expenditures for barangay roads in the same district in
1977 amounted to P140,692.00, and these were all
completed within the period from November to December,
1977. These completed projects were properly funded by
legitimate LAAs and CDCs in the total amount of only
P754,504.00. However, an additional amount of
P3,839,810.74, was spent by the Cebu First HED for
maintenance of roads and bridges for the same year
(1977) but the same could not be traced to any
authoritative document coming from the MPH.
The following payments for materials purchased for the
year 1977 were made to appear as payment for prior
year’s obligation and were paid out of fake LAAs:
The NBI also discovered that there were purchases of
materials in 1977 that were charged to current obligations
but paid out of spurious LAAs, to wit:
Grand Total ………. P3,839,810.74
A total of 132 General Vouchers, emanating from fake
LAAs and ACDCs, were traced back to Rolando
Mangubat, Regional Accountant of Region VII and
Adventor Fernandez, Regional Highway Engineer, also of
Region VII. Those LAAs and ACDCs became the vehicles
in the disbursement of funds amounting to P3,839,810.74,
through the vouchers purportedly issued for the purchase
and delivery of the aforementioned materials allegedly
used for the maintenance and repair of the national
highways within the Cebu First HED. Despite the
enormous additional expenditure of P3,839,810.74, the
roads and bridges in the district, as found out by the NBI,
did not show any improvement (Exhibit II). As testified to
by several barangay captains, the road maintenance
consisted merely of spreading anapog or limestone on
potholes of the national Highway.
Obviously, the vouchers for payments of alleged
maintenance of roads and bridges in the additional
amount of P3,839,810.74 were prepared for no other
purpose than to siphon off the said amount from the
government coffer into the pockets of some officials and
employees of Region VII and the Cebu First HED, as well
as the suppliers and contractors who conspired and
confederated with them.53
After a close re-examination of the records, the Court
finds no reason to disturb the finding of the anti-graft court
that petitioners are co-conspirators of the other accused,
headed by Chief Accountant Rolando Mangubat, who
were similarly convicted in practically all the 119 counts of
estafa. Undisturbed is the rule that this Court is not a trier
of facts and in the absence of strong and compelling
reasons or justifications, it will accord finality to the
findings of facts of the SB. The feeble defense of
petitioners that they were not aware of the ingenuous plan
of the group of accused Mangubat and the indispensable
acts to defraud the government does not merit any
consideration. The State is not tasked to adduce direct
proof of the agreement by petitioners with the other
accused, for such requirement, in many cases, would
border on near impossibility. The State needs to adduce
proof only when the accused committed acts that
49
constitute a vital connection to the chain of conspiracy or
in furtherance of the objective of the conspiracy. In the
case at bench, the signing of the fake tally sheets and/or
Page
delivery receipts, reports of inspection, and requests for
supplies and materials by petitioners on separate
occasions is vital to the success of the Mangubat Group in
siphoning off government funds. Without such fabricated
documents, the general vouchers covering the supply of
materials cannot be properly accomplished and submitted
to the disbursing officer for the preparation of checks.
State witness Ruth Paredes, Supervising COA Auditor,
elaborated on the procedure regarding the award of the
contract more specifically to the payment of the contractor
or supplier. Once the Request for Supplies and Equipment
is approved by the Regional Office, the Request for
Obligation of Allotment (ROA) or the request for funds is
signed by the District Engineer pursuant to the approved
plans and budget and signed by the district accountant as
to availability of funds.
The district office will advertise the invitation to bid and
award the contract to the lowest bidder. The Purchase
Order (PO) is prepared and addressed to the winning
bidder. Upon delivery of the supplies and materials, the
supplier bills the district office for payment. Consequently,
the requisitioning officer will prepare the general voucher
which must be accompanied by the following documents:
a. The ROA;
b. The PO;
c. The abstract of Bid together with the Bid quotations;
d. The delivery receipts together with the tally sheets;
and
e. The tax clearance and tax certificate of the supplier.
After the preparation and submission of the general
voucher and the supporting documents, the disbursing
officer shall prepare and draw a check based on said
voucher. The check is countersigned by an officer of the
district office and/or the COA Regional Director based on
the amount of the check.
Thus, it is clear that without the tally sheets and delivery
receipts, the general voucher cannot be prepared and
completed. Without the general voucher, the check for the
payment of the supply cannot be made and issued to the
supplier. Without the check payment, the defraudation
cannot be committed and successfully consummated.
Thus, petitioners’ acts in signing the false tally sheets
and/or delivery receipts are indispensable to the
consummation of the crime of estafa thru falsification of
public documents. Surely, there were ghost or false
deliveries of supplies and materials as convincingly shown
by the testimonies of the barangay captains, officials, and
residents of the areas where the materials were allegedly
used. More importantly, if there were actual deliveries of
materials made, then there would be no need to fake the
LAAs because the suppliers will have to be paid the cost
of said materials plus a reasonable profit. As a result,
there is nothing or not much to share with the more than
30 or so co-conspirators, for the suppliers would not be
too dim-witted to part with even their cost in buying the
materials they allegedly supplied. Moreover, the fake
delivery receipts and tally sheets signed by petitioners
were linked to the general vouchers upon which check
payments were made to the suppliers who were found
guilty of participating in the fraud. With respect to
petitioner Fernan, Jr., he signed tally sheets on the ghost
deliveries of Juliana de los Angeles and Ismael Sabio, Jr.
On the part of petitioner Torrevillas, he signed false tally
sheets and delivery receipts on supplies allegedly
delivered by Rufino V. Nuñez, Juliana de los Angeles,
Ismael Sabio, Jr., and Manuel Mascardo. Lastly, the
checks issued to these suppliers based on general
vouchers supported by the false tally sheets and general
vouchers signed by petitioners cannot be traced to any
genuine LAAs, resulting in the inescapable conclusion that
these LAAs were unauthorized; hence, fake or fabricated.
These are undisputed tell-tale signs of the complicity by
petitioners with the Mangubat syndicate.
In People v. Mangubat, the court a quo elucidated the
conspiracy in the Cebu highway scam in a trenchant
manner:
Where the acts of each of the accused constitute an
essential link in a chain and the desistance of even one of
them would prevent the chain from being completed, then
no conspiracy could result as its consummation would
then be impossible or aborted. But when each and
everyone of the accused in the instant cases performed
their assigned tasks and roles with martinet-like precision
and accuracy, by individually performing essential overt
acts, so much so that the common objective is attained,
which is to secure the illegal release of public funds under
the guise of fake or simulated public documents, then
each and everyone of said accused are equally liable as
co-principals under the well-established and universally-
accepted principle that, once a conspiracy is directly or
impliedly proven, the act of one is the act of all and such
liability exists notwithstanding no-participation in every
detail in the execution of the offense.54
In sum, the required quantum of proof has been adduced
by the State on the conspiracy among the accused
including petitioners. The conviction of petitioners must
perforce be sustained.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the
December 4, 1997 Decision of the SB in the consolidated
criminal cases subject of this petition.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168852 September 30, 2008
50
SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN vs.
SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L. TAN
Page
Before the Court is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the Resolution1 dated March 7, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-
05-54536 and the RTC Resolution2 dated July 11, 2005
which denied petitioner's Verified Motion for
Reconsideration.
The factual background of the case:
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and
Steven L. Tan (Steven) were married.3 Out of this union,
two female children were born, Kyra Danielle4 and Kristen
Denise.5 On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the
marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO)6 against
Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan
and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She
alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were
causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon
her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)
(5), and (i)7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,8 otherwise
known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004."
On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an
Order/Notice9 granting petitioner's prayer for a TPO.
On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to
Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent
Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the
Petition,10 contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over
their persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner,
they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.
On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on
Opposition11 to respondents' Motion to Dismiss arguing
that respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a
liberal interpretation thereof aimed at promoting the
protection and safety of victims of violence.
On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a
Resolution12 dismissing the case as to respondents on the
ground that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they
were not included/covered as respondents under R.A. No.
9262 under the well-known rule of law "expressio unius
est exclusio alterius."13
On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion for
Reconsideration14 contending that the doctrine of
necessary implication should be applied in the broader
interests of substantial justice and due process.
On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment on the
Verified Motion for Reconsideration15 arguing that
petitioner's liberal construction unduly broadened the
provisions of R.A. No. 9262 since the relationship
between the offender and the alleged victim was an
essential condition for the application of R.A. No. 9262.
On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution16 denying
petitioner's
Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned
that to include respondents under the coverage of R.A.
No. 9262 would be a strained interpretation of the
provisions of the law.
Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law, to
wit:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES
PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW OF
SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR
THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "ANTI-VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF
2004".17
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be
understood in the light of the provisions of Section 47 of
R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for the suppletory
application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and,
accordingly, the provision on "conspiracy" under Article 8
of the RPC can be suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262;
that Steven and respondents had community of design
and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient
financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be
ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing
her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically; that
respondents should be included as indispensable or
necessary parties for complete resolution of the case.
On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not
covered by R.A. No. 9262 since Section 3 thereof
explicitly provides that the offender should be related to
the victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating
or sexual relationship; that allegations on the conspiracy
of respondents require a factual determination which
cannot be done by this Court in a petition for review; that
respondents cannot be characterized as indispensable or
necessary parties, since their presence in the case is not
only unnecessary but altogether illegal, considering the
non-inclusion of in-laws as offenders under Section 3 of
R.A. No. 9262.
The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against
women and their children'' as "any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman who is his
wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom he has a common child, or against her child
whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the
family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery,
assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty."
While the said provision provides that the offender be
related or connected to the victim by marriage, former
marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not
preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy
under the RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides
for the suppletory application of the RPC, thus:
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this
Act, the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws,
shall have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)
Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:
51
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this
Page
Code. – Offenses which are or in the future may be
punishable under special laws are not subject to the
provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code
may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes
punished under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in
which the special law is silent on a particular matter.
Thus, in People v. Moreno,18 the Court applied suppletorily
the provision on subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of the
RPC to cases of violations of Act No. 3992, otherwise
known as the "Revised Motor Vehicle Law," noting that the
special law did not contain any provision that the
defendant could be sentenced with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
In People v. Li Wai Cheung,19 the Court applied
suppletorily the rules on the service of sentences provided
in Article 70 of the RPC in favor of the accused who was
found guilty of multiple violations of R.A. No. 6425,
otherwise known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,"
considering the lack of similar rules under the special law.
In People v. Chowdury,20 the Court applied suppletorily
Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the RPC to define the words
"principal," "accomplices" and "accessories" under R.A.
No. 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," because said words were
not defined therein, although the special law referred to
the same terms in enumerating the persons liable for the
crime of illegal recruitment.
In Yu v. People,21 the Court applied suppletorily the
provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of
the RPC to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, otherwise
known as the "Bouncing Checks Law," noting the absence
of an express provision on subsidiary imprisonment in
said special law.
Most recently, in Ladonga v. People,22 the Court applied
suppletorily the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of
the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary
provision therein.
With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy
under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied suppletorily to
R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of
Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said
law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their
nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied
suppletorily.
Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A.
No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action in concert to
achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the
act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or
modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.23
It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262
expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against
women and their children may be committed by an
offender through another, thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their
Children. - The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts:
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless
conduct, personally or through another, that alarms
or causes substantial emotional or psychological
distress to the woman or her child. This shall include,
but not be limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in
public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the
residence of the woman or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the
property of the woman or her child against her/his
will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings
or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or
her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x
x x. (Emphasis supplied)
In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at
purpose of preventing further acts of violence against the great length on the attendance of circumstances
woman or her child may include evidencing the conspiracy or connivance of Steven and
respondents to cause verbal, psychological and economic
individuals other than the offending husband, thus: abuses upon her. However, conspiracy is an evidentiary
matter which should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on
the merits and cannot be determined in the present
SEC. 8. Protection Orders. – x x x The protection orders petition since this Court is not a trier of facts.26 It is thus
that may be issued under this Act shall include any, some premature for petitioner to argue evidentiary matters since
or all of the following reliefs:
this controversy is centered only on the determination of
whether respondents may be included in a petition under
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to R.A. No. 9262. The presence or absence of conspiracy
commit or committing, personally or through can be best passed upon after a trial on the merits.
another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of
this Act; 1avvphi1.net Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of
conspiracy may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262,
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, the Court will no longer delve on whether respondents
annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise may be considered indispensable or necessary parties. To
communicating with the petitioner, directly do so would be an exercise in superfluity.
or indirectly; x x x (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal assailed Resolutions dated March 7, 2005 and July 11,
construction of the law, thus: 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City
in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 are
SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally hereby PARTLY REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as
the dismissal of the petition against respondents is
construed to promote the protection and safety of victims
of violence against women and their children. (Emphasis concerned. SO ORDERED.
supplied)
It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the
law24 and that this intent must be effectuated by the
courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A.
No. 9262 reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal
construction as will best ensure the attainment of the
object of the law according to its true intent, meaning and
spirit - the protection and safety of victims of violence
against women and children.
Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the
maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius" finds no
application here. It must be remembered that this maxim
is only an "ancillary rule of statutory construction." It is not
52
of universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It should
be applied only as a means of discovering legislative
intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not be
Page
permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the
legislature.25