ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

FINALS REVIEWER

INTERNAL RULES

Concept
In the very nature of things in many cases it becomes impracticable for the legislative department of the Government to provide
general regulations for the various and varying details for the management of a particular department of the Government. It
therefore becomes convenient for the legislative department of the Government, by law, in a most general way, to provide for the
conduct, control, and management of the work of the particular department of the Government; to authorize certain persons, in
charge of the management, control, and direction of the particular department, to adopt certain rules and regulations providing for
the detail of the management and control of such department. Such regulations have uniformly been held to have the force of law,
whenever they are found to be in consonance and in harmony with the general purposes and objects of the law.
The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can
authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself
Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to
anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required
is that the regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should conform to the standards that the
law prescribes
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an
exception to the nondeleption of legislative, powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation calculated to promote the
public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modem life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of
the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions.
The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it his been
enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by
the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned
There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation of
a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations,
it "makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it
merely interprets a pre-existing law. Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred
upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal
sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes,
objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left
to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product
of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law.
A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory
authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom
(Davis, op. cit., 195-197). On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts
that finally determine what the law means.

CASE PRINCIPLES:
MAGLUNOB VS NAFCO
Nevertheless, there is another ground which makes it unnecessary to remand the case for further proceedings to ascertain who is
the owner of the parcel of land involved in the litigation, because granting that the parcel of land is included among those that
should be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 65, still the petitioners have no specific legal right and
the respondent has no specific legal duty enjoined by law to perform in connection therewith.
It is only a preference and that involves a discretion to determine whether the applicants for lease or sale of parts of a parcel of land
under the management of the respondent are entitled to such lease or purchase under the provisions of Republic Act No. 65. Going
over the provisions of the directives referred to in the petition for mandamus we fail to find any which confers upon the petitioners a
specific legal right and imposes a duty upon the respondent enforceable by mandamus. And it must be so, because executive orders
or directives of the President are administrative in nature and they cannot, generally, confer any right because this is only
conferred by law.

INTERPROVINCIAL AUTOBUS CO INC VS COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE

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It cannot be denied that the regulation is merely a directive to the tax officers; it does not purport to change or modify the law.
The regulation above quoted falls within the scope of the administrative power of the Secretary of Finance, as authorized in
Section 79 (B) of the Revised Administrative Code, because it is essential to the strict enforcement and proper execution of the law
which it seeks to implement. Said regulations have the force and effect of law.
“In the very nature of things in many cases it becomes impracticable for the legislative department of the Government to provide
general regulations for the various and varying details for the management of a particular department of the Government. It
therefore becomes convenient for the legislative department of the Government, by Law, in a most general way, to provide for the
conduct, control and management of the work of the particular department of the Government; to authorize certain persons, in
charge of the management, control, and direction of the particular department, to adopt certain rules and regulations providing for
the detail of the management and control of such department. Such regulations have uniformly been held to have the force of law,
whenever they are found to be in consonance and in harmony with the general purposes and objects of the law Such regulations,
once established and found to be in conformity with the general purposes of the law, are just as binding upon all of the parties, as
if the regulations had been written in the original law itself.”

PENAL REGULATIONS

US VS BARRIAS
The fixing of penalties for criminal offenses is the exercise of a legislative power which cannot be delegated to a subordinate
authority.
By sections 1, 2, and 3 of Act No. 1136, passed April 29, 1904, the Collector of Customs is authorized to license craft engaged in the
lighterage or other exclusively harbor business of the ports of the Islands, and, with certain exceptions, all vessels engaged in
lightering are required to be so licensed.
The necessity of confiding to some local authority the framing, changing, and enforcing of harbor regulations is. recognized
throughout the world, as each region and each harbor requires peculiar rules more minute than could be enacted by the central
lawmaking power, and which, when kept within their proper scope, are in their nature police regulations not involving an undue
grant of legislative power.
Under Act No. 1235, the Collector is not only empowered to make suitable regulations, but also to "fix penalties for violation
thereof," not exceeding a fine of P500. This provision of the statute does, indeed, present a serious question.
"One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be
delegated by that department to any other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the
authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is
changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been entrusted cannot relieve
itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be developed, nor can it substitute the
judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this
sovereign trust."
This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by
the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the
intervening mind of another. In the case of the United States vs. Breen, an Act of Congress allowing the Secretary of War to make
such rules and regulations as might be necessary to protect improvements of the Mississippi River, and providing that a violation
thereof should constitute a misdemeanor, was sustained on the ground that the misdemeanor was declared not under the delegated
power of the Secretary of War, but in the Act of Congress, itself. So also was a grant to him of power to prescribe rules for the use of
canals.
But a law authorizing him to require alterations of any bridge and to impose penalties for violations of his rules we held invalid, as
vesting in him a power exclusively lodged in Congress. The subject is considered and some cases reviewed by the Supreme Court of
the United States, in re Kollock, which upheld the law authorizing a commissioner of internal revenue to designate marks and stamps
on oleomargarine packages, an improper use of which should thereafter constitute a crime or misdemeanor, the court saying (p.
533):
"The criminal offense is fully and completely defined by the Act and the designation by the Commissioner of the particular marks and
brands to be used was a mere matter of detail. The regulation was in execution of, or supplementary to, but not in conflict with, the
law itself. . . ."
In Massachusetts it has been decided that the legislature may delegate to the governor and council the power to make pilot
regulations.
In the case of The Board of Harbor Commissioners of the Port of Eureka vs. Excelsior Redwood Company (88 Cal., 491), it was ruled
that harbor commissioners cannot impose a penalty under statutes authorizing them to do so, the court saying:
"Conceding that the legislature could delegate to the plaintiff the authority to make rules and regulations with reference to
the navigation of Humboldt Bay, the penalty for the violation of such rules and regulations is a matter purely in the hands of
the legislature."
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Having reached the conclusion that Act No. 1136 is valid, so far as sections 5 and 8 are concerned. We are also of the opinion that
none of the subsequent statutes cited operate to repeal the aforesaid section of Act No. 1136.

US VS TUPASI MOLINA
A violation of a regulation prescribed by an executive officer of the Government in conformity with and based upon a statute
authorizing such regulation, constitutes an offense and renders the offender liable to punishment in accordance with the
provisions of law.
In the very nature of things in many cases it becomes impracticable for the legislative department of the Government to provide
general regulations for the various and varying details for the management of a particular department of the Government. It
therefore becomes convenient for the legislative department of the Government, by law, in a most general way, to provide for the
conduct, control, and management of the work of the particular department of the Government; to authorize certain persons, in
charge of the management, control, and direction of the particular department, to adopt certain rules and regulations providing
for the detail of the management and control of such department. Such regulations have uniformly been held to have the force of
law, whenever they are found to be in consonance and in harmony with the general purposes and objects of the law.

PEOPLE VS MACEREN
The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can
authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself.
Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body finds it impracticable, if not impossible,
to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is
required is that the regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should conform to the
standards that the law prescribes.
The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the enforcement of a particular statute.
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an
exception to the non-delegation of legislative, powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislations” calculated to
promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modem life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law".
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions
of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law
itself cannot be extended. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.
The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been
enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered
by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.

INTERPRETATIVE RULES

HILADO VS COLLECTOR
Philippines Internal Revenue Laws are not political in nature and as such were continued in force during the period of enemy
occupation and in effect were actually enforced by the occupation government. Such tax laws are deemed to be laws of the
occupied territory and not of the occupying enemy. As of the end of 1945, there was no law which Hilado could claim for the
destruction of his properties during the battle for the liberation of the Philippines. Under the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1948,
the payment of claims by the War Damage Commission depended upon its discretions non-payment of which does not give rise to
any enforceable right. Assuming that the loss (deductible item) represents a portion of the 75% of his war damage claim, the
amount would be at most a proper deduction of his 1950 gross income (not on his 1951 gross income) as the last installment and
notice of discontinuation of payment by the War Damage

VICTORIAS MILLING CO INC VS SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS

There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation of
a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and
regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while, when it renders an opinion or gives a statement
of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law.
Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by
law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is
so because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions
intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agency
entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to
create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law.
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A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory
authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom. On
the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what
the law means.

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS VS SSS

The Rules and Regulations of the SSS, having been promulgated in implementation of a law, have the force and effect of a statute.
While the amendment to the Rules may have been lawfully made by the Commission and duly approved by the President on January
1958, such amendment was only published in the November 1958 issue of the Official Gazette, and after appellants' employment
had already ceased. Suffice it to say, in this regard, that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the date of publication of laws in the Official
Gazette is material for the purpose of determining their effectivity, only if the statutes themselves do not so provide.
In the present case, the original Rules and Regulations of the SSS specifically provide that any amendment thereto subsequently
adopted by the Commission, shall take effect on the date of its approval by the President. Consequently, the delayed publication
of the amended rules in the Official Gazette did not affect the date of their effectivity, which is January 14, 1958, when they were
approved by the President.

QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS

It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact, the gathering, the organization and the
analysis of evidence. 7 Investigations are useful for all administrative functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and licensing,
but also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining general policy, for recommending, legislation, and for
purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out what if anything should be done. 8 An administrative agency
may be authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose
sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken and may require the
attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for
correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions
It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies exercise and perform adjudicatory powers and functions,
though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial authority to administrative agencies is well recognized
in our jurisdiction, basically because the need for special competence and experience has been recognized as essential in the
resolution of questions of complex or specialized character and because of a companion recognition that the dockets of our regular
courts have remained crowded and clogged. In general the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative
agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may
exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. In the
exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private
parties under such contracts.
The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking.
To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law
Factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired expertise in matters entrusted to their jurisdictions are accorded by
this Court not only respect but finality if supported by substantial evidence
It has been said that where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve
the exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial. When
acting as quasi-judicial tribunal, administrative agencies cannot ignore the requirements of procedural due process in resolving the
petitions.

INSPECTION, INVESTIGATION, AND ADJUDICATION

ANG TIBAY VS COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation. It is more an
administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation.
The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this character.

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In the light of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe that, except as to the alleged agreement between the
Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood, the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which
to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.

CARMELO VS RAMOS
The rule is that Rule 64 of the Rules of Court applies only to inferior and superior courts and does not comprehend contempt
committed against administrative officials or bodies like the one in this case, unless said contempt is clearly considered and
expressly defined as contempt of court, as is done in paragraph 2 of Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code.
One who invokes this provision of the law must first show that he has "authority to take testimony or evidence" before he can apply
to the courts for the punishment of hostile witnesses. There is nothing said in the executive order of the Mayor creating the
committee about such a grant of power. All that the order gives to this body is the power to investigate anomalies involving certain
city employees. SC does not agree with the petitioner that a delegation of such power to investigation implies also a delegation of
the power to take testimony or evidence of witnesses whose appearance may be require by the compulsory process of subpoena.
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the provisions of section 580 of the Administrative Code are applicable to the City of Manila as
these pertain to national bureaus or offices of the government. Even granting that the Mayor has the implied power to require the
appearance of witnesses before him, the rule, is that the Mayor cannot delegate this power to a body like the committee of the
petitioner.

VIVO VS MONTESA
We agree with petitioning Commissioner that the court below is without jurisdiction to restrain the deportation proceedings of
respondents Calacdays. These proceedings are within the jurisdiction of the Immigration authorities under Sections 28 and 37 of the
Philippine Immigration Act. That jurisdiction is not tolled by a claim of Filipino citizenship, where the Commissioner or
Commissioners have reliable evidence to the contrary; and said officers should be given the opportunity to determine issues of
citizenship before the courts interfere in the exercise of the power of judicial review of administrative decisions.
It is well to note here that when the petition for certiorari and prohibition (the respondent judge considered it as such) was filed,
deportation proceedings had been started against the respondents (petitioners below) but had not been completed. In view of the
non-completion of the proceedings, the Board of Commissioners has not rendered as yet any decision. The respondents Calacdays,
therefore, are not being deported. Before the Board reaches a decision, it has to conduct a hearing where the main issue will be
the citizenship or alienage of the respondents. Therefore, there is nothing so far for the courts to review.
The Calacdays have alluded in this Court to certain documents in support of their claim to Philippine citizenship. The proper
procedure is for said respondents to appear before the Immigration officials and there submit these documents as evidence on their
part to show cause why they should not be deported.

EVANGELISTA VS JARENCIO
It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact, the gathering, the organization and the
analysis of evidence. 7 Investigations are useful for all administrative functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and licensing,
but also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining general policy, for recommending, legislation, and for
purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out what if anything should be done. 8 An administrative agency
may be authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose
sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken and may require the
attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for
correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions.
To hold that the subpoena power of the Agency is confined to mere quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions would therefore
imperil or inactiviate the Agency in its investigatory functions under sub-paragraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the enabling
authority itself (Executive Order No. 4, para. 5) fixes no distinction when and in what function should the subpoena power be
exercised. Similarly, we see no reason to depart from the established rule that forbids differentiation when the law itself makes
none.

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD VS PHILIPPINE AIR LINES

There exists but an insignificant doubt in our mind that the C.A.B. is fully authorized by law (RA 776) to impose fines in the nature
of civil penalty for violations of its rules and regulations. To deprive the C.A.B. of that power would amount to an absurd
interpretation of the pertinent legal provision because the CAB is given full power on its own initiative to determine whether to
"impose, remit, mitigate, increase or compromise" "fines and civil penalties", a power which is expressly given to the Civil
Aeronautics Administrator whose orders or decision may be reviewed, revised, reversed, modified or affirmed by the CAB.
Besides, to deprive the C.A.B. of its power to impose civil penalties would negate its effective general supervision and control over air
carriers if they can just disregard with impunity the rules and regulations designed to insure public safety and convenience in air
transportation. If every time the C.A.B. would like to impose a civil penalty on an erring airline for violation of its rules and
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regulations it would have to resort to courts of justice in protracted litigations then it could not serve its purpose of exercising a
competent, efficient and effective supervision and control over air carriers in their vital role of rendering public service by affording
safe and convenient air transit.
There is no doubt that the fine imposed on appellant PAL in CAB resolution 109(70) and 132(70) is that fine or civil penalty
contemplated and mentioned in the foregoing provisions of Republic Act 776 and not a fine in the nature of criminal penalty as
contemplated in the Revised Penal Code, because the "fine" in this case was imposed by the C.A.B. because of appellant PAL's
violation of C.A.B. rules on flagstops without previous authority. In other words, it is an administrative penalty which administrative
officers are empowered to impose without criminal prosecution.
The CAB has the power to "investigate, upon complaint or upon its own initiative, whether any individual or air carrier, domestic or
foreign, is violating any provision of this act, or the rules and regulations issued thereunder, and shall take such action, consistent
with the provisions of this Act, as may be necessary to prevent further violation of such provision, or rules and regulations so issued"
Likewise, the CAB has the power to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal any administrative decision or order" of the
Civil Aeronautics Administrator on matters pertaining to "imposition of civil penalty or fine in connection with the violation of any
provision of this Act or rules and regulations issued thereunder." It has the power also "either on its own initiative or upon review on
appeal from an order or decision of the Civil Aeronautics Administrator, to determine whether to impose, remit, mitigate, increase,
or compromise, such fine and civil penalties, as the case may be.

ANTIPOLO REALTY CORP VS NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY

It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies exercise and perform adjudicatory powers and functions,
though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial authority to administrative agencies is well recognized
in our jurisdiction, basically because the need for special competence and experience has been recognized as essential in the
resolution of questions of complex or specialized character and because of a companion recognition that the dockets of our regular
courts have remained crowded and clogged. In general the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative
agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity
may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency.
In the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of
private parties under such contracts.
Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 957, known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Decree", states that National Housing
Authority. — The National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in
accordance with the provisions of this decree. Presidential Decree No. 1344, clarified and spelled out the quasi-judicial dimensions of
the grant of regulatory authority to the NHA.
There is no question that under Presidential Decree No. 957, the NHA was legally empowered to determine and protect the rights of
contracting parties under the law administered by it and under the respective agreements, as well as to ensure that their obligations
thereunder are faithfully performed.

RCPI VS NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

NTC has no jurisdiction to impose a fine. Under Section 21 of C. A. 146, as amended, the Commission was empowered to impose an
administrative fine in cases of violation of or failure by a public service to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or
any orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission. Petitioner operated under a legislative franchise, so there were no terms nor
conditions of any certificate issued by the Commission to violate. Neither was there any order, decision or regulation from the
Commission applicable to petitioner that the latter had allegedly violated, disobeyed, defied or disregarded.
No substantial change has been brought about by Executive Order No. 546 invoked by the Solicitor General's Office to bolster NTC's
jurisdiction. The Executive Order is not an explicit grant of power to impose administrative fines on public service utilities, including
telegraphic agencies, which have failed to render adequate service to consumers. Neither has it expanded the coverage of the
supervisory and regulatory power of the agency. There appears to be no alternative but to reiterate the settled doctrine in
administrative law that:
Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that jurisdiction and powers of administrative
agencies, like respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the
legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective.

EPZA VS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

In Hon. Isidro Cariño, et al. vs. Commission on Human Rights, et al., we held that the CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-
judicial body.
“The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence
and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not
adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The
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function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To
be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat,
the Commission does not have.”
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged
whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue
a restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is
conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication.
The "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including
a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations.
Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued
"by the judge of any court in which the action is pending, or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. It may also
be granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in any action pending in an inferior court within his
district." (Sec. 2, Rule 58, Rules of Court). A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending
principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no other purpose.

FEDERICO SANDOVAL VS COMELEC

Although the COMELEC is clothed with jurisdiction over the subject matter and issue of SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206, we find
the exercise of its jurisdiction tainted with illegality. We hold that its order to set aside the proclamation of petitioner is invalid for
having been rendered without due process of law. Procedural due process demands prior notice and hearing. The facts show that
COMELEC set aside the proclamation of petitioner without the benefit of prior notice and hearing and it rendered the questioned
order based solely on private respondent's allegations.
Public respondent submits that procedural due process need not be observed in this case because it was merely exercising its
administrative power to review, revise and reverse the actions of the board of canvassers.
We cannot accept public respondent's argument.
Taking cognizance of private respondent's petitions for annulment of petitioner's proclamation, COMELEC was not merely
performing an administrative function. The resolution of the adverse claims of private respondent and petitioner as regards the
existence of a manifest error in the questioned certificate of canvass requires the COMELEC to act as an arbiter. It behooves the
Commission to hear both parties to determine the veracity of their allegations and to decide whether the alleged error is a manifest
error. Hence, the resolution of this issue calls for the exercise by the COMELEC of its quasi-judicial power. It has been said that where
a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of functions
of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial. The COMELEC therefore, acting
as quasi-judicial tribunal, cannot ignore the requirements of procedural due process in resolving the petitions filed by private
respondent.

UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL VS COSLAP

COSLAP is not justified in assuming jurisdiction over the controversy. It may not assume jurisdiction over cases which are already
pending in the regular courts.
Section 3(2) of Executive Order 561 speaks of any resolution, order or decision of the COSLAP as having the "force and effect of a
regular administrative resolution, order or decision." The qualification places an unmistakable emphasis on the administrative
character of the COSLAP's determination, amplified by the statement that such resolutions, orders or decisions "shall be binding
upon the parties therein and upon the agency having jurisdiction over the same." An agency is defined by statute as "any of the
various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled
corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein."
Section 3(2) of Executive Order 561 patently indicates that the COSLAP's dispositions are binding on administrative or executive
agencies.

DETERMINATION OF SUFFICIENCY OF STANDARDS

PEOPLE VS ROSENTHAL
In view of the intention and purpose of Act No. 2581 — to protect the public against "speculative schemes which have no more basis
than so many feet of blue sky" and against the "sale of stock in fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other
like fraudulent exploitations", — we incline to hold that "public interest" in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular
Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates or permits.
-CmC & RDC- 7
Cases where there is sufficient standard:
1. 'whenever he has reasonable ground to believe that the securities being sold or offered for sale are of a speculative character.' Act
No. 2581 defines and enumerates what are "speculative securities" and all the other provisions of the Act must be read and
construed in conjunction and harmony with said section.
2. "be satisfied of the good repute in business of such applicant and named agents". If the conditions are within the power of the
State to impose, they can only be ascertained by an executive officer. Reputation and character are quite tangible attributes, but
there can be no legislative definition of them that can automatically attach to or identify individuals possessing them, and necessarily
the aid of some executive agency must be invoked.
3. "good business reputation of the applicant". It is well-settled principle of law in this state that by legislative act a commission or
board may be empowered to ascertain the existence of facts, upon the finding of which may depend the right to continue in the
practice of a profession or a regulated business.

INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD & VENEER CO VS PANGIL FEDERATION OF LABOR

Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 prescribes that in the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or
controversy and in exercising any duties and power under this Act, the court shall act according to justice and equity and substantial
merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms. The National Assembly has by this section furnished a sufficient
standard by which the court will be guided in exercising its discretion in the determination of any question or controversy before it,
and we have already ruled that the discretionary power thus conferred is judicial in character and does not infringe upon the
principle of separation of powers, the prohibition against the delegation of legislative function, and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

CERVANTES VS AUDITOR-GENERAL
The rule is that so long as the Legislature "lays down a policy and a standard is established by the statute" there is no undue
delegation. Republic Act No. 51 in authorizing the President of the Philippines, among others, to make reforms and changes in
government-controlled corporations, lays down a standard and policy that the purpose shall be to meet the exigencies attendant
upon the establishment of the free and independent government of the Philippines and to promote simplicity, economy and
efficiency in their operations. The standard was set and the policy fixed. The President had to carry the mandate. This he did by
promulgating the executive order in question which, tested by the rule above cited, does not constitute an undue delegation of
legislative power.

PACU VS SEC OF EDUCATION

The Secretary of Education has fixed standards to ensure adequate and efficient instruction, as shown by the memoranda fixing or
revising curricula, the school calendars, entrance and final examinations, admission and accreditation of students etc.; and the
system of private education has, in general, been satisfactorily in operation for 37 years. Which only shows that the Legislature did
and could, validly rely upon the educational experience and training of those in charge of the Department of Education to ascertain
and formulate minimum requirements of adequate instruction as the basis of government recognition of any private school.
At any rate, petitioners do not show how these standards have injured any of them or interfered with their operation. Wherefore, no
reason exists for them to assail the validity of the power nor the exercise of the power by the Secretary of Education.

EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS

ISSUANCE OR REVOCATION OF LICENSES, PERMITS, AND LEASES

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC VS TORRES

The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and
oppressive. It has been necessitated by "the growing complexity of the modern society". More and more administrative bodies are
necessary to help in the regulation of society's ramified activities. "Specialized in the particular field assigned to them, they can deal
with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice"
A careful reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within the "administrative and policing
powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred" upon the respondents. The power to "restrict and regulate conferred by
Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of police power. To "restrict" means "to confine, limit or stop" and whereas the power to
"regulate" means "the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interests, first and foremost,
of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons".
The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive branch of Government.
Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the
National Administrative Register as required

-CmC & RDC- 8

GONZALO SY TRADING VS CBP
It is one of the first principles in the field of administrative law that a license or a permit is not a contract between the sovereignty
and the licensee or permitee, and is not a property in any constitutional sense, as to which the constitutional prescription against
impairment of the obligation of contracts may extend. A license is rather in the nature of a special privilege, of a permission or
authority to do what is within its terms. 25 It is not in any way vested, permanent, or absolute. A license granted by the State is always
revocable. As a necessary consequence of its main power to grant license or permit, the State or its instrumentalities have the
correlative power to revoke or recall the same. And this power to revoke can only be restrained by an explicit contract upon good
consideration to that effect. 26 The absence of an expiry date in, a license does not make it perpetual. Notwithstanding that absence,
the license cannot last beyond the life of the basic authority — under which it was issued.

COHON VS COURT OF APPEALS

The law provides that all cases involving the fixing of rates must have concurrence and signatures of at least two board members. The
law referred to are the Rules of Practice and Procedure then enforced by the defunct BOT, specifically Sec. 2 of Rule 14 of said Rules.
Considering that the CPC which involved the fixing of rates was issued against the mandatory requirements of the aforecited law, it
follows that the decision allowing the grant of the CPC and the CPC itself are void and ineffective and, therefore, the Certificate did
not confer any right or privilege to respondent-awardee. For being invalid from the beginning, the same cannot be ratified nor
validated. It further follows that the Maritime Industry Authority (the agency which took over the powers and functions of the Board
of Transportation) has no jurisdiction to proceed with MARINA Case No. 85-079 which allegedly involved the approval and sale of the
invalid CPC.

FIXING OF RATES, WAGES, AND PRICES

A public service may propose new rates, as the respondent did (Phil Railway Co) , but it cannot lawfully make said new rates effective
without the approval of the Public Service commission, and the Public Service Commission itself cannot authorize a public service to
enforce new rates without the prior approval of said rates by the commission.
While the NTC may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of PHILCOMSAT, such rate-fixing order,
temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the
requirement of reasonableness.

YCHAUSTI CO VS PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONER

There is a legal presumption that the fixed rates are reasonable, and it must be conceded that the fixing of rates by the Government,
through its authorized agents, involves the exercise of reasonable discretion and, unless there is an abuse of that discretion, the
courts will not interfere. Also that, although the fixing of rates is a legislative and governmental power over which the
Government has complete control, it has no power to fix rates that are unreasonable or to regulate them arbitrarily, and that as to
whether a given rate is fair and reasonable is a judicial question over which the courts have complete control.
In arriving at the present or market value of the vessel, its original cost, the cost of reproduction and any other evidence, which will
tend to show its present or market value, should be considered. The original cost of a vessel should only be considered for the
purpose of determining its present market value. Under the normal conditions the value of the vessel is to be determined as of the
time when the rate investigation is made. When property becomes a public utility, for operating purposes, it ipso facto amounts to a
taking and appropriation of the property to the public use so long as it is a public utility.

PANAY AUTOBUS CO VS PHIL RAILWAY CO

The Public Service Commission was not authorized by law to delegate to the respondent its powers of altering freight rates at will or
to regard them as maximum rates whenever in the opinion of respondent it would be to its advantage to do so. The Legislature has
delegated to the Public Service Commission the power of fixing the rates of public services.
A public service may propose new rates, as the respondent did, but it cannot lawfully make said new rates effective without the
approval of the Public Service commission, and the Public Service Commission itself cannot authorize a public service to enforce new
rates without the prior approval of said rates by the commission. The commission cannot determine in advance whether or not the
new rates of the respondent will be just and reasonable. Because it does not know what those rates will be.

VIGAN ELECTRIC LIGHT CO INC VS PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

Ratio Consistent with the principle of separation of powers, which underlies our constitutional system, legislative powers may not be
delegated except to local governments, and only to matters purely of local concern. However, Congress may delegate to
administrative agencies of the government the power to supply the details in the execution or enforcement of a policy laid down
by a which is complete in itself.

-CmC & RDC- 9

Such law is not deemed complete unless it lays down a standard or pattern sufficiently fixed or determinate, or, at least,
determinable without requiring another legislation, to guide the administrative body concerned in the performance of its duty to
implement or enforce said policy. Otherwise, there would be no reasonable means to ascertain whether or not said body has acted
within the scope of its authority, and, as a consequence, the power of legislation would eventually be exercised by a branch of the
Government other than that in which it is lodged by the Constitution, in violation, not only of the allocation of powers therein made,
but, also, of the principle of separation of powers.
Although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises
of a given kind throughout the Philippines may partake of a legislative character, such is not the nature of the order complained of.
Indeed, the same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact based upon a report
submitted by the General Auditing Office that petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied
by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross- examine the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the
contents thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion drawn there from by the respondent. In
other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character the valid exercise
of which demands previous notice and hearing.
Sections 16(c) and 20 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 146, explicitly require notice and hearing before the Commission can fix and
determine joint rates, tolls charges, classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as commutation, mileage kilometerage, and other
special rates which shall be imposed, observed, and followed thereafter by any public service.
Whether notice and a hearing in proceedings before a public service commission are necessary depends chiefly upon statutory or
constitutional provisions applicable to such proceedings, which make notice and hearing, prerequisite to action by the
commission, and upon the nature and object of such proceedings, that is, whether the proceedings, are, on the one hand,
legislative and rule-making in character, or are, on the other hand, determinative and judicial or quasi-judicial, affecting the rights
an property of private or specific persons. As a general rule, a public utility must be afforded some opportunity to be heard as to
the propriety and reasonableness of rates fixed for its services by a public service commission.

BAUTISTA VS BOARD OF ENERGY

Section 16 (c) of CA 146 empowers respondent board — (c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, toll charges, classifications,
or schedules thereof, as well as commutation, mileage, kilometrage, and other special rates which shall be imposed, observed, and
followed thereafter by any public service; Provided, That the Commission may, in its discretion approve rates proposed by public
services provisionally and without necessity of any hearing-, but it shall call a hearing thereon within thirty days thereafter, upon
publication and notice to the concerns operating in the territory affected....
Section 2 of Rule 12 of the Rules of Practice of the BOE provides: “Provisional Relief-Upon the filing of an application, petition or
complaint or at any stage thereafter, the Board may grant on motion of the pleader or on its own initiative the relief prayed for
without prejudice to a final decision after completion of the hearing should the Board find that the pleading, together with the
affidavits and supporting documents attached thereto and such additional evidence as may have been presented, substantially
support the provisional order, and such action will be consistent with the public interest.“
Under similar circumstances, this Court has upheld the authority of regulatory boards like the Energy Regulatory Board to grant
provisional relief upon the filing of an application, petition or complaint or at any stage thereafter, and without the need of prior
hearing, but it shall call a hearing thereon within thirty days thereafter for the determination of its final decision. The order
granting such provisional relief, however, must be based upon substantial evidence — supporting papers duly verified or
authenticated, and is without prejudice to rendition of a final decision after hearing. This Court ruled in the case of the Board of
Transportation that the provisional nature of the authority and the fact that the primary application is given a full hearing, are
the safeguards against its abuses.

PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORP VS ALCUAZ

The NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable
feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power.
The NTC order violates procedural due process because it was issued motu proprio, without notice to PHILCOMSAT and without the
benefit of a hearing. Said order was based merely on an “initial evaluation,” which is a unilateral evaluation, but had PHILCOMSAT
been given an opportunity to present its side before the order in question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate reduction
and the consequent deterioration of the public service could have been shown and demonstrated to NTC. The order pertains
exclusively to PHILCOMSAT and to no other. Reduction of rates was made without affording PHILCOMSAT the benefit of an
explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements warranted a corresponding rate reduction.
PHILCOMSAT was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the inspector who issued the report on which NTC based its
questioned order.
While the NTC may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of PHILCOMSAT, such rate-fixing order,
temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the
requirement of reasonableness. Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it may not exercise the same in an arbitrary and
-CmC & RDC- 10
confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order as temporary in nature does not perforce entail the applicability of a different rule of
statutory procedure than would otherwise be applied to any other order on the same matter unless otherwise provided by the
applicable law. NTC has no authority to make such order without first giving PHILCOMSAT a hearing, whether the order be temporary
or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission’s
own motion.

MACEDA VS ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD

Court ruled that "the Board Order authorizing the proceeds generated by the increase to be deposited to the OPSF is not an act of
taxation but is authorized by Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137. The OPSF must not be
understood to be a funding designed to guarantee oil firms' profit although as a subsidy, or a trust account, the Court has no doubt
that oil firms make money from it. The court held that OPSF was established precisely to protect the consuming public from the
erratic movement of oil prices and to preclude oil companies from taking advantages of fluctuations occurring every so often. As a
buffer mechanism, it stabilizes domestic prices by bringing about a uniform rate rather than leaving pricing to the caprices of the
market.

GOVERNMENTAL OR PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS

BLAQUERA VS ALCALA
The Pres. is the head of the government. Governmental power and authority are exercised and implemented through him. His power
includes the control of executive departments as provided under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution.
Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The Pres. can, by virtue of his power of control, review,
modify, alter or nullify any action or decision of his subordinate in the executive departments, bureau or offices under him.
When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits, enjoining heads of government agencies from granting
incentive benefits without approval from him and directing the refund of the excess over the prescribed amount, the Pres. was just
exercising his power of control over executive departments.
The Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of productivity incentive benefits and to prevent discontent, dissatisfaction and
demoralization among government personnel by committing limited resources of government for the equal payment of incentives
and awards. The Pres. was only exercising his power of control by modifying the acts of the heads of the government agencies who
granted incentive benefits to their employees without appropriate clearance from the Office of the Pres., thereby resulting in the
uneven distribution of government resources.
The President’s duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of executive departments

ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS

It has been correctly said that administrative proceedings are not exempt from the operation of certain basic and fundamental
procedural principles, such as the due process requirements in investigations and trials. And this administrative due process is
recognized to include (a) the right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a
person's legal rights; (b) reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights, introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his
favor, (c) a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent Jurisdiction;
and (4) a finding or decision by that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
records or disclosed to the parties affected.
The "cardinal primary" requirements of due process in administrative proceedings and these are:
(1) the right to a hearing which includes, the right to present one's case and submit evidence in support thereof; (2) the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have something to support itself, (4) the evidence must be substantial, and
substantial evidence means such evidence as a reasonable mind must accept as adequate to support a conclusion; (5) the decision
must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6)
the tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy,
and not simply accept the views of a subordinate; (7) the board or body should in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

ANG TIBAY VS COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth
Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation.
-CmC & RDC- 11
The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements
does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of
due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his
own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights
which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached."
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be "substantial."
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed
to the parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the
law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties
to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered.

DANAN VS ASPILLERA
This Court cannot help expressing its concern for the Commission's ex-parte evocation of certificate without giving the operators
previous notice and opportunity to explain their side. This practice violates the due process clause of the Constitution, the express
provision of section 16 (n) of the Public Service Act, and the doctrines of this Court. The Public Service Commission is an agency of
the comment, and should at all times, maintain a due regard the constitutional rights of parties litigant. Also, the Commissioners
(who are not judges in the true sense) would do well to ponder the implications of Article 32, No. 6, of the New Civil Code on the
individual responsibility of public officers and employees who impair a person’s right against deprivation of property without due
process of law.

AIR MANILA VS BALATBAT

It has been correctly said that administrative proceedings are not exempt from the operation of certain basic and fundamental
procedural principles, such as the due process requirements in investigations and trials. And this administrative due process is
recognized to include (a) the right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a
person's legal rights; (b) reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights, introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his
favor, (c) a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent
Jurisdiction; and (4) a finding or decision by that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the records or disclosed to the parties affected.
For, under the law, the Civil Aeronautics Board is not only empowered to grant certificates of public convenience and necessity; it can
also issue, deny, revise, alter, modify, cancel, suspend or revoke, in whole or in part, any temporary operating permit, upon petition
or complaint of another or even at its own initiative. The exercise of the power, of course, is supposed to be conditioned upon the
paramount consideration of public convenience and necessity, and nothing has been presented in this case to prove that the
disputed action by the Board has been prompted by a cause other than the good of the service.

VILLA VS LAZARO
Administrative proceedings are not exempt from the operation of certain basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the
due process requirements in investigations and trials. And this administrative due process is recognized to include (a) the right to
notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a person's legal right; (b) reasonable
opportunity to appear and defend his rights, introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor, (c) a tribunal so constituted as
to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction; and (d) a finding or decision by
that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the records or disclosed to the
parties affected.
Some of those essential elements did not obtain or were not present in the proceedings complained of, any judgment rendered, or
order issued, therein was null and void, could never become final, and could be attacked in any appropriate proceeding. The Court
finds no merit in the proposition that relief is foreclosed to Villa because her motion for reconsideration was filed out of time. The
very informal character of the so-called administrative proceedings, an informality for which Commissioner Dizon himself was
responsible and which he never sought to rectify, militates against imposing strict observance of the limiting periods applicable to
proceedings otherwise properly initiated and regularly conducted. Indeed, considering the rather "off-the-cuff" manner in which the
inquiry was carried out, it is not even certain that said petitioner is chargeable with tardiness in connection with any incident thereof.

-CmC & RDC- 12

What the record shows is that she invariably responded promptly, at times within a day or two of receiving them, to orders of
communications sent to her. At any rate, the Court will not permit the result of an administrative proceeding riddled with the
serious defects already pointed out to negate an earlier judgment on the merits on the same matter regularly rendered by
competent court.

LUPO VS ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION BOARD

Thus, in the case of Jose Rizal College v. National Labor Relations Commission, this Court reiterated the "cardinal primary"
requirements of due process in administrative proceedings and these are:
(1) the right to a hearing which includes, the right to present one's case and submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) the decision must have something to support itself,
(4) the evidence must be substantial, and substantial evidence means such evidence as a reasonable mind must accept as adequate
to support a conclusion;
(5) the decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected;
(6) the tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) the board or body should in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered. (Emphasis supplied)

NOTICE AND HEARING

WHEN REQUIRED

VIGAN ELECTRIC VS PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

Whether notice and a hearing in proceedings before a public service commission are necessary depends chiefly upon statutory or
constitutional provisions applicable to such proceedings, which make notice and hearing, prerequisite to action by the commission,
and upon the nature and object of such proceedings, that is, whether the proceedings, are, on the one hand, legislative and rule-
making in character, or are, on the other hand, determinative and judicial or quasi-judicial, affecting the rights an property of private
or specific persons. As a general rule, a public utility must be afforded some opportunity to be heard as to the propriety and
reasonableness of rates fixed for its services by a public service commission.

MACABUHAY VS MANUEL
This Court ruled for the petitioner. In including the petitioner's name in the list of officials and employees in the Department of
Education and Culture facing administrative charges, the respondent Secretary acted not only oppressively but also in flagrant
violation of the agreement of the parties in the previous case, to wit:
4. As stated in the respondents' manifestation of July 26, 1974, 'the administrative investigation of petitioners will continue to
be conducted with the formalities and under the rules and procedure provided for by law in administrative hearings and that,
needless to say, both the complainant and respondents in the said investigation will be accorded a f air and impartial
investigation consonant with the requirements of due process.
Obviously, the petitioner's inclusion in the aforesaid list and her consequent summary dismissal from the government service are
unwarranted, and in effect', deprived the petitioner of her right to due process. Hence, petitioner's summary dismissal is null and
void.
Petitioner is in no way to blame for the unreasonably long delay in the investigation of the administrative case against her. Because of
the protracted investigation, she reached the compulsory age of retirement without any decision being reached in the administrative
case against her. Nonetheless, she is entitled to such a decision.

RICAMARA VS SUBIDO
A civil service employee should be heard before he is condemned.
In the absence of investigation and hearing, the patrolmen's right to due process would be violated by their ex parte separation
from the public service.
Since it clearly appears that petitioner-appellee was denied due process and that respondent commissioner did not conduct an
investigation and give petitioner an opportunity to be heard before issuing his peremptory order for the cancellation of his civil
service eligibility for patrolman and the termination of his services, no error was committed by the trial court in ordering petitioner’s
retention in the service.
The offense of anti-littering which the petitioner admittedly committed and which fact he did not conceal, cannot be taken as an
offense involving moral turpitude.
-CmC & RDC- 13
If respondent commissioner's successors share the same strict interpretation, they may raise the question anew by initiating new
proceedings at which petitioner shall be duly heard and given an opportunity to present his side, unlike what was done in this case.

MABUHAY TEXTILE MILLS CORP VS ONGPIN

It is clear from the above provisions that the respondent Board is the body charged with the function of granting export quota
allocations, issuing licenses to operate bonded warehouses and revoking or cancelling the same. Correspondingly, it is also
authorized to conduct hearings to determine whether or not violations have been committed by the grantee .The Board acted
arbitrarily when, after acting solely upon the initial findings of the Bureau of Customs, it issued the questioned order but once the
basis for its action proved non-existent, it refused to lift its erroneous and unfounded order.
However, since the Board has reason to believe that the petitioner might have violated its rules and regulations in connection with
the importation of materials for the petitioner's garment industry then it has the discretion to conduct a proper hearing to
determine the petitioner's culpability or non-culpability. It does not have to rely on the findings of other agencies to discharge this
function.

WHEN NOT REQUIRED

Where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal a charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted
whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing.
When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge
against the passport holder, hearing maybe dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of
such hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution.
This would not violate the due process clause as, in the case at bar, the letter of appellant-commissioner advising de Bisschop to
depart in 5 days is a mere formality, a preliminary step, and, therefore, far from final, because, as alleged in paragraph 7 of
appellant’s answer to the complaint, the “requirement to leave before the start of the deportation proceedings is only an advice to
the party that unless he departs voluntarily, the State will be compelled to take steps for his expulsion”. It is already a settled rule in
this jurisdiction that a day in court is not a matter of right in administrative proceedings.
Losing party appealed to office of the president-court said that by doing this, he subjected the controversy to appellate review, thus is
already sufficient compliance with the requirements of Due Process. Also, during pendency of the OP-Appeal, losing party filed
petition to RTC to annul the appealed judgment. Court said, by filing, he abandoned the appeal to OP.

SUNTAY VS PEOPLE
Counsel for the petitioner insists that his client should have been granted a "quasi-judicial hearing" by the respondent Secretary
before withdrawing or cancelling the passport issued to him. Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the
withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal a
charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his
discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and
cancelling such passport. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer
vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing maybe
dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due
process of law clause of the Constitution.

DE BISSCHOP VS GALANG
The administration of immigration laws is the primary and exclusive responsibility of the Executive branch of the government.
Extension of stay of aliens is purely discretionary on the part of immigration authorities. Since CA 613 (Philippines Immigration Act of
1940) is silent as to the procedure to be followed in these cases, the Courts are inclined to uphold the argument that courts have no
jurisdiction to review the purely administrative practice of immigration authorities of not granting formal hearings in certain cases
as the circumstances may warrant, for reasons of practicability and expediency. This would not violate the due process clause as, in
the case at bar, the letter of appellant-commissioner advising de Bisschop to depart in 5 days is a mere formality, a preliminary step,
and, therefore, far from final, because, as alleged in paragraph 7 of appellant’s answer to the complaint, the “requirement to leave
before the start of the deportation proceedings is only an advice to the party that unless he departs voluntarily, the State will be
compelled to take steps for his expulsion”. It is already a settled rule in this jurisdiction that a day in court is not a matter of right in
administrative proceedings. Further, the immigration laws specifically enumerate when the decisions of the Board of Commissioners
shall be in writing, to wit: (1) in cases of appeal from a decision of the Board of Special Inquiry as to matters of admission or exclusion
of aliens, as provided in Section 27(c) of the Immigration Act; and (2) the decision of the Board of Commissioners in cases of
deportation under Section 37, paragraph (a) and (c). There is nothing in the immigration law which provides that the Board of
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Commissioners must render written decisions on petitions for extension of stay. Section 8 of the Immigration Act merely refers to the
number of “votes” necessary to constitute the decision of said Board.

ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY VS COURT OF APPEALS

In ruling that the Decisions of the Office of the President were vitiated by failure to accord due process of law to MENDOZA,
respondent Appellate Court relied on its observations that MENDOZA was: (1) not made a party to the administrative case; (2) not
served with a copy of the 10 February 1969 Decision; and (3) not notified of proceedings before the 13 May 1969 Decision nor served
a copy thereof.
The foregoing observations do not justify the conclusion arrived at. After the Office of the President had rendered its Decision dated
13 May 1969, MENDOZA filed a letter-protest on 1 August 1969 with the BOL. The latter office directed him to file his protest with
the Office of the President, which he did. On 28 September 1971, MENDOZA's request for reconsideration was denied by said Office.
So that, even assuming that there was absence of notice and opportunity to be present in the administrative proceedings prior to the
rendition of the 10 February 1969 and 13 May 1969 Decisions by the Office of the President, such procedural defect was cured when
MENDOZA elevated his letter protest to the Office of the President, which subjected the controversy to appellate review but
eventually denied reconsideration. Having thus been given a chance to be heard with respect to his protest there is sufficient
compliance with the requirements of due process.
It should also be recalled that MENDOZA filed his petition for certiorari before the then Court of First Instance of Cotabato seeking to
annul the 13 May 1969 Decision. At the time it was presented on 27 January 1970, MENDOZA's request for reconsideration with the
Office of the President, involving the same Decision, was still pending. In fact, it was only on 28 September 1971 that said Office
denied reconsideration. Evidently, MENDOZA had abandoned his pending administrative request for reconsideration in favor of
judicial proceedings. Again, therefore, MENDOZA cannot justifiably claim that he was denied due process.

RULES OF PROCEDURE

GOSECO VS COURT OF INDUSTRUAL RELATIONS

The petitioner's contention completely puts out of consideration the express provision of section 17, of the Commonwealth Act No.
103 —
". . . That at any time during the effectiveness of an award, order or decision, the court may, on application of an interested party,
and after due hearing, alter, modify in whole or in part, or set aside any such award, order or decision, or reopen any question
involved therein." Upon the other hand, section 7 of the same Act empowers the Court of Industrial Relations ". . . to conduct hearing
in any place for the determination of a question, matter or controversy within its jurisdiction, . . . correct, amend or waive any error,
defect or irregularity, whether in substance or in form; extend any prescribed time; give all such directions as it may deem necessary
or expedient in the determination of the dispute before it; . . .." It would seem that the act of the respondent court in entertaining a
motion allegedly filed outside of the statutory period, is consistent with, if not indeed tantamount to, its power thus expressly
granted to "extend any prescribe time."
Commonwealth Act No. 103 has for its major and salutary objective the settlement of disputes between employers and employees,
between landlords and tenants. Justice, equity and substantial merits of their cases are the keynote and controlling considerations of
the law. By its section 20, it goes on to provide that "The Court of Industrial Relations shall adopt its rules of procedure and shall have
such other powers as generally pertain to a court of justice: Provided, however, That in the hearing, investigation and determination
of any question or controversy and in exercising any duties and power under this Act, the court shall act according to justice and
equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner
as it may deem just and equitable."
To rule, therefore, that the decision of the respondent court of December 28, 1937, attained finality ten days after its rendition in the
sense that it became immune from further and subsequent revision or amendment, and that the respondent court, in so amending
what it thought was not reflective of justice and equity, went beyond the bounds of its jurisdiction, is to uproot the very purpose of
the law and to countenance the very mischief which it seeks to avoid, namely, the subjection of the respondent court to the
technicalities of procedure.

FORM OF JUDGMENT

Consti provision - "no decision shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it is based. The obligation to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which the decision is based is
incumbent on a court of record. The Public Service Commission is not a court of record within the meaning of the above constitutional
provision. So it was held by us in Dagdag v. Public Service Commission, with its categorical pronouncement of the Commission not
being "a judicial tribunal," its functions being "limited and administrative in nature."

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Note: refer to 7 cardinal primary requirements of due process. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it(admin bodies).

TACLOBAN ELECTRIC VS MEDINA

With regard to the validity of the promulgation of the February 3, 1965 order, it is pertinent to consider the provisions of Section 3,
paragraph 3 of the Public Service Act as amended by Republic Act 2677:
That any motion for reconsideration of a decision or non-interlocutory order of any commission or division shall be heard
directly by the commission en banc and the concurrence of at least four commissioners shall be necessary for the
promulgation of a final decision or order resolving such motion for reconsideration.
This provision of law clearly provides that four (4) Commissioners should at least concur before a final decision or order
resolving a motion for reconsideration may be promulgated. Obviously, then, the promulgation of the order of February 3,
1965 with a 3 to 3 vote was improper.
It is not correct to argue that there is no such thing as a tie vote in the Commission and that the effect was a denial of the motion
for reconsideration. The last sentence of the first paragraph of section 3 of the Act, as amended, provides for the procedure in
case of inability of the requisite number of Commissioners to render a decision:
In the event of a tie vote among the commissioners, the Secretary of Justice may designate such number of Judges of the
Courts of First Instance or such number of Attorneys of the legal division of the Commission, as may be necessary, to sit
temporarily as Commissioners in the Public Service Commission.
The tie referred to here can only be when the Commission sits en banc and is equally divided. Commissioner Medina should not have
promulgated the order of February 3, 1965, for the Commissioner should have tried to resolve the impasse and if it failed, should
have referred the matter to the Secretary of Justice for action on his part under the law. The denial of the supplemental motion was
merely the consequence of the denial of the motion for reconsideration which, as stated, was improper.

SERRANO VS PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

The above constitutional mandate does not lend support to petitioner's plea. Its wording is clear and definite. The obligation to state
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which the decision is based is incumbent on a court of record. The Public Service
Commission is not a court of record within the meaning of the above constitutional provision. So it was held by us in Dagdag v. Public
Service Commission, with its categorical pronouncement of the Commission not being "a judicial tribunal," its functions being
"limited and administrative in nature."
It does not mean, however, that the non-inclusion of the administrative tribunal within the scope of the above constitutional
provision justifies the summary disposition of petitioner's application in the manner followed by respondent Public Service
Commission. In Ang Tibay v. Court, speaking of the Court of Industrial Relations, which is likewise an administrative tribunal
possessed of quasi-judicial powers like the Public Service Commission, we made clear that while it is "free from the rigidity of
certain procedural requirements," it does not mean "that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard
the fundamental and essential requirement of due process ...."
Seven cardinal primary rights, which, this Court held, must be respected, are enumerated, the last being "that quasi-judicial
tribunals, should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know
the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. “
The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. It does not admit of doubt that when in a decision
under review respondent Public Service Commission did not even bother to refer individually to petitioner and state why his
application is either dismissed or denied, there was a violation of the above cardinal primary right.
The failure to respect such cardinal primary right of petitioner to have his application decided in such a manner as to inform him not
only of the issues involved but the reasons for the decision, which necessarily would likewise require a finding of facts, cannot
receive judicial approval. The error of the Public Service Commission is thus marked and manifest.

GRACILLA VS COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation CA103). It is
more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive
organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and
deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear
from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive.
The respondent court cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trial and
investigations of an administrative character. Cardinal primary rights must be respected; otherwise the dictates of due process are
not complied with. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that

-CmC & RDC- 16

the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance
of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

BOARD TO DELIBERATE COLLECTIVELY NOT INDIVIDUALLY

AROCHA VS VIVO
Individual action by members of a board plainly renders nugatory the purpose of its constitution as a Board. The Legislature
organized the Board of Commissioners precisely in order that they should deliberate collectively and in order that their views and
ideas should be exchanged and examined before reaching a conclusion. This process is of the essence of a board's action, save where
otherwise provided by law, and the salutary effects of the rule would be lost were the members to act individually, without benefit of
discussion.
The powers and duties of boards and commissions may not be exercised by the individual members separately. Their acts
are official only when done by the members convened in session, upon a concurrence of at least a majority and with at least
a quorum present.
Where the action needed is not of the individuals composing a board but of the official body, the members must be
together and act in their official capacity, and the action should appear on the records of the board.
Where a duty is entrusted to a board, composed of different individuals, that board can act officially only as such, in
convened session, with the members, or a quorum thereof, present.

PROMULGATION OF JUDGMENT

NERIA VS COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION

As provided in section 12, "the result of the deliberation of the Board of Special Inquiry shows that at least two members vote for
landing, a note thereof shall be made and the alien shall, without waiting for the decision to be put in writing, be released from
custody", then promulgation can take place even before a decision is actually written and a copy thereof served upon the alien.
Again, if, as provided in section 14, "in every case the alien shall be furnished with a copy of the decision upon promulgation thereof,"
then notice of a decision of the board shall be made only after or upon promulgation, and not before. In both sections 12 and 14,
therefore, promulgation always takes place before copy of the written decision of the board is furnished to an alien.
And in any of these circumstances, the date of promulgation is the date when the Board of Special Inquiry in question voted and
resolved to admit an alien, and this date can be ascertained from the minutes of the proceedings had before such board.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable "where the question in dispute is purely a legal one", or
where the controverted act is "patently illegal" or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction and "nothing of
an administrative nature is to be or can be done" thereon. The case at bar falls under these exceptions.
The matters determined by the Court, namely: (1) the meaning of the term "promulgation" in relation to the Rules and Regulations
of the Bureau of Immigration, and (2) the time the reversing decision of the new Board of Commissioners was actually rendered,
involve questions of law.

LIANGA BAY LOGGING CO VS LOPEZ ENAGE

Bureau of Forestry has jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation, protection, management, reproduction, reforestration,
occupancy and use of all public forests and forest reserves and over the granting of licenses for game and fish and for the taking of
forest products including stone and earth therefrom.
Decisions of Administrative Officers shall not be disturbed by the courts except when the former acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with abuse of discretion.
It is elementary that a draft of a decision does not operate as judgment on a case until the same is duly signed and delivered to
the clerk for filing and promulgation. A decision cannot be considered as binding on the parties until its promulgation.
Beliefs, suspicions and conjectives cannot overcome presumption of regularity and legality of official actions.

EVIDENCE MUST BE SUBSTANTIAL

In reviewing administrative decisions, the reviewing court cannot reexamine the sufficiency of the evidence as if originally instituted
therein, and receive additional evidence that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned. The findings of fact must be
respected, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant.

-CmC & RDC- 17

In administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required as basis for a judgment of the legality
of an employer's dismissal of an employee, nor even preponderance of evidence, substantial evidence being sufficient. The
proceedings being administrative, the quantum of proof is governed by the substantial evidence rule

POLICE COMMISSION VS LOOD

Rep. Act No. 4864 does not provide that the Board of Investigators shall be a "board of record," and as such it does not provide for
office personnel such as clerks and stenographers who may be employed to take note of the proceedings of the board. The
proceeding provided for is merely administrative and summary in character, in line with the principle that "administrative rules of
procedure should be construed liberally in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of their respective claims and defenses." The formalities usually attendant in court hearings need not
be present in an administrative investigation, provided that the parties are heard and given the opportunity to adduce their
respective evidence.
In reviewing administrative decisions, the reviewing court cannot reexamine the sufficiency of the evidence as if originally
instituted therein, and receive additional evidence that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned. The findings of
fact must be respected, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant.

MERALCO VS NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISISON

In administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required as basis for a judgment of the
legality of an employer's dismissal of an employee, nor even preponderance of evidence, substantial evidence being sufficient.
And this Court has ruled that the ground for an employer's dismissal of an employee need be established only by substantial
evidence, it not being required that the former's evidence "be of such degree as is required in criminal cases, i.e., proof beyond
reasonable doubt." It is absolutely of no consequence that the misconduct with which an employee may be charged also constitutes
a criminal offense: theft, embezzlement, assault on another employee or company officer, arson, malicious mischief, etc.
The proceedings being administrative, the quantum of proof is governed by the substantial evidence rule and not, as the
respondent Commission seems to imagine, by the rule governing judgments in criminal actions.

BANCO FILIPINO VS MONETARY BOARD, CENTRAL BANK,

It is a well-recognized principle that administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered with by the courts. In general,
courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the government. This is
generally true with respect to acts involving the exercise of judgment or discretion, and findings of fact. But when there is a grave
abuse of discretion which is equivalent to a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment or where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner, then there is a justification for the courts to set aside the administrative determination reached.
Administrative due process does not mean that the other important principles may be dispensed with, namely: the decision of the
administrative body must have something to support itself and the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a
mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Hence,
where the decision is merely based upon pieces of documentary evidence that are not sufficiently substantial and probative for the
purpose and conclusion they are presented, the standard of fairness mandated in the due process clause is not met.

DECISION-MAKING

ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING CO VS COURT OF APPEALS

In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce the reviewing officer must perforce
be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different viewor there would be no real
review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being
human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case.

DE LEON VS HEIRS OF REYES

While, as previously remarked, the decisions of administration officials are subject to review by their superiors. such review, to be
valid, must not be whimsical or arbitrary or devoid of substantial basis. There is no question that the public respondent, acting on
behalf of the President. can re reverse the decisions of a department head although the former is lower in rank than the Cabinet
member. But that is not the point. The point is that, although the power is conceded, it must be exercised, like all powers, within the
limits of the law, if substantive rights are to be protected and justice is to be upheld.
The writ of certiorari is available in this case. If all administrative decisions were conclusive upon us in any event, there would have
been no reason at all to offer this extraordinary remedy to litigants who otherwise would have been deprived of this only and last
resort to the courts of justice. This remedy applies to administrative decisions up to the highest level and includes the decision at bar
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even if rendered "by authority of the President." Tile sacramental phrase does not remove these decisions from the certiorari
jurisdiction of the Court or inhibit us from reversing them when warranted by a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion.

AQUINO-SARMIENTO VS MORATO
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrate remedies simply provides that before a party litigant is allowed resort to the courts, he is
required to comply with all administrative remedies available under the law. The rationale behind this salutory principle is that for
reasons of practical considerations, comity and convenience, the courts of law will not entertain a case until all the available
administrative remedies provided by law have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given ample opportunity
to act and to correct the errors committed in the administrative level. If the error is rectified, judicial intervention would then be
unnecessary.
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute. The applicability of the principle admits of
certain exceptions, such as:
1) when no administrative review is provided by law;
2) when the only question involved is one of law;
3) where the party invoking the doctrine is guilty of estoppel;
4) where the challenged administrative action is patently illegal, arbitrary and oppressive;
5) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that would greatly prejudice the;
6) where to exhaust administrative review is impractical and unreasonable; and
7) where the rule of qualified political agency applies.

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987, CHAPTER 4, BOOK 7, SECS 19-24

MERIS VS CUESTA
It is true that the Director of Lands had, pursuant to the notice of sale aforementioned, the right to reject any and all bids, but it is no
less true that decisions and other acts of said officer are appealable to 3 and subject to the control of the Secretary of Agriculture, and
that this power of control entails the right to review and, hence, to affirm, modify or reverse the decisions and other determinations
of the Director of Lands, and even to substitute him in the exercise of his judgment and discretion.

MENDEZ VS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with
the provision of law.
A cursory reading of P.D. 807, otherwise known as "The Philippine Civil Service Law" shows that said law does not contemplate a
review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges.
Section 37 paragraph (a) thereof, provides:
The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of
suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or
transfer, removal or dismissal from office. ...
Said provision must be read together with Section 39 paragraph (a) of P.D 805 which contemplates:
Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision.
The phrase "party adversely affected by the decision" refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is
filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or
dismissal from office.
Pursuant to Section 37 paragraph (b) of P.D. 807, the city mayor, as head of the city government, is empowered to enforce judgment
with finality on lesser penalties like suspension from work for one month and forfeiture of salary equivalent to one month against
erring employees.
By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a case where the respondent is found guilty of the
charges filed against him. But when the respondent is exonerated of said charges, as in this case, there is no occasion for appeal.

FABIAN VS DESIERTO
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law
which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court.
In line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals
under the provisions of Rule 43.

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MIRALLES VS GO
"SEC. 91. Application of Civil Service Laws. The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all
personnel of the Department.
That in cases where the decision rendered by a bureau or office is appealable to the Commission, the same may initially
be appealed to the department and finally to the Commission.
Administrative Code of 1987 promulgated by the CSC, Sections 31 and 32, Rule XIV of the said Rules provide as follows:
"SEC. 31. Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Commission shall have the final authority to pass
upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service and upon all matters relating
to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees.
"SEC. 32. The secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentality's, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have
jurisdiction to Investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their
jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final incase the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine
in an amount not exceeding thirty (30) days' salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable
to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department, then to the Merit Systems Protection Board,
and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executors except when the penalty is removal, in
which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned."

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