Willamette Iron & Steel Works v A.H. muzzal
DOUGLAS FISHER AND BETTINA FISHER, and the COURT OF
Facts
Defendant has a liability to ptr for obligations contracted by a
california corporation of which he is a stockholder at the time the said
debt was contracted. Pursuant to sec 322 of the civil code of
california:
SEC. 322. Each stockholder of a corporation is individually and
personally liable for such proportion of all its debts and liabilities
contracted or incurred during the time he was a stockholder as the
amount of stock or shares owned by him bears to the whole of the
subscribed capital stock or shares of the corporation. Any creditor of
the corporation may institute joint or several actions against any of its
stockholders, for the proportion of his claim payable by each, and in
such action the court must (1) ascertain the proportion of the claim or
debt for which each defendant is liable, and (2) a several judgment
must be rendered against each, in conformity therewith. If any
stockholder pays his proportion of any debt due from the corporation,
incurred while he was such stockholder, he is relieved from any further
personal liability for such debt, and if an action has been brought
against him upon such debt, it must be dismissed, as to him, upon his
paying the costs, or such proportion thereof as may be properly
chargeable against him. The liability of each stockholder is determined
by the amount of stock or shares owned by him at the time the debt or
liability was incurred; and such liability is not released by any
subsequent transfer of stock.
Issue
1. Won the foreign law is properly proved
2. Won the california law must be enforced
Ruling
1. Yes. Mr. Arthur W. Bolton, an attorney-at-law of San Francisco,
California, since the year 1918, under oath, quoted verbatim
section 322 of the California Civil Code and stated that said
section was in force at the time the obligations of the defendant
to the plaintiff were incurred, i. e., on November 5, 1928 and
December 22, 1928. This evidence sufficiently established the
fact that the section in question was the law of the State of
California on the above dates. A reading of sections 300 and
301 of our Code of Civil Procedure will convince one that these
sections do not exclude the presentation of other competent
evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law.
2. appellant argues: since the law of California, as to the liability of
stockholders of a corporation, is different from and inconsistent
with the Philippine Corporation Law the courts here should not
impose liability provided in that law upon a resident of these
Islands who is a stockholder of a California corporation.
defendant cannot now escape liability by alleging that the
California law is unjust and different from the inconsistent with
the Philippine Corporation Law.
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs.
TAX APPEALS, respondents.
Facts:
Walter G. Stevenson is married to Beatrice Stevenson, died with a will.
In his will, he instituted his wife as his sole heir to their properties here
in the Ph.
His will was probated in California as well as here in the Ph. The
administrator here in the Ph filed a preliminary estate and inheritance
tax return with a reservation of having the real properties finally
appraised. After receiving the other valuation and deducting the funeral
expenses, the estate tax was paid.
An amended estate and in inheritance tax return was made by the
administrator pursuant to the reservation and for the purpose of
availing sec 91 of the NIRC. The wife of the decedent assigned her
rights to herein resp.
A second amended return was made by the administrator which
contain d new exemption and deduction:
1. deduction in the amount of P4,000.00 from the gross estate of
the decedent as provided for in Section 861 (4) of the U.S.
Federal Internal Revenue Code which the ancillary administrator
averred was allowable by way of the reciprocity granted by
Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code
2. exemption from the imposition of estate and inheritance taxes on
the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode
Mines, Inc. also pursuant to the reciprocity proviso of Section
122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
The estate claimed that it overpaid the govt as a result so it asked for a
refund where the ptr denied. The resp now filed (before the cta) an
action for recovery for the said amount.
CTA:
a) the one-half (½) share of the surviving spouse in the conjugal
partnership property as diminished by the obligations properly
chargeable to such property should be deducted from the net
estate of the deceased Walter G. Stevenson, pursuant to
Section 89-C of the National Internal Revenue Code;
b) the intangible personal property belonging to the estate of said
Stevenson
The is is
foreign law exempt from
a matter inheritance
of fact. Aside fromtax,thepursuant
testimonytoof the
Attorney Bolt
provision of section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code
in relation to the California Inheritance Tax Law but decedent's
estate is not entitled to an exemption of P4,000.00 in the
computation of the estate tax;
c) for purposes of estate
CAB: Theand inheritance
herein taxation
defendant the Baguio
is chargeable with real
notice of the l
estate of the spouses should be valued at P52,200.00, and
210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines,
Inc. should be appraised at P0.38 per share; and
d) the estate shall be entitled to a deduction of P2,000.00 for
funeral expenses and judicial expenses of P8,604.39.
Issue:
1. Whether or not, in determining the taxable net estate of the
decedent, one-half (½) of the net estate should be deducted
therefrom as the share of tile surviving spouse in accordance
with our law on conjugal partnership and in relation to section 89
(c) of the National Internal revenue Code;
2. Whether or not the estate can avail itself of the reciprocity
proviso embodied in Section 122 of the National Internal
Revenue Code granting exemption from the payment of estate
and inheritance taxes on the 210,000 shares of stock in the
Mindanao Mother Lode Mines Inc.;
3. Whether or not the estate is entitled to the deduction of
P4,000.00 allowed by Section 861, U.S. Internal Revenue Code
in relation to section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code;
Ruling:
First issue
Ptr’s contention: The property relations must be based on english law
where there is no legal ptsp bet sps. That the prop pertain exclusively
to the husband. This is also based on art 16 of the new civil code
SC: let it be noted that since the mariage of the Stevensons in the In line with this view, we find no error, therefore, on the part of the Tax
Philippines took place in 1909, the applicable law is Article 1325 of the Court in considering the pertinent California law as proved by
old Civil Code and not Article 124 of the New Civil Code which became respondents' witness.
effective only in 1950. It is true that both articles adhere to the so-
called nationality theory of determining the property relation of spouses
where one of them is a foreigner and they have made no prior
agreement as to the administration disposition, and ownership of their
conjugal properties. In such a case, the national law of the husband
becomes the dominant law in determining the property relation of the
spouses.

There is, however, a difference between the two articles in that Article
124 of the new Civil Code expressly provides that it shall be applicable
regardless of whether the marriage was celebrated in the Philippines
or abroad while Article 1325 of the old Civil Code is limited to
marriages contracted in a foreign land.

It must be noted, however, that what has just been said refers to mixed
marriages between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.

CAB: In the instant case, both spouses are foreigners who married in
the Philippines. But, as correctly observed by the Tax Court, the
pertinent English law that allegedly vests in the decedent husband full
ownership of the properties acquired during the marriage has not been
proven by petitioner. Except for a mere allegation in his answer, which
is not sufficient, the record is bereft of any evidence as to what English
law says on the matter. In the absence of proof, the Court is justified,
therefore, in indulging in what Wharton calls "processual presumption,"
in presuming that the law of England on this matter is the same as our
law.

Nor do we believe petitioner can make use of Article 16 of the New

Civil Code (art. 10, old Civil Code) to bolster his stand. A reading of
Article 10 of the old Civil Code, which incidentally is the one applicable,
shows that it does not encompass or contemplate to govern the
question of property relation between spouses. Said article distinctly
speaks of amount of successional rights and this term, in speaks in our
opinion, properly refers to the extent or amount of property that each
heir is legally entitled to inherit from the estate available for distribution.
It needs to be pointed out that the property relation of spouses, as
distinguished from their successional rights, is governed differently by
the specific and express provisions of Title VI, Chapter I of our new
Civil Code (Title III, Chapter I of the old Civil Code.)
CAB: We, therefore, find that the lower court correctly deducted the
half of the conjugal property in determining the hereditary estate left by
the deceased Stevenson.

Second issue:
Ptr’s contention: walay exemption sa inheritance tax kay The proviso in
the california revenue and taxation has not been proved.

To prove the pertinent California law, Attorney Allison Gibbs, counsel

for herein respondents, testified that as an active member of the
California Bar since 1931, he is familiar with the revenue and taxation
laws of the State of California. When asked by the lower court to state
the pertinent California law as regards exemption of intangible
personal properties, the witness cited article 4, section 13851 (a) and
(b) of the California Internal and Revenue Code as published in
Derring's California Code, a publication of the Bancroft-Whitney
Company inc. And as part of his testimony, a full quotation of the cited
section was offered in evidence as Exhibits "V-2" by the respondents.

It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our

jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of
them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.

Section 41, Rule 123 of our Rules of Court prescribes the manner of
proving foreign laws before our tribunals. However, although we
believe it desirable that these laws be proved in accordance with said
rule, we held in the case of Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal,
61 Phil. 471, that "a reading of sections 300 and 301 of our Code of
Civil Procedure (now section 41, Rule 123) will convince one that these
sections do not exclude the presentation of other competent evidence
to prove the existence of a foreign law." In that case, we considered
the testimony of an attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California who
quoted verbatim a section of California Civil Code and who stated that
the same was in force at the time the obligations were contracted, as
sufficient evidence to establish the existence of said law.
Asia Vest ltd v Ca, antonio heras
Facts:
Ptr filed a complaint against defendant praying that the latter shall pay
the amounts awarded by the HK court (the case before the hk court
was based on the personal guarantee of resp of the obligations of
compania hermanos de navegacion s.a.). During the pre trial
conference, the parties stipulated the following:
1. Defendants admits the existence of the judgment but not the validity
2. Pf is not doing and not licensed to do business in the PH
3. The residence of Antonio heras is in mnl
The resp presented 2 witnesses
1. Dela Vega (secretary of heras) - n writ of summons was served
to heras into his office as well as in his residence
2. Mr lousich- presented as an expert on the laws of hongkong. No
record service of summons as well as the copy of the judgment
was served to resp
RTC: the hk judgment had been duly proved, it is a presumptive
evidence of a right as bet the parties. The party impugning it had the
burden to prove want of jurisn. Heras wasn’t able to overcome the
presumption
CA: reversed the RTC. Foreign judgment has no extraterritorial
application. The foreign tribunal should’ve acquired jurisn over the
person and the subject matter. If not then the judgment is void
The Court of Appeals agreed with HERAS that "notice sent outside the
state to a non-resident is unavailing to give jurisdiction in an action
against him personally for money recovery." Summons should have
been personally served on HERAS in Hong Kong, for, as claimed by
ASIAVEST, HERAS was physically present in Hong Kong for nearly 14
years. Since there was not even an attempt to serve summons on
HERAS in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Supreme Court did not acquire
jurisdiction over HERAS.
Issue: won the hk judgment can be enforced
Ruling: no
Under paragraph (b) of Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a
foreign judgment against a person rendered by a court having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is presumptive evidence of a
right as between the parties and their successors in interest by the
subsequent title. However, the judgment may be repelled by evidence
of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.
Also, Section 3(n) of Rule 131 of the New Rules of Evidence provides
that in the absence of proof to the contrary, a court, or judge acting as
such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, is presumed to have
acted in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction. Hence, once the authenticity
of the foreign judgment is proved, the burden to repel it on grounds
provided for in paragraph (b) of Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court is on the party challenging the foreign judgment — HERAS in
this case.
At the pre-trial conference, HERAS admitted the existence of the Hong
Kong judgment. On the other hand, ASIAVEST presented evidence to
prove rendition, existence, and authentication of the judgment by the
proper officials. The judgment is thus presumed to be valid and binding
in the country from which it comes, until the contrary is shown.
Consequently, the first ground relied upon by ASIAVEST has merit.
The presumption of validity accorded foreign judgment would be
rendered meaningless were the party seeking to enforce it be required
to first establish its validity.
The main argument raised against the Hong Kong judgment is that the
Hong Kong Supreme Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person
of HERAS. This involves the issue of whether summons was properly
and validly served on HERAS.
It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those
relating to the service of process upon the defendant are governed by
the lex fori or the law of the forum, i.e., the law of Hong Kong in this
case. HERAS insisted that according to his witness Mr. Lousich, who
was presented as an expert on Hong Kong laws, there was no valid
service of summons on him.
We note that there was no objection on the part of ASIAVEST on the
qualification of Mr. Lousich as an expert on the Hong Kong law.
Under Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the New Rules of Evidence, the
record of public documents of a sovereign authority, tribunal, official
body, or public officer may be proved by (1) an official publication
thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody
thereof, which must be accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. The
certificate may be issued by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent, or any officer in
the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct
copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be, and
must be under the official seal of the attesting officer. Nevertheless, the
testimony of an expert witness may be allowed to prove a foreign law
(willamette v muzzal), that Section 41, Rule 123 (Section 25, Rule 132
of the Revised Rules of Court) does not exclude the presentation of
other competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law. the
Supreme Court considered the testimony under oath of an attorney-at-
law of San Francisco, California, who quoted verbatim a section of
California Civil Code and who stated that the same was in force at the
time the obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to establish
the existence of said law.
CAB: There is, however, nothing in the testimony of Mr. Lousich that
touched on the specific law of Hong Kong in respect of service of
summons either in actions in rem or in personam, and where the
defendant is either a resident or nonresident of Hong Kong. In view of
the absence of proof of the Hong Kong law on this particular issue, the
presumption of identity or similarity or the so-called processual
presumption shall come into play. It will thus be presumed that the
Hong Kong law on the matter is similar to the Philippine law.
In the case at bar, the action filed in Hong Kong against HERAS was in
personam, since it was based on his personal guarantee of the
obligation of the principal debtor. Before we can apply the foregoing
rules, we must determine first whether HERAS was a resident of Hong
Kong.
We note that the residence of HERAS insofar as the action for the
enforcement of the Hong Kong court judgment is concerned, was
never in issue. He never challenged the service of summons on him
through a security guard in his Quezon City residence and through a
lawyer in his office in that city. In his Motion to Dismiss, he did not
question the jurisdiction of the Philippine court over his person on the
ground of invalid service of summons. What was in issue was his
residence as far as the Hong Kong suit was concerned. We therefore
conclude that the stipulated fact that HERAS "is a resident of New
Manila, Quezon City, Philippines" refers to his residence at the time
jurisdiction over his person was being sought by the Hong Kong court.
With that stipulation of fact, ASIAVEST cannot now claim that HERAS
was a resident of Hong Kong at the time.
Accordingly, since HERAS was not a resident of Hong Kong and the
action against him was, indisputably, one in personam, summons
should have been personally served on him in Hong Kong. The
extraterritorial service in the Philippines was therefore invalid and did
not confer on the Hong Kong court jurisdiction over his person. It
follows that the Hong Kong court judgment cannot be given force and
effect here in the Philippines for having been rendered without
jurisdiction.
HERAS, who was also an absentee, should have been served with
summons in the same manner as a non-resident not found in Hong
Kong. Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court providing for
extraterritorial service will not apply because the suit against him was
in personam. Neither can we apply Section 18, which allows
extraterritorial service on a resident defendant who is temporarily
absent from the country, because even if HERAS be considered as a
resident of Hong Kong, the undisputed fact remains that he left Hong
Kong not only "temporarily" but "for good."
WILDVALLEY SHIPPING CO., LTD. petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT LINES INC., respondents.
Facts:
Resp is the owner of a vessel named Philippine Roxas. When it was
being navigated thru the Orinoco river by Mr Ezzar del Valle
Solarzano, it reached into a shallow portion of the river. The Ph Roxas
ran aground the river so it caused a blockage on the channel which
prevented the vessel of ptr to sail out on that it day therefore causing to
incur losses
For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following
requisites are mandatory:
(1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the
records or by his deputy; and
(2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular
or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal
of his office. The latter requirement is not a mere technicality
but is intended to justify the giving of full faith and credit to
the genuineness of a document in a foreign country.

Ptr filed an action before the RTC of manila against Resp for damages.
RTC: ruled in favor of ptr. Ordering resp to pay damages and cost of
suit
CA: reversed the RTC. Ordering ptr to pay def atty’s fees and cost of
suit
Issue: won venezuelan law is applicable
Ruling: no. the law was not properly proved
It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of
them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
A distinction is to be made as to the manner of proving a written and
an unwritten law. The former falls under Section 24, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, the entire provision of which is quoted
hereunder. Where the foreign law sought to be proved is "unwritten,"
the oral testimony of expert witnesses is admissible, as are printed and
published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the country
concerned if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.
Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:
"Sec. 24. Proof of official record. -- The record of public documents
referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or
by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If
the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer
in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country
in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office."
(Underscoring supplied)
The court has interpreted Section 25 (now Section 24) to include
competent evidence like the testimony of a witness to prove the
existence of a written foreign law.
CAB: It is not enough that the Gaceta Oficial, or a book published by
the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela, was presented as
evidence with Captain Monzon attesting it. It is also required by
Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that a certificate that
Captain Monzon, who attested the documents, is the officer who had
legal custody of those records made by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or by
any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
Venezuela, and authenticated by the seal of his office accompanying
the copy of the public document. No such certificate could be found in
the records of the case.
With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for
the written law itself is the best evidence. According to the weight of
authority, when a foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule
requires that it be proved by a duly authenticated copy of the statute.
At this juncture, we have to point out that the Venezuelan law was not
pleaded before the lower court.
A foreign law is considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the
pleading about the existence of the foreign law, its import and legal
consequence on the event or transaction in issue.
A review of the Complaint revealed that it was never alleged or invoked
despite the fact that the grounding of the M/V Philippine Roxas
occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of Venezuela.
We reiterate that under the rules of private international law, a foreign
law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In the absence of
pleading and proof, the laws of a foreign country, or state, will be
presumed to be the same as our own local or domestic law and this is
known as processual presumption.
Q: unsay relevance kung Venezuelan law ang mag apply?

CAB: We do not dispute the competency of Capt. Oscar Leon Monzon,

the Assistant Harbor Master and Chief of Pilots at Puerto Ordaz,
Venezuela,28 to testify on the existence of the Reglamento General de
la Ley de Pilotaje (pilotage law of Venezuela) and the Reglamento
Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco (rules governing the
navigation of the Orinoco River). Captain Monzon has held the
aforementioned posts for eight years. As such he is in charge of
designating the pilots for maneuvering and navigating the Orinoco
River. He is also in charge of the documents that come into the office
of the harbour masters.

Nevertheless, we take note that these written laws were not proven in
the manner provided by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

CAB: The Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje was published in

the Gaceta Oficial of the Republic of Venezuela. A photocopy of the
Gaceta Oficial was presented in evidence as an official publication of
the Republic of Venezuela. The Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje
No 1 del Orinoco is published in a book issued by the Ministerio de
Comunicaciones of Venezuela. Only a photocopy of the said rules was
likewise presented as evidence.

Both of these documents are considered in Philippine jurisprudence to

be public documents for they are the written official acts, or records of
the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals,
and public officers of Venezuela.
 Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge.
Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001
decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney,
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs.
Australia.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.

2. It is not clear won resp was legally capacitated to marry

Facts:

Resp (a Filipino then) was previously married to Editha Samson a. Proof of Australian law
(Australian) but was subsequently dissolved by a divorce decree (1989).
The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the
When resp became an Australian citizen, he married Ptr Grace Recio national law of the party concerned.
(1994). Their marriage was also unsuccessful. Ptr subsequently filed a The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the
complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage (1998, March) on the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or
ground of bigamy as resp was allegedly still married at the time they defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the
were married. burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint
when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have
1998, July, Resp was able to secure a divorce decree while the declaration the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer
of nullity was pending. In his answer now to the complaint, he prayed when they introduce new matters.
that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.

RTC: dissolved. That the divorce issued in Australia was validly CAB: Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent,
recognized in the Philippines. the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating
it falls squarely upon him.
Issue:
1. WON the divorce between resp and Editha Samson was It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take
proven judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must
2. Won resp was legally capacitated to marry ptr be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not
among those matters that judges are supposed to know by
Ruling: court ordered the REMAND of the case to receive proof as the reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice
legal capacity of Resp to marry must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt
1. The divorce decree was admitted in evidence for failure of the upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
counsel of ptr to object the admissibility of the decree.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off
b. the mere presentation of the divorce decree did not establish
points for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute
divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. A marriage between two the capacity of rep to remarry
Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad,
because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce
involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive
allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule
divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating 39 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof
him or her to remarry." A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce
both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is decree obtained under Australian laws.
consistent with their respective national laws.

Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the

document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best
evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to
be a written act or record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a
foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or

document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either:
(1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document.

If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

CAB: The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson

appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family
court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated. Fortunately
for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was
submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its
admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the
Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was
admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification.
G. R. No. 183622 February 8, 2012 Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent
MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN, Petitioner, vs. LOUELLA marriage, she has the preferential right to be issued the letters of
A. CATALAN-LEE, Respondent. administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of administration may
be issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of
kin of the deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the
Facts:
Revised Rules of Court.

Orlando Catalan, an American Citizen was married to Felicitas Amor but
was severed by a divorce decree. He contracted a 2nd marriage with
herein ptr. Orlando died intestate in the Ph

Ptr filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration. Another
petition for the issuance of LoA was also filed by Resp (child of Orlando
and Felicitas)

Reps alleged that she is not an interested person to file the petition as
there was a pending criminal case for bigamy against her (resp was
allegedly has a prior marriage to one Eusebio Bristol when she married
Orlando). She was acquitted of the charge in which according to reso
belies her claim of having an interest in the estate of Orlando. (kay void
ilang marriage)

RTC: t he marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid
and subsisting when she married Orlando. Without expounding, it
reasoned further that her acquittal in the previous bigamy case was
fatal to her cause. Thus, the trial court held that petitioner was not an
interested party who may file a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration

CA: a marriage certificate, like any other public document, is only
prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The fact that the
petitioner had been charged with bigamy and was acquitted has not
been disputed by the petitioner. The deduction of the trial court that the
acquittal of the petitioner in the said case negates the validity of her
subsequent marriage with Orlando B. Catalan has not been disproved
by her. There was not even an attempt from the petitioner to deny the
findings of the trial court. There is therefore no basis for us to make a
contrary finding. Thus, not being an interested party and a stranger to
the estate of Orlando B. Catalan, the dismissal of her petition for letters
of administration by the trial court is in place.

Issue: WON Ptr is an interested party

Ruling: REMAND the case to receive proof as to the validity of the
divorce

The SC citing Garcia v Recio: Before a foreign judgment is given
presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented
and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the
divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the
judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an
act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or

document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either:
(1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document.

If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial

notice of foreign laws.1âwphi1 Like any other facts, they must be
alleged and proved.

CAB: It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove
the validity of Orlando’s divorce under the laws of the United States
and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is
a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception
of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.
G.R. No. 189998 August 29, 2012
MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT, INC., Petitioner, vs.
ELLEN JOHANNE HARPER, JONATHAN CHRISTOPHER HARPER,
and RIGOBERTO GILLERA, Respondents
Facts:
Resps are is the widow and child of the deceased Christian Fredrik
Harper who was stabbed to death in the Hotel owned by ptr. The heirs
filed an action for damages against ptr. The RTC and the CA ruled in
favor of resp.
custody of the documents, the deviation was not enough reason to
reject the utility of the documents for the purposes they were intended
to serve.
Constantino v Pangandaman: the Court has said that substantial
compliance, by its very nature, is actually inadequate observance of
the requirements of a rule or regulation that are waived under equitable
circumstances in order to facilitate the administration of justice, there
being no damage or injury caused by such flawed compliance. The
focus in every inquiry on whether or not to accept substantial
compliance is always on the presence of equitable conditions to
administer justice effectively and efficiently without damage or injury to
the spirit of the legal obligation.

In the appeal to the SC, the Ptr:
1. Questioned the capacity of the resp to sue as allegedly it
was not proven by competent evidence that reps were the
widow and son of the deceased.
2. The original of the documentary evidence were not
presented in court as it was only a translation that was
presented.
3. That some of the documents presented were not duly
attested by the legal custodians thereof (the marriage cert
by the vicar of the parish and the certificate from the probate
court declaring the resp ad heirs by the judge or clerk of the
probate court) as required by the Rules of Court.
The resp countered that:
1. the marriage cert, the birth cert of the child and the probate
court cert was translated by the Kingdom of Norway thru an
authorized translator and was authenticated by the Royal
Ministry of Foreign affairs and the Consul of the Embassy of
the Rep of the Ph in Sweden
2. the marriage cert as issued by the Vicar is an exception to
the hearsay rule
Issue: WON the resp were able to prove their relationship with the
deceased?
CAB: There are, indeed, such equitable conditions attendant here, the
foremost of which is that respondents had gone to great lengths to
submit the documents.
The principle of substantial compliance recognizes that exigencies and
situations do occasionally demand some flexibility in the rigid
application of the rules of procedure and the laws. That rules of
procedure may be mandatory in form and application does not forbid a
showing of substantial compliance under justifiable circumstances
because substantial compliance does not equate to a disregard of
basic rules. For sure, substantial compliance and strict adherence are
not always incompatible and do not always clash in discord. The power
of the Court to suspend its own rules or to except any particular case
from the operation of the rules whenever the purposes of justice
require the suspension cannot be challenged. In the interest of
substantial justice, even procedural rules of the most mandatory
character in terms of compliance are frequently relaxed. Similarly, the
procedural rules should definitely be liberally construed if strict
adherence to their letter will result in absurdity and in manifest
injustice, or where the merits of a party’s cause are apparent and
outweigh considerations of non-compliance with certain formal
requirements. It is more in accord with justice that a party-litigant is
given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his claim or
defense than for him to lose his life, liberty, honor or property on mere
technicalities. Truly, the rules of procedure are intended to promote
substantial justice, not to defeat it, and should not be applied in a very
rigid and technical sense.

Ruling: Requirements for authentication of documents establishing

respondents’ legal relationship with the victim as his heirs were
complied with.

Public documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record. The attestation must
state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be
under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be
the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.

If the record is not kept in the Philippines, the attested copy must be
accompanied with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If
the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer
in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country
in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

CAB: The documents involved in this case are all kept in Norway.
These documents have been authenticated by the Royal Norwegian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs; they bear the official seal of the Ministry and
signature of one, Tanja Sorlie. The documents are accompanied by an
Authentication by the Consul, Embassy of the Republic of the
Philippines in Stockholm, Sweden to the effect that, Tanja Sorlie is duly
authorized to legalize official documents for the Ministry.
1 1 1
Although Exhibit Q, Exhibit Q-1, Exhibit R and Exhibit R-1 were not
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record or by his
deputy in the manner required in Section 25 of Rule 132, and said
documents did not comply with the requirement under Section 24 of
Rule 132 to the effect that if the record was not kept in the Philippines
a certificate of the person having custody must accompany the copy of
the document that was duly attested stating that such person had