ASME_FM_Vol_III_pi-lxxxiv.

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Companion Guide to the

ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code
Criteria and Commentary on Select Aspects of the
Boiler & Pressure Vessel and Piping Codes
Third Edition

VOLUME 3

EDITOR
K. R. RAO
ASME_FM_Vol_III_pi-lxxxiv.qxd 6/6/09 12:27 PM Page ii

© 2009 by ASME, Three Park Avenue, New York, NY 10016, USA (www.asme.org)

ISBN 978-0-7918-0271-7

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The Library of Congress has cataloged the previous edition as follows:

Companion guide to the ASME boiler & pressure vessel code/editor,

K. R. Rao. — 2nd ed
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index
ISBN 0-7918-0218-3 (v. 1) — ISBN 0-7918-0219-1 (v. 2) — ISBN 0-7918-0220-5 (v. 3)
1. Steam-boilers—Standards. 2. Pressure vessels—Standards. I. Rao, K. R., 1933–

TJ289.R36 2006
621.1 83021873–dc22
2005032521

Cover photos:
Volumes 1 & 2: Cover designer: Paul Moran
Paul Nehrenz, photographer; Courtesy of Entergy Corporation:
Volume 1: Ninemile Point; Volume 2: Waterford Nuclear Plant
Volume 3: Cover designer: Rorshach Design.
Background image: Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station, Courtesy of Tokyo Electric Power Company, Japan. Foreground image: UK
Slugcatcher Vessel Complex, Courtesy of Whessoe Oil and Gas Ltd, Darlington, UK, Top left: Pt. Lepreau plant Provided by NB Power Nuclear,
Canada. Bottom left: Column Pressure Vessel (10 bar), Courtesy of Richard Ducros Corporation, France.
ASME_FM_Vol_III_pi-lxxxiv.qxd 6/6/09 12:27 PM Page iii
DEDICATION TO THE FIRST EDITION
THIS MONUMENTAL EFFORT IS DEDICATED TO THE
ASME PRESSURE VESSELS AND PIPING DIVISION AND
TO TWO SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTORS TO THE DEVEL-
OPMENT OF THE DESIGN-BY-ANALYSIS CON-STRUCTION
RULES IN THE MODERN ASME CODE.
This two-volume compendium dedication is not the first recog-
nition of the achievements of Bernard F. Langer and William E.
Cooper. The Bernard F. Langer Nuclear Codes and Standards
Award, established in 1977, provides a posthumous and lasting
tribute to one of these contributors, an intellectual giant who was
instrumental in providing the leadership and statesmanship that
was essential to the creation of construction rules for nuclear ves-
sels and related equipment. William E. Cooper, the first recipient
of the Bernard F. Langer Nuclear Codes and Standards Award, is
another intellectual giant instrumental in the creation of the mod-
ern ASME Code. In addition, Dr. Cooper acted in a number of
ASME Codes and Standards leadership positions. It was my plea-
sure to join many of my colleagues in April 2001 for the presenta-
tion to Dr. Cooper of the ASME President's Award from the 120th
President of ASME International, William A. Weiblen. That most
prestigious award recognized a lifetime of achievement in ASME
and, in particular, in ASME Code activities.
Bernie Langer and Bill Cooper were essential in both the devel-
opment of the modern ASME Code and in the creation of the
forums for technical information exchange that support the Code
rules. The publication of these two volumes by ASME Interna-
tional is a legacy of that duality. These volumes continue a long
and productive relationship between the development of the mod-
ern ASME Code and the technical exchanges on pressure vessel
and piping technology sponsored by the ASME Pressure Vessels
and Piping Technical Division. This process of technical informa-
tion exchange, through conference paper and panel presentations,
and through refereed paper publication, is an essential step in the
reduction to standard practice, standard practice that is eventually
embodied in the rules of the ASME Code. Information exchange
at technical conferences and in technical publications goes hand
in hand with the deliberations of ASME Code bodies.
This relationship goes back to the pivotal events leading up to
the development of the modern ASME Code — the appointment
of the Special Committee to Review Code Stress Basis in the late
1950s. The principles formulated by that group became the basis
for Section III and Section VIII, Division 2 (design by analysis)
of the Code. These basic principles were published by ASME in
1968 under the title “Criteria of the ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code for Design by Analysis in Sections III and VIII,
Division 2.” At the same time that the work of the Special
Committee to Review Code Stress Basis was nearing fruition,
leaders in the field of pressure vessel design, including Bernie
Langer and Bill Cooper, recognized that an improved forum for
fundamental technical information exchange was needed. The
need eventually led to the formation of an ASME technical divi-
sion, the Pressure Vessel and Piping (PVP) Division, in 1966.
Many of us who became involved in the PVP Division in the
early years were drafted by the leaders in the field to help pre-
pare a compendium of the technical information on pressure ves-
sel and piping technology. The Decade of Progress volumes, as
they were known then, were published by ASME in the early
1970s, covering the most significant contributions to pressure
vessel and piping design and analysis; materials and fabrication;
and operations, applications, and components. The Decade of
Progress volumes should be considered the antecedents of these
two volumes. Both sets of volumes should be considered as inte-
gral parts of the technical literature supporting the Code and the
Criteria document.
The PVP Division has acted with great vigor over the years to
continue to provide the technical forums needed to support
improvements in the modern ASME Code. This year marks the
Division's 35th anniversary. When I first became involved in PVP
Division activities, the second year had just been completed, with
Vito Salerno as the second Chair of the Division Executive Com-
mittee. Dana Young had been the first Chair, during 1966–1967,
and Gunther Eschenbrenner was ready to become the third Chair,
for the 1968–1969 year. Planning was well underway for the first
International Conference on Pressure Vessel Technology
(ICPVT), scheduled for Delft, the Netherlands, in the following
year. The plan was to hold such an international conference every
four years, with the Secretariat rotating between Europe (1969),
the United States (San Antonio, 1973), and Asia (Tokyo, 1977).
Nine of these international conferences have now been held, the
most recent in Sydney, Australia, in April 2000.
At the same time, initial planning for the First U.S. National
Congress on Pressure Vessels and Piping, to be held every four
years in the United States, was also underway. It was my privilege
to be the Technical Program Chair for the Second U.S. National
Congress on PVP in 1975 in San Francisco, and the Conference
Chair for the Third U.S. National Congress on PVP in 1979, also
in San Francisco. In addition, the activity within the PVP Divi-
sion was such that we cosponsored ASME technical conferences
with the Materials Division, the Nuclear Engineering Division,
and the Petroleum Division in alternate years. This has since led
to the annual PVP Conference, the most recent being PVP 2001
in Atlanta, Georgia, in July 2001.
The paper flow from the technical conferences and the network
of contributors for the Decade of Progress volumes eventually led
to the creation of the ASME Transactions Journal of Pressure
Vessel Technology in late 1973, only seven years after formation
of the Pressure Vessel and Piping Technical Division. Dr. Irwin
Berman was its first Senior Technical Editor, with two Technical
Editors representing the PVP Division and the Petroleum Divi-
sion. Once again, I consider it a privilege to have been selected as
ASME_FM_Vol_III_pi-lxxxiv.qxd 6/6/09 12:27 PM Page iv
iv • Dedication
the Technical Editor for the PVP Division, later becoming the
Senior Technical Editor in 1978. The Journal and the technical
conferences have provided robust mechanisms for the needed
technical information exchange.
But ASME Code rules and the associated technical information
exchange is not enough. In one of the very early issues (Novem-
ber 1974) of the Journal of Pressure Vessel Technology, two arti-
cles were published on the duty and responsibility of engineers
and their engineering societies to address public concerns about
the safety and reliability of power plants. One, by Bernie Langer,
was titled “The Role of the Engineering Societies in Obtaining
Public Acceptance of Power Plants.” The other, by Bill Cooper,
was titled “Nuclear — Pressure Vessels and Piping — Materials:
Where to Next.” Both articles clearly identified the additional
commitment that we all share to bring sound information to the
attention of the general public and to policymakers in federal,
state, and local jurisdictions. In the almost three decades since the
publication of those two articles, this commitment has been
extended, as the reach of ASME International, the ASME Boiler
and Pressure Vessel Code, and the PVP Division covers the entire
world. We owe a debt of gratitude to these two giants, and these
two volumes represent a “down payment” on that debt.
Robert E. Nickell, Ph.D. William E. Cooper, Ph.D, P.E.
1999–2000 President
ASME International
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS TO THE FIRST
EDITION
The editor is indebted to several individuals and organiza-
tions in the preparation of this two-volume book. Some of them
are identified for their assistance in completion of this effort.
My thanks are to all of the thirty-nine contributors whose dedi-
cated efforts made this possible by their singular attention to
detail, even while they succinctly conveyed the voluminous
information.
I wish to thank Dr. Jack Ware, Pressure Vessels and Piping
Division who suggested this effort. My thanks are in particular to
Martin D. Bernstein who had from the start of this project been
my inspiration to rally around during several ups and downs. I
also thank Dr. Robert E. Nickell for his encouragement to see the
end of the tunnel.
This effort would not have been possible but for the encourage-
ment and support provided by my employer, Entergy Operations
Inc., and in particular by Frederick W. Titus, William R.
Campbell, John R. Hamilton, Willis F. Mashburn, Raymond
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS TO THE SECOND
EDITION
This second edition following the success of the first edition
has an enlarged scope including the addition of a third volume.
This warranted the addition of several contributors who are all
experts in their respective specialties. The editor appreciates their
contributions, as well as the continued support of the contributors
from the first edition.
S. Lewis, Jaishanker S. Brihmadesam, Brian C. Gray, and Paul
H. Nehrenz.
My special thanks to Professor Dr. Robert T. Norman,
University of Pittsburgh, for the untiring pains he had taken in
training me to undertake efforts such as these — from their very
initiation to their logical conclusion.
This unique two-volume publication, which Dr. Frederick
Moody aptly called a “monumental effort,” would have never
taken off had it not been for the vision and sustained support pro-
vided by the staff of ASME Technical Publishing. My thanks to
them for their support.
Finally, all of this saga-type effort, spread over three years, would
have never been possible had it not been for the constant encourage-
ment and untiring support provided by my wife, Dr. Indira Rao, that
included all of the sundry chores associated with this project. In
addition, I wish to thank other members of my family, Uma and
Sunder Sashti, and Dr. Ishu V. Rao, for their zealous support.
Editor intends to once again thank Entergy Operations for their
continued support. Thanks are especially due to Dr. Indira Rao
whose support in several capacities made this voluminous effort
possible. My thanks are to the staff of ASME publishing for their
continued zeal and support.
ASME_FM_Vol_III_pi-lxxxiv.qxd 6/6/09 12:27 PM Page vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS TO THE THIRD
EDITION
This third edition follows the unprecedented success of the pre-
vious two editions.
As mentioned in the first edition, this effort was initiated with
the ‘end user’ in mind. Several individuals and a few organiza-
tions had provided support ever since this effort started.
In the second edition the success of the first edition was
enlarged in scope with the addition of a third volume, with
experts in their respective specialties to contribute chapters they
authored.
In response to the changing priorities of Boiler and Pressure
Vessel (B&PV) industry and global use of ASME B&PV Codes
and Standards the scope and extent of this edition has increased.
The result of the current effort is in a 2,550 page book spread in
three volumes.
The editor pays homage to the authors Yasuhide Asada, Martin
D. Bernstein, Toshiki Karasawa, Douglas B. Nickerson and
Robert F. Sammataro who passed away and whose expertise
enriched the chapters they authored in the previous editions.
This comprehensive Companion Guide with multiple editions
spanning over several years has several authors contributing to this
effort. The editor thanks authors who had contributed to the previ-
ous editions but did not participate in the current edition and they
are Tom Ahl, Domenic A. Canonico, Arthur E. Deardorff, Guy H.
Deboo, Jeffrey A. Gorman, Harold C. Graber, John Hechmer,
Stephen Hunt, Yoshinori Kajimura, Pao-Tsin Kuo, M. A. Malek,
Robert J. Masterson, Urey R. Miller, Kamran Mokhtarian, Dennis
Rahoi, Frederick A. Simonen, John D. Stevenson, Stephen V.
Voorhees, John I. Woodworth and Lloyd W. Yoder.
The editor appreciates the effort of the continuing contributors
from the previous editions, who had a remarkable influence on
shaping this mammoth effort, few of them from the very begin-
ning to this stage. The editor gratefully acknowledges the follow-
ing authors Kenneth Balkey, Warren Bamford, Uma
Bandyopadhyay, Jon E. Batey, Charles Becht IV (Chuck), Sidney
A. Bernsen, Alain Bonnefoy, Marcus N. Bressler, Marvin L.
Carpenter, Edmund W. K. Chang, Kenneth C. Chang, Peter
Conlisk, Joel G. Feldstein, Richard E. Gimple, Jean-Marie
Grandemange, Timothy J. Greisbach, Ronald S. Hafner, Geoffrey
M. Halley, Peter J. Hanmore, Owen F. Hedden, Greg L.
Hollinger, Robert I. Jetter, Guido G. Karcher, William J. Koves,
John T. Land, Donald F. Landers, Hardayal S. Mehta, Richard A.
Moen, Frederick J. Moody, Alan Murray, David N. Nash, W. J.
O’Donnell, David E. Olson, Frances Osweiller, Thomas P. Pastor,
Gerard Perraudin, Bernard Pitrou, Mahendra D. Rana, Douglas K.
Rodgers, Sampath Ranganath, Roger F. Reedy, Wolf Reinhardt,
Peter C. Riccardella, Everett C. Rodabaugh, Robert J. Sims Jr.,
James E. Staffiera, Stanley Staniszewski, Richard W. Swayne
(Rick), Anibal L.Taboas, Elmar Upitis and Nicholas C. Van Den
Brekel.
Similarly the editor thanks the contribution of authors who
joined this effort in this third edition. Sincerity and dedication of
the authors who joined in this effort is evident from two instances
— in one case, a contributor hastened to complete his manuscript
before going for his appointment for heart surgery! In another
case, when I missed repeatedly a correction made by a contribu-
tor, he never failed to draw my attention to the corrections that I
missed!
Thus, the editor wishes to appreciate efforts of authors who joined
in this edition and worked zealously to contribute their best for the
completion of this ‘saga’. The authors are Joseph F. Artuso, Hansraj
G.Ashar, Peter Pal Babics, Paul Brinkhurst, Neil Broom, Robert G.
Brown, Milan Brumovsky, Anne Chaudouet, Shin Chang, Yi-Bin
Chen, Ting Chow, Howard H. Chung, Russell C. Cipolla, Carlos
Cueto-Felgueroso, K. B. Dixit, Malcolm Europa, John Fletcher, Luc
H. Geraets, Stephen Gosselin (Steve), Donald S. Griffin, Kunio
Hasegawa, Philip A. Henry, Ralph S. Hill III, Kaihwa Robert Hsu,
D. P. Jones, Toshio Isomura, Jong Chull Jo, Masahiko Kaneda,
Dieter Kreckel, Victor V. Kostarev, H. S. Kushwaha, Donald Wayne
Lewis, John R. Mac Kay, Rafael G. Mora, Dana Keith Morton,
Edwin A. Nordstrom, Dave A. Osage, Daniel Pappone, Marty
Parece, Michael A. Porter, Clay D. Rodery, Wesley C. Rowley,
Barry Scott, Kaisa Simola, K. P. Singh (Kris), Alexander V
Sudakov, Peter Trampus, K. K. Vaze, Reino Virolainen, Raymond
(Ray) A. West, Glenn A. White, Tony Williams.
The editor thanks Steve Brown of Entergy Operations for his
help in the search for expert contributors for this edition.
This edition was initiated by me in August 2006 and has taken
over 3000 hours of computer connection time. My thanks are
especially to my wife, Dr. Indira Rao whose sustained support for
this effort and participation in several chores related to editing. In
addition, I appreciate her tolerating my working on it during a
4-month overseas vacation.
The editor thanks the staff of ASME Technical Publications for
their unstinted zeal and support in aiming at this publication’s
target of ‘zero tolerance’ for ‘errors and omissions’.
Finally, the editor thanks all of you, readers and users of
this ‘Companion Guide’ and hopes it serves the purpose of this
publication.
ASME_FM_Vol_III_pi-lxxxiv.qxd 6/6/09 12:27 PM Page vii
CONTRIBUTOR BIOGRAPHIES
AHL, THOMAS J.
Thomas J. Ahl earned a B.S.C.E. in 1960
and M.S.C.E. in 1961 from University of
Wisconsin. He is a Registered Structural and
Professional Engineer in Illinois. He held
the position of Principal Engineer in Nuclear
& Pressure Vessel Design Department,
Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., Plainfield, IL,
(1961–1998), and was engaged in design
and analysis of nuclear related vessels and
structural components. Ahl was a Member of ANSI Working Group
ANS-56.8 that prepared the ANSI/ANS-56.8-1981—Containment
System Leakage Testing Requirements standard.
Ahl is a Member of ASCE, Member of ASCE Hydropower Deve-
lopment Committee, and Conventional Hydropower Subcommittee.
He served as Co-Chair of the Task Committee preparing the publi-
cation “Manual of Practice for Steel Penstocks ASCE Manual No.
79,” Vice-Chair-ASCE Committee preparing the “Guidelines for
Evaluating Aging Penstocks,” and member of ASCE Hydropower
Committee preparing “Civil Engineering Guidelines for Planning
and Design of Hydroelectric Developments.”
Two of these publications received the ASCE Rickey Award
Medal in 1990 and 1994. Thomas Ahl is a member of the Peer
Review Group to Sandia National Laboratories and the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Structural Engineering Branch for the Safety
Margins for Containment’s Research Program, 1980–2001.
ARTUSO, JOSEPH F.
Joseph F. Artuso is the CEO of Construc-
tion Engineering Consultants, Inc. He has
over 40 years experience in developing and
managing quality control inspection and
testing programs for construction materi-
als. He is also actively involved in the
Code and Standards writing bodies of ACI
and ASME. Mr. Artuso earned a B.S. in
Civil Engineering at Carnegie Institute of
Technology in 1948 and became a Level III Inspection Engineer
at the National Council of Engineering Examiners in 1975. He is
a registered Professional Engineer in the states of Pennsylvania,
Ohio, New York, Florida, Maryland and West Virginia, as well
as being registered as Quality Control Engineer in state of
California. His memberships in national committees include
A.S.C.E. (Task committee on Inspection Agencies), A.C.I
(Committees 214, 304 and 311), A.N.S.I (N-45-3.5 Structural
Concrete and Steel), A.S.M.E. (Committee 359 (ASME Sec. III,
Div. 2) Construction Materials and Exam.), ACI-ASME
(Committee on Concrete Pressure Components for Nuclear
Service), ASTM, and NRMCA. He was a contributing editor of
McGraw-Hill “Concrete Construction Handbook”. Mr. Artuso
was the Director of Site Quality Control for the Duquesne Light
Company, Beaver Valley, Unit 2. He also supervised construc-
tion quality control activities on many nuclear power plants dur-
ing the period of high construction activity from the 1970’s to
1980’s.
ASADA, YASUHIDE
Late Dr. Yasuhide Asada was Professor
Emeritus of The The University of Tokyo.
He has been an internationally renowned
scientist in the area of Elevated Temperature
Design technology as well as plasticity,
creep and creep and fatigue. He was an
author of over 150 scientific/technical pub-
lications with respect to the technical area
of his specialty. His contributions have
been awarded by JSME, ASME, ASTM and other engineering
organizations.
After six years of field experience at Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries Ltd., he was invited to be a faculty member of School
of Engineering, The University of Tokyo in 1969. He has been a
Professor of Applied Mechanics in the Mechanical Engineering
Department since 1980 and retired from the university in 1999
due to the university retirement age of 60.
He was a leader of structural integrity administration at METI
on Japanese Nuclear Power plants and components and a leader
of Japanese Codes and Standards activity for nuclear and non-
nuclear facilities and Japanese representative for ISO/TC11
Boilers and Pressure Vessels where he proposed a new concept of
IPEC for international standards.
He has been contributing in international codes and standards
activity and was a member of SC. III of ASME B&PV Code
Committee, Board on Nuclear Codes and standards of ASME and
was a member of ASME Council on Codes and Standards as well
as to the Board on Codes and Standards Technology Institute. He
has contributed to JSME Power generation Code Committee was
a member since 1998 and was chair for first four years.
In scientific activity, he chaired International Council on
Pressure Vessel Technology (ICPVT) for 1996 to 2000 and chaired
Asian and Oceanic regional Committee (AORC) of ICPVT since
1996. He was a Japanese representative member of International
Creep Conference and chaired 7th International creep Conference
2000. Dr. Asada was the recipient of Bernard F. Langer Award and
the ASME Dedication Service Award. Professor Emeritus
Yasuhide Asada passed away on Nov. 23rd, 2005.
ASME_FM_Vol_III_pi-lxxxiv.qxd 6/6/09 12:27 PM Page viii
viii • Contributor Biographies
ASHAR, HANSRAJ, G.
Mr. Ashar has a Master of Science degree
in Civil Engineering from the University of
Michigan. He has been working with the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the
last 35 years as a Sr. Structural Engineer.
Prior to that Mr. Ashar has worked with a
number of consultants in the U.S. and
Germany designing Bridges and Buildings.
Mr. Ashar has authored 30 papers related
to structures in nuclear power plants.
Mr. Ashar’s participation in National and International
Standards Organization includes Membership of the NSO and
INSO Committees such as American Institute of Steel
Construction (AISC), Chairman of Nuclear Specification
Committe (January 1996 to March 2008), (AISC/ANSI N690);
Member of Building Specification Committee, and Corresponding
of Seismic Provisions Committee.
Mr. Ashar’s professional activities with The American
Concrete Institute (ACI) 349 Committees include Member of the
Main committee, Subcommittee 1 on General Requirements,
Materials and QA, and Subcommittee 2 on Design. His profes-
sional activities also include American Society of Mechanical
Engineers (ASME), Corresponding Member, Working Group on
lnservice Inspection of Concrete and Steel Containments
(Subsections IWE and IWL of ASME Section XI Code),
Member, ASME/ACI Joint Committee on Design, Construction,
Testing and Inspection of Concrete Containments and Pressure
Vessels; Member, RILEM Task Committee 160-MLN:
Methodology for Life Prediction of Concrete Structures in
Nuclear Power Plants; Member, Federation Internationale du
Beton (FIB) Task Group 1.3: Containment Structures, and
Consultant to IAEA on Concrete Containment Database (2001 to
2005).
Mr Ashar is a Professional Engineer in the State of Ohio and
State of Maryland; Fellow, American Concrete Institute; Fellow,
American Society of Civil Engineers; Professional Meer –
Posttensioning Institute. Mr. Ashar is a Peer Reviewer of the Papers
to be published in ASCE Material Journal, Nuclear Engineering and
Design (NED) Periodicals and ACI Material Journal.
BABICS, PETER PAL
Peter Pal Babics graduated as Mechanical
Engineer from Bánki Donát Polytechnic
Institute (BDPI) of Budapest, Hungary in
1975 and obtained an MSc equivalent
degree in 1980 as ME at the Technical
University of Miskolc. He post graduated
as Welding Engineer at the Technical
University of Budapest, and European
Welding Engineer (EWE) at the Austrian
Institute of Material Science and Welding Technology (SZA),
Wien. After graduating he worked as pressure vessel designer and
technologist of welding material production (1975–80). From
1980 he directed pressure vessel and pipelines construction in the
oil refinery and gas industry. Since 1990 he has been working as
member of the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority (HAEA). His
main activity is licensing ISI programs, welding procedures,
repairs and replacements of safety related equipment of NPP of
the Nuclear Safety Directorate (NSD). In 1997 he took part in a
six-month training at the US NRC to study the ASME B&PV
CODE Section XI regulatory application and practice. Since 2003
he has been responsible for the ISI System Qualification of the
NSD. Since March 2007 he works as leader of Section of
Component Supervision in Licensing Department of NSD.
Since 1996 he has been member of the Hungarian Association
of Welding and Non-destructive Testing Organisation and his duty
is the education, training and examination of metal welders. He
has taken part and given presentations in more than 30 confer-
ences and workshop. He is the author of several Hungarian
Regulatory Guides.
BALKEY, KENNETH R.
Kenneth R. Balkey is currently a Con-
sulting Engineer in Nuclear Services, with
Westinghouse Electric Company in
Pittsburgh, PA with over 36 years of ser-
vice in the nuclear power industry. Mr.
Balkey provides consultation and advises
technology developments related to Codes
and Standards and critical asset protection
initiatives. He performed and directed reli-
ability and risk evaluations for nuclear and non-nuclear structures,
systems and components over his lengthy career. He has produced
more than 100 publications and documents relating to risk evalua-
tions of the integrity of piping, vessels and structures, and the per-
formance of components using state-of-the-art probabilistic
assessment techniques.
Mr. Balkey is vice chair, ASME Codes and Standards Board of
Directors (June 2008 – June 2011), a member of the ASME
Board on Nuclear Codes and Standards, past vice president,
Nuclear Codes and Standards (June 2005 – June 2008), and past
chair, ASME Board on Nuclear Codes and Standards (June 2005 –
June 2008). Mr. Balkey also served as a senior technical advisor
to the ASME Innovative Technologies Institute LLC, providing
consultation on the development of guidance for Risk Analysis
and Management for Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAPTM) and
working with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. His
honors include ASME’s Dedicated Service Award (1991), the
Bernard F. Langer Nuclear Codes and Standards Award (2002),
the Melvin R. Green Codes and Standards Medal (2008), and sev-
eral other awards from ASME, Westinghouse, and other institu-
tions. Mr. Balkey earned B.S. and M.S. degrees in Mechanical
Engineering at the University of Pittsburgh. Mr. Kenneth R.
Balkey is a Registered Professional Engineer.
BAMFORD, WARREN
Warren Bamford has been a member of
Section XI since 1974, and now serves as
Chairman of the Subgroup on Evaluation
Standards, whose charter is to develop and
maintain flaw evaluation procedures and
acceptance criteria. He is a member of the
Executive Committee of Section XI, and
was also a charter member of the ASME
Post Construction Committee, whose goal
is to develop inspection, evaluation and repair criteria for non-
nuclear plants. He has taught a course on the Background and
Technical Basis of the ASME Code, Section III and Section XI.
ASME_FM_Vol_III_pi-lxxxiv.qxd 6/6/09 12:27 PM Page ix
COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • ix
Warren has been educated at Virginia Tech, Carnegie Mellon
University, and the University of Pittsburgh.
Warren’s research interests include environmental fatigue crack
growth and stress corrosion cracking of pressure boundary materi-
als, and he has been the lead investigator for two major programs
in this area. He was a charter member of the International
Cooperative Group for Environmentally Assisted Cracking, which
has been functioning since 1977.
Warren Bamford has been employed by Westinghouse Electric
since 1972, and now serves as a consulting Engineer. He special-
izes in applications of fracture mechanics to operating power
plants, with special interest in probabilistic applications. Over 80
technical papers have been published in journals and conference
proceedings.
BANDYOPADHYAY, UMA S.
Bandyopadhyay received his BSME from
Jadavpur University (1970), Calcutta,
India, MSME from the Polytechnic
Institute of Brooklyn (1974). He is a regis-
tered Professional Engineer in the states of
New York, New Jersey, Connecticut,
Massachusetts, Virginia, Wyoming and
District of Columbia. He has 28 years of
extensive experience in design, engineer-
ing and manufacturing of pipe supports and pipe support products
for Water Treatment and Waste Water Treatment Facilities, Oil
Refineries, Co-generation, Fossil and Nuclear Power Plants.
Bandyopadhyay is currently employed by Carpenter and Paterson,
Inc. as Chief Engineer and works as a consultant and Registered
Professional Engineer for affiliate Bergen-Power Pipe Supports,
Inc. Prior to his current employment, he held the positions of
Design Engineer (1977–1980), Project Engineer (1980–1986) and
Chief Engineer (1986–1992) with Bergen-Paterson Pipesupport
Corp. Bandyopadhyay is a member, Working Group on Supports
(Subsection NF), since 1993; was an alternate member,
Subsection NF (1986–1993). He is also an alternate member,
Manufacturer’s Standardization Society (MSS), Committee 403-
Pipe hangers (MSS-SP-58, 69, 89, 90 and 127) since 1992.
BATEY, JON E.
Jon Batey has been a member of ASME
Subcommittee V since 1995 and has
served as Chairman since 2002. Jon has
served on various sub-tier committees of
Subcommittee V since 1990 and currently
is a member of the Subgroup on
Volumetric Examination Methods, the
Subgroup on General Requirements,
Personnel Qualifications and Interpreta-
tions, the Working Group on Radiography, and the Working
Group on Acoustic Emission. He is also a member of the ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Standards Committee plus its Honors
and Awards Committee, and the ASME Post Construction
Standards Committee and its Subcommittee on Inspection
Planning. Jon was also a member of the ASME B-16 Standards
Committee from 1979 to 1993.
Jon is the Global Inspection Leader for The Dow Chemical
Company in Freeport, TX. In his current role, Jon is responsible
for inspection performed by Dow or third-party inspectors at sup-
plier fabrication shops. He received a B.S. in Physics from Texas
State University. His certifications include ASNT Level III
Certificates in Radiography, Ultrasound, Liquid Penetrant,
Magnetic Particle, Visual and Leak Test Methods.
BECHT 1V, CHARLES
Dr. Becht is a recognized authority in pres-
sure vessels, piping, expansion joints, and
elevated temperature design. He is President
of Becht Engineering Co. Inc, a consulting
engineering company providing services to
the process and power industries
(www.becht.com, www.bechtns.com for the
nuclear services division, and www.tech-
training.info for technical training);
President of Becht Engineering Canada Ltd.; President of Helidex,
LLC (www.helidex.com); and Director of Sonomatic Ltd. (also dba
Becht Sonomatic, www.vsonomatic.com) a NDE company that
provides advanced ultrasonic imaging. Chuck was previously with
Energy Systems Group, Rockwell International and Exxon
Research and Engineering where he was a pressure equipment spe-
cialist. He received a PhD from Memorial University in Mechanical
Engineering (dissertation: Behavior of Bellows), a MS from
Stanford University in Structural Engineering and BSCE from
Union College, New York. Chuck is a licensed professional engi-
neer in 16 states and provinces, an ASME Fellow since 1996, recip-
ient of the ASME Dedicated Service Award in 2001, and has more
than 60 publications including the book, Process Piping: The
Complete Guide to ASME B31.3, and five patents.
Dr. Becht is Chair of the ASME B31.3, Process Piping
Committee; Chair (founding) of the Post Construction
Subcommittee on Repair and Testing (PCC), and member of other
ASME Committees including the Post Construction Standards
Committee (past Chair); Post Construction Executive Committee
(past Chair); B&PV Code Subcommittee on Transport Tanks;
B&PV Code Subgroup on Elevated Temperature Design (past
Chair); B31 Code for Pressure Piping Standards Committee; B31
Mechanical Design Committee; B31 Executive Committee; and is
a past member of the Board on Pressure Technology Codes and
Standards; the B&PV Code Subcommittee on Design; and the
B&PV Code TG on Class 1 Expansion Joints for liquid metal ser-
vice. He is a member of ASTM Committee F-17, Plastic Piping
Systems Main Committee; and the ASME PVP Division, Design
and Analysis Committee.
BERNSEN, SIDNEY A.
Dr. Bernsen, earned his B.S.M.E in 1950,
M.S.M.E in 1951, and Ph.D. in 1953, from
Purdue University. He has been involved in
nuclear power activities for over 50 years,
initially at Argonne National Laboratory and
subsequently with Bechtel Corporation. At
Bechtel he held a variety of positions includ-
ing Chief Nuclear Engineer and Manager
of Quality Assurance for Bechtel Power
Corporation. Since retirement from Bechtel, after more than
30 years, he has provided consulting services and has remained
active in ASME Nuclear Codes and Standards. Dr. Bernsen
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x • Contributor Biographies
served as the initial Chair of the ASME Committee on Nuclear
Quality Assurance (NQA) and is now an honorary member of
the NQA committee.
Dr. Bernsen, was a founding member of the ASME Board on
Nuclear Codes and Standards (BNCS) and has continuously
served on BNCS since its inception. He was the initial Chair of
the ASME Committee on Nuclear Risk Management and com-
pleted his second term in 2004. During his tenure, the committee
completed and published the first issue of this Standard in April
2002 and the first addendum was published in December 2003.
Through his long career, including extensive involvement in
licensing and safety, as well as his work in coordinating the devel-
opment and approval of the Nuclear Risk Management Standard,
he has obtained valuable insight into nuclear risk related activities
and how they are being and may be applied in the future to
ASME Codes and Standards. Dr. Bernsen, an ASME Fellow, has
been involved in Codes and Standards for over 35 years.
BERNSTEIN, MARTIN D.
Mr. Bernstein was involved in the design
and analysis of steam power equipment
since joining Foster Wheeler Energy
Corporation in 1960. Retired in 1996, he
continued to serve as a consultant to Foster
Wheeler and as their representative on the
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Committee, on which he had served for
more than 25 years. He was Vice Chair,
Subcommittee on Power Boilers, Chair, Subcommittee on Safety
Valve Requirements, a member of the Main Committee
(Standards Committee) and past Chair of Subgroup General
Requirements and the Subgroup Design of the Subcommittee on
Power Boilers. Since 1986 he and Lloyd Yoder taught a two-day
course on Power Boilers for the ASME Professional Development
Department. In 1998, ASME Press published Power Boilers—A
Guide to Section I of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code
that Bernstein and Yoder developed from their course notes.
Mr. Bernstein was active for many years in ASME’s PVP
Division. He was also author and editor of numerous ASME pub-
lications, including journal articles on ASME design criteria,
ASME rules for safety valves, flow-induced vibration in safety
valve nozzles, and tubesheet design. Mr. Bernstein obtained a
B.S. and M.S. in civil engineering from the Columbia School of
Engineering and Applied Science. He was elected an ASME
Fellow in 1992, received the ASME Dedicated Service Award in
1994, and was awarded the ASME J. Hall Taylor Medal in 1998.
He was a Registered Professional Engineer in New York State.
Mr. Bernstein passed away in 2002.
BONNEFOY, ALAIN
Alain Bonnefoy graduated from the INSA
in Lyon-France. He began his career at
CETIM (French Technical Center of
Mechanical Industries) in R & D in the
field of Pressure Vessel, Piping and
Boilers. In 1976 he held the position of
Department manager for the design and
analysis of structure and components.
Mr. Bonnefoy has published more than
20 papers in structural design particularly seismic analysis,
mounded vessels and buried piping areas. Since 2001 he is the
Technical Manager of the SNCT (French Pressure Equipment
Manufacturer’s Association) that publishes the French Codes of
Construction such as CODAP (Vessels), CODETI (Piping),
COVAP (Boilers). Alain Bonnefoy is also in charge of the French
version of the ASME Section VIII Division 1, currently under
preparation.
Mr. Bonnefoy is a Member of the different working groups
preparing these codes and is also active in European standardiza-
tion in the field of piping.
BRESSLER, MARCUS N.
Mr. Bressler is President of M. N.
BRESSLER, PE, INC., an engineering
consulting firm founded in 1977, specializ-
ing in codes and standards, quality assur-
ance, design, fabrication, inspection and
failure analysis for the piping, power,
petroleum and chemical industries. He has
over 54 years of experience. He joined
TVA in 1971 as Principal Engineer and
was promoted in 1979 to Senior Engineering Specialist, Codes
Standards and Materials. He took early retirement in 1988 to open
up a private consulting practice. His previous experience was with
the US Army (1952) where he served as an Industrial Hygiene
Engineer; the Babcock & Wilcox Company(1955), where he held
the positions of Engineering Draftsman, Stress Analyst, and
Boiler Division Materials Engineer; Gulf & Western Lenape
Forge Division (1966) where he became Senior Design Engineer,
and Taylor Forge Division (1970) as Product Development
Manager. At Lenape Forge he developed a design for a quick-
opening manway for pressure vessels and piping that was granted
a patent in 1971.
Mr. Bressler began his activities in Codes, Standards and
Materials in 1960. He has been a member of the ASME B&PV
Standards Committee since 1979 to 2009, and is now a member
of the Technical Oversight Management Commitee. He is a
member and past Vice Chair of the Committee on Nuclear
Certification. He is a member of the Standards Committees on
Materials and on Nuclear Power, the subgroup on Design
(SCIII), the special working group on Editing and Review
(SC III), the Boards on Nuclear Codes and Standards and on
Conformity Assessment. He is the Chair of the Honors
and Awards Committee (BNCS). Mr. Bressler is a member of
the ASTM Committees A-01 and B-02 and many of their
subcommittees.
Mr. Bressler holds a BME degree from Cornell University
(1952) and an MSME degree from Case Institute of Technology
(1960). In 1989 he received a Certificate of Achievement from
Cornell University for having pursued a course that, under today’s
requirements, would have resulted in a Master of Engineering
degree. He was awarded the ASME Century Medallion (1980),
and became a Fellow of ASME in 1983. He is now a Life Fellow.
He received the 1992 ASME Bernard F. Langer Nuclear Codes
and Standards Award. and is the 1996 recipient of the ASME J.
Hall Taylor Medal. He received the 2001 ASME Dedicated
Service Award. He is a Registered Professional Engineer in the
State of Tennessee (Retired).
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • xi
BRINKHURST, PAUL
Mr. Brinkhurst graduated from the
University of the South Bank, London in
1971 with a BSc (Hons) in Chemical
Technology. After spending a number of
years in the Chemical and Mining indus-
tries he has worked predominately in the
nuclear power generation industry since
1983. Mr. Brinkhurst has been employed
by the South African electricity utility
Eskom since 1993, working mainly in the areas of inservice
inspection, integrity and licensing.
Mr. Brinkhurst’s specific activities included application of
Sections III and XI of the ASME B&PV Code at Koeberg
Nuclear Power Station. His current position is Chief Engineer in
the Eskom Nuclear Safety Assurance department.
BROOM, NEIL
Neil Broom has been involved with heat
exchanger and pressure vessel design and
manufacture for the power generation
industry for over 30 years. He is currently
employed at PBMR with responsibility for
Code related activities.
He serves as a member of Subgroup
Strategy and Management Divisions 1 and
2 (SC III), Member of Special Working
Group High Temperature Gas Cooled
Reactors (SC XI).
BROWN, ROBERT G.
Mr. Brown is a Principal Engineer and
Director of Consulting for the Equity
Engineering Group in Shaker Heights,
Ohio. He has experience as both an
owner-user and consultant providing
engineering support to refineries and
chemical plants worldwide. Mr. Brown
uses advanced skills in Finite Element
Analysis to provide practical and cost
effective solutions to solve design and operational issues relat-
ed to fixed equipment.
Mr. Brown assisted with the development of API 579
Fitness-For-Service and has been a consultant for the PVRC
effort to develop the new ASME, Section VIII, Division 2,
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, taking into consideration the
latest developments in materials, design, fabrication, and
inspection technologies.
Mr. Brown is an active member of the Battelle International
Joint Industry Project on the Structural Stress Method for Fatigue
Assessment of Welded Structures and performs fatigue assess-
ments/reviews of equipment in cyclic service. Mr. Brown also
serves on the ASME Subgroup on Design Analysis and performs
code compliance calculations and interpretations for pressure ves-
sels. Mr. Brown is a registered Professional Engineer in the States
of Ohio and Pennsylvania.
BRUMOVSKY, MILAN
Dr. Milan Brumovsky finished his M.S. in
nuclear physics and RNDr. in experimental
physics in Charles University in Prague,
Czech Republic, and his PhD. in experimen-
tal physics at the Moscow Engineering
Physics Institute, Moscow, Russia Fede-
ration. Then he joined Research and
Development Centre of SKODA Nuclear
Machinery in Pilsen, Czech Republic
(head of Reactor Component Integrity and Safety) – manufacturer
of WWER type reactors for Central Europe. After 35 years he
moved to the Nuclear Research Institute Rez in Rez, Czech
Republic as project manager. Thus, last year he celebrated 50
years in the nuclear power area.
During his career he was involved in many projects connected
with the material and integrity research projects, mainly in the
field of material qualification for WWER reactors pressure ves-
sels, radiation damage in structural materials, material testing by
standard and large scale test specimens and components, fracture
mechanics study and application to components integrity. He
worked also in preparation of many regulatory documents within
the Interatomenergo organization as well as in the Czech nuclear
codes. He was also co-ordinator of several IAEA Co-ordinated
research projects in the field of radiation damage and fracture
mechanics. He is also an active member in the ASTM E-10
Committee as well as in ASME PVP O&C Committee. Finally,
he served as a co-ordinator of the European project for prepara-
tion of VERLIFE- “Unified Procedure for Lifetime Assessment of
Components and Piping in WWER NPPs during Operation”.
CANONICO, DOMENIC A.
Dr. Canonico received his B. S. from
Michigan Technological University, M.S.
and Ph.D. from Lehigh University. He has
over 40 years experience in pressure parts
manufacturing. Dr. Canonico is currently
employed by ALSTOM POWER facilities
in Chattanooga, Tennessee. He is Past
Chair of the ASME Boiler Pressure Vessel
(BPV) Code Main Committee and a mem-
ber of the ASME Council on C. & S. and Vice President-elect
Pressure Technology, C&S. He is a Fellow in ASME, the
American Welding Society (AWS) and the American Society for
Metals (ASM). In 1999 Dr. Canonico received the ASME Melvin
R. Green C&S Medal. He was the 1994 recipient of the ASME J.
Hall Taylor Medal, in 1996 and 1999 respectively he was awarded
the Dedicated Service Award., and the ASME Region XI Industry
Executive Award. In 1978, 1979, and 1985 respectively AWS
awarded him the Dr. Rene Wasserman Award, the James F.
Lincoln Gold Medal, and the William H. Hobart Memorial
Medal; he was the 1983 Adams Lecturer. He is a member of the
State of Tennessee Boiler Rules Board.
He has written over 100 technical papers and given technical
talks in U.S., Canada, Mexico, Europe and Asia. He is named in
Who’s Who in Engineering and Men and Women of Science. Dr.
Canonico is an Adjunct Professor at the University of Tennessee,
Knoxville and on the Advisory Committee of the School of
Engineering, University of Tennessee, Chattanooga.
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xii • Contributor Biographies
CARPENTER, MARVIN L.
Marvin L. Carpenter graduated with honors
from Michigan Technological University
(MTU) with a B.S. in Metallurgical
Engineering. He continued at MTU and
received his Masters in Metallurgical
Engineering in 1974. Since graduating, his
career has been focused on welding fabrica-
tion and testing in accordance with the
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.
ASME Code Committees first caught his attention in the late seven-
ties and he has remained active in the Code ever since. He serves on
the Subcommittee on Welding (IX), Chaired the Subgroup on
Brazing (IX) and currently Chairs the Subgroup on Materials (IX).
Mr. Carpenter gained expertise in production welding, brazing,
failure analysis, coatings, and material testing while working for
major corporations including Westinghouse Electric Corporation,
The Trane Company, and Bechtel. His experience ranges from
supervising a Welding Engineering Develop group to setting up
and operating a materials testing laboratory that performed chem-
ical analysis, mechanical testing, metallography, and welding
qualification.
In addition to his extensive materials and welding background,
he was granted a patent in 1995 for a GTAW-HW circular weld-
ing system. His current position is as a Principal Engineer with a
major U.S. company that provides power plant equipment. Mr.
Carpenter resides in Pittsburgh, PA with his wife, Denise, and two
children, Scott and Michelle.
CHANG, EDMUND W. K.
Edmund W.K. Chang, P.E., received his
BSME from the University of Hawaii
(UHM), 1969. Mr. Chang is currently
employed as the Boiler & Welding
Maintenance Engineer with Hawaiian
Electric Company, Inc., Power Supply
Engineering Department, Honolulu, Hawaii.
Mr. Chang’s responsibilities include being
in-charge of all company boiler condition
assessments, and National Board (NB) “R” and “VR” Symbol
Stamp repair programs. Mr. Chang is also a NB commissioned O/U
Inspector, in charge of in-service and acceptance inspections. He is a
AWS Certified Welding Inspector (CWI), in charge of welding pro-
gram, and the company’s NDT Level III in PT and MT in charge of
the NDT program.
Mr. Chang’s professional affiliations include ASME
Membership since 1971; association with ASME Hawaii Section
as Chairman 2008–2009, Honors & Awards Committee Chair,
Webmaster, Newsletter Editor, and Section Chair 1993–1994;
ASNT Hawaii Section Director and Webmaster; AWS Hawaii
Section Webmaster; and Chair 1996 of Hawaii Council of
Engineering Societies. Mr. Chang is a member of the Department
of Mechanical Engineering, UHM, Industry Advisory Board.
Mr. Chang’s professional publications include as a lead author
of “T91 Secondary Superheater Tube Failures Investigation,”
1997, ASME PVP Conference, Orlando, Florida; and
“Tangential-Fired Boiler Tube Failures, A Case Study,” 2007,
EPRI International Conference on Boiler & HRSG Tube Failures,
Calgary, Alberta, Canada.
CHANG, KENNETH C.
Dr. Chang is a registered professional engi-
neer and received his Ph.D. in applied
mechanics from the Department of
Mechanical Engineering, University of
California, Berkeley. Through his technical
and management career at Westinghouse, he
has been involved in the design, analysis,
and construction of nuclear power plant sys-
tems, structures and components, and ASME
Section Code development for more than 34 years. Dr. Chang is a
renowned professional in the field of fatigue design, structural
dynamics, and aging managing for ASME Class 1 components, and
authored over twenty-five technical papers and professional presenta-
tions. He is a key participant in the development of the new review
and audit process for aging management reviews (AMRs) and aging
management programs (AMPs) for license renewal applications
(LRAs) at USNRC and conducted several training on the subject.
Dd. Chang retired as a branch chief of License Renewal Division
responsible for performing on-site audits and reviews for the new
LRAs. In that capacity he was also a staff member planning for the
guidance documents update, involving industry participation, for
more efficient preparation and review of LRAs.
CHANG, SHIN
Dr. Chang received her B.S. in 1983 from
the National Tsing Hua University in
Taiwan. She continued her study in the
USA and earned her MS and Ph.D. in
Nuclear Engineering from the University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Illinois.
After graduation in 1991, she was
employed by the Atomic Energy Council
at Taiwan (TAEC). Since then, she has
been working at the Department of Nuclear Regulation of TAEC
for more than 15 years.
During Dr. Chang’s career at TAEC, she has been involved in
various regulatory safety reviews and inspection works related to
nuclear power plants. She has been section chief of the License
Review Section and section chief of the Kuosheng Regulatory
Task Force of the Nuclear Regulation Department of TAEC. She
is currently the section chief of Chinshan Regulatory Task Force
of the Nuclear Regulation Department of TAEC. In this role,
she is now responsible for all the regulatory activities, which
include resident inspections, periodic inspections, maintenance
quality inspections, safety review of measurement recapture
power uprate application, safety review of the aging management
program that includes Chinshan NPP operational safety.
CHAUDOUET, ANNE
Ms Chaudouet earned a Master of Pure
Maths at Paris XIII University in 1974 and
then obtained a Mechanical Engineering
Degree from ENSMP (Mines) in Paris,
France in 1976. The same year, she started
her career at Cetim (French Technical
Center of Mechanical Industries) in R&D
in the field of solid mechanics analysed by
the Boundary Element Method (BEM).
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • xiii
Soon after, she became in charge of the team responsible for
the development of all software developed at Cetim in the domain
of 2D and 3D heat transfer and solid mechanics. In that role she
had the direct responsibility for the analyses of components by
BEM and of fracture mechanics. In 1984, she became head of the
Long Term Research Service involved in more theoretical studies
and development of design rules for pressure vessels. In the same
year she initiated Cetim’s participation in PVRC (Pressure Vessel
Research Council).
Since 2003, Ms Chaudouet has been actively involved in
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code organization where she
became a member of the Subcommittee on Materials, of SC
II/International Material Specifications (currently, Chair) and of
SC D/Bolted Flanged Joints. She is also an active member of the
ASME/API Joint Committee on Fitness for Service. Ms
Chaudouet has published over 30 papers in French and in English
in the domain of Boundary Elements, Fracture Mechanics and
more recently on Fitness-For-Service. Most of these were present-
ed at International Conferences.
Ms Chaudouet has developed professional courses on these
topics. In the domain of pressure equipment she has also given
courses on the PED (European Directive).
CHEN YI-BIN
Dr. Chen received his B.S. in Nuclear
Engineering from National Tsing-Hua
University (Taiwan), M.S. and his Ph.D. in
Nuclear Engineering from Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA.
Dr. Chen has spent his entire career in
the field of nuclear energy, beginning in
research and development of thermal
hydraulics and safety for light water reac-
tors, and then with regulatory body conducting safety inspection,
audit and review of design, construction and operation of nuclear
power plants in Taiwan.
Dr. Chen has held a number of senior management positions
including Deputy Director of the Institute of Nuclear Energy
Research (INER) and Department Directors of Planning, Nuclear
Technology, Radiation Protection and Nuclear Regulation at
Atomic Energy Council (AEC). He has also taught graduate
courses in the Nuclear Engineering Department of National
Tsing-Hua University for more than 10 years.
CHOW, TING
Mr. Ting Chow, specialized in earthquake
engineering application to nuclear power
facilities, and has been acting head of
Seismic Test/Research Laboratory of
Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER)
of Atomic Energy Council of Taiwan since
the Lab.’s establishment in 1995.
Mr. Ting Chow has been working on
varieties of seismic safety related topics,
such as: (1) Seismic Probabilistic Risk assessment at Kuosheng
Nuclear Power Plant, (2) Study on Necessity of Installing
Earthquake Auto-Scram System for NPPs in Taiwan, (3)
Principal review of several NPP’s seismic/structural related topics
and issues including USI A-46 issue, Chapter 3 of Final Safety
Analysis Report of Maanshan PWR NPP, design earthquake
review of Lungmen ABWR NPP FSAR, (4) Seismic shake table
system for seismic qualification of safety related component (5)
INER’s seismic shake table set up, (6) Commercial Grade Item’s
Seismic Dedication, and (7) Soil structure interaction analysis for
the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.
Mr. Chow had also been adjunct associate professor in Chun-
Yuan Christian University, Taiwan from 1997–2003. Mr. Chow,
born in 1955, joined INER right after his MS degree in Civil-
Structural Engineering from National Taiwan University in 1979.
He also holds MS degree from Massachusetts Institute of
.Technology (1987) and a Ph.D candidate from Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute (1990).
CHUNG HOWARD H.
Dr. Howard H. Chung has over 35 years
of diversified technical and managerial
experience in the nuclear, pressure vessel,
and aerospace industries in the areas of
analytical and experimental structural
mechanics, fluid transport phenomena,
flow-induced vibrations, shock and vibra-
tion isolation, seismic engineering, haz-
ardous radioactive wastes transportation
technologies, pressure vessels and piping design, computer codes
development, and nuclear facility configuration management.
Currently, he is the President of Structural System Integrity in
Naperville, Illinois. He previously worked as a Research Engineer
and Project Manager on nuclear reactor and nuclear fuel process-
ing facility R&D programs at Argonne National Laboratory,
Argonne, Illinois for twenty-five years (1994–1999). Prior to join-
ing Argonne, he was a technical research staff at MIT Lincoln
Laboratory, Lexington, Massachusetts working on U.S. Air Force
satellite R&D program for two years (1992–1994).
Howard Chung received BS in Naval Architecture and Marine
Engineering from Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea in 1966,
MS and Ph.D. in Mechanical Engineering from Tufts University,
Medford, Massachusetts in 1971 and 1974, respectively. In addi-
tion, he received his MBA degree from University of Chicago in
1983. Dr. Chung has published over 60 technical papers and
reports in his fields of expertise and served as an Associate Editor
of the ASME Journal of Engineering for Gas Turbines. Dr. Chung
served as a member of the ASME Board on Nuclear Codes and
Standards (BNCS) for ten years (1987–1997) and as a member of
the ASME B&PV Section III Subgroup on Containment Systems
for Nuclear Spent Fuel and High Level Waste Transportation
Packaging (SG-NUPACK) for more than ten years. In addition, he
has been serving as a member of the Committee on Design and
Fabrication of Nuclear Structures (N690) of the American Institute
of Steel Construction (AISC) since 1991.
Dr. Chung has been also active on serving various professional
organizations including the Chair (2002–2003) of the ASME
Pressure Vessels and Piping, the Vice-Chair (1995–1996) of
the ASME Nuclear Engineering Division and the Vice-Chair
(2003–2005) of the Anti-Seismic Systems International Society
(ASSISi). He also chaired many international conferences, includ-
ing the 2002 ASME Pressure Vessels and Piping Conference in
Vancouver, Canada. Dr. Chung is an ASME Fellow and received
the ASME Dedicated Service Award in 1999.
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xiv • Contributor Biographies
CIPOLLA, RUSSELL C.
Mr. Russell Cipolla is Vice President,
Nuclear Power Generation, and Principal
Engineer for APTECH Engineering Ser-
vices, Inc., Sunnyvale, California (USA).
Mr. Cipolla received his B.S. degree
in Mechanical Engineering from
Northeastern University in 1970, and his
M.S. in Mechanical Engineering from
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Mechanics in 1972. He has been active in the Nuclear Power
Industry since the early 1970s having worked at the nuclear divi-
sions of Babcock & Wilcox and General Electric in the area of
ASME Section III design associated with both naval and commer-
cial power plants systems.
Russ has specialized in stress analysis and fatigue and fracture
mechanics evaluations of power plant components in operating
plants. He has applied his skills to many service problems to
include stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of J-groove attachments
welds in reactor vessel head penetrations and pressurizer heater
sleeves, mechanical and thermal fatigue in piping, SCC in low
pressure steam turbine rotors and blades, and fitness-for-service
of components supports. Russ was also involved in resolving
the NRC Generic Safety Issues A-11 and A-12 regarding fracture
toughness and bolted joint integrity. He is well versed in the
integrity of threaded fasteners for both structural joints and pres-
sure boundary closures.
In recent years, Russ has been active in both deterministic
and probabilistic methods and acceptance criteria for nuclear
steam generators (SG) regarding pressure boundary integrity in
compliance with NEI 97-06 requirements. In support of indus-
try group efforts, he has made significant contributions to the
industry guidelines for the assessment of tube integrity and
leakage performance for various degradation mechanisms
affecting Alloy 600 and 690 tubing materials. He has develop-
ment methods for predicting tube burst and leak rates under
various service conditions, which have become part of the
industry standards.
Russ has been very active in ASME Section XI since joining the
Working Group on Flaw Evaluation in 1975, for which he is current-
ly Chairman. Russ is also a member of the Subgroup on Evaluation
Standards and Subcommittee Section XI, and has participated in
many ad hoc committees on such topics as environmental fatigue,
SCC of austenitic materials, and fracture toughness reference curves
for pressure vessels and piping, and SG tube examination. Russ has
authored/coauthored over 80 technical papers on various subjects
and assessments from his past work.
CONLISK, PETER J.
Dr. Conlisk’s has a B.S. in Mechanical
Engineering and M.S. in Engineering
Science from the University of Notre
Dame and Ph.D. in Engineering Mechanics
from the University of Michigan. He has
forty years experience applying engineer-
ing principles, com-puters, experimental
techniques, and Codes and Standards to
solving design of processing equipment
and vessels in the chemical industry. From 1960 until 1968, he
worked in the Aerospace industry and from 1968 until his early
retirement in 1993, Dr. Conlisk worked for the Monsanto
Corporation, the last 19 years in the Engineering Department. He
was a key member in a team at Monsanto that developed acoustic
emission examination for fiberglass and metal tanks and vessels.
His services are now available through Conlisk Engineering
Mechanics, Inc., a consulting firm he formed in 1994. He has con-
centrated on design of tanks and pressure vessel, especially fiber-
glass composite (FRP) vessels. Dr. Conlisk is a nationally recog-
nized authority in FRP equipment design and analysis. He is a
member of the ASME committee that developed the ASME/ANSI
Standard: “Reinforced Thermosetting Plastic Corrosion Resistant
Equipment, RTP-1.”
Dr. Conlisk is past chairman and current vice-chairman of the
ASME B&PV Code subcommittee, Section X, governing FRP
pressure vessels. He is also a past member of the main committee
of the ASME B&PV Code. Dr. Conlisk is a registered profession-
al engineer in Missouri.
CUETO-FELGUEROSO, CARLOS
Carlos Cueto-Felgueroso obtained a
Naval Engineer (M.Sc.) degree in the
Escuela Técnica Superior de Ingenieros
Navales of the Polytechnic University of
Madrid in 1977. He worked for four years
in the Structural Mechanics Section of
AESA, the major shipbuilding company
in Spain. Carlos moved to IBM Spain,
and in 1985 joined the Integrity of
Components Group (now Materials and Life Management Unit)
of Tecnatom S.A. He specializes in the stress and fracture
mechanics analyses of components and piping, in both nuclear
and fossil plants. Main activities to date have been in the analyt-
ical evaluation of flaws of major components (reactor pressure
vessels, turbines, etc.) and piping. He developed Flaw
Evaluation Handbooks for streamlining the evaluation of NDE
flaw indications. Carlos was involved in the development of
Steam Generator tubes plugging criteria for several types of
degradation (PWSCC, IGA/ODSCC, etc.). He has expertise in
the development of acceptance criteria for PWSCC defects in
the CRDM penetrations of vessel heads, and in the Bottom
Mounted Instrumentation penetrations.
Carlos has experience in the evaluation of piping failure proba-
bilities for the development of Risk-Informed ISI programs. He
participated in the Working Group on Codes and Standards
(WGCS) organized by the European Commission and he is mem-
ber of the ENIQ Task Group on Risk (TGR) dedicated to RI-ISI
activities in Europe.
In recent years Carlos participated in several European projects
such as the benchmarking of Structural Reliability Models for RI-
ISI applications (NURBIM project) and the comparison of struc-
tural evaluation methodologies for Thermal Fatigue in piping
(THERFAT project) both in the 5th Framework Program of the
European Commission. Carlos is a member of the ASME B&PV
Section XI Working Groups on Implementation on Risk Based
Examination and of the Working Group and on Inspection on
Systems and Components.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • xv
DEARDORFF, ARTHUR F.
Arthur F. Deardorff has a Mechanical
Engineering B.S, from Oregon State
University (1964) and MS, University of
Arizona (1966). He is a Registered
Mechanical Engineer, State of California.
He is a Vice President, Structural
Integrity Associates, San Jose, California.
His professional experience includes 1987
to present with Structural Integrity
Associates, San Jose, CA, 1976–1987 with NUTECH, San Jose,
CA, 1970–1976 with General Atomic Company, San Diego, CA
and 1966–1970 with The Boeing Company, Seattle, WA. His
professional associations include American Society of
Mechanical Engineers and American Nuclear Society. He is a
Past Member of the ASME Code Section XI Subgroup Water
Cooled Systems, Working Group on Implementation of Risk-
Based Inspection, Task Group on Erosion-Corrosion Acceptance
Criteria, Task Group on Fatigue in Operating Plants, and Task
Group on Operating Plant Fatigue Assessment, and the ASME
Code Post Construction Committee, Subgroup on Crack-Like
Flaws.
Mr. Deardorff has expertise in fracture mechanics, stress
analysis and reactor systems evaluation, with a strong academic
background in thermal-hydraulics and fluid system. His exper-
tise includes PWR and BWR systems and fossil-fired power
plants. Art is known internationally for providing ASME Code
training in Section III design and analysis and Section XI flaw
evaluation.
DEBOO, GUY H.
Guy DeBoo has a B.S., Mechanical Engi-
neering from Northwestern University,
1976 and M.S. Mechanical Engineering
from University of Illinois, 1986. His pro-
fessional experience from 1995 to present
is as Senior Staff Engineer, Common-
wealth Edison, Senior Staff Engineer with
Exelon Nuclear and with Sargent & Lundy
Engineers 1976 to 1995. During his
24 years in nuclear power generation, DeBoo has worked on
major nuclear design projects including design, inspection and
testing phases.
Mr. DeBoo’s recent experience includes fatigue, crack
growth, flaw stability analyses and operability for power plant
components. He supervised functionality and operability evalu-
ations of systems and components to address unanticipated
operating events or conditions, which do not meet inspection or
test requirements. Mr. DeBoo provides engineering direction
for design and operability evaluations of pressure vessels,
piping and components and provides technical responses
to NRC.
He is a Member ASME B&PV Code Section XI, Secretary,
WG Flaw Evaluation, and WG Pipe Flaw Evaluations. Guy is a
PE (Illinois), Member of National Society of Professional
Engineers.
His industry participation includes PVRC Technical Committee
on Piping Systems; publications include “Position Paper on
Nuclear Plant Pipe Supports,” WRC Bulletin 353, May 1990, and
a Tutorial on “An Integrated Approach to Address Engineering of
Operating Nuclear Power Plants Functionality and Operability
Criteria,” 1994, ASME PV&P Conference.
DIXIT, K. B.
K.B. Dixit graduated from the Indian
Institute of Technology, Bombay (IITB)
with a B. Tech. in Mechanical Engineering
in 1972. After completion from the 16th
Batch of Training School of Bhabha Atomic
Research Centre in 1973, he joined Nuclear
Power Corporation of India Limited
(NPCIL), Mumbai. His initial field of work
was in the area of Structural Analysis and
Design of Reactor Components of Indian Pressurized Heavy Water
Reactors, using Finite Element Method and ASME Boiler &
Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Nuclear Vessels.
Mr. Dixit was involved in design of nuclear components of
Narora Atomic power station, which has India’s first indigenous
Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors. He has made significant
contributions in evolving technology, for design and manufac-
ture, of nuclear components. He was also involved in Design
of coolant channel components of PHWRs and development of
shutdown systems of Indian PHWRs. He has also made impor-
tant contributions in resolution of problems associated with core
components where remotely operated toolings had to be devel-
oped indigenously.
In addition to design and analysis, Mr. Dixit has also gained
expertise in Ageing Management, Equipment Qualification and
Seismic Revaluation. He has also participated in regulatory
reviews for operating reactors as well as those under various
stages of design/construction. Publications by him include papers
presented at Conferences for Structural Mechanics in Reactor
Technology, International conference on Pressure Vessels technol-
ogy etc. Presently he is working as Executive Director for engi-
neering group of NPCIL and is in charge of all design activities
for all systems and components of Indian PHWR plants.
EUROPA MALCOLM
Malcolm Europa is a Senior Engineer with
the South African National Nuclear
Regulator where he carries responsibility
for coordination of safety and technical
assessment of nuclear facilities and nuclear
equipment under South African nuclear
regulations. He has participated in regulato-
ry reviews of the Koeberg nuclear reactors
as well as design reviews of pressurized
components of the PBMR plant. His background includes nuclear
power industry operations experience which includes planning,
engineering design, safety reviews and mechanical integrity
assessment of pressurised equipment for both nuclear and conven-
tional service.
ASME_FM_Vol_III_pi-lxxxiv.qxd 6/6/09 12:28 PM Page xvi
xvi • Contributor Biographies
He currently represents the South African National Nuclear
Regulator at the Multinational Design Evaluation Programme
(MDEP) on both the Codes and Standards and Vendor Inspection
Cooperation working groups.
Malcolm is a Mechanical Engineering graduate from the
Peninsula Technikon (1986) and the University of Southern
California (1993). He is a Registered Professional Engineer in the
Republic of South Africa.
FELDSTEIN, JOEL G.
Joel Feldstein has a Metallurgical Engi-
neering B.S. (1967) and M.S. (1969) from
Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute. He has
more than 30 years experience in the weld-
ing field, ranging from welding research
for a filler metal manufacturer to welding
engineering in the aerospace and power
generation industries. He began his career
in power generation with Babcock &
Wilcox in 1972 at their R&D Division working on manufactur-
ing-related projects and moved into plant manufacturing in 1984
as the Manager of Welding. There he became familiar with the
construction of components for both nuclear and fossil applica-
tions. His first assignment on coming to Foster Wheeler in 1993
was in the Technical Center as Manager of Metallurgical Services
later taking on the additional responsibility of the Welding
Laboratory. In 1998 Joel Feldstein assumed the responsibility of
Chief Welding Engineer.
Joel Feldstein, who is currently Chairman of the ASME B&PV
Code Standards Committee and a member of the Board on
Pressure Technology Codes & Standards began his ASME Code
involvement with the Subcommittee on Welding (the responsible
subcommittee for Section IX) in 1986. In 1992 he became
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Welding and became a mem-
ber of the B&PVC Standards Committee. He is a recipient of the
J Hall Taylor Medal from ASME for the advancement of stan-
dards for welding in pressure vessel and piping construction. He
has also been an active member of the Subcommittee on Boilers
(Section I).
Joel Feldstein is also active in other professional societies
including AWS and the Welding Research Council where he
served as Chairman of the Stainless Steel Subcommittee, the High
Alloys Committee and a member of their Board of Directors.
FLETCHER, JOHN
John Fletcher earned a masters degree in
Plasma Physics and spent the early part of
his career as a researcher on the South
African Tokomak, Tokoloshe. He spent
13 years in a Research & Development
environment and during this period
authored and co authored five papers in
international research journals and thirteen
contributions to international conferences.
He then spent 10 years as project manager in the South African
power generation industry, managing projects on fossil plants
and the Koeberg nuclear power plant.
John Fletcher is currently employed at PBMR, with the
responsibility for the development and implementation of an
ISI program for PBMR. John Fletcher serves as the Chair of
the Special Working Group HTGRs established in February
2004.
The SWG has the charter to rewrite SC XI Division 2 Rules
for Inspection and Testing of Gas-cooled plants. This SWG has
produced a first complete draft of a rewritten SC XI Div 2 for
Gas Reactors. The draft introduces the concept of Reliability
and Integrity Management (RIM) program that provides the
rules and requirements for the creation of the RIM Program for
the Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (MHR)
type.
GERAETS, LUC H.
Dr. Geraets has an M.S. Degree and a
Ph. D. in Mechanical Engineering from the
University of Louvain in Belgium. He also
holds an MBA from the Mons Poly-
technical Institute (Mons, Belgium). He is
an expert in the design of mechanical
equipment and piping, seismic engineer-
ing, and the ASME Section III pressure
component code. His fields of expertise
include thermal transient, fatigue, water hammer, vibration,
pipe rupture, dynamic analysis, finite element stress analysis,
inelastic analysis, code compliance, inelastic response of piping,
and fitness-for-service criteria. Dr. Geraets’ extensive background
in engineering mechanics in the areas of analysis, design, criteria
development, and management of projects rest on 35 years of
engineering experience with the various metamorphisms
(Tractionel, Tractebel, SUEZ) of GDF SUEZ, including 20 years
in the analysis and design of power plant buildings, mechanical
equipment, and supports. He has participated in all phases of
power projects including conceptual studies, licensing, design,
construction, as-built, modifications, and resolution of operating
problems. Based in Brussels (Belgium), Dr. Geraets is now in
charge of Strategy, Business Development and Research for the
Nuclear Activities Division of GDF SUEZ.
Dr. Geraets joined the ASME Pressure Vessel and Piping
Division in 1983. He has published several Conference papers. A
founding member of the Seismic Engineering Technical Committee,
of which he has occupied various Offices, including Chairmanship
(1995–1999), he has been the first International Coordinator of PVP
between 2001 and 2004. In 2004, Dr. Geraets became a member of
the Executive Committee of the PVP Division, in charge of Honors
and Awards from 2004 to 2008, and Vice Chair and Secretary for
2008–2009. He served as Technical Program Chair of the 2008
Pressure Vessels and Piping Conference in Chicago, and will be the
Conference Chair for the 2009 PVP Conference in Prague, Czech
Republic.
Dr. Geraets is a Fellow of ASME. He has been extensively
involved with ASME Code activities, strongly promoting the
development of Code knowledge in Belgium, through various
means including participation to Section III Code Committees; he
has been a member of both the Working Group on Piping and the
Working Group on Components Supports between 1984 and
1994. Dr. Geraets has been awarded the Calvin W. Rice Lecture
Award in 2008.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • xvii
GIMPLE, RICHARD E.
Richard Gimple has a BSME from Kansas
State University (1974) and is a Registered
Professional Engineer. Since 1982 he has
been employed by the Wolf Creek Nuclear
Operating Corporation. Previous employ-
ment was with Sauder Custom Fabrication
(1979–1982) and Fluor Engineers and
Constructors (1974–1979).
As a nuclear utility employee, he has
primarily been involved in implementation of ASME’s Boiler
& Pressure Vessel Code Section III and Section XI during
construction and operation activities. Previous non-nuclear
experience involved Section VIII pressure vessel and heat
exchanger design and construction. At present, as a Principal
Engineer, Mr. Gimple provides company wide assistance in
the use of ASME Codes, with emphasis on Section III and
Section XI.
Mr. Gimple has been active in the Codes and Standards devel-
opment process since 1984. Mr. Gimple was the 2005 recipient of
the ASME Bernard F. Langer Nuclear Codes and Standards
Award. He is currently a member of the B&PV Standards
Committee (since 2000), the Subcommittee on Inservice
Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components (since 1994, serv-
ing 5 years as Chairman of Subcommittee XI during 2000–2004),
the Section XI Executive Committee (since 1992), and the
Subgroup on Repair/Replacement Activities (since 1987, serving
as Chairman for 7 of those years). Past Codes and Standards par-
ticipation included 6 years on the Board on Nuclear Codes and
Standards and memberships on the Subcommittee on Nuclear
Accreditation, Subgroup on Design (in Section III), and three
Section XI Working Groups.
GORMAN, JEFFREY A.
Jeff Gorman has been working on materials
issues related to nuclear power since 1959,
when he was assigned to Naval Reactors. He
studied civil engineering at Cornell before
working for Naval Reactors. After leaving
the Navy, he did graduate work in engineer-
ing science, with emphasis on materials sci-
ence, at CalTech. Since 1968 he has worked
as a consulting engineer in the civilian
nuclear power program, with most of his work involving materials,
corrosion, stress analysis and fracture mechanics.
In 1980, Dr. Gorman was a co-founder of Dominion
Engineering, Inc., and is still actively working for the company. A
significant part of his consulting work has been for EPRI. His
work for EPRI has included preparation of many workshop pro-
ceedings involving PWR steam generator technology, preparation
of topical reports on materials and corrosion issues, and assisting
in revision of water chemistry guidelines. He has also worked
extensively for utilities and other industrial organizations on
materials and corrosion issues, such as evaluation of the causes of
failures of pressure vessels and piping, and developing predictions
of the probable rate of failure of PWR steam generator tubes. Dr.
Gorman is a registered professional engineer and is a member of
AMS, NACE and ANS.
GOSSELIN, STEPHEN R. (STEVE)
Steve Gosselin is a Senior Principal Con-
sultant at Scandpower Risk Management
(SRM) with over 30 years nuclear power
industry experience. Prior to joining the
SRM team in 2008, Mr. Gosselin was Chief
Engineer in the Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory (PNNL) Materials and Engi-
neering Mechanics Group (1998–2008) and
a Project Manager at Electric Power
Research Institute (EPRI) from 1993–1998. His work has focused
primarily on fitness-for-service, structural integrity, safety, and relia-
bility of pressure vessels and piping components. He has made sig-
nificant contributions in the areas of fatigue analyses and flaw toler-
ance methodologies for nuclear pressure vessel and piping
components, environmental fatigue computational methods, fatigue
crack flaw detection probability, on-line fatigue monitoring, and the
development of risk-informed inservice inspection and reliability
integrity management programs for nuclear power plant vessel and
piping components.
Mr. Gosselin’s computational expertise is complemented by
over 13 years experience in system engineering and mechanical
design analyses at Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering
PWR commercial nuclear power plants and 8 years operating
experience on U.S. Navy SIC, S5W, and S3G submarine nuclear
power plant designs.
Mr. Gosselin is an ASME Fellow (2009) and is a member of the
ASME Section XI Working Group on Operating Plant Criteria,
ASME Section XI Special Working Group on High Temperature
Gas Cooled Reactors, and the ASME Committee on Nuclear Risk
Management (CNRM) Subcommittee on Applications. His work
has resulted in improved Code rules for operating nuclear power
plant piping and vessel component fitness-for-service (ASME
Section XI Non-mandatory Appendices E and L) and risk-informed
inservice inspection (Code Case N-578).
Mr. Gosselin has a B.S. degree in Mechanical Engineering
from the California State Polytechnic University (1980) and a
M.S. degree in Mechanical Engineering from the University of
North Carolina at Charlotte (1998). He is a registered professional
engineer in California. Mr. Gosselin has published 45 papers, arti-
cles, and reports in the open literature and is a consulting expert
to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the areas of
plant life extension, design reconciliation and risk-informed inser-
vice inspection.
GRABER, HAROLD C.
Harold Graber works as an Independent
Consultant. Previously he was with the
Babcock Wilcox Company in the Nuclear
Equipment Division for 34 years. He was
Manager of NDT Operations and Manager
of Quality Assurance Engineering. Harold
Graber is a Member of ASME for 15 years.
He is an active participant on the B&PV
Code, Subcommittee V on Nondestructive
Examination. He was Vice Chair Subcommittee V; Chair,
Subgroup on Surface Examination. He was Member of
Subcommittee V on Nondestructive Examination, Subgroup of
ASME_FM_Vol_III_pi-lxxxiv.qxd 6/6/09 12:28 PM Page xviii
xviii • Contributor Biographies
Volumetric Examination, Subgroup on Personnel Qualification
and Inquiries.
Harold Graber is a Member, American Society for Testing
Materials (ASTM) for 26 years. He was Chairman, Subcommittee
E7.01 on Radiology. His Committee memberships include Com-
mittee E-7 on Nondestructive Examination, Subcommittee
E7.02—Reference Radiological Images, Subcommittee E7.06–
Ultrasonic Method. He is a Member, American Society for
Nondestructive Testing (ASNT). He is a Past Chair, Cleveland,
Ohio Section—1971.
Harold Graber is the recipient of ASTM Merit Fellow Award
(1992); ASTM Committee E-7—C.W Briggs Award (1989);
ASNT Fellow Award (1978). His Certifications include ASNT;
Level III certificates in Radiography, Ultrasonic, Liquid Penetrant
and Magnetic Particle Methods.
GRANDMANGE, JEAN-MARIE
After graduating in 1972 from the Applied
Physics Department of the Institut National
Des Science Appliquées in Lyon (France),
Jean-Marie Grandemange was a research
engineer at the Ecole des Mines research
laboratory in Paris, where for three years he
worked in the field of fractures mechanics.
He joined the Framatome Group in 1976,
working initially in the Safety Dept. on the
safety of mechanical components (design assumptions and criteria).
He then moved on to the Primary Components Division, working in
the Materials and Technology Dept., where he was in charge of the
“Design” section from 1981 to 1997, and later Assistant to the head
of department. He was named Senior Consultant in 1996.
Since 1978 he has led the Editorial Group in charge of writing
the RCC-M design rules. He became a member of the RCC-M
Sub-Committee in 1984 and was appointed Chairman of the com-
mittee in 1989. Since 1989 he has been responsible for
Framatome’s contribution to the preparatory work for the con-
struction joint rules for use in the EPR project.
He led the Framatome Structural Analysis Group during the
period 1989–1995, representing the company in the Cetim
Boilerwork Commission, the RSE-M sub-committee responsible
for in-service component inspection rules, and the Working
Group on Codes and Standards (WGCS) organized by the
European Commission.
Since 1986, he has been the manufacturer’s designated expert
both to the CCAP (French Central Commission for Pressure-
Retaining Equipment) and its Permanent Nuclear Section (SPN) in
charge of regulatory text discussion and application. He has lectured
in several courses organized by Framatome, EDF, various French
Institutes and run seminars in South Korea, Taiwan and China.
GRIESBACH, TIMOTHY J.
Timothy J. Griesbach earned a B.S. in 1972
and M.S. in 1974 in Metallurgy and
Materials Science from Case Western
Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio. He
is currently an Associate with Structural
Integrity Associates (SI) in San Jose,
California. Before joining Structural
Integrity Associates, Mr. Griesbach was the
Director of Technical Services for ATI
Consulting. Mr. Griesbach was a Project Manager with the Electric
Power Research Institute (EPRI) from 1982 to 1993 where he
managed programs on reactor vessel integrity, research on neutron
irradiation embrittlement, vessel material toughness properties,
fracture mechanics methods, and management of reactor vessel
integrity issues including pressurized thermal shock. From 1977 to
1982 he was a Principal Engineer at Combustion Engineering
responsible for evaluating the response of nuclear systems and
components to severe loading conditions using advanced finite ele-
ment techniques. From 1974 to 1977 Mr. Griesbach was a
Materials Engineer with Pratt & Whitney Aircraft where he was a
member of a select research team developing a unique process to
produce diffusion bonded jet turbine blades.
Mr. Griesbach is a member of ASME and the American
Nuclear Society, and he has been a member of Section XI since
1989. He is chairman of the Working Group on Operating Criteria
whose charter is to develop and maintain the Code criteria for
operating pressure vs. temperature limits, operating plant fatigue
assessment, and related operating plant issues. He is also a mem-
ber of the Working Group on Flaw Evaluation and Subgroup on
Evaluation Standards.
Mr. Griesbach specializes in evaluation of aging degradation
mechanisms for nuclear components, including developing data-
bases and modeling predictions on irradiated materials behavior.
He has taught courses on managing the integrity of reactor pres-
sure vessels for extended vessel life, and he has written numerous
technical papers on these topics.
GRIFFIN, DONALD S.
Dr. Don Griffin has 30 years of experience
in the structural design, development, and
evaluation of nuclear reactor systems. At
Westinghouse he developed computer-
oriented methods of analysis, structural
design criteria, and design procedures for
naval, PWR, and fast breeder reactors. He
has directed structural analysis of static
and dynamic systems including effects of
fatigue, fracture, thermal shock, seismic, fluid-solid interactions,
and non linear and creep response of materials. He has personal
expertise in buckling and instability, inelastic analysis, and elevated-
temperature structural design. Current ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code activities include development of design limits for
high-temperature and creep buckling, and participation in the
Subgroup for Elevated-Temperature Design. Responsible for pre-
sentation and resolution of elevated-temperature structural design
issues raised during NRC licensing review of CRBRP.
Key relevant experience of Dr. Griffin includes Support of
integrity evaluation of the CRBRP Containment Vessel during
NRC licensing review; Responsibility for evaluation of Hanford
N Reactor pressure tube integrity and pressure tube rupture propa-
gation; Provided structures, seismic, and materials input to the
Westinghouse Independent Safety Review of Savannah River
Production Reactors; and In-depth review of the Loss of Coolant
Accident Design Basis for the Savannah River Production
Reactors – Leak Before Break Report.
Dr. Griffin is a Fellow of ASME, past Associate Editor of the
Journal of Applied Mechanics, past Chairman of the ASME
Pressure Vessel and Piping Division, a recipient of the ASME
PVP Medal, and author of 26 publications in applied mechanics,
ASME_FM_Vol_III_pi-lxxxiv.qxd 6/6/09 12:28 PM Page xix
COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • xix
computer methods, and elevated-temperature design. He has been
an active contributor to the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,
Section III, Subsection NH for elevated-temperature nuclear appli-
cations. Griffin earned his BME, Cornell University (1952), MS
(1953) and PhD (1959), at Stanford University.
HAFNER, RONALD S.
Ronald S. Hafner has more than 40 years
experience in a variety of disciplines ranging
from radar systems and nuclear instru-
mentation, to non-destructive testing using
gamma-ray sources and electronic devices,
to nuclear reactor- and tritium facility-
operations, to regulatory issues associated
with Department of Energy facilities and the
transportation, storage, and disposal of
radioactive materials. After a seven-and-a-half year enlistment in the
U.S. Air Force, he went to work at Sandia National Laboratories, in
Livermore, CA, in 1974, where he specialized in tritium operations
and tritium health physics. While at Sandia, he went back to school
and received his Bachelor of Science Degree from California State
University, Hayward, CA, in 1983, with a major in Physical
Sciences and a minor in Physics. In 1987, he moved to Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory where, for the first four years, he
worked in tritium operations and tritium facility management. In
1991, he moved to the Mechanical Engineering Division, where he
has been part of an engineering consulting organization.
His ASME activities started in 1993, with the Operations,
Applications, and Components Committee of the PVP Division.
Since that time, he has been involved with the development of
more than 90 PVPD Conference sessions on the Transportation,
Storage, and Disposal of radioactive materials. He is currently a
member of the Executive Committee of ASME’s Pressure Vessels
& Piping Division.
HALLEY, GEOFFREY M.
Geoffrey M Halley, P.E. holds degrees in
Electrical Engineering, Mechanical Engi-
neering, and Engineering Administration
(Masters). He is a Registered Professional
Engineer in Illinois. From 1993 to the pre-
sent he is the President of Sji Consultants,
Inc., a technical consulting company, provid-
ing services to the boiler industry in the
areas of product design, development, trou-
ble shooting and forensic investigation/expert witness work. He has
40 years of boiler industry experience, ranging from research/prod-
uct development, design and applications/installation., primarily in
the institutional and industrial segments of the marketplace. He held
various positions at Kewanee Boiler Corporation from 1968 to 1986,
initially as Supervisor of Research and Development, and as Vice
President – Technical Director from 1979 onwards. From 1986
through 1992 he was president of Halcam Associates a Mechanical
Contracting Company specializing in commercial, institutional and
industrial design/build/service and repair of boiler and HVAC sys-
tems. From 1959 through 1968 he was employed in the Aerospace
and the Nuclear Engineering industries.
Geoffrey Halley was Chair of ABMA Joint Technical Committee
(1981–1986), and has been a member of several boiler industry
advisory groups to the USEPA and USDOE. He currently is ABMA
Director of Technical Affairs, and was Editor of ABMA Packaged
Boiler Engineering Manual. He has been an Instructor at boiler
industry technician training schools offered by ABMA/NBBI, and
boiler manufacturers. He has authored a number of papers on boiler
related topics, published in The National Board Bulletin, Boiler
Systems Engineering, and Maintenance Management.
Geoffrey Halley currently is a member of the ASME CSD-1
Committee, and the National Board Inspection Code Sub-committee
on Installation.
HANMORE, PETER
Peter has worked within the engineering
inspection industry since 1972. After joining
Commercial Union Assurance Company as
a metallurgist in the engineering laboratory
he moved into the New Construction
Department in 1984 and has been continu-
ously associated with inspection during the
manufacture of many types of work equip-
ment. Although qualified as a metallurgist he
has been involved in many related aspects of work equipment. He is
an Authorized Inspector Supervisor for the provision of ASME
Code services and maintains close links with that organization. Peter
is currently a member at Large of the Board of Directors of Codes
and Standards. His career within the inspection industry is extremely
varied and includes experience such as; Health and Safety Manager,
Quality Manager as well Project Manager for the obtaining notifica-
tion and subsequent implementation of services associated with the
Machinery, Lift and Pressure Equipment Directives.
Peter Hanmore has been associated with the Pressure
Equipment Directive for many years even before its publication
and represents the UK Inspection Bodies on many national and
European Committees. Peter represents Bureau Veritas (Notified
Body) at the European and UK Conformity Assessment Body
Forums for both machinery and pressure equipment. He is a Past-
Chairman of the European Conformity Assessment Body Forum
(CABF), for pressure equipment and currently Chairman of the
UK Notified Body Forum for machinery. During his period as
Chairman of the CABF he represented the notified bodies at
member states working group meetings; Working Group Pressure,
Working Party Guidelines and Working Party Materials, and is
still an active member of the latter.
Peter has provided numerous training courses on European
Directives and related topics throughout the world for various
organisations, e.g. ASME, IMechE, BSI, JSME, European
Commission as well as many workshops tailored to individual
manufacturers/users requirements.
HASEGAWA, KUNIO
Dr. Kunio Hasegawa graduated from
Tohoku University with a Doctor of
Engineering degree in 1973. He joined
Hitachi Research Laboratory, Hitachi Ltd.,
over 30 years back. During his term at
Hitachi, he was also visiting professors of
Yokohama National University and
Kanazawa University for several years.
Since 2006, Dr. Hasegawa serves as a princi-
pal staff in Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES).
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xx • Contributor Biographies
Dr. Kunio Hasegawa is a member of Japan Society of
Mechanical Engineers (JSME), and is a past member of the JSME
Fitness-for-Service Committee for nuclear facilities. He is also a
member of ASME and is involved in ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code Section XI Working Group, Subgroup and
Subcommittee activities. He has been active for three years as a
Technical Program Representative of Codes and Standards
Technical Committee in ASME PVP Division.
He has been involved with structural integrity for nuclear
power components, particularly, leak-before-break, fracture and
fatigue strengths for pipes with cracks and wall thinning, and flaw
characterizations for fitness-for-service procedures. Dr, Hasegawa
has published for over 100 technical papers in journals and con-
ference proceedings.
HECHMER, JOHN
Mr. John Hechmer has a degree in I
Mechanical Engineering from the
University I of Notre Dame (1957). He
joined the I Babcock & Wilcox Co. (now
owned by I McDermott, Inc.) for design
and analysis I work for pressure vessels.
His work was I primarily for the power
generation and I defense industries. His
experience included project and engineer-
ing management, technology development, and management. His
Power Generation products were for both BWR and PWR nuclear
electric plants. Defense Industries work addressed Class 1 pres-
sure vessels for the nuclear navy program, primarily nuclear reac-
tors and steam generators for aircraft carriers and submarines.
Research products included Breeder Reactor Program, Sodium-
steam Generator, Molten Salt Steam Generator. Technology
Development was spent in developing tools and procedures for
design-analysis interfacing with the Research Center and
Engineering Fabrication of Babcock & Wilcox Co. This was
enhanced by many years of participation in ASME B&PV
Committees, PVRC, and PV&P Conferences. These engineering
efforts occurred for 40 years.
Mr. John Hechmer has more than 25 publications, addressing
primary and secondary stress evaluation, stress intensity factors,
finite element methods and its applications, brittle fracture, weld-
ing capability for fatigue, and material’s characteristic, examples
of this are PVRC Bulletins #429 (3D Stress Criteria Guidelines
For Application) and #432 (Fatigue-Strength-Reduction Factors
for Welds Based on NDE).
HEDDEN, OWEN F.
Owen F. Hedden retired from ABB
Combustion Engineering in 1994 after over
25 years of ASME B&PV Committee
activities with company support. His res-
ponsibilities included reactor vessel speci-
fications, safety codes and standards, and
interpretation of the B&PV Code and other
industry standards. He Continued working
part-time for that organization into 2002.
Subsequently, he has been a part-time consultant to the ITER pro-
ject and several other organizations. Prior to joining ABB he was
with Foster Wheeler Corporation (1956–1967), Naval Nuclear
program. Since 1968 Mr. Hedden has been active in the Section
XI Code Committee, Secretary (1976–1978), Chair (1991–2000).
In addition to Section XI, Owen has been a member of the ASME
C&S Board on Nuclear Codes and Standards, the Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Committee, and B&PV Subcommittees on Power
Boilers, Design, and Nondestructive Examination. He is active in
ASME’s PVP Division. Mr Hedden was the first Chair of the
NDE Engineering Division 1982–1984. He has presented ASME
Code short courses in the US and overseas. He was educated at
Antioch College and Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
His publications are in the ASME Journal of Pressure Vessel
Technology, WRC Bulletins and in the Proceedings of ASME
PVP, ICONE, IIW, ASM, and SPIE. He is an ASME Fellow
(1985), received the Dedicated Service Award (1991), and the
ASME Bernard F. Langer Nuclear Codes and Standards Award in
1994.
HENRY, PHILIP A.
Mr. Henry, Principal Engineer for the
Equity Engineering Group in Shaker
Heights, Ohio, is a specialist in the design,
installation, sizing and selection of pressure
relief devices and relieving systems. He is
currently chairman of the API Pressure
Relieving System Subcommittee’s Task
Force on RP 520 related to the design and
installation of pressure relieving systems.
He conducts audits of pressure relieving systems to ensure compli-
ance with OSHA PSM legislation and ASME, API and DIERs
standards, codes and publications. He also teaches the official API
Pressure Relieving Systems course.
Mr. Henry is actively involved in the development of technolo-
gy for the API Risk-Based Inspection (RBI) methodology. He is
co-author of the re-write of API 581, Risked-Based Inspection
Base Resource Document and is responsible for the development
and implementation of Risk-Based Inspection programs for pres-
sure relief valves and heat exchanger bundles at refining and
petrochemical plants. He also teaches the official API 580/581
Risk-Based Inspection course.
Mr. Henry provides technical support and engineering consulting
to all levels of refinery capital projects. He has been responsible for
the preparation of purchase specifications, bid tabulations, design
reviews and the development and validation of approved vendors
lists. He conducts project safety reviews for construction and pre-
startup phases of major capital projects. His responsibilities include
developing and maintaining engineering specifications in the pres-
sure relief and heat transfer areas and providing overall coordination.
Mr. Henry is a registered Professional Engineer in the States of
Ohio and Texas.
HILL III, RALPH S.
Ralph S. Hill III is a Consulting Engineer
with Westinghouse Electric Company in
Pittsburgh, PA. He has over 30 years of
technical and management experience
including more than eighteen years in
planning, engineering design, construction,
and modification for the nuclear power
industry and fourteen years providing
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • xxi
strategic planning, system engineering, risk management, process
evaluation, and project management consulting services to the
U.S. Department of Energy in spent nuclear fuel, radioactive
waste management, and nuclear materials disposition-related
projects.
Mr. Hill is a Member of the ASME Board on Nuclear Codes
and Standards where he serves as Chairman of the Risk
Management Task Group. Mr. Hill is actively involved in bringing
risk-informed probabilistic design methods into the ASME Code
and initiatives to support both advanced and next-generation
nuclear reactors.
HSU, KAIHWA ROBERT
Kaihwa Robert Hsu earned a B.S. in Civil
Engineering from Chung Yuan Christian
College, and an M.S. from University of
South Carolina. He has thirty years experi-
ence applying engineering principles, devel-
oping computer codes of corrosion erosion
monitoring system, fatigue cycle monitoring
system, fatigue crack growth, and fracture
mechanics evaluation for nuclear industry.
From 1981 until 2003, he worked in Westinghouse and has been
involved in the areas of stress analysis, fatigue, fracture mechanics,
leak before break, residual stress, primary water stress corrosion
crack, and ASME Code related analyses pertaining to PWR.
Mr. Hsu is currently a senior engineer with U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC). He is a key member in the development of
the review and audit process improvement for aging management
reviews. He is an audit team leader for license renewal application,
responsible for metal fatigue time-limited aging analyses (TLAA)
and aging management programs (AMPs) audit and review.
Publications of Kaihwa Robert Hsu are in the Proceedings of
ASME Pressure Vessels and Piping Conference, the Proceedings
of 10th Environmental Degradation Conference, and the Proceedings
of 8th International Conference of Nuclear Engineering.
HOLLINGER, GREG L.
Greg L. Hollinger is a Senior Principal
Engineer for BWX Technologies, Inc. in
Barberton, Ohio. He has responsibility
for Mechanical/Structural Technology App-
lications and Design Analysis of Navy
Nuclear Pressure Vessel Components
and use of the ASME Boiler & Pressure
Vessel Code. He chairs the Engineering
Department’s Technical Support Team res-
ponsible for developing technology procedures. He is involved with
both nuclear and non-nuclear ASME Certificates of Authorization
for BWXT’s Nuclear Equipment Division.
Greg is a Fellow Member of ASME, and was the 2004 recipi-
ent of the ASME Pressure Vessels and Piping Medal. He is the
Chairman of the Subgroup on Design Analysis of the Sub-
committee on Design of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Code. Greg is a member of the Pressure Vessel Research Council
(PVRC) and the International Council on Pressure Vessel
Technology (ICPVT). He has served on several Boards within the
ASME Council on Codes and Standards, and he served as Chair
of the ASME Pressure Vessels and Piping Division in 1995.
Greg is an Registered Professional Engineer (Ohio) with
30 years of engineering practice in power-related industries.
HUNT, STEPHEN
Since receiving his BSME from Purdue
University in 1995, Steve Hunt has been
involved in equipment design, stress analy-
sis and root cause failure analysis of
mechanical equipment primarily for the
commercial nuclear power and offshore oil
industries. This work has included com-
mercial and research nuclear power plants,
fossil power plants, floating and fixed off-
shore oil/gas production facilities, deep diving submersibles, large
optical telescopes, tower cranes, paper mills, and chemical plants.
In 1980, Steve Hunt was a co-founder of Dominion
Engineering, Inc., and he is currently a Principal Officer. A signif-
icant part of Mr. Hunt’s recent consulting work has been for the
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). Major areas of effort
have included primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC)
of Alloy 600 material, boric acid corrosion, leakage reduction
technology, and life cycle management. Publications for EPRI
have included many documents related to Alloy 600 PWSCC, the
Boric Acid Corrosion Guidebook, and most of the Sealing
Technology and Plant Leakage Reduction Series reports. Mr.
Hunt also works extensively for electric utilities in the areas of
Alloy 600 PWSCC failure analysis and strategic planning, life
cycle management, and root cause failure analysis. Mr. Hunt also
provides technical consulting in the areas of offshore oil produc-
tion facilities, high pressure sealing technology, large diameter
bearings, and pressure vessel failure analysis. Mr. Hunt has
authored several hundred reports for a wide range of clients and
holds several patents. Mr. Hunt is a registered professional engi-
neer and is a member of ASME and IEEE.
ISOMURA, TOSHIO
Toshio Isomura is a mechanical engineer
with over 30 years of experience in all of the
aspects of pressure vessels for petro and
petrochemical plants. After graduating from
Mechanical Engineering of Osaka Uni-
versity in 1972, he joined Chiyoda
Chemical Engineering and Construction Co.
Ltd, and was engaged in the design and
development works of pressure vessels.
He started his new career in the High Pressure Gas Safety
Institute of Japan at their Inspection and Certification Department
in 2000, and is a manager of technical assessment division from
2006 succeeding Mr. Kajimura. At present, his main work is tech-
nical assessments of the technologies of non-standard pressure
vessels for the special appraisal under the High Pressure Gas
Safety Laws and the standardization tasks for technologies of
pressure vessel designs, including Fitness-for-Service code.
He is also a member of the JIS (Japanese Industrial Standards)
Pressure Vessels Technical Committee and contributes to the main-
tenance of existing JIS codes and development of new JIS codes.
He has also been involved with ISO/TC11 activities and
Japanese committees and is the secretary of ISO/TC11/WG10
since 2006
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xxii • Contributor Biographies
JETTER, ROBERT I.
Mr. Jetter has over 40 years experience in
the design and structural evaluation of
nuclear components and systems for ele-
vated temperature service where the effects
of creep are significant. He was a contribu-
tor to the original ASME Code Cases
eventually leading to Subsection NH. For
over 20 years he was Chair of the
Subgroup on Elevated Temperature Design
responsible for the design criteria for elevated temperature
nuclear components. He was Chair of the Subgroup on Elevated
Temperature Construction, Vice Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Design and a member of the Subcommittee on Nuclear Power.
He currently again chairs the SG-ETD. Mr. Jetter has participated
in domestic and international symposia on the elevated tempera-
ture design criteria. He was a member of a Department of Energy
(DOE) steering committee responsible for the design criteria, and
was a consultant and reviewer on various DOE projects. As a long
time employee of Rockwell International/Atomics International,
he was associated from the early sodium cooled reactors and
space power plants through all the US LMFBR programs.
Recently he was an International Fellow for the Power Reactor
and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation at the Monju Fast
Breeder Reactor site in Japan. He is a graduate in Mechanical
Engineering from Cal Tech (BS) and Stanford (MS) and has a
degree from UCLA in Executive Management. He is a fellow of
the ASME.
JONES, DAVID P.
Dr. Jones has 40 years experience in struc-
tural design analysis and is lead consultant
and developer on structural design proce-
dures for SDB-63 (Structural Design Basis,
Bureau of Ships, Navy Dept., Washington,
D.C.). Dr. Jones is an expert on brittle frac-
ture, fatigue crack growth, fatigue crack ini-
tiation, elastic and elastic-plastic finite ele-
ment methods, elastic and elastic-plastic
perforated plate methods, limit load technology, linear and non-lin-
ear computational methods and computer applications for structural
mechanics. Dr. Jones’s key contributions have been developing com-
puter programs that allow use of complex three-dimensional finite
element stress and strain results for the evaluation of ASME struc-
tural design stress limits. He introduced numerical methods to com-
pute fatigue usage factors, fatigue crack growth, brittle fracture
design margins and the like that have now become standards for use
in naval nuclear design. He is currently working on using finite ele-
ment elastic-plastic analysis tools for evaluation of limit load,
fatigue, shakedown, and ratchet failure modes.
Dr. Jones has been an active contributor to the ASME Boiler
and Pressure Vessel Code Committees; secretary and member of
Subgroup on Fatigue strength, Member and chairman of the
Subgroup on Design Analysis, Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Design, and Chairman of the Task Force on Elastic-Plastic FEA.
Dr. Jones was Chairman of Metal Properties Council Task Force
on Fatigue Crack Growth Technology. He has also served as
Associate Editor of the ASME Journal of Pressure Vessels and
Piping. He has published over thirty papers on the topics of
fatigue, fatigue crack growth, fracture mechanics, perforated plate
technology, computational structural mechanics methods, non-
linear structural analysis methods, finite element code development
for fracture mechanics applications, finite element applications for
perforated plate analysis (elastic and elastic-plastic), post-
processing finite element results for ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code Section III assessment, limit load technology, and
elastic-plastic fracture mechanics. He has been awarded ASME
PVP Literature Award – Outstanding Survey Paper of 1992 in
ASME Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping and ASME PVPD
Conference Award – Outstanding Technical Paper form Codes &
Standards – July 26, 2000. Dr. Jones received his BS and MS
degrees from the University of Toledo in 1967 and 1968 and his
PhD from Carnegie Mellon University in 1972. Dr. Jones is a
member of ASME and has worked at the Bettis Atomic Power
Laboratory in West Mifflin, Pennsylvania since 1968 where he
currently holds the position of Consultant Engineer.
JO, JONG CHULL
Dr. Jong Chull Jo is a mechanical engineer
who graduated from Hanyang University,
Seoul, Korea in 1979, and obtained his M.S.
and Ph. D. degrees from the same university
in 1981 and 1985, respectively. Currently, he
is a technical consultant of the Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), Nuclear Energy Agency in the area
of Nuclear Safety and Regulation and con-
currently is affiliated as a principal researcher with the Korea Institute
of Nuclear Safety (KINS) Daejon, Korea for which he has been
working since 1986. Before that, he worked as a full-time lecturer
and subsequently an Assistant Professor of Mechanical Engineering
Department at Induk College, Seoul for 5 years.
Dr. Jo’s job for over the past two decades relates to the safety
regulation of nuclear reactors including safety inspection and
licensing review, preparing regulatory requirements and guides,
and developing nuclear regulatory technology.
Dr. Jo was Head of Safety Issue Research Department at KINS
and concurrently Project Manager of the Regulatory Framework
Development for an Integral–Type Pressurized Water Reactor
Licensing. He served as a member of the Korean National
Technology Road Map Committee and a member of the National
R&D Projects Evaluation Committee. He lectured extensively on
the technologies for evaluation and resolution of nuclear reactor
safety issues at National Research Institutions, Academic
Conferences, Engineering Companies and Universities in Korea,
and served as a lecturer from 2003–2005 at the Graduate School
of Jeonju University, Korea.
Dr. Jo has been a member of the ASME Pressure Vessels and
Piping Division (PVPD) since 1999 and has been serving as Chair
of the PVPD Fluid-Structure Interaction Technical Committee since
July of 2008. He has also been serving as Chair of the Fluid-
Structure Interaction Division of the Korean Society of Pressure
Vessels and Piping since 2004. He has been a member of the Korean
Society of Mechanical Engineers since 1981, a member of the
Korean Nuclear Society since 1986, and a member of the Korea
Foundation of Science and Technology since 2003. He has pub-
lished about 50 technical journal papers and over 100 conference
proceeding papers. He has also co-authored or co-edited many
monographs and books. He has been invited as a peer reviewer of
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • xxiii
contributing papers for several archival journals such as ASME
Journal of Pressure Vessel Technology, Journal of Numerical Heat
Transfer, Journal of Numerical Heat and Mass Transfer, Journal of
Nuclear Engineering and Design.
Dr. Jo received ‘Korean Prime Ministerial Citation’ for recog-
nizing contribution to the promotion of science and technology in
1994 and ‘Korean Presidential Citation’ for contribution to devel-
opment of science and technology in 2004.
KAJIMURA, YOSHINORI
Yoshinori Kajimura has a Mechanical
Engineering B.S. (1966) from Hiroshima
University. He has more than 30 years of
experience in the design of all kinds of
pressure vessels including multi-layered
pressure vessels for oil refinery, petro-
chemical industries and so on for Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries, Hiroshima Works as a
manager of design.
He began his career in The High Pressure Gas Safety Institutes
of Japan (called KHK) at their Inspection and Certification
Department in 1995. He responsible as the manager of technical
assessment and special appraisal for the pressure vessels under
the High Pressure Gas Safety Law and their regulations.
He also has been an active member of the committee of JIS
(Japanese Industrials Standards) for pressure vessels since 1990
and also contributes to the development and restructuring of the
standards for pressure vessels in Japan.
He has also been involved in ISO/TC11 activities and Japanese
committee since 1997 at the restart of ISO/TC11 activities and he
began to be the secretariat of ISO/TCI11/WG10 since 2003.
KANEDA, MASAHIKO
Masahiko Kaneda is Senior Vice President
of Mitsubishi Nuclear Energy Systems, Inc.
He has more than thirty years of experience
in development and management of nuclear
power plant design in Japan. Mr. Kaneda
received a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering
from Seikei Univ. in Tokyo, Japan in 1978.
From September 2006 to March 2008, he
was employed by MHI in Tokyo, Japan as
the General Manager of Advanced Pressurized Water Reactor
Promoting Department, Nuclear Energy Systems Headquarters. He
directed all aspects of the APWR Promoting Department’s opera-
tions to control activities such as Design Certification of US-APWR,
Luminant Project and Potential Customer Engineering. From
October 2005 to August 2006, he was employed by MHI in Hyogo,
Japan as the General Manager of the Water Reactor Engineering
Department, Nuclear Energy Systems Engineering Center, Nuclear
Energy Systems Headquarters.
Under the direction of Mr. Kaneda, The Water Reactor
Engineering Department got involved in the conceptual and basic
design of the entire nuclear power plant facility, and consisted of
various sections specialized in the system design, layout design,
structural and seismic design, electrical design, instrumentation and
control design, turbine system design, and water reactor engineer-
ing. In this position, Mr. Kaneda directed the entire operations of the
Water Reactor Engineering Department and he established the
department’s annual operational goals, and planned the budget and
resources needed for the achievement of annual operation goals.
Thus, Mr. Masahiko Kaneda has nearly three decades of expe-
rience related to plant design for nuclear power plants such as
Japanese prototype FBR, Monju and many commercial PWRs in
Japan. He is not only a specialist for plant layout design but seis-
mic design as well. Currently, as the General Manager of APWR
Promoting Department, Nuclear Energy Systems Headquarters in
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, LTD Japan, he is responsible for the
promotion of US-APWR.
KARASAWA, TOSHIKI
The late Toshiki Karasawa graduated with
honors form Yamanashi University with a
B.E in Mechanical Engineering in 1973.
Since graduating, his career had focused on
nuclear power technology in Tokyo Electric
Power Company (TEPCO). He had more
than 30 years of broad experience in Design,
Manufacturing, Inspection, Quality Assu-
rance (QA) and Nuclear Fuel. He was the
general manager of QA of Nuclear Division at the time of his pass-
ing away in March 2008.
During 1980’s, Mr. Karasawa demonstrated excellent leader-
ship to introduce ASME Boiler and Pressure Code Sec. III to
METI (Ministry on Economy, trade and Industry) Notification
No.501, which regulated the detail design and manufacturing of
equipment for nuclear power plant in Japan. Following that, he
had been contributing to develop Codes and Standards (C&S) in
Japan and ASME.
Mr. Karasawa was a member of ASME, a Member-at-large of
Board on International Standards (BIS) of CCS, since 1997. His
report entitled “ASME Success Story in Japan” was favorably
received at BIS meeting in June 2003.
Mr. Karasawa was a member of Japan Society of Mechanical
Engineers (JSME) and serves as a Secretary of C&S Main
Committee since 2001. He was a member of Nuclear C&S Main
Committee of Japan Electric Association (JEA) and he served as
Vice Chair of QA committee and Chair QA Sub-committee. He
was a member of Structural Design Sub-committee in Thermal
and Nuclear Power Engineering Society (TENPES). He was a
member of The Japan Welding Engineering Society (JWES) and
served as Secretary of Codes and Accreditation Committee since
2001. He was an Executive member of Atomic Energy Society of
Japan (AESJ) since 1999 up untill his passing away.
Mr. Karasawa resided in Yokohama City Kanagawa Prefecture,
with his wife, Chiharu, and two daughters, Mayumi and Hanae.
KARCHER, GUIDO G.
Guido G. Karcher, P.E. is a consulting engi-
neer with over 48 years of experience in the
mechanical engineering aspects of pressure
containing equipment. He retired from the
Exxon Research and Engineering Co. after
serving 30 years as an internationally recog-
nized engineering advisor on pressure ves-
sel, heat exchangers, piping and tankage
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xxiv • Contributor Biographies
design, construction and maintenance. On retire from Exxon
Research & Engineering Co. in 1994; he became a Consulting
Engineer on fixed equipment for the petrochemical industry and
related industry codes and standards. Guido has also functioned as
the Technical Director of the Pressure Vessel Manufactures
Association, for 15 years, in the areas of mass produced pressure
vessel construction and inspection requirements.
Guido’s code activities include over 35 years of participation
in ASME, PVRC and API Codes and Standards activities serv-
ing on numerous committees and technical development task
groups. He was elected to the position of Chairman of the
ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Standards Committee for two
terms of office (2001–2007) and was elected to the office of
Vice President Pressure Technology Codes and Standards
(2005–2008). Guido also served as Chairman of the Pressure
Vessel Research Council and the American Petroleum Institute
Subcommittee on Pressure Vessels and Tanks. He has written
numerous technical papers on subjects related to pressure con-
taining equipment.
Guido is an ASME Life Fellow and a recipient of the J. Hall
Taylor Medal for outstanding contributions in the development of
ASME Pressure Technology Codes and Standards. Guido was
also recently awarded the 2007 Melvin R. Green Codes and
Standards Medal for outstanding contributions to the development
and promulgation of ASME Codes and Standards within the USA
and Internationally. Other awards include the API Resolution of
Appreciation and Honorary Emeritus Membership of Pressure
Vessel Research Council. He earned a B.S.M.E. from Pratt
Institute and M.S.M.E. from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and
is a registered Professional Engineer in the States of New York
and New Jersey.
KOSTAREV, VICTOR V.
Victor V. Kostarev is a Mechanical
Engineering (Gas and Steam Turbines)
graduate of Saint-Petersburg Polytechnic
University, Russia. He earned his Ph.D.
degree in 1979 for investigation of self-
excited vibration of high speed rotors of
supercritical steam turbines.
His professional career includes over
35 years experience in analysis and
qualification of structures, systems, piping and components for
vibration, operational, seismic loads and design basis
accidental loads of nuclear power plants and other facilities in
different industries. Dr. Kostarev is a founder of the State
Laboratory for seismic and external events protection of SSC in
CKTI Institute (1977). Then he established in 1992 a private
Structural – Mechanical Engineering Company located in
Saint-Petersburg, Russia (www.cvs.spb.su) where he is the
president up to date. He is an author of more than 50 papers
and 10 inventions.
V.Kostarev is a consultant for International Atomic Energy
Agency. He is a member of ASME BPVC Nuclear Section III
Subcommittee on Nuclear Power and Section III ASME BPVC
Working Group on Piping. Victor Kostarev has been the volunteer
ASME corresponding author/representative in Russia.
KOVES, WILLIAM J.
William Koves, Ph.D., P.E., ASME Fellow,
is a Senior Engineering Fellow at UOP, a
high technology company that develops
and licenses process and related equipment
technology in the petrochemical, process
and related industries.
Dr. Koves has 40 years of experience in
the design, analysis and troubleshooting of
equipment and structures including air-
craft, nuclear reactors, and petrochemical equipment. His special-
ties include stress analysis, fracture, elevated temperature design,
heat transfer, stability, vibration, fatigue, fluid mechanics, and
mechanics of granular solids.
Dr. Koves is author of numerous publications in the field and
holder of 24 US and 3 European patents. He has been very
involved with numerous ASME and PVRC committees includ-
ing, Past Chair of ASME B31.3 Process Piping Committee,
Chair of ASME B31 Mechanical Design Committee, Member
of the B31 Standards Committee, Member of ASME Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Subcommittee on Design Analysis, Elevated
Temperature Design, Special Working Group on Design of
Bolted Flange Joints and member of the Post Construction
Standards Committee and Subcommittee on Repair.
Dr. Koves was Vice-Chair of the Pressure Vessel Research
Council (PVRC), Member of PVRC Committee on Piping and
Nozzles, Chair of PVRC Committee on Elevated Temperature
Design, Chair of PVRC Subcommittee on Shell Intersections,
and Past the Chair of the Post Construction Flaw Evaluation
Committee and Member of the Main and Executive
Committees.
KRECKEL, DIETER
Dieter Kreckel graduated in 1968 from the
FH Bingen, Germany with a Dipl.-Ing.
(FH) specializing in mechanical/chemical
engineering. Dieter Kreckel started his
active profession in 1968 within the
Department of Engineering and Lay out,
piping and components of the UHDE
GmbH Company. The nuclear activities
that he started in 1971 continue to this
date. He is with AREVA NP GmbH (ex. Framatome ANP GmbH,
ex. Siemens NP, and ex. KWU).
Dieter Kreckel’s work experience includes Engineering compo-
nents of BWR and PWR, Co-ordination of equipment specifica-
tions, QM- Engineering (ENACE Argentina 1981 to 1985), QM-
Engineering in various Projects, International co-operation on
Design Codes e.g. for EPR Development (GERMAN/ FRENCH),
EU DG TREN, WGCS (Working Group “Codes and Standards”).
Dieter Kreckel has immense experience in the field of
European Nuclear Code activities that include Collaboration with-
in the French REP 2000 Programme, Comparison of German and
French Nuclear Codes and their application as a basis for the joint
proposals to the European Pressure Water Reactor Technical
Code for Mechanical Equipment (ETC-M), Elaboration of ETC-
M Class 1 to 3 together with partner Framatome ANP SAS,
Review of ETC-M Class 1 to 3 proposal together with German
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • xxv
Utilities and EDF, NPP upgrading of RUSSIAN NPP and compli-
ance of the Russian Code analysis for applying to European
Codes and Standards.
Dieter Kreckel organized various Seminars for the implementa-
tion of the PED and Harmonized EN Standards to Nuclear Codes
in Europe. Since 2003 Dieter Kreckel is assigned and acts as
Quality Manager for the Olkiluto 3 Project in Finland.
KUO, PAO-TSIN
Dr. Kuo earned an engineering diploma
from Taipei Institute of Technology, a MS
from North Dakota State University and a
PhD from Rice University. He is a
Registered Professional Engineer in the
State of Maryland. He has been employed
by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory commis-
sion (NRC) since 1975. He held various
positions in the NRC during this period.
He is currently the Program Director for the License Renewal
and Environmental Impacts Program in the Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, responsible for guidance development and
licensing activities of the license renewal programme as well as
environmental reviews of application for license renewal, licens-
ing amendments and early site permits.
Dr. Kuo is a member of the ASME Section XI Special Working
Group on Plant Life Extension and former member of the ASME
Section III Working Group of Piping Design as well as Task
Group on Dynamic Stress Limits. Currently, he is the chairman of
Working Group I, General Long Term Operation Framework,
IAEA Extra Budgetary Program on Safety Aspects of Long Term
Operation of Water Moderated Reactors.
KUSHWAHA H. S.
Mr. H.S. Kushwaha, M.Tech. (Mechanical
Engineering), is Director, Health Safety
and Environment Group at Bhabha Atomic
Research Centre, Mumbai, India. He
joined Reactor Engineering Division,
Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC)
in 1971. Since then, he has been engaged
in R&D activities for Structural Design
and Safety Analysis of Indian Heavy Water
Reactor program. He contributed significantly in the area of com-
putational Mechanics, Pressure Vessel and Piping Design and
Analysis and Leak-Before-Break (LBB) study of high energy pip-
ing system. Mr. Kushwaha has been associated with Seismic
Design, Analysis and Testing of major components of 540 MW(e)
Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor built at Tarapur, Maharashtra.
He is currently steering the research activities in the field of
structural reliability, radiological risk assessment and uncertainty
analysis. Mr. Kushwaha is Chairman of BARC Safety Council
and President of Indian Association for Radiation Protection. Mr.
Kushwaha is a member of Safety Review Committee for
Operating Plants (SARCOP) of Atomic Energy Regulatory Board
(AERB). He has published more than 600 technical papers. He is
recipient of prestigious Indian Nuclear Society award. He is a
Fellow of the National Academy of Engineering.
LAND, JOHN T.
John T. Land, P.E., has been involved in the
design, analyses and manufacturing of
Westinghouse’s PWR nuclear primary
equip-ment products for almost thirty years.
His product design experience includes reac-
tor internals, steam generators, presurizers,
valves, and heat exchangers. Mr. Land also
contributed to the design and development
of the AP600 and AP1000 MWe Advanced
Power Plants, the Westinghouse/Mitsubishi APWR 4500 MWt
Reactor Internals, and many of the currently operating
Westinghouse PWR domestic and international reactor internals
components. In addition, he has directed and reviewed the design
and analysis efforts of engineers from Italy (FIAT and ANSALDO),
Spain (ENSA), Czech Republic, and Japan (MHI) on several collab-
orative Westinghouse international efforts. His experience included
five years with Westinghouse as a stress analyst on nuclear valves in
support of the Navy’s Nuclear Reactor Program. Prior to working
for Westinghouse, Mr. Land spent eleven years with the General
Electric Company on the design and development of Cruise Fan and
XV-5A Vertical Take-Off and Landing aircraft propulsion systems.
He also holds eleven patents from General Electric, and
Westinghouse. Mr. Land received his BS in Mechanical Engineering
from Drexel University and his MS in Applied Mechanics from the
University of Cincinnati.
Over the past thirty years, John has been active in ASME
B&PV Code work. Mr. Land is currently member of the Working
Group Core Support Structures and participates in the rule mak-
ing and maintenance of Sub-Section NG. John is also a member
of Sub-Group Design that oversees Section III and Section VIII
Design Rules.
LANDERS, DONALD F.
Donald F. Landers, P.E., is currently Chief
Engineer of Landers and Associates. He was
General Manager and President of Teledyne
Engineering Services where he was
employed from 1961 to 1999. Mr. Landers,
an ASME Fellow, has been involved in
ASME Code activities since 1965 serving as
a Member of B31.7 and Chairman of their
Task Group on Design, Section III Working
Group on Piping Design and Subgroup on Design. He continues as a
member of these Section III groups as well as Subcommittee III and
also served as a member of section XI and the BPVC Standards
Committee.
Mr. Landers also served as a member of the Board on
Nuclear Codes and Standards and as Vice Chairman. He has
served on PVRC committees and was heavily involved in the
PVRC research that led to the new seismic design rules in
Section III.
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xxvi • Contributor Biographies
He is an internationally recognized expert in piping design and
analysis and application of ASME Code and regulatory require-
ments. Mr. Landers has authored over 20 technical papers related
to design and analysis of pressure components.
He is currently involved in providing consulting services to the
utility industry in the areas of Life Extension, Code compliance,
and Operability issues. Don continues to provide training and
seminars on Code Criteria and application internationally. He is
recipient of the Bernard F. Langer Award, J. Hall Taylor Award,
and ASME Dedicated Service Award.
LEWIS, D. WAYNE
Mr. Donald Wayne Lewis is a Project
Engineer for Shaw Stone & Webster
Nuclear with over 27 years of experience
in commercial nuclear power and
Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear
related projects. He has worked on a vari-
ety of Mechanical/Structural engineering
applications including nuclear power sys-
tem design and construction, MOX fuel
assembly design, spent fuel management and related NRC
licensing. He has spent 17 years in his primary area of expertise
which is related to dry spent nuclear fuel storage and is current-
ly Project Engineer for several Independent Spent Fuel Storage
Installation (ISFSI) projects. He has also served as a design
reviewer for the DOE Yucca Mountain Project concerning spent
fuel processing and disposal.
Mr. Lewis is a Member of the ASME Subgroup on Containment
Systems for Spent Fuel and High-Level Waste Transport
Packagings. He is the author of two publications related to spent
fuel storage which are in the 2003 and 2005 proceedings of the
International Conference on Environmental Remediation and
Radioactive Waste Management (ICEM) sponsored by ASME.
Mr. Lewis received a B.S. in Civil Engineering from Montana
State University in 1980. He is a Registered Professional
Engineer in New York, Maine, Iowa, Utah and Colorado.
MAC KAY, JOHN R.
Mr. John Mackay has over 50 years experi-
ence as a mechanical engineering specialist
in boilers, pressure vessels, steam accu-
mulators, ASME Code construction,
Nondestructive examination, heat transfer
systems, combustion and municipal incin-
erator design and construction. John has a
Bachelor of Engineering (Mech.), 1951
from McGill University, Montreal and fol-
lowed it by numerous courses over the years in Management,
Management Techniques, and Post-graduate engineering and
management courses at Concordia University.
Mr. John Mackay was an employee of Dominion Bridge
Company Limited in Montreal from 1951 to 1984 and has since
continued to work as a private consultant in his field. His major
accomplishments of the hundreds of projects he has been involved
include the Primary System Feeder Pipes for the CANDU nuclear
reactors, boilers for waste/refuse mass burn disposal systems and
design and maintenance of API Storage Tanks. John has extensive
experience in the design and construction of heat recovery boilers
for the metallurgical industry. John is recognized as one of the
leading practitioners of his specialties in Canada.
Mr. John Mackay has been a member of ASME for over 40 years,
during which he has served on a variety of committees engaged in
updating existing Codes, introduction of new Codes, and the investi-
gation and resolution of questions referred to these committees. He
has been a member of Section I Power Boiler Subcommittee since
1968 to present time, Chaired it 1989–2004; Member Standards
Committee, 1971–present; Subgroup Electric Boilers (SCI) and
chaired it in 1978–84; Member & Chairman Adhoc Task group on
Acceptance Criteria. John was a Member and Chair of the Section V
Subcommittee on Nondestructive Examination; Joint Task group
B31.1/SCI. John is a member of Subgroup on General requirements
& Surface Examination (SCV); and is a member of Subgroup on
Materials (SCI). John was a member of Honors & Awards
Committee (B&PV) from 1989–2006, and chaired in 1995–2006.
He was a Member Executive Committee (B&PV Main Committee)
from 1992–2004. In addition to ASME John is affiliated with sever-
al professional organizations including Engineering Institute of
Canada and Quebec Order of Engineers.
John Mackay has several publications and has given lectures on
engineering topics both in Canada and USA. John was a partici-
pant of several PVP conferences and ASHRAE. He has several
hobbies that include Contract Bridge and John is happily married
with adult children.
MALEK, M. A.
M. A. Malek is a Professional Engineer
(P.E.) registered in the state of Maine,
P.Eng. Canada registered in the Province of
I New Brunswick and Prince Edward
Island. Mohammad is a Certified Plant
Engineer, CPE, U.S.A., and has more than
27 years experience in boiler and pressure
vessel technology. Presently he is the Chief
Boiler Inspector for the state of Florida.
Prior to his present position, he was Chief Boiler, Elevator and
Tramway Inspector for the state of Maine, Deputy Chief Inspector
of state of Louisiana and Chief Boiler Inspector, Bangladesh.
Mr. Malek has demonstrated leadership in B&PV boiler and
pressure vessel industry. His achievements include developing
and designing a special husk-fired, fire-tube boiler of capacity
500 lbs/hr at 50 psi for developing countries. He has vast knowl-
edge and experience in writing, and enforcing boiler and pressure
vessel laws, rules, and regulations. He has written numerous arti-
cles and published in several technical journals. Malek obtained his
BSME degree from Bangladesh Engineering and Technology,
Dhaka (1972) and MBA from Institute of Business Admini-
stration, University of Dhaka (1979).
Malek has been a member of ASME since 1980 and Fellow of
Institution of Engineers, Bangladesh. He is an instructor of
ASME Professional Development courses, and serves on three
ASME Committees including CSD-1 Committee, QFO-1
Committee, and Conference Committee of the ASME B&PV
Committee. Malek has been a member of the National Board of
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors since 1997.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • xxvii
MASTERSON, ROBERT J.
Masterson has a BSME from University of
Rhode Island (1969) and course work for
MSME, University of Rhode Island
(1973). He is a Registered Professional
Engineer in states of RI, MA, IL, NE, MI
and AK, and is currently self-employed at
RJM Associates in Fall River, MA.
Masterson is a retired Captain, U.S. Army
Corp of Engineers (1986). His professional
experience included New England Electric System (1969–1970),
ITT Grinnell Corporation, Pipe Hanger Division, Providence, RI
(1972–1979). With ITT Grinnell he was a Manager of Piping and
Structural Analysis for the Pipe Hanger Division (1974) and
developed stress analysis, and testing for ASME Section III
Subsection NF and provided training in Subsection NF for
ITT Grinnell, several Utilities, AEs and support for NRC Audit.
In 1978 he became Manager Research, Development and
Engineering. He was Manager of Engineering (1979) at
Engineering Analysis Services, Inc. East Greenwich RI later in
1990 called EAS Energy Services. He was Vice President of
Operations (1984) and tasks included NRC audit support, turnkey
projects and valve qualification.
Masterson was an alternate member, Working Group on
Component Supports (Subsection NF), 1973–1979; Member
Subsection NF 1979 to the present. Chaired Task Groups for
Subsection NF jurisdiction; Chair of Working Group on Supports
(SG-D) (SC III) since May, 2000 and Member of Committee for
the First Symposium on Inservice Testing of Pumps and Valves,
1989, Washington, DC, NUREG/CP-0111.
MEHTA, HARDAYAL S.
Dr. Mehta received his B.S. in Mechanical
Engineering from Jodhpur University
(India), M.S. and Ph.D. from University of
California, Berkeley. He was elected an
ASME Fellow in 1999 and is a Registered
Professional Engineer in the State of
California.
Dr. Mehta has been with GE Nuclear
Division (now, GE-Hitachi Nuclear
Energy) since 1978 and currently holds the position of Chief
Consulting Engineer. He has over 35 years of experience in the
areas of stress analysis, linear-elastic and elastic-plastic fracture
mechanics, residual stress evaluation, and ASME Code related
analyses pertaining to BWR components. He has also participated
as principal investigator or project-manager for several BWRVIP,
BWROG and EPRI sponsored programs at GE, including the
Large Diameter Piping Crack Assessment, IHSI, Carbon Steel
Environmental Fatigue Rules, RPV Upper Shelf margin
Assessment and Shroud Integrity Assessment. He is the
author/coauthor of over 40 ASME Journal/Volume papers. Prior to
joining GE, he was with Impell Corporation where he directed vari-
ous piping and structural analyses.
For more than 25 years, Dr. Mehta has been an active member
of the Section XI Subgroup on Evaluation Standards and associat-
ed working an task groups. He also has been active for many
years in ASME’s PVP Division as a member of the Material &
Fabrication Committee and as conference volume editor and
session developer. His professional participation also included
several committees of the PVRC, specially the Steering
Committee on Cyclic Life and Environmental Effects in Nuclear
Applications. He had a key role in the development of environ-
mental fatigue initiation rules that are currently under considera-
tion for adoption by various ASME Code Groups.
MILLER, UREY R.
Mr. Miller is an ASME Fellow and has
more than 30 years of experience in the
pressure vessel industry. He has participat-
ed in ASME Pressure Vessel Code
Committee activity for well more than
20 years. He is a Registered Professional
Engineer in Indiana and Texas. He is cur-
rently a member of the following ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Committees:
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Standards Committee
Subcommittee Pressure Vessels—Section VIII
Subgroup Design—Section VIII (Chairman)
Special Working Group for Heat Transfer Equipment (past
Chairman)
Special Committee on Interpretations—Section VIII
Subcommittee Design.
Mr. Miller has been the Chief Engineer with the Kellogg
Brown & Root Company (KBR), a major international engineer-
ing and construction company for the petrochemical industry,
since 1992. In this position, he consults on a wide array of sub-
jects including pressure vessesl, heat exchanger, and piping
design issues, including application and interpretation of all
ASME Code requirements. He has had extensive experience with
international projects. He has provided significant engineering
support and advice to KBR projects throughout the world. In the
role as Chief Engineer, he has traveled extensively providing
engineering support for projects in Brazil, Malaysia, Egypt,
Algeria, Nigeria, Philippine Islands, South Africa, United
Kingdom, Mexico, etc. in addition to a variety of projects in
United States. He has experience in refinery, petrochemical, lique-
fied natural gas, ammonia, phenol, and other types of projects.
Previously, he held responsible positions related to process pres-
sure equipment at Union Carbide Corporation and Foster Wheeler
Energy Corporation. In addition, he has had over eight years
experience in designing pressure vessels for nuclear power gener-
ation applications with the Babcock and Wilcox Co. Mr. Miller
has a Bachelor’s Degree in Mechanical Engineering (cum laud)
from the University of Evansville (Indiana).
MOEN, RICHARD A.
Richard (Dick) Moen has been a member of
numerous Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code
committees since 1969. Richard (Dick)
Moen was an active member of various
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code committees
from 1969, until his retirement in 2005.
During that time span, he served on the
Standards Committee, the Subcommittee on
Materials, the Subcommittee on Nuclear
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xxviii • Contributor Biographies
Power, and additional Subgroups and Task Groups serving in those
areas. He is a life member of ASM International.
Richard Moen earned a BS degree in Metallurgical Engineering
from South Dakota School of Mines and Technology in 1962,
with additional graduate studies through the University of Idaho
and the University of Washington. He has spent his entire profes-
sional career in the field of nuclear energy, beginning in research
and development, and then with commercial power plant con-
struction, operation support, and maintenance. He now consults
and teaches through Meon Technical Services.
Richard Moen’s primary area of expertise is in materials behav-
ior and applications. He has authored numerous papers and has
been involved in several national materials handbook programs.
And with his long-time involvement in the ASME Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code, he has authored a popular book entitled
“Guidebook to ASME Section II, B31.1, and B31.3—Materials
Index”. His classes are built around that book.
MOKHTARIAN, KAMRAN
Kam Mokhtarian graduated from the
Northwestern University with a Master of
Science degree, in 1964. He worked for
Chicago Bridge and Iron Company from
1964 through 2000, in a variety of assign-
ments. He was responsible for design and
analysis of nuclear vessels and pressure ves-
sels for a number of years. He also provided
technical consulting to the engineering staff.
Mr. Mokhtarian has been involved with the ASME B&PV
Code Committee, since 1980. He has served as member and
chairman of several committees. He was Chairman of Subgroup
Design of Subcommittee VIII and the Vice-chairman of Subgroup
Fabrication and Inspection. He is presently the Vice-chairman of
Subcommittee VIII.
Mr. Mokhtarian is also a member of the Post Construction
Standards Committee and the Vice-chairman of the Subcommittee
on Flaw Evaluation. He has also served as an associate editor of the
ASME’s Journal of Pressure Vessel Technology for several years.
Mr. Mokhtarian has been an active member of the Pressure
Vessel Research Council (PVRC) since 1980 and has served as
Chairman of several committees. He is presently the Chairman of
the PVRC. He has authored several WRC Bulletins, including
Bulletin 297 that has become a major resource for pressure vessel
designers. He has also been teaching a number of pressure vessel
related ASME courses.
MOODY, FREDERICK J.
Ph.D., M.S., B.S., Mechanical Engineering
(Stanford, Stanford, U. of Colorado)
Consulting Engineer, Thermal-Hydraulics,
GE Nuclear Energy, 41 years with emphasis
on fluid mechanics, thermodynamics, heat
transfer, and coupled fluid-structure interac-
tion, pertaining to reactor and containment
technology. Adjunct Professor, Thermo-
sciences, San Jose State University, 28 years,
Instructor, GE Advanced Engineering Programs. Instructor for
ASME Continuing Education courses. Invited courses, lectures in
U. S. universities and national labs, Rome, Israel, Holland, Japan,
India, Germany, Spain, and Taiwan on unsteady thermofluid behav-
ior. National Academy of Engineering, 2001, Induction into Silicon
Valley Engineers Hall of Fame, 2000, ASME PV&PD Award
(1999), ASME Fellow (1981); George Westinghouse Gold Medal
Award (1980), and Alfred Noble Award for technical paper (1967).
Has been Committee chair and co-chair, ASME Fluids Engineering
Division, PV&P Division and Associate Editor of ASME Journals.
Participated on NRC-appointed peer review groups, and ongo-
ing consulting assignments with several NRC studies and panels.
Publications include Introduction to Unsteady Thermofluid
Mechanics, Wiley, and The Thermal-Hydraulics of a Boiling
Water Nuclear Reactor, ANS (co-author), and more than 50 pub-
lications in technical journals, and symposium volumes.
MORA, RAFAEL G.
Mr. Rafael Mora is a graduate in Civil
Engineering from the University of La
Gran Colombia, and holds a Master of
Business Administration, UNET-UFPS,
Venezuela-Colombia. He is a registered
professional engineer in Canada.
Mr. Mora has been working for the
pipeline industry for over seventeen years
that include pipeline operating; integrity
consulting and in-line inspection service companies. He recently
joined the National Energy Board as a Technical Leader,
Engineering within the Compliance Planning and Analysis Team.
Mr. Mora is currently also a professor in the Pipeline
Engineering Master Degree program at the University of Calgary.
He has taught courses in pipeline integrity extensively within
North and South America and has authored a number of technical
papers on this subject.
MORTON, D. KEITH
Mr. D. Keith Morton is a Consulting
Engineer at the Department of Energy’s
(DOE) Idaho National Laboratory, operated
by Battelle Energy Alliance. He has worked
in the Applied Mechanics Department for
nearly 33 years. Mr. Morton has gained a
wide variety of structural engineering experi-
ence in many areas, including performing
nuclear piping and power piping stress analy-
ses, completing plant walkdowns, consulting with the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, developing life extension strategies for the
Advanced Test Reactor, performing full-scale seismic and impact
testing, and helping to develop the DOE standardized spent nuclear
fuel canister. His most recent work activities include performing full-
scale drop tests of DOE spent nuclear fuel canisters and developing a
test methodology that allows for the quantification of true stress-
strain curves that reflect strain rate effects.
Mr. Morton is a Member of the ASME Working Group on the
Design of Division 3 Containments, is the Secretary for the ASME
Subgroup on Containment Systems for Spent Fuel and High-Level
Waste Transport Packagings, and is a Member of the ASME Section
III Subcommittee. He has co-authored over twenty-five conference
papers, one journal article, and recently co-authored an article on
DOE spent nuclear fuel canisters for Radwaste Solutions.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • xxix
Mr. Morton received a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering from
California Polytechnic State University in 1975 and a Masters of
Engineering in Mechanical Engineering from the University of
Idaho in 1979. He is a Registered Professional Engineer in the state
of Idaho.
MURRAY, ALAN
Dr. Alan Murray is the Professional Leader
Engineering at the National Energy Board
in Calgary and an Adjunct Professor in the
Chemical Engineering Department of the
University of Calgary.
He is a graduate of The Queen’s Uni-
versity of Belfast, Northern Ireland in Civil
Engineering and Mechanical Engineering
and has spent most of his career in Design
and Development activities mostly in heavy engineering. He has held
a number of senior management positions with a major North
American pipeline company and was founding chair of the ASME
Pipeline Systems Division. He is the co—author of the ASME book
Pipeline Design and Construction: A Practical Approach, and has
published over 50 papers on a variety of engineering topics.
NASH, DAVID
Dr. Nash is the Vice-Dean of Engineering
and a Reader in Mechanical Engineering at
the University of Strathclyde in Glasgow,
Scotland. After spending several years with
a vessel fabricator, Dr Nash joined the
Department as a researcher where he gained
an MSc and PhD working on local load and
saddle support contact problems. His
research interests lie broadly in the area of
pressure equipment design procedures, and most recently in the area
of bolted joints and sealing technology. He has written over
90 papers and authored and contributed to several books. He has co-
written and organised a suite of pressure equipment design courses
for industry and these have been run on an annual basis since 1986.
Dr Nash is a Fellow of the Institution of Mechanical
Engineering and a Chartered Engineer and has been an ASME
member since 1987. He was made an ASME Fellow in 2006. He
is the present Vice-Chairman of the Pressure Systems Group of
the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, is a member of the
British Standards Committee for Design Methods (BSi PVE-
1–15) and is the current UK national representative to EPERC,
the European Equipment Research Council.
NICKERSON, DOUGLAS B.
Douglas B. Nickerson graduated from Cal-
Tech with a BSME. He was a registered
Engineer in the State of California and is a
Fellow of ASME. He worked in the
Aerospace Industry until 1965 when he
founded his consulting business, Stress
Analysis Associates. During his tenure
in the Aerospace Industry he developed
the Hi-V/L ® pump for aerocraft booster
pump application. He was active in dynamic analyses of pumps
and valves as a consultant to most of the commercial pump manu-
facturers including those manufacturing nuclear pumps.
As a corollary to the dynamic analysis of pumps and valves Mr.
Nickerson developed a number of computer programs to carry out
these analyses. Some of these programs were successfully mar-
keted. Not only active in Engineering he helped organize the
Fluid Machinery Section of the Local ASME Section. In recogni-
tion of his activities he was made “Engineer of the Month” of
Southern California for August 1973.
Mr. Nickerson was on the SURF Board of CalTech and was
formerly its Chairman.
Douglas Nickerson had served on a number of ASME Section III
Committees and was Chairman of QR Subcommittee of QME.
Mr. Douglas B. Nickerson passed away since the completion of
the first edition.
NORDSTROM, EDWIN A.
On the personal side, Ed is a native of
Kansas who was educated at the University
of Kansas as an undergraduate and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology where
he earned graduate degrees in both
Chemistry and Management – the latter from
the Sloan School. He served in administrative
positions for 16 years on school boards and
40 years in the Episcopal Church.
Without an engineering degree, Ed rose to be Manager of
Process Engineering for a chemical company and then to VP
Engineering for A O Smith Water Products Division. In the latter
post, he became active in ASME where he has served on Section
IV for 25 years. This activity continued across job changes to
Amtrol [Manager, Hot Water Maker Sales]; Viessmann
Manufacturing [COO for US operations]; Gas Appliance
Manufacturers Association; and Heat Transfer Products.
O’DONNELL, WILLIAM J.
Bill O’Donnell has Engineering Degrees
from Carnegie Mellon University and the
University of Pittsburgh. He began his career
at Westinghouse Research and Bettis where
he became an Advisory Engineer. In 1970
Bill founded O’Donnell and Associates, an
engineering consulting firm specializing in
design and analysis of structures and compo-
nents. The firm has done extensive work in
the evaluation of structural integrity, including corrosion fatigue,
flaw sensitivity, crack propagation, creep rupture and brittle fracture.
Dr. O’Donnell has published 96 papers in engineering mechanics,
elastic-plastic fracture mechanics, strain limits and damage evalua-
tion methods. He is Chairman of the Subgroup on Fatigue Strength
and a Member of the Subcommittee on Design of the ASME Code.
He has patents on mechanical processes and devices used in plants
worldwide. He is recognized expert in Failure Causation Analyses.
Dr. O’Donnell has given invited lectures at many R&D laboratories,
design firms and universities. He is a registered Professional
Engineer. He received the National Pi Tau Sigma Gold Medal
Award “For Outstanding Achievement in Mechanical Engineering”
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xxx • Contributor Biographies
and the ASME Award for “Best Conference Technical Paper” in
1973 and 1988. The Pittsburgh Section of ASME named Bill
“Engineer of the Year.” (1988) He was awarded the ASME PVP
Medal (1994) and received the University of Pittsburgh ME
Department’s Distinguished Alumni Award (1996) and Carnegie
Mellon University’s 2004 Distinguished Achievement Award for
distinguished service and accomplishments in any field of human
endeavor. He is a Fellow of the ASME and is listed in the Engineers
Joint Council “Engineers of Distinction,” Marquis “Who’s Who in
Science and Engineering” and “Who’s Who in the World.”
OLSON, DAVID E.
David Olson, as part of his career at
Sargent & Lundy LLC, has been involved
in solving piping and rotating equipment
vibration problems at over 50 nuclear and
fossil power plants. He has managed the
design and successful implementation of
preoperational and initial startup piping
test programs at BWR and PWR plants.
Throughout his career has been responsible
for diagnosing and solving field problems with piping systems at
both nuclear and fossil power plants. Mr. Olson has also been
responsible for initial design, backfits and modifications of both
nuclear and fossil power plants. As part of this experience he has
developed expertise in vibration analysis, testing and field prob-
lem resolution. Mr. Olson is the current and long standing
Chairman of ASME Operation and Maintenance Subgroup on
Piping Systems, the group responsible for writing the OM-3 stan-
dard on piping vibration. Mr. Olson has published numerous tech-
nical papers on vibration and piping dynamics, testing and design
and has also given numerous training seminars.
Mr. Olson has also managed various industry initiatives includ-
ing the development of improved guidance for piping design and
analysis, piping operability criteria, the development of risk
informed methods to reduce seismic loads, and the patented
design of radiation shielding pipe insulation. University of Illinois –
B.S. Engineering, University of Chicago – MBA, Registered
Professional Engineer.
OSAGE, DAVID A.
Mr. Osage, President and CEO of the
Equity Engineering Group in Shaker
Heights, Ohio, is internationally recog-
nized as an industry expert and leader in
the development and use of FFS technolo-
gy. As the architect and principal author of
API 579 Fitness-For-Service, he developed
many of the assessment methodologies and
supporting technical information. As the
chairperson for the API/ASME Joint Committee on Fitness-For-
Service, he was instrumental in completing the update to API 579
entitled API 579-1/ASME FFS-1 Fitness-For-Service. Mr. Osage
provides instruction on Fitness-For-Service technology to the
international community under the API University Program.
Mr. Osage is also a recognized expert in the design of new
equipment. As the lead investigator and principal author of the
new ASME, Section VIII, Division 2, Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Code, he developed a new organization and writing style for this
code and was responsible for introducing the latest developments
in materials, design, fabrication and inspection technologies.
These technologies include a new brittle fracture evaluation
method, new design-by-analysis procedures including the intro-
duction of elastic-plastic analysis methods, and a new fatigue
method for welded joints. Mr. Osage has delivered lectures on the
new pressure vessel code in Europe and Japan and will be offer-
ing a training course highlighting advantages of the new code for
use with refinery and petrochemical equipment.
Mr. Osage was a lead investigator in revamping the API Risk-
Based Inspection (RBI) technology and software. The main focus of
this effort was a clean sheet re-write of API 581 Risk-Based
Inspection and the development of a new version of the API RBI
software. He is currently working on the next generation of RBI tech-
nology where Fitness-For-Service assessment procedures will be
used to compute the Probability of Failure for Risk-Based Inspection.
As an Adjunct Visiting Assistant Professor at Stevens Institute
of Technology, Mr. Osage has taught graduate level courses in
strength of materials and elasticity, structural analysis and finite
element methods, and structural optimization.
OSWEILLER, FRANCIS
Francis Osweiller got international recogni-
tion for his expertise in French, European
and ASME Pressure Vessel Codes &
Standards. He has been the head of the
French delegation to CEN/TC 54 (European
Technical Committee for Unfired Pressure
Vessels) for several years and has chaired
several committees such as Simple Pressure
Vessels, Testing & Inspection, Tubesheets
and Bellows. Mr. Osweiller has been actively involved in Europe
with the development of the Pressure Equipment Directive and the
new CEN Standard for Unfired Pressure Vessels. He gave several
courses on these issues in France UK and USA. As member of the
Main Committee of CODAP, he developed several design rules for
the French Pressure Vessel Code (CODAP). His main contribution
was the development of Tubesheet Heat-exchanger rules to replace
the existing (TEMA) rules.
Francis Osweiller obtained a Mechanical Engineering degree in
Paris, France. He started his career at CETIM-France with FEM
analysis applied to pressure vessels. He has published more than
40 papers in France, UK, Germany and US on European Codes,
ASME Code and Pressure Equipment Directive and gave lectures
at AFIAP, ICPVT (International Conference of Pressure Vessel
Technology) and ASME-PVP (Pressure Vessel & Piping
Conference). He has been the representative for France at ICPVT
andISO/TC11.
Since 1985 Osweiller has been actively involved in ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code organization where he is mem-
ber of SCII/International Material Specifications, SCSVIII/SWG
on Heat Transfer Equipment, Post Construction Main Committee,
Board on Pressure Vessel Technology and Council on Codes and
Standards. His principal accomplishment is his role for the publi-
cation of common rules in ASME Code, European Code and
French Code for the design of tube-sheets and expansion bellows.
Osweiller is the recipient of several awards and certificates from
ASME and PVP and was elevated to the grade of Fellow by
ASME in 2001 and is listed in the Who’s Who in the World.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • xxxi
PAPPONE, DAN
Mr. Daniel Pappone is Chief Consulting
Engineer in Plant Performance at GE-
Hitachi Nuclear Energy. He joined GE in
1978. Mr. Pappone has extensive experi-
ence in safety evaluations for BWR acci-
dent conditions with a primary focus
on the vessel and containment response to
Loss-of-Coolant Accidents. He is involved
in the ongoing development of the generic
extended power uprate programs and has held lead technical posi-
tions in several stretch and extended power uprate projects.
Currently, Mr. Pappone has been leading research into under-
standing the fatigue loading acting on BWR steam dryers. His past
responsibilities have included degraded core cooling studies,
Emergency Procedure Guideline development, and the design, plant
application and installation of safety parameter display and plant
monitoring computer systems. He brings an overall integrated per-
spective to the projects, including analysis, system design, opera-
tions, and regulatory aspects. Mr. Pappone holds a BS degree in
Nuclear Engineering from the University of California, Los
Angeles.
PARECE, MARTIN
Martin Parece is Chief Engineer and Vice
President, Technology for AREVA NP, Inc.
He is responsible for technical oversight
and configuration control of pressurized
water reactor and high temperature gas
reactor designs planned for deployment in
North America.
Mr. Parece has B.S. and M.S. degrees in
Nuclear Engineering from the University of
Illinois and is a member of the American Nuclear Society. During
the last 26 years with Babcock & Wilcox, Framatome and AREVA
NP, he has gained extensive experience in safety analysis, core
reload analysis, plant performance analysis, plant simulation, com-
puter code development, accident mitigation, operator guidance,
thermal-hydraulics, plant auxiliary and control systems, Class 1
component design, and licensing. Mr. Parece is the author of
numerous papers and topical reports, he also holds a patent on a
method and system for emergency core cooling. Mr. Parece is a
highly regarded speaker on reactor power uprates, nuclear power
plant safety and new reactors.
PASTOR, THOMAS P.
Mr. Pastor has over thirty one years experi-
ence working in the areas of stress analysis
and pressure vessel design. He holds a
Bachelors and Masters degree in Civil
Engineering from the University of
Connecticut, with emphasis on structural
design and analysis.
Mr. Pastor began his career with
Combustion Engineering in 1977, where
he was a member of the structural analysis group, responsible for
performing load analyses of nuclear reactor inernals subject to
seismic and LOCA events. Over nine years he developed signifi-
cant expertise in performing finite element analyses and scientific
programming.
In 1986 Mr. Pastor joined the Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection
and Insurance Co. (HSB) working in the Codes and Standards
Group in Hartford, Ct. During his 22 year tenure at HSB, Mr.
Pastor rose from staff engineer, to Manager Codes & Standards,
Director, and presently Vice-President Code Services. He has
managed the Codes & Standards (C&S) Group for over 17 years,
and led the development of several knowledge based databases
which are used today to provide Code technical support to over
3000 ASME Certificate Holders and Inspectors worldwide. Mr.
Pastor’s ASME code expertise is in pressure vessels, and he has
taught basic to advanced seminars on Section VIII, Division 1
over 100 times to audiences around the world. He has authored
numerous technical papers on the subject of stress analysis and
ASME Code developments,
Mr. Pastor is a licensed Professional Engineer in the states of
Connecticut and Indiana. He is currently serves on several ASME
Committees such as Codes & Standards Board of Directors, Board
on Hearings and Appeals, Continuous Improvement Committee,
Board on Pressure Vessel Technology, BPV Technical Oversight
Management Committee (Vice-Chairman), Standards Committee
on Pressure Vessels – Section VIII (Chairman), Subgroup Design –
Section VIII, and Special Committee on Interpretations –
Section VIII.
PERRAUDIN, GERARD
Gerard Perraudin is a recognized authority
on materials in pressure vessel technology.
Initially he worked on a variety of assign-
ments for the French Technical Center of
Mechanical industries from 1970 through
1980. There on he has been the supervisor
of inspectors on a refinery of Exxon
Chemical (1980–1983) and later was
employed by TECHNIP, a major interna-
tional engineering and construction company. He has been active-
ly involved in various petroleum and chemical industries over the
world (Exxon, BP, Elf). Mr. Perraudin is the Chairman of CODAP
Committee responsible for French Pressure Vessel Code. Based
on his expertise of Codes he is actively involved in several French
and European Code working committees.
PITROU, BERNARD
Bernard Pitrou has more than 40 years of
experience in the piping industry. He held
the position of manager in Design and
Calculations Department, ENTREPOSE
(currently called ENDEL). He was engaged
in design and analysis of power and process
piping as well as nuclear and transportation
piping. He is a member of the Pressure
Vessel and Piping Committee of the
Technical Center of Mechanical Industries and was responsible for
several new theoretical developments in the field of piping such as
flanges and large openings. Mr. Pitrou served on the first French
Piping Committee (1970) created by the SNCT (French Pressure
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xxxii • Contributor Biographies
Equipment Manufacturer’s Association) and is now the Chairman of
CODETI Committee responsible for French Piping Code. He has
been active in the European Standardization and is currently
Chairman of Working Group 1 (General) and 3 (Design) of the
European Technical Committee 267 in charge of Industrial Piping.
PORTER, MICHAEL (MIKE) A.
Michael (Mike) A. Porter is the Principal
Engineer of Porter McGuffie, Inc. In the 40
years since he obtained a Mechanical
Engineering degree from the University of
Illinois at Champaign/Urbana, he has
worked in the natural gas industry, man-
aged a construction firm and served as a
consultant to numerous industries in the
fields of vibration, thermal and stress
analysis. He has published more than 30 ASME conference and
journal publications, most of which have been for the Piping and
Pressure Vessel Division. His most recent PVP Journal paper “A
Suggested Shell/Plate Finite Element Nozzle Model Evaluation
Procedure” provides guidance for the application of Finite
Element (FE) analysis as it applies to the Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code. He has also authored papers for the Acoustical
Society of America and published two books on the application of
the FE method of analysis.
Mike has extensive experience in the diagnosis and solution of
stress and vibration problems. Much of this experience stems from
his work as a technical services engineer at Panhandle Eastern
Pipeline Company and as a consultant with Bolt Beranek and
Newman. Building on this base, Mr. Porter has established an inte-
grated computational facility for the analysis of mechanical systems
and their interaction with fluids. These capabilities include the codes
for linear and non-linear stress analysis, computational fluid dynam-
ics and gas/liquid pulsation FE analyses. For the past 15 years, Mike
has served as a member of the Design and Analysis Committee of
the Piping and Pressure Vessel Division of ASME. He has served as
the Technical Program Representative for this committee as well as
developing and chairing numerous conference sessions on the sub-
jects of vibration, water hammer, pulsation and stress.
The projects overseen by Mr. Porter cover a broad range of
industries and topics. Representative examples include the petro-
chemical industry (analyses of numerous pressure vessels and
components); the aerospace industry (analyses for the
International Space Station and FEA training for NASA person-
nel); and building dynamics (design review and analysis of multi-
storied structures for the Environmental Protection Agency and
the National Ocean Service, among others). These projects have
included linear and non-linear stress analyses as well as computa-
tional fluid dynamics, structural dynamics and thermal analyses.
RAHOI, DENNIS
D. W (Dennis) Rahoi is an authority on
materials used in the pharmaceutical-/
biotechnology, chemical process, fossil
fuel, and nuclear power industries. The
author of more than 50 papers on materi-
als, corrosion and oxidation, he received
the Prime Movers Award in Thermal
Electric Generating Equipment and
Practice by Edison Electric Institute for work published on solv-
ing problems in high pressure feedwater heaters. He currently
consults in material selections, failure analysis and does other
forensic metallurgical work. Mr. Rahoi is also the current editor
of Alloy Digest (an ASM International, Inc. publication) and is an
active consultant to the Nickel Institute. Mr. Rahoi was the first
chairman of NACE’s Power Committee and is active on many
stainless steel ASTM and ASME (including B31) materials com-
mittees. He is the current chairman of the ASME Sub-Group
Non-Ferrous Materials for Section II and holds a master’s degree
in metallurgical engineering from Michigan Technological
University.
Mr. Rahoi’s work on writing many new ASTM specifications,
his active sponsoring of 10 pipe and tube specifications and his
active involvement in Welding Research Council and EPRI
research proposals on welding and repair keep him in constant
touch with the needs of industry. This, combined with his other
experiences and consulting, allow him to contribute to the current
chapter in this book with authority.
RANA, MAHENDRA D.
Mahendra, an ASME Fellow has a bach-
elor’s degree in mechanical engineering
from M.S. University in Baroda, India,
and a master’s degree in mechanical
engineering from the Illinois Institute of
Technology, Chicago, Illinois. He is a
registered professional engineer in New
York State. He is an Engineering Fellow
working in the Global Supply System
Engineering Department of Praxair, Inc. for the last 34 years.
He is involved in the areas of fracture mechanics, pressure ves-
sel design, pressure vessel development, and materials testing.
He is also involved in the structural integrity assessment, and
fracture control programs of pressure vessels and the member
of Board on Pressure Technology, Codes and Standards.
Mahendra became the Chairman of the Subgroup on Design
and Materials of Subcommittee XII when it was formed in
1996. He is a member of several other ASME Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code committees: member of Subcommittee
VIII, member of joint API/ASME Fitness- for Service
Committee and the member of the Main Committee of the
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and the member of Board on
Pressure Technology, Codes and Standards. Mahendra is also
a member of several ISO, ASTM and CGA (Compress Gas
Association) standards committees. He is a Chairman of the
Codes and Standards Technical Committee of Pressure Vessel
and Piping Division of ASME. He has received several awards
from the Pressure Vessel and Piping Division for his contribu-
tion in organizing Codes and Standards sessions in Pressure
Vessel and Piping Conferences. He has given several lectures
in the pressure vessel technology topics in the USA and
abroad. He has taught a course on ASME Section VIII,
Division 1 to ASME section of Buffalo New York. He is the
co-recipient of two patents and the co-author of 25 technical
papers. He also has written several technical reports for his
company.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • xxxiii
RANGANATH, SAM
Dr. Sam Ranganath is the Founder and
Pricipal at XGEN engineering, Sam Jose,
CA. XGEN, founded in 2003, provides
consulting services in fracture mechanics,
materials, ASME Code applications and
structural analysis to the power plant
industry. Before that he held various lead-
ership positions at General Electric for
28 years. Dr. Ranganath is a Fellow of the
ASME and has been active in the development of Section III
and Section XI, ASME Code rules for the evaluation and inspec-
tion of nuclear pressure vessel components. Sam has a Ph.D. in
Engineering from Brown University, Providence, RI and an
MBA from Santa Clara University, Santa Clara, CA. He has also
taught Graduate Courses in Mechanical Engineering at Santa
Clara University and Cal State University, San Jose for over
15 years.
RAO, K. R.
KR Rao retired as a Senior Staff Engineer
with Entergy Operations Inc. and was previ-
ously with Westinghouse Electric Cor-
poration at Pittsburgh, PA and Pullman
Swindell Inc., Pittsburgh, PA. KR got his
Bachelors in Engineering from Banaras
University, India with a Masters Diploma in
Planning from School of Planning &
Architecture, New Delhi, India. He complet-
ed Post Graduate Engineering courses in Seismic Engineering,
Finite Element and Stress Analysis, and other engineering subjects
at Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA. He earned his Ph.D.,
from University of Pittsburgh, PA. He is a Registered Professional
Engineer in Pennsylvania and Texas. He is past Member of
Operations Research Society of America, (ORSA).
KR was Vice President, Southeastern Region, ASME Inter-
national. He is a Fellow of ASME, active in National, Regional,
Section and Technical Divisions of ASME. He has been the Chair,
Director and Founder of ASME EXPO(s) at Mississippi Section. He
was a member of General Awards Committee of ASME Inter-
national. He was Chair of Codes & Standards Technical Committee,
ASME PV&PD. He developed an ASME Tutorial for PVP Division
covering select aspects of Code. KR is a Member, Special Working
Group on Editing and Review (ASME B&PV Code Section XI) for
September 2007 – June 2012 term.
Dr. Rao is a recipient of several Cash, Recognition and Service
Awards from Entergy Operations, Inc., and Westinghouse Electric
Corporation. He is also the recipient of several awards,
Certificates and Plaques from ASME PV&P Division including
Outstanding Service Award (2001) and Certificate for “Vision and
Leadership” in Mississippi and Dick Duncan Award, Southeastern
Region, ASME. Dr. Rao is the recipient of the prestigious ASME
Society Level Dedicated Service Award.
Dr. Rao is a Fellow of American Society of Mechanical
Engineers, Fellow of Institution of Engineers, India and a
Chartered Engineer, India. Dr. Rao was recognized as a ‘Life
Time Member’ for inclusion in the Cambridge “Who’s Who” reg-
istry of executives and professionals. Dr. Rao was listed in the
Marquis 25th Silver Anniversary Edition of “Who’s Who in the
World” as ‘one of the leading achievers from around the globe’.
REEDY, ROGER F.
Roger F. Reedy has a B.S. Civil
Engineering from Illinois Institute of
Technology (1953). His professional
career includes the US Navy Civil
Engineering Corps, Chicago Bridge and
Iron Company (1956–1976). Then he
established himself as a consultant and is
an acknowledged expert in design of pres-
sure vessels and nuclear components
meeting the requirements of the ASME B&PV Code. His expe-
rience includes design, analysis, fabrication, and erection of
pressure vessels and piping components for nuclear reactors and
containment vessels. He has expertise in components for fossil
fuel power plants, and pressure vessels and storage tanks for
petroleum, chemical, and other energy industries. Mr. Reedy has
been involved in licensing, engineering reviews, welding
evaluations, quality programs, project coordination and ASME
Code training of personnel. He testified as an expert witness in
litigations and before regulatory groups.
Mr. Reedy has written a summary of all changes made to the
ASME B&PV Code in each Addenda published since 1950 which
is maintained in a computer database, RA-search.
Mr. Reedy served on ASME BP&V Code Committees for
more than 40 years being Chair of several of them, including
Section III for 15 years. Mr. Reedy was one of the founding
members of the ASME PV&P Division. Mr. Reedy is registered
Engineer in seven states. He is a recipient of the ASME
Bernard F. Langer Award and the ASME Centennial Medal and
is a Life Fellow of ASME.
REINHARDT, WOLF D.
Wolf D. Reinhardt earned a Dipl. Ing.
Degree in Mechanical Engineering from
the Technical University in Braunschweig,
Germany, and a Ph.D. from the University
of Waterloo, Canada. He is a registered
Professional Engineer in Ontario.
His current position as Senior Section
Head, Computational Mechanics Develop-
ment, at Atomic Energy of Canada encom-
passes the application of numerical analysis to problems in the
design, analysis and fitness-for-service evaluation of reactor com-
ponents. He is also engaged in performing applied research pro-
grams for the Canadian nuclear industry.
Previously, he worked as a Lead Engineer in Nuclear
Engineering at Babcock & Wilcox Canada on the design and
analysis of nuclear components, principally steam generators and
heat exchangers, and in the in-service assessment of steam gener-
ator tubes.
Wolf is holding an appointment as adjunct professor at Memorial
University in Newfoundland. He has published over 50 technical
papers in the fields of nonlinear vibration, metal plasticity, computa-
tional methods for the nonlinear analysis of pressure vessels, elastic-
plastic pressure vessel design and fracture mechanics. He received
various Best Paper Awards at ASME PVP conferences and at the
ASTM National Symposium on Fatigue and Fracture Mechanics.
His current research interests include plastic shakedown analysis as
well as structural performance criteria and in-service assessment of
piping and reactor components.
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xxxiv • Contributor Biographies
Wolf Reinhardt is a member of the ASME B&PV Code
Subgroup Design Analysis and participates in the Task Group
Elastic-Plastic FEA. He is also contributing to the PVPD
Computer Technology Technical Committee and acted as
Technical Program Representative at PVP Conferences for this
committee. He taught courses on elastic-plastic design using
Section III and Section VIII rules, on methods for fitness-for-ser-
vice assessment, and on the design, analysis and fabrication rules
of Section III.
RICCARDELLA, PETER C.
Pete Riccardella received his Ph.D. from
Carnegie Mellon University in 1973 and is
an expert in the area of structural integrity
of nuclear power plant components. He co-
founded Structural Integrity Associates in
1983, and has contributed to the diagnosis
and correction of several critical industry
problems, including:
• Feedwater nozzle cracking in boiling water reactors
• Stress corrosion cracking in boiling water reactor piping &
internals
• Irradiation embrittlement of nuclear reactor vessels
• Primary water stress corrosion cracking in pressurized water
reactors
• Turbine-generator cracking and failures.
Dr. Riccardella has been principal investigator for a number of
EPRI projects that led to advancements and cost savings for the
industry. These include the FatiguePro fatigue monitoring sys-
tem, the RRingLife software for turbine-generator retaining ring
evaluation, Risk-Informed Inservice Inspection methodology
for nuclear power plants, and several Probabilistic Fracture
Mechanics applications to plant cracking issues. He has led major
failure analysis efforts on electric utility equipment ranging from
transmission towers to turbine-generator components and has testi-
fied as an expert witness in litigation related to such failures.
He has also been a prime mover on the ASME Nuclear Inservice
Inspection Code in the development of evaluation procedures and
acceptance standards for flaws detected during inspections. In 2002
he became an honorary member of the ASME Section XI
Subcommittee on Inservice Inspection, after serving for over twen-
ty years as a member of that committee. In 2003, Dr. Riccardella
was elected a Fellow of ASME International.
RODABAUGH, EVERETT C.
Mr. Rodabaugh has B.S. from Iowa State
College, Ames, Iowa (1939) and M.S.
from the University of Louisville,
Kentucky (1959). He is a Registered
Professional Engineer in the State of Ohio.
He has extensive experience in power
plant operations and the design of piping
and pressure vessels. His previous experi-
ence was with Joseph E. Seagram Co., E.I.
duPont, U.S. Maritime Service (1943–1946). He was with Tube
Turns in Louisville, Kentucky (1946–1961). Mr. Rodabaugh was
with Bat-telle-Columbus Laboratories, Columbus, Ohio
(1961–1981).
In 1981 he started his own consulting firm and since 1991 he
has continued his work on piping and pressure vessels as a
consultant.
Mr. Rodabaugh was a member of the original ASME Design
Group that prepared ANSI B31.7. He was a member of several
ASME Code committees including Section III Committees and
Subgroup on Design and Working Group on Piping. Everret
Rodabaugh was Chairman of ANSI B16 and its Subcommittees.
Mr. Rodabaugh is also a member of the Pressure Vessel
Research Council, Design Division and its Subcommittee on
Piping, Nozzles and Vessels. Mr. Rodabaugh published over
60 articles and has written over 100 reports. Everret Rodabaugh is
a Fellow in the ASME and received the ASME Bernard F. Langer
award in 1998.
RODERY, CLAY D.
Clay Rodery is Technical Authority/
Fixed Equipment for BP North American
Products. He has over 27 years of experi-
ence consulting in the areas of pressure
vessels and piping to Amoco and BP
refining, chemicals, and upstream facili-
ties and projects worldwide. After receiv-
ing his BSCE from Purdue University in
1981, he joined Amoco Oil Company’s
Texas City Refinery, where he was involved in project, mainte-
nance, and inspection engineering. In 1990, he moved to Amoco
Oil’s Refining & Transportation Engineering Department as
pressure vessel specialist. In 1995, he became the principal ves-
sel specialist within Amoco Corporation’s Worldwide
Engineering & Construction Department. In 1999, he moved to
BP Chemicals’ Technology & Engineering Department as pres-
sure vessel and piping specialist. He became BP Chemicals’
Pressure Vessel and Piping Advisor in 2004, until moving to his
current role in 2006.
Clay began participating in ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code activity in 1993. He joined the Subgroup on
Fabrication & Inspection (Section VIII) in 1997, and the
Subgroup on Design in 1999. In May 2000, he was appointed
Chairman of the Subgroup on Fabrication & Inspection and
member of the Subcommittee on Pressure Vessels. Clay is a
member of the ASME Post Construction Standards Committee,
and Vice Chair of the Subcommittee on Repair and Testing. He
is also a member of the Special Working Group on Flange
Joint Assembly.
As a member of the Design & Analysis Technical
Committee of the ASME Pressure Vessels and Piping Division,
Clay has served as an Author, Session Developer/Chair, Editor,
Technical Program Representative, and Tutorial Presenter.
Clay is a member of the API Subcommittee on Inspection and
the Task Group on Inspection Codes. He is former Team
Leader of the Process Industry Practices (PIP) Vessel Function
Team.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • xxxv
RODGERS, DOUGLAS K.
Doug Rodgers earned a B.A.Sc (1982) in
Engineering Science, with a specialization
in Material Science from the University of
Toronto and an M.A.Sc (1992) in
Mechanical Engineering from the
University of Ottawa. Doug has been a
member of the ASM International (former-
ly the American Society for Metals) since
1982 and is currently a Chapter Sustaining
Member of the Ottawa Valley Chapter. Doug is a registered pro-
fessional engineer in the Canadian provinces of Ontario and New
Brunswick, and has been a member of ASME since 1999.
Doug has worked for Atomic Energy of Canada Limited for
more than 20 years, specializing in performance characteristics
of CANDU power reactor materials. Initially with the engineer-
ing design group, Doug transferred to the Metallurgical
Engineering Branch of the Reactor Materials Division where he
was responsible for failure analysis and material surveillance
testing of CANDU fuel channel components. With a well-
established interest in fracture phenomena, Doug spent several
years studying delayed hydride cracking in Zr-2.5Nb pressure
tube materials, later becoming the manager of the Materials and
Mechanics Branch, responsible for research and development
programs relevant to metal fracture. Doug is currently Director
of the Fuel Channels Division, incorporating material expertise,
varying from computational mechanics, metallurgy, surface sci-
ence, corrosion, deformation, and fracture, as it is applied to
design, research & development, and services for CANDU
nuclear reactor systems.
ROWLEY, C. WESLEY
C. Wesley Rowley is Vice President,
Engineering & Technical Services, with
The Wesley Corporation in Tucson, AZ.
He has been with TWC since 1985. Mr.
Rowley manages engineering and non-
metallic structural repair activities for
nuclear power plants. He has published
numerous reports and technical papers for
EPRI, ASME, ICONE Conferences, Pump
& Valve Symposiums, and other nuclear industry events. He is a
recognized expert on risk-informed Inservice Testing, as well as
non-metallic materials and non-metallic structural repairs.
Mr. Rowley has been a member of the ASME Board on
Nuclear Codes and Standards for over fifteen years. He is also a
member of the ASME Post Construction Committee, the
Subcommittee on Repair & Testing, and the Chairman of
the Non-metallic Repair Project Team. Additionally he has been the
Chairman of the ASME BPV/Subcommittee II, Materials/Special
Working Group, Nonmetallic Material since 2002. He is the past
Chairman of the ASME BPV Joint Subcommittee III/XI Project
Team for Plastic Pipe. ASME past Vice President, Nuclear Codes
& Standards and past Chairman, Board on Nuclear Codes &
Standards. He is currently a member of the ASME BPV/
Subcommittee III/Special Working Group on Polyethylene Pipe.
ASME, Member, Operations & Maintenance Committee (and
Sub-group ISTE, Risk-Informed Inservice Testing).
Mr. Rowley is a retired Submarine Captain in the U. S. Naval
Reserve. He has a M.A. degree in International Relations and
Strategic Studies from the Naval War College (1986). He also has
a B.S. in General Engineering (1965) and M.S. in Nuclear
Engineering from the University of Illinois (1967). Mr. Rowley is
a Registered Professional Engineer.
SAMMATARO, ROBERT F.
The late Mr. Sammataro was Proto-Power’s
Program Manager — ISI/IST Projects. He
was responsible for Proto-Power’s Inservice
Inspection (ISI) and Inservice Testing (IST)
programs. These programs included devel-
opment and implementation of programs
involving ISI, IST, design integrity, design
reconciliation, 10CFR50, Appendix J, inte-
grated leakage rate testing, and in-plant and
out-plant training and consulting services.
Mr. Sammataro was also responsible for Proto-Power’s ISI and
IST Training Programs has developed Proto-Power’s three-day
Workshop on Containment Inservice Inspection, Repair, Testing,
and Aging Management. He was recognized as an expert in con-
tainment inservice inspection and testing.
Mr. Sammataro was the past Chair of the ASME PV&P
Division (1999–2000), General Chair of PVP Conference (1999)
and was the Technical Program Chair (1998).
He was a member and chair of an ASME Section XI Subgroup
and a member of an ASME Section XI Subgroup Subcommittee.
He was a past member of the ASME BP&V Code Main
Committee (1989-1994). Mr. Sammataro was an ASME Fellow.
Mr. Sammataro earned BSCE and MSCE from Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute.
SCOTT, BARRY
Barry Scott is currently Director of Quality
Assurance Department (Power) with
responsibility to provide QA/QC support
for the engineering, procurement and con-
struction phases of Power projects. Barry
has experience in the development, imple-
mentation and auditing of Quality
Programs. He has considerable knowledge
of industry Quality Standards, including
ISO 9000, 10CFR50 Appendix B, NQA 1 and Government
(DOE, DOD) requirements. Barry has extensive experience with
projects and project engineering management with special exper-
tise in the structural design of Nuclear Power Plant structures
including design of reinforced concrete Containment structures.
Barry has been a Member of various ASME Section III commit-
tees including Subgroup on General Requirements, Subcommittee
on Nuclear Power and Joint ASME-ACI Committee on Concrete
Components for Nuclear Service for more than 30 years.
Barry has a Master of Science in Civil Engineering from Drexel
University and is a licensed PE (Civil Engineering) in the states of
Pennsylvania, California and Washington. He is a certified Lead
Auditor in accordance with the requirements of ASME NQA-1 and
previously held certification as an ACI Level III Concrete Inspector
as required by the ASME Section III Division 2 Code.
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xxxvi • Contributor Biographies
SIMOLA, KAISA
Dr. Kaisa Simola is a senior research scien-
tist with 20 years research experience in risk
and reliability analysis, analyses of nuclear
power plant operating experience, ageing
analyses, and risk-informed decision mak-
ing. Presently her main area of interest is
risk-informed in-service inspections at
nuclear power plants. She has worked for the
Technical Research Centre of Finland, VTT,
since 1987. In 2004–2006 she was a Visiting Scientist at the Joint
Research Centre of the European Commission in Petten, the
Netherlands. She is the chairperson of the Task Group on Risk of the
European Network for Inspection and Qualification (ENIQ). She is
also a member of the board of directors of the European Safety,
Reliability and Data Association (ESReDA).
SIMONEN, FREDRIC A.
Fredric A. Simonen earned B.SM.E in
1963 from Michigan Technology
University and a Ph.D. in Engineering
Mechanics form Stanford University in
1966. Since joining Pacific Northwest
Laboratory in 1976, and before that at the
Battelle Columbus Division, Dr. Simonen
has worked in the areas of fracture
mechanics and structural integrity. His
research has addressed the safety and reliability of nuclear pres-
sure vessels and piping as well as other industrial and aerospace
structural components.
Since the early 1980’s he has been the lead for several studies for
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of the effects of
pressurized thermal shock on the failure probability of reactor pres-
sure vessels. This work has advanced the technology of probabilistic
fracture mechanics and has developed methods for estimating the
number and sizes of flaws in vessel piping welds. During the 1990’s
Dr. Simonen was a leader on the behalf of NRC and the American
Society of Mechanical Engineers in developing the technology and
furthering the implementation of risk-informed methods for the
inspection of nuclear piping systems.
Dr. Simonen is a member of the Section XI Working Groups on
Implementation of Risk-Based Inspection, Flaw Evaluation, and
Operating Plant Criteria. He is also a member of the ASME
Committee on Nuclear Risk Management and the ASME
Research Committee on Risk-Based Technology. He has pub-
lished over 200 papers, articles and reports in the open literature.
SIMS, J. ROBERT, J.
Mr. Sims is a recognized authority in the
field of pressure equipment, with over years
experience in risk based technologies for
optimizing inspection and maintenance deci-
sions, high pressure equipment, and
mechanical integrity evaluation of existing
equipment. He has been with Becht
Engineering since 1998. Prior to that, he
worked for more than thirty years with
Exxon as a pressure equipment specialist, developed risk based
decision-making tools, led a multi-disciplinary team in development
of the flaw evaluation guide that was used as the basis for the API-
579 Standard on Fitness for Service, and designed a 30,000 psi reac-
tor vessel. Other positions within Exxon included design and opera-
tion of high pressure equipment used in the production of low
density polyethylene at facilities worldwide.
Bob is the current Senior Vice President of Codes and
Standards of ASME. He is a member of several ASME
Committees, such as the Council on Codes and Standards, the
B&PV Code Subcommittee VIII for Pressure Vessels, and he
chairs the Special Working Group on High Pressure Vessels.
Bob is also the past Chair of the ASME Post Construction
Committee, and chair of the Pressure Vessel Research Council
Committee on Continued Operation of Equipment. He was previous-
ly a member of ASME B31.3 Process Piping Code Committee and
Chair of the B31.3 Task Group on High Pressure Piping. He is an
ASME Fellow and has more than 20 publications and two patents.
SINGH K. P. (KRIS)
Dr. K.P. (Kris) Singh is the President and
Chief Executive Officer of Holtec
International, an energy technology com-
pany that he established in 1986. Dr.
Singh received his Ph.D. in Mechanical
Engineering from the University of
Pennsylvania in 1972, a Masters in
Engineering Mechanics, also from Penn
in 1969, and a B.S. in Mechanical
Engineering from the Ranchi University in India in 1967.
Since the mid-1980s, Dr. Singh has endeavored to develop inno-
vative design concepts and inventions that have been translated by
the able technology team of Holtec International into equipment
and systems that improve the safety and reliability of nuclear and
fossil power plants. Dr. Singh holds numerous patents on storage
and transport technologies for used nuclear fuel, and on heat
exchangers/pressure vessels used in nuclear and fossil power plants.
Active for over thirty years in the academic aspects of the technolo-
gies underlying the power generation industry, Dr. Singh has
published over 60 technical papers in the permanent literature in
various disciplines of mechanical engineering and applied mechan-
ics. He has edited, authored, or co-authored numerous monographs
and books, including the widely used text “Mechanical Design of
Heat Exchangers and Pressure Vessel Components”, published in
1984. In 1987, he was elected a Fellow of the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers. He is a Registered Professional Engineer
in Pennsylvania and Michigan, and has been a member of the
American Nuclear Society since 1979, and a member of the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers since 1974.
Over the decades, Dr. Singh has participated in technology
development roles in a number of national organizations, includ-
ing the Tubular Exchange Manufacturers Association, the Heat
Exchange Institute, and the American Society of Mechanical
Engineers. Dr. Singh has lectured extensively on nuclear technol-
ogy issues in the U.S. and abroad, providing continuing education
courses to practicing engineers, and served as an Adjunct
Professor at the University of Pennsylvania (1986–92).
Dr. Singh serves on several corporate boards including the
Nuclear Energy Institute and the Board of Overseers, School of
Engineering and Applied Science (University of Pennsylvania),
Holtec International, and several other industrial companies.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • xxxvii
STAFFIERA, JIM E.
Jim E. Staffiera earned a BS in Mechanical
Engineering from Drexel University in 1971
and a Masters in Business from Old
Dominion University in 1975. He has been
involved with nuclear power plant contain-
ment vessel and steel structure design, fabri-
cation, construction, and operation since
1971. Originally employed by Newport
News Industrial Corporation (a subsidiary
of Newport News Shipbuilding), he assisted with development of
commercial nuclear fabrication programs for ASME Code N-type
Certificate authorization. This progressed into nuclear component
fabrication and construction activities, resulting in his current
employment with FirstEnergy Corporation at the Perry Nuclear
Power Plant, where he works in the Structural Mechanics Unit and
is frequently involved with ASME Code Section XI-related issues.
Jim has been a member of ASME since 1972 and is involved in
numerous ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Committee
activities, including holding positions as Chair, Secretary, and
Member of various Section XI committees on inservice require-
ments for operating nuclear power plants. He currently chairs the
Working Group on Containment and is also a member of the
Section XI Subcommittee, the Subgroup on Water-Cooled
Systems, and the Special Working Group on Editing and Review.
Jim is an active member of the ASME Pressure Vessels and
Piping Division, having chaired the Codes and Standards (C&S)
Technical Committee and been C&S Technical Program
Representative for the annual ASME Pressure Vessels and Piping
Conference. He has also been a member of the American Society
for Quality (ASQ) since 1975.
Jim has been involved in several nuclear industry initiatives, the
most recent of which was as a member of the Expert Panel for the
EPRI Containment Integrated Leak-Rate Test (ILRT) Interval
Extension Project.
STANISZEWSKI, STANLEY (STAN)
Stanley Staniszewski is a senior Mechanical
Engineer with the U.S. Department of
Transportation, Pipelines and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration. He is a ‘76
Alumni of the Fenn College of Engineering,
from Cleveland State University of Ohio and
has completed graduate level course work in
Business Administration at Johns Hopkins
University and advanced engineering degree
work at the University of Virginia. Mr. Staniszewski has been a
member of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, since
joining as a student. He currently serves on the ASME Section XII
SubCommittee on Transport Tanks, Vice Chairs the Sub Group
on General Requirements, and is a member of the ASME
Hydrogen Steering Committee, and various taskgroups. Mr.
Staniszewski is also a member of the National Board Inspection
Code, Main Committee, Subgroups RB, and Nonmandatory
Appendices. He has experience in the international standards
arena through membership and participation as a governmental
technical expert to the United Nations and International
Standards Organizations on various Technical Committees, Sub-
Committees and Work-Groups on gas cylinders, cryogenic
vessels and Hydrogen technologies.
He has 10 years of varied experience in the private sector span-
ning tool & die, manufacturing, research and product develop-
ment, design, construction and inspection. Within the federal
government he has spent 20 years in the areas of mechanical/
electrical/chemical project engineering, management, inspection
and enforcement issues that affect hazardous materials/dangerous
goods in national and international commerce.
SUDAKOV, ALEXANDER V.
Alexander V. Sudakov was born in 1944 in
Rybinsk, Russia. In 1962 after high school
graduation he entered Saint Petersburg
Polytechnic University, Division of Nuclear
Power Stations and graduated in 1968 as a
NPP engineer. The same year he started his
professional engineering activity in the
Central Boiler and Turbine Institute. He held
positions from scientific researcher (1968)
up to Deputy Director General of the Institute (current position).
Dr. Sudakov obtained a Doctor of Science in 1994 and subse-
quently held a position as Professor of Saint Petersburg
Polytechnic University. Dr Sudakov has authored 10 books and
published over 100 papers and manuscripts on thermodynamics,
strength analysis and life extension of NPPs components and pip-
ing. Dr Sudakov is a Member of a number of Russian scientific
committees and nuclear power associations. He was honored with
the Russian Federation Government Prize in 1995.
STEVENSON, JOHN D.
Dr. John D. Stevenson is a Senior
Consultant for J.D. Stevenson, Consulting
Engineer Co. He has extensive experience
worldwide in the nuclear power field
where he served as a consultant to the
IAEA and several non U.S. utilities and
consulting firms. He holds a Ph.D. in Civil
Engineering from Case Western Reserve
University. He has provided structural-
mechanical consulting services to the nuclear power industry in
the U.S. and abroad for the past 35 years and has been a member
of various committees of ASME and B&PVC Section III for the
past 35 years. He is currently also a member of several of
American Society of Civil Engineers, American Nuclear Society,
and American Concrete Institute committees and consultant to
government agencies dealing with the structural-mechanical safety
of nuclear facilities.
SWAYNE, RICHARD W.
Mr. Swayne has worked as a metallurgist,
welding engineer, quality assurance manag-
er, and consultant, in the pressure vessel and
piping industry, since 1975. He has experi-
ence in design, fabrication, and operation of
various power and refinery plant compo-
nents, including valve design and applica-
tion, welding and materials engineering, and
quality assurance program management for
construction and operation. He is an expert and well-known instruc-
tor in inservice inspection, inservice testing, and repair/replacement
ASME_FM_Vol_III_pi-lxxxiv.qxd 6/6/09 12:28 PM Page xxxviii
xxxviii • Contributor Biographies
programs in operating power plants. He has assisted many organiza-
tions in preparation for new and renewal ASME Certificates of
Accreditation and has participated in many ASME National Board
Accreditation Surveys. Mr. Swayne has been an active participant
since 1977 as a member of ASME and ASTM Codes and Standards
Committees. He is a member of the ASME Board on Nuclear Codes
and Standards and the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Standards
Committee and is the Vice Chair of the ASME Subcommittee on
Nuclear Inservice Inspection. Mr. Swayne is also a past member of
the Subcommittee on Materials and several working groups under
the Subcommittee on Nuclear Power.
He has served as a consultant to utilities, architect/engineers,
manufacturers, and material manufacturers and suppliers. He is a
Qualified Lead Auditor, and was a Qualified Level II Examiner in
several nondestructive examination methods. He has been
involved in engineering reviews, material selection and applica-
tion, and quality assurance auditing.
TABOAS, ANÍBAL L.
Aníbal L. Taboas is an executive generalist
who consults on environment, governance,
and strategic risk management. His back-
ground ranges from nuclear CONOPS, to
line management of national laboratories
and programs, and conflict resolution. He
led various regulatory and legislative initia-
tives, including changing the disposal limits
for transuranic waste. Accomplishments in
the federal Senior Executive Service have been recognized by the
Vice President’s Hammer Award, Secretary of Energy Gold Medal,
the University of Chicago Medal for Distinguished Performance,
and several Exceptional and Distinguished Service Awards. Taboas
has a solid reputation for innovative resolution of regulatory and leg-
islative issues, project management, diversity, and independent peer
review. Aníbal actively participates in pro-bono activities, such as
the Board of Directors of the Center of Excellence for Hazardous
Materials Management, and of the Institute for Regulatory Science,
editorial boards, and peer review (e.g., National Science Foundation
and International Atomic Energy Agency). Dr. Taboas has a BS in
Physics/Theology (Univ. of Dayton), MS in Physics (Indiana State
Univ.), MS in Mechanical & Nuclear Engineering (Northwestern
Univ.), a PhD honoris causa in Environmental Policy (UPAEP), and
numerous peer-reviewed publications. Aníbal is Fellow of the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, edited The
Decommissioning Handbook, and has served multiple times as
Chair of the International Conference on Environmental
Management. Aníbal L. Taboas can be reached via electronic mail
at: TaboasA2@ASME.org.
TRAMPUS, PETER
Peter Trampus earned his MSc in 1972 in
Mechanical Engineering from the Technical
University of Budapest, Hungary. He
obtained his second degree as Specialized
Engineer on Plastic Deformation from the
same university in 1979. He earned his PhD
in Materials Science in 1985 from the
Technical University of Dresden, former
East Germany. After graduating, Peter
Trampus joined the Csepel Iron and Steel Works, where he
worked as research engineer and, then, head of laboratory. In
1982, Peter Trampus moved to the Paks NPP, where he was in
charge of the Material Testing and Evaluation Section (1982 to
92) being responsible for in-service inspection and RPV sur-
veillance, basically all structural integrity related issues of the
pressurized components, and later (1992 to 95) he was the
Head of the Advisory Board to the General Director.
From 1996 to 2003, he worked for the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), a member of the United Nations family,
Vienna. He headed projects on managerial and engineering
aspects of nuclear power program development, implementation
and performance improvement. From 2003 to 2004 he was a visit-
ing scientist at the Institute for Energy, Petten, The Netherlands,
one of the seven institutes of the European Commission’s Joint
Research Center. Here, he was dealing with nuclear safety issues
in Central and Eastern European countries. In 2003, Peter
Trampus established his own consultant company and now works
as principal consultant. Currently, the major focus of his activity
is on nuclear power plant life management.
Peter Trampus is a Founding Member of the Hungarian
Academy of Engineering (1990), recipient of the IAEA’s
Distinguished Service Award (2002), the Hungarian delegate of
IIW Commission V “Quality control and quality assurance of
welded products” (since 2006), President of the Hungarian
Association for Nondestructive Testing (since 2005). He is the
author of more than 100 papers in technical journals and confer-
ence proceedings, several of which are in English.
UPITIS, ELMAR
Elmar Upitis received a B.S. degree in Civil
Engineering from University of Illinois in
1955 and did postgraduate studies at the
Illinois Institute of Technology. He served in
the US Army and was employed by Chicago
Bridge & Iron Company from 1955 to 1995
in various capacities, including Chief Design
Engineer, Manager of Metals Engineering,
and Senior Principal Engineer–Materials.
He was also responsible for oversight of CBI engineering in
South America, Europe and Africa and Middle East. Mr. Upitis
provides engineering consulting services in the areas of codes and
standards (ASME, API, ASTM, etc.), design of plate structures,
fitness-for-service evaluation, and materials related issues. He is a
licensed professional and structural engineer in the State of
Illinois, ASME Fellow and a member of various technical com-
mittees in the ASME B&P Vessel Code, ASTM Fellow and a
member of several ASTM technical committees, former Chair of
Pressure Vessel Research Council (PVRC) and an active partici-
pant in the PVRC, and a member of AWS and WRC. He is
involved in the development of the new B&PV Code to replace
the present Section VIII, Division 2 and several other projects
related to the ASME B & PV Code.
Mr. Upitis is a co-author of WRC Bulletin 435 on design mar-
gins in ASME Section VIII, Divisions 1 and 2, WRC Bulletin 447
on evaluation of operating margins for in-service pressure equip-
ment, WRC Bulletin 453 on minimum weld spacing requirements
for API Standard 653, PVRC report on the European Pressure
Equipment Directive, and several other published papers on
Cr-Mo steel pressure vessels.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • xxxix
VAN DEN BREKEL, NICHOLAS C.
Nicholas C. van den Brekel is a recognized
authority on Periodic Inspection for
CANDU Nuclear Power Plants (the
CANDU equivalent to ASME XI In-Service
Inspection requirements). Over the last 16
years, Nick has been a major contributor to
the Canadian Standards Association (CSA)
N285B Technical Committee on Periodic
Inspeciton of CANDU NPPs. Nick has
served as an Executive Member and Secretary of this committee for
the last 5 years (1999 onwards).
Nick has 23 years of experience in the Inspection and
Maintenance of CANDU Nuclear Power Plants. Much of Nick’s
experience has been in dealing with the unique inspection and fit-
ness for service evaluation challenges posed by the zirconium alloy
fuel channels and other reactor internals at the heart of the CANDU
reactor design. Many of these components are subjected to irradia-
tion damage, damage that can result in physical changes to the mate-
rial and material properties, conditions that must be monitored in
accordance with Canadian nuclear standards. Nick has been
involved in development of new non-destructive evaluation tech-
niques to assess the material condition of zirconium alloy pressure
tubes. Nick’s experience extends to inspection and maintenance of
all CANDU reactor components, including nuclear fuel, fuel chan-
nel feeder pipes, steam generator tubes, nuclear piping and vessels,
as well as conventional side heat exchangers and steam turbines.
Nick is currently employed as the Technical Advisor to
Inspection Services Division of Ontario Power Generation, which
provides specialized inspection services to all CANDU reactor
units, including 16 operating units in Canada. Nick’s experience
includes consultation to the international CANDU community on
inspection and maintenance related issues.
VAZE, K.K.
K.K. Vaze graduated from Indian Institute
of Technology, Bombay (IITB) with a B.
Tech. in Mechanical Engineering in 1973.
After completion of the 17th Batch of
Training School of Bhabha Atomic
Research Centre in 1974, he joined the
Nuclear Systems Division of Indira Gandhi
Centre for Atomic Research, Kalpakkam.
He worked in the area of Structural
Analysis and Design of Fast Reactor Components using Finite
Element Method and ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,
Section III, Nuclear Vessels.
In 1989, he joined the Reactor Safety Division of Bhabha
Atomic Research Centre, Mumbai. Mr. Vaze was involved in the
Structural analysis and design of Pressurized Heavy Water
Reactor (PHWR) Components. The scope of work included
Fatigue and Fracture Analysis, Experimental Stress Analysis,
Fracture Mechanics, Seismic analysis, Fitness-for-Purpose
Evaluation, Residual Life Estimation and Life Extension. He
piloted a project on “Leak before Break evaluation of Primary
Heat Transport piping of PHWR”.
In addition to design and analysis, Mr. Vaze has expertise in
Ageing Management, Equipment Qualification and Seismic
Revaluation. He is a member of many committees formed by
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board to look into the safety aspects of
operating reactors as well as those under various stages of
design/construction. He has 24 publications in Journals and over
60 papers in International Conferences. His current position is Head,
Reactor Structures Section, in Reactor Safety Division of Bhabha
Atomic Research Centre, Mumbai. Mr. Vaze resides in Mumbai
with his wife, Ashlesha and two daughters, Anuja and Manasi.
VIROLAINEN, REINO
Mr. Virolainen graduated from Helsinki
University of Technology (Material
Engineering) in 1972. In 1973–1982, he
worked at VTT, Electrical engineering lab-
oratory, as a research scientist. Since 1982
he has been working for STUK (Radiation
and Nuclear Safety Authority) as inspector,
section leader and head of office of risk
assessment. His main topics at VTT and
STUK have been method development for level 1 PRA, CCFs,
reviews of PRA applications for the Finnish NPPs and develop-
ment of Risk Informed Regulation procedures including Risk-
Informed Inservice Inspection (RI-ISI). Mr. Virolainen has been a
long term member of Working Group RISK at OECD/NEA/
CSNI, Vice Chairman in 1991–1992 and Chairman 1992–1996.
He is a member of IAPSAM Board since 2006.
Mr. Virolainen is a special lecturer on systems reliability and
risk assessment at Lappeenranta University of Technology. He has
several technical publications in U.S., European and International
Journals covering PRA, Risk-Informed Regulation and Nuclear
Engineering and Design.
VOORHEES, STEPHEN V.
Employed in the Authorized Inspection
Agency sector since 1976 with Factory
Mutual, Commercial Union Insurance Com-
pany, Hartford Steam Boiler I and I, and
OneBeacon America Insurance Company.
Duties have included inspection of all types
of boilers, pressure vessels, heat exchangers,
nuclear components as well as supervision of
these activities and finally management of
same.
Currently serves on Section IV Heating Boilers as Vice Chair,
Section XII, Transport Tanks as a member and Chair of Sub-
Group Fabrication and Inspection, and serve as member of the
Standards Committee.
From 1970 to 1974 served in the US Navy in the Western
Pacific on destroyers as a boiler technician.
Married to Louise for 25 years with two sons. Reside in
Allentown, PA. Hobbies include hunting, shooting and golf.
WEST, RAYMOND (RAY) A.
Mr. West began his nuclear career in the US
Navy in 1971 and then proceeded into its
Nuclear Power Program in 1976. He has
been a welder, a Level III in several Non-
destructive Examination (NDE) methods,
and has developed Inservice Inspection (ISI)
programs for both Pressured Water Reactors
and Boiling Water Reactors. In 1979 he
began work in the commercial nuclear
industry and he continues to do so today.
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xl • Contributor Biographies
His major accomplishments include ASME Engineer of the
Year in 1997 in the State of Connecticut for Northeast Utilities,
and several other ASME awards including one for the develop-
ment of the Section XI, Nonmandatory Appendix R, “Risk-
Informed Inspection Requirements For Piping,” where he served
as the ASME Technical Project Manager Responsible for
Development and Approval of this Appendix (a 14 year effort),
Approved for Publication in the 2005 Addenda of Section XI,
October 2004. He has also authored or co-authored many
technical papers centering on ISI and Risk-Informed Inservice
Inspection (RI-ISI) and the latest was for the ASME 16th
International Conference on Nuclear Engineering (ICONE16) in
May 2008 that was related to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission’s Rulemaking Process and its effects on the
Endorsement of ASME Nuclear Codes and Standards in the
USA.
Ray is currently the Vice Chair of the ASME Board on Nuclear
Codes and Standards (BNCS), the Co-Chair of the BNCS Task
Group on Regulatory Endorsement (TG-RE), a member of the
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel (BPV) Code Subcommittee XI
on Nuclear Inservice Inspection ISI, a member of the Section XI
Executive Committee, and several of its lower level BPV Code
writing groups. He has been involved with nuclear power for over
30 years. His experience has been focused on welding, NDE, and
ISI and he is currently a Technical Consultant and the senior ASME
representative for his company Dominion Resources, Inc. at the
Millstone Power Station in Waterford, Connecticut.
WHITE, GLENN A.
Glenn White is a principal engineer and
principal officer at Dominion Engineering,
Inc. in Reston, Virginia. Mr. White man-
ages consulting and analysis projects
primarily for the nuclear power industry
and often related to aging degradation of
materials, boric acid corrosion, or thermal
performance.
Mr. White was the principal author of
the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) safety assessment
report for primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) of
U.S. PWR Alloy 600 reactor vessel closure head penetrations.
In 2007, he was the principal investigator for EPRI’s crack
growth and leak-before-break evaluation of PWSCC of PWR
pressurizer nozzle dissimilar metal welds in response to indica-
tions of circumferentially oriented PWSCC at one plant. Mr.
White’s projects to evaluate materials degradation include
nuclear safety and economic risk assessments and apply analyti-
cal tools such as probabilistic Monte Carlo simulation, net pre-
sent value analysis, Weibull statistical modeling, and stress and
fracture analyses.
In the area of thermal performance degradation of nuclear
steam generators, Mr. White investigates the sources of steam
pressure loss, the fouling deposition process, and the effects of
tube deposits on boiling heat transfer and corrosion.
Before joining Dominion Engineering, Inc. in 1993, Mr. White
received BS (summa cum laude) and MS degrees in mechanical
engineering from the University of Maryland at College Park. Mr.
White is a registered professional engineer and is a member of
NACE.
WILLIAMS, TONY
Tony Williams is head of the nuclear fuel
department of the Nordostschweizerische
Kraftwerke AG (NOK), the company
responsible for the general management
and fueling of the two Beznau PWR units
and the Leibstadt BWR in Switzerland.
Both plants are renowned for their pro-
gressive fuel burnup strategies as well as
extensive use of MOX and Reprocessed
Uranium fuels.
In addition to fuel procurement, his responsibilities include in-
house fuel assembly and core design, administration of reprocess-
ing contracts, planning of interim off-site storage, flask procure-
ment and transport as well as some aspects of final disposal. He is
a member of the Swiss nuclear fuel commission and a board
member of ZWILAG, the facility responsible for interim dry fuel
storage and waste conditioning in Switzerland. In previous posi-
tions he was manager of a research program investigating fuel and
core issues related to Pebble Bed Modular Reactors as well as
working as a reactor physicist for the British commercial nuclear
industry.
Dr. Williams holds a diploma in Business Management, has an
honors degree in Physics from Durham University (1981) as well
as an M.Sc. and Doctors degree in neutron physics from
Birmingham University (1984).
WOODWORTH, JOHN I.
John I. Woodworth has BSME from Univ.
of Buffalo, 1948. He is engaged in consult-
ing on Steam and Hot Water (hydronic)
heating systems and Codes and Standards.
He provides information for legal proceed-
ings of hydronic heating systems and
equipment. He was previously with
Fedders Corp. (1948–1959), as Technical
Director of Hydronics Institute (predeces-
sor Institute of Boiler and Radiator Manufacturers.), 1959–1990.
Woodworth’s professional activities 1990 to date are supported by
Hydronics Institute Division, GAMA.
He is a member of ASME, and a member of several ASME
Code Committees such as Section IV, (1967–date), Cast-Iron
Subgroup; Chair, ASME Section VI; Vice-Chair Controls and
Safety Devices for Automatically-Fired Boilers Standards
Committee (1973–2000). He was a consultant with the National
Institute of Science and Technology (formerly the National
Bureau of Standards). Woodworth is a Life Member of ASHRAE,
Member of several of its Technical Committees, Secretary, Vice
Chair and Chair of SPC. He has written numerous technical
articles for trade magazines.
John received ASME Distinguished Service Award (1991),
Dedicated Service Award (2000) and ASHRAE Standards
Achievement Award (1996). He was a Member, National Fuel
Gas Code Committee, VP, Uniform Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Laws Society and Liaison to Building Energy Codes & Standards
Committee. He was a Member of technical advisory committees
for Brook-haven National Laboratories.
ASME_FM_Vol_III_pi-lxxxiv.qxd 6/6/09 12:28 PM Page xli
COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • xli
YODER, LLOYD W.
Mr. Yoder is a Mechanical Engineering
graduate (BSME) of the University of
Pittsburgh (1952). He joined ASME as a stu-
dent member and continued membership
until now as an honorary life member. Upon
graduation from college, he joined Babcock
and Wilcox Company as a graduate student
that provided intense training in the opera-
tions of all divisions of the Company. Upon
graduation from this program, he joined the Company’s research
center as a test and research engineer. During six years at the
research center, he worked on both fossil and nuclear projects and
was awarded several patents for fossil boiler inventions.
Mr. Yoder later transferred to the Company’s main office, ini-
tially as a functional performance contact engineer and later as a
design engineer responsible for developing utility boiler
Company standards. It was during this time in 1971, that Mr.
Yoder became a committee member of the Subcommittee on
Power Boilers of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.
He continued this membership and is now an honorary member
of that Subcommittee. Mr. Yoder later became an engineering
manager in Babcock & Wilcox’s marketing department and
with the Company’s international business growing he subse-
quently joined the International Division as Technical
Operations Manager of Licensee and Joint Venture Companies.
After retirement in 1996, he became a consultant for several
engineering companies on various problems and served as an
expert witness in a number of litigations. For fourteen consecu-
tive years, he and the late Martin D. Bernstein taught a continu-
ing education course for the ASME on Section I of the ASME
Boiler and Pressure Code. In 1999 the ASME published a book,
Power Boilers: A Guide to Section I of the ASME Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code, which was co-authored by Lloyd W.
Yoder and the late Martin D. Bernstein.
ASME_FM_Vol_III_pi-lxxxiv.qxd 6/6/09 12:28 PM Page xlii
ASME_FM_Vol_III_pi-lxxxiv.qxd 6/6/09 12:28 PM Page xliii

CONTENTS

Dedication to the First Edition CHAPTER 42 License Renewal and Aging Management
Robert E. Nickell and William E. Cooper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii Kenneth C, Chang, P.T. Kuo and Kaihwa R. Hsu . . . . . . . 29
42.1 Introduction 29
Acknowledgements (to the First Edition) . . . . . . . . . . . v
42.2 Historical Background 29
42.3 License Renewal Review Process 30
Acknowledgements (to the Second Edition) . . . . . . . . . v 42.4 LRA 31
42.5 Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) Process 40
Acknowledgements (to the Third Edition) . . . . . . . . . . vi 42.6 Guidance Documents 40
42.7 International Activities 42
Contributor Biographies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii 42.8 References 42

Preface (to the First Edition)

K. R. Rao and Robert E. Nickell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xlix CHAPTER 43 PWR Reactor Vessel Integrity and
Internals Aging Management
Preface (to the Second Edition) Timothy J. Griesbach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
K. R. Rao . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l 43.1 Introduction 43
43.2 Codes and Regulations for the Prevention of
Preface (to the Third Edition) Brittle Fracture 44
K. R. Rao. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . li 43.3 Reference Toughness Curves 50
43.4 Margin Studies for Operating P-T Limits 55
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . liii 43.5 Areas for Future Improvements to Section XI,
Appendix G 56
Organization and Operation of the ASME Boiler 43.6 Aging Management of PWR Vessel Internals 57
and Pressure Vessel Committee lxxvii 43.7 References 60

PART 12: CURRENT ISSUES OF B&PV CODES AND

CHAPTER 44 PWR Reactor Vessel Alloy 600 Issues
STANDARDS
Jeff Gorman, Steve Hunt, Pete Riccardella, and
Glenn A. White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
CHAPTER 41 BWR Reactor Internals and
Other BWR Issues 44.1 Introduction 63
Hardayal S. Mehta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 44.2 Alloy 600 Applications 63
44.3 PWSCC 66
41.1 Introduction 1 44.4 Operating Experience 68
41.2 BWR Internals 1 44.5 Inspection Methods and Requirements 71
41.3 BWR Pressure Vessel 6 44.6 Safety Considerations 73
41.4 Reactor Pressure Boundary Piping 16 44.7 Degradation Predictions 76
41.5 Crack Initiation, Growth Relationships, 44.8 Repairs 80
and Plant Monitoring 20 44.9 Remedial Measures 82
41.6 Summary 24 44.10 Strategic Planning 84
41.7 References 25 44.11 References 85
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xliv • Contents

CHAPTER 45 PRA and Risk-Informed Analysis 48.6 Acknowledgments 188

Sidney A. Bernsen, Fredric A. Simonen, 48.7 References 188
Kenneth R. Balkey, Raymond A.West, and
Ralph S. Hill III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 CHAPTER 49 French Codes Dealing with
45.1 Introduction 89 Pressure Equipment
45.2 Background 89 Francis Osweiller, Alain Bonnefoy, Jean-Marie
45.3 ASME PRA Standard ASME/ANS RA-S-2008 90 Grandemange, Gerard Perraudin, and
45.4 ASME B&PV Section Xi In-Service Inspection 94 Bernard Pitrou . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
45.5 ASME B&PV Section Xi Repair and Replacement 98
45.6 ASME Operation and Maintenance Code 103 49.1 Introduction 191
45.7 Regulatory and Industry Interactions 106 49.2 Overview of French Codes Devoted to the
45.8 Future Plans for Risk-Informed Activities 107 Non-Nuclear Sector 191
45.9 Summary and Conclusions 110 49.3 Overview of French Codes Devoted to the
45.10 References 111 Nuclear Sector 193
49.4 Presentation of CODAP® 198
49.5 Presentation of CODETI® 208
CHAPTER 46 Applications of Elastic-Plastic 49.6 Presentation of COVAP® 217
Fracture Mechanics in Section XI, ASME Code 49.7 Presentation of RCC-M 226
Evaluations 49.8 Conclusions 254
Hardayal S. Mehta and Sampath Ranganath . . . . . . . . . 113 49.9 Abbreviations used in this Chapter 255

46.1 Introduction 113

46.2 Early Progress in the Development of EPFM 113 CHAPTER 50 Recent Development of Codes and
46.3 Engineering Approach to EPFM and Piping Standards of Boiler and Pressure Vessels in Japan
Applications 114 Kunio Hasegawa, Toshio Isomura, Yoshinori Kajimura,
46.4 Application to RPV Evaluation 121 Yasuhide Asada and Toshiki Karasawa . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
46.5 References 126
50.1 Introduction 257
50.2 B&PV Codes and Standards System in Japan 259
PART 13: INTERNATIONAL CODES & STANDARDS 50.3 Status of B&PV Codes and Standards in Japan 260
RELATED TO ASME B&PV CODE 50.4 Recent Topics 294
50.5 Considerations for Design Factor 307
CHAPTER 47 Perspectives of the Pressure
Equipment Directive with Respect to ASME BPVC CHAPTER 51 UK Rules for Unfired Pressure
Anne Chaudouet, Francis Osweiller, Peter Hanmore, Vessels
and Guido G. Karcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 David H. Nash. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309
47.1 Introduction 129 51.1 Introduction 309
47.2 The European Context 129 51.2 PD 5500 311
47.3 Development of the PED 129 51.3 EN 13445 324
47.4 The PED 131 51.4 References 330
47.5 Guidelines 144
47.6 Link of PED With Codes and Standards 147
47.7 Points of Comparisons with the ASME Code 147 PART 14: OTHER ONGOING ISSUES OF
47.8 Conclusions 149 PUBLIC SAFETY
47.9 References 150
CHAPTER 52 The Evolution of U.S. Transportation
CHAPTER 48 Canadian Boiler and Pressure Regulations for Radioactive Materials—A
Vessel Standards Retrospective
Wolf Reinhardt, Nick van den Brekel, Ronald S. Hafner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
and Douglas Rodgers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
52.1 Introduction 333
48.0 Introduction 159 52.2 Background 333
48.1 Overview of Canadian Standards Governing 52.3 Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations,
Boilers and Pressure Vessels 160 Part 71 (10 CFR 71) 334
48.2 CSA Non-Nuclear Boiler, Pressure Vessel, 52.4 Major Changes — 1968 338
and Piping Design and Construction Standards 168 52.5 Transfer of Licensing Responsibilities
48.3 CSA Nuclear Boiler and Pressure Vessel From DOT to AEC 341
Design and Construction Standards 171 52.6 Double Containment for Plutonium, and Quality
48.4 CSA Nuclear Boiler and Pressure Vessel Assurance Requirements — 1973 to 1978 343
Inservice Inspection Standards 181 52.7 NRC Regulatory Guide 7.6 345
48.5 Conclusions and Outlook 187 52.8 1979 Proposed Rule, 10 CFR 71 346
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • xlv

52.9 NUREG/CR-1815, 1981 346 55.2 National Efforts 425

52.10 1983 Final Rule, 10 CFR 71 346 55.3 Managing Risk 428
52.11 Additional Regulatory Guidance, NRC, 1985 346 55.4 Applied D&D Engineering Management 428
52.12 Major Changes, 10 CFR 71, 1988 55.5 Technology Development Needs 428
Proposed Rule 347 55.6 Conclusions 431
52.13 Reg. Guides 7.11 and 7.12, 1991 348 55.7 References 431
52.14 10 CFR 71, 1995 Final Rule 348
52.15 Double Containment Issues Revisited 349
PART 15: ISSUES CRITICAL for the NEXT
52.16 10 CFR 71, 2002 Proposed Rule 349
GENERATION OF NUCLEAR FACILITIIES
52.17 10 CFR 71, 2004 Final Rule 350
52.18 Conclusions 355
52.19 Acknowledgements 355 CHAPTER 56 Spent Nuclear Fuel
52.20 References 355 Tony Williams and K.P. Singh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 433
56.1 Introduction 433
CHAPTER 53 Description of Rules of Section XII 56.2 The Origins of Reprocessing 433
Transport Tank Code 56.3 The Reprocessing Process: Plutonium and
Mahendra D. Rana, Stanley Staniszewski and Uranium Extraction 435
Stephen V. Voorhees. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357 56.4 Wastes and Resources: Mass and Volume
Balance 436
53.1 Introduction 357 56.5 Reprocessing: From the Microscopic to the
53.2 Rules on General Requirements, Macroscopic Scale 438
Pressure Relief Devices, Stamping, Marking 56.6 The Future of Reprocessing 439
Certification, Reports and Records 358 56.7 Wet Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel:
53.3 Rules for Materials and Design 359 Selected Case Studies 440
53.4 Rules on Fabrication and Inspection 364 56.8 Aboveground Ventilated Storage
53.5 Additional Rules in Modal Appendix 1 on Technologies: Selected Case Studies 443
Categories 406, 407, 412, 331 and 338 56.9 Underground Ventilated Storage Module
Cargo Tanks 367 (HI-Storm 100 U): Study of a Unique Technology 448
53.6 Conclusions 370 56.10 Metal Casks: Selected Case Studies 449
53.7 Acknowledgment 370 56.11 Design Basis Threat 450
53.8 References 370 56.12 References 452

CHAPTER 54 Pipeline Integrity and Security CHAPTER 57 Generation III ⴙ PWRs

Alan Murray and Rafael G. Mora . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371 Part A: AP1000 John T. Land
54.1 Introduction 371 Part B: EPR Marty Parece
54.2 Purpose and Cost-Effectiveness of Pipeline Part C: US-APWR Masahiko Kaneda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455
Transportation 371
57.1 Introduction 455
54.3 Brief Overview of Pipeline Systems 372
57.2 Scope of Commentary 455
54.4 Pipeline Systems—Safety and Environmental
57a AP1000 456
Protection 372
57a.1 Introduction 456
54.5 Pipeline Integrity Management Programs 375
57a.2 AP1000 Plant Design 456
54.6 Elements of an Integrity Management
57a.3 Operational Technology 456
Program 378
57a.4 Safety Features 458
54.7 Risk Assessment and Risk Mitigation 381
57a.5 Containment Design 460
54.8 Integrity Assessment Methods 386
57a.6 Modularization and Construction 462
54.9 Defect Assessment Methods 395
57a.7 Operation and Maintenance 462
54.10 Pipeline Repair 402
57a.8 ASME Code Aspects 462
54.11 Pipeline Corrosion Control 405
57a.9 Future Direction on the AP1000 463
54.12 Pipeline Protection—Coatings, Cathodic
57a.10 References 463
Protection, Inhibition 409
57a.11 Nomenclature 463
54.13 Third Party Damage Awareness and
57b EPR 464
Control 416
57b.1 Introduction 464
54.14 Security Management Programs 418
57b.2 EPR Development 464
54.15 References 421
57b.3 Plant Design 464
57b.4 EPR Safety 468
CHAPTER 55 Decommissioning Technology 57b.5 Containment Design 471
Development 57b.6 Construction 471
57b.7 Operation and Maintenance 471
Anibal L.Taboas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425
57b.8 Code Aspects 472
55.1 Introduction 425 57b.9 Building Now 472
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xlvi • Contents

57b.10 References 472 60.5 Experiences of Olkiluoto 3 NPP Risk-Informed

57c US-APWR 473 Licencing 527
57c.1 Introduction 473 60.6 European Orientation to Risk-Informed
57c.2 US-APWR Plant Design Concept 473 Inspections- ENIQ 529
57c.3 Operational Technology 473 60.7 Extension of Risk-Informed Activities 532
57c.4 Safety Features 476 60.8 Summary and Conclusions 532
57c.5 Building Configuration 478 60.9 References 533
57c.6 Modularization and Construction 479 Acronyms 534
57c.7 Operation and Maintenance 480
57c.8 ASME Code Aspects 480
57c.9 Future Direction on the US-APWR 480 CHAPTER 61 Belgium Pressure Equipment Regulation
57c.10 References 480 Luc H. Geraets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 535
57c.11 Nomenclature 481
61.1 Introduction 535
61.2 Belgium Pressure Equipment Regulation 535
CHAPTER 58 New Generation of BWRs 61.3 The Derogation 537
Hardayal S. Mehta and Daniel C. Pappone. . . . . . . . . . . 483 61.4 Quality Groups, Classes, and Applicable
Codes 538
58.1 Introduction 483 61.5 Repairs, Replacements, and Modifications 539
58.2 Evolution of BWR Product Line from BWR/1 61.6 Subsection IWA – General Requirements 539
Through ESBWR 483 61.7 Subsection IWB – Requirements for Class 1
58.3 Key Features of ESBWR 491 Components of Light-Water Cooled Plants 542
58.4 Materials, Fabrication, and Applicable 61.8 Subsection IWC – Requirements for Class 2
ASME Code Edition 498 Components of Light-Water Cooled Plants 542
58.5 Future Direction – Fabrication and 61.9 Subsection IWE – Requirements for Class
Modularization 502 MC and Metallic Liners of Class CC
58.6 Summary 502 Components of Light-Water Cooled Plants 543
58.7 References 502 61.10 Subsection IWL – Requirements for Class
CC Concrete Components of Light-Water
CHAPTER 59 Future Code Needs for Very High Cooled Plants 543
Temperature Generation IV Reactors 61.11 Appendix II – Owner’s Reports for In-Service
Inspections 543
William J. O’Donnell and Donald S. Griffin . . . . . . . . . . . 505
61.12 Appendix IX – Application Rules of the ASME
Abstract 505
Code Section III or Other Regulations for
59.1 Background 505
Repair or Replacement of Components in
59.2 Summary 505
Operating Nuclear Units 543
59.3 Structural Integrity Evaluation Approach 507
61.13 Appendix X – An Independent Body Distinct
59.4 Structural Integrity Evaluation Methods 507
from the Mandated Organization Performing
59.5 Regulatory Issues 508
the AIA Role 545
59.6 Current Regulatory Issues for Structural
61.14 Evolution of the Rules 545
Design of VHTR and Gen IV Systems 511
61.15 Acknowledgment 546
59.7 How Structural Integrity Issues are Addressed
61.16 References 547
by Current ASME Code? Including Code Cases
61.17 Appendices 548
and Section IIII, Subsection NH, “Class 1
Components in Elevated Temperature Service” 515
59.8 Material Models Design Criteria and Analysis CHAPTER 62 Boiler and Pressure Vessels in Germany
Methods Needed in the ASME Code for Very
Dieter Kreckel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 553
High-Temperature Service 516
59.9 Acknowledgement 517 62.1 Introduction 553
59.10 References 517 62.2 European Directive (PED) and German Legal
Adaptations 553
62.3 Nuclear Regulations of Pressure Vessels
PART 16: GLOBAL PV&P ISSUES of WESTERN Applicable to German NPP 554
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 62.4 Nuclear Regulations for Pressure Vessels
Applicable to New NPP for Potential Export 555
CHAPTER 60 Risk-informed Licensing, Regulation, 62.5 Conclusions 557
and Safety Management of NPPs in Finland 62.6 References 561
Reino Virolainen and Kaisa Simola . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 519 62.7 Further Readings 561

60.1 Introduction 519

60.2 Risk-Informed Regulatory Frame 519 CHAPTER 63 Pressure Equipment Regulations,
60.3 PRA in the Regulatory Process 520 Codes, and Standards in Spain
60.4 Examples of Risk-Informed Applications 524 Carlos Cueto-Felgueroso . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 563
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • xlvii

63.1 Introduction 563 66.3 Development and Actual State of Nuclear

63.2 Spanish Regulation in the Nonnuclear Codes for Design and Analysis of NPPs
Industry 563 Equipment and Piping 603
63.3 Codes and Standards in the Nuclear Industry 567 66.4 Comparison of Russian Nuclear Standard PNAE
63.4 Conclusions 574 With ASME BPVC in Application to Seismic
References 574 Analysis of a Primary Loop of PWR (VVER)
Reactor 605
66.5 European High Viscous Dampers Approach
PART 17: GLOBAL PV&P ISSUES of EASTERN EURO- in Protecting NPP Primary and Secondary
PEAN COUNTRIES Systems from Seismic Loads and Operational
Vibration 614
CHAPTER 64 Czech and Slovakian Codes 66.6 Conclusion 617
66.7 Nomenclature 619
Milan Brumovsky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 577
66.8 Glossary 621
64.1 Short History and Introduction 577 66.9 References 622
64.2 SONS Requirements for Lifetime Evaluation 577
64.3 NTD ASI Code for WWER Reactor
PART 18: GLOBAL PV&P ISSUES of
Components 577
AFRICAN COUNTRIES
64.4 VERLIFE Procedure 580
64.5 Covers Continuation 582
64.6 Conclusion 583 CHAPTER 67 Codes and Standards Used in the
64.7 Comments 583 Nuclear Industry in the Republic of South Africa
64.8 References 583 Malcolm J. Europa, Paul J. Brinkhurst,
64.9 Structure of NTD ASI 584 John Fletcher, and Neil Broom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 625
Section I – Welding of Components and
67.1 Introduction 625
Piping in WWER Type NPPs 584
67.2 Regulatory Control of Pressurized Equipment
Section II – Characteristics of Materials and
used in the Nuclear Industry 625
Welds for Components and Piping in WWER
67.3 Nuclear Code and Standards Usage in
Type NPPs 585
Republic of South Africa 627
Section III – Evaluation of Strength of Components
67.4 Future Outlook 633
and Piping in WWER-Type NPPs 585
67.5 References 633
Section IV – Evaluation FO Residual Lifetime of
Components and Piping In WWER – Type
NPPs 586 PART 19: GLOBAL PV&P ISSUES
Section V — Material Testing 587 of ASIAN COUNTRIES

CHAPTER 65 Comprehensive Adaptation CHAPTER 68 Design of Indian Pressurized

of the ASME Code at Paks NPP, Hungary Heavy Water Reactor Components
Peter Trampus and Peter Pal Babics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 589 H.S. Kushwaha, K.K. Vaze, and K.B. Dixit. . . . . . . . . . . . 635
65.1 Introduction 589 68.1 Introduction 635
65.2 Motivation of the ASME Code Adaptation in 68.2 Indian PHWR 635
Hungary 589 68.3 Design of Indian Pressurized Heavy Water
65.3 Main Features of the Current Hungarian ISI Reactor Components 638
System 591 68.4 Deviations from ASME Code 642
65.4 International Experiences 592 68.5 Seismic Qualification, Leak-Before-Break, ISI,
65.5 Comparative Assessment of the U.S. and Containment Design 643
Hungarian Legislative/Regulatory Framework 594 68.6 Organization of Design, Fabrication,
65.6 Analysis and Evaluation of Individual Documents 594 Construction, Operation, and ISI of NPPs
65.7 Design Review of Selected Components 596 in India 651
65.8 Conclusions 598 68.7 Conclusions 653
65.9 References 598 68.8 Acknowledgments 653
68.9 References 653
CHAPTER 66 Some Aspects of Russian
Regulation and Codes in Nuclear Power CHAPTER 69 Korean Regulatory System and
Victor V. Kostarev and Alexander V. Sudakov . . . . . . . . . 601 Codes of Nuclear Boiler and Pressure Vessels
Jong C. Jo and Howard H. Chung. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 655
66.1 Brief History of Regulatory Activity and Boiler
Codes in Russia 601 69.1 Introduction 655
66.2 System and a List of Standards Relevant to 69.2 Nuclear Regulatory Organizations 656
the State Safety Regulation in Nuclear Power 602 69.3 Legislation System 657
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xlviii • Contributor Biographies

69.4 Licensing System and Safety Assessment 658 69.9 Conclusions 677
69.5 Locations of the Nuclear Power Plants in 69.10 References 677
Korea 663
69.6 Introduction to the Notices of the Minister of the CHAPTER 70 Development of Nuclear Boiler and
Education, Science and Technology Related to Pressure Vessels in Taiwan
Nuclear Power Reactor Boiler and Pressure
Yi-Bin Chen, Shin Chang, and Ting Chow . . . . . . . . . . . 679
Vessels in Korea 663
69.7 Guidelines for the Application of the Korea 70.1 Introduction 679
Electric Power Industry Codes to the Technical 70.2 Role of Regulatory Authority 680
Standards of Reactor Facilities (Notice of the 70.3 Seismic Design 681
Minister of Education, Science and Technology 70.4 Pressure Boundary Integrity 684
No. 05-04) 664 70.5 Power Uprate and License Renewal 685
69.8 Industrial Code In Korea: Korea Electric Power 70.6 Radioactive Waste Management of NPPs 685
Industry Code (KEPIC) 674 70.7 References 685
ASME_FM_Vol_III_pi-lxxxiv.qxd 6/6/09 12:28 PM Page xlix
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
This book provides “The Criteria and Commentary on Select
Aspects of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel and Piping Codes”
in two volumes. The intent of this book is to serve as a “Primer”
to help the user weave through varied aspects of the ASME Codes
and B31.1 and B31.3 Piping Codes and present a summary of
specific aspects of interest to users. In essence, this Primer will
enable users to understand the basic rationale of the Codes as
deliberated and disseminated by the ASME Code Committees.
This book is different from the Code Cases or Interpretations of
the Code, issued periodically by these ASME Code Committees,
although these are referred in the book. It is meant for a varied
spectrum of users of Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) and
B31.1 and B31.3 Piping Codes in United States and elsewhere in
the world. This book should be considered as a comprehensive
guide for ASME B&PV Code Sections I through XI, B31.1 and
B31.3 Piping Codes. The contents of these two volumes can be
considered as a companion book—a criteria document—for the
latest editions of the Code, written by thirty-six professionals with
expertise in its preparation and use.
ASME and the industry volunteers have invested immense
resources in developing Codes and Standards for the Power and
Petrochemical Industry, including nuclear, non-nuclear, fossil,
and related. The industry has been relying on these documents,
collectively referred to as the ASME Code, on a day-today
basis, and regulators consult them for enforcing the rules.
Research and development, in both the material science and ana-
lytical areas, find their results in the revisions and updates of the
Codes. Over a period of time, these B&PV and Piping Codes,
encompassing several disciplines and topics, have become volu-
minous Standards that belie the intent and expectations of the
authors of the Codes. In a word, the B&PV Codes can become a
“labyrinth” for an occasional user not conversant with the infor-
mation contained in the Code. Thus, given the wealth of infor-
mation contained in the Code, these cannot be easily discerned.
For example, the B&PV Code, even though it is literally an
encyclopedia of rules and standards to be followed by engineers
in the nuclear or fossil or related industries, is not easy to com-
prehend and conform to. Alphanumeric text and graphics are
loaded with information, arrived at by a consensus process from
the deliberations of practicing engineers, professionals, acade-
mia, and regulators meeting several times a year. A lack of
understanding of the Code, therefore, can cause not only profes-
sional errors but also misplaced confidence and reliance on the
engineer’s interpretation that could lead to serious public safety
hazards. Spread over several volumes and thousands of pages of
text, tables, and graphics, it is not easy to decipher the criteria
and the basis of these Codes.
Thus, given the importance of these ASME Codes related to
the industry and the attendant technological advances, it becomes
a professional expediency to assimilate and appropriately apply
the wealth of information contained in the Codes. The first step,
then, is to ask, “Where is what?” The Code is spread over eleven
Sections; attending the tutorials is one way to understand first-
hand the various Sections of the Code. However, this is not within
the reach of all of the engineers in the industry. The next best
solution is to have expert authors, versatile in the individual
Sections and Subsections, to make the subject matter understand-
able to the practicing engineers in a book format such as “A
PRIMER.”
In this book, all of the Sections I through XI of the B&PV and
B31.1 and B31.3 Piping Codes are summarily addressed with
examples, explanatory text, tables, graphics, references, and anno-
tated bibliographical notes. This permits engineers to more easily
refer to the material requirements and the acceptance criteria
whether they are in the design basis or in an operability situation
of a nuclear plant or process piping. In addition, certain special
topics of interest to engineers are explicitly addressed. These
include Rules for Accreditation and Certification; Perspective on
Cyclic, Impact, and Dynamic Loads; Functionality and
Operability Criteria; Fluids; Pipe Vibration; Stress Intensification
Factors, Stress Indices, and Flexibility Factors; Code Design and
Evaluation for Cyclic Loading; and Bolted-Flange Joints and
Connections. Important is the inclusion of unique Sections such
as Sections I, II, IV through VII, IX, and X that enriches the value
of the book as a comprehensive companion guide for B&PV and
Piping Codes. Of considerable value is the inclusion of an in-
depth treatment of Sections III, VIII, and XI. A unique aspect of
the book chapters related to the Codes is the treatment of the ori-
gins and the historical background unraveling the original intent
of the writers of the Criteria of the Codes and Standards. Thus,
the current users of these Codes and Standards can apply their
engineering knowledge and judgment intelligently in their use of
these Codes and Standards.
Although these two volumes cannot be considered to be a per-
fect symphony, the subject matter orchestrates around a central
theme, that is, “The Use of B&PV and Piping Codes and
Standards.” Special effort is made by the contributors, who are
experts in their respective fields, to cross-reference other Sections;
this facilitates identifying the interconnection between various
B&PV Code Sections, as well as the B31.1 and B31.3 Piping
ASME_FM_Vol_III_pi-lxxxiv.qxd 6/6/09 12:28 PM Page l
l • Preface
Codes. The Table of Contents, indexing, and annotated notes for
individual Chapters are provided to identify the connection
between varied topics. It is worth mentioning that despite the
chapters not being of equal length, comprehensive coverage is
ensured. The coverage of some sections is intentionally increased
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
This edition continues to address the purpose of the first edition
to serve as a “Primer” to help the user weave through varied aspects
of the ASME Codes and B31.1 and B31.3 Piping Codes and pres-
ent a summary of specific aspects of interest to users. In providing
the “end user” all of these aspects, the first edition has been revised
appropriately to be consistent with the current 2004 Codes.
Contributors of the first and second volumes had taken
immense pains to carefully update their write-ups to include as
much of the details that they could provide. Significant changes
can be seen in Sections II, III, VIII and XI with repercussions on
Sections I, IV, V, VII, IX and X. Thus, these consequences had been
picked up by the contributors to bring their write-up up-to-date.
Similarly changes of Power Piping (B31.1 Code) and B31.3
(Process Piping) have also been updated.
Included in this edition is a third volume that addresses the crit-
ical issues faced by the BWR and PWR Nuclear facilities such as
BWR Internals, PWR Reactor Integrity, and Alloy 600 related
issues. With the aging of the Nuclear Plants, the regulators per-
spective can be meaningful, and this has been addressed by
experts in this area. In today’s industrial spectrum the role of
Probabilistic Risk Analysis has taken an important role and this
to provide in-depth discussion, with examples to elucidate the
points citing the Code Subsections and Articles.
K. R. Rao, Ph.D., P. E. Robert E. Nickell, Ph.D.
Editor 1999–2000 President
ASME International
volume has a chapter contributed by recognized authorities. With
the increased use of computer–related analytical tools and with
ASME Codes explicitly addressing them, a chapter has been
devoted to the Applications of Elastic Plastic Fracture Mechanics
in ASME Section XI Code.
ASME Codes are literally used around the world. More impor-
tantly the European Community, Canada, Japan and UK have
been increasingly sensitive to the relevance of ASME Codes. In
this second edition, experts conversant with these country Codes
had been invited to detail the specifics of their Codes and cross-
reference these to the ASME Codes.
Public Safety, more so than ever before, has become extremely
relevant in today’s power generation. Experts hade been invited to
provide a perspective of the regulations as they emerged as well
as discuss the salient points of their current use. These include the
transportation of radioactive materials and the new ASME
Section XII Code, Pipe Line Integrity and pertinent topics
involved in decommissioning of nuclear facilities.
K. R. Rao, Ph.D., P.E.
Editor
ASME_FM_Vol_III_pi-lxxxiv.qxd 6/6/09 12:28 PM Page li
PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION
This edition continues to address the purpose of the previ-
ous editions to serve as a “Primer” to help the user weave
through varied aspects of the ASME Codes and B31.1 and
B31.3 Piping Codes, in addition to a discussion of “The
Criteria and Commentary on Select Aspects of ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel and Piping Codes” of interest to
“end users”. This publication has been revised in providing
all of the aspects of the previous editions, while updating to
the current 2007 Codes, unless otherwise mentioned. This
book in three volumes strives to be a comprehensive
‘Companion Guide to the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Code’.
Since the first edition, a total of 140 authors have con-
tributed to this publication, and in this edition there are 107
contributors of which 51 are new authors. Several of the
new contributors are from countries around the world that
use ASME B&PV Codes, with knowledge of ASME Codes,
in addition to expertise of their own countries’ B&PV
Codes. All of these authors who contributed to this third
edition considerably updated, revised or added to the con-
tent matter covered in the second edition to address the
current and futuristic trend as well as dramatic changes in
the industry.
The first two volumes covering Code Sections I through XI
address organizational changes of B&PV Code Committees
and Special topics relating to the application of the Code.
Considering significant organizational changes are taking
place in ASME that reflect the industry’s demands both in
USA and internationally, the salient points of these have
been captured in this publication by experts who have first
hand information about these.
Volume 1 covers ASME Code Sections I through VII,
B31.1 and B31.3 Piping Codes. Continuing authors have
considerably updated the text, tables, and figures of the pre-
vious edition to be in line with the 2007 Code, bringing the
insight knowledge of these experts in updating this Volume.
Fresh look has been provided by new authors, who in
replacing previous contributors of few chapters, have pro-
vided an added perspectives rendered in the earlier edi-
tions. In one case, the chapter had been entirely rewritten
by new experts, with a new title but addressing the same
subject matter while updating the information to the 2007
ASME Code Edition.
ASME Code Committees have spent time and consider-
able resources to update Section VIII Division 2 that was
completely rewritten in the 2007 Code Edition, and this
effort has been captured in Volume 2 by several experts
conversant with this effort. Volume 2 has chapters address-
ing Code Sections VIII through XI, refurbished with addition-
al code material consistent with the current 2007 Code edi-
tion. Notable updates included in this Volume relate to
maintenance rule; accreditation and certification; perspec-
tives on cyclic, impact and dynamic loads; functionality and
operability criteria; fluids; pipe vibration testing and analysis;
stress intensification factors, stress indices and flexibility
factors; Code design and evaluation for cyclic loading; and
bolted-flange joints, connections, code design and evalua-
tion for cyclic loading for Code Sections III, VIII and a new
chapter that discusses Safety of Personnel using Quick-
actuating Closures on Pressure Vessels and associated liti-
gation issues. While few chapters have been addressed by
new authors who added fresh perspective, the efforts of
continuing authors have provided their insights with addi-
tional equations, figures and tables in addition to extensive
textual matter.
The third volume of this edition is considerably enlarged
to expand the items addressing changing priorities of
Codes and Standards. Continuing authors who addressed
these topics in the previous edition have discussed these
with respect to the ASME 2007 Code Edition. The discus-
sions include chapters on BWR and PWR Reactor
Internals; License Renewal and Aging Management; Alloy
600 Issues; PRA and Risk-Informed Analysis; Elastic-
Plastic Fracture Mechanics; and ASME Code Rules of
Section XII Transport Tank Code. Chapters covering ‘U.S.
Transportation Regulations for Radioactive Materials’;
‘Pipeline Integrity and Security’, and ‘Decommissioning of
Nuclear Facilities’ have been considerably revised.
In Volume 3 experts around the world capture ‘Issues
Critical for the Next Generation of Nuclear Facilities’ such as
Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel, Generation III⫹ PWRs,
New Generation of BWRs and VERY High Temperature
Generation IV Reactors.
The impact of globalization and inter-dependency of
ASME B&PV Codes had been examined in the previous
edition in European Community, Canada, France, Japan
and United Kingdom. Contributors who authored these
country chapters revisited their write-up and updated to
capture the current scenario.
Significant contribution in the third volume is the inclusion
of additional countries with changing priorities of their
Nuclear Facilities. In-depth discussions cover the international
ASME_FM_Vol_III_pi-lxxxiv.qxd 6/6/09 12:28 PM Page lii
lii • Preface
experts of these countries which own and operate nuclear
reactors or have nuclear steam supply vendors and fabrica-
tors that use ASME B&PV Code Sections I through XII. This
information is meant to benefit international users of ASME
Codes in Finland, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Czech and
Slovakia, Russia, South Africa, India, Korea and Taiwan that
have been added in this third edition.
A unique feature of this publication is once again, as in
the previous editions, the inclusion of all author biographies
and an introduction that synthesizes every chapter, along
with an alphabetical listing of indexed terms
K. R. Rao, Ph.D., P.E.
Editor
ASME_FM_Vol_III_pi-lxxxiv.qxd 6/6/09 12:28 PM Page liii
This third edition is in three volumes composed of 19 Parts, with
Parts 1–5 in Volume 1, Parts 6–11 in Volume 2 and Parts 12–19 in
Volume 3. Common to all three volumes is the front matter,
including the Organization of the Code. Organization and
Operation of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV)
Committee has been initially authored by Martin D. Bernstein for
the first edition but considerably updated in the previous second
edition by Guido G. Karcher. However, the current dramatic
changes in the ASME B&PV organization these have been cap-
tured by Guido Karcher in this current third edition. Included are
detailed discussions pertaining to the “Research Projects for the
Maintenance and Development of Codes and Standards” and
“Realignment Activities of the ASME B&PV Code Committee
Structures”. An index is provided at the end of each volume as a
quick reference to topics occurring in different Code Sections of
that volume. In addition to indexing several topics covered in
this publication, it is also meant to assist in reviewing the inter-
connection of the ASME Boilers & Pressure Vessel Code
Sections/Subsections/Paragraphs occurring in the particular vol-
ume. In each chapter, all discussions generally pertain to the latest
2007 Code Edition unless noted otherwise by the chapter
author(s). The ASME Code is generally accepted in the United
States (and in many foreign countries) as the recognized mini-
mum safety standard for the construction of pressure vessels and
piping. Toward that end, the first two volumes can be considered
“a primer.” Although this primer is authored by several Code
Committee members who are considered experts in their respec-
tive fields, the comments and interpretations of the rules con-
tained in this book are strictly the opinions of the individual
authors; they are not to be considered official ASME Code
Committee positions.
Since the first edition, a total of 140 authors contributed to this
publication and in this edition there are 107 contributors of which
51 are new authors. Several of the new contributors are from coun-
tries around the world that use ASME Boiler & Pressure Codes,
with knowledge of ASME Codes in addition to expertise of their
own country Boiler & Pressure Vessel Codes. All of these authors
who contributed to this third edition considerably updated, revised
or added to the content matter covered in the second edition.
Volume 1 has five Parts, each addressing a unique aspect of the
Code. Part 1 covers Power Boilers (Code Sections I and VII); Part
2 covers Materials and Specifications (Code Section II); Part 3
provides an in-depth commentary on Rules for Construction of
Nuclear Power Plant Components (Code Section III, Divisions 1,
2, and 3); Part 4 covers Power Piping (B31.1 Code) and Process
Piping (B31.3 Code); and Part 5 covers Heating Boilers (Code
Sections IV and VI).
Volume 2 covers Parts 6–11, with Part 6 covering
Nondestructive Examination (NDE) (Code Section V); Part 7 pro-
viding in-depth criteria and commentary of Code Section VIII,
INTRODUCTION
including Divisions 1, 2, and 3; Part 8 covering welding and braz-
ing qualifications of Code Section IX; Part 9 covering Code
Section X and pertaining to fiber-reinforced plastic pressure ves-
sels; Part 10 providing in-depth discussions of Code Section XI;
and Part 11 covering special topics of interest to ASME Boiler
and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code Users and Practicing
Engineers.
The scope of Volume 3 that contains Parts 12 to 19 has consid-
erably expanded from the previous edition. This volume has in
addition to aspects with critical bearing on ASME Boiler &
Pressure Vessels addresses countries that have become increasingly
important with ASME Codes being applicable to them. Part 12
addresses Current BWR Reactor Internals & Other BWR Issues in
chapters that cover License Renewal and Aging Management
(NRC), PWR Reactor Vessel Integrity, PWR Reactor Vessel Alloy
600 Related Issues, PRA & Risk Based Analysis, and Applications
of Elastic Plastic Fracture Mechanics in ASME Section XI Code
Applications. In Part 13 International Codes & Standards Related
to ASME B&PV Code are addressed, which include Pressure
Equipment Directive used by the European Community, Canadian
B&PV Codes & Standards, French Pressure Equipment Codes,
Recent Development of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Codes in
Japan, and British Codes & Standards. With the recent trends to
pay particular attention to Public Safety, more so than previously,
Part 14 focuses on Other Ongoing Issues of Public Safety with
chapters covering 40-Year Retrospective on the Transportation
Regulations for Radioactive Materials, Description of Rules of
Section XII Transport Tank Code, Pipe Line Integrity & Security,
and Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities. In Part 15 issues criti-
cal for the next generation of nuclear facilities is addressed. In this
Part, topics deal with Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel,
Generation III+ PWRs, New Generation of BWRs and very High
Temperature Generation IV Reactors. Global Pressure Vessel and
Piping Issues of several countries of Western and Eastern Europe,
Africa and Asia are dealt with in Parts 16 to 19. In each of these
Chapters authors with expertise in their Country Codes and con-
versant with ASME Pressure Vessel Codes provided the write-up.
In Part 16 PV&P Codes of West European Countries covered are
Finland, Belgium, Germany and Spain. In Part 17 the PV&P
Codes of East European Countries included are Czech and
Slovakian Codes, Hungary and Russia. Codes and standards used
in the nuclear industry in the Republic of South Africa are covered
in Part 18. Pressure & Vessel Issues of Asian countries such as
India, Korea and Taiwan are included in Part 19.
VOLUME 1
Chapter 1 of the 1st edition was authored by the late Martin D.
Bernstein. It discussed Power Boilers, Section I of the ASME
Code. His objective was to provide an overview of the intent,
ASME_FM_Vol_III_pi-lxxxiv.qxd 6/6/09 12:28 PM Page liv
liv • Introduction
application and enforcement of Section I rules for the construc-
tion of power boilers. This chapter is an abbreviated version of
the book Power boilers, A Guide to Section I of the ASME Boiler
and Pressure Vessel Code, used as the textbook for a two day
ASME professional developement course on Section I developed
and taught for many years by Martin D. Bernstein and Lloyd W.
Yoder. Mr. Yoder has reviewed and updated the 1st edition
Chapter 1 for this 2nd edition to commemorate his close friend
and associate. In doing so, he found that only minor changes and
updating were required because the 1st edition Chapter 1 was so
well crafted by Mr. Bernstein, like all of the many things he was
known to have written.
Chapter 1 was reviewed and updated by John R. Mackay, long-
time member and past chairman of Subcommittee I. The current
edition of this Chapter covers revisions to Section I, Power
Boilers through the 2007 Edition. Significant additions are includ-
ed in this update that pertain to Code changes regarding Cold
Forming of Austenitic Materials, Hydrostatic Test, increased
allowable stresses of many materials, and a new Part PHRSG,
Requirements for Heat Recovery Steam Generators.
Chapter 1 covers some of the more important aspects of Section
I construction, including the history and philosophy of Section I:
how the ASME Code works; the organization and scope of Section
I; the distinction between boiler proper piping and boiler external
piping; how and where Section I is enforced; and the fundamentals
of Section I construction. These fundamentals include permitted
materials; design; fabrication; welding and postweld heat treat-
ment; NDE; hydrostatic testing; third-party inspection; and
certification by stamping and the use of data reports. A number of
design examples also have been included in this chapter.
The design and construction of power boiler involves the use of
other sections of the ASME Code besides Section I, such as
Section II, Materials; Section V, Nondestructive Examination;
and Section IX, Welding and Brazing Qualifications. In a rather
unusual arrangement, the construction rules for boiler piping are
found partly in Section I and partly in the B31.1 Power Piping
Code. This arrangement has led to considerable misunderstanding
and confusion, as explained in Chapter 1, Section 1.5, where the
distinction between boiler proper piping and boiler external pip-
ing is discussed.
In the 1st edition Mr. Bernstein stated “The ASME B&PV Code
changes very slowly but continuously. Thus, although this chapter
provides a substantial body of information and explanation of the
rules as they now exist, it can never provide the last word.
Nevertheless, the chapter should provide the User with a very
useful introduction and guide to Section I and its application.”
His words are still true for the reason that Chapter 1, as updated,
retains the philosophy and intent of the original author, Martin D.
Bernstein.
Chapter 2, authored by Edmund W. K. Chang and Geoffrey M.
Halley, covers ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Section VII,
Recommended Guidelines for the Care of Power Boilers. This
Section is very useful for operators of power boilers, as stated in
the Preamble of Section VII, “The purpose of these recommended
guidelines is to promote safety in the use of power boilers. These
guidelines are intended for use by those directly responsible for
operating, maintaining, and inspecting power boilers.” In line
with the other Code Sections, the nine Subsections, C1–C9, are
addressed by the authors, including Fundamentals such as Boilers
Types, Combustion, and Boiler Efficiency; Boiler Operation;
Boiler Auxiliaries; Appurtenances; Instrumentation, Controls, and
Interlocks; Inspection; Repairs, Alterations, and Maintenance;
Control of Internal Chemical Conditions; Preventing Boiler
Failures; and Guidelines for Safe and Reliable Operation of the
Power Boilers.
The authors present the commentary in Chapter 2 from the per-
spective of Owner–Operator personnel with experience in operat-
ing, maintaining, and inspecting industrial and utility power boil-
ers. In some instances, although certain paragraphs are
reiterations of Section VII, they, combined with additional infor-
mation, stress the importance of the aspects covered. It is suggest-
ed that the reader review existing literature, such as manufactur-
er’s instructions or existing company procedures, for additional
details. Section VII is a Nonmandatory Standard, and it, along
with Section VI (Chapter 19 of Volume 1) provides recommended
practices and serves as a guideline. However, Section VII touches
on many activities that the Owner–Operator personnel must be
aware of before a power boiler is commissioned. New personnel
who are not familiar with boiler operation, maintenance, and
inspection can use Section VII as an introduction to these activi-
ties. Experienced personnel will find Chapter 2 to be a good
review of the essentials of operation, maintenance, and inspection,
with useful figures and references. In the “Summary of Changes”
of the 2007 Edition, it was written that “No revisions are con-
tained in Section VII of this Edition.” However, there were a few
minor corrections made that were not listed. It is the authors’
opinion that more effort should be made by the committee to
update and expand Section VII as recommended in the Chapter 2
commentary. Like the other Sections, Section VII should also be a
living document providing the latest information in this ever-
changing world. If the committee does not put in any effort in
revising Section VII, they should at least alert prospective pur-
chasers that no changes were made so that holders of the previous
Edition do not have to buy it.
Chapter 3 has multiple authors, and in Chapter 3.1, History of
Materials in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,
Domenic Canonico traces the chronological evolution of materi-
als and associated technologies, from the need for materials to
accommodate riveted construction to the acceptance of fusion
welding as a fabrication process. Included in this discussion are
the application of advanced materials, the revisions to the basis
for setting allowable stress values, and the acceptance of Material
Specifications other than those approved by ASTM. Also covered
is the evolution of materials, from their humble beginning as a
35-page inclusion in the 1914 Edition of the Boiler Code to the
3994-page, four-Part 2001 Edition of Section II of the ASME
B&PV Code. Chapter 3.1 provides some insight not only into the
materials needed for the design and fabrication of power boilers
but also into the determination of the Maximum Allowable
Working Pressure. With the aid of tables, Domenic discusses the
Material Specifications from the 1914 through the present Code
Editions.
Chapter 3.2, authored by Richard Moen and Elmar Upitis, dis-
cusses Code Section II, Part A—Ferrous Material Specifications,
adopted by ASME for the construction of boiler, pressure vessel,
and nuclear power plant components. They note that all materials
accepted by the various Code Sections and used for construction
within the scope of the Code Sections’ rules must be furnished in
accordance with the Material Specifications contained in Section
II, Parts A, B, or C, or referenced in Appendix A of Part A—
except where otherwise provided in the ASME Code Cases or in
the applicable Code Section. Discussions in Chapter 3.2 include
The Organization of Section II, Part A, Guideline on the Approval
of New Materials, Appendices, and Interpretations.
ASME_FM_Vol_III_pi-lxxxiv.qxd 6/6/09 12:28 PM Page lv
COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • lv
In Chapter 3.3, Dennis W. Rahoi provides the basis of and com-
mentary on Section II, Part B—Nonferrous Material Specifications,
adopted by ASME for the construction of boiler, pressure vessel,
and nuclear power plant components. He notes that all materials
allowed by the various Code Sections and used for construction
within the scope of the Code Sections’ rules must be furnished in
accordance with the Material Specifications contained in Section II,
Part B or referenced in Appendix A of Part B-except where other-
wise provided in the ASME Code Cases or in the applicable Code
Section. Dennis discusses alloy definitions; the organization of
Section II, Part B Appendices; the acceptable ASTM Editions;
Nonmandatory guidelines; the guideline on the Approval of New
Materials; the allowable stresses for alloys; and the basis for materi-
al acceptance for Code Construction. Dennis also provides cross-
references to weldability; ASME Code Sections I, III, IV, VIII, and
IX; and Piping Codes B31.1 and B31.3.
Chapter 3.4, authored by Marvin Carpenter, discusses Section
II, Part C—Specification for Welding Rods, Electrodes, and Filler
Metals. Welding plays a major role in the fabrication of pressure
vessels and related components to the requirements of the ASME
B&PV Code. Marvin provides the basis for the Specifications and
Standards enveloped by Section II, Part C and their relations to
the ANSI/AWS specifications. Marvin indicates that Section II,
Part C does not include all the welding and brazing materials
available to the industry—only those Specifications applicable to
ASME Code Construction. Discussions also include Code Cases
pertinent to this chapter. Chapter 3.4 highlights the major features
of the Welding Material Specifications contained in Section II,
Part C and the relationship of these Specifications to other
Sections of the Code, including Section IX. Included are the elec-
trode classification system, material descriptions, welding material
applications, welding material procurement, and filler-metal
certification. Chapter 3.4 should prove useful for one to gain a
basic understanding of ASME/AWS Welding Material Classification
and Specification.
Chapter 3.5, authored by Richard Moen and Elmar Upitis, cov-
ers Section II, Part D—Properties. The coverage includes proper-
ties of ferrous and nonferrous materials adopted by the Code for
design of B&PV and nuclear power plant components. This cov-
erage includes tables of maximum allowable stresses and design-
stress intensities for the materials adopted by the various Code
Sections, as well as a discussion of yield strength and tensile
strength at various temperatures, external-pressure charts, and
other properties for the design of items covered by the various
Code Sections. With the aid of several tables, they provide in-
depth information about “where is what” in Section II, Part D,
and in addition, they note that although much of the information
in the various Subparts and Appendices of Section II, Part D was
compiled in several places in earlier Code Section Editions, in
current editions it is compiled entirely in Section II, Part D to
reduce the length of, avoid the duplication of, and facilitate the
use of the Code Sections. Thus their commentary can be a useful
“road map” even for Users of earlier Code Sections, because it
encapsulates—all in one place-information crucial to Designers
and Practicing Engineers.
In Chapter 4, Roger Reedy provides commentary for the under-
standing and application of the principles of the ASME B&PV
Code. Roger traces the history of the Code, from its initial charter
and the voluntary effort of engineers for establishing a Code with
a safety record to the current Code developed by a consensus
process. Roger suggests that Code Users apply common sense
when using the Code and for understanding Code requirements.
He emphasizes that “the Code is not a handbook and cannot sub-
stitute for the use of engineering judgment.” Also, Roger empha-
sizes the need for a better understanding of the basic principles of
the Code Interpretations in the application of safety factors for the
Section III Nuclear Code, the Section VIII Pressure Vessels, and
the Section I Boiler Code. Roger states that the term safety factor
is both incorrect and misleading, because a reduction in the factor
seems to indicate a reduction in safety. In fact, when the Code
Committee considers a reduction in design factor, it allows the
reduction only after it determines that other changes in Code
requirements have compensated for the reduction.
Chapter 5, authored by Richard W. Swayne, describes the gen-
eral requirements of Section III applicable to all Construction
Classes, including concrete structures and steel vessels, piping,
pumps, and valves. It identifies how to classify components and
describes how the jurisdictional boundaries of Section III define
what is within and what is outside the scope of the Code. This
chapter includes coverage of Subsection NCA, which pertains to
general requirements for Divisions 1, 2, and 3 of Section III.
Division 1 includes steel items such as vessels, storage tanks, pip-
ing systems, pumps, valves, supports, and core support structures
for use at commercial nuclear power plants; Division 2 includes
concrete reactor vessels and concrete containment vessels; and
Division 3 includes requirements for the construction of contain-
ment vessels for transportation of spent nuclear fuel. The scope of
Division 3 now also includes recently-published requirements for
construction of storage canisters for spent nuclear fuel and spent-
fuel transportation-containment vessels.
Chapter 5 also explains the use of Code Editions, Addenda, and
Code Cases. The requirements for design basis, design and con-
struction specifications, and design reports are described, and the
responsibilities and quality assurance program requirements of
the different entities involved in nuclear power plant construc-
tion—from the Material Manufacturer to the Owner—are
addressed. Requirements for ASME accreditation, application of
the ASME Code Symbol Stamp, and use of Code Data Reports are
described. With in-depth information, Mr. Swayne outlines the
basis for exemptions, component classification, load combina-
tions, responsi-bilities, Certificate of Authorization Holders and
Quality System Certificate Holders. Also, Mr. Swayne provides
cross-referencing to other Code Sections and Subsections, such as
Sections III and XI, as well as to pertinent Regulatory Guides,
such as the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).
Chapter 6 originally authored by John Hechmer for the first
edition and updated by Greg Hollinger for the second edition has
been largely revised by David Jones for the current third edition.
Authors cover Subsection NB, Class 1 Components. In present-
ing the rules and requirements for Section III, Subsection NB, the
authors discuss the theories, on which the rules and requirements
are based, the appropriate application for applying the rules and
requirements, and the interfaces for design, analysis, and con-
struction. The chapter emphasizes the analytical rules and require-
ments, and makes reference to the Criteria of the ASME Boiler
and Pressure Vessel Code for Design by Analysis in Sections III
and VIII, Division 2, 1968 that is considered the basis document
for Sections III and VIII. John provided the design theory and
ramifications of the key considerations, with cross-references to
other Code Sections discussing the subtle differences between the
Section III design criteria and the Section I and Section VIII,
Division 1 design criteria.
In addition, commentary is provided on the Code requirements
of Class 1 for design by analysis “because of the prominent role
ASME_FM_Vol_III_pi-lxxxiv.qxd 6/6/09 12:28 PM Page lvi
lvi • Introduction
played by stress analysis in designing vessels by the rules of
Section III . . . and because of the necessity to integrate the design
and analysis efforts.”—The authors emphasize that the design by
analysis theme of NB is to provide high assurance that the failure
modes of burst, plastic collapse, excessive plastic deformation,
fatigue, ratcheting, brittle fracture, elastic instability (buckling),
stress corrosion, and corrosion fatigue. The intent of the rules of
NB is to provide assurance that high quality is reached; therefore,
stress analysis is added to the “NB rules for all of the disciplines
and their interaction” in an effort to reach high quality. Chapter 6
has been updated by Greg Hollinger and David Jones to the 2007
version of the Code including discussions of the differences
between Section VIII Division 2 and Section III NB. Discussions
have been added on the Section VIII Division 2 rules dealing with
Limit Analysis, Finite Element Analysis and Environmental
Fatigue, and new methods for fatigue of weldments.
Chapter 7, authored by Thomas J. Ahl for the first Edition, and
co-authored by Marcus N. Bressler for the second Edition, pro-
vides commentary on Section III, Subsections NC and ND. This
commentary addresses pressure atmospheric tanks, and 0–15 psig
tanks as presented in the ASME B&PV Code, Section III,
Division 1, Subsection NC, Class 2 Components and Subsection
ND, Class 3 Components. This chapter does not address piping,
pumps, and valves; these are addressed in Chapter 8 for Class 2
and Class 3 Piping, and in Chapter 13 for Nuclear Pumps and
Valves. This chapter discusses, in order, each of the eight major
Code Articles: Introduction; Materials; Design, Fabrication and
Installation; Examination; Testing; Overpressure Protection and
Name Plates; and Stamping and Reports. In the 1971 Edition,
Subsection NB was fully developed in the evolution of the
Nuclear Codes; all other were written by using the outline estab-
lished for NB. Consequently, many of the basic paragraphs con-
tained in Subsection NB and other reference documents were
included verbatim in both Subsections NC and ND, when the sub-
sections were published as separate volumes in the 1974 Edition.
Subsections NC and ND are a combination of rules and require-
ments taken from Section III, Subsection NB and Section VIII. In
Chapter 7, Thomas has referenced all of these Codes and meticu-
lously identified both obvious and subtle differences between
Subsection NB, the parent Code, and Subsections NC and ND.
Thus, because Thomas addresses the Articles of Subsections NC
and ND in this part of the commentary, he presents comparisons,
the most probable source of origin of the Code requirements, cer-
tain insights as well as contradictions that seem to exist, and the
specific source document and some of the underlying theory. He
provides cross-references to other Code Sections/Subsections/
Paragraphs where applicable. Marcus has taken this work and
simplified it where possible, and updated it to the 2007 Edition.
Chapter 8, authored by Donald Landers, discusses Section III,
Division 1 (Piping). Chapter 7 indicates that the requirements of
Section III, Division 1 provide for three classes of components.
Chapter 8 indicates that each Class can be considered a quality
level, with Class 1 the highest and Class 3 the lowest. These qual-
ity levels exist because of the various requirements for each Class
in Section III related to materials, fabrication, installation, exami-
nation, and design. Design was placed last on the list because
sufficient evidence exists to indicate that the other considerations
listed are more important than (or, at best, equal to) the design
requirements.
In Chapter 8, Donald mentions the foregoing list in his discus-
sions leading to the Code requirements and his commentary
regarding the criteria and basis for requirements of Subsections
NB, NC and ND Piping. He provides the stress requirements for
Nuclear Classes 1, 2, and 3 Piping and the corresponding design
processes and Design Specifications, with pertinent references,
tables, and figures. His commentary provides insight into load
classifications and the responsibility of Owners. The Code rules
ensure that violation of the pressure boundary will not occur if the
Design Specification satisfactorily addresses all issues necessary
for Code compliance. In his commentary, Donald shows the sub-
tle differences between the piping rules and design by analysis,
and he explains what items the analyst should be concerned with
in satisfying Code requirements. He provides cross-references to
B31.7 Code techniques and discusses the current controversy
regarding seismic requirements in the piping rules in Section III,
Division 1, along with the anticipated revisions that will resolve
the controversy.
Chapter 9, has been authored by Kamran Mokhtarian for the
previous two editions and now updated considerably by Roger F.
Reedy continues the discussion of Subsection NE, Class MC
Components. This chapter summarizes some of the more
significant requirements of Section III, Subsection NE and pro-
vides a commentary on such requirements. Kamran’s comments
and interpretations of the rules are based on his several years of
experience in design, analysis, and construction of containment
vessels, as well as his participation in various ASME Code
Committees. Some comparisons of the rules of Section VIII are
included for information. The analysis procedures are not dealt
with in any great detail, for they are similar to those of Subsection
NB and Section VIII, Division 2; more emphasis is placed on the
unique features of Subsection NE. A number of Code Cases and
references regarding the rules of Subsection NE are cited, with
cross-references to other Code Sections and Subsections. This
chapter is based on the 2007 Edition of the Code.
The items covered in Chapter 9 include Scope of Subsection NE;
Boundaries of Jurisdiction of Subsection NE; General Material
Requirements; Certified Material Test Reports; Material Toughness
Requirements; General Design Requirements; Qualifications of
Professional Engineers; Owner’s Design Specifications; Certified
Design Report; Design by Analysis; Appendix F; Fatigue Analysis;
Buckling; Reinforcement of Cone-to-Cylinder Junctions; Plastic
Analysis; Design by Formula; Openings; Bolted Flange Connections;
Welded Connections; General Fabrication Requirements; Tolerances;
Requirements for Weld Joints; Welding Qualifications; Rules for
Making, Examining, and Repairing Welds; Heat Treatment;
Examination; Qualification and Certification of NDE Personnel;
Testing; Overpressure Protection; and Nameplates, Stamping, and
Reports.
Chapter 10 was authored for the first edition by Robert J.
Masterson, who covered Subsection NF (Supports). The second
and third editions had been updated by Uma S. Bandyopadhyay
with the current third edition addressing the changes of the 2007
Code Edition. Robert traced the historical background of this
Subsection, which provides a single source of rules for the design,
construction, fabrication, and examination of supports for the
nuclear industry. Section III, Division 1, Subsection NF was
developed to provide rules for the estimated 10,000 piping and
component supports existing in a typical nuclear power plant. The
criteria and commentary of Chapter 10 provides information on
the origin and evolution of design rules and is intended to allow
designers, engineers, and fabricators to make better use of
Subsection NF. Topics of greatest interest are discussed from both
a technical and a historical viewpoint. However, it is not the intent
to address every detail associated with the use of Subsection NF.
ASME_FM_Vol_III_pi-lxxxiv.qxd 6/6/09 12:28 PM Page lvii
COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • lvii
Subsection NF rules have evolved dramatically over the past 25
years so that today’s support rules seldom resemble the original
rules of 1973. In Chapter 10, commentary is provided to explain
how the criteria are used, the source and technical basis for equa-
tions and rationale, and the reasons for change. Robert covers the
scope and classification of the types of supports and attachments.
Subsection NF contains rules for the material, design, fabrication,
examination, testing, and stamping of supports for Classes 1, 2, 3,
and MC construction. Robert provides cross-referencing to
Subsections NB, NC, ND, NE, and NG, as well as to the B31.1
and B31.3 Codes, and he also addresses Code Cases and
Interpretations. Discussions include Subsection NF Appendices
and with the help of figures, tables, and references, it is anticipat-
ed that the reader will develop a better understanding of
Subsection NF and appreciate its complexities and usefulness.
Chapter 11, authored by John T. Land, deals with Subsection
NG (Core-Support Structures). This chapter provides commen-
tary and practical examples on the materials, design, fabrication,
installation, and examination requirements for core-support struc-
tures in Section III, Division 1, Subsection NG. In addition, com-
mentary on Section XI as it applies to core-support structure
repair, replacement, examination, and inspection requirements is
presented. In the first edition, the 1998 Edition of the Code was
used to provide examples and discussion points. In this edition,
the 2001 Edition of the Code up to and including July 2003
Addenda is used to provide examples and discussion points. The
objective of the Subsection NG rules is to provide a Code for the
design and manufacture of structures that support the core in pres-
surized water reactors (PWRs) and boiling water reactors
(BWRs). John indicates the subtle differences and overlaps
between this Subsection and other Code Subsections. With the aid
of figures, tables, and examples, John discusses important consid-
erations in the design of core-support structures, the Owner’s
Design Specification, and the jurisdictional boundaries between
core-support structures and reactor pressure vessels (RPVs). John
explains the differences between core-support structures and
internal structures, threaded structural fasteners, and temporary
attachments. Discussions also include unique conditions of serv-
ice; construction materials; special materials; fabrication and
installation rules; examination and repair; general design rules;
design by analysis; testing and overpressure protection; and
examples of load combinations for core-support structures.
The third edition of this chapter has been updated to the 2007
Edition of the ASME B&PV Code with new or additional com-
mentary covering: Background on Subsection NG Development;
Discussion of Typical Materials Used in CSS, IS, and TSFs;
Owner’s Design Specification and Design Reports; Environmental
Effects; CSS Code Cases; Improvements in Subsection NG;
Material Degradation Issues; Compatibility of Subsection NG
with Other International Codes; Trends Towards Realistic Design
Loads in Reactor Internals; and Summary of Changes to 2007
Edition of the ASME Code for CSS.
Chapter 12, authored by Robert I. Jetter, discusses Subsection
NH, 2007 Edition, (Class 1 Components in Elevated Temperature
Service). The purpose of this chapter is to provide background
information on the development and application of the rules for
construction of elevated temperature components for nuclear serv-
ice. Also discussed are the rules for Class 2 and 3 components
and core-support structures that are contained in a series of Code
Cases. Robert covers all aspects of construction: materials,
design, fabrication, inspection, overpressure protection, testing,
and marking for Class 1 components in elevated temperature
service. In Section III, elevated temperature is defined as 700°F
for ferritic steels and 800°F for austenitic stainless steels and
nickel-base alloys. Elevated temperature behavior and associated
failure modes are discussed to provide background for the unique
features of the Subsection NH rules. Robert presumes that readers
have a basic familiarity with the rules for construction of Classes
1, 2, and 3 components and core-support structures contained in
Subsections NB, NC, ND, and NG, respectively, that are dis-
cussed in other chapters of this book. Thus Robert provides cross-
referencing to these Code Subsections. Based on 40-plus years in
the development and implementation of elevated temperature
design and construction rules, Robert, with the aid of figures,
tables, and references, provides a historical perspective to estab-
lish the criteria for the rules contained in Subsection NH. Also
discussed are current and future needs.
Chapter 13 was authored for the first edition by the late
Douglas B. Nickerson, who held several memberships on Code
Committees spread over several decades. He was associated with
the design and qualification of pumps and valves, a topic that he
covers in this chapter. Marcus Bressler agreed to undertake the
updating of this chapter for the Second Edition. Douglas discuss-
es those items that are the driving and controlling forces in
hydraulic systems for nuclear power plants. The pump in each
system drives the flow through the piping to provide the transfer
of energy from one component to another. The valves control the
flow through these fluid systems and thus the operation of the sys-
tems. Fluid systems have varying degrees of criticality, depending
on their function. This commentary explains the relevancy of the
ASME Code requirements for safety-related nuclear pumps and
valves using the latest issue of the Code. The Code is limited to
pressure-boundary requirements. Douglas states that because of
this limitation of the scope of the Code, most conditions neces-
sary to the satisfactory design of a nuclear pump or valve are not
subjected to Code rules. The Design Specification specifies opera-
tional requirements and thus is the most important element in
their function and approval. This commentary not only defines the
applicable Code but also explains how these components function
in their applications.
Chapter 13 also discusses the role of system design and com-
ponent design engineers, as well as the integrity of the
Manufacturer. Douglas provides a historical perspective for the
Code rules, cross-referencing other Subsections of the Code. He
notes that Owner’s Responsibilities for system design plays an
important part in establishing the rules applicable to the Design
Specification for each safety-related pump and valve. Drawing
upon considerable practical experience, Douglas covers opera-
tional and qualification requirements for the procurement of these
items from the Manufacturer. He discusses these items for differ-
ent service conditions with the aid of schematics and references.
Marcus, a member of the subgroup on Design since 1974, and
Chairman of the working group on Valves from 1974 to 1977, pro-
vides the background to the development of the design rules for
valves, and updates the Chapter to the 2007 Edition of the Code.
Chapter 14 describes the bases and provisions of the Code for
Concrete Reactor Vessels and Containments updating to 2007 Code
Edition. After a short description of the provisions for Concrete
Reactor Vessels, the Chapter describes the concrete containment
general environment, types of existing containments, future con-
tainment configurations, and background development including
the regulatory bases of concrete containment construction code
requirements. The description covers sequentially the following
topics: Introduction, Concrete Reactor Vessels, Concrete Reactor
ASME_FM_Vol_III_pi-lxxxiv.qxd 6/6/09 12:28 PM Page lviii
lviii • Introduction
Containments, Types of Containments, Future Containments,
Regulatory Bases for the Code Development, Background
Development of the Code, Reinforced Concrete Containment
Behavior, Containment Design Analysis and Related Testing, Code
Design Requirements, Fabrication and Construction, Construction
Testing and Examination, Containment Structural Integrity Testing,
Containment Overpressure Protection, Stamping and Reports,
Containment Structure and Aircraft Impact, Containment and
Severe Accident Considerations, Other Relevant Information,
Summary and Conclusion.
The previous editions of this Chapter were developed by John
D. Stevenson, and it has been expanded by the current authors,
utilizing the expertise of their respective fields. The basic format of
this chapter is kept the same as in the previous editions. The
updates and additional information relating to the regulatory bases
for the code requirements, future containments and considerations
for future revisions of the Code included in this update are based on
contributions from Hansraj Ashar, Barry Scott, and Joseph Artuso.
In Chapter 15, authored by D. Keith Morton and D. Wayne
Lewis, a commentary is provided regarding the containments used
for the transportation and storage packaging of spent fuel and
high-level radioactive material and waste. John D. Stevenson was
the author of this chapter for the earlier two editions of this publi-
cation. However, this is a complete rewrite of the Chapter, includ-
ing a slightly different Chapter title.
In 1997, ASME issued the initial version of Division 3 of
Section III. Before the publication of Division 3, Section III, the
Section applicable to the construction of nuclear pressure-retaining
components and supports had only two divisions: Division 1, for
metal construction, and Division 2, for concrete construction.
Division 3 was added to cover the containments of packaging for
nuclear materials. Currently, the scope for Division 3 is limited to
transportation and storage containments for only the most haz-
ardous radioactive materials—namely, spent fuel and other highly
radioactive materials, such as high-level waste. Division 3 contains
three published subsections: Subsection WA providing general
requirements, Subsection WB addressing rules for transportation
containments, and Subsection WC addressing storage containment
rules. Under active development is Subsection WD, which will
provide the construction rules applicable to internal support struc-
tures (baskets) for the transportation and storage containments
covered by Subsections WB and WC.
Consistent with current Code practice, the primary concern of
Division 3 is the integrity of these containments under design,
operating conditions (including normal, off-normal, and accident),
and test conditions. In particular, the structural and leak-integrity
of these containments is the focus of the ASME B&PV Code
rules. Division 3 is also concerned with certain aspects of contain-
ment-closure functionality because of the potential for leakage,
which is a key consideration in the containment function. Division
3 covers all construction aspects of the containment, including
administrative requirements, material selection, material qualifica-
tion, design, fabrication, examination, inspection, testing, quality
assurance, and documentation.
Chapter 16, authored by Charles Becht, IV, covers Power
Piping, the ASME B31.1 Code. This chapter is based on the 2007
edition of ASME B31.1, Power Piping Code. This Code was writ-
ten specifically for power piping; it is intended to cover fuel-gas
and fuel-oil systems in power plants (downstream of the meters),
central- and district-heating systems; and water and steam sys-
tems in power plants. Charles provides exhaustive coverage of the
overlapping and interfacing Codes and Standards that Users of the
B31.1 Power Piping should be aware of, and he also discusses the
applicability of this Code to various applications and systems. His
coverage includes cross-references to ASME B&PV Code
Sections and to other B31 Codes, as well as to API, AWWA,
ASTM, and other pertinent Standards and publications. Also
included is the balance of plant piping beyond the block valve(s)
that defines the boundary of the boiler, the rules of which fall
entirely within the scope of the B 31.1 Power Piping Code.
Charles distinguishes this Code from Process Piping, the ASME
B31.3 Code, as well as from other B31 Codes.
Chapter 16 provides a commentary, discussing the historical
perspective of, information about, and sources of the B31.1 Code.
With the aid of equations, schematics, figures, tables, and appen-
dices, Charles elaborates on the basics of the B31.1 Code. Topics
include design conditions and criteria, including thermal expan-
sion; design for pressure; flexibility analysis; supports and
restraints; an overview of materials; components and joints;
requirements for specific piping systems; fabrication, assembly,
and erection; pressure testing; and nonmetallic piping systems.
References are included for each of these topics.
Chapter 17, also authored by Charles Becht, IV, covers Process
Piping, the ASME B31.3 Code. This Code has the broadest scope
of application of any B31 Code for pressure piping. This chapter
covers essentially the entire B31.3 Code, including design, mate-
rials, fabrication, assembly, erection, examination, and testing,
and includes special topics, such as nonmetallic piping and piping
for Category M and high-pressure fluid services. This chapter is
based on the 2006 edition of ASME B31.3, Process Piping Code.
Changes—some very significant—are made to this Code every
year, for which reason the reader should refer to it for any
specific requirements. Charles cross-references Sections I, II, III,
V, VIII, and IX of the ASME B&PV Code, and he also cross-
references API, AWWA, ASTM, and other pertinent Standards
and publications.
Charles provides the history of the B31.3 Code and the over-laps
of and differences between this Code and other B31 Codes. The
B31.3 Code was written specifically for process piping; Chapter 17
provides examples of the typical facilities for which the Code is
intended to cover. The exclusions for the applications with the
B31.3 Code are discussed, and with the aid of examples, figures,
tables, appendices, and references for each topic, a detailed com-
mentary is provided for the following topics: design conditions and
criteria; design for pressure; flexibility analysis; supports and
restraints, limitations on components and joints; requirements for
materials; fabrication, assembly, and erection; examinations;
pressure testing; nonmetallic piping systems; Category M piping;
high-pressure piping; and the organization of the B31.3 Code.
Chapter 18, was authored by M. A. Malek and John I.
Woodworth for the first edition, and co-authored by Geoffrey M.
Halley for the Second edition. The current third edition has been
revised by Edwin A. Nordstrom. In the first edition, the chapter
covered Section IV, Rules for Construction of Heating Boilers,
using the 1998 Edition, 1999 Addenda, and Interpretations and has
now been updated to the 2007 edition. To assist the reader in under-
standing and using the Code, this chapter is presented in a simpli-
fied manner, with the understanding that it is not a Code book and
is not written to replace the Code book published by ASME. A his-
torical perspective of Section IV is provided to trace the criteria
covered by the Code. The authors define the boilers that fall within
the jurisdiction of this Section and provide a detailed discussion of
the minimum requirements for the safe design, construction, instal-
lation, and inspection of low-pressure-steam boilers and hot-water
ASME_FM_Vol_III_pi-lxxxiv.qxd 6/6/09 12:28 PM Page lix
COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • lix
boilers, which are directly fired with oil, gas, electricity, or other
solid or liquid fuels. However, the authors do not cover the opera-
tion, repair, alteration, rerating, and maintenance of such boilers,
but they do cover potable-water heaters and water-storage tanks for
operation at pressures not exceeding 160 psi and water tempera-
tures not exceeding 210°F.
In the first edition, Chapter 18 addressed the Code Interpretations,
the Addenda, and the Code Inquiry procedure as they relate to
Section IV. The authors mentioned that the format used for this
chapter is compatible with the format used in Section IV (1998
Edition, 1999 Addenda, and Interpretations). For the current edition
using the 2007 Code, this is still valid. For easy identification, the
exact numbers of paragraphs, figures, and tables from the Code
book have been used in the running text. The appendices include
Method of Checking Safety Valve and Safety Relief Valve Capacity;
Examples of Methods of Calculating a Welded Ring Reinforced
Furnace; Examples of Methods of Computation of Openings in
Boiler Shells; Glossary; and two examples of Manufacturer’s Data
Report Forms.
Chapter 19 provides criteria and commentary for ASME
Section VI, Recommended Rules for the Care and Operation of
Heating Boilers. This chapter that had been initially authored by
M. A. Malek was updated for the second edition by Geoffrey M.
Halley with Edwin A. Nordstrom as the author of the current edi-
tion. While heating boilers are designed and constructed safely
under Section IV, the rules of this Section are nonmandatory
guidelines for the safe and efficient operation of steam-heating
boilers, hot-water-supply boilers, and hot-water-heating boilers
after installation. These rules, however, are not applicable to
potable-water heaters. This chapter is divided into nine parts,
along with the necessary figures and tables for each part: General,
covering the scope, use of illustrations, manufacturer’s informa-
tion, references to Section IV, and glossary of terms; Types of
Boilers; Accessories and Installation; Fuels; Fuel-Burning
Equipment and Fuel-Burning Controls; Boiler-Room Facilities;
Operation, Maintenance, and Repair of Steam Boilers and Hot-
Water Boilers; and Water Treatment. The authors have several
years of professional field experience in overseeing Code imple-
mentation and are conversant with regulatory practice; as such,
they discuss the juris-dictional responsibilities and role of licens-
ing agencies.
The authors note that the format used for this chapter is com-
patible with the format used in Section VI 2007 Code Edition. For
easy identification, the exact numbers of paragraphs, figures, and
tables from the Code book have been used in the running text. The
Exhibits include the maintenance, testing, and inspection log for
steam-heating boilers and the maintenance, testing, and inspection
log for hot-water-heating boilers and tests. Bibliographical refer-
ences and notes are also provided.
VOLUME 2
The first edition of Chapter 20, was authored by Harold C. Graber,
and the subsequent second edition as well as the current third edi-
tion have been revised by Jon Batey. The authors discuss Section
V, Nondestructive Examination (NDE). The purpose of this chap-
ter is to provide Users of Section V insight into the significant
requirements, the NDE methods, the NDE methodology, the rela-
tionship of Section V with other Code Sections, and the use of
ASTM Standards. The information provided is based on the 2007
Edition of Section V. The charter and scope of this Section is to
develop and maintain Code rules for NDE methodology and
equipment involved with the performance of surface and volumet-
ric testing methods. These test methods are used for the detection
and sizing of defects, dis-continuities, and flaws in materials and
weldments during the manufacture, fabrication and construction of
parts, components, and vessels in accordance with the ASME
B&PV Code and other ASME Codes, such as B31.1 (Power
Piping)
Harold and Jon provide commentary on the contents of Section V,
including Subsection A, which contains Articles and both
Mandatory and Nonmandatory Appendices that address general
requirements, test methods, and specific Code requirements and
acceptance criteria; and Subsection B, which contains the ASTM
Standards adopted by the ASME B&PV Code. This chapter address-
es an audience that includes manufacturers (including equipment
manufacturers), insurance companies, architect-engineers, research
organizations, utilities, consultants, and the National Board. The
authors address additions, revisions, inquires, interpretations, and
Code Cases relevant to Section V. An important aspect of this chap-
ter is its coverage of the inter-connection of Section V with other
Code Sections and Subsections. This coverage provides insight into
how the rela-tionships of the Code Sections are integrated.
Chapter 21 initially authored by Urey R. Miller for the previous
first and second editions is revised by Thomas P. Pastor for the
current third edition. This chapter covers Section VIII—Division
1, Rules for Construction of Pressure Vessels. The author discuss-
es the historical background of this Section in relation to the con-
struction and safe operation of boilers and pressure vessels.
Section VIII Division 1 is written to cover a wide range of indus-
trial and commercial pressure vessel applications. This Section is
applicable to small compressed air receivers as well as to very
large pressure vessels needed by the petrochemical and refining
industry. Section VIII Division 1 is intended for the construction
of new pressure vessels. Miller discusses the applicability of Code
and Code jurisdictions, as well as situations of the inapplicability
and exemptions from this Section.
This chapter provides an overview to each of the parts of Section
VIII Division 1 Code. The commentary includes Subsection A—
General Requirements for All Methods of Construction and
Materials; Subsection B—Requirements Pertaining to Methods of
Fabrication of Pressure Vessels; Subsection C—Requirements
Pertaining to Classes of Material; Mandatory Appendices; Non-
Mandatory Appendices; and Bibliography. The intent of the author
is to provide a broad per-spective for the reader to have better
understanding of the Code’s intent, and to point out, by example,
some of the sub-tleties that may not be evident. It is not the objec-
tive of this Chapter to provide the reader with a detailed “how to”
hand-book. The user of the equipment must define the requirements
that are needed for a specific application. With the help of equa-
tions, tables, figures and examples Miller provides detailed com-
mentary of Section VIII, Division 1. He comments about several
pertinent Code Interpretations and Code Cases pertaining to this
Section.
There have been a number of significant changes to Section VIII
Division 1 since the First Edition of this Guidebook. The most
significant is that the previously non-mandatory rules for
tubesheets (Appendix AA) and flanged and flued expansion joints
(Appendix CC) are now mandatory and are in Part UHX and
Appendix 5 respectively. Also, a new mandatory appendix
(Appendix 32) has been added to the Code to allow consideration
of local thin spots in shells and heads, and Appendix 33 has been
added to define the standard units to be used in Code equations.
ASME_FM_Vol_III_pi-lxxxiv.qxd 6/6/09 12:28 PM Page lx
lx • Introduction
The 2nd Edition of the Guidebook was updated to cover the ongo-
ing Code revisions (that affect shell-to-tubesheet joints, Appendix 26
expansion joints, and Appendix M.
The Third Edition of the Guidebook covers revisions to Section
VIII, Division 1 from the 2004 Edition through the 2007 Edition.
Included are detailed descriptions of several new Nonmandatory
Appendices, including Appendix FF: “Guide for the Design and
Operation of Quick-Actuating (Quick Opening) Closures, and
Appendix GG: “Guidance for the Use of U. S. Customary and SI
Units in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code”. This
Chapter also includes extensive updating of referenced figures and
tables from the 2007 Edition of Section VIII, Division 1.
Chapter 22, initially authored by Kamran Mokhtarian for the
previous two editions has been revised in its entirety by David A.
Osage, Clay D. Roldery, Guido G. Karcher, Thomas P. Pastor,
Robert G. Brown and Philip A. Henry. This revision covers the
2007 Edition of Section VIII, Division 2. The 2007 Edition is a
complete rewrite of the standard, a project that began in 1998 and
took nine years to complete. The decision to completely rewrite
VIII-2 was made so that the standard could be modernized with
regard to the latest technical advances and pressure vessel construc-
tion, and also be structured in a way to make it more user-friendly
for both users and the committees that maintain it. The 2007
Edition of Section VIII, Division 2 is the result of an extensive col-
laborative effort involving ASME Volunteers and Staff, the Pressure
Vessel Research Council and The Equity Engineering Group.
Mr. David A. Osage was the lead author for the new standard, and
he made significant contributions to the design by rule and design by
analysis chapters (Parts 4 and 5). He also had responsibility for the
assembly of all material that ultimately made up the 9 parts of the
new standard: 1. General Requirements, 2. Responsibility and
Duties, 3. Materials Requirements, 4. Design by Rule Requirements,
5. Design by Analysis Requirements, 6. Fabrication Requirements 7.
Inspection and Examination Requirements, 8. Pressure Testing
Requirements, 9. Pressure Vessel Overpressure Protection.
This chapter provides an overview of the development of the
new standard, its organization, and a detailed description of each
of the nine parts. Emphasis is given to those areas of the standard
where new technology was introduced.
Chapter 23, authored by J. Robert Sims, Jr., discusses Section
VIII, Division 3 (Alternative Rules for the Construction of High-
Pressure Vessels). It is intended to be used as a companion to the
Code by Manufacturers and Users of high-pressure vessels and also
provides guidance to Inspectors, materials suppliers, and others. The
chapter’s text is generally presented in the same order in which it
appears in the Code. Comments are not given about each Paragraph,
but Paragraph numbers are referenced as appro priate. The com-
ments apply to the 2007 Edition. The ASME Subgroup on High-
Pressure Vessels (SG-HPV) of Subcommittee VIII developed the
Code. The comments herein are Bob’s opinions; they should not be
considered Code Interpretations or the opinions of the Subgroup on
High-Pressure Vessels or any other ASME Committee.
This chapter provides commentary that is intended to aid indi-
viduals involved in the construction of high-pressure vessels, but
it cannot substitute for experience and judgment. Bob covers gen-
eral, material, and design requirements; supplementary require-
ments for bolting; special design requirements for layered vessels;
design requirements for attachments, supports, and heating and
cooling jackets; fracture mechanics evaluation; design using aut-
ofrettage; special design requirements for wirewound vessels and
frames; design requirements for openings, closures, heads, bolt-
ing, and seals; scope, jurisdiction and organization of Division 3;
fatigue evaluation; pressure-relief devices; examination, fabrica-
tion, and testing requirements; marking, stamping, reports, and
records; and Mandatory and Nonmandatory appendices.
Appendix to Part 7 has been authored by Roger Reedy and is a
new chapter included in this volume 2 of the third edition. Part 7
covers ASME Section VIII—Rules for Construction of Pressure
Vessels with chapters dealing with Section VIII Division 1- Rules
for Construction of Pressure Vessels, Section VIII: Division
2-Alternative Rules, and Section VIII, Division 3—Alternative
Rules for Construction of High-Pressure Vessels. This Chapter
written by Roger F. Reedy deals with items pertaining to Part 7
Safety of Personnel Using Quick-Actuating Closures on Pressure
Vessels and Associated Litigation Issues.
The Appendix to Part 7 is new and was written because of the
number of lawsuits against manufacturers of quick-actuating clo-
sures on pressure vessels. Often manufacturers are sued even
though the closures had been operating with no accidents for 20
or 30 years. Because of Worker’s Compensation rules, the owner
of the equipment often cannot be sued, so the lawyers search for
“deep pockets” to compensate their clients and themselves. In
order to bring forth litigation, these lawyers would skillfully take
words in the Code completely out of context. The Appendix is
based on Roger’s personal experience in a number of litigations
involving quick-actuating closures during the last 25 years. He
identifies each of the changes made to the Code rules in Section VIII,
Division 1, from 1952 to the 2007 Edition of the ASME Code. In
every case where Roger has testified as an expert witness, the
manufacturer of the quick-actuating closure was not at fault, and
the ASME Code rules had been properly followed. However, the
attorneys for the injured party often misinterpret the Code rules to
accuse the manufacturer of not having complied with the Code
when the closure was made. Based on experience, Roger warns
the writers of the ASME Code to assure that the rules are clear,
concise and understandable to the common man. The most impor-
tant point however, is for everyone to understand that in order to
avoid severe accidents, users of quick-actuating closures must
maintain the equipment and ensure that inferior components are
not used as replacement parts, and that the design is not modified
or changed. The other key element for safety is that owners of
pressure vessels that have quick-actuating closures are responsible
for training all employees regarding the proper care and use of the
equipment. This training has been neglected by the employer in
most accidents.
Chapter 24, authored by Joel G. Feldstein, discusses Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications. As the title indicates, this chap-
ter deals with the qualification of welding and brazing proce-dures as
well as the qualification of individuals performing those procedures
as required by the Construction Codes of the ASME B&PV and
Piping Codes. Joel discusses the two-Part organization of the 2007
Edition of Section IX: Part QW, covering welding, and Part QB, cov-
ering brazing. Each Part is divided into four Articles. The coverage
for Part QW includes general requirements for both welding proce-
dure and welder performance qualification and the variables applica-
ble to welding procedure and welder per-formance qualification.
Part QB has a similar format: general requirements for brazing pro-
cedure and brazer performance qualification and the variables applic-
able to brazing procedure and brazer performance qualification.
Commentary is provided on all of the Articles with aid of figures and
tables, and Code Interpretations are used to provide the Code User
with some insight into the requirements of Section IX.
Joel provides a description of the more common welding
processes used in Code construction, reviews the qualification
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • lxi
rules, provides commentary on those requirements, and covers the
historical background leading to the increased use of welding in
manufacturing operations. Where comments are provided, they
represent Joel’s opinions and should not be regarded as the posi-
tions of the ASME Code or its Subcommittee on Welding.
In Chapter 25, Peter J. Conlisk covers Section X, Fiber-
Reinforced Plastic Pressure Vessels, and ASME RTP-1, Reinforced
Thermoset Plastic Corrosion-Resistant Equipment. Peter mentions
that this chapter is tailored for engineers and designers whose expe-
rience with vessels is primarily with metal equipment, although he
adds that those with experience using fiberglass equipment but not
using Section X or RTP-1 will also find this chapter useful, espe-
cially its discussions on fiber-rein-forced plastic (FRP) technology.
Section X has been enacted into law in 37 jurisdictions in the
United States and Canada, whereas RTP-1, although usable as a
Code, has not been enacted into law anywhere; therefore, at pre-
sent, it is a voluntary Standard. Both Standards govern vessels con-
structed of thermosetting resin rein-forced with glass fibers, but
Section X addresses vessels rein-forced with carbon or aramid
fibers as well. The pressure scope of Section X is 15 psig internal
pressure and greater, the upper limit depending on the size and con-
struction of the vessel. RTP-1 cov-ers tanks and vessels with design
pressures of 0 to 15 psig. Both Standards have provisions for
vessels with external pressures of 0 to 15 psig.
Neither RTP-1 nor Section X is meant to be a handbook or text-
book on FRP vessel design. Chapter 25 is intended to be a manual
on the use of these documents. An engineer who specifies an FRP
vessel does not need to understand FRP to the same extent that a
vessel designer does; however, in specifying the vessel, an engi-
neer necessarily makes many design choices. Peter discusses the
basics of FRP technology; the fabrication methods and stress
analysis of FRP vessels; the scope of Section X and RTP-1; the
design qualification of Section X, Class I, Class II, and RTP-1 ves-
sels; the design qualification overview; Section X example of a
Design Specification and its calculations; RTP-1 design examples;
and quality assurance of Section X and RTP-1. He provides equa-
tions, tables, and figures as well as annotated bibliographical notes
indicating the relevance of the cited references.
In Chapter 26, Owen F. Hedden provides an overview of the
stipulations of Section XI, Rules for Inservice Inspection of
Nuclear Power Plant Components. A chronological overview of
the development of Section XI is presented, from its inception in
1968 up to the 2004 Edition including 2006 Addenda. The chapter
traces the development, Edition-by-Edition, of important elements
of the Code, including the philosophy behind many of the revi-
sions. Emphasis is placed on the 1989 through 2004 Editions, for
they apply to the majority of plants in the United States and else-
where. Through an extensive tabulation of Code Interpretations,
this chapter also attempts to give the Code User some insight into
clarification of many Section XI requirements.
In the current revisions of Section XI, feedback from operating
plants has resulted in new requirements to address stress corro-
sion cracking mechanisms, weld overlay piping repair techniques,
and a program for risk-informed piping inspections.
Owen notes that subsequent chapters of this book address the
major areas of Section XI: inservice inspection examination and test
programs, repairs and replacements, acceptance and evaluation crite-
ria, containment programs, and fatigue crack growth. Nondestructive
examination (NDE) is addressed in this chapter, as its requirements
evolve. Owen mentions that Section XI initially had only 24 pages in
1970 but that it now has over 700 pages. Although originally it cov-
ered only light-water reactor Class 1 components and piping, now it
includes Class 2 and Class 3 sys-tems, metal and concrete contain-
ment, and liquid metalcooled reactor plants. With his association
with Section XI Code Committee activities since their beginning,
Owen is in a good posi-tion to comment on important areas that
should not be overlooked as well as unimportant areas that should not
distract attention.
In Chapter 27, Richard E. Gimple addresses the repair/replace-
ment (R/R) activities for nuclear power plant items. Article IWA-
4000 of Section XI contains the requirements for performing R/R
activities on nuclear power plant items. Richard examines the back-
ground of these R/R activities and the changes in R/R activity
requirements since the original 1970 Edition, and he reviews in
detail the requirements in IWA-4000 in the 2007 Edition of Section
XI. This information is beneficial to personnel performing R/R
activities (e.g., designing plant modifications, obtaining replace-
ment items, and performing welding, brazing, defect removal,
installation, examination, and pressure-testing activi-ties). Although
the 2007 Edition is used to discuss IWA-4000 requirements, discus-
sions involving earlier editions and addenda of Section XI have
been retained from previous editions of the Companion Guide. The
thorough discussion of changes from earlier editions and addenda
will be very beneficial to personnel using other editions and addenda,
especially those updating their Repair/Replacement Programs.
In Chapter 27, Richard uses his unique professional expertise
to discuss R/R activity requirements and provides the basis and
pertinent explanations for the requirements. The discussion of the
scope and applicability of Section XI R/R activities is informative
to both new and longtime Users. Richard notes that Section XI is
used in many countries, that it is often recognized as an interna-
tional Standard, and has written Chapter 27 such that it applies
regardless of the country where the Section is used. To benefit the
reader, numerous Code Interpretations and Code Cases are
included in this chapter to help clarify and implement R/R activi-
ties. Commentary is provided regarding Interpretations that might
be of great benefit in understanding the Code. With over 20 years
of association with Code Committee activities, Richard provides
clarity and in-depth understanding of Section XI.
Chapter 28, authored by Richard W. Swayne, discusses the
Section XI rules for inservice inspection and testing of nuclear
power plant components. This chapter covers the general require-
ments of Section XI applicable to all Classes of components,
including concrete structures and steel vessels, piping, pumps,
and valves. It identifies the limits of applicability of Section XI,
that is, what is within and outside the scope of the Code.
Interfaces with applicable regulatory requirements are addressed,
and the use of Code Editions, Addenda, and Cases is explained.
Mr. Swayne comments on the periodic NDE and pressure testing
to ensure the integrity of components, other than containment ves-
sels, within the scope of jurisdiction of this Code. These require-
ments include NDE, from personnel qualification to conduct of
the NDE. They also include the type and frequency of NDE
required, including sample expansion and increased frequency
required because of defect detection.
Mr. Swayne also addresses periodic pressure testing and pres-
sure testing following R/R activities. Responsibilities and quality
assurance program requirements of the different entities involved
in examination and testing of a nuclear power plant are discussed.
This chapter addresses many controversial issues and topics of
current concern, including the applicability of recent U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) Generic Letters and Information
Notices, and describes ways in which readers can use recent revi-
sions of Section XI to their advantage. References to ASME
ASME_FM_Vol_III_pi-lxxxiv.qxd 6/6/09 12:28 PM Page lxii
lxii • Introduction
Interpretations are included to explain how the Code requirements
can be applied to common problems. This Edition contains new
information from Mr. Swayne on risk-informed inservice inspec-
tion and reliability integrity management programs for high-
temperature gas-cooled reactors.
In Chapter 29, which was originally written by Arthur F.
Deardorff, and updated and expanded by Russell C. Cipolla, the
flaw acceptance criteria and evaluation methods specified in the
2007 Edition of ASME Section XI Code are discussed. Coverage
includes the evaluation of flaws in nuclear power plant compo-
nents and piping using ASME Section XI procedures. The authors
discuss flaw acceptance criteria based on the use of predefined
acceptance standards and of detailed fracture-mechanics evalua-
tions of flaws. Commentary is provided on flaw characterization
and acceptance standards, Class 1 vessel flaw evaluation, piping
flaw evaluation (for austenitic and ferritic materials), and evalua-
tion of piping thinned by flow-assisted corrosion. The authors dis-
cuss the background and philosophy of the Section XI approach
for evaluating inservice degradation, including the rules for inser-
vice inspection of nuclear power plant components and piping as
they relate to the criteria, to determine if flaws are acceptable for
continued operation without the need for repair.
Drawing upon their participation in Code Committees and pro-
fessional experience with both domestic and international nuclear
plants, the authors discuss step-by-step procedures for the evalua-
tion of flaws in austenitic and ferritic components and piping. The
underlying philosophy of Section XI evaluation of degraded com-
ponents is to provide a structural margin consistent with that
which existed in the original design and construction code. Russ
has expanded the chapter to describe the updated flaw evaluation
procedures for piping, which were added to Section XI in 2002.
Also discussed are revised flaw acceptance criteria for Class 1 fer-
ritic vessels in IWB-3610, updated structural factors for austenitic
and ferritic piping in Appendix C, and revised fatigue crack
growth reference curves, along with the technical basis for these
changes.
Russ has also added the historical development and technical
basis for Appendices E, G and K, which deal with evaluations for
fracture prevention during operating plant events/conditions in the
fracture-toughness transition temperature region, and at upper
shelf. Further, recent Code Cases N-513 and N-705 to Section XI
are described, which cover the requirements and procedures for
temporary acceptance of service induced degradation in piping
and vessels in moderate energy Class 2 and 3 systems. The degra-
dation can be associated with various mechanisms (cracking, pit-
ting, general wall thinning, etc.) and can include through-wall
degradation where leakage can be adequately managed via moni-
toring. These Cases provide the basis for continued operation
until repair can be implemented at a later time.
Wherever possible, the authors cite references to published
documents and papers to aid the reader in understanding the tech-
nical bases of the specified Code flaw evaluation methods and
acceptance criteria. The authors also cite related Section XI
requirements that are discussed in Chapters 26, 27, 28, 31, 32, 35,
and 39 of this book.
Chapter 30 originally authored by the late Robert F. Sammataro
(a well-known and respected colleague well-versed in ASME
Codes and Standards) and now updated by Jim E. Staffiera,
addresses Subsections IWE and IWL for nuclear containment
vessels. Subsection IWE, Requirements for Class MC and
Metallic Liners of Class CC Components of Light-Water Cooled
Plants, specifies requirements for preservice and inservice
examination/inspection, repair/replacement activities, and testing
of Class MC (metal containment) pressure-retaining components
and their integral attachments and repair/replacement activities
and testing of Class CC (concrete containment) pressure-retaining
components and their integral attachments for BWRs and PWRs.
Similarly, Subsection IWL, Requirements for Class CC Concrete
Components of Light-Water Cooled Plants, specifies require-
ments for preservice and inservice examination/inspection,
repair/replacement activities, and testing of the reinforced con-
crete and the post-tensioning systems of Class CC (concrete con-
tainment) components for BWRs and PWRs. Together with
Subsection IWA, General Requirements, a comprehensive basis is
provided for ensuring the continued structural and leak-tight
integrity of containments in nuclear power facilities.
Subsections IWE and IWL also provide requirements to ensure
that critical areas of primary containment structures/components
are inspected to detect degradation that could compromise struc-
tural integrity. These two Subsections have received significant
attention in recent years since the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) mandated nuclear-industry compliance with these two
Subsections of the Code through publication of revised Paragraph
55(a) of Title 10, Part 50, of the Code of Federal Regulations [10
CFR 50.55(a)] in September, 1996. In incorporat-ing these two
Subsections into the Regulations, the NRC identi-fied its concern
with the increasing extent and rate of occurrence of containment
corrosion and degradation. Since that time, numerous additional
changes have taken place in all aspects of nuclear power plant
inservice inspection requirements, not the least of which have been
those for nuclear containment vessels. With increasing emphasis in
the nuclear industry on plant life-extension, these changes have
resulted in several initiatives cur-rently moving through the ASME
Code ‘consensus-committee’ process, including action items
addressing the need for more appropriate and effective examina-
tions/inspections and the expanded use of risk-informed inservice
inspection activities.
This updated Chapter 30 introduces the latest Commentaries
for Subsections IWE and IWL, important documents for users of
the Code because of the background information and technical
justification provided regarding the reasons for changes made to
these two subsections over the years. As noted in the Introduction
to this book, the user is cautioned that these documents are the
opinions of individuals only. These documents are not products of
the ASME Code Committee consensus process, and thus do not
represent ASME Code Committee positions.
In Chapter 31, Warren H. Bamford discusses the Code evalua-
tion of fatigue crack growth, consistent with the evaluation meth-
ods of Section XI. Fatigue has often been described as the most
common cause of failure in engineering structures, and designers
of pressure vessels and piping have incorporated fatigue consider-
ations since the first Edition of Section III in 1963. The develop-
ment of this technology and its application in Section III is dis-
cussed in Chapter 39; its application in Section XI is discussed in
Chapter 31. With the advancement of the state of the art has come
the capability for allowing the presence of a crack, for predicting
crack growth, and for calculating the crack size that could lead to
failure. This capability has been a key aspect of the Section XI
flaw evaluation procedures since the 1974 edition of Section XI; it
is discussed thoroughly in Chapter 31.
Warren discusses the background of the criteria for fatigue
crack growth analyses and crack growth evaluation methods.
Drawing upon his considerable experience in formulating these
criteria and his professional expertise in these analyses and
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • lxiii
evaluations, Warren provides commentary on the calculation of
crack shape changes; calculation of elastic–plastic crack growth
with the aid of crack growth rate reference curves for ferritic and
austenitic steels in air environments; and crack growth rate curves
for ferritic and austenitic steels in water environments. He also
discusses operating plant fatigue assessment with the aid of
Appendix L of Section XI. Also included are discussions pertain-
ing to Appendix A, fatigue evaluation, and flaw toler-ance evalua-
tion. He provides extensive bibliographical notes and references.
PART 11: SPECIAL TOPICS RELATED
TO ASME B&PV AND PIPING CODES
Part 11, unlike Parts 1–10, discusses topics that are not covered
exclusively by specific Code Sections/Subsections/Paragraphs.
Even when the topics are covered, their usage is so overwhelming
that a detailed discussion about them is warranted. Thus the
chapters of Part 11, written by recognized authorities in their
respective fields, not only clarify subtle points of professional
interest to the Practicing Engineers but also elaborate on the basic
information of the criteria of the subjects discussed.
In Chapter 32, John D. Stevenson covered in first and second
edition the Maintenance Rule. In this edition this has been updat-
ed by C. Wesley Rowley. July 10, 1991, a Maintenance Rule titled
Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at
Nuclear Power Plants was published by the NRC in the Federal
Register (56 Fed. Reg. 31324) as 10 CFR 50.65. The rule was
developed for the NRC to have an established regulatory frame-
work to provide the means for evaluating the administrative effec-
tiveness of nuclear power plant licensees’ maintenance programs.
The NRC’s overall objective is that structures, systems, and com-
ponents important to nuclear power plant safety be maintained
properly so that plant equipment perform its intended safety func-
tions reliably when required. The Maintenance Rule is perfor-
mance-based, providing focus on results rather than on program-
matic prescriptive requirements.
With his experience in domestic and international nuclear
power plants, Wes updates the discussions pertaining to the rudi-
ments of the Maintenance Rule and the criteria on which the Rule
is based. Wes also updates historical background, purpose and
scope, and expectations of the license holder to abide by the stip-
ulations dictated in the Maintenance Rule. His commentary
includes requirements; the methodology to select plant structures,
systems, and components (SSCs); the use of existing Standards
and programs; establishing risk and performance criteria, goal set-
ting, and monitoring; SSCs subject to effective program mainte-
nance programs; the evaluation of systems to be removed from
service; periodic maintenance effectiveness assessments; docu-
mentation; and references.
In Chapter 33, Marcus N. Bressler discusses the rules for
accreditation and certification and similar issues. This chapter has
been revised to address the current 2007 Code revisions and to
up-date several accompanying graphics. This chapter is intended
to provide an overview of the history of the ASME B&PV Code
from its inception through the incorporation of nuclear compo-
nents to the present. Accordingly the title of the Chapter has also
been revised to reflect the scope of the discussions contained in
the chapter. From earlier coverage of boilers and pressure vessels,
the nuclear initiative required coverage for piping, pumps, valves,
storage tanks, vessel internals, and compo-nent and piping sup-
ports. Rules for repairs and replacements of nuclear components
and the use of newer Codes are discussed, including the need for
Code reconciliation and commercial grade dedication. The devel-
opment of certification and accreditation is covered, with empha-
sis on the new requirements for organizations seeking ASME
accreditation. The globalization of the ASME cer-tificates and
stamps is described thoroughly.
Marcus, based on his experience working with many Code
Committees, is justly the right person to provide in-depth cover-
age of the various aspects of the Code and connecting these with
the topic of this chapter. A discussion is provided regarding the
role of regulators, and the commentary includes accreditation for
nuclear construction, Code stamping, the role of the Registered
Professional Engineer and Authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANI),
and the related Mandatory and Nonmandatory Appendices in the
Code. Marcus details two examples of the use of Code reconcilia-
tion: repair of steam-generator feedwater-nozzle cracks at a 1970s
nuclear plant and the support material requirements of an
Example Nuclear Plant (ENP).
Marcus Bressler has provided in this revised script his thoughts
on Future Developments in the ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel
Code, as well as ASME’s emphasis on Globalization of its Codes
and Standards. In addition, applicable Code references, descrip-
tion of a typical nuclear survey, and an annotated bibliography are
also provided.
John D. Stevenson initially authored Chapter 34 for the first
and second editions of this publication. This update of this chap-
ter is covered by Michael A. Porter.
In the previous editions John Stevenson dealt with perspectives
on cyclic, impact, and impulse dynamic loads. John notes that
dynamic loads applied to the design of mechanical systems and
components are of three basic types: cyclic, impulse, and impact.
In addition, there is a fourth potential cyclic-type load in the
vibratory motion category. Although vibratory motion is not usu-
ally considered in the original design basis, it may be observed
during steady-state or transient operations to cause premature
fatigue or ratchet failure of metal components. The original
Section III definition of a plant’s operating life includes design-
basis normal, abnormal, emergency, and faulted plant- or system-
operating conditions, as defined in the Design Specification. John
notes that these operating conditions should not be confused with
Service Levels A, B, C, and D currently defined in the Code for
design purposes. It is possible to have different Service Level
design conditions for the same operating condition, depending on
the required response of a component.
John covered in-depth Nonmandatory Appendix N (Dynamic
Analysis Methods) of Section III. For completeness, he covers
other types of dynamic loads not addressed explicitly by
Appendix N that the designer of pressure-retaining nuclear com-
ponents must consider. He also discusses the ASCE Standard
used for defining earthquake motions to a building foundation and
for supporting the mechanical system or component; these two
references deal primarily with earthquake cyclic–type dynamic
loads. In addition, commentary is provided on the guidelines used
for dynamic impulse and impact loadings provided in the ANS,
ASME Appendix B, and B31.1 Code Standards. A discussion is
provided about the ASME Operation and Maintenance (O&M)
Standard, used for determining the effect of operational vibratory
motion independent of the cause of vibration.
In past editions of the handbook, this chapter has primarily
addressed issues as they pertained to Section III of the ASME
B&PV Code. In particular, it has addressed issues concerning the
seismic response of nuclear facilities. Currently, many other
ASME_FM_Vol_III_pi-lxxxiv.qxd 6/6/09 12:28 PM Page lxiv
lxiv • Introduction
facilities covered by the ASME B&PV Code have had to address
these same issues, often with little guidance from the appropriate
Code section. Modern LNG terminals, for example, have had to
undergo extensive seismic reviews. These facilities contain equip-
ment covered by Section VIII and B31.3 of the Code. Neither of
these Code section give any guidance to the designer concerning
seismic analysis, other than to require that seismic loads be
addressed. In this revision of the chapter by Michael A. Porter,
some of these issues will be addressed. In addition, a new section
discussing the use of computer software for analysis has been
included. This section will address some of the issues associated
with different computer codes used for different parts of a plant.
In addition, the Code references have been revised to reflect the
current (2007) Code provisions.
Chapter 35, the functionality was initially authored by Guy
Deboo for the previous two editions. This third edition has been
updated by Stephen R. Gosselin who revised the discussions per-
taining to and operability criteria, which address evaluations for
operating plant systems, structures, or components (SSCs) found
to be degraded, nonconforming, or subjected to unanalyzed con-
ditions during nuclear plant operation. This revision discusses the
methodologies and acceptance criteria applicable to these evalua-
tions. Gosselin introduces typical SSCs that may require operabil-
ity assessments and functionality evaluations and discuss methods
and assessments, failure modes, functionality and operability, and
as-built conditions divergent from design. He covers, with the aid
of figures, tables, and references, Code requirements as well as
short-term and long-term operability acceptance criteria for
valves, pumps, snubbers, piping, reactor vessels, tanks, heat
exchangers and supports (including component standard and lin-
ear supports as well as spring hangers), structural bolts, concrete
expansion anchors, and integral welded attachments.
The current practice involves a process of consensus among the
regulator viewpoints; plant-specific Technical Specification (TS)
requirements; and applicable Codes, Standards, rules, and other
licensing-basis compliance requirements. Guy discusses the role of
related agencies and committees, such as the U.S. NRC, the ASME
Code Committees, and the ASME O&M Code Committees. This
chapter includes basic concepts, definitions, evaluation methods,
and acceptance criteria from these docu-ments. In this chapter, the
scope of SSCs is limited to mechanical systems and their compo-
nents and supporting structures. Authors discuss the role of the
CFR-facility TSs as they relate to the topics of this chapter. Authors
provide examples of specified safety func-tions, operating condi-
tions, and events to be considered for some SSCs and piping. The
discussions elucidate the often complex, and sometimes nonuni-
form nature of operability concepts and criteria.
Chapter 36, authored by Frederick J. Moody, covers fluids.
Frederick is a recognized authority in the field of fluids; he explains
briefly the force predictions from fluid phenomena and behavior,
which are significant in the formulations and criteria employed in
the ASME B&PV Code. He focuses on the nature of fluid forces
imposed on vessels and piping systems from the standpoint of
designers, who require guidelines for both the design and opera-
tional recommendations of fluid-transport systems. Fluid forces are
the result of pressure and shear phenomena and are caused by the
energy transfer at pumps or turbines or by disturbances arising from
sources such as valve operation, pipe rupture, vapor-void collapse,
and the motion of the frame to which the system in question is
anchored. A fluid disturbance generally occurs over a pre-dictable
time period, and the fluid may respond simultaneously (bulk-flow
response) or in a propagation sense (waterhammer response),
depending on the system geometry. The nature of bulk-flow and
waterhammer responses is significantly different, making it essen-
tial to identify the specific fluid response before calculating the
resulting forces.
With appropriate equations and references, Frederick covers the
basic formulations resulting in fluid forces. He describes the nature
of such fluid forces as hydrostatic forces and pressure, as well as
shear forces from fluid motion. Predictions made of fluid forces of
concern in boiler and piping design are from pressure and shear
within internal-flow systems. However, fluid forces are of
significant concern in external-flow systems as well, where struc-
tures are sub-merged in fluids. Frederick discusses disturbance
sources, including motor- or manual-operated valves, safety-relief
valves, check-valve closures, pipe ruptures, liquid-column impact
at area contractions, liquid-column separation, condensation-
induced waterhammer, centrifugal pumps, pipe movements, posi-
tive-displacement pumps, gas cushions, and vortex shedding.
Frederick also addresses bulk-flow and propagative-flow modeling
in pipes, the estimation of fluid-flow forces in pipes, and fluid
forces, such as acceleration and standard drag forces, on sub-
merged structures.
Chapter 37 has been revised for this edition by David E. Olson
who authored this chapter for the previous two editions. David E.
Olson discusses pipe vibration testing and qualification. The discus-
sions center on how piping vibration is typically monitored, quanti-
fied and qualified in the power industry. The methods presented for
addressing piping vibration are in compliance with the relevant
industry codes, standards and regulations, including the 2007 edi-
tions of the ASME B&PV Code, the B31.1 Power Piping Code and
relevant NRC NUREG’s and Regulatory Guides. The chapter
addresses the cause and effects of both steady state (e.g. flow
induced vibration) and dynamic transient (e.g. water hammer). The
development of testing acceptance criteria are discussed along with
data acquisition and reduction techniques. Also discussed are vibra-
tion prevention and control techniques along with problem resolu-
tion examples. The methods presented in this chapter comply with
the requirements of ASME O&M-3 “Vibration Testing of Piping
Systems”.
In Chapter 38, Everett C. Rodabaugh discusses stress intensifi-
cation factors, stress indices, and flexibility factors with the aid of
equations, references, and tables. Everett, a well-recognized author-
ity on the aforementioned topics, notes that piping systems tend to
be rather complex structures that include straight pipe and a variety
of complex components, such as elbows and tees. A typical piping
system might include about 50 components along with many inter-
vening lengths of straight pipe. Each component is subjected to a
complex set of loadings. The evaluation of any one component by
the detailed analysis methods prescribed in Subsection NB-3200 is
an onerous task. The complexity of analyses of piping components
and the “standard” aspect of piping components has led to use of
stress intensification factors (also called i-factors), stress indices,
and flexibility factors for evaluations of piping systems. In this
chapter, the general concepts behind the development of i-factors,
stress indices, and flexibility factors are discussed briefly, with ref-
erences to details of developments.
Everett discusses strain control and stress control as design
considerations. Chapter 38 is replete with scholastic discussions
and references to substantiate the use of indices. The discussions
are provided for the nominal design margin and tests to support
these. Stress intensification factors are discussed for girth butt
welds; C and K stress indices are discussed for internal-pressure
loading, elbows, and butt-welding tees; moment loading; and
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • lxv
thermal-gradient loadings (including branch connections). Fatigue
evaluations, ASME Class 2 or 3 piping, and Class 1 Codes for
straight pipe, elbows, and seismic analysis are also addressed.
Everett provides examples to cover piping systems; moments;
Code equations; girth butt welds; elbows; branch connections for
Class 2 or 3 piping with branches; best estimates for Class 1 pip-
ing; and ASME B31.1 and B31.3 Codes. These examples illus-
trate how i-factors and stress indices are used to check Code com-
pliance and, for a branch connection, to illustrate the quantitative
significance of flexibility factors.
In Chapter 39, William J. O’Donnell, whose consulting ser-
vices have covered all aspects of fatigue evaluations, covers Code
design and evaluation for cyclic loading in Sections III and VIII.
The author notes that fatigue “is recognized as one of the most
frequent causes of failure in pressure vessels and piping compo-
nents ... for fatigue strength is sensitive to design details, such as
stress raisers, and to a myriad of material and fabrication factors,
including welding imperfections. Fatigue is also sensitive to such
unforeseen operating conditions as flow-induced vibrations, high-
cycle thermal mixing, thermal striations, and environmental
effects. What is somewhat surprising is the number of fatigue fail-
ures that are directly related to poorly chosen design and fabrica-
tion details.” The ASME B&PV Code was one of the first Codes
and Standards to treat the design for fatigue explicitly.
Dr. O’Donnell covers the historical background of fatigue fail-
ures. He notes that Section III was the first to include fatigue in its
1963 Edition; Section VIII, Division 2 (Alternate Rules for
Pressure Vessels). Section VIII, Division 1 (Rules for Construction
of Pressure Vessels) still does not include explicit fatigue design
life-evaluation methods. Fatigue in pressure vessels and piping is
of considerable importance. They frequently operate in the low-
cycle regime where local stresses are far in excess of yield. This
chapter covers the use of strain-controlled fatigue data; stress-
strain concentration effects; the effects of mean stress; fatigue fail-
ure data; the procedure for fatigue evaluation; cumulative damage;
exemption from fatigue analyses; experimental verification of
design fatigue curves; and fatigue data for pressure vessel alloys.
More than half of this updated Chapter is devoted to Current
and Future Code fatigue design evaluation developments. High
temperature water environmental effects are shown to be very
important, and the available data is presented in numerous plots.
New fatigue design curves proposed by the ASME Code Subgroup
on Fatigue are included. Environmental fatigue is expected to be a
major Code issue for decades.
Fig. 39.18 presents a new fatigue design curve for austenitic
stainless steels in air, revised from the 2006 Second Edition of the
Companion Guide to the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.
Figure 39.40 is the corresponding fatigue design curves for
austenitic stainless steels in reactor water, also revised from the
Second Edition of the Companion Guide.
The environmental fatigue design curves in the Second Edition
of the Companion Guide are independent of temperature. The tem-
perature dependence of reactor water environmental effects on
fatigue degradation have recently been determined to be quite sig-
nificant for carbon, low alloy and stainless steels. Their effects
decrease with decreasing temperature below 350ºC (662ºF).
Methods of taking credit for such temperature effects have been
developed and are included in this new Third Edition of the
Guidelines. Section 39.15 describes these new temperature correc-
tions and Figs. 39.41 and 39.42 show their comparison with data
for austenitic stainless steels and A333-Gr. 6 carbon steels, respec-
tively. The Chapter includes a comprehensive bibliography.
In Chapter 40, William J. Koves addresses the design of bolted-
flange joints and connections, perhaps one of the crucial safety
aspects of the power and petrochemical industries because entire
piping systems and components are ultimately held together by
connections and welded joints. Addressed in this chapter are
flanged joints, which are essential and complex components in
nearly all pressurized systems. Many factors determine the suc-
cessful design and operation of a flange joint in service. William
notes that the bolted-flange joint involves the interaction between
the bolting, flange, and gasket, with important nonlinear variables
such as friction and gasket properties considered. The Code design
rules provide a method for sizing the flange and bolts to be struc-
turally adequate for the specified design conditions; however, these
rules do not address assembly or special requirements, nor do they
guarantee a leak-tight joint for all transient-operating conditions.
The purpose of Chapter 40 is to provide the background and
basis for the bolted-flange joint design rules contained in the
ASME Codes in addition to a discussion of how the rules are
applied. Considering this topic’s interaction with several ASME
Code Sections and Piping and related Codes, William, who has
several years of experience serving in ASME Code Committees,
translates his professional and Code experience in the writing of
this chapter by providing cross-references to the various Codes
and Standards. He discusses Codes that address flange-joint
design, including design requirements and applicability, and he
discusses flange standards as well as flange design for pressure
vessels and piping. He provides an in-depth discussion of flange-
stress design methods, including the ASME design methodology;
the historical background and technical basis; the scope and
design philosophy; and the flange types. He comments on flange
designs not addressed by ASME: design for external loads, leak-
tightness-based design, and flange joint assembly, including
ASME Appendix S, bolting and gasket considerations.
VOLUME 3
Chapter 41, authored by Hardayal Mehta, presents a review of
the applications of many and sometimes unique ways in which the
provisions of Section III and Section XI of the ASME Boiler &
Pressure Vessel Code have been used in addressing the service
induced degradation in the BWR vessels, internals and pressure
boundary piping. The vessel internals addressed included steam
dryer, shroud and jet pumps. The vessel components considered
were feedwater nozzle, stub tube welds, attachment and shroud
support welds. Review of pressure boundary piping flaw evalua-
tion methods also included consideration of weld overlay repairs.
The service related degradation mechanisms considered were
environmental fatigue crack initiation and growth, and stress cor-
rosion cracking. The most form of service-induced cracking in the
stainless steel and Ni-Cr-Fe components in the BWR pressure
boundary is typically due to intergranular stress corrosion crack-
ing (IGSCC).
Dr. Mehta has included extensive bibliographical references
from his own publications, research journals, related EPRI,
ASME, and other international publications. Accompanying
tables, several figures and examples are used for supporting the
detailed discussions regarding several topics he touched upon
including BWR Internals, Pressure Vessel, Reactor Pressure
Boundary Piping and Crack Initiation & Growth relationships and
Plant Monitoring. In the discussions of BWR Internals the inspec-
tion, evaluation and repair methods are covered. Dr. Mehta has
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lxvi • Introduction
included in his discussions about BWR Pressure Vessel topics
such as the application of probabilistic fracture mechanics for
inspection exemption, and low upper shelf energy evaluations.
Discussing about Reactor Pressure Boundary Piping, Dr. Mehta
expounds the causes of cracking, and remedial/mitigation/repair
measures. Fatigue initiation, Relationships for Fatigue and Stress
Corrosion Cracking and Crack Growth Monitoring are covered in
the last part of this chapter. The updated chapter includes consider-
ation of developments pertaining to the 2007 ASME Code, the
NRC actions and EPRI reports.
Chapter 42, initially authored by Drs. Kenneth Chang and Pao-
Tsin Kuo for the second edition is currently updated by Robert
Kaiwaha Hsu. This provides a detailed description of the NRC’s
license renewal process and its guidance documents developed for
ensuring a uniform format and technical content of a license
renewal application and a consistent review of the application by
the NRC staff. The authors also provide a clear synopsis of the
NRC’s technical requirements for license renewal of current oper-
ating licenses. In addition, this chapter provides a summary of the
emerging issues at the present time and the NRC’s interim staff
guidance process to capture early any lessons learned from oper-
ating experience and/or past license renewal application reviews.
Authors address the License Renewal and Aging Management.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) license renewal
process establishes the technical and administrative requirements
for renewal of operating nuclear power plant licenses. Reactor
operating licenses were originally issued for 40 years and are
allowed to be renewed for up to an additional 20 years. The
review process for license renewal applications (LRAs) provides
continued assurance that the level of safety provided by an appli-
cant’s current licensing basis is maintained for the period of
extended operation. The license renewal review focuses on pas-
sive, long-lived structures and components of the plant that are
subject to the effects of aging. The applicant must demonstrate
that programs are in place to manage those aging effects. The
review also verifies that analyses that are based on the current
operating term have been evaluated and shown to be valid for the
period of extended operation. As of July 1, 2005, the NRC has
renewed the licenses for 33 reactors licenses. Applications to
renew the licenses of 15 additional reactors are under review. If
the applications currently under review are approved, approxi-
mately 50 percent of the licensed operating reactors will have
extended their life span by up to 20 years. As license renewal is
voluntary, the decision to seek license renewal and the timing of
the application is made by the licensee. However, the NRC
expects that, over time, essentially all U.S. operating reactors will
request license renewal.
Authors recognize the growing interest in License Renewal and
mention that to meet this demand, the NRC has established a
streamlined process for reviewing applications in a consistent and
timely manner. Likewise, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) has
developed guidance for the industry on how to prepare an applica-
tion for renewal. This chapter describes a number of license
renewal guidance documents that have been developed to describe
interrelated aspects of preparing and reviewing license renewal
applications: Standard Review Plan for License Renewal (SRP-
LR), Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL) Report, Regulatory
Guide for License Renewal (RG-LR) which endorses NEI’s
industry guideline for implementing the requirements of 10 CFR
Part 54—The License Renewal Rule (NEI 95-10). The objective
of the chapter is to provide back-ground information on the devel-
opment of these documents and to briefly explain the intended use
of the guidance documents singularly and in combination—to
facilitate the renewal process from application development to
NRC staff review including its audits and inspections of on-site
supporting technical documentation. This chapter also provides a
brief description of the NEI’s environmental review process for
license renewal.
Chapter 43, authored by Timothy J. Griesbach, covers PWR
Reactor Vessel Integrity and the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Code. The authors’s objective is to provide an overview of the
codes and regulations for prevention of brittle fracture of reactor
pressure vessels. The background and bases for the original
Section III, Appendix G Code requirements are discussed along
with a description of the recent improvements that have been
implemented in the Code in Section XI, Appendix G using more
up-to-date technology. The changes and improvements are detailed
such as the method for determining stress intensity factors, struc-
tural factors to account for uncertainties in the analytical methods,
and material reference toughness curves. While the Code has
incorporated these technical changes, the philosophy of protecting
the vessel against brittle fracture has remained the same. The chap-
ter also discusses ongoing efforts to incorporate the Master Curve
approach for vessel toughness into the ASME Code, it considers
areas for future improvements in the Code method for brittle frac-
ture prevention of PWR reactor vessels, and it summarizes the
aging management of PWR reactor vessel internals.
Jeffrey Gorman, Steve Hunt, Pete Riccardella authored Chapter
44 for the previous edition that has been updated by Pete
Riccardella and Glenn White for this edition. They have consider-
able expertise and experience in handling PWR Reactor Vessel
Alloy 600 and related issues confronted by the industry.
Considering the extreme importance of this topic the authors have
covered concerns pertinent to several ramifications of the problem.
Primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) of Alloy 600
nickel-chromium-iron base metal and related Alloy 82/132/182
weld metal has become an increasing concern to commercial pres-
surized water nuclear power plants. Cracks and leaks have been
discovered in Alloy 600/82/182 materials at a number of locations
in PWR reactor vessels and other reactor coolant loop components
worldwide. These locations include control rod drive mechanism
(CRDM) nozzles, bottom head instrument nozzles, reactor vessel
nozzle butt welds, and pressurizer nozzle welds. The consequences
of PWSCC have been significant including numerous leaks, many
cracked nozzles and welds, expensive inspections, more than 60
reactor vessel heads replaced, and extensive repair and mitigation
activities on reactor coolant loop butt welds. A number of plants
experienced months-long outage extensions to repair leaks, and
one plant was down for over two years as a result of regulatory
action following the detection of extensive corrosion to the vessel
head resulting from a leaking CRDM nozzle. This chapter address-
es Alloy 600/82/182 material locations in reactor vessels, operat-
ing experience, causes of PWSCC, inspection methods and find-
ings, safety considerations, degradation predictions, repair
methods, remedial measures, and strategic planning to address
PWSCC at the lowest possible net present value cost. Recent
industry and ASME Code activities to address these concerns are
also discussed.
Chapter 45, authored by Sidney A. Bernsen, Fredric A. Simonen,
Kenneth R. Balkey, Raymond A. West and Ralph S. Hill III, traces
the development of nuclear power plant probabilistic risk assess-
ment (PRA) from its initial evolution as a means for evaluation of
public safety through the recognition of its use to identify important
safety concerns. This chapter ultimately addresses the PRA’s use in
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • lxvii
Codes and Standards through the 2007 Edition of the Boiler and
Pressure Vessel (BPV) Code and its associated Nuclear Code Cases
in helping to determine risk importance and the appropriate alloca-
tion of resources, and inservice activities under Section XI of the
BPV Code.
It discusses the current status of related Codes and Standards that
provide rules and guidance for the development of the PRA and the
risk analysis needed to support nuclear power plant applications.
The chapter also addresses several specific activities in place or
underway to risk-inform the Operation and Maintenance (OM)
Code requirements for inservice testing and Code design rules
being developed under Section III of the BPV Code. The authors
were all active participants in the development and implementation
of risk-informed methods for ASME Codes and Standards.
Chapter 46, authored by Hardayal Mehta and Sampath
Ranganath, recognized authorities on the Elastic-Plastic Fracture
Mechanics (EPFM), are providing in this chapter a review of
EPFM applications in ASME Section XI Code. The early ASME
Section XI flaw evaluation procedures have been typically based
on LEFM. Early progress in the development of EPFM methodol-
ogy is first reviewed. A key element in the application of EPFM
to flaw evaluation is the estimation of the fracture parameter J-
Integral. Therefore, the applied J-Integral estimation methods
developed by EPRI/GE are first reviewed. Basics of the J-T stabil-
ity evaluation are then discussed. The first application of EPFM
methodology to flaw evaluation of austenitic piping welds is dis-
cussed. The extension of EPFM techniques to flaw evaluations in
ferritic piping is then covered. Technical background and evolu-
tion of Section XI Code Cases (N-463, N-494) and non-mandatory
Appendices (C and H) related to pipe flaw evaluation is then
provided. Another EPFM based pipe flaw evaluation procedure
using the so-called DPFAD approach is also covered.
Drs. Mehta and Ranganath then describe the application of
EPFM methods to the flaw evaluations of reactor pressure vessel.
An early application has been the evaluation of RPVs with pro-
jected upper shelf energy less than that required by 10CFR50. The
technical background of Section XI Code Case N-512 and non-
mandatory Appendix K is provided. Finally, a proposed Code Case
currently under consideration by appropriate Section XI Working
Groups, is discussed in detail that would permit the use of EPFM
methodology for RPV flaw evaluations per IWB-3610. The updat-
ed chapter considers the developments up to 2007 ASME Code as
they relate to EPFM flaw evaluation methods discussed.
The authors have included extensive bibliographical refer-
ences from their own publications, research publications, inter-
national journals and related EPRI and ASME publications.
Chapter 47 has been updated with Anne Chaudouet as the lead
for this revision with other authors Peter Hanmore and Guido
Karcher from the previous editions continuing to be co-authors for
this edition, as well. The authors, Francis Osweiller, Peter
Hanmore and Guido Karcher all have considerable experience of
the US pressure equipment market as well as that in Europe. They
have provided a background to the methodology and objectives of
the pressure equipment directive and CE marking in general before
attempting to portray the detail. The directive is a document of
only 55 pages, yet it is applicable to all equipment that can oper-
ate at a pressure greater than 0.5 bar and is a mandatory require-
ment for all pressure equipment to be put into service in the
European Union. In common with other European directives the
pressure equipment directive specifies general safety objectives
which the manufacturer must meet and this leaves considerable
scope for interpretation.
Having accumulated considerable experience in the implemen-
tation of the directive since its application in November 1999, the
authors have provided details of how to design and build pressure
equipment to meet the European requirements and thus permit its
CE marking and its free movement throughout Europe. After
describing the system used to categorize pressure equipment and
the conformity assessment requirements that are linked to them the
authors go on to explain the routes that can be followed to meet the
directive including an explanation of “harmonized stan-dards” and
“Notified Bodies”. Each of the essential safety requirements relat-
ing to design, manufacture and testing is dis-cussed and guidance
provided to assist manufacturers to comply, thus providing the
potential exporter to Europe with a wealth of valuable information.
A special attention has been given in this revision to material
aspects and to the use of ASME Codes with PED. The areas of
compliance of the new Section VIII Division 2 with PED are also
highlighted. The authors close with a brief look into a crystal ball
and consider the possibility of these “performance based” require-
ments becoming the basis of global trade.
Chapter 48, authored by Wolf Reinhardt, Nick van den Brekel
and Douglas Rodgers, introduces the Canadian pressure vessel
standards and explains their relationship to the ASME Code.
Distinct features of the Canadian approach to standard develop-
ment are discussed. The chapter provides the reader with an out-
line of the Canadian standards and an appreciation of some of their
important characteristics. Generally, the Canadian pressure vessel
standards adopt the applicable ASME Code sections as the base
documents, and then supplement these rules for specific applica-
tions as needed. Beyond the ASME Code, the Canadian non-
nuclear pressure vessels and piping standard addresses mostly reg-
istration and classification of components, and the require-ments
for specialized systems such as liquefied natural and petroleum gas
systems. The Canadian nuclear construction and in-service inspec-
tion standards are based on the corresponding Sections of the
ASME Code, but many unique features of the Canadian CANDU
(heavy-water) reactor design and licensing basis necessitate addi-
tional or modified requirements. In this edition authors added valu-
able text and graphics to address the ‘Future CANDU
Developments’ in the Advanced CANDU Reactor technology as
an evolution of the CANDU® 6 reactor with improvements to
deliver enhanced safety margins, lower capital and operating costs,
improved maintenance and high operating performance. They pro-
vide a detailed discussion about the distinctive Canadian nuclear
seismic standards. A typical CANDU reactor design is illustrated
to allow readers to appreci-ate the background of these rules.
Generation III and Generation IV CANDU designs are outlined. A
brief outlook to expected future developments in Canadian stan-
dards in the international context concludes the chapter.
Chapter 49 was authored by Francis Osweiller, Alain Bonnefoy,
Jean-Marie Grandemange, Gerard Perraudin and Bernard Pitrou in
the second edition to address “French Codes Dealing with
Pressure Equipment”. In the current edition authors have updated
the Chapter to be consistent with the current ASME Codes in USA
as well as the French Boiler and Pressure Vessel Codes. In France
two important organizations SNCT (Pressure Vessel and Piping
Manufacturer’s Association) and AFCEN (French Association for
Design, Construction and In-Service Inspection) are responsible
for the implementation of pressure equipment Codes. SNCT devel-
ops Codes such as CODAP for Unfired Pressure Vessels, CODETI
for Industrial Piping and COVAP for Steam Boilers and Super-
heated Water Boilers, with Thermal Fluid Boilers to be included in
2005. AFCEN develops Codes for die nuclear sector namely
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lxviii • Introduction
RCCM and RCCMR. Chapter 49 deals with pressure equipment
covered by the above Codes that deal particularly with the case of
a boiler falling within the scope of the PED in which case it shall
be considered as an “assembly” i.e. “several pieces of pressure
equipment assembled by a Manufacturer to constitute an integrat-
ed and functional whole”. In Chapter 49 Francis Osweiller assem-
bles contributions of four experts conversant with these Codes,
explains the outlines of the organizations and development of these
Codes. CODAP is covered by Gerrarand.Perraudin, Barnard.Pitrou
covers CODETI, Alain. Bonnefoy discusses COVAP and RCCM
is addressed by Jean-.Marie Grandemange.
Originally published in 1943 and updated and republished eight
times, the CODAP has been fully revised in 2000 by the French
organization of Pressure Vessel and Piping Manufacturers in order
to comply with the new European regulation (Pressure Equipment
Directive 97/23 EC). The Code is composed of the following
Sections: Generals, Materials, Design, Fabrication and Testing and
Inspection. The last Section, Testing and Inspection, covers also
the task concerning Assessment of conformity to the PED when
applicable. The different rules of the 2000 edition are related to the
concept of Construction Category which appeared in the 1980 edi-
tion. This concept enables the construction quality of a vessel to be
adapted and consistent within its future working condition. In this
chapter CODAP scope is first detailed both for application in com-
pliance with the PED and for application in accordance with other
regulations. Main requirements relating to Materials, Design,
Fabrication, Testing and Inspection are presented and significant
differences widi ASME VIII Division 1 or 2 are outlined.
CODETI that applies to Industrial Piping i.e., piping intended
for industrial plant and covers the same scope as ASME B31-1 and
B31.3. CODAP and CODETI are based on the concept of “con-
struction category”, which enables the construction quality of a
piping to be adapted and consistent with its future working con-
ditions. Originally published in 1974 and updated and republished
four times (‘79, ‘82, ‘91, ‘95), CODETI has been entirely revised
in 2001 by SNCT (French Pressure Equipment Manufacturer’s
Association) in order to comply with the new European regulation
(Pressure Equipment Directive 97/23 EC). Originally CODETI
had two sections, the first covering low and medium pressures
(P 25 bar; T 350°C), the second covering high pressures. This
structure based on early European developments in the field of pip-
ing was replaced by the concept of Construction Category which
enables the construction quality of a piping to be adapted and con-
sistent with its future working conditions. This concept has been
maintained for the 2001 edition. Division 1 applies to industrial
metallic piping (i.e. intended for an industrial plant) above ground,
ducted or buried. Division 2 and 3 will cover pipeline transporta-
tion and water transportation and steel penstock respectively.
Scope of Division 1 is detailed both for application in compliance
with the PED and for application in accordance with other regula-
tions. Main requirements relating to Materials, Design, Fabrication
and Installation, Testing and Inspection are presented. Relevant
significant differences with ASME B31.1 and B31.3 are provided.
COVAP applies to steam boilers, super-heated water boilers
and thermal fluid boilers and covers the scope as ASME Section I.
This code covers all the pressure equipment, which can be assem-
bled by a manufacturer to constitute an integrated and functional
whole. The rules of this Code have been established first in order
to cover equipment, which shall meet the requirements of the
PED, but also to be used where other regulations shall be applied.
This Code published by the French organization of Pressure
Vessel and Piping Manufacturers is based on the French Standard
Serie NF E 32-100 which was withdrawn when the new European
regulation (Pressure Equipment Directive 97/23 EC) came in
force. Then main requirements relating to Materials, Design,
Fabrication and Installation, Testing and Inspection as well as
those for Water Quality are presented and significant differences
with ASME Section I and Section VIII provided where relevant.
RCCM addresses Inspection rules for Nuclear Island
Components and safety related pressure equipment. As indicated
in 49.3, the RCC-M was initially based on the ASME III design
rules and the French industrial experience. Procurement, manu-
facturing, and examination practices have since evolved according
to the evolution of European and international standards. Design
rules applicable to class 1 and 2 components have been updated to
comply with applicable regulations and in order to take account of
service experience. Less specific work was dedicated to class 3
components, and it is anticipated that more and more reference
will be done to applicable non-nuclear industrial standards, and
more particularly European harmonized standards, in the near
future, as agreed in particular for application to the Finland proj-
ect. For this reason, the discussions are more particularly dedicated
to class 1 and 2 pressure components, with additional information
being provided for specific components, such as reactor pressure
vessel internals, supports and storage tanks. Additional comments
are given in 49.7.10 on construction rules applicable to fast
breeder reactor components and in-service surveillance of pres-
surized water reactor equipment.
Chapter 49 provides the basic philosophy of the Codes and dis-
cusses with the help of several tables and graphics General rules,
Materials, Design (including flexibility analysis), Fabrication and
Installation rules, Testing and Inspection. The authors also discuss
their link with the Pressure Equipment Directive or other regula-
tions in addition to a comparison with the relevant ASME Codes.
The authors conclude with futuristic ideas and the chapter is
replete with pertinent references.
Chapter 50, authored by Kunio Hasegawa, Toshio Isomura,
Yoshinori Kajimura, the late Yasuhide Asada and the late Toshiki
Karasawa, deals with recent developments of Japanese Codes and
Standards for boiler and pressure vessels. This Chapter is revised
based on the Second Edition (2006).
Authors provide a brief review of historical background that
includes a discussion of the Japan Industrial Standards (JIS) and
endorsement of Japan Society of Mechanical Engineers (JSME)
Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) codes. Authors describe the
current situation of B&PV Code, including the developments of
codes and standards by private sectors such as JSME and its rela-
tion to regulation. As a sample of governmental regulation, they
cover the situation of High Pressure Gas Safety Law (HPGSL)
and Japan Industrial Standard JIS. The authors provide a summary
of HPGSL, Designated Equipment Inspection Regulation (DEIR)
and Detailed Technical Criteria. In addition, new fitness-for-service
rules for pressure vessels published by High Pressure Institute
(HPI) are explained briefly.
As part of new trends and deregulation, codes and standards
activities of the JSME are discussed covering code and standards
for thermal power, nuclear power and fusion power plant compo-
nents including materials, design and construction, inspection,
welding, wall thinning managements, and fitness-for-service. The
Fundamental Policy and Organization of the Codes are addressed
with the help of several tables and figures. Furthermore, recent
trends such as technical developments, upgrading of codes and
standards, modification of seismic design standards for nuclear
piping, and wall thinning pipes under seismic events are described.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • lxix
Chapter 51 has been authored by David H. Nash and deals with
UK Rules for Unfired Pressure Vessels. The author provides a
brief introduction to the UK scene tracing the background and ori-
gins of the current Code PD5500 published in 2006 with 2008
updates and its relationship to the European Standard EN 13445
for Unfired Pressure Vessels and the Pressure Equipment Directive
(PED) addressed in Chapter 47 of this publication. Dr. Nash points
out several issues of PED that have a bear-ing on PD5500. The
author thereafter discusses in detail each of the salient design
items contained within PD5500. The role of materi-als and design
strength for low and high temperature application is included and
with the aid of several graphics he discusses the design aspects for
shells under internal and external pressure, and buckling related
issues. In addition, other vessel component items such as nozzle
reinforcements, bolted flanged joints, flat plates and covers, jacketed
vessels are also presented. The author also addresses briefly rules
for welded joints and inspection and testing. The procedures for
design of vessel supports, attachments and other local loading
problems are covered and the author discusses the ramifications of
these approach especially where failure by fatigue is a possibility.
The UK approach for fatigue design is also included and compar-
isons with the 2007 edition of the ASME codes are made. Design
by Analysis is mentioned by the author again cross referencing to
the efforts of ASME Codes. Finally a brief overview of the new
European code EN13445 is given, this in the light of the PED;
Dr. Nash, with the help graphs and tables discusses the various
parts and Sections that comprise this Code. Dr. Nash provides
exhaustive list of references cited in this chapter.
Chapter 52, authored by Ronald S. Hafner, covers the historical
Development of U.S. Regulations for the Transportation of
Radioactive Materials. The discussion in this Chapter is a highly
condensed version of the information presented previously in
Chapter 52 of the Second Edition of the Companion Guide to the
ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code. This Chapter offers a high-
level overview of the information presented previously, including
all of the appropriate references. Primarily based on the require-
ments for Type B quantities of radioactive material, the informa-
tion present-ed in this chapter includes a number of citations that
describe the detailed interactions that have taken place between a
variety of U.S. governmental agencies, commissions, and depart-
ments, such as, the Department of Transportation and its prede-
cessor, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Department of
Energy and its predecessors, the Energy Resource and
Development Agency and the Atomic Energy Commission, and
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, etc. The information pre-
sented also includes numer-ous citations from the interactions that
have also taken place between these governmental agencies and
the International Atomic Energy Agency.
From a regulatory perspective, the information presented cov-
ers the time period from 1965 through 2004, or about 40 years.
Starting in 1978, however, the information also begins to look
into the interactions that have taken place between the regulatory
requirements for transportation packages specified in 10 CFR 71
and the regulatory guidance for transportation packages provided
by the NRC in the form of Reg. Guides, NUREGs, and
NUREG/CRs. As is shown throughout the chapter, the regulatory
guidance provided by the NRC specifically notes that the regula-
tory requirements of 10 CFR 71 can be met using the additional
requirements defined in specific sections of the ASME’s Boiler &
Vessel Pressure Code as a metric for the design, fabrication,
assembly, testing, use, and maintenance of packagings used for
the transport of Type B quantities of radioactive materials.
Presented in a chronological format, the information provided in
this chapter clearly shows how the current system was developed.
Chapter 53, initially authored by Mahendra D. Rana, Stanley
Staniszewski and Stephen V. Voorhees provide a Description of
Rules of ASME Section XII covering Transport Tank Code of the
2004 edition. This chapter was revised by Mahendra D. Rana and
Stanley Staniszewski to incorporate the latest Code changes in the
2007 edition. The first edition of ASME Section XII Transport
Tank Code was published in July 2004. This newly developed
Code provides rules for construction and continued service of
pressure vessels used in transportation of dangerous goods via
highway, rail, air or water. The authors provide an overview of
Section XII while covering specific topics such as the scope and
general requirements, materials and design, fabrication, inspec-
tion and testing requirements. The need for a pressure vessel code
dealing with the whole spectrum of tanks to transport dangerous
goods was a result of the review of USDOT (U.S. Department of
Transportation) regulations. The regulations had become cumber-
some to use, and in a global market without compromising safety
the need to make the rules for transport tanks acceptable interna-
tionally became urgent. Hence the inaugural edition of ASME’s
Section XII focus was Portable Tanks. The subcommittee pre-
pared the Code to be transparent with existing ASME Code
requirements such as Section VIII, Div.1, while including the
existing DOT requirements that impacted the scope of the charter
to prepare the Section XII Code.
This chapter had been coordinated by Mahendra Rana with the
help of experts covering topics in their respective fields. Stan
Staniszewski dealt with the scope and general requirements of the
Code including rules on pressure relief devices, stamping, mark-
ing certification, reports and records. The scope of the new Code
applies to pressure vessels 450L and above, including additional
components and criteria addressed in Modal Appendices that are
to be used along with applicable regulations and laws. Steve
Voorhees initially handled the sections on fabrication, inspection
and testing requirements of Code Section XII. These sections
have been further revised by Mahendra Rana to incorporate the
2007 Code changes. From the perspective of fabrication and
inspection, Section XII is a mixture of familiar and new concepts
to the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Mahendra Rana covered
the sections on materials and design rules. The coverage included
Design Conditions and Allowable Stresses, Design Temperatures,
Design and Allowable Working Pressures, Loadings, Design of
Formed Heads, Torispherical Heads, External Pressure Design,
Flat Heads and Covers, Openings and Reinforcements, Design of
Welded Joints, and Articles covering Portable Cryogenic Tanks
including Materials and Design. The rules for fatigue design are
also given in the article covering Portable Cryogenic Tanks.
Chapter 54 on Pipeline Integrity and Security Pipelines had ini-
tially been authored by Alan Murray for the second edition, and
coauthored by Alan Murray and Rafael Mora in this current third
edition. The authors note that pipelines are an economic and com-
paratively safe means of transporting hydrocarbons and many
other fluids over great distances. Incidents, while relatively rare,
can have serious consequences, so protecting the public, and the
environment, is paramount. This is achieved through a combina-
tion of regulatory oversight, prudent pipeline integrity management
and the use of appropriate technology. Regulatory requirements
vary greatly throughout the world and are reflective of an underly-
ing safety philosophy, ranging from the prescriptive approach
adopted in the United States to the performance-based methods
favored in the United Kingdom. These various approaches are
ASME_FM_Vol_III_pi-lxxxiv.qxd 6/6/09 12:28 PM Page lxx
lxx • Introduction
compared before addressing how they, and accompanying codes
and standards, are used to formulate the essential elements needed
in a sound integrity management plan. The finite resources avail-
able for maintaining a pipeline means that, a risk-based approach
must be followed, so as to prudently allocate expenditures.
Accordingly both qualitative and quantitative methods of assigning
risk are described. The four main methods of undertaking integrity
assessments are outlined and a detailed approach to assessing
defects is provided including several worked examples.
A number of relatively simple means of protecting a pipeline
asset are available, ranging from coatings and cathodic protection
to preventing third-party damage. These are described, before
addressing a relatively new threat stemming from willful targeting
a pipeline operation either through physical or cyber attack.
Chapter 55, authored by Anibal L. Taboas for the second edition
has been completely revised for the current third edition. In this
edition, author presents an editorial view of Decommissioning
Technology Development within a context that energy, environ-
ment, education, and economy are inextricably linked. The author
highlights related approaches by the US Department of Energy
and the UK Nuclear Decommissioning Authority. The causes and
contributing factors to significantly increased cost estimates are
discussed, as well as the cost of delay (missed regulatory oppor-
tunities, reluctance to cut back non-productive expenditures, a
bias against innovation, and lack of incentives for transition to
other significant missions after the completion of environmental
remediation).
A compendium of technology challenges and needs is presented,
along with an overall program performance rating. The author
observes that (1) funding for basic, long, and medium term com-
ponents, has dwindled as to support primarily paper [or desk]
studies, (2) fiduciary responsibility requires demonstrating
whether the resources consumed by industry and government in
the safe and compliant environmental remediation of radiological
and nuclear facilities remains commensurate with the risks avert-
ed, and that (3) reverting the funding trend in D&D technology
development requires integrated planning, strategic action, and
effective communication.
The chapter concludes with a call for a plan to (1) develop the
business case for investment; (2) invest in high visibility projects
of demonstrably high return for investment; (3) meet customer-
identified expectations; (4) track leading indicators and contractu-
al incentives; (5) resolve key policy issues; and (6) transparent
independent peer review.
Drs. K.P. (Kris) Singh and Tony Williams collaborate in
Chapter 56 to present a comprehensive assay of the backend of
the commercial nuclear power cycle. The management of the
spent nuclear fuel removed from the reactor after a period of
power generation in the reactor core by nuclear fission has been
described as the Achilles heel of the commercial nuclear industry
and the source of much of the disparate political opposition to its
use, despite its evidently sterling credentials as a non-polluting
and commercially viable alternative to fossil power.
The perceived undesirability of the spent nuclear fuel derives
from the transmutation of uranium into an array of isotopes (known
as actinides and fission products) that produce copious quantities of
radiation for thousands of years after the fuel has been removed
from the reactor. Although the rate of dose accretion gradually
attenuates with the passage of time, a spent nuclear fuel assembly
remains a highly radioactive material for millennia. The technolo-
gies developed to manage this unavoidable byproduct of commer-
cial nuclear power generation are discussed in this chapter with a
critical assessment of their strengths and weaknesses. For this pur-
pose, spent fuel management technologies are divided into (1)
reprocessing, which consists of reclaiming the fissionable portion
of the spent fuel for reuse as an energy source and (2) passive stor-
age in either deep pools or in an inert gas environment.
The essential characteristics of the reprocessing technology,
namely, the PUREX process, are described in the context of its
historical origins and its dependence on chemical separation tech-
niques since the very beginning in the 1940s. The authors explain
how the continuance of reprocessing in Europe and its abandon-
ment in the U.S. because of proliferation concerns over thirty
years ago led to profound differences in fuel management paths
taken by the U.S. and oversea nuclear operators.
Williams and Singh provide a concise description of the wet
storage technology that advanced in the U.S. in the wake of the
ban on reprocessing in the U.S, but has remained a largely
untapped option in those countries that rely on reprocessing
and/or dry storage. The evolution of dry storage technologies in
the U.S. (ventilated systems) and overseas (metal casks) is also
discussed with respect to their technical attributes, safety, reliabil-
ity, and maintainability. In particular, the role of the ASME Codes
in providing a sound platform for the mechanical design and
stress analysis of the systems, components, and structures used in
wet and dry storage technologies is explained.
The special demands on the used fuel transport packages
imposed by the regulations of the USNRC and the guidelines of
IAEA to ensure safety in fuel transportation are explained along
with the latest developments in the field. Finally, the authors also
provide a succinct summary of the methodology to analyze the
effect of a postulated aircraft crash on a storage or transport cask
to deal with what is an unmistakably unique design consideration
in the twenty-first century. (The authors wish to recognize the
valuable contribution of Dr. David McGinnes in the preparation
of Chapter 56.)
In Chapter 57 Generation III+ PWRS has been addressed in
three distinct parts: in Part A: AP1000 by John T. Land, in Part B:
EPR by Marty Parece and in Part C: U.S. APWR by Masahiko
Kaneda. From the commissioning of the first commercial nuclear
reactor more than 50 years ago, the nuclear power industry has
been developing and improving reactor technology with particular
emphasis on reliability and safety. There are several generations
of reactors that have been developed or are being developed.
These reactors are generally categorized as Generation I, II, III,
III+, and IV reactors. The authors illustrate with the help of
schematics the development and the technology distilled from 50
years of successful nuclear operating experience that has led to
the Generation III+ pressurized water reactors (PWRs).
Generation I reactors were developed in the 1950s and 1960s,
Generation II reactors were developed in the 1970s through the
1990s, and Generation III reactors were developed in the 1990s and
2000s. Generation III reactors are considered to be evolutionary
reactors such as the System 80+, and advanced pressurized water
reactor (APWR). Generation III+ reactors are based on the nomen-
clature from the Department of Energy, that is, Generation III reac-
tors with improved economics and safety. Generation IV reactors
are new technologies that are being developed for future reactors.
The Generation III+ PWR reactors discussed in this chapter
have design features with more robust design improvements,
higher availability and longer operating life, extended fuel life,
and improved and innovative safety features over the currently
operating reactors. The Generation III+ Boiling Water Reactors
(BWRs) are discussed in Chapter 58.
ASME_FM_Vol_III_pi-lxxxiv.qxd 6/6/09 12:28 PM Page lxxi
COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • lxxi
The scope of this commentary is to describe in some detail the
Generation III+ PWR plant design features, technology, safety
and reliability features, and the elimination or mitigation of degra-
dation issues associated with Generation I, and II PWR designs.
This chapter provides commentary on the following Generation
III+ PWRs that have received Design Certification approval or are
in the process of receiving certification approval from the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC): AP1000, EPR and U.S.
APWR. Authors have with the help of illustrations, graphs, charts
and figures provided in addition to the historical background and
futuristic scope covered the current practices covering each of the
three topics of the Generation III+ PWRs.
The coverage for each of these three parts are: In Section 57A
the coverage of AP1000 included AP1000 Plant Design, AP1000
Operational Technology, Safety Features, Containment Design,
Modularization and Construction, Operation and Maintenance,
ASME Code Aspects, Future Direction, References and
Nomenclature; In Section 57B discussions regarding EPR covered
EPR Development, EPR Plant Design, EPR Safety, Containment
Design, Construction, Operation and Maintenance, Code Aspects,
Building Now and References were addressed; In Section 57C
coverage of U.S. APWR included U.S. APWR Plant Design,
Operational Technology, Safety Features, Containment Design,
Modularization and Construction, operation and Maintenance,
ASME Code Aspects, Future Direction on the U.S. APWR,
References and Nomenclature.
Chapter 58 authored by Hardayal Mehta and Daniel Pappone,
provides details of the development of boiling water reactor
(BWR) based nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) and the role
of ASME Code in its design, material selection, fabrication and
in-service inspections. A general background of the development
of the BWR product line is first provided including the current
offerings (the Advanced Boiler Water Reactor, ABWR, and the
Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor, ESBWR). This
includes the description of the reactor and reactor system design,
safety system design and the containment design. The authors
next describe the key features of the ESBWR including the natur-
al circulation design, operating domain and passive safety fea-
tures. The ESBWR core and containment cooling systems repre-
sent a radical departure from those of the earlier BWR product
lines in that the cooling systems are passive and do not rely on
electrically driven pumps. The ASME Code aspects covered
include the ASME Code versions used in the construction, treat-
ment of environmental fatigue issues, material selection, and oth-
ers. Future directions in terms of fabrications, modularization, and
others are lastly discussed.
Chapter 59, authored by William J. O’Donnell and Donald S.
Griffin, describes the structural integrity issues in Section II, VIII,
III, and Subsection NH (Class 1 Components in Elevated
Temperature Service), and Code Cases that must be covered to
support the licensing of High Temperature Generation IV
Reactors. It also describes how the Code addresses these issues,
and the need for additional criteria to cover unresolved structural
issues for very high temperature reactors.
Since the 1980s, the ASME Code has made numerous improve-
ments in elevated temperature structural integrity design criteria.
These advances have been incorporated into Subsection NH of
Section III of the Code. The current need for designs for very
high temperature and for GEN IV systems requires the extension
of operating temperature from about 1400ºF (760ºC) to about
1742ºF (950ºF) where creep effects limit structural integrity, safe
allowable operating conditions, and design life.
Materials with more creep and corrosion resistance are needed
for these higher operating temperatures. Material models are
required for cyclic design analyses. Allowable strains, creep
fatigue and creep rupture interaction evaluation methods are need-
ed to provide assurance of structural integrity for very high tem-
perature applications. These criteria intended to prevent through-
wall cracking and leaking.
The detailed material properties needed for cyclic finite ele-
ment creep design analyses are generally not provided in the
Code. Chapter 59 describes the material models, design criteria
and analysis methods which NRC has indicated are remaining
needs in the ASME Code to cover Regulatory Issues for Very
High Temperature Service:
1. Material cyclic creep behavior, creep-rupture, creep-fatigue
interaction and environmental effects.
2. The structural integrity of welds.
3. The development of extended simplified analysis methods (to
avoid dependence on “black box” finite element analyses
(FEA) for cyclic creep).
4. Test verification of 1, 2 and 3.
Chapter 60 authored by Reino Virolainen and Kaisa Simola cover
Risk-Informed Licensing, Regulation and Safety Management of
NPPS in Finland. The authors discuss the four operating nuclear
power plant units in Finland. The TVO power company has two 840
MWe BWR units supplied by Asea-Atom at the Olkiluoto site. The
FORTUM corporation (formerly IVO) has two 500 MWe VVER
440/213 units at the Loviisa site. All the units were commissioned
between 1977 and 1982. In addition a 1600 MWe European
Pressurized Water Reactor (EPR) supplied by the Framatome
ANP—Siemens Consortium is under construction at the Olkiluoto
site. Current international safety requirements and especially French
and German operating experience have been used in the design.
Finnish requirements and operating experience have also been used,
especially regarding site-specific features. Severe accident manage-
ment and protection against collision of a large passenger airplane
are implemented in the plant design.
In Finland, risk-informed applications are formally integrated
in the regulatory process of NPPs that are already in the early
design phase, run through the construction and operation phases
through the entire plant service-time-living PRA models have
been developed for both the Olkiluoto 1/2 and Loviisa 1/2 NPPs.
The PRA studies include level 1 and level 2 models. Level 1 com-
prises the calculation of severe core damage frequency (probabili-
ty per year) and level 2 the determination of the size and frequen-
cy of the release of radioactive substances to the environment. At
the moment, level 1 studies for full power operation cover internal
events, area events (fires, floods), and external events such as
harsh weather conditions, and seismic events. The shutdown and
low power states of level 1 PRA cover internal events, floods,
fires, harsh weather conditions and seismic events. Special atten-
tion is devoted to the use of various risk informed PRA applica-
tions in the licensing of Olkiluoto 3 project, such as RI-ISI, RI-
TechSpecs, RI-IST and safety classification of SSCs. In this
context this chapter makes several references to the ASME stan-
dards on RI-ISI and the European Network for Inspection and
Qualification, ENIQ and its RI-ISI related activities. The chapter
is has several tables and schematics in addition to references and
acronyms to explain the terminology used in this chapter.
The scope of the coverage includes Risk- Informed Regulatory
Frame with discussions about PRA in Nuclear Safety Legislation
ASME_FM_Vol_III_pi-lxxxiv.qxd 6/6/09 12:28 PM Page lxxii
lxxii • Introduction
and Risk Informed Regulation Policy sequences. The authors also
dwell on PRA IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS and address
Development of PRA Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants,
and PRA in the Licensing Process of New Designs with tables to
support their presentation. Risk-Informed Applications for a
Construction License, for Operating License, Risk- Informed
Applications during operation control and Review Process of
PRA also discussed with the help of schematics, examples and
experiences of Olkiluoto 3 NPP Risk Informed Licensing along
with EPR safety features. The authors dwell on the European ori-
entation to risk and cover European network for inspection and
qualification, ENIQ task group risk, ENIQ documents supporting
the RI-ISI framework document, and ENIQ recommended prac-
tices. As a part of the extension of risk-informed activities authors
dwell on analysis of oil spills, and probabilistic fire simulation,
risk-informed regulatory inspections. The authors close the chap-
ter with summary and conclusions.
Chapter 61, authored by Dr. Luc H. Geraets, introduces Belgium
as an important actor in the applications of nuclear energy. The
author provides a short historical summary of the development of
nuclear power in Belgium. He explains the choice made by
Belgium to follow the USNRC rules for the construction of its
nuclear units, and details how the design and safety analysis of
these units have been done by applying the US rules and all the
associated documentation (regulatory guides, standard review
plans, ASME Code, IEEE standards, ANSI, ANS, etc.). The practi-
cal transposition of the ASME Code to the Belgian environment is
then presented; in particular, the use of Section XI for repairs and
replacements is analyzed in full detail.
This system has proven its workability and efficiency. However,
in 2003, Belgium voted a nuclear phase-out law, which provides
for abandoning the use of fissile nuclear energy for industrial
electricity production; until new legislation happens, there will be
no reason to question the rules that would be imposed for design
and construction. If it happens, and new plants are built in
Belgium, it is likely that the same philosophy as for the currently
operating plants would be applied, with the selection of a “fresh-
er” version of ASME Code Section III (and the other Sections
called upon by ASME III) and Section VIII Div. 1. Transpositions
would be revised, but the general framework and the actors would
remain the same.
In Chapter 62, authored by Dieter Kreckel an overview of the
Codes and Standards for Pressure Equipment to be applied in
Germany is presented. Dieter Kreckel provides an overview of
the historical perspective of Pressure Equipment Directive
(PED). The Pressure Equipment Directive (PED) (97/23/EC) was
adopted by the European Parliament and the European Council
in May 1997. Initially it came into force on November 29, 1999,
and from May 29, 2002 the Pressure Equipment Directive was
obligatory throughout the European Union. Germany as a mem-
ber of the European Union had to respect the Directives issued
by the EU and to transfer these to national law, so the PED came
into effect.
Dieter Kreckel discusses several aspects of the pressure equip-
ment directive including series of technical harmonization direc-
tives for machinery, electrical equipment, medical devices, simple
pressure vessels, gas appliances, and so on. The Directive con-
cerns manufacturers of items such as vessels pressurized storage
containers, heat exchangers, steam generators, boilers, industrial
piping, safety devices, and pressure accessories. Such pressure
equipment is widely used in the process industries (oil and gas,
chemical, pharmaceutical, plastics and rubber, and the food and
beverage industry), high temperature process industry (glass,
paper, and board), energy production utilities, heating, air-condi-
tioning, and gas storage and transportation.
Dieter Kreckel also discusses exclusions from the scope of the
PED such as Article 1 that has Items specifically designed for
nuclear use, failure of which may cause an emission of radioac-
tivity. For Nuclear Power Plant Licensing in Europe the applica-
tion limits of the PED and the Nuclear Codes have to be agreed
with the National Nuclear Licensing Authorities, there is no har-
monization process agreed in the European Union. The German
Nuclear Power Plants in operation are licensed by the German
Codes and Standards for Pressure Vessels effective from the con-
struction time as defined in the operation license. These identify
the potentials for the application of the Codes and Standard, as
the state of the art. The effort spent in Germany for the develop-
ment of the new Generation 3 of NPP, for example, the European
Pressurized Water Reactor (EPR) or the SWR1000 with respect to
the code and standard evolvement is introduced in the AREVA
NP engineering process.
Carlos Cueto-Felgueroso discusses, in Chapter 63, pressure
equipment regulations, codes, and standards in Spain, in the nonnu-
clear industry as well as in the nuclear field. In both cases, empha-
sis is placed on periodic inspections and testing. The basic Spanish
regulation on pressurized equipment in the nonnuclear industry
may be found in the Regulation on Pressurized Apparatus, pub-
lished by the Ministry of Industry and Energy in 1979. The regula-
tion consists of a set of general standards and leaves the specifics to
a set of Complementary Technical Instructions. After Spain joined
the European Community in 1986, a process of modification of the
Pressure Equipment Regulation began, with a view to bring it in
line with those of the other Member States to facilitate the trade of
goods and services within the European Union.
Carlos Cueto-Felgueroso discusses the implications in the
process of European harmonization and the Pressure Equipment
Directives issued by the European Parliament and Council that
became obligatory, regarding the design, manufacture, testing,
and conformity assessment of pressure equipment and assemblies
of pressure equipment. In the nuclear field, in the absence of a
national regulation, the codes and standards of the countries of
origin of the design of each reactor are applied. The Spanish
nuclear fleet is currently made up of seven pressurized water reac-
tors (PWR) and boiling water reactors (BWR) of U.S. design and
one German designed PWR.
Carlos Cueto-Felgueroso’s association with ASME Code
Committees is reflected in his discussions pertaining to the several
Sections of the ASME B&PV Code. He mentions the application
of Section III of the ASME Code in the design and construction of
the Spanish nuclear power plants, except in the case of the German
designed PWR, for which the KTA rules were used. He indicates
that on the other hand, the rules of Section XI of the ASME Code
are applied to all the plants for In-Service Inspection (ISI).
The author discusses Spanish Regulation in the Nonnuclear
Industry that pertains to Design and Construction, including
design, fabrication, and conformity assessment of pressure equip-
ment that is currently regulated in Spain according to PED. The
main provisions of the PED are summarized with reference to
Spain. He discusses the basic requirements regarding the inspec-
tion and testing, including regulation on Pressurised Apparatus
and its Complementary Technical Instructions, with particular ref-
erence to boilers, economizers, water preheaters, steam reheaters
and piping for fluids. The author shows his expertise relating to
oil refineries and petrochemical plants. He discusses regulations
ASME_FM_Vol_III_pi-lxxxiv.qxd 6/6/09 12:28 PM Page lxxiii
COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • lxxiii
covering cryogenic tanks and thermal power generation plants
using solid, liquid or gaseous fossil fuels. The presentation
includes inspection and testing requirements for fossil fuel power
generation plants, and oil refineries and petrochemical plants.
Carlos Cueto-Felgueroso’s familiarity with ASME Codes and
Standards, Section XI is evident from a detailed discussion about
Nuclear Industry as it relates to Qualification of NDT for ISI and
accounts the U.S. developments regarding Risk-Informed ISI. The
author mentions the role of the Nuclear Regulator (CSN) and
UNESA (Spanish Utilities Group) and an increasing interest in
possible optimization of the ISI programs. There is also a discus-
sion of the international Programme for the Inspection of Steel
Components (PISC). In addition, a description of the Spanish
NDE Qualification Methodology is described with a mention of
the objectives, scope, principles of qualification, functions, and
responsibilities of the parties.
The chapter has several tables, graphics and references, includ-
ing ASME Code Cases, US NUREGs, NRC and PED publica-
tions used in the chapter.
In Chapter 64 Dr. Milan Brumovsky discusses the Czech and
Slovakian Codes with respect to the Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs)
Jaslovske Bohunice (440 MW) in Slovakia, Dukovany (440 MW)
and Temelín (1000 MW) in the Czech Republic (both in former
Czechoslovakia). Dr. Brumovsky mentions the agreement between
the former Czechoslovakia and Soviet Union in context of mutual
cooperation in building NPPs. The author traces the Government
decisions regarding an extended project of the technical standard
documentation of NPPs organized by the International Economic
Association “Interatomenergo” in Moscow. The association was set
up to cooperate in the field of nuclear power between individual
member states of the Council of Mutual Economical Co-operation
(CMEA).. The entire complex of technical standard documentation
ended in 1990, when GAEN finished the whole project at interna-
tional level and consequently also in the Soviet Union.
Dr. Brumovsky mentions that the fundamental problem of the
project was a question of legal obligation to CMEA standards.
Elaboration of obligatory position of state regulatory bodies
among the members of the CMEA was done. This facilitated in
determining the documentation of technical standards in the form
of a legal-agreement. From the point of international relations, the
procedure could be considered as sufficient; but from the stand-
point of Czech NPPs, the effectiveness of utilizing these standards
was at zero point, since effective steps were not organized to
bring them into action. The CMEA rules resulted in merely
upgrading of the Soviet rules and standards incorporated into new
set of Soviet rules and standards issued around 1989. These rules
and standards existed for service lifetime assessment of reactor
components and were limited only to design and manufacturing;
in very special cases these rules were for operation also but not
from the lifetime evaluation point of view. Thus, assessment of
defects, found during in-service inspection, has to be based on
acceptance levels valid for manufacturing and on special proce-
dures, prepared by the Nuclear Research Institute (NRI) Rez and
manufacturers of components; for case by case application, these
had to be accepted by the Czech State Office for Nuclear Safety
(SONS).
SONS requirements for Lifetime Evaluation and mentions that
in 1993, the SONS initiated a project “Requirements for Lifetime
Evaluation of VVER Main Components” (VVER: Water—Water
Energetical Reactor is of pressurized water reactor type but
designed and manufactured in accordance with former Soviet
codes and rules). Within the scope of this project, preparation of
regulatory requirements for lifetime evaluation of reactor compo-
nents, including all aspects of integrity and degrading processes
of these components, was performed. Responsibility of this pro-
ject was given to the NRI Rez, which focused on reactor pressure
vessel (RPV) and reactor internals and issued as a SONS docu-
ment with recommendations that included Operational Safety
Reports. In this document, no practical procedure for lifetime
evaluation was given; only general and some detailed technical
requirements for evaluation of these two components were
described.
Dr. Brumovsky discusses the NTD ASI Code for VVER Reactor
Components. He mentions that approximately during the same
time, a second activity was initiated by the Czech Association of
Mechanical Engineers (ASI), which decided that a set of codes for
reactor components, namely, Normative Technical Documentation
(NTD) was needed for Czech nuclear industry. A plan for prepara-
tion of such codes was discussed, accepted, and put into action,
details of which are presented in the chapter.
Next is a discussion of the VERLIFE PROCEDURE which is a
proposal for the European Union 5th Framework Programmes that
was prepared and accepted with the aim to use proposals of the
Section IV as the first document to be discussed, changed, upgraded,
enlarged, and finally accepted. The main goal of the project was in
the preparation, evaluation, and mutual agreement of a “Unified
Procedure for Lifetime Assessment of Components and Piping in
VVER Type Nuclear Power Plants.” The author thereon discusses
the COVERS CONTINUATION. In 2005, a new project within the
EU 6th Framework Programmes was opened: COVERS—VVER
Safety Research that is also coordinated by the NRI. In this pro-
ject, WP 4 deals with the upgrading and updating of the VERLIFE
procedure to assure that the experience obtained as well as new
developments will be appropriately included in the new version.
Experts from nine countries are taking part in this project, in addi-
tion to VVER-operating countries such as Czech Republic, Slovak
Republic, Hungary, Finland, Spain, The Netherlands, Germany,
Russia, and Ukraine, as well as from EU-JRC IE (Joint Research
Center—Institute of Energy in Petten, The Netherlands) and ISTC
(Institute for Scientific and Technical Cooperation).
Dr. Brumovsky concludes that The VERLIFE procedure is now
fully accepted as a main regulatory document for lifetime assess-
ment of VVER components in the Czech Republic and Slovakia
and partially in Hungary and Finland. Negotiations are now in
progress for its use in Ukraine and China.
The chapter has information about several manufacturing com-
panies in the Czech Republic, Slovakia that obtained ASME
Certification for manufacturing reactor (and also nonreactor com-
ponents in accordance with ASME Section VIII) components for
export to other countries where ASME Codes are required. The
author provides References with annotated bibiliography and
author’s publications pertinent to this chapter.
Dr. Brumovsky provides detailed information about the
Structure of NTD ASI. The final version of the VERLIFE proce-
dure in Czech was accepted as a new version of the Section IV of
the NTD ASI. Czech SONS accepted NTD ASI Sections I, II, III,
and IV in 2005 and recommended them for their use in the chosen
safety important components in NPPs. Similarly in the Slovak
Republic, Sections I and II, prepared by the Welding Institute of
Slovakia in cooperation with the Welding Institute of the Czech
Republic were accepted by Slovak Office for Nuclear Regulation.
Structure of the Sections I, II, and III is similar to the appropriate
Sections of the ASME Code Sections I, II, and III, where as the
structure of Sections IV and V is fully new. The author provides
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lxxiv • Introduction
detailed comparison of each of the Czech Codes with ASME
B&PV Code Sections I, II, III, IV and V.
Chapter 65, co-authored by Peter Trampus and Peter Pal
Babics, provides an overview on the recent activity in Hungary
concerning comprehensive adaptation of the ASME Code. The
owner of Paks NPP, Hungary’s sole nuclear generating facility, is
aiming at adjusting the ISI and IST program to meet ASME Code
requirements. The objective is to achieve an internationally
acceptable level in structural and functional integrity assessment
of long-lived and passive as well as of active components, and to
create the basis for a proper aging management program in the
operations period beyond the design life of the units. Apart from
this, it will extend the current four-year inspection interval for
Class 1 components up to an eight-year one, which will contribute
to a more cost-efficient operation and maintenance. The
Hungarian nuclear regulatory regime gives an opportunity for this
because the nuclear safety rules do not determine explicitly the
applicable codes neither for the design nor for the ISI / IST.
The Chapter briefly describes the background of the Paks life
extension project and its regulatory aspects. The basic regulatory
principles related to ASME adaptation are summarized. The
authors focus on aspects of maintaining the current licensing basis
as well as on the necessity to demonstrate the compliance with
Section III requirements. The substantial part of the work is the
design review of Class 1 and 2 components and, if needed, a re-
design of selected components to comply with the Section III
requirements. As an example for the ongoing design review
process, the comparison of Fatigue Strength Reduction Factors
for welds in pressure vessels and piping is presented.
Chapter 66 deals with some aspects of Russian Regulation and
Codes in nuclear power and is authored by Victor V. Kostarev and
Alexander V. Sudakov. Authors with vast domestic and internation-
al experience discuss the Code perspective covering Russia, with
appropriate comparisons of Codes of the USA, Canada, Japan,
China, India and several European countires. Dr. Kostarev’s interac-
tion with ASME is in evidence in detailed discussions presented in
this chapter with tables and graphics about Code allowables,
Seismic regulations and on-going applications of seismic excitation
studies.
The authors present a brief history of regulatory activity and Boiler
Codes in Russia and continue with a write-up about System and a list
of Standards relevant to the State Safety Regulation in nuclear power.
Development of Nuclear Codes for design and analysis of NPPS
equipment and piping have been presented along with a comparison
of Russian nuclear standard PNAE (Rules and Standards in Atomic
Energy Industry of Russia), with ASME BPVC (Boiler Pressure
Vessel Code) in application to seismic analysis of a primary loop
of PWR (VVER) reactor. Documentation of Guidelines for the
Seismic Analysis of NPP (Nuclear Power Plant) Systems, require-
ments for seismic analysis and capacity, Equipment Classification of
the PCLS according to different codes including PNAE, ASME,
JEAG, PCLS (Primary Coolant Loop System) have been presented.
The authors through several tables, schematics and graphics
have compared the Russian Codes with Codes of Japan and
Europe. These include definition of stresses and array of materi-
als, allowable of stresses, formulas for Piping Stress Analaysis,
definition of Seismic Loads, Seismic and Dynamic Analysis, and
results of Comparative Analysis of PLCS by PNAE and ASME
BPVC. Authors also used the Finite Element Analysis results to
reinforce their presentation.
European high viscous dampers approach in protecting NPP
primary and secondary systems from seismic loads and opera-
tional vibration are discussed in this chapter. Using bibliographi-
cal notations, schmatics and analytical information, the authors
discuss Viscoelastic Piping Dampers, also known as High Viscous
Dampers (HVD) extensively used since the mid-1980s in the seis-
mic upgrading of nuclear power stations in Europe and currently
used in new nuclear power plant installations in China and India.
General operational characteristics of HVDs as a dynamic
restraint are discussed in this chapter. The authors discuss their
expertise with HVD, as a device that works in a softer manner
than snubbers do, providing to the system essential additional
damping rather than stiffness. High damping in the device is a
result of deformation of a special extremely high viscous liquid
that is located in the space between damper’s piston and housing.
The chapter includes a glossary of several terms used in this
chapter and has 61 references from scholastic publications includ-
ing Dr. Kostarev’s own contributions to international conferences.
Chapter 67, co-authored by Malcolm Europa, Paul Brinkhurst,
Neil Broom, and John Fletcher, provides an overview of the
codes and standards for pressurized equipment as used in the
South African nuclear industry. The applicable legislation, regu-
latory requirements, and the roles of the respective regulatory
bodies governing the use of pressurized equipment are discussed.
A historical perspective of the construction, licensing, and opera-
tional phases of two pressurized water reactor (PWR) units of
Westinghouse design but constructed under license from
Framatome is given, with emphasis on the design and quality
rules used and risk considerations allowed by the licensing
framework.
Furthermore a description is given of the pebble bed modular
reactor (PBMR) to be constructed for Eskom, the owner and
licensee, by PBMR (Pty) Ltd, a largely state-owned and funded
nuclear design company. The PBMR is a high-temperature gas-
cooled reactor (HTGR) and is one of the next- generation nuclear
power plants (NGNP). The PBMR is designed according to the
ASME Section III Codes, utilizing light water reactor (LWR) ser-
vice conditions and materials. This has imposed certain con-
straints on the design and required innovative design features
which are discussed.
In conclusion, the paper discusses the stated intentions of the
South African Government in terms of the expansion of the nuclear
industry and the implications thereof. It also reviews the changes
being made to the regulatory frameworks, the need for change, and
the implications with respect to code and standards usage in the
industry.
At present, the Nuclear Power Program in India (Chapter 68,
by H.S. Kushwaha, K.K. Vaze, and K.B. Dixit) is based mainly
on a series of Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs). This
chapter first provides a general overview of the Indian PHWR
design and its evolution. The design approach, material selection,
and fabrication practices are described for major components
such as calandria, headers, steam generators, and piping.
In Indian PHWRs, the design, fabrication, testing, and inspec-
tion of all mechanical components basically follow the require-
ments of appropriate sections of the ASME Boiler & Pressure
Vessel Code (ASME B&PV Code). In a few cases, where it was
not possible to meet the code criteria, it is the intent of the code
that is met.
Other international codes used are (1) Canadian Code
CAN/CSA N285.4-05 and IAEA Safety Guide 50-SG-02 for ISI
and (2) French Code RCC-G for containment design.
Details are provided of the development and the use of leak-
before-break (LBB) criterion to eliminate the need for installation
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • lxxv
of pipe whip restraints. Results of experiments conducted to
determine load-carrying capacity of cracked pipes and the results
of fatigue crack growth rate tests in support of LBB criteria are
discussed. As a further example of the research and development
work conducted in India related to nuclear power plant applica-
tions, the development of a modified B2 stress index (used in
NB-3600-type stress analyses) for pipe elbows and curved pipes
and quantification of additional safety factors to account cyclic
tearing in LBB assessment are discussed.
Chapter 69, authored by Jong Chull Jo and Howard H. Chung,
provides an overview of the Korean nuclear safety regulatory sys-
tem and codes for design, manufacturing, operation, and mainte-
nance of nuclear boiler and pressure vessels.
Since the 1970s, Korea has been promoting the nuclear energy
industry to produce electricity needed for rapidly expanding indus-
try and for enhancing the quality of human life. In the early stages
of the introduction of reactors into Korea, due to lack of a well-
established domestic regulatory framework for the safety regula-
tion of operating reactors, the technical safety requirements and
safety standards of the countries that supplied the reactors were
applied. However, after a while, the Korean regulatory authority
streamlined the regulatory framework and applied these rules and
regulations to domestic nuclear installations. Furthermore, for
strengthening the level of safety of nuclear installations Korea has
been making every effort to improve the nuclear safety regulatory
system and to continuously update the codes and standards, based
on the up-to-date knowledge and experience.
This chapter describes Korean nuclear regulatory organizations,
aspects of the regulatory authority including licensing, status of
nuclear installations, nuclear reactor regulatory framework and
regulations referring to domestic and/or international industrial
codes and standards in the area of pressure vessels and piping.
The chapter also describes the status of Korean Electric Power
Industry Codes (KEPIC) that covers standards for design, manu-
facturing, operation, maintenance, and testing and inspection of
nuclear and non-nuclear mechanical components, including pres-
sure vessels and piping. A comparative assessment of U.S. and
Korean codes is also addressed. Besides, a comparison between
the KEPIC code and its reference to codes of other foreign coun-
tries is also provided.
Chapter 70, co-authored by Y. B. Chen, S. Chang, and T. Chow,
provides an overview of the nuclear energy application and develop-
ment in Taiwan, which includes historical background of the devel-
opment, role of the regulatory authority and current status of nuclear
facilities. This chapter also addresses important issues such as seis-
mic design features of the nuclear power plants (NPPs), PWR/BWR
pressure boundary integrity, power uprate and license renewal, and
radioactive waste management of NPPs in Taiwan.
Taiwan is located at a complex juncture between the Eurasian
plate and Philippine Sea plate, where earthquakes occur frequently.
Hence, seismic design/qualification of structures, systems and com-
ponents (SSC) of NPPs in Taiwan is an important issue. Although
Taiwan is prone to earthquake strikes, up to now Taiwan’s NPPs
have never experienced any earthquakes that challenged the seismic
design of the plants. However, the disastrous Chi-Chi earthquake
prompted Taiwan’s nuclear regulatory authority Atomic Energy
Council (AEC) to request the largest and only nuclear utility,
Taiwan Power Company (TPC), to install the Automatic Seismic
Trip System in all six operating nuclear units to further enhance the
plant safety.
N-service inspections (ISI) followed the ASME Section XI for
the operating units are conducted during each scheduled outage to
ensure the integrity of the SSCs. Recently, more attention has been
focused on the inter-granular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) in
BWRs and primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) in
PWRs especially at the dissimilar metal (DM) welds connecting
vessel nozzle to austenitic stainless steel piping according to both
foreign or domestic operating experiences. More details of the
inspection results are discussed in this Chapter.
To improve the performance of the NPPs, a power uprate pro-
ject has been launched for the NPPs in operation. The power
uprate considered is the Measurement Uncertainty Recapture
(MUR) type and up to 1.7% rated thermal power increase for
license application. Submission of operating license renewal
applications for all the operating units is under planning and
preparation. Preliminary feasibility study of stretch power uprate
(~5%) is also ongoing. Besides the aforementioned activities,
radioactive waste management is also an issue receiving more
attention. Right now, the application submitted by TPC for con-
struction permit of independent spent fuel storage installations
(ISFSI) at Chinshan site is still under review. Before any ISFSI is
allowed to be constructed, the on-site spent fuel storage pools are
the only available facilities for the spent fuel management of the
nuclear power plants.
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ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE
ASME BOILER AND PRESSURE VESSEL
COMMITTEE
ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITY
In 1911 the ASME set up a committee for the purpose of formu-
lating standard rules for the construction of steam boilers and other
pressure vessels. The committee is now known as the ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Committee. From one small group of
seven members in 1911, the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Committee
has grown to a 2008 membership of about 800 volunteers in the
overall committee structure. This consists of the Standards
Committee the Executive Committee, 14 subcommittees, and vari-
ous sub-tier committees called subgroups, working groups, and
special committees. Recent figures show a membership breakdown
as follows: there are 30 members of the Standards Committee,
about 300 on subcommittees, and over 1200 on related subordinate
committees. (The total number of committee positions is larger
than the volunteer membership of 800 because many individuals
serve on more than one committee.)
At the foundation of the committee structure are the subgroups
and working groups. Typically, these groups are responsible for a
specific technical field or a specific part of a section of the Code,
for example, the Subgroup on Radiography (a Section V sub-
group) or the Subgroup on Design (a Section I subgroup). At the
subcommittee level, the responsibilities broaden to include a com-
plete section of the Code, such as Section I, or a complete techni-
cal field, such as Section V, Nondestructive Examination. The
Standards Committee, consisting of a maximum of 30 members
satisfies the ANSI requirements as the official “consensus com-
mittee”, and is responsible for every technical action taken by the
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Committee. It deals with all sections
of the Code, Code Cases, and Accreditation. It also hears appeals
arising from technical or accreditation activities when these mat-
ters cannot be resolved at the subcommittee level.
There are four other functions that act in an advisory capacity to
the Standards Committee. These are called the Conference
Committee, the Marine Conference Group, and the recently intro-
duced International Interest Review Group (IIRG) and the ASME
Delegate program described below. These committees represent
legal jurisdictions or other authorities that have made the Code a
legal requirement. Each state in the U.S., each province in Canada,
and certain large cities that have adopted one or more sections of
the ASME Code and maintain a department that enforces the Code
is invited to appoint a representative to act on the Conference
Committee. There are about 60 such representatives on the
Conference committee. An analogous committee is the Marine
Conference Group, composed of representatives of marine inter-
ests who promulgate and enforce regulations based on the ASME
Code. The five members of the Marine Conference Group repre-
sent the American Bureau of Shipping, the U.S. Coast Guard, the
U.S. Department of the Navy, Lloyds Register of Shipping, and the
Canadian Coast Guard. All these advisory functions have direct
access to the Standards Committee, and can bring to it any prob-
lems with respect to implementation of Code requirements. They
are all entitled to participate in discussion at the Standards
Committee and in voting by letter ballot for items that are receiv-
ing first consideration (explained below under Voting by the
Standards Committee). On items receiving reconsideration, such
advisory Committee members’ participation is limited to discus-
sion, without vote. This participation by the regulatory authorities
fosters their willingness to accept Code rules in their jurisdictions
and assists in uniform administration of the Code.
As noted above both the International Interest Review Group
(IIRG) and the ASME Delegate programs are recent additions to
the Boiler and pressure Vessel Code Committee. The principal
objectives of these new additions is improved international commu-
nications and to reduce the barriers to participation in ASME stan-
dards development activities by people living outside the U.S. and
Canada. A delegate is an individual appointed to a committee or
subtier group who represents an organization that is outside the
U.S. and Canada, and that is recognized within its country.
Members of the group could work in their native language, and des-
ignate an English-speaking representative as a voting member of an
ASME codes and standards committee. These groups could be
trade organizations such as manufacturers’ associations or user
groups, national standards committees, or organizations responsible
for oversight of a particular industry. Delegates may be appointed
to any committee, group, or project team needed to support the
development, update and maintenance of ASME codes and stan-
dards. The IIRG consists of appointed representatives from any
national agency that accepts one or more Sections of the ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code as a means of meeting regulatory
requirements for which they have responsibility. Not only does par-
ticipation give national jurisdictional authorities knowledge of pro-
posed changes to the ASME Code, it also gives them an opportunity
to contribute to the process based on the needs of their industry and
their organization’s responsibility to protect the safety of the public.
The balloting and advisory privileges of a Delegate and the
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lxxviii • Organization and Operation of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Committee
members of the IIRG are essentially identical to the members of the
Conference Committee and the Marine Conference Group.
Many members of ASME and Code Users may not have a clear
picture of its overall organizational structure and just how and
where the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Committee fit in. In this
regard, the top ASME level of authority is the Board of Governors
(BOG). The ASME Codes and Standards Board of Directors
reports directly to the BOG. The ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code reports to the Codes and Standards BOD via the
Board on Pressure Technology Codes and Standards. Major poli-
cy and organizational decisions and directions are developed at
the Board level and they also serve as the highest levels for
appeals. However the majority of the technical development and
balloting occurs at the subcommittee and Standards committee
levels.
The personnel of the Boiler and Pressure Committees,
Subcommittees, Subgroups, and Working Groups are listed in the
front of all book sections. The majority of the subgroup members
are also members of their parent subcommittees. The Standards
Committee is made up of a few members from each of the sub-
committees, usually the chairman, and some subgroup chairmen
or other senior members of the subcommittee. This arrangement
of overlapping membership facilitates the work of the Standards
Committee since certain members of the Standards Committee
are quite familiar with items originating in their respective sub-
committees, and can thus explain and answer questions about the
items when the Standards Committee considers them.
A BALANCE OF INTERESTS
Since its inception in 1911 when the Committee was established,
it has been ASME policy that the members should represent a bal-
ance of interests, to avoid domination by any one interest group.
This is one of the ways by which the ASME tries to ensure that
actions of the Committee represent a valid Technical consensus, fair
to all and free of any commercial bias. Above all, the goal of the
Committee is to promote the welfare and safety of the public. In fur-
therance of this goal, each committee member must sign an agree-
ment to adhere to the ASME policy on avoidance of conflict of
interest and to conform to the ASME Canon of Ethics. The ASME
has also established procedures to provide for due process in
Committee operation (e.g. hearings and appeals), thus safeguarding
the members and the ASME against any charges of unfairness.
Members of the Committee are categorized according to the
interests they represent. ASME has designated 14 categories of
interest involved in codes and standards activities. Eight of these
categories are represented on the Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Committee:
1 Designer/Constructor
2 General Interest, such as consulting engineers and educators.
3 Insurance/Inspection
4 Manufacturer
5 Material Manufacturer
6 Regulatory, e.g., representatives of local, state, or federal
jurisdictions
7 User, i.e., a user/owner of the products to which the Code
applies
8 Utility, e.g., power plant user/operator
Individuals typically become members of the Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Committee by attending committee meetings as guests
(meetings are open to the public), by indicating their desire to join,
by participating in discussions, and assisting in the technical activi-
ties of the committee. There is a practical limit to the size of these
various active committees, and as openings arise, the chairman
chooses members to maintain a balance of interests on the commit-
tees and, also, seeks out individuals with particular expertise. New
members usually start by joining a subgroup or working group, and
as they gain experience in committee operations and demonstrate
their abili-ty by contributing their own expertise, they eventually
move up within the committee organization. Prospective members
should be aware that they need employer or personal support for
committee participation, to cover the travel and time expenses
required to participate and attend meetings.
In addition to the many volunteer members of the committee,
who are supported in these activities by their companies, the ASME
maintains a staff of directors and secretaries who facilitate the work
of the committees by managing meeting arrangements, preparation
of meeting agenda and minutes, arrangements for publication of the
Code, scheduling, record keeping, correspondence, and telephone
inquires from the public. Staff secretaries prepare the agenda and
take minutes at the Standards Committee and subcommittee level.
At the subgroup and working group level, one of the volunteer
members of the committee usually serves as secretary.
THE CODE SECTIONS AND THEIR
RELATED SUBCOMMITTEES
The formulation of “standard rules for the construction of
steam boilers and other pressure vessels” on which the commit-
tee started in 1911 eventually became the first edition of Section I
of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, in 1915. That first
edition actually dealt only with boilers. Section VIII, covering
pressure vessels for other than steam, was added later, in 1925, as
part of the expanding coverage of the Code. (Section VIII now
covers all kinds of vessels, including those containing steam.)
There are now twelve sections of the Code, designated by Roman
Numerals I through XII. Section XII is the most recent with the
initial publication issue in 2004 and it covers the design, construc-
tion, and continued operation of tanks used to carry dangerous
materials by all means of transport. The twelve Sections of the
Code can be divided into two basic categories which are “product
Sections” (i.e., components are constructed to the rules), and “ref-
erence Sections” (i.e., the rules are used via reference by the
product Sections) as shown in Table 1. The various sections of the
ASME Code (sometimes called the book sections) and the com-
mittees directly responsible for each are shown in Table 1.
THE SERVICE COMMITTEES
In addition to the ten subcommittees governing the various
book sections, there are two subcommittees under the Standards
Committee, called the service committees because they serve the
book sections.
The Subcommittee on Safety Valve Requirements (SC-SVR)
deals with the design, construction, testing, and certification of the
pressure relief devices. There is no separate book section on safety
valves; each of the product Sections provide appropriate rules for
these devices. Inquiries that pertain to safety valves are usually
referred by these book committees to the Subcommittee on Safety
Valve Requirements. Actions approved by that committee are
returned to the book committees for further approval and action.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • lxxix
TABLE 1 THE BOOK SECTIONS OF THE ASME B&PV CODE
Code Section*
Section I (1915), P
Rules for the Construction of Power Boilers
Section II (1924), R
Materials
Section III (1963), p
Nuclear Power Plant Components
Section IV (1923), p
Heating Boilers
Section V (1971), R
Nondestructive Examination
Section VI (1971), R
Recommended Rules for Care and Operation of
Heating Boilers
Section VII (1926), R
Recommended Guidelines for the Care of Power Boilers
Section VIII (1925), p
Rules for the Construction of Pressure Vessels
Section IX (1941), R
Welding and Brazing Qualifications
Section X (1961), P
Fiberglass-Reinforced Plastic Pressure Vessels
Section XI (1970), R
Rules for Inservice Inspection of Nuclear Power
Plant Components
Section XII, Transport Tanks (2004), P
*
Year shown is first publication as a separate Code Section
*
P denotes a product Code
*
R denotes a reference Code
Until 1989, a service committee known as the Subcommittee
on Properties of Metals (SC-P) established the allowable stress
for all the materials used throughout the Code. In 1989, this com-
mittee was merged with Subcommittee on Material specifications
(SC II) into a new committee called the Subcommittee on
Materials (SC II), which carries out all the duties formerly han-
dled by the two separate committees.
The Subcommittee on Design (SC-D) deals with special design
problems and advises the other subcommittees in formulating design
rules. Among the many subjects covered by this subcommittee are
the design of openings, design for external pressure, elevated-
temperature design, creep, fatigue, and the interaction of creep and
fatigue. The reference Sections are also used by other pressure
equipment Codes and Standards such as the B31 Piping Code, B16
Components Standards and Bioprocessing Equipment Code.
THE ACCREDITATION COMMITTEES
As explained in the discussion of the various Code symbol
stamps in section 1.7.8.3, no organization may do Code work
without first receiving from the ASME a Certificate of authoriza-
tion to use one of the Code symbol stamps. The accreditation com-
Governing Committee
Subcommittee on Power Boilers
(Subcommittee I)
Subcommittee on Materials
(Subcommittee II)
Subcommittee on Nuclear Power
(Subcommittee III)
Subcommittee on Heating Boilers
(Subcommittee IV)
Subcommittee on Nondestructive Examination
(Subcommittee V)
Subgroup on Care and Operation of Heating Boilers (A
subgroup of Subcommittee IV)
Subgroup on General Requirements
(A subgroup of Subcommittee I)
Subcommittee on Pressure Vessels
(Subcommittee VIII)
Subcommittee on Welding
(Subcommittee IX)
Subcommittee on Reinforced Plastic Pressure Vessels
(Subcommittee X)
Subcommittee on Nuclear Inservice Inspection
(Subcommittee XI)
Subcommittee on Transport Tanks
(Subcommittee XII)
mittees issue these certificates to applicants found to be qualified by
ASME review teams. The Subcommittee on Boiler & Pressure
Vessel Accreditation (SC-BPVA) handles this work for boiler and
pressure vessel activities. The Subcommittee on Nuclear
Accreditation (SC-NA) does the same for nuclear activities. Any
disagreements as to the qualifications of applicants and any allega-
tions of Code violations are dealt with by one or the other of these
two accreditation committees, in deliberations that are not open to
the general public. An ASME Certificate of Authorization can be
revoked by cause, following hearing and appeal procedures.
COMMITTEE OPERATIONS
Since 1986, the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Committee has had
four major meetings a year, during four weeks known as Code-
weeks. The Committee used to meet six times a year, but decided to
reduce the number of meetings as an economy measure. The four
meetings are scheduled to result in approximately equal time inter-
vals between meetings (i.e., February, May, August and November).
The May meeting (sometimes called the out-of-town meeting) is
held jointly with the annual meeting of the National Board of Boiler
and Pressure Vessel Inspectors. The chief inspectors of the various
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lxxx • Organization and Operation of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Committee
states and provinces of Canada who comprise the membership
of the National Board are the top officials who enforce those
sections of the Code that are adopted into the laws of their jurisdic-
tions. This meeting also provides an opportunity for them to observe
and participate as guests or conference committee members at the
various Code committee meetings. The Standards Committee
always meets on Friday; the subcommittees meet earlier in the
week. Section II, IX, XII and the Accreditation Subcommittees meet
on Tuesday, Section IV on Wednesday, and Sections I, III, VIII,
and XI meet on Thursdays of a Code week. Subgroups and working
groups usually meet earlier in the week than their parent subcom-
mittees. This arrangement facilitates an orderly and timely flow of
information from the sub-tier commit-tees upward to the Standards
Committee.
HOW THE COMMITTEE DOES ITS WORK
The Boiler and Pressure Vessel Committee administers the
Code. The major technical work of the Committee falls into four
categories; providing interpretations of the Code in response to
inquiries, developing Code Cases, revising the Code, and adding
new provisions to it. This work usually starts at the sub-tier levels
of the committee structure (i.e., the subgroups and working
groups). Proposals developed there are then considered at the sub-
committee level. Many items (Code changes for instance) require
consideration by the Standards Committee. Actions of the
Standards Committee are subject to approval by one or the other
of the two Boards above the Standards Committee (one for
nuclear and the other for non-nuclear items). All proposed,
revised or withdrawn standards shall be announced on the ASME
Web site for public review. A notification shall also be included in
Mechanical Engineering that, at a minimum, directs interested
parties to the ASME Web site for public review announcements,
and provides instructions on obtaining hard copies of the public
review proposals. Since all proposed Code revisions also require
ANSI approval, they are also announced in ANSI Standards
Action.
Following the spirit of redesign summarized below, these
approval actions are conducted concurrently with the Standards
Committee voting following the respective Standards Committee
meetings. Thus these items have received very careful technical
consideration within the Committee and are also open to review
by the public to avoid any inequity, hardship, or other problem
that might result from a Committee action. Any comments
received during public review delay an item until the originating
subcommittee considers those comments. The several categories
of the committee work are now described.
CODE INQUIRES AND INTERPRETATIONS
Anyone who has used the Code knows the aptness of the sec-
ond paragraph of the preamble to Section I and similar statements
in Sections IV and VIII, Div. 1 & Div. 2: “The Code does not con-
tain rules to cover all details of design and construction.” What it
contains rather are many rules for what might be called standard
construction covering most typical and common construction
details. This has evolved over the past 90 plus years as modern
boiler and pressure vessel construction have evolved, presenting
new situations, new arrangements, and new equipment. It is thus
not surprising that so many inquiries are received by the
Committee, asking for guidance in the application of specific pro-
visions of the Code.
The ASME has established procedures and controls on
responding to inquiries and publishes the questions and replies for
the guidance of all users of the Code. These procedures are
intended to protect the committee members and the ASME from
any inference that a specific industry or company has an undue
influence in the formulation of the questions or replies, or may
benefit to the detriment of others. Sometimes inquirers ask ques-
tions that the Committee can’t answer, for various reasons. The
Committee is not in the business of consulting engineering. It
does not have the resources to study plans and details sent in by
inquirers and pass judgment on those designs. It also is in no posi-
tion to undertake the potential liability for making such judg-
ments. Accordingly, the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Committee
Operating and Administrative Procedures provide four form let-
ters for responding to the most common types of questions con-
sidered inappropriate: Indefinite questions that don’t address
some particular Code requirement; semi-commercial questions;
questions that would involve review or approval of a specific
design; and questions that ask for the basis or rationale of Code
rules. These form letters explain that the Committee cannot or
does not answer such questions and advises the inquirer to pose
only general questions that pertain to existing wording and
addressing particular Code requirements, or to make specific rec-
ommendations for any proposed Code changes with supporting
technical reasons or data. The committee also issues “intent inter-
pretations” as described below.
In 1983, to reduce the work involved in replying to inquiries,
mandatory appendices that give instructions on how to prepare
technical inquiries were added to the various book sections. (See,
for example, Appendix I of Section I). Inquiries are supposed to
be sent to the Secretary of the Standards Committee, but in actual
practice they are often sent to an Assistant Secretary, who is the
secretary of the subcommittee involved. That secretary gives the
inquiry an item number and usually reviews the files of previous
inquiries to see if the same question or a similar one has previous-
ly been answered. If such a reply is found, it is sent to the new
inquirer. If not, there are three ways to handle an interpretation of
a inquiry as follows:
• Standards Committee or Cognizant Subcommittee:
Interpretations are approved by a vote of the Standards
Committee or cognizant subcommittee. No member interest
category shall have a majority on the cognizant subcommittee.
• Special Committee: Interpretations may be approved by the
unanimous vote of a special committee. Members of the spe-
cial committee shall be members of the Standards committee
or a sub-tier group responsible for the standard. No member
interest category shall have a majority on the special commit-
tee. The special committee shall have at least five members,
one of which shall be the ASME staff secretary responsible
for the subject standard. Special committee members shall be
appointed by the Chair of the Standards Committee or cog-
nizant subcommittee.
• Intent Interpretations: The basic objective of an interpretation
is to clarify words or requirements that exist in the Code.
However in some cases technical inquiries that cannot be
answered on the basis of existing wording of the pertinent
standard and these may be answerable by an “intent” inter-
pretation. Intent interpretations can answer questions about
subjects that address industry construction practices not
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • lxxxi
specifically covered in the Code or clarify conflicting or
incorrect wording. An intent interpretation shall be submitted
to the consensus committee for approval along with a pro-
posed revision(s) to the standard that support the intent inter-
pretation. Both the intent interpretation and the revision(s) to
the standard must be approved for the interpretation to be
issued.
ASME staff and/or volunteers may also offer informal responses
to inquiries, as a means of providing guidance. Such individual
responses are not published and are accompanied by a statement
making it clear that they are the opinion of the individual, and not
an official interpretation. These responses may be either verbal or
written. If written, the response shall not be on ASME interpreta-
tion letterhead. After approval, all inquiries and replies are pub-
lished, twice a year, as further explained in section 1.3.2 in
Chapter 1 of this volume.
ADDITIONS AND REVISIONS OF THE CODE
The code is subject to continuous change-some provisions are
revised, others deleted, still others added. Although some changes
originate high in the committee structure (e.g., the mandatory
appendices in each book section on preparation of technical
inquiries), most start at the subgroup level, in response to an
inquirer’s request for a change or a request by members of the sub-
committee to clarify, update, or expand existing Code provisions.
The development of a Code change follows a path similar to
that of a technical inquiry. The cognizant subgroup chairman
assigns a task group to do the work. Often, more than one sub-
group may be involved, and the task group may include members
from more than one subgroup. In appointing the task group, the
chairman tries to maintain a balance of interests while making
sure to include members with the specific expertise appropriate
for the task. If and when the subgroup approves the change pro-
posed by the task group, the proposal is forwarded to the sub-
committee for consideration, with documentation giving the
background of the proposed change.
During deliberation on the item at subcommittee level, the item
may be approved, or further changes may be suggested, or strenu-
ous objections may be raised, in which case the chairman may
accept the presentation as a so-called “progress report” and return
the item to the subgroup for further work. The subgroup then
attempts to modify the proposal to overcome objections raised at
the subcommittee level. Usually, this process of refinement leads
to a proposal that is eventually approved by the subcommittee and
the secretary forwards the item for inclusion in the next Standards
Committee letter ballot. That ballot contains all items approved by
the subcommittees that require further approval by the Standards
Committee, and is placed on the ASME Website and mailed to the
members about a month after Codeweek. The ballots must be
returned either by mail or electronically within a few weeks so that
the results are available to all committees before the next
Codeweek. The letter ballot is also sent to the Board on Pressure
Technology Codes and Standards, for technical consideration. A
member of the Board can offer a comment or cast a negative ballot
on any agenda item, and that comment or negative would delay the
item until the originating subcommittee responds to it.
The secretary or one of the Subcommittee members also writes
a paragraph of background explanation that accompanies each
item on the Standards Committee letter ballot, in what is called
“an action box” for the item. This explanation may include other
technical information supporting the proposed action, such as a
paper from an ASME conference describing a new or improved
design method. If there were negative notes on the item at the sub-
committee, those voters have to provide their objections in writing,
and the secretary summarizes these objections as part of the expla-
nation sent to the Standards Committee. This explanation is very
helpful since the first time a Standards Committee member sees an
item that hasn’t come from his own subcommittee is when it
appears on the Standards Committee letter ballot. Voting on
Standards Committee items is explained below. Code Cases are
issued to clarify the intent of existing requirements or provide,
when the need is urgent, rules for materials or constructions not
covered by existing Code rules. It is a common practice to issue a
Code Case for new or enhanced materials, testing practices, or
design methods and then after a trial period the Code Case require-
ments are incorporated into the Code book requirements and the
Code Case annulled. Code Cases and their use are explained in
more detail in section 1.3.3 of Chapter 1 of this volume.
REDESIGNING THE ASME BOILER AND
PRESSURE VESSEL COMMITTEE PROCESS
It should be evident that the committee work required to
answer inquiries, to approve Code Cases, and to make revisions to
the Code can sometimes by a very complex and time-consuming
process, especially when, as is often the case, many different
committees are involved. In 1996, the ASME established a task
force to study the process by which codes and standards are
approved with a view to redesigning and streamlining it. The task
force identified over 85 aspects of the system where improvement
might be achieved. Among the task force proposals was one to
maximize the simultaneous consideration of items when several
committees are involved. Another was to appoint a project man-
ager who would be responsible for facilitating the efficient flow of
individual work items, so that the information necessary for their
consideration by the various committees could be available in a
timely fashion. In 1998 the task force started pilot improvement
programs involving several committees, to test its recommenda-
tions. The pilot program was then extended to the operation of the
Standards Committee and the Board of Pressure Technology
Codes and Standards, by changing the way they vote. Until that
time items approved by subcommittees during one Code week
were put on the Standards Committee agenda for consideration
during the next Code week. A voice vote was taken at the
Standards Committee meeting on every agenda item. A member
who cast a negative ballot in the voice vote was required to write
a letter to the secretary explaining the reason for his negative vote
within a short time after the meeting; otherwise the negative bal-
lot was considered void. This permitted the ASME staff secretary
to include those negative written ballots within the minutes of the
meeting, and to forward them to the next higher committees, the
BPTCS and the BNCS. Those committees were given several
weeks to review the minutes before they met to conduct a further
vote. Under the new redesigned procedures the cycle of approval
has been shortened considerably, by providing simultaneous con-
sideration of Standards Committee items by the Standards
Committee, the Conference Committee, the BPTCS, and the
BNCS, by letter ballot shortly after each Code week, as described
under Voting by the Standards Committee. This has reduced the
time to approve Code revisions by one or two meeting cycles.
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lxxxii • Organization and Operation of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Committee
It was also recommended that more extensive use of the Internet
be considered to improve the efficiency of Code activities to take
advantage of electronic voting procedures and the data base man-
agement systems.
ASME WEB SITE TOOLS AND “CODES &
STANDARDS CONNECT”
About eight years ago and following the spirit of redesign ASME
started an intensive program to use the Internet for managing and
coordination C&S activities and balloting. This started very basi-
cally with what was called the WBPMS (Web-Based project
Management System. The WBPMS began by supporting Standards
Committee balloting and has since grown into a major tool in the
development, coordination and balloting of C&S actions. In
September 2004 the WBPMS was changed to “Codes & Standards
Connect” (formerly the Web-based Process Management System)
and is an electronic tool used by both Staff and Volunteers to process
many committee functions. C&S Connect is a subset of the Codes &
Standards Electronic Tools Website that provides access to:
• Committee Pages
• Leadership and Training Modules
• C&S Connect
• The AS-11 Electronic Personnel Directory
• Public Review Drafts
• Public Review of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Proposed
Revisions
• Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Case Review
• Code Case Database download of approved “to be published”
code cases
• Boiler and Nuclear Pressure Vessel Certificate Holder Search
C&S Connect is currently composed of five main pieces:
Record Storage, Ballot Processing, Email Communication, ANSI
Form Processing and Data Reporting. Together with the Codes &
Standards Committee Web Pages (which constitute the public side
of C&S work) they form a dynamic web-enabled tool that can be
accessed by Staff, Committee Volunteers and Interested Public
Viewers.
Record Storage forms the backbone of C&S Connect. Records
found on C&S Connect are proposals (approved, pending or dis-
approved) and are classified as Revisions, Code Cases,
Interpretations, Entire Codes or Standards, Addenda, White
Papers, Scopes, Membership, Charters or Errata. The entire histo-
ry of the proposal and its details can be found on each record in
C&S Connect.
The Ballot Processing piece uses a connection to both the
Record Storage piece and the ASME Membership Database to
process all committee-related ballots. Over fifteen different ballot
types with a combination of ten different voting options are avail-
able to staff when creating a ballot. Once created, balloted com-
mittee members are notified via email of a ballots creation,
reminded of a vote not posted and notified of a ballots closure.
Voters are provided with electronic access to a listing of ballots
they are eligible to vote on. Project managers and staff are provided
with the ability to respond to comments and negatives posted by
voters.
The email communication piece provides both staff and volun-
teers with the opportunity to communicate with other C&S mem-
bers through a section known as the Volunteer Contact Center. In
this center, members can send emails to specific members or
entire committees. Because this center is connected to the ASME
Membership Database, email addresses are always updated; elim-
inating the need to keep personal address books for committee
use. Within the email communication piece are a series of trig-
gered automatic email notifications alerting members of numer-
ous committee actions.
The ANSI Form Processing piece’s main role is the manage-
ment of all forms submitted to the American National Standards
Institute. Its secondary role is to work with the C&S Committee
web pages to publicly notify and list records available for review
or public review.
Finally, the data reporting piece slices and dices all of the data
found in C&S Connect to create hundreds of reports and tracking
lists. Reports produced by this piece are often used to generate
Minutes, Agendas, Tracking Lists, Publication Checklists, Mem-
bership reports, Committee Rosters and Balance of Interest
Reports. There are currently 750 reports used by 700⫹ commit-
tees in the Data Reporting piece. The C&S Connect site can be
reached at www.asme.org/codes/ for tracking of Standards
Committee actions and ANSI public review items.
VOTING BY THE STANDARDS COMMITTEE
The Standards Committee letter ballot contains all items
approved by the subcommittees that require further approval by
the Standards Committee, and is placed on the ASME Web-site
and mailed to the members about a month after each Codeweek.
This letter ballot is also distributed to the Conference Committee
for technical comment. The boiler and pressure vessel items are
sent to the Board on Pressure Technology Codes and Standards
(BPTCS)and the nuclear items are sent to the Board on Nuclear
Codes and Standards (BNCS) for technical comment. The ballots
must be returned either by mail or electronically within a few
weeks so that the results are available to all committees before the
next Codeweek. After the letter ballot closes the Secretary col-
lects and mails (by e-mail and regular mail) copies of all com-
ments and negative ballots to the Standards Committee members
and to the subcommittees from which the items came, where any
comments and negative ballots can be considered. This informa-
tion is also posted on the ASME Web-site. Negative voters are
required to explain their objections so that the originating sub-
committee has something to work on as it reconsiders the item.
Items coming before the Standards Committee are considered
within two categories: first consideration and reconsideration,
usually called second consideration. A new item appearing for the
first time on a letter ballot is given “first consideration” by the
Committee. Items that did not receive negatives from members of
the Standards Committee or objections from the Conference
Committee, BPTCS and BNCS are reported as “approved” at the
Standards Committee meeting and require no further action. A
single negative vote cast by e-mail or on the ASME Web-site
within a specified time is sufficient to stop a first consideration
item and return it to the originating subcommittee for reconsidera-
tion. Technical objections from the Conference Committee,
BPTCS, and BNCS are treated like negative votes received from
members of the Standards Committee and responses must be pro-
vided to those objections. When a negatively voted item is
returned to a subcommittee, several different actions may be
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • lxxxiii
taken. The item may be held in abeyance for the time being, with
no action taken at the subcommittee level, pending further work.
Another possibility is that the subcommittee is not persuaded
by the reasons given by the negative voter, and at its meeting dur-
ing the Codeweek following the letter ballot the subcommittee
responds to that effect, perhaps with rebuttal arguments, and reaf-
firms its earlier action. In that case the item proceeds to the
Standards Committee meeting on Friday of that same Codeweek,
where it is then given what is considered “second consideration”
(since this is the second time the Standards Committee has seen
the item). The subcommittee also has the option of delaying
action for one meeting and reaffirming at the next meeting. (If the
item is delayed longer than one meeting it reverts to first consid-
eration status). During second consideration, four negative ballots
are required to stop and, in effect, kill the item. If the originating
subcommittee wants to pursue the matter further, it must start all
over, usually by making sufficient revision to satisfy the objec-
tions raised. A subsequent appearance of the item would be a new
first consideration. On the other hand, if on second consideration
an item receives less than four negative votes, it is considered
approved by the Standards Committee, and it proceeds to the next
two approval levels, the BPTCS for boiler and pressure vessel
items and the BNCS for nuclear items, and public review. At this
stage, the only basis for a negative vote at the Board is an asser-
tion that proper procedures had not been followed by the lower
committees.
Yet another way that an item receiving a negative vote at the
Standards Committee may be handled at subcommittee level is
that the subcommittee may make a technical change to the item to
satisfy the negative voter. In that case the item would revert to
first consideration status and proceed once again to the Standards
Committee on the next letter ballot. However, if the change were
considered merely editorial, the item would also proceed to the
Standards Committee on the next letter ballot, but this time with
second consideration status.
Most of the items considered by the Standards Committee are
proposed changes in the various book sections of the Code. Fairly
regularly, some items fail to pass because of strong objections by
other Standards Committee members who perceive the change as
having negative consequences to safety or representing an
unworkable situation when applied to other comparable circum-
stances. This is part of the give-and-take of committee actions,
which are intended to achieve a technical consensus of the mem-
bership, but with concern for safety always being paramount.
DUE PROCESS
Persons who consider themselves injured by an action of the
Committee regarding a technical revision, response to an inquiry,
or the refusal to issue a certificate of authorization, can request a
hearing to present their side of the story. Such hearings start at the
subcommittee that originated the item. Appeals that can’t be
resolved at the subcommittee level may be referred to the
Standards Committee. If the Standards Committee can’t reach a
mutually acceptable solution, the appeal may be submitted to the
appropriate supervisory board and, if necessary, to the Board on
Hearings and Appeals of the Codes and Standards Board of
Directors. This careful attention to due process is the result of an
unfortunate event that happened in 1971, the infamous Hydrolevel
Corporation case. Here is the essence of that case.
Section IV stipulates that boilers must have an automatic low-
water fuel cutoff that stops the fuel supply when the surface of the
water falls to the lowest visible part of the water gage glass.
Hydrolevel had developed a new probe-type low-water fuel cutoff
that relied on an electrode on the probe. Water covering the elec-
trode completed a circuit that maintained fuel flow. When the
water level fell below the electrode and uncovered it, the circuit
was broken and the fuel was stopped.
At that time, another manufacturer dominated the low-water
fuel cutoff market with a float-operated device. That rival manu-
facturer happened to have a representative serving as vice-chair-
man of the Section IV committee. Court records subsequently
showed that three officers of the rival manufacturer, including that
vice-chairman, met with the chairman of the committee to draft
an inquiry to the committee. The inquiry asked whether a low-
water cutoff with a time-delay feature met the Code. The
Subcommittee chairman at that time had the authority to respond
to the inquiry on the ASME’s behalf without the endorsement of
the full committee. His letter of response implied that the device
did not meet Section IV requirements and would not provide ade-
quate safety. Hydolevel subsequently alleged that the inquiry was
deliberately intended to put the probe-type of device in a bad light
and that copies of the ASME response were used by the rival
manufacturer’s sales force to discredit Hydrolevel’s device. When
a former Hydolevel customer reported this to Hydrolevel in 1972,
Hydrolevel complained to the ASME and asked for a clarification
of the ruling. This time the ruling was put before the entire
Section IV subcommittee (the vice president of the rival manufac-
turer had by this time become chairman of the committee), where
it was reconfirmed, perhaps because of the subcommittee’s belief
that the Code required the fuel to be cut off as soon as the water
level was no longer visible in the water gage glass (and not after a
time delay). However, the Standards Committee reversed the rul-
ing and issued an official communication to Hydrolevel saying
that the Section IV paragraph in question did not prohibit the use
of low-water cutoff with a time delay.
In 1975 Hydrolevel sued the parties, including the ASME,
alleging conspiracy in restraint of trade. The other parties settled,
but the ASME contested the charge, in the understandable belief
that it had done no wrong. A district court judge awarded
Hydrolevel 47.5 million in damages. The ASME appealed, lost
that appeal, and then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which
affirmed the appellate court’s decision. The essence of the court’s
finding was that the ASME had put certain committee members in
positions where they appeared to represent the ASME and had
thereby conferred on those agents the ASME’s so-called apparent
authority. Even thought the ASME is a nonprofit professional
organization, it was found liable for the willful, anticompetitive,
wrongful conduct of its agents. With interest on the triple dam-
ages called for by the antitrust act, ASME had to pay almost 10
million dollars (in addition, of course, to legal fees). This was a
heavy price for an educational nonprofit organization that gets
much of its financial support from the dues of its members. In an
ironic twist of fate, the principal owner of Hydrolevel died of a
heart attack shortly after hearing the news of the Supreme Court
decision. Following that decision, the ASME developed improved
procedures in an attempt to ensure the fairness of interpretations
and to provide for hearings and appeals for anyone who considers
himself injured by an action of the Code committee, such as an
Interpretation or a proposed Code change. These procedures
should prevent any further cases like the Hydrolevel case.
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lxxxiv • Organization and Operation of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Committee
RESEARCH PROJECTS FOR THE
MAINTENANCE AND DEVELOPMENT
OF CODES AND STANDARDS
ASME formed the Codes and Standards Technology Institute
(CSTI) in November 2001 to ensure that ASME codes and stan-
dards committees are provided with a continuing source of
research in the technologies that they cover. In August 2004 the
ASME Standards Technology, LLC (ASME ST-LLC) was
formed, replacing CSTI. ASME ST-LLC is a not-for-profit
Limited Liability Company with ASME as the sole member,
formed to carry out work related to newly commercialized tech-
nology. The ASME ST-LLC mission includes meeting the needs
of industry and government by providing new standards-related
products and services, which advance the application of emerging
and newly commercialized science and technology and providing
the research and technology development needed to establish and
maintain the technical relevance of codes and standards. Visit
www.stllc.asme.org for more information.
Historically, ASME has periodically identified needs for specific
research projects to support the codes and standards development
process. This research was previously performed by outside
organizations with ASME support. ASME ST-LLC has helped
enhanced the coordination and long range planning and manage-
ment of codes and standards development activities while strength-
ening volunteer participation in developing the technology for
codes and standards.
ASME’s approach to standards development for emerging tech-
nologies recognizes the important role of technically relevant stan-
dards in advancing the commercialization, enhancing consumer con-
fidence, and protecting public health and safety. ASME ST-LLC
research and development (R&D) projects strive to bridge the gaps
between technology advancement and standards development.
ASME’s involvement in R&D projects helps produce results that
respond to the needs of voluntary consensus committees in develop-
ing technically relevant codes and standards. ASME identifies and
prioritizes R&D needs to help focus the use of limited resources in
these priority areas. Collaboration in R&D projects helps to mini-
mize individual investment while maximizing benefits.
As of early 2008, ASME ST-LLC was managing over 40 sepa-
rate development projects. Some examples of ASME ST-LLC pro-
jects include the rewrite of ASME Pressure Vessel Code, Section
VIII, Division 2, hydrogen infrastructure standards development,
high temperature materials for Generation IV reactors, probabilistic
risk assessment (PRA) training development, and fusion magnet
code development. Projects can be initiated by anyone, but require
a clear scope definition, a legitimate business need, establishment
of any funding requirements, and identification of applicable code,
standard or committee. Project Initiation Requests can be submitted
online at http://stllc.asme.org/Initiate_Project.cfm.
ASME ST-LLC publishes project deliverables as Standards
Technology Publications (STPs), which are available through the
ASME Catalog and Digital Store. (http://catalog.asme.org/).
REALIGNMENT ACTIVITIES OF THE
ASME BOILER AND PRESSURE VESSEL
CODE COMMITTEE STRUCTURES
In February 2007 the BNCS and BPTCS approved motions to
move forward with the concept of realigning the BPV Standards
Committees. The need for such realignment was based on the
observations that the organization is strained considering the cur-
rent climate and projected future work loads in both the nuclear
and non-nuclear areas and the need to prepare for the future.
Considering this the following Code and Standards vision and
mission statements were developed for guidance:
Vision: To be the world leader in mechanical and multidiscipli-
nary engineering codes, standards, conformity assessment pro-
grams, and related products and services.
Mission: Develop the preeminent, universally applicable codes,
standards, conformity assessment programs, and related products
and services for the benefit of humanity. Involve the best and
brightest people from around the world to develop, maintain, pro-
mote, and employ ASME products and services globally.
In addition to these global guidance statements the following
specific categories were also addressed:
• Volunteer work loads
• Responsiveness to Industry-Specific Needs
• Global Acceptance
• Integrity/Credibility of Standards
• Turnaround/Cycle Time
• Volunteer Recruitment and Retention
Using the above as metrics a facilitated workshop meeting was
held in January 2008 with the participation of a broad cross-
section of Volunteer, Regulatory, ASME Staff and International
participation. The outcome of that workshop and subsequent
deliberations by the BPTC&S, BNCS and BOD Codes &
Standards resulted in the formulation of an initial plan that would
essentially transition BPV Subcommittees that currently produce
ASME BPV Code book sections into Standards Committees.
Implementation planning is proceeding. The bottom line objec-
tives of assuring safe pressure containing structures via ASME
C&S and ANSI consensus requirements for the Codes and
Standards will be maintained. In addition, technical interchanges
and liaisons between the nuclear and non-nuclear Codes and regu-
latory organizations (e.g., NRC, National Board, Jurisdictions,
etc.) will also be assured.
ASME_Ch41_p001-028.qxd 6/3/09 9:25 AM Page 1
BWR REACTOR INTERNALS
AND OTHER BWR ISSUES
41.1 INTRODUCTION
The objective of this Chapter is to provide some details of
many and sometimes unique ways in which the provisions of
Section III and Section XI have been used in addressing the
service-induced degradations in the BWR vessels, internals, and
pressure boundary piping. Among the items covered are reactor
internals, weld overlays, and reactor vessel. The most common
form of service-induced cracking in the stainless steel and Ni-Cr-Fe
components in the BWR pressure boundary is typically due to
intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC).
41.2 BWR INTERNALS
The BWR reactor internals fall into two categories. The first
category includes components constituting the core support
structure that are important to safe shutdown of the reactor. The
components in this category include the shroud, shroud support
structure, core plate, jet pumps, and such. Most of the BWR
internals were designed using the guidance of Class 1 component
design by analysis rules of Subsection NB in Section III. Only in
some of the newer BWRs was Subsection NG formally used. The
second category includes internal components (e.g., steam dryer)
that are not safety related (i.e., not important to safe shutdown of
the reactor). Only some recently observed cracking in steam dry-
ers under increased steam flows due to extended power uprate
has drawn some attention to the need for inspection and detailed
stress evaluation of this component to assure its structural
integrity [1]. The discussion in this section is mostly focused on
the first category of components; the steam dryer issues are cov-
ered at the end of this section. Figure 41.1 shows a schematic of
the BWR internal components.
Most of the BWR RPV internals are fabricated from either
stainless steel or Ni-Cr-Fe to avoid the presence of corrosion
products in the reactor water. In view of the earlier IGSCC experi-
ence with Type 304 and 316 stainless steels in external piping, the
material for later-constructed BWR internals was replaced by
lower carbon (L grade, carbon 0.035%) stainless steels [2,3].
For some of the replacement external piping, low carbon stainless
steel with added nitrogen (LN grade) for structural strength (i.e.,
higher Sm value) was used. An additional degradation mechanism
for the reactor internals is the irradiation. The irradiation can
CHAPTER
41
Hardayal S. Mehta
cause the initiation of cracking (irradiation-assisted stress-corrosion
cracking or IASCC), accelerated crack growth rate, and a reduc-
tion in fracture toughness. Typically, the components affected by
irradiation are the shroud and the top guide.
41.2.1 Inspection, Evaluation, and Repair Methods
In the Section XI space, the reactor internals fall under category
B-N-2 core support structures. However, Section XI does not have
evaluation standards or repair/replacement guidelines available for
this category for the following reason [4]: “A Subgroup of SC XI
was established to develop a complete program, including evalua-
tion standards and repair/replacement techniques. After several
years of work to establish generic requirements and, later, to sepa-
rate PWR and BWR requirements, the Subcommittee failed to
reach a consensus on its approach, and because industry interest
and support had diminished, the effort was terminated. The power
plants and the NRC now resolve problems on an individual basis.”
In the wake of the observed cracking in the shroud of an over-
seas reactor followed by several in the United States, an urgent
need was identified to develop inspection, evaluation, and, if nec-
essary, repair techniques. The BWR Vessels and Internals Project
(BWRVIP) was formed in 1994 with the following objectives
[5–7]: to lead the BWR industry towards generic resolution of
reactor pressure vessel and internals materials condition issues; to
identify or develop generic cost-effective material management
strategies from which each operating plant will select the most
appropriate alternative; to serve as the focal point for the regulato-
ry interface with the industry on BWR vessel and internals issues;
and to share information and promote communication and coop-
eration among participating utilities. The first BWR internal com-
ponent addressed was the shroud. Since then, over 100 reports
have been published by the BWRVIP on the various internals and
RPV issues. Key reports have been approved by the NRC for use
by utilities on a generic basis. This obviates the need for an indi-
vidual submittal and its review/approval by the NRC for a specific
technical evaluation. Most of the BWRVIP reports are proprietary.
However, technical details from the published technical papers are
provided in this Section to illustrate the use of flaw evaluation
procedures of IWB-3600 in flaw disposition.
41.2.2 Shroud
One of the first BWR internal components to show cracking was
the shroud, and the observed cracking was in the heat-affected
ASME_Ch41_p001-028.qxd 6/3/09 9:25 AM Page 2
2 • Chapter 41
FIG. 41.1 OVERVIEW OF BWR PRESSURE VESSEL AND INTERNAL COMPONENTS
zones (HAZs) of the circumferential welds. The BWR shroud is a
cylindrical structure surrounding the core. The shroud material is
Type 304 or 304L grade stainless steel. It is typically 200 in. in
diameter and 1.5–2 in. thick. It is constructed by welding together
several cylindrical sections (see Fig. 41.2).
The limit load methodology for cylindrical geometries outlined
in Appendix C of Section XI has been used as a flaw evaluation
guideline for the shroud [8]. However, several additional consid-
erations were required to complete an analytical evaluation of
flaws per IWB-3600. These considerations include crack growth
rate under BWR water environment, inspection uncertainty, and
the fracture toughness considering irradiation effects.
41.2.2.1 SCC Growth Rate Relationships. The crack growth
rate relationship for stainless steels included in the current Section
XI is for fatigue mechanism in air environment only. For a crack
exposed to BWR water environment, the crack growth rate due to
stress corrosion cracking (SCC) essentially overwhelms that due to
fatigue. The Section XI Committee is currently in the process of
developing SCC growth rate relationships for austenitic materials.
ASME_Ch41_p001-028.qxd 6/3/09 9:25 AM Page 3

COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 3

0.472 in. and 0.108 in., respectively, for the purpose of the struc-
tural evaluation.

41.2.2.3 Irradiated Stainless Steel Fracture Toughness. Data

showing trends in yield strength, reduction in area, and uniform
elongation as a function of fluence at irradiation and test tempera-
ture of 550 F have been published previously [16,17]. A review of
this data indicated that the yield strength increases occur at a
significant rate beyond 3  5  1020 n/cm2. Based on this and
other ductility data, the limit load flaw evaluation for the shroud is
also supplemented by a LEFM/EPFM analysis where the fluence
exceeds 3  1020 n/cm2. Based on the irradiated fracture toughness
tests reported [1820], a KIc value of 150 ksi 1in. has been used
in the shroud flaw evaluations [15]. Additional irradiated stainless
steel fracture toughness data in the fluence range of BWR shrouds
have also recently become available [21]. The BWRVIP has devel-
oped fracture toughness relationships for irradiation levels cover-
ing fluences in excess of 1  1021 n/cm2 [22] that have been
reviewed and approved by the NRC.

FIG. 41.2 BWR CORE SHROUD WELD DESIGNATIONS 41.2.2.4 Evaluation With Multiple Indications. When multi-
ple indications are involved, which is generally the case, a conser-
vative approach is to stack all of the indications (after adding crack
In the crack length direction, the evaluations use a bounding crack growth, inspection uncertainty, and the application of proximity
growth rate of 5  105 in./hr approved by the USNRC [9,10]. criteria) into one continuous flaw and compare it with the allow-
The detailed guidance for the crack growth rates (CGRs) used in able flaw length calculated using the limit load equation of
the evaluation of BWR stainless steel internals is provided in Appendix C. However, this approach is too conservative and,
BWRVIP-14 [11], as modified by the stipulations given in the therefore, an alternative approach has generally been followed.
NRC’s final safety evaluation (SE) [12] on this report. The SE stat- Figure 41.3 shows a schematic representative plan view of an
ed, in part, “. . . by using an appropriately reduced value for the asymmetrically distributed uncracked ligament. It is assumed that
CGR from the 5  105 in./hr value found in NUREG-0313, Rev. there are 1, 2,...i,...n ligament lengths and that the i length is of
2, it would be possible for licensees to get credit for improved thickness ti and extends from an azimuth of
i1 to
i2. The liga-
water chemistry and other measures to mitigate cracking, e.g., ment length li of the i ligament is related to azimuth angles
i1 and
hydrogen water chemistries (HWC) and/or noble metal additions.
i2 by the following relationship:
The revised CGR of 2.2  105 in./hr corresponds to water
chemistries with a conductivity of  0.15 S/cm and an electro- li  (D/2)(
i1 
i2) (1)
chemical potential (ECP) of 200 mV. The BWRVIP-14 correla-
tion indicates that this bounding CGR could be reduced for HWC where
with ECP  230 mV. The staff finds acceptable a reduction in the
CGR from 2.2  105 in./hr to 1.1  105 in./hr for plants with D  the diameter of the shroud
HWC. The crack growth rates stated are only applicable to compo-
nents with uences  5  1020 n/cm2 (E  1 MeV), since the CGR
database is presently based only on unirradiated materials.”
In many of the inspected shrouds, the fluence at the midcore
weld such as the H4 weld in Fig. 41.2 is greater than 5  1020
n/cm2. For such cases, the approach used is to take no structural
credit for the material that is expected to exceed the preceding
value during the evaluation period [13]. The BWRVIP proposed
SCC growth rate relationships [14] are currently under review by
the NRC.

41.2.2.2 Inspection Uncertainty. The shroud inspections are

typically conducted by either the visual testing (VT) or ultrasonic
testing (UT) means. Since the VT cannot provide the crack depth,
the VT-detected flaws are assumed as through-wall for the purpos-
es of the shroud structural evaluation. The indication length and/or
depth measurement uncertainties are a function of NDE delivery
system that may vary by the vendor. The BWRVIP conducted an
extensive program to document these uncertainties as a function of
internal component, NDE method, vendor, and other variables
[15]. For example, in one typical case [13], each nominally report-
ed indication length and depth in the shroud was increased by FIG. 41.3 A DISTRIBUTED LIGAMENT LENGTH EXAMPLE
ASME_Ch41_p001-028.qxd 6/3/09 9:25 AM Page 4
4 • Chapter 41
The calculation of moment M that this ligament configuration
can resist is somewhat complicated, because it is not a priori clear
as to which azimuthal orientation of the neutral/central axis would
produce the least value of bending moment, M. Therefore, the value
of M is calculated for various orientations of the central axis from
0 to 360 . This calculation is performed in the following two steps:
41.2.2.5 Repair/Replacement. BWR utilities have taken a vari-
ety of approaches to addressing shroud cracking, ranging from a
proactive implementation of a preemptive repair to an inspection
based approach in which a repair is installed only when warranted
by periodic inspection results. The approach selected by a utility is
based on many factors, including a plant-specific assessment of the
potential for significant cracking. The design, fabrication, and
(a) In this step, a central axis orientation,  is first selected. The installation of a shroud repair implemented at a BWR plant has
location of the neutral axis, which is parallel to the central been described [23]. An example of the shroud replacement (along
axis, at a distance
from the central axis is determined with other internals such as jet pumps) has been given [24]. The
using the following (see Fig. 41.3): replacement shroud material was chosen as Type 316L stainless
steel to ensure higher IGSCC resistance.
a + b - (p - a + b)

Rt(u) du - Rt n du = (sm/sf)(2pRt n) (2) 41.2.3 Jet Pumps

3 3 The jet pump recirculation system provides forced circulation
- (p - a + b) a+b
flow through the BWR core. During the normal operation of the
where plant, the jet pump structure is subjected to flow-induced vibration
(FIV) and exposed to a high-temperature (approximately 530 F)
  assumed azimuth angle of the central axis
reactor water environment. The FIV loading could produce fatigue
  angle of the neutral axis with respect to central axis, or
crack growth in a flaw if the applied stress intensity factor range
sin1( /R)
exceeds the fatigue threshold (cyclic stress intensity factor range,
 distance between the central axis and the neutral axis
Kth) below which cracks do not propagate (i.e., virtually no crack
R  mean radius of the shroud
growth) under cyclic stress. The magnitude of the FIV stresses is
t(
)  ti (thickness of the i ligament), if angle
is such that
proportional to the square of the flow rate in the riser. The power

i1

i2, or 0 otherwise
produced by the reactor is typically proportional to the core flow
tn  nominal thickness of shroud
rate. Thus, the predicted fatigue crack growth at a flaw would
m  membrane stress
depend on the operating scenario (i.e., core flow) assumed.
f  material flow stress  3Sm
An example of the flaw evaluation at one of the locations in a jet
Thus, this step helps define the location of the neutral axis when pump where inservice inspection (ISI) detected an indication has
the central axis is assumed to be at an azimuth angle of . been provided [25]. The flaw was approximately 13 in. long, ori-
ented circumferentially, and located in a 10-in. diameter schedule
(b) Once the location of the neutral axis relative to the central axis 40 section. Figure 41.4 shows the BWR jet pump geometry. For
is determined, the moment M is then obtained by integrating the analysis purposes, the flaw was assumed to be through-wall.
the bending moment contributions from individual ligament Since it is not a pressure boundary, a through-wall flaw in a reactor
lengths. The mathematical expression used is the following: internal is acceptable for continued operation as long as the safety
margins of either the original Code of construction or ASME
a + b
BPVC Section XI are satisfied. Allowable circumferential flaw
Ma = sf R2t(u) sin(a - u) du length was determined as approximately 18 in. using the limit load
3 equations (with a/t assumed to be 1.0) in Appendix C of Section
- (p - a + b)
XI. The SCC growth rate was assumed to be 5  105 in./hr.
- (p - a + b) The flaw length at inspection was such that crack growth due to
- sf R2t n sin(a - u) du (3) fatigue during next cycle of operation could not be ruled out. A
3 key input in the fatigue crack growth evaluation was the relation-
a+b
ship between the applied stress intensity range (K) and the crack
growth rate per cycle (da/dN). The fatigue crack propagation
The orientation  that produces the least value of M is called
behavior above Kth can be represented by the following equation:
 min and defines the axis capable of resisting the limiting
moment. Whether the specified set of uncraked ligament lengths
provides the required structural margin is verified by the following: da/dN  C(K)n (5)

M min/Z  Pm  SF(Pm  Pb) (4) where

where da  increment in crack length, a

N  number of cycles
Z  section modulus of the shroud based on uncracked cross- K  mode I stress intensity factor range(C and n are constants)
section
Pm  applied membrane stress The K is equal to the maximum value of K (Kmax) minus the
Pb  applied bending stress minimum value of K (Kmin). When a mean stress or load is pre-
SF  safety factor sent, the value of Kmin is different from the negative of Kmax. An
indication of the relative magnitudes of the mean and the fluctuat-
The current approach uses a safety factor of 2.78 for normal/ ing stresses is the R ratio or R, defined as Kmin/Kmax. The cyclic fre-
upset (Level A/B) conditions and 1.39 for emergency/faulted (Level quency of the FIV stresses is on the order of 32 Hertz. This cyclic
C/D) conditions. frequency is high enough that the reactor water environmental
ASME_Ch41_p001-028.qxd 6/5/09 11:36 AM Page 5
COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 5
FIG. 41.4 TYPICAL GEOMETRY OF A BWR JET PUMP
effects are expected to be negligible. Therefore, the fatigue crack
growth rate relationship developed in air environment was used in
the evaluation. ASME Section XI, Fig. C-3210-1 of Appendix C
shows air fatigue crack growth rate curves for austenitic stainless
steels. The exponent n of the curve is given as 3.3. The dotted-line
curves in this figure are at 550F. The R ratio for the subject flaw
configurations was determined to be of the order of 0.5.
Interpolation between R values of 0.0 and 0.79 was used to obtain
the curve for R  0.5.
A review of the GE test data [26] and those available in the
open literature indicated that 5 ksi 1in. is a reasonably conserva-
tive value for Kth at R  0.5. Thus, the fatigue crack growth rate
relationship used in this evaluation was mathematically represent-
ed as the following:
da/dN  2.705  1010 (K)3.3 for K  5 ksi 1in. (6)
 0.0 for K  5 ksi 1in.
During startup testing, the riser brace is instrumented with
strain gages and, thus, the strain/stress ranges at that location are
available. The key task is to infer the stress-time history at the
cracked location given the stress-time history at the riser brace.
The steps involved in calculating the vibration stress ranges at the
cracked section from the test data are summarized as follows:
(a) Review the startup vibration data for the applicable lead
plant to determine the primary structural modes of interest
for the jet pump. A 128-sec trace of the startup test data was
available for this purpose.
(b) Using a finite element model of the jet pump, determine the
natural frequencies, mode shapes, and modal stresses of all
structural modes of interest. Compare the results to the startup
test results to ensure applicability of strain measurements.
(c) From the modal stresses, determine the mode shape factor
for each mode of interest to relate the strain at the riser brace
to the stress at the crack location.
(d) Decompose the riser brace strain-time history into individ-
ual modal strain-time histories for each mode of interest.
The jet pump riser brace-time history is from the startup test
data for the lead plant, whose jet pump was identical in
design to that for the plant with cracked thermal sleeve.
(e) Multiply these individual modal strain-time histories by
their corresponding mode shape factors to arrive at the crack
location modal stress–time histories.
(f) Algebraically sum (recombine) the modal stress–time histo-
ries at the crack location to arrive at the resultant stress–time
history. Care was taken in the decomposition (d) and recom-
bination processes to ensure that the phase relationships
among the modal components were maintained. Figure 41.5
shows the plot of a small segment of the stress-time history.
(g) Using the resultant stress-time history at the crack location,
rank the stress amplitudes from maximum to minimum.
(h) Combine the largest positive and negative amplitudes to
determine the maximum stress ranges.
(i) Group the stress ranges in increments of 50 psi and count the
number of cycles in each group. Assign the median stress
value to that group. For example, the cycles grouped in the
700–750 psi range were assigned a stress range of 725 psi.
(j) Scale the cycle numbers from the 128-sec test data sample
to equivalent numbers for 100 hr of operation. The 100-hr
interval was chosen to correspond to the time increment
used in the crack growth calculation to update the crack
length. Table 41.1 shows the resulting cycle numbers for
each stress range determined.
(k) The K values from the FIV stress cycles were determined
using the mathematical expressions provided by Zahoor [27].
When the calculated value of K for an FIV stress cycle
exceeds the assumed threshold value of 5 ksi 1in., crack growth
due to fatigue is predicted. Because the subject crack is also
expected to experience crack growth due to SCC, the crack
growth due to both mechanisms was linearly added. A small time
interval of 100 hr was chosen to calculate the SCC and fatigue
crack growth. The calculated value of crack growth from these
two mechanisms was then added together and the crack length a
at the beginning of the interval was updated to a 2a. The fac-
tor of 2 accounts for crack growth at each end of the postulated
FIG. 41.5 SAMPLE OF STRESS TIME HISTORY AT
CRACKED LOCATION
ASME_Ch41_p001-028.qxd 6/3/09 9:25 AM Page 6
6 • Chapter 41
through-wall indication. This time-integration process was contin-
ued for operation intervals of interest.
Figure 41.6 shows the results of crack growth calculations for
two core flow scenarios. The FIV stresses are proportional to the
square of the core flow and, thus, the fatigue crack growth is sensi-
tive to the assumed core flow. Typically, the power produced by the
plant is directly proportional to core flow. At 80% core flow, the
crack is predicted to grow to allowable crack length in 2,000 hours
(~3 months) of operation. On the other hand, at 80% core flow
level, the crack is predicted to grow to allowable value in excess of
8,000 hours or approximately 1 year of operation. The difference
between the two scenarios is essentially the crack growth rate dif-
ference due to fatigue. Similar curves were generated for other core
flow levels for use by the plant operator; this allowed for flexibility
in operating at different core flow (power) levels while ensuring
that predicted total crack length is less than the allowable value.
Following approximately 4 months of operation at 80% core
flow, the plant was shut down for the installation of repair hard-
ware at the cracked weld. UT ultrasonic examination of the crack
prior to the installation of the repair showed virtually no crack
growth since the last examination. This confirmed the conserva-
tive nature of the fracture mechanics and crack growth evaluations
to justify continued operation in the as-is condition for a limited
period. The repair consisted of installing a tongue-and-groove
type of clamp to replace the cracked weld.
41.2.4 Other BWR Internals and Steam Dryers
Other internal components covered by the BWRVIP reports are
core shroud support, top guide, core plate, core spray
piping/spargers, standby liquid control system, CRD guide/stub
FIG. 41.6 PREDICTED CRACK LENGTHS FOR VARIOUS
CORE FLOW LEVELS
tube/housing instrument penetrations, and vessel ID brackets. The
flaw evaluation guidelines for most of these components are
essentially based on the limit load methods described in Appendix
C of ASME BPVC Section XI.
Recently observed fatigue failure in the steam dryer of a BWR
plant has focused attention on this component [1]. Although per-
forming a nonsafety-related function, the steam dryer in a BWR
plant must maintain its structural integrity to avoid loose dryer
parts from entering the reactor vessel or steam lines and adverse-
ly affecting plant operation. Figure 41.7 shows the details of a
BWR steam flow path and the steam dryer assembly. The steam
dryer assembly is mounted in the reactor vessel above the steam
separator assembly and forms the top and the sides of the wet
steam plenum. Vertical guides on the inside of the vessel provide
alignment for the dryer assembly during installation. The dryer
assembly is supported by pads extending inward from the vessel
wall. Steam from the separators flows upward and outward
through the drying vanes. These vanes are attached to a top and
bottom supporting member forming a rigid, integral unit.
Moisture is removed and carried by a system of troughs and
drains to the pool surrounding the separators and then into the
recirculation down-comer annulus between the core shroud and
RPV wall.
Figure 41.8 shows the failure locations in a steam dryer [28].
Extensive metallurgical and analytical evaluations (e.g., detailed
finite element analyses, flow-induced vibration analyses, compu-
tational fluid dynamics analyses, 1:16 scale model testing, and
acoustic circuit analyses) concluded that the root cause of this
steam dryer failure was high cycle fatigue driven by flow-
induced vibrations associated with the higher steam flows during
extended power uprate (EPU) conditions (~18% above the origi-
nal rated power). It is noted that no significant fatigue failures
were observed in this dryer during the rated thermal power oper-
ation for more than 20 years. Most of the plant start-up FIV data
are at the original rated power level or less, and the sensors, such
as strain gages, on the dryer were not necessarily located where
the fatigue failures were observed during EPU operation. The
repairs at the failure locations were designed to provide a
significant relative improvement (e.g., a factor of improvement in
excess of 3) in the cyclic fatigue stress compared to that in the
previous configuration. This technical approach was necessary in
view of significant uncertainty in the fatigue loading during
uprated condition operation. A recommended action was, among
others, a VT-1 inspection of susceptible locations as determined
by a dryer stress analysis [28]. Subsequently, the BWRVIP has
developed an inspection and evaluation guidelines document [29]
for the BWR steam dryers. The current stress analyses are
conducted using the ASME BPVC Section III, Class 1 rules as
guidance. Some of the activities currently in progress include
extensive subscale model testing and acoustic circuit analysis.
Also, some of the replacement steam dryers are being instru-
mented with strain gages and accelerometers to validate the
analytically calculated vibratory stress magnitudes.
41.3 BWR PRESSURE VESSEL
41.3.1 Application of Probabilistic Fracture
Mechanics for Inspection Exemption
The ISI of pressure-retaining RPV shell welds (Category B-A
welds in Table IWB-2500-1) is an important element of ASME
BPVC Section XI inspection requirements. Examination of the
BWR vessel beltline region in early design BWRs posed problems
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 7

FIG. 41.7 BWR STEAM DRYER ASSEMBLY (WHITE ARROWS INDICATE STEAM FLOW PATH)

because of the limited access on the outside surface between the
vessel and the biological shield. Also, interference from jet pumps
and the complication of inspecting through the clad made inspec-
tion from the inside surface difficult. For the older plants with
access problems, the NRC had granted exemption from the inspec-
tion requirement. In the early 1990s, the NRC changed its position
and required inside diameter (ID) examinations of the older
BWRs. This has led to the development of new inspection systems
to meet the challenge of ID inspections [30]. Over the past several
years, BWRVIP has developed [31] and successfully completed a
program to assess the reliability of BWR vessels, specifically
focusing on the effect of not inspecting the RPV circumferential
welds [32]. The technical approach is based on probabilistic frac-
ture mechanics (PFM) [33].
“In January 1991, the NRC published in the Federal Register a
proposed Rule to amend Section 50.55a to Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations [10 CFR 50.55a], ‘Code and Standards’ [33].
One purpose of this amendment was to incorporate by reference a
later edition and addendum to ASME BPVC Section XI, Division 1,
and Addenda through 1988. Also, the rule proposed to create
Section 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A) to 10 CFR 50.55a, “Augmented
Examination of Reactor Vessel,” which required that all licensees
perform volumetric examinations of “essentially 100%” of the
RPVs pressure-retaining shell welds during all inspection inter-
vals in accordance with ASME BPVC Section XI on an “expedit-
ed” schedule, and revoked all previously granted reliefs for RPV
weld examinations. Expedited in this context effectively meant
during the inspection interval when the rule was approved or the
first period of the next inspection interval. The final rule was pub-
lished in the Federal Register on August 6, 1992.
By letter dated September 28, 1995, as supplemented, the
BWRVIP submitted EPRI proprietary report BWRVIP-05 [31].
ASME_Ch41_p001-028.qxd 6/5/09 11:38 AM Page 8
8 • Chapter 41
FIG. 41.8 STEAM DRYER DAMAGE
The BWRVIP-05 report evaluated the current inspection require-
ments for the RPV shell welds in BWRs, formulated recommen-
dations for alternative inspection requirements, and provided a
technical basis for these recommended requirements. As
modified, it proposed to perform ISI on “essentially 100% of the
RPV axial shell weld, and eliminate the inspection of all but
approximately 2–3% of the circumferential welds at the intersec-
tion of the axial and circumferential welds.”
The NRC’s technical bases for granting this exemption are sum-
marized. “Regulatory Guide 1.174 provides guidelines as to how
defense-in-depth and safety margins are maintained, and states that
a risk assessment should be used to address the principle that pro-
posed increases in risk, and their cumulative effect, are small and
do not cause the NRC Safety Goals to be exceeded. The estimated
failure frequency of the BWR RPV circumferential welds is well
below the acceptable core damage frequency (CDF) and large early
release frequency (LERF) criteria discussed in RG 1.174. Although
the frequency of RPV weld failure cannot be directly compared to
the frequencies of core damage or large early release, the staff
believes the estimated frequency of RPV circumferential weld fail-
ure bounds the corresponding CDF and LERF that may result from
a vessel weld failure. On the above bases, the NRC staff concluded
that the BWRVIP-05 proposal, as modified, to eliminate BWR ves-
sel circumferential weld examinations, was acceptable.”
The alternate PFM analysis of the NRC also considered a low-
temperature overpressure (LTOP) transient at a non-U.S. BWR
[34]. During this transient, the RPV was subjected to high pres-
sure (7.9 MPa or 1,150 psig) at a low temperature (26–31⬚C or
79⬚–88⬚F). An Appendix E–based deterministic fracture mechan-
ics analysis and corrective actions that justified plant startup
following the transient are documented [34].
The PFM analysis can also be used to justify inspecting less
than 100% of the vertical welds due to the local inaccessibility of
the RPV and equipment issues. During a refueling outage, a U.S.
BWR found that only 89.9% of the total length of the beltline ver-
tical welds and 91.8% of the total vessel vertical weld length
could be inspected. In the case of one particular vertical weld, the
entire length was not accessible. Part of this weld was in the belt-
line region. A PFM evaluation [35] concluded that the resultant
increase in the vessel failure probability was very small, even
after factoring in the contribution of a postulated LTOP event.
Thus, a less than 100% inspection of the welds was technically
justified.
41.3.2 Feedwater Nozzle
Cracking was observed in BWR feedwater nozzles and control
rod drive (CRD) return line nozzles during the 1970s. Since then,
the CRD return lines in most BWRs have been rerouted and the
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 9
FIG. 41.9 CROSS-SECTION OF FEEDWATER NOZZLE
WITH CRACKING LOCATION
nozzles capped. In the case of the feedwater nozzle, an extensive
study of the problem attributed the cracking to relatively cooler
feedwater leaking past loosely fitted sparger thermal sleeves
installed inside the nozzle. The bypass leakage from around the
loose thermal sleeves caused fluctuations in nozzle metal temper-
atures, which resulted in metal fatigue and crack initiation (see
Fig. 41.9). These cracks were then driven deeper by the larger
temperature and pressure cycles associated with startups, shut-
downs, and certain operational transients. The NRC issued its
findings and resolutions of the cracking problem in NUREG-0619
[36] in which it recommended that licensees take the following
six actions to reduce the potential for initiating and growing
cracks in the inner nozzle areas:
(a) remove the cladding from the inner radii
(b) replace loose-fitting or interference-fitting sparger thermal
sleeves
(c) evaluate flow controllers for acceptability
(d) modify operating procedures to reduce thermal fluctuations
(e) reroute reactor water clean-up system to both feedwater
loops
(f) conform to the inspection interval specified in Table 41.2 of
NUREG-0619
Most of the BWRs adopted a triple thermal sleeve design as
replacement for the original loose-fitting design. This design was
developed as a part of an extensive experimental and analytical
program [37] conducted to address feedwater nozzle cracking.
Figure 41.5 shows this design and the temperature variations with
and without bypass.
In 1981, the NRC issued Generic Letter 81-11 amending the
recommendations in NUREG-0619. The generic letter allowed
plant-specific fracture mechanics analysis in lieu of hardware
modifications. To be acceptable to the NRC, such analysis had to
analytically demonstrate that stresses from conservative controller
temperature and flow profiles, when added to those resulting from
the other crack growth phenomena such as startup/shutdown
cycles, did not result in the growth of an assumed crack to greater
than the allowable value of 1 in. during the 40-year life of the
plant. The BWR feedwater nozzles have large flaw tolerance. The
leak-before-break analyses concluded that even a through-wall
flaw is structurally acceptable at the cracking location [37]. Thus,
the critical flaw depth at this location is the through-wall dimen-
sion, typically 10 in. in most BWRs. If the approach of ASME
BPVC IWB-3611 (for normal/upset conditions) is taken in setting
the allowable flaw depth to be one-tenth of the critical flaw depth,
one obtains the value of 1 in. as the allowable flaw depth.
The initial flaw depth is assumed to be 0.25 in.; this is consid-
ered to be a reasonable depth detectable with a high degree of
confidence. The fatigue crack growth rate relationship used is that
provided in Appendix A of ASME BPVC Section XI for water
environment. This fracture mechanics analysis is essentially simi-
lar to a flaw tolerance evaluation per Appendix L of ASME
BPVC Section XI. Figure 41.11 shows the results of fracture
mechanics calculations for some of the BWRs. The results show a
fairly large interval (in excess of 25 years) before the projected
crack depth reaches 1 in.
Improvements in UT capability and the acceptable crack
growth results seen in a majority of the fracture mechanics analy-
ses provided justification to revise the inspection frequency and
allow an alternate method. In fact, it was the intent of the NRC to
eliminate penetrant testing (PT) requirements when improved UT
techniques were available. The revised inspection schedules (see
Table 41.2) were developed [38] and were approved by the NRC
[39] for use by the BWR owners. The inspection zones referred to
in Table 41.2 are shown in Fig. 41.12. The inspection intervals
based on Table 41.2 provide considerable relief in inspection
efforts without sacrificing safety.
Several BWR plants have implemented thermal sleeve bypass
leakage detection systems since the time NUREG-0619 was pub-
lished. Such systems were still under development at that time,
but preliminary testing and implementation of the systems sug-
gested them to be feasible and practical. The intent of these sys-
tems was to detect significant leakage through degraded thermal
sleeve seals or cracks in thermal sleeve welds. This detection was
accomplished by relating exterior surface metal temperatures
(from newly installed thermocouples) to leakage flow. Leakage
monitoring was expected to be a beneficial system to employ,
because it might provide the most direct assessment of conditions
known to lead to nozzle fatigue cracking.
Leakage monitoring systems have not been implemented as
consistently as anticipated when NUREG-0619 was published.
This has been primarily due to high installation and maintenance
costs as well as field experience suggesting that the cracking
problem had been eliminated. Also, erroneous leakage readings
can be common with these systems due to sensor movement,
which has led to unnecessary leakage concerns. Systems that have
continued to operate properly have shown leakage to be
insignificant; these results have further verified observations of no
sparger cracking.
Based on these results, leakage monitoring does not possess the
necessity and promise it once had. Nevertheless, for those instal-
lations that continue to operate properly, it does remain a viable
method for further assessing the presence of fatigue cracking in
nozzles. Therefore, for those plants that have such systems, leak-
age data obtained from these systems can be used to enhance the
technical argument used to establish inspection frequency.
41.3.3 Inspections of Other Vessel Nozzles and Welds
41.3.3.1 Alternate Inspection Method for Nozzle Inner
Radii. Other than the feedwater nozzles and the operational CRD
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10 • Chapter 41
TABLE 41.2 FEEDWATER NOZZLE/SPARGER INSPECTION RECOMMENDATIONS(1)
return line nozzles in BWRs, the ISI inspections of inner radii of
the other RPV nozzles, including PWR vessel nozzles, have not
found any indications. This led to the adoption of Code Case
N-648-1 [40]. This Code Case allows a VT-1 examination of the
inner radii surface [surface M-N in Figs. IWB-2500-7(a)
through(d)] in lieu of the volumetric examination required by
Table IWB-2500-1, Examination Category B-D, Item B3.20 or
B3.100, for ISI of reactor vessel nozzles other than BWR feedwa-
ter nozzles and operational CRD return line nozzles. If crack-like
surface flaws exceeding the acceptance criteria of Table IWB-
3510-3 are found, acceptability for continued service can be shown
by meeting the requirements of ASME BPVC IWB-3142.2, IWB-
3142.3, or IWB-3142.4.
Briefly, the technical bases [41] for this Code Case are as fol-
lows: volumetric inspections have been required for the nozzle
inner radius regions of reactor vessels since the inception of
Section XI of the ASME Code in 1970. In over 30 years of
inspections, no indications have been found in any pressurized
water reactor (PWR) nozzles. Indications have been found in two
nozzle types in boiling water reactor (BWR) nozzle, both the
other nozzle types have the same flawless history as the PWRs. In
1999, a project was begun to eliminate this inspection from the
requirements of ASME BPVC Section XI; the following three
independent arguments were advanced:
(a) a good inspection history (the nozzles that had cracked in
service were eliminated)
(b) a very large flaw tolerance
(c) a risk argument that was based on the finding that elimina-
tion of the inspection resulted in negligible change in core
damage frequency
These arguments were accepted by the ASME Code, as well as
the NRC, and Code Case N-648-1 was approved by ASME in
December of 2000 [41].
The NRC, in a conditional acceptance of this Code Case, stated
the following [42]: “In place of a UT examination, licensees may
perform a visual examination with enhanced magnification that
has a resolution sensitivity to detect a 1-mil width wire or crack,
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 11
FIG. 41.10 IMPROVED THERMAL SLEEVE DESIGN AND TEMPERATURE VARIATIONS WITH AND WITHOUT BYPASS
utilizing the allowable flaw length criteria of Table IWB-3512-1
with limiting assumptions on the flaw aspect ratio. The provi-
sions of Table IWB-2500-1, Examination Category B-D, contin-
ue to apply except that, in place of examination volumes, the
surfaces to be examined are the external surfaces shown in
the figures applicable to this table.” Thus, the NRC requires a
more sensitive visual examination technique than that specified
in the Code Case.
41.3.3.2 Alternate Inspection Frequency. Currently, BWR
RPV nozzle inner radius and nozzle-to-shell welds are inspected
per ASME BPVC Section XI requirements (Table IWB-3500-1,
Examination Category B-D), which requires 100% inspection for
each 10-year interval. These examinations are costly and result in
significant radiation exposure to examiners. Since 1990, the per-
formance of NDE has improved substantially such that there is a
AQ: Please provide
Fig.41.10 Callout.
high reliability of detecting flaws that can challenge the structural
integrity of BWR nozzles and their associated welds. Code Case
702 [43], approved at the December 2003 meeting of the Section
XI Main Committee, allows a reduction of the nozzle-to-shell
welds and nozzle blend radii from 100% to 25% of the nozzles
every 10 years, 25% inspection each 10-year interval.
BWRVIP-108 [44], which provided the technical basis for this
Code Case, described the technical approach as follows: “The pro-
ject team evaluated the available field inspection data and perfor-
mance demonstration data for BWR nozzles. They selected repre-
sentative nozzles for the evaluation, including core spray, main
steam, and recirculation inlet and outlet nozzles. PFM and deter-
ministic fracture mechanics (DFM) calculations were performed to
assess the reliability of the nozzles after implementing the revised
inspection approach. The PFM code, VIPER, developed by the
BWRVIP with a successful first use in BWRVIP-05, employs
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12 • Chapter 41

Cracking and, in some case, leakage has been observed in BWR

plants with furnace-sensitized stub tubes. The observed leakage
has been well within the system leakage limits and has been a
small fraction of the system makeup capability. Unlike the PWRs
where the coolant uses borated water, there is no boron in the
BWR water and leakage from the stub tube cracking does not lead
to boron corrosion concerns. Stub tube cracking by itself does not
pose a direct safety issue. Limiting the leakage has been the focus
of the corrective action prior to plant startup. Roll expansion of the
housing against the vessel penetration has been used to address the
leakage concern. The plastic deformation of the housing against
the vessel results in an effective leakage barrier.
The stub tube roll expansion repair has been used successfully
in several BWRs and has been reviewed by the NRC staff. For
FIG. 41.11 FRACTURE MECHANICS RESULTS FOR the domestic BWR plants, the NRC typically approved the
SEVERAL BWRs repair process as an alternative to the requirements of ASME
BPVC Section XI, para. IWA-5250(a)(3) pursuant to 10 CFR
50.55a(a)(3)(I) on a case-by-case basis. Recently, the NRC
allowed continued plant operation for the second cycle following
discovery of CRD stub tube leakage in a BWR/2 plant [45].
Summary of the NRC’s safety evaluation follows.

The NRC staff concluded that, based on industry experience,

roll expansion of the CRD housing to the RPV is an appropri-
ate alternative repair for use at the BWR/2 plant. The roll
expansion process will eliminate, or reduce to an acceptable

FIG. 41.12 BWR FEEDWATER NOZZLE INSPECTION

ZONES (CLAD-REMOVED NOZZLE)

Monte Carlo methods to assess the reliability of a BWR RPV hav-

ing flaw distributions, material properties, fluence distributions,
and several other parameters, which are assumed to be randomly
distributed. A DFM evaluation was also performed to demonstrate
that expected flaws, based on field experience, would not jeopar-
dize the structural integrity of the vessel. A flaw is selected that
bounds any expected flaws based on field inspection results. Using
appropriate material properties, a deterministic LEFM evaluation
is performed to demonstrate that failure is not expected.”

41.3.4 Stub Tube Cracking

The CRD and In-Core Housing penetrations in a BWR are on
the bottom head of the vessel. The earlier BWR CRD penetrations
used a stub tube to which the CRD housing is welded. The typical
CRD housing is 6 in. in diameter and is made of either Type 304
stainless steel or Alloy 600. The use of the stub tube allows the
stainless steel housing to be welded to the stub tube after post-
weld heat treatment (PWHT) of the vessel. Figure 41.13 shows
the typical CRD stub tube penetration in a BWR/2 bottom head.
This is referred to as a set-in stub tube design since the stub tube
is in a socket in the bottom head prior to welding. In some BWRs,
the stub tube was made of Type 304 stainless steel and was weld-
ed to the bottom head before PWHT. The subsequent PWHT
caused furnace sensitization of the stub tube making it susceptible
to IGSCC with the exposure to a high-temperature, water environ-
ment. The cracking could occur in the HAZs of the welds and FIG. 41.13 A TYPICAL BWR SET-IN CRD STUB TUBE
anywhere along the length of the sensitized stub tube. DESIGN
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 13

level, leakage from CRD housings. The housings will be plas-

tically expanded within the RPV lower head bore to create a
radial contact pressure between the housing and the vessel
bore. Proper contact pressure is achieved by controlling the
radial expansion of the housing and by utilizing additional
passes to increase the contact length. The process will have no
harmful effects on the CRD housing, stub tubes, or the reactor
vessel. Potential failures, which could occur as a result of this
repair, have been evaluated. The roll repair will meet the
qualification criteria, without exception, and the nominal 3–5%
minimum thinning to achieve continuous contact. Additionally,
the alternative provides for the pre-repair and post-repair
inspections to ensure the adequacy of this proposed repair.
Thus, the proposed alternative will provide assurance of struc-
tural integrity for the approval period requested.

Imposition of the Code repair would require that the plant

remain in a shutdown condition for an extended period in order
to disassemble and remove fuel from the reactor to determine
the exact leak location and to perform an in-vessel repair involv-
ing additional personnel exposure. Because use of the alterna-
tive repair (roll expansion) until the next refueling outage will
provide adequate assurance of structural integrity, compliance
with the specified requirements of the Code (a weld repair) FIG. 41.14 STUB TUBE NARROW GROOVE WELDED
would result in hardship or unusual difficulty without a com- PARTIAL DESIGN
pensating increase in the level of quality and safety.

The NRC staff has evaluated the licensee’s proposed alterna-
tive for the plant. The staff finds that the proposed roll expan-
sion repair, as described above, is acceptable until the next
refueling outage. The NRC staff does not approve the roll-
expansion process as a permanent repair in lieu of meeting
the ASME Code repair criteria. The NRC staff recommends
that if the licensee intends to use this alternative as a perma-
nent repair, it should pursue this alternative repair of the CRD
housings with the Code Committee to accept this as a perma-
nent repair through a Code Case on an expedited basis.
Should this prove to be not successful, the NRC staff recom-
mends that the licensee follow up with a schedule for a per-
manent Code repair. The implementation of the alternative is
subject to inspection by the NRC.
Based on the NRC’s recommendation, the plant owner helped
develop Code Case N-730 [46], the technical basis of which is docu-
mented in [47]. Reference 47 builds on the BWRVIP roll repair doc-
ument [48] that was part of a full-scale effort to develop and qualify
the roll repair process and equipment. A Code Case (tentatively
assigned the number N-769) is currently under development for the
roll repair of BWR bottom head in-core housing penetrations.
Other types of stub tube repair concepts include the following:
(a) a mechanical seal forming a pressure boundary around
the weld
(b) a welded sleeve forming a pressure boundary and weld load
path (see Fig. 41.14 for a typical example for a set-on stub
tube [49])
(c) a replacement of the stub tube and housing
The replacement option involves welding close to the P3 vessel
material where preheat or PWHT may not be feasible. Code Case
N-606-1 [50] was specifically developed to permit the use of
ambient temperature machine GTAW temper bead technique for
BWR CRD housing/stub tube repairs.
41.3.5 Vessel Attachment Weld Cracking
There are numerous internal attachments to the BWR RPV that
are welded using the alloy 182 that is known to be susceptible to
SCC. Also, some attachments such as the jet pump riser brace are
fatigue sensitive. One of the aspects that needs to be considered
when field cracking is detected at an attachment weld is the
potential for crack growth into the vessel material during future
operation.
41.3.5.1 Vessel-to–Shroud Support Weld Cracking. In late
1999, stress corrosion cracks were discovered in alloy 182 welds
in the shroud support structure of Tsuruga-1, a BWR-2 located in
Japan (see Fig. 41.15). This weld material was used in the con-
struction of the conical support structure as well as to attach the
support structure to the RPV. These cracks were detected visually
and confirmed with penetrant inspection as well as by metallogra-
phy during core shroud replacement activities. The number of
crack indications was more extensive than had been seen previ-
ously in BWRs and the cracks were located on the underside of the
core support structure; thus, they could not be detected during rou-
tine visual inservice inspection from the top.
Following this finding, BWR owners were advised to review
their inservice inspection programs and consider performing an
examination of the RPV-to–shroud support plate weld [51].
Somewhat similar cracking on the underside of the H9 weld was
detected at a U.S. BWR-2 plant though UT inspection conducted
from outside the vessel. A fracture mechanics evaluation [52] was
performed to address the following two issues:
(a) What is the structural margin during future operation at the
shroud support in the presence of observed cracking?
(b) What is the number of years of plant operation until an
assumed flaw at the clad base metal interface would be pro-
jected to grow into the base metal to allowable flaw depth
calculated by the rules of ASME BPVC IWB-3600?
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14 • Chapter 41
FIG. 41.15 BWR-2 SHROUD SUPPORT GEOMETRY
The evaluations conducted to address both of these issues con-
sidered projected crack growth from at least 80,000 hr (approxi-
mately 10 years) of future operation.
The detailed examinations during shroud replacement activi-
ties at the Japanese BWR-2 confirmed that none of the cracks
entered the vessel low-alloy steel base metal adjacent to the weld
metal. This clearly indicated that the cracking was confined to
alloy 182 even though the plant had operated for over 25 years.
Therefore, the fracture mechanics approach to quantify the
allowable operating time conservatively considered a long axial
flaw (aspect ratio of 0.1) placed at the depth of the clad low-alloy
steel interface.
The stresses considered in the evaluation were those due to
internal pressure, thermal expansion, cladding, and weld residual.
The values of total applied stress intensity factor K as a function
of crack depth a are shown in Fig. 41.16. The fatigue crack
growth using the Appendix A curves was found to be
insignificant. However, the potential crack growth due to stress
corrosion cracking was taken into account using the following K
versus da/dt relationship [53]:
FIG. 41.16 CALCULATED VALUES OF TOTAL K AND THE
POLYNOMIAL FIT
FIG. 41.17 PREDICTED CRACK GROWTH AS A FUNCTION
OF OPERATING HOURS
da/dt  2.8  106 in./hr for K  50 ksi 1in. (7)
6.82  1012 (K)4 in./hr for transient condition,
or K  ksi 1in. (8)
For the purpose of the crack growth calculation, it was assumed
that there would be approximately 800 hr of transient condition
operation during a 2-year (approximately 16,000 hr) cycle of
operation. The results of crack growth prediction are shown in
Fig. 41.17. The allowable crack depth was determined to be 2 in.
based on normal/upset conditions. Figure 41.17 indicates that this
value of crack depth is reached in excess of 200,000 hours of
operation. This flaw evaluation provided technical justification for
continued operation of the RPV with the observed H9 weld
cracks for at least 5 additional operating cycles, equivalent to 10
years of operation.
41.3.5.2 Steam-Dryer-Support-Bracket Cracking. Steam
dryer support brackets are four stubby projections from the ID of
the vessel that support the steam dryer. They are 3  5  11-in.
tall forgings, full penetration welded to alloy 182 pads about 10 ft
below the closure flange. Figure 41.18 shows the geometry of the
cracked bracket [54]. A metallurgical analysis indicated that the
bracket failed by a fatigue mechanism. During normal operation,
the only design loads transferred between the steam dryer and the
support brackets are vertical. The loads are transferred to the
bracket through a seismic block, which provides horizontal
restraint during earthquake loading. Examination of the failed
bracket on the upper surface showed that the dryer support ring
was in direct contact with the edge of the bracket farthest from the
reactor wall due to an improperly positioned seismic block. This
was different from the other three identical brackets that showed
contact with the seismic block attached to the support ring. The
point of application of the load on the failed bracket was 80% far-
ther away from the crack initiation edge than was the load appli-
cation point on the uncracked bracket 180 away from it. This
meant 56% higher cyclic bending stresses at the failed bracket.
Therefore, the corrective action for the cracked bracket was to
replace it exactly as in the original design (same bracket material,
configuration, and weld material) and to ensure that the seismic
block was in contact with the bracket rather than the dryer support
ring. A review of the ASME BPVC Section III fatigue design
curve for Ni-Cr-Fe materials (ASME BPVC Section III, Fig. 19.2)
indicated that a 56% improvement in stress would translate into a
fatigue life improvement by a factor of at least 25. This meant that
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 15
FIG. 41.18 STEAM DRYER SUPPORT BRACKET CRACK
the repair extended the life of the bracket significantly past the ves-
sel design life. A VT examination after 1 year of service revealed
that this bracket was free of cracks.
41.3.6 Low Upper Shelf Energy Evaluation
41.3.6.1 Background. Appendix G of 10 CFR50 [52] states
that the RPV must maintain upper-shelf energy (USE) throughout
its life of no less than 50 ft-lb, unless it is demonstrated, in a man-
ner approved by the director of the office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, that lower values of USE will provide margins of
safety against fracture equivalent to those required by Appendix
G of ASME BPVC Section XI. Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision
2 [56] provides a method to estimate the decrease in USE as a
function of fluence and copper content. It was recognized in the
early 1980s that some RPVs have materials for which the USE
may fall below 50 ft-lb due to irradiation embrittlement. In 1982,
the NRC published proposed procedures for the analyses required
by 10 CFR50 for operating RPVs as NUREG-0744 [57]. At the
time of publication of this document, the NRC officially request-
ed that the ASME Code recommend criteria, analysis methods,
and suitable specifications for material properties to be used for
the assessment of reactor vessels that do not meet the Charpy USE
requirements. As a result of this request, the Section XI Working
Group (WG) on Flaw Evaluation developed, through an approxi-
mately 10-year effort, acceptance criteria and acceptable analysis
methods to address this issue. The WG also developed simplified
evaluation procedures applicable for use in evaluations of Service
Level A and B conditions. WRC Bulletin 413 [58] documents the
results of the WG’s effort; Part 1 of the Bulletin contains the basis
for the recommendations sent from the WG to the NRC, dated
January 11, 1991. These recommendations included the accep-
tance criteria that were subsequently implemented as Code Case
N-512 [59] and later as Nonmandatory Appendix K in ASME
BPVC Section XI. Part 2 of the Bulletin contains the basis for the
simplified evaluation procedures for Service Level A and B con-
ditions. The NRC published Regulatory Guide 1.161 [60] to pro-
vide additional guidance to include analysis procedures for
Service Levels C and D, guidance on selecting the transients for
evaluation, and details on temperature-dependent material proper-
ties. The low USE analysis also has been called equivalent mar-
gin analysis.
For the evaluation of Level A and B service conditions, a 1/4 t
surface flaw with an aspect ratio of 6:1 oriented axially or circum-
ferentially (whichever direction is relevant) is postulated. The two
criteria to be satisfied are the following.
(a) The applied J-integral, evaluated at a pressure that is 1.15
times the accumulation pressure as defined in the plant-
specific Overpressure Protection Report, with a factor of
safety of 1.0 on thermal loading for the plant-specified heat-
up/cool-down conditions, shall be shown to be less than J0.1,
the J-integral characteristic of the material resistance to duc-
tile tearing at a flaw growth of 0.1 in.
(b) The flaw shall be shown to be stable, with the possibility of
ductile flaw growth at a pressure that is 1.25 times the accu-
mulation pressure defined in (a), with a safety factor of 1.0
on thermal loading.
The J-R curve shall be a conservative representation for the
vessel material under evaluation. The criteria for the evaluation of
Level C service conditions are essentially the same, except that
1
the postulated flaw is 10 t deep and the safety factor on the pres-
sure loading is 1.0. Additional relaxation in the criteria for Level
D service conditions is that a best estimate J-R curve can be used.
41.3.6.2 Generic BWR Evaluation. In September 1992, the
NRC, in discussing the preliminary review of the responses to
Generic Letter 92-01, strongly recommended that equivalent mar-
gin analyses be done by the Owners Group. The BWR Owners
Group developed a generic analysis in the form of a topical report
[61]. The objective was to provide a safety net analysis for plants
that could not quantitatively demonstrate, using NRC-approved
methods, that USE would remain above 50 ft-lb and might, there-
fore, be subject to regulatory action. A second objective, which
developed within the BWR Owners Group in the process of per-
forming the analysis, was to provide a topical report, which could
be referenced by utilities as part of their licensing basis, to address
compliance with the 50 ft-lb requirement on USE in 10 CFR50
Appendix G.
Both the axial and circumferential flaws in plate material, with
the corresponding longitudinal and transverse USE data, were
considered in the analysis. For welds, only the more limiting axial
flaw case was evaluated. The analysis addressed BWR/2 plates
separately from BWR/3–6 plates, due to differences in geome-
tries, material properties, and availability of USE data. The welds
were addressed together for BWR/2–6 vessels but were grouped
by weld type, specifically shielded metal arc, electroslag, and sub-
merged arc welding.
Figure 41.19 shows the Level C condition transient used in
the analysis, and Figure 41.20 shows the results for J0.1 assess-
ment also for Level C conditions. Topical report was reviewed
and approved by the NRC [62]. Table 41.3 (Table 1 [62]) pro-
vides a summary of the results. Equivalent margin was demon-
strated for 35 ft-lb USE values, except in the longitudinal plate
direction where the results were 50 ft-lb for BWR/2 plates and
59 ft-lb for BWR/3 – 6 plates. The analysis results for Levels C
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16 • Chapter 41

and D conditions were less limiting than Levels A and B condi-

tions. The material property projections used 32 effective full-
power years (EFPY), which is taken to be the equivalent to
40 years of operation. Table 41.3 also shows the NRC-predicted
end-of-life USE values.
Specific BWR plants can compare their USE surveillance
results to the predictions of Regulatory Guide 1.99 to verify that
the comparisons of 32 EFPY USE with the equivalent margin
analysis are bounding for their vessel beltline, using a worksheet
[61]. Once the bounding nature of the BWR Owners Group analy-
sis has been established, the plant can reference the analysis [61]
to demonstrate compliance with the USE requirements of 10
CFR50 Appendix G for 32 EFPY of operation.

41.4 REACTOR PRESSURE BOUNDARY

FIG. 41.19 TEMPERATURE-TIME VARIATIONS DURING
AUTOMATIC BLOWDOWN TRANSIENT (LEVEL C
CONDITION)
PIPING
The BWR reactor pressure boundary piping material is typically
either carbon steel (SA-106, Grade B, SA-333, Grade 6, and
SA-516 Grade 70) or stainless steel (Type 304 or 316, regular car-
bon, L grade, or LN grade). The safe end material could also be
Ni-Cr-Fe material (SB-166). The experience with the BWR carbon
steel piping has been excellent and there is no field degradation
incidents attributed to it. On the other hand, the BWR stainless
steel piping (made of Type 304/316) has experienced cracking dur-
ing service [63–65]. As discussed later, the development of
Appendix C of ASME BPVC Section XI in the early 1980s and
several Code Cases were intended to provide guidance in the eval-
uation and repair of this type of stainless steel pipe cracking.

41.4.1 Cause of Cracking

FIG. 41.20 J0.1 ASSESSMENT FOR LEVEL C CONDITIONS
Cracking in weld-sensitized Type 304 stainless steel piping has
been mainly due to IGSCC. The IGSCC mechanism requires a
combination of sensitized material condition, high-sustained
stress, and susceptible environment. Weld sensitization results in
carbide precipitation in the HAZ leaving a region of IGSCC sus-
ceptible material. Applied stress coupled with weld residual
stresses provide conditions that could cause cracking. Finally, the

TABLE 41.3 BWR RPV EQUIVALENT MARGIN REVIEW SUMMARY [62]

Summary on results from equivalent margin analysis for eight types of beltline material
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 17
high-temperature oxygenated water provides the environmental
conditions needed for IGSCC. The IGSCC is explained by the
presence of the three necessary conditions for cracking.
41.4.2 Remedial/Mitigation/Repair Measures
In October 1979, in response to the increased number of inci-
dents of IGSCC of austenitic stainless steel piping in BWRs and
the appearance of cracking in large-diameter (24–28 in.) recircu-
lation system piping, a group of BWR utilities organized an
Owners Group to provide the R&D resources necessary to solve
the pipe-cracking problem. EPRI was given the responsibility of
integrating these resources into ongoing research and develop-
ment efforts funded by EPRI, the BWR Owners, and GE so as to
establish a single, unified industry program addressing pipe crack-
ing in BWRs. Most overseas BWR Owners also participated in
the resulting program, known as the BWR Owners Group IGSCC
Research Program, which began in 1979 and was completed in
1988 [66–68].
The initial set of IGSCC remedies was referred to as near term.
These remedies could be applied to susceptible Type 304 stainless
steel components in the short term to field repairs and replace-
ments and to plants under construction that were committed to the
use of Type 304 stainless steel piping. The near-term remedies
included solution heat treatment (SHT), corrosion-resistant
cladding (CRC), and heat-sink welding (HSW). Following welding,
SHT redissolves grain-boundary carbides and restores the grain-
boundary chromium concentration. CRC consists of cladding the
susceptible part of the pipe inside the surface adjacent to the girth
weld with SCC-resistant duplex weld metal. HSW is designed to
generate compressive residual stresses at the ID of the HAZ
through the use of carefully controlled welding parameters in
conjunction with water cooling of the inside of the pipe during
welding.
To mitigate IGSCC in operating piping, induction heating
stress improvement (IHSI) and last-pass heat sink welding
(LPHSW) were also qualified in the early 1980s. IHSI modifies
the as-welded residual stresses by inducing small amounts of
plastic deformation in the HAZ. This is accomplished by generat-
ing a through-wall temperature gradient (by induction heating the
outside of the pipe and water cooling the inside) that is sufficient
to cause a small amount of yielding. The LPHSW is essentially
similar to HSW except that it only involves remelting the weld
crown while providing a heat sink and, therefore, can be applied
to existing welds. Mechanical stress improvement (MSIP) has
also been used to favorably modify the weld residual stresses in
HAZ [69]. In MSIP, a similar result as IHSI is obtained by
hydraulically squeezing the pipe adjacent to the HAZ to induce a
small amount of plasticity.
IGSCC-resistant piping materials (Type 316 nuclear grade and
Type 304 nuclear grade stainless steel) were also developed as the
materials remedy for replacement piping. All stress- and sensiti-
zation-related remedies are limited to the specific component to
which they are applied. In contrast, environment-related remedies
have the potential of protecting the whole coolant system.
Laboratory and field studies demonstrated that electrochemical
corrosion potential (ECP) of stainless steel in the recirculation
systems of operating BWRs can be reduced to low values by
injecting hydrogen into the feedwater (hence the name hydrogen
water chemistry) and that IGSCC is suppressed when the ECP is
below 230 mV SHE.
Stress improvement remedies and hydrogen water chemistry
were effective in retarding the further growth of shallow cracks;
however, sometimes deep cracks were observed, particularly in
the alloy 182 butter at the low-alloy steel nozzles. The dissimilar
metal weldment joining the BWR nozzles to safe ends is one of
the more complex configurations in the entire recirculation sys-
tem. Field installation techniques typically specify that a special
shop weld deposit (butter) be placed on the end of the nozzle prior
to final shop PWHT to facilitate field welding without PWHT.
Many BWR vessels used Inconel 182 manual shielded metal arc
electrodes to weld deposit the butter. Later laboratory studies
determined that alloy 182 was susceptible to IGSCC, especially
under severe conditions such as crevices and/or cold work.
Repair/replacement activities at two BWRs, where axially orient-
ed IGSCC from the butter progressed into the low-alloy steel
nozzle, have been described [70]. Many BWR plant owners
proactively undertook repair/replacement/mitigation activities to
address potential IGSCC of alloy 182 butters [71].
Weld overlay type of repair is also a very attractive remedy and
has been used extensively in the field. It is applicable both at the
pipe-to-pipe welds and at pipe-to-nozzle or safe-end welds.
41.4.3 Weld Overlay Repairs
Weld overlays were first applied in 1982 as a repair for IGSCC
in stainless steel piping [72]. As shown in Fig. 41.21, the repair
technique is based on the application of weld metal to the outside
pipe surface over and to either side of the flawed location, extend-
ing circumferentially 360 . The weld overlay repair performs the
following functions:
(a) It provides structural reinforcement of the flawed location,
such that adequate load-carrying capability is provided,
either in the overlay by itself or in some combination of the
overlay and the original pipe wall thickness.
(b) It provides a barrier of IGSCC-resistant material to prevent
IGSCC propagation into the overlay weld metal.
(c) It introduces a compressive residual stress distribution in at
least the inner portion of the pipe wall, which will inhibit
IGSCC initiation and propagation in the original pipe joint.
(d) It prevents local leakage from small axial flaws.
Although these repairs were accepted by the NRC, the early reg-
ulatory position was that such repairs were only interim measures.
The utilities were allowed to operate for two fuel cycles with weld
overlay repairs to enable them to develop and adequately plan for
replacement activities. In NUREG-0313, Revision 2 [9], the NRC
FIG. 41.21 WELD OVERLAY REPAIR
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18 • Chapter 41
indicated that, “If it is desired to operate for more than two fuel
cycles with overlay reinforcement repair, the overlayed weldments
should be inspected to ensure that the overlays will continue to
provide the necessary safety margin.” The BWR Owners Group
and EPRI in the meanwhile conducted several inspections, weld
residual stress measurement, and fracture toughness studies on
weld overlays [73–75] to justify their long-term operation. In
1992, the ASME BPVC Code published Code Case 504 [76]
specifically addressing the weld-overlay-type repair of cracked
austenitic stainless steel piping.
41.4.3.1 Code Case 504. The Code Case specifies various
requirements for implementing weld overlay repairs, such as weld
metal composition, surface preparation, design, pressure testing,
and examination. Some of these requirements are discussed.
The requirement (e) specifies that the first layer of weld metal
with delta ferrite content of at least 7.5 FN shall constitute the
first layer of the weld reinforcement design thickness. Generally,
ferrite readings are taken at the weld center and edge of the weld
crown in the overlay layer at each of the quadrants. The values are
averaged for comparison with the minimum required value.
Lower values, but no less than 5 FN, may be acceptable based on
evaluation.
The design considered in (f)(1) is what is called as the full
structural or standard weld overlay. The flaw is assumed to be
100% through the original pipe wall thickness for the entire cir-
cumference of the pipe. The advantage of this design is that any
uncertainty in the sizing of the original crack(s) is unimportant
for this case. The thickness of the full structural weld overlay can
be based on either the Tables given in ASME BPVC IWB-3640
or the source equations in Appendix C of ASME BPVC Section
XI. The source equations in Appendix C [77,78] typically pro-
vide smaller thickness. The reason is that the membrane stress
(Pm) used in the source equations is the calculated value and is
typically smaller than the assumed Pm of 0.5 Sm in the Tables.
The source equations applicable to full structural weld overlay
are the following:
   (1  a 兾t  Pm 兾f )/(2  a兾t) (9)
Pbc  (2f 兾)(2  a兾t) sin () (10)
Pbc  Pm  SF (Pm  Pb) (11)
where
f  material flow stress  3Sm
Sm  material design stress intensity
Pm  primary membrane stress
Pb  primary bending stress
Pbc  failure bending stress
a  crack depth (equal to pipe thickness)
t  total thickness (pipe wall  weld overlay thickness)
SF  safety factor
 2.77 for normal/upset conditions
 1.39 for emergency/faulted conditions
The weld overlays are typically applied using gas tungsten arc
welding (GTAW), a nonflux welding process. Therefore, only
the primary stresses are used in the above equations. The prima-
ry loading is typically the internal pressure, weight, and seismic
inertia. The membrane and bending stresses are calculated on
the basis of overall thickness including the weld overlay thick-
ness. Therefore, an iterative solution of Eqs. (9) through (11) is
necessary to calculate the required weld overlay thickness. The
ASME BPVC IWB-3640 rules require the a/t value to be
 0.75. In many cases, this criterion would require an increase
in the calculated thickness. Although not explicitly stated in the
rules of ASME BPVC IWB-3640, the weld overlay design
thickness is also typically evaluated against the primary stress
limits of the Code of Construction. For Class 1 components such
as piping, ASME BPVC IWB-3610(d)(2) states that a compo-
nent containing the flaw is acceptable for continued service dur-
ing the evaluated time period if the primary stress limits of
ASME BPVC NB-3000, assuming a local area reduction of the
pressure-retaining membrane that is equal to the area of the
detected flaw.
The Code Case also provides guidance for overlay thickness
determination when fewer than five axial flaws and/or short cir-
cumferential flaws (less than 10% of circumference) are present
at a weld. The specified overlay length is at least 0.75 (Rt)
beyond each end of the observed flaws, where R and t are the
outer radius and nominal wall thickness of the pipe prior to
depositing the weld overlay. The circumferential cracks are gen-
erally assumed to be located axially at the end of the HAZ. If
the cracked weld has on one side a larger thickness component
such as a valve, the overlay can be terminated in the length
direction where the valve section thickness is equal to the pipe
thickness plus overlay thickness.
The results of experiments conducted to assess the adequacy of
the thickness design equations for the weld overlay repairs
(WORs) are documented [79]. The maximum stress from each of
the four WOR pipe experiments conducted was significantly high-
er than that predicted by the ASME BPVC IWB-3640 analysis for
a full structural overlay. The calculated safety factors were 30%
higher than those used in the Code. The margins were slightly
lower when actual flaw dimensions were used.
Application of weld overlays typically is performed with water
backing on the inside of the weld to be repaired, which produces a
through-wall gradient. The temperature difference, coupled with
the normally occurring shrinkage of the overlay weld metal, has
been shown to produce a highly favorable residual stress distribu-
tion in the pipe wall [80]. A favorable stress distribution is the one
when combined with the applied stress distribution produces a
nonpositive calculated value of stress intensity factor at a crack
depth equal to the pipe thickness. This ensures nonpropagation of
the IGSCC cracking during future operation. In some cases, the
structural configuration may be such that water backing is not fea-
sible; then, typically an application-specific finite element residual
stress analysis is conducted to demonstrate that a favorable resid-
ual stress distribution is produced following the weld overlay.
Weld overlay application results in both radial and axial
shrinkage at the repaired weld. Axial shrinkage magnitude is a
function of the pipe diameter, weld overlay length, and the num-
ber of weld layers applied. Field measurements suggest that the
bulk of the shrinkage occurs as a result of application of the first
two layers. Generally, a finite element model of the piping sys-
tem is required to calculate the shrinkage stresses at the various
locations in the system. These shrinkage stresses are steady state
secondary stresses of the cold-spring type and are not explicitly
factored into the equations of ASME BPVC Section III,
NB-3650; NB-3672.8 limits the cold springing stress to 2Sm.
However, the shrinkage stresses due to weld overlay are typically
limited to a smaller value equal to the yield strength at tempera-
ture. In the evaluation of other flawed locations in the piping sys-
tem, the calculated axial shrinkage stress shall be included as an
expansion stress (Pe).
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 19
The axial shrinkage may result in changed air gaps of pipe
whip restraints, the normal set points of variable spring hangers,
and so on. Therefore, the Code Case requires the evaluation of
system restraints, supports, and snubbers to determine whether
design tolerances are exceeded. The non-mandatory Appendix O
[81] of ASME Section XI also provides additional design, exami-
nation and inspection guidance for austenitic stainless steel weld
overlay repairs.
41.4.3.2 Dissimilar Metal Weld Overlays. With the develop-
ment of the weld overlay repair as an acceptable long-term repair
measure to primary system austenitic stainless steel pressure
boundary piping, industry attention had expanded to those pres-
sure boundary joints that do not fall within this family of accept-
able joints for weld overlay repair. In a BWR recirculation system,
the inlet and outlet nozzle joints, where the low-alloy steel nozzle
is welded to an austenitic safe-end material, represent a special
weld overlay repair case not covered by Code Case 504. IGSCC
had been observed in the Inconel 182 butter to the low-alloy steel
nozzles. As a result, an Inconel 82 weld overlay repair technique
was developed for application to a low-alloy steel nozzle to stain-
less steel or Inconel 600 safe end [82]. The alloy 82 weld overlay
repair could also be used at a weld joint between an austenitic
stainless steel pipe and alloy 600 safe end.
The repair approach consisted of a full structural weld overlay,
using automatic GTAW technique deposited in accordance with a
temper-bead-welding approach similar to that presented in Code
Case N-432 [83]. The temper bead technique generally requires
the application of elevated preheat, specific bead/layer formation,
heat input controls, and a postweld heat treatment (PWHT). The
preheat and PWHT requirements are specified primarily to pre-
clude the introduction of hydrogen into the final weld. Hydrogen,
the source of delayed cracking in the base material HAZ, is of
FIG. 41.22 CORE SPRAY SAFE END TO SAFE-END EXTENSION WELD OVERLAY
primary concern when welding ferritic materials. Preheat is
intended to eliminate moisture and contaminants that could be
introduced into the molten metal during welding. PWHT allows
the hydrogen potentially trapped in the HAZ and weld metal to
diffuse out.
A later Code Case, N-638 [84], allowed an ambient tempera-
ture temper bead welding without the use of preheat or PWHT for
implementation. This technique is applicable to both the similar
(e.g., austenitic pipe to pipe) and dissimilar (e.g., safe end to noz-
zle) metal weld overlay repairs.
Figure 41.22 shows an example of the dissimilar metal weld
overlay. Code Case 504 currently does not cover dissimilar weld
overlays; therefore, this Code Case was used only as a guide in
the design of this weld overlay. The provision regarding ferrite
number does not apply to alloy 82 weld overlays. The weld over-
lay thickness was determined using the source equations in
ASME BPVC Appendix C using Sm value for alloy 600 materials.
Note that the length of the weld overlay in Fig. 41.22 is slightly
larger (by the shaded length) to facilitate its inspection. Except for
the flat surface requirement for UT inspection, the minimum
thickness requirement is optional in the shaded area. At the safe
end side, the weld overlay was terminated where the pipe plus
overlay thickness exceeds the safe-end thickness. Alloy 82 weld
metal has been used in some early dissimilar metal weld overlay
repairs; nevertheless, more recently, Alloy 52 has been used in
most applications.
The ASME Code has now developed the Code Case N-740
[85] to cover the application of dissimilar metal weld overlay
repairs.
41.4.3.3 Impact of Revised ASME BPVC Section XI,
Appendix C (2002 Addenda). Prior to the 2002 Addenda of
ASME BPVC Section XI, the safety factors for the evaluation of
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20 • Chapter 41
flawed austenitic piping, specified in Appendix C and referenced
in ASME BPVC IWB-3640, were 2.77 for normal and upset con-
ditions and 1.39 for emergency and faulted conditions [see Eq.
(11)]. These safety factors were revised when a revised Appendix
C was included in the 2002 Addenda [86]. Example calculations to
assess the impact of the revised safety factors on existing evalua-
tions of weld overlay repairs were performed [87,88]. The pipe
material was Type 304 austenitic stainless steel, and the service
temperature was assumed as 550⬚F. A summary of the calculations
of the required weld overlay thickness values for three welds is
given in Table 41.4. Required weld overlay thickness values from
acceptance criteria on (␴m ⫹ ␴b) in the 2001 Edition of Section XI
were governed by Service Level B (upset condition). Required weld
overlay thickness values from acceptance criterion on (␴m ⫹␴b) in
the 2002 Addenda to Section XI were governed either by Service
Level B or C (emergency) condition, while required weld overlay
thickness values from the separate acceptance criterion on 6m in
the 2002 Addenda were governed by Service Level B. The
required weld overlay thickness values from the governing criteri-
on for each weld are highlighted in bold italic in Table 41.4, and
these are governed by the ASME BPVC Section III, NB-3200, pri-
mary stress intensity limits. Based on these results, it was con-
cluded that there is no significant impact of the revised safety fac-
tors in the 2002 Addenda to Section XI on the required thickness
of the weld overlay repairs.
The revised safety factors in Section XI, Appendix C, of the
2002 Addenda are also applicable Ni-Cr-Fe materials (Alloy 600
base metal and Alloy 82 or 52 welding materials).
41.5 CRACK INITIATION, GROWTH
RELATIONSHIPS, AND PLANT
MONITORING
Protection against fatigue crack initiation through an explicit
calculation of cumulative fatigue usage factor, is one of the design
criteria for ASME Code Sections III and VIII (Division 2) pres-
sure-retaining components. Protection against SCC type of crack
initiation is not currently covered in the Code. However, several
mitigation measures have been used by the BWR plant owners as
indicated by the discussion in earlier paragraphs (e.g., para. 4.2
for BWR NSSS piping). When a component is inspected and found
TABLE 41.4 COMPARISON OF REQUIRED THICKNESS OF WELD OVERLAY REPAIR
to have cracking, the appropriate crack growth rate relationship is
an essential element in the flaw evaluation to justify continued
operation. The cyclic loading aspects are covered in Chapter 39.
Some of the unique aspects of fatigue evaluations for BWRs and
the SCC growth rate relationships are discussed. A comprehen-
sive review of the fatigue and SCC crack growth rate relationships
in BWR water environment in provided in Reference 89.
41.5.1 Fatigue Initiation
The scope and intent of the ASME BPVC Section III fatigue
design procedure was articulated in a presentation by Dr. William
Cooper to the PVRC Workshop on the Environmental Effects on
Fatigue Performance in January 1992 [90]. Some of the points of
this presentation are summarized.
(a) The Design-by-Analysis procedure included several relat-
ed considerations; however, the purpose for adding fatigue
as one of the failure modes was to ensure that the reduc-
tion of the nominal safety factor from four to three did not
result in a decrease in reliability if the vessel was expect-
ed to be subjected to cyclic operating conditions. The
fatigue design procedures were intended to provide
confidence that the component could be placed in service
safely, not necessarily to provide a valid measure of actu-
al component service life.
(b) The cyclic loading conditions defined in the Owner’s
Design Specification were not intended to represent a com-
mitment on how the vessel was to be operated, only that the
design transient definitions should provide useful informa-
tion. For example, if an Owner were able to show the
Design Specification included a cyclic event more severe
than an event actually experienced, this would verify that
the vessel was not subjected to an unevaluated condition.
41.5.1.1 Actual Versus Design Cyclic Duty. As pointed out in
the preceding, the number and severity of cyclic events may differ
from those specified in the design specification. Figure 41.23
shows a comparison of the actual number of transient events com-
pared to the design basis for a typical BWR plant [91]. It is seen
that the actual number of transients (such as startup and shutdown or
SCRAM events) experienced at some operating reactors may be
higher than that expected in the design basis. However, the severity
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 21
FIG. 41.23 DESIGN VERSUS ACTUAL NUMBER OF
TRANSIENT EVENTS FOR A TYPICAL BWR PLANT
of the actual transient events (i.e., temperature and pressure fluctu-
ations) is typically significantly lower than that assumed in the
design basis. Figure 41.24 shows a comparison of the assumed
design basis event and the actual transient based on measured tem-
peratures; the number of actual transients may be higher but they
are often less severe than the design basis, and the overall fatigue
usage may be lower. In this respect, online, continuous monitoring
of system transients and keeping track of the resulting fatigue
usage in critical plant components offer important benefits in
meeting plant licensing basis. The technical basis and the results of
online fatigue usage monitoring at some BWR plants has been
described [92,93]. In most cases, the calculated fatigue usage by
the fatigue monitor was an order of magnitude lower than that cal-
culated by design basis transient.
ASME BPVC Section XI, IWB-3740 and Nonmandatory
Appendix L permit the fatigue usage factor reevaluation for a
component in service. If the recalculated fatigue usage is greater
than 1.0, flaw tolerance evaluation procedures can be used to
demonstrate acceptance of a component for service.
41.5.1.2 Environmental Fatigue Effects. The current Section
III fatigue design curves were based primarily on strain-controlled
fatigue tests of small polished specimen at room temperature in air.
Higuchi and Iida [94] demonstrated that the fatigue life of carbon
FIG. 41.24 SEVERITY OF TRANSIENT ACTUAL TEMPE-
RATURE CHANGE VERSUS PERCENTAGE OF DESIGN
BASIS
steel laboratory specimen could be considerably shorter than that
predicted by the Code S-N curves when exposed to high-tempera-
ture reactor water. Since then extensive laboratory testing has been
conducted both in Japan [95,96] and the United States, principally
at Argonne National Laboratory [97,98]. One of the earliest pro-
posed methodologies to incorporate environmental effects in the
Code fatigue analyses was the so-called EPRI/GE methodology
[99]. This methodology was adopted by the PVRC with some
modifications [100] and was forwarded to the BNCS for potential
implementation into the ASME Code [101]. The NRC also wrote
a letter to the BNCS requesting ASME action to address issues
related to the effects of the reactor water environment on the reduc-
tion of fatigue life of light-water reactor (LWR) components [102].
In Japan, the Thermal and Nuclear Power Engineering Society
(TENPES) Committee for Environmental Fatigue Evaluation
Guidelines also has issued a document [103] providing procedures
for the evaluation of environmental fatigue effects. Section III has
formed a special Task Group to address the issue; the Task Group
plans to consider input [100,103] to develop a recommended pro-
cedure in the form of a Code Case.
Examples of application of EPRI/GE methodology at critical
locations in the RPV and main piping in a BWR have been pro-
vided [104,105], as identified elsewhere [106]. The results of
environmental fatigue evaluations for one BWR and two PWRs
for 60-year operation have been reported [107], and they showed
the CUF to be less than 1.0.
Based on the probabilistic analyses and associated sensitivity
studies, the NRC concluded that no generic regulatory action was
required for the 40-year operating life. However, for the 60-year
operation (i.e., an additional 20-year license renewal operation),
the Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL) Report [108] pro-
vides the regulatory guidance to address issues related to metal
fatigue of reactor coolant pressure boundary components for
license renewal. “The aging management program (AMP)
addresses the effects of the coolant environment on component
fatigue life by assessing the impact of the reactor coolant environ-
ment on a sample of critical components, as a minimum, those
components selected in NUREG/CR-6260. The sample of critical
components can be evaluated by applying environmental correc-
tion factors to the existing ASME Code fatigue analyses.
Formulas for calculating the environmental life correction factors
are contained in NUREG/CR-6583 for carbon and low-alloy
steels and in NUREG/CR-5704 for austenitic stainless steels.”
The GALL report also lists ten desirable characteristics of an
AMP on metal fatigue.
The NRC issued Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1144 [109], later
issued as Regulatory Guide 1.207 in March 2007, which includes
guidelines for evaluating fatigue analyses incorporating the life
reduction of metal components due to the effects of the light
water reactor environment for new reactors. The technical basis
for the guidelines is contained in NUREG/CR-6909 [110]. The
results of the application of DG-1144 guidelines to a BWR feed-
water piping system are reported in Reference 111.
41.5.2 Crack Growth Rate Relationships for Fatigue
Fatigue crack growth rates for air environment for austenitic
stainless steels is included in ASME BPVC Section XI, Appendix
C, and for ferritic materials in Appendix A. Crack growth rela-
tionships in the BWR water environment are discussed.
41.5.2.1 Austenitic Stainless Steels. Some of the early fatigue
crack growth data in the BWR environment are documented
ASME_Ch41_p001-028.qxd 6/5/09 11:39 AM Page 22
22 • Chapter 41
[112,113]. In 1986, a Section XI task group reviewed the available
data for both PWR and BWR environment [78]. It recommended
that the fatigue crack growth rate for BWR environment be higher
than the air rate by a factor of 10. Argonne researchers have pro-
posed the following relationship of the form [114]:
da兾dNenv  (da兾dN)air  A(da兾dN)air0.5 (12)
where (da/dN)air is that given by the equations in ASME BPVC
Section XI, Appendix C. Recently, Argonne researchers have pro-
posed that the first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (12) be mul-
tiplied by a factor of two [115]. Japanese researchers also have
proposed the following relationship [116]:
da兾dNenv  (8.17  1012)(Tr 0.5)(K)3.0兾(1  R)2.12 (13)
 (R  0, 1  K  50 MPa 1m)
where, da/dN is in m/cycle, Tr is the rise time in seconds, and
K is in MPa 1m. Tr should be assumed to be 1 sec when rise
time is less than 1 sec; Tr should be assumed to be 1,000 seconds
if rise time is unknown. This relationship has been incorporated in
the draft Japan Maintenance Standard [117].
An EPRI-funded effort [118] is currently underway to review
the available literature to develop austenitic stainless steel fatigue
crack growth relationships in a water environment for inclusion in
ASME BPVC Section XI, Appendix C. It may be noted that the
fatigue crack growth is typically insignificant compared to SCC
growth rate in the evaluation of cracked stainless steel compo-
nents subjected to a BWR water environment.
41.5.2.2 Ferritic Steels. ASME BPVC Section XI, Appendix A,
contains the environmental fatigue crack growth rates. These rela-
tionships are presently used in BWR applications such as the frac-
ture mechanics evaluation of postulated nozzle corner crack.
Based on more recent data on the LWR environment, a new rise-
time-based model has been proposed [119]. Based on this work
and the work by James [120] on conditions that lead to the initiation
FIG. 41.25 EFFECT OF LOADING CONDITIONS ON
a/
NEAC AND COMPARISON WITH ASME SECTION XI
CURVES
and cessation of environmentally assisted crack growth, Code
Case N-643 [121] has been developed for PWR applications.
Some recent data [122] indicate that, under certain conditions
(such as very high R-ratio and long rise time), environmentally
assisted fatigue crack growth under a BWR environment could be
significantly higher than that predicted by the current ASME
BPVC Section XI, Appendix A curves (see Fig. 41.25). A review
of available relevant BWR data is in progress under a joint
EPRI/GE-sponsored program; the outcome of this program is
expected to be a proposed Code Case, similar to Code Case
N-643, applicable to BWR environments.
41.5.3 Crack Growth Rate Relationships for SCC
Key drivers in the crack growth rate due to SCC are the sus-
tained stresses that include not only the externally applied stresses
but also residual stresses from sources such as welding.
Therefore, the crack growth rate relationships are of the following
form:
da兾dt  C(K)n (14)
where C and n are constants dependent on material and environ-
mental conditions. ASME BPVC Section XI does not provide any
guidance in this area. Efforts are currently underway in the
Working Group on Flaw Evaluation to review the available infor-
mation and develop SCC growth rate relationship for incorpora-
tion into ASME BPVC Section XI. The BWR Owners have gen-
erally used the NRC-approved bounding crack growth rates for
flaw evaluation purposes (e.g., see discussion in para. 41.2.2.1
regarding shroud). For piping, NUREG-0313, Revision 2 [9] pro-
vides crack growth rate relationship in the Eq. (14) format. Some
of the other available BWR SCC growth rate correlations are
reviewed.
FIG. 41.26 SCHEMATIC OXIDATION CHARGE DENSITY/
TIME RELATIONSHIP FOR A STRAINED CRACK TIP AND
UNSTRAINED CRACK SIDES
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 23

41.5.3.1 Austenitic and Nickel-Based Materials. A crack

growth rate prediction model based on slip dissolution/film rup-
ture mechanism [123] has correlated well with the measured
crack growth rates in widely varying BWR environmental condi-
tions (e.g., NWC and HWC). In this model (Fig. 41.26), crack
advance is related to the oxidation reactions that occur at the
crack tip as the protective film is ruptured by increasing strain in
the underlying matrix. This rupture event occurs with a periodic-
ity, tf , which is determined by the fracture strain of the oxide and
the strain rate at the crack tip. The extent of the crack advance is
related by Faraday’s Law to the oxidation charge density associ-
ated with dissolution and oxide growth (passivation) on the bare
metal surface, as represented in Fig. 41.26. These relations vary
with time in a complex manner for different environment and FIG. 41.27 COMPARISON OF BWRVIP-14 AND JAPAN
material chemistries; however, the resultant growth rate, VT , rela- MAINTENANCE CODE PREDICTIONS
tionship shown in Fig. 41.26 can be restated in a general form as
follows:
The units of da/dt and K are the same as those in Eq. (17). The
draft Japan Maintenance Standard [117] provides the following
VT  f (n)(ct)n
(15) crack growth rate relationship for BWR NWC conditions [units
the same as in Eq. (19)]:
where ct ’, the crack tip strain rate, embodies the mechanical
contributions and n is a parameter that represents the effects of the da兾dt  2.27  1007 K 2.161 (20)
environment (ECP, water conductivity) and material chemistries
(EPR, a measure of sensitization of stainless steel) on environ-
Figure 41.27, [125] shows a comparison of the predictions of
mentally assisted crack growth. For NWC conditions (conductivi-
Eqs. (19) and (20). It is seen that the crack growth predictions
ty  0.1 S/cm, ECP  200 mV), and EPR  15.0 (weld-sensi-
based on the BWRVIP and draft Japan Maintenance Standard are
tized condition), n  0.61 and the crack growth rate relationship
very close. However, the factors of reduction in crack growth rate
is the following:
in going from NWC to HWC are different. The BWRVIP correla-
tion predicts a reduction factor of 4.7 and the draft Maintenance
da兾dt  2.93  1007 K 2.455 (16) Standard allows a factor of 7.9. The NRC has, however, allowed
only a credit of factor of 2 in BWR flaw evaluations [126].
For HWC conditions (conductivity  0.1 S/cm, ECP  230 For the nickel-based alloys (such as alloy 600, weld metals
mV), and EPR  15.0 (weld-sensitized condition), n  0.97 and alloys 182 and 82), several relationships have been proposed. The
the crack growth rate relationship is the following: relationships based on the film/rupture model have been given
[127], including the BWRVIP-59 relationships [125]. Lastly, the
da兾dt  2.53  1011 K 3.884 (17) crack growth relationships proposed by the Argonne researchers
have also been described [115].
where
41.5.3.2 Ferritic Steels. ASME BPVC Section XI does not con-
da兾dt  crack growth rate in mm/hr
tain SCC growth rate relationship for the ferritic materials in BWR
K  sustained stress intensity factor, MPa 2m
environment. Reference 128 provides an assessment of SCC crack
The BWRVIP has also developed an SCC growth rate relation-
growth rate algorithms for low alloy steels under BWR conditions.
ship for use by the participating members [124] and represented
Figure 41.28 shows the BWRVIP-proposed relationship [122].
by the following:
The basic crack growth rate is 2  1011 mm/sec. The DL2 line is
given by the following:
Ln(da/dt)  C1[ln (K)]  C2(Cond )m  C3(ECP)
 C4兾TABS C5 (18)
da兾dt  3.29  1014 (K)4 (21)
where
da兾dt  crack growth rate
K  sustained stress intensity factor
Cond  water conductivity
TABS  temperature, K
C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, and m are constants
For BWR NWC conditions, the appropriate values are as follows
Cond  0.1 S/cm, ECP  200 mV (SHE), and TABS  tempera-
ture, K,  561 K (  550 F). Using a specified factor of 10.3 to
obtain 95th percentile curve, the relationship is the following:

da/dt  2.135  1007 K 2.181 (19)

FIG. 41.28 BWRVIP-60 SCC DISPOSITION LINES
ASME_Ch41_p001-028.qxd 6/3/09 9:25 AM Page 24

24 • Chapter 41

where K is in MPa 1m and the crack growth rate is in mm/sec.

The vertical line in Fig. 41.28 is at 55 MPa 1m.
Field experience [129,52] has shown that even when SCC initi-
ated in the cladding, the cracks did not progress into the low-alloy
steel base metal or beyond HAZ. However, the proposed
BWRVIP relationship was used in flaw evaluation [52].
The data that formed the basis of the BWRVIP SCC relation-
ship and the fatigue crack growth rate data, such as that shown in
Fig. 41.25, will be reviewed as a part of a joint EPRI/GE project
discussed in para. 41.5.2.2.

41.5.4 Crack Growth Rate Monitoring

Online monitoring of crack growth rates on a fracture mechan-
ics specimen under actual reactor environment may provide extra
confidence in the crack growth rate used in the flaw evaluation.
One such monitoring system is called crack arrest/advance
verification system (CAVS); an example of the successful applica-
FIG. 41.29 CRACK LENGTH VERSUS TOTAL TIME-ON-TEST
tion of CAVS for monitoring crack indications in the recirculation
FOR TYPE 304 STAINLESS STEEL
inlet safe end at an operating BWR has been presented [130]. Use
of CAVS confirmed the benefit of water chemistry improvements
implemented at this plant and, subsequently, led to the elimination
of a special midcycle UT examination required by the NRC.
During a routine scheduled ISI, UT indications were discov-
ered in certain recirculation inlet safe ends at an operating BWR
plant. The indications were located in the region of the thermal
sleeve to safe-end weld. Since immediate replacement of the safe
end would have caused an unanticipated extended outage and
very high costs, a fracture mechanics crack growth analysis was
performed to demonstrate that continued operation for the next
fuel cycle could be justified while maintaining acceptable struc-
tural margins required by ASME BPVC Section XI. The analysis
considered the indication in the limiting safe end and assumed
conservative residual stresses for crack growth analysis. Also, the
plant owner agreed to complete the maintenance of plant chemi-
cal equipment and to implement improved water quality proce-
dure, along with the installation of CAVS, to monitor the expected
improvements in crack growth during the following operating
cycle. Although the NRC accepted the technical arguments con-
cerning structural integrity, they also requested a midcycle UT to FIG. 41.30 PREDICTED CRACK GROWTH IN SAFE END
provide further assurance that sufficient structural margins were
being maintained.
The CAVS installed at the plant consisted of a crack growth below the bounding crack growth evaluation based on plant
monitor and a water quality module. The crack growth monitor water chemistry history. In turn, the final crack depth at the end
used reversing DC potential technology for accurate measurement of the fuel cycle was well below the allowable depth based on
of the growth of pre-existing cracks in fracture mechanics speci- providing the nominal ASME Code margin of 3 on stress and an
mens. The water chemistry module monitored the bulk water additional factor of 1.5 on crack depth imposed by the NRC.
chemistry (dissolved oxygen, pH, conductivity, and ECP) of the These results confirmed that sufficient structural margins were
water being supplied to CAVS; 1 in. thick compact tension speci- maintained and that a special midcycle examination was unnec-
mens with heat treatment similar to that of the safe end were test- essary. The NRC concurred, and the midcycle inspection require-
ed in an autoclave connected to the reactor recirculation line. ment was eliminated.
Because CAVS used the actual plant recirculation water, the crack
growth specimens were subjected to the same water chemistry
exposure as recirculation safe ends and piping. 41.6 SUMMARY
Figure 41.29 shows typical results from CAVS for a 304 stain-
less steel specimen. It is seen that the monitoring system is A review of the applications of many and sometimes unique
extremely sensitive and that the observed crack growth rates cor- ways in which the provisions of ASME BPVC Sections III and
relate with conductivity [i.e., the crack growth rate is higher XI have been used in addressing the service-induced degrada-
when the conductivity is high over a period of time (such as dur- tion in the BWR vessels, internals, and pressure boundary pip-
ing startup) and is lower when the average conductivity is lower]. ing. The vessel internals addressed included steam dryer,
Using the CAVS specimen data, plant-specific growth rates were shroud, and jet pumps. The vessel components considered were
established and used to predict crack growth in the safe end feedwater nozzle, stub tube welds, and attachment and shroud
(Fig. 41.30). It is seen that the CAVS growth prediction was well support welds. A review of pressure boundary piping flaw
ASME_Ch41_p001-028.qxd 6/3/09 9:25 AM Page 25
COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 25
evaluation methods also included consideration of weld overlay
repairs. The service-related degradation mechanisms considered
were environmental fatigue crack initiation and growth and
stress corrosion cracking.
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and Low-Alloy-Steels in Oxygen-Containing High-Temperature
Water. Nuclear Engineering and Design 1991;129:293–306.
95. Higuchi M. Fatigue Curves and Fatigue Design Criteria for Carbon
and Low-Alloy Steels in High-Temperature Water (ASME PVP Vol.
386). New York: American Society of Mechanical Engineers; 1999:
pp. 161–169.
96. Higuchi M, Iida K. Reduction in Low-Cycle Fatigue Life of
Austenitic Stainless Steels in High Temperature Water (ASME PVP
Vol. 353). New York: American Society of Mechanical Engineers;
1997: pp. 79–85.
97. Chopra OK, Shack WJ. Effects of LWR Coolant Environments on
Fatigue Design Curves of Carbon and Low-Alloy Steels
(NUREG/CR-6583). Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission; 1998.
98. Chopra OK. Effects of LWR Coolant Environments on Fatigue
Design Curves of Austenitic Stainless Steels (NUREG/CR-5704).
Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; 1999.
99. Mehta HS, Gosselin SR. Environmental Factor Approach to
Account for Water Effects in Pressure Vessel and Piping Fatigue
Evaluations. Nuclear Engineering and Design 1998;181:
175–197.
100. Mehta HS. An Update on the Consideration of Reactor Water
Effects in Code Fatigue Initiation Evaluations for Pressure Vessels
and Piping (ASME PVP Vol. 410-2). New York: American Society
of Mechanical Engineers; 2000: pp. 45–51.
101. Hollinger GL. Executive Director, PVRC, Letter to J.H. Ferguson,
Chairman, BNCS, October 31, 1999.
102. Craig JW. Director, Division of Engineering Technology, Office of
Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Letter to J.H. Ferguson, Chairman, BNCS, December 1,
1999.
103. Guidelines on Environmental Fatigue Evaluation for LWR
Component. Japan: Thermal and Nuclear Power Engineering
Society; 2002 (English translation).
104. Mehta HS. Application of EPRI/GE Environmental Factor
Approach to Representative BWR Pressure Vessel and Piping
Fatigue Evaluations (ASME PVP Vol. 360). New York: American
Society of Mechanical Engineers; 1998: pp. 413–425.
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105. Evaluation of Environmental Thermal Fatigue Effects on Selected
Components in a Boiling Water Reactor Plant (EPRI Report
TR110356). Palo Alto, CA: Electric Power Research Institute; 1998.
106. Ware AG, et al. Application of NUREG/CR-5999 Interim fatigue
Curves to Selected Nuclear Power Plant Components
(NUREG/CR6260). Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission; 1995.
107. Ohata H, et al. Environmental Fatigue Evaluation on Japanese
Nuclear Power Plants (ASME PVP Vol. 410-2). New York:
American Society of Mechanical Engineers; 2000: pp. 79–84.
108. Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL) Report: Appendix X.M1,
Metal Fatigue of Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (NUREG1801,
Volume 1). Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission;
2001.
109 Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1144: Guidelines for Evaluating
Fatigue Analyses Incorporating the Life Reduction of Metal
Components Due to the Effects of the Light Water Reactor
Environment for New Reactors; US Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, July 2006.
110. Chopra, O.K. and W.J. Shack, “Effects of LWR Coolant
Environments on the Fatigue Life of Reactor Materials,” NUREG/
CR-6909, Draft Report, February 2006; Final Report February 2007.
111. Mehta, H.S. and H.L. Hwang, “Application of Draft Regulatory
Guide DG-1144 Guidelines for Environmental fatigue Evaluation to
a BWR feedwater Piping System,” Proceedings of ASME-PVP
2007, Paper No. PVP2007-26143.
112. Hale DA, et al. Fatigue Crack Growth in Piping and RPV Steels in
Simulated BWR Water Environment (GE Report GEAP-24098, pre-
pared for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 1978.
113. Kawakubo T, et al. Crack Growth Behavior of Type 304 Stainless
Steel in Oxygenated 290C Pure Water Under Low Cyclic Frequency
Loading. Corrosion 1980;36:638-647.
114. Review of Environmental Effects on Fatigue Crack Growth of
Austenitic Stainless Steels (NUREG/CR-6176). Washington, DC:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; 1994.
115. Chopra OK, Shack W. Crack Growth Rates in Austenitic Stainless
Steels and Ni-Alloys in LWR Environments. Proceedings of
Workshop on Flaw Growth in Austenitic and Nickel Based
Materials, August 1, 2002, Snowbird, Utah.
116. Itatani M, et al. Fatigue Crack Growth Curve for Austenitic Stainless
Steels in BWR Environment. Journal of Pressure Vessel Technology
2001;123:166–172.
117. Honjin M, Hasegawa K, Iida K. Items Concerned with Flaw
Evaluation in a Draft of New Maintenance Standards for LWR in
Japan. Presentation at Section XI S/G Evaluation Standards
Meeting, Lake Buena Vista, FL, August 12, 1998.
118. Cipolla RC. Overview of ASME Section XI Needs. Proceedings of
Workshop on Flaw Growth in Austenitic and Nickel Based
Materials, August 1, 2002, Snowbird, Utah.
119. WRC Bulletin 404, Fatigue Crack Growth of Low-Alloy Steels in
Light Water Reactor Environments. New York: Welding Research
Council; 1995.
120. James LA. Technical Basis for the Initiation and Cessation of
Environmentally Assisted Cracking of Low-Alloy Steels in
Elevated Temperature PWR Environments (ASME PVP Vol. 374).
New York: American Society of Mechanical Engineers; 1998:
pp. 207–230.
121. ASME BPVC Code Case N-643, Fatigue Crack Growth Rate Curves
for Ferritic Steels in PWR Water Environment, Section XI, Division
1. In: ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. New York: American
Society of Mechanical Engineers.
122. Seifert HP, Ritter S. Effect of Temperature and Loading
Frequency on SICC and Corrosion Fatigue Crack Growth
Behavior of Low-Alloy RPV Steels Under BWR/NWC
Conditions. Eleventh International Conference on Environmental
Degradation of Materials in Nuclear Power Systems – Water
Reactors, 2003.
123. Ford FP, Andresen PL. Development and Use of a Predictive Model
of Crack Propagation in 304/316L, A533B/A508 and Inconel
600/182 Alloys in 288¡C Water. Proceedings of Third International
Symposium on Environmental Degradation of Materials in Nuclear
Power Systems -Water Reactors, TMS-AIME, Warrendale, 1988,
pp. 789–800.
124. Carter, R. and Pathania, R., “Technical Basis for BWRVIP Stainless
Steel Crack growth Correlations in BWRs.” Proceedings of ASME
PVP 2007, Paper # PVP2007-26618.
125. Mehta HS. Fatigue and SCC Growth Rate Relationships for
Austenitic and Nickel-Based Materials in BWR Water Environment
– A BWRVIP and GE Perspective. Proceedings of Workshop on
Flaw Growth in Austenitic and Nickel-Based Materials, August 1,
2002, Snowbird, Utah.
126. U.S. NRC Final Safety Evaluation Report on BWRVIP-14 (TAC
M94975). Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission;
1999.
127. Andresen PL. Fracture Mechanics Data and Modeling of
Environmental Cracking of Nickel-Base Alloys in High
Temperature Water, Paper No. 44, Corrosion 91, Cincinnati, Ohio,
March 11–15, 1991.
128. Ford FP, et al. Stress Corrosion Cracking of Low Alloy Steels Under
BWR Conditions; Assessment of Crack Growth Rate Algorithms.
Proceedings of Ninth International Symposium on Environmental
Degradation of Materials in Nuclear Power Systems – Water
Reactors, 1999, pp. 855–864.
129. Evaluation of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Cracking in Two
Domestic BWRs (EPRI Report TR-101971). Palo Alto, CA: Electric
Power Research Institute; 1993.
130. Kiss E, Ranganath S. On-Line Monitoring to Assure Structural
Integrity of Nuclear Reactor Components. International Journal of
Pressure Vessel and Piping 1988;34:3–15.
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LICENSE RENEWAL AND AGING
MANAGEMENT
Kenneth C, Chang, P.T. Kuo and Kaihwa R. Hsu
42.1 INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) license
renewal process establishes the technical and administrative
requirements for renewal of operating power plant licenses.
Reactor operating licenses were originally issued for 40 years and
are allowed to be renewed for up to an additional 20 years. The
review process for license renewal applications (LRAs) provides
continued assurance that the level of safety provided by an appli-
cant’s current licensing basis is maintained for the period of
extended operation. The license renewal review focuses on pas-
sive, long-lived structures and components of the plant that are
subject to the effects of aging. The applicant must demonstrate
that programs are in place to manage those aging effects. The
review also verifies that analyses that are based on the current
operating term have been evaluated and shown to be valid for the
period of extended operation. As of April 1, 2008, the NRC has
renewed the licenses for 48 reactors, applications to renew the
licenses of 15 additional reactors are under review. If the applica-
tions currently under review are approved, approximately 60% of
the licensed operating reactors will have extended their life span
by up to 20 years. As license renewal is voluntary, the decision to
seek license renewal and the timing of the application is made by
the licensee. However, the NRC expects that, over time, essential-
ly all U.S. operating reactors will request license renewal.
To meet this growing interest, the NRC has established a vigor-
ous process for reviewing applications in a consistent and timely
manner. Likewise, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) has devel-
oped guidance for the industry on how to prepare an application
for renewal. This chapter describes several license renewal guid-
ance documents that have been developed to describe interrelated
aspects of preparing and reviewing LRAs, including the following:
the Standard Review Plan for review of License Renewal
Applications for nuclear power plants [22], the Generic Aging
Lessons Learned (GALL) Report [29], and the regulatory guide for
license renewal [24], which endorses NEI’s industry guideline
for implementing the requirements of 10 CFR Part 54, the license
renewal rule (NEI 95-10) [5]. The objective of this chapter is to
provide background information on the development of these doc-
uments and to briefly explain the intended use of the guidance
documents, singularly and in combination, to facilitate the renew-
al process from application development to NRC staff review,
including its audits and inspections of onsite supporting technical
CHAPTER
42
documentation. This chapter also provides a brief description of
the NRC’s environmental review process for license renewal.
42.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Based on the Atomic Energy Act as amended [7], the NRC
issues licenses for commercial power reactors to operate for up to
40 years and allows these licenses to be renewed. A 40-year
license term was selected on the basis of economic and antitrust
considerations, not technical limitations. However, once the
license term was selected, individual plant designs may have been
engineered on the basis of an expected 40-year service life.
There are currently 104 licensed, operating commercial nuclear
power plant reactors in the United States. The first 40-year operat-
ing licenses will expire for four reactors in the year 2009; 36 of the
remaining operating reactors have licenses that will expire by the
year 2015. License renewal is voluntary and the decision whether
to seek license renewal rests entirely with nuclear power plant
owners. This decision is typically based on the plant’s economic
situation and whether it can continue to meet NRC’s requirements.
The NRC has established a license renewal process that can be
completed in a reasonable period of time with clear requirements
to ensure safe nuclear plant operation for up to an additional 20
years of plant life. Currently, nuclear power provides approxi-
mately 20% of the electricity generated in the United States and is
the second largest source of electrical generation.
In the 1980s, the NRC established a comprehensive program
for nuclear plant aging research. Based on the results of that
research, a technical review group concluded that, although many
aging phenomena were identified, they do not pose technical
issues that would preclude life extension for nuclear power plants.
In 1991, the NRC first published safety requirements for
license renewal as Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10
CFR) Part 54 (the license renewal rule). To establish a scope of
review, the rule defined age-related degradation unique to license
renewal. The NRC participated in an industry-sponsored demon-
stration program to apply the rule to a pilot plant and develop
experience to establish implementation guidance. However, dur-
ing the demonstration program, the NRC found that many aging
effects are dealt with adequately during the initial license period
and that no aging unique to the period of extended operation was
identified. Also, the NRC found that the review did not allow
ASME_Ch42_p029-042.qxd 6/5/09 11:45 AM Page 30
30 • Chapter 42
sufficient credit for existing programs, particularly the mainte-
nance rule (10 CFR 50.65) [9].
As a result, the NRC amended the license renewal rule in 1995
[8]; the amended Part 54 established a regulatory process that is
more efficient, more stable, and more predictable than the previous
license renewal rule. In particular, Part 54 was clarified to focus on
managing the adverse effects of aging on passive, long-lived struc-
tures and components instead of age-related degradation unique to
license renewal. The rule changes were intended to ensure that
important systems, structures, and components continue to perform
their intended function during the 20-year period of extended opera-
tion. In parallel, the staff initiated a first-ever attempt to consolidate
aging information from various sources; in 1996, the result of this
effort in the “Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL) Report” [6].
To provide credit for existing plant programs and to increase the
effectiveness and efficiency of the license renewal review process,
the Commission completed and published a second GALL Report
[23] in July 2001. The second GALL Report [23] built on the first
one [6] and updated the database to include all aging-related events
reported in the licensee event reports (LERs) up to 1998. It also
expanded the scope to include evaluation of existing plant programs
to determine whether any of the existing plant programs can be
acceptable as adequate aging management programs for the iden-
tified aging effects. The third GALL Report [29], builds on the sec-
ond GALL Report [23], but updates the database to include NRC-
endorsed past precedents, approved interim staff guidance (ISGs),
and aging related events reported in the LERs up to 2004.
The NRC’s responsibilities under the U.S. National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969 [10] require a review of the impact of
license renewal on the environment. In parallel with aging review
efforts, the NRC pursued a separate rule making to revise its envi-
ronmental regulation, 10 CFR Part 51 [11], to focus the scope of
review of environmental issues.
42.3 LICENSE RENEWAL REVIEW
PROCESS
The license renewal process proceeds along two tracks: one for
review of safety issues (10 CFR Part 54) and another for environ-
mental issues (10 CFR Part 51). An applicant must provide the NRC
with an evaluation that addresses the technical aspects of plant aging
and describes the ways those effects will be managed. It must also
prepare an evaluation of the potential impact on the environment if
the plant operates for another 20 years. The NRC staff reviews the
application and verifies the safety evaluations through inspections.
42.3.1 Safety Reviews
42.3.1.1 Principles and Process. The license renewal rule rests
on the determination that current operating plants continue to
maintain an adequate level of safety, and, over the lives of the
plants, this level has been enhanced through maintenance of the
current licensing basis, with appropriate adjustments to address
new information from industry operating experience. Also, regula-
tory activities have provided ongoing assurance that the current
licensing basis will continue to provide an acceptable level of
safety. Based on this determination, the NRC established two
fundamental principles for license renewal.
(a) The regulatory process is adequate to ensure that the licens-
ing basis of all currently operating plants provides and
maintains an acceptable level of safety so that operation will
not be inimical to public health and safety or common
defense and security. A possible exception may be the
detrimental effects of aging on the functionality of certain
systems, structures, and components, and possibly a few
other issues that arise only during the period of extended
operation.
(b) Each plant’s licensing basis must be maintained during the
renewal term in the same manner and to the same extent as
during the original licensing term.
The NRC’s regulatory process ensures the safety of operating
plants through a variety of methods. These methods include the
issuance of NRC bulletins, generic letters, information notices,
orders, and new or revised regulations that require action by
licensees. These activities are supported by numerous special
NRC inspections that are performed in addition to the continuous
oversight and routine inspection activities performed by the NRC
onsite inspectors. Because of this comprehensive regulatory
process, compilation of the current licensing basis or reverifica-
tion of the current licensing basis is not considered necessary for
license renewal.
The license renewal rule defines the technical and administra-
tive process for evaluating the effects of aging on system, struc-
ture, and component performance, and for developing an LRA.
There are two major safety assessments that an applicant must
perform and submit in an LRA.
(a) an integrated plant assessment
(b) an assessment of time-limited aging analyses (TLAA)
These assessments are in addition to the requirement to update
the plant’s final safety analysis report (FSAR) to include a sum-
mary description of the programs and activities for managing the
effects of aging, the evaluation of TLAA, and any revisions to the
plant’s operating technical specifications that may be required.
42.3.1.2 Integrated Plant Assessment. The applicant’s inte-
grated plant assessment must demonstrate that the structures and
components within the nuclear power plant requiring aging man-
agement review (AMR) have been identified, and that the effects
of aging on the functionality of such structures and components
will be managed for the current licensing basis and to ensure that
an acceptable level of safety will be maintained for the period of
extended operation. The first step in the process is to identify all
plant systems, structures, and components that are within the
scope of the license renewal rule. The scope of the rule is defined
as those systems, structures, and components that meet the follow-
ing criteria:
(a) safety-related and relied upon to ensure the following
functions:
(1) maintain the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure
boundary
(2) ensure the capability to shut down the reactor and main-
tain it in a safe shutdown condition
(3) prevent or mitigate off-site radioactive exposures com-
parable to limits specified in the regulations
(b) Non-safety-related and whose failure could prevent satis-
factory accomplishment of safety-related functions
(c) Relied upon to perform a function that demonstrates com-
pliance with the NRC’s regulations for fire protection
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 31
(10 CFR 50.48) [17], environmental qualification (10 CFR
50.49) [18], pressurized thermal shock (10 CFR 50.61) [19],
anticipated transients without scram (10 CFR 50.62) [20],
and station blackout (10 CFR 50.63) [21]
Once the systems, structures, and components that are within the
scope of the license renewal rule are identified, the applicant must
identify those structures and components that are subject to an
AMR. Structures and components subject to an AMR are those that
are passive and long-lived. Passive structures and components per-
form their intended function without moving parts or without a
change in configuration or properties. Long-lived structures and
components are those that are not subject to replacement based on a
qualified life or a specified time period. Passive and long-lived struc-
tures and components include the reactor vessel, reactor coolant sys-
tem piping, steam generators, pressurizer, pump casings, valve bod-
ies, containment building, electrical cables, and electrical cabinets.
The NRC determined that structures and components with only
active functions could be generically excluded from a license
renewal review, because functional degradation resulting from the
detrimental effects of aging in active components is more readily
detected and corrected by routine surveillance, performance indi-
cators, and maintenance. Surveillance and maintenance programs
for active components are required throughout the period of
extended operation. Active components include equipment such
as motors, diesel generators, control rod drives, cooling fans,
switchgear, breakers, batteries, relays, and switches.
The LRA must contain a list of all structures and components
subject to an AMR and a description of the methodology used to
identify them. The application must also identify the materials of
construction, the environment in which the structure or compo-
nent must function, and all potential aging effects. The applicant
is then required to demonstrate that aging management programs
(AMPs) exist such that the effects of aging are managed so that
the intended functions of those structures and components will be
maintained for the period of extended operation.
For some passive structures and components within the scope
of the renewal evaluation, no additional action may be required
where an applicant can demonstrate that the existing programs
provide adequate aging management throughout the period of
extended operation. However, if additional aging management
activities are warranted for a structure or component within the
scope of the rule, applicants will have the flexibility to determine
appropriate actions. These activities could include, for example,
adding new monitoring programs or increasing inspections.
42.3.1.3 TLAA. Another requirement for license renewal is the
identification and update of TLAA. During the design phase for a
plant, certain assumptions about the length of time the plant would
be operated are made and incorporated into design calculations of
certain plant systems, structures, and components. Under a
renewed license, these calculations must be shown to be valid for
the period of extended operation.
TLAA are defined as those licensee calculations and analyses
that meet all six of the following criteria:
(a) Involve systems, structures, and components within the
scope of the license renewal rule.
(b) Consider the effects of aging.
(c) Involve time-limited assumptions defined by the current
operating term (40 years).
(d) Are determined to be relevant by the licensee in making a
safety determination.
(e) Involve conclusions or provide the basis for conclusions
related to the capability of a system, structure, or compo-
nent to perform its intended functions.
(f) Are contained or incorporated by reference in the plant’s
current licensing basis.
The LRA must contain a list of all TLAAs that were identified.
The LRA must also contain a demonstration that each analysis
remains valid for the period of extended operation, has been pro-
jected to the end of the period of extended operation, or that the
effects of aging on the intended functions will be adequately man-
aged for the period of extended operation.
Typical TLAAs that must be evaluated include reactor vessel
neutron embrittlement, metal fatigue, environmental qualification
of electrical equipment, concrete containment tendon prestress,
and containment liner plate and penetration sleeve fatigue.
42.3.2 Environmental Reviews
Environmental protection regulations were revised in December
1996 to facilitate the environmental review for LRAs. Certain
issues are evaluated generically for all plants rather than separately
in each plant’s LRA. The Generic Environmental Impact Statement
(GEIS) for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants [14] assesses the
scope and impact of environmental effects that would be associated
with license renewal at any nuclear power plant site. A plant-
specific supplement to the generic environmental impact statement
is required for each licensee who applies for license renewal.
The NRC performs plant-specific reviews of the environmental
impacts of license renewal in accordance with the National
Environmental Policy Act [10] and the requirements of 10 CFR
Part 51 [11]. A public meeting is held near the nuclear power
plant seeking renewal to scope out or identify environmental
issues specific to the plant for the license renewal action. The
result is an NRC recommendation on whether or not the environ-
mental impacts are so great that they should preclude license
renewal. This recommendation is presented in a plant-specific
draft supplement to the GEIS and is published for comment and
discussed at a separate public meeting. After consideration of
comments on the draft, the NRC prepares and publishes a final
plant-specific supplement to the GEIS.
The NRC issued a supplement to the Environmental Standard
Review Plan [15], which provides guidance on how to review the
environmental portions of renewal applications. The NRC also
issued a supplement to the Environmental Regulatory Guide [16],
identifying the format and content of environmental reports that
must accompany LRAs.
42.4 LRA
LRAs are prepared to provide the administrative, technical, and
environmental information required by 10 CFR Part 54 [8] and 10
CFR Part 51 [11] to support the renewal of the operating license
for nuclear power plants.
The format and content of the LRA follows the recommenda-
tion of the Regulatory Guide [24], which endorses the NEI guid-
ance document [5]. The following sections and appendices are the
essential portions of the LRA:
(a) Section 2.0 of the LRA, “Scoping and Screening
Methodology for Identifying the Structures and
Components Subject to Aging Management Review
Implementation Results,” provides the scoping and screen-
ing results for those components, structural members, and
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32 • Chapter 42
commodity groups that are subject to AMR. Tables are nor-
mally provided in the LRA to identify those plant systems
and structures that are and are not in the scope of license
renewal.
(b) Section 3.0 of the LRA, “Aging Management Review
Results,” describes the results of the aging management
reviews (AMRs) for the components and structures requir-
ing them and includes a comparison of these results with the
evaluation in the GALL Report [29].
(c) Section 4.0 of the LRA, “Time-Limited Aging Analyses,”
includes a list of TLAAs, as defined by 10 CFR 54.3. Also,
it includes the identification of the component or subject,
and an explanation of the time-dependent aspects of the
calculation or analysis.
(d) Appendix A of the LRA, “Final Safety Analysis Report
Supplement,” contains a summary description of the pro-
grams for managing the effects of aging for the period
of extended operation. A summary description of the evalu-
ation of TLAAs for the period of extended operation is also
included. The license renewal commitments are identified
in a license renewal commitment table.
(e) Appendix B of the LRA, “Aging Management Programs
and Activities,” describes the aging management programs
(AMPs) used for managing the aging effects on structures
and components within the scope of license renewal and
demonstrates that the aging effects are managed such that
the structures and components continue to perform their
intended functions consistent with the current licensing
basis for the period of extended operation. Where the AMPs
are consistent with corresponding programs in the GALL
Report [29], the appropriate GALL Report program is
referenced.
42.4.1 Scoping and Screening Methodology
The applicant, in the integrated plant assessment (IPA),
describes and justifies methods used to identify those passive,
long-lived structures and components subject to an AMR. The
identification of the systems, structures, and components (SSCs)
within the scope of license renewal is called “scoping.” For those
SSCs within the scope of license renewal, the identification of
passive, long-lived structures and components that are subject to
an AMR is called “screening.” To verify that the applicant has
properly implemented scoping and screening methodology, the
staff reviews the implementation results.
42.4.1.1 Scoping. To determine the safety-related SSCs that are
within the scope of the rule under 10 CFR 54.4 (a)(1), the applicant
must identify those SSCs that are relied upon to remain functional
during and following DBEs, consistent with the CLB to ensure the
required functions defined in para. 42.3.1.2. Most licensees have
developed lists or a database that identify SSCs relied upon for com-
pliance with other regulations in a manner consistent with the CLB.
Under the rule of 10 CFR 54.4 (a)(2), all non-safety-related SSCs
whose failure could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of any of
the functions identified in 10 CFR 54.4 (a)(1) are within the scope
of license renewal. By rule 10 CFR 54.4 (a)(3), all SSCs relied upon
in safety analysis to perform a function that demonstrates compli-
ance with the regulations for fire protection, environmental
qualification, pressurized thermal shock, anticipated transients with-
out scram, and station blackout are also within the scope.
The applicant need not consider technical specifications and
applicable limiting conditions of operation when scoping for
license renewal. Rather, those SSCs governed by an applicant’s
technical specifications that are relied upon to remain functional
during a DBE, as identified within the applicant’s updated FSAR,
applicable NRC regulations, license conditions, NRC orders, and
exemptions, need to be included within the scope of license renewal.
For licensee responses to NRC bulletins, generic letters, or
enforcement actions; those documented in staff SEs or LERs; and
those that make up the remainder of an applicant’s CLB, many of
the associated SSCs need not be considered under license renew-
al. However, any generic communication, safety evaluation, or
licensee commitment that specifically identifies or describes a
function associated with an SSC necessary to fulfill the require-
ment of a particular regulation, order, license condition, and/or
exemption may need to be considered when scoping for license
renewal. An applicant may take an approach in scoping and
screening that combines similar components from various systems.
42.4.1.2 Screening. Once the SSCs within the scope of license
renewal have been identified, the next step is to determine which
structures and components are subject to an AMR.
42.4.1.2.1 Passive. The applicant’s methodology shall ensure
that passive structures and components are identified as those that
perform their intended functions without moving parts or a change
in configuration or properties. The description of passive may also
be interpreted to include structures and components that do not
display a change in state. The reviewer verifies that the applicant’s
screening methodology includes consideration of the intended
functions of structures and components consistent with the plant
CLB. The license renewal rule focuses on passive structures and
components because they generally do not have performance and
condition characteristics that are as readily observable.
42.4.1.2.2 Long-Lived. The applicant’s methodology shall
ensure that long-lived structures and components are identified as
those that are not subject to periodic replacement based on a
qualified life or specified time period. Passive structures and com-
ponents that are not replaced on the basis of a qualified life or
specified time period require an AMR. Replacement programs
may be based on vendor recommendations, plant experience, or
any means that establishes a specific replacement frequency under
a controlled program. Structures and components that are replaced
on the basis of performance or condition are not generically
excluded from an AMR. Rather, performance or condition moni-
toring may be evaluated later in the integrated plant assessment as
programs to ensure functionality during the period of extended
operation.
42.4.1.3 Review Process
42.4.1.3.1 Scoping. The scoping methodology used by the
applicant should be consistent with the process described in
Section 3.0, “Identify the SSCs Within the Scope of License
Renewal and Their Intended Functions,” of the NEI guideline doc-
ument [5], endorsed by the license renewal regulatory guide [24],
or the justification provided by the applicant for any exceptions.
42.4.1.3.2 Screening. The screening methodology used by the
applicant should be consistent with the process described in
Section 4.1, “Identification of Structures and Components Subject
to an Aging Management Review and Intended Functions,” of the
NEI guidance document [5].
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 33
42.4.1.3.3 Review Procedures. Preparation for the review of the
scoping and screening methodology should include the following:
(a) Review of the NRC’s safety evaluation report (SER) for
the initial operating license for the purpose of familiar-
ization with the principal design criteria for the facility
and its CLB.
(b) Review of Chapters 1 through 12 of the updated FSAR and
the facility’s technical specifications for the purposes of
familiarization with the facility design and the nomenclature.
(c) Review of Chapter 15 (or equivalent) of the updated FSAR
to identify the anticipated operational occurrences and pos-
tulated accidents that are explicitly evaluated in the accident
analyses for the facility.
(d) Review of the set of design basis events as defined in the
rule is not limited to Chapter 15 (or equivalent) of the
updated FSAR.
(e) Review of the facility’s probabilistic risk analysis (PRA)
summary report that was prepared by the licensee in
response to Generic Letter (GL) 88-20 “Individual Plant
Examination (IPE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities – 10
CFR 50.54(f),” November 23, 1988 [13].
(f) Review of the results of facility’s individual plant examina-
tion of external events (IPEEE) study conducted as a follow-
up to the IPE to identify any changes or modifications made
to the facility.
(g) Review of the applicant’s docketed correspondence related
to the following:
(1) fire protection
(2) environmental qualification of electric equipment
(3) fracture toughness requirements for protection against
pressurized thermal shocks
(4) requirements for reduction of risk from anticipated tran-
sients without scram
(5) loss of all alternating current power (applicable to PWR
plants only)
42.4.2 AMR Process and AMPs
The methodology used by the applicant should be consistent
with the process described in the latest revision of the NEI guid-
ance document [5], which is endorsed by the NRC in its regula-
tory guide [24]. Justifications shall be provided by the applicant
and accepted by the reviewers for any exceptions.
AMRs reported by the applicant in the LRA are structured in
three component groups: aging management evaluations that are
consistent with the GALL Report, for which no further evaluation
is required; aging management evaluations that are consistent with
the GALL Report, for which further evaluation is recommended;
and AMR results that are not consistent with the GALL Report.
The staff reviews the applicant’s evaluation for each component
group to determine whether conclusions are accurate and justified.
For aging management evaluations that are consistent with the
GALL Report and for which further evaluation is recommended,
the staff verifies whether or not it adequately addressed the issues
for which the GALL Report recommended further evaluation. The
following demonstrate typical aging management evaluations of
auxiliary systems for which further evaluation is recommended:
(a) loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice
corrosion
(b) hardening and cracking or loss of strength due to elastomer
degradation or loss of material due to wear
(c) cumulative fatigue damage
(d) crack initiation and growth due to cracking or stress corro-
sion cracking
(e) loss of material due to general, microbiologically influenced
pitting and crevice corrosion
(f) loss of material due to general, galvanic, pitting, and crevice
corrosion
(g) loss of material due to general, pitting, crevice, and micro-
biologically influenced corrosion and biofouling
(h) quality assurance for aging management of non-safetyrelat-
ed components
(i) crack initiation and growth due to stress corrosion cracking
and cyclic loading
(j) reduction of neutron-absorbing capacity and loss of materi-
al due to general corrosion
(k) loss of material due to general, pitting, crevice, and micro-
biologically influenced corrosion
42.4.2.1 AMRs. The staff verifies that the AMRs reported by
the applicant to be consistent with the GALL Report are consistent
with the GALL Report, and verifies that the plant-specific AMRs
reported to be justified on the basis of an NRC-approved precedent
are technically acceptable and applicable. For component groups
evaluated in the GALL Report for which the applicant claimed
consistency with the GALL Report, and for which the GALL
Report recommended further evaluation, the staff reviews the fur-
ther evaluation summarized in the LRA to determine whether or
not it adequately addressed these issues. The AMRs reviewed by
the staff are either consistent with the GALL Report, justified by
the applicant on the basis of an NRC-approved precedent, or
justified by the applicant on a plant-specific basis.
The applicant is required to provide a summary of AMRs for
the applicable systems, which include structures and components,
associated materials, environment, aging effects requiring man-
agement, and an AMP for each line item in LRA tables. Notes in
the table describe how the information in the LRA aligns with the
information in the GALL Report. Those AMRs that are defined in
the GALL Report are assigned standard notes with letters A
through J (described in Table 42.1) consistent with the GALL
Report classification. Those notes defined by the applicant are
assigned numbers and are defined in the LRA. For any discrepan-
cies or issues discovered by the staff during the audit and review
process that require a response on the docket are documented in
an audit and review report a request for additional information
(RAI) is to be prepared by the staff describing the issue and the
information needed to disposition the issue. The RAI will be
included and dispositioned in the SER related to the plant LRA.
42.4.2.2 AMP. For those AMPs for which the applicant claims
consistency with the GALL AMPs, the staff conducts an audit to
verify that the applicant’s AMPs are consistent with the AMPs in
the GALL Report. For each AMP that has one or more deviations,
the staff evaluates each deviation to determine the following:
(a) whether the deviation is acceptable
(b) whether the AMP, as modified, would adequately manage
the aging effect(s) for which it is credited
For AMPs that are not evaluated in the GALL Report, the staff
must fully justify the adequacy of the plant-specific AMPs. The
applicant evaluates the AMPs against the ten program elements
defined in SRP-LR Appendix A (see Table 42.2).
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34 • Chapter 42
TABLE 42.1 CONSISTENT WITH GALL REPORT CLASSIFICATION
42.4.2.3 AMP/AMR Audits. A significant portion of the
review and audit of AMPs and AMRs are performed at the plant
site with the intention to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness
of the LRA review process. In addition to the review of consisten-
cy with the GALL Report, consistency with previously approved
AMPs/AMRs is also reviewed onsite. For those AMPs that the
applicant claims are consistent with the GALL Report, an audit
team of NRC staff and contractors review and audit the appli-
cant’s work and conclusions onsite. The audits are performed in
accordance with the procedure and methodology described in a
plant-specific audit plan. The applicant’s internal documents,
including the basis document, engineering calculations, condition
reports, corrective actions, and other supporting references, are
reviewed onsite. The applicant’s staff involved in the preparation
of the basis document and the LRA are interviewed by the audit
team members. The face-to-face discussions between the applicant
and NRC staff enable the staff to resolve most of the questions
which, in turn, minimizes the number of requests for additional
information and expedites the review process.
The audit results are documented in an audit report that is refer-
enced in a plant-specific SER. The AMP/AMR review and audit
logic is showed in Figs. 42.1 through 42.4.
42.4.3 TLAA
The requirement for the identification and update of TLAAs is
discussed in Section 2.1.3 of the SRP-LR. Typical TLAAs that
must be evaluated include reactor vessel neutron embrittlement,
metal fatigue, environmental qualification of electrical equipment,
concrete containment tendon prestress, and containment liner
plate and penetration sleeve fatigue. This section focuses on the
discussion of metal fatigue.
42.4.3.1 Metal Fatigue. Fatigue protection for SSCs of
nuclear power plants is provided either through explicit rules
defined in the ASME BPVC Section III [1] or through implicit
rules defined in the USAS B31.1 Code [25]. Fatigue damage, mea-
sured in terms of cumulative usage factor (CUF), is calculated
using the design fatigue curves defined in the ASME Code.
NUREG/CR-6260 [26] provides an environmental fatigue evalua-
tion of select components for representative plants using the inter-
im fatigue curves presented in NUREG/CR-5999 [4]. The GALL
Report recommends the assessment of the reactor coolant environ-
mental impact on a sample of critical components that includes, as
a minimum, those presented in NUREG/CR-6260. The assessment
applies the correction factors (Fen) to obtain the environmentally
adjusted fatigue usage. Acceptable means for calculating Fen are
contained in NUREG/CR-6583 [2] and NUREG/CR-5704 [3].
The Fen method includes using the results of existing Code
fatigue analysis. For plants where explicit fatigue analyses were
performed, the application of the Fen is straightforward. However,
when pressure boundary piping was designed to the implicit rules
of the ASME B31.1 Code, a process needs to be established to
assess or calculate fatigue usage factors at critical locations.
(a) Critical Locations. The GALL Report contains an AMP to
monitor and track the number of critical temperature and pres-
sure transients for the effects of the coolant environment on the
fatigue life for a sample of critical components that includes,
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 35
TABLE 42.2 ELEMENTS OF AN AGING MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
as a minimum, those components presented in NUREG/
CR-6260. Also, a review should be performed to identify addi-
tional locations for which transient monitoring may be
necessary to ensure that the fatigue design limit is not exceed-
ed during the period of extended operation.
(b) Operating Transients. CLB fatigue analysis was performed
using design transients and the associated cycles. TLAA
fatigue analysis may use the actual operating transients to
perform its CUF evaluation. The operating transient experi-
ence has to be review to ensure that all transients, including
those unanticipated transients during design stage, has to be
addressed.
Some applicant’s TLAA used current operating transient
CUF result to project CUF for early operation. This
approach has to provide adequate justification, since opera-
tion procedures may have been modified. For example,
PWR surge line stratification transients are changed due to
modification of operation procedures.
(c) Fatigue Monitoring. Each plant may have to implement a
fatigue monitoring program (FMP) for all significant plant
transients. The GALL Report recommended FMP is an
acceptable aging management program to address metal
fatigue of the reactor coolant system components accord-
ing to 10 CFR 54.21(c) (1) (iii). Cycle-based FMP and
stress-based FMP are most commonly presented by LRA
applicants. The cycle based FMP tracks and monitors tran-
sient cycles to ensure that the assumed cycles of design
transients in the fatigue analysis are not exceeded. If a
specified alarm limit is reached, a correct action program
will be initiated. The stress-based FMP has the ability to
compute a real time stress history for a given components
from actual temperature, pressure transient data. Fatigue
usage is then evaluated from the stress history. The stress-
based method involves developing transfer function/
Green’s function to convert plant data to stress versus time
for a given component.
In one of the NRC’s safety evaluation reports (SERs) of
License Renewal, the SER describes that applicant using a
specific stress-based FMP software could underestimate the
CUF. This specific stress-based software implement Green’s
function input which assumes that shear stress components
are negligible. This specific implementation is simplified
NB-3200 analysis for regular piping as stated in NB-3653.2
of ASME Code Section III. It is numerically adequate for
pipe/safe-end when non-axisymmetric loading not applica-
ble. This implementation may not be valid for those loca-
tions with geometric discontinuity or non-axisymmetric
load cases (e.g, thermal stratifications), which may cause
significant shear stress. Moreover, it is difficult to determine
the threshold for when shear stresses are negligible. The
SER stated that the way of this specific software calculated
stress intensity is inconsistent with the ASME Code.
Therefore, it is very important to ensure that the method
used in stress-based software is adequate.
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36 • Chapter 42

FIG. 42.1 AUDIT OF AMPS CONSISTENT WITH THE GALL REPORT

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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 37

FIG 42.2 AUDIT OF PLANT-SPECIFIC AMPs

(d) Environmentally Assisted Fatigue (EAF) Evaluation. The
GALL Report addresses the effects of the reactor coolant
environment on component fatigue life by applying a fatigue
life correction factor Fen, which is the ratio of life in water at
the service temperature to that in air at room temperature. The
usage factor for a specific load pair is multiplied by the cor-
rection factor Fen. Formulas for calculating Fen are contained
in NUREG/CR-6583 [2] and NUREG/CR-5704 [3].
The following three options are identified for calculating Fen:
(1) single-factor multiplication to the CUF
(2) simplified method (using average strain rate to calculate Fen
for each load pair)
(3) detailed method (using average strain rate to calculate Fen
for each time interval)
Option (2) is the most economical way to address the effects of
reactor coolant environment.
Discussions on using an FMP to address the environmental
effects on high-CUF components have been presented in many
LRAs. A reevaluation of the fatigue usage factors at critical
locations will be performed prior to the period of extended oper-
ation to determine the bounding locations that will be included
in the FMP.
The aging management approach developed for the locations
with CUF exceeding design limit of 1.0 could include one or
more of the following options:
(1) further refinement of the fatigue analysis to lower the
CUF(s) below 1.0
(2) repair of the affected locations
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38 • Chapter 42
FIG. 42.3 AMR REVIEW PROCESS, CONSISTENT WITH GALL REPORT
(3) replacement of the affected locations
(4) management of the effects of fatigue through an inspection
program that has been reviewed and approved by the NRC
(e.g., periodic nondestructive examination of affected loca-
tions at inspection intervals to be determined by a method
accepted by the NRC)
If option (4) is selected, the inspection details, including scope,
qualification, method, and frequency, must be provided to the
NRC for review and approval prior to the commencement of the
period of extended operation. Several recently submitted LRAs
applied the combination of FMP, online CUF calculations, and the
environmental correction factor Fen to CUF. All high-fatigue loca-
tions are to be qualified to the Code limit of 1.0 for 60-year life
considering the environmental effect. Some programs included
plant-specific locations beyond those defined in NUREG/CR-
6260 [26]. When option (1) alone does the job, the more costly
and time-consuming options (2) through (4) are not required.
42.4.4 FSAR Supplement
The application for a renewed operating license is required by
10 CFR 54.21(d) to include an FSAR supplement that provides a
summary description of the programs and activities for managing
the effects of aging for the period of extended operation. A sum-
mary description of the evaluation of TLAAs for the period of
extended operation must also be included, as well as a list of the
license renewal commitments.
42.4.5 Issues of Interest
License renewal permits the applicant to operate a facility up to
20 years beyond the initial 40-year license term. Although the
license renewal process and staff’s review relies on the principle
that the CLB is adequate to ensure safe operation, additional
aging management issues could be identified based on operating
experience that warrant consideration for license renewal. During
the review of LRAs, issues may be identified affecting current as
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 39

FIG. 42.4 AMA REVIEW PROCESS, CONSISTENT WITH PRECEDENT

well as future operation (for the period of extended operation). (c) medium voltage underground cable testing
The following are some examples: (d) steam Generator tube integrity
(e) small bore piping ISI
(a) environmental impact on fatigue (f) fuse holder AMP
(b) alloy 600/PWSCC issues (g) reactor internal loose-parts-monitoring program
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40 • Chapter 42

FIG. 42.5 INTERIM STAFF GUIDANCE PROCESS FLOW CHART

42.5 INTERIM STAFF GUIDANCE (ISG) 42.6 GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS

PROCESS
The objective of the ISG process is to capture lessons learned
from license renewal reviews and communicate them to stake-
holders. The process (see Fig. 42.5) includes interaction with stake-
holders during the development of the ISG, including publishing of
a Federal Register notice for comment. If the ISG is approved,
then an applicant for a renewed license needs to address the issue.
Also, the ISG will be incorporated into the next revision of the
license renewal guidance (LRG) documents.
42.6.1 Standard Review Plan for License Renewal
The NRC uses standard review plans to process licensing
actions. Standard review plans specify the quality requirements for
performing licensing review activities and provide the framework
to ensure that staff reviews are uniformly conducted. Standard
review plans provide guidance to NRC staff performing applica-
tion reviews. This standardized guidance ensures that the staff
reviews are consistently applied to all applicants for renewal. It
defines how the review of an application should be and presents a
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 41
well-defined approach for evaluating AMPs and similar activities.
The SRP-LR also serves as a source of information to the nuclear
power industry and members of the public who are interested in
the regulatory review process governing license renewal. It is not a
requirement for the applicant to follow the SRP-LR format or sug-
gestions, but the guidance facilitates staff reviews. The SRP-LR
incorporates the GALL Report by reference and focuses the NRC
review on areas where existing programs need to be augmented or
further evaluated for license renewal as recommended in the
GALL Report.
The SRP-LR is divided into the following four major chapters:
(a) administrative information
(b) scoping and screening methodology
(c) AMR results
(d) TLAAs
The administrative information chapter provides criteria for
determining the sufficiency of an application for docketing. The
scoping and screening chapter focuses the staff’s review on the
applicant’s identification of passive and long-lived structures and
components. It also directs the staff to determine if the applicant
properly implemented a methodology to identify structures and
components subject to an AMR. The AMR chapter directs the
review staff to perform a consistent and thorough evaluation of
aging effects and AMPs provided in the application. The TLAA
chapter directs the staff to verify that all applicable TLAAs have
been included in an application and have been adequately evaluat-
ed for the period of extended operation.
An appendix to the SRP-LR contains branch technical positions,
which document the staff’s resolution of specific regulatory issues.
The SRP-LR can be applied to a wide variety of plant designs and
site conditions. It consists of multiple sections, each of which con-
tains complete procedures for performing staff reviews. For any
specific application, the staff may focus its review on particular
aspects of an SRP-LR section as appropriate to ensure an adequate
level of staff understanding to support a licensing decision.
Each SRP-LR section is organized into six subsections.
Subsection 1 governs the areas of review; it describes the SSCs,
analyses, data, or other information in the application that should be
reviewed. Subsection 2 identifies the acceptance criteria (applicable
NRC requirements) and defines the technical basis (e.g., by refer-
encing NRC regulatory guides, codes and standards, and branch
technical positions) for determining if an applicant’s proposal is
acceptable. Subsection 3 contains step-by-step review procedures
for verifying that applicable acceptance criteria have been met.
Subsection 4 governs evaluation findings and presents alternative
staff conclusions that may apply to a particular review area.
Subsection 5 addresses implementation of the SRP-LR by specify-
ing the conditions under which the SRP-LR can be applied as guid-
ance for the review of LRAs. Subsection 6 contains references.
42.6.2 GALL Report
The GALL Report evaluates existing programs generically to
document the conditions under which existing programs are con-
sidered adequate to manage identified aging effects without
change and the conditions under which existing programs should
be augmented for this purpose.
During the review of the first renewal application, the NRC and
industry recognized that many of the existing programs at the
plants could adequately manage aging effects for license renewal
without change. Therefore, the NRC staff undertook a generic
review and a technical evaluation of existing plant programs to
determine which ones would adequately manage aging effects
without change and which ones would need to be augmented.
These existing AMPs were evaluated against a set of ten element
criteria as defined in Branch Technical Position RLSB-1 in the
SRP-LR. Only those programs that passed the 10-element test
were accepted as adequate AMPs.
The GALL Report evaluates existing programs generically to
document the following:
(a) the conditions under which existing programs are considered
adequate to manage identified aging effects without change.
(b) the conditions under which existing programs should be
augmented for this purpose.
The GALL Report is referenced in the SRP-LR as the technical
basis for identifying those programs that warrant particular attention
during the NRC’s review of an LRA. The principal purposes of the
GALL Report are to ensure the quality and uniformity of reviews
and to present a well-defined base from which to evaluate renewal
applicant programs and activities for the period of extended opera-
tion. The GALL Report is also intended to make information about
regulatory matters widely available to enhance communication with
interested members of the public and the nuclear power industry.
The GALL Report is treated as an approved topical report.
Because the AMPs are already reviewed generically, the NRC
reviewers need not repeat their review of a matter described as
acceptable in the GALL Report, but would ensure that the materi-
al presented in the GALL Report is applicable to the specific plant
involved. The reviewer would also ensure that the applicant-iden-
tified AMPs are consistent with the AMPs evaluated in the GALL
Report, if they rely on the report for license renewal.
42.6.3 Regulatory Guide
The NRC also issued the license renewal regulatory guide [24],
which provides applicants with the format and content for an
LRA. The regulatory guide endorses the NEI guidance document
[5]. The SRP-LR sections are numbered consistently using the
regulatory guide standard format.
42.6.4 License Renewal Guidance Documents
Updates
Since the publication of the guidance documents in July 2001, the
NRC staff has completed a significant number of LRA reviews.
During the course of its evaluation, both the NRC staff and applicants
have gained valuable lessons in preparing and reviewing LRAs. The
lessons learned have been in both technical and procedural areas. To
document these lessons learned and to incorporate additional staff
positions established on current issues of interest, an update of these
guidance documents was initiated. A draft of the revised documents
was published for public comment in January 2005. The revised final
guidance documents were published in 2005; two companion docu-
ments were published at the same time. The first document, Analysis
of Public Comments on the Revised License Renewal Guidance
Documents (NUREG-1832) [28], addresses all comments received
during the public comment period for the revised guidance docu-
ments. The second document, Technical Bases for Revision to the
License Renewal Guidance Documents (NUREG-1833) [27], pro-
vides staff positions and technical justifications that provide the bases
for the changes to the guidance documents.
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42 • Chapter 42
42.7 INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES
With the success of U.S. license renewal programs, the interest
on the program has increased among the international nuclear
utilities. The International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA)
has taken the lead to organize the international efforts to generate
guidance documents for its member states. Working groups were
set up to collect ideas and recommendations on safety aspects of
long-term operation of water-moderated reactors. The NRC staff
has been supporting IAEA at all levels and sharing the U.S. expe-
rience by placing license renewal–related documents on the
NRC’s Web site www.nrc.gov.
The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the Authors
and do not represent the position of USNRC.
42.8 REFERENCES
1. ASME BPVC Section III, Nuclear Power Plant Components. In:
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. New York: American Society
of Mechanical Engineers; 1989.
2. Chopra O, Shack WJ. Effects of LWR Coolant Environments on
Fatigue Design Curves of Carbon and Low-Alloy Steels
(NUREG/CR-6583). Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission; 1998.
3. Chopra O. Effects of LWR Coolant Environments on Fatigue Design
Curves of Austenitic Stainless Steels (NUREG/CR-5704).
Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; 1999.
4. Majumdar S, Chopra O, Shack WJ. Interim Fatigue Design Curves for
Carbon, Low-Alloy, and Austenitic Stainless Steels in LWR
Environments (NUREG/CR-5999). Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission; 1993.
5. Nuclear Energy Institute Industry Guideline for Implementing the
Requirements of 10 CFR Part 54: The License Renewal Rule (NEI
95–10).
6. Nuclear Power Plant Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL),
Volumes 1 and 2 (NUREG/CR-6490). Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission; 1996.
7. U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
8. CFR Title 10, Part 54, Requirements for Renewal of Operating
Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants. In: Code of Federal Regulations.
Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration’s
(NARA) Office of the Federal Register (OFR)/Government Printing
Office (GPO); 2005.
9. CFR Title 10, Part 50, Section 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring
the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants. In: Code of
Federal Regulations. Washington, DC: National Archives and
Records Administration’s (NARA) Office of the Federal Register
(OFR)/Government Printing Office (GPO); 2005.
10. U.S. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.
11. CFR Title 10, Part 51, Environmental Protection Regulations for
Domestic Licensing and Related Regulatory Functions. In: Code of
Federal Regulations. Washington, DC: National Archives and
Records Administration’s (NARA) Office of the Federal Register
(OFR)/Government Printing Office (GPO); 2005.
12. U.S. NRC Bulletin 88-11, Pressurizer Surge Line Thermal Stratification.
Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; 1988.
13. U.S. NRC Generic Letter (GL) 88-20, Individual Plant Examination
(IPE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities: 10 CFR 50.54(f).
Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; 1988.
14. U.S. NRC Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License
Renewal of Nuclear Plants (NUREG-1437). Washington, DC: U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission; 1996, 1999.
15. U.S. NRC Standard Review Plans for Environmental Reviews for
Nuclear Power Plants, Supplement 1 (NUREG-1555). Washington,
DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; 2000.
16. U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 4.2, Preparation of Supplemental
Environmental Reports for Applications to Renew Nuclear Power
Plant Operating Licenses, Supplement 1. Washington, DC: U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission; 2000.
17. CFR Title 10, Part 50, Section 50.48, Fire Protection. In: Code of
Federal Regulations. Washington, DC: National Archives and
Records Administration’s (NARA) Office of the Federal Register
(OFR)/Government Printing Office (GPO); 2005.
18. CFR Title 10, Part 50, Section 50.49, Environmental Qualification of
Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants. In:
Code of Federal Regulations. Washington, DC: National Archives and
Records Administration’s (NARA) Office of the Federal Register
(OFR)/Government Printing Office (GPO); 2005.
19. CFR Title 10, Part 50, Section 50.61, Fracture Toughness
Requirements for Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock
Events. In: Code of Federal Regulations. Washington, DC: National
Archives and Records Administration’s (NARA) Office of the Federal
Register (OFR)/Government Printing Office (GPO); 2005.
20. CFR Title 10, Part 50, Section 50.62, Requirements for Reduction of
Risk from Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS) Events for
Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants. In: Code of Federal
Regulations. Washington, DC: National Archives and Records
Administration’s (NARA) Office of the Federal Register
(OFR)/Government Printing Office (GPO); 2005.
21. CFR Title 10, Part 50, Section 50.63, Loss of All Alternating
Current Power. In: Code of Federal Regulations. Washington, DC:
National Archives and Records Administration’s (NARA) Office of
the Federal Register (OFR)/Government Printing Office (GPO);
2005.
22. U.S. NRC Standard Review Plan for Review of License Renewal
Applications for Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG-1800), Revision 1.
Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; 2005.
23. U.S. NRC Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL) Report
(NUREG1801). Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission; 2001.
24. U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.188, Standard Format and Content
for Applications to Renew Nuclear Power Plant Operating
Licenses. Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission;
2001.
25. USAS B31.1, Power Piping Code. New York: American Society of
Mechanical Engineers; 1967.
26. Ware AG, Morton DK, Nitzel ME. Application of NUREG/CR-5999
Interim Fatigue Curves to Selected Nuclear Power Plant Components
(NUREG/CR-6260). Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission; 1995.
27. US NRC Technical Bases for Revision to the License Renewal
Guidance Documents (NUREG-1833). Washington, D.C: U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission; 2005.
28. US NRC Analysis of Public Comments on the Revised License
Renewal Guidance Documents (NUREG-1832). Washington, D.C:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; 2005.
29. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, Generic Aging
Lessons Learned (GALL) Report, NUREG-1801, Revision 1,
September 2005.
ASME_Ch43_p043-062.qxd 6/3/09 9:37 AM Page 43
PWR REACTOR VESSEL INTEGRITY
AND INTERNALS AGING MANAGEMENT
43.1 INTRODUCTION
The integrity of the reactor pressure vessel is critical to plant
safety. A failure of the vessel is beyond the design basis.
Therefore, the design requirements for vessels have significant
margins to prevent brittle or ductile failure under all anticipated
operating conditions. The early vessels in the United States were
designed to meet the requirements of ASME BPVC Section VIII.
The design requirements for these vessels were supplemented by
special requirements based on earlier U.S. Navy design experi-
ences. In general, the allowable stress limits were lower than ves-
sels designed to later ASME BPVC Section III requirements. The
early design codes did not include the rigorous fracture toughness
requirements found in today’s codes. Section VIII relied on a
“fracture-safe” design approach, which sought to ensure that pres-
sure vessels were operated in a temperature regime (upper-shelf
region) where small flaws or cracks would not affect the load-
carrying capacity of the structure.
As Section III of the ASME Code was developed, many of the
early special requirements were incorporated and used to update
the earlier requirements of Section VIII. Section III included
requirements for more detailed design stress analyses than did
Section VIII. Thus, the explicit design safety factor could be
reduced without reducing the actual margin against vessel failure.
Section III also included a fracture mechanics approach to estab-
lish operating pressure-temperature heat up and cooldown curves
and to ensure adequate margins of safety against brittle or ductile
failure incorporating the nil-ductility reference temperature index,
RTNDT, that was correlated to the material reference toughness.
Radiation embrittlement is a known degradation mechanism in
ferritic steels, and the beltline region of reactor pressure vessels is
particularly susceptible to irradiation damage. To predict the level
of embrittlement in a reactor pressure vessel, trend curve predic-
tion methods are used for projecting the shift in RTNDT as a func-
tion of material chemistry and fluence at the vessel wall. Because
the ASME Code does not include trend curves for prediction of
embrittlement, the NRC issued Regulatory Guide 1.99. Revision
2 of this Regulatory Guide is being used by all plants for predict-
ing RTNDT shift in determining heatup and cooldown limits and
hydrostatic test limits.
In 1988, the ASME Code approved the Section XI Nonmandatory
Appendix G, Fracture Toughness Criteria for Protection Against
Failure [1]. This appendix replaced the Section III, Appendix G
CHAPTER
43
Timothy J. Griesbach
[2] for heatup and cooldown limits in operating plants when it
became mandatory according to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G,
Fracture Toughness Requirements [3]. Since the inclusion of
Appendix G in ASME BPVC Section XI, the appendix has been
updated several times to use more up-to-date technology for
determining stress intensity factors, safety margins, and material
reference fracture toughness. While incorporating these technical
changes, the philosophy of protecting the vessel against brittle
fracture has remained the same.
As plants age, the effect of radiation damage on vessel materi-
als has caused a narrowing of operating heatup and cooldown lim-
its for PWRs and an increase of the hydrostatic test temperatures
for BWRs, which may cause hardships for plant operation. The
requirements for low-temperature overpressure protection (LTOP)
systems for PWRs also reduce the operating window for plants.
Improvements in the Code methods for determining the heatup
and cooldown limit curves have provided some relief from the
narrowing window of operation. However, the possible future
changes to embrittlement trend curves based on new embrittle-
ment data may negate the benefits obtained from the improve-
ments in Section XI, Appendix G.
For example, the NRC is planning to issue draft Revision 3 of
Regulatory Guide 1.99 in 2009. Preliminary versions of the
revised embrittlement trend curve model show higher predicted
RTNDT shifts than Regulatory Guide 1.99, Rev. 2 for the limiting
materials in many BWR vessels. The corresponding increase in
Adjusted Reference Temperature (ART) causes a change in the
P-T limit curves for heatup/cooldown and hydrotest conditions. In
some cases, plants may have to perform the system hydrotest at
temperatures exceeding 212°F (i.e., boiling at atmospheric pres-
sure) in order to maintain the ASME Code safety margins for
prevention of vessel brittle fracture. This issue will need to be
revisited by the ASME Code Section XI Working Group on
Operating Plant Criteria.
Another aspect of ensuring reactor vessel integrity is character-
izing the actual toughness of the reactor vessel materials. Because
sampling of the vessel is not a realistic option, using surveillance
sample coupons to measure a toughness may be the best available
source for irradiated vessel material data. However, small speci-
mens do not provide a representative constraint for large speci-
mens or structures, so the data must be characterized according to
a Master Toughness curve. The alternative Master Curve
approach, recently approved by ASTM and the ASME BPVC,
ASME_Ch43_p043-062.qxd 6/3/09 9:37 AM Page 44
44 • Chapter 43
provides a measured To value that relates the measured fracture
toughness data directly to the Master Curve reference toughness.
The ASTM test method was specifically developed to provide a
reliable measure of fracture toughness transition temperature, To,
that is independent of specimen size. This will have direct
benefits for determining plant heatup and cooldown limits.
Related discussions of pressure vessel integrity margins in the
French and Japanese Codes are given in Chapters 49 and 50,
respectively.
43.2 CODES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE
PREVENTION OF BRITTLE
FRACTURE
43.2.1 10 CFR 50, Appendix G
The rules and regulations governing the licensing of nuclear
facilities are contained in Title 10, Part 50 of the U.S. Code
of Federal Regulations. In particular, Appendix G, Fracture
Toughness Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors [3], and
Appendix H, Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program Requirements
[4], define applicable rules and reference the Codes and Standards
that determine the methods of compliance and margins to be
maintained for prevention of vessel fracture. The requirements of
Appendices G and H became effective on August 16, 1973, when
the fracture mechanics concepts for prevention of brittle fracture
were fully adopted.
The basis for these regulations first came from the recommen-
dations of the PVRC Task Group on Toughness Requirements
that was formed in 1971. The charter of the PVRC Task Group
was as follows:
To recommend, on the basis of current knowledge, criteria for
ferritic material toughness requirements for pressure-retaining
components of the reactor pressure boundary, which will permit
the establishment of safe procedures for operating nuclear reactor
components below 700F.
43.2.2 Section III, Appendix G and WRC 175
The Task Group completed a draft report and delivered it to the
PVRC, ASME, and AEC on August 13, 1971. The delivery to
the AEC was, in part, a response to their proposal for new
toughness requirements, which had been published in July 1971
in the Federal Register. The ASME Code approved, with some
modifications, the new requirements proposed by the PVRC Task
Group in January 1972, which were then issued, first as Code
Case 1514, and subsequently as revisions to ASME BPVC
Section III, NB-2330 and a new Appendix G in the Summer 1972
Addenda of the Code. The PVRC Task Group draft report was
modified to be consistent with the ASME Code modifications and
the final draft was published as WRC 175 [5] in August 1972.
The key to this new approach was the establishment of the
fracture mechanics term of crack tip “stress intensity factor” (KI),
which can be compared to the measured material toughness
(Kcritical) as a function of reference temperature, RTNDT, to deter-
mine crack stability. The initial RTNDT values for all reactor vessel
beltline materials had to be measured or estimated from test data.
Critical values of K are determined from precracked specimen
tests loaded to failure, and the Charpy test specimens were stan-
dardized as the method of establishing an initial RTNDT and
changes in RTNDT due to irradiation. While not a true measure of
toughness, the Charpy test specimen results for energy to break the
specimen are correlated to a dynamic or static reference toughness
curve. In particular, the temperature to achieve either 30 ft-lb or 50
ft-lb of energy are the results determined from a series of Charpy
test specimens that are then correlated to the vessel material refer-
ence toughness. When adequate Code margins were included, this
approach permitted the safe design and operation of pressure ves-
sels for all anticipated normal and abnormal events.
This was the first time that a fracture mechanics – based
approach was used in the ASME Code, and it represented a sig-
nificant change in the design procedure for nuclear pressure ves-
sels, which is still being used today. It also provided a method for
establishing acceptable plant operating criteria for the prevention
of brittle fracture of the vessel. The Section III, Appendix G
approach established margins against failure in three areas:
(a) A reference toughness curve was adopted from a conserva-
tive lower bound of available fracture toughness data, desig-
nated as KIR, which is a function of temperature, for reactor
vessel steels.
(b) A very large (quarter-thickness) postulated reference flaw
was to be used in the analysis.
(c) A safety factor of 2 was applied to the calculated stress
intensity factor for pressure loading.
Each of these assumptions and procedures of the traditional
Appendix G method are discussed here in more detail.
43.2.2.1 KIR Index and Temperature Indexing. The basis for
the KIR curve was the available unirradiated dynamic and crack
arrest fracture toughness data from three heats of SA-533-B1 and
SA-508-2 steels. The KIR curve was established as an empirical
lower bound to the data that were normalized on a (T-RTNDT) scale.
RTNDT is intended to be a heat-normalizing parameter, and the pro-
cedure for obtaining the initial RTNDT is contained in ASME
BPVC, Section III, NB-2300 [6]. With the establishment of the KIR
curve for the lower-bound material toughness, the RTNDT for all
vessel materials was required to be measured in vessels that were
designed or fabricated to Code requirements after 1972. The same
requirements were not in place for those vessels prior to 1972, so
the initial RTNDT for those vessels had to be inferred from limited
data or bounded conservatively from generic data sets. The RTNDT
reference temperature index, adjusted to include the effects of radi-
ation damage, has become the single most important parameter in
determining the allowable (P-T) limits for plant operation and for
evaluation of reactor vessel integrity form severe events such as
pressurized thermal shock (PTS) transients.
43.2.2.2 Postulated Flaw Size and Location. For locations
away from discontinuities (e.g., the vessel beltline region), the
maximum postulated reference flaw is a semi-elliptical surface
crack oriented in the axial direction. This postulated flaw has a
depth of one-fourth of the section thickness and a length of 1.5
times the thickness. For sections less than 4-in. thick, a 1-in. deep
flaw is postulated. Smaller flaw sizes may be used on an individ-
ual case basis if a smaller size of maximum postulated flaw can be
ensured. However, no plants to date have been able to take credit
for smaller than a 14 -t flaw.
The relatively large quarter-thickness reference flaw size was
selected because a database did not exist at that time to assess
NDE reliability, and it was thought that the chosen reference flaw
was the largest flaw that could be missed by the inspection meth-
ods in use at that time. Another determining factor was the on-site
preservice hydrotest failure of a fossil vessel. In this instance,
ASME_Ch43_p043-062.qxd 6/3/09 9:37 AM Page 45
COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 45
failure resulted from a 3.5-in. deep by 13-in. long flaw that was
produced after weld repair. Although no NDE was performed on
this vessel after the repair, the failure was used as evidence that
large flaws could exist in vessels. Finally, the reference flaw was
considered to be an end-of-life flaw size that supposedly would
include any (unspecified) environment-induced subcritical crack
growth.
43.2.2.3 Factor of Safety. For normal and upset events (Levels
A and B), Appendix G to Section III of the Code adopted safety
factors within the range included in WRC 175, a safety factor of
2.0 on the stress intensity factor due to pressure (KIM) and a factor
of 1.0 on the thermal stress intensity factor (KIT). A safety factor of
2.0 for pressure is consistent with the Code margins for other
allowable loadings. The PVRC Task Group recommended the
lower factor of 1.0 on KIT in WRC 175 “due to its secondary and
self-relieving nature.”
ASME BPVC Section III, Appendix III became mandatory by
reference in Appendix G of 10 CFR Part 50; the BPVC appendix
defines the pressure-temperature requirements for vessel heatup
and cooldown when the core is critical. Supplemental require-
ments were added to 10 CFR Part 50 for the flange region and for
critical and noncritical core operation. For example, when the
core is not critical and when pressure exceeds 20% of the presser-
vice hydrostatic test pressure, the temperature of the closure
flange regions that are highly stressed by the bolt preload must
exceed the reference temperature of the material in those regions
by at least 120°F for normal operation and by 90F for hydrostat-
ic pressure tests and leak tests. When the core is critical (other
than for the purpose of low-level physics tests), the temperature of
the reactor vessel must not be lower than 40F above the mini-
mum permissible temperature established for noncritical opera-
tion, nor lower than the minimum permissible temperature for the
inservice system hydrostatic pressure test.
An exception was made for boiling-water reactor (BWR) ves-
sels when the water level is within the normal range for power
operation and the pressure is less than 20% of the service system
hydrostatic test pressure. In this case, the minimum permissible
temperature is 60F above the adjusted reference temperature of
the reactor vessel material in the region that is controlling. If there
is fuel in the reactor during hydrostatic pressure test or leak test,
the preceding requirements apply, depending on whether the core
is critical during the test.
In July 1973, the NRC established specific material surveil-
lance requirements by adding Appendix H, Reactor Vessel
Material Surveillance Program Requirements, to 10 CFR Part 50.
Appendix H requires a material surveillance program to monitor
changes in the fracture toughness properties of ferritic materials
in the reactor vessel beltline region. Appendix H applies to all
light-water reactors (LWRs) and the fracture toughness degrada-
tion is directly related to the exposure of the beltline materials to
neutron irradiation and thermal environments. Charpy impact
specimens are exposed to the neutron flux in surveillance capsules
and withdrawn periodically from the reactor vessel. The impact
specimens are tested and the Charpy shift data used in accordance
with trend curve prediction methods and 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix G. For reactor vessels that can conclusively show the
peak neutron fluence (E  1 Mev) at the end of the vessel design
life is below 1  1017 n/cm2, Appendix H specifies that no materi-
al surveillance program is required. For vessels projected to be
above this fluence, surveillance programs must be in place in
accordance with Appendix H.
43.2.3 ASME BPVC Section XI, Appendix G
In the mid-1980s it became obvious that the original Section
III, Appendix G method needed to be revised. ASME BPVC
Section XI, Appendix G was first introduced into the Code in
1987 as a duplication of ASME BPVC Section III, Appendix G
with the addition of toughness shift due to irradiation embrittle-
ment for plant operating pressure-temperature limit curves. The
adoption of Appendix G into Section XI provided a vehicle to
review the Appendix and update it to current technology. The
ASME Section XI Working Group on Operating Plant Criteria
has responsibility for this section of the Code; there is no equiva-
lent group in Section III that meets to review the Section III,
Appendix G. While Section XI, Appendix G is considered to be a
nonmandatory appendix, it became mandatory by reference in 10
CFR50, Appendix G, officially replacing ASME BPVC Section
III, Appendix G for operating plants.
The Section XI, Appendix G method is used as the basis for
calculating pressure-temperature operating limits and tempera-
ture limits for cold hydrostatic testing and leak testing. However,
in the implementation of the Appendix G method, there are
numerous additional technical and administrative requirements
that, in essence, add to the margins for protection against brittle
fracture of the vessel. One such requirement for pressurized water
reactors (PWRs) is to have a LTOP system. These LTOP system
requirements came about as part of the resolution of a generic
safety issue (USI-A26) in the 1970s. The recommendations were
documented in NUREG-0224, Reactor Vessel Pressure Transient
Protection for Pressurized Water Reactors, and the results were a
revision to NRC’s Standard Review Plan Section 5.2.2 [7] and the
establishment of Branch Technical Position RSB 5-2 [8].
Following these regulatory actions, PWRs have implemented
procedures and modified equipment to protect the Appendix G
heatup and cooldown limit curves. This was accomplished by
installing or enabling relief valves with fixed or variable setpoints
that would function during low-temperature operation to mitigate
the severity of inadvertent pressure excursions. The fact that these
valves are set below the limits of the calculated Appendix G curve
means that additional margin was added for protection against brit-
tle fracture in the implementation of the LTOP systems. The imple-
mentation of the LTOP systems causes restrictions in the operating
window for heatup and cooldown. The LTOP setpoint limits may
come close to the minimum required pressure to achieve pump seal
or the net positive suction head (NPSH) limit for prevention of
pump cavitation. These restrictions become even more severe for
plants with a significant amount of vessel embrittlement.
43.2.3.1 Revisions to ASME BPVC Section XI, Appendix G.
The stress intensity factors of Appendix G are based on an
assumed semi-elliptical surface flaw oriented in the axial direction,
i.e., normal to the direction of maximum principal stress. The orig-
inal methods used for computing KI for pressure and thermal load-
ing are described in Welding Research Council Bulletin 175 [6].
The methods included classical stress function methods, boundary
collocation methods, and the (then emerging) finite element
method. For the KI due to pressure, the particular expression cho-
sen was based on the collective work of many experts at that time,
and the general expression is given as follows:
K Im = Mmsm (1)
where sm is the membrane pressure stress and the M m factor was
based was based on a semi-elliptical surface crack solution in a
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46 • Chapter 43

FIG. 43.1. Mm FACTOR FOR MEMBRANE STRESS INTENSITY FACTOR FROM ASME SECTION XI, APPENDIX G

plate under uniform tension. The M m factor combined flaw shape
correction factors and included corrections for plastic zone size for
the 14 -thickness reference flaw. A plot of the M m factor as a func-
tion of wall thickness and stress ratio is given in Fig 43.1.
For the KI due to thermal loading, a simplified stress function
was used that related the thermal stress intensity factor to the ther-
mal gradient as follows:
43.2.3.2 Revised Stress Intensity Factors. In 1993, the ASME
Section XI Working Group on Flaw Evaluation approved changes
to the Appendix A flaw evaluation method including revisions for
determination of the applied stress intensity factor, KI, in Article
A-3000 [10]. This Article provides a method for calculating KI

K lt = M t ¢Tw (2)

where Tw is the temperature difference through the wall due

to heatup or cooldown. The Mt factor was based on a plate solu-
tion for an infinitely long flaw assuming a typical (parabolic) tem-
perature distribution across the vessel wall. A plot of the Mt factor
vs. wall thickness is given in Fig 43.2. This method was judged to
be conservative for the full range of heatup or cooldown rates in
the range of 0 to 100F/hr.
The postulated reference flaw adopted in WRC 175, and later
in Appendix G of ASME BPVC Section III, has a semi-elliptical
surface geometry with a 14 thickness depth and a surface length
equal to six times the depth. The basis for this reference flaw is
discussed in the EPRI White Paper on Reactor Vessel Integrity
Requirements for Levels A and B Conditions [9].
Prior to 1993, the general approach for flaw evaluation (given in
ASME BPVC Section XI, Appendix A) was a simplified method for
calculating stress intensity factor whereby stresses at the flaw loca-
tion are resolved into membrane and bending stresses using a lin-
earization technique. The equivalent linear representation of stress
distribution is shown in Fig. 43.3. This figure demonstrates the dif-
ferences between the actual stress distribution and the equivalent lin-
ear stress distribution through the vessel wall. This same approxima- FIG. 43.2. Mt FACTOR vs. THICKNESS FOR BENDING
tion applies to the simplified method of stress intensity factors used STRESS INTENSITY FACTOR FROM ASME SECTION XI,
in ASME BPVC Section XI, Appendix G. APPENDIX G
ASME_Ch43_p043-062.qxd 6/3/09 9:37 AM Page 47

COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 47

finite element analyses were used to determine the specific G

coefficients as a function of crack depth for semi-elliptical cracks.
Ultimately, the Appendix A coefficients were determined from
several sources, and the tabulated coefficients in Table A-3320-1
were chosen for applicability to surface flaws of various depths,
flaw aspect ratios, and crack tip positions [11].
This same approach was applied for the 14 -thickness reference
flaw of Appendix G (with a 6:1 aspect ratio), which is a special
case of the general solutions provided in Appendix A. The revi-
sion to Appendix G in 1996 incorporated the most recent elastic
solutions for KI due to pressure and radial thermal gradients dur-
ing heatup and cooldown of reactor vessels. The new solutions
were based on finite element analyses for inside surface flaws per-
formed by ORNL [11] and other research published by EPRI for
outside surface flaws [12]. These solutions provided results that
were essentially the same as those obtained by Raju and Newman
[13].
These solutions are determined to be a more accurate method
for implementation in Appendix G that provides consistent com-
putational methods for both pressure and thermal stress intensity
factors. In addition, the revisions to Appendix G provide a
method to calculate the thermal stress intensity factor, KIT, for any
thermal gradient through the vessel wall and at any time during
the transient. Consistent with the original version of Appendix G,
no contribution for crack face pressure is included in the KI due to
membrane tension (i.e., pressure) loading terms. Also, the revised
solutions do not include plastic zone size correction, because
plastic zone size is negligible during normal heatup and cooldown
conditions.

43.2.3.3 Pressure Stress Intensity Factors. The variation in

hoop stress due to internal pressure in a hollow cylinder can be
expressed as follows:

R2i p R2o
su u(r) = a1 + b (5)
R2o - Ri 2
r2
FIG. 43.3. LINEARIZED REPRESENTATION OF STRESSES
FOR SURFACE FLAWS where

p  internal pressure
r  radial distance through the vessel wall
using a representative third-order polynomial stress distribution at
Ri  vessel inner radius
the flaw location of the following form:
Ro  vessel outer radius
s = Co + C1 (x/a) + C2(x/a)2 + C3 (x/a)3 (3)
While the through-wall stress varies, the revised pressure stress
where, intensity factor determination in ASME BPVC Section XI,
Appendix G was simplified by using a stress formula (pRi/t) and a
x  distance through the wall from the flawed surface constant (Mm) such that the membrane stress intensity factor, KIm,
a  maximum flaw depth is given by the following:
Co, C1, C2, C3  curve-fitted constants.
The stress intensity factor, KI, is calculated using an equation of K Im = M m * (pRi/t), (6)
the following form:
where Mm for a postulated inside surface axial reference flaw is
K 1 = [C0G0 + C1G1a + C2G2a 2 + C3G3a 3]2pa/Q (4) given by the following:
where G0, G1, G2, and G3 are stress intensity factor influence
coefficients and Q is a flaw shape parameter. Mm = 1.85 for 2t 6 2
This methodology of stress intensity factor influence coeffi-
Mm = 0.926 2t for 2 … 2t … 3.464
cients was proposed by Raju and Newman for internal and external
surface cracks in cylindrical vessels [6], and three-dimensional Mm = 3.21 for 2t 7 3.464.
ASME_Ch43_p043-062.qxd 6/3/09 9:37 AM Page 48

48 • Chapter 43

Similarly, Mm for a postulated outside surface axial reference

flaw is given by the following:

Mm = 1.77 for 2t 6 2
Mm = 0.893 2t for 2  2t  3.464
Mm = 3.09 for 2t  3.464

where

p = internal pressure (psi)

Ri = vessel inner radius (in.)
t = vessel wall thickness (in.)

These Mm factors were calculated for the 41 -thickness, semi-

elliptical (6:1 aspect ratio) surface flaws in cylindrical vessels,
and are determined to be exact solutions for a vessel mean radius-
to-thickness ratio of 10.

43.2.3.4 Thermal Stress Intensity Factors. A general solution

for stress thermal stress intensity factor was provided in the revi-
sion to ASME BPVC Section XI, Appendix G for any thermal
stress distribution at any specified time during heatup or cooldown
for assumed 14 -thickness surface flaws [7]. The new Appendix G
method used the same polynomial form of the radial thermal gra-
dient at the reference flaw location as given by Eq. (3). Then, the
KIt value can be determined for an axial inside surface flaw during
cooldown from the equation following:
K It = [1.0359C0 + 0.6322C1 + 0.4753C2 + 0.3855C3] 2pa (7)
Similarly, the Klt value can be determined for an axial outside
surface flaw during heatup from the following equation:
K It = [1.043C0 + 0.630C1 + 0.481C2 + 0.401C3] 2pa (8)
where C0, C1, C2, and C3 are the curve-fitted constants determined
from the thermal stress distribution at a particular time in the hea-
tup or cooldown transient.
Note that these equations differ slightly from the form of Eq. (5);
the term ( 2Q) representing the flaw shape parameter is included in
the influence factor terms since Q is a constant based on the 14 thick-
ness reference flaw. The flaw shape factor for an elliptical crack is
approximated by the following equation:
1.65
Q = 1 + 1.464 (a/c) (9)
where a is the depth and c is the half-crack length. For the refer-
ence flaw geometry (a/2c  1/6), the shape factor is the following:
Q = 1 + 1.464 (1/3)1.65 = 1.239 (10)
The 3-D influence coefficients for the inside surface flaw were
generated from finite element stress analyses conducted at Oak
Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). Detailed finite element
analyses were performed for a range of crack depths and aspect
ratios, and the results were used to determine the exact
coefficients used in Eq. (7) [12]. The ORNL analyses were com-
pared to the Raju and Newman solutions and other published
results that showed good agreement in all cases. The 3-D
FIG. 43.4. EXAMPLES OF 50F/hr. COOLDOWN CURVES
USING THE ORIGINAL AND REVISED APPENDIX G
STRESS INTENSITY FACTOR METHODS
influence coefficients for the outside surface flaw were deter-
mined from closed-form solutions by Zahoor given in the EPRI
Ductile Fracture Handbook [13].
These new solutions are elastic solutions that do not include a
plastic zone size correction. The new stress intensity factor solutions
better characterize the conditions for irradiated vessels in the low-
temperature region where the thermal stresses and allowable pres-
sure are low. For these conditions, the plastic zone size is negligible,
and the elastic solutions are the technically correct solutions. This
new method will provide some relief in the allowable operating
pressure curve, as shown in Fig. 43.4 for a sample 50°F/hr cooldown
limit curve. The benefit is approximately a 70 psi increase in allow-
able pressure at the low-temperature portion of the curve. Although
the relief may be relatively small in terms of absolute pressure, the
benefits to plant operators are substantial because even a small
increase in allowable pressure can be a significant increase in the
operating window at the low temperatures.
43.2.3.5 Circumferential Reference Flaw. The traditional
Appendix G reference flaw is assumed to be axially oriented. This
came about from the words in Article G-2120 as follows:
“The postulated defect used in this recommended procedure is
a sharp, surface defect normal to the direction of maximum stress.
For section thicknesses of 4 in. to 12 in., it has a depth of one-
fourth of the section thickness and a length of 112 times the section
thickness.”
The basis for this reference flaw is documented in WRC 175.
The axial orientation was assumed because it is normal to the
maximum (membrane) stress in the vessel. The flaw is assumed to
be in the vessel beltline weld or plate material with the highest
RTNDT. Even if there are no longitudinal welds in the vessel, it has
traditionally been the interpretation of WRC 175 and Appendix G
that a longitudinal flaw must be assumed. While this is clearly
conservative, it is unrealistic for vessels with only circumferen-
tially oriented welds.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 49
FIG. 43.5. ASSUMED AXIAL FLAWS IN CIRCUMFEREN-
TIAL WELDS
Historically, vessels made from ring forgings have had to
assume long axial flaws at the vessel I.D. and O.D. extending out-
side the weld region as well as the toughness properties of the
weld occuring at the deepest point of the crack front as shown in
Fig. 43.5. Although physically unrealistic, this assumption was
generally agreed to be conservative because
(a) the flaw is projected to occur well outside the girth weld region.
(b) the weld thickness is small compared to the total reference
flaw length.
(c) no credit is given for the toughness of the adjacent heat-
affected zone or base metal.
(d) worst-case girth weld properties are used with the assumed
axial flaw orientation.
(e) there is no evidence of transverse-oriented defects occurring
in welds.
In 1996, the Section XI Working Group on Operating Plant
Criteria approved a Code Case [15] and a Code Change to
Appendix G to permit the assumed orientation of circumferential
reference flaws for vessels with circumferential welds. As shown
in Fig. 43.6, these assumed circumferentially oriented reference
flaws would remain within the plane of the girth weld.
This is a more physically realistic assumption for a reference
flaw for vessels fabricated from ring forgings, and it results in
improved pressure-temperature operating limits. The applied
stress intensity factor for pressure loading on a circumferential
flaw is half as large as that for an axial flaw because the vessel
membrane stresses normal to the circumferential reference flaw
are half as large. This results is an increase in the allowable pres-
sure vs. temperature for heatup and cooldown.
The allowable pressure is determined from the following
equation:
2K Im + K It 6 K IR (11)
where
KIm  the applied pressure stress intensity factor
KIt  the applied thermal stress intensity factor
KIR  the material reference toughness of the limiting vessel
beltline material
The corresponding changes for calculation of applied pressure
and thermal stress intensities have been incorporated into ASME
BPVC Section XI, Appendix G and are now standard practice for
determining allowable pressure-temperature limits. When using
the circumferential reference flaw for girth welds, the other
regions of the vessel must still assume an axial reference flaw and
similar pressure-temperature limits calculated for these regions.
The final set of operating heatup and cooldown limit curves is
then a composite of the lowest allowable pressure as a function of
temperature for all conditions.
43.2.4 LTOP Setpoints
Reactors must operate within the specified pressure-tempera-
ture limits to maintain adequate safety margins against brittle
fracture. However, LTOP transients sometimes cause reactors to
operate beyond those limits. In the implementation of the require-
ments for prevention against brittle fracture reactor vessels, one
such requirement for PWRs is to have LTOP. This came about in
the 1970s when the NRC conducted a review of 30 reported over-
pressure transients that exceeded the Appendix G pressure-tem-
perature (P-T) limits. Because of the frequency and severity of
LTOP occurrences, the LTOP issue became an Unresolved Safety
Issue in 1978. This was resolved in 1979 by the NRC recom-
mending that all PWRs must implement procedures and install
LTOP systems to mitigate such events.
Prior to 1992, the ASME Code did not provide guidelines for
the margins and setpoints for the LTOP systems. The regulatory
guidelines at that time required plants with LTOP systems to
have LTOP P-T limits that precluded exceeding the P-T limits
for normal heatup and cooldown at temperatures less than
RTNDT  90°F, where RTNDT is the adjusted reference tempera-
ture, including margin, at the vessel 1/4-thickness location.
This was accomplished by plants installing or enabling pressure
relief valves to limit the pressure at low-temperature operation.
The fact that the pressure settings for the LTOP valves were set
below the limits of the Appendix G curve meant that the margin
against brittle fracture of the vessel had been added by the
LTOP systems.
These requirements for LTOP protection create further restric-
tions in plant operability, as shown in Fig. 43.7.
FIG. 43.6. CIRCUMFERENTIAL FLAWS IN GIRTH WELDS
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50 • Chapter 43
FIG. 43.7. FIXED LTOP SETPOINT AFFECTS OPERATING
WINDOW
The LTOP setpoint limits may come close to the minimum
required pressure to achieve pump seal or the NPSH for preven-
tion of pump cavitation. Part of the restriction in implementation
of these systems has to do with additional administrative mar-
gins that are added to account for pressure overshoot during an
LTOP event and to account for instrument error uncertainty. The
net effect of these administrative margins is to make the plant
operating window narrower. These restrictions become even
more severe for plants with a significant amount of vessel
embrittlement.
In 1992, the Section XI Working Group on Operating Plant
Criteria approved a Code Case and a Code change to incorporate
the method for determining LTOP setpoints into ASME BPVC
Section XI, Appendix G. There are two setpoints involved:
the enable temperature below which LTOP systems must be
active and the LTOP pressure setpoint limiting the maximum
pressure during a low temperature overpressurization event. The
change addressed both of these setpoints by incorporating the
following words into Appendix G:
“LTOP systems shall be effective at coolant temperatures less
than 200°F or at coolant temperatures corresponding to a reactor
metal temperature less than RTNDT ⫹ 50°F, whichever is greater.
LTOP systems shall limit the maximum pressure in the vessel to
110% of the pressure determined to satisfy Appendix G of
Section XI, Article G-2215.”
The criteria for the pressure setpoint of 110% of the Appendix
G curve pressure at the lowest temperature applies only if the
curve is based on the KIR reference toughness, as given in eq. (11).
Subsequent changes to Appendix G allowed the use of the KIC
reference toughness curve instead of KIR. When the KIC curve is
used in place of KIR, the resulting heatup and cooldown plant limit
curves provide a larger window of operation; however, the corre-
sponding LTOP pressure setpoint criterion is only 100% of the
pressure to satisfy the Appendix G limits.
An alternative method for determining the LTOP enable tem-
perature setpoint was approved in Code Case N-641. This Code
Case allows an enable temperature of RTNDT ⫹ 40°F for assumed
axial surface flaws in axial welds and plates, and RTNDT ⫺85°F
for assumed flaws in circumferential welds. Use of this Code
Case increases the plant operating window when determining the
LTOP enable temperature setpoints.
43.3 REFERENCE TOUGHNESS CURVES
43.3.1 Initial RTNDT and Shift Due to Irradiation
The toughness levels of reactor vessel plates, ring forgings, and
welds must be established to perform a vessel integrity analysis or
to establish pressure-temperature operating limits. The fracture
toughness of ferritic steels is very temperature dependent, as noted
by distinct changes in fracture behavior from brittle to ductile, with
characteristic changes in fracture toughness from low to high values
as temperature increases. This transition behavior is most apparent
when the specimen contains a sharp notch or a crack. The Charpy
V-notch (ASTM E 370-88a) and the drop weight tests (ASTM E
208-87a) are the most commonly used specimens for this purpose.
The temperature at which the material changes from ductile to brit-
tle behavior, as measured in the drop weight test, is often referred to
as the nil-ductility transition temperature, or NDTT. The initial
RTNDT for vessel materials must be established in accordance with
ASME BPVC Section III, NB2331 requirements. The reference
nil-ductility transition temperature, RTNDT, is the higher of either the
NDTT or the temperature, obtained from Charpy tests, at which the
material exhibits at least 50 ft-lb of impact energy and 35 mils lat-
eral expansion, minus 60°F.
Reactor vessel surveillance programs, using actual vessel
steel samples loaded in surveillance capsules and placed in or
near the core region, monitor neutron embrittlement of reactor
vessel materials. Embrittlement is measured by an upward shift
in the RTNDT temperature of the materials. This shift is equated
to the change in temperature of the Charpy 30 ft-lb energy level
between unirradiated and irradiated material, as shown in
Fig. 43.8.
Prediction of embrittlement in reactor vessel welds, plates, and
forgings is determined according to the methods in Regulatory
Guide 1.99, Rev. 2 [13], which provides trend curves as a function
FIG. 43.8. CHARPY V-NOTCH SURVEILLANCE DATA
SHOWING RTNDT SHIFT DUE TO IRRADIATION
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FIG. 43.9. ASME CODE KIC AND KIR TOUGHNESS CURVES
of copper and nickel content and fluence or determines projec-
tions of embrittlement (for the same heat of material) from the
fitted results to actual Charpy surveillance data.
43.3.2 KIC Versus KIR Reference Toughness
There are two lower bound fracture toughness curves available
in ASME BPVC Section Xl, as shown in Fig. 43.9. KIA (also
known as KIR) is lower bound on all static, dynamic, and arrest
fracture toughnesses and KIC is lower bound on static fracture
toughness only.
Code Case N-640 [17], which was approved in 1999, changed
the fracture toughness curve used for development of P-T limit
curves from KIR to KIC. The other margins involved with the
process remained unchanged. The justification for this change is
as follows. The methodology defined in Appendix G of ASME
BPVC Section XI incorporates four specific safety margins as
follows:
(a) large postulated flaw, 14 thickness (14 T)
(b) safety factor  2 on pressure stress
(c) lower bound fracture toughness (KIA)
(d) upper bound adjusted reference temperature (RTNDT)
Although the four safety margins were originally included in
the methodology used to develop P-T limit curves and hydrotest
temperatures, some sources of stress were not considered in the
original methodology. These include weld residual stresses and
stresses due to clad-base metal differential thermal expansion.
Furthermore, the original methodology assumed that the maxi-
mum value of the computed stress intensity factor occurred at the
deepest point of the flaw. Therefore, these elements required con-
sideration to assess their effects on safety margins and justify the
use of KIC.
There are several reasons for the limiting toughness in the
Appendix G P-T limits being changed from KIA to KIC. Each of
these is described in the following paragraphs.
43.3.2.1 Use of KIC Is More Technically Correct. The heatup
and cooldown processes for nuclear plants are very slow, with the
fastest rate allowed typically being 100°F/h. For this rate of tem-
perature change, the rate of change of pressure and temperature is
often constant, so the resulting stresses are essentially constant.
Therefore, both the heatup and cooldown processes, as well as
pressure test conditions that have little or no thermal stress, are
essentially static processes. In fact, with regard to fracture tough-
ness, all operating transients (levels A, B, C, and D) correspond to
static loading conditions.
The only time when dynamic loading can occur and where the
dynamic/arrest fracture toughness, KIA, should be used for the
reactor pressure vessel (RPV) is when a crack is propagating.
This situation may be postulated during a PTS transient event, but
is not a credible scenario during the heatup or cooldown process-
es. Therefore, use of the static lower bound fracture toughness,
KIC, is more technically correct for development of P-T limit
curves.
43.3.2.2 Use of Historically Large Margin Is No Longer
Necessary. In 1974, when the Appendix G methodology was first
approved for use and implemented into the ASME Code, the use
of KIA (KIR in the terminology of the time) to provide an addition-
al margin was thought to be necessary to cover uncertainties and
several postulated (but unquantified) effects. Almost 25 years later,
significantly more information was known about these uncertain-
ties and effects.
43.3.2.3 Flaw Size. With regard to flaw indications in RPVs,
there have been no indications found at the inside surface of any
operating reactor in the core region that exceed the acceptance
standards of ASME BPVC Section XI in the entire 28-year histo-
ry of Section XI. This is a particularly impressive conclusion con-
sidering that core region inspections have been required to con-
centrate on the inner surface and near inner surface region since
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52 • Chapter 43
FIG. 43.10. STATIC FRACTURE TOUGHNESS DATA (KJC) NOW AVAILABLE, COMPARED TO KIC
the implementation of U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.150 in 1983.
Flaws have been found, but all have been qualified as buried or
embedded.
There are many reasons why no surface flaws exist, and these
are related to the fabrication and inspection practices for vessels.
For the base metal and full penetration welds, a full volumetric
examination and surface exam are required before cladding is
applied, and these exams are repeated after cladding deposition.
Further confirmation of the lack of any surface indications has
recently been obtained by the destructive examination of portions
of several commercial RPVs, such as the Midland vessel and the
PVRUF vessel.
43.3.2.4 Fracture Toughness. Since the original formulation of
the KIA and KIC fracture toughness curves in 1972, the fracture
toughness database has increased by more than an order of magni-
tude, and both KIA and KIC remain lower bound curves. This is
shown in Fig. 43.10 for KIC [1], compared to Fig. 43.11, which is
FIG. 43.11. ORIGINAL KIC REFERENCE TOUGHNESS
CURVE, WITH SUPPORTING DATA
the original database [2]. Also, the temperature range over which
the data have been obtained has been extended to both higher and
lower temperatures than the original database. It can be seen from
Fig. 10 that there are a few data points falling just below the KIC
curve. Consideration of these points, as well as the many (over
1,500) points above the curve, leads to the conclusion that the KIC
curve is a lower bound for a large percentage of the data. An exam-
ple set, of carefully screened data in the extreme range of lower
temperatures, is shown in Fig. 43.12 [3]. Data in Figs. 43.11 and
43.12 satisfy KIC validity limits in ASTM E 399 standard for cleav-
age fracture toughness, whereas KJC data in Fig. 43.10 include
significant ductile tearing in higher toughness data points.
43.3.2.5 Local Brittle Zones. Another argument for the use of
KIA in the original version of Appendix G was based on the con-
cern that there could be a small, local brittle zone in the weld or
heat-affected zone of the base material that could pop-in and
produce a dynamically moving cleavage crack. Therefore, the
FIG. 43.12. KIC REFERENCE TOUGHNESS CURVE WITH
SCREENED DATA IN THE LOWER TEMPERATURE RANGE
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 53
toughness property used to assess the moving crack should be
related to dynamic or crack arrest conditions, especially for a fer-
ritic RPV steel showing distinct temperature and loading-rate
(strain-rate) dependence. The dynamic crack should arrest at a 14
thickness depth (14 T), and any reinitiation should consider the
effects of a minimum toughness associated with dynamic loading.
This argument provided a rationale for assuming a 14 T postulated
flaw size and a lower bound fracture toughness curve considering
dynamic and crack arrest loading. The KIR curve in Appendix G of
Section III and the equivalent KIA curve in Appendices A and G of
Section XI provide this lower bound curve for high-rate loading
(above any realistic rates in RPVs during any accident condition)
and crack arrest conditions. This argument, of course, relied on the
existence of a local brittle zone.
After over 30 years of research on RPV steels fabricated under
tight controls, microcleavage pop-in has not been found to be sig-
nificant. This means that researchers have not produced cata-
strophic failure of a vessel, component, or even a fracture tough-
ness test specimen in the transition temperature regime. Testing of
some specimens at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) [4]
has shown some evidence of early pop-ins for some simulated
production weld metals. However, the level of fracture toughness
for these possible early initiations is within the data scatter for
other ASTM-defined fracture toughness values (KIC and/or KJC).
Therefore, there is excess conservatism associated with this pos-
tulated condition and the use of the lower bound KIA curve to
assess fracture initiation. This conservatism leads to the unneces-
sary margin that could reduce overall plant safety.
43.3.2.6 Overall Plant Safety Is Improved. The primary rea-
son for developing Code Case N-640 was to reduce the excess con-
servatism in the current Appendix G approach that could in fact
reduce overall plant safety. Considering the impact of the change
on other systems (such as pumps) and also on personnel exposure,
a strong argument was made that the change increases plant safe-
ty and reduces personnel exposure for both PWRs and BWRs.
lower bound of the original KIC data. Wallin then performed a
43.3.3 Master Curve Reference Toughness
During the late 1990s, industry research focused on the direct
use of measures fracture toughness properties in the assessment of
RPV integrity. These efforts were initiated to develop procedures
for determining a material transition temperature, designated as
To, based on measured fracture toughness testing using the Master
Curve approach [21]. The ASME Code endorsed this new tech-
nology by adopting two Code Cases in 1998, Code Cases N-629
and N-631. In these Code Cases, the fracture toughness curves are
not changed from the reference fracture toughness curves, KIC and
KIA, but the indexing parameter RTNDT is determined from the ref-
erence temperature To from the Master Curve method of ASTM E
1921 [22]. In contrast to RTNDT, To is determined by performing
fracture toughness tests on the material of interest. This procedure
was made possible by the development of J-integral fracture
toughness test techniques generally used on 1-in. (2.54 cm) (or
less) thick specimens. By testing multiple specimens at a single
temperature, it is possible to use Weibull statistics to determine
the median fracture toughness.
The development of the Master Curve is based on the observa-
tion that fracture toughness transition curves for all ferritic steels
have a characteristic shape. Therefore, one Master Curve is used
for all ferritic steels and the curve is shifted along the temperature
axis to match a measured mean fracture toughness. The tempera-
ture at which the mean fracture toughness curve equals 100 Mpa
2m (91 ksi 2in.) is defined as the fracture toughness reference
temperature, To. Because it is a statistical methodology, the
Master Curve approach might also be used to construct a bound-
ing curve for the data, with a corresponding degree of confidence.
Typically a bounding curve with a 95% degree of confidence is
used as a lower bound on the fracture toughness; a lower toler-
ance bound noted as 5% is most commonly used. This implies
that 95% of all fracture toughness measurements should fall
above the confidence/tolerance bound.
The statistical basis of the ASTM E 1921 procedure allows a
consistent level of conservatism to be set by selecting an appro-
priate level of confidence. The ASTM procedure incorporates
advances in fracture mechanics technology that were not available
when the ASME reference curve was adopted. The ASME KIC
reference toughness curve and the 5% bounding curve from the
ASTM test method are both lower limits to the fracture toughness
data. However, the manner in which these lower limits to the frac-
ture toughness data leads to some significant differences. The KIC
curve is a lower limit to all data on a series of pressure vessel
steels, while the Master Curve bound is a statistically derived
bound based on measurements for a specific material. The shape
and location of the KIC reference curve is actually set by a rela-
tively small sampling of materials. By comparison, the distribu-
tion of measurements with respect to the ASTM bounding curve
is predictable and described by the Weibull parameters.
The procedure used to determine To is based on measurements
of fracture toughness, and a lower bound toughness curve can be
constructed with a specified level of confidence. Wallin performed
a statistical analysis of the empirical relationship between RTNDT
and fracture toughness by treating the horizontal shift temperature
between the data and the KIC curve as a statistical variable [23].
Figure 43.13 shows how the new variable TKIC T, is defined for
the plate and forging data used for the KIC curve.
The average shift between the measured data and the KIC curve
is 40.4°C (72.7°F); the standard deviation of this population is
20.2°C (36.4°F). Therefore, the KIC curve appears to represent a
2-
similar analysis by size-adjusting the same fracture toughness
data to 1T equivalent values and comparing the results to the 5%
lower confidence bound to the corresponding Master Curve, as
shown in Fig. 43.14.
FIG. 43.13. ORIGINAL ASME KIC DATA AND NEW VARIABLE
TKIC -T
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54 • Chapter 43
FIG. 43.14. ORIGINAL KIC TOUGHNESS DATA VERSUS
T - TO
There is a fundamental relationship between the KIC curve and
the Master Curve: both curves bound the static crack initiation
toughness results. Thus, it should be possible to use the parameter
To to define a value of reference temperature, RTTo, such that the
KIC curve appropriately bounds the fracture toughness data. The
KIC curve is an empirical lower bound curve, whereas the Master
Curve method fits the median of the measured fracture toughness
data.
The key parameters required to determine the Master Curve-
based lower bound structural curve are To and the appropriate sta-
tistical lower tolerance bound level. The bounding curve for the
Master Curve technique is defined for a specific specimen size. In
determining To, it is common practice to adjust all fracture tough-
ness data to the 1-in. (2.54 cm) thickness (1T) equivalent value,
even though the actual test specimens might be larger or smaller.
The method for applying the Master Curve as given in Code
Cases N-629 and N-631 is to determine To and then add an appro-
priate temperature shift to the KIC curve using the following equa-
tion:
RTTO  To35F (12)
where the value of R0TTo replaces the initial RTNDT. Figure 43.15
shows how this applies to three large data sets evaluated in the
PVRC Task Group activities. These toughness data were first nor-
malized to 1T size and the corresponding alternate KIC curve
indexed using To  35F is shown relative to data.
FIG. 43.15. FRACTURE TOUGHNESS DATA NORMALIZED
TO 1T AND COMPARED TO CODE CASE N-629 CURVE
43.3.4 Alternative Shift Prediction Method: E900
Trend Curves
The embrittlement correlation described in ASTM E 900-87,
Standard Guide for Predicting Neutron Radiation Damage to
Reactor Vessel Materials [24], was derived from Regulatory
Guide 1.99, Rev. 2 [16], and was based on 216 Charpy V-notch
surveillance data points that were available in the mid-1980s
[25,26]. Since that time, the database of Charpy surveillance test
data has increased by a factor of about five. A reevaluation of
these data produced draft radiation embrittlement trend equations,
which were submitted for ASTM Subcommittee E 10.02 consid-
eration [27,28]. These draft trend equations were developed using
mechanistic modeling of the embrittlement process and statistical
analyses.
Following this, EPRI sponsored work to independently evaluate
the mechanistic and statistical bases for these draft trend equa-
tions and, in particular, provide further statistical basis [29],
which contains several additional correlation parameters. The
EPRI correlation agreed with the general form of the draft NRC
correlation parameters; the primary difference between the EPRI
study and the NRC studies was in the interpretation of the statisti-
cal results. This EPRI correlation was subsequently accepted for
use in ASTM E 900-02, Guide for Predicting Radiation-Induced
Transition Temperature Shift in Reactor Vessel Materials [30].
The revised transition temperature shift correlation has the fol-
lowing form:
Shift  A exp[20,730/(Tc  460) (ft)0.5076
 B[12.106 Ni1.173] F(Cu) G (ft) (13)
where
A  6.70  10 18
Tc  the cold leg (irradiation) temperature (F)
(ft)  the fluence (n/cm2 for E > 1MeV)
234, weld
B = μ ∂
128, forging
208, plates in CE vessels
156, other plates
Ni is the measured nickel content in wt%
F(Cu) = e f
0, Cu … 0.072 wt%
(Cu - 0.072)0.577, Cu 7 0.072 wt%
and subject to the following:
Cu max = e f
0.25, for welds with Linde 80 or Linde 0091 flux
0.305, for other welds
and G(ft) is a fluence function term as follows:
+ tanh c d
1 1 log(ft) - 18.24
G(ft) =
2 2 1.052
This correlation showed improvement over previous trend
curve prediction methods, and the overall fit to the latest database
has a standard error of 22.0F. In using the ASTM E 900-02
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At the time the method was developed, there were no good

FIG. 43.16. COMPARISON OF RESIDUALS FROM ASTM
E900-02 AND RECENT NRC EMBRITTLEMENT TREND
CURVE EQUATIONS
correlation, a proper understanding of uncertainties is required.
The past regulatory practice in using Regulatory Guide 1.99,
Rev. 2, applies a two-standard deviation approach, where 2
 toughness (KIC), and arrest toughness (KIa). The analyses assumed
34F for base metal and 2s  56F for welds.
This newly adopted ASTM E 900-02 trend equation is a
simplified version of the general form originally developed by the
NRC [27]. There is a general consensus that this form of the trend
equation provides an improvement over the current Regulatory
Guide 1.99, Rev. 2 equations [16]. However, there remains some
controversy over the significance and importance of some of the
terms in a later version of the draft NRC equation [28], which has
not been openly published. A comparison of the two differing trend
curve forms shows much similarity. Evidence supporting the similar-
ity of the approaches is given in Fig. 43.16, which shows a compari-
son of the residual (actual/predicted) results for the two methods.
A form of these new trend curves may be included in a future
revision to Regulatory Guide 1.99, but until the NRC decides to
make the change, Rev. 2 of the Regulatory Guide is to be used for
developing P-T limits and for performing vessel integrity analyses.
inspection techniques that could detect and characterize actual
flaws or indications in a reactor vessel, so a large reference flaw
was assumed. Today, we have the technology to use focused NDE
techniques to detect the presence or absence of vessel flaws and to
measure the toughness of the vessel irradiated vessel materials,
which enables a best estimate determination of the vessel integrity
limits. Using the state-of-the-art technologies, much can be
learned about the margins or degree of conservatism in the
Appendix G method. In fact, these analyses formed part of the
technical basis for changing from the KIa toughness to the KIC ref-
erence toughness curve for P-T limits.
A probabilistic fracture mechanics analysis that quantifies the
conditional probability of failure for a PWR vessel as a function
of temperature and pressure was performed by Gamble [31]. This
probabilistic analysis used LEFM to predict conditions for which
brittle failure would occur in the embrittled vessel beltline region.
Four stress components were considered: pressure stress, stress
due to a difference in thermal expansion between the clad and
base metal, residual stress associated with the pressure boundary
welds, and thermal stress due to the heatup or cooldown of the
vessel. Probability distributions were used for many of the
unknown variables including flaw depth, copper and nickel con-
tents, initial RTNDT, neutron fluence, shift in RTNDT, initiation
a cooldown rate of 100F/hr from 500F to 410F and a rate of
20F/hr from 415F to 100F. An adjusted RTNDT of 320F was
selected because it approximates the highest end-of-life value cur-
rently predicted for U.S. reactors. The results of the evaluation are
shown in Fig. 43.17. The Appendix G P-T limits for a 20°F/hr
cooldown based on the KIa curve is also shown.
A deterministic crack initiation limit was also calculated to
compare with these results for conditional failure probability of
the vessel. The deterministic analysis used similar vessel model

43.4 MARGIN STUDIES FOR OPERATING

P-T LIMITS
Several studies to evaluate margin in the P-T operating limit
curves have been performed to support the activities of the ASME
Section XI Working Group on Operating Criteria. Analyses were
performed using both deterministic and probabilistic methods to
assess the true margins in the Appendix G heatup and cooldown
limit curves. These analyses are discussed in the White Paper on
Reactor Vessel Integrity Requirements for Levels A and B
Conditions [9]. The Appendix G approach uses a deterministic
fracture mechanics method with defined assumptions (e.g., 14 t ref-
erence flaw) and safety factors, such as the factor of 2 on pressure
stress to establish allowable pressure as a function of temperature
that ensures no brittle fracture of the vessel. The built-in assump-
tions and safety factors are intended to bound the uncertainties in
the analysis without knowing the exact condition of the vessel. They
also allowed the simplification of the Appendix G method, because FIG. 43.17. ESTIMATES OF CRACK INITIATION COMPARED
they were generally regarded to have adequate conservatism. TO P-T LIMITS FOR NORMAL COOLDOWN TRANSIENT
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56 • Chapter 43

assumptions (including cladding), with an assumed semi elliptical
surface flaw at the I.D. of the vessel with a depth through the clad
and 10% into the base metal thickness (1.17 in.). A comparative
evaluation of these curves estimated the conditional failure proba-
bility associated with the deterministic crack initiation limit as
approximately 10 4 at the low temperatures. The comparison of
conditional failure probability with the Appendix G cooldown
limit (based on KIa toughness) shows that the probability of vessel
failure during a normal vessel cooldown is less than 10 6. While
attempts were made to ensure compatibility between the analyses
(i.e., the same cooldown rate and vessel RTNDT), identical fracture
mechanics algorithms and identical assumptions were not entirely
possible. Consequently, the above evaluation only provides a
rough estimate of conditional failure probability associated with a
crack initiation limit. Nevertheless, it provides another benchmark
for comparison of the margin embedded in the Appendix G
method.
More recently, ORNL, under NRC funding, has developed an
improved version 3.1 of the FAVOR Code [32]. As part of the
ongoing pressurized thermal shock (PTS) reevaluation effort by
the NRC, the updated FAVOR code has been used to analyze the
risk of vessel failure during PTS events. The results of the NRC
PTS reevaluation study from the NRC draft NUREG state that the
risk of vessel failure due to PTS is very low, and the same method
could be applied to evaluate vessel integrity during normal heatup
and cooldown events.
43.5.2 Consider Probabilistic P-T Limit Curves
Probabilistic fracture mechanics analyses have been considered
as an alternative means for assessing margins in the Appendix G
method. The probabilistic analyses have several advantages.
Firstly, the results can be directly compared to safety levels estab-
lished for the nuclear industry, such as what vessel conditions are
needed to ensure a probability of less than 1  10 6 that a large
release will occur. Secondly, the event frequencies, as well as fail-
ure probabilities, can be included in the evaluation to better define
margins associated with normal operation and postulated events.
Finally, because distributed variables are used, sensitivity studies
can be performed to more accurately assess the effect of uncer-
tainties on the overall failure margin. The probabilistic methods
provide a useful tool for evaluating vessel integrity margins and
developing an alternative means to assess the acceptable level of
protection against vessel failure.
It is recognized that, because of the interaction between the
variables in the Code method (e.g., toughness, reference flaw size,
and safety factors), there are trade-offs to consider in the selection
of the individual values or assumptions used to establish the P-T
limit curves. This is where the probabilistic analyses can be used
most effectively to assess the level of protection against nonductile
failure of the vessel. Because the inputs for the variables are given
as distributions rather than single values, the uncertainties can be
built into the method. In fact, curves of allowable PT can be con-
structed without having to assume conservative values for each of
the variables for a specific reactor vessel.

43.5 AREAS FOR FUTURE

IMPROVEMENTS TO SECTION XI,
APPENDIX G
Several areas for improvement to the Section XI, Appendix G
method have been identified [9]; two of the key areas are dis-
cussed here.

43.5.1 Reduce the Reference Flaw Size

The postulated flaw size used in determining the allowable P-T
curves has a great effect on the margin associated with the
Appendix G limits. The 41 t flaw was intentionally chosen to be a
conservative bound to any existing flaws in the vessel. At the time
it was selected, a database did not exist to assess NDE reliability,
and it was thought that a 14 t flaw was the largest flaw that could be
missed by then current ASME inspection methods. UT inspection
methods were not yet available, and reliable volumetric examina-
tion techniques were not expected to be used inservice. An addi-
tional factor to note is the relationship between the allowable sur-
face indications in ASME BPVC Section XI (Table IWB-3510)
and the Appendix G reference flaw. This relationship was estab-
lished to maintain a factor of 10 on the allowable flaw size in the
flaw acceptance standards, as noted in Fig. 43.18.
Appendix G (Article G-2120) states that, in choosing a refer-
ence flaw size, “smaller defect sizes may be used on an individual
case basis if a smaller size of maximum postulated defect can be
ensured.” Unfortunately, there is no guidance on how to justify a
smaller reference flaw in the ASME Code. With the improve-
ments in NDE technology, and with the current requirements of
Appendix VIII of Section XI for demonstration of near-surface
flaw detection capabilities, it may be appropriate to evaluate the
new inspection reliability in light of the credit that may be derived FIG. 43.18. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MAXIMUM POSTU-
for adjusting the Appendix G reference flaw size if certain accep- LATED DEFECT (ASME BPVC SECTION III) AND ALLOW-
tance standards can be met. ABLE SURFACE INDICATIONS (ASME BPVC SECTION XI)
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 57
Options for managing the increase in hydrotest temperature in
BWRs (i.e., performing effective leak detection and minimizing
costs and personnel risks while maintaining fracture margin) are
needed to avoid the additional burden caused by increases in flu-
ence and changes in Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 3. One
promising option is the use of a risk-informed approach for devel-
oping P-T limit curves, including an alternative method for calcu-
lating the hydrostatic pressure test curve limits that would reduce
the hydrotest temperature. This EPRI-funded study is one or more
years from completion and submission to the ASME Code for
approval, but it may offer the best hope for managing the difficul-
ties associated with the increasing hydrotest temperatures in
BWRs. Another option may be to justify the use of a smaller flaw
for the Appendix G analysis. Both options will reduce the
hydrotest temperature to manageable levels while assuring suffi-
cient fracture margins.
43.6 AGING MANAGEMENT OF PWR
VESSEL INTERNALS1
Management of materials aging effects, such as loss of materi-
al, reduction in fracture toughness, or cracking, depends on the
demonstrated capability to detect, evaluate, and potentially correct
conditions that could affect function of the internals during the
license renewal term. License renewal applicants in their submit-
tals to the NRC have identified the general elements of AMP for
PWR reactor internals, including the use of inservice inspection
and monitoring with the possibility of enhancement or augmenta-
tion if a relevant condition is discovered. As plants near the
license renewal term, plant-specific AMP are implemented, focus-
ing on those regions most susceptible to aging degradation. A
framework for the implementation of an AMP is proposed in this
paper. This proposed framework is based on currently available
research results and the state of knowledge, and uses inspections
and flaw tolerance evaluations to manage the degradation issues.
The important elements of this framework are as follows:
(a) the screening of components for susceptibility to the aging
mechanisms
(b) performing functionality analyses of the components with
representative material toughness properties under PWR
conditions
(c) evaluating flaw tolerance of lead components or regions of
greatest susceptibility to cracking, loss of toughness, or
swelling
(d) using focused inspections to demonstrate no loss of integri-
ty in the lead components or regions of the vessel internals
The EPRI Material Reliability Program (MRP) Reactor
Internals Issue Task Group (RI-ITG) is actively working to devel-
op the data and methods to quantify understanding regarding
aging and potential degradation of reactor vessel internals and to
develop materials/components performance criteria, providing
tools for utilities to implement for extended plant operation.
Under this MRP, the technical basis for the framework will be
documented. Then, based on that technical basis, PWR internals
Inspection and Evaluation Guidelines will be developed for plants
1
The author acknowledges the contributions of coauthors for this
section: Robert E. Nickell (Consultant), H.T. Tang (EPRI), and Jeff
D. Gilreath III (Duke Energy).
to manage reactor internals aging and associated potential degra-
dation.
43.6.1 Overview
The reactor internals assembly in a PWR is part of the reactor
coolant system (RCS) and is located inside the reactor vessel. The
reactor internals are long-lived, passive structural components that
support the RCS functions of core cooling, provide guidance and
protection (for insertion) of the rod control cluster assemblies,
and ensure integrity of the fuel and the surrounding vessel pres-
sure boundary. There are some differences in the internals designs
among the three different NSSS vendor types of plants. However,
many similarities exist in the overall means of structural support
and guidance and in the flow of coolant through the reactor vessel
and internals.
Several aging mechanisms have been identified that may affect
the reactor internals components, such as irradiation embrittle-
ment, thermal embrittlement, stress corrosion cracking (SCC),
irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC), irradia-
tion-enhanced stress relaxation (i.e., loss of preload), and irradia-
tion-induced void swelling. Demonstration that these potential
aging effects do not lead to the loss of component function is an
important part of a plant LRA. Several industry programs and
Owners Group programs are being conducted to examine these
effects in more detail, gather data for improved understanding of
the aging mechanisms, recommend aging management strategies
for plants considering license renewal, and ensure component
function of the PWR vessel internals.
As more PWR plants are submitting LRAs, several utilities
have committed to performing inspections for detecting and man-
aging cracking and loss of toughness of susceptible reactor inter-
nals components. The NRC has either approved these applications
or has required additional utility commitments to perform inspec-
tions for managing the aging effects in reactor internals. Void
swelling appears to be an issue that may require additional data to
demonstrate that it is not a concern through the end of the license
renewal period for PWR plants.
43.6.2 Aging Management Review
An LRA has to consider the effects of aging on SSCs within
the scope of license renewal. The subcomponents of the reactor
internals are subject to an AMR to identify any potential age-
related degradation. When these analyses indicate that aging
mechanisms exist that may affect the function of the internals dur-
ing the license renewal term, an AMP has to be in place to effec-
tively manage the potential aging effects.
The potential for significant age-related degradation of specific
PWR vessel internals components depends on their design fea-
tures, materials, operation and maintenance histories including
fluence and temperature environments, and the extent to which
they are susceptible to the age-related degradation mechanisms. If
it can be shown that the internals components are either not sus-
ceptible, or are susceptible but to such a degree that the specific
component safety function is not affected throughout the license
renewal term, then the component/degradation mechanism is not
significant. Similarly, future advances in technology and evalua-
tion methodology may be able to show the adequacy of compo-
nents to avert further measures. Otherwise, an AMP must be
defined to address these potential conditions.
In 2001 the NRC issued the Standard Review Plan for Review
of License Renewal Applications for Nuclear Power Plants
(NUREG-1800) [33], and the Generic Aging Lessons Learned
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58 • Chapter 43
(GALL) Report (NUREG-1801) [34], which provided the NRC
staff’s evaluation of existing plant AMPs and documented the
technical basis for determining where existing programs are ade-
quate without modification and where existing programs should
be augmented for extended plant operation.
According to these documents, a license renewal applicant is
required to demonstrate that the effects of aging on structures and
components subject to an AMR will be adequately managed so that
their intended functions will be maintained consistent with the cur-
rent licensing basis (CLB) for the period of extended operation.
43.6.3 Aging Management Program Attributes
AMPs are generally of four types: prevention, mitigation, con-
dition monitoring, and performance monitoring. Prevention pro-
grams preclude the effects of aging. Mitigation programs attempt
to slow the effects of aging. Condition monitoring programs
inspect for the presence and extent of aging effects. Performance
monitoring programs test the ability of a structure or component
to perform its intended function(s). In defining an AMP, it is not
necessary to demonstrate absolute assurance that structures and
components will not fail, but rather that there is reasonable assur-
ance that they will perform the intended functions through the
period of extended operation. An acceptable AMP should consist
of the 10 elements described in the GALL Report [34] and here.
43.6.3.1 Scope of Program. The specific program necessary for
license renewal should be identified. The scope of the program
should include the specific structures/components of which the
program manages the aging.
43.6.3.2 Preventive Actions. The activities for prevention and
mitigation programs should be described. These actions should
mitigate or prevent aging degradation.
43.6.3.3 Parameters Monitored or Inspected. The parame-
ters to be monitored or inspected should be identified and linked
to the degradation of the particular structure/component intended
function(s).
43.6.3.4 Detection of Aging Effects. Detection of aging effects
should occur before there is a loss of the structure/component
intended function(s). The parameters to be monitored or inspected
should be appropriate to ensure that the structure/component
intended function(s) will be adequately maintained for license
renewal under all CLB design conditions. This includes aspects
such as method or technique (e.g., visual, volumetric, surface
inspection), frequency, sample size, data collection, and timing of
new/one-time inspections to ensure timely detection of aging
effects. Information should be provided that links the parameters
to be monitored or inspected to the aging effects being managed.
Nuclear power plants are licensed based on redundancy, diversi-
ty, and defense-in-depth principles. A degraded or failed compo-
nent might reduce the reliability of the system, challenge safety
systems, and contribute to plant risk. Thus, the effects of aging on a
structure or component should be managed to ensure its availability
to perform its intended function(s) as designed when called upon.
This program element describes “when,” “where,” and “how”
program data are collected (i.e., all aspects of activities to collect
data as part of the program). The method or technique and fre-
quency may be linked to plant-specific or industry-wide operating
experience. Justification should be provided, including codes
and standards referenced, that the technique and frequency are
adequate to detect the aging effects before a loss of structure/com-
ponent intended function.
When sampling is used to inspect a group of structures/compo-
nents, provide the basis for the inspection population and sample
size. The inspection population should be based on such aspects
of the structures/components as a similarity of materials of con-
struction, fabrication, procurement, design, installation, operating
environment, or aging effects. The sample size should be based
on such aspects of the structures/components as the specific aging
effect, location, existing technical information, system and struc-
ture design, materials of construction, service environment, or
previous failure history. The samples should be biased toward
locations most susceptible to the specific aging effect of concern
in the period of extended operation. Provisions should also be
included on expanding the sample size when degradation is
detected in the initial sample.
43.6.3.5 Monitoring and Trending. Monitoring and trending
activities should be described, and they should provide pre-
dictability of the extent of degradation and, thus, affect timely cor-
rective or mitigative actions. Plant-specific and/or industry-wide
operating experience may be considered in evaluating the appro-
priateness of the technique and frequency.
This program element describes “how” the data collected are
evaluated and may also include trending for a forward look. This
includes an evaluation of the results against the acceptance crite-
ria and a prediction regarding the rate of degradation to confirm
that timing of the next scheduled inspection will occur before a
loss of structure/component intended function. Although aging
indicators may be quantitative or qualitative, aging indicators
should be quantified, to the extent possible, to allow trending. The
parameter or indicator trended should be described. The method-
ology for analyzing the inspection or test results against the
acceptance criteria should be described. Trending is a comparison
of the current monitoring results with previous monitoring results
to make predictions for the future.
43.6.3.6 Acceptance Criteria. The acceptance criteria of the
program and its basis should be described. The acceptance criteria,
against which the need for corrective actions will be evaluated,
should ensure that the structure and component intended func-
tion(s) are maintained under all CLB design conditions during the
period of extended operation. The program should include a
methodology for analyzing the results against applicable accep-
tance criteria.
Acceptance criteria could be specific numerical values or could
consist of a discussion of the process for calculating specific
numerical values of conditional acceptance criteria to ensure that
the structure and component intended function(s) will be main-
tained under all CLB design conditions. Information from avail-
able references may be cited.
It is not necessary to justify any acceptance criteria taken
directly from the design basis information that is included in the
FSAR because that is a part of the CLB. Also, it is not necessary
to discuss CLB design loads if the acceptance criteria do not per-
mit degradation because a structure and component without
degradation should continue to function as originally designed.
Acceptance criteria, which do permit degradation, are based on
maintaining the intended function under all CLB design loads.
43.6.3.7 Corrective Actions. Actions to be taken when the
acceptance criteria are not met should be described. Corrective
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 59
actions, including root cause determination and prevention of
recurrence, should be timely.
If corrective actions permit analysis without repair or replace-
ment, the analysis should ensure that the structure and component
intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB.
43.6.3.8 Confirmation Process. The confirmation process
should be described. It should ensure that preventive actions are
adequate and that appropriate corrective actions have been com-
pleted and are effective. The effectiveness of prevention and miti-
gation programs should be verified periodically. For example, in
managing internal corrosion of piping, a mitigation program
(water chemistry) may be used to minimize susceptibility to cor-
rosion. However, it may also be necessary to have a condition-
monitoring program (ultrasonic inspection) to verify that corrosion
is indeed insignificant.
When corrective actions are necessary, there should be follow-up
activities to confirm that the corrective actions were completed,
the root cause determination was performed, and recurrence is
prevented.
43.6.3.9 Administrative Controls. The administrative controls
of the program should be described. They should provide a formal
review and approval process.
Any AMPs to be relied on for license renewal should have reg-
ulatory and administrative controls. That is the basis for 10 CFR
54.21(d) to require that the FSAR supplement includes a summa-
ry description of the programs and activities for managing the
effects of aging for license renewal. Thus, any informal programs
relied on to manage aging for license renewal must be administra-
tively controlled and included in the FSAR supplement.
43.6.3.10 Operating Experience. Operating experience with
existing programs should be discussed. The operating experience
of AMPs, including past corrective actions resulting in program
enhancements or additional programs, should be considered. A
past failure would not necessarily invalidate an AMP, because the
feedback from operating experience should have resulted in
appropriate program enhancements or new programs. This infor-
mation can show where an existing program has succeeded and
where it has failed (if at all) in intercepting aging degradation in
a timely manner. This information should provide objective evi-
dence to support the conclusion that the effects of aging will be
managed adequately so that the structure and component intend-
ed function(s) will be maintained during the period of extended
operation.
An applicant may have to commit to providing operating experi-
ence in the future for new programs to confirm their effectiveness.
43.6.4 Aging Concerns in PWR Vessel Internals
43.6.4.1 Irradiation Embrittlement. Irradiation embrittlement
is a potential age-related degradation mechanism for PWR reactor
vessel internals fabricated from austenitic stainless steel and
nickel-base alloys, which experience neutron fluences in excess of
1  1020 n/cm2 (E  1 MeV). Irradiation embrittlement is a well-
documented effect that is known to increase strength and reduce
toughness properties. The internals components most susceptible
to irradiation embrittlement are those located nearest to the reactor
core. The main concern related to irradiation embrittlement is that
cracked or fractured parts may be the result of a reduced toughness
material toughness and a lower resistance to crack initiation.
43.6.4.2 Thermal Aging Embrittlement. Thermal aging
embrittlement is a potential age-related degradation mechanism
for cast austenitic stainless steel (CASS) PWR vessel internals
components (predominantly for materials with high delta ferrite
content). The synergistic effect of thermal aging and irradiation
embrittlement is a particular concern for CASS materials.
43.6.4.3 Stress Corrosion Cracking. Stress corrosion cracking
(SCC) is a potential age-related degradation mechanism for PWR
reactor internals components that are fabricated from alloy 286 or
Alloy X-750 materials. A limited number of A 286 core barrel bolt
failures have been observed that may be attributable to SCC.
43.6.4.4 Irradiation-Assisted Stress Corrosion Cracking.
Irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking is a potential age-
related degradation mechanism for PWR internals components
with combinations of high accumulated neutron fluence and oper-
ating stress above some prescribed thresholds.
43.6.4.5 Stress Relaxation. Irradiation-enhanced stress relax-
ation is a potential age-related degradation mechanism for PWR
internals components that require adequate preload to perform
their intended function. This is a concern only for those compo-
nents with substantial preloads, such as torqued bolts, because
adequate preload may be required to their functionality.
43.6.4.6 Void Swelling. Irradiation-induced void swelling has
been identified as a potential age-related degradation mechanism
under the combination of high fluence neutron exposure and high
temperatures. Swelling generally proceeds at a very low rate dur-
ing an incubation period before accelerating to a higher rate.
Almost all of the currently available data are from non-PWRs
(e.g., fast reactors).
43.6.5 Aging Management Strategies The EPRI Materials
Reliability Program (MRP) Reactor Internals Issue Task Group
(RI-ITG) has been sponsoring research to obtain data for improved
understanding of the degradation mechanisms and develop recom-
mended strategies and guidelines for managing the effects of aging
in PWR internals.
Inservice inspection and flaw tolerance evaluation are key ele-
ments of the overall process for managing aging effects for PWR
internals components. A proposed framework for the implementa-
tion of an AMP incorporating these research results and using
inspections and flaw tolerance evaluations to manage these issues
is given in Fig. 43.19.
A key element in this framework is the reliance on focused
inspections to detect the presence (or absence) of degradation in the
lead components. Enhanced visual examinations, along with screen-
ing to identify lead components and flaw evaluation criteria, may be
necessary for certain components in certain regions. The procedure
will use screening and categorization of components to eliminate
those regions that are not susceptible to aging degradation.
Visual examinations using VT-3 and enhanced VT-1 techniques
are being considered along with flaw tolerance evaluations assum-
ing postulated reference flaws. Also being evaluated are flaw
tolerance, or fitness-for-service, demonstrations that rely on the
relationship between frequency/coverage of inservice examina-
tions; the reference flaw location, orientation and size; service
loads expected to occur during the period of operation between
inspections; and the critical flaw size that serves as a surrogate for
component failure.
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60 • Chapter 43
FIG. 43.19. FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF AGING MANAGEMENT USING INSPECTIONS AND FLAW EVALUATION
The NRC staff have stated that ASME Subsection IWB
Examination Category B-N-3 is inadequate, in part, as a program
for managing some of the effects of aging during the license
renewal term. They questioned the capabilities of current VT-3
inspections to detect the effects of cracking. The ostensible rea-
sons for this question are the relevant conditions cited in IWB-
3520.2 (compared with those of IWB-3520.1 for VT-1 visual
examination) together with the differences between maximum
examination distance and character recognition height for VT-1
and VT-3 inspections, as given in Table IWA-2210-1. Both the
maximum direct examination distance and the character recogni-
tion height are essentially twice as large for VT-3 as for VT-1.
For the accessible surfaces of removable PWR internals compo-
nents subject to relatively high service or residual stresses, includ-
ing relatively high preload stresses, enhanced VT-3 visual examina-
tion may not be capable of surface-breaking crack detection and
sizing without excessive uncertainty. For such cases, VT-1 visual
examination may be an acceptable alternative for PWR internals.
Another key aspect of the aging management strategy is per-
forming functionality analyses of the components to assure no loss
of component function throughout the period of extended plant
operation. Standard fracture mechanics methods may be used along
with bounding assumptions for crack growth due to IASCC and
loss of toughness due to irradiation. Research data and predictive
models can be useful in determining the performance of these com-
ponents in the PWR environment. These models will be based on
irradiated materials data obtained in hot cell tests.
43.6.6 Status
Radiation effect on materials behavior and reactor internals
components performance is a complex phenomenon. The EPRI
Materials Reliability Program (MRP) Reactor Internals Focus
Group (RI-FG), guided by its utility advisors, is working with
utilities, vendors, and owners groups sponsors to coordinate the
industry research and development related to PWR vessel inter-
nals. The objectives are to better understand aging and the poten-
tial degradation mechanisms and to quantify the effects of aging
in PWR internals. The research and development will provide data
and tools for evaluating aging effects in the internals components
and will form the technical basis to recommend strategies and
approaches for managing these aging effects. In particular, the
EPRI MRP is planning to issue IRE Guidelines for PWR internals
in 2008. These Guidelines will include “mandatory” or “needed”
actions under the NEI 03-08 materials initiative for managing the
effects of aging degradation in PWR vessel internals.
43.7 REFERENCES
1. ASME BPVC Section XI, Appendix G, Fracture Toughness Criteria
for Protection Against Failure. In: ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Code. New York: American Society of Mechanical Engineers.
2. ASME BPVC Section III, Appendix G, Protection Against
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3. CFR Title 10, Part 50, Appendix G, Fracture Toughness Requirements
for Nuclear Power Reactors. In: Code of Federal Regulations.
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(NARA) Office of the Federal Register (OFR)/Government Printing
Office (GPO).
4. CFR Title 10, Part 50, Appendix H, Reactor Vessel Materials
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5. WRC 175, PVRC Recommendations on Toughness Requirements for
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 61
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Technologies, April 1998.
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Fracture Toughness Methodology for Ferritic Steels (PWRMRP-01).
Palo Alto, CA: Electric Power Research Institute; 1999.
22. ASTM E 1921-97, Test Method for the Determination of Reference
Temperature, To, for Ferritic Steels in the Transition Range. In:
Annual Book of ASTM Standards, Vol. 03.01. West Conshohocken,
PA: American Society for Testing and Materials; 1998.
23. Wallin K. Statistical Aspects of Fracture Toughness Estimates. Notes
for the Short Course for Background and Use of the Master Curve
Method, Denver, CO, June 1997.
24. ASTM E 900-87, Guide for Predicting Neutron Radiation Damage to
Reactor Vessel Materials, E706 (IIF). In: Annual Book of ASTM
Standards, Vol. 12.02. West Conshohocken, PA: American Society for
Testing and Materials.
25. Randall PN. Basis for Revision 2 of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission’s Regulatory Guide 1.99, Radiation Embrittlement of
Nuclear Reactor Pressure Vessel Steels: An International Review (Vol.
2), ASTM STP 909, L. E. Steele, Ed., pp 149-162.
26. EPRI NP-3319, Physically Based Regression Correlations of
Embrittlement Data From Reactor Pressure Vessel Surveillance
Programs. Palo Alto, CA: Electric Power Research Institute; 1984.
27. Eason ED, Wright JE, Odette GR. Improved Embrittlement
Correlations for Reactor Vessel Steels (NUREG/CR-6551).
Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; 1998.
28. Kirk M. Revision of _T30 Embrittlement Trend Curves. Presented at
the EPRI MRP/NRC PTS Re-Evaluation Meeting in Rockville, MD,
August 30, 2000.
29. Materials Reliability Program: Validation and Use of ASTM E 900-02
for Reactor Pressure Vessel Integrity (MRP-86). Palo Alto, CA:
Electric Power Research Institute; 2003.
30. ASTM E 900-02, Guide for Predicting Neutron Radiation Damage to
Reactor Vessel Materials, E706 (IIF). In: Annual Book of ASTM
Standards, Vol. 12.02. West Conshohocken, PA: American Society for
Testing and Materials; 2002.
31. Gamble RM. Evaluation of Reactor Vessel Beltline Integrity
Following Unanticipated Operating Events (EPRI NP-5151). Palo
Alto, CA: Electric Power Research Institute; 1987.
32. NUREG/CR-XXX, Fracture Analysis of Vessels – Oak Ridge,
FAVOR, v 03.1, Computer Code: User’s Guide (draft). Washington,
DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2003.
33. Standard Review Plan for Review of License Renewal Applications
for Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG-1800). Washington, DC: U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission; 2001.
34. U.S. NRC Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL) Report (NUREG-
1801). Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; 2001.
35. Materials Initiative Guidance: Addenda to NEI 03–08 Guideline for the
Management of Materials Issues, Nuclear Energy Institute, July 2005.
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PWR REACTOR VESSEL
ALLOY 600 ISSUES
Jeff Gorman, Steve Hunt, Pete Riccardella, and Glenn A. White
44.1 INTRODUCTION
Primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) of alloy 600
nickel-chromium-iron base metal and related alloys 82 and 182
weld metal has become an increasing concern for commercial
pressurized water reactor (PWR) plants. Cracks and leaks have
been discovered in alloys 600/82/182 materials at numerous PWR
plant primary coolant system locations, including at several loca-
tions in the reactor vessels. The reactor vessel locations include top
head control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) nozzles, top head ther-
mocouple nozzles, bottom head instrument nozzles, and reactor
vessel outlet and inlet nozzle butt welds. The consequences of this
PWSCC have been significant worldwide with 72 leaks through
May 2004 (56 CRDM nozzles, 13 reactor vessel closure head
thermocouple nozzles, 2 reactor pressure vessel bottom-mounted
instrument nozzles, and 1 piping butt weld), many cracked noz-
zles and welds, expensive inspections, more than 60 heads
replaced, several plants with several-month outage extensions to
repair leaks, and a plant shutdown for more than 2 years due to
extensive corrosion of the vessel head resulting from leak-age
from a PWSCC crack in a CRDM nozzle. This chapter addresses
alloys 600/82/182 material locations in reactor vessels, operating
experience, causes of PWSCC, inspection methods and findings,
safety considerations, degradation predictions, repair methods,
remedial measures, and strategic planning to address PWSCC at
the lowest possible net present value cost.
Several example cases of PWSCC, and resulting boric acid cor-
rosion, are described in the following paragraphs of this chapter
and, in some cases, the remedial or repair measures are described.
It is important to note that the repairs and remedial measures
described may not apply to all situations. Accordingly, it is
important to review each new incident on a case-by-case basis to
ensure that the appropriate corrective measures are applied,
including the need for inspections of other similar locations that
may also be affected.
44.2 ALLOY 600 APPLICATIONS
Figure 44.1 shows locations where alloy 600 base metal and
alloy 82 or 182 weld metal are used in PWR plant reactor ves-
sels. It should be noted that not all PWR reactor vessels have
alloys 600/82/182 materials at each of the locations shown in
Fig. 44.1.
CHAPTER
44
44.2.1 Alloy 600 Base Metal
Alloy 600 is a nickel-based alloy (72% Ni minimum, 14–17%
Cr, 6–10% Fe) with high general corrosion resistance that has
been widely used in light water reactor (LWR) power plants, i.e.,
in PWRs and boiling water reactors (BWRs). In PWR plants,
alloy 600 has been used for steam generator tubes, CRDM
nozzles, pressurizer heater sleeves, instrument nozzles, and simi-
lar applications. The alloy was originally developed by the
International Nickel Corporation (INCO) and is also known as
Inconel 600, which is a trademark now held by the Special Metals
Corporation [1]. The reasons that alloy 600 was selected for use
in LWRs in the 1950s and 1960s include the following [2–7]:
(a) It has good mechanical properties, similar to those of
austenitic stainless steels.
(b) It can be formed into tubes, pipes, bars, forgings, and cast-
ings suitable for use in power plant equipment.
(c) It is weldable to itself and can also be welded to carbon,
low-alloy, and austenitic stainless steels.
(d) It is a single-phase alloy that does not require postweld heat
treatment. Also, when subjected to postweld heat treatments
that are required for low-alloy steel parts to which it is weld-
ed, the resulting sensitization (decreased chromium levels at
grain boundaries associated with deposition of chromium
carbides at the boundaries) does not result in the high sus-
ceptibility to chloride attack exhibited by austenitic stain-
less steels that are exposed to such heat treatments.
(e) It has good general corrosion resistance in high temperature
water environments, resulting in low levels of corrosion
products entering the coolant and resulting in low rates of
wall thinning.
(f) It is highly resistant to chloride stress corrosion cracking
(SCC), and has better resistance to caustic SCC than
austenitic stainless steels.
(g) Its thermal expansion properties lie between those of car-
bon/low-alloy steels and austenitic stainless steels, making
it a good transition metal between these materials.
It was alloy 600’s high resistance to SCC, especially chloride-
induced SCC, that led to its selection for steam generator tubing
in PWRs in the 1950s and 1960s. Several early PWRs had experi-
enced SCC of austenitic stainless steel steam generator tubing,
variously attributed to chlorides and caustics, and this had led to a
desire to use a tubing alloy with increased resistance to these
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64 • Chapter 44
FIG. 44.1 LOCATIONS WITH ALLOYS 600/82/182 MATERIALS IN TYPICAL PWR VESSEL
environments. Similarly, some early cases of SCC of stainless
steel nozzle materials in BWRs during initial plant construction
and startup, which was attributed to exposure to chlorides and
fluorides, led to the wide-scale adoption of alloy 600 and its relat-
ed weld materials for use in BWR vessel nozzles and similar
applications [8].
The first report of SCC of alloy 600 in high-temperature pure or
primary water environments was that of Coriou and colleagues in
1959 [9] at a test temperature of 350C (662F). This type of crack-
ing came to be known as pure water or primary water SCC
(PWSCC) or, more recently, as low potential SCC (LPSCC). In
response to Coriou’s 1959 report of PWSCC, research was conduct-
ed to assess alloy 600’s susceptibility to SCC in high-temperature
pure and primary water. Most of the results of this research in the
1960s indicated that alloy 600 was not susceptible unless specific
contaminants were present [10–12]. The conditions leading to sus-
ceptibility included the presence of crevices and the presence of
oxygen. Most of the test results of the 1960s did not indicate
susceptibility in noncontaminated PWR primary coolant environ-
ments. However, by the early 1970s, it had been confirmed by sever-
al organizations in addition to Coriou that PWSCC of highly
stressed alloy 600 could occur in noncontaminated high-temperature
pure and primary water environments after long periods of time
[13–15]. Starting with Siemens in the late 1960s, some designers
began to move away from use of alloy 600 to other alloys, such
as alloy 800 for steam generator tubes and austenitic stainless
steels for structural applications [15]. By the mid-1980s, alloy 690,
an alternate nickel-based alloy with about twice as much chromium
as alloy 600 (~30% vs. ~15%), had been developed and began to
be used in lieu of alloy 600 for steam generator tubing [16]. By the
early 1990s, alloy 690 began to be used for structural applications
such as CRDM nozzles and steam generator divider plates.
44.2.2 Alloys 82 and 182 Weld Metal
Weld alloys 82 and 182 have been commonly used to weld
alloy 600 to itself and to other materials. These alloys are also
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 65
used for nickel-based alloy weld deposit (buttering) on weld
preparations and for cladding on areas such as the insides of reac-
tor vessel nozzles and steam generator tubesheets. Alloy 82 is bare
electrode material and is used for gas tungsten arc welding
(GTAW), also known as tungsten inert gas (TIG) welding. Alloy
182 is a coated electrode material and is used in shielded metal arc
welding (SMAW). The compositions of the two alloys are some-
what different, leading to different susceptibilities to PWSCC.
Alloy 182 has lower chromium (13–17%) than alloy 82 (18–22%)
and has higher susceptibility to PWSCC, apparently as a result of
the lower chromium content. Most welds, even if initiated or com-
pleted with alloy 82 material, have some alloy 182 material.
In recent years, alloys 52 and 152, which have about 30%
chromium and are thus highly resistant to PWSCC, have been
used in lieu of alloys 82 and 182, respectively, for repairs and for
new parts such as replacement reactor vessel heads.
44.2.3 RPV Top-Head Penetrations
CRDMs in Westinghouse- and Babcock & Wilcox–designed
PWR plants and control element drive mechanisms (CEDMs) in
Combustion Engineering–designed PWR plants are mounted on
the top surface of the removable reactor vessel head. Figure 44.2
shows a typical CRDM nozzle in a Babcock & Wilcox-designed
plant. Early vintage Westinghouse PWR plants have as few as 37
CRDM nozzles and later vintage Combustion Engineering plants
have as many as 97 CEDM nozzles. These nozzles are machined
from alloy 600 base metal with finished outside diameters ranging
from 3.5 to 4.3 in. and with wall thicknesses ranging from about
0.4 to 0.8 in. In some cases, a stainless steel flange is welded to
the alloy 600 nozzle with an alloy 82/182 butt weld. The nozzles
are installed in the reactor vessel head with a small clearance or
interference fit (0.004 in. maximum interference on the diameter)
and are then welded to the vessel head by an alloy 82/182
J-groove weld. The surface of the J-groove weld preparation is
coated with a thin butter layer of alloy 182 weld metal before
stress relieving the vessel head so that the nozzles can be installed
and the final J-groove weld can be made after vessel stress relief.
This avoids possible distortion that could occur if the CRDM noz-
zles were welded into the vessel head before vessel stress relief.
Most vessels have a single 1.0–1.3 in. outside diameter alloy
600 head vent nozzle welded to a point near the top of the head by
a J-groove weld. Two of the early Babcock & Wilcox–designed
FIG. 44.2 TYPICAL CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISM
(CRDM) NOZZLE
vessels had eight 1.0-in. outside diameter alloy 600 thermocouple
nozzles welded to the periphery of the head by J-groove welds.
Most of the Combustion Engineering vessels have alloy 600
incore instrument (ICI) nozzles welded to the periphery of the top
head by J-groove welds. These ICI nozzles are similar to CEDM
nozzles except that they range from 4.5 to 6.6 in. outside diame-
ter. Several Westinghouse plants have 3.5 to 5.4 in. outside diame-
ter alloy 600 auxiliary head adapters and de-gas line nozzles
attached to the top head by J-groove welds. Several Westinghouse
plants have 5.3 to 6.5 in. outside diameter internals support hous-
ings and auxiliary head adapters attached to the vessel top head
surface by alloy 82/182 butt welds.
In summary, PWR reactor vessels have 38 to 102 alloy 600 noz-
zles welded to the top head, with most of these attached to the
heads after stress relief of the head by alloy 82/182 J-groove welds.
44.2.4 BMI Penetrations
All of the Westinghouse and Babcock & Wilcox–designed reac-
tor vessels in the United States and three of the Combustion
Engineering–designed reactor vessels in the United States have
alloy 600 instrument nozzles mounted to the vessel bottom heads.
These are often referred to as bottom-mounted instrument (BMI)
nozzles. These nozzles range from 1.5 to 3.5 in. outside diameter.
As shown in Fig. 44.3, a typical BMI nozzle is welded to the bot-
tom head by a J-groove weld. In the case of the Westinghouse and
Combustion Engineering plants, the J-groove welds were made
after stress relieving the vessel. In the case of the Babcock &
Wilcox–designed plants, the J-groove welds were made prior to
vessel stress relief. Early test experience at a Babcock & Wilcox-
designed plant showed a flow vibration concern with the portions
of the BMI nozzles inside the bottom head plenum. Accordingly,
all of the Babcock & Wilcock plant BMI nozzles were modified
after initial installation to increase the diameter of the portion of
the nozzle extending into the lower plenum. The new extension
was alloy 600 and the modification weld was made using alloy
82/182 weld metal, with no subsequent stress relief heat treatment.
44.2.5 Butt Welds
Many Westinghouse reactor vessels have alloy 82/182 butt
welds between the low-alloy steel reactor vessel inlet and outlet
nozzles and the stainless steel reactor coolant pipe, as shown in
Fig. 44.4. In most cases, these welds include alloy 182 cladding
on the inside of the nozzle and an alloy 182 butter layer applied to
the end of the low-alloy steel nozzle prior to vessel stress relief.
FIG. 44.3 TYPICAL BOTTOM-MOUNTED INSTRUMENT
(BMI) NOZZLE
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66 • Chapter 44
FIG. 44.4 TYPICAL REACTOR VESSEL INLET/OUTLET
NOZZLE
Babcock & Wilcox–designed plants, and all but one
Combustion–Engineering-designed plant, do not have alloy 82/182
butt welds at reactor vessel inlet and outlet nozzles since the reac-
tor coolant piping is low-alloy steel as opposed to stainless steel.
Reactor vessel core flood line nozzles in Babcock & Wilcox–
designed plants have alloy 182 cladding and alloy 82/182 butt
welds between the low-alloy steel nozzle and stainless steel core
flood pipe.
44.2.6 Core Support Attachments
Most PWR vessels have alloy 600 lugs attached to the inside
surface of the vessel, as shown in Fig. 44.5, to guide the reactor
internals laterally or to support the reactor internals in the event of
structural failure of the internals. These lugs are attached to
cladding on the inside of the vessel by full penetration alloy
FIG. 44.5 TYPICAL CORE SUPPORT LUG
82/182 welds. In most cases, the vessel cladding in the area of the
lugs is also alloy 182 weld metal.
44.2.7 Miscellaneous Alloy 600 Parts
Most reactor vessel lower closure flanges have alloy 600 leak-
age monitor tubes welded to the flange surface by alloys 82/182
weld metal. These are not discussed further since the leakage
monitor tubes are not normally filled with water and, therefore,
are not normally subjected to conditions that contribute to
PWSCC.
44.3 PWSCC
44.3.1 Description of PWSCC
PWSCC is the initiation and propagation of intergranular
cracks through the material in a seemingly brittle manner, with
little or no plastic deformation of the bulk material and without
the need for cyclic loading. It generally occurs at stress levels
close to the yield strength of the bulk material, but does not
involve significant material yielding.
PWSCC occurs when three controlling factors, material sus-
ceptibility, tensile stress, and the environment, are sufficiently
severe. Increasing the severity of any one or two of the three
factors can result in PWSCC occurring, even if the severity of the
remaining factor or factors is not especially high. The three
factors are discussed separately in the following sections.
While mechanistic theories for PWSCC have been proposed, a
firm understanding of the underlying mechanism of PWSCC has
not been developed. Accordingly, the influence of material
susceptibility, stresses, and environment must be treated on an
empirical basis, without much support from theoretical models.
44.3.2 Causes of PWSCC: Material Susceptibility
Based on laboratory test data and plant experience, the follow-
ing main factors influence the susceptibility of alloy 600 base
metal and its weld alloys to PWSCC:
(a) Microstructure. Resistance to PWSCC tends to increase as
the fraction of the grain boundaries that are decorated by
chromium carbides increases. Various models have been
proposed to explain this effect such as one where the car-
bides act as dislocation sources and enhance plastic defor-
mation at crack tips, thereby blunting the cracks and imped-
ing their growth [17]. The absence of carbides in the matrix
of grains also correlates with higher resistance to PWSCC,
as does larger grain size [18].
(b) Yield Strength. Susceptibility to PWSCC appears to increase
as the yield strength increases. However, this is considered to
be a result of higher yield strength material supporting high-
er residual stress levels and is, therefore, more of a stress
than a material effect. As discussed in para. 44.3.3, tests indi-
cate that the time to PWSCC initiation varies inversely with
the fourth to seventh power of the total (applied plus resid-
ual) tensile stress [19–21].
(c) Chromium Concentration. Tests of wrought materials and
weld materials in the nickel–chromium–iron alloy group of
materials consistently indicate that susceptibility to PWSCC
decreases as the chromium content increases [22,23].
Materials with 30% chromium or more are highly resistant
to PWSCC. The improved resistance of alloy 82 vs. alloy
182 weld metal is attributed to the higher chromium
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 67
concentration of alloy 82 (18–22%) vs. that of alloy 182
(13–17%). Alloy 690 base metal and alloys, 52 and 152
weld metal, with about 30% chromium, have been found to
be highly resistant to PWSCC in numerous tests.
(d) Concentrations of Other Species and Weld Flaws. No clear
trends in PWSCC susceptibility have been observed as a
function of the concentration of other species in the alloy
such as carbon, boron, sulfur, phosphorous, or niobium.
However, to the extent that these species, in combination
with the thermomechanical processing to which the part is
subjected, affect the carbide microstructure, they can have
an indirect influence on susceptibility to PWSCC. Also, hot
cracks caused by some of these species (e.g., sulfur and
phosphorous) can act as PWSCC initiators and, thus,
increase PWSCC susceptibility.
44.3.3 Causes of PWSCC: Tensile Stresses
Industry design requirements, such as ASME BPVC Section
III, specify the allowable stresses for reactor vessel components
and attachments. The requirements typically apply to operating
condition loadings such as internal pressure, differential thermal
expansion, dead weight, and seismic conditions. However, the
industry design standards do not typically address residual stress-
es that can be induced in the parts during fabrication. These resid-
ual stresses are often much higher than the operating condition
stresses and are ignored by the standards since they are secondary
(self-relieving) in nature. It is the combination of operating condi-
tion stresses and residual stresses that lead to PWSCC.
For the case of penetrations attached to the vessel heads by par-
tial penetration J-groove welds, high residual stresses are caused
by two main factors. Firstly, the surfaces of nozzles are typically
machined prior to installation in the vessel. This machining cold
works a thin layer (up to about 0.005 in. thick) on the surface,
thereby significantly increasing the material yield and tensile
strength near the surface. Secondly, weld shrinkage, which occurs
when welding the nozzle into the high restraint vessel shell, pulls
the nozzle wall outward, thereby creating yield strength level
residual hoop stresses in the nozzle base metal and higher
strength cold-worked surface layers. These high residual hoop
stresses contribute to the initiation of axial PWSCC cracks in the
cold-worked surface layer and to the subsequent growth of the
axial cracks in the lower strength nozzle base material. The lower
frequency of cracking in weld metal relative to base metal may
result from the fact that welds tend not to be cold worked and
then subjected to high strains after the cold work.
Residual stresses in the nozzles and welds can lead to crack ini-
tiation from the inside surface of the nozzle opposite from the
weld, from the outside surface of the nozzle near the J-groove
weld, or from the surface of the J-groove weld.
Most PWSCC cracks have been axially oriented. This is consis-
tent with results of finite element stress analyses, which predict
that the hoop stresses exceed the axial stresses at most locations.
However, axial stresses can also be high and circumferential
cracks have occurred in a few cases.
For the case of butt welds, the weld shrinkage that occurs as
progressive passes are applied from the outside surface produces
tensile hoop stresses throughout the weld, axial tensile stresses on
the outside weld surface (and often also the inside weld surface),
and a region of axial compressive stress near midwall thickness.
The hoop stresses can contribute to axial PWSCC cracks in the
weld and the axial stresses can contribute to circumferential
cracks. Finite element analyses show that the hoop stresses on the
wetted inside surface of a butt weld are typically higher than the
axial stresses at high stress locations, such that cracks are predict-
ed to be primarily axial in orientation. However, if welds are
repaired on the inside surface, or subjected to deep repairs from
the outside surface, the residual hoop and axial stresses on the
wetted inside surface can both approach the yield strength of the
weld metal and can cause circumferential as well as axial cracks.
44.3.4 Causes of PWSCC: Environment
Several environmental parameters affect the rate of PWSCC
initiation and growth. Temperature has a very strong effect. The
effects of water chemistry variations are not very strong, assum-
ing that the range of chemistry variables is limited to those that
are practical for PWR primary coolant, i.e., with the coolant con-
taining an alkali to raise pH above neutral and hydrogen to scav-
enge oxygen.
(a) Temperature. PWSCC is strongly temperature dependent.
The activation energy for crack initiation is about 44
kcal/mole for thick section nozzle materials [24] and 50
kcal/mole for thinner cold-worked steam generator tubing
material [25]. The activation energy for crack growth is
about 31 kcal/mole [26]. Using these values, the relative
factors for crack initiation and growth at typical pressuriz-
er and cold leg temperatures of 653F and 555F relative to
an assumed hot leg temperature of 600F are given in
Table 44.1.
(b) Hydrogen Concentration. Tests using crack growth rate
specimens have shown that crack growth tends to be a max-
imum when the hydrogen concentration results in the elec-
trochemical potential being at or close to the potential where
the Ni/NiO phase transition occurs [27]. Higher or lower
values of hydrogen decrease crack growth rates. This effect
can be substantial, with peak crack growth rates in some
cases being up to four times faster when the hydrogen con-
centration is at the value causing peak growth rate as com-
pared to conditions with hydrogen values well away from
the peak growth rate value, as shown in Fig. 44.6 [27]. Tests
at various temperatures show that the hydrogen concentra-
tion for the Ni/NiO transition varies systematically with
temperature, and that the hydrogen concentration causing
the peak growth rate exhibits a similar trend, with the
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68 • Chapter 44
FIG. 44.6 ALLOY 600 CRACK GROWTH RATE AT 338°C PLOTTED VS.
HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION [27]
concentration causing the peak crack growth rate becoming
lower as temperature decreases (e.g., 10 cc/kg at 320C, 17
cc/kg at 330ºC, 24 cc/kg at 338C, and 27.5 cc/kg at 360C).
Crack initiation may depend on hydrogen concentration in a
similar manner. However, enough testing to determine the
effect of hydrogen on time to crack initiation has only been
performed at 330C, where it resulted in the most rapid
crack initiation in alloy 600 tubing at about 32 cc/kg vs.
about 17 cc/kg for peak crack growth rate. Reported data
regarding effects of hydrogen concentration on PWSCC ini-
tiation and growth are shown in Fig. 44.7 [28]. The reasons
that the hydrogen concentration for peak aggressivity
appears to be about twice as high for crack initiation vs.
crack growth rate (32 cc/kg vs. 17 cc/kg) are not known; the
difference may be real or may be an artifact of data scatter
or imprecision.
(c) Lithium Concentration and pH. Tests indicate that the
effects of changes in pH on crack growth rate, once the pH
is well above neutral, are minimal and cannot be distin-
guished from the effects of data scatter [28]. However, when
considering the full pH range from acid to neutral to caus-
tic, several tests indicate that crack growth rates decrease as
pH is lowered to the neutral range and below, but is essen-
tially constant for pHT of about 6 to 8 [29,30].
FIG. 44.7 HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION VS. TEMPERA-
TURE FOR N2/N2O PHASE TRANSITION, PEAK PWSCC
SUSCEPTIBILITY, AND PEAK CRACK GROWTH RATE [28]
While tests of crack growth rate indicate increases in pH and
lithium concentration within the normal ranges used for PWRs
have minimal effects on crack growth rate, some evaluations of
crack initiation data indicate that increases in pH and lithium
cause moderate increases in the rate of crack initiation, e.g., in the
range of 10–15% for increases in cycle pHT from 6.9 to 7.2 [29].
However, recent tests sponsored by the Westinghouse Owners
Group (WOG) indicate that the effect may be stronger, such as an
increase by a factor of two for an increase in cycle pHT from 6.9
to 7.2. Further tests under EPRI sponsorship are underway (as of
2004) to clarify this situation.
44.4 OPERATING EXPERIENCE
44.4.1 Precursor PWSCC at Other RCS Locations
PWSCC of alloy 600 material has been an increasing concern
in PWR plants since cracks were discovered in the U-bend region
of the original Obrigheim steam generators in 1971. The history
of PWSCC occurrences around the full reactor coolant system up
though 1993, i.e., not limited to the reactor vessel, is documented
in an EPRI report [31]. Between 1971 and 1981, PWSCC cracks
were detected at additional locations in steam generator tubes
(e.g., at dents and at roll transitions), and in an increasing number
of tubes. This experience showed that alloy 600 in the metallurgi-
cal condition used for steam generator tubes was quite susceptible
to PWSCC, with susceptibility increasing as stress, cold work,
and temperature increase. It was found that susceptibility was also
strongly affected by the microstructure of the material, with sus-
ceptibility tending to decrease as the density of carbides on the
grain boundaries increases.
The first case of PWSCC of alloy 600 in a non–steam generator
tube application was reported in 1982. This incident involved
PWSCC of an alloy 600 pressurizer heater sleeve [31]. Swelling
of a failed electric heater element inside this sleeve was identified
as a contributing cause. Subsequent to this occurrence, an increas-
ing number of alloy 600 instrument nozzles and heater sleeves in
pres-surizers have been detected with PWSCC. Also, increasing
numbers of instrument nozzles in reactor coolant system hot legs
and steam generator heads have also been detected with PWSCC.
Many of the susceptible nozzles and sleeves have (as of May
2005) been repaired or replaced on a corrective or preventive
basis [31].
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PWSCC in alloys 182 and 82 weld metals was first detected in
October 2000 in a reactor vessel hot leg nozzle weld [32]. This
was only a month before the first detection of PWSCC in a reac-
tor vessel head penetration weld, as discussed in para. 44.4.2.
44.4.2 RPV Top-Head Penetrations
The first reported occurrence of PWSCC in a PWR reactor
vessel application involved a leak from a CRDM nozzle at Bugey
3 in France that was detected during a 10-year inservice inspec-
tion program hydrostatic test conducted in 1991 [33]. This initial
occurrence, and the occurrences detected during the next few
years, involved PWSCC of alloy 600 base material at locations
with high residual stresses resulting from fabrication. The high
residual stresses were mainly the result of weld-induced defor-
mation being imposed on nozzles with cold-worked machined
surfaces.
Subsequent to the initial detection of PWSCC in a CRDM
nozzle in 1991, increasing numbers of plants detected similar
types of PWSCC, typically resulting in small volumes of leak-
age and boric acid deposits on the head surface as shown in
Fig. 44.8. In 2000, circumferential cracks were detected on the
outside diameter of some CRDM nozzles. In 2002, significant
wastage of the low-alloy steel Davis-Besse reactor vessel head
occurred adjacent to an axial PWSCC crack in an alloy 600
CRDM nozzle. The wastage was attributed to corrosion by boric
acid in the leaking primary coolant that concentrated on the
vessel head. Figure 44.9 shows a photograph of the corroded
surface at Davis-Besse. The Davis-Besse plant was shut down
for approximately 2 years for installation of a new head and
incorporation of changes to preclude similar corrosion in the
future. The NRC issued several bulletins describing these events
and requiring utilities to document their inspection plans for this
type of cracking [34–36].
FIG. 44.8 TYPICAL SMALL VOLUME OF LEAKAGE FROM CRDM NOZZLE
The cracking discussed above was mainly related to PWSCC of
alloy 600 base materials. Starting in November 2000, some plants
found PWSCC primarily in the J-groove weld metal, e.g., in
CRDM nozzle-to-vessel alloy 182 J-groove welds [37]. Since that
time, several other cases of PWSCC of CRDM nozzle-to-head
welds have been detected. Also, detection of PWSCC in alloys
182 and 82 welds appears to be increasing in frequency at other
non–reactor vessel locations around the reactor coolant system.
However, the frequency of PWSCC in welds remains lower than
in alloy 600 base material. For example, after the detection of
PWSCC in the weld metal of a CRDM nozzle at a PWR in the
United States in November 2000, and the detection of PWSCC in
the alloy 182 weld metal at reactor vessel outlet nozzles in the
United States and Sweden in late 2000, EDF inspected 754 welds
in 11 replaced reactor vessel heads without detecting any cracks
[24].
44.4.3 RPV Nozzle Butt Welds
In October 2000, a visual inspection showed a leak from an
alloys 82/182 butt weld between a low-alloy steel reactor vessel
hot-leg outlet nozzle and stainless steel hot-leg pipe at the V.C.
Summer plant. Destructive failure analysis showed that the leak
was from a through-wall axial crack in the alloys 82/182 butt
weld, as shown in Fig. 44.10. The axial crack arrested when it
reached the low-alloy steel nozzle on one side and stainless steel
pipe on the other side, since PWSCC does not occur in these
materials. The axial crack can propagate into the low-alloy steel
and stainless steel by fatigue, but the fatigue crack growth rates
will be low due to the small number of fatigue cycles. The
destructive examination also showed a short-shallow circumferen-
tial crack intersecting the through-wall axial crack that grew
through alloy 182 cladding and terminated when it reached the
low-alloy steel nozzle base metal. Examination of fabrication
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70 • Chapter 44

FIG. 44.9 LARGE VOLUME OF WASTAGE ON DAVIS-BESSE REACTOR VESSEL HEAD

FIG. 44.10 THROUGH-WALL CRACK AND PART-DEPTH CIRCUMFERENTIAL

CRACK IN V.C. SUMMER REACTOR VESSEL HOT-LEG OUTLET NOZZLE

records showed that the leaking butt weld had been extensively
repaired during fabrication, including repairs made from the
inside surface. Nondestructive examinations of other reactor ves-
sel outlet and inlet nozzles at V.C. Summer showed some addi-
tional shallow axial cracks.
Shortly before the leak was discovered at V.C. Summer, part-
depth axial cracks were discovered in alloys 82/182 reactor vessel
outlet nozzle butt welds at Ringhals 3 and 4. Some of these cracks
were removed and two were left in place to allow a determination
of the crack growth rate. The crack growth rate is discussed in
para. 44.7.2.
In addition to the PWSCC cracks in alloys 82 and 182 weld
metal in reactor vessel CRDM nozzles and inlet and outlet nozzle
butt welds, a leak was found from a pressurizer nozzle butt weld
at Tsuruga 2 in Japan and a part-depth crack was detected in a
hot-leg pressurizer surge line nozzle butt weld at TMI-1. Both of
these cases occurred in 2003. Cracks were also detected in alloys
82 and 182 cladding in steam generator heads that had been ham-
mered and cold worked by a loose part [24].
In the 2005–2008 time period, the industry has begun imple-
menting a massive inspection program for PWSCC in primary
coolant loop Alloy 82/182 butt welds (In accordance with
Industry Guideline MRP-139 [58] – see Section 44.5.6 below
for complete discussion). Considering the temperature sensitivi-
ty of the PWSCC phenomenon discussed above, this program
started with the highest temperature welds in the system: those
at pressurizer nozzles. To date, essentially all pressurizer nozzle
dissimilar metal butt welds (typically five or six per plant) have
been inspected, mitigated, or both. Approximately 50 nozzles
were inspected (many more were mitigated using weld overlays
with no pre-inspections), resulting in PWSCC-like indications
being detected in nine nozzles, as documented in Table 44.2
below.
Through mid-2008, inspections of reactor vessel nozzle butt
welds have not yet been performed; hot leg nozzle inspections
under MRP-139 are slated to begin in Fall 2008. Given the above
pressurizer nozzle experience, it would not be surprising if at least
some welds with PWSCC-like indications are discovered.
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TABLE 44.2 CRACKING INDICATIONS DETECTED IN REACTOR COOLANT LOOP ALLOY 82/182 BUTT WELDS,
2005 THROUGH MID-2008

Inspection Type of Indication OD Indication a/ l/

Plant Date Nozzle Indication Depth (a, in) Length (l, in) thickness circumference

Calvert Cliffs 2 2005 CL Drain Circ 0.056 0.628 10% 10%

Calvert Cliffs 2 2005 HL Drain Axial 0.392 0.000 70% 0%
DC Cook 2005 Safety Axial 1.232 0.000 88% 0%
Calvert Cliffs 1 2006 HL Drain Circ 0.100 0.450 19% 5%
Calvert Cliffs 1 2006 Relief Axial 0.100 0.000 8% 0%
Calvert Cliffs 1 2006 Surge Circ 0.400 2.400 25% 6%
Davis Besse 2006 CL Drain Axial 0.056 0.000 7% 0%
San Onofre 2 2006 Safety Axial 0.420 0.000 30% 0%
San Onofre 2 2006 Safety Axial 0.420 0.000 30% 0%
Wolf Creek 2006 Relief Circ 0.340 11.500 25.8% 46%
Wolf Creek 2006 Safety Circ 0.297 2.500 22.5% 10%
Wolf Creek 2006 Surge Circ 0.465 8.750 32.1% 19%
Farley 2 2007 Surge Circ 0.500 3.000 33% 6%
Davis Besse 2008 Axial
Crystal River 3 2008 Circ

44.4.4 RPV Bottom-Head Penetrations
In 2003, bare metal visual inspections of the reactor vessel bot-
tom head at South Texas 1 showed small leaks from two BMI noz-
zles, as shown in Fig. 44.11. These leaks were traced to PWSCC
cracks in the nozzles that initiated at small regions of lack-
of-fusion in the J-groove welds between the nozzles and vessel
head [38]. The nozzles were repaired. Examinations of the other
BMI nozzles at South Texas 1 showed no additional cracks.
Essentially all other U.S. plants have performed bare metal visual
inspections of RPV bottom-head nozzles without any evidence of
leaks. At least a dozen U.S. plants have completed volumetric
examinations of the BMI nozzles, representing more than 20% of
the total population of RPV bottom-head nozzles in the U.S., with
no reported cracking. Similarly, no indications of in-service degra-
dation have been identified in volumetric inspections of RPV bot-
tom-head nozzles performed in other countries. PWSCC of BMI
nozzles that operate at the plant cold-leg temperature is generally
considered to be less likely than PWSCC at locations operating at
hot-leg or pressurizer temperatures. The earlier-than-expected
FIG. 44.11 LEAK FROM SOUTH TEXAS 1 BMI NOZZLE
PWSCC in BMI nozzles at South Texas 1 may be related to a com-
bination of high material susceptibility and welding flaws.
44.5 INSPECTION METHODS AND
REQUIREMENTS
As a result of the increasing frequency of PWSCC cracks and
leaks identified in important PWR reactor vessel alloys 600, 82,
and 182 materials since 2000, significant efforts are in progress by
the nuclear industry and the NRC to improve inspection capabilities
and develop appropriate long-term inspection requirements. The
following summarizes the status of inspection methods and require-
ments as of May 2005. It is recommended that users check with the
NRC and industry programs to remain abreast of the latest changes
in inspection methods and requirements.
44.5.1 Visual Inspections
Bare metal visual inspections have proven to be an effective
way of detecting very small leaks, as shown by Figs. 44.8 and
44.11, and, therefore, should play an important role in any inspec-
tion program. A key prerequisite for these inspections is that the
surface should be free of preexisting boric acid deposits from other
sources, because the presence of preexisting boric acid deposits can
mask the small volumes of deposits shown in Figs. 44.8 and
44.11. Visual inspections with insulation in place can provide a
useful backup to bare metal visual inspections but will be inca-
pable of detecting small volumes of leakage, as shown in Figs.
44.8 and 44.11.
In many cases, it has been necessary to modify insulation pack-
ages on the vessel top and bottom heads to facilitate performing
bare metal visual inspections. As of May 2005, most of these
modifications have been completed for PWR plants in the United
States.
ASME Code Case N-722, Additional Examinations for PWR
Pressure-Retaining Welds in Class 1 Components Fabricated with
Alloys 600/82/182 Materials, Section XI, Division 1, was
approved in 2005 to provide for increased visual inspections of
potentially susceptible welds for boric acid leakage.
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72 • Chapter 44
44.5.2 Nondestructive Examinations
Technology exists as of May 2005 to nondestructively examine
all of the alloys 600, 82, and 182 locations in the reactor vessel.
Partial penetration nozzles (CRDM, CEDM, ICI) are typically
examined using one of two methods. The nozzle base metal can
be examined volumetrically from the inside surface by ultrasonics
to confirm that the nozzle base material is free of internal axial or
circumferential cracks. Alternatively, the wetted surfaces of the
alloy 600 base metal and alloys 82 and 182 weld metal can be
examined by eddy current probes to ensure that there are no sur-
face cracks. If there are no surface cracks on wetted alloy 600 sur-
faces, then it can be inferred that there will also be no internal
cracks. Nozzles in the reactor vessel top head can be examined
when the head is on the storage stand during refueling. Nozzles in
the reactor vessel bottom head can be examined ultrasonically or
by eddy current when the lower internals are removed from the
vessel during a 10-year in-service inspection outage. In some
cases, the inside surfaces of BMI instrument nozzles can be
examined by tooling inserted through holes in the lower internals.
Reactor vessel inlet and outlet nozzle butt welds are normally
inspected ultrasonically from the inside surface using automated
equipment. These inspections are typically performed during
10-year in-service inspection outages when the lower internals are
removed from the reactor vessel. Eddy current methods are also
being used in some cases for examining the inside surfaces of
these welds for cracks, although eddy current inspection sensitivi-
ty is a function of the condition of the weld surface. For example,
discontinuities in the weld profile can cause the eddy current
probes to lift off of the surface being examined and, thereby,
adversely affect the inspection sensitivity.
CRDM nozzle butt welds can be examined from the outside
surface by standard ultrasonic methods.
A key to obtaining good nondestructive examinations is to have
the process and the operators qualified on mockups containing
prototypical axial and circumferential flaws. The EPRI NDE
Center in Charlotte, NC, is coordinating qualification efforts for
inspection methods and inspectors in the United States.
44.5.3 ASME BPVC Reactor Vessel Inspection
Requirements
ASME BPVC Section XI specifies inservice inspection require-
ments for operating nuclear power plants in the United States.
Portions of these requirements that apply to PWSCC susceptible
components in the RPV are summarized as follows:
(a) Table IWB-2500-1, Examination Category B-P, requires a
VT-2 visual examination of the reactor vessel pressure-
retaining boundary during the system leak test after every
refueling outage. No leakage is permitted.
(b) Table IWB-2500-1, Examination Category B-O, requires
that 10% of the CRDM nozzle-to-flange welds be inspected
by volumetric or surface methods each inspection interval.
(c) Table IWB-2500-1, Examination Category B-N-1, requires
that attachment welds to the inside surface of the reactor
vessel be examined visually each inspection interval. Welds
in the beltline region must be inspected by VT-1 methods
while welds outside the beltline region must be inspected by
VT-3 methods.
(d) Table IWB-2500-1, Examination Category B-F, specifies
examination requirements for dissimilar metal welds in
reactor vessels. Nozzle-to–safe end socket welds must be
examined by surface methods every inspection interval.
Nozzle-to-safe end butt welds less than NPS 4 must be exam-
ined by surface methods every inspection interval. Nozzle-
to-safe end butt welds NPS 4 and larger must be examined by
volumetric and surface examination methods every inspection
interval. Some deferrals of these inspections are permitted.
(e) As of May 2005, the ASME Code did not require nonde-
structive examination of the partial penetration welds for the
CRDM and BMI nozzles. However, Code Case N-729-1
[63] was published later in 2005 that contained alternative
examination requirements for PWR closure heads with noz-
zles having pressure-retaining partial-penetration welds.
This Code Case included visual, surface and volumetric
examinations for PWR closure heads with Alloy 600 noz-
zles and Alloy 82/182 partial-penetration welds at inspec-
tion intervals that are based on the temperature dependence
of the PWSCC phenomenon described in para. 44.3.4.
(Since RPV closure heads operate at varying temperatures,
there are significant head-to-head temperature differences
between plants.) Code Case N-729-1 also contains inspec-
tion requirements for PWR closure head with nozzles and
partial-penetration welds of PWSCC resistant materials to
address new and replacement heads.
(f) As noted in para. 44.5.1, Code Case N-722 [64] for visual
inspections of alloys 82/182 welds was approved in 2005.
(g) As of May 2008, the ASME Code is working on a new
Section XI Code Case that contains alternate inspection
requirements Alloys 82/182 welds butt welds. ASME Code
actions are also in progress addressing various repair and
mitigation options for dealing with PWSCC. These are
discussed below in para. 44.9.
44.5.4 NRC Inspection Requirements for RPV
Top-Head Nozzles
Subsequent to the discovery of significant corrosion to the
Davis-Besse reactor vessel head, the NRC issued NRC Order
EA-03-009 [39]. This order specifies inspection requirements for
RPV head nozzles based on the effective degradation years of
operation. Effective degradation years (EDYs) are the effective
full-power years (EFPYs) adjusted to a common 600F tempera-
ture using an activation energy model. For plants with 600F head
temperatures, the EDYs are the same as the EFPYs. For plants
with head temperatures, greater than 600F, the EDYs are greater
than the EFPYs. For plants with head temperatures less than
600F, the EDYs are less than the EFPYs. The NRC order
specifies two types of inspections:
(a) bare metal visual inspections of the RPV head surface
including 360 around each RPV head penetration nozzle
(b) nondestructive examinations of the RPV nozzles by one of
the two following methods:
(1) ultrasonic testing of each RPV head penetration nozzle
(i.e., base metal material) from 2 in. above the J-groove
weld to the bottom of the nozzle plus an assessment to
determine if leakage has occurred through the interfer-
ence fit zone
(2) eddy current testing or dye penetrant testing of the wetted
surface of each J-groove weld and RPV head penetration
nozzle base material to at least 2 in. above the J-groove weld
The first of the nondestructive examinations is to show that
there are no axial or circumferential cracks in the nozzle base
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 73
metal or leak paths past the J-groove weld. The second of the
nondestructive examinations is to show that there are no axial or
circumferential cracks in the nozzle base metal by confirming the
absence of surface breaking indications on the nozzle and weld
wetted surfaces.
The order specifies inspection intervals for three categories of
plants: high susceptibility plants with greater than 12 EDY or
where PWSCC cracks have already been detected, moderate sus-
ceptibility plants less than or equal to 12 EDY and greater than or
equal to 8 EDY, and low susceptibility plants with less than 8 EDY.
As of June 2008, the U.S. NRC is expected shortly to transition
the requirements for inspection of RPV top-head nozzles based on
NRC Order EA-03-009 [39] to a set based on ASME Code Case
N-729-1 [63], with caveats. The inspection schedules in this code
case are generally based on the RIY (reinspection years) concept,
which normalizes operating time between inspections for the
effect of head operating temperature using the thermal activation
energy appropriate to crack growth in thick-wall alloy 600 material
(31 kcal/mol (130 kJ/mol)). The basis for this approach to nor-
malizing for the effect of head temperature is that the time for a
flaw just below detectable size to grow to through-wall (and leak-
age) is dependent on the crack growth process. The requirements
in ASME Code Case N-729-1 [63] were developed by ASME,
with extensive technical input provided by a U.S. industry group
(Materials Reliability Program) managed by EPRI [68].
44.5.5 NRC Inspection Requirements for
RPV BMI Nozzles
NRC Bulletin 2003-02, Leakage from Reactor Pressure Vessel
Lower Head Penetrations and Reactor Coolant Pressure
Boundary Integrity [40], summarizes the leakage from BMI noz-
zles at South Texas 1 and requires utilities to describe the results
of BMI nozzle inspections that have been performed at their
plants in the past and that will be performed during the next and
following refueling outages. If it is not possible to perform bare
metal visual examinations, utilities should describe actions that
are being made to allow bare metal visual inspections during sub-
sequent outages. If no plans are being made for bare metal visual
or nonvisual surface or volumetric examinations, then utilities
must provide the bases for concluding that the inspections that
have been performed will ensure that applicable regulatory
requirements are met and will continue to be met. On September
5, 2003, the NRC issued Temporary Instruction 2515/152 [41],
which provides guidance for NRC staff in reviewing utility sub-
mittals relative to Bulletin 2003-02. While the Temporary
Instruction does not represent NRC requirements, it does indicate
the type of information that the NRC is expecting to receive in
response to the bulletin.
44.5.6 Industry Inspection Requirements for
Dissimilar Metal Butt Welds
The industry in the United States has developed a set of manda-
tory inspection guidelines for PWSCC susceptible. Alloy 82/182
butt welds, which are documented in the report MRP-139 [58].
MRP-139 defines examination requirements in terms of categories
of weldments that are based on 1) the IGSCC resistance of the
materials in the original weldment, 2) whether or not mitigation
has been performed on the original weldment, 3) whether or not a
pre-mitigation UT examination has been performed, 4) the exis-
tence (or not) of cracking in the original weldment, and 5) the
likelihood of undetected cracking in the original weldment. The
categories range from A through K, with the higher letter
categories requiring augmented inspection intervals and/or sample
size. Category A is the lowest category, consisting of piping that
has been replaced (or originally fabricated) with PWSCC resistant
material. These weldments are to be inspected at their normal
ASME Code frequency, as defined in ASME Section XI, Table
IWB-2500-1. Category D refers to unmitigated PWSCC suscepti-
ble weld in high temperature locations (e.g. pressurizer or hot leg
nozzles). These require an early initial inspection (before end of
2008 for pressurizer nozzles and before 2010 for hot leg nozzles),
followed by more frequent inspections if they are not treated with
some form of mitigation. Other categories (thru Category K)
address susceptible welds that have been mitigated (B and C),
welds that have been inspected and found cracked, with or with-
out mitigation, and welds for which geometric or material condi-
tions limit volumetric inspectability. For the latter group, by the
time the examination is due, plant owners are required to have a
plan in place to address either the susceptibility of the weld or the
inspectability of the weld.
At the time of this writing, inspections are well under the
MRP-139 guidelines are well underway in U.S. plants. Essentially
all pressurizer nozzles have been inspected and or mitigated, and
plans are in place to perform the other initial inspections required
by MRP-169. Plans include mitigation of most susceptible weld-
ments in high temperature locations, thus moving the weldments
into Categories A, B or C. Work is also currently underway to
develop an ASME Section XI Code Case (N-790, alternative
examination requirements for PWSCC pressure-retaining butt
welds in PWRs) which will eventually replace MRP-139 and
place the augmented examination requirements for PWSCC sus-
ceptible butt welds back under the ASME Section XI Code.
44.6 SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS
44.6.1 Small Leaks
Small leaks due to axial cracks such as shown in Figs. 44.8 and
44.11 do not pose significant safety risk. The leak rates are low
enough that the leaking primary coolant water will quickly evapo-
rate leaving behind a residue of dry boric acid. Most of the leaks
detected to date have resulted in these relatively benign condi-
tions. As shown in the figures, very small leaks are easily detected
by visual inspections of the bare metal surfaces provided that the
surfaces are free from boric acid deposits from other sources. One
explanation for the extremely low leak rates is that short tight
PWSCC cracks can become plugged with crud in the primary
coolant, thereby preventing leakage under normal operating con-
ditions. It is hypothesized that distortions, which occur during
plant transients, allow small amounts of leakage through the crack
before it becomes plugged again. Regardless, these small leaks do
not pose a significant safety concern.
44.6.2 Rupture of Critical Size Flaws
Initially, leaking RPV top-head nozzles were thought to be
exclusively the result of axial cracks in the nozzles, and it was
thus believed that they did not represent a significant safety con-
cern. However, as more examinations were performed, findings
arose that called this hypothesis into question.
(a) Relatively long circumferential cracks were observed in two
nozzles in the Oconee Unit 2 RPV head, and several other
plants also discovered shorter circumferentially oriented
cracks.
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74 • Chapter 44
FIG. 44.12 SCHEMATIC OF RPV TOP-HEAD NOZZLE
GEOMETRY AND NATURE OF OBSERVED CRACKING
(b) Circumferential NDE indications were discovered in the
North Anna Unit 2 head in nozzles that showed no apparent
signs of boric acid deposits due to leakage.
Figure 44.12 presents a schematic of a top-head CRDM nozzle
and J-groove weld and the nature of the cracking that has been
observed. There is some uncertainty as to whether circumferential
cracks arise as a result of axial cracks growing through the weld
or nozzle and causing leakage into the annular region between the
nozzle and head, ultimately leading to reinitiation of circumferen-
tial cracking on the outside surface of the tube, or if they are due
to the axial cracks branching and reorienting themselves in a
circumferential direction, as depicted on the right-hand side of
Fig. 44.12. A destructive examination program has been per-
formed on several of the North Anna Unit 2 nozzles, indicating
that the circumferential nozzle defects found there were in fact the
result of grinding during fabrication rather than service-related
cracking. Nevertheless, the occurrence of circumferential crack-
ing adds a new safety perspective to the RPV top-head nozzle
cracking problem, because of the potential for such cracks to
grow to a critical length and ultimately lead to ejection of a nozzle
from the vessel, although a large circumferential flaw covering
more than 90% of the wall cross section is typically calculated for
nozzle ejection to occur because of the relatively thick wall typical
of RPV top-head nozzles.
PWSCC in PWR RPV inlet/outlet nozzles could also potentially
develop circumferentially oriented flaws, which could lead to pipe
rupture. To date, observed cracking has been primarily axial with
only very small circumferential components. With time, however,
PWSCC in large piping butt welds might be expected to follow
trends similar to the IGSCC cracking issue in BWRs [42]. In the
BWR case, cracking and leakage were initially seen only as axial-
ly oriented cracks in smaller diameter piping. With time, however,
axial and circumferential cracking were observed in pipe sizes up
to and including the largest diameter pipes in the system.
Considering the potential existence of weld repairs during initial
construction of the plants and the associated high residual stresses
that they produce in both axial and circumferential directions,
significant circumferential cracking may eventually be observed
in large-diameter PWR pipe-to-nozzle butt welds.
Because of the concern for PWSCC in PWR piping dissimilar
metal butt welds, methods for predicting the critical crack size for
rupture in such welds have received recent attention [59]. Axial
PWSCC flaws in these welds are limited to the width of the alloy
82/182/132 weld material. Experience has confirmed that the
PWSCC cracks arrest when they reach the PWSCC-resistant low-
alloy steel and stainless steel materials [50]. Therefore, the maxi-
mum axial crack lengths are limited to a few inches at most
(much less than the critical axial flaw length), except for the small
number of cases involving alloy 600 safe ends or alloy 600
pipe/tube (CRDM and BMI nozzles), where axial cracks initiating
in the weld could potentially propagate into the alloy 600 base
metal. Thus, critical crack size calculations for PWR piping dis-
similar metal butt welds typically assume one or more circumfer-
entially oriented PWSCC flaws.
In 2007, EPRI sponsored a detailed investigation of the growth
of circumferential PWSCC flaws in PWR pressurizer nozzle dis-
similar metal butt welds [59]. Using finite-element methods, this
study examined the effect of an arbitrary crack profile on crack
growth and subsequent crack stability and leak rate versus the
standard assumption of a semi-elliptical crack profile. The crack
stability (i.e., critical crack size) modeling of the EPRI study was
based on a standard limit load (i.e., net section collapse)
approach as applied to an arbitrary crack profile around the weld
circumference [65]. The potential for an EPFM failure mode was
considered using a Z-factor approach specific to piping dissimilar
metal welds [66]. Finally, the role of secondary piping thermal
constraint stresses in the rupture process was investigated on the
basis of available experimental pipe rupture data [67], elastic-
plastic finite-element analyses of a pipe with an idealized
through-thickness crack [59], and pressurizer surge line piping
models applied to evaluate the maximum capacity of the
secondary loads to produce rotation at a cracked pressurizer
surge nozzle [59].
44.6.3 Boric Acid Wastage Due to Larger Leaks
Small concentrations of boron are added to the primary coolant
water in PWR plants in the form of boric acid to aid in controlling
core reactivity. At the start of an operating cycle with new fuel,
the boron concentration is typically about 2,000 ppm or less. The
concentration of boron is reduced with fuel burnup to about
0 ppm at the end of an operating cycle when fuel is ready to be
replaced. Work by EPRI and others to determine the probable rate
of corrosion of low-alloy steel by boric acid is documented in the
EPRI Boric Acid Corrosion Guidebook [43]. This document
shows that the corrosion rate of low-alloy steel by deareated pri-
mary coolant (inside the pressure vessel and piping) with 2,000
ppm boron is negligible. The corrosion rate for low concentration
(2,000 ppm) aerated boric acid is also very low. However, when
high-temperature borated water leaks onto a hot surface, the water
can boil off leaving concentrated aerated boric acid. The corro-
sion rate of low-alloy steel by hot concentrated aerated boric acid
can be as high as 10 in./year under some conditions.
As evidenced by the significant volume of material corroded
from the Davis-Besse reactor vessel head, boric acid corrosion
has the potential to create significant safety risk. Figure 44.13
shows cross-section and plan views of the corroded region of the
Davis-Besse head shown in Fig. 44.9. As indicated, a large vol-
ume of the low-alloy head material was corroded, leaving the
stainless steel cladding on the inside of the vessel head to resist
the internal pressure. Part-depth cracks were discovered in the
unsupported section of cladding.
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FIG. 44.13 PLAN AND CROSS-SECTION THROUGH CORRODED PART OF

DAVIS-BESSE REACTOR VESSEL HEAD

Based on available evidence, it was determined that the leakage of the nozzles frequently enough to catch PWSCC cracks before
that caused the corrosion had been occurring for at least 6 years. they grow through wall. Secondly, clean the external surfaces of
While it was known that boric acid deposits were accumulating preexisting boric acid deposits from other sources and perform bare
on the vessel top head surface, the utility attributed the accumula- metal visual inspections at frequent enough intervals to detect leaks
tions to leakage from spiral-wound gaskets at the flanged joints at an early benign stage. Thirdly, if the risk is believed high or
between the CRDM nozzles and the CRDMs. The accumulations
of boric acid had not been removed due to poor access to the
enclosed plenum between the top of the vessel head and the bot-
tom of the insulation, as shown in Fig. 44.14.
The transition from relatively benign conditions, such as shown
in Figs. 44.8 and 44.11, to severe conditions, which created the cav-
ity shown in Figs. 44.9 and 44.13, is believed to be a function of the
leakage rate. A PWSCC crack that first breaks through the nozzle
wall or weld will initially be small (short), resulting in a low leak
rate. It is believed that the small leak rate will not lower the metal
surface temperature enough to allow liquid conditions to exist. As
the crack grows in length above the J-groove weld, the leak rate is
expected to increase to the point where boric acid on the surface
near the leak remains moist or where the leaking borated water
locally cools the low-alloy steel material to the point where the sur-
face will remain wetted and allow boric acid to concentrate.
Preliminary models of these conditions have been developed, and
test work was started by EPRI in 2004 to more accurately deter-
mine the conditions where the leakage produces wetted conditions
that can cause high boric acid corrosion rates and where the leakage
results in essentially benign dry boric acid deposits.
Conditions such as occurred at Davis-Besse can be prevented by FIG. 44.14 CROSS-SECTION THROUGH DAVIS-BESSE
a three-step approach. Firstly, perform nondestructive examinations REACTOR VESSEL HEAD
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76 • Chapter 44
inspections are difficult or costly, replace the susceptible parts or
apply a remedial measure to reduce the risk of PWSCC leaks.
44.7 DEGRADATION PREDICTIONS
44.7.1 Crack Initiation
Initiation of PWSCC in laboratory test samples and in PWR
steam generator tubing has been found to follow standard statisti-
cal distributions such as Weibull and log-normal distributions
[44–47]. These distributions have been widely used for modeling
and predicting the occurrence of PWSCC in PWRs since about
1988, and continue to be used for this purpose.
The parameters of a statistical distribution used to model a
given mode of PWSCC, such as axial cracks in CRDM nozzles,
only apply to the homogeneous set of similar items that are
exposed to the same environmental and stress conditions, and
only to the given crack orientation being modeled. For example,
axial and circumferential cracking are modeled separately since
the stresses acting on the two crack orientations are different.
In general, two parameter Weibull or log-normal models are used
to model and predict the future occurrence of PWSCC. An initia-
tion time, which sometimes is used as a third parameter, is not gen-
erally modeled, because use of a third parameter has been found to
result in too much flexibility and uncertainty in the predictions.
PWSCC predictions are most reliable when the mode of crack-
ing is well developed with results for detected cracking available
for three or more inspections. In this situation, the fitted parameters
to the inspection data are used to project into the future. When no
cracking has been detected in a plant, rough predictions can still be
developed using industry data. This is generally done using a two-
step process. The first step involves developing a statistical distribu-
tion of times to occurrence of PWSCC at a selected threshold level
(such as 0.1%) for a set of plants with similar designs. Data for
plants with different temperatures are adjusted to a common tem-
perature using the Arrhenius equation (see Table 44.1). The distrib-
ution of times to the threshold level is used to determine a best esti-
mate time for the plant being modeled to develop PWSCC at that
threshold level. Techniques are available to adjust the prediction to
account for the time already passed at the plant without detecting
the mode being evaluated. Once the best estimate time for occur-
rence at the threshold level is determined, future cracking is pro-
jected from that point forward using the median rate of increase
(Weibull slope or log-normal standard deviation) in the industry for
the mode of PWSCC being evaluated.
44.7.2 Crack Growth
Numerous PWSCC crack growth studies have been performed
on thick-wall alloy 600 material in PWR environments at test tem-
peratures that span the range of typical PWR operating tempera-
tures. In 2002, these tests were reviewed and summarized under
sponsorship of EPRI [26,48]. The EPRI study (MRP-55) conclud-
ed that PWSCC crack growth rates for thick-wall alloy 600 base
metal behave in accordance with the following relationship:
Qg 1
a = exp c- a - b da(K - K th)b
. 1
R T Tref
where
. R  universal gas constant
a  crack growth rate at temperature T in m/sec (or in./hr)
Qg  thermal activation energy for crack growth
 130 kJ/mole (31.0 kcal/mole)
R  universal gas constant
 8.314  10–3 kJ/mole • K (1.103  10–3 kcal/mole • R)
T  absolute operating temperature at location of crack,
K (or R)
Tref  absolute reference temperature used to normalize data
 325C  598.15 K (617F  1076.67 R)
  crack growth amplitude
K  crack tip stress intensity factor, Mpa 1m (or ksi 1in)
Kth  crack tip stress intensity factor threshold
 9 Mpa 1m (8.19 ksi 1in)
  exponent
 1.16
Temperature dependence is modeled in this crack growth rate
equation via an Arrhenius-type relationship using the aforemen-
tioned activation energy of 31 kcal/mole. The stress intensity
factor dependence is of power law form with exponent 1.16.
Figure 44.15 presents the distribution of the coefficient () in the
power law relationship at constant temperature (617F). The data
in this figure exhibit considerable scatter, with the highest and
lowest data points deviating by more than an order of magnitude
from the mean. The 75th percentile curve (see Figure 44.15a) was
recommended for use in deterministic crack growth analyses
[26,48], and this curve is now included in Section XI for disposi-
tion of PWSCC flaws in RPV top-head nozzles. In addition, prob-
abilistic crack growth rate studies have been performed of top
head nozzles using the complete distribution [49]. An additional
factor of 2 has been applied to the 75th percentile value when
analyzing crack growth exposed to leakage in the annular gap
between the nozzle and the head, to allow for possible abnormal
water chemistry conditions that might exist there [26,48].
Similar crack growth rate testing has been conducted for
alloys 82 and 182 weld metals. The weld metal crack growth
data are sparser and exhibit similar statistical variability. A
review of weld metal PWSCC crack growth data has also been
completed under EPRI sponsorship [61,62]. This study (MRP-
115) showed that Alloy 182/132 weld metal crack growth obeys
a similar relationship to that shown above for alloy 600 base
metal, but with crack growth rates about four times higher than
the alloy 600 curve for stress intensity factors greater than about
20 ksi 1in (see Figure 44.15a). Similar to the heat-by-heat
analysis for the wrought material, a weld-by-weld analysis was
performed on the available worldwide laboratory crack growth
rate data for the weld materials (see Figure 44.15b). The EPRI
study (MRP-115) concluded that PWSCC crack growth rates for
alloy 82/182/132 weld metal behave in accordance with the fol-
lowing relationship, where no credit for a stress intensity factor
threshold greater than zero was taken because of insufficient
data on this parameter:
Qg 1
a = exp c- a - b da falloy forient K b
. 1
R T Tref
where:
.
a  crack growth rate at temperature T in m/s (or in/h)
Qg  thermal activation energy for crack growth
 130 kJ/mole (31.0 kcal/mole)
 8.314  10–3 kJ/mole-K (1.103  10–3 kcal/mole-°R)
T  absolute operating temperature at location of crack, K
(or °R)
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 77

FIGURE 44.15A DETERMINISTIC CRACK GROWTH RATE CURVES

FOR THICK-WALL ALLOY 600 WROUGHT MATERIAL AND FOR ALLOY
182/132 AND ALLOY 82 WELD MATERIALS [61,62]

FIGURE 44.15B LOG-NORMAL FIT TO 19 WELD FACTORS FOR SCREENED

MRP DATABASE OF CGR DATA FOR ALLOY 82/182/132 [61,62]

Tref  absolute reference temperature used to normalize data
 598.15 K (1076.67°R)
  power-law constant
. applicable temperature.
 1.5  10–12 at 325°C for a in units of m/s and K in
. Figure 44.16 shows typical crack growth predictions for a cir-
units of MPa 1m (2.47  10–7 at 617°F for a in units
of in/h and K in units of ksi 1in)
falloy  1.0 for Alloy 182 or 132 and 1/2.6  0.385 for Alloy 82
forient  1.0 except 0.5 for crack propagation that is clearly
perpendicular to the dendrite solidification direction
K  crack-tip stress intensity factor, MPa 1m (or ksi 1in)
  exponent
 1.6
Deterministic crack growth rate predictions have been per-
formed for axial and circumferential cracking in RPV top- and
bottom-head nozzles and in large-diameter butt welds [49,50].
Welding residual stresses are a primary factor contributing to
crack growth in all these analyses. Stress intensity factors versus
crack size, considering residual stresses plus operating pressure
and thermal stresses are first computed in these studies. These are
then inserted into the appropriate crack growth relationship (alloy
600, 82, or 182) at the component operating temperature and inte-
grated with time to predict crack size versus operating time at the
cumferential crack in a steep angle RPV top-head (CRDM) noz-
zle. (Nozzles in the outer rings of vessel heads having the steepest
angles between the nozzle and the head have been found to be
controlling in terms of predicted growth rates for circumferential
cracks). The analysis depicted in Fig. 44.16 assumed a through-
wall, 30 of circumference crack in the most limiting azimuthal
location of the nozzle at time zero, and predicted the operating time
for it to grow to a size that would violate ASME Section XI flaw
evaluation margins with respect to nozzle ejection (~300). It is
seen that, even for relatively high RPV temperatures, operating
times on the order of 8 years or greater are predicted for circumfer-
ential nozzle cracks to propagate to a size that would violate
ASME Section XI safety margins.
Figure 44.17 shows similar crack growth predictions for a
postulated circumferential crack in a large-diameter nozzle butt
weld. Stress intensity factors were computed in this analysis for
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78 • Chapter 44

FIG. 44.16 CRACK GROWTH RATE PREDICTIONS FOR CIRCUMFER-ENTIAL

CRACKS IN RPV TOP-HEAD NOZZLE AT VARIOUS ASSUMED OPERATING
TEMPERATURES INITIAL CRACK ASSUMPTION ⴝ 30ⴗ THROUGH-WALL
CRACK AT MAXIMUM STRESS AZIMUTH IN HIGH ANGLE NOZZLE.

a 6-to-1 aspect ratio crack in a large-diameter RPV inlet/outlet
nozzle, ranging in depths from 0.1 in. to 2.2 in. The nozzle was
conservatively assumed to have a large, inside surface repair,
and the crack was assumed to reside in the center of that repair
(i.e., in the most unfavorable residual stress region of the weld).
The predicted crack growth in this case is fairly rapid for a typi-
cal outlet nozzle temperature, 602F, propagating to 75%
through-wall (the upper bound of ASME Section XI allowable
flaw sizes in piping) in about 3 years. Conversely, if no weld
repair were assumed, little or no crack growth would be predict-
ed over the plant lifetime. For this same crack, including the
effect of the repair, the predicted time for a 0.1 in. deep crack to
grow to 75% through-wall at a typical inlet nozzle temperature
(555F) is about 11 years.
The strong effect of operating temperature is apparent in both
crack growth analyses. The outlet nozzle analysis also demon-
strates the detrimental effect of weld repairs that were performed
during construction at some plants.

FIG. 44.17 CRACK GROWTH RATE PREDICTIONS FOR CIRCUMFERENTIAL

CRACKS IN RPV MAIN COOLANT LOOP DISSIMILAR METAL NOZZLE BUTT
WELD AT OPERATING TEMPERATURES TYPICAL OF REACTOR INLET AND
OUTLET NOZZLES INITIAL CRACK ASSUMPTION ⴝ 0.1ⴖ ⴛ 0.6ⴖ INSIDE
SURFACE CRACK AT MAXIMUM STRESS AZIMUTH IN NOZZLE WITH
ASSUMED INSIDE SURFACE FIELD REPAIR.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 79

FIG. 44.18 PROBABILITY OF NOZZLE FAILURE (NSC) AS A FUNCTION OF

VARIATIONS IN TOP-HEAD TEMPERATURE AND INSPECTION INTERVALS

44.7.3 Probabilistic Analysis
Because of the large degree of statistical scatter in both the
crack initiation and crack growth behavior of PWSCC in alloy
600 base metal and associated weld metals, probabilistic fracture
mechanics (PFM) analyses have been used to characterize the
phenomenon in terms of the probabilities of leakage and failure
[49] for RPV top head nozzles. The analysis incorporates the fol-
lowing major elements:
(a) computation of applied stress intensity factors for circum-
ferential cracks in various nozzle geometries as a function
of crack length and stresses
(b) determination of critical circumferential flaw sizes for noz-
zle failure
(c) an empirical (Weibull) analysis of the probability of nozzle
cracking or leakage as a function of operating time and tem-
perature of the RPV head
(d) statistical analysis of PWSCC crack growth rates in the
PWR primary water environment as a function of applied
stress intensity factor and service temperature
(e) modeling of the effects of inspections, including inspection
type, frequency, and effectiveness
A series of PFM analysis results is presented in [49], which cov-
ers a wide variety of conditions and assumptions. These include
base cases, with and without inspections, and sensitivity studies to
evaluate the effects of various statistical and deterministic assump-
tions. The model was benchmarked with respect to field experience,
considering the occurrence of cracking and leakage and of circum-
ferential cracks of various sizes. The benchmarked parameters were
then used to evaluate the effects of various assumed inspection pro-
grams on probability of nozzle failure and leakage in actual plants.
A sample of the results is presented in Figs. 44.18 and 44.19.
Figure 44.18 shows the effect of inspections on probability of
nozzle failure (Net Section Collapse, or ejection of a nozzle) for
head operating temperatures ranging from 580F to 600F. A no-
inspection curve is shown for each temperature. Runs were then
made assuming NDE inspections of the nozzles. Inspections were
assumed to be performed at intervals related to head operating tem-
perature (more frequent inspections for higher head temperatures,

FIG. 44.19 PROBABILITY OF NOZZLE LEAKAGE AS A FUNCTION OF

VARIATIONS IN TOP-HEAD TEMPERATURE AND INSPECTION INTERVALS
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80 • Chapter 44
FIGURE 44.19A PRESSURIZER DISSIMILAR METAL BUTT WELD FLAW INDICATIONS
COMPARED TO CRITICAL FLAW SIZE PROBABILITY ESTIMATES
less frequent for lower temperatures). It is seen from the figure
that the assumed inspection regimen is sufficient to maintain the
nozzle failure probability (per plant year) below a generally
accepted target value of 1  103 for loss of coolant accidents
due to nozzle ejection.
Figure 44.19 shows similar results for the probability of leak-
age from a top-head nozzle. It is seen from this figure that the
same assumed inspection regimen maintains the probability of
leakage at or about 6% for the cases analyzed. Analyses similar to
those reported in Figs. 44.18 and 44.19 have been used, in conjunc-
tion with deterministic analyses, to define an industry-recommended
inspection and corrective action program for PWR top heads that
results in acceptable probabilities of leakage and failure. This
work also constituted the basis for the inspection requirements
incorporated in ASME Code Case N-729-1 [63].
Similar probabilistic analyses have been performed for PWSCC
susceptible butt welds in pressurizer nozzles, as part of the effort
documented in MRP-216 [59]. Analyses established the current
expected flaw distribution based on pressurizer nozzle DMW
inspections to date, (Table 44.1), estimates were made of the prob-
ability of cracking versus flaw size, and of crack growth rate ver-
sus time. A plot of the flaw indications found to date, in terms of
crack length as percentage of circumference (abscissa) versus
crack depth as percentage of wall thickness (ordinate) is illustrated
in Figure 44.19a. Axial indications plot along the vertical axis
(l/circumference = 0) in this plot, with leaking flaws plotted at a/t
= 100%. Circumferential indications plot at non-zero values of
l/circumference, at the appropriate a/t. Clean inspections are plot-
ted randomly in a 10% box near the origin, to give some indication
of inspection uncertainty. Also shown on this plot are loci of criti-
cal flaw sizes based on an evaluation of critical flaw sizes present-
ed in Ref. [59]. 50th and 99.9th percentile plots are shown. It is
seen from this figure that all of the flaw indications detected were
far short of the sizes needed to cause a rupture. The probabilistic
analysis also addressed the small but finite probability that larger
flaws may exist in uninspected nozzles, plus the potential for crack
growth during future operating time until all the nozzles are
inspected (or mitigated) under MRP-139 [58] guidelines.
44.8 REPAIRS
When cracking or leakage is detected in operating nuclear
power plant pressure boundary components, including the reactor
vessel, repair or replacement may be performed in accordance
with ASME BPVC Section XI [51]. Section XI specifies that the
flaws must be removed or reduced to an acceptable size in accor-
dance with Code-accepted procedures. For PWSCC in RPV alloy
600 components, several approaches have been used.
44.8.1 Flaw Removal
For relatively shallow or minor cracking, flaws may be
removed by minor machining or grinding. This approach is per-
mitted by the ASME Code to eliminate flaws and return the com-
ponent to ASME Code compliance. However, this approach gen-
erally does not eliminate the underlying cause of the cracking.
There will still be susceptible material exposed to the PWR envi-
ronment that caused the cracking originally, and in some cases the
susceptibility might be aggravated by surface residual stresses
caused by the machining or grinding process. Simple flaw
removal is thus not considered to be a long-term repair, unless
combined with some other form of mitigation. However, in the
short term, for example, where future component replacement is
planned, it may be a viable approach for interim operation.
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FIG. 44.20 SCHEMATIC OF RPV TOP-HEAD NOZZLE
FLAW EMBEDMENT REPAIR
44.8.2 Flaw Embedment
Surface flaws are much more significant than embedded flaws
from a PWSCC perspective, because they continue to be exposed
to the PWR primary water environment that caused the crack and
that can lead to continued PWSCC flaw growth after initiation.
Accordingly, one form of repair is to embed the flaw under a
PWSCC-resistant material. Figure 44.20 shows an embedment
approach used by one vendor to repair PWSCC cracks or leaks in
top-head nozzles and welds. The PWSCC-susceptible material,
shown as the cross-hatched region in the figure, is assumed to be
entirely cracked (or just about to crack). PWSCC-resistant material,
typically alloy 52 weld metal, is deposited over the susceptible
material. The assumed crack is shown to satisfy all ASME BPVC
Section XI flaw evaluation requirements, in the absence of any
growth due to PWSCC, since the crack is completely isolated
from the PWR environment by the resistant material. Note that
the resistant material in this repair must overlap the susceptible
material by enough length in all directions to preclude new cracks
growing around the repair and causing the original crack to be
reexposed to the PWR environment. Although this repair
approach has been used successfully in several plants, there have
been many incidents in which nozzles repaired by this approach
during one refueling outage have been found to be leaking at the
subsequent outage. These occurrences were attributed to lack of
sufficient overlap of the repair, because it is sometimes difficult to
distinguish the exact point at which the susceptible material ends
(for instance the end of the J-groove weld butter and the begin-
ning of the RPV cladding in Fig. 44.20).
44.8.3 Weld Overlay
Another form of repair that has been used extensively to repair
cracked and leaking pipe welds is the weld overlay (WOL).
Illustrated schematically in Fig. 44.21, WOLs were first con-
ceived in the early 1970s as a repair for IGSCC cracking and
leakage in BWR main coolant piping. Over 500 such repairs have
been applied in BWR piping ranging from 4 in. to 28 in. in diam-
eter, and some weld overlay repairs have been in service for over
20 years, with no evidence of any resumption of the IGSCC
FIG. 44.21 SCHEMATIC OF WELD OVERLAY REPAIR
APPLIED TO RPV OUTLET NOZZLE
problem. Although WOLs, shown in Fig. 44.21, do not eliminate
the PWSCC environment from the flaw as in the flaw embedment
process, the repair has been shown to offer multiple improve-
ments to the original pipe welds, including the following:
(a) structural reinforcement
(b) resistant material
(c) favorable residual stress reversal
Weld overlays also offer a significant improvement in inspec-
tion capability, because once a weld overlay is applied, the
required inspection coverage reduces to just the weld overlay
material plus the outer 25% of the original pipe wall, often a
much easier inspection than the original dissimilar metal weld
(DMW) inspection.
Weld overlay repairs have been recognized as a Code-accept-
able repair in an ASME Section XI Code Case [52] and accepted
by the U.S. NRC as a long-term repair. They have also been used,
albeit less extensively, to repair dissimilar metal welds at nozzles
in BWRs.
The weld overlay repair process was first applied to a PWR
large-diameter pipe weld (on the Three Mile Island 1 pressurizer
to hot-leg nozzle) in the fall of 2003. Since that time, as part of
the MRP-139 inspection effort described in para. 44.5.6, over 200
weld overlays have been applied to pressurizer nozzle dissimilar
metal butt welds. Part of the reason for this trend is that many
pressurizer nozzles were unable to be volumetrically inspected to
achieve the required examination coverage in their original con-
figuration. By applying weld overlays, in addition to mitigating
the welds, their inspectability was enhanced such that post over-
lay ultrasonic exams could be performed in accordance with
applicable requirements. Technical justification for the WOL
process as a long-term repair is documented in Ref. [53].
Requirements for weld overlays in PWR systems, including their
use as mitigation as well as repair, is documented in Ref. [60].
44.8.4 Weld Replacement
Finally, the flawed weld may be replaced in its entirety. In PWR
top-head nozzles, this process has been implemented extensively by
relocating the pressure boundary from the original PWSCC-
susceptible J-groove weld at the inside surface to a new weld at the
midwall of the RPV head (see Fig. 44.22). With this repair
approach, the PWSCC-susceptible portion of the original J-groove
weld and buttering is left in the vessel, but it is no longer part of
the pressure-retaining load path for the nozzle. The lower portion of
the original nozzle is first removed by machining to a horizontal ele-
vation above the J-groove weld (left-hand side of Fig. 44.22). A
weld prep is produced on the bottom of the remaining portion of
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82 • Chapter 44
FIG. 44.22 SCHEMATIC OF RPV TOP-HEAD NOZZLE WELD
REPLACEMENT REPAIR
the nozzle, and a new, horizontal weld is made between the original
nozzle and the bore of the RPV head (righthand side of Fig. 44.22).
The new weld is made with PWSCC-resistant material (generally
alloy 52 weld metal), and the surface of the weld is machined for
NDE. The repair process still leaves some portion of the original
PWSCC-susceptible alloy 600 nozzle in place, potentially in a high
residual stress region at the interface with the new weld. However, a
surface treatment process, such as roll peening or burnishing, has
been applied to this interface in many applications to reduce poten-
tial PWSCC concerns. Experience with this repair process has been
good, in terms of subsequent leakage from repaired nozzles, and in
most cases the repair need only survive for one or two fuel cycles,
because, once PWSCC leakage is detected in an RPV head, com-
mon industry practice has been to schedule a future head replace-
ment (not because of the repaired nozzle, but because of concerns
that other nozzles are likely to be affected by the problem leading to
costly future inspections, repairs, and outage extensions).
44.9 REMEDIAL MEASURES
44.9.1 Water Chemistry Changes
Three types of water chemistry changes that could affect the
rate of PWSCC are zinc additions to the reactor coolant, adjust-
ments to hydrogen concentration, and adjustments to lithium
concentration and pH. The factors are described below.
(a) Zinc Additions to Reactor Coolant. Laboratory tests indicate
that the addition of zinc to reactor coolant significantly slows
down the rate of PWSCC initiation, with the improvement
factor increasing as the zinc concentration increases [29].
The improvement factor (slowdown in rate of new crack ini-
tiation) shown by tests varies from a factor of two for 20 ppb
zinc in the coolant to over a factor of ten for 120 ppb zinc.
The effect of zinc on crack growth rate is not as certain, with
some tests indicating a significant reduction in crack growth
rate but others indicating no change. Further testing is under-
way under EPRI sponsorship (as of 2004) to clarify the
effects of zinc on crack growth rate. As of mid-2004, evalu-
ation of plant data, especially the data for a two-unit station
with PWSCC at dented steam generator tube support plates,
is encouraging but not conclusive with regard to whether use
of zinc is reducing the rate of PWSCC. The uncertainty is the
result of changes in inspection methods simultaneously with
changes in zinc concentration.
(b) Adjustments of Hydrogen Concentration. The EPRI PWR
Primary Water Chemistry Guidelines require the hydrogen
concentration in the primary coolant to be kept between 25
and 50 cc/kg [28]. As discussed in the Guidelines and sum-
marized above in para. 44.3.4, the rate of PWSCC initiation
and rate of PWSCC crack growth both seem to be affected
by the hydrogen concentration, with lower concentrations
being more aggressive at lower temperature and higher
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 83
concentrations at higher temperature. Depending on the
plant situation as far as which parts are at most risk of
PWSCC, and depending on the temperature at those parts,
there may be some benefit, such as an improvement factor
of about 1.2, in operating at hydrogen concentrations at
either end of the allowed range. In the longer term,
increased benefit may be achieved by operating slightly
outside of the allowed range (e.g., at 60 cc/kg), although
this will require confirmation that the change does not
result in some other undesirable effects.
(c) Adjustments of Lithium Concentration and pH. As dis-
cussed in para. 44.3.4, some tests indicate that the rate of
PWSCC initiation is increased by increases in lithium con-
centration and pH, e.g., by factors ranging from about 1.15
to 2.0. On the other hand, increases in lithium and pH pro-
vide proven benefits for reducing the potential harmful
deposit buildup on fuel cladding surfaces and for reducing
shutdown dose rates [28]. Based on these opposing trends,
plants can select a lithium/pH regime that best suits their
needs, i.e., does not involve substantial risks of aggravating
PWSCC, while still providing benefits for reducing fuel
deposits and shutdown dose rates. When evaluating the pos-
sible risks to PWSCC of increasing lithium and pH, it
should be noted that crack growth rate tests show no harm-
ful effect while crack initiation tests do. The data from crack
growth rate tests are considered to be more reliable, and it is
recommended that they be given greater weight than the
results from crack initiation tests. An additional considera-
tion is that the use of zinc can provide a stronger benefit
than the possible deficit associated with increases in lithium
and pH, and, thus, can make use of a combined zinc adjust-
ment and increase in lithium and pH attractive.
44.9.2 Temperature Reduction
To date, a main remedial measure applied in the field for RPV
top-head PWSCC has been modification of the reactor internals
package to increase bypass flow through the internals flange
region and, thereby, reduce the head temperature. The lower head
temperature is predicted to reduce the rates of crack initiation and
growth based on the thermal activation energy model, as shown in
Table 44.1. However, experience in France suggests that PWSCC
may occur at head temperatures close to the reactor cold-leg tem-
perature. This is especially significant given PWSCC of two
South Texas Project Unit 1 BMI nozzles at a temperature of about
565⬚F. The South Texas Project experience shows that materials
and fabrication-related factors can result in PWSCC at tempera-
tures lower than otherwise expected.
44.9.3 Surface Treatment
EPRI has sponsored tests of a range of mechanical remedial
measures for PWSCC of alloy 600 nozzles. Results of these tests
were reported by Rao at the Fontevraud 5 Symposium [54]. The
remedial measures test program consisted of soliciting remedial
measures from vendors, fabricating full-diameter and wall-thickness
ring specimens from archive CRDM nozzle material, installing
specimens in rings that locked in high residual stresses on the
specimen inside surface, applying the remedial measures to the
stressed surface, and then testing the specimens in doped steam
with hydrogen overpressure at 400⬚C (750⬚F). The specimens
were removed from the autoclave at intervals and inspected for
SCC. A complicating factor in interpreting the test results is that
not all of the specimens were fabricated from the same heat of
material. Therefore, there were differences in material PWSCC
susceptibility in addition to differences in remedial measure effec-
tiveness. The methods used to correct for differences in specimen
PWSCC susceptibility are discussed in the paper.
The remedial measures fell into three main effectiveness groups.
(a) most effective
(1) waterjet conditioning
(2) electro mechanical nickel brush plating
(3) shot peening
(b) intermediate effectiveness
(1) electroless nickel plating
(2) GTAW weld repair
(3) laser weld repair
(c) least effective
(1) EDM skim cutting
(2) laser cladding
(3) flapper wheel surface polishing
As of May 2005, it is not believed that any of these remedial
measures had actually been applied to a reactor vessel in the field.
44.9.4 Stress Improvement
To mitigate against the IGSCC problem in BWR piping, many
plants implemented residual stress improvement processes. These
were performed both thermally (induction heating stress improve-
ment or IHSI) and by mechanical means (mechanical stress
improvement process or MSIP). As described above, residual
stresses play a major role in susceptibility to both IGSCC and
PWSCC, because large piping butt welds tend to leave significant
residual stresses at the inside surfaces of the pipes, especially
when field repairs were performed during construction. Both
stress improvement processes have been demonstrated to reverse
the unfavorable residual stresses, leaving compressive stresses on
the inside surface of the pipe, which is exposed to the reactor
environment. MSIP has also been applied to PWSCC-susceptible
butt welds in PWR piping, primarily dissimilar metal welds at
vessel nozzles, such as the V.C. Summer outlet nozzle cracking
problem described above. As long as the stress improvement
process is applied relatively early in life, when cracking has not
initiated or grown to significant depths, it clearly constitutes a
useful remedial measure that can be applied to vessel nozzles,
eliminating one of the major factors that contribute to PWSCC.
One of the benefits of the weld overlay process described above
to repair PWSCC-cracked butt welds is that it reverses the resid-
ual stress pattern in the weld, resulting in compressive stresses on
the inside surface. Thus, a novel mitigation approach that is being
explored at several plants is the application of weld overlays pre-
emptively, before cracking is discovered. Applying a preemptive
WOL in this manner produces the same remedial benefits
described above for the stress improvement processes, but also
places a PWSCC-resistant structural reinforcement on the outer
surface of the pipe. So, if the favorable residual stresses were to
relax in service, or for some reason be ineffective in arresting the
PWSCC phenomenon, the PWSCC-resistant overlay would still
provide an effective barrier against leakage and potential pipe
rupture. Moreover, the revised inspection coverage requirements
specified for WOLs apply to such preemptive overlays, providing
the added benefit of enhanced inspectability [52].
ASME_Ch44_p063-088.qxd 6/5/09 12:18 PM Page 84
84 • Chapter 44
44.9.5 Head Replacement
The most obvious way to address RPV top-head cracking
issues is head replacement. Approximately one-third of operating
PWRs in the United States have replaced their heads or have
scheduled head replacements in the near future. Such head
replacements take advantage of the lessons learned to date regard-
ing the PWSCC phenomenon, and the new heads are generally
produced so as to eliminate all PWSCC-susceptible materials,
replacing them with resistant materials (alloy 690 and associated
weld metals alloys 52 and 152). RPV head replacement is a key
aspect of strategic planning to address the alloy 600 problem in
PWRs, and is performed as part of a coordinated alloy 600 main-
tenance program that addresses steam generator, pressurizer, and
piping issues as well as the RPV.
44.10 STRATEGIC PLANNING
Within constraints posed by regulatory requirements, utilities
are free to develop a strategic plan that ensures a low risk of leak-
age, ensures an extremely low risk of core damage, and results in
the lowest net present value (NPV) cost consistent with the first
two criteria. Development of a strategic plan for RPV top-head
nozzles was described by White, Hunt, and Nordmann at the 2004
ICONE-12 conference [55]. The strategic planning process was
based on life cycle management approaches and NPV economic
modeling software developed by EPRI [56,57].
The main steps in the strategic planning process are as follows:
(a) predicting time to PWSCC
(b) assessing risk of leaks
(c) assessing risk of rupture and core damage due to nozzle
ejection
(d) assessing risk of rupture and core damage due to boric acid
wastage
(e) identifying alternative life cycle management approaches
(f) evaluating economically the alternative management
approaches
While the paper and following discussion are based on RPV
top-head nozzles, the same basic approach can be applied to BMI
nozzles and butt welds.
44.10.1 Predicting Time to PWSCC
Predictions of the time to PWSCC crack initiation are
described in para. 44.7.1. The predictions are typically based on a
statistical distribution such as a two-parameter Weibull or log-
normal model. Predictions are most accurate if based on plant-
specific repeat inspections showing increasing numbers of
cracked nozzles. If such data are not available, then predictions
are typically based on data for other similar plants (e.g., design,
material, operating conditions) with corrections for differences in
operating time and temperature.
44.10.2 Assessing Risk of Leaks
The risk of leakage at a particular point in time (typically refu-
eling outage number) is typically determined by a probabilistic
(Monte-Carlo) analysis using the distribution of predicted time to
crack initiation (para. 44.7.1), crack growth (para. 44.7.2), and
other probabilistic modeling techniques (para. 44.7.3). The proba-
bilistic analysis should include a sensitivity study to identify the
most important analysis input parameters, and these important
parameters should be reviewed to ensure that they can be substan-
tiated by available data.
44.10.3 Assessing Risk of Rupture and Core Damage
Due to Nozzle Ejection
The risk of nozzle ejection (net section collapse) is determined
using methods such as described in para. 44.6.2.
44.10.4 Assessing Risk of Rupture and Core Damage
Due to Boric Acid Wastage
The risk of failure of the carbon or low-alloy steel reactor ves-
sel head by boric acid wastage is determined using methods such
as described in para. 44.6.3.
44.10.5 Identifying Alternative Life Cycle
Management Approaches
An important step in developing a life cycle management plan
is to identify the alternative approaches that can be considered.
These alternatives can include the following:
(a) continue to inspect and repair indefinitely without applying
remedial measures.
(b) apply remedial measures, such as lowering the vessel head
temperature by increasing bypass flow through the vessel
internals flange, adding zinc to the primary coolant, and
water-jet conditioning the wetted surface of nozzles and
welds to remove small flaws and leave the material surface
with a compressive residual stress.
(c) replace the vessel head as quickly as possible.
(d) replace the vessel head shortly after detecting the first
PWSCC cracks.
(e) use other approaches identified.
Each of these alternatives must be studied to determine the
difficulty of application, the likely effectiveness, and the effect of
the change on required inspections. For example, head replace-
ment may involve the need to cut an access opening in the con-
tainment structure or to procure a new set of CRDMs to allow the
head changeout to be performed quickly, so as to not adversely
affect the refueling outage time. If openings must be cut in con-
tainment, consideration should also be given to the possible need
to cut other openings in the future, such as for steam generator or
pressurizer replacements. Consideration must also be given to the
disposal of a head after it is replaced.
44.10.6 Economic Evaluations of Alternative
Management Approaches
Most life cycle management evaluations include economic
analyses to determine the NPV cost of each alternative. The NPV
cost is the amount of money that is required today to pay all pre-
dicted future costs, including the effects of inflation and the dis-
count rate. Inputs to an LCM economic analysis typically include
the following:
(a) costs of planned preventive activities including inspections,
remedial measures, and replacements.
(b) predicted failure mechanisms (e.g., cracks, leaks, and rup-
ture) and failure rates.
(c) costs for corrective maintenance in the event of a failure
including the cost to make the repair, the estimated value of
lost production, and an allowance for consequential costs such
as increased regulatory scrutiny. Consideration should be
given to the fact that a major incident such as the Davis-Besse
RPV head wastage can result in lost production and conse-
quential costs far higher than the cost to replace the affected
component.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 85
FIG. 44.23 TYPICAL RESULTS OF STRATEGIC PLANNING ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR
RPV HEAD NOZZLES
Figure 44.23 shows typical results of a strategic planning
analysis with economic modeling.
The final step in the economic evaluation is to review the pre-
dictions in light of other plant constraints, such as planned plant
life, potential power uprates, budget constraints, and the availability
of replacement heads. In many cases, the alternative with the low-
est predicted NPV cost may not represent the best choice.
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in Nuclear Power Systems–Water Reactors, NACE, 2001.
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Requirements for Reactor Pressure Vessel Heads at Pressurized Water
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Commission; 2003.
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Penetrations and Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity
(Bulletin 2003-02). Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission; 2003.
41. U.S. NRC Reactor Pressure Vessel Lower Head Penetration Nozzles
(Bulletin 2003-02), Temporary Instruction 2515/152. Washington,
DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; 2003.
42. U.S. NRC Technical Report on Material Selection and Processing
Guidelines for BWR Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping (NUREG-
0313, Rev. 2). Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission; 1988.
43. Managing Boric Acid Corrosion Issues at PWR Power Stations. In:
Boric Acid Corrosion Guidebook, Rev. 1. Palo Alto, CA: Electric
Power Research Institute; 2001.
44. Staehle RW, Stavropoulos KD, Gorman JA. Statistical Analysis of
Steam Generator Tube Degradation (NP-7493). Palo Alto, CA:
Electric Power Research Institute; 1991.
45. Turner APL, Gorman JA, et al. Statistical Analysis of Steam
Generator Tube Degradation: Additional Topics (TR-103566). Palo
Alto, CA: Electric Power Research Institute; 1994.
46. Stavropoulos KD, Gorman JA, et al. Selection of Statistical
Distributions for Prediction of Steam Generator Tube Degradation.
Proceedings of the 5th International Symposium on Environmental
Degradation of Materials in Nuclear Power Systems – Water
Reactors, pp. 731–738, ANS, 1992.
47. Gorman JA, et al. PWSCC Prediction Guidelines (TR-104030). Palo
Alto, CA: Electric Power Research Institute; 1994.
48. Materials Reliability Program (MRP) Crack Growth Rates for
Evaluating Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) of
Thick-Wall Alloy 600 Materials (MRP-55NP) Revision 1, EPRI, Palo
Alto, CA: 2002. 1006695-NP.
49. Riccardella P, Cofie N, Miessi A, Tang S, Templeton B.
Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics Analysis to Support Inspection
Intervals for RPV Top Head Nozzles. U.S. NRC/Argonne National
Laboratory Conference on Vessel Head Penetration Inspection,
Cracking, and Repairs, September 29-October 2, 2003, Gaithersburg,
Maryland.
50. Materials Reliability Program (MRP-113NP): Alloy 82/182 Pipe Butt
Weld Safety Assessment for U.S. PWR Plant Designs (1007029-NP).
Palo Alto, CA: Electric Power Research Institute; 2004.
51. ASME BPVC Section XI, Rules for Inservice Inspection of Nuclear
Power Plant Components. In: ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Code. New York: American Society of Mechanical Engineers;
2002.
52. ASME BPVC Code Case N-504-2, Alternative Rules for Repair of
Classes 1, 2, and 3 Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping, Section XI,
Division 1. In: ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. New York:
American Society of Mechanical Engineers; 1997.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 87
53. Riccardella PC, Pitcairn DR, Giannuzzi AJ, Gerber TL. Weld Overlay
Repairs From Conception to Long-Term Qualification. International
Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping 1988;34:59–82.
54. Rao GV, Jacko RJ, McIlree AR. An Assessment of the CRDM Alloy
600 Reactor Vessel Head Penetration PWSCC Remedial Techniques.
Proceedings of Fontevraud 5 International Symposium, September
23–27, 2002.
55. White GA, Hunt ES, Nordmann NS. Strategic Planning for RPV Head
Nozzle PWSCC. Proceedings of ICONE12, 12th International Conference
on Nuclear Engineering, April 25–29, 2004, Arlington, Virginia.
56. Demonstration of Life Cycle Management Planning for Systems,
Structures and Components: With Applications at Oconee and Prairie
Island Nuclear Stations, Palo Alto, CA: Electric Power Research
Institute; Charlotte, NC: Duke Power; East Welch, MN: Northern
States Power (now Xcel Energy); 2001.
57. Demonstration of Life Cycle Management Planning for Systems,
Structures and Components – Lcm VALUE User Manual and Tutorial.
Palo Alto, CA: Electric Power Research Institute; 2000.
58. Materials Reliability Program: Primary System Piping Butt Weld
Inspection and Evaluation Guidelines (MRP-139), EPRI, Palo Alto,
CA: 2005. 1010087.
59. Materials Reliability Program: Advanced FEA Evaluation of Growth
of Postulated Circumferential PWSCC Flaws in Pressurizer Nozzle
Dissimilar Metal Welds (MRP-216, Rev. 1), EPRI, Palo Alto, CA:
2007. 1015400.s
60. Materials Reliability Program: Technical Basis for Preemptive Weld
Overlays for Alloy 82/182 Butt Welds in PWRs (MRP-169), EPRI,
Palo Alto, CA: 2005. 1012843.
61. Materials Reliability Program Crack Growth Rates for Evaluating
Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) of Alloy 82, 182,
and 132 Welds (MRP-115NP), EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 2004. 1006696-NP.
62. G. A. White, N. S. Nordmann, J. Hickling, and C. D. Harrington,
“Development of Crack Growth Rate Disposition Curves for Primary
Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) of Alloy 82, 182, and 132
Weldments,” Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on
Environmental Degradation of Materials in Nuclear Power Systems -
Water Reactors, TMS, 2005.
63. ASME Code Case N-729-1, Section XI, Division 1, “Alternative
Examination Requirements for PWR Reactor Vessel Upper Heads
With Nozzles Having Pressure-Retaining Partial-Penetration Welds,”
approved March 28, 2006.
64. ASME Code Case N-722, Section XI, Division 1, “Additional
Inspections for PWR Pressure Retaining Welds in Class 1 Pressure
Boundary Components Fabricated with Alloy 60/82/182 Materials,”
approved July 5, 2005.
65. S. Rahman and G. Wilkowski, “Net-Section-Collapse Analysis of
Circumferentially Cracked Cylinders—Part I: Arbitrary-Shaped
Cracks and Generalized Equations,” Engineering Fracture Mechanics,
Vol. 61, pp. 191–211, 1998.
66. G. Wilkowski, H. Xu, D.-J. Shim, and D. Rudland, “Determination of
the Elastic-Plastic Fracture Mechanics Z-factor for Alloy 82/182 Weld
Metal Flaws for Use in the ASME Section XI Appendix C Flaw
Evaluation Procedures,” PVP2007 26733, Proceedings of ASME-
PVP 2007: 2007 ASME Pressure Vessels and Piping Division
Conference, San Antonio, TX, 2007.
67. G. M. Wilkowski, et al., Degraded Piping Program-Phase II,
Summary of Technical Results and Their Significance to Leak-
Before-Break and In-Service Flaw Acceptance Criteria, NUREG/CR-
4082, Vol. 1–8, January 1985 to March 1989.
68. Materials Reliability Program Reactor Vessel Closure Head
Penetration Safety Assessment for U.S. PWR Plants (MRP-110NP):
Evaluations Supporting the MRP Inspection Plan, EPRI, Palo Alto,
CA: 2004. 1009807-NP.
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PRA AND RISK-INFORMED
ANALYSIS
Sidney A. Bernsen, Fredric A. Simonen, Kenneth R. Balkey,
Raymond A. West, and Ralph S. Hill III
45.1 INTRODUCTION
Over the past 20 years, nuclear power plant design and operating
practices have entered into an evolutionary period of change from
the experience-based, deterministic requirements established by
expert opinion to one that also includes a formalized application of
risk importance determinations. This chapter traces the development
of nuclear power plant probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) from its
initial evolution as a means for evaluation of public safety through
the recognition of its use to identify important safety concerns and
ultimately to its use in helping to determine risk importance and the
appropriate allocation of resources and in-service activities. It also
discusses the current status of Codes and Standards that provide
rules and guidance for the development of probabilistic risk analysis
to support nuclear power plant applications.
The chapter addresses several specific topics of interest to
Section XI and also covers related activities in place or underway
to risk inform Code requirements for in-service testing and Code
design rules. Also included is a discussion of how the risk-
informed methods developed for nuclear activities are now being
used to help allocate resources for the protection of critical
national assets to enhance homeland security.
45.2 BACKGROUND
The consideration of risk has always been implicitly or explic-
itly a part of ASME’s development of Codes and Standards. With
traditional engineering methods, design factors are incorporated
into Codes and Standards to manage this risk based on expert
judgment. The emergence of PRA technology now provides the
opportunity to better focus Codes and Standards requirements on
the most important risks.
Application of PRA technology to nuclear power safety consider-
ations began over 30 years ago, when the Atomic Energy
Commission initiated the Reactor Safety Study that was reported in
WASH 1400 [1]. This study adapted methods previously used by the
Department of Defense and by National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) to predict the effect of failures of small
components in large, complex systems. Two plants were analyzed in
detail to predict the effect of failures of small components in large
and complex nuclear systems. Initial use of the results of this study
CHAPTER
45
involved a general comparison of the public risk from nuclear power
with risks from other natural phenomenon and industrial accidents,
which indicated that risks from potential U.S. nuclear power plant
accidents were small compared to other risks encountered in a com-
plex technological society. The study did conclude that for the plants
analyzed, accidents initiated by transients or small loss of coolant
accidents (LOCAs) were more likely to cause a core meltdown than
the traditional large break design-basis LOCAs. The Reactor Safety
Study also identified a wide variety of accident sequences and ensu-
ing equipment failures (initiators and/or operator errors) that have
the potential to cause core meltdown.
While it was evident to the authors of the WASH-1400 [1]
study that the methodology and results had a large potential to
improve, the regulation and licensing of nuclear power plants by
focusing attention on significant safety issues, it was unclear
how the methodology should be integrated into the regulations
[2]. In addition, an independent review group appointed by the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a report in
September 1978 [3] that concurred that the risks from nuclear
power appeared to be very low, but questioned many of the
assumptions and conclusions of the study. This report and other
public controversies surrounding the use of nuclear power caused
the NRC commissioners to withdraw endorsement of the
Executive Summary of the Reactor Safety Study. It was not until
the accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) and subsequent plant risk
evaluations that the importance of the PRA methodology in iden-
tifying vulnerabilities and the relative safety importance of plant
systems and components was appreciated.
As a result of the TMI accident, follow-up investigations were
performed by various groups, including a Presidential Commission
[4] and a special group appointed by the NRC commissioners [5].
Also, the Industry Degraded Core Rulemaking (IDCOR) pro-
gram was initiated by the industry through the Atomic Industrial
Forum to respond to the question of whether existing nuclear
plants met severe accident safety goals and if specific plants
had unrecognized vulnerabilities. These studies identified some
unique vulnerabilities to severe accidents. Generally, the undesir-
able risk from these unique features was reduced by low-cost
changes in procedures or minor design modifications. All these
studies confirmed the general insights of the Reactor Safety
Study [1].
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90 • Chapter 45
The next major effort was the NRC’s evaluation of five light
water reactor (LWR) designs in the NUREG-1150 study [6] pub-
lished in 1990. This study assessed the health risks to the public
from not only internal initiators but also from earthquakes and
fires. It also examined the uncertainties in the estimated risks by
assigning uncertainties to input parameters and models and then
propagating them to uncertainties in core damage frequency, mag-
nitudes of radioactive releases, and public health effects. NUREG-
1150 [6] concluded that commercial nuclear power plants imposed
even smaller risks on the public than had been predicted in
WASH-1400 [1]. A significant conclusion from these risk studies
was that only a relatively small number of safety-related plant
components (as defined by deterministic regulatory criteria) are
significant contributors to risk. For example, Specter in a briefing
to the NRC commissioners in 1992 [7] pointed out that after rank-
ing components according to their contribution to core damage fre-
quency, of ' 100,000 active components in a power plant, “50 to
500 or ⱕ0.5% of the total number control/determine about 90% of
the Core Damage Frequency (CDF).” By focusing more resources,
for example, quality assurance, regular testing, preventive mainte-
nance, on these 500 components and by allocating less resources
to the other 99,500 components, utilities could simultaneously
enhance the safety of their power plants and reduce Operating and
Maintenance costs.
Observations of this nature also served as the motivation for
work by ASME initiated in the late 1980s to factor risk informa-
tion into the requirements of Codes and Standards. Recognizing
the need for risk-informed methods in the formulation of policies,
codes, standards, and guides, ASME organized multidisciplinary
research task forces on risk-informed in-service inspection (RI-ISI)
and in-service testing (IST). These research groups, financially
supported by both domestic and international organizations from
industry and government, including the U.S. NRC, worked to
determine appropriate risk-informed methods for developing
inspection and testing guidelines for several applications.
Initial pilot plant applications were used to demonstrate the pro-
posed methods. A series of ASME publications [8–13] presents this
work for nuclear and industrial applications. From this work,
ASME was able to demonstrate that risk-informed methods offered
the potential to technically enhance existing in-service inspection
(ISI) and IST programs by relating inspection and test requirements
to the failure modes of a component and associated risks.
Development of Codes and Standards using these new insights
could provide alternative requirements that were more attractive to
users when compared to the prescriptive set of general require-
ments that had been developed using traditional engineering judg-
ment based on some implicit risk considerations. Risk-informed
strategies could be structured to enhance the examinations and tests
for high safety significant (HSS) components and to reduce unnec-
essary requirements for the low safety significant (LSS) compo-
nents. The ASME determined that these enhancements could be
performed using a plant’s existing PRA blended with appropriate
expert judgment and operational experience. Implementation of
these methods would offer the ability for industry and the regulator
to better focus and allocate limited resources to the high safety sig-
nificant components thereby enhancing overall plant safety. ISI and
IST programs would also now be better correlated with PRA results
and risk insights for each nuclear plant.
Given these promising results, ASME worked with the NRC,
owners, and industry groups during the last decade to implement
risk-informed ISI and IST approaches into ASME Codes and
Standards, NRC Regulatory Guides, and industry documents.
Subsequent sections of this chapter discuss the ASME risk-
informed Codes and Standards in more detail.
45.3 ASME PRA STANDARD ASME/ANS
RA-S-2008
All of the risk-informed applications rely to a great extent, but
not entirely, upon the results of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment
applicable to the facility being evaluated. As noted above, PRAs
have evolved over a period of more than 30 years from relatively
simple limited scope evaluations to rather complex, full scope
modeling of the plant. During this time, there was no standard to
determine the technical capability, fidelity, and adequacy of the
PRA. As codes, standards, and regulatory applications evolved,
there was clearly a need to develop standards for the adequacy of
a PRA to support these applications. As a result, a new standard
project to develop an appropriate PRA Standard was initiated by
the ASME Board on Nuclear Codes and Standards (BNCS) in
1998 The initial standard, ASME RA-S-2002, was published in
2002 [14] and the first Addendum was issued in 2003 as ASME
RA-Sa-2003 [15]. A second addendum was issued in 2005 as
ASME RA-Sb-2005 [16] and a third addendum was issued as
ASME RA-Sc-2007 [17] in August 2007.
Revision 1 of this standard was issued in early 2008. As dis-
cussed in Section 45.3.1, this revision, designated ASME/ANS
RA-S1-2008 [18], combines the requirements of ASME RA-S-2002
and its three addenda with the requirements of two related stan-
dards initially issued by the American Nuclear Society.
45.3.1 Evolution and Objectives of PRA Standard
The ASME Board on Nuclear Codes and Standards began con-
sidering the development of a consensus standard for the use of
PRA in risk-informed decision-making in the summer of 1997.
The BNCS and the ASME Council on Codes and Standards eval-
uated this consideration with regard to ASME safety criteria and
activities associated with risk-informed applications. Given the
advancements in developing risk-informed Code Cases issued by
the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Committee and the Operations and
Maintenance Committee, it was determined that a need existed for
a Standard to address the PRA capability necessary to support
ASME applications of this emerging technology. After approval
by the ASME Council on Codes and Standards, an initial Project
Team was formed in early 1998 to develop a PRA Standard that
would provide a foundation for existing and future risk-informed
applications for commercial LWR nuclear power plants. In paral-
lel, a Standards Committee, the Committee on Nuclear Risk
Management (CNRM),1 was formed to direct the work, provide
for consensus approval, and manage maintenance and future
development.
The Project Team was comprised of key individuals with the
direct knowledge and experience needed to produce a technically
adequate document under the ASME Codes and Standards
Redesign Process. A unique part of this process was the review of
1
CNRM has the following approved charter. “To develop, revise and
maintain standards and guides on risk management techniques,
including PRA for nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities.”
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 91
two drafts of the Standard by experts inside and outside the
ASME Committee structure. Several thousand comments were
addressed by the Project Team and incorporated within the
Standard where they were considered to be appropriate.
Concurrent with the development of the standard, the U.S.
nuclear industry developed a peer review process for assessing the
technical capability and adequacy of a PRA to support risk-
informed regulatory licensing applications [19]. The guidelines of
NEI 00-02 were considered in the development of the PRA
Standard to facilitate application to facilities that had already been
reviewed to the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) guidelines.
Subsequent to the publication of RA S-2002 intensive reviews
by industry teams, the NRC identified numerous areas where clar-
ification or qualification of its requirements was considered desir-
able. As a result, a significant effort was undertaken to consider
this input and adopt suggestions considered necessary or desir-
able. The result was Addendum “a” published in December 2003
as ASME RA-Sa-2003.
During the later part of 2003, the PRA Standard was subject to
trial use during review of existing PRAs. This experience identi-
fied a number of additional areas where clarification or formatting
changes would help in its application. As a result, a Project Team
was formed, including members who had been involved in these
applications, to develop proposed changes for incorporation in
Addendum “b” of the Standard issued in 2005 and Addendum “c”
issued in August 2007.
The initial scope of ASME RA-S addressed the determination
of core damage frequency and large early release only for inter-
nal events (excluding fire) occurring at full power, since this
was the most highly developed and used area of PRA applica-
tion. Concurrent with the ASME development of RA-S, the
American Nuclear Society was preparing comparable standards
covering external events, internal fires, and low power and shut-
down conditions. Over the last few years, the two societies as
well as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and industry recog-
nized the value of combining the requirements in a single stan-
dard, and agreements were reached to develop this document as
a revision to RA-S that is designated ASME/ANS RA-S1-2008
[18]. The initial issue of this revision adds internal fire and
external events to the scope. Low power and shutdown require-
ments will be added in a future addendum, scheduled for release
in 2009.
45.3.2 Introduction and Scope
The Standard is organized into parts as follows:
(1) General Requirements for Level 1 and large early release
frequency (LERF) PRA at power, including internal events,
internal fire, and external events; a Level 1/LERF PRA at
low power and shutdown, including internal and external
events (except internal fires).
(2) Technical and Peer Review Requirements for Level 1 and
LERF PRA for at power, internal events.
(3) Technical and Peer Review Requirements for Level 1 and
LERF PRA for at power, internal fire events.
(4) Technical and Peer Review Requirements for Level 1 and
LERF PRA for at power, external events.
Technical and Peer Review Requirements for Level 1 and LERF
PRA for low power and shutdown, including internal and external
events (except internal fires) will be included at a future date.
Part 1 of the PRA Standard provides an introduction defining
scope and applicability and a brief overview of the remaining
content. It includes acronyms and definitions, as specifically used
in the standard, and requirements that are essentially applicable to
all parts of the standard such as the elements of a risk assessment
application process, configuration control, and general require-
ments for performing a PRA and peer reviews.
The objectives of the standard are to provide requirements for
probabilistic risk assessments used to support risk-informed deci-
sions for commercial nuclear power plants, and to prescribe meth-
ods for applying these requirements for specific applications. In
addition, it provides requirements for configuration control of the
PRA and a peer-review process to assess how well a PRA meets
the requirements of the standard. The scope is limited to commer-
cial light water nuclear power plants. It establishes requirements
for Level 1 analysis2 and a limited Level 2 analysis sufficient to
evaluate the large early release3 frequency, and is intended for a
wide range of applications that require a corresponding range of
PRA capabilities.
PRA applications vary with respect to which risk metrics are
employed, which decision criteria are used, the extent of reliance
on the PRA results in supporting a decision, and the degree of reso-
lution required of the factors that determine the risk significance of
the proposed changes. Furthermore, existing PRAs differ in terms
of their scope and level of detail. To support these variations, the
standard provides requirements for three capability categories, as
shown in Table 45.1 (Table 1.3-1 of ASME/ANS RA-S1-2008),
each representing an increasing level of fidelity and detail.
45.3.3 Application of the PRA Standard
Section 3 of Part 1 of the PRA Standard covers the methodolo-
gy for applying PRA information to risk-informed decision-
making and is located in the standard preceding the delineation of
specific PRA requirements provided in Section 4 to emphasize
several points such as follows:
• Risk-informed decision-making involves more than compar-
ing PRA results.
• Different risk-informed decisions can require PRAs of differ-
ing scope, level of detail, and fidelity of results.
• PRAs that do not meet all the technical requirements of the
standard may be used to support risk-informed decisions.
• A PRA meeting all the technical requirements of the standard
may not be sufficient for some risk-informed decision-making.
Section 3 describes the activities to determine the capability of
a PRA needed to support a particular risk-informed application
and identifies actions to be taken when a PRA is found deficient.
This process is outlined in the flowchart of Figure.45.1 (Fig. 3.1-1
from the standard). The process recognizes that many PRAs are
incomplete and even those complying with the standard may not
adequately model or analyze conditions necessary to fully evalu-
ate the risk impact of a proposed application. Hence methods for
2
A Level 1 analysis includes the identification and quantification of
the sequences of events leading to the onset of core damage, for
example, core damage frequency.
3
Large early release is the rapid, unmitigated release of airborne
fission products from the containment to the environment occurring
before the effective implementation of off-site emergency response
and protective actions such that there is a potential for early health
effects.
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92 • Chapter 45

TABLE 45.1 CAPABILITY CATEGORIES FOR PRAS

CRITERIA
1. Scope and level of detail:
The de gree to which
resolution and specificity are
incorporated such that the
technical issues are
addressed
2. Plant-specificity :
The degree to which plant-
specific information is
incorporated such that the
as-built and as-operated
plant is addressed
3. Realism:
The degree to which realism
is incorporated such that the
expected response of the
plant is addressed
CAPABILITY CATEGORY I
Resolution and specificity sufficient
to identify the relative importance
of the contributors at the system or
train level (and for Fire PRA, at
a fire area level), including
associated human actions [Notes
(4) and (5)]
Use of generic data/models
acceptable except for the need to
account for the unique design and
operational features of the pla
nt
Departures from realism will have
moderate impact on the conclusions
and risk insights as sup ported by
good practices [see Note (2)]
CAPABILITY CATEGORY II
Resolution and specificity sufficient
to identify the relative importance
of the contributors at the SSC
component level (and for Fire
PRA , at a physical analysis unit
level including fir e protection
program and design elements)
including associated human actions,
as necessary [see Note (1) (3), (4)
and (5) ].
] actions, as necessary [see Note (1)
Use of plant-specific data/models to
capture to the extent practical all
significant features represented in
the scope of the PRA model
Departures from realism will have
small impact on the conclusions
and risk insights as supported by
good practices [see Note (2)]
CAPABILITY CATEGORY III
Resolution and specificity
sufficient to identify the relative
importance of the contributors at
the component level(and for
Fi re PRA , for specific
locations within fire areas or
physical analysis units,
including fire protection
program and design elements)
including associated human
(3), (4) and (5) ].
]
Use of plant -specific data/models
to capture to the extent practical all
significant features represented in
the scope of the PRA model
Departures from realism will have
negligible impact on the
conclusions and risk insi ghts as
supported by good practices [see
Note (2)]

NOTES:
(1) The definition for Capability Category II is not meant to imply that the resolution and specificity is to a level to identify every SSC and human action;
only those necessary for the specific SR. Similarly for Capability Category III, it is not meant to imply that the resolution and specificity is to a level
to identify every sub-component for every component.
(2) Differentiation from moderate (conservative or acknowledged, potential non-
which the impact on the conclusions and risk insights could affect a decision under consideration. This differentiation recognizes that the PRA would
generally not be the sole input to a decision. A moderate impact implies that the impact (of the departure from realism) is of sufficient size that it is
likely that a decision could be affected; a small impact implies that it is unlikely that a decision could be affected, and anegligible impact implies that
a decision would not be affected.
(3) The term “fire protection program and design elements” as used here is intended to broadly encompass fire protection systems,
features, and program provisions implemented in support of fire protection defense-in-depth. The term is intended to encompass
active systems such as fire detection and suppression systems, passive features such as fire barriers, and programmatic elements such
as administrative controls, as well as other aspects of the fire protection program such as the manual fire brigade and postfire safe
shutdown.

(4) The terms “fire area” and “physical analysis unit” are defined in Section 1-2.2. Fire areas are defined in the context of regulatory
compliance documentation. Physical analysis units are subdivisions of a fire area used for the purposes of the Fire PRA.
(5) The Fire PRA capability categories are distinguished, in part, based on the level of resolution provided in the analysis results. There is
a gradation in resolution from fire areas for Capability Category I to specific locations within a fire area or physical analysis unit for
Capability Category III. This distinction should not be confused with the task of plant partitioning (see Section 3-1.7.1 A Capability
Category III Fire PRA could, for example, partition the plant at a fire area level and yet resolve fire risk contributions to the level of
specific fire scenarios within each fire area. This approach would satisfy the intent of the Capability Category III basis inthis regard.
The term “Fire Protection Program and Design Elements” as used here is intended to broadly encompass fire protection systems,
features, and program provisions implemented in support of fire protection defense-in-depth. The term is intended to encompass
active syst ems such as fire detection and suppression systems, passive features such as fire barriers, programmatic elements such as
administrative controls, as well as other aspects of the fire protection program such as the manual fire brigade and post-fire safe
shutdown.

assessing the risk importance of those elements not included in
the PRA are identified.
45.3.4 Technical Requirements
Section 4 of Part 1 of the PRA Standard contains the general
technical requirements for PRAs used to support risk-informed
decision-making. It also includes general requirements for the use
of expert judgment to resolve specific technical issues for verifica-
tion of analyses and calculations. The detailed technical require-
ments of PRAs constitute the major portion of Section 4 and these
are delineated in the subsequent parts of the standard.
45.3.5 Configuration Control
Section 5 of Part 1 of the PRA Standard provides requirements
for configuration control. It includes requirements for
(1) monitoring PRA inputs and collecting new information,
(2) maintaining the PRA consistent with the as-built, as-operated
plant,
(3) considering the cumulative impact of pending changes
when applying the PRA,
(4) maintaining configuration control of computer codes used
to support PRA quantification, and
(5) documentation of the Configuration Control Program.
45.3.6 Peer Reviews of PRAs
A unique part of the standard is the requirement in Section 6 of
Part 1 for Peer Reviews of the PRA to independently assess
whether the methodology and its implementation meet the
requirements of the standard. Requirements for the qualifications
and independence of the peer review teams are enumerated and a
typical scope for the content of the review is provided. The
Section contains requirements for documenting Peer Review
Team results, including exceptions and deficiencies with respect
to the requirements of the Standard, and identification of strengths
and weaknesses in the PRA. Provisions for follow-up peer
reviews of significant changes in the PRA are also included.
45.3.6.1 Content of Other Parts Each of the other parts of the
standard contains a brief introduction followed by sections defin-
ing the detailed technical requirements and peer review scope for
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 93

1 Evaluate the plant or operational

A change being assessed

2 Identify SSCs and activities affected

by the plant change including the
cause-effect relationship

3 Identify hazard groups,PRA model

scope,and risk metrics needed to
evaluate plant changes and to
support application

For each relevant Hazard Group

Portions irrelevant to application
4 Determine Capability Category Portions needing Capability Category I
needed for each portion of PRA to
support application Portions needing Capability Category II
Portions needing Capability Category III

B 5 PRA scope and risk metrics sufficient N N

6a Upgrade
to evaluate plant change?
Y

C 8 Supporting Requirements of N Are absent

9 Y
Standard are sufficient for requirements
application? relevant?
Y N

D 10 PRA satisfies Supporting 12 Are differences

N Y 6b Upgrade N
Requirements for significant for
PRA?
application? this application?
N Y
Y

14 For each hazard

7 Use supplementary
group, characterize Analyses and require-
E 11 PRA has sufficient 13 Use PRA to risk contributors ments to support
capability support application and associated application
uncertainties

15 Provide risk
input to
decision maker

FIG. 45.1 FLOW CHART FOR EVALUATING THE CAPABILITY OF PRA

the area covered. Since many of the technical requirements are (5) Human reliability analysis
essentially the same for each part, Part 2 contains this material, and (6) Data analysis
the requirements sections of the other parts refer to those in Part 2 (7) Internal flooding
with amplification, amendment or clarification, as necessary. (8) Quantification
The technical requirements of Part 2 include the following: (9) Large early release analysis
(1) Initiating event analysis For each of these elements, a set of objectives is presented
(2) Accident sequence analysis defining its scope. These are followed by a set of high-level
(3) Success criteria requirements (HLRs) that apply to all PRAs covered by the stan-
(4) Systems analysis dard, and these, in turn, are followed by supporting requirements
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94 • Chapter 45
(SRs) that fully implement the related HLRs. Differentiation of
the requirements for the three PRA capability categories is pro-
vided at the SR level.
The SRs are defined in terms of action statements that are
intended to identify what is required. In general, however, they do
not define or prescribe how to accomplish the requirement. In
some cases, examples are provided or acceptable methods are ref-
erenced. It is recognized that a diversity of acceptable approaches
have been used to develop existing PRAs and that the standard
should neither preclude these nor prevent the development of
technological innovations in the future.
45.4 ASME B&PV SECTION XI IN-SERVICE
INSPECTION
45.4.1 Overview
The ASME BNCS chose Code Cases to incorporate risk-
informed research results for ISI requirements in Section XI of the
Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code [20]. In the case of ISI, three Code
Cases for inspection of piping systems and their revisions, Code
Case N-560, N-560-1, and N-560-2 [21–23]; Code Case N-577
and N-577-1 [24, 25]; and Code Case N-578 and N-578-1 [26, 27],
have been approved through the efforts of Section XI of the ASME
Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code. These Cases and their revisions
were subsequently combined for incorporation as Nonmandatory
Appendix R, “Risk-Informed Inspection Requirements for Piping”
[28], in the 2005 Addenda of ASME Section XI. The results of
research programs, industry developments, and pilot plant applica-
tions on risk-informed technology have formed the technical bases
for initiating the Code changes.
The current U.S. efforts on risk-informed in-service inspection
are focused so far on the selection of welds (and other locations)
for Section XI in-service inspections. Changes to Section XI
inspection frequencies and nondestructive examination (NDE)
methods could be addressed in the future. The intent of RI-ISI
has been to make no changes to augmented ISI programs such as
for inner granular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC), primary
water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC), and for flow-assisted
corrosion (FAC). The selection of components for Section XI
inspections can cover all piping systems in a plant or can be par-
tial in scope such as only for Class 1 systems. Systems not
addressed by RI-ISI continue to be inspected by the traditional
ASME Section XI requirements. Other provisions of Section XI,
including visual examinations and leak tests, are generally not
impacted by the RI-ISI process.
The pilot plants for ISI began to receive NRC approval in 1998.
The majority of the industry has now developed plant-specific
programs with at least one of the methodologies contained in the
Code Cases, their revisions, or in Nonmandatory Appendix R
cited above. To support obtaining NRC approval of these risk-
informed in-service inspection programs, the industry, represented
by the NEI, developed program submittal templates. These tem-
plates were used to meet the guidance contained in NRC
Regulatory Guide 1.178 [29] that was developed for plant-specific,
risk-informed decision-making for ISI. The above ASME infor-
mation and results were utilized by the NRC in the development
of this guidance document and its revision, and these ASME
applications provided useful examples during the development
and revision of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.174 [30].
The set of risk-informed Code Cases differ from the majority of
Code Cases in that these Cases generally define substantially new
approaches, relative to application of the Code. Thus, they tend to
be significantly longer, so that sufficient detail can be provided
regarding requirements for the technical approach to be used,
such as the acceptance metrics and metric target values, PRA
capability, and use of expert decision-making panels. However,
the Code Cases did not include a strategy for dealing with exist-
ing augmented and other programs such as IGSCC, PWSCC,
FAC, and pitting. None of these Code Cases provided system-
level guidelines for change-in-risk evaluations to ensure that the
risk from individual system failures would be kept small and
dominant risk contributors would not be created. This situation
has now been resolved within the Code by the publication of rules
contained in Nonmandatory Appendix R [28].
As of now, Nonmandatory Appendix R [28] has not been
endorsed by the NRC and another Code Case N-716 [31] has
been developed to continue the implementation of operating expe-
rience that has been gained through all the efforts described
above. It contains a less rigorous dependence on the plant-specific
PRA in the development of a risk-informed in-service inspection
program and has established streamlined criteria for two pilot
plant applications, which have been approved by the NRC.
45.4.2 Development of Code Cases and Code Rules
for In-Service Inspection
ASME Section XI formed a Task Group on Risk-Based
Examination in 1992 to follow-up on the developments of the
ASME Research Task Force on Risk-Based Inspection, which
were described in guidance documents and by results of some ini-
tial pilot studies. After review of the early research results, ASME
Section XI formed the Working Group on Implementation of
Risk-Based Examination in 1993. The initial efforts developed
three Code Cases related to risk-informed ISI requirements for
piping as follows:
• Case N-560, Alternative Examination Requirements in Class 1
B-J Piping Welds, Section XI, Division 1 [21]
• Case N-577, Risk-Informed Requirements for Class 1, 2, and
3 Piping, Method A, Section XI, Division 1 [24]
• Case N-578, Risk-Informed Requirements for Class 1, 2, or 3
Piping, Method B, Section XI, Division 1 [26]
These Cases included both the methods for selecting the exami-
nation locations in nuclear plant piping systems and provided the
applicable examination requirements. The Cases brought forward
two key insights: (1) the identification of the potential sites for
degradation in piping systems based on operating experience and
on probabilistic fracture mechanics (PFM) evaluations, and (2) the
identification of areas of high consequences (e.g., core damage)
given a pipe failure using insights gained from plant PRA models.
A key feature of RI-ISI is the team effort aspect of the process.
The team is drawn from the plant/utility staff with first-hand
knowledge of the plant, typically consisting of (1) an ISI engi-
neer, (2) a piping system engineer, (3) a materials engineer, (4)
system engineers, and (5) PRA specialists. The PRA aspects of
RI-ISI are an essential part of the process and are usually covered
by PRA specialists from the utility. Steps of the RI-ISI Code
Cases that require PRA applications are similar to procedures
used for other PRA-based activities such as compliance with
requirements of the NRC Maintenance Rule [32] and thus involve
familiar types of calculations for a PRA specialist. Applications
of the RI-ISI Code Cases have also benefited from the use of out-
side facilitators from owners groups or consulting organizations
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 95
FIG. 45.2 OVERALL RISK-INFORMED ISI PROCESS
that contribute their knowledge of the RI-ISI process to compli-
ment the plant-specific knowledge of the utility staff.
The Section XI Code Cases presume that a suitable PRA exists
for the plant being addressed. NRC staff reviews have considered
potential shortcomings of the plant’s PRA. The ASME PRA
Standard can also serve to ensure that PRAs are of sufficient qual-
ity. There are no known cases where the PRA has not been of a
quality that would not support the RI-ISI applications. An expert
panel process is included in one method to review the selection of
components for ISI and to address concerns where a PRA may
not adequately deal with components of interest.
While the Code Cases themselves provide all the requirements
and procedures needed to develop a Section XI inspection pro-
gram, there are topical reports [33, 34] for all the three RI-ISI
Code Cases that provide more detailed guidance that can con-
tribute to the successful application of the Code Cases.
Figure 45.2 shows the essential elements of a RI-ISI process
(specifically for Code Case N-577, but generally applicable to the
other Code Cases) that begins with a definition of scope of the
program to be covered by the risk-informed process (i.e., piping
systems to be addressed). There is then a detailed breakdown of
each piping system into segments that are to be subjected to a
ranking process. The ranking process begins with two types of
evaluations that are performed in parallel. Consequences are eval-
uated by application of the PRA for the plant being addressed.
Structural failure probabilities for the piping segments are evalu-
ated based on service experience and from applications of struc-
tural reliability models. The risk evaluation then combines results
from the consequence and failure probability calculations, and
provides input to the assignment of each pipe segment to a risk
categorization. The process includes a high-level review (e.g.,
expert panel) that addresses other factors, as listed on Figure 45.2
(e.g., defense in depth, consideration of uncertainties, limitations
in the scope of the PRA, and so on). The final step is the selection
of structural elements (e.g., welds) for inspections and the imple-
mentation of the ISI program. A feedback loop is included to
guide periodic updates to the RI-ISI program to reflect new infor-
mation from plant operating experience and changes to the esti-
mated consequences coming from revisions to the plant PRA.
45.4.3 Code Case N-560
Code Case N-560, “Alternative Examination Requirements for
Class 1, Category B-J Piping, Section XI, Division 1,” was first
issued in 1996 [21]. This Case provides risk-informed require-
ments for ISI that may be applied to all Class 1 piping or to
individual systems subject to Category B-J examination require-
ments. It should be emphasized that Code Cases N-577 [24] and
N-578 [26] can be applied to all of the piping systems of a plant
or alternatively to limited scope applications such as to only
address particular piping systems or classes of piping systems.
The piping not addressed by RI-ISI continues to be inspected by
the usual Section XI requirements. Code Case N-560 was devel-
oped to respond to utility interest in gaining the benefits of RI-ISI
(reduced inspection costs and reduced worker radiation expo-
sures) without the full costs of performing the extensive evalua-
tions needed to develop a full-scope RI-ISI program.
The examination program of Code Case N-560 is based on a
total number of inspected elements (e.g., welds) consisting of not
less than 10% of Category B-J piping welds in each system,
excluding socket welds, which are to be inspected during each
inspection interval. Structural elements of the piping systems cor-
respond to welds, fittings, or other specific piping locations. Each
element contains an examination volume determined in accor-
dance with the requirements of this Case.
A key feature of Code Case N-560 is the risk-informed process
(known as Method B) that is used for the selection of piping seg-
ments and piping structural elements in systems that will be
scheduled for ISI. Elements are selected based on results of a rel-
ative ranking process that identifies the more risk-important seg-
ments in the system with regard to failure probabilities and conse-
quences of failure. Elements are selected from the pipe segments
that fall into the highest risk group.
The piping within a system is divided into segments that have
common failure consequences and susceptibility to common
degradation mechanisms. Potential failure modes for each pipe
segment are identified, and the failure effects for each mode are
evaluated. The evaluations consider potential break sizes, isolabil-
ity of the breaks, indirect effects, initiating events, system
impact/recovery, and system redundancies. A failure modes and
effects analysis assigns each pipe segment to one of the three
impact groups: initiating event, system degradation, or combina-
tion of these two impacts. The consequence categories (high,
medium, or low) are selected using PRA-based impact group
tables that perform an initiating event impact group assessment, a
system impact group assessment, and a combination impact group
assessment. Containment performance is also assessed, particularly
to address potential pipe failures that can increase the potential
for an unisolated loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) outside con-
tainment. The plant PRA is used with the impact group tables to
determine the consequence categories. No specific requirements
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96 • Chapter 45
are provided in Code Case N-560 to evaluate the adequacy of the
PRA. However, the ASME Standard for PRA adequacy can be
applied, or it can be established that the PRA meets PRA adequacy
requirements approved by the regulatory authority having juris-
diction over the plant site.
The ranking process addresses relevant degradation mecha-
nisms and industry failure experience with the systems and com-
ponents. The following factors are considered for the identifica-
tion of degradation mechanisms: piping design characteristics,
fabrication practices, operating conditions, industry-wide service
experience, results of prior examinations, and presence of prior
repairs. The Code Case provides a table of degradation mecha-
nisms and outlines attributes and susceptible piping regions asso-
ciated with thermal fatigue, stress corrosion cracking, localized
corrosion, flow-sensitive areas, and water hammer.
Further information is provided to categorize the degradation
mechanisms (high, medium, or low) in accordance with their
potential to cause large pipe breaks or small leaks.
Using the results of the consequence and degradation mecha-
nism categorizations, a risk matrix is used to combine the results
to assign each pipe segment to one of the seven risk categories
that are then grouped into high, medium, and low risk groups.
Elements are selected starting with the elements in the high risk
group and working toward the low risk group, until a total number
of elements equal to 10% of the category B-J piping welds,
excluding socket welds, has been selected. Examinations may be
concentrated on systems with more high-risk segments as per
guidance given in the Case with additional consideration given to
access, radiation exposure, and other attributes.
Once the structural elements have been selected for examina-
tion, a change-in-risk calculation is performed to ensure that the
proposed change in the inspection program reduces risk or is risk
neutral. The examination methods and techniques are determined
in accordance with a Table of Examination Categories for
Category B-J, Class 1 Piping. In general, the ASME Section XI
standards for inspection schedules, acceptance standards,
repair/replacement, system pressure tests, record, and report
requirements are directly utilized by reference to the appropriate
Code paragraphs. The selected elements are examined during sub-
sequent examination intervals. Any modifications to the list of
selected elements are based on changes in industry operating
experience, changes in plant design or operation, new metallurgi-
cal knowledge, or prior examination results.
Further details on this application of Method B are provided in
EPRI TR-112657 Revision B-A by the Electric Power Research
Institute (EPRI) [34], which has been approved by the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Code Case N-560-2 [23], which
was approved in 2000, reflects the revision to the original Case to
incorporate the lessons learned from the pilot plant and follow-on
applications. A second Code Case N-560-1 [22] was also pub-
lished to incorporate a Method A for performing the risk ranking
of pipe segments. However, this version of the Case has never been
used because a later revision to Code Case N-577-1 [25], which is
discussed next, superseded the need for this alternative Code Case.
45.4.4 Code Case N-577
Code Case N-577, “Risk-Informed Requirements for Class 1, 2,
and 3 Piping, Method A, Section XI, Division 1” was first issued
in 1997 [24]. This Case provides risk-informed requirements for
ISI of Class 1, 2, and 3 piping. For Class 1 and 2 piping, the
requirements are an alternative to the requirements of Categories
B-F, B-J, C-F-1, and C-F-2. Application of the Case may result in
the examination of some Class 3 piping. Piping in systems evaluated
as part of the plant PRA, but outside the current ASME Section XI
examination boundaries, may also be included.
A key feature of this Code Case N-577 [24] is a risk-informed
selection process, known as Method A and described in Appendix I
of the Case. This process establishes the piping segments and pip-
ing structural elements in systems that will be scheduled for ISI.
The Owner’s Level 1 PRA and its evaluated safety function
(i.e., core damage protection) and the numerical risk measure asso-
ciated with that safety function (core damage frequency) provide
the necessary information for the system boundaries to be used in
this process. If a piping system, or portions thereof, provides an
additional safety function such as containment integrity, then
insights from the Owner’s Level 2 PRA may be used along with its
associated risk measure and safety function (large early release
frequency). Use of PRA insights beyond the Level 1 PRA for the
determination of system boundaries are documented, reviewed,
and approved by a plant expert panel. The scope and quality of the
PRA should realistically reflect the as-built, as-operated, and
as-maintained plant and should reflect operating experience at the
plant. As per Code Case N-577 [24], the PRA shall meet the
guidelines of the “PSA Applications Guide” [35]. Alternatively,
the PRA may meet the regulatory requirements of a document
approved by the regulatory authority having jurisdiction over the
plant site that provides requirements for PRA adequacy.
Estimates of the failure probability of piping segments are
required inputs to the risk calculations. Piping failure rates are
analogous to the active component failure rates used in the PRA,
where the rate is the number of observed failures divided by the
number of years. Historical or service data, expert judgment, or
validated PFM calculations are used to estimate the piping seg-
ment failure probabilities. The PFM calculations are the primary
method used to estimate failure probabilities for Code Case
N-577 [24] unless the piping materials and operating characteris-
tics assessed are not compatible.
The core damage frequencies and large early release frequency
values are estimated for each piping segment, by combining the
PRA consequence and the failure probability estimates. The values
are then summed to obtain a total pressure boundary risk for the
piping systems of interest. Risk importance measures are applied
to identify piping segments as being high or low safety significant.
The risk evaluation is reviewed by a plant expert panel, along with
other deterministic and safety insights to make the final determina-
tion of the safety significance of each piping segment.
Structural elements in the HSS segments are selected for
examination. Structural elements (e.g., welds) in HSS segments
with known or postulated degradation mechanisms are subject to
100% examination. Structural elements in the HSS systems or
portions of the HSS systems with low failure potential are selected
using a sampling plan that achieves at least a 95% confidence of
not exceeding an estimated leak frequency defined from industry
operating experience based upon the best estimate failure proba-
bilities. All piping segments, including LSS segments, are sub-
ject to system pressure tests and visual VT-2 examinations. Once
the structural elements have been selected for examination, a
change-in-risk evaluation is performed to ensure that the piping
risk is reduced or remains neutral when the plant moves from the
current ISI program to a risk-informed program. The examina-
tion methods and techniques that are to be used for the inspec-
tions of areas or volumes are determined in accordance with the
requirements provided in a Table of Risk-Informed Piping
Examinations provided in the Code Case. In general, the ASME
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 97
Section XI standards for inspection schedules, acceptance stan-
dards, repair/replacement, system pressure tests, and record and
report requirements are directly utilized by reference to the
appropriate Code paragraphs.
The selected elements are examined during subsequent exami-
nation intervals. Examinations that reveal flaws or other relevant
conditions exceeding the acceptance standards result in additional
inspections. The additional examinations include piping structural
elements with the same postulated failure mode and the same or
higher failure potential. The number of additional elements equals
the number of piping structural elements with the same postulated
failure mode originally scheduled for inspection for that fuel cycle.
Risk-informed ISI selections are reevaluated each inspection
period to account for new information that could alter the pro-
gram. Such information includes changes to the PRA, inspection
results, new failure modes experienced by the industry, repair/
replacement activities, or operational changes.
The Code Case N-577 [24] was approved in 1997 with the
understanding that it would be revised to incorporate the lessons
learned from a pilot application to the Surry Unit 1 nuclear power
plant and other follow-on plant applications. Further details on
this application of Method A to Surry Unit 1 are provided in
WCAP-14572, Revision 1-NP-A by Westinghouse [33], which
has been approved by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Code Case N-577-1 [25], which was approved in 2000, reflects
the revision to the original Case to incorporate the lessons learned
from the pilot plant and follow-on applications.
45.4.5 Code Case N-578
Code Case N-578, “Risk-Informed Requirements for Class 1,
2, and 3 Piping, Method B, Section XI, Division 1” was also first
issued in 1997 [26]. Like Code Case N-577 [24], this Case pro-
vides risk-informed ISI requirements for Class 1, 2, and 3 piping.
For Class 1 and 2 piping, these requirements are an alternative to
the requirements of Categories B-F, B-J, C-F-1, and C-F-2.
Application of this Case may result in a requirement for examina-
tion of some Class 3 piping. This Case may be applied to all Class
1, 2, and 3 piping systems, an individual Class of piping (e.g.,
Class 1 piping), or to individual systems. Piping in systems evalu-
ated as part of the plant PRA, but outside the current ASME
Section XI examination boundaries, may also be included.
This Case uses exactly the same risk-informed process, known
as Method B, as previously presented for Code Case N-560 [21].
The only additional clarification in Appendix I to Code Case
N-578 [26] is related to the inspection sample sizes to address all
classes of piping.
For piping segments determined to have degradation mecha-
nisms other than those included in the existing plant FAC and
IGSCC Inspection Programs, a prescribed number of locations are
examined as part of the risk-informed program. For those seg-
ments in Risk Category 6 or 7, volumetric and surface element
examinations are not required. All elements, regardless of risk
category, are pressure and leak tested. The elements within each
risk category are further ranked for examination as per guidance
in the Case with considerations of access, radiation exposure, and
other attributes.
Once the structural elements have been selected for examina-
tion, a change-in-risk evaluation is performed to ensure that the
change in piping risk is a risk reduction or is risk neutral. Like
Code Case N-577 [24], the examination methods and techniques
for the examination areas or volumes are determined in accordance
with the requirements provided in a Table for Risk-Informed
Piping Examinations in the Case. In general, the ASME Section
XI standards for inspection schedules, acceptance standards,
repair/replacement, system pressure tests, and record and report
requirements are directly utilized by reference to the appropriate
Code paragraphs.
The selected elements are examined during subsequent exami-
nation intervals. Examinations that reveal flaws or other relevant
conditions exceeding the acceptance standards are extended to
include additional examinations. The additional examinations
address piping structural elements with the same postulated fail-
ure mode and the same or higher failure potential. The number of
additional inspected elements equals the number of piping struc-
tural elements with the same postulated failure mode originally
scheduled for that fuel cycle.
The affected portions of the risk-informed in-service inspection
program are reevaluated, as new information effecting implemen-
tation of the program becomes available. Examples include piping
system design changes, industry-wide failure notifications, and
prior examination results.
The Code Case was originally approved in 1997 with the under-
standing that it would be revised to incorporate the lessons learned
from pilot application to the James A. Fitzpatrick and Arkansas
Nuclear One–Unit 2 nuclear power plants and other follow-on
plant applications. Further information on the detailed application
of Method B is provided in EPRI TR-112657 Revision B-A by the
Electric Power Research Institute [34], which has been approved
by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Code Case N-578-1
[27], which was approved in 2000, reflects the revision to the orig-
inal Case to incorporate the lessons learned from the pilot plant
and follow-on applications.
45.4.6 Nonmandatory Appendix R
Nonmandatory Appendix R, Risk-Informed Inspection
Requirements for Piping, ASME Section XI, 2005 Addenda [28],
was developed from the operating experience of the plants that
have implemented Code Cases N-560, N-560-2, N-577, N-577-1,
N-578, and N-578-1 [21, 23–27]. Some of the significant differ-
ences between the Code Cases and the Appendix are the addition
of the following requirements:
(1) Adequacy of the PRA (e.g., reference to the ASME PRA
Standard RA-Sb-2005) [16].
(2) Preservice examination requirements related to high and
low safety significant items and specific criteria for these
examinations when conducted as part of repair/replacement
activities.
(3) Additional examination requirements related to high and
low safety significant items.
(4) How to credit augmented examinations.
(5) Consistent change in risk evaluations.
The Section XI, Working Group on Implementation of Risk-
Based Examination included all of these requirements into the
Appendix to resolve NRC conditions that had been placed on
individual plant programs based on the use of the Code Cases.
45.4.7 Code Case N-711
Code Case N-711, “Alternative Examination Coverage
Requirements for Examination Category B-F, B-J, C-F-1, C-F-2,
and R-A, Piping Welds, Section XI, Division 1,” was approved by
ASME in 2006 [36]. This Case uses risk insights to define alter-
native examination coverage requirements to Table IWB-2500-1
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98 • Chapter 45
(examination categories B-F and B-J) and Table IWC-2500-1
(examination categories C-F-1 and C-F-2) and to examination cat-
egory R-A as used in risk-informed ISI programs.
The existing examination figures of IWB and IWC were devel-
oped over 30 years ago and are reflective of the state of knowl-
edge at the time. There has been minimal or no change to these
figures since that time. Advances in fracture mechanics and evalu-
ations, material susceptibility, operating experience, as well as
insights from risk-informed technology all lead to a more com-
plete understanding of piping system integrity, putting the Code in
a position to identify more informed examination requirements.
Code Case N-711 provides a technically justified means for
taking the first step in evaluating limited coverage examinations.
It establishes criteria based on risk-informed principles to deter-
mine if the limited Code examination captured the volume of
primary interest, thus assuring component reliability. As such, it
provides a more robust means of determining the most prudent
examination locations, volumes, and areas. From an administra-
tive standpoint, this Case uses a prescriptive process for the evalu-
ation of limited coverage while focusing relief requests on those
locations that merit them. The Case provides the technical justifi-
cation for establishing that an acceptable level of quality and safety
are being met as required by 10 CFR 50.55a.
45.4.8 Code Case N-716
Code Case N-716, “Alternative Piping Classification and
Examination Requirements, Section XI, Division 1,” was approved
by ASME in 2006 [31]. The Case represents the next step in the
use of risk-informed insights, design basis principles, and operat-
ing experience for defining Section XI requirements. The Case
builds upon the experience gained within ASME, the industry,
and the NRC in developing and performing risk-informed and
treatment activities. Because of this experience, an increased
emphasis, in this Case, has been laid on each individual plant’s
flooding analysis for determining the safety significance of those
items selected for examination. Two pilot plants that have applied
the Code Case are Grand Gulf BWR and DC Cook PWR. Both of
these pilot plants submitted their programs to the NRC, and they
have been approved. A revision of this Code Case is now being
developed within ASME to incorporate the experience gained
from these successful pilot plant programs.
45.4.9 Code Case N-747
Code Case N-747, “Reactor Vessel Head-to-Flange Weld
Examinations, Section XI, Division 1,” was approved by ASME in
2006 [37]. This Case provides an alternative to the volumetric and sur-
face examination requirements for the reactor vessel head-to-flange
weld contained in Section XI, Table IWB-2500-1, Examination
Category B-A, Item No. B1.40. This alternative requires that after a
preservice or in-service ultrasonic examination has been performed
with no defect found, only the surface examination requirements of
B1.40 need to be met. The Category B-P pressure tests and visual
examinations normally conducted in conjunction with refueling out-
ages will also continue. Note that this weld is not a dissimilar metal or
Alloy 600 weld, and is full penetration.
This Case provides an option to reduce undue burden while
maintaining plant safety by eliminating the requirement for con-
current surface and volumetric examination of the reactor vessel
head-to-flange weld. This alternative is based on nearly 40 years
of plant operation experience, analytical results that indicate that
flaw initiation, growth, and fracture are unlikely, and evaluations
that show risk is extremely low.
45.5 ASME B&PV SECTION XI REPAIR
AND REPLACEMENT
ASME Code Case N-660, “Risk-Informed Safety Classification
for Use in Risk-Informed Repair/Replacement Activities” [38], and
Code Case N-662 “Alternative Repair/Replacement Requirements
for Items Classified in Accordance with Risk-Informed Processes”
[39] were developed to expand the breadth of risk-informed
requirements for pressure-retaining items. The Code Cases,
which were built from the prior ASME Section XI risk-informed
ISI developments, were undertaken in conjunction with NRC’s
risk-informed regulation efforts. The NRC has worked with the
industry on risk-informing Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations
Part 50 (10 CFR 50) as outlined in SECY-98-300 by the NRC
[40]. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s basic proposal has
been to allow modification of some of the special treatment
requirements of 10 CFR 50. Background information is given
in a technical paper published and presented at the 10th
International Conference on Nuclear Engineering [41]. The dis-
cussion below also summarizes the technical basis for the two
Code Cases.
45.5.1 Background on Risk-Informed Regulation
Initiative–Option 2
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s basic proposal was to
allow modification of some of the special treatment requirements
of 10 CFR 50 using a risk-informed approach. This proposed
approach is defined as Option 2 in the SECY-98-300 NRC paper.
Option 1 continues risk-informed changes on a case-by-case
basis, and Option 3 proposes to directly risk-inform the technical
requirements in 10 CFR 50. Special treatment requirements are
current requirements imposed on structures, systems, and compo-
nents (SSCs) that go beyond industry-established requirements
for equipment classified as commercial grade. The requirements
provide additional confidence that the equipment is capable of
meeting its functional requirements under design basis conditions.
Special treatments include additional design considerations,
qualification, change control, documentation, reporting, mainte-
nance, testing, surveillance, and quality assurance requirements
above those that occur with typical industry practices. Some of
the requirements of ASME Section XI are considered special
treatment (e.g., Repair/Replacement Program meeting Appendix B
of 10 CFR 50). Following earlier NRC efforts via an Advanced
Notice of Public Rulemaking in 2000 and issuance of a Proposed
Rule for Public Comment in 2003, the NRC issued a final new
rule 10 CFR 50.69, “Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment
of Structures, Systems, and Components for Nuclear Power
Plants” [42] in the Federal Register in November 2004. A parallel
task by the NEI to develop guidance on how to perform the risk-
informed safety classification process portion of the rulemaking
has proceeded via NEI 00-04, Revision 0, “10 CFR 50.69 SSC
Categorization Guideline” [43]. The NRC has also issued
Regulatory Guide 1.201 [44] for trial use that endorses the NEI
00-04 document and provides additional guidance for categoriz-
ing SSCs to meet the requirement of Section 50.69. The ASME
Code Cases are discussed in these documents. Since the incep-
tion of commercial electrical generation by nuclear power,
SSCs have been classified on a deterministic basis. The first
criterion is related to whether the SSC is safety related (requir-
ing special treatment) or not safety related (commercial quality
requirements apply). The definition of safety related in 10 CFR
50 is those structures, systems, and components that are relied
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 99
upon to remain functional during and following design basis
events to assure
(1) the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary,
(2) the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a
safe shutdown condition; or,
(3) the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of
accidents that could result in potential off-site exposures
comparable to applicable guideline exposures.
These criteria led to the applicable ASME Code classification
for the SSC. The classification requirements are defined in 10 CFR
50 and Regulatory Guide 1.26. In brief, if the SSC is part of the
reactor coolant pressure boundary, it is Class 1. If the SSC has
functions that add makeup to the reactor coolant system, it is Class 2.
Finally, if the SSC has functions that remove heat directly or from
support systems critical to the reactor coolant system (e.g., auxil-
iary feedwater removes heat from the reactor core via the steam
generators, emergency diesel heat exchangers), it is Class 3.
These deterministic rules do not factor the probability of the
SSC being required to function, nor its reliability. For instance,
the containment spray system in a pressurized water reactor
(PWR) plant provides a source of cooled water to the atmosphere
of the containment. This is typically, in turn, injected into the
reactor coolant system via high-pressure safety injection pumps.
The containment spray system is only credited for large break
LOCAs and for keeping the containment pressure within design
limits for main steam and feedwater breaks inside containment.
The primary means of heat removal for a small break LOCA are
the steam generators. Therefore, the containment spray system is
only required for highly unlikely events. In contrast, the auxiliary
feedwater system provides makeup to the steam generators when-
ever the normal main feedwater system is no longer available.
The main feedwater system can be lost by a number of means.
Loss of main feedwater is a much more likely event than a large
break loss-of-coolant accident. Therefore, a demand for the auxil-
iary feedwater system is more likely than for the containment
spray system. Despite this, in the current deterministic methodol-
ogy, the containment spray system is Class 2 while the auxiliary
feedwater system is Class 3. In contrast, the risk-informed process
utilizes an integrated decision-making process that uses both risk
insights and traditional engineering insights. This is possible due
to recent advances in technology and compilations of operating
reactor experience. An Owner can determine the safety signifi-
cance of each of their SSCs using plant-specific PRA models
combined with operating and industry experience.
45.5.2 Scope of Code Cases
The risk-informed repair/replacement activities are currently
addressed in Code Cases N-660 and N-662. Case N-660 provides
the requirements to determine the safety significance for pressure-
retaining items and their associated supports subjected to
repair/replacement activities. Case N-662 provides the requirements
for how to treat items that have been classified by Case N-660.
The scope of the Code Cases covers both items and their asso-
ciated supports currently classified as Code Class 1, 2, or 3, and
items that are currently non-Section XI in accordance with the
risk-informed safety classification requirements established by the
regulatory authority having jurisdiction over the plant site. Core
support structures and Class MC (metal containment) and CC
(concrete containment) items are not currently included in the
scope of the Code Cases since a basis to evaluate these items has
not been demonstrated with the proposed risk-informed safety
classification process. Therefore, as experience is gained in classi-
fying passive items related to the Class MC and CC boundary, the
scope of the Case will be expanded when appropriate.
45.5.3 Code Case N-660
The Code Cases for risk-informed in-service inspection of pip-
ing describe two approaches to determine safety significance. Each
Code Case addresses the consequence of component failure and its
failure potential. While in-service inspection programs have been
successfully developed using both techniques, the long-range
objective is to provide a single process that can be applied univer-
sally. As such, the two existing techniques were analyzed for com-
monality. The object is to allow the Owner to utilize as much of an
existing risk-informed in-service inspection analyses as possible.
Because of limitations in the methods for estimating failure
probabilities, a decision was made by ASME Section XI to base
the process on conditional consequence given a failure, which
removed the concern with large uncertainties regarding failure
estimates. Essentially, the proposed process initially sets the fail-
ure probability of any component to unity (1.0). The conclusion
does not contradict the previous risk-informed ISI work, as it is
acknowledged for inspection purposes that a failure assessment is
necessary to allow examination resources to be allocated to the
areas most likely to fail. As such, future risk-informed ISI work
on nonpiping components will require the development of new
failure estimate techniques or new component failure databases
for each component type. The process has been limited specifically
to considerations of Code repairs and replacements, and has been
refined to eliminate consideration of failure probability.
The goal of the consequence assessment is to provide a method
to consistently rank the consequences of failure. The ranking phi-
losophy uses four “bins” to rank the effect of the failure as either
high, medium, low, or none. The high category represents events
with significant impact on plant safety and the low category repre-
sents those events with minimal impact on plant safety. The none
category represents those locations that are typically defined as
“abandoned in place.” The consequence ranking methodology can
be summarized as follows:
• High Consequence Pressure boundary failures resulting in
events that are important contributors to plant risk and/or
pressure boundary failures that significantly degrade the
plant’s mitigation ability.
• Low Consequence Pressure boundary failures resulting in
anticipated operational events and/or pressure boundary fail-
ures, which do not significantly impact the plant’s mitigation
ability.
• Medium Consequence This category is included to accom-
modate pressure boundary failures that fall between high and
low rank.
• None Consequence This category includes failures that have
no effect on risk.
Using this approach, the consequences that an Owner may have
previously determined via Code Cases N-577 and N-578 to develop
their risk-informed ISI piping programs can be directly mapped to
the above consequence bins. (Owners who only did a Code Case
N-560 application will have limited benefit since Class 1 items
are usually high safety significant, and the new structural integrity
requirements in Code Case N-662 will not be applicable.) In
instances where quantitative PRA consequence results are avail-
able for either Code Case N-577 or N-578 programs, a Table is
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100 • Chapter 45

provided in Code Case N-660 that provides guidance to be used terms of other risk metrics or conditions. Therefore, the following
for this assignment related to conditional core damage probability conditions shall be evaluated:
(CCDP). Conditional large early release probability (CLERP) val-
ues have been determined to be 0.1 of the CCDP values. (1) The piping segment is a part of a system that acts as a bar-
These CCDP and CLERP ranges are specified in an EPRI rier to fission product release during severe accidents.
Topical Report [34] and are determined based on the estimates of (2) The piping segment supports a significant mitigating or
the total risk associated with the failure. Using a conservative esti- diagnosis function as addressed in the Emergency Operating
mate of total pressure boundary failure frequency for the plant of Procedures or the Severe Accident Management Guidelines.
1E-2 per year, CCDP and CLERP ranges were selected to guaran- (3) Failure of the piping segment will result in unintentional
tee that all locations ranked in the low consequence category do releases of radioactive material in excess of plant off-site
not have a potential CDF impact greater than 1E-8 per year or a dose limits as defined by 10 CFR Part 100.
potential LERF impact greater than 1E-9 per year. The boundaries
A review is also performed to ensure that defense-in-depth and
between the high and medium consequence categories are set to
safety margins are maintained.
correspond to the definitions of small CDF and LERF values of
Components classified in accordance with Code Case N-660
1E-6 and 1E-7 per year. The assumption that these are suitably
are classified as either HSS or LSS. Piping segments determined
small values is consistent with the decision criteria for acceptable
to be a high consequence category by ranking shall be considered
changes in CDF and LERF found in Regulatory Guide 1.174 [30].
HSS. The Owner may further refine the classification ranking by
The medium category covers the area between the high and low
more extensive application of the process. These analyses are
categories. The consequence evaluation in Code Case N-660,
required to be documented.
which is compatible with either Code Case N-577 or N-578, can
Piping segments assigned to the medium consequence category
be applied for piping segments that may not have been included in
by the consequence evaluation are determined as HSS or LSS by
an Owner’s risk-informed ISI program. However, some new
considering the classification evaluation and the other relevant
requirements are included in Code Case N-660 that go beyond the
information provided for determining classification. Any piping
respective evaluations in Code Cases N-577 and N-578 dealing
segment initially determined to be a medium consequence category
with piping segments, functions, and design, operational, or risk
and that is subject to a known active degradation mechanism is
considerations not modeled in the PRA.
classified HSS.
Each PRA model inherently has some limitation with regard to
Piping segments determined to be as consequence category low
its use in any application. Certain components may not be specifi-
or none (no change to base case by the consequence evaluation),
cally modeled or the model may not address certain safety func-
or not modeled, shall be determined HSS or LSS using the other
tions (e.g., shutdown risk). These limitations need to be addressed
relevant information.
to allow a more complete decision-making process with regard to
A component support or snubber is assigned the same classifica-
risk-informed classification. Fortunately, considerable work in
tion as the highest ranked piping segment within the piping analyt-
this regard was performed for the South Texas Project’s exemp-
ical model in which the support is included. A trial application of
tion request from special treatment requirements. The Code Case
the risk-informed safety significance process of proposed ASME
adapts excerpts from a letter dated July 19, 2000 to STP Nuclear
Code Case N-660 was completed for the Chemical Volume &
Operating Company from the NRC [45]. The corresponding Code
Control System (CVCS) and the Feedwater (FW) System at the
Case sections are designed to be used in conjunction with the
Surry Power Station Unit 1. In this application the CVCS and FW
analysis provided by a PRA or as a stand-alone insight for the
systems were chosen to represent one system where a significant
integrated decision-making process. If any of the conditions in (a)
number of safety-related items are expected to be LSS and another
or (b) below are true, the piping is classified HSS.
system where a number of nonsafety-related items are expected to
For piping segments, functions, and design, operational, or risk
be HSS. More than 50% of the items in the CVCS were deter-
considerations that are not explicitly modeled in the PRA, the fol-
mined to be LSS following a review of additional considerations
lowing are evaluated:
(piping segments not modeled, defense-in-depth, and adequacy of
safety margins) by the Surry Unit 1 integrated decision-making
(1) Failure of the piping segment will significantly increase the
panel (IDP). As expected, a significant number of nonsafety-related
frequency of an initiating event, including those initiating
items in the FW system were determined to be HSS. This result
events originally screened out in the PRA, such that the
was consistent with the Surry Unit 1 risk-informed ISI program
CDF or LERF would be estimated to increase more than
where nondestructive exams have been added to these piping seg-
1E-6/year or 1E-7/year, respectively.
ments (see previously cited Westinghouse Topical Report [33]. It
(2) Failure of the component will compromise the integrity of
was concluded that application of the process across many plant
the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
systems should result in more than 50% of safety-related items
(3) Failure of the component will fail a high safety significant
being determined to be LSS with a few isolated cases of nonsafe-
function, including consideration of operator actions used to
ty-related items being HSS.
mitigate an accident.
In summary, ASME Code Case N-660 offers the opportunity to
(4) Failure of the component will result in failure of other safety
define the risk-informed safety classification for pressure-retaining
significant piping segments (e.g., through indirect effects)
items and then to apply appropriate treatment for repair/replacement
(5) Failure of the piping segment will prevent or adversely
activities.
affect the plant’s capability to reach and/or maintain safe
shutdown conditions.
45.5.4 Code Case N-662
In addition to being high safety significant in terms of their To establish treatment options for the Risk-Informed Safety
contribution to CDF or LERF, components might also be HSS in Classifications determined by ASME Code Case N-660, the early
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 101
versions of the Case N-662 simplistically addressed two classifi-
cations, Section XI Code versus nonclass and HSS versus LSS.
During committee work, it was determined that the vast majority
of systems that are classified as Section XI Code are also safety
related and that nonclass systems are typically nonsafety related.
Nevertheless, many plants had some minor overlap between
Section XI Code and nonsafety related and nonclass and safety
related. For the special treatment requirements of 10 CFR 50 sys-
tems not covered by ASME Codes (e.g., electrical, instrumenta-
tion items), there are two classifications of concern, namely, safety
related versus nonsafety related, and HSS versus LSS.
The requirements ensure that items will meet their functional
design requirements. For Section XI Code items, the revised
approach represents a decrease in requirements. However, for
HSS nonclass items, they represent an increase in requirements
beyond how the Owner is probably technically treating the items
at the present time. Although these are increased requirements,
the “Structural Integrity” requirements of the Code Case match
those of commercial practices. Therefore, in most applications,
the only increase in requirements for HSS nonclass items will be
related to documentation of the repair/replacement activities,
Authorized Inspector involvement, and possibly more rigorous
failure analyses.
HSS nonclass items are in the scope of structural integrity
requirements because they were deterministically classified as
nonsafety related or non-Section XI, but such that the risk-
informed process concludes that they make a significant contribu-
tion to plant safety. Examples of these items could include the sta-
tion blackout emergency diesel, start-up feedwater pumps, or
those items that function for PWR “feed and bleed” capability.
Based on their safety significance, some additional Code require-
ments are appropriate to ensure that over the life of the plant, they
maintain their function or are evaluated for impact on plant safety
and possible increased requirements when they fail.
LSS Section XI Code safety-related items were included in the
scope of structural integrity requirements because they were
deterministically determined to be safety related or Section XI
Code Class, and thus had importance in deterministic space. The
risk-informed process has determined the items to be of low safety
significance, but they must be given special treatment so as to
remain functional. Examples would be the previously mentioned
containment spray system for a PWR or the hydrogen recombin-
ers installed in large dry containments. The principle of this Code
Case is to ensure that these items have sufficient Code require-
ments such that they are still expected to meet functional require-
ments, albeit at a reduced level of assurance.
HSS items have minimal coverage in Code Case N-662. HSS
items and their associated supports classified as Code Class 1, 2,
or 3 have no exclusions. They must meet the full requirements of
IWA-1400(n) for documentation of a Quality Assurance Program,
IWA-4000 Repair/Replacement Activities, and IWA-6210(e)
Owner’s Report for Repair/Replacement Activities of ASME
Section XI. These requirements apply because both the determin-
istic and risk-informed processes classify these items as important
for reactor safety. No reductions in the special treatment require-
ments for these items are appropriate.
Nonclass LSS and nonsafety-related LSS Class 1, 2, or 3 items
are exempt from IWA-1400(n), IWA-4000, and IWA-6210(e)
requirements because both the deterministic and risk-informed
processes have classified them as low safety significant. Code Case
N-662 does require the Owner to meet a nationally recognized
code or standard and Owner’s Requirements for these items.
New Structural Integrity treatment requirements for repair/
replacement activities have been developed, which represent the
main purpose of Code Case N-662. These new requirements obvi-
ously apply for HSS nonclass items because the risk-informed
process has demonstrated that they are important to plant safety.
The Code Case, however, represents a significant reduction in
both technical and administrative requirements for the LSS
Section XI Code safety-related items.
The following paragraphs summarize the key elements of the new
structural integrity treatment requirements in relation to the respec-
tive ASME Section XI subarticles for repair/replacement activities:
IWA-4110 Scope These requirements are invoked because they
define the scope of what work is covered by repair/replacement
activities (e.g., welding, brazing, defect removal). It also defines
the range of items that the requirements apply to, that is, the pres-
sure boundary, or component support function. Code Case N-662
requirements do not apply to active functions such as opening and
closing of valves or development of pump head, or to nonmechan-
ical functions such as electrical supply or instrumentation and
control.
IWA-4120 Applicability This subarticle provides a list of
items that are not covered by the rules of Section XI (e.g., valve
operators, instruments).
IWA-4130 Alternative Requirements These requirements
were derived from the current Small Item Applicability rules in
IWA-4131 such as tubing, sleeves, and welded plugs. For LSS
items, the key is to provide a reasonable assurance of functional
adequacy. This is accomplished by requiring the items to meet the
technical requirements of the Construction Code selected for use
in the repair/replacement activity. Administrative requirements
are not to be met because, for this scope of items, they have been
typically lessened in the Construction Codes (e.g., NDE, mark-
ing). Consideration of their small size along with their LSS classi-
fication leads to a reasonable requirement of only meeting techni-
cal requirements. For HSS items, the user must meet the
requirements of the Code Case, but as with existing Section XI
requirements, the use of an Authorized Inspection Agency (AIA)
and administrative requirements of the Construction Code are
exempted.
IWA-4140 Responsibilities For Code Case N-662, the Owner
does not need to comply with IWA-4142, in that their
Repair/Replacement Program need not comply with 10 CFR 50
Appendix B or ASME NQA-1 Quality Assurance Program. This
approach is deemed acceptable because the HSS non-Section XI
items have been performing for years without the benefit of an
Appendix B or NQA-1 program. Their existing performance
results will be the input for the risk classification process. An
Appendix B or NQA-1 program has controlled the LSS items
within the scope of Section XI, but their low safety significance
allows them to simply comply with the Owner’s procedure devel-
opment requirements. Despite not having to comply with
Appendix B or NQA-1, the Owner is required to apply a graded
approach to Quality Assurance based on the safety significance of
the item. This is required in paragraph (3)(a) of the Case. Specific
controls will be developed in Owner’s programs subject, as
always, to be reviewed by the jurisdictional and regulatory author-
ities. A specific plan for each repair/replacement activity is to
ensure that critical Code-related actions (e.g., specifying
Construction Code, defect removal requirements, and examina-
tion acceptance criteria) are performed and documented.
Functionality of the items is ensured because the critical Code
requirements are met. Nevertheless, the level of pedigree (i.e., full
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102 • Chapter 45
compliance with Appendix B or NQA-1) is not quite as high, and
thus the cost to the Owner can be lower. The Owner is not
required to use a unique repair/replacement plan document for
each repair/replacement activity. The requirements may be
embedded in work control documents. The Owner and the
Authorized Nuclear In-service Inspector (ANII) must work
together to determine what documentation is signed by the ANII
to signify their acceptance of the activity.
IWA-4150 Repair/Replacement Program The Repair/
Replacement Program is not necessary because the Code Case
defines the minimum set of requirements the Owner must meet.
Although no specific program requirements are established, the
Owner does need to ensure that for each repair/replacement activity
performed under the scope of this Case, all requirements are met.
Alternative Provisions (Similar to) Verification of
Acceptability The failure analysis intent of IWA-4160 is met in
principle by requirements in the Code Case. If the repair/replace-
ment activity is being performed due to the item having failed to
satisfy structural integrity requirements, the Owner must perform
an evaluation to determine suitability of the item subjected to the
repair/replacement activity. The Code Case further requires that
corrective provisions be instituted if the requirements of the origi-
nal item are determined to be deficient (e.g., improper material,
inadequate provisions for erosion or fatigue failure). The Owner
must correct the deficiency and not just replace the item in kind.
In addition, U.S. Owners are required to monitor system perfor-
mance at a much more aggressive level. The Owner’s normal
maintenance and operations process was augmented with the
implementation of 10 CFR 50.65, “Requirements for Monitoring
the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants” [32].
IWA-4170 Inspection Third party inspection is required for all
repair/replacement activities. The committee had mixed thoughts
on this issue, particularly given that secondary plant work is not
covered by an ANII and there is no significant personnel or
nuclear safety issues arising from this work. However, after much
discussion, the committee voted to include ANII requirements
because it provides an effective level of oversight for this new
process of risk-informing repair/replacement requirements.
IWA-4180 Documentation Although not contained in the list
of mandatory IWA-4000 subarticles and sub-subarticles, IWA-
4180 is invoked at appropriate places in Code Case N-662.
Generic application of IWA-4180 is not required. Use of Form
NIS-2–Owner’s Report for Repair/Replacement Activity is not
required because it was deemed not to provide sufficient value to
warrant the cost.
IWA-4200 Items Used for Repair/Replacement Activities
Items used for repair/replacement activities, alternative provisions
for IWA-4200, follow the pattern established throughout the Code
Case N-662. The Case allows items used for repair/replacement
activities for which structural integrity requirements apply to meet
commercial practices using three options:
(1) Comply with the original Construction Code and Owner’s
Requirements as required by IWA-4220 Code Applicability.
Included within the Owner’s Requirements are the original
temperature, pressure, mechanical loads, and other loading
conditions that are the basis for the design. It is expected that
the item will still meet seismic requirements if they were
required for the original item, but the level of documentation
of the analyses or qualifications does not have to be as high.
(2) Meet the requirements of the applicable nationally recog-
nized Code or Standard for that item. For example, a vessel
that meets ASME Section III nuclear requirements could be
replaced with an industrial vessel that meets ASME Section
VIII requirements. If this option is selected, the Owner must
meet all of the technical and administrative requirements of
the nationally recognized Code. Structural Integrity
Requirements ensure that the item will meet its design basis
and the assumptions used in the associated risk-informed
process. To ensure that there are no “technical gaps”
between the original Construction Code and the alternative
Code, a reconciliation of material, fabrication, and exami-
nation requirements, as compared to the design require-
ments, must be performed because of the wide range of
available Construction Code options. This reconciliation is
not required for components because they are constructed to
a consistent set of comprehensive rules.
(3) Allow material, parts, piping subassemblies, appurtenances,
complete valves or pumps, and component supports (i.e., no
vessels or complete piping systems) to meet the technical
requirements of the Construction Code for the item being
replaced. Administrative requirements of the Construction
Code need not be met. The purpose of this option is to allow
the Owner to procure materials to technical Code require-
ments, but avoid the costly NCA-3800 material procure-
ment controls. This option allows for less administrative
requirements, while not reperforming design analyses,
which would be required in the second option when select-
ing an alternative Code or Standard.
There are two final requirements for replacement items.
Deletion or revision of original loading requirements (e.g., seis-
mic, wind, tornado) reflected in the Owner’s Requirements, via
reconciliation, based solely on a change in classification of the
item is not allowed. Under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.69 [42],
Owners are not allowed to revise their design bases (e.g., seismic,
environmental qualification inputs). They can only use alternative
special treatment provisions to implement those requirements.
The second requirement is to meet the fracture toughness require-
ments of the original Construction Code, or later Edition or
Addenda of the Construction Code, to meet functional adequacy.
IWA-4300 Design These provisions cover configuration con-
trol of specifications and design reports, analysis, or evaluations;
Class 1 mechanical joints; and rerating requirements. The Case
requires that the Owner conform to design control provisions to
ensure that changes will not impact the ability of the item to meet
its function assumed in the risk analysis.
IWA-4400 Welding, Brazing, Defect Removal, and
Installation Inclusion of these requirements is vital to ensure that
well-controlled fabrication processes are used for these activities.
Studies have shown that most failures occur due to poor practices
during construction or installation of items that result in defects
being left in weld joints. In many instances, this Case reduces
NDE requirements; therefore, it is important that the fabrication
processes are sound. As an alternative to the Construction Code
requirements of IWA-4411, the Owner may meet the require-
ments of other nationally recognized Codes or Standards with the
following considerations:
• The Owner must comply with all the provisions of IWA-4400
except for alternatives to the Construction Code contained in
IWA-4411. These provisions provide a minimum set of
requirements to ensure that welding, brazing, defect removal,
and installation processes are adequately controlled.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 103
• The Owner may still use the provisions of IWA-4211(b) to
revise Owner’s Requirements.
• The IWA-4460 requirements for mechanical and thermal
metal removal and the IWA-4422 examination requirements
for defect removal areas must still be met.
• The Owner can still use IWA-4600 alternative welding meth-
ods as allowed by IWA-4411(e) and (f). The requirements for
tube plugging were only invoked on reactor coolant pressure
boundary plugs (e.g., steam generators) due to the fact that
Owners have been routinely plugging other types of heat
exchangers (e.g., service water, nonessential cooling water)
outside of Code requirements with reasonable success.
Another option is defined in Code Case N-662 with practicality
provisions for nonclass RISC-2 items for the IWA-4400 require-
ments. The Owner is allowed to use alternative design techniques
and materials than those proscribed in existing nationally recog-
nized Codes and Standards. This approach provides the freedom
to use unique design concepts and a wide range of available mate-
rials. The Owner must demonstrate the acceptability of the final
design by analysis, evaluation, or testing, and document this in
accordance with IWA-4300. With this provision, the requirements
on RISC-2 items are still being increased, yet flexibility is provided
where Code repairs could lead to significant unavailability. This
improvement in safety offsets the risk of allowing Owners to con-
duct repairs outside of Code provisions.
IWA 4500 Examination and Test This subarticle invokes the
requirements that are selected in accordance with this Case. In
other words, if the Owner used B31.1 for the repair/replacement
activity, they must use B31.1 for the NDE. The Case does not
remove the option in IWA-4520(c), allowing alternative examina-
tion methods provided the Inspector is satisfied that the results are
demonstrated to be equivalent or superior to the specified method,
because the Case invokes IWA-4500 with exceptions, but not dis-
allowing this option. Preservice examinations depend on what
requirements currently exist in the Owner’s program. This situa-
tion invokes examination requirements for items that may never
have had required examinations based on the item now being
included in the plan due to risk-informed examinations. It also
provides for not examining an item when the risk-informed
process has excluded it. There are no risk-informed preservice
requirements for pumps, valves, and vessels. Consistent with
existing Code requirements, the Owner only performs preservice
examinations when the item has been selected for in-service
inspection in that interval. A system leakage test is required, in
lieu of a hydrostatic pressure test. The system leakage test will
typically be as effective in demonstrating functional performance
as a hydrostatic pressure test and can be performed at significantly
lower cost.
In summary, ASME Code Case N-662 offers the opportunity to
define the risk-informed safety classification for pressure-retaining
items and then to apply appropriate treatment for repair/replace-
ment activities.
45.6 ASME OPERATION AND
MAINTENANCE CODE
The ASME BNCS chose Code Cases to incorporate risk-
informed research results as alternative IST requirements for the
ASME OM Code [46]. In the IST area, the ASME Operation and
Maintenance Committee has developed the following series of
Code Cases: OMN-3 [47], OMN-4 [48], OMN-7 [49], OMN-10
[50], OMN-11 [51], and OMN-12 [52]. Code Case OMN-3 is cur-
rently being incorporated into a new Subsection ISTE of the ASME
OM Code. The results of research programs, industry develop-
ments, and pilot plant applications on risk-informed technology
have formed the technical bases for initiating the Code changes.
The intent of risk-informed IST is to change the ASME
requirements for testing mechanical components mandated by 10
CFR 50.55 using risk insights in combination with traditional
engineering deterministic information. Risk-informed IST focuses
testing on those components determined to be HSS and relaxes
the testing requirements for those components identified as LSS.
The various pump and valve ASME OM working groups were
assigned a task to develop testing strategies for HSS and LSS com-
ponents under their jurisdiction. Primarily, the task was assigned to
the pump, motor-operated valve, and check valve working groups.
The concept of risk-informed application to differentiate compo-
nents into two populations was a new concept to those groups.
Given the short time frame requested of the task, the working
groups approached the task by utilizing existing Code and/or
Code Cases as the basis with only minimal changes in methods
and/or frequency. A summary of these Code Cases is provided
below.
The pilot plants for IST began to receive NRC approval in
1998. The remainder of the industry has developed plant-specific
programs or is budgeting resources to initiate work on at least one
of these applications at the present time. To support this major ini-
tiative, the NRC has developed Regulatory Guide 1.175 [53] for
plant specific, risk-informed decision-making for IST. NRC uti-
lized the above ASME information and results in the development
of these guidance documents, and these ASME applications pro-
vided useful examples during the development of NRC
Regulatory Guide 1.174 [30].
In-service testing programs are intended to identify potential
malfunctions of equipment before they can lead to unanticipated
incidents or accidents. All aspects of in-service testing, including
where, when, and how to test, affect the benefits of the test in
enhancing equipment and plant reliability. In-service tests are cur-
rently based on mandated requirements, such as those for nuclear
power plant components in the ASME Section XI Code (devel-
oped by the ASME OM Code Committee), technical specification
requirements, and NRC regulations. Most in-service test require-
ments are based on past experience and engineering judgment and
have only an implicit consideration of risk-informed insights, such
as component failure rates and consequence impacts for the specific
operating conditions, equipment functions, and environment.
The ASME OM committee sponsored a major risk-informed
initiative in the area of IST over the last several years. This initia-
tive was intended to lead to the development of a number of code
cases providing alternative requirements to the ASME OM Code.
Initial emphasis during 1993 through 1995 was on the establish-
ment of a methodology by an ASME research effort that led to the
publication of ASME CRTD Vol. 40-2 [11]. During 1996 and
1997, this research methodology was converted into a series of
Code Cases.
The ASME OM Committee formed a Task Group on Component
Importance Ranking in 1996 to follow the developments of the
ASME Research Task Force on Risk-Based In-service Testing
Guidelines that included issuance of guidance documents and some
initial pilot studies. The Task Group’s focus was on categorization
of ASME components. The individual component organizations of
ASME OM (check valves, motor-operated valves, and pumps) were
ASME_Ch45_p089-112.qxd 6/5/09 12:21 PM Page 104
104 • Chapter 45
responsible for the development of test methods and frequencies for
the high safety significant components and the low safety signifi-
cant components. This resulted in the initial development of the
following Code Cases:
• Case OMN-3, Requirements for Safety Significance
Categorization of Components Using Risk Insights for
In-service Testing of LWR Power Plants [47]
• Case OMN-4, Requirements for Risk Insights for In-service
Testing of Check Valves at LWR Power Plants [48]
• Case OMN-7, Alternative Requirements for Pump Testing [49]
• Case OMN-11, Risk-Informed Testing for Motor-Operated
Valves [51]
Following completion of these primary Code Cases, two addi-
tional Code Cases were initiated:
• Case OMN-12, Alternative Requirements for In-service
Testing Using Risk Insights for Pneumatically and
Hydraulically Operated Valve Assemblies in Light Water
Reactor Power Plants [52]
• Case OMN-10, Requirements for Safety Significance
Categorization of Snubbers Using Risk Insights and Testing
Strategies for In-service Testing of LWR Power Plants [50].
Code Cases OMN-4, OMN-7, OMN-11, and OMN-12 refer-
ence the categorization requirements of OMN-3, whereas Code
Case OMN-10 is unique in that it includes both the categorization
process as well as the testing requirements. The major elements of
each Code Case are described below.
45.6.1 Code Case OMN-3 for Risk Categorization
The component importance ranking Code Case was designated
OMN-3 and published in the 1998 Edition of the ASME OM
Code. The Code Case provides the methodology for ranking com-
ponents into the high and low safety significant categories and
evaluating the change-in-risk from the proposed testing program.
Code Case OMN-3 discusses the use of the plant-specific PRA
for component ranking, the use of a plant expert panel, the philos-
ophy of the testing strategies for high and low safety significant
components, the evaluation of the aggregate risk, and the use of
feedback and corrective actions.
Regarding the scope of the program, the current IST program
requirements use ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 as the bounding
scope, because those requirements are referenced via 10 CFR
50.55a and ASME Section XI. The scope of the current ASME
Code for IST includes those components that are required to per-
form a specific function in
(1) shutting down the reactor to the safe shutdown condition,
(2) maintaining the safe shutdown condition, or
(3) mitigating the consequences of an accident.
The pump and valve components addressed in a risk-informed
IST application include all components currently incorporated
within the existing IST program. Any components (pumps and
valves) modeled within the PRA should also be included in the
scope. Components included in a shutdown analysis (either a
shutdown PRA or other analysis) and those that are necessary to
ensure the maintenance of the reactor primary coolant system
pressure boundary may also be included in the scope.
During implementation of the risk-informed IST program,
additional pumps or valves not already included in the current
IST program may be identified as high safety significant
components; in such cases, those components should also be
included in the IST program or other testing and maintenance
programs.
The overall risk-informed IST process in Code Case OMN-3 is
consistent with the NRC RG-1.175 [53]. The process includes the
following:
• Component Risk Determination–using the PRA to categorize
components
• Component Safety Categorization–to blend probabilistic,
deterministic, and operational insights into the process using
a plant expert panel
• Test Strategy Formulation–determination of appropriate test
methods and frequencies for the two categories of components
• Evaluation of Aggregate Risk–requantification of the PRA to
determine the impact on safety from the revised IST program
• Testing Program–guidance for IST programs, implementa-
tion, and update process
• Performance Monitoring–review and evaluation of tests and
component performance
• Feedback and Corrective Actions review of IST program for
potential program changes and corrective action for each of
the above programmatic elements, as appropriate.
For component risk categorization using a plant-specific
PRA, there are a number of probabilistic risk ranking measures
that are available to the industry. The final safety classification
of components into HSS and LSS categories is performed by the
plant expert panel using additional deterministic insights and
information.
Sensitivity studies are performed to ensure that the risk
changes are insensitive to the reliability of the components
included in the low safety significant category. The sensitivity
studies performed are identified in Regulatory Guide 1.175 and
the ASME Code Case OMN-3. Sensitivity studies are performed
to provide additional clarification and justification and to consider
(1) data and uncertainties, (2) human factors, (3) test and mainte-
nance unavailability variations, (4) low safety significant failure
rates, (5) PRA truncation limits, and (6) common cause failure
considerations.
The risk importance measures provide a sound basis for deter-
mining the plant risk for normal power operation and the required
response to internal initiating events. However, a blended process
of traditional engineering analysis and judgment with the PRA is
part of the risk-informed IST methodology. Considerations that
also need to be incorporated into the component safety signifi-
cance assessment, for a final risk-informed IST determination,
include the segment importance for external events (seismic, fire,
and external flood), performance of safety functions during shut-
down modes, the importance to design basis analysis and other
accident scenarios, and operation and maintenance insights that
should be taken into account.
In the risk-informed IST process, a plant expert panel (such as
the expert panel used for the Maintenance Rule) makes the final
determination of the risk significance of components. Two safety
significance categories (HSS and LSS) are defined. The plant
expert panel is responsible for the review and approval of all risk-
informed categorization results by utilizing their expertise
(including knowledge of plant operations, design and licensing
basis, plant-specific and industry data) and PRA insights to develop
the final list of categorized components.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 105
The plant expert panel is trained and indoctrinated in the spe-
cific requirements of the Code Case and of the PRA analysis. The
panel includes expertise in the following areas:
• Plant operation
• Safety analysis
• Probabilistic risk assessment
• Maintenance
• Licensing
• ASME in-service testing
• Quality Assurance
Meetings are held with the plant expert panel to review the
available information and to make the final determination of
safety significance. Once the determinations of safety signifi-
cance are made and the testing strategies are defined for the high
and low safety significant components, the overall risk change
(the aggregate effect) of relaxing all testing strategies for low
safety significant components is calculated using the PRA
model. The final selection of test intervals for the component
groups depends on additional qualitative arguments (including
any compensatory measures) and the NRC Regulatory Guide
requirements.
A performance monitoring plan is developed to ensure that the
following criteria are met:
• Sufficient tests are conducted to provide meaningful data.
• The in-service tests are conducted such that incipient degra-
dation can reasonably be expected to be detected.
• The Owner will trend appropriate parameters to provide rea-
sonable assurance that the component will remain operable
over the test interval.
A performance monitoring plan is sufficient to ensure that
degradation is not significant for components placed on an
extended test interval, and that failure rates assumed for these
components will not be significantly compromised. The plant-
specific feedback and corrective action process are also modified
as part of the program to ensure component performance is cap-
tured and any changes in ranking are considered. Periodic evalua-
tions of the program are recommended.
45.6.2 Code Case OMN-4 for Treatment of Check
Valves
Code Case OMN-4, “Requirements for Risk Insights for In-service
Testing of Check Valves at LWR Power Plants,” was first issued in
1998. This Code Case uses the features of the check valve Condition
Monitoring Program Mandatory Appendix (ASME OMN Code-
1996, Appendix II, Check Valve Condition Monitoring Program) to
define the testing strategy for the high safety significant check
valves. For the LSS check valves, the Code Case recommends
either a code test as per Subsection ISTC or a Condition
Monitoring Program. No specifics on test intervals are provided in
the Code Case. However, through the use of the Condition
Monitoring Appendix, the HSS population will be arranged into
groups that determine the test intervals. For the LSS components,
ISTC recommends a bidirectional exercise test with the intervals
specified in the ASME Subsection ISTC as either quarterly, at Cold
Shutdown, or at the maximum, at refueling outages.
As stated in the ASME OMN-4 white paper [54], the coupling
of OMN-3 with OMN-4 “results in a good mix of requirements
that actually complement each other.”
45.6.3 Code Case OMN-7 for Treatment of Pumps
Code Case OMN-7, “Alternative Requirements for Pump
Testing,” which provides testing requirements for pumps, was
issued in 1999. For pumps categorized as HSS, the frequencies
and improved test methods of the ASME OMN-Code 1995
Edition through 1996 Addenda are required. The HSS pumps are
further divided into Group A and Group B pumps. Group A
pumps are pumps that are operated continuously or routinely dur-
ing normal operation, cold shutdown, or refueling operations.
Group B pumps are pumps in standby systems that are not operated
routinely except for testing. The testing requirements and inter-
vals are based on these groups.
For LSS pumps, these same Code requirements are specified.
However, the frequency of testing may be reduced for these com-
ponents. In addition, comprehensive pump testing is not required,
although the other improved requirements of the Code are applic-
able. An additional requirement for testing LSS pumps at high
flow once every 5 years or three refueling outages was included to
help ensure that hydraulic degradation does not go undetected.
45.6.4 Code Case OMN-11 for Treatment
of Motor-Operated Valves
Code Case OMN-11, “Risk-Informed Testing for Motor-
Operated Valves,” which provides the testing requirements for
motor-operated valves, was issued in 2001 [51]. Code Case
OMN-11 establishes the requirements for MOV testing based on
the component design basis requirements and functional margin.
All MOVs are exercised on an interval not to exceed 1 year or one
refueling cycle. Changes in functional margin over time are evalu-
ated to determine the test intervals. Code Case OMN-11 had
already included a section on risk-informed criteria for MOV test-
ing, but was not prescriptive in how this was to be accomplished.
The HSS motor-operated valves in OMN-11 are tested in
accordance with Code Case OMN-11 using a mix of static and
dynamic MOV performance testing using the established frequen-
cies of OMN-1. LSS motor-operated valves are grouped and test-
ed as per Code Case OMN-11 with an initial test frequency of
three refueling cycles or 5 years until sufficient data exist to deter-
mine a more appropriate test frequency.
45.6.5 Code Case OMN-12 for Treatment
of Pneumatic and Hydraulic Valves
Code Case OMN-12, “Alternative Requirements for In-service
Testing Using Risk Insights for Pneumatically and Hydraulically
Operated Valve Assemblies in Light Water Reactor Power
Plants,” was also issued in 2001. It took much longer to develop
this Code Case since there was no specific guidance in the ASME
OMN Code on these types of valves.
The Code Case requires that the test frequencies for HSS
valves be determined based on an evaluation of the data or should
be every two refueling cycles or 3 years, whichever is longer.
Valve exercising is to occur once each fuel cycle. For LSS valves,
the test frequency is based on component history, safety function,
and manufacturer recommendations. Valve exercising is to occur
once each fuel cycle.
45.6.6 Code Case OMN-10 for Snubbers
Code Case OMN-10, “Requirements for Safety Significance
Categorization of Snubbers Using Risk Insights and Testing
Strategies for In-service Testing of LWR Power Plants,” was
issued in 2001. In late 1996, the major risk-informed IST initia-
tive was broadened to include snubbers. An EPRI risk-informed
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106 • Chapter 45
IST pilot project for snubbers was established with seven pilot
plants. This group of pilot plants tested the draft categorization
methodology and provided feedback that was incorporated into
the Code Case OMN-10.
This Code Case did not use the categorization of OMN-3 but
provided another process for the categorization of snubbers. First,
for all the systems in the plant in which there are safety-related
snubbers, the systems are classified as high or low risk systems
based on quantitative or qualitative analysis. An expert panel is
also employed in the process similar to OMN-3.
The criteria for categorizing snubbers differ from those in Code
Case OMN-3. The decision criteria are set up as mandatory inclu-
sion criteria and nonmandatory exclusion criteria. The inclusion
criteria (Level A) for HSS snubbers are as follows:
• All snubbers protecting the following components: steam
generators and reactor coolant pumps in PWRs and recircula-
tion pumps in boiling water reactors (BWRs).
• All snubbers protecting components in systems with PRA
importance ranking Fussell-Vesely (FV) >0.05 or, if evaluat-
ed at the component/train level, all snubbers supporting the
components in trains with PRA importance ranking FV
>0.005 or risk achievement worth (RAW) >2.
The exclusion criteria (Level B) for LSS snubbers are as follows:
• All snubbers that support the component with an importance
ranking FV 60.005 and a RAW 6 2.
• All snubbers associated with unmodeled components and
associated with components that would likely be unmodeled
in Levels 1, 2, 3, and shutdown PRAs, including both internal
and external events.
Testing strategies and frequencies are then developed based not
only on the ranking of HSS or LSS snubbers, but also on the type
of environment for the snubber. A harsh environment is defined
for those operating environments where the snubber is exposed to
higher temperatures, vibration, or other service condition vari-
ables that would result in a predicted service life of more than
10 years. A benign environment is defined for those operating
environments where the snubber is exposed to lower tempera-
tures, minimal vibration, or other service condition variables that
would result in a predicted service life of less than 10 years.
The frequencies of testing are then based on the two categories
and use a sampling plan, similar to the current ISTD Code sam-
pling plan, based on the population of snubbers. For HSS snub-
bers in a harsh environment, all snubbers must be either tested or
replaced every 6 years, whereas for HSS snubbers in a benign
environment and for LSS snubbers in a harsh environment, all
snubbers must either be tested or replaced every 10 years. No
requirement is made for LSS snubbers in a benign environment.
45.7 REGULATORY AND INDUSTRY
INTERACTIONS
Risk-informed activities have involved extensive interactions
between regulatory staff and industry organizations as described
in the sections below.
45.7.1 Regulatory Acceptance and Recognition
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has been supportive of
the risk-informed activities of ASME Codes and Standards and
has provided guidance consistent with the provisions of the rele-
vant Code Cases. For example, the NRC has developed
Regulatory Guides 1.175 [53] and 1.178 [29] for plant-specific,
risk-informed decision-making for IST and ISI, respectively, that
have provisions consistent with OMN-3 [47] and B&PV Code
Cases N-577, N-577-1 [24, 25], and N-578, N-578-1 [26, 27]. In
addition, NRC has not generically endorsed any of the ASME
B&PV Code Cases related to risk-informed in-service inspection.
These Code Cases N-560, N-560-1, N-560-2, N-577, N-577-1,
N-578, and N-578-1 are listed as unacceptable in Regulatory
Guide 1.193 [55]. The conditions cited in the Regulatory Guide
that make these Cases unacceptable are as follows:
(1) The Code Cases do not address inspection strategy for exist-
ing augmented and other inspection programs such as
IGSCC, FAC, MIC, and pitting.
(2) The Code Case does not provide system-level guidelines for
change-in-risk evaluation to ensure that the risk from indi-
vidual system failures will be kept small and dominant risk
contributors will not be created.
Understanding these conditions, plant owners developed their
risk-informed in-service inspection programs using one of the
Code Cases listed above. These conditions were addressed by the
owners on a plant-specific basis to the satisfaction of the NRC.
The fact that almost 95% of the plants in the United States now
have some type of NRC approved risk-informed in-service
inspection programs in place set the direction for ASME to solve
the issue. ASME decided that the best approach was to address
these limitations in their development of Nonmandatory
Appendix R [28] to ASME B&PV Code Section XI. Because of
this decision, the only complete set of requirements that ASME
now has for a risk-informed in-service inspection program is con-
tained in the Appendix. ASME has no plans to further revise the
existing Code Cases listed above and they will remain as generi-
cally unacceptable to the NRC. Nonmandatory Appendix R is
expected to be approved by the NRC in its next rulemaking that
will update the Code of Federal Regulations, specifically Title 10,
Part 50, Section 55a Codes and Standards, by endorsing the 2007
Edition of the ASME B&PV Code Section XI, Division 1. It is
also anticipated that Code Case N-716 [31] will be the first
Section XI Code Case to be approved for use conditionally in
Regulatory Guide 1.147, Revision 16 [56], which is currently
under development by the NRC.
For the OM risk-informed Code Cases, the NRC has divided
them into several different levels of approval. Only one Code
Case OMN-10 [50] is listed as unacceptable in Regulatory Guide
1.193 [55] and Code Case OMN-7 is approved without conditions
in Regulatory Guide 1.192 [57]. All the other OM risk-informed
Code Cases, OMN-3, OMN-4, OMN-11, and OMN-12, are con-
ditionally approved in Regulatory Guide 1.192 [57].
NRC’s endorsement of ASME-RA-S-2002 and the 2003 and
2005 Addenda has been timely and explicit through the develop-
ment of Regulatory Guide 1.200 [58]. This Regulatory Guide
describes one acceptable approach for determining whether the
quality of the PRA, in total or the parts that are used to support an
application, is sufficient to provide confidence in the results, such
that the PRA can be used in regulatory decision-making for light
water reactors. The guidance is intended to be consistent with the
NRC’s PRA Policy Statement and subsequent, more detailed,
guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.174 [30]. It is also intended to
reflect and endorse guidance provided by standards setting and
nuclear industry organizations.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 107
This Guide contains an Appendix that identifies the acceptability
of the standard with a number of clarifications and a limited num-
ber of qualifications. Clarifications are essentially items where the
NRC staff has no objection to the provisions of the standard but has
offered comments to clarify the requirement. Qualifications are
cases where the staff does not object to the requirement if the quali-
fications identified are addressed in following the standard. RG
1.200 also includes an Appendix endorsing, with qualifications, the
industry peer-review process in NEI 00-02 and subsequent plans for
self-assessments against the criteria in the ASME PRA Standard
that were not addressed during the NEI peer review.
The NRC issued this regulatory guide for trial use in February
2004, and five trial applications were conducted. The NRC subse-
quently revised the guide to incorporate lessons learned from the
pilot applications. The NRC also revised the appendices to address
the changes made in the professional society PRA Standards and
industry PRA guidance documents. The NRC then issued the
revised guide (including its associated appendices) for public
review and comment as Draft Guide-1161 in September 2006. The
staff subsequently reviewed the stakeholder comments and, where
appropriate, revised the guide accordingly. Revision 1 of RG 1.200
was issued in January 2007. Subsequently, “Clarification to RG
1.200, Rev.1,” was issued by the NRC to provide additional expla-
nation to clarify the staff’s regulatory position on the treatment of
sources of uncertainty and assumptions as stated in Revision 1.
As discussed in Section 45.5.1, the NRC issued rule 10 CFR
50.69, “Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of
Structures, Systems, and Components for Nuclear Power Plants,”
on November 22, 2004 [42]. ASME Code Cases that provide
requirements related to this initiative are addressed in the state-
ment of considerations for rule 10 CFR 50.69.
45.7.2 Related Industry Developments
The nuclear industry has provided extensive support in the devel-
opment of risk-informed Codes and Standards, not only through the
commitment of knowledgeable individuals to participate in the
standards committees, but by providing support of technical investi-
gations, pilot activities, and production of implementing docu-
ments. Through the Electric Power Research Institute, industry pro-
vided guidance on the use of a PRA (PSA) in risk-informed
applications [35]. Also, industry, through the NEI, published guid-
ance on peer reviews [19] that contained useful input on PRA tech-
nical elements and peer-review practices for the development of
ASME RA-S-2002. Industry has conducted numerous pilot tests of
the various risk-informed codes and standards and these tests have
provided valuable feedback and improvements. These pilot activi-
ties have demonstrated that application of risk-informed techniques
is an iterative process requiring cooperative efforts of the industry,
regulatory body, and the Codes and Standards community to arrive
at practical and cost-effective methods.
45.8 FUTURE PLANS FOR
RISK-INFORMED ACTIVITIES
The Board on Nuclear Codes and Standards has full responsi-
bility for managing ASME activities related to codes, standards,
and accreditation programs directly applicable to nuclear facilities
and technology. This effort includes full administrative and tech-
nical responsibility for the following Standards Committees:
• Operations & Maintenance Committee
• Nuclear Cranes Committee
• Nuclear Air & Gas Treatment Committee
• Nuclear Quality Assurance Committee
• Nuclear Risk Management Committee
• Qualification of Mechanical Equipment Committee
Besides, the responsibility also includes technical supervision
of the following three Subcommittees of the B&PV Committee
that administratively report to the Board on Pressure Technology
Codes and Standards (BPTCS):
• Subcommittee III, Nuclear Power
• Subcommittee XI, In-service Inspection
• Subcommittee, Nuclear Accreditation
Risk-informed activities related to nuclear power have been
underway for several decades. Specific ASME Codes and
Standards products came under development in the early 1990s.
In recent years the pace of development has quickened with new
products being developed by ASME, the nuclear industry, and
NRC to support broader and more pervasive applications of the
technology. A key driver has been NRC’s plans to risk inform the
nuclear power plant safety regulations in 10 CFR Part 50. These
and future activities are discussed in next section.
45.8.1 BNCS Risk Management Strategic Plan
In January 2000, the BNCS set up a task group to assist the
Board in responding to the NRC’s plans for a multiphased pro-
gram to increasingly risk inform the rules for licensing nuclear
power plants contained in 10 CFR 50 (Code of Federal
Regulations Title 10–Part 50). The task group was originally
named the Risk-Informed Part 50 Task Group (RIP-50 TG). Over
the next 2 years, the task group was increasingly assigned the role
of developing a coordinated BNCS approach to respond to NRC
and nuclear industry risk-informed initiatives. In early 2002, the
task group was renamed the Risk Management Task Group, and
its membership was expanded to include one or more representa-
tives for all committees under the technical supervision of BNCS
that were involved in risk-informed activities. Development of a
Risk Management Strategic plan became an important activity.
An initial BNCS approved version was completed in early 2002.
This plan was adopted as a part of the overall BNCS Operational
Plan and is maintained as a living document that is reviewed and
updated prior to each BNCS meeting. The latest version of the
BNCS Risk Management Strategic Plan can be always obtained
from the ASME BNCS website–www.asme.org. The high-level
mission and goal of the planning effort are as follows:
Mission Factor risk as well as performance in all ASME
Nuclear Codes and Standards as appropriate to further ensure,
on a worldwide basis, that they protect public health and safety
and meet the needs of users.
Goal To determine the need and provide risk-informed, per-
formance-based ASME Nuclear Codes and Standards for the
benefit of users.
The February 2008 version of this plan, as summarized in this
section, has the following short- and long-term initiatives:
Short-Term Initiatives (2008–2009)
• Incorporate air-operated valves into approved risk-informed
ASME OM Code, Subsection IST, which will be published in
2008 Code Addenda of the ASME OM Code.
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108 • Chapter 45
• Ensure that ASME risk-informed Code Cases and Codes and
Standards are properly integrated with risk-informed regula-
tion initiatives.
• Integrate application of PRA Standard into other ASME risk-
informed Codes and Standards, as appropriate.
• Work with Nuclear Risk Management Coordinating Committee
to coordinate risk management development activities by SDOs,
regulators, and industry, where appropriate.
• Support ASME research effort to develop reliability-based
load and resistance factor design (LRFD) methods for piping
in ASME Section III.
• Adapt similar provisions of the risk-informed safety classifi-
cation Code Case for ISI repair/ replacement activities (Case
N-660) for a new classification Code Case (Case N-720) for
Section III design.
• Investigate use of load and resistance factor design and risk-
informed methods for concrete components for nuclear ser-
vice for Section III, Division 2.
• Complete risk-informed initiatives on minimum exam cover-
age, pressure testing and leakage, and heat exchanger exams.
• Using experience from risk-informed ISI applications and
trial risk-informed repair/replacement applications, develop
alternative piping risk-informed classification and exam
requirements, revise Code Case N-660 to address service
water systems, and revise Code Case N-660 for all plant sys-
tems to support 10 CFR 50.69 initiative.
• Develop an Appendix that risk informs the requirements of
NQA-1.
• Investigate approaches for the development of a life-cycle
risk-informed nuclear code and make decision regarding
nuclear system code development.
• Develop an OM Standard on treatment of LSSC pumps and
valves excluded from OM Code requirements through 10
CFR 50.69.
• Identify actions necessary to respond to Commission paper
COMNJD-03-0002 on PRA quality.
Long-Term Initiatives (2010–Beyond)
• Expand risk-informed, performance-based approaches into
new ASME Nuclear Codes and Standards to support next
generation reactors.
• Implement and complete scope additions to the PRA
Standard.
• Develop risk-informed safety classification Code Case(s) for
use across all ASME Nuclear Codes and Standards.
The BNCS Risk Management Strategic Plan summarizes the
status of work being performed by the Code Committees to
achieve the above short- and long-term initiatives. Updates to the
BNCS Risk Management Strategic Plan are prepared by the Task
Group on Risk Management and approved by the BNCS at each
of its meetings, which are held thrice a year. The next section
briefly discusses some of the actions that may be incorporated in
specific codes.
45.8.2 B&PV Code Initiatives
Safety Classification An activity has been initiated, in con-
junction with the ASME Committee on Nuclear Risk
Management, to develop a Section III Code Case N-720 that pro-
vides requirements for risk-informed safety classification and
treatment for design. This Case uses Section XI Code Case
N-660, “Risk-Informed Safety Classification for Use in Risk-
Informed Repair/Replacement Activities,” as a basis for develop-
ment of this Section III Case. Code Case N-720 will be consistent
with the recently issued NRC Rule 10 CFR 50.69 and will reflect
lessons learned from implementation of Code Case N-660 in
commercial nuclear pilot plant repair and replacement projects.
Similar risk-informed safety classification efforts are also being
initiated by the American Nuclear Society to address nuclear
plant safety classification criteria, and both the ASME and ANS
work is being reviewed by the Nuclear Risk Management
Coordinating Committee.
Reliability-Based Load and Resistance Factor Design
Methods for Piping A research project was initiated in late 2002
with the objective of developing the technical basis for reliability-
based load and resistance factor design of ASME Section III,
Class 2/3 piping. Intermediate results from this project were pub-
lished in ASME research report, CRTD-86, “Development of
Reliability-Based Load and Resistance Factor Design (LRFD)
Methods for Piping,” in 2007 [59]. This report provides the tech-
nical basis for LRFD methods for Class 2/3 piping for primary
loading that include pressure, deadweight, seismic, and accidental
loading. The outcomes of the project include design models and
equations and partial safety factors that can be used to compose
LRFD guidelines and criteria. The research provides a proof of
concept of the LRFD for the design of piping. Such design meth-
ods should lead to consistent reliability levels and can initially be
used in parallel with current design procedures. However, further
work is needed and the report makes seven specific recommenda-
tions for project completion:
(1) The project has only evaluated stresses in a pipe due to
internal pressure, sustained weight, and seismic and
mechanical loading and their combinations. Fatigue and
thermal loads, in combination with the primary loads, need
to be included in the LRFD formats.
(2) The probabilistic characteristics of the basic random vari-
ables for both the load and the strength play a vital role in
reliability assessment and reliability-based design for pip-
ing components. Quantification of the probabilistic char-
acteristics of these variables is an essential element for
developing LRFD rules. The characteristics can be devel-
oped from laboratory testing of mechanical properties of
materials and measurements in plants for dimensions and
tolerances.
(3) Sensitivity analysis and the effect of correlation between the
load and strength random variables.
(4) Identification of a target range for reliability levels to com-
pute the partial safety factors.
(5) Computations of partial safety factors for use in LRFD
design formats.
(6) Sample LRFD guidelines and rules for piping summarizing
target reliability levels, strength factors, and load factors.
(7) Comparative design examples from actual nuclear plant
configurations to illustrate the use of load and strength fac-
tors in selected LRFD-based design equations.
Section XI A number of activities are underway in Section XI
to extend risk-informed in-service inspection requirements to
cover all Section XI systems, components, and their supports. In
addition, Code Case N-716 [31] is being revised to incorporate
the lessons learned from the pilot plant applications and to extend
the scope of the Case to include piping supports and other compo-
nents connected to the piping. Ultimately, all this new experience
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 109

will be added into Nonmandatory Appendix R [28]. There is also
an effort to consider how to develop requirements for new plants
to use risk-informed in-service inspection program requirements
in the future.
45.8.3 Systems-Based Code
Current ASME Nuclear Codes and Standards rely primarily on
deterministic and mechanistic approaches to design of compo-
nents, including piping systems. The design code is a separate
volume from the code for ISI and both are separate from the code
for IST. Work is in progress to develop an ASME Nuclear
Systems-Based Code, which would include a planned evolution
that integrates the various nuclear codes and standards and adopts
a risk-informed approach across a facility life cycle, encompass-
ing design, construction, operation, maintenance, and closure.
Figure 45.3 offers a conceptual development.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is considering devel-
opment of a risk-informed performance-based and technology
neutral alternative licensing process for new reactor designs [60].
A dynamic or “living” facility-specific PRA is integral to a tech-
nology neutral risk-informed performance-based licensing
process. The design processes used today are predominately
deterministic and not risk informed. Revised design processes,
reflecting risk insights derived from a “living” PRA, that evolves
along with the design are needed.
It is envisioned that a Systems-Based Code design process
would be based on risk-informed probabilistic methodologies that
cover a facility’s life cycle from the start of conceptual design
through decontamination and decommissioning [61]. The method-
ology would use a “living” PRA to identify target reliabilities for
facility systems and components. Target reliabilities would be used
in system and subsystem simulation analyses to determine the
optimum combination of initial system and component construc-
tion reliability, maintenance frequency, and inspection frequency
for both active and passive components. The target reliabilities
would also be used for systems-based code margin exchange for
passive components to reduce excessive level of margins to appro-
priate levels resulting in a more flexible structure of codes and
standards that improves facility reliability and cost.
The concept of code margin exchange or “Systems-Based Code”
has been initiated and promoted by Japanese nuclear experts. This
approach recognizes that the current material, design, construction,
inspection, and maintenance codes are well established, indepen-
dent, and self-complete. Each code provides safety margins to
assure integrity. Through the current design process, margins accu-
mulate and can become excessive resulting in overly conservative
and costly designs. The Systems-Based Code concept introduced
by Professor Asada [62, 63] and further developed by Asayama
et al. [64, 65], proposes to resolve this problem. The Systems-
Based Code is a design process that reduces the excessive level of
margins for passive (pressure boundary and structural integrity)
functions to appropriate levels based on design to target reliability.
It embraces expansion of technical options beyond what current
codes and standards allow and exchange of margin among the tech-
nical options. Margin exchange utilizes the flexible structure of
codes and standards and optimizes both reliability and cost.
45.8.4 Related ASME Standards
As shown in the BNCS Risk Management Strategic Plan,
ASME has identified a number of current and planned risk-
informed standards activities. In addition, the American Nuclear
Society has issued one standard and has two others under devel-
opment that relate to these activities. Now that the concept of
grading the treatment of structures, systems, and components
using their risk importance has achieved general acceptance, there
is an apparent need to define the treatment requirements for SSCs
of lower importance. While this has been a primary objective of
the ISI and IST risk-informed Code Cases, to date no other codes
and standards have developed similar graded treatment approaches.
The ASME Nuclear Quality Assurance (NQA) Committee has
prepared a draft standard addressing this need and plans to com-
plete it in 2008. To date, no other ASME nuclear standards com-
mittees have initiated similar action.
45.8.5 Other Standards Development Organizations
As discussed in Section 45.3.1, the American Nuclear Society’s
(ANS) Risk-Informed Standards Committee (RISC) has devel-
oped or is developing the following PRA standards:

Load and Resistance

Factor Design (LRFD) Risk-Informed Design
• Cold piping
• Direct use of plant PRA
• Hot piping ASME III ASME III Life-Cycle Process/ Alternative
Code Cases • Develop risk criteria Code System-Based Code Code
Current classification
• • Piping application Changes Framework
• Plant PRA insights
• Other components
• Current risk criteria

Prior ASME 2-3 years 3-5 years 5-10 years

Research &
Code Risk-
Informed Other ASME
Work Nuclear C&S

Risk-Informed Safety
Classification ASME O&M
• Risk-Informed IST
Plant Review and adapt ASME
PRA risk-informed safety Code Case
classification Code ASME Section XI
Case N-660 for
repair/ replacement to • Risk-Informed ISI
ASME III design • Risk-Informed RRM

FIG. 45.3 POTENTIAL EVOLUTION TO NUCLEAR SYSTEMS CODE

ASME_Ch45_p089-112.qxd 6/3/09 9:52 AM Page 110
110 • Chapter 45
• PRA methodology for treatment of earthquake and other
external events (ANSI/ANS-58.21-2007) initially published
in 2003 and revised in 2007 [66].
• PRA methodology for internal fire (ANSI/ANS-58.22-2007)
published in 2007 [67].
• Low Power and Shutdown–under development.
All of these are intended to be compatible with the ASME
Standard and rely on its generic requirements, and these standards
are in the process of being incorporated into the ASME/ANS
combined PRA standard, ASME/ANS RA-S1-2008 [18]. Other
Standards Developing Organizations (SDOs) are considering
development of standards to support risk-informed approaches,
although specific projects have not yet been identified.
ANS has also initiated work of standards addressing full Level
2 and Level 3 PRA scopes. These involve evaluation of long-term
containment following core damage and release of radioactive
materials to the containment and beyond. It is expected that these
standards will also be issued as joint undertakings of ANS and
ASME.
However, to assure coordinated development and consistency
of content and use, ASME and ANS assisted in the formation of a
Nuclear Risk Management Coordinating Committee. This
Committee coordinates the development and maintenance of
codes and standards that address risk management and risk-
informed decision-making for nuclear power plants and other
nuclear facilities, and the transportation and storage of spent
nuclear fuel. This coordination is established to avoid redundancy
and facilitate utilization of the resulting codes and standards. The
current membership includes the following:
• American Nuclear Society
• ASME
• Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
• U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
• U.S. Department of Energy
• Nuclear Energy Institute
Other interested SDOs will be invited to join as they become
involved in the development of related standards. Among the cur-
rently proposed strategic actions for this group are the following:4
• Assure that current and emerging standards are developed and
maintained to meet the needs of the user and are consistent
and compatible so that they can be readily applied.
• Integrate the risk-informed methodology set forth in PRA
Standards into other application-specific codes and standards,
as appropriate.
• Facilitate the implementation and use of nuclear risk-related
standards required to meet the identified needs of the user
community.
• Evaluate alternatives and recommend actions intended to
optimize the number and mix of separate standards necessary
to implement a full scope of risk-informed applications and to
avoid redundancy.
• Work with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the develop-
ment of its plans to implement 10 CFR 50.69 and future plans
for risk-informed regulation of the nuclear power industry.
4
Edited selections from the NMRCC Strategic Plan dated May 5, 2005.
• Define appropriate training and qualification initiatives for
users of risk-informed standards, including Integrated
Decision-Making Panels.
• Identify needs, priorities, and timing for development of new
or modification of existing standard(s) to address unique PRA
requirements for new reactors.
• Determine the need for a standard to develop a risk-informed
safety classification scheme, particularly to assist the
advanced and new reactor designs.
45.8.6 Emerging Security Applications
Used for many years by the nuclear power as well as other
industries, risk analysis is now being used to assist in determin-
ing measures to protect the nation’s critical assets against acts of
terrorism. Several key critical infrastructure sectors, such as
nuclear reactors and spent fuel storage, chemical plants, refiner-
ies, and liquefied natural gas tanks, are being evaluated in an
initial phase of work involving risk analysis via the ASME
Innovative Technologies Institute, LLC with the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security. The project will provide par-
ticular guidelines for risk analysis in each of these areas.
Chapter 56, “Post 9–11 Related Issues” provides more informa-
tion on these developments.
45.9 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
As a result of significant efforts over the past 20 years, PRA
and risk-informed technology have been significantly incorporat-
ed into ASME Nuclear Codes and Standards, as also summarized
in “Risk Initiatives in ASME Nuclear Codes and Standards”
[68]. An ASME PRA Standard–ASME RA-S-2002 along with
Addenda RA-Sa-2003, RA-Sb-2005, and RA-Sc-2007 provides
a standard to determine the technical capability, fidelity, and
adequacy of plant PRAs for use in nuclear power plant applica-
tions. A combined ASME/ANS RA-S1-2008 was approved in
February 2008 incorporating internal fire and external events and
will add low power and shutdown considerations within a year. It
is expected that this combined standard will be endorsed by the
U.S. NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.200, Revision 2. The combined
Standard represents a truly international effort as committee
members included knowledgeable individuals from Japan, the
International Atomic Energy Agency, United Kingdom, and
Mexico. More than 10 ASME Code Cases have been completed,
approved, and implemented to support the application and use of
risk-informed technology for plant inservice inspection and
in-service testing programs that reduce unnecessary burden
while maintaining or enhancing safety. These efforts continue
to be coordinated with corresponding regulatory and industry
initiatives, including those of other standards development
organizations. Future plans are outlined to expand the applica-
tion of risk-informed methods to new areas such as design,
risk-informed safety classification, and consideration of a sys-
tems-based code. The use of risk-informed technology will
continue to provide benefits to support the safe operation of
today’s reactors and to provide more effective processes for the
design, construction, and operation of advanced reactors.
ASME_Ch45_p089-112.qxd 6/3/09 9:52 AM Page 111
COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 111
45.10 REFERENCES
1. USNRC, Reactor Safety Study WASH-1400 (NUREQ-75/014),
Initiated in 1972, Final Report in 1975.
2. Wall, I.B., Haugh, J.J., and Worledge, D.H., Recent Applications of
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3. Lewis, H.W. et al., Risk Assessment Review Group Report to the U.S.
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4. Kemeny, President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile
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5. USNRC, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Special Inquiry Group,
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6. USNRC, Severe Accident Risks: An Assessment of Five U.S. Nuclear
Power Plants, NUREG-1150, 1990.
7. Brons, J.C., Rasin, W.H., and Specter, H., Public Briefing of NRC
Commissioners, March 10, 1992. Transcript Available from U.S.
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8. ASME, Risk-Based Inspection: Development of Guidelines, Volume 1,
General Document, CRTD–Vol. 20-1, ASME Research Task Force on
Risk-Based Inspection Guidelines, American Society of Mechanical
Engineers, Washington, DC, 1991.
9. ASME, Risk-Based Inspection: Development of Guidelines, Volume 2,
Part 1, Light Water Reactor (LWR) Nuclear Power Plant Components,
CRTD–Vol. 20-2, ASME Research Task Force on Risk-Based
Inspection Guidelines, American Society of Mechanical Engineers
Washington, DC, 1992.
10. ASME, Risk-Based Inspection: Development of Guidelines, Volume 3,
Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Station Applications, CRTD–Vol.
20-3, ASME Research Task Force on Risk-Based Inspection Guidelines,
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Washington, DC, 1994.
11. ASME, Risk-Based In-Service Testing: Development of Guidelines,
Volume 2, Light Water Reactor (LWR) Nuclear Power Plant
Components, CRTD–Vol. 40-2, ASME Research Task Force on Risk-
Based In-Service Testing Guidelines, American Society of
Mechanical Engineers, Washington, DC, 1996.
12. ASME, Risk-Based Inspection: Development of Guidelines, Volume 2,
Part 2, Light Water Reactor (LWR) Nuclear Power Plant Components,
CRTD–Vol. 20-4, ASME Research Task Force on Risk-Based
Inspection Guidelines, American Society of Mechanical Engineers,
Washington, DC, 1998.
13. ASME, Risk-Based Testing: Development of Guidelines, Volume 1,
General Document, CRTD–Vol. 40-1, ASME Research Task Force on
Risk-Based In-Service Testing Guidelines, American Society of
Mechanical Engineers, Washington, DC, 2000.
14. ASME, Standard for Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear
Power Plant Applications, ASME RA-S-2002, American Society of
Mechanical Engineers, New York, NY, 2002.
15. ASME, “Addendum a” to ASME RA-S-2002, Standard for
Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications,
ASME RA-Sa-2003, American Society of Mechanical Engineers,
New York, NY, 2003.
16. ASME, “Addendum b” to ASME RA-S-2002, Standard for
Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications,
ASME RA-Sb-2005, New York, NY, 2005.
17. ASME, “Addendum c” to ASME RA-S-2002, Standard for
Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications,
ASME RA-Sc-2007, New York, NY, 2007.
18. ASME/ANS, Standard for Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear
Power Plant Applications, ASME/ANS RA-S1-2008, American
Society of Mechanical Engineers, New York, NY, 2008.
19. NEI, Probabilistic Risk Assessment Peer Review Process Guidance,
NEI-00-02, Revision A3, Nuclear Energy Institute, Washington, DC
20006-3708, 2000.
20. ASME, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI Rules for
In-Service Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components, American
Society of Mechanical Engineers, New York, NY, 2007.
21. ASME, Code Case N-560, Alternative Examination Requirements for
Class 1, Category B-J Welds, Section XI, Division 1, American
Society of Mechanical Engineers, New York, NY, 1996.
22. ASME, Code Case N-560-1, Alternative Examination Requirements
for Class 1, Category B-J Welds, Section XI, Division 1, American
Society of Mechanical Engineers, New York, NY, 1999.
23. ASME, Code Case N-560-2, Alternative Examination Requirements
for Class 1, Category B-J Welds, Section XI, Division 1, American
Society of Mechanical Engineers, New York, NY, 2000.
24. ASME, Code Case N-577, Risk-Informed Requirements for Class 1,
2, and 3 Piping, Method A, Section XI, Division 1, American Society
of Mechanical Engineers, New York, NY, 1997.
25. ASME, Code Case N-577-1, Risk-Informed Requirements for Class
1, 2, and 3 Piping, Method A, American Society of Mechanical
Engineers, New York, NY, 2000.
26. ASME, Code Case N-578, Risk-Informed Requirements for Class 1,
2, and 3 Piping, Method B, Section XI, Division 1, American Society
of Mechanical Engineers, New York, NY, September 8, 1997.
27. ASME, Code Case N-578-1, Risk-Informed Requirements for Class
1, 2, and 3 Piping, Method B, Section XI, Division 1, American
Society of Mechanical Engineers, New York, NY, 2000.
28. ASME, 2005 Addenda. Nonmandatory Appendix R, ASME Boiler
and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI Rules for In-Service Inspection
of Nuclear Power Plant Components, American Society of
Mechanical Engineers, New York, NY, 2005.
29. USNRC, An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decision-
making: In-Service Inspection of Piping Regulatory Guide 1.178
(Draft for Trial Use) and Revision 1, Issued for Use in September
2003, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC,
1998–2003.
30. USNRC, Regulatory Guide 1.174, An Approach for Using
Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-
Specific Changes to the Current Licensing Basis, Revision 1, Issued
for Use in November 2002, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC, 1998–2002.
31. ASME, Code Case N-716, Alternative Piping Classification and
Examination Requirement, Section XI, Division 1, American Society
of Mechanical Engineers, New York, NY, 2006.
32. USNRC, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of
Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, 10 CFR 50.65, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, 1991.
33. Westinghouse Electric, Westinghouse Owners Group Application of
Risk-Informed Methods to Piping, In-Service Inspection Topical
Report, WCAP-14572, Westinghouse Electric Company, Revision 1-
NP-A, Pittsburgh, PA, 1999.
34. EPRI, Revised Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection Evaluation
Procedure (PWRMRP-05), TR-112657 Revision B-A, Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, 1995.
35. EPRI, PSA Applications Guide, EPRI TR-105396, Electric Power
Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, 1995.
ASME_Ch45_p089-112.qxd 6/3/09 9:52 AM Page 112
112 • Chapter 45
36. ASME, Code Case N-711, Alternative Examination Coverage
Requirements for Examination Category B-F, B-J, C-F-1, C-F-2, and
R-A, Piping Welds, Section XI, Division 1, New York, NY, 2006.
37. ASME, Code Case N-747, Reactor Vessel Head-to-Flange Weld
Examinations, Section XI, Division 1, New York, NY, 2006.
38. ASME, Code Case N-660, Risk-Informed Safety Classification for
Use in Risk-Informed Repair/Replacement Activities, Section XI,
Division 1, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, New York,
NY, 2002.
39. ASME, Code Case N-662, Alternative Repair/Replacement
Requirements for Items Classified in Accordance with Risk-Informed
Processes, Section XI, Division 1, American Society of Mechanical
Engineers, New York, NY, 2002.
40. USNRC, Options for Risk-Informed Revisions to 10 CFR Part 50:
Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, SECY-
98-300, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC,
1998.
41. Balkey, K. and Holston, W., Developments on ASME Code Cases to
Risk-Informed Repair/Replacement Activities in Support of Risk-
Informed Regulation Initiatives, Proceedings of the 10th International
Conference on Nuclear Engineering, ICONE10-22733, American
Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2002.
42. CFR, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Systems,
Structures, and Components for Nuclear Power Plants, Federal
Register, Vol. 69, No. 224–10 CFR Part 50.69, RIN 3150-AG42,
Washington, DC, November 22, 2004.
43. NEI, 10 CFR 50.69 SSC Categorization Guideline, NEI 00-04,
Revision 0, Nuclear Energy Institute, Washington, DC, July 2005.
44. USNRC, Regulatory Guide 1.201 (for Trial Use), Guidelines for
Categorizing Structures, Systems, and Components in Nuclear Power
Plants According to Their Safety Significance, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, January 2006.
45. USNRC, South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2: Draft Review Guidelines
on Risk-Informed Exemptions from Special Treatment Requirements,
Letter to STP Nuclear Operating Company, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC, July 19, 2000.
46. ASME, ASME Code on Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear
Power Plants, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, New York,
NY, 2004.
47. ASME, Code Case OMN-3, Requirements for Safety Significance
Categorization of Components Using Risk Insights for In-Service
Testing of LWR Power Plants, New York, American Society of
Mechanical Engineers, NY, 1998.
48. ASME, Code Case OMN-4, Requirements for Risk Insights for
In-Service Testing of Check Valves at LWR Power Plants, American
Society of Mechanical Engineers, New York, NY, 1998.
49. ASME, Code Case OMN-7, Alternative Requirements for Pump
Testing, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, New York, NY,
1999.
50. ASME, Code Case OMN-10, Requirements for Safety Significance
Categorization of Snubbers Using Risk Insights and Testing Strategies
for In-Service Testing of LWR Power Plants, American Society of
Mechanical Engineers, New York, NY, 2001.
51. ASME, Code Case OMN-11, Risk-Informed Testing for Motor-
Operated Valves, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, New
York, NY, 2001.
52. ASME, Code Case OMN-12, Alternative Rules for In-Service Testing
Using Risk Insights for Pneumatically and Hydraulically Operated
Valve Assemblies in Light Water Reactor Power Plants, American
Society of Mechanical Engineers, New York, NY, 2001.
53. USNRC, Regulatory Guide 1.175, An Approach for Plant Specific,
Risk-Informed Decision-Making: In-Service Testing, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, 1998.
54. ASME, Risk Insight Check Valve Code Case, White Paper OMN-4,
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, New York, NY, 1997.
55. USNRC, Guide 1.193, ASME Code Cases Not Approved for Use,
Revision 2, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory,
10/2007.
56. USNRC, Regulatory Guide 1.147, In-Service Inspection Code Case
Acceptability, ASME Section XI, Division 1, Revision 15, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory, 10/2007.
57. USNRC, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide
1.192, Operation and Maintenance Code Case Acceptability, ASME
OM Code, 6/2003.
58. USNRC, Regulatory Guide 1.200, An Approach for Determining the
Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for
Risk-Informed Activities, Revision 1, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC, January 2007.
59. ASME, Development of Reliability-Based Load and Resistance
Factor Design (LRFD) Methods for Piping, CRTD-86, Research and
Development Report, New York, NY, 2007.
60. NRC, Advanced Notice of Public Rule Making for a Risk-Informed
Performance-Based 10 CFR Part 53, Proposed Rules, Federal
Register, Vol. 71, No. 86, pp. 26267–26275, May 4, 2006.
61. Hill, R, Implementing Risk-Informed Life-Cycle Design, Proceedings
of the 15th International Conference on Nuclear Engineering,
ICONE15-10482, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2007.
62. Asada, Y., Tashimo, M., and Ueta, M., System-Based Code, Principal
Concept, Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on
Nuclear Engineering, ICONE10, American Society of Mechanical
Engineers, 2002.
63. Asada, Y., Tashimo, M., and Ueta, M., System-Based Code, Basic
Structure, Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on
Nuclear Engineering, ICONE10, American Society of Mechanical
Engineers, 2002.
64. Asayama, T., Morishita, M., and Tashimo, M., Development of
System-Based Code, Methodologies for Life-Cycle Margin
Evaluation, Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on
Nuclear Engineering, ICONE14-89393, American Society of
Mechanical Engineers, 2006.
65. Asayama, T., Morishita, M., and Tashimo, M., Development of
System-Based Code, Case Study of Life-Cycle Margin Evaluation,
Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Nuclear
Engineering, ICONE14-89397, American Society of Mechanical
Engineers, 2006.
66. ANS, External Events in PRA Methodology, ANSI/ANS-58.21-2007,
Available from American Nuclear Society, http://www.ans.org/
store/vi-240265.
67. ANS, Fire PRA Methodology, ANSI/ANS-58.22-2007, Available
from American Nuclear Society, http://www.ans.org/store/vi-240270.
68. ASME Standards Technology, LLC, Risk Initiatives in ASME
Nuclear Codes and Standards, 2005.
ASME_Ch46_p113-128.qxd 6/3/09 9:55 AM Page 113
APPLICATIONS OF ELASTIC-PLASTIC
FRACTURE MECHANICS IN SECTION XI,
ASME CODE EVALUATIONS
Hardayal S. Mehta and Sampath Ranganath
46.1 INTRODUCTION
The role of fracture mechanics in Section XI applications
comes in the form of evaluation of indications or flaws detected
during inservice inspection of nuclear components. The early
ASME BPVC Section XI evaluation procedures have been typi-
cally based on linear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM). For
example, the vessel flaw evaluation procedure in IWB-3600 in the
1977 edition was based on the LEFM analyses described else-
where [1,2]. Appendix G of Section XI (essentially the same as
Appendix G of Section III) also is an example of the first use of
LEFM in Section XI applications. The background of Appendix
G LEFM technology is provided in WRC-175 [3]. The current
Section XI flaw evaluation procedures (Appendix A) have some
provision for loading with limited plasticity in the form of plastic
zone size correction. LEFM is limited by the small-scale yielding
(SSY) condition that the plastic zone around the crack tip be
small compared to the size of the K-dominant region and any rel-
evant geometric dimension. It is virtually impossible to satisfy
this condition for high-toughness, low-strength materials, which
generally undergo extensive plastic deformation and crack tip
blunting prior to the initiation of crack growth. Crack initiation in
these materials is usually followed by stable crack growth or tear-
ing. The need to include the influence of significant plastic defor-
mation, which may accompany crack initiation and the subse-
quent stable growth, has been the main driving force for the
development of the field of elastic-plastic fracture mechanics
(EPFM). Furthermore, higher load capability (over that predicted
by LEFM) can be demonstrated in ductile materials by allowing
limited stable crack extension using EPFM techniques. Figure
46.1 [4] shows the role of elastic-plastic or nonlinear fracture
mechanics; a center-cracked plate loaded to failure is considered.
This figure shows a schematic plot of failure stress versus fracture
toughness (KIc). For low toughness materials (such as ferritic
steels at lower shelf), brittle fracture is the governing failure
mechanism and the critical stress is predicted by the usual LEFM
equations and the material KIc. At very high toughness values,
CHAPTER
46
LEFM is no longer valid and failure (or collapse by limit load) is
governed by the flow properties of the material. Fracture mechan-
ics ceases to be relevant to the problem because the failure stress
is insensitive to toughness; a simple limit load analysis is all that
is required to predict failure stress. The appropriate material prop-
erty in this case is the flow stress that may be generally taken as
the average of the material yield and ultimate stress or a suitable
multiple (e.g., a factor of 3) of the Code allowable stress, Sm. At
intermediate toughness levels, there is transition between brittle
fracture under linear elastic conditions and ductile overload or
collapse. Nonlinear or EPFM bridges the gap between LEFM and
collapse. When the plasticity is limited to a small zone surround-
ing the crack tip, an LEFM solution modified by a plastic zone
size is adequate; this zone is called the SSY zone. Some of the
ferritic materials used in the nuclear pressure vessel applications
at the upper-shelf temperatures are analyzed using this approach
with the material fracture resistance determined through appropri-
ate J integral testing.
46.2 EARLY PROGRESS IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF EPFM
The movement toward the use of EPFM started in the 1960s; the
progress through 1980s is summarized elsewhere [4]. Extracts [4]
are presented here to provide the reader a brief background on the
development of EPFM. LEFM ceases to be valid when significant
plastic deformation precedes failure. During a relatively short time
period (1960–1961), several researchers, including Irvin [5],
Dugdale [6], Barenblatt [7], and Wells [8], developed analytical
methods to correct for yielding at the crack tip. The Irwin plastic
zone correction was a relatively simple extension of LEFM, while
Dugdale and Barenblatt each developed somewhat more elaborate
models based on a narrow strip of yielded material at the crack tip.
Wells proposed the displacement of the crack faces, the parameter
now known as crack tip opening displacement (CTOD), as an alter-
native fracture criterion when significant plasticity precedes failure.
ASME_Ch46_p113-128.qxd 6/3/09 9:55 AM Page 114
114 • Chapter 46
FIG. 46.1 EFFECT OF FRACTURE TOUGHNESS ON THE
GOVERNING FAILURE MECHANISM
In 1968, Rice [9] developed another parameter to characterize
nonlinear material behavior ahead of a crack. By idealizing plas-
tic deformation as nonlinear elastic, Rice was able to generalize
the energy release rate to nonlinear materials. He showed that
this nonlinear energy release rate can be expressed as a line inte-
gral, which he called the J integral, evaluated along an arbitrary
contour around the crack. At the time his work was being pub-
lished, Rice discovered that Eshelby [10] had previously pub-
lished several so called conservation integrals, one of which was
equivalent to Rice’s J integral. Eshelby, however, did not apply
his integrals to crack problems. That same year, Hutchinson [11]
and Rice and Rosengren [12] related the J integral to crack tip
stress fields in nonlinear materials. These analyses showed that
the J integral can be viewed as a nonlinear stress intensity para-
meter as well as an energy release rate. Rice’s work might have
been relegated to obscurity had it not been for the active
research effort by the nuclear power industry in the United
States in the early 1970s. Because of legitimate concerns for
safety, as well as political and public relations considerations,
the nuclear power industry endeavored to apply state-of-the-art
technology, including fracture mechanics, to the design and con-
struction of nuclear power plants. The difficulty with applying
fracture mechanics in this instance was that most nuclear pres-
sure vessel steels were too tough to be characterized with LEFM
without resorting to enormous laboratory specimens. In 1971,
Begley and Landes [13], who were research engineers at
Westinghouse, came across Rice’s article and decided, despite
skepticism from their coworkers, to characterize fracture tough-
ness of these steels with the J integral. Their experiments were
very successful and led to the publication of a standard proce-
dure for J testing of metals 10 years later [14]. Material tough-
ness characterization is only one aspect of fracture mechanics.
To apply fracture mechanics concepts to design or flaw evalua-
tion, one must have a mathematical relationship between tough-
ness, stress, and flaw size. Although these relationships were
well established for linear elastic problems, a fracture design
analysis based on the J integral was not available until Shih and
Hutchinson [15] provided the theoretical framework for such an
approach in 1976. A few years later, the Electric Power
Research Institute (EPRI) published a fracture design handbook
[16] based on the Shih and Hutchinson methodology. The
components covered were the basic fracture test specimen
geometries; this was followed by solutions for geometries (e.g.,
reactor pressure vessels and piping) typical in nuclear industry
applications [17,18]. The applied J integral values were
obtained through an estimation scheme that used material stress
strain characteristics and a tabulated set of coefficients. This is
discussed further in the next section. In the United Kingdom, the
CTOD parameter was applied extensively to fracture analysis of
welded structures beginning in the late 1960s. While fracture
research in the United States was driven primarily by the nuclear
power industry during the 1970s, fracture research in the United
Kingdom was motivated largely by the development of oil
resources in the North Sea. In 1971, Burdekin and Dawes [19]
applied ideas proposed by Wells [20] several years earlier and
developed the CTOD design curve, a semiempirical fracture
mechanics methodology for welded steel structures. The nuclear
power industry in the United Kingdom developed their own
fracture design analysis [21], based on the strip yield model of
Dugdale and Barenblatt. Shih [22] demonstrated a relationship
between the J integral and CTOD, implying that both parame-
ters are equally valid for characterizing fracture. The J-based
material testing and the flaw evaluation methodologies devel-
oped in the United States and the British CTOD methodology
have begun to merge in recent years, with positive aspects of
each approach combined to yield improved analyses. Both para-
meters are currently applied throughout the world to a range of
materials. A survey paper [23] and another publication [24] pro-
vide an excellent description of the advances made in EPFM
through 1980.
46.3 ENGINEERING APPROACH TO EPFM
AND PIPING APPLICATIONS
There are essentially three approaches considered in the
application of EPFM in flaw evaluations. These approaches are
the following: (a) J-integral tearing modulus–based approach
or J-T methodology (b) deformation plasticity failure assess-
ment diagram (DPFAD) methodology (c) R-6 methodology
ASME BPVC Section XI has considered the first two approaches
in the flaw evaluations. All three methodologies consider the
calculation of the J integral, directly or indirectly. Therefore,
the engineering estimation of the applied J integral is dis-
cussed next.
46.3.1 J Integral Estimation Method
As one would guess, many of the problems of practical inter-
est are in the elastic-plastic regime requiring an estimation
scheme to calculate the J integral. The elastic-plastic estimation
procedure derives from the work of Shih and Hutchinson [15]
and others [25,26]. The elastic and plastic components of J inte-
gral are computed separately and added to obtain the total J as
follows:
Jtotal  Jel  Jpl (1)
Figure 46.2 [4] schematically illustrates a plot of J versus
applied load. The material stress-strain behavior in the estima-
tion scheme is characterized in the Ramberg-Osgood form as
follows:
(/0)  (/0)  ((/0)n (2)
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 115

where
b  the uncracked ligament length
a  the crack length
h1, h2, and h3  dimensionless parameters that depend on
geometry and strain-hardening exponent; the h
factors for various geometries and n values
have been tabulated in several EPRI reports
[16–18,27]
P  the applied load

The reference load, P0, is usually defined by a limit load solu-

FIG. 46.2 THE EPRI J ESTIMATION SCHEME
where
0  a reference stress value that is usually equal to the yield
strength, 0  0 /E
E  Young’s modulus
  a dimensionless constantn
n  the strain-hardening exponent
Figure 46.3 [27] shows a typical Ramberg-Osgood fit for a car-
bon steel material typically used in nuclear applications. Typical
fully plastic equations for J, crack mouth opening displacement
(Vp), and load line displacement (p) would have the following
form in the estimation scheme:
Jpl   0 0 b h1 (a/W, n) (P/P0)n1 (3)
tion for the geometry of interest; P0 normally corresponds to the
load at which the net cross-section yields. It should be noted that
the plastic load line displacement, p, is only that component of
plastic displacement that is due to the crack. The total displace-
ment in a structure is the sum of the elastic and plastic crack and
no-crack components.
Figure 46.4 shows the analytical expression for the calculation
of Jpl for a pipe with a through-wall circumferential crack subject-
ed to axial load and/or bending moment. The specific values for
dimensionless parameter h1 are given in Table 46.1.
The elastic component of J is computed from the elastic stress
intensity factor for an effective crack size as follows:
Jel  {KI 2 (aeff)}/E (6)
where
E  E for plane stress and E  E/(1 v2) for plane strain
condition; v is the Position’s ratio and is typically assumed
equal to 0.3.
The parentheses in the preceding equation indicate that KI is a
function of aeff rather than a multiplication product. The effective
crack size is determined from the Irwin correction modified to
account for strain hardening as follows:

Vp   0 a h2 (a/W, n) (P/P0)n (4) aeff  a  {1/[1 (P/P0)2]}{1/(

)}
p   0 a h3 (a/W, n) (P/P0) n
(5)  {(n 1)/(n 1)}{KI(a)/0}2 (7)

where

 2 for plane stress

 6 for plane strain conditions
The analytical expressions for KI are available from fracture
mechanics handbooks [27]. When J-controlled crack growth is
applicable, the condition for continued crack growth is [28,29] as
follows:

J(a, P)  JR(a a0) (8)

For any given configuration, the crack driving force J is a func-

tion of crack length a and load per unit thickness P. The JR curve
is a function of the amount of crack growth, a  (a a0), and is
obtained experimentally. Therefore, crack growth is unstable if
the following applies:

(0 J/0 a)T dJR/da (9)

FIG. 46.3 TRUE-STRESS TRUE-STRAIN CURVE FOR A333 The subscript in the preceding equation denotes a partial deriv-
GRADE 6 BASE MATERIAL IN NRC/BCL 4111-1 PIPE ative with the total displacement ¢ T held fixed. It is convenient in
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116 • Chapter 46

FIG. 46.4 FULLY PLASTIC J INTEGRAL FOR CIRCUMFERENTIAL THROUGH-WALL FLAWS IN CYLINDERS

examining stability to introduce nondimensional tearing moduli
[28] as follows:
TJ  {E/02}(0 J/0 a)T and TJR  {E/02}(dJR/da)
The instability criterion is then simply phrased in terms of
these moduli as follows:
failure and only primary membrane and bending stresses were used
when performing flaw evaluations in accordance with IWB-3640. A
J-T analysis for assumed through-wall flaw geometries [30] showed
(10) that the predicted instability loads essentially reach those predicted
by limit load and, thus, provided additional technical basis for the

TJ  TJR (11)

Figure 46.5 shows the J-T diagram. The predicted instability

load is shown in Fig. 46.5b.

46.3.2 Application of J-T Approach to Austenitic

Stainless Steel Piping Flaw Evaluations
Prior to the publication of the BPVC 1983 Addenda, flaw eval-
uation procedures in IWB-3600 were applicable to ferritic steel
components 4 in. or greater in thickness (based on LEFM). Flaw
evaluation procedures and allowable flaw sizes for LWR austenitic
piping first appeared in IWB-3640 in that Addenda. The evaluation
was based on a plastic collapse failure mechanism and allowable
flaw sizes were developed using limit load analysis. Because plastic
collapse is the anticipated failure mechanism, secondary stress, such FIG. 46.5 DETERMINATION OF INSTABILITY J, T, AND
as bending due to thermal expansion, is assumed to be relaxed at ASSOCIATED LOAD FOR LOAD CONTROL EPFM ANALYSIS
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 117
TABLE 46.1 FULLY PLASTIC J INTEGRAL FOR CIRCUMFERENTIAL THROUGH-WALL FLAWS IN CYLINDERS
limit load approach. Figure 46.6 shows an example of this predic-
tion. For limit load comparison, the flow stress was assumed as 3Sm,
where the Sm is the Code-specified allowable stress for the pipe
material. Through-wall flaw geometries were assumed. A similar
EPFM evaluation for a weld overlay geometry, where a 360 flaw
with depth equal to the original pipe thickness was assumed, was
reported [31] with the conclusion that limit load conditions are
achieved at the cracked section. Subsequently, the need arose to dis-
tinguish between high-toughness materials, such as the wrought
FIG. 46.6 COMPARISON OF NET-SECTION COLLAPSE
LOAD AND ESTIMATION SCHEME MAXIMUM LOAD FOR
AXIALLY LOADED 304 STAINLESS STEEL PIPE WITH
THROUGH-WALL CIRCUMFERENTIAL CRACK
austenitic material, and certain lower toughness flux welds, which
include shielded metal arc welds (SMAW) and submerged arc welds
(SAW). This distinction became necessary because some small
specimen experimental data suggested that the applicable failure
mechanism for the flux welds is unstable crack extension that would
occur at loads lower than the plastic collapse load [32,33]. The
approach used was to develop some penalty factors or so-called Z
factors to reduce the allowable flaw size at any specified load for
flux welds relative to the high-toughness materials. An EPFM
approach was used to develop these factors. Figure 46.7 [32] shows
an example of this evaluation. The analysis considered a pipe with a
through-wall flaw subjected to a bending moment.
The ratio of the limit load to the calculated instability load pro-
vided the Z factor value. By taking conservative bounds of the
instability load results, the following expressions for Z factors
were developed:
for SMAW, Z  1.15 [1  0.013 (OD-4)] (12)
for SAW, Z  1.30 [1  0.010 (OD-4)] (13)
FIG. 46.7 DETERMINATION OF J AND T AT CRACK INSTA-
BILITY FOR AUSTENITIC SAW AT 550F
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118 • Chapter 46

where
OD  the pipe outer diameter in inches
Subsequent experimental work by Battelle [34] indicated that
there was no statistically significant difference between the SAW
and SMAW J-R curves and, therefore, the 2004 Edition of
Appendix C specifies the SAW Z factor for SMAW also.
For Ni-Cr-Fe base metal welds, the load multipliers are
given by:
(U.S. Customary Units)
change was to bring consistency with ASME BPVC Section III.
The technical basis for these changes is provided elsewhere [35].
Table 46.2 gives the revised SFs; these SFs are applicable to
Classes 1, 2, and 3 piping and to both the austenitic and ferritic
materials. The flow stress was also redefined from 3Sm to the aver-
age of yield and ultimate stress. Also, the use of actual material
properties was allowed where such information is available.
The revision of SFs and the definition of flow stress do not
directly affect the Z factors, because they are based on the ratio to
limit load; however, the allowable flaw depth would be affected
by these changes.

46.3.3 Application of J-T Approach to Ferritic Piping

Z  6.5  10 4 D 3 0.01386D 2  0.1034D  0.902
Flaw Evaluations
for 2 in.  D  8 in.
In 1983, the Working Group on Flaw Evaluation of Section XI
Z  2.2  10 6 D 3 2.0  10 4 D 2  0.0064 D  1.1355 initiated work on the development of flaw evaluation procedures for
for 8 in.  D  40 in. ASME Class 1 ferritic piping. Flawed ferritic piping was recog-
nized to have possible failure mechanisms, which, depending on
(SI Units)
operating temperature, could range from linear elastic fracture to
elastic-plastic ductile tearing to plastic collapse. This wide variation
Z  3.967  10 8 D 3 2.148  10 5D 2  0.004071D  0.902 of failure mechanisms necessitated an evaluation procedure that
for 51 mm  D  203 mm could account for all possible failure modes. The ASME Section XI
Z  1.343  10 10 D 3 3.10  10 7 D2  2.52  10 4 D  1.1355 Working Group on Flaw Evaluation approached this problem
for 203 mm  D  1016 mm through the development of two separate approaches to address the
region where EPFM is applicable. The first approach was similar to
the J-T approach used for austenitic piping [36,37]. This resulted in
Where, D is pipe nominal diameter. the introduction of Code Case N-463 [38] in the 1988 Addenda and
The flow stress shall be that of the austenitic piping material Nonmandatory Appendix H in the 1989 Edition [39]. The other
Because limit load may not be reached prior to failure, it was approach, based on the DPFAD, is described in the next section.
recommended that the expansion stresses with a margin of 1.0 be As a minimum, the EPFM approach requires JIC data of the
included along with primary membrane and bending stress when material. The evaluation methodology also developed a correla-
evaluating flaws in flux welds. The allowable flaw sizes (e.g., in tion between JIC and the more generally available Charpy V-notch
ASME BPVC Section XI, Appendix C, 2004 Edition) are present- (CVN) absorbed energy. A screening procedure based on DPFAD
ed in tabular form as a function of stress ratio. When using the method is provided to identify the appropriate failure mode.
EPFM approach, the stress ratio for a circumferentially flawed Figure 46.8 shows the screening procedure used; the parame-
pipe is defined as the following: ters are the same as those used in DPFAD. Simply, the parameters
Kr and Sr are defined as follows:
stress ratio  Z[(m  b  e / SFb)/f (14)
Kr  [KI2/(EJIC)]0.5 (15)
Sr  (b  e)/b (16)
where
The stress intensity factor KI is the sum of the LEFM contribu-
m  primary membrane stress
tions from applied membrane and bending stresses including e.
b  primary bending stress
The Code Case and the Nonmandatory Appendix of the Section
e  secondary bending stress
XI Code provide the appropriate mathematical expressions to cal-
f  material flow stress
culate the values. JIC is the measure of toughness at the onset of
SFb  structural factor for bending
crack extension. The reference limit load bending stress is sb ¿
Note that the preceding definition of stress ratio is consistent calculated using y as the flow stress. For circumferential flaws, the
with the 2002 Addenda of ASME BPVC Section XI. Prior to that, JIC and y values (if user-specified values are unavailable) are
Sm was used instead of  f in developing tables. The structural fac-
tor (SF) has the same meaning as the safety factor. The Code is TABLE 46.2 SAFETY/STRUCTURAL FACTORS FOR CIR-
currently transitioning from safety factor terminology to structural CUMFERENTIAL AND AXIAL FLAWS
factor to specify the required structural margins.
It should also be noted that, prior to the 2002 Addenda, the
allowable circumferential flaws were developed using an SF of
2.77 (for normal/upset or Levels A/B conditions) and 1.39 (for
emergency/faulted or Levels C/D conditions) on the sum of the
primary membrane and bending stresses. Allowable longitudi-
nal flaw sizes were developed using an SF of 3.0 and 1.5 on pri-
mary membrane stress for normal/upset and emergency/faulted
conditions, respectively. Separate SFs for primary membrane
and primary bending and separate SFs for various service levels
were incorporated in the 2002 Addenda. The rationale for this
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 119

shown in Table 46.3. The DPFAD assessment curve was generat- TABLE 46.3 DEFAULT MATERIAL PROPERTIES AND Z
ed using a lower-bound, stress-strain curve with the following FACTORS FOR FERRITIC PIPING WITH CIRCUMFEREN-
values of Ramberg-Osgood parameters:   2.51, n  4.2, TIAL FLAWS
0  27.1 ksi, and E  26000 ksi.
A high Kr value at failure (a point on the failure assessment
curve) in Fig. 46.8 implies that the associated Sr value is small, indi-
cating small-scale yielding. If a low Kr value is calculated at initia-
tion, it is an indication that fracture would be predicted near limit
load. Based on this concept, the applicability range of limit load and
LEFM were defined by the ratio of Kr to Sr, as shown in Fig. 46.8.
The flow diagram leading to EPFM evaluation option is shown
in Fig. 46.9. The default material properties used in the evaluation
and the corresponding Z factor expressions are shown in Table
46.3. Figure 46.10 [37] shows the J-T curves associated with two
JIC that were used to generate the mathematical expressions for Z
factors. When user-specified JIC values are available, the resulting
Z factors expressions are provided in Table 46.4.
In the ASME BPVC 2002 Addenda, Appendices H and C were
combined into a revised Appendix C. The revision also included
the incorporation of separate SFs for membrane and bending
loading into the screening criteria evaluations and the mathemati-
cal expressions for the calculation of allowable stresses [40].

46.3.4 DPFAD Method

The DPFAD procedure uses deformation plasticity solutions
[16,17] for cracked structures in the format of the British Central
Electricity Generating Board’s (CEGB) R-6 two-criteria failure
assessment diagram (FAD). In 1990, the Code approved Code
Case N-494 [41] as an alternative procedure for evaluating flaws
in light-water reactor (LWR) ferritic piping. The approach was an
alternate to then Appendix H of Section XI and allowed the user
to remove some conservatism in the existing procedure by allow-
ing the use of pipe-specific material properties. The technical
basis was documented in several technical papers authored by
J.M. Bloom and coworkers [42-45].
The general DPFAD procedure involves the following three
steps [45]:
(a) The generation of the DPFAD curve from elastic-plastic
analysis of a flawed structure using deformation plasticity
solutions for a simple power law strain hardening material
based on the Ramberg-Osgood stress-strain equation. If the

J-integral response of the structure can be represented by

the following:

Japplied  JIe  Jp (17)

then the following applies:

[Japplied/G]  1Kr2  (JIe  Jp)/G

K r = 2(G/Japplied) = f(Sr)

where
Sr  the ratio of applied stress to net section plastic col-
FIG. 46.8 DPFAD FOR FAILURE MODE SCREENING lapse stress
CRITERION G  KI2/E
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120 • Chapter 46

FIG. 46.10 FERRITIC MATERIAL J-T CURVES USED IN EPFM

EVALUATION

The difference between JIe and G is that JIe includes the

FIG. 46.9 FLOW CHART FOR SCREENING CRITERIA TO
ESTABLISH THE ANALYSIS METHOD
small-scale, yielding plastic zone correction while G does
not. The resulting expression defines a curve in the Kr  Sr
plane, which is a function of flaw geometry, structural
configuration, and stress-strain behavior of the material
defined uniquely by  and n. Because both Kr and Sr are lin-
ear in applied stress, the DPFAD curve is independent of
the magnitude of the applied loading.

TABLE 46.4 Z FACTORS FOR CIRCUMFERENTIAL FLAWS IN FERRITIC PIPING WITH USER-SPECIFIED
MATERIAL PROPERTIES
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 121
(b) The determination of assessment points based the ratio of
KI or 1JI of the structure divided by the relevant material
property 1KIC or 1JIC at flaw initiation or for stable crack
growth, 1Jg(¢a), the tearing resistance of the material for
the ordinate, Kr, and the ratio of the applied stress (load)
to net section plastic collapse (limit load) for the abscissa,
Sr. For flaw initiation, a single assessment point is calcu-
lated. For stable crack growth, a locus of assessment points
are determined by incrementing the crack size a by a  a
in the calculation of JI for a constant applied load. The
resulting locus is shown in Fig. 46.11 in the shape of a
candy cane.
(c) Crack initiation or tearing instability can be determined
graphically by plotting the calculated assessment point(s)
on the FAD. For crack initiation, the single assessment
point must fall on the DPFAD curve or inside the curve. For
tearing instability, the critical instability load is determined
by the tangency of the assessment locus with the DPFAD
curve, as shown in Fig. 46.11. Any assessment point on a
line from the origin of the diagram is directly proportional
to load with any other point on that same line, and only one
load level is needed to determine the instability load. The
instability load is determined by multiplying the applied
load by the ratio of the distance from the origin to the point
of intersection of the line with the DPFAD curve to the dis-
tance from the origin of the diagram to the applied load
point. Work is in progress to revise the Sr cut-off to be con-
sistent with Appendix C.
The original Code Case N-494 was further revised in 1994 to
include assessment of austenitic piping where the material stress-
strain behavior cannot be fit to the Ramberg-Osgood model
[46,47]. This Code Case has been revised in 2007 to incorporate
the impact of separate safety factors for membrane and bending
stresses. The 2002 Addenda to ASME BPVC Section XI also cre-
ated a new Nonmandatory Appendix H covering the DPFAD
methodology (the old Appendix H was folded into a revised
Appendix C).
FIG. 46.11 INSTABILITY POINT DETERMINATION IN
DPFAD SPACE
46.3.5 R-6 Method and EPFM in Non-U.S. Codes and
Standards
The British R-6 method was used as the initial framework of
the DPFAD method. The first R-6 document [21] emerged in
1976 as a result of a requirement of the Central Electricity
Generating Board in the United Kingdom to include the assess-
ment of fracture resistance in the design of steam-generating
heavy-water reactor (SGHWR), which was being considered at
that time for commercial operation. The last major revision of R-6
was in 1986 [48]. Recently, developments in fracture mechanics
methodology, in particular the procedure resulting from the
European project SINTAP, the British Standards Guide BS7910,
and the American Petroleum Institute document API 579, stimu-
lated the decision to revise R-6 in its entirety as the new Revision
4 [49]. Other work of interest related to EPFM is the Swedish SKI
work [50,51].
46.4 APPLICATION TO RPV EVALUATION
The EPFM has been applied to RPV evaluation in three distinct
ways: upper-shelf energy evaluation, the new Section XI flaw
evaluation approach, and a probabilistic approach.
46.4.1 LOW UPPER-SHELF ENERGY
EVALUATION
One of the first applications of EPFM for pressure vessels was
in addressing the resolution of the low upper-shelf toughness
issue. Appendix G of 10 CFR Part 50 [52] requires that “reactor
vessel beltline materials must have Charpy upper-shelf energy of
no less than 75 ft-lb (102 J) initially and must maintain upper-
shelf energy (USE) throughout the life of the vessel of no less
than 50 ft-lb (68 J),” unless it is demonstrated that lower upper-
shelf energy will provide safety margins equivalent to those
required by ASME BPVC Appendix G [53]. It was found that
vessels welded with the Linde 80 weld material did not always
meet the regulatory requirement of 50 ft-lb. The problem of evalu-
ating materials that did not meet the regulatory requirement of 50
ft-lb was designated as Unresolved Safety Issue A-11. The resolu-
tion of USI A-11 was documented by the U.S. NRC in NUREG-
0744, Resolution of the Task A-11 Reactor Vessel Materials
Toughness Safety Issue [54]. Although NUREG-0744 provided
methods for evaluating the fracture behavior of these materials, it
did not provide specific criteria for demonstrating the equivalence
of margins with Appendix G of the ASME Code. This was subse-
quently developed by the ASME Section XI Subgroup on
Evaluation Standards and then issued as Appendix K of Section
XI [55]. The U.S. NRC approved Appendix K but provided guid-
ance acceptable to the NRC staff for evaluating pressure vessels
that did not meet the 50 ft-lb regulatory requirement in
Regulatory Guide 1.61 [56].
46.4.1.1 Appendix K Criteria. Appendix K specifies different
requirements for Levels A/B conditions and Levels C and D con-
ditions, as summarized below:
(a) Level A/B Conditions. When the upper-shelf Charpy energy
of the base metal is less than 50 ft-lb, both axial and cir-
cumferential interior flaws are postulated. These are evalu-
ated using the toughness properties for the corresponding
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122 • Chapter 46
orientation. A semielliptical surface flaw with an a/t  0.25
and with an aspect ratio of 6-to-1 surface length to flaw
depth is postulated. A smaller flaw size may be used on an
individual case if the basis is justified. Two criteria must be
satisfied as described below: the crack driving force must
be shown to be less than the material toughness, as given by
the following equations:
Japplied  J0.1 (18)
where
Japplied  the J-integral value calculated for the postulated flaw
under pressure and thermal loading, where the
assumed pressure is 1.15 times the maximum accumu-
lation pressure, with thermal loading using the plant-
specific heatup and cooldown conditions.
J0.1  the J-integral characteristic of the material’s resis-
tance to ductile tearing (Jmaterial), as denoted by a J-R
curve test at a crack extension of 0.1 in.
Japplied/a  Jmaterial/a, with load held
constant at Japplied  Jmaterial (19)
where
Japplied  the J-integral value calculated for the postulated flaw
under pressure and thermal loading, where the assumed pressure
is 1.25 times the maximum accumulation pressure, with thermal
loading.
The first criterion is based solely on limited ductile crack
extension (initiation). The second criterion is based on flaw stabil-
ity, in which case ductile stable tearing is considered. The J-R
curve used in the analysis must be a conservative bound of the J-R
data representative of the vessel material.
(b) Level C Conditions. For Level C conditions, the postulat-
ed flaw is somewhat smaller: 0.1 times the thickness plus
clad thickness but not more than 1 in. and aspect ratio a/ᐉ
 1/6. The initiation and stability criteria are the same as
those in Eqs. (1) and (2), except that the Japplied is
TABLE 46.5 APPENDIX K REQUIREMENTS FOR DIFFERENT CONDITIONS
calculated for the governing Level C loading conditions
(i.e., factor one on pressure and thermal stresses). The
lower factor is justified based on the fact that Level C rep-
resents lower probability events. Also, the J-R curve used
in the analysis must be a “conservative representation” of
the vessel material.
(c) Level D Conditions. For Level D conditions, the postulated
flaw is the same as that for Level C: 0.1 times the thickness
plus clad thickness but not more than 1 in. and aspect ratio
a/ᐉ 1/6. There is no criterion for ductile crack extension
(initiation) but there is a criterion for crack stability. The
stability requirement of Eq. (19) applies with Japplied being
calculated for the governing Level D loading conditions
(i.e., factor one on pressure and thermal stresses). The
lower factor is justified based on the fact that Level D rep-
resents the lowest probability events. Also, the J-R curve
used in the analysis must be a “best estimate representa-
tion” of the vessel material. In addition to the flaw stability
requirement, the stable flaw depth must not exceed 0.75
times the wall thickness and the remaining ligament must
be safe from tensile instability.
Table 46.5 summarizes the different requirements for the differ-
ent conditions: Levels A/B, Level C, and Level D for the low
upper-shelf evaluation.
The technical basis for Appendix K is described in detail in
WRC Bulletin 413 [57]. Specifically, it describes the procedure for
calculating Japplied and three methods for the stability evaluation.
46.4.1.2 Evaluation Procedure for the Calculation of Japplied.
The calculation of Japplied assumes small-scale yielding. The first
step is the calculation of K for pressure {KIp(a)} and thermal
{KIt(a)} loading for the postulated flaw. The elastic K calculations
can be performed using the equations in Appendix K or other frac-
ture mechanics solutions. The effective flaw depth, ae, for small-
scale yielding is determined by adding the plastic zone size to the
postulated flaw size as follows:
ae  a  (1/(6))[(KIp(a)  KIt(a))/y]2 (20)
where
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 123

a  the postulated flaw depth (inches)

KIp and KIt  ksi 1inch
y  the yield strength (ksi)
The effective stress intensity factor Ke  KIp(ae)  KIt(ae) is
determined by substituting ae in place of a. The applied J for
small-scale yielding is given by the following:

J  1000 Ke2 / [E/(1 v2)] (21)

where
J  in.-lb/in.2
E  Young’s modulus (ksi)
v  Poisson’s ratio
The J integral (JI) for the 0.1-in. flaw extension is given by using
Eq. (4) and the appropriate factor on stress (e.g., 1.15 on pressure
stress and 1 on thermal stress for Levels A/B conditions). The flaw FIG. 46.13 DPFAD FOR A 1/4 T FLAW
depth is set at 0.25t  0.1 in. for Levels A/B conditions; the appro-
priate acceptance criterion for ductile crack extension is JI  J0.1. the origin and the assessment point. The pressure is multi-
plied by 1.25 when the assessment points are calculated and
46.4.1.3 Evaluation Procedure for Flaw Stability Analysis. plotted on the DPFAD. The acceptance criterion for flaw
WRC Bulletin 413 describes three ways to perform the stability stability is satisfied when the assessment points lie inside
analysis. the DPFAD curve.
(c) J-Integral/Tearing Modulus (J-T) Procedure. Figure 46.14
(a) J-R Curve-Crack Driving Force Diagram Procedure. shows a schematic plot of the J-T curve. The J-T procedure
Figure 46.12 shows the concept of ductile crack extension consists of the following steps:
and crack stability evaluation. The applied J is calculated
for a series of crack depths corresponding to increasing lev-
els of crack extension. For Levels A/B conditions, a factor
of 1.25 on pressure is used. The applied J is plotted against
crack depth. As shown in Fig. 46.12, the material J-R curve
is superposed. Flaw stability at a given applied load is
demonstrated when the slope of the applied J curve is less
than the slope of J-R curve at the point where the two
curves intersect.
(b) Failure Assessment Diagram Procedure. The DPFAD for a
quarter T flaw is shown in Fig. 46.13. The DPFAD plots the
relationship between Kr (square root of the ratio of the elas-
tic J and the elastic-plastic J) and Sr (ratio of the actual
pressure to the limit pressure). The structural factor on pres-
sure is determined by scaling distances along a line through

FIG. 46.12 DUCTILE CRACK GROWTH STABILITY EVAL- FIG. 46.14 THE J INTEGRAL-TEARING MODULUS (J-T)
UATION PROCEDURE
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124 • Chapter 46
(1) Determine the material J-T curve.
(2) Calculate the value of J at the onset of instability (intersec-
tion of the applied J-T and material J-T curve).
(3) Calculate the internal pressure at the point of flaw insta-
bility.
(4) Apply the acceptance criteria.
46.4.1.4 Guidance on the Material J-R Curve. The generic
J-integral fracture resistance curve equation is given in RG 1.161
[56] as follows:
JR  (MF){C1(a)C2 exp[C3(a)C4]} (22)
The values for C1, C2, C3, and C4 are based on correlations
developed by Eason et al [58]. For generic reactor pressure welds,
RG 1.161 provides the values of various constants in the preced-
ing equation. For analyses addressing Service Levels A, B, and C,
the factor MF was set as 0.629. For analyses addressing Service
Level D, the value of MF was set as 1.0. Table 46.6 gives the val-
ues for other materials such as the Linde 80 flux welds and reac-
tor pressure vessel plate materials.
C1  exp[ 4.12  1.49 ln (CVN) 0.00249T] (23)
C2  0.077  0.116 ln C1 (24)
C3  0.0812 0.0092 ln C1 (25)
C4  0.5 (26)
CVN is the Charpy USE in ft-lb and T is the crack tip tempera-
ture in F. Note that the equations for C2, C3, and C4 are the same
for all materials. In the application of the JR formulation in Eq.
(5), CVN is the irradiated USE. This may be available from sur-
veillance specimen testing or, alternatively, the values can be esti-
mated from RG 1.99, Revision 2 [59], which provides the rela-
tionship of USE to crack tip fluence. The alternative relationship
between the irradiated USE and the unirradiated USE and fluence
is provided elswhere [7].
Mehta [60] and Griesbach and Smith [61] provided examples
for the use of Appendix K in evaluating reactor vessels with low
upper-shelf toughness. An important thing to remember is that
Appendix K considers postulated flaws not actual flaws. Its intent
is only to determine whether adequate structural factors can be
maintained even in the low USE condition and with rather large
flaw postulates.
TABLE 46.6 RECOMMENDED J-R CURVE PARAMETERS FROM RG 1.161
JR  (MF){C1(a)C2 exp[C3(a)C4]}
46.4.2 New Section XI Approaches for EPFM
Evaluation
ASME BPVC Section XI procedures for vessel flaw assess-
ment are based on LEFM evaluation. The LEFM methods may be
sometimes overly conservative and may underestimate the actual
margin, particularly for upper-shelf condition when the deforma-
tion behavior is ductile. ASME BPVC Section III recognizes the
inherent ductile nature of pressure vessel behavior by excluding
secondary stresses (displacement-governed stresses such as ther-
mal and discontinuity stresses) from explicit stress limits (the 3Sm
limit on secondary stress range is related to shakedown and
fatigue, not to ductile failure.) Appendix G and the recent
Appendix K also recognize the inherent differences between ther-
mal and pressure stresses by assigning structural lower factors for
thermal stresses. ASME is in the process of developing alternate
acceptance criteria based on EPFM techniques. The proposed
Code Case N-XXX, Alternative Acceptance Criteria and
Evaluation Procedure for Flaws in Ferritic Steel Components
Operating in the Upper Shelf Range [62], has been approved by
the ASME Section Subgroup on Evaluation Standards and is now
being considered by the Section XI Subcommittee. Because of the
importance of this Code Case and the fact that it represents a
significant change in the technical approach to flaw evaluation,
the Code Case criteria and the technical basis are described in
detail here.
46.4.2.1 Background. The ASME Section XI flaw evaluation
rules for vessels (IWB-3600 plus Appendix A) are based on LEFM
techniques and were developed primarily for the irradiated RPV
belt-line region and other low-temperature carbon and low-alloy
steel applications in which the material exhibits limited or no duc-
tility. There are situations in which ferritic steel components
operate at the upper-shelf region and, therefore, exhibit ample duc-
tility. Application of LEFM techniques to these Cases is very
conservative. This Code Case proposes alternate acceptance
criteria for situations in which the component is operating in the
upper-shelf temperature region and, therefore, possesses adequate
ductility to allow the use of EPFM techniques.
46.4.2.2 Technical Approach. EPFM is a more appropriate
fracture mechanics technology than LEFM for nonirradiated mate-
rials at higher temperatures, such as normal operating conditions
for both PWRs and BWRs. In the proposed Code Case, both stable
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 125
ductile crack extension and flaw stability due to ductile tearing are
considered to ensure that crack extension, even for a stable flaw, is
limited.
(a) Basis for the Use of EPFM. Ample precedent exists in
ASME BPVC Section XI for the application of EPFM to
materials that exhibit some ductility. Such precedent may
be seen in Appendix C for evaluation of flaws in austenitic
piping and ferritic piping and in Appendix K for the assess-
ment of RPVs with low upper-shelf toughness. Appendix C
includes a screening criterion to determine which regime a
ferritic piping flaw evaluation must consider (LEFM, EPFM,
or limit load), and, for the problems that fall into the EPFM
regime, specifies different structural factors for primary
stresses ( ' 3) than for secondary loadings (1). An even
more appropriate approach is presented in Appendix K; in
addition to different structural factors for primary versus
secondary loadings, this appendix also provides an approx-
imate procedure for performing flaw instability analysis for
flaws in RPV materials operating at the upper shelf. The
EPFM approach proposed in this Code Case is very similar
to that in Appendix K of Section XI, and, in that sense, the
use of the EPFM techniques proposed for this Code Case is
not unprecedented, except that these techniques are applied
to actual flaws rather than hypothetical flaws.
(b) Determination of Upper-Shelf Temperature. For use of this
Code Case, it must be demonstrated that the vessel materi-
al is operating within the upper-shelf range of its Charpy
energy curve. This Code Case requires that the operating
temperature must exceed the upper-shelf, trigger-point
temperature, Tc, defined as RTNDT  105F. The definition
ensures that the material exhibits ample ductility in thick
sections and, under applied loading, allows the use of
EPFM techniques.
(c) Loads and Stresses. All primary stresses (i.e., from pres-
sure and mechanical loads) and secondary and peak stress-
es (i.e., thermal, residual, and highly localized stresses) are
to be considered in applying this Code Case. This is con-
sistent with the present procedure for flaw evaluation in
vessels in Section XI, IWB-3600, and Appendix A.
46.4.2.3 Evaluation Procedure. The following analytical pro-
cedure must be used:
(a) Applicability of this procedure and acceptance criteria
is limited to ferritic steel components on the upper shelf
of the Charpy energy curve. The temperature of the
operating condition must exceed the upper-shelf trigger
temperature, defined as Tc  RTNDT  105F. The effect of
radiation embrittlement must be considered in determin-
ing RTNDT.
(b) The flaws must be characterized in accordance with the
requirements of IWA-3300, including the proximity rules
of IWA-3300. The flaws must be projected in both axial
and circumferential orientations, and each orientation eval-
uated.
(c) A flaw growth analysis must be performed to determine
the maximum amount of crack propagation due to fatigue,
stress corrosion cracking, or both mechanisms when
applicable, during a specified evaluation period.
(d) All applicable loading (primary and secondary) must be
evaluated, including weld residual stresses, in calculating
the crack growth and determining flaw acceptability.
46.4.2.4 Acceptance Criteria. Two alternate acceptance criteria
are proposed in this proposed Code Case. The first criterion is
based solely on limited ductile crack extension (initiation). This
criterion does not consider stable ductile tearing and, therefore, is
conservative. It does offer simplicity in the evaluation process for
cases where the material is relatively tough or the applied loads are
relatively small. The second criterion is based on flaw stability, in
which case ductile stable tearing is considered. A flaw is accept-
able for continued operation if the J integral (J) satisfies either of
the criteria below. For all evaluations, the J-integral resistance ver-
sus flaw extension curve must be a conservative representation for
the vessel material at the flaw location.
(a) Acceptance Criteria Based Solely on Limited Ductile Crack
Extension
(1) Normal/Upset Conditions. J must be evaluated at loads
equal to 3.0 times the primary loads and 1.0 times the
secondary loads, including thermal and residual stress-
es. The applied J must be less than the J integral of the
material at a ductile flaw extension of 0.10 in.
(2) Emergency and Faulted Conditions. J must be evaluated
at loads equal to 1.5 times the primary loads and 1.0
times the secondary loads, including thermal and resid-
ual stresses. The applied J must be less than the J inte-
gral of the material at a ductile flaw extension of 0.10 in.
(b) Acceptance Criteria Based Solely on Limited Ductile
Crack Extension and Instability
(1) Normal/Upset Conditions
(a) For ductile crack extension, J must be evaluated at
loads equal to 1.5 times the primary loads and 1.0
times the secondary loads, including thermal and
residual stresses. The applied J must be less than
the J integral of the material at a ductile flaw exten-
sion of 0.10 in.
(b) For flaw instability due to ductile tearing, the
applied J must be evaluated at loads equal to 3
times primary loads and 1.0 times secondary
loads, including thermal and residual stresses. The
applied J must be less than the predicted instability
point, as shown in Fig. 46.14.
(2) Emergency/Faulted Conditions
(a) For ductile crack extension, J must be evaluated at
loads equal to 1.25 times the primary loads and 1.0
times the secondary loads, including thermal and
residual stresses. The applied J must be less than
the J integral of the material at a ductile flaw
extension of 0.10 in.
(b) For flaw instability due to ductile tearing, the
applied J must be evaluated at loads equal to 1.5
times primary loads and 1.0 times secondary
loads, including thermal and residual stresses. The
applied J must be less than the predicted instability
point determined as shown in Fig. 46.14.
46.4.2.5 Justification for the Structural Factors. The LEFM
methodology treats all loadings on the vessel equivalently, apply-
ing equal structural factors ( ' 3 for normal and upset loads) to both
primary stresses due to internal pressure and mechanical loads as
well as to secondary and peak stresses, such as those caused by
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126 • Chapter 46
differential thermal expansion and residual stresses. These load-
ings are equivalent in their potential to produce fracture in only the
most brittle of materials, such as glass; RPV beltline materials at
low temperatures after significant irradiation embrittlement; and
thick, ferritic materials at very low temperatures.
In the EPFM evaluation in Appendix K, structural factors of 3 on
primary loads and 1 on secondary loads are applied. However, it
must be recognized that Appendix K is not dealing with flaw evalu-
ations, rather with demonstrating adequate levels of toughness, and,
in so doing, it postulates very large hypothetical flaw sizes. This
Code Case deals with realistic flaw sizes that might potentially be
expected to occur in vessels. Therefore, more conservative structur-
al factors, paralleling those in ASME BPVC Section XI, Appendix
C, are deemed appropriate. Similar to Section XI, Appendix C, this
Code Case proposes different structural factors for normal/upset
conditions and emergency/faulted conditions.
Different structural factors are also proposed for flaw instability
and limited ductile crack extension. Because in an EPFM evalua-
tion, failure is predicted at instability, higher structural factors are
applied for this condition and lower structural factors are applied
when considering limited ductile crack extension.
(a) Normal/Upset Conditions. For the acceptance criterion
based solely on limited ductile crack extension, structural
factors of 3 for primary loads and 1.0 for secondary and
peak loads (including residual stresses) are proposed. Note
that these are more conservative than the structural factors
actually specified for primary and secondary loads in
Appendix K of 1.5 for primary loads and 1.0 for secondary
loads. The proposed structural factor of 1.0 on secondary
loads is also consistent with that specified in Section XI,
Appendix C for secondary loads.
For the acceptance criterion based on flaw instability,
structural factors of 3 for primary loads and 1.0 for sec-
ondary and peak loads (including residual stresses) are
proposed. For this Code Case also, a check is made on lim-
ited ductile crack extension with structural factors of 1.5
for primary loads and 1.0 for secondary loads to ensure
that crack extension is not excessive. Because failure is not
associated with ductile crack extension, these structural
factors are deemed to be appropriate.
(b) Emergency/Faulted Conditions. For the acceptance criterion
based solely on limited ductile crack extension, structural fac-
tors of 1.5 on primary loads and 1.0 on secondary and peak
loads are proposed. This is consistent with the structural fac-
tors for EPFM evaluations in Appendix C of Section XI.
For the acceptance criterion based on flaw instability,
structural factors of 1.5 for primary loads and 1.0 for sec-
ondary and peak loads (including residual stresses) are
proposed. For this Code Case also, limited ductile flaw
extension, structural factors of 1.25 on primary loads and
1.0 on secondary loads are proposed. Once again, these
lower safety factors for limited ductile crack extension are
justified because limited stable ductile extension does not
constitute failure.
46.4.2.6 J-Integral Material Resistance Curve. The use of
EPFM as a basis for acceptance criteria requires adequate charac-
terization of the J-integral resistance curve for the vessel material.
Section XI, Appendix K specifies three methods for selection of
the material J-integral resistance curve. A J-R curve may be gen-
erated by actual testing of the material, following accepted test
procedures; it may be generated from a J-integral database
obtained from the same class of material with the same orientation;
or an indirect method of estimating the J-R curve may be used,
provided the method is justified for the material. This Case pro-
poses the same three methods for determining the J-R curve as in
Section XI, Appendix K.
46.4.2.7 Conclusion. The proposed Code Case provides alternate
criteria for using EPFM methodology for the evaluation of flaws dis-
covered in ferritic steel components, which have been clearly
demonstrated to operate in the upper-shelf temperature range. The
technical requirements in this Code Case are very similar to those in
Section XI, Appendix K, which allows the use of EPFM techniques
for RPVs with low upper-shelf toughness. Structural factors consis-
tent with other provisions in Section XI, which allow the use of
EPFM for actual flaws, are proposed in this Code Case.
It is expected that the proposed Code Case will reduce the
excess conservatisms inherent in present flaw evaluation method-
ologies in Section XI and allow for more appropriate flaw evalua-
tion procedures for vessels that operate in the upper-shelf temper-
ature range.
46.4.3 Probabilistic EPFM
The nuclear industry is increasingly using probabilistic analysis
and risk-informed evaluation to optimize inspections of pressure
vessel and piping inspections. The risk-informed analysis methodol-
ogy and application have been defined and approved by the ASME
Code and the U.S. NRC. Most of the risk-informed fracture
mechanics evaluations have been based on LEFM analysis. With
greater acceptance of EPFM and risk-informed analysis, it is reason-
able to expect that, at some point in the future, probabilistic EPFM
evaluations will be used to assess the effectiveness of inspections.
Rahman [63] described a probabilistic model for predicting
elastic-plastic fracture initiation in piping with part through finite
length circumferential cracks in piping, using J-integral–based
EPFM methods and standard methods of structural reliability the-
ory. The model uses a deformation plasticity–based J-integral
analysis and incorporates a local reduced thickness analogy for
simulating system compliance due to the presence of a crack.
Analytical equations are developed to predict the J integral for a
surface-cracked pipe under pure bending. The models were
qualified by comparison with finite element calculations of the J
integral. Statistical representation of the uncertainties in loads,
crack size, loads, and material properties, were used in conjunc-
tion with first- and second-order reliability methods. The statisti-
cal distribution of the initial flaw was not based on in-service
inspection data. Instead, it was assumed that the crack length and
depth would follow a Gaussian probability distribution. The sta-
tistical parameters and their probability distribution were arbitrary
and the intent was to illustrate the methodology. For a given
applied moment, the J distribution was calculated both by the
application of the second-order reliability method and by Monte
Carlo simulation. The results indicated that the reliability theory
was consistent with the Monte Carlo simulation.
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PERSPECTIVES OF THE PRESSURE
EQUIPMENT DIRECTIVE WITH RESPECT
TO ASME BPVC
Anne Chaudouet, Francis Osweiller, Peter Hanmore,
and Guido G. Karcher
47.1 INTRODUCTION
Pressure equipment presents inherent hazards due to the poten-
tial energy of its content, especially for gases. Consequently most
industrialized countries have, for many decades, regulated these
products. In European countries, each national authority devel-
oped regulations that were significantly different from each other:
some were very detailed (e.g., in France), some contained only
general requirements (e.g., in the UK), and others included very
detailed conformity assessment procedures (e.g., in Germany).
These different regulations naturally led to trade barriers caused by
various technical requirements (to export to a certain European coun-
try, the manufacturer was obliged to meet the specific regulations
applicable to that country). As one of the cornerstones of the single
market was to establish the free movement of goods among the
member states, it became evident that the technical barriers to trade
for pressure equipment had to be removed. In 1989, the European
Community agreed to develop a Pressure Equipment Directive
(PED) based on the New Approach concept, which is the basis of the
regulatory system in the European Union (EU) for promoting free-
dom of movement of goods; the PED was implemented in 2002.
47.2 THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT
47.2.1 New Approach Directives
The PED is part of the regulatory system that was set up in the
EU in 1985, known as the New Approach to Technical
Harmonization and Standards. The main objectives of this New
Approach are the following:
(a) remove technical barriers to trade to permit free movement
of goods throughout the EU
(b) implement common regulations and common standards
throughout the EU
47.2.2 Fundamental Principles
The fundamental principles of the New Approach are as follows:
(a) Directives are European regulations that must be imple-
mented in national law in each member state and supersede
the National Regulations.
CHAPTER
47
(b) Directives contain essential safety requirements (ESRs) that
are defined in terms of general safety objectives, which will
ensure a high level of protection from the hazards of the
products.
(c) Harmonized standards lay down and quantify these ESRs to
achieve the general safety objectives. The use of these
harmonized standards is not mandatory, but products com-
plying with these Standards are presumed to comply with the
ESRs of the Directive.
(d) Each Directive sets out conformity assessment procedures,
which are the steps to be taken by the manufacturer to
demonstrate that the product complies with the requirements
of the Directive and are proportionate to the level of risk
posed by that equipment.
(e) Notified Bodies (NB) are the independent bodies involved with
the conformity assessment of equipment and, as required by the
applicable conformity assessment procedure, verify and certify
that the pressure equipment complies with the requirements of
the PED.
(f) CE Marking is affixed to the equipment to indicate that it
complies with the applicable provisions of all the relevant
directives. The presence of the CE marking ensures free
movement throughout the EU, the EEA (European Economic
Area) and countries that have adopted the directive such as
Switzerland and Turkey.
47.3 DEVELOPMENT OF THE PED
47.3.1 Historical Background
Before 1985, the main barrier to trade across the 15 European
countries in the pressure equipment sector was the coexistence of
the following:
(a) different mandatory requirements given by national regula-
tory authorities
(b) different codes and standards developed by private or
national organizations
(c) different testing and certification practices to ensure equip-
ment compliance with the relevant regulations and standards
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130 • Chapter 47

The EU responded to this challenge by agreeing, in 1989, to (b) Classification. Equipment falling into the scope of the
develop a common European regulation (the PED) covering all PED and above specific thresholds are classified in four cat-
pressure-containing equipment, which is now mandatory through- egories (I, II, III, and IV) according to the level of risk
out the EU. The PED has been developed by the European resulting from the nature of the fluid contained (more or less
Commission with the participation of official representatives of dangerous), the internal pressure (more or less high), and
the 15 countries who voted on it, using the weighted vote rule. A the internal volume (more or less important).
first draft was issued in 1991 and a final draft was presented to the (c) Conformity Assessment Procedures. Each item of equipment
European Council in 1993. After several modifications, the PED must be subject to a conformity assessment procedure to
was finally adopted on May 29, 1997 and published in the Official demonstrate that it complies with the requirements of the
Journal of European Communities on July 9, 1997 under the directive. For each category, one or several procedures are pro-
reference 97/23/EC. posed to the manufacturer. These procedures are more
The inclusion of the PED by each member state into its national demanding for the higher categories. The modules are stan-
regulations was achieved in May of 1999. After a transitional peri- dardized and must be selected for use in each directive from
od of 2 12 years, the PED became fully mandatory throughout the the list established in the Modules Decision (93/475/EEC).
15 EU countries on May 29, 2002, superseding the current nation- (d) Notified Body. The conformity assessment is performed
al regulations. Equipment that falls within the scope of the PED by an independent inspection organization, notified by a
must comply with it and bear the CE marking. For countries join- member state to the European Commission.
ing the EU after this date, the inclusion of PED into their national (e) CE Marking. The CE marking must be affixed to each item
regulations must have been performed prior to their effective entry of equipment that falls within the scope of the directive and
in the EU. The directive only applies to equipment placed on the complies with its requirements, thus ensuring the benefit of
market or put into service in Europe for the first time; equipment free movement throughout the EU.
already in service is not subject to the PED but must continue to (f) Essential Safety Requirements. Each item of equipment clas-
meet the National Regulations. The text of the PED can be sified in one of the four categories must fulfill the ESRs spec-
found on the Web site of the European Commission at: http:// ified in Annex I of the PED. These technical requirements
ec.europa.eu/enterprise/pressure_equipment/ped/index_en.html. cover design, material, fabrication, testing, and inspection
aspects relating to the equipment.
47.3.2 Objectives and Requirements
47.3.4 Structure
(a) The PED has three objectives. The PED has 21 articles, which are listed in Table 47.1.
(1) Adopt a common regulation for pressure equipment
throughout the EU. TABLE 47.1 PED CONTENTS
(2) Remove the technical barriers to trade for this industri-
al sector and permit free movement of products
throughout the EU.
(3) Maintain or improve the current levels of safety in pres-
sure equipment in the EU.
This third objective is important as the PED is based on the
concept of identifying the applicable health and safety hazards
and taking proportionate action to bring these to an acceptable
level. This is addressed by the adoption of different safety levels
and the identification of four categories, each with increasing
technical and conformity assessment requirements as risk rises.
The PED covers only the hazards due to pressure; other directives
may be applicable where other hazards are identified.
(b) The PED, like other European directives, lays down three
types of requirements.
(1) requirements of a legislative nature, which are con-
tained in Articles 1 to 21
(2) requirements devoted to conformity assessment proce-
dures (detailed in Annex III), which concern the
responsibilities of manufacturers and NB
(3) requirements devoted to the equipment itself, which
are the ESRs (detailed in Annex I)
47.3.3 Main Concepts
The PED has been mandatory in the EU since May 29, 2002.
(a) Scope. The Directive applies to all pressure equipment
(vessels, piping, boilers, pressure accessories, safety acces-
sories, and assemblies) subject to a pressure greater than 0.5
bar. Despite many exclusions, this scope is very wide; it
covers individual items of pressure equipment such as ves-
sels as well as large industrial equipment and assemblies.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 131
(a) About half of the articles are legal or administrative in
nature and are common to all New Approach directives.
(1) Articles devoted to the Member States are the following:
(a) Article 2 (Market Surveillance)
(b) Article 4 (Free Movement)
(c) Article 5 (Presumption of Conformity)
(d) Article 8 (Safeguard Clause)
(e) Articles 16 to 21 (Administration)
(2) Articles 6 and 7 are devoted to the Committees to assist
in implementation.
(b) Other articles form the cornerstone of the PED.
(1) Article 1 defines the scope of the PED and includes
definitions and exclusions.
(2) Article 3 defines the thresholds (pressure and volume)
above which the pressure equipment will have to be
classified in categories and subject to ESRs (listed in
Annex I).
(3) Article 9 defines the four categories (I, II, III, and IV)
that are obtained from tables (given in Annex II).
(4) Article 10 defines which conformity assessment mod-
ules are applied for the different categories (detailed in
Annex III).
(5) Article 11 defines the European Approval for Materials.
(6) Article 12 defines the role of the NB.
(7) Article 20 defines the transitional provisions.
(c) These articles are completed by seven Annexes, listed in
Table 47.1, which are technical (Annexes I, II, and III) and
administrative (Annexes IV to VII). A flowchart of the PED
is also provided in Fig. 47.1.
47.3.5 Operation
The implementation of the PED is monitored by the Commi-
ssion, which is assisted by a Standing Committee [Working Group
Pressure (WGP)] composed of representatives of member states.
Making a revision to the PED is a difficult task; it requires the
votes of the member states and the approval of the European
Parliament and Council of the EU. Up to now, no revision has
been made. Accordingly, clarifications of the PED are made via
Guidelines issued by the WGP (see para. 47.5).
47.4 THE PED
47.4.1 Scope
The PED embraces all equipment subject to an internal pressure
greater than 0.5 bar (1 bar ⫽ approximately 14.5 psi). It applies to
all pressure equipment placed on the market or put into service in
Europe for the first time; it applies whether the equipment is
manufactured inside or outside the EU and for any material
(metallic or nonmetallic). Also, within the scope of the PED is the
assembly of pressure equipment on site, unless this assembly is
performed under the responsibility of the User and does not create
new pressure equipment. Inservice inspection of pressure equip-
ment is covered by the national regulations of each EU member
state. However the need to develop an EU directive covering inser-
vice inspection is presently under study.
47.4.1.1 Types of Equipment Covered. In the context of the
PED, pressure equipment means the following:
(a) Vessel. This is a housing designed and built to contain a fluid
(gas or liquid) under pressure. This covers what are known as
pressure vessels and includes, for example, heat exchangers.
(b) Piping. These are piping components, when connected
together for integration into a pressure system, intended for
the transport of fluids.
(c) Safety Accessories. These are devices designed to protect
the equipment from exceeding safe operating limits.
(d) Pressure Accessories. These are devices with an operational
function and having a pressure bearing housing (such as
valves, pressure regulators, pressure gauges, filters, and
expansion joints).
The PED also covers assemblies consisting of several pieces of
pressure equipment assembled by the manufacturer to constitute
an integrated and functional whole (e.g., boilers).
Only these types of pressure equipment can bear the CE mark-
ing and are covered by the PED. Components, such as covers,
collars, gaskets, flanges, bolts, and nozzles, are not considered as
pressure equipment and must not bear a CE marking. Equipment
that is 0.5 bar and below is not within the scope of the PED
because it does not present a significant hazard and there should
not be a barrier to trade.
47.4.1.2 Exclusions. Due to the fact that the PED scope is very
wide, numerous exclusions are provided, (21 in total); they are of
three types as follows:
(a) specific equipment (e.g., pipelines, water networks, and
nuclear sector well control equipment) where there are issues
beyond the free movement of goods that must be considered.
(b) equipment already covered by other pressure Directives
(e.g., simple pressure vessels, aerosol dispensers, and trans-
portation of dangerous goods) and equipment covered by
non pressure Directives for equipment classified no higher
than Category I in PED (i.e, machinery, low voltage equip-
ment, lifts, medical devices, . . .)
(c) equipment that does not present significant hazards due to
pressure (e.g., equipment for the functioning of motor vehi-
cles, tires, and cans/bottles for carbonated drinks).
A list of these exclusions is provided in Table 47.2.
47.4.2 Classification of Pressure Equipment
47.4.2.1 Level of Hazard in Pressure Equipment. Pressure
equipment is classified into one of four categories based on an
ascending level of hazard. This has practical consequences for the
equipment, as both its compliance with the ESRs and the required
conformity assessment procedures will be affected. Generally, the
higher the category, the higher the level of risk, the greater the
technical requirements, and the more comprehensive the conformi-
ty assessment procedure.
(a) The pressure is 0.5 bar or below: the legislators deemed
there to be no significant hazard due to pressure and, there-
fore, excluded such equipment from the scope of the PED.
(b) The pressure is above 0.5 bar but the equipment presents
only a minor pressure hazard: this equipment falls below the
level at which conformity assessment is required and is
called Category 0; such equipment is within the scope of the
PED but is not subject to its requirements.
(c) The pressure hazard level is low: the equipment is classified
as Category I. The manufacturer self-declares conformity
with the directive and there is no intervention by a NB.
(d) The pressure hazard level is moderate: the equipment is clas-
sified as Category II. The manufacturer declares conformity
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132 • Chapter 47

FIG. 47.1 PED FLOWCHART

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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 133
TABLE 47.2 PED EXCLUSIONS (Article 1, para. 3)
the directive and the NB participates in some of the final
inspections.
(e) The pressure hazard level is high: the equipment is classi-
fied as Category III. Various options are available to the
manufacturer; however, the NB will be involved in either
the approval of the manufacturer’s quality system or in
checking the design and the fabrication.
(f) The pressure hazard level is very high: the equipment is
classified as Category IV. The same rules apply as for
Category III and the NB will perform an increased check of
the design and fabrication.
Two main cases appear depending on if the equipment is below
or above the thresholds of Category 0.
47.4.2.2 Equipment in Category 0 (Article 3.3). This concerns
all the equipment that is below the thresholds defined in Article 3.3.
The thresholds depend on the type of the equipment, the nature and
type of the fluid, and the pressure (PS) and volume (V) or nominal
diameter (DN). Such equipment is NOT
(a) required to comply with the ESR; it must be constructed in
accordance with the sound engineering practice of a mem-
ber state.
(b) subject to the conformity assessment procedures.
(c) subject to the EC Declaration of Conformity; it must only
bear the identification of the manufacturer and be accompa-
nied by instructions for use.
(d) marked with the CE marking; however, it does have the
benefit of free movement throughout the EU.
47.4.2.3 Equipment in Hazard Categories I to IV (Article
3 - para. 1).
(a) Equipment that is above the thresholds, is classified as
Category I to IV, depending on the level of hazard; such
equipment is
(1) required to conform to relevant ESRs
(2) required to be subject to the applicable conformity
assessment procedure
(3) required to be supported by an EC Declaration of
Conformity
(4) required to exhibit CE marking
(5) ensured free movement throughout the EU
(b) The category depends on the following factors:
(1) the type of equipment: vessel (fired or unfired), piping,
safety accessory, or pressure accessory
(2) the nature of the fluid
(a) gas in the sense of the PED (Article 3, para. 1.1a):
gas, liquefied gas, gas dissolved under pressure,
vapors, and so forth
(b) liquid in the sense of the PED (Article 3, para.
1.1b): liquids having a vapor pressure ⬍0.5 bar
(3) properties of the fluids that are classified into two groups
(Article 9, para. 2):
(a) group 1: dangerous fluids; defined in 67/548/EEC (clas-
sification, packaging and labeling of dangerous sub-
stances) as explosive, extremely flammable, highly
flammable, flammable, very toxic, toxic, and oxidizing
(b) group 2: all fluids not in group 1
(4) operating conditions characterized by the maximum allowable
PS and the internal V (for vessels) or the DN (for piping)
The hazard categories are defined in the PED by graphs (Tables 1
to 9 of Annex II); determination of the category is explained
below for each type of equipment.
47.4.2.4 Unfired vessels (Article 3, para. 1.1). Figure 47.2,
reproduced from Table 1 of the PED, enables the determination of
the Category of a vessel containing a group 1 (dangerous) gas, as
a function of its internal V and maximum allowable PS. Three
additional tables are provided in the PED to cover the following:
(a) vessels containing a group 2 nondangerous gas (Table 2 of
the PED).
(b) vessels containing a group 1 dangerous liquid (Table 3 of
the PED).
(c) vessels containing a group 2 nondangerous liquid (Table 4
of the PED).
47.4.2.5 Fired or Otherwise Heated Pressure Equipment
(Article 3, para. 1.2). Vessels subject to direct or indirect heating,
where there is a risk of overheating, that are intended for the gen-
eration of steam or superheated water (at T ⬎ 110⬚C; e.g., boilers
and pressure cookers) are treated separately. Steam is a group 2
fluid; only one graph (Table 5 of the PED) is required to specify
the Category.
47.4.2.6 Piping (Article 3, para. 1.3). As with unfired vessels,
four graphs are necessary to determine the Category of a piping
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134 • Chapter 47
FIG. 47.2 HAZARD CATEGORIES FOR A VESSEL CONTAINING A DANGEROUS GAS
(Tables 6 through 9 of the PED). See Fig. 47.3 (Table 6 of the
PED), where DN is the nominal diameter of the piping in mm.
47.4.2.7 Safety Accessories (Article 3, para. 1.4; Annex II,
para. 2). Generally, safety accessories are classified as Category
IV. This is because the original manufacturer probably does not
know where it will be put into service and the safety accessory
should be at least equal to the highest category of the equipment it
is protecting. It is possible, however, that where the safety acces-
sory is designed for use on a particular piece of equipment, it may
be classified at the category of the equipment concerned.
According to the category of the equipment on which the safety
accessory is fitted, two cases are possible.
(a) The equipment is in Category 0 (Article 3, para. 3): the
safety accessory is classified as Category 0, which means
use of sound engineering practice (instead of ESR), no con-
formity assessment, and no CE marking.
(b) The equipment is in Category I, II, III, or IV (Annex II,
para. 2): two cases are possible.
(1) The accessory is fabricated specifically for the equip-
ment: the accessory is in the same category as the
equipment.
(2) The accessory is not fabricated specifically for the
equipment: the accessory is classified as Category IV.
47.4.2.8 Pressure Accessories (Article 3, para. 1.4; Annex II,
para. 3). According to the category of the equipment on which the
pressure accessory is fitted, two cases are possible (Annex II, para. 2).
(a) The equipment is in Category 0 (Article 3, para. 3): the
pressure accessory is in Category 0, which means use of
sound engineering practice (instead of ESR), no conformity
assessment, and no CE marking.
(b) The equipment is in Category I, II, III, or IV: the accessory
is classified using its PS and V (using Table 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5
of the PED, as appropriate) or its DN (using Table 6, 7, 8,
or 9 of the PED, as appropriate). If both V and DN are con-
sidered appropriate to define the accessory, it is classified in
the higher category.
47.4.2.9 Conclusion. The categorization of pressure equipment
forms the cornerstone of the PED on the technical and legal
aspects. The category has a significant impact on the technical
requirements in the ESRs applicable to the equipment and the
extent of conformity assessment to be performed by the NB and
the Manufacturer. Finally, nine tables are proposed in Annex II of
the PED, which are listed below.
(a) Table 1: Vessels Containing a Group 1 Dangerous Gas
(b) Table 2: Vessels Containing a Group 2 Nondangerous Gas
(c) Table 3: Vessels Containing a Group 1 Dangerous Liquid
(d) Table 4: Vessels Containing a Group 2 Nondangerous Liquid
(e) Table 5: Fired or Otherwise Heated Equipment
(f) Table 6: Piping Containing a Group 1 Dangerous Gas
(g) Table 7: Piping Containing a Group 2 Nondangerous Gas
(h) Table 8: Piping Containing a Group 1 Dangerous Liquid
(i) Table 9: Piping Containing a Group 2 Nondangerous Liquid
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FIG. 47.3 DETERMINATION OF HAZARD CATEGORY FOR A PIPING CONTAINING A DANGEROUS GAS

47.4.3 Conformity Assessment Procedures (Article 10; TABLE 47.3 LIST OF CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT
Annex III) MODULES

47.4.3.1 Basic Principles. The PED proposes 13 conformity

assessment procedures from which the manufacturer may select
one that is appropriate, based on the category of the equipment, the
type of production envisaged, and the manufacturer’s preference.
These procedures may involve a single module or a combination
of modules covering the design and manufacturing phases. A man-
ufacturer may always apply a procedure from a higher category
than required for the particular equipment, with the exception of
pressure equipment within the scope of Article 3, para. 3, which
must not be CE marked.
The multiplicity of conformity assessment procedures in pres-
sure equipment is justified by the following:

(a) the wide range of pressure equipment covered by the directive

(b) the different production systems used in manufacturing
pressure equipment (unit production, series production)
(c) the requirement to offer the manufacturer the option of fol-
lowing a quality system approach if he so chooses
(d) the different hazard levels (categories) identified for pressure
equipment, and the need to provide proportionate solutions

Each conformity assessment module is described in detail in

Annex III of the PED and specifies the respective tasks and
responsibilities of the Manufacturer and of the NB. The
Manufacturer selects the conformity assessment module applica-
ble to the category of the equipment from Table 47.3.

47.4.3.2 Choice of Conformity Assessment Procedures.

Although at first glance there appears to be a bewildering choice of
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136 • Chapter 47
modules, once the manufacturer takes account of the actual cate-
gory of the equipment, the type of manufacturing system, and
whether to follow a quality assurance (QA) route or not, the choic-
es are diminished. Table 47.4 indicates the various options avail-
able and the most suitable options. One can see immediately that,
if the manufacturer does not wish to follow the QA route, 50% of
the options disappear immediately.
47.4.3.3 Conformity Assessment Modules Without QA.
Various modules are available to a manufacturer that does not wish
to follow the quality assurance route; these vary from self certifi-
cation by the manufacturer for the low risk Category 1 equipment,
to design examination and inspection during all phases of manu-
facture by a NB.
(a) Module A: Internal Production Control. This module is
applicable to pressure equipment in Category I. The manu-
facturer must design and manufacture the equipment, pre-
pare technical documentation that demonstrates how the
requirements of the directive have been met, apply the CE
marking, and declare conformity with the PED. There is no
requirement for participation by a NB in this procedure.
(b) Module A1: Internal Manufacturing Checks With Monitoring
of the Final Examination. This module is applicable to pres-
sure equipment in Category II. This procedure requires the
manufacturer to follow the requirements in Module A and
the NB must monitor the final testing performed by the
manufacturer. The frequency of NB monitoring is estab-
lished by taking into account the production frequency and
lot size/batch size. Generally, this frequency will be not less
than two visits per year. Although the directive does not
foresee the issue of a certificate for this category, a NB nor-
mally issues some form of a report.
(c) Module B1: EC-Design Examination. This module is applica-
ble to pressure equipment in Category III when used in
conjunction with Module F or D. The manufacturer submits
an application for EC-design examination together with the
technical documentation to a NB of choice. The NB exam-
ines the documentation to assess conformance with the
requirements and, where satisfied as to the conformance
with the PED, issues an EC-design examination certificate
to the applicant.
(d) Module B: EC-Type Examination.This module is applicable
to pressure equipment in Category III when used in conjunc-
tion with Module C1 or E or in Category IV when used in
conjunction with Module F or D. The manufacturer submits
an application for EC-type examination together with the
technical documentation and makes available an item(s) of
the envisaged (type). The NB examines the documentation
TABLE 47.4 SELECTION OF CONFORMITY
ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES
as described for Module B1. Upon successful completion of
this phase, the NB arranges to attend the site to perform
examinations and tests to verify that the equipment has been
manufactured in accordance with the approved design and
satisfies the other provisions of the PED that apply to it.
Where satisfied that the design and the sample of produc-
tion meet the requirements, the NB issues an EC-type
examination certificate. The manufacturer must communi-
cate any proposed changes to the approved type, even of a
minor nature, so that the NB can evaluate their effect and
take appropriate action to approve the proposal.
(e) Module C1: Conformity to Type. This module is applicable
to pressure equipment in Category III and can only be used
in conjunction with Module B (EC-type examination). After
obtaining an EC-type examination certificate, the manufac-
turer produces pressure equipment in accordance with the
approved design. The manufacturer must enter into an
agreement with a NB to monitor the final testing, which is
performed as per module A1.
(f) Module F: Product Verification. This module is used for
pressure equipment in conjunction with Module B1 for
Category III equipment or Module B for Category IV equip-
ment. The NB carries out the appropriate examinations and
tests during the final assessment of each item of pressure
equipment to verify that it conforms to the relevant EC
Design Examination Certificate or EC Type Examination
Certificate. Where the NB is satisfied that the pressure
equipment meets the requirements, a Certificate of
Conformity for the tests carried out is issued and submitted
to the manufacturer.
(g) Module G: EC Unit Verification. This module is applicable
to pressure equipment in Category IV. The manufacturer
submits an application and technical documentation to the
NB of choice for unit verification. The NB assesses the
technical documentation, as per module B1, and subse-
quently carries out examinations and tests during all phases
of manufacture, as defined in the relevant construction code
or in accordance with a quality plan prepared by the manu-
facturer and marked up by the NB.
47.4.3.4 Conformity Assessment Modules With QA.
Manufacturers that choose to demonstrate conformity by the qual-
ity assurance route must have their quality assurance system
approved by a NB and then be subject to ongoing surveillance and
unexpected visits. Although the quality system requirements are
based on those of ISO 9000, manufacturers who currently hold
ISO 9000 certification still require approval by a NB. If their ISO
Registrar is also a NB, there will still be a need for an assessment
that the quality system contains all the elements that will ensure
consistent conformance to the PED. However, manufacturers with
an existing ISO 9000 approval will be given a presumption of con-
formity for those aspects that are covered by ISO 9000, thus reduc-
ing the scope of the assessment.
There are several subtle differences between traditional ISO
9000 certification from an accredited Registrar and approval by
the NB. The ISO 9000 certification system is voluntary, but once
approved by a NB, the manufacturer is under an obligation to dili-
gently apply the quality system. All products resulting from the
approved quality system and destined to be put into service in
Europe must display the NB’s unique identification number after
the CE marking. This means that the NB is participating far more
closely with the manufacturer in bringing safe equipment to the
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 137
market than an ISO Registrar. It is for these reasons that many
different requirements for the quality assurance documentation
compared to that for the normal registration.
The quality system documentation is required to specify all the
requirements that ensure that the equipment will consistently
comply with the PED in all respects. Because of this, certain
detailed information is required to be in the documented system
and disseminated to the appropriate staff. Also, the NB must have
full confidence that there are sufficient numbers of staff perform-
ing the critical activities, who are appropriately trained and expe-
rienced and, where necessary, independent and impartial.
Proposed changes to the quality system must first be submitted to
the NB for assessment prior to implementation.
The quality system documentation may consist of ISO 9000
documentation revised to include the various aspects required (not
appropriate for manufacturers that manufacture only some of their
products for putting into service in Europe); ISO 9000 documen-
tation supplemented by a PED quality plan called up at contract
review (suitable for manufacturers with markets inside and out-
side Europe); or A stand-alone document that only addresses the
requirements of the PED (appropriate for manufacturers who do
not wish to embrace all the ISO 9000 requirements).
(a) Module E: Product Quality Assurance. This procedure is
applicable to pressure equipment in Category III when used
in conjunction with Module B. The manufacturer must
operate a quality system for final inspection and testing of
the pressure equipment, and must submit to an initial assess-
ment by a NB and subsequent surveillance and unexpected
visits.
(b) Module E1: Product Quality Assurance. This procedure is
applicable to pressure equipment in Category II when the
manufacturer also prepares the applicable technical docu-
mentation. The requirements of this module are the same as
for Module E; additionally, the manufacturer must draw up
the technical documentation.
(c) Module D: Production Quality Assurance. This procedure
is applicable to pressure equipment in Category III when
used in conjunction with Module B1 or in Category IV
when used in conjunction with Module B. The manufactur-
er must operate a quality system for production, final
inspection, and testing of the pressure equipment, and must
submit to an initial assessment by a NB and subsequent sur-
veillance and unexpected visits.
(d) Module D1: Production Quality Assurance. This procedure
is applicable to pressure equipment in Category II when the
manufacturer also prepares the applicable technical docu-
mentation. The requirements of this module are the same as
for Module D; additionally, the manufacturer must draw up
the technical documentation.
(e) Module H: Full-Quality Assurance. This procedure is applic-
able to pressure equipment in Category III. The manufactur-
er must operate a quality system for design, manufacture,
and final inspection and testing of pressure equipment, and
must submit to an initial assessment by a NB and subse-
quent surveillance and unexpected visits.
(f) Module H1: Full-Quality Assurance With Design Examination
and Special Surveillance of the Final Assessment. This proce-
dure is applicable to pressure equipment in Category IV. In
addition to the requirements of Module H, the manufacturer
must apply to the NB to carry out design examination as out-
lined in Module B1. If acceptable, an EC design examina-
tion certificate is issued. Any modifications to the design
must be similarly appraised and the certificate amended to
include the additions where they may affect conformity with
the requirements or the prescribed conditions for use of the
equipment. Final assessment is subject to increased surveil-
lance by unexpected visits; at these visits, examinations are
carried out on the pressure equipment. Generally, final
assessment of all one-off Category IV equipment is wit-
nessed by the NB.
47.4.3.5 Application to NB. At the time manufacturers apply
to a NB for a service, they are required to make a declaration
that they have not applied to another NB for the same scope of
activity. This is not to prevent the manufacturer from shopping
around to obtain the best quote, rather to prevent the manufactur-
er from trying to change NBs if he does not like the outcome of a
particular assessment. Once the particular activity is completed,
the manufacturer may then apply to a different NB for subsequent
activities.
47.4.3.6 Technical Documentation. Manufacturers are always
required to prepare technical documentation to support pressure
equipment that they place on the market or put into service. The
purpose of this documentation is to demonstrate that the pressure
equipment meets the requirements of the PED that are applicable to
it. The technical documentation does not have to exist in a physical
form, but it must be able to be assembled within a reasonable time
when a duly substantiated request from an enforcement authority is
received. It is, therefore, essential that the manufacturer identifies
all that makes up the technical documentation and prepares any
required justifications at the time the equipment is manufactured.
Various documents may then be listed on an index and assembled
as and when required. Some modules, of course, require the sub-
mission of the technical documents to the NB; in such cases, they
will have to be assembled before manufacture to comply.
(a) The technical documents consist of the following:
(1) hazard analysis
(2) a general description of the pressure equipment
(3) conceptual design and manufacturing drawings
(4) descriptions and explanations necessary for under-
standing the drawings and operation of the equipment
(5) details of materials conformance with accepted specifi-
cations (harmonized standards, EAMs, PMAs)
(6) a list of harmonized standards used in full or in part
(7) where harmonized standards are not used, a description
of the solutions adopted to meet the ESRs
(8) results of design calculations made and examinations
carried out
(9) test reports
(b) For certain pressure equipment, the following may also be
required:
(1) information concerning tests in manufacture
(2) information concerning both the qualification of joining
procedures and joining/nondestructive testing (NDT)
personnel
47.4.4 Notified Bodies
Where third-party inspection is required in conformity assess-
ment procedures in the context of a New Approach directive, this
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138 • Chapter 47
is performed by notified bodies. Member states are responsible
for establishing the competence of a candidate NB and, where
they are found to meet the requirements, their details are advised
to the European Commission and published in the Official
Journal of the European Communities.
Each member state may inform the Commission of a NB once
it has established that the NB meets the requirements set down in
Annex IV of the PED. Generally, the member state will appoint a
competent authority, e.g., National Accreditation Body, to assess
the applicant against these criteria and make recommendations as
to their suitability. Although it is not compulsory for the NB to be
accredited, the assessment is normally carried out against the gen-
eral requirements of the applicable accreditation standard (e.g.,
EN 45004 (ISO 17020) and EN 45012).
Once notified, a NB may offer its services in any country and
its services must be equally accepted as work carried out by any
other NB. A NB may subcontract some of its activities but must
retain overall control and all certificates issued must be in its
name. Lists of NB and their scope of approval are available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newapproach/nando.
The approval of joining procedures, joining operators (particu-
larly welders), and nondestructive testing personnel may, in some
cases, be performed by recognized third-party organizations.
These entities are similarly assessed by the member states and
must comply with criteria similar to those of the NB.
47.4.5 CE Marking
(a) The CE marking is the physical symbol affixed to the
item of pressure equipment that is placed on the EU mar-
ket. It attests that the equipment complies with all the pro-
visions of the PED and any other relevant directives. This
passport allows the equipment free movement throughout
the EU.
(b) The CE marking is affixed by the manufacturer, who takes
the responsibility for declaring that the equipment complies
with all the requirements of the PED.
(c) An item of equipment may be subject simultaneously to
various New Approach directives, such as the machinery
directive (if including moving parts) or the low voltage
directive (if electrical energy is involved). In such cases, a
single CE marking must be affixed, which symbolizes the
compliance with all applicable directives. It is, therefore,
the responsibility of the manufacturer to verify the list of
directives to which the equipment may be subject.
47.4.6 Essential Safety Requirements (Annex I)
47.4.6.1 Basic Principles. The technical requirements concern-
ing the pressure equipment itself are listed in Annex I of the PED.
The following principles apply:
(a) All pressure equipment that is above the thresholds men-
tioned in Article 3 (i.e., classified in Category I, II, III, or
IV) must comply with the ESRs. They concern the various
steps of the construction including design, material selec-
tion, manufacturing, inspection, safety devices, and other
aspects to ensure that the equipment can be put into service
and operate safely.
(b) The ESRs are generally formulated in terms of safety
objectives (e.g., pressure equipment must be constructed
in such a way to ensure its safety in reasonable foreseeable
conditions).
The PED is not a technical code and does not provide the
details of how to meet these requirements; this is the role of
the harmonized standards. However, some specific quantita-
tive requirements have been noted in Annex 1, para. 7 that
apply as a general rule. Manufacturers can, therefore, depart
from these quantitative requirements; but, they must convince
the NB that they have taken appropriate measures to achieve
an equivalent overall level of safety. These specific quantita-
tive requirements must not be considered as optional.
(c) It is the role of the harmonized standards to provide practi-
cal advice as how the requirements can be met. These stan-
dards have been written on a mandate from the Commission
with the specific aim to meet the ESRs of the PED.
Consequently, they provide a presumption of conformity to
the PED (see Article 5, para. 2) for manufacturers that fol-
low their requirements.
The use of harmonized standards, however, is not compulso-
ry; the legal requirement is simply to meet the ESRs. This
can be achieved by the manufacturer designing and building
pressure equipment using any code or standard, but such a
route does not provide a presumption of conformity and the
manufacturer must be able to demonstrate to the NB that the
vessel complies with each of the applicable ESR of Annex I.
(d The manufacturer may use one of the following options to
demonstrate compliance of his equipment with the ESR:
(1) using the harmonized standard that give a presumption
of conformity
(2) using a recognized code like ASME, PD 5500, or CODAP
(3) applying directly the ESRs.
For (2) and (3), the manufacturer must justify the solutions
adopted to meet the ESRs to the NB involved.
47.4.6.2 Design (Annex I, paras. 1 and 2)
(a) General (Annex I, para. 1). All equipment classified in haz-
ard Categories I, II, III, and IV must meet each of the ESRs,
as far as they are applicable to the equipment. A list of ESRs
is provided in para. 47.10.
(b) Hazard Identification. The manufacturer is obliged to ana-
lyze the hazards due to pressure and then design the equip-
ment taking this into account. This assessment should be
proportional to the level of hazard and its documentation
kept with the technical documents.
(c) Design for Adequate Strength. Pressure equipment is designed
by taking all relevant factors into account, including the
following:
(a) internal/external pressures
(b) ambient and operational temperatures
(c) static pressure and mass of contents in operating and
test conditions
(d) traffic, wind, and earthquake loading
(e) reaction forces and moments that result from the
supports, attachments, and piping
(f) corrosion and erosion, fatigue
(g) decomposition of unstable fluid
The pressure equipment must be designed for adequate strength
based on a calculation method. Where necessary, this is supple-
mented by an experimental design method.
An experimental design method may also be used without cal-
culation but only when the product of PS.V is less than 6000
bar.L or the product of PS.DN is less than 3000 bar. It should be
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 139
noted that the use of the experimental design method is not per-
mitted in the context of Module B1 (EC design examination).
The calculation method may be based on either the Harmonized
European Product Standard or ASME Section I or Section VIII, PD
5500, CODAP, AD 2000, (ASME B31.1 or B31.3, CODETI for
piping) or another recognized standard.
Where standards other than the Harmonized European Product
Standard are used, the designer must ensure that the variations
needed to comply with the PED are incorporated.
Where an appropriate code is not followed, the Designer may
use one of the following calculation methods as appropriate and if
necessary to supplement or use in combination with another
method: design by formula, design by analysis, or design by frac-
ture mechanics.
(d) Calculation Method. The designer must prepare a full set of
design calculations to demonstrate the adequacy of the
equipment. The calculation pressures used must not be less
than the maximum allowable pressure and due account
taken of the following:
(1) static head.
(2) dynamic fluid pressures.
(3) decomposition of unstable fluids.
(4) multichamber vessels must consider the worst case of
pressure loading.
(5) calculation temperatures must allow an appropriate
safety margin.
(6) all possible combinations of temperature and pressure
must be considered.
(7) maximum stress and peak stress must be kept within
safe limits.
(8) appropriate safety factors must be applied.
(9) material properties used must be based on the data
specified in the appropriate harmonized standard,
EAM or PMA.
(10) material characteristics to be considered (where
appropriate) include the following:
(a) yield strength, 0.2 % or 1.0 % proof strength
as appropriate for the material at calculation tem-
perature)
(b) tensile strength
(c) time-dependent strength (creep)
(d) fatigue data
(e) Young’s modulus
(f) appropriate amount of plastic strain
(g) impact strength
(h) fracture toughness
(11) appropriate joint factors.
(12) foreseeable degradation mechanisms.
(13) stability.
(e) Experimental Design. Where an experimental design method
is adopted, it is carried out in accordance with an appropriate
test program. The test program is prepared by the manufac-
turer, defines the test conditions and criteria for acceptance
and refusal, and is submitted to the NB for approval.
(f) Allowable Stresses. In keeping with the European philosophy,
the harmonized standards do not specify allowable stresses
for materials. The materials accepted for use in these stan-
dards all have properties assured by material manufacturers,
and it is these properties that are used in calculations for
sufficient strength. Many national product standards specify
the allowable stresses to be used for calculation purposes;
this is not acceptable to PED, as the properties used in cal-
culation must be those assured by the material manufacturer
and not those established by a separate committee.
The designer is also required to verify that the maximum mem-
brane stress for predominately static loads for temperatures out-
side the creep range must not exceed the smaller of:
(1) For ferritic steels, 32 of Re/t and 125 of Rm/20
(2) In the case of austenitic steels
(a) if its elongation after rupture exceeds 30%, 23 of Re/t
(b) if its elongation after rupture exceeds 35%, 56 of Re/t
and 31 of Rm/t
(3) In the case of aluminum, 23 of Re/t
(4) In the case of aluminum alloys (excluding precipitation
hardening alloys), 32 of Re/t and 125 of Rm/20
(g) Joint Coefficients. For welded joints, the joint coefficient
must not exceed the following values:
(1) for equipment subject to destructive and nondestructive
tests that confirm the whole series of joints show no sig-
nificant defects: 1.0
(2) for equipment subject to random (sample) testing: 0.85
(3) for equipment not subject to nondestructive testing
other than visual inspection: 0.7
(h) Other Considerations. The manufacturer is required to con-
sider the following and adopt suitable solutions:
(1) provisions to ensure safe handling and operation
(2) means of examination
(3) means of draining and venting
(4) corrosion or other chemical attack
(5) wear
(6) assemblies are suitable and adequately integrated
(7) provisions for filling and discharge
(8) protection against exceeding allowable limits of pres-
sure equipment
(9) specific requirements for safety accessories
(10) ability to withstand external fire
Where the manufacturer designs and manufactures pressure
equipment and offers it for sale, the above aspects must be
addressed and suitable solutions adopted, either by inclusion in
the product or by providing appropriate information in the operat-
ing instructions. Frequently, however, pressure equipment is pro-
duced to a specification provided by the User or an engineering
contractor who has made many of the decisions that the manufac-
turer must declare as conforming to the PED. The manufacturer
must still declare conformity of all aspects with the PED even if
the manufacturer was not directly responsible for some of the
decisions (e.g., selection of material). As the PED makes no
allowance for sharing responsibility, the manufacturer must satis-
fy himself that the decisions made by others actually comply with
the applicable ESRs and that certification of this is available in
writing from the applicable source.
47.4.6.3 Manufacturing (Annex I, para. 3)
47.4.6.3.1 Preparation of Component Parts. The PED speci-
fies “the preparation of component parts (e.g., forming and cham-
fering) must not give rise to defects or cracks or changes in the
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140 • Chapter 47
mechanical characteristics likely to be detrimental to the safety of
the pressure equipment.” This requires the designer to consider the
manufacturing techniques and materials to be used to ensure
compatibility. To verify that the selected combinations have been
successful, the formed and chamfered material must be inspected
and, to demonstrate this to the NB, appropriately documented.
Effectively, this paragraph requires a quality plan that details the
operations associated with the preparation of materials and
requires them to be inspected and signed off as complying.
47.4.6.3.2 Permanent Joining. Permanent joints and adjacent
zones must be free from any surface or internal defects detrimental
to the safety of the equipment. Permanent joints are those that can-
not be disconnected, except by destructive methods; this includes
welded and brazed joints. The requirement indicates that all com-
pleted welds shall be examined. It is not unreasonable to require a
visual examination of all permanent joints and an appropriate
amount of volumetric testing. The hazard analysis combined with
the requirements for joint coefficients determines the appropriate
amount of volumetric testing. It would be helpful to use the quality
plan referred to above to specify the extent of volumetric testing to
be carried out and provide a means of recording the examination.
47.4.6.3.3 Joining Procedure Qualifications. All welding of
components that contributes to pressure-retaining capability of the
equipment or components joined directly to them must be carried
out using suitably qualified personnel according to suitable operat-
ing procedures. Where the pressure equipment is in Category II,
III, or IV, the procedures and personnel must be approved by a NB
or a recognized third-party organization (RTPO), recognized by a
member state.
NBs and RTPOs, involved with the approval of procedures, must
perform (or have performed) the examinations and tests specified in
the harmonized standard. As the harmonized product standards
specify EN ISO 15614 for procedures and EN 287 for personnel,
the appropriate tests specified in these standards are applicable.
Manufacturers that have welding procedures qualified to other
standards would not necessarily have to requalify the procedure,
rather to perform the additional required tests.
The properties of permanent joints must meet the minimum prop-
erties specified for the materials to be joined unless other relevant
property values are specifically taken into account in the design cal-
culations. To comply with this requirement, welding procedure tests
must be certified as meeting the appropriate requirements of the
base material, tensile, elongation, impact, and such. This require-
ment includes the deposited metal and the heat-affected zone, where
applicable, and so would apply to, for instance, welded pipe. As the
PED has specific requirements for strength, ductility, and toughness
for certain materials, these requirements are transferred to the weld-
ing procedure testing for the weld and heat-affected zone.
If the material or joining process is unable to meet the proper-
ties of the base material specified, e.g., brazed joints, the PED
permits the use of actual results obtained from the joint in the
design calculations.
47.4.6.3.4 Joining Personnel. Suitably qualified personnel
must perform welds and brazed joints in pressure-retaining mater-
ial and components joined to them. Where the pressure equipment
falls within Category II, III, or IV, these personnel must be certi-
fied by a NB or RTPO. The body that approves the personnel must
perform the examinations and tests set out in the appropriate
harmonized standard (or equivalent examinations and tests).
Welding procedures may be qualified to EN ISO 15614, with
welders qualified to EN 287. It is permissible to use other welding
qualifications if the tests are equivalent or can be supplemented to
be equivalent. There are no specific rules relating to prolongation
of certification, and guidance should be taken from the applicable
EN standard.
47.4.6.3.5 Nondestructive Tests. Nondestructive tests must be
carried out by appropriately approved personnel. Where the equip-
ment falls within Categories III or IV, the personnel must be qual-
ified by an RTPO. The PED does not specify any particular
requirements for certification of NDT personnel, although there is
a harmonized standard (EN 473) that may be followed. NDT per-
sonnel may be certified under systems other than the harmonized
standard, provided the RTPO is satisfied that certification criteria
equivalent to the harmonized standards have been met and that the
scope of certification is relevant to the testing of permanent joints
in pressure equipment. Individuals holding an EN 473 or ISO 9712
certificate issued by a certification body which is not an RTPO, but
which has a formal contractual arrangement with an RTPO to carry
out assessments as a sub-contractor may also be approved by the
RTPO upon receipt of satisfactory documented evidence of quali-
fication and certification only.
An RTPO may subcontract part of its work but retains full
responsibility for the issue and approval of the personnel on an
individual basis. Approval of an individual solely on the basis of
a certificate issued by another body, where no contractual
arrangement exists with the RTPO, does not fulfill the require-
ment of the PED.
All these principles are detailed in a Technical Report pub-
lished by CEN (European Standardization Body for mechanical
equipment): CEN/TR 15589:2007.
The extent of testing is determined according to the joint coeffi-
cient chosen and the hazard analysis. The joint coefficient may be
determined by a requirement for the thinnest possible vessel (joint
coefficient 1), in which case full NDT is required; if the manufac-
turer does not wish to perform NDT, a coefficient of 0.7 must be
selected. Where sample NDT is used, a joint coefficient of 0.85
may be applied. There is no guidance as to what sample NDT
consists of (2%, 5%, 10%); the hazard analysis or the product
standard may be used for guidance.
Records of NDT (e.g., reports, radiographs, charts, personnel
qualifications) must be kept to demonstrate to the NB full
compliance with the requirements and as part of the technical
documentation.
47.4.6.3.6 Heat Treatment. The manufacturer is obliged to
identify the need for heat treatment and to perform or have per-
formed the appropriate treatment. The need may arise as a result of
the following:
(a) restoring original mechanical properties after forming
(b) restoring material properties after welding
(c) reducing residual stress in welds
(d) reducing potential to specific cracking mechanisms (e.g.,
stress corrosion and hydrogen-induced cracking)
47.4.6.3.7 Traceability. Material incorporated in pressure
equipment must be traceable to an acceptable specification from
receipt through production up to the final test. There is no specific
requirement as to how this must be achieved, but it must be suit-
able. Manufacturers may choose between physical marking on the
components or recording details on an appropriate map.
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47.4.6.3.8 Final Assessment. All pressure equipment must be
subject to a final assessment that consists of a final inspection and
a proof test.
47.4.6.3.8.1 Final Inspection. The final inspection consists of
the following:
marking must be followed by the identification number of the NB
involved with the conformity assessment program.
(a) Additional information must be provided, depending on the
type of equipment, but may be on a separate plate. This
information includes the following:

(a) internal and external visual examination (1) identification of manufacturer/authorized representative
(b) examination of accompanying documents (2) year of manufacture
(3) identification of pressure equipment
The purpose of this inspection is to verify that the equipment has (4) essential maximum and minimum limits
been manufactured in accordance with the applicable design docu-
ments and the regulations. Tests carried out during manufacture (b) Depending on the type of equipment, the following may
may be taken into account. Where examination during the final also be required:
inspection would not be possible (e.g., internal examination of a
(1) volume of the equipment (L)
fixed tube heat exchanger), the inspection must be carried out at
(2) the nominal size for piping
an appropriate time during manufacture.
(3) the test pressure applied (bar and date)
47.4.6.3.8.2 Proof Test. Pressure equipment must undergo a test (4) safety device set pressure (bar)
for the pressure containment aspect. The PED envisages that this (5) output of the pressure equipment (kW)
will normally be a hydrostatic test. The pressure for the hydrosta- (6) supply voltage (V)
tic test must be the greater of the following: (7) intended use
(8) filling ratio (kg/L)
(a) the maximum allowable pressure, taking into account the (9) maximum filling mass (kg)
maximum operating temperature multiplied by the coeffi- (10) tare mass (kg)
cient 1.25. (11) the product group
fa The CE marking indicates that the equipment complies with all
Pt = 1.25 PS applicable essential requirements and also all applicable directive.
ft
where Designers of safety accessories may also need to consider confor-
Pt ⫽ test pressure mance with other directive, such as the low-voltage directive and
PS ⫽ maximum allowable pressure the electromagnetic compatibility directive. Manufacturers of
fa ⫽ nominal design stress for design conditions at test tem- pressure equipment that incorporates stirrers or mixers may need
perature to consider the machinery directive as well.
ft ⫽ nominal design stress for design conditions at design
temperature 47.4.6.3.10 Operating Instructions. Pressure equipment may
(b) the maximum allowable pressure times 1.43 be designed and fabricated by the manufacturer and offered for
sale to a purchaser who will determine if this equipment is suitable
Pt ⫽ 1.43 PS for their purposes. Such equipment is placed on the market and
must be accompanied by instructions in the language of the final
Although the test pressure is one of the quantitative requirements user. Such instructions must include the necessary safety informa-
specified in Annex I, para. 7, the values specified must be used tion relating to the following:
unless there is clear justification that an equivalent overall level of
safety can be achieved. The values to be used for proof test were (a) mounting including assembling different pieces of pressure
established in a research project and offer the optimum fatigue life. equipment
Series-produced pressure equipment in Category I does not need (b) putting into service
an individual test; the test may be performed on a statistical basis. (c) use
There are times when a hydrostatic test is impractical or harmful (d) maintenance, including checks by the user
to the equipment under test. In such cases, the PED allows another
Other pressure equipment is manufactured to specific instruc-
test of recognized value to be performed. The PED clearly envisages
tions provided by the user or engineering contractor for a specific
the alternative to be a pneumatic test, as it requires such a test to be
application. Such equipment is not placed on the market but goes
preceded by additional measurers such as NDT. There is no direct
directly into service. It would not be appropriate for the manufac-
reference in the PED to replacing a proof test with NDT alone.
turer of equipment that is put into service to provide comprehen-
sive instructions to the user who knows far more about the
47.4.6.3.8.3 Inspection of Safety Devices. In the case of assem-
process than the manufacturer. In these circumstances, the manu-
blies, the final inspection must include the verification that appropri-
facturer is obliged to provide the user with such information of
ate devices for protection against exceeding the allowable limits of
which the user may not be aware.
the pressure equipment have been fitted. For pressure-limiting
devices, particularly for pressure vessels, the momentary surge of 47.4.7 Material Specifications
pressure must be limited to 10% of the maximum allowable pressure.
47.4.7.1 Introduction. The requirements for materials in the
47.4.6.3.9 Marking and Labeling. The CE marking must be PED are based on the clear separation of responsibilities between
affixed to the equipment or assembly in a clearly visible position. the pressure equipment manufacturer and the material manufacturer.
It may be directly on the equipment or on a data plate. The CE The pressure equipment manufacturer is responsible for designing
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142 • Chapter 47
equipment using appropriate properties that have been assured by
the material manufacturer. The material manufacturer is responsi-
ble for providing certification that the material provided meets a
particular specification. Although the supply of material is not
covered by the PED, the pressure equipment manufacturer must
ensure that the requirements for materials have been met.
47.4.7.2 Choice of Material. Irrespective of category, the PED
requires pressure equipment manufacturers to select material that
is suitable for the intended application and envisaged lifetime.
The materials used must conform to one of the following speci-
fications:
(a) materials listed in harmonized standards
(b) materials covered by a European Approval of pressure
equipment Materials
(c) materials covered by a Particular Material Appraisal and
supported by documentation that demonstrates its confor-
mance
47.4.7.3 Materials Listed in Harmonized Standards. There
are several product standards that have been harmonized in the
context of the PED. These include the unfired pressure vessel stan-
dard EN 13445, industrial piping EN 13480, water tube boilers EN
12952, and shell boilers EN 12953. These product standards each
have a table that lists acceptable materials for use in the manufac-
ture of that product. The materials in these standards have been
selected from European standards for materials such as EN 10028,
EN 10216, and so on. The lists currently consist of materials
exclusively from European standards; however, the product stan-
dard has not necessarily adopted all grades of a given material and
in some cases restrictions are applied.
Any material listed in such a product standard may be used in
the manufacture of that product, but not necessarily for products
covered by another product standard. Materials listed in a
European material standard that is not listed in the appropriate
table of the harmonized product standard may not be used for fab-
ricating pressure equipment by this route.
The Commission has agreed to the harmonization of many EN
material standards, even though they do not meet some of the
conditions for harmonization and, in some instances, do not meet
the ESRs. These materials, whose details have been published in
the Official Journal, may be used for pressure equipment; but, the
manufacturer must ensure they are suitable and meet the applica-
ble ESRs.
47.4.7.4 European Approval of Material (PED Article 11).
The legislators foresaw the need to have a fast track for the approval
of a new material intended for repeated use by pressure equipment
manufacturers. The process is known as the European Approval of
Materials (EAM) and, when issued, provides that material specifi-
cation with a presumption of conformity with the ESRs. The
process is available to manufacturers of materials and manufactur-
ers of pressure equipment and can be applied to new or existing
materials that have not been included in the harmonized standard
(e.g., foreign materials). The applicant requests approval for a
material (grade not specification) from a NB that has been approved
for the task. The NB performs tests (or has tests performed) to ver-
ify that the material conforms to the ESRs of the PED.
Materials that were used for pressure equipment manufacture
prior to the implementation of the PED may not need to be
retested, as existing test data may be taken into account. It has
been determined that materials that are of a similar type to one
specified in a harmonized standard cannot be issued with an
EAM. There are numerous widely used materials where this inter-
pretation will prevent the issue of an EAM (e.g., ASME SA-312
and SA-240).
When the NB is satisfied that the properties assured in the
material specification meet the ESRs, a data sheet is prepared
that provides full details of the material and its properties and
may indicate variations and/or restrictions. It is important that
the NB follows the Guiding Principles issued by the Commission
relating to preparation of the data sheet, as this will maximize the
chances of success. This data sheet and relevant supporting infor-
mation is sent to the member states’ permanent representatives
and the Commission, who must comment within 3 months. The
Commission together with representatives from the member
states formed the Working Group Materials (WGM) to provide a
critical assessment of candidate EAMs before the NB submits
through the official channels.
Approved EAMs are sent to the member states, NB and the
Commission. The Commission publishes details of approved
EAMs in the Official Journal of the European Communities. Once
the reference has been published, any manufacturer anywhere in the
world may use that material to manufacture pressure equipment.
The list of published EAMs (as of January 2008, includes only
nickel alloys) can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/
pressure_equipment/ped/materials/index_en.html.
EAMs prepared with the financial assistance of the European
Commission can also be downloaded from this website. Original
copies of EAMs can also be obtained from the NB that obtained
approval.
Guiding Principles for the contents of EAM drafts are pub-
lished in the European document PE-01-01 which is available
from the same web page.
47.4.7.5 Particular Material Appraisal (PMA). This option is
intended for material that is not referenced in a harmonized stan-
dard or for which an EAM has not been issued; generally, any
material that meets the requirements can be issued with a PMA
and used in pressure equipment. The PMA is the assessment of the
material’s suitability and its conformance with the ESRs, and is
performed by the pressure equipment manufacturer. Where the
pressure equipment has been determined to fall into category III or
IV, the NB in charge of the conformity assessment procedure of
the pressure equipment also performs the assessment. In either
case, the pressure equipment manufacturer or the NB reviews the
assured properties in the material specification for compliance
with the ESRs and documents this appraisal in a suitable form.
Materials may only be approved for conditions for which they
have properties assured by the material manufacturer. Decisions
made concerning a specific material for use in a specific sets of
conditions, do not need to be repeated. However, manufacturers
and where applicable notified bodies must ensure the PMA is suit-
able for its application and that this is recorded in the technical
documentation.
Pressure equipment manufacturers may utilize PMAs prepared
and supplied by another manufacturer, e.g. the manufacturer of an
assembly, on condition that the PMA is reviewed and adopted by
the pressure equipment manufacturer and where applicable the
NB in charge of the conformity assessment procedure, to ensure
accuracy of the document and suitability for the application.
Guiding Principles for the contents of PMA are published in the
European document PE-03-28 which is available from the same web
page as the one referencing document PE-01-01 on EAM.
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47.4.7.6 Material Requirements. Before a material can be
accepted into a harmonized standard or issued with an EAM or
PMA, it must comply with the applicable ESRs.
47.4.7.6.1 ESRs for Material (FED Annex 1, para. 4). The
ESRs for materials are the following:
(a) Appropriate properties for all foreseeable operating and test
conditions. The material must have properties assured by
the material manufacturer appropriate for the operating con-
ditions of the equipment. For example, if the equipment is
to be used at elevated temperatures, the manufacturer must
either declare conformance of the material with a specifica-
tion that has assured properties at the relevant temperature
or must affirm compliance with specified properties on the
material certificate. Under the philosophy adopted by the
PED, it is not acceptable for the pressure equipment manu-
facturer to perform tests to establish values or use values
established elsewhere.
(b) Sufficiently chemically resistant to fluid contained. The
manufacturer must select materials that will be suitable for
the environment envisaged; this may include coatings,
lining, cladding, as well as corrosion-resistant material.
(c) Not significantly affected by aging. As many materials suf-
fer aging even at room temperature with a corresponding
loss of ductility, manufacturers must select material that will
be suitable for the intended life and envisaged operating
conditions. This may include specifying materials with min-
imum Al/N2 ratios.
(d) Suitable for intended processing procedures (e.g., welding
and forming). Manufacturers must select material that has
appropriate properties for the envisaged processing activi-
ties. Consideration should be given to ensuring that the
material has appropriate properties after the intended
processing.
(e) Selected to avoid undesirable effects when various materi-
als are put together. Care should be exercised to ensure that
materials are not put together in such a way as to cause gal-
vanic effects.
(f) Sufficiently ductile (in steel, minimum 14%).
(g) Sufficiently tough (in steel, 27 J at the minimum of 20 ⬚C
and of lowest operating temperature).
The quantitative requirements in (f) and (g) apply “as a general
rule”. Other figures can be used provided an equivalent overall
level of safety is maintained [PED Annex I (7)]. Any deviation
from these figures must be fully justified for each case and record-
ed in the technical file.
Many materials traditionally used in manufacture of pressure
equipment do not have specifications that assure the properties
required by the PED, either for elevated temperature or impact
properties. These materials cannot appear in a harmonized stan-
dard or be issued with an EAM, as they could not be presumed to
conform to the essential requirements in the PED. They may,
however, be used in PED equipment if the material manufacturer
certifies the properties on the material certification.
There are two WGP Guidelines in the field of materials that are
of particular importance, WGP 7/17 and 7/24. The former con-
cerns impact properties of the material and has been revised sev-
eral times by the Member States. The original versions required
assured impact properties in the material specification but provid-
ed for exemptions for materials that do not undergo ductile/brittle
transition and are naturally tough and ductile. The revision agreed
at WGP meeting of April 07 now also permits the use of materi-
als where the Code of construction has specific rules to assess the
use of the material for the specific conditions envisaged, e.g.
actual material and heat treatment, thickness, temperature. This
means that the rules for the avoidance of brittle fracture in the
ASME Codes can be used to justify the use of materials that do
not have assured impact properties within the specification, e.g.
SA-516 Gr 70.
Guideline WGP 7/24 indicates that the values used in the calcu-
lations for establishing the required thickness of pressure equip-
ment should be those “assured” by the material manufacturer. The
European Standards (ENs) for materials suitable for elevated
temperature include values of minimum yield strength at various
temperatures. Where the material manufacturer certifies compli-
ance with one of these specifications, he is certifying that the
material will meet the minimum yield strength values at the vari-
ous temperatures. The Equations in the European Pressure Vessel
Codes used for establishing adequate strength, require the input of
the minimum yield strength value at the operating temperature.
The ASME Codes on the other hand utilise values that are consid-
ered to be suitable for use in calculations for establishing the
required thickness. These values have been established by the
Code committee for various temperatures and are based on trend
curves and experience. The ASTM/ASME material specifications
indicate only room temperature properties, hence certification by
the material manufacturer assures only those properties.
To address this issue ASME have issued Code Case 2556. The
Code Case indicates that the method by which material manufac-
turers certify materials is essentially the same whether the specifi-
cation includes elevated temperature properties or not. The
European material standards call for the material manufacturer to
certify the elevated temperature properties not by testing the
material at the temperature but by ensuring a test at any tempera-
ture meets the requirements specified in a trend curve. To prepare
the trend curve the material manufacturer performs tensile tests at
different temperatures (see EN 10314). A trend curve is then
established using a recognised statistical procedure and once
established the material manufacturers need only perform one test
at any temperature on the curve and if it exceeds the value in the
trend curve for that temperature, the material manufacturer may
declare conformance with all elevated temperature values. In
practice this temperature is often room temperature.
47.4.7.6.2 Material Certification. Documentation must be
issued by the material manufacturer confirming compliance with
an appropriate specification and must be obtained by the pressure
equipment manufacturer for all material. Where the component is
a main pressure-bearing part of equipment in Category II, III, or
IV, this must be a certificate of specific product control [e.g., EN
10204: 2004–3.1]. Certificates issued by a body other than the
material manufacturer are not acceptable alternatives. Certificates
of Conformity issued by the material manufacturer are adequate
only for equipment in Category I and for joining materials, bolting,
and welding consumables [e.g., EN 10204: 2004–2.2].
Certificates issued by material manufacturers that hold quality
system certification issued by a competent body established in
Europe can be presumed to provide accurate information. Where the
material manufacturer does not hold such certification, his certifi-
cates are not presumed to comply with the relevant requirements
and, therefore, the pressure equipment manufacturer requires addi-
tional confidence in its validity, e.g. by independent inspection of the
testing (and the issue of an EN 10204:2004 - 3.2 Inspection Report).
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144 • Chapter 47
47.4.7.6.3 Allowable Stresses. The pressure equipment manu-
facturer is responsible for determining the values to be used in
design calculations; this must be based on properties assured by
the material manufacturer. He is also responsible for identifying
and providing any required treatments to the materials selected to
restore properties after the manufacturing process. Limits for the
allowable membrane stress are given in PED Annex I (para. 7.1)
for certain materials. When harmonized product standards are not
followed, designers should provide a calculation that demonstrates
that this maximum allowable membrane stress has not been
exceeded.
In the case of ferritic steel including normalized steel and
excluding fine-grained steel and specially heat treated steel: 23 of
5
Re/t and 12 of Rm/20.
47.4.7.6.4 Welding Consumables and Joining Materials
(PED Annex 1, para. 4). Welding consumables and other joining
materials, such as bolting, are required to meet only some of the
requirements specified for materials. In particular, the requirement
to be sufficiently tough and ductile applies to both the weld metal
and the joint in which it is deposited. The same criteria for the
selection of suitable consumables for the application are valid, but
there is no specific requirement for the source of the consumable
(harmonized standard, EAM, PMA) or for approval of the con-
sumable manufacturer. Pressure equipment manufacturers must,
therefore, purchase suitable consumables with appropriate proper-
ties. Consumables must be supplied with documentation in
the form of a manufacturer’s Certificate of Conformity. When the
pressure equipment manufacturer performs welding procedure
qualifications, impacts tests of the weld and heat-affected zone
must be carried out and meet the same quantitative requirements as
the material.
47.4.8 Manufacturer’s Responsibility
In the New Approach, “the manufacturer is the person who is
responsible for design, manufacture and conformity assessment of
a product with a view of placing it on the European Market on his
behalf.”
The manufacturer must take full responsibility for the product,
but he may subcontract any or all of the design and manufacturing
activities, provided he maintains overall control and has the nec-
essary competence to take responsibility for the product. No
allowance is made for sharing responsibility with the user, engi-
neering contractor, or designer. There may only be one manufac-
turer for pressure equipment, although there may be more than
one NB.
Pressure equipment is frequently engineered by the user or
engineering contractor and a specification submitted to a pressure
equipment manufacturer to perform the Code calculations and
fabricate the equipment. The manufacturer may only declare con-
formity with the PED after obtaining confirmation that the deci-
sions taken meet the applicable ESRs. One way to achieve this is
for the decision-maker to provide the manufacturer with a certi-
fied design specification confirming that the relevant ESRs have
been respected.
Whichever conformity assessment procedure is selected, the
manufacturer must:
(a) ensure that the pressure equipment satisfies the essential
requirements given in the PED
(b) carry out conformity assessment in accordance with the
procedures given by the PED
(c) draw up an EC Declaration of Conformity (per Annex VII)
(d) affix the CE marking to the equipment
The manufacturer is also responsible for ensuring that his
equipment complies with the requirements of all directives that
may apply to it. By affixing the CE marking, the manufacturer
officially declares that his equipment complies with all the rele-
vant directives.
Table 47.5 gives the list (as of January 2008) of all New
Approach directives that may be applicable to pressure equip-
ment. An updated list can be obtained from the Web site of the
Commission at:
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newapproach/index_en.htm or at
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/pressure_equipment/new_approa
ch/index_en.html.
47.5 GUIDELINES
To manage and monitor the implementation of the PED, the
European Commission has set up the Standing Committee,
the Working Group Pressure (WGP). The WGP is chaired by the
Commission and consists of representatives from the enforcement
authorities of all member states, together with representatives of
NB, European Federations, and CEN. The WGP meets two or three
times per year and generally discusses specific questions raised by
manufacturers or NBs; answers are published on the Commission’s
Web site as Guidelines. The WGP also discusses other areas of
implementation, such as safeguard action and market surveillance.
The Guidelines approved by the WGP have no legal authority;
that must be left to the European Court. However, they represent
the best opinion available, being the unanimous view of the
enforcing authorities of the member states, and as such should be
respected. Guidelines take the form of question and answer
sheets, similar to those issued for the ASME Code, and they are
grouped according to subject. Those Guidelines that deal with
issues concerning the scope are prefixed with 1/followed by a
consecutive number. The prefixes are as follows:
(a) 1: scope
(b) 2: classification in categories
(c) 3: assemblies
(d) 4: conformity assessment procedure
(e) 5: ESR concerning design
(f) 6: ESR concerning manufacturing
(g) 7: ESR concerning materials
(h) 8: other ESR
(i) 9: miscellaneous
(j) 10: general
The Guidelines can be found on the Commission’s Web site at:
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/pressure_equipment/ped/guide-
lines/index_en.html, which also contains the text of the PED with
hyperlinks that cross-reference applicable Guidelines. A typical
Guideline is provided below.
Guideline 72
Original version as adopted on: 29 Jan 1999 and modified on
31 Mar 2006.
Pressure equipment directive 97/23/EC
Commission’s Working Group Pressure
Guideline related to Annex I, Section 4.3
Question: What is a competent body for the certification of the
quality (assurance) systems of material manufacturers?
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TABLE 47.5 LIST OF NEW APPROACH DIRECTIVES (as of January 2008)

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146 • Chapter 47

TABLE 47.5 (Continued)

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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 147
Answer: A “competent body” for certification of the quality
systems of material manufacturers can be any third party body
established as a legal entity within the Community which has rec-
ognized competence in the assessment of quality (assurance) sys-
tems for the manufacture of materials and in the technology of the
materials concerned. Competence can be demonstrated, for exam-
ple, by accreditation.
See also guideline 7/7.
Note 1: A body not established as a legal entity within the
Community, even if it has a recognition agreement through
the International Accreditation Forum, does not comply with the
requirements of Annex I Section 4.3.
Note 2: A notified body may perform this task only if it has a
recognized competence in the field of quality assurance, materials
and related process technology. For this certification, the possible
use of the notification number for PED is irrelevant.
Note 3: The certificate of quality system shall make reference
to the legal entity established in the Community and its address.
Accepted by WPG on: 28 Nov 2005 Accepted by Working Group
“pressure”: 31 Mar 2006.
47.6 LINK OF PED WITH CODES
AND STANDARDS
The PED, like other New Approach directives, requires confor-
mance to the ESRs. This may be achieved by following harmo-
nized standards or by addressing the ESRs directly. As part of the
development of the PED, a program was put in place by the CEN
to prepare a suite of standards to enable manufacturers to meet the
requirements for all aspects associated with design, manufacture,
examination, and testing of pressure equipment.
Harmonized standards are European standards that have been
written on a mandate from the Commission, specifically to
address one or more ESRs applicable to a particular directive.
Each candidate for a harmonized standard must contain an
Annex, known as Annex Z, that lists the ESRs addressed and pro-
vides cross-references to where in the standard the solution can be
found. Where a standard addresses more than one directive, it will
have an Annex Z for each directive (e.g., Annex ZA and Annex
ZB, in the case of a standard that addresses ERS of two different
directives). The term Annex Z is specifically associated with har-
monized European standards and its use outside this context may
be misleading, as the presumption of conformity is available only
where the harmonized European standard is used.
Once the standard has been completed, it is checked by the
CEN consultant to ensure it meets its objectives; it is then
approved by a Europe-wide voting process. Once this is complet-
ed, its number is published in the Official Journal of the European
Community and, subsequently, equipment that conforms to its
provisions is presumed to comply with the PED.
Where manufacturers choose not to use a harmonized standard,
they may address the ESRs directly. This is most usually achieved
by the manufacturer basing the design and manufacture on exist-
ing codes and standards that have a history of providing safe pres-
sure equipment.
Any code or standard may be used as the basis for meeting the
PED, but because there is no presumption of conformity with any
standard other than the harmonized standard, the manufacturer will
need to justify the solutions he has adopted for each ESR. This jus-
tification must be recorded in the technical documentation. Care
must be taken to ensure that the solutions adopted actually meet
the applicable requirement. It is an insufficient argument to state
that following any particular code alone, offers an equivalent overall
level of safety.
47.7 POINTS OF COMPARISONS WITH
THE ASME CODE
47.7.1 General Aspects of the PED Vs the ASME
Codes
It is important to recognize that the PED is not a construction
code. It is a set of safety objectives that will ensure a minimum
safety level, which, in turn, will facilitate the removal of barriers to
trade in pressure equipment within Europe. The New Approach
indicates the ESRs for the particular product, then supports this
with a set of standards that are written specifically to address the
identified requirements. The use of these harmonized standards is
not mandatory, but, if they are followed, the manufacturer is
assured that the requirements are met. On the whole, the safety
requirements are generic in nature and may be satisfactorily
addressed by following many of the recognized pressure equipment
standards in regular use throughout the world, including the ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code). The scope of the
PED, however, is far broader than traditional construction codes
and requires solutions to potential hazards that are not covered in
current codes.
In principle, pressure equipment manufacturers may use any
pressure vessel construction code as a basis for meeting the PED. It
must be remembered, however, that only the harmonized standard
gives a presumption of conformity; therefore, any other code used
must be supported by technical documentation that justifies the
conformance with each of the PED’s requirements. This process
is relatively straightforward for most ESRs, but there are a few
that are based on the European philosophy, which sometimes dif-
fers markedly to that adopted in the ASME Codes.
To determine the acceptance of the ASME Codes in the context
of the PED, it is necessary to compare each ESR with the solu-
tions adopted by the applicable ASME Code Section. This activi-
ty has already been performed and published by ASME, for
Section VIII Div 1 and Section I and the documents provide valu-
able guidance as to the acceptance and other wise of the ASME
solutions. But, there is no presumption of conformity, and the
solutions adopted must be acceptable to the NB involved with the
conformity assessment, where appropriate.
In general, the ASME Codes provide appropriate design calcu-
lations to ensure adequate strength. The main difficulty comes
with the materials for construction. The ASME Codes require that
only material permitted by the particular section, and for which
allowable stresses are quoted in the applicable tables, may be
used in construction. With only a few exceptions, these are ASTM
(ASME) materials and are certified by their manufacturers as con-
forming to those specifications. In many instances, the specifica-
tion only indicates room temperature tensile properties and does
not provide assured properties at elevated temperatures. The val-
ues to be used in the calculations are specified by the Code com-
mittee and are based on experience and trend curves. This is in
conflict with the European philosophy, which requires the materi-
al manufacturer to provide assured properties for the material so
that the pressure equipment manufacturer can use assured figures
in calculations.
This problem also exists with toughness requirements for mate-
rials. Specifications for many familiar ASTM (ASME) steels in
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148 • Chapter 47
common use throughout the world do not assure minimum tough-
ness in terms of impact properties. In many instances, the con-
struction codes provide rules for the use of these materials to
ensure absence from brittle fracture. Although arguments have
been used by manufacturers that such an approach provides an
equivalent overall level of safety, various Guidelines have been
issued that establish that this does not conform with the PED. The
PED and the European codes in general permit higher allowable
stresses in materials than those permitted in the ASME Codes. In
these circumstances, it is appropriate that the greater level of con-
fidence is obtained in the material and its performance under dif-
ferent conditions. To this end, the PED requires the material man-
ufacturer to assure the properties of the material at different
temperatures that the pressure equipment manufacturer may use
in design calculations. It is not sufficient for the pressure equip-
ment manufacturer to perform a test on a particular piece of mate-
rial and base the calculations on the results obtained.
The design aspects of the ASME Codes generally meet the
PED; however, they need to be supplemented to demonstrate con-
formance to the requirements that ensure that the equipment will
operate safely in service (e.g., safe handling and operation, means
of draining and venting, provision for filling and discharge).
Manufacturers that have been accredited by ASME will have
systems in place that will meet most of the PED requirements for
manufacture. The requirements in the ASME Codes meet the
PED for preparation of component parts, traceability of materials,
heat treatment, and most of the requirements for joining, NDT,
and final assembly. Both ASME and PED require joining proce-
dures and personnel to be approved; for ASME, these approvals
are performed by the manufacturer. This is also true for PED for
pressure equipment in Category I; however, the procedures and
personnel involved with pressure equipment in Categories II, III,
and IV must be approved by a NB or RTPO. The manufacturer
must invite a NB to witness the welding of the coupon plates and
have appropriate tests performed. The PED is specific that the
tests performed are those specified in the harmonized standard. In
the case of steel welding, this refers to the tests specified in EN
ISO 15614-1 and EN 287 (for welders), which are more compre-
hensive than requirements of ASME BPVC Section IX.
A similar problem exists with NDT personnel; there is no
requirement in PED to approve procedures, but personnel must be
approved for all NDT examinations. For equipment in Categories
I and II, the personnel could be approved by the manufacturer per
ASNT TC 1A; however, for equipment in Categories III and IV,
the NDT examiners must be approved by an RTPO. It is possible
to use the ASNT scheme, but a representative of the RTPO must
be in attendance to invigilate the testing.
The requirements for final assessment are very similar between
PED and ASME; the only significant difference is the test pres-
sure of the proof test. The PED gives a minimum pressure, some-
what higher than the minimum pressure specified in the ASME
Code, which has been established to provide the maximum level
of confidence together with optimum fatigue properties. This
higher value should be adopted by manufacturers using the
ASME Code as the basis of satisfying PED.
The PED requires operating instructions to be provided with
the equipment in a language appropriate to where it is to be put
into service. Generally, where a manufacturer offers equipment
for sale to an open market, he must provide appropriate instruc-
tion for the safe installation operation, maintenance, and such.
Where equipment is manufactured specifically for a customer and
put directly into service, it is likely that the operator will know
more about the safe operation of the equipment than the manufac-
turer. Thus, the manufacturer need only provide the information
of which he is aware that the customer is not.
In addition to the problems previously described with materi-
als, there are some more differences between PED and ASME.
Materials must be selected from one of three sources: harmonized
standard, EAM, or PMA. As there are still very few EN materials
in ASME Codes and very few materials have been issued with
EAMs, the manufacturers widely use the PMA option. Details
have been provided in para. 47.4.7.6. The certification of the
materials is also rather different, requiring the manufacturer to
certify conformance with the applicable specification and only
accepting the manufacturers results if he has an appropriate quali-
ty system.
Table 47.6 provides a broad comparison between the EU sys-
tem and the U.S. system, which shows that the two systems are
quite different.
47.7.2 Section VIII, Division 2 Rewrite and ASME
PED Guides.
A clean sheet rewrite of the ASME Section VIII, Division 2
was initiated in 1998 and approved by the ASME BPV Standards
Committee in February 2007 resulting in the first publication of
the new Code in July of 2007. This completely new and more
user-friendly organizational structure has been introduced along
with the adoption of the latest technology available for construc-
tion of pressure vessels. A comprehensive summary along with
background references and future directions of the new Division 2
code are provided in Chapter 22 of this guide. However it is also
noted here to highlight the following major revisions that result in
increased compliance with the PED. The following highlights
those areas of compliance:
(a) Facilitates NB approval and acceptance of requirements by
now satisfying the minimum required pressure testing,
toughness and materials manufacturer guaranteed proper-
ties requirements.
(b) The test pressure limits specified in the new Code are sim-
ilar to the values used in the European Pressure Equipment
Directive (PED). The ratio ST/S shall be lowest ratio for the
pressure-boundary materials, excluding bolting materials,
of which the vessel is constructed.
(c) The new toughness requirements are based on 20 ft-lbs
and the exemption curves were derived on a model that
requires 20 ft-lbs. Therefore the PED 27 J toughness
requirements at 20ºC (68ºF) is complied with under these
new rules.
(d) Code Case 2556 has been recently approved which proves
a “Method for Basing Design Values on Material Properties
Affirmed by Material Manufacturers Section I and Section
VIII, Divisions 1, 2 and 3”. This will permit the construc-
tion of ASME pressure vessels with SA/SB material speci-
fications that satisfy the PED material manufacturers
affirmed property requirements.
(e) Section II, Part D, Appendix 5 provides requirements for
requests for ASME acceptance of material specifications of
recognized national or international organizations other
than ASTM or AWS. This process has been used to accept
AS, CSA, EN and JIS materials in Section II, Part A and
provides a means for ASME acceptance of EAM in the
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 149
construction of ASME pressure vessels that are also
required to have CE marking.
(f) In addition to the above, it was intended to publish a cross
reference between ASME materials and materials used in
the construction of pressure vessels to EN materials to
facilitate PED acceptance of pressure vessels constructed to
VIII-2. This work was not completed in time for publica-
tion, and will be added in later addenda.
The changes described should NOT be considered as satisfying
the PED requirements of an Annex Z, but the revisions and practices
will assist in the construction and installation of ASME pressure
vessels in the countries requiring the CE marking. In addition to the
recent ASME Code additions outlined above reference should be
made to the ASME Guides on satisfying the PED requirements for
Section VIII and Section I constructions [2], [3] & [4].
47.8 CONCLUSIONS
(a) The liberal principles of the New Approach applied to the
PED will lead to more freedom than before for the
Manufacturers, who will be free to select the following:
(1) their NB: anywhere in the EU
(2) the conformity assessment procedure, adapted to
their fabrication
(3) compliance with the ESRs: use of the European har-
monized standard or national code
(b) The ASME BPVC as well as piping codes offer a reason-
able basis for meeting the PED. There are several small dif-
ferences in the approval of welding procedures and
welders, the approval of NDT personnel, requirements for
material certification, and test pressure. These differences
can be easily accommodated and the inconvenience is more
than made up for by the size of the European market (over
TABLE 47.6 EUROPEAN SYSTEM VERSUS U.S. SYSTEM PRESSURE EQUIPMENT
450 million population) and the one set of requirements to
access the entire market. The main problem with their use
in PED is concerned with the different philosophies for
materials. This makes it difficult to use many of the famil-
iar materials and, in case of equipment operating at temper-
atures above 50°C, it makes it very difficult to use the
ASME Codes. In light of the development of ASME BPVC
Section VIII Division 2 with much higher allowable stress-
es than previously permitted by ASME Codes, there is like-
ly to be a similar need for greater confidence in material
properties. Assistance could be provided to manufacturers
who wish to use the ASME Code by:
(1) revising the Codes to permit the widespread use of EN
materials in ASME Code construction. A small number
of EN material grades are already permitted by ASME. It
is necessary to provide a means to use materials that are
not specifically listed in the Code but meet certain crite-
ria. Allowable stresses could then be based on the assured
properties but subject to the ASME safety factor.
(2) confirmation on material certificates issued by material
manufacturers that the material supplied has appropri-
ate properties to justify the use of the allowable stress-
es quoted in the Codes. In this way, the requirement to
assure elevated temperature and impact properties can
be achieved.
(3) developing new ASTM specifications with tighter con-
trol of composition and assured properties for elevated
temperature and impact strength. Modern steelmaking
techniques make it much easier to control the
chemistry of the material and, hence, its properties.
Many materials are supplied with dual certification, to
ASTM (ASME) and EN specifications, so that, in
practice, there should be very little difference between
them.
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150 • Chapter 47
The principles of the New Approach are a possible blueprint
for global trade in the future. There is already considerable interest
in the approach in the Far East, and, with the rapidly expanding
European Union, it is already a major trading tool.
The New Approach obviously addresses European interests and
was not intended to facilitate global trade. It is our opinion, how-
ever, that the principles could be adapted to a wider market. The
essential requirements are logical and necessary; but, they could
be reviewed in light of a global instead of just European market.
The means of conformance could be revised to incorporate har-
monized standards from sources other than CEN (e.g., ASME).
The conformity assessment requirements are sensible, adapting
the inspection to the level of risk; however, the current definition
of NB would need to be changed to allow all countries that sign
up to the global solution to appoint NBs. Another issue would be
agreement as to which marking to put on the equipment.
47.9 REFERENCES
1. Pressure Equipment Directive (adopted on May 29, 1997). Official
Journal of the European Communities. 1997;40.
Web site of the European Commission. For general information:
http://europa.eu.int; for PED information: http://ec.europa.eu/enter-
prise/pressure_equipment/ped/index_en.html.
2. “Guide for ASME Stamp Holders, Use of ASME Section VIII,
Division 1 to Meet the EC Pressure Equipment Directive (97/23/EC)”,
ASME, (2001).
3. “ASME SECTION I PED GUIDE - Supplement to Guide for ASME
Stamp Holders Use of ASME Section I to Meet the EC Pressure
Equipment Directive (97/23/EC)”, STP/PT-002, ASME, (2005).
4. “Comparison of Pressure Vessel Codes ASME Section VIII and EN
13445”, STP-PT-007, (2006).
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THE ESSENTIAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS IN THE PRESSURE EQUIPMENT DIRECTIVE

The first column gives the reference number of the ESR as specified in Annex I of the PED. Mandatory words are in bold characters.

ESSENTIAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
1. The obligations arising from the essential requirements listed in this Annex for pressure equipment also apply to assemblies where
the corresponding hazard exists.
2. The essential requirements laid down in the Directive are compulsory. The obligations laid down in these essential requirements
apply only if the corresponding hazard exists for the pressure equipment in question when it is used under conditions which are
reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer.
3. The manufacturer is under an obligation to analyze the hazards in order to identify those which apply to his equipment on
account of pressure; he must then design and construct it taking account of his analysis.
4. The essential requirements are to be interpreted and applied in such a way as to take account of the state of the art and current
practice at the time of design and manufacture as well as of technical and economic considerations which are consistent with a
high degree of health and safety protection.
1. GENERAL
1.1 Pressure equipment must be designed, manufactured and checked, and if applicable equipped and installed, in such a way as to
ensure its safety when put into service in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions, or in reasonably foreseeable conditions.
1.2 In choosing the most appropriate solutions, the manufacturer must apply the principles set out below in the following order:
– eliminate or reduce hazards as far as is reasonably practicable,
– apply appropriate protection measures against hazards which cannot be eliminated,
– where appropriate, inform users of residual hazards and indicate whether it is necessary to take appropriate special measures to
reduce the risks at the time of installation and/or use.
1.3 Where the potential for misuse is known or can be clearly foreseen, the pressure equipment must be designed to prevent danger
from such misuse or, if that is not possible, adequate warning given that the pressure equipment must not be used in that way.
2. DESIGN
2.1 General
The pressure equipment must be properly designed taking all relevant factors into account in order to ensure that the equipment
will be safe throughout its intended life.
The design must incorporate appropriate safety coefficients using comprehensive methods which are known to incorporate ade-
quate safety margins against all relevant failure modes in a consistent manner.
2.2 Design for adequate strength
2.2.1 The pressure equipment must be designed for loadings appropriate to its intended use and other reasonably foreseeable operating
conditions. In-particular, the following factors must be taken into account:
– internal/external pressure,
– ambient and operational temperatures,
– static pressure and mass of contents in operating and test conditions,
– traffic, wind, earthquake loading,
– reaction forces and moments which result from the supports, attachments, piping, etc.,
– corrosion and erosion, fatigue, etc.,
– decomposition of unstable fluids.
Various loadings which can occur at the same time must be considered, taking into account the probability of their simultaneous
occurrence.
2.2.2 Design for adequate strength must be based on:
– as a general rule, a calculation method, as described in 2.2.3, and supplemented if necessary by an experimental design method as
described in 2.2.4, or
– an experimental design method without calculation, as described in 2.2.4, when the product of the maximum allowable pressure
PS and the volume V is less than 6 000 bar.L or the product PS.DN less than 3 000 bar.
2.2.3 Calculation method:
a) Pressure containment and other loading aspects:
The allowable stresses for pressure equipment must be limited having regard to reasonably foreseeable failure modes under operat-
ing conditions. To this end, safety factors must be applied to eliminate fully any uncertainty arising out of manufacture, actual oper-
ational conditions, stresses, calculation models and the properties and behaviour of the material.
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152 • Chapter 47

These calculation methods must provide sufficient safety margins consistent, where applicable, with the requirements of section 7.
The requirements set out above may be met by applying one of the following methods, as appropriate, if necessary as a supplement
to or in combination with another method:
– design by formula,
– design by analysis,
– design by fracture mechanics.
b) Resistance:
Appropriate joint factors must be applied to the material properties depending, for example, on the type of non-destructive testing,
the materials joined and the operating conditions envisaged,
– the design must take appropriate account of all reasonably foreseeable degradation mechanisms (e.g. corrosion, creep, fatigue)
commensurate with the intended use of the equipment. Attention must be drawn, in the instructions referred to in section 3.4,
to particular features of the design which are relevant to the life of the equipment, for example:
• for creep: design hours of operation at specified temperatures,
• for fatigue: design number of cycles at specified stress levels,
• for corrosion: design corrosion allowance.
c) Stability aspects:
– Where the calculated thickness does not allow for adequate structural stability, the necessary measures must be taken to remedy
the situation taking into account the risks from transport and handling.
2.2.4 Experimental design method:
The design of the equipment may be validated, in all or in part, by an appropriate test programme carried out on a sample represen-
tative of the equipment or the category of equipment.
The test programme must be clearly defined prior to testing and accepted by the notified body responsible for the design conformity
assessment module, where it exists.
This programme must define test conditions and criteria for acceptance or refusal. The actual values of the essential dimensions and
characteristics of the materials which constitute the equipment tested, shall be measured before the test.
Where appropriate, during tests, it must be possible to observe the critical zones of the pressure equipment with adequate instrumen-
tation capable of registering strains and stresses with sufficient precision.
The test programme must include:
a) A pressure strength test, the purpose of which is to check that, at a pressure with a defined safety margin in relation to the max-
imum allowable pressure, the equipment does not exhibit significant leaks or deformation exceeding a determined threshold.
The test pressure must be determined on the basis of the differences between the values of the geometrical and material char-
acteristics measures under test conditions and the values used for design purposes; it must take into account the differences
between the test and design temperatures.
b) where the risk of creep or fatigue exists, appropriate tests determined on the basis of the service conditions laid down for the
equipment, for instance hold time at specified temperatures, number of cycles at specified stress-levels, etc.
c) where necessary, additional tests concerning other factors referred to in 2.2.1 such as corrosion, external damage, etc.
2.3 Provisions to ensure safe handling and operation:
The method of operation specified for pressure equipment must be such as to preclude any reasonably foreseeable risk in operation
of the equipment. Particular attention must be paid, where appropriate, to:
– closures and openings,
– dangerous discharge of pressure relief blow-off,
– devices to prevent physical access whilst pressure or a vacuum exists,
– surface temperature taking into consideration the intended use,
– decomposition of unstable fluids.
In particular, pressure equipment fitted with an access door must be equipped with an automatic or manual device enabling the user
easily to ascertain that the opening will not present any hazard. Furthermore, where the opening can be operated quickly, the pressure
equipment must be fitted with a device to prevent it being opened whenever the pressure or temperature of the fluid presents a hazard.
2.4 Means of examination:
a) Pressure equipment must be designed and constructed so that all necessary examinations to ensure safety can be carried out.
b) Means of determining the internal condition of the equipment must be available, where it is necessary to ensure the continued
safety of the equipment, such as access openings allowing physical access to the inside of the pressure equipment so that appro-
priate examinations can be carried out safely and ergonomically.
c) Other means of ensuring the safe condition of the pressure equipment may be applied:
– where it is too small for physical internal access, or
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– where opening the pressure equipment would adversely affect the inside, or
– where the substance contained has been shown not to be harmful to the material from which the pressure equipment is made
and no other internal degradation mechanisms are reasonably foreseeable.
2.5 Means of draining and venting:
Adequate means must be provided for the draining and venting of pressure equipment where necessary:
– to avoid harmful effects such as water hammer, vacuum collapse, corrosion and uncontrolled chemical reactions. All stages of
operation and testing, particularly pressure testing, must be considered,
– to permit cleaning, inspection and maintenance in a safe manner.
2.6 Corrosion or other chemical attack:
Where necessary, adequate allowance or protection against corrosion or other chemical attack must be provided, taking due
account of the intended and reasonably foreseeable use.
2.7 Wear:
Where severe conditions of erosion or abrasion may arise, adequate measures must be taken to:
– minimize that effect by appropriate design, e.g. additional material thickness, or by the use of liners or cladding materials,
– permit replacement of parts which are most affected,
– draw attention, in the instructions referred to in 3.4, to measures necessary for continued safe use.
2.8 Assemblies:
Assemblies must be so designed that:
– the components to be assembled together are suitable and reliable for their duty,
– all the components are properly integrated and assembled in an appropriate manner.
2.9 Provisions for filling and discharge:
Where appropriate, the pressure equipment must be so designed and provided with accessories, or provision made for their fitting,
as to ensure safe filling and discharge in particular with respect to hazards such as:
a) on filling:
– overfilling or over pressurization having regard in particular to the filling ratio and to vapour pressure at the reference tem-
perature,
– instability of the pressure equipment.
b) on discharge: the uncontrolled release of the pressurized fluid.
c) on filling or discharge: unsafe connection and disconnection.
2.10 Protection against exceeding the allowable limits of pressure equipment:
Where, under reasonably foreseeable conditions, the allowable limits could be exceeded, the pressure equipment must be fitted
with, or provision made for the fitting of, suitable protective devices, unless the equipment is intended to be protected by other pro-
tective devices within an assembly.
The suitable device or combination of such devices must be determined on the basis of the particular characteristics of the equip-
ment or assembly.
Suitable protective devices and combinations thereof comprise:
a) safety accessories as defined in Article 1, section 2.1.3,
b) where appropriate, adequate monitoring devices such as indicators and/or alarms which enable adequate action to be taken
either automatically or manually to keep the pressure equipment within the allowable limits.
2.11 Safety accessories
2.11.1 Safety accessories must:
– be so designed and constructed as to be reliable and suitable for their intended duty and take into account the maintenance and
testing requirements of the devices, where applicable,
– be independent of other functions, unless their safety function cannot be affected by such other functions,
– comply with appropriate design principles in order to obtain suitable and reliable protection. These principles, include, in partic-
ular, fail-safe modes, redundancy, diversity and self-diagnosis.
2.11.2 Pressure limiting devices:
These devices must be so designed that the pressure will not permanently exceed the maximum allowable pressure PS; however a
short duration pressure surge in keeping with the specifications laid down in 7.3 is allowable, where appropriate.
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154 • Chapter 47

2.11.3 Temperature monitoring devices:

These devices must have an adequate response time on safety grounds, consistent with the measurement function.
2.12 External fire:
Where necessary, pressure equipment must be so designed and, where appropriate, fitted with suitable accessories, or provi-
sion made for their fitting, to meet damage-limitation requirements in the event of external fire, having particular regard to its
intended use.
3. MANUFACTURING
3.1 Manufacturing procedures:
The manufacturer must ensure the competent execution of the provisions set out at the design stage by applying the appropriate
techniques and relevant procedures, especially with a view to the aspects set out below.
3.1.1 Preparation of the component parts:
Preparation of the component parts (e.g. forming and chamfering) must not give rise to defects or cracks or changes in the
mechanical characteristics likely to be detrimental to the safety of the pressure equipment.
3.1.2 Permanent joining:
Permanent joints and adjacent zones must be free of any surface or internal defects detrimental to the safety of the equipment.
The properties of permanent joints must meet the minimum properties specified for the materials to be joined unless other relevant
property values are specifically taken into account in the design calculations.
For pressure equipment, permanent joining of components which contribute to the pressure resistance of equipment and components
which are directly attached to them must be carried out by suitably qualified personnel according to suitable operating procedures.
For pressure equipment in categories II, III and IV, operating procedures and personnel must be approved by a competent third
party which, at the manufacturer’s discretion, may be:
- a notified body,
- a third-party organization recognized by a Member State as provided for in Article 13.
To carry out these approvals the third party must perform examinations and tests as set out in the appropriate harmonized standards
or equivalent examinations and tests or must have them performed.

3.1.3 Non-destructive tests:

For pressure equipment, non-destructive tests of permanent joints must be carried out by suitable qualified personnel. For pres-
sure equipment in categories III and IV, the personnel must be approved by a third-parry organization recognized by a Member
State pursuant to Article 13.
3.1.4 Heat treatment:
Where there is a risk that the manufacturing process will change the material properties to an extent which would impair the safety
of the pressure equipment, suitable heat treatment must be applied at the appropriate stage of manufacture.
3.1.5 Traceability:
Suitable procedures must be established and maintained for identifying the material making up the components of the equipment
which contribute to pressure resistance by suitable means from receipt, through production, up to the final test of the manufactured
pressure equipment.
3.2 Final assessment:
Pressure equipment must be subject to final assessment as described below.
3.2.1 Final inspection:
Pressure equipment must undergo a final inspection to assess visually and by examination of the accompanying documents compli-
ance with the requirements of the Directive. Test carried out during manufacture may be taken into account. As far as is necessary
on safety grounds, the final inspection must be carried out, internally and externally on every part of the equipment, where appro-
priate in the course of manufacture (e.g. where examination during the final inspection is no longer possible).
3.2.2 Proof test:
Final assessment of pressure equipment must include a test for the pressure containment aspect, which will normally take the form
of a hydrostatic pressure test at a pressure at least equal, where appropriate, to the value laid down in 7.4.
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For category I series-produced pressure equipment, this test. may be performed on a statistical basis.
Where the hydrostatic pressure test is harmful or impractical, other tests of a recognized value may be carried out. For tests other
than the hydrostatic pressure test, additional measures, such as non-destructive tests or other methods of equivalent validity, must be
applied before those tests are carried out.
3.2.3. Inspection of safety devices:
For assemblies, the final assessment must also include a check of the safety devices intended to check full compliance with the
requirements referred to in 2.10.
3.3 Marking and labelling:
In addition to the CE marking referred to in Article 15, the following information must be provided:
a) for all pressure equipment:
– the name and address or other means of identification of the manufacturer and, where appropriate, of his authorized representa-
tive established within the Community,
– the year of manufacture,
– identification of the pressure equipment according to its nature, such as type, series or batch identification and serial number,
– essential maximum/minimum allowable limits.
b) depending on the type of pressure equipment, further information necessary for safe installation, operation or use and, where
applicable, maintenance and periodic inspection such as:
– the volume V of the pressure equipment in L,
– the nominal size for piping DN,
– the test pressure PT applied in bar and date,
– safety device set pressure in bar,
– output of the pressure equipment in kW,
– supply voltage in V (volts),
– intended use,
– filling ratio kg/L,
– maximum filling mass in kg,
– tare mass in kg,
– the product group.
c) where necessary, warnings fixed to the pressure equipment drawing attention to misuse which experience has shown might occur.
The CE marking and the required information must be given on the pressure equipment or on a data plate firmly attached to it, with
the following exceptions:
– where applicable, appropriate documentation may be used to avoid repetitive marking of individual parts such as piping compo-
nents, intended for the same assembly. This applies to ~ CE > marking and other marking and labelling referred to in this Annex,
– where the pressure equipment is too small, e.g. accessories, the information referred to in b) may be given on a label attached to
that pressure equipment,
– labelling or other adequate means may be used for the mass to be filled and the warnings referred to in (c), provided it remains
legible for the appropriate period of time.
3.4 Operating Instructions
a) When pressure equipment is placed on the market, it must be accompanied, as far as relevant, with instructions for the user,
containing all the necessary safety information relating to:
– mounting, including assembling of different pieces of pressure equipment,
– putting into service,
– use,
– maintenance including checks by the user;
b) Instructions must cover information affixed to the pressure equipment in accordance with 3.3, with the exception of serial identi-
fication, and must be accompanied, where appropriate, by the technical documents, drawings and diagrams necessary for a full
understanding of these instructions.
c) If appropriate, these instructions must also refer to hazards arising from misuse in accordance with 1.3 and particular features of
the design in accordance with 2.2.3.
4. MATERIALS
Materials used for the manufacture of pressure equipment must be suitable for such application during the scheduled lifetime unless
replacement is foreseen.
Welding consumables and other joining materials need fulfil only the relevant requirements of 4.1, 4.2 (a) and the first paragraph of
4.3, in an appropriate way, both individually and in a joined structure.
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156 • Chapter 47

4.1 Materials for pressurized parts must:

a) have appropriate properties for all operating conditions which are reasonably foreseeable and for all test conditions, and in par-
ticular they should be sufficiently ductile and tough. Where appropriate the characteristics of the materials must comply with
the requirements of 7.5. Moreover, due care should be exercised in particular in selecting materials in order to prevent brittle-
type fracture where necessary; where for specific reasons brittle material has to be used appropriate measures must be taken,
b) be sufficiently chemically resistant to the fluid contained in the pressure equipment; the chemical and physical properties neces-
sary for operational safety must not be significantly affected within the scheduled lifetime of the equipment,
c) not be significantly affected by ageing,
d) be suitable for the intended processing procedures,
e) be selected in order to avoid significant undesirable effects when the various materials are put together.
4.2 a) the pressure equipment manufacturer must define in an appropriate manner the values necessary for the design calculations
referred to in 2.2.3 and the essential characteristics of the materials and their treatment referred to in 4.1.
b) the manufacturer must provide in his technical documentation elements relating to compliance with the materials specifications of
the Directive in one of the following forms:
– by using materials which comply with harmonized standards,
– by using materials covered by a European approval of pressure equipment materials in accordance with Article 11,
– by a particular material appraisal.
c) for pressure equipment in categories III and IV, particular appraisal as referred to in the third indent of (b) must be performed by
the notified body in charge of conformity assessment procedures for the pressure equipment.
4.3 The equipment manufacturer must take appropriate measures to ensure that the material used conforms with the required speci-
fication. In particular, documentation prepared by the material manufacturer affirming compliance with a specification must be
obtained for all materials.
For the main pressure-bearing parts of equipment in categories II, III and IV, this must take the form of a certificate of specific
product control.
Where a material manufacturer has an appropriate quality-assurance system, certified by a competent body established within the
Community and having undergone a specific assessment for materials, certificates issued by the manufacturer are presumed to certi-
fy conformity with the relevant requirements of this section.

SPECIFIC PRESSURE EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS

In addition to the applicable requirements of sections 1 to 4, the following requirements apply to the pressure equipment covered by sec-
tions 5 and 6.
5. FIRED OR OTHERWISE HEATED PRESSURE EQUIPMENT WITH A RISK OF OVERHEATING AS REFERRED TO IN
ARTICLE 3 (1)
This pressure equipment includes:
– steam and hot-water generators as referred to in Article 3, section 1.2, such as fired steam and hot-water boilers, super-heaters and
re-heaters, waste-heat boilers, waste incineration boilers, electrode or immersion-type electrically heated boilers, pressure cook-
ers, together with their accessories and where applicable their systems for treatment of feed water and for fuel supply,
And
– process-heating equipment for other than steam and hot-water generation falling under Article 3, section 1.1, such as heaters for
chemical and other similar processes and pressurized food-processing equipment.
This pressure equipment must be calculated, designed and constructed so as to avoid or to minimize risks of a significant loss of
containment from overheating. In particular it must be ensured, where applicable, that:
a)appropriate means of protection are provided to restrict operating parameters such as heat input, heat take-off and, where applica-
ble, fluid level so as to avoid any risk of local and general overheating,
b) sampling points are provided where required to allow evaluation of the properties of the fluid so as to avoid risks related to
deposits and/or corrosion,
c) adequate provisions are made to eliminate risks of damage from deposits,
d) means of safe removal of residual heat after shutdown are provided,
e) steps are taken to avoid a dangerous accumulation of ignitable mixtures of combustible substances and air, or flame blowback.
6. PIPING AS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 3, SECTION 1.3
Design and construction must ensure:
a) that the risk of overstressing from inadmissible free movement or excessive forces being produced, e.g. on flanges, connections,
bellows or hoses, is adequately controlled by means such as support, constraint, anchoring, alignment and pre-tension,
b) that where there is a possibility of condensation occurring inside pipes for gaseous fluids, means are provided for drainage and
removal of deposits from low areas to avoid damage from water hammer or corrosion,
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 157

c) that due consideration is given to the potential damage from turbulence and formation of vortices; the relevant parts of 2.7 are
applicable,
d) that due consideration is given to the risk of fatigue due to vibrations in pipes,
e) that, where fluids of Group 1 are contained in the piping, appropriate means are provided to isolate take-off pipes the size of
which represents a significant risk,
f) that the risk of inadvertent discharge is minimized; the take-off points must be clearly marked on the permanent side, indicating
the fluid contained,
g) that the position and route of underground piping is at least recorded in the technical documentation to facilitate safe mainte-
nance, inspection or repair.
7. SPECIFIC QUANTITATIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTAIN PRESSURE EQUIPMENT
The following provisions apply as a general rule. However, where they are not applied, including in cases where materials are not
specifically referred to and no harmonized standards are applied, the manufacturer must demonstrate that appropriate mea-
sures have been taken to achieve an equivalent overall level of safety.
This section is an integral part of Annex I. The provisions laid down in this section supplement the essential requirements of sec-
tions 1 to 6 for the pressure equipment to which they apply.
7.1 Allowable stresses
7.1.1 Symbols:
R
e/t yield limit, indicates the value at the calculation temperature of:
– the upper flow limit for a material presenting upper and lower flow limits,
– the 1.0% proof strength of austenitic steel and non-alloyed aluminium,
– the 0.2% proof strength in other cases.
R
m/20 indicates the minimum value of the ultimate strength at 20°C.
R
m/t designates the ultimate strength at the calculation temperature.

7.1.2 The permissible general membrane stress for predominantly static loads and for temperatures outside the range in which creep is
significant must not exceed the smaller of the following values, according to the material used:
– in the case of ferritic steel including normalized (normalized rolled) steel and excluding fine-grained steel and specially heat-
treated steel, 2/3 of Re/t and 5/12 of Rm/20
– in the case of austenitic steel:
– if its elongation after rupture exceeds 30%, 2/3 of Re/t
– or, alternatively, and if its elongation after rupture exceeds 35%, 5/6 of Re/t, and 1/3 of Rm/t
– in the case of non-alloy or low-alloy cast steel, 10/19 of Re/t and 1/3 of Rm/20
– in the case of aluminium, 2/3 of Re/t
– in the case of aluminium alloys excluding precipitation hardening alloys 2/3 of Re/t and 5/12 of Rm/20
7.2 Joint coefficients:
For welded joints, the joint coefficient must not exceed the following values:
– for equipment subject to destructive and non-destructive tests which confirm that the whole series of joints show no significant
defects: 1,
– for equipment subject to random non-destructive testing: 0.85,
– for equipment not subject to non-destructive testing other than visual inspection: 0.7;
If necessary, the type of stress and the mechanical and technological properties of the joint must also be taken into account.
7.3 Pressure limiting devices, particularly for pressure vessels.
The momentary pressure surge referred to in 2.11.2 must be kept to 10% of the maximum allowable pressure.
7.4 Hydrostatic test pressure:
For pressure vessels, the hydrostatic test pressure referred to in 3.2.2 must be no less than:
– that corresponding to the maximum loading to which the pressure equipment may be subject in service taking into account its
maximum allowable pressure and its maximum allowable temperature, multiplied by the coefficient 1.25, or
– the maximum allowable pressure multiplied by the coefficient 1.43, whichever is the greater.
7.5 Material characteristics:
Unless other values are required in accordance with other criteria that must be taken into account, a steel is considered as sufficient-
ly ductile to satisfy 4.1 (a) if, in a tensile test carried out by a standard procedure, its elongation after rupture is no less than
14% and its bending rupture energy measured on an ISO V test-piece is not less than 27 J, at a temperature not greater than 20°C
but not higher than the lowest scheduled operating temperature.
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CANADIAN BOILER AND PRESSURE
VESSEL STANDARDS
Wolf Reinhardt, Nick van den Brekel, and Douglas Rodgers
48.0 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 48 introduces the Canadian boiler and pressure vessel
standards and discusses their relationship to the ASME Code. The
chapter provides the reader with an outline of the Canadian stan-
dards and an appreciation of some of their important characteris-
tics, without going into every detail of these publications. For fur-
ther information, interested readers should consult the text of the
applicable standard(s).
Generally, the Canadian boiler and pressure vessel standards
adopt the applicable ASME BPVC Sections as the base docu-
ments, and then supplement these rules for specific applications
as needed. Also, the standards give the Canada-specific require-
ments for the registration of pressurized components with provincial
or territorial authorities and specific requirements for documenta-
tion, quality control, and inspection.
Non-nuclear pressure vessels and piping are addressed by the
Canadian standard CAN/CSA-B51. A brief outline of the general
rules in Part 1 of this standard is included to give readers a gener-
al sense of the publication. The standard adopts the non-nuclear
construction sections of the ASME Code as well as the ASME
B31 series of standards for piping. An important part of the
Canadian standard deals with registration and assigning of
Canadian Registration Numbers (CRNs); there are also special
rules for unfired vessels, boilers, pipes, and fittings. Parts 2 and 3
of the standard give more detailed rules for liquid natural gas sys-
tems and filling stations; due to their specialized nature, these
rules are not addressed here. A separate standard exists for
pipeline systems (CAN/CSA Z 662), for which only a brief out-
line is given.
The nuclear construction standards generally refer to ASME
BPVC Section III. However, unique features of the Canada
Deuterium Uranium (CANDU®; a registered trademark of Atomic
Energy of Canada Limited) reactor design and licensing basis
necessitate additional or modified requirements. A typical
CANDU® reactor design is described in general terms in this chap-
ter to give the reader the opportunity to appreciate the background
of the Canadian nuclear standards. General requirements, classifi-
cation, registration, and reporting are addressed in the Canadian
standard CAN/CSA-N285.0. For some special components of the
CANDU® system, the rules of Section III are not directly applica-
ble (such as the mobile online refueling machines), and
CAN/CSA-N285.2provides guidelines to ensure a similar level of
CHAPTER
48
safety. The CANDU® reactor core internals use many specialized
components fabricated from high-strength, low-neutron-absorption
zirconium alloys. The CSA-N285.6-series of standards provide
material fabrication and testing requirements for these specialized
components. The CANDU® containment systems, which include
negative-pressure containment systems for multi-unit power plants
and pressure suppression systems, have design requirements
defined in the CAN/CSA-N285.3 and CAN/CSA-N287.1 stan-
dards. The N287 series of standards provides requirements for the
design, construction, and testing of concrete containment struc-
tures. Seismic qualification requirements are defined in the CSA
N289 series of standards; quality assurance program requirements
are provided in the CSA N286 series of standards. Brief sum-
maries of these standards are presented.
The Canadian approach to inservice inspection of nuclear plants
has distinctive characteristics and is, therefore, outlined in some
detail. Periodic inspection requirements for CANDU® plants, the
CANDU® equivalent to ASME BPVC Section XI Inservice
Inspection requirements, are defined in a series of separate stan-
dards. The CAN/CSA-N285.4 standard governs periodic inspec-
tion of primary nuclear systems. Selection of components for peri-
odic inspection and inspection sample sizes are established using
simplified risk-based criteria. This standard includes specialized
inspection requirements, including material property surveillance,
for the zirconium alloy pressure tubes that undergo significant
material and dimensional changes as a result of irradiation. These
pressure tubes are also subject to potential delayed hydride crack-
ing and hydride blister formation and to creep degradation mecha-
nisms, corrosion and deuterium ingress. Complementing the N285.4
standard is the new CSA-N285.8 standard that provides detailed
requirements for evaluating flaws and material properties of
CANDU® zirconium alloy pressure tubes. Periodic inspection of
containment components is addressed in the CSA-N285.5 (for
metallic and plastic containment components, including extensions
to the containment boundary) and CSA-N287.7 standards (con-
crete and structural containment boundary). The requirements in
each of these standards are briefly outlined with interfaces and par-
allels to the ASME Code.
The approach taken by the Canadian boiler and pressure vessel
standards avoids needless duplication of normative efforts and
achieves a high degree of harmonization with the ASME Code.
Also, the presence of the national standards creates a fair and
uniform regulatory environment throughout Canada, although the
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160 • Chapter 48
regulatory jurisdiction for non-nuclear applications lies in the
provincial or territorial domain. For nuclear facilities, the federal
government has assigned regulatory authority to the Canadian
Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC). Due to ongoing efforts for
further harmonization, both within CSA standards and with inter-
national standards, it seems likely that the codes and standards
will continue to converge more in the future.
Additional information on the CSA standards can be obtained
from the Canadian Standards Association, 5060 Spectrum Way,
Suite 100, Mississauga, ON, Canada L4W 5N6 or at www.csa.ca.
48.1 OVERVIEW OF CANADIAN
STANDARDS GOVERNING BOILERS
AND PRESSURE VESSELS
48.1.1 Standards Development in Canada
In Canada, the development and implementation of national
standards is overseen by the Standards Council of Canada (SCC)
[1]. The SCC is a federal Crown corporation with the mandate to
promote efficient and effective standardization. Located in Ottawa,
the SCC has a 15-member governing council and a staff of approx-
imately 80. The organization reports to Parliament through the
Minister of Industry. The SCC carries out a variety of functions
intended to ensure the effective and coordinated operation of stan-
dardization in Canada. It also represents Canada’s interests in stan-
dards-related matters in foreign and international forums. The SCC
is an approximate Canadian equivalent of the American National
Standards Institute (ANSI) and the National Institute for Standards
and Technology (NIST) in the United States.
The SCC accredits organizations that develop standards in
Canada. Accreditation is the verification that an organization has
the competence necessary to carry out a specific function. The
SCC’s accreditation programs are based on internationally recog-
nized guides and standards.
Accredited standards-developing organizations (SDOs) may
submit their standards for approval as National Standards of
Canada. This designation indicates that a standard is the official
Canadian Standard on a particular subject. It also shows that the
development process met certain specified criteria. National
Standards of Canada may be developed in Canada or adopted,
with or without changes, from international standards. The SCC
has accredited four SDOs in Canada.
(a) Bureau de normalisation du Québec (BNQ)
(b) Canadian General Standards Board (CGSB)
(c) Canadian Standards Association (CSA)
(d) Underwriters’ Laboratories of Canada (ULC)
The four Canadian SDOs may develop standards in any subject
area; however, they have generally agreed upon areas of specialty
that reflect the expertise of their technical committees. The
Canadian Standards Association (CSA) [2] is the independent pri-
vate organization that develops standards in the field of boilers
and pressure vessels.
Internationally, the SCC manages Canada’s participation in the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), and regional
standards organizations. It also encourages the adoption and
application of international standards in Canada, and reviews
standards submitted by SDOs for approval as National Standards
of Canada.
48.1.2 Organization of CSA Standards Committees
The CSA technical committees (TCs) are made up of a mem-
bership selected to achieve a required balanced matrix of experts
and interests that represent a cross-section of interests for the
field. The matrix for a typical committee includes representation
from the following groups:
(a) owner/operator/producer
(b) government/regulatory authority
(c) service industry
(d) supplier/fabricator
(e) general interest (including public interest groups like
environmental groups and members of the general public)
Each TC has an executive consisting of a chair, vice chair, and
secretary, all of whom must be approved by the Standards
Steering Committee (SSC). The committee executives are charged
with the organization of all TC work and are the primary interface
with the CSA staff. A full-time project manager from the CSA
supports each technical committee; CSA provides the full range
of services to support the development and publication of stan-
dards.
48.1.3 CSA Standards-Developing Process
The standards-developing process under which CSA and other
SDOs operate is well developed and formally documented and
controlled [3,4]. This process includes eight distinct stages, which
are consistent with international standards development practice
(Fig. 48.1).
(a) Preliminary Stage. Upon receipt of a request for the devel-
opment of a standard, an evaluation is conducted and the
project is submitted for authorization by the SSC. The SSC
considerations include the ability to adopt existing codes
and standards and the business or societal needs for a new
standard.
(b) Proposal Stage. Public notice of intent to proceed is pub-
lished and a TC is formed or the project is assigned to an
existing TC.
(c) Preparatory Stage. A working draft is prepared and a pro-
ject schedule is established.
(d) Committee Stage. The TC or technical subcommittee, facil-
itated by CSA staff, develops the draft through an iterative
process that typically involves several committee meetings.
(e) Inquiry Stage. The draft is offered to the public for review
and comment, the TC reaches consensus, CSA staff conduct
a quality review, and a preapproval edit is completed.
(f) Approval Stage. The TC approves the technical content by
letter ballot or recorded vote. A second-level review verifies
that standards-developing procedures were followed.
(g) Publication Stage. CSA staff conduct a final edit to verify
conformity with the applicable editorial and procedural
requirements, and then publishes and disseminates the
standard.
(h) Maintenance Stage. The standard is maintained with the
objective of keeping it up to date and technically valid. This
may include the publication of amendments, the interpreta-
tion of a standard or clause, and the systematic (5-year)
review of all standards.
In the process of developing or updating a standard, CSA com-
mittee members aim for substantial agreement among the interest
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FIG. 48.1 CSA STANDARD-DEVELOPING PROCESS [4]
groups represented on the committee. The committee matrix is bal-
anced such that no interest group has a control of committee votes.
The committee considers the views of all participants and develops
the content by a consensus process but not necessarily unanimity. If
an issue is complex, special working groups are set up to discuss
the issues and recommend the wording of a clause that states the
technical requirement. The TC members review and discuss the
working group’s recommendation. Once the wording is finalized, a
formal ballot and/or recorded vote is taken. All negative votes must
be resolved before the clause/standard can be adopted. The second-
level reviews, completed in the approval stage, confirm that all
recorded votes (which may occur over an extended time period)
were compliant with the established committee matrix to ensure
balanced substantial agreement has been achieved.
Once a new standard has been developed, it may be sent to the
SCC where it will evaluated to see if it meets the criteria of a
National Standard of Canada. Key criteria for designation as a
National Standard of Canada include the following:
(1) developed by consensus of a balanced committee of stake-
holders
(2) subjected to public scrutiny
(3) published in both official languages (English and French)
(4) consistent with or incorporates existing international and
pertinent foreign standards
(5) does not act as a barrier to trade
National Standards of Canada can be submitted to international
SDOs for consideration and adoption as international standards.
48.1.4 Format and Structure of CSA standards
CSA Canadian standards are given a unique standard
letter/number combination. Nuclear standards are designated
with the letter N (e.g., N285). The year of the latest issue is
appended to the standard number; for example, B51-03 is the
2003 edition of the B51 boiler and pressure vessel standard.
Similarly, N285.0.06 is the 2006 edition of the nuclear standard
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162 • Chapter 48
N285.0. The standards are grouped into clauses (paragraphs)
and subclauses (subpara-graphs) and supplemented with addi-
tional material and forms in annexes. The annexes are designated
either as informative (non-mandatory) or normative (mandato-
ry). Each clause or subclause is uniquely identified by a numeri-
cal scheme indicating the relation-ship of each clause to general
subject matter areas and indicating the hierarchy of specified
requirements.
Canadian standards are typically written as a standard; that is,
the required end product is defined, but the specific means of how
to achieve the end product may not be defined in detail. This
approach to developing a standard is different than other codes
that typically provide much more detailed requirements. It should
be noted that recent updates to CSA standards have tended to
include more detailed requirements so as to minimize discussions
with regulatory authorities on how to demonstrate compliance
with the requirements of a standard.
48.1.5 CSA Publications and Updates Frequency:
Standards, Interpretations, and Inquiries
CSA has the formal requirement for every standard to be
reviewed periodically (on a 5-year cycle) to consider if the stan-
dard should be reaffirmed or withdrawn. At this review, the con-
tinued need for the standard’s ongoing existence is questioned and
addressed. A formal ballot process is used to record the decisions
of the SSC and the TC regarding reaffirmation or withdrawal of
existing standards.
The scope of all new standards, or a revision to an existing
standards is approved by the SSC. The SSC provides oversight
from the major stakeholders to ensure a high-level focus on
potential overlaps among standards, ability to harmonize with
other standards, and ability to streamline complexity and costs of
standards (including implementation costs for new requirements).
Addenda or errata to CSA standards can be issued via publica-
tion of a General Instruction or Update. The issue of a General
Instruction/Update must satisfy all the process requirements for
development of a new standard. If the extent of the General
Instruction/Update is sufficiently large, CSA practice has been to
issue a new edition of the standard. Registered owners of CSA
standards are notified directly of the issuance of General
Instructions/Updates. The CSA publication CSA Info Update,
available on the CSA Web site, is used for public notification of
addenda and errata.
Inquiries and interpretations may be submitted to the CSA staff
for formal action. The CSA staff project manager refers the
request to the chair of the TC for consideration and response. All
interpretations are approved by the TC via the formal balloting
process. Following a decision, the CSA project manager sends a
copy of the interpretation to the requester and publishes the inter-
pretation in a CSA publication, normally CSA Info Update. In
some cases, an interpretation may warrant an amendment to a
standard, and such amendments are issued as a General
Instruction/Updates.
The CSA does not have a process that results in the generation
of Code Cases in a manner similar to ASME BPV Code Cases.
When the TC has determined that the requirements of a standard
should be modified (including provision of alternative require-
ments), a General Instruction/Update is prepared.
48.1.6 Canadian Non-Nuclear Standards
The Canadian non-nuclear standards for boilers, pressure ves-
sels, and piping largely adopt the applicable ASME standards
and supplement them with additional requirements for specific
applications and with detailed governing regulatory require-
ments, such as registration and documentation. A summary of
the standards applicable for various pressurized systems is given
in the following:
(a) Pressure Vessels: General
(1) CAN/CSA-B51, Boilers, Pressure Vessels, and Pressure
Piping (also contains specific regulations for onboard
storage and filling stations for automotive compressed
natural gas and hydrogen fuel)
(b) Pressure Vessels: Special
(1) CAN/CSA-Z662, Oil and Gas Pipeline Systems
(2) CSA-B52, Mechanical Refrigeration Code
(3) CAN/CSA-B149.1, Natural Gas and Propane Installation
Code
(4) CAN/CSA-B149.2, Propane Storage and Handling Code
(5) CAN/CSA-B149.5, Installation Code for Propane Fuel
Systems and Tanks on Highway Vehicles
(6) CAN/CSA-Z180.1, Compressed Breathing Air and
Systems
(7) CAN/CSA-Z305.1, Nonflammable Medical Gas Piping
Systems
The present outline will focus on the general parts of the
CAN/CSA-B51 standard. The development of this standard is
pursued by a TC (main committee) and four subcommittees. The
subcommittees each have a specific area of expertise and develop
the standard in their domain. The subcommittees are the
Association of Chief Inspectors Subcommittee, Subcommittee on
Boilers and Related Components, Editorial Subcommittee, and
Subcommittee on Parts 2 and 3 of CSA Standard B51.
The TC has volunteer members from the pressure vessel manu-
facturers, consultants, provincial regulators, insurers, and CSA
staff members. Members of the subcommittees are typically also
members of the TC, which convenes once per year to vote on rec-
ommendations advanced by the subcommittees.
CAN/CSA-B51 refers to other Canadian standards that supple-
ment its broader requirements, such as the Quality Assurance
Program (Z series), Quality Management Systems (CAN/CSA-
ISO-9001-00), and Welding Specifications (W series).
In addition to the CSA series of standards, several international
standards are used by the B51 standard. Standards, codes, and
specifications in this category include those from the following
organizations:
(1) American National Standards Institute (ANSI) [5,6]
(2) American Petroleum Institute (API) [7]
(3) ASME [8-21]
(4) Copper Development Association (CDA) [22]
(5) Canadian General Standards Board (CGSB; for testing) [23]
(6) International Organization for Standardization (ISO) [24]
(7) Manufacturers Standardization Society of the Valves and
Fitting Industry (MSS) [25]
(8) National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors
(Canada) [26,27]
(9) National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) [28]
(10) Petroleum Association for the Conservation of the
Canadian Environment (PACE) [29]
(11) Rubber Manufacturers Association (RMA) [30]
(12) Underwriters Laboratories of Canada (ULC) [31]
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48.1.7 Canadian Nuclear Standards
In addition to formal Canadian licensing requirements the
design, construction and inspection/maintenance of CANDU®
nuclear reactors follow a prescribed set of standards. The
Canadian suite of standards consists of regulatory and jurisdic-
tional documents, which are normally produced by formal licens-
ing bodies, and a set of standards that are produced jointly by
industry stakeholders. The general approach of the industry is to
adopt existing international/industrial standards, wherever possi-
ble, to draw upon the vast industrial experience and to maintain a
large pool of qualified suppliers and support industry. In large
part, the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code [32,33] has been
adopted or referenced in the Canadian suite of nuclear standards.
Specific Canadian standards have been developed where needed
to address the unique features of the CANDU® design and
specific Canadian licensing requirements. The Canadian standards
specify the application of or complement the use of other interna-
tionally accepted codes and standards wherever practical.
(a) The CSA Nuclear Strategic Steering Committee (NSSC)
consists largely of senior executives and managers from the
industry and regulators, it operates under the auspices of
the CSA and its Board of Directors and Standards Policy
Board. The NSSC’s primary role is to set the long-term
strategic direction for Canadian nuclear standards, and to
provide guidance and sup-port to the TC structure.
There are 11 TCs reporting to the NSSC, each covering distinct
functional areas. Each TC is headed by a chair and consists of tech-
nical experts drawn from across the industry and relevant public
interest groups. The TCs generate standards in the following areas:
(1) N285 (A), pressure-retaining components
(2) N285 (B), periodic inspection
(3) N286, quality assurance/quality management
(4) N287, concrete containment structures
(5) N288, environmental radiation protection
(6) N289, seismic design
(7) N290, safety and safety-related systems
(8) N291, safety-related structures
(9) N292, waste management
(10) N293, fire protection
(11) N294, decommissioning
These 11 TCs, supported by more than 50 subcommittees and
working groups, maintain a suite of 38 published standards and are
working on the development of draft versions for 12 new standards.
(b) In addition to the N series of the CSA standards, CANDU®
reactors use many CSA standards that are developed for
other industrial applications [37]. The key CSA standards
that are applied to CANDU® reactors from these series
include the following:
(1) construction and structural specifications (S series)
(2) construction materials (A series)
(3) electrical codes and standards (C series)
(4) quality assurance program (Z series)
(5) structural steel specification (G series)
(6) tolerance specifications and pressure boundary stan-
dards (B series)
(7) welding specifications (W series)
(c) In addition to the CSA series of standards, numerous other
standards are used in the CANDU® reactor design.
Standards, codes, and specifications in this category
include those from the following organizations:
(1) Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute (cooling
equipment)
(2) Aerospace Material Specifications (materials)
(3) American National Standards Institute (mechanical
equipment)
(4) American Welding Society
(5) ASME [32 – 34]
(6) ASTM
(7) Canadian General Standards Board (testing and
construction materials)
(8) IEEE
(9) Instrument Society of America
(10) National Building Code (Canada) [35]
(11) National Fire Code (Canada) [36]
(12) National Fire Protection Association Fire Code
Further information and background on the Canadian approach
to standardization in the nuclear field are available elsewhere [37].
48.1.8 CANDU® Reactor Design Description
In Canada, all nuclear reactors for power production are of the
CANDU® design. The CANDU® reactor is a pressurized heavy
water reactor (PHWR), using heavy water as both moderator and
as the primary heat transport system (PHTS) coolant. Because
heavy water is an extremely efficient moderator, relatively few
neutrons are lost from the nuclear reaction. The design emphasis
on neutron economy enables the use of natural uranium fuel. This
design feature eliminates the need for uranium enrichment pro-
cessing, although the CANDU® design is adaptable to other fuel
cycles [e.g., the direct use of spent pressurized water reactor
(PWR) fuel in CANDU® (DUPIC)]. The CANDU® design makes
use of multiple horizontal fuel channels that contain the pressur-
ized coolant in a pressure tubes rather than the large pressure ves-
sels of PWR and boiling-water reactor (BWR) reactor designs.
The use of natural uranium results in a generally shorter fuel
cycle than in PWRs or BWRs. However, without the need for ura-
nium-enrichment technology, and combined with the relatively
simple fuel bundle design and on-power refuelling (an exchange
of some of the fuel bundles in a specific fuel channel without a
reactor shutdown), an economically favorable and flexible fuel
cycle is achieved.
The CANDU® reactor core is a large cylindrical vessel (the
calandria) fabricated from austenitic stainless steel and containing
the heavy-water moderator at relatively low temperatures (less
than about 80⬚C) and low pressure. Each end of the calandria ves-
sel is closed with an end shield consisting of two parallel plates
and shielding balls filling the space between the plates. The end-
shield plates are perforated with a square array of holes and
joined by lattice tubes to allow the fuel channels to penetrate the
core. Calandria tubes, made from Zircaloy-2, are connected to the
inner plates of the end shields at each side of the reactor and serve
to isolate the cool moderator from the much hotter reactor cooling
system. The coolant circulates inside a zirconium-alloy pressure
tube inside each calandria tube.
The PHTS (reactor cooling system) of a CANDU® 6 reactor
consists of two loops. Each loop has two pumps in series causing
the coolant to pass through the fuel channels of the reactor core
(at about 10 MPa/1,500 psi). The coolant flows from one pump to
the inlet header at one side of the reactor (at about 250⬚C) and
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164 • Chapter 48
then through feeder pipes to each of the fuel channels. At the out-
let end of the fuel channel, an outlet feeder pipe carries the
coolant to an outlet header (at about 300⬚C) and then to one of
two steam generators in the loop. The coolant exiting the steam
generator passes through the second pump of the loop before
returning through the reactor core to the steam generator in
advance of the first pump (Fig. 48.2). A simplified three-
dimensional view of the PHTS is shown in Fig. 48.3.
The CANDU® fuel channel assembly is the portion of the
PHTS that passes through the reactor core. The number of fuel
channels varies depending on the size (MWe) of the specific reac-
tor; for example, a CANDU® 6 reactor has 380 fuel channels (in
lieu of one large pressure vessel). The major components of this
assembly are the pressure tube and the end fittings, with one at
each end of the fuel channel (Figs. 48.4 and 48.5). The pressure
tube is fabricated from a zirconium alloy, containing 2.5% by
weight niobium as the principal alloying element (UNS R60901),
FIG. 48.2 CANDU® PRIMARY HEAT TRANSPORT SYSTEM
and is approximately 6.3 m long (20 ft) with an inside diameter of
103 mm (about 4 in.). Zirconium alloys are commonly used in
nuclear reactor cores, for purposes of reactor control mechanisms
and fuel cladding, because of their low neutron capture cross-sec-
tion, i.e., high neutron efficiency. As the primary pressure bound-
ary, the high strength and corrosion resistance of the Zr-2.5Nb
alloy are advantageous for pressure tubes. The pressure tube is
connected to the martensitic stain-less steel end fittings by a
rolled joint formed by internal roll expansion of the pressure tube
into grooves on the inside bore of the end fitting.
Each fuel channel is axially positioned within the core by the
positioning assemblies at each end of the fuel channel. Each of the
end fittings is supported within the end shield on two bearings.
The pressure tube and surrounding calandria tube are separated by
a gap that is maintained by the use of annulus spacers, which allow
for relative displacements of the concentric tubes during reactor
startups and shutdowns. The annulus is sealed at the outer end-shield
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FIG. 48.3 THREE-DIMENSIONAL REPRESENTATION OF
THE CANDU® PRIMARY HEAT TRANSPORT SYSTEM
SHOWING CALANDRIA VESSEL (BOTTOM), PRIMARY
PUMPS, AND REPRESENTATIVE STEAM GENERATORS
(UPPER LEVEL) AND INTERCONNECTING PIPING
plates by metallic bellows. The closed annulus is filled with circu-
lating dry CO2 that makes it possible to detect any moisture leak-
ing into the annulus from either the moderator or the PHTS.
The feeder pipes are bolted to the outside of the end fitting to
enable access to the end of the end fitting for on-power refueling of
the reactor. Each fuel channel contains 12 or 13 fuel bundles, some
FIG. 48.4 CANDU® 6 FUEL CHANNEL ASSEMBLY
FIG. 48.5 SIMPLIFIED SCHEMATIC OF CANDU® FUEL
CHANNEL ASSEMBLY IN REACTOR CORE
of which are exchanged during each refueling. On-power refueling
is accomplished using fueling machines that connect to the out-
board end of the end fittings. The channel closure, seal, and shield
plug are retracted into the fueling machine to permit the new fuel to
be inserted at one end of the fuel channel and spent fuel to be
simultaneously removed at the other end. The fueling machine and
fuel channel components are all designed as part of the PHTS.
Reactivity mechanisms are located within the calandria vessel,
between adjacent fuel channels. Two independent shutdown sys-
tems exist to automatically terminate reactor operation, if neces-
sary. The first system consists of vertical rods, containing neu-
tron-absorbing material, that are inserted into the reactor to shut
down the reaction if specified abnormal conditions are detected.
The second system consists of horizontal nozzles, which are at
right angles to the fuel channels, through which a neutron-absorb-
ing solution is injected into the moderator water to halt the chain
reaction (liquid injection system). The two systems have indepen-
dent instrumentation and in-reactor components.
The reactor core and PHTS of a CANDU® reactor are located
within the reactor building (also called a containment building).
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The purposes of the reactor building are to protect workers from
the radiation of the reactor and to contain releases of radioactivity
to the atmosphere in the unlikely event of a release from the core.
The reactor building is designed to withstand the pressurization
resulting from a major break of one of the high-temperature, high-
pressure water systems. The structure is leak-tight, with sealed
penetrations for cables, piping, and airlock entry doors. In multi-
unit stations, the reactor buildings are interconnected by a com-
mon system using a single vacuum building to prevent pressuriza-
tion of the reactor building. Many further details on the CANDU®
design can be found on the CANTEACH Web site [38].
48.1.9 Future CANDU® Developments
The Advanced CANDU® Reactor (ACR®, Fig. 48.6) technolo-
gy is an evolution of the CANDU® 6 reactor with improvements
to deliver enhanced safety margins, lower capital and operating
costs, improved maintenance and high operating performance.
The ACR-1000® is a Generation III+, 1200 megawatt electrical
(MWe) class pressure tube reactor, with a 60-year design life. The
FIG. 48.6 CUTAWAY VIEW OF THE ADVANCED CANDU® REACTOR (ACR) (Source: Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd):
ACR-1000 retains many essential features of the CANDU® plant
design, such as a modular, horizontal fuel channel core, a low-
temperature heavy-water moderator, water-filled shield tank
around the calandria vessel, two independent diverse shutdown
systems, on-power fuelling and a reactor building accessible for
on-power maintenance.
One major objective of the design was to reduce the heavy
water inventory. Therefore, light water coolant was selected while
the moderator is still heavy water. This reduces the operational
loss of heavy water, since the entire inventory is now at low pres-
sure and temperature. The use of light water coolant requires the
reactor to use low-enriched uranium (the level of enrichment
being lower than what light water reactors require). This fuel
results however in improved burnup. The CANFLEX® fuel will
also offer less variation in reactivity during burnup, and makes it
ideally suited to mixed-oxide (MOX) and thorium fuels.
The core size was decreased through a reduced fuel channel
lattice pitch. Besides reducing the heavy water inventory still fur-
ther, it was possible to achieve a flat core neutron flux with
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 167
FIG. 48.7 SCHEMATIC OF GENERATION IV CANDU® SCWR (Source: Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd):
increased stability and increased safety margins due to an opti-
mized power profile and negative power coefficient.
As is used for current CANDU® reactors, the ACR® pressure
tube material remains the zirconium 2.5wt% niobium alloy.
ACR® fuel channel improvements include an increased pressure
tube wall thickness to allow a longer operational life and an
increased pressure for slightly better thermal efficiency. The
ACR® calandria tube was designed to be thicker and stronger than
in the present CANDU® 6 design providing additional confidence
that it will contain a pressure tube rupture.
Due to the large amount of cool moderator in the calandria ves-
sel, which is again surrounded by a large shield tank, the passive
safety characteristics of the present CANDU® design are very
favourable. For ACR®, a long-term cooling system and a reserve
water tank were added. The reserve water tank can add cooling
water by gravity alone.
Other improvements include an enhanced state-of-the-art con-
trol room design with better monitoring and alarm recognition
abilities and human/machine interfaces, and the use of innovative
construction techniques such as modular design to minimize pro-
ject cost and schedule.
Generation IV CANDU® designs are currently in the early
development stages. Generation IV refers to the development and
demonstration of new nuclear energy systems that offer advantages
in the areas of sustainability, economics, safety and reliability, pro-
liferation resistance and physical protection. The effort involves
international cooperation on longer-term or higher-risk research
and development activities. Of the various technologies that were
selected for the cooperative program, Canada will focus on devel-
oping the Supercritical Water Cooled Reactor (SCWR) and also
contribute to the development of the Very High Temperature
Reactor (VHTR). In conjunction with the development effort for
the reactors itself, there are also projects exploring their applica-
tion to generate hydrogen fuel and other process heat applications.
The SCWR development is expected to result in a feasible
design before the VHTR. The following remarks will therefore
concentrate on the SCWR. The SCWR would use light water
coolant that is heated above the critical temperature where the dis-
tinction between liquid and vapor vanishes. The intended outlet
temperature would be 650⬚C at an operating pressure of 25 MPa.
These process parameters would allow a thermal cycle efficiency
of 45% or more, and would also be sufficient for some processes
that generate hydrogen from water. Electricity generation would
be direct cycle, as the process parameters would be not unlike
those found in current fossil generation plants (Figure 48.7).
The SCWR design would be based on a further development of
the ACR. The advantages of the CANDU® concept for SCWR
would include that the substantial density changes in the core as
the supercritical water gets heated are not expected to be a prob-
lem since the moderator is separated. The coolant would be inside
the relatively small-diameter pressure tubes, which offers advan-
tages over a larger size vessel at high pressures and temperatures.
A multipass core for higher temperatures could be achieved rela-
tively easily. For passive safety, the moderator would be cooled by
natural circulation, which might eliminate the risk of core melting.
The key feature of the SCWR CANDU®-type design would be
a pressure-tube fuel channel with an internal ceramic insulator
and liner. The insulator and liner would separate the pressure tube
from the hot supercritical water, such that the pressure boundary
(tube) would be at the low moderator temperature. A calandria
tube would then not be necessary. Obviously, the described con-
cept relies heavily on the integrity of the insulting layers, which is
one important area of ongoing research.
Other important research topics include the selection of materi-
als and design of components that need to withstand the high
temperatures and pressures. Reactor physics, chemistry and
required fuel characteristics need to be explored. Development is
also needed for the control mechanisms and instrumentation of
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168 • Chapter 48
the reactor. Given the high energy content of the coolant, safety
issues would have to be considered.
Finally, design and acceptance standards will be developed, as
the current Canadian standards do not address high-temperature
issues. Additional details of the matter presented here can be
found in the literature, e.g. [47].
48.2 CSA NON-NUCLEAR BOILER,
PRESSURE VESSEL, AND PIPING
DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION
STANDARDS
48.2.1 CAN/CSA-B51 Boiler, Pressure Vessel and
Pressure Piping Code
48.2.1.1 Introduction. CSA-B51-03 is currently in its sixteenth
edition since the original issue in 1939. The standard applies to all
pressure vessels except pressure-retaining systems in hydraulic
elevators, pressure containment systems for gas-filled switch gear
and control gear, and pressure vessels for the trans-portation of
dangerous goods regulated by Transport Canada. The standard is
not applicable to vessels with a maximum working pressure of 103
kPa (15 psig). The primary units of the standard are metric.
The latest issue of the B51 standard is designated as B51-03
and was published in March of 2003. The standard is revised
and reissued as the need arises, not on a fixed schedule. In prac-
tice, the period between editions has been between 2 and 6
years. Revisions to the standard are the responsibility of the TC
and its subcommittees, which address specific issues. The sub-
committees advance recommendations for changes and addi-
tions to the standard at the annual meeting of the TC for
ballot/recorded vote; the final adoption is by letter ballot.
Subsequently, each province or territory must adopt the latest
edition of the standard to give it the force of law. Each province
designates a governmental or independent agency that acts as
regulator and performs the registration of components. For
example, in New Brunswick, the Department of Public Safety of
the provincial government oversees the inspection and registra-
tion of pressure vessels, whereas in Ontario, the provincial gov-
ernment has delegated this task to the Technical Standards and
Safety Authority (TSSA).
Formal inquiries and requests for interpretation can be
addressed to the B51 TC, which refers each one to the appropriate
subcommittee. The latter decides on a proposed response and
returns it to the TC. The final reply is issued after the annual
meeting of that committee.
The philosophy of the B51 standard is to adopt the ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code as a proven basis for the design,
fabrication, and inspection of pressure vessels and piping. Where
necessary, this is supplemented with Canada-specific additional
requirements. This has the additional advantage of ensuring a
large degree of harmonization between the U.S. and Canadian
approaches to pressure vessel safety. In developing the standard,
the CSA TC has worked closely with the National Board of
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors in the United States and
with the ASME BPVC committees.
The standard has three parts as follows:
(a) Part 1 contains requirements for boilers, pressure vessels,
pressure piping, and fittings. Its primary objectives are to
promote safe design, construction, installation, operation,
inspection, testing, and repair practices, and to facilitate the
adoption of uniform requirements by Canadian jurisdictions.
(b) Parts 2 and 3 give more detailed rules for automotive liquid
natural gas and hydrogen systems and filling stations. Due
to their specialized nature, these rules are not addressed in
this chapter. The Standard also includes eight appendices/
annexes, seven of which are informative (non-mandatory)
only.
48.2.1.2 Structure of the Standard
(a) Part 1: Boilers, Pressure Vessels, and Pressure Piping
(1) Scope
(2) Reference Publications
(3) Definitions
(4) General Requirements
(5) Identification
(6) Boilers and Related Components
(7) Pressure Vessels
(8) Piping and Fittings
(9) Refrigeration Equipment
(10) Fired-Heater Pressure Coils in Petroleum and
Chemical Plant Service
(11) Repairs and Alterations
(b) Annexes
(1) A (informative): Burial of Pressure Vessels
(2) B (informative): Quality Control Program for Defect
Prevention and Inservice Reliability
(3) C (informative): Guidelines for Safety Valve, Relief
Valve, and Safety-Relief Valve Repair
(4) D (informative): Sample Forms
(5) E (informative): Inspection of Welds in Pressure Coils
Exposed to Direct Radiant Heat
(6) F (informative): Quality Control Program Manufacturers
of Fittings
(7) G (normative): Automotive Propane Vessel Standards
(8) H (informative): Overpressure Protection Devices
(c) Part 2: High-Pressure Cylinders for the On-Board Storage
of Natural Gas and hydrogen as Fuels for Automotive
Vehicles
(d) Part 3: Compressed Natural Gas and Hydrogen Refueling
Station Pressure Piping Systems and Ground Storage Vessels
The following provides only an overview of important regula-
tions of the standard. For details, the reader is referred to the orig-
inal text. The standard can be obtained from the CSA, 5060
Spectrum Way, Suite 100, Mississauga, ON, Canada L4W 5N6,
or at www.csa.ca.
48.2.1.3 Registration. CSA-B51 requires all boilers, pres-sure
vessels, fittings, fire-heated pressure coils, and pressure piping to
be registered with the (provincial) regulatory authority. For regis-
tration, drawings, specifications, and calculations must be submit-
ted and the working medium (substance) must be identified. Once
a design has been registered, it can be fabricated in any numbers
unless it is later found defective, or relevant changes in the applic-
able standards occur. Designs that do not conform to the B51 stan-
dard may only be used with a complete review and written per-
mission from the regulatory authority.
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Fittings are categorized into categories A – H depending on
their function, as given in Table 48.1.
Each category (but not each fitting) must be registered separately
by the manufacturer with the provincial regulator, or, if permitted
in the specific province of application, with a nationally recog-
nized organization such as the CSA. The registration of fittings
requires proper identification and either conformance to national
standards, such as ASME BPVC Section VIII, Division 1 (UG44)
[12] or ASME B31.3 (Table 326.1) [16], or a proof test. Quality
programs for fittings must be validated every 5 years.
Upon registration of pressure component designs and
specifications, a registration number is assigned by the regulatory
authority. This task lies with specific provincial agencies, and the
design is registered for a specific province or territory. The regis-
tration number is appended with a number or letter designating
the province in which the design was registered (e.g., a number
could be assigned as CRN 357.5, where the appended 5 stands for
the province of Ontario). If the design is subsequently registered
in another province, the appropriate additional number is appended.
A design that has been registered in a single province may be sub-
mitted subsequently to all other provinces and territories simulta-
neously, upon which a C would be appended to its registration
number (e.g., 357.5C).
Beside the pressure components themselves, welding or braz-
ing procedures need to be registered as well. Registration is
required in the province where the operation is to be performed,
or at the place of installation if the equipment is manufactured
outside Canada. Procedures and qualifications must be in accor-
dance with ASME BPVC Section IX [13] or the code to which
the equipment is manufactured or installed.
When the construction of a pressurized component has been
completed, inspections must be performed as required by the
ASME construction code, and a manufacturer’s data report, coun-
tersigned by the inspector, must be submitted to the regulatory
authority. Fabrication inspections are required for any equipment
above the sizes specified in the standard.
Any inservice repairs or alterations must be approved by the
regulatory authority that has the jurisdiction at the installation
site. The owner is responsible for keeping the equipment in safe
working order. Manufacturers and organizations that modify or
repair pressurized equipment must demonstrate to the regulatory
authority that they have a quality control program. Valid quality
control programs may follow CSA-Z299 or ISO 9001 [24]. A
Certificate of Authorization from ASME is considered sufficient
proof of an acceptable quality control system.
48.2.1.4 Identification. Boilers, other pressure vessels, and
pressure-relief devices must be equipped with a nameplate in
accordance with the appropriate section of the ASME Code; the
nameplate must also indicate the CRN. Additional nameplates are
required for alterations, rerating, and such. Boilers, pressure ves-
sels, and safety/relief devices must also be stamped as described in
the ASME Code (or equivalent if another construction standard is
used).
48.2.1.5 Boilers. For boilers, the Canadian standard requires
construction according to the applicable sections of the ASME
Code. In particular, the standard references Section I [8]; Section
II, Parts A, B, C, and D [9]; Section IV [10]; Section V [11];
Section VIII, Division 1, 2, and 3 [12]; and Section IX [13]. Along
with the provisions of the ASME Code, the standard has an age
limitation for lag-seam riveted boilers and supplementary require-
ments for the visibility of water gauges in boiler installations. It
gives requirements for low water cut-off (i.e., interruption of the
fuel supply at low water level), dampers, accessibility of boiler
installations, and minimum manhole sizing. Additional require-
ments concern the discharge from blowoff systems and thermal
fluid heaters and piping. Finally, a proof test is required for cast
iron boilers.
48.2.1.6 Pressure Vessels. Unfired pressure vessels are to be
constructed in accordance with ASME BPVC Section II, Parts A,
B, C, and D [9]; Section V [11]; Section VIII, Division 1, 2, or 3
[12]; Section IX [13]; Section X [14]; and ASME PVHO-1 [21].
In addition to ASME requirements, impact tests are required for
carbon steel components of vessels with a minimum design metal
temperature below ⫺46⬚C (⫺50⬚F).
The standard requires adequate clearances around the vessel for
maintenance and operation, including access aids such as walk-
ways or ladders.
For buried propane tanks, the use of CAN/CSA-B149.2 is man-
dated. For other buried pressure vessels, the regulations give guid-
ance to ensure adequate corrosion protection through sacrificial
cathodic systems (following CAN/ULC-S603.1 [31] or other sim-
ilar protective measures). The effectiveness of the protection must
be monitored. Minimum manhole sizing requirements are as for
boilers.
48.2.1.7 Other Vessels. Some special rules are provided for
water heaters, hot-water tanks, hydropneumatic tanks, and cush-
ion tanks. Mostly, the rules of ASME BPVC Section VIII,
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170 • Chapter 48
Division 1 [12] are required, but equipment below certain sizes
and performance limits is exempted from the rules of the
CSAB51 standard.
Blowoff vessels of specified minimum size and rating are
required to collect blowoff from boiler installations. Handholes
and drains are required for these blowoff vessels. Special rules
apply to vessels in anhydrous ammonia service and in liquefied
petroleum gas and natural gas liquids service.
48.2.1.8 Piping. For piping and fittings, the standards governing
design, material, construction, installation, inspection, testing, and
repair are as follows:
(a) ASME B31.1 [15]
(b) ASME B31.3 [16]
(c) ASME B31.4 [17]
(d) ASME B31.5 [18]
(e) ASME B31.9 [19], except for the use of soldered joints for
air piping
(f) CAN/CSA-B149.1, Natural Gas and Propane Installation
Guide
(g) CAN/CSA-B149.2, Propane Storage and Handling Code
(h) CAN/CSA-Z180.1, Compressed Breathing Air and Systems
(i) CAN/CSA-Z305.1, Nonflammable Medical Gas Piping
System
(j) CAN/CSA-Z305.3, Pressure Regulators, Gauges, and Flow-
Metering Devices for Medical Gases
(k) CAN3-Z305.4, Qualification Requirements for Agencies
Testing Nonflammable Gas Piping Systems
(l) CAN/CSA-Z662, Oil and Gas Pipeline Systems
(m) RMA IP-2, (Rubber Manufacturer’s Association) The 1996
Hose Handbook [30]
Design, construction, installation, inspection, testing, and repair
of refrigeration equipment should follow the CSA B52 standard
(Mechanical Refrigeration Code).
Fired-heater pressure coils in petroleum and chemical plant ser-
vice are to be constructed according to ASME BPVC Section I
[8], ASME B31.1 [15], or ASME B31.3 [16] and API 530 [7].
The design and service conditions must be identified by the
owner. Full inspection is required for welds that are exposed to
direct radiant heat.
48.2.1.9 Special Issues. The standard acknowledges that repairs
and inservice alterations may not be fully covered by the specified
construction codes. However, the factor of safety specified in the
applicable ASME Code section shall be maintained.
Part 2 of the B51-03 standard contains requirements for high-
pressure cylinders for the on-board storage of natural gas as a
fuel for automotive vehicles. It has been harmonized with ISO
11439:2000, Gas Cylinders-High-Pressure Cylinders for the
On-Board Storage of Natural Gas as a Fuel for Automotive
Vehicles. In addition, the CSA subcommittee responsible for
developing Part 2 has consulted with the ANSI committee
responsible for developing ANSI NGV2-2000, Basic Require-
ments for Compressed Natural Gas Vehicle (NGV) Fuel
Containers.
Part 3 contains requirements for compressed natural gas refuel-
ing station pressure piping systems and ground storage vessels.
These requirements have been allotted a separate part of the stan-
dard to emphasize the differences between them and the require-
ments of Part 1, and thus to facilitate their application.
48.2.1.10 Conclusions and Comparison to ASME Code. The
B51 standard adopts the ASME Code as the primary document
governing the construction of pressure vessels. For specific appli-
cations, the ASME Code rules are supplemented with additional
Canadian requirements. Additional rules are specified to a greater
extent for compressed fuel gas (natural and petroleum gas and hro-
gen) for auto-motive applications (content of B51-03 Parts 2 and 3)
and for pipeline systems, for which a separate detailed standard
exists (CAN/CSA-Z662; see below for a short summary of the
contents). The B51 standard also goes beyond the ASME Code in
specifying details for regulatory purposes like registration num-
bers and Canadian inspection requirements.
48.2.1.1 Future Developments
Updates to the 2003 B51 standard were issued in 2004 and
2005. Substantial changes in these concerned mainly Part 2 and
Part 3 of the standard, where rules for hydrogen as an automotive
fuel have been developed. These updates will be incorporated into
the new edition of the standard, which will be published in 2008.
Part 1 of the standard, which addresses boilers and pressure ves-
sels, has only undergone minor changes. No significant further
developments are expected in the near term in this part. Further
developments in Parts 2 and 3 are likely if the use of hydrogen as
an automotive fuel becomes more widespread.
48.2.2 CSA-Z662, Oil and Gas Pipeline Systems
(a) This standard will not be discussed in detail because of the
more specialized nature of the topic. However, the organi-
zation of the contents is reproduced here to provide a topi-
cal outline of the 2003 edition. The interested reader is
referred to the full text of the standard.
(1) Scope
(2) Reference Publications
(3) Definitions
(4) Design: design conditions; design criteria; valve loca-
tion and spacing; selection and limitation of piping
joints; flexibility and stress analysis; cover and clear-
ance; crossings; requirements for pipelines in proximi-
ty to electrical transmission lines and associated facili-
ties; design of compressor stations and pump stations;
liquid storage in oil pipeline pump stations, tank farms,
and terminals; gas storage in pipe-type and bottle-type
holders; vaults; pressure control and overpressure pro-
tection of piping; instrument, control, and sampling pip-
ing; leak detection capability; odorization
(5) Materials: qualification of materials, steel materials and
gaskets, other materials, sour service, oilfield water ser-
vice, cement-mortar linings, reuse of materials, records
of materials
(6) Installation: activities and pipeline rights-of-way, pipe
surface requirements applicable to steel piping, electri-
cal test leads on pipeline systems, inspection, precau-
tions to avoid the explosion of gas-air mixtures and
uncontrolled fires during installation
(7) Joining: arc and gas welding: classification, welding
equipment, materials, qualification of welding proce-
dure specification, testing for qualification of welding
procedure specification and qualification of welders,
qualification of welders, production welding, inspection
and testing of production welds, standards of accept-
ability for nondestructive evaluation, repair of welds
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 171
containing repairable defects, materials and equipment
for radiographic inspection, production of radiographs,
ultrasonic inspection of circumferential butt welds in
piping, explosion welding, mechanical interference fit
joints
(8) Pressure Testing: strength and leak tests, testing of fab-
ricated items, tie-ins, maximum operating pressure,
pressure-test records, safety during pressure test, dis-
posal of pressure test mediums, test head assemblies,
testing procedures and techniques
(9) Corrosion Control: external corrosion control of buried
or submerged piping systems, external corrosion con-
trol of piping exposed to the atmosphere, internal cor-
rosion control, corrosion control records
(10) Operating, Maintenance, and Upgrading: operating
and maintenance procedures, records, safety, right-of-
way inspection and maintenance, operation and main-
tenance of facilities and equipment, change of class
location and crossings of existing pipelines, evaluation
of imperfections and repair of piping containing
defects, maintenance welding, pipeline hot tabs,
integrity of pipeline systems, odorization, abandon-
ment of piping
(11) Offshore Steel Pipelines: design, materials, installation,
joining, pressure testing, corrosion control, operating
and maintenance
(12) Gas Distribution Systems: applicability; gas containing
hydrogen sulphide; design; materials; installation; join-
ing; pressure testing; corrosion control; operating,
maintenance, and upgrading
(13) Plastic Pipelines: fibre-reinforced composite pipeline;
thermoplastic-lined pipeline; polyethylene pipeline for
gathering, multiphase, LVP, and oilfield water services
(14) Oilfield Steam Distribution Pipelines: design, materials,
joining, pressure testing, corrosion control, commis-
sioning and operation
(15) Aluminium Piping: applicability; specific definition-
sour service; design; materials; installation; joining;
pressure testing; corrosion control; operating, mainte-
nance, and upgrading; offshore pipelines; gas distribution
pipelines
(b) Annexes (informative)
(1) A, Reference Organizations
(2) B, Guidelines for Risk Assessment of Pipelines
(3) C, Limit States Design
(4) D, Guidelines for Inservice Inspection of Piping for
Corrosion Imperfections
(5) E, Recommended Practice for Liquid Hydrocarbon
Pipeline System Leak Detection
(6) F, Slurry Pipeline Systems
(7) G, Precautions to Avoid Explosions of Gas-Air
Mixtures and Uncontrolled Fires During Construction
Operations
(8) H, Pipeline Risk Dictionary
(9) J, Recommended Practice for Determining the
Acceptability of Imperfections in Fusion Welds Using
Engineering Critical Assessment
(10) K, Standards of Acceptability for Circumferential Pipe
Butt Welds Based on Fracture Mechanics Principles
(11) L, Test Methods for Coating Property Evaluation
48.3 CSA NUCLEAR BOILER AND
PRESSURE VESSEL DESIGN AND
CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS
48.3.1 Overview
CSA-N285.0 incorporates the general requirements for the
design, fabrication, and installation of pressure-retaining systems,
components, and their supports in CANDU® nuclear power
plants. The standard makes extensive reference to ASME BPVC
Section III. CSA N285.2 addresses requirements for CANDU®-
specific components for which the rules of the ASME Code [32]
are insufficient or nonexistent. Rules for containment system
components are contained in CSA-N285.3, which largely refer-
ences ASME BPVC Section III, Subsection NE [32]. The CSA-
N285.1 standard addressing Classes 1, 2, and 3 components was
abandoned; it predominantly cross referenced the applicable sec-
tions of the ASME Code and was included in CSA-N285.0.
The following gives an overview of the N285 standards that
provide design and construction requirements:
(1) N285.0 General Requirements for Pressure-Retaining
Systems and Components in CANDU® Nuclear
Power Plants
(2) N285.2 Requirements for Class 1C, 2C, and 3C
Pressure-Retaining Components and Supports in
CANDU® Nuclear Power Plants
(3) N285.3 Requirements for Containment System
Components in CANDU® Nuclear Power Plants
(4) N285.6 Material Standards for Reactor Components for
CANDU® Nuclear Power Plants
The motivation for the Canadian nuclear standards comes mostly
from special features of the CANDU® reactor system, which is dif-
ferent from U.S. nuclear plants in several important ways. See
para. 48.1.8 for a brief overview of the CANDU® system.
Specifically, the objectives of the CSA N285 standards are to
do the following:
(a) Establish technical requirements for pressure boundary
items of CANDU® power reactors in a format that regulato-
ry authorities can reference.
(b) Establish requirements for each class of system or compo-
nent consistent with the regulations of the CNSC.
(c) Reference applicable requirements of the ASME Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code when they are appropriate to
CANDU® power reactors.
(d) Specify requirements for materials and modified rules for
design, fabrication, installation, quality assurance, and
inspection of pressure-retaining components and supports
when the requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code are not established for CANDU® power reactors.
(e) Establish rules for the periodic inservice inspection of
CANDU® nuclear power plants.
The N286 series of standards provides quality assurance pro-
gram requirements for all phases of CANDU® nuclear power plant
design, fabrication, and operation. The N287 series of standards
provides requirements for the design, construction, and testing of
CANDU® concrete containment structures and systems. The N289
series of standards addresses requirements for seismic qualification
of CANDU® plant structures and systems. Brief overviews of each
of these standards are provided in the following sections.
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172 • Chapter 48
48.3.2 CSA-N285.0, General Requirements for
Pressure-Reetaining Systems and Components
in CANDU® Nuclear Power Plants
48.3.2.1 Nuclear Classification. In the classification of nuclear
systems, the CSA-N285.0 standard goes beyond the ASME Code
in defining the following classes:
(a) Class 1: components of the systems that directly remove
heat from the nuclear fuel, the failure of which would cause
a loss of coolant accident (LOCA); ASME BPVC Section
III, Subsection NB [32] applies.
(b) Class 2: sections of pressure-retaining systems that penetrate
the containment and form part of the containment boundary;
ASME BPVC Section III, Subsection NC [32] applies.
(c) Class 3: sections of systems that are not Class 1 or 2 and
contain radioactive material with an activity exceeding the
equivalent of 74 GBq/kg (2 Ci/kg) tritium concentration;
ASME BPVC Section III, Subsection ND [32] applies.
(d) Class 4: containment system components; the standard
CSA-N285.3 and, through it, ASME, BPVC Section III,
Subsection NE (Class MC components) [32] apply.
(e) Class 6: sections of systems that do not contain radioactive
material with an activity above the equivalent of 74 GBq/kg
(2 Ci/kg) tritium concentration and components other than
registered vessels with an inlet nominal diameter of NPS 3/4
or less; the standard CAN/CSA-B51 and, through it, ASME
BPVC Section VIII, Division 1 or 2 [12], or, for piping,
ASME B31.1 [15], apply, with slight changes in the formal
documentation of inspection.
(f) Classes 1C, 2C, and 3C: components that should be Class 1,
2, or 3 from their function, but for which requirements are
not given in CSA-N285.0 or for which these requirements
cannot be applied. These are special CANDU® components
for which, due to their function or design, the rules of the
ASME Code are insufficient. CSA-N285.2 describes the
components and applicable rules for Classes 1C, 2C, and 3C.
The classification system gives rise to the question, why is there
no Class 5? The original intent was to define a Class 5, Special, for
components with such specialized functions in the CANDU® sys-
tem that application of the ASME Code rules was not feasible.
However, it was later decided to drop Class 5 in favor of Classes
1C, 2C, and 3C, because it seemed more logical to classify and reg-
ulate these components according to the same function-al system as
all other components. Furthermore, it was felt that a single class of
its own might be used to relax the stringency of the rules compared
to the ASME Code rules for other components.
Generally, adjoining systems with different classifications must
be separated by a valve that is normally closed or closes automati-
cally or by a flow restrictor. The only exceptions are adjoining
Class 6 systems with nominal diameter NPS 3/4 or smaller.
Multicompartment vessels such as heat exchangers can have dif-
ferent classifications for different compartments. Emergency
coolant injection and shutdown systems must generally be Class 1.
Normally, the standards to be used are those in effect at the
time of construction or modification. Code Cases of the ASME
Code may be used if agreed to by the regulatory authority.
48.3.2.2 Responsibilities. The CSA N285.0 standard defines the
responsibilities of the licensee, plant designer, system designer,
component designer, fabricator, and installer. The responsibilities
are similar to those defined in ASME BPVC Section III, Subsection
NCA [32], but more detailed.
The licensee is responsible for obtaining the required site and
operating licenses, the overall plant quality assurance system, and
the operation of the plant.
The plant designer prepares the design specifications and has to
get the systems classification approved by the regulatory authority.
Another responsibility is the preparation of an overpressure
protection report and the review of documents from the providers
of the other functions.
The system designer prepares flowsheets, specifications, and
related documents for a particular system (e.g., steam generation
system or shutdown system). The preparation of a design report
and registration of the design with the authorized inspection
agency of the province of installation is also within the responsi-
bility of this function.
The component designer must prepare the drawings, calcula-
tions, and design reports. The component design must be regis-
tered with the authorized inspection agency of the province of
installation. Finally, oversight of the fabricator falls into the com-
ponent designer’s responsibilities.
The fabricator must create the shop fabrication documents and
drawings, and establish the fabrication quality assurance program.
Records of the required tests and examinations must be provided,
and the required permanent record that will become part of the
history docket must be forwarded to the licensee.
The installer’s task is to prepare the installation documents and
drawings, notify and apply for approval if systems need to be
changed, and prepare an inspection and test plan for each system.
Where necessary, the piping installation records of the required
tests and examinations must be provided, and the required perma-
nent record that will become part of the history docket must be
forwarded to the licensee owner.
48.3.2.3 Registration
(a) Registration of specific designs is required, generally in the
province (or territory) of installation. In particular, registra-
tion is required for the following:
(1) piping systems, vessels, supports, pumps, and fittings
(2) Class 1/2/3 or 1C/2C/3C systems and components with
a design pressure greater than 103 kPa
(3) Class 2, 2C, or 4 containment systems and components
with a design pressure greater then 35 kPa
(4) Class 6 systems and components in accordance with
CSA B51
(5) welding procedures, to be registered in the province of
fabrication (except for fabrication outside Canada)
(b) A system registration requires the following documents:
(1) list of documents submitted
(2) certified system design specification
(3) system classification and record of acceptance by the
regulatory authority
(4) certified system flowsheet
(5) certified design report, when required by the ASME
Code
(6) overpressure protection report
(7) the Licensee’s review and acceptance of the design
report
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 173
(8) for manufacture outside of Canada, the name of an
authorized inspection agency
(c) A component registration requires the following documents:
(1) list of documents submitted
(2) certified component design specification
(3) component classification and record of acceptance by
the regulatory authority
(4) general arrangement and shop drawing to prove com-
pliance with the N285 Standard
(5) certified design report, if required in the N285 standard
(6) the Licensee’s review and acceptance of the design
report, general arrangement drawing, and load capacity
data sheets for supports
(7) for manufacture outside of Canada, the name of an
authorized inspection agency
(d) The registration of a fitting requires less elaborate docu-
mentation. Overpressure protection fittings require a capac-
ity certification test report. See para. 48.2.1 on the B51 stan-
dard for categories of fittings.
The applicant for system registration is the system designer.
For components, the component designer submits the application
for registration. Welding procedures are to be submitted by the
fabricator or installer.
Provisional registration can be obtained if a required design
report or final drawing is not complete at the time of application.
Manufacturing or installation shall not begin before the
Authorized Inspection Agency has accepted at least a provisional
registration. An application for provisional registration requires
only a certified provisional report and general arrangement draw-
ings showing materials and thicknesses of the external boundary.
Any modifications or repairs to the design require approval from
the regulatory authority.
The Authorized Inspection Agency will assign a registration
number for each registration. The registration number contains
information about the type of registration (e.g., system, vessel,
welding procedure) and the province(s) of registration. For exam-
ple, a Class 1 vessel might be registered as NV-1-123 45, where
NV denotes a nuclear vessel, -1 is the classification, -123 is the
registration number, and 45 represents the two provinces in which
the design was registered.
48.3.2.4 Design Documentation. For an entire plant, a system
classification list and an overpressure protection report must be
produced.
The system classification list identifies all the nuclear and non-
nuclear, pressure-retaining systems and provides the classification
of these systems. It also specifies the effective dates for standards
and the seismic category. It contains the formal identification of
the systems with flowsheet number, registration number, and
such, and is continually updated during construction of the plant
and thereafter whenever changes are made.
The overpressure protection report lists, for each system and
component, its function, and the report describes the types of
overpressure protection devices, set pressures, and capacities. It
addresses the system fluids that could be discharged, isolatability,
and testability.
For each (piping) system, a system design specification, system
design report, and system flowsheet is required.
The piping system design specification must define the basic
requirements of the system, like functional and performance
requirements, safety requirements, environmental conditions, and
material requirements, among others. It must give a design
description and the derived requirements. The envisioned operat-
ing conditions must be described and specified. The standard
mandates a categorization, following para. NCA-2142 of ASME
BPVC Section III, Subsection NCA [32], into four classes. Level
A service loading encompasses the normal and planned operating
conditions that occur frequently. For safety systems, this includes
the designed response to abnormal plant conditions as well as the
normal standby condition. Level B loading consists of deviations
from the intended Level A conditions that occur frequently
enough to be relevant for the evaluation of cyclic effects. Level C
conditions are unplanned events that are anticipated to occur no
more than 25 times during the design life of the component. The
design basis earthquake is to be included in this level. Local per-
manent deformation of components is acceptable. Level D condi-
tions are unplanned anticipated events with an expected frequency
of no more than two times over the design life. Structural integrity
must be maintained, but gross deformation is acceptable.
For Class 1, the design specification must contain detailed
descriptions of service loading and cycles; for Classes 2 and 3,
the service cycles need not be described in detail. Design and test
loadings must also be specified. Load combinations for each ser-
vice loading category must be defined. Acceptance criteria are to
be given as required by para. NCA-2143 of ASME BPVC Section
III, Subsection NCA [32].
The piping system design report demonstrates that the applica-
ble acceptance criteria are satisfied for a specific system.
Loadings applied to supports and adjacent components must be
determined and evaluated.
For each system, a system flowsheet must be produced. The
flowsheet provides reference for system information such as sys-
tem boundaries; the design, operating, and test pressures; con-
tained fluids; and containment penetrations.
Each component must have a design specification, a design
report, and a general arrangement drawing.
The component design specification should be in accordance
with para. NCA-3250 and Appendix B of ASME BPVC Section III
[32]. Its objectives and contents are similar to those of the system
design specification, which can be referenced to avoid duplication.
The component design report demonstrates that the specified
service limits and acceptance criteria are satisfied following the
guidelines contained in para. NCA-3550 and Appendix C of
ASME BPVC Section III [32].
For standard supports, a general arrangement drawing and a
load capacity data sheet must be supplied. Nonstandard supports
require a certified design specification, a certified design report,
and a general arrangement drawing.
Depending on the individual requirements, which are discussed
in more detail in the standard, the following processes may be
required in conjunction with the document preparation:
(a) certification of documents
(b) review of design report
(c) design verification
Design specifications, design reports, and overpressure protec-
tion reports must be certified, when required by ASME BPVC
Section III [32], as meeting the requirements of the standard by a
registered engineer competent in the applicable field of design.
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174 • Chapter 48
Certification confirms that the methodology, modeling, assump-
tions, data, and accuracy of the document are acceptable.
The design report review is performed to confirm that the
report addresses the service conditions from the design
specification and that the applicable ASME Code service limits
and acceptance criteria are satisfied.
Designs and documentation are to be subject to verification.
CSA-N285.0-06 gives sample forms that provide evidence of
the above processes in the design documents.
48.3.2.5 Fabrication-Related Issues. In addition to the ASME
Code materials applicable to the class of system or component, the
standard permits the use of materials from CAN/CSA-N285.6. The
identification of materials follows the ASME Code.
The fabrication and installation guidelines of the ASME Code
apply. Components, piping systems, and welding procedures need
to be registered.
A quality assurance program is required for both the licensee
and suppliers; the licensee’s quality assurance program shall fol-
low N286.0. Procurement shall follow CSA-N286.1 and the
ASME Code; design and fabrication activities and installation and
commissioning shall meet the ASME Code requirements.
Material supply is regulated according to ASME BPVC Section
III, Division 1 [32]. A contractor’s quality assurance program
shall meet the requirements of the ASME Code.
An inspection of all items is required before acceptance by the
licensee. The inspections extend to the registration requirements,
operator qualifications, materials, tests, examinations, as-built
dimensions and tolerances, and compliance with quality assur-
ance requirements.
Items must be examined and tested in accordance with the
requirements of the applicable standard. The nondestructive
examination methods must conform to the requirements defined
in ASME BPVC Section III [32], and the procedures must be
acceptable to the client and to the regulatory authority. The exam-
ination personnel must be qualified according to the applicable
Canadian standard, or, for fabrication outside of Canada, to a
standard acceptable to the licensee and the regulatory authority.
48.3.2.6 Certification. The standard declares certain documents
from the fabrication and installation processes as permanent and
others as nonpermanent. The permanent records are to be assem-
bled into a history docket for a system, subassembly, component,
or part. The history docket remains with the Licensee for the life
of the plant. Nonpermanent records may be destroyed after a peri-
od defined in the standard.
Each registered vessel, pump, or fitting must be identified with
a nameplate or with directly applied markings. The required
information and suggested layout are given in the standard.
A formal data report must be submitted for each system, sub-
assembly, component, or part. The data report is completed after
fabrication when all required tests have been completed.
48.3.2.7 Inservice Requirements. Inaugural inspections and
periodic inservice inspections of systems, components, and items
under the scope of CSA-N285.0 are covered in CSA-N285.4 and -
N285.5 (see paras. 48.4.1 and 48.4.2).
A replacement item, defined as an item that replaces another
with unchanged design conditions, can be purchased to the same
or an updated design specification, provided that the original
design requirements are met. The intent is always to allow more
stringent requirements than for the original item but not less.
Similarly, for example, the Code year for the replacement item
may be chosen as the same or newer than that of the original item.
Subject to these and some additional requirements regarding com-
patibility with the remaining system and installation and welding
procedures, the replacement item is considered acceptable with-
out further approval by the regulatory authority. A modification of
an existing system, on the other hand, requires approval and an
authorized inspection.
48.3.2.8 Supports. Generally, the rules of ASME BPVC
Section III, Subsection NF [32], apply for the design of supports.
Like in the ASME Code, supports are classified into plate-/shell-
type (such as pipe anchors, vessel skirts, and saddles), linear (such
as trusses, struts, frames, rings, cables beams, and columns), and
component standard supports (typically mass-produced items with
load ratings as for pipe hangers, snubbers, and such). Component
supports must be registered separately and a certified design report
is required. Any intervening elements between the component and
the support need not be registered, but it must be demonstrated by
analysis or test that they are capable of withstanding the support
loads. The material for supports may be taken either from the
ASME Code or from CSA-N285.6. Note that component supports
are subject to inservice inspection requirements as required by
CSA-N285.4 and -N285.5.
48.3.3 CSA-N285.2, Requirements for Class IC, 2C,
and 3C Pressure-Retaining Components and
Supports in CANDU® Nuclear Power Plants
48.3.3.1 Intention and Content. CSA-N285.2 addresses
CANDU®-specific components for which the rules of the ASME
Code are insufficient or nonexistent. The rules concern mainly the
components related to the reactor vessel, which has a completely
different structure than those of the typical PWR. The main reactor
vessel (known as the calandria vessel) is subject to a low pressure,
but contains many zirconium alloy tubes (fuel channel pressure
tubes) that form the main pressure boundary of the primary heat
transport system in the reactor. Various other components, such as
removable end plugs (known as a closure plugs) for the fuel chan-
nels and the fueling machine, are required for online refueling in the
natural (unenriched or low-enriched) uranium fuel reactor design.
48.3.3.2 Fuel Channels. The pressure tube to end-fitting joint is
a mechanical rolled joint that connects the zirconium pressure tube
to the stainless steel end fitting. Since this is a Class 1 component,
the ASME Code would require either a full penetration welded
joint or a flanged and bolted connection. However, welding is not
possible due to the dissimilar materials, and the geometry does not
permit a flanged and bolted connection. A similar design margin as
required by the ASME Code is achieved by qualifying the joint by
replicate tests at design temperature, which must show a pull-out
load of three times the design condition axial load.
The pressure tubes are made from zirconium and form part of
the pressure boundary of the PHTS. Material requirements and
design material properties are contained in CAN/CSA-N285.6. In
addition to the regular material testing as required by the ASME
Code, the effect of irradiation on the material must be considered.
Irradiated fatigue curves must be obtained, and the (adverse)
effect on ductility must be considered. For the mechanical proper-
ties, credit may be taken for an experimentally supported radia-
tion-induced enhancement of the properties. The design of the
tubes must include the following:
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 175
(a) design against delayed hydride cracking that occurs in zir-
conium under certain conditions.
(b) a leak detection system and demonstration of leak-
beforebreak.
(c) an evaluation of creep deformations (sagging) of the tubes;
adequate support against sagging must be provided.
The fuel channel closures are removable but locked into place
by closure safety locks. Self-energizing flexible seal disks prevent
leakage of the coolant. The closure body must be designed such
that a failure of the seal disk will not result in a loss of coolant
accident, i.e., leakage beyond the makeup capacity of the system.
Misaligned installation must not lead to progressive distortion or
failure of the pressure boundary. The closures are classified as
Class 1 components.
48.3.3.3 Calandria Assembly. The calandria tubes are connected
to the calandria vessel tubesheets by rolled joints. The ASME Code
does not address rolled joints in vessels. Therefore, CSA N285.2
adopts the (piping) rules of paras. ND-3671.2 and NC-3671.2 of
ASME BPVC Section III [32] for the design of these joints, if the
calandria vessel is registered as a Class 3C or 2C component
(designed to ASME BPVC Section III, Subsection NC, NC-3300),
respectively. If the calandria is registered as a Class 1C or 2C com-
ponent designed to ASME BPVC Section III, Subsection NC, NC-
3200, then the rolled joint should be designed according to ASME
BPVC Section III, Subsection NB, NB-3200 (design by analysis)
rules, or testing should be used to justify the joint.
The calandria tubes have diametral internal supports (spacers)
onto the pressure tubes inside them; the ASME Code has no pro-
visions for such a situation. CSA-N285.2 requires that the poten-
tial deformation of a calandria tube under external pressure from
any service condition should not cause rupture of the tube. The
satisfaction of this condition may be shown by test or analysis.
The geometry of the assembly near the calandria end shields is
fairly complicated. The lattice tube–to–calandria tubesheet joint
requires hubs, in which case the ASME Code would require that
forged hubs be used; however, this is impractical because the
large number of welds would cause excessive distortion.
Therefore, CSA-N285.2 allows the hubs to be machined directly
onto the tubesheet and fully ultrasonically examined, subject to
ASME acceptance criteria with a more stringent limit on the
largest permissible indication. After welding, the tubesheet bores
must be ultrasonically examined from one side (there is no access
from the other) and liquid-penetrant examined in accordance with
the ASME Code. The Canadian experience has shown the
machined hubs to be adequate for the present application.
Using the ASME Code, the lattice tube–to–calandria welds
would have to be 100% radiographically inspected; due to acces-
sibility restrictions, this is not possible for this particular joint.
CSA-N285.2 permits that only a statistical sampling of joints be
radiographed if the joints are machine welded, as the repeatability
and quality of such welds was found to be high. In addition to
fully radiographically examining one of every ten joints made
with a fixed set of process parameters, rigorous sample testing
and liquid-penetrant testing of all root and final passes ensures the
required high overall weld quality.
The lattice tube – to – calandria tubesheet joint would have to
be a full-penetration joint according to the ASME Code (para.
NC-3352.4(d), [32]); however, this is not possible due to access
restrictions. The present standard allows a partial penetration
weld under the condition that the necessary joint strength is
demonstrated by analysis or test, that there is an interference fit
between tube and tubesheet bore, and that the root and final pass-
es are examined by the liquid-penetrant method.
The ASME Code requires components to be radiographed
within 20% of their final dimensions. For the lattice tubes, a con-
siderable amount of machining must be performed in their final
assembled position, which precludes radiography at that time.
The present standard allows radiography of centrifugally cast lat-
tice tubes in a partially machined condition if the penetrameter
size is based on the final machined thickness.
48.3.3.4 Reactivity Control Units. The CANDU® reactor has
two independent shutdown systems: one uses the common control
rod system and the other uses a liquid-injection shutdown system
that distributes a neutron poison in the core. The requirements of
ASME BPVC Section III, subsection NCA, para. NCA-1271 [32],
are not applicable to CANDU® control rod drive housings, because
these do not form part of the PHTS pressure boundary. The liquid-
injection shutdown system nozzles are made from Zircaloy and are
threaded into stainless steel tubes. This connection is not covered
by Class 1 requirements.
48.3.3.5 Fuel-Handling Equipment. The CANDU® reactor
requires relatively frequent refueling and, therefore, is equipped with
online fueling equipment. In refueling, a fuel channel of the reactor
needs to be accessed while the reactor continues to operate. This
requires a removable fuel channel closure plug and a fueling machine
that will provide a temporary closure while the fuel is being
refreshed, thereby ensuring continuous cooling of the reactor fuel. A
schematic overview of the refueling process is given in Fig. 48.8.
Parts of the refueling equipment are not addressed in the ASME
Code. The fuel channel closure plug must be secured with a safety
lock that prevents an inadvertent opening of the channel. The safety
lock must have a positive mechanical locking device. Materials,
design, and examination of the pressure-retaining parts of the safety
lock shall follow the applicable ASME Code rules. When the pres-
sure tube is being refueled, the fueling machine is attached to the
channel and the channel closure plug is removed. An accidental
uncoupling from the fueling machine must be prevented with anoth-
er safety lock, also of the positive mechanical locking type, and a
manual override of the safety lock must be impossible. The fueling
machine safety lock must be engaged before the channel closure plug
is removed, and it must remain engaged until the channel closure
plug has been replaced and secured. The safety locks must be remote-
ly monitored. Functional tests on a test channel are required.
Materials, design, and examination of the pressure-retaining parts of
the safety lock shall follow the applicable ASME Code rules.
The fueling machine requires movable parts to enable it to be
positioned at all fuel channel locations. Movable supports are
required, and the rules and limits of ASME BPVC Section III,
Subsection NF, NF-3200 and NF-3300 [32], are extended to be
applicable to the design of these mechanisms. Also, controls and
interlocks need to be provided to prevent inadvertent movements
that could overstress the pressure-retaining components or their sup-
ports in operation. It must be possible to verify the actuation of these
controls and interlocks. Movable pressure-retaining parts are permit-
ted to use reinforced elastomeric hose assemblies; the use of these
materials is permitted only for Classes 2 and 3 systems if no alterna-
tive designs exist. Safety-relevant consequences of failure of the
hose assembly must be considered, and the released dose must be
limited, e.g., by a quick-acting closure system. End fittings must
comply with the appropriate ASME Code Subsection of Section III
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176 • Chapter 48
FIG. 48.8 SCHEMATIC OVERVIEW OF CANDU® ONLINE REFUELLING SYSTEM
[32], and the materials must be from either the ASME Code or
CSA-N285.6. Environmental effects must be considered in the
design of the hose and reinforcement. Each hose must be subjected
to hydrostatic tests, and burst and fatigue tests must be performed on
samples from each production batch. A replacement schedule must
be established based on the aging of the hose material.
48.3.4 CSA-N285.3, Requirements for Containment
System Components in CANDU® Nuclear
Power Plants
48.3.4.1 Intention and Content. CSA-N285.3 establishes the
rules for the design, fabrication, and installation of containment
system components, excluding concrete containment systems
(which are addressed by the N287 series of standards). The
CANDU® containment system differs from that of U.S. PWRs:
single-unit reactor designs use a dousing tank and spray system
with-in the main containment structure. In some multi-unit power
plant designs, a common vacuum building structure (under nega-
tive pressure), connected to each of the individual unit contain-
ment structures, is used to remove containment atmosphere in the
event of a small pressure rise (approximately 6 psig) in a reactor
unit. The main vacuum building structure contains the main dous-
ing tank and spray systems for pressure suppression. In some mul-
tireactor unit CANDU® designs, where the reactor unit contain-
ments are typically connected, the design minimizes the reactor
unit containment volume consistent with the vacuum building
structure and pressure suppressions system capacity. In these plant
designs, some major components (e.g., steam generators, PHTS
pump motors, and the reactivity control mechanism deck) pene-
trate the containment boundary using a flexible seal (bellows).
48.3.4.2 Overview. Except in special cases, components that
form the containment boundary are deemed Class 4. Components
of a system that penetrates the containment boundary are deemed
Class 2, except if they are otherwise deemed Class 1.
Containment components must be registered and receive their
own registration number. Mostly, the rules for design, fabrication,
installation, and testing reference the applicable sections of
ASME BPVC Section III, Subsection NE [32]. The standard has
specific rules for overpressure protection, vessels, airlocks and
transfer chambers, isolation bulkheads (which could, for example,
be installed temporarily between the containment areas of differ-
ent reactor units), seal plates, flexible bellows and seals, and
inflatable seal assemblies.
Construction materials may be chosen from the appropriate
section of the ASME Code [32] (i.e., Subsection NE for Class 4
components, Subsection NC for Class 2, and so on) or from CSA-
N285.6. Containment components are subject to inservice inspec-
tions as required by CSA-N285.5 (see para. 48.4.2).
48.3.5 CSA-N285.6, Material Standards for Reactor
Components for CANDU® Nuclear Power Plants
48.3.5.1 Materials Standards for CANDU® Zirconium Alloy
Components. The CANDU® reactor design, which uses natural
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 177
uranium fuel (with no enrichment), requires use of materials with
low-neutron-absorption cross-sections to maximize overall
process efficiency. Many key pressure boundary components in the
reactor core (e.g., fuel channel pressure tubes) have been manu-
factured from zirconium alloys that provide both high-strength and
low-neutron-absorption properties. Because zirconium is not a rec-
ognized ASME Code material [9] for pressure-retaining compo-
nents, specific requirements had to be defined for zirconium alloy
material use in CANDU® reactor designs. The specific standards
addressing material requirements for CANDU® zirconium alloy
components include the following:
(a) CSA-N285.6.1, Pressures Tubes for Use in CANDU® Fuel
Channels
(b) CSA-N285.6.2, Seamless Zirconium Alloy Tubing for
Reactivity Control Units
(c) CSA-N285.6.3, Annealed Seamless Zirconium Alloy
Tubing for Liquid-Injection System (LISS) Nozzles
(d) CSA-N285.6.4, Thin-Walled, Large-Diameter Zirconium
Alloy Tubing (e.g., calandria tubes)
(e) CSA-N285.6.5, Zirconium Alloy Wire for Fuel Channel
Spacers (note; the N285.6.5 standard was withdrawn in the
2005 edition, as the heat treated zirconium spacer design is
no longer used in new or refurbished racotors)
(f) CSA-N285.6.6, Nondestructive Examination Criteria for
Zirconium Alloys
(g) CSA-N285.6.7, Zirconium Alloy Design Data
(h) CSA-N285.6.11, Zirconium Alloy Wire (newly added in
2005 edition, to provide rules for wire used in welding of
zirconium alloy components and for use in some fuel chan-
nel spacer designs)
The basic material requirements, including material composi-
tion, processing, and inspection and test requirements for zirconi-
um alloy components are defined in CSA-N285.6.1 through-
N285.6.5., and in -N285.6.11. Each standard addresses the specific
needs for unique CANDU® components, and requires that materi-
al satisfies both ASTM B 350/B 350M and B351/B351M, as well
as B 352/B 352M or B353/B 343M, in addition to the require-
ment of the N285.6 standards.
The nondestructive examination requirements for all zirconium
alloy components are summarized in CSA-N285.6.6. The
specified inspection methods include visual, liquid-penetrant,
radiographic, ultrasonic, and eddy current inspection methods. In
general terms, inspection methods and procedural requirements
reference ASME BPVC Section V [11] requirements. Inspection
acceptance criteria, geared to specific design needs for the
CANDU® component, are provided.
The material design data used for all CANDU® zirconium alloy
components is provided in CSA-N285.6.7.
48.3.5.2 Material Standard for CANDU® Fuel Channel
End-Fitting Assemblies. The CANDU® fuel channel design
includes an end fitting at each end of the fuel channel. The end
fitting is connected to the zirconium alloy pressure tube in the reac-
tor core, provides a connection to the PHTS feeders (ferritic pip-
ing), and provides an attachment point on the fuel channel for the
on-power refueling machine. As a result, the end fitting has many
challenging and unique design requirements. The basic material
requirements, including material composition, processing, and
inspection and test requirements, are defined in CSA-N285.6.8,
Martensitic Stainless Steel for Fuel Channel End Fittings.
48.3.5.3. Material Standard for Pressure-Retaining Item
Supports. CSA-N285.6.9, Materials for Supports for Pressure-
Retaining Items, provides material requirements for supports of
pressure-retaining items in addition to the materials permitted by
ASME BPVC Section III, Subsection NF, NF-2000 [32]. Material
specifications including material composition, processing, and
inspection and test requirements are provided.
48.3.5.4 Material Standard for Nickel Based Alloy Fuel
Channel Spacers
The current fuel channel spacer design is based on nickel based
alloy wire (AMS 5698). The material requirements, including
material composition, processing and test requirements are
defined in CSA N285.6.10.
48.3.5.5 Second Edition and Future Work. The second edition
of the entire CSA-N285.6 series of standards was published in 2005.
The 2005 edition is a major revision and streamlining of the N285.6
standards that focuses requirements on the properties and inspec-
tions of the final product. Thus, many of the inspections defined for
intermediate stages of product processing, as included in the 1988
edition, have been removed in the 2005 edition. Also, CSA-N285.6
Series-05 provides increased harmonization with existing material
standards by including more references to ASTM standards (e.g.,
ASTM B 350 and B 353 for zirconium alloy products), with sup-
plementary CANDU®-specific requirements identified.
48.3.6 CSA N286 Series of Standards, Quality
Assurance Program Requirements for
Nuclear Power Plants
48.3.6.1 Quality Assurance From Plant Design to
Decommissioning Activities. The standards of the N286 series on
quality assurance were prepared as the industry increasingly rec-
ognized that quality assurance standards were needed throughout
the life cycle of a nuclear power plant. The CSA N286 standards
are based on a set of common quality assurance principles. These
principles define the essentials to ensure that items and services
will be of the required quality, and they are consistent with good
management practice.
(a) The CSA N286 series consists of two tiers. The first-tier
standard, CSA-N286.0, is addressed to the nuclear power
plant owner/licensee. It contains the requirements for the
overall quality assurance program that applies to the com-
plete life cycle of a nuclear power plant, from site assess-
ment and conceptual design to decommissioning.
The CSA-N286.0 standard
(1) states the principles for assuring the achievement of quality
(2) defines the requirements for an overall quality assurance
program, including the following:
(a) corporate activities associated with specifying, direct-
ing, and administering work in all phases of the power
plant’s life cycle
(b) the evaluation and integration of the activities and pro-
grams of all participants.
(b) Each second-tier standard embodies the principles set forth
in the first-tier CSA-N286.0 standard. Each one includes
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178 • Chapter 48
specific program requirements, limits of responsibility,
authority, and application of criteria as they apply to the
specific needs of each of the constituent phases of a nuclear
power plant life cycle. Each is complete in establishing the
quality assurance requirements for a particular phase of the
nuclear power plant’s life cycle, and is structured such that
the activities addressed may be performed by organizations
other the plant owner/licensee. The plant owner/licensee
may directly perform activities covered by the second-tier
standards. In this event, the owner must meet the require-
ments of the relevant second-tier standard in addition to
those stated in the first-tier standard, CSA-N286.0. The sec-
ond-tier N286 Standards are as follows:
(1) CSA-N286.1, Procurement Quality Assurance Program
Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants
(2) CSA-N286.2, Design Quality Assurance for Nuclear
Power Plants
(3) CSA-N286.3, Construction Quality Assurance for
Nuclear Power Plants
(4) CSA-N286.4, Commissioning Quality Assurance for
Nuclear Power Plants
(5) CSA-N286.5, Operations Quality Assurance for
Nuclear Power Plants
(6) CSA-N286.6, Decommissioning Quality Assurance for
Nuclear Power Plants
A new edition of the CSA N286 standards was published in
2005. The 2005 edition has integrated the first- and second-tier
standards into one N286.0 standard. The restructuring of the 2005
edition is aimed at streamlining the quality assurance programs,
in recognition, of industry restructuring needs. Also, the revision
aims to increase harmonization with other quality assurance stan-
dards, so as to increase flexibility in obtaining qualified suppliers
of parts and services.
Since the 2005 edition (with its major streamlining) has been
issued, there has been much industry debate about how to
mange the transition from the original CSA N286 series of
standards (which is referenced in legislation and reactor
operating licences) to adoption of the 2005 edition. The chal-
lenges are being dealt with, in the short term, by referencing
withdrawn (superseded) standards within updated standards,
legislation, and reactor operating licences. The long term chal-
lenges are being addressed via improved industry coordination
of priorities through the CSA Nuclear Standards Steering
Committee.
The original CSA N286 series of standards focused on
owner/licensee activities and was complemented by the CSA
Z299 series of quality assurance standards, which addressed man-
ufacturing activities. In recognition of the fact that ISO-9001 has
since been widely adopted by manufacturing and service indus-
tries, a recent (2007) update to CSA-N286-05 has provided a
mandatory appendix (Annex G) detailing supplementary require-
ments for vendors no longer use CSA-Z299 programs. Quality
Assurance programs in accordance with U.S. 10 Code of Federal
Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B are considered to satisfy the
requirements of CSA-N286-05 Annex G.
48.3.6.2 Analytical, Scientific, and Design Computer
Programs. There are very few standards that address quality
assurance of critical computer programs used in the design and
ongoing analysis of nuclear reactors. The recently developed
(1999) CSA-N286.7 standard provides a major improvement in the
standardization of computer program quality assurance.
CSA-N286.7 applies to the design, development, maintenance,
modification, and use of computer programs that are used in nuclear
power plant applications to perform or support the following:
(a) design and analysis of safety-related equipment, systems,
structures, and components, as identified by the owner/
licensee
(b) deterministic and probabilistic safety analyses and reliabil-
ity studies
(c) reactor physics and fuel management calculations
(d) transfer of data between computer programs or pre- or post-
processing calculations associated with (a), (b), and (c) above.
CSA-N286.7 incorporates all of the fundamental quality princi-
ples used as the basis of the CSA N286 standards. The interested
reader is referred to the text of the CSA N286 standards for addi-
tional detail.
48.3.7 CSA N287 Series of Standards, Requirements
for Concrete Containment Structures for
CANDU® Nuclear Power Plants
(a) The CSA N287 series of standards for concrete contain-
ment structures for CANDU® nuclear power plants pro-
vides general requirements that ensure that the design,
construction, and testing of concrete containment struc-
tures meets a quality and standard commensurate with the
safety principles necessary to comply with the Canadian
nuclear safety philosophy. The N287 series of standards
includes the following:
(1) CSA-N287.1, General Requirements
(2) CSA-N287.2, Material Requirements
(3) CSA-N287.3, Design Requirements
(4) CSA-N287.4, Construction, Fabrication, and Installation
Requirements
(5) CSA-N287.5, Examination and Testing Requirements
(6) CSA-N287.6, Pre-Operational Proof and Leakage Rate
Testing Requirements
(7) CSA-N287.7, In-Service Examination and Testing
Requirements
(b) The N287 series of CSA standards applies to the compo-
nents, parts, and materials of the CANDU® concrete con-
tainment structures, including the following:
(1) reinforcing systems of the components
(2) concrete used in the construction of the components
(3) steel
(4) anchorage systems
(5) metallic and nonmetallic materials that perform sealing
functions, such as waterstops, concrete sealants, joint
filler materials, and expansion seals connecting por-
tions of class containment, but excluding seals that con-
nect class containment with nuclear Class 1, 2, 3, 1C,
2C, or 3C components
(6) metallic and nonmetallic liners
(7) nonpenetration embedded parts
(8) penetration embedded parts, except those that are con-
tinuations of the following:
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(a) nuclear Classes 1, 2, 3, 1C, 2C, and 3C, in which case the
provisions of CSA-N285.0 and -N285.2 shall apply
(b) non-nuclear systems, in which case the provisions of the
codes and standards applicable to the non-nuclear systems
shall apply
The N287 standards make extensive use of existing standards,
codes, and other reference material wherever possible, supple-
menting or modifying the requirements of referenced standards
where needed to address CANDU®-specific issues. The CSA
N287 standards generally exceed the requirements of the National
Building Code of Canada [35]. The interested reader is referred to
the text of the N287 standards for further detail; more information
on the CSA-N287.7 standard, which covers inservice inspection,
is provided in para 48.4.3.
At the time of this writing, the N287 TC, has been re-estab-
lished. Work on updating the N287 series of standards is in
progress, with a focus to address recent updates to the National
Building Code of Canada [35] and identify opportunities for
improved harmonization with the other standards.
48.3.8 CSA N289 Series of Standards, Requirements
for Seismic Qualification of CANDU® Nuclear
Power Plant Structures and Systems
48.3.8.1 Outline The Canadian seismic philosophy is distinctly
different from the approach followed in the US, which has strongly
shaped the design rules of the ASME Code that are applicable to seis-
mic design. The Canadian seismic standards, consisting of 5 docu-
ments of the N289 series, has much more comprehensive guidance
on the seismic evaluation of nuclear plants than the ASME Code.
In 1976, the Canadian Nuclear Association’s Codes, Standards,
and Practice Committee sponsored the development of the N289
Standards. In 1977, efforts began to publish the documents as
CSA Standards. The intent in developing the standards was to
document technical and regulatory guidelines applicable to the
seismic qualification of nuclear structures and components of a
CANDU® nuclear power plant.
The main focus of the standards is the nuclear safety aspects of
CANDU® Nuclear Power Plants. However, if specified by the
owner, these standards may be applied to other non-safety-related
structures or systems necessary for the operation of the plant.
Otherwise, non-safety related structures and equipment can be
designed in accordance with the National Building Code of
Canada [35].
The following is a brief overview of the five standards:
(a) CSA Standard CAN3-N289.1, General Requirements for
Seismic Qualification of CANDU® Nuclear Power Plants,
provides guidelines for the applicability of the N289 stan-
dards. It also contains seismic classification and lays out the
responsibility with respect to seismic qualification of the
parties involved in the design, construction and operation of
nuclear plants.
(b) CSA Standard CAN3-N289.2, Ground Motion
Determination for Seismic Qualification of CANDU®
Nuclear Power Plants, details requirements for site and
regional seismic investigations. These investigations have
the purpose to collect historical data that allow the design
seismic events to be defined, as well as identifying hazards
such as faults, tsunamis, seiches or dam failures. Guidelines
are given for establishing the design seismic ground motion.
(c) CSA Standard CAN3-N289.3, Design Procedures for
Seismic Qualification of CANDU® Nuclear Power Plants,
covers methods used to design for seismic events. It covers
methods to obtain the ground response for application to
engineering design, i.e. ground spectra and time histories.
Requirements are given for foundation seismic analysis,
such as analysis for soil-structure interaction, ground failure
and stability of structures. Thirdly, the standard focuses on
seismic qualification by analytical methods. The standard
presents various acceptable methods of seismic analysis
(not unlike ASME BPVC Section III, Appendix N). Finally,
CAN3-N289.3 stipulates seismic design criteria for struc-
tures (like the containment structure), components (in par-
ticular, pressure boundary components) and component
supports.
(d) CSA Standard CAN3-N289.4, Testing Procedures for
Seismic Qualification of CANDU® Nuclear Power Plants,
provides design requirements and methods for seismic qual-
ification of specific structures and systems by test, provides
a basis for the development of specifications for seismic
qualification by testing, and aids in selecting appropriate
test methods for performing acceptable seismic qualifica-
tion tests commensurate with the Canadian nuclear safety
principles.
(e) CSA Standard CAN3-N289.5, Instrumentation, Inspection
and Records for Seismic Qualification of CANDU®
Nuclear Power Plants, establishes the requirements for
seismic instrumentation and for seismic-related inspec-
tion of structures and systems before and after a seismic
event.
A brief overview of the Canadian seismic philosophy as laid
out in these documents, as well as an abstract of expected future
developments, is given in the following.
48.3.8.2 Canadian Seismic Approach In the US, the typical
approach is to design pressure boundary components for two sep-
arate seismic events of different severity level. The lower level
event, or operational basis earthquake (OBE), is postulated to
occur several times during the plant life, and a cyclic analysis is
performed in addition to a primary stress assessment for Design
stress limits. For the higher level event, the safe shutdown earth-
quake (SSE), only a single occurrence is postulated and only pri-
mary stresses are evaluated to accident (Level D) limits.
Similarly, CAN3-N289.1 and CAN3-N289.3 define two earth-
quakes with different severity levels, the site design earthquake
(SDE) and the more severe design basis earthquake (DBE). The
SDE is intended to have a probability of exceedance of about
10⫺2 per year, while the DBE is currently defined as having “suf-
ficiently low probability”. The upcoming 2008 edition of N-289.1
will specify the mean probability of exceedance as 10⫺4 per year,
applicable to new construction. Only one of these two events is
used in the design of each component.
The basic requirements following a DBE are that the reactor
can be shut down safely, that decay heat can be removed, that the
pressure boundary does not fail, and that the reactor building and
other critical structures will not allow a radiation release above
regulatory limits. In addition, an SDE event following a loss of
coolant event must leave the emergency core cooling (ECC) sys-
tem and systems supporting ECC intact.
The SDE has historically been employed to design some rarely-
used systems, but most pressure boundary is designed for the DBE
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as a single event. Unlike SSE, the DBE is classified as a Level C
event, and a primary stress as well as cyclic evaluation needs to be
performed. This approach agrees quite well with the results of
recent tests on piping systems, which suggest that the failure of
such systems under seismic loading is by fatigue or ratchet-fatigue
in the vast majority of cases. Furthermore, for low-strength materi-
als, the level C primary stress limit provides a nominal margin of
roughly two against the ultimate load, which is consistent with the
finding [44] that for seismic events, a margin of two against burst
means the event has a negligible effect on the core damage fre-
quency. Of course, the seismic Level D limits in ASME BPVC
Section III, Subsection NB, NB-3600 are meant to provide the
same actual margin of two against burst, and in consequence
imposing Level C limits must provide significantly more margin.
In the analysis of components that would be within the scope of
the ASME BPVC, N289 therefore requires the following
(a) An analysis of primary stress from a combination of seismic
and sustained loads. Seismic loads must be combined with
specified operating conditions that occur with a total expo-
sure time (time to complete one transient times number of
specified cycles) of more than 1% of the total operating
time, or with transients that may be caused by the earth-
quake. Level C limits apply.
(b) An analysis of the primary plus secondary stress range due
to seismic loads (inertial and anchor motions) alone. If this
range exceeds 3 Sm, plastic cycling is expected and a
fatigue analysis is required for Class 1 components.
Otherwise, the fatigue analysis is waived because the usage
factor is expected to be low.
(c) If required from above, a fatigue analysis is to be performed
that accounts for the effect of plasticity (e.g. simplified elas-
tic-plastic). The usage factor from seismic alone is to be
combined with the cumulative usage factor due to Level A/B
events. The required cycles for the single seismic event are
15 for ground supported components and 25 for floor sup-
ported components. If a fatigue curve based on deformation
controlled tests is used (as the ones given in ASME BPVC
Section III, Appendix I), CAN3-N289.3 considers 200
cycles as “adequate”. The reason for the larger number of
cycles are concerns about the high level of seismic load con-
trolled load due to the use of Level C limits on primary
stress, which would allow net section plasticity. In a static
system under load control with net section plasticity, a lin-
ear-elastic analysis can severely underestimate the strains
and, therefore, the fatigue damage. However, this concern is
erroneous because, unlike static analysis, an elastic dynamic
analysis does not underestimate the gross deformation
(amplitude) relative to an elastic-plastic (nonlinear) analysis.
In an elastic dynamic analysis, viscous damping is selected
to represent the energy dissipation, which is usually due to
nonlinear effects, such as plasticity, frictional effects, and
such. The level of damping is set such that the vibration
amplitude of the linear-elastic system matches (or typically
overestimates) that of the nonlinear system. When the ampli-
tude of the elastic-plastic and linear-elastic system are equiv-
alent, the ASME fatigue analysis approach is directly applic-
able and will estimate the strains conservatively. The
N289.3 analysis becomes, therefore, very conservative.
Seismic structural damping levels are taken from the 1983 edi-
tion of the BPVC, and are therefore very low for piping systems
compared to those in Section III, Appendix N of the 2007 BPVC
or in recent NRC guidance. N289.3 permits the use of higher
damping if justified by tests that are relevant to the component
that is being analyzed. An update of seismic damping level is
expected for the upcoming new issue of the N289.3 standard.
The interested reader is referred to the text of the N289 stan-
dards for additional details.
Overall, the N289 standards are mainly aimed at the assess-
ment of moderate to medium level seismic zones. For high-level
seismic zones, the considerations may not be sufficient to
address all possible concerns. At the same time, the targeted
seismic level may also explain the relatively high level of con-
servatism in the design methods. The use of only a single level
of seismic event, not two as in the US approach, may also work
best for such a target seismic level. The question is how opera-
tion after a significant seismic event can be justified. If the seis-
mic level reached or exceeded the bounding DBE or SSE level,
it is clear that an assessment, and possibly repair, is needed
before the plant can be restarted. If the seismic event was only a
significant fraction of the DBE, the question may arise how
much of the cyclic life has been exhausted. With OBE, the effect
of several such events has been analyzed in the design phase,
thus giving the required justification. With just one DBE ana-
lyzed, it may be more difficult to argue that the remaining cyclic
life is still sufficient for the required cycles including a possible
future DBE.
In some cases, seismic events were not part of the original
design basis. In this case, seismic margin assessments (SMA) have
been performed. This assessment method has been developed and
documented, e.g. in [45] and [46]. The starting point of an SMA is
an analysis to identify components that are critical to perform and
maintain a safe shutdown of the plant. Once these systems are
identified, a plant walkdown by qualified engineers is performed.
During the walkdown, systems and components are classified.
Some components are known by experience to be seismically
rugged and are screened out. The basis for screening is a review
level earthquake that is typically set at a higher level than the DBE.
On the other hand, components that are considered as the weakest
link (have the lowest seismic capacity) are also identified. All
components that were not screened out are subjected to a simpli-
fied analytical analysis or testing to determine the seismic margin.
In addition to assessing seismic capacity and likely failure modes
of components, seismic walkdowns also serve to observe and iden-
tify system deficiencies, such as detrimental interactions between
components, fire hazards, potential for seismic induced flooding
due to piping failures, and other similar risks. The new issue of
CSA N289.1 will formalize approaches for seismic margin assess-
ments.
48.3.8.3 Future Developments At the time of its writing, the
Canadian seismic standard was quite an advanced set of rules,
which is reflected in the fact that no significant changes were made
for about 20 years since the initial issuing of the documents.
However, over the years, many advances have been made in the
areas of seismic design and qualification. In response, the N289
TC has been re-established recently. The goal is to update the
N289 series of standards, with a focus on addressing recent
updates to the National Building Code of Canada [35], and also to
identify opportunities for improved harmonization with the N287
series of standards (which has many areas of commonality in
design of plant structures).
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A new edition of CSA-N289.1 has been created, and has passed
through the public comment phase. It is expected that the new
CSA-N289.1 standard will be published in 2008. The scope of the
document has been broadened from being mainly an introduction
to the N289 series of Standards to supplementing the existing
N289 standards with current seismic qualification concepts. For
example, guidelines for seismic margin assessments have been
developed, and the derivation of ground motion input from uni-
form hazard spectra has been incorporated. The responsibilities
and duties now include rules for the operator response to seismic
events, e.g. under what conditions plant shutdown is required.
Means of demonstrating that nuclear power plant safety-related
structures, systems and components possess seismic capacity at
very low probabilities of exceedance have been developed.
The TC will start work on revising the CSA-N289.3 standard in
2008. It is expected that the scope will include reconciliation of
damping levels in the current standards with new experimental evi-
dence, particularly for piping, and revisiting the question of seis-
mic cycles for fatigue analysis. Consideration is being given to
including methods of probabilistic seismic design in the standard.
48.3.9 Summary
The CSA N285, N286, N287, and N289 design standards have
provided the basis for the successful construction of CANDU®
reactors in Canada and internationally. Generally, the ASME
Code is followed closely, being put into the Canadian regulatory
context. Special Canadian experience with design features and
materials beyond the ASME Code context is also incorporated.
Future efforts will continue to work on continual improvement,
publishing amendments/updates, or new editions, as agreement is
reached on key topics. Priorities include addressing issue related
to implementation issues, life extension and refurbishment of
existing plants, and needs for new build reactors. Harmonization
and integration with international standards, specifically the
ASME Code, will also be pursued.
48.4 CSA NUCLEAR BOILER AND
PRESSURE VESSEL INSERVICE
INSPECTION STANDARDS
In the Canadian nuclear standards, the requirement for routine
mandatory inspections of pressure boundary and containment
components is referred to as periodic inspection, which is the
CANDU® equivalent to the ASME BPVC Section XI [33] inser-
vice inspection requirements. Given the unique design of the
CANDU® nuclear power plant, the inherent safety features
included in the plant design, and the Canadian regulatory/licens-
ing framework a direct adoption of ASME BPVC Section XI is
neither practical nor feasible. For these reasons, the CSA has
developed a series of nuclear standards unique to periodic inspec-
tion of CANDU® nuclear power plants.
The purpose of periodic inspection is to provide assurance that
the likelihood of failure that could endanger health and safety of
the general public has not increased significantly since the plant
was put into service. The primary concern is the accidental
release of radioactive materials.
The fundamental postulates used in developing the periodic
inspection requirements are that the plants are properly designed,
fabricated, and operated, in accordance with their design intent. In
the case where compliance with these postulates is questioned
(via operating experience, inspection results, and such) or the
plant/system has been subject to a Service Level C or D operating
condition, additional inspection (beyond the minimum specified
in the standards) shall be considered.
Currently, there are three primary CSA standards that define
the CANDU® periodic inspection requirements. These
Standards, described in more detail in the subsequent para-
graphs, are as follows:
(a) CAN/CSA-N285.4, Periodic Inspection of CANDU®
Nuclear Power Plant Components (which governs periodic
inspection of primary nuclear pressure boundary systems)
(b) CAN/CSA-N285.5, Periodic Inspection of CANDU®
Nuclear Power Plant Containment Components (which
governs periodic inspection of penetrations and extensions
to the nuclear containment boundary and inspection of sys-
tems required for suppressing/reducing pressure within the
containment boundary during the functional mode, i.e.,
when the containment system is activated)
(c) CAN/CSA-N287.7, Inservice Examination and Testing
Requirements for Concrete Containment Structures for
CANDU® Nuclear Power Plants (which addresses the struc-
tural integrity of all concrete components and leak tightness
of the containment boundary through inservice inspections
and leakage rate testing)
The CSA N285B TC on periodic inspection is evaluating the
need for a new standard geared at periodic inspection of conven-
tional plant systems and components whose failure may negative-
ly affect nuclear safety. The initial evaluation is aimed at defining
the specific goals and needs for such a standard, followed by an
assessment of what can be provided by existing codes and stan-
dards (e.g., ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code) The N285B
TC is also monitoring international efforts on the topic of risk-
informed inspection programs, and assessing how to take best
advantage of risk informed processes to provide a more effective
periodic inspection program that enhances nuclear safety, plant
reliability, and plant economics.
In addition, new CSA standards are under development to
supplement the periodic inspection requirements with standard
methodologies for assessment and evaluation of periodic inspec-
tion results. In particular, CSA-N285.8 has been specifically
developed to provide uniform rules for the evaluation of detect-
ed (or postulated) flaws and material surveillance test results in
zirconium alloy pressure tubes, which are subject to unique
degradation mechanisms. (Additional information on CSA-
N285.8 is provided in the para. 48.4.4). The CSA N285B TC on
periodic inspection is evaluating the need for other new stan-
dards for the assessment and evaluation of results from steam
generator tubing and fuel channel feeder piping inspections.
These new standards will be pursued only if there are major
CANDU®-specific needs that are not addressed by existing
codes and standards (e.g., ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Code [33] or EPRI Steam Generator Guidelines [39]).
48.4.1 CSA-N285.4, Periodic Inspection of CANDU®
Nuclear Power Plant Components
CAN/CSA-N285.4 governs periodic inspection of primary
nuclear pressure boundary systems. Selection of components for
periodic inspection and inspection sample sizes are established using
simplified risk-based criteria. Throughout the process of determin-
ing the extent of periodic inspection, CSA-N285.4 attempts to strike
a balance between the nuclear safety and radiological consequences
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182 • Chapter 48
of component failure and worker radiation dose expenditure
required to perform the mandated inspections.
To date, there have been four published editions of CSA-
N285.4, published in 1978, 1983, 1994 and 2005. The fourth edi-
tion is a major update of the standard to account for operating
experience and changes in the Canadian nuclear regulatory frame-
work. The operating experience reviews have led to increased
inspection requirements for fuel channel pressure tubes, fuel
channel feeder pipes, and steam generator tubes (see para.
48.4.1.5 and 48.1.8).
48.4.1.1 Systems/Components Subject to Inspection
(a) The periodic inspection program focuses on health and safe-
ty issues, with an emphasis on the accidental release of
radioactive substances. The systems and components sub-
ject to inspection include the following:
(1) systems containing fluid that directly transports heat
from the nuclear fuel (e.g., PHTS)
(2) systems essential for safe shutdown of the reactor or
safe cooling of the fuel (e.g., shutdown systems and
shut-down cooling systems)
(3) other systems or components whose failure could jeop-
ardize the function of the systems identified in (1) and
(2)
(4) materials or components used beyond proven engineer-
ing experience (e.g., zirconium alloy fuel channel pres-
sure tubes and fuel channel feeder pipes)
(b) CSA-N285.4 uses several simple risk-informed criteria for
reducing the extent of inspection on systems or portions there-
of. For example, a system can be exempted from periodic
inspection if it contains fluid that directly transports heat from
the nuclear fuel and satisfies any of the following conditions:
(1) The system has two or more credited barriers between
the fluid and the external atmosphere.
(2) Failure of the system, without operation of the contain-
ment system, would result in a release of radioactive
material to the public less than the defined regulatory
limits for a serious process failure.
The reader is encouraged to study CSA-N285.4 to better under-
stand the full process for identifying the systems subject to peri-
odic inspection and the subsequent means of focusing inspection
efforts on the high-risk areas.
Through the process of applying the criteria for determining the
extent of periodic inspection, some vital components may be
exempt from periodic inspection. Normally, systems/components
can be exempted from inspection on the basis that failure of a sin-
gle component (e.g., a fuel channel pressure tube) does not result
in a release of radioactive material to the public above the regula-
tory limits for a serious process failure. CSA-N285.4, recognizing
that these vital components may be present in large numbers (e.g.,
thousands of steam generator tubes) or that these components are
being used beyond the proven engineering experience (e.g., fuel
channel pressure tubes), have developed supplementary periodic
inspection requirements for such components. The supplementary
periodic inspection requirements for fuel channel pressure tubes,
fuel channel feeder pipes, and steam generator tubes are defined
separately (see para. 48.4.1.5).
48.4.1.2. Inspection Sample Sizes
(a) The number of components to be inspected is determined on
a sampling basis, allowing for grouping of similar compo-
nents. For multi-unit stations, smaller inspection sample
sizes are permitted for units that can be shown to be essen-
tially identical to the lead unit (first unit in service). The
basic guidelines applied to the selection of inspection sites
include the following:
(1) Provision of sufficient coverage to ensure that any gen-
eral deterioration from corrosion, erosion, or wear is
identified.
(2) Components whose failure may severely tax the capa-
bility of reactor safety systems are addressed.
(3) Components whose failure could lead to the impair-
ment of a safety system or lead to major damage of a
process system are addressed.
(b) In addition to these requirements, the site selection process
includes consideration of the following:
(1) component design (applied stress intensity and cyclic
loading)
(2) operating environment
(3) failure size and consequences of failure
(4) inspection site accessibility
(5) inspection personnel radiation dose expenditure
(6) previous operating experience (internal and world
experience)
(7) results of previous inspection results (including manu-
facturing inspection results)
In general, the number of components selected for inspection is
less than what is typically required by ASME BPVC Section XI
[33]. The lower sample size requirements are based on the unique
design and safety features of the CANDU® reactor. For the high-
est inspection category, Category A requirements, the sample size
for the lead reactor unit is defined by the following relation:
NiA ⫽ 1 ⫹ 2.2*log10Nic (valid for Nic ⬍ 100)
where
NiA ⫽ the number of components to be inspected for Category
A components
Nic ⫽ the number of identical components in a system
As can be seen by the sample size relation, the inspection sample
size can be a high percentage for small groups of identical compo-
nents and relatively small for large groups of identical components.
Typically, in a CANDU® plant the groups of identical components
range from 2 to 16 identical components per group.
The extent of inspection is reduced even further for lower inspec-
tion categories. Inspection categories are defined using a combina-
tion of failure size, consequence of failure, applied stress intensity,
and cyclic loading (fatigue usage) factors. Inspection requirements
in a given category may be increased when there is potential for
erosion/corrosion or welds are made of dissimilar metals.
48.4.1.3 Inspection Frequency/Intervals. An inaugural inspec-
tion is required to establish a baseline for future comparisons and
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 183
determination of inservice degradation rates. Inaugural inspec-
tions are typically performed in the fabrication/assembly stage
of the reactor construction. When such inaugural inspections are
performed prior to the component hydrostatic pressure test, a
confirmatory inspection (of a 10% sample) is required post-
hydrostatic test.
The inservice inspection frequency is defined by industry stan-
dards and is updated based on operating experience feedback.
Periodic inspections for ferritic components are generally per-
formed on a 10-year interval. For other components, primarily
fuel channel pressure tubes, inspection frequency for the lead unit
(for multi-unit stations) was increased to a 6-year interval in the
third edition of CSA-N285.4.
Recent operating experience and the development of new tech-
nologies that permit increased inspection with minimal radiation
dose expenditure for workers have led to significant increases in
periodic inspection requirements for fuel channel pressure tubes,
fuel channel feeders, and steam generator tubes. The fourth edi-
tion of CSA-N285.4 includes significant increases in the extent
and frequency of inspection for these components, typically
resulting in a 6-year inspection interval for these components
(para. 48.4.1.5)
48.4.1.4 Inspection Methods. Inspection procedures can use
any methods that can be categorized as one of the following:
(a) visual
(b) dimensional
(c) surface and volumetric (including but not limited to meth-
ods such as liquid-penetrant, magnetic-particle, ultrasonic,
radiographic, or eddy current methods)
(d) integrative (including but not limited to monitoring overall
component integrity such as leak detection, acoustic emis-
sion, and strain measurement)
Unless otherwise specified by the standard, inspection methods
and procedures are to comply with ASME BPVC Section V [11].
Where inspection procedures are not addressed by Section V or do
not meet or exceed Section V requirements, regulatory approval is
required prior to procedure usage.
48.4.1.5 Supplementary Periodic Inspection Requirements.
As discussed in para. 48.4.1.1, supplementary periodic inspection
requirements have been developed for those vital components that
are exempted under the normal criteria of CSA-N285.4 but may be
present in large numbers (i.e., have potential increased risk of mul-
tiple component failures) or are being used beyond the proven
engineering experience. Specifically, supplementary periodic
inspection requirements have been defined for fuel channel pres-
sure tubes, fuel channel feeder pipes, and steam generator tubes.
The fuel channel pressure tubes, which are fabricated from a
Zr-2.5Nb alloy, are tubes that undergo significant material and
dimensional changes as a result of irradiation. These pressure
tubes are also subject to delayed hydride cracking, hydride blister
formation and creep degradation mechanisms. The inspection
requirements for pressure tubes include volumetric flaw detection
and sizing, dimensional measurements (length, diameter, wall
thickness, and sag), measurements of material hydrogen isotope
concentration, and material property testing.
The fuel channel feeder pipes, fabricated from bent ferritic pip-
ing, are subject to inspections of the numerous feeder hangers and
supports (including seismic dampers and restraints), as well as
wall thickness measurements in those areas most susceptible to
erosion/corrosion. In response to recent experience at one
CANDU® plant, the fourth edition of CSA-N285.4 includes addi-
tional requirements to assess the potential for cracking (including
base material) and to establish appropriate inspection programs
based on these assessments.
Steam generator tube inspection requirements are also expand-
ed to include examination of tubes for flaws using conventional
inspection methods, visual inspection of the tube bundle support
structures, and removal of selected tubes for metallographic
examination (to provide early indications of active degradation
mechanisms).
48.4.1.6 Assessment of Inspection Results. CSA-N285.4 pro-
vides acceptance criteria for all inspections. The inspection accep-
tance criteria are based on original component manufacturing
acceptance criteria and the level of inservice degradation expected
(consistent with the design basis). Where appropriate, ASME
BPVC Section XI [33] acceptance criteria are applied. Update 1 to
CSA-N285.4-05 has provided an acceptable flaw size look-up
table for fuel channel pressure tube inspections, providing a much
simplified assessment procedure that eliminates unnecessary eval-
uation work.
Clear actions are defined for cases where inspection results
exceed acceptance criteria, which include the following:
(a) Notify regulatory authorities of inspection findings.
(b) Perform additional inspection, using alternate inspection
techniques, to better characterize the detected flaw.
(c) Assess flaw acceptability and determine potential compo-
nent impairment.
(d) If required, submit a disposition request (i.e., request to
amend the operating license) to the regulatory authority.
(e) Revise inspection program to address the need to expand the
inspection sample (including inspection of other units) and
increase inspection frequency.
48.4.1.7 Program Management. To ensure that the periodic
inspection program remains effective, the program is reviewed on
a routine basis. The program is modified as required to address
operating experience, previous inspection results, updated engi-
neering and safety assessments, plant modifications, new operating
conditions, and new regulatory requirements.
A quality management system is employed to ensure that all
periodic inspection activities comply with CSA-N285.4 require-
ments and that all activities are auditable.
Periodic inspection documentation that is required includes the
following:
(a) periodic inspection programs
(b) periodic inspection schedules
(c) periodic inspection procedures
(d) periodic inspection records
(e) periodic inspection reports (including disposition requests)
48.4.1.8 Future Work. Improvements being evaluated for
future amendments/editions include the following:
(a) fundamental review of erosion/corrosion inspection require-
ments for PHTS and shutdown cooling systems
(b) review of lead unit concept and its implications on inspection
sample sizes
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184 • Chapter 48
(c) improved clarification of performance demonstration/
inspection qualification requirements
(d) addition of simplified acceptable flaw sizes for fuel channel
pressure tube inspection
(e) inclusion of a more robust, risk-informed approach to
defining inspection requirements for PHTS and shutdown
cooling systems
(f) harmonization with fabrication and construction standards
to integrate inaugural/baseline inspection requirements so as
to minimize overall life cycle inspection costs
48.4.2 CSA-N285.5, Periodic Inspection of CANDU®
Nuclear Power Plant Containment Components
The CSA-N285.5 and CSA-N287.7 standards govern periodic
inspection of nuclear containment boundary systems. The inter-
face between these standards is summarized in Table 48.2 (which
is extracted from CSA-N285.5). CSA-N285.5 primarily addresses
inspection of metallic and plastic containment boundary compo-
nents; CSA-N287.7 addresses inspection of concrete containment
and embedded parts and containment leakage testing.
Selection of containment boundary components for CSA-
N285.5 periodic inspection and inspection sample sizes are estab-
lished using simplified risk-based criteria. Throughout the process
of determining the extent of periodic inspection, CSA-N285.5
attempts to strike a balance between the nuclear safety and radio-
logical consequences of component failure and worker radiation
dose expenditure required to perform the mandated inspections.
There are numerous parallels between the CSA-N285.4 and CSA-
N285.5 standards, as both focus on inspections to assess the extent
of inservice degradation of pressure-retaining components, using
similar inspection methods. In application of these two standards,
there are cases where specific components may require inspection
under both. In such cases, only the most onerous inspection require-
ments need be applied. Typically, such cases require full volumetric
inspection of the component, as per CSA-N285.4 requirements.
To date, there have been two published editions of CSA-
N285.5: a preliminary standard first edition published in 1988 and
a second edition published in 1990. The second edition included
many improvements based on lessons learned through a pilot pro-
gram with the first edition applied to a multi-unit CANDU® sta-
tion. The CSA-N285.5-M90 standard was reaffirmed in 2005. At
the time of this writing, development of the third edition is well
underway way with publication planned for late 2008. The third
edition will include updates based on operating experience,
*
Approved Operating Practice
increased harmonization with CSA-N287.7, and will also address
changes in the Canadian nuclear regulatory framework that have
been introduced since the standard was last revised (in 1990).
48.4.2.1 Systems/Components Subject to Inspection. CSA-
N285.5 addresses the structural integrity of all metallic and plastic
components of the containment boundary. The containment bound-
ary is defined as the outer that prevents the release of radioactive
materials to the general public. Operability of these components is
addressed through routine testing programs. Leak tightness of the
containment boundary is addressed in CSA-N287.7.
As the periodic inspection program focuses on components
forming the credited containment boundary, the systems and com-
ponents subject to inspection, as per CSA-N285.5 requirements,
include the following:
(a) penetrations in the containment structure equivalent to, or
greater than, a 1-in. diameter pipe
(b) components required for suppressing or reducing pressure
within the containment boundary during the functional
mode (i.e., when the containment system is activated)
(c) other systems or components that form extensions to the
containment boundary, up to and including the credited iso-
lation barrier
48.4.2.2 Inspection Sample Sizes. The number of components
to be inspected is determined on a sampling basis, allowing for
grouping of similar components. In multi-unit stations, smaller
inspection sample sizes are permitted for units that can be shown
to be essentially identical to the lead unit (first unit in service). The
inspection sample size rules are based on the same sampling crite-
ria used in CSA-N285.4.
The inspection site selection process incorporates the following:
(a) applied component loadings during normal operation and in
the functional mode (i.e., when the containment system is
activated)
(b) operating environment
(c) inspection site accessibility
(d) inspection personnel radiation dose expenditure
(e) previous operating experience (internal and world experience)
(f) previous inspection results (including manufacturing
inspection results)
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48.4.2.3 Type and Extent of Inspection. The type and extent of
inspections to be performed are determined by the component
loading and the potential degradation mechanisms for each com-
ponent. Components that are subject to their most severe loadings
under normal reactor operating conditions (i.e., loads are equiva-
lent or lower under accident conditions) require visual inspection
only. Failure of any of these components could occur at any time
(not necessarily during accident conditions), and would be readily
detected through routine system monitoring.
Where components could be subjected to more severe load-
ings under accident scenarios, it is essential to provide addi-
tional assurance that no degradation occurs, which could impair
system integrity during the functional mode (when the contain-
ment system is activated). In many cases, degradation of this
nature would not be detected by routine system monitoring.
Therefore, CSA-N285.5 requires that, for all components where
the functional loads exceed routine service loads, the potential
for loss of material (e.g., corrosion), corrosion-related cracking,
and discontinuity formation (e.g., fatigue cracking) must be
assessed. When conditions for any of these degradation mecha-
nisms exist, the type and extent of inspections to be performed
are designed to be capable of detecting the degradation mecha-
nism(s) identified.
The graded approach to the type and extent of inspection is
designed to focus inspection resources (including inspection per-
sonnel radiation dose expenditure) on those areas that pose the
greatest threat to structural integrity of the containment boundary
in the event of an accident.
48.4.2.4 Inspection Frequency/Intervals. The inspection fre-
quency is defined by industry standards and is updated based on
operating experience feedback. Periodic inspections are generally
performed at a 10-year interval. For components that are poten-
tially subject to corrosive conditions, inspections are generally per-
formed at intervals less than 10 years until such time that there is
sufficient operating experience to support a 10-year inspection
interval.
48.4.2.5 Inspection Methods. For most CANDU® plants, the
vast majority of CSA-N285.5 – required inspections are performed
using visual inspection methods. Visual inspection, within the con-
text of CSA-N285.5, is used to do the following:
(a) determine the surface condition of a component for corro-
sion, erosion, wear, and condition of protective coatings
(b) detect and locate evidence of leakage
(c) determine the mechanical and structural condition of a
component
Surface inspection methods, liquid penetrant or magnetic parti-
cle, are used to inspect accessible surfaces for the presence of
cracks or material discontinuities. Volumetric inspection methods,
including ultrasonics, eddy current, and radiography, are used to
inspect material for the presence of discontinuities caused by cor-
rosion-related cracking and service loadings. Required thickness
measurements can be performed using direct (e.g., gauge) or indi-
rect methods (e.g., ultrasonics).
Unless otherwise specified by the standard, inspection methods
and procedures are to comply with ASME BPVC Section V [11].
Where inspection procedures are not addressed by Section V or
do not meet or exceed Section V requirements, regulatory
approval is required prior to procedure usage.
48.4.2.6 Assessment of Inspection Results. CSA-N285.5 pro-
vides acceptance criteria for all inspections. Clear actions are
defined for cases where inspection results exceed acceptance crite-
ria. CSA-N285.5 follows the same basic approach to the assessment
of inspection results as defined in CSA-N285.4 (see para. 48.4.1.6).
48.4.2.7 Program Management. To ensure that the periodic
inspection program remains effective, the program is reviewed on
a routine basis. The program is modified as needed to address
operating experience, previous inspection results, updated engi-
neering and safety assessments, plant modifications, new operating
conditions, and new regulatory requirements. CSA-N285.5 fol-
lows the same basic approach to program management as defined
in CSA-N285.4 (see para. 48.4.1.7).
48.4.2.8 Future Work. Future work will incorporate operating
experience feedback. Since the issuance of the second edition of
CSA-N285.5 in 1990, all CANDU® stations have developed CSA-
N285.5 periodic inspection programs, and many units have now
completed a full 10-year cycle of inspections. A future focus will
be the need to increase alignment and harmonization with the
CSA-N287.7 requirements. A task force has been set up to find
ways to optimize CSA-N285.5 and CSA-N287.7 requirements,
which have many interfaces (see Table 48.2), so as to minimize
implementation costs (money, staff, and radiation dose expenditure
costs). At the time of writing, development of the third edition is
well underway, with publication expected in late 2008. The TC is
evaluating the need to establish more detailed requirements for
material surveillance programs for the fibre reinforced materials
used in the pressure suppression system at some CANDU® plants.
48.4.3 CSA-N287.7, Inservice Examination and
Testing Requirements for Concrete
Containment Structures for CANDU® Nuclear
Power Plants
The CSA-N287.7 and CSA-N285.5 standards govern periodic
inspection of nuclear containment boundary systems; the interface
between these standards is summarized in Table 48.2. CSA-
N285.5 primarily addresses inspection of metallic and plastic con-
tainment boundary components; CSA-N287.7 addresses inspec-
tion of concrete containment and embedded parts and
containment leakage testing.
The purpose of CSA-N287.7 is to provide uniform rules to
ensure that the structural and leak-tight integrity of containment
boundary components is reaffirmed through periodic inspections
and the likelihood of failure has not increased significantly since
the plant was put into service. The containment boundary is
defined as the outer barrier that prevents the release of radioactive
materials to the general public.
To date, there have been three editions of CSA-N287.7, the most
recent of which was published in 1996, and reaffirmed in 2005. At
the time of this writing, the N287 TC has been re-established and
work is in progress to focus on updating and harmonizing the N287
series of standards.
48.4.3.1 Systems/Components Subject to Inspection. CSA-
N287.7 addresses the structural integrity of all concrete compo-
nents of the containment boundary. Inservice inspections, testing,
and leak tightness of the containment boundary are addressed
through periodic inspection programs. CSA-N287.7 does not use a
lead component approach as is used in CSA-N285.5.
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186 • Chapter 48
The systems and components subject to inspection include the
following:
(a) concrete (including pre-stressing and post-tensioning sys-
tems, where applicable)
(b) metal liner
(c) protective coatings
(d) embedded parts
48.4.3.2 Inspection Sample Sizes. The number of components
to be inspected is determined on a sampling basis, allowing for the
grouping of similar components. The inspection site selection
process incorporates the following:
(a) applied component loadings during normal operation and in
the functional mode (i.e., when the containment system is
activated)
(b) operating environment
(c) inspection site accessibility
(d) inspection personnel radiation dose expenditure
(e) previous operating experience (internal and world experience)
(f) results of previous inspection results (including manufac-
turing inspection results)
48.4.3.3 Type and Extent of Inspection. The component load-
ing and the potential degradation mechanisms for each component
determine the type and extent of inspections to be performed. All
structures are visually inspected where applicable. Areas consid-
ered critical with regard to structural integrity and leak tightness
must take into consideration the following:
(a) areas deemed to be subject to high stress
(b) seals and embedded parts
(c) areas where pipes are anchored against thermal expansion/
contraction
(d) areas exposed to corrosive or severe atmospheric conditions
(e) components or parts with materials that exhibit high creep
or brittle characteristics
(f) areas covered by a nonmetallic liner
Prestressed and post-tensioning systems are tested to determine
and confirm that the measurements of the time-related changes
are within the predicted ranges. Leakage rate testing is used on all
components classified as Class Containment.
48.4.3.4 Inspection Frequency/Intervals. The inspection fre-
quency is defined by industry standards and is updated based on
operating experience feedback. Periodic visual inspections are gen-
erally performed at a 5-year interval. The leakage rate testing fre-
quency is agreed upon between the licensee and regulatory authority.
For multi-unit stations, station-wide leakage rate tests and inspection
of the vacuum-building structures historically have been performed
at 10-year intervals. For components exhibiting design deficiencies
or inservice deterioration, inspections are generally performed at
shorter inspection intervals until such time that there is sufficient
operating experience to support the normal inspection interval.
48.4.3.5 Inspection/Test Methods. Most inspections of the
containment structure are performed by direct visual examina-
tion methods. In practice, the following additional methods are
employed to assess the condition of the containment boundary:
(a) visual inspection aids, including binoculars and cameras.
(b) gauges to evaluate concrete crack dimensions.
(c) impact/rebound hammer tests (ASTM C 805 [40]) or pulse
velocity measurements (ASTM C 597 [41]) to assess con-
crete quality.
(d) thickness measurement of metal liners using ultrasonic
thickness measurement devices, depth dial gauge, or
Vernier calipers.
(e) inspections of metal liner welds using magnetic particle,
liquid-penetrant, vacuum box, eddy current, radiographic,
or ultrasonic methods.
(f) hardness (durometer) testing of the condition of sealants
and elastomers.
(g) film thickness measurement of protective coatings and
epoxy liners.
Appendix (Annex) A of the standard provides guidelines for
using test beams for evaluating bonded prestressing systems,
including beam flexural tests, beam lift-off tests, and destructive
examination of the test beam. (Note: these tests are not intended
to simulate the structural behavior of the containment structure
under loads, but it is aimed at the detection of deterioration in the
materials used.)
Appendix (Annex) B provides guidelines for evaluating unbond-
ed post-tensioned systems including measurement of tendon forces,
examination of tendon wires or strands, assessment of tendon-
corrosion-prevention media, and inspection of anchor regions.
Leakage rate tests require closure of the containment envelope
and monitoring of containment pressure over extended periods of
time, under specified temperature, pressure and humidity levels.
The instrumentation for leakage rate testing shall employ the
instrument selection guide (ISG) approach given in ANSI/ANS-
56.8 [42] or its equivalent, as defined in Appendix (Annex) D of
CSA-N287.7. Appendix (Annex) C provides containment leakage
rate analysis methodology.
48.4.3.6 Assessment of Inspection Results. Inspection proce-
dure standards provide acceptance criteria for all visual and quan-
titative inspections. Test results within 10% of time-dependent the-
oretical results are generally considered acceptable for prestress
measurements. Test results less than or equal to the operational tar-
get value in leakage rate test specifications are considered accept-
able. Major repairs or replacements require a leakage test per
CSA-N287.6.
48.4.3.7 Program Management. To ensure that the periodic
inspection program remains effective, the program is reviewed on
a routine basis. The program is modified as needed to address
operating experience, previous inspection results, updated engi-
neering and safety assessments, plant modifications, new operating
conditions, and new regulatory requirements.
A quality management system is employed to ensure that all
periodic inspection activities comply with CSA-N287.7 require-
ments and that all activities are auditable.
Periodic inspection documentation that is required includes the
following:
(a) inspection and test programs
(b) inspection and test specifications
(c) inspection and test procedures
(d) inspection and test records
(e) inspection and test reports (including disposition requests)
48.4.3.8 Future Work. Future work will incorporate operating
experience feedback. A future focus will be the need to increase
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alignment and harmonization with the CSA-N285.5 requirements.
A task force is being set up to find ways to optimize CSA-N285.5
and CSA-N287.7 requirements, which have many interfaces (see
Table 48.2), so as to minimize implementation costs (money, staff,
and radiation dose expenditure costs).
48.4.4 CSA-N285.8, Technical Requirements for the
Inservice Evaluation of Zirconium Alloy
Pressure Tubes in CANDU® Reactors
This new standard, which addresses the technical requirements
for the inservice evaluation of zirconium alloy pressure tubes in
CANDU® reactors, is only applicable to pressure tubes manufac-
tured in accordance with the requirements of CSA-N285.6.1.
Pressure tubes in Canadian CANDU® nuclear power plants are
inspected in accordance with CSA-N285.4. When a detected flaw
indication does not satisfy the criteria of acceptance by examina-
tion or a pressure tube to calandria tube contact is detected or pre-
dicted, CSA-N285.4 permits a fitness-for-service assessment to
determine acceptability. Also, CSA-N285.4 requires evaluation of
the results of specified material property surveillance measure-
ments. CSA-N285.8 specifies mandatory technical requirements
and nonmandatory evaluation procedures for fitness-for-service
assessments.
(a) CSA-N285.8 consists of a mandatory main body and five
nonmandatory annexes. The main body contains the manda-
tory rules and acceptance criteria for inservice evaluation of
zirconium alloy pressure tubes in CANDU® reactors. The
nonmandatory annexes are as follows:
(1) Annex A, Procedures for Evaluation of Pressure Tube
Flaws
(2) Annex B, Procedures for Evaluation of Pressure Tube to
Calandria Tube Contact
(3) Annex C, Procedures for Assessment of a Reactor Core
(4) Annex D, Material Properties and Derived Quantities
(5) Annex E, Notification of Inservice Evaluation Form
Annexes A through C contain evaluation procedures that may
be used to demonstrate compliance with the acceptance criteria in
the main body of the standard. Annex D contains the material
properties and derived quantities that are required when perform-
ing an evaluation. Annex E contains a form for providing
notification of the evaluation to the regulatory authority.
(b) Throughout the course of applying the contents of the
N285.8 Standard it is assumed that the typical process con-
sists of the following:
(1) pressure tube inspection
(2) evaluation of the inspection results
(3) documentation of the inspection and evaluation results
(4) notification to the regulatory authority of the inspection
and evaluation
(5) acceptance by the regulatory authority of the disposition
of pressure tubes prior to returning the reactor to service
CSA-N285.8 is the culmination of the best historical industry
practices and includes recent advances in delayed hydride crack-
ing flaw assessment methodology. This standard is based in part
on fitness-for-service guidelines developed by a technical task
team formed by the CANDU® Owners Group (COG) [43]. The
COG guidelines used the applicable rules of ASME BPVC
Section XI [33]. Because the ASME Code does not provide spe-
cific requirements for CANDU® reactors, additional rules were
developed in the COG guidelines to address the delayed hydride-
cracking and hydride-blister-formation mechanisms in CANDU®
pressure tubes. The COG guidelines were first published in 1991
on a trial basis by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, with
updates issued in 1994 and 1996 to incorporate advances in
research. The new CSA-N285.8 standard includes a new process-
zone flaw assessment methodology that better describes experi-
mental test data and operating experience with the delayed
hydride cracking mechanism.
CSA-N285.8 has been developed with the extensive participa-
tion of industry experts. Industry-funded assessments of indepen-
dent external reviewers were used to increase industry and regula-
tory acceptance of the new requirements provided in the standard.
CSA-N285.8 has been developed with a fully documented techni-
cal basis for all requirements.
An Update to CSA_N285.8-05 has been published in 2007,
implementing minor enhancements to flaw evaluation procedures.
Additional updates will be issued as industry agreement is
achieved. Significant improvement initiatives under way include:
new flaw root radius dependent fatigue crack initiation evaluation
curves; flaw evaluation procedures for DHC initiation under con-
stant loading for hydride non-ratchetting conditions and for crack
initiation due to a hydrided region overload; and use of partial
safety factors for deterministic Leak-Before-Break evaluations.
48.5 CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
The development of Canadian standards has certainly been
influenced by the United States, which is both a large market and
a much larger pool of suppliers than the Canadian market.
Therefore, it has been necessary to include some degree of flexi
bility to and give the regulating authorities some latitude to accept
goods manufactured to standards other than the Canadian ones.
Also, in the field of pressure vessels, the ASME Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code exists as a mature document; therefore, it
was decided to make use of it to a large degree. This approach
avoided a duplication of effort, avoided an unnecessary trade bar-
rier, and still addressed specific Canadian needs by amending the
existing rules where the necessity arose. Furthermore, Canadian
organizations and individuals have participated in many ASME
Code commit-tees and, thus, had input to the content of the
ASME Code as well.
The CSA nuclear standards are presently in a cycle of signifi-
cant updates to do the following:
(a) To address changes in the Canadian nuclear regulatory
framework.
(b) To incorporate lessons learned from operating experience and
implementation of new requirements of updated standards.
(c) To support life extension for existing plants, including impacts
of refurbishment of selected systems or major components.
Challenges arose regarding the synchronization of the updates
to standards referenced in legislation and reactor operation
licences (issued by the regulatory authority). The challenges are
being dealt with, in the short term, by referencing withdrawn
(superseded) standards within updated standards, legislation, and
reactor operating licences. The long-term challenges are being
addressed via improved industry coordination of priorities
through the CSA Nuclear Standards Steering Committee.
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Future needs for CSA standards development include harmo-
nization of CSA’s standards with international standards where
practical, and enhanced input from international CANDU® plants.
CSA will address emerging or evolving disciplines, while enhanc-
ing public input and supporting a competitive industry.
Technology developments continue to bring new products and
processes to the marketplace, many of which the public will
expect to be standardized. As a specific example, the CANDU®
reactor type is evolving with new conceptual designs, such as the
Advanced CANDU® Reactor (ACR®; a registered trademark of
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited-see also para. 48.1.9), that
include advanced technologies and a blending of best-proven fea-
tures from other reactor designs. These new reactor designs may
require updating of existing standards and, in some cases, may
require unique new standards.
The public expectations for continual improvement in safety and
a lessening of environmental impacts from industrial processes will
continue to push the need for improved standards. Industry is fac-
ing ever-increasing challenges to maintain viability and profitability
with increased globalization (the impact of free trade agreements),
increased deregulation and decontrol of previously government-
regulated industries (e.g., Canadian nuclear industry), and the need
to have a variety of qualified suppliers to enhance competition.
Industry will require rationalization and harmonization of standards
to improve safety performance and reduce costs. The various code
committees need to find improved ways of working together to
integrate the requirements from all disciplines in a way that results
in smarter and more cost-effective requirements. To achieve ratio-
nalization, harmonization, and optimization of standards require-
ments, industry will have to support codes and standards commit-
tees with additional resources, particularly with the dedicated
assignment of industry’s most knowledgeable experts and strategic
thinkers. With many projects underway (or in the planning stages)
for major refurbishment and life extension of some CANDU®
plants, and the assessment of new build options, there are even
greater challenges for industry to assign its most knowledgeable
experts and strategic thinkers to enhance the CSA standards.
48.6 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of the many
members, past and present, of the numerous CSA TC, subcom-
mittees, and working groups, who have given their time and
expertise to developing and maintaining a comprehensive suite of
standards that have contributed to public safety. In particular, the
authors wish to thank the following individuals for their guidance,
information provided, and expert review during the development
of this chapter:
(a) Ted Shin, Canadian Standards Association, CSA Project
Manager for Nuclear Standards.
(b) Dennis Dueck, Babcock & Wilcox Canada (retired), Chair
of the CSA N285A TC.
(c) Douglas Scarth, Kinectrics Inc., member of CSA N285B TC
on periodic inspection and the driving force behind CSA-
N285.8.
(d) John Graham, Babcock & Wilcox Canada, member of the
CSA B51 TC on boilers and pressure vessels and the sub-
committee on boilers and related components.
(e) Tarek Aziz, Atomic Energy of Canada, Chair of the CSA
N289 TC.
48.7 REFERENCES
1. Standards Council of Canada (SCC): www.scc.ca.
2. Canadian Standards Association (CSA): www.csa-international.org;
www.csa.ca.
3. CSA-SDP-2.1-99, CSA Directives and Guidelines Governing
Standardization, Part 1: Participants and Organizational Structure.
Canadian Standards Association; 1998.
4. CSA-SDP-2.2-98, CSA Directives and Guidelines Governing
Standardization, Part 2: Development Process. Canadian Standards
Association; 1999.
5. ANSI/ASQC Z1.4, Sampling Procedures and Tables for Inspection by
Attributes. New York: American National Standards Institute.
6. ANSI K61.1/CGA G-2.1, Safety Requirements for the Storage and
Handling of Anhydrous Ammonia. New York: American National
Standards Institute.
7. API 530. Calculation of Heater Tube Thickness in Petroleum Refiner-
ies. American Petroleum Institute; 1996.
8. ASME BPVC Section I, Power Boilers. In: ASME Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code. New York: American Society of Mechanical
Engineers.
9. ASME BPVC Section II, Materials: Part A, Ferrous Material
Specifications; Part B, Nonferrous Material Specifications; Part C,
Specifications for Welding Rods, Electrodes and Filler Materials; Part
D, Properties. In: ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. New York:
American Society of Mechanical Engineers.
10. ASME BPVC Section IV, Heating Boilers. In: ASME Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code. New York: American Society of Mechanical
Engineers.
11. ASME BPVC Section V, Nondestructive Examination. In: ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. New York: The American Society of
Mechanical Engineers.
12. ASME BPVC Section VIII, Divisions 1, 2, and 3, Pressure Vessels.
In: ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. New York: American
Society of Mechanical Engineers.
13. ASME BPVC Section IX, Welding and Brazing Qualifications. In:
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. New York: American Society
of Mechanical Engineers.
14. ASME BPVC Section X, Fiber-Reinforced Plastic Pressure Vessels.
In: ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. New York: American
Society of Mechanical Engineers.
15. ASME B31.1, Power Piping. New York: American Society of
Mechanical Engineers.
16. ASME B31.3, Process Piping. New York: American Society of
Mechanical Engineers.
17. ASME B31.4, Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid
Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids. New York: American Society of
Mechanical Engineers.
18. ASME B31.5, Refrigeration Piping and Heat Transfer Components.
New York: American Society of Mechanical Engineers.
19. ASME B31.9, Building Services Piping. New York: American
Society of Mechanical Engineers.
20. ASME CSD-1, Controls and Safety Devices for Automatically Fired
Boilers. New York: American Society of Mechanical Engineers.
21. ASME PVHO-1, Safety Standard for Pressure Vessels for Human
Occupancy. New York: American Society of Mechanical Engineers.
22. CDA A401S, Copper Tube Handbook. Copper Development
Association ; 1994, 1995.
ASME_Ch48_p159-190.qxd 6/3/09 10:02 AM Page 189
COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 189
23. CAN/CGSB-48.9712, Qualification and Certification for Nondestructive
Testing Personnel. Canadian General Standards Board (CGSB).
24. ISO 9001, Quality Management Systems - Requirements. Geneva:
International Organization for Standardization.
25. SP-25, Standard Marking System for Valves, Fittings, Flanges and
Unions. Manufacturers Standardization Society of the Valves and
Fittings Industry.
26. NB-18, National Board Pressure Relief Device Certification. Columbus,
OH: National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors.
27. NB-23, National Board Inspection Code. Columbus, OH: National
Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors.
28. NFPA-58, Liquefied Petroleum Gas Code. Quincy, MA: National Fire
Protection Association.
29. Report No. 87-1, Guideline Specification for the Impressed Current
Method of Cathodic Protection of Underground Petroleum Storage
Tanks. Petroleum Association for the Conservation of the Canadian
Environment (PACE; now Canadian Petroleum Products Institute).
30. IP-2, The 1996 Hose Handbook Rubber Manufacturer’s Association
(RMA); 1996.
31. CAN/ULC-S603.1, Galvanic Corrosion Protection Systems for
Underground Steel Tanks. Toronto, Ontario, Canada: Underwriters’
Laboratories of Canada.
32. ASME BPVC Section III, Divisions 1, 2, and 3, Rules for Construction
of Nuclear Facility Components. In: ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Code. New York: American Society of Mechanical Engineers.
33. ASME BPVC Section XI, Rules for Inservice Inspection of Nuclear
Power Plant Components. In: ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.
New York: American Society of Mechanical Engineers.
34. ASME OM Code-1995, Appendix I, Testing of Pressure-Relief
Device in Light-Water Reactor Power Plants. New York: American
Society of Mechanical Engineers.
35. NRCC 38726, National Building Code of Canada. National Research
Council; 1995.
36. NRCC 38727, National Fire Code of Canada. National Research
Council; 1995.
37. Azeez S, Dua S, Shin T. The Canadian Approach to Nuclear Codes
and Standards, presented at Pacific Nuclear Basin Conference, in
Hawaii, March 2004.
38. CANTEACH Reference Library. Available at: http://canteach.candu®
.org.
39. EPRI TR-106589-V1, PWR Steam Generator Examination
Guidelines, Revision 4, Vol. 1: Guidelines. Palo Alto, CA: Electric
Power Research Institute; 1996.
40. ASTM C 805-02, Standard Test Method for Rebound Number of
Hardened Concrete. West Conshohocken, PA: American Society for
Testing and Materials; 2003.
41. ASTM C 597-02, Standard Test Method for Pulse Velocity Through
Concrete. West Conshohocken, PA: American Society for Testing and
Materials; 2003.
42. ANSI/ANS-56.8-2002, Containment System Leakage Testing
Requirements. La Grange Park, IL: American Nuclear Society; 2002.
43. COG - CANDU® Owners Group, Inc. Available at: www.candu®.org.
44. Slagis, G. “Piping Seismic Stress Limits – a Critical Review”, ASME
PVP Vol. 445-1, Seismic Engineering, ASME, 2002, p. 240.
45. Electric Power Research Institute, “A Methodology for Assessment of
Nuclear Power Plants Seismic Margin”, EPRI NP-6041 Revision 1, 1991.
46. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “An Approach to the
Quantification of Seismic Margins in NPPs”, NUREG/CR-4334,
Washington, DC, 1985.
47. D.F. Torgerson, B.A. Shalaby, S. Pang, “CANDU® Technology for
Generation III+ and IV Reactors”, Nuclear Engineering and Design,
Vol. 236, Issue 14–16, Aug. 2006, pp. 1565–1576.
ASME_Ch49_p191-256.qxd 6/3/09 10:16 AM Page 191
FRENCH CODES DEALING WITH
PRESSURE EQUIPMENT
Francis Osweiller, Alain Bonnefoy, Jean-Marie Grandemange,
Gerard Perraudin, and Bernard Pitrou
49.1 INTRODUCTION
This Chapter presents the basic philosophy of the French Codes
listed below and explains how they are linked to the Pressure
Equipment Directive (PED), which is mandatory in the European
Union (see Chapter 47); a comparison with the ASME Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code is provided. The presentation of nuclear
codes will be limited to those applicable to pressure equipment.
All of the acronyms used are provided at the end of this Chapter.
In France, two important organizations are responsible for the
implementation of pressure equipment Codes:
(a) SNCT, which stands for Syndicat National de la
Chaudronnerie, Tolerie et Tuyauterie (pressure vessel and
piping manufacturers association), develops codes for the
non-nuclear sector.
(1) CODAP (Code de construction des Appareils à
Pression) for pressure vessels
(2) CODETI (Code de construction des Tuyauteries
Industrielles) for industrial piping
(3) COVAP (Code de construction des generateurs de
Vapeur) for boilers
(b) AFCEN, which stands for French association for design,
construction, and inservice inspection rules for nuclear
island components, develops codes for the nuclear sector.
(1) RCC-M (design and construction rules for mechanical
components of PWR nuclear islands)
(2) RCC-MR (design and construction rules for mechanical
components of FBR nuclear islands)
(3) RCC-E (design and construction rules for electrical
equipment of nuclear islands)
(4) RCC-C (design and construction for fuel assemblies of
nuclear power plants)
(5) RSE-M (in-service inspection rules for mechanical
components of PWR nuclear islands)
(6) RCC-G (design and construction rules for civil works
of PWR nuclear islands)
The French Codes pertinent to the current discussion are pre-
sented in Table 49.1.
CHAPTER
49
49.2 OVERVIEW OF FRENCH CODES
DEVOTED TO THE NON-NUCLEAR
SECTOR
49.2.1 General
SNCT [1] is a private organization that is supported and man-
aged by French pressure equipment manufacturers who pay a fee
to be a member of the organization. SNCT develops and publishes
pressure equipment Codes for the non-nuclear sector. Other activ-
ities are devoted to training courses and consulting.
49.2.2 Scope
CODAP applies to unfired pressure vessels and covers the same
scope as ASME BPVC Section VIII, Division 2. CODAP is based
on the concept of construction category, which enables the con-
struction quality of a vessel to be adapted and consistent with its
future working conditions. CODAP is structured in six.
CODETI applies to industrial piping (i.e., piping intended for
industrial plants) and covers the same scope as ASME B31.1 and
B31.3. CODETI is based on the concept of construction category,
which enables the construction quality of a piping to be adapted
and consistent with its future working conditions. The structure of
the Code is similar to that of the CODAP with five parts: general
rules, material, design (including flexibility analysis), fabrication
and installation, and testing and inspection.
COVAP applies to steam boilers, superheated water boilers, and
thermal fluid boilers and covers approximately the same scope as
ASME BPVC Section I. This Code Covers any pressure equip-
ment that can be assembled by a manufacturer to constitute an
integrated and functional whole subject to overheating risk. In
addition to chapters covering material, design, and fabrication and
testing, specific chapters have been developed to cover water
quality and repairs and modifications.
49.2.3 Organization
CODAP, CODETI, and COVAP are developed by SNCT. Each
Code is under the responsibility of a Management Board who has
representatives from manufacturers, material producers, third-
party organizations, customers, and French regulatory authorities.
They make all the decisions concerning the strategic aspects of
the Code. The technical development of the Code is devoted to
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192 • Chapter 49

TABLE 49.1 FRENCH PRESSURE EQUIPMENT CODES

Technical Committees (General, Design, Material, Fabrication,
Testing-Inspection, and Safety Devices) who are each in charge of
one part of the Code.
All decisions are made by consensus in these committees and
must be endorsed by the Management Board. When a new text is
ready, it is reviewed by a reading committee of about 25 members.
The comments are reviewed by the relevant Technical Committee
and the text is finalized for publication.
The duration for this process can extend from 1 to 2 years,
depending on the importance on the text. Figure 49.1 shows this
organization for CODAP.
49.2.4 Link With PED and European Harmonized
Standards
CODAP, CODETI, and COVAP have been reviewed in 2000 to
comply with the requirements of Pressure Equipment Directive
97/23/EC. These Codes are private Codes, developed by a private
organization, contrary to French Standards, which are developed by
the French Standardization Organization (AFNOR–Association
Française de Normalisation). AFNOR publishes the French ver-
sion of the European Standards, known as EN Standards.
Manufacturers are free to use for the fabrication of their pressure
equipment either the relevant SNCT Code or the EN Standard.

SNCT

CODAP MANAGEMET BOARD

(15 members)

"GENERAL "PRESSURE RELIEF

"MATERIAL" "DESIGN" "FABRICATION" "INSPECTION"
REQUIREMENTS" DEVICES"
COMMITTEE COMMITTEE COMMITTEE COMMITTEE
COMMITTEE COMMITTEE
M C F I
G S

READING
COMMITTEE
(25members)

FIG. 49.1 CODAP COMMITTEE STRUCTURES

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49.2.5 Structure
CODAP, CODETI, and COVAP are generally divided into six
main parts as follows:
(a) Part G: the general outlines of the Code (scope, conditions
of applicability, general requirements, link with PED, and
main concepts)
(b) Part M: material requirements
(c) Part C design rules (design by formula and design by analysis)
(d) Part F: fabrication requirements
(e) Part I: testing and inspection requirements
(f) Part S: safety devices requirements
Each Part is divided in to Sections and Chapters. Appendices
may fall into one of three categories: mandatory, nonmandatory,
or informative. These Codes comply with the European
Regulations (PED) and provide an Annex Z, which states how the
PED requirements are satisfied in the Code. The Codes rely on
the concept of construction categories, which is based on the
assessment of the potential risks of failure of the vessel and the
consequences of a failure. Each category is based on a severity
level for the vessel, which has consequences on the level of
requirements contained in the various Parts of the Codes.
49.2.6 Publications, Updates, Interpretations,
and Inquiries
CODAP, CODETI, and COVAP are published by SNCT every
5 years in a loose-leaf edition. Addenda are generally published
every year on January 1. Errata may be published at any time as
necessary. Interpretations and inquiries must be forwarded to
SNCT (SNCT : Syndicat National de la Chaudronnerie, Tôlerie,
Tuyauterie Industrielle 92038 Paris La DÈfense Cedex France.
Web site: www.snct.org).
49.3 OVERVIEW OF FRENCH CODES
DEVOTED TO THE NUCLEAR
SECTOR
49.3.1 General
In the early 1970s, France had decided to launch an important
construction program of PWRs under a Westinghouse licence.
From 1971 to 1974, when preparing the regulatory requirements
that had to be imposed on the main primary system of these plants
[1], the group in charge of the writing of these requirements took
the precaution to ensure that they were globally compatible with
the American license, considering at the same time the French
regulatory and industrial practices.
Thus, the 900 MWe and the first series of 1300 MWe plants
were built according to the ASME III code as far as design was
concerned, completed by additional rules to comply with the reg-
ulation and according to the French EDF electricity utility manu-
facturing and examination requirements. When building the South
African Koeberg 900 MWe plant, it appeared necessary for for-
eign applications to gather in a self-contained document all the
design and construction rules that were applied according to the
above rules. Acceptance from EDF to refer to these new prescrip-
tions as well as a strong incentive from the French Administration
constituted favorable conditions for the preparation of this Code,
which started beginning of 1978. The process leading to RCC-M
is shown in Fig. 49.2.
US regulations, codes French and European
and standards for the rules, regulations and
general design of systems practices for the
and components construction of plants
PWR technology progressively
adapted to French industrial and
regulatory context
RCC-M
FIG. 49.2 INITIAL PRAGMATIC APPROACH FOR
ESTABLISHING RCC-M
A first edition was ready in 1980 for the construction of the sec-
ond French 1300 MWe series. From the end of 1978 and before
official issuing by AFCEN in 1981, the text was submitted to the
main manufacturers of nuclear-related products and discussed in
parallel with the French Safety Authority, leading to the first issue
of the Fundamental Safety Rule RFS V.2.c (in 1981, later revised
in 1986 [2]) approving the use of the RCC-M. The 1981 adden-
dum of the RCC-M was applied to the Korean Ulchin 9-10 project.
Successive editions of the RCC-M followed in 1983 (1984 adden-
dum referred to for N4 series contract), 1985 (edition applied to
the Chinese Daya Bay 1 and 2 contract), 1988, 1993 (1994 adden-
dum referred to for Ling Ao 1 and 2 contract), and 2000 (2002
addendum applied for Finland Olkiluoto 3 project). Following the
issue of PED and leading to a new 2007 edition, updating of
RCC-M did continue to incorporate answers to project needs and
consequences of regulatory evolutions in the nuclear field.
When developing the EPR in the context of a French-German
collaboration, a comparison of the French RCC-M and German
KTA provisions was conducted and the bases of an ETC-M (EPR
Technical Code – Mechanical Components) were prepared [3].
This work did lead to modification requests to update the RCC-M
practices, which are proposed for the EPR project.
In the case of fast breeder reactors, the process was similar.
Following recommendations from the RAMSES committee created
by the French CEA (Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique) in
1977, the work conducted for the RCC-M preparation as well as
the ASME III BPVC Section III and N-47 Code Case for high-
temperature application were considered in addition to specific
developments managed within a tripartite committee grouping
CEA, EDF (ElectricitÈ de France), and Novatome (now a division
of Areva-NP). The RCC-MR Code was first issued in 1985 for
application to replacement parts and future LMFBR reactors. A
second edition was issued in 1993. In the context of the European
Fast Reactor (EFR) studies, a Design and Construction Rules
Committee (DCRC) was constituted to conduct precodification
studies, which did lead to a compendium of DCRC recommenda-
tions that constituted valuable inputs for the preparation of modi-
fication requests to be evaluated by the tripartite committee and
then within the AFCEN organization. After the cancelling of the
FBR projects in Europe, the decision was made by AFCEN to
issue a 2002 edition of the RCC-MR, to record the result of this
huge development effort [16]. This edition constituted a sound
basis for developments of new applications in the high tempera-
ture field. It was then updated to conform with the regulatory evo-
lutions and completed to cover evolutionary projects needs, in
particular ITER vacuum vessel construction, leading to a new
2007 edition [16], [38].
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194 • Chapter 49

DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION: IN-SERVICE SURVEILLANCE:

Nuclear Islands
Mechanical components
RSE-M

Fire Protection System Design Safety

RCC-I classification
RCC-P

Safety related Components

Mechanical
components
PWR: RCC-M Civil Works
FBR:RCC-MR RCC-G

Electrical
Fuel
components
RCC-C
RCC-E

FIG. 49.3 ORGANIZATION OF FRENCH NUCLEAR CODES

In 1985, after initial operating experience based on ASME
BPVC Section XI–inspired programs, adapted to French context
and taking into account risk and consequences for equipment sur-
veillance and periodic inspection, EDF developed the first RSE-M
rules for inservice surveillance with the support of Framatome.
This had the objective of following the French practice, which
could also be used in the preparation of the inspection programs
for the Daya Bay Chinese plants. The result was the first 1990
edition, quickly edited by AFCEN and then updated within the
framework of the AFCEN organization, the AFCEN society
extending its scope and organization to cover the inservice sur-
veillance aspects. The RSE-M was then updated and adopted in
the 1997 edition [17] and subsequently updated by the December
1998 and 2005 addenda.
49.3.2 Scope
During the period from 1978 to 1980, Framatome-EDF teams
prepared the RCC rules. In October 1980 AFCEN was established
among Framatome, Novatome (now a division of Areva-NP), and
EDF.1
The AFCEN scope covers the following codes:
(a) RCC-M for mechanical components of light-water reactors
(b) RCC-E for electrical components
(c) RCC-C for nuclear fuel
(d) RCC-MR for mechanical components of fast breeder reactors
(e) RSE-M for inservice surveillance of mechanical compo-
nents of light-water reactors
AFCEN is also in charge of the edition of the RCC-G on civil
works, although its content is not prepared within the organization.
Other codes on fire protection (RCC-I) and system design
(RCC-P) are issued by Areva-NP and EDF teams but are not pub-
lic documents and are not edited by AFCEN. The general organi-
zation of RCCs is shown on Fig. 49.3.
49.3.3 Organization
AFCEN is established according to the French 1901 law on
associations, with a board of directors, a general secretary, a
1
AFCEN mailing address: Tour Areva, 92084 Paris La Défense
Cedex, France.
writing committee, and dedicated writing subcommittees in
charge of the various codes covered by AFCEN (Fig. 49.4).
Below the RCC-M Subcommittee, working groups are estab-
lished covering design and analysis, materials and procurement,
welding and manufacturing, and nondestructive examination. The
general parts (QA, general organization) are handled directly by
the subcommittee. Similar groups are established for the RCC-
MR and working groups within the SE-M subcommittee cover the
following:
(a) Group 1: field of application, hydraulic testing, inspection
programs and quality
(b) Group 2: nondestructive examinations
(c) Group 3: mechanical analyses and tables of defect accep-
tance
(d) Group 4: interventions on the plants, including repairs
The global sharing of responsibilities within AFCEN organiza-
tion is defined as follows: the chairman of the board is from EDF
and the general secretary is from Areva-NP. The chairman of the
editorial committee is from EDF and the secretaries of the sub-
committees are from Areva-NP for fuel and construction and from
EDF for the inservice surveillance and electrical equipment. Each
working group is managed by two group leaders, one from EDF
and one from Areva-NP.
49.3.4 Structure
The general structure of the RCC-M is presented in Table 49.2.
In compiling the RCC-M, an analogy was deliberately created
between its structure and that of the ASME BPVC Section III,
Division 1 (and related sections), so that persons working with
either of these codes could find the correspondence between them
with a minimum of confusion. Differences come essentially from
the fact that the RCC-M scope is reduced compared to the ASME
Code. The ASME Code scope includes components outside the
nuclear island as mentioned in Table 49.3, which addresses the
correspondence with non-nuclear codes applicable to conventional
boilers and pressure components in France.
When correspondence is given with RCC-M sections (for mate-
rials, welding, and NDE) in Table 49.3, this applies only for
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 195

BOARD General Secretary

Editorial committee

RCC-C Sub RCC-E Sub RCC-M Sub RCC-MR Sub RSE-M Sub
committee committee committee committee committee

WG General Design General Inspection

Qualification Material Design NDE

Design Technology Material Flaw Analysis

Softwares Examination Fabrication Repair

Installations

Examination

FIG. 49.4 STRUCTURE OF AFCEN ASSOCIATION

equipment of nuclear islands. For other components (conventional
boilers, pressure vessels, and piping), these topics are covered in
the applicable non-nuclear AFNOR/SNCT Codes (EN, COVAP,
CODAP, or CODETI).
The various subsections of RCC-M Section I have the same
general structure and refer to applicable provisions on procure-
ment, manufacturing, examination, or technical appendices, as
shown in Fig. 49.5.
The RCC-MR structure is very similar to the RCC-M structure,
as shown in Table 49.4.
49.3.5 Publications, Updates, Interpretations, and
Inquiries
The RCCs were initially based on the photography of the
industrial practice as applied to the PWR or FBR nuclear islands,
taking into account design and construction and inservice experi-
ence. Modification requests may be issued by every user or by the
AFCEN members themselves depending on industrial needs.
In preparing the code evolutions, the AFCEN committees rely
on development results [4] and integrate plant experience feed-
back, taking advantage of the centralized organization of the
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196 • Chapter 49

TABLE 49.3 COMPARISON OF ASME CODE STRUTURE AND FRENCH CODES

French nuclear industry [5]. The CEA was associated to the
developments through the AFCEN consultative scientific commit-
tee [6], more particularly as far as fast breeder rules development
was concerned. The role of this committee was to give its mem-
bers a general overview of the research and development pro-
grams, undertaken with respect to RCC codification activities, to
help them examine the correspondence between these programs
and the needs and, consequently, make recommendations on the
programs that should be initiated, so that AFCEN can be provided
with the results it needs to perform its task correctly.
Updating the Code is a continual process. In particular, the
RCC-M refers to more than 200 covering materials, processes,
qualifications, tests, and examination. These standards are con-
stantly evolving, with more and more standards becoming
European or International. Codes shall evolve in parallel to
remain consistent with the industrial needs, while keeping the
overall consistency of the rules.
Codes also evolve following regulatory evolution. In particular,
the issuing of the European PED [7] has led to updating the regu-
lation in the various European countries. Even if the nuclear

1000 chapters Subsection A

. Scope
. Documentation
. Identification
2000 chapters
. Prevention of corrosion Section 2Materials
. Applicable procurement
specification
Subsection Z
3000 chapters
. Sizing
. Analysis
Section 3 Examination
4000 chapters
. Manufacturing and Section 4 Welding
examination Section 5 Fabrication
5000 chapters
. Hydrostatic tests

6000 chapters
. Overpressure Protection

FIG. 49.5 STRUCTURE OF SUBSECTIONS OF THE RCC-M AND

RELATIONS AMONG SECTIONS
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 197
TABLE 49.4 CONTENTS OF THE RCC-MR CODE
equipment is not addressed in this directive, the nuclear industry
uses practices based on the approach; the nuclear regulations
issued in the various European countries generally refer to these
practices as minimum requirements to which specific nuclear pro-
visions may be added. In France, this approach was followed
under the form of a specific Order referring to PED provisions
and completing them depending on safety aspects and potential
radioactive releases [34], [35].
Modification requests or interpretation may be prepared by
Code users or at the initiative of AFCEN working group mem-
bers. Requests are first analyzed by the dedicated working group
depending on the topic (design, procurement, manufacturing,
examination) addressed, then discussed and approved by the RCC
subcommittee. In case an agreement is not reached on the work-
ing group proposal, a revised instruction sheet is issued and ana-
lyzed again by the working group.
When an agreement is reached in the RCC subcommittee, a
modification sheet to the code is prepared by the technical secre-
tary of the subcommittee on the basis of this agreement. This
sheet is verified by the working group leaders and the subcommit-
tee secretary and then approved by the president of the writing
committee; it is issued by the general secretary by delegation of
the AFCEN board of directors. Discussion by the board is only
needed in cases of significant revisions (e.g., the issuing of a new
section).
All these activities are conducted according to rules described
in the AFCEN Quality Manual. Each modification sheet issued is
distributed to concerned users and can be applied to projects sub-
jected to the condition that an agreement among the subcontrac-
tor, the contractor, and the client is obtained. Sets of modification
sheets are transmitted for information and remarks to the Safety
Authority.
Periodically, the set of issued modification sheets are gathered
in an addendum that is published. The addendum lists the modifi-
cation sheets that are included as well as the concerned chapters.
There cannot be a single modification, even on details, included in
RCC addenda unless it has been subjected to the complete
process of modification request/modification sheet instruction.
From time to time, where judged appropriate by the AFCEN
board, a new edition of the code is issued. A new edition is the
sum of the previous one as modified by the successive addenda
(which means by the successive modification sheets). Addenda
are issued with a periodicity that depends on the contract needs
and the amount of modifications. RCC-M addenda were issued
every 6 months in the 1980s; the frequency progressively
decreased to one every 2 years for the 2000 Edition. Modification
frequency is likely to increase with projects needs for the 2007
edition.
All these processes are conducted in the French language; con-
sequently, the only official AFCEN version is the French edition,
as mentioned in the first page of the English edition. The transla-
tion of the RCC editions and of every subsequent modification
sheet is done according to the AFCEN procedure. In case of
doubts, the French edition shall be considered; in case of transla-
tion error, the appropriate approach is to correct the RCC-M fol-
lowing the erratum process. Errata are applicable retroactively.
These revisions are presented periodically to the French Safety
Authority, leading to an update of the Fundamental Safety Rule
dedicated to each code or to the issuing of a Safety Authority
Decision, as was the case on July 10, 2001 [8], for the use of the
RCC-M 2000 Edition. Eventual conditions expressed in these
decisions are taken into account in the next addendum, as was the
case in the 2002 addendum to the RCC-M for the above decision.
Conditions for code evaluation in the context of the new regula-
tion is still under discussion.
The working groups discuss interpretation requests; they issue
an answer directly to the requestor. Instructions are periodically
presented a posteriori to the RCC subcommittee. Interpretations
are not edited, although this may be necessitated depending on
user needs. There are no RCC Code cases in case of new materi-
als or processes, because a specific agreement may be reached
through the equipment specification. Nevertheless, the concept of
a transitory modification sheet was integrated in the AFCEN pro-
cedures to anticipate the need for a code case approach for foreign
applications. It was used only once to allow a new procurement
possibility.
Some modification requests may necessitate an evaluation of
their consequences. This is particularly time when a reference to a
new standard is proposed, or for the development of a new rule. In
such a case, a specific inquiry may be addressed to potential sup-
pliers and, where appropriate, an AFCEN development study may
be decided according to the provisions discussed above.
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198 • Chapter 49
49.4 PRESENTATION OF CODAP®
49.4.1 Scope
Originally published in 1980, CODAP is reissued every 5 years
(1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005).
CODAP® was entirely revised in 2000 by the French organiza-
tion of pressure vessel and piping manufacturers association
(SNCT) to comply with the new common regulation adopted in
the European Union in May 2002 (PED). However, the rules of
the Code can also be applied to construction of vessels which are-
structured in two Divisions (see Table below):
However, the rules of CODAP can also be applied to construc-
tion of vessels which are structured in tow disvisons as shown in
the following table:
49.4.2 Links With PED
(a) CODAP® 2000 is in full conformity with the PED due to the
following:
(1) Integration of PED hazard categories (Article 9, Article
10, and Annex II) in Part General
(2) Integration of PED conformity assessment procedures
(Article 10 and Annex III) in part Testing and Inspection
(3) Conformity with the PED essential safety requirements
(Annex I) in the relevant parts of CODAP®
(b) Regarding hazard categories, Figs. 1 to 4 given in Annex II
of the PED for unfired pressure vessels have been included
in § G6 of CODAP Division 1 & 2 (see Fig. 49.6.). These
figures show four hazard categories (I, II, III, IV in ascend-
ing order) depending on the following four parameters:
(1) nature of the fluid (gas or liquid)
(2) dangers of the fluid (flammable, explosive, toxic,
oxidizing)
(3) volume of the vessel, V (liters)
(4) operating pressure, P (bar)
Determination of the hazard category of a vessel should not be
considered as a hazard analysis, which, in other respects, is
required by Annex I of the PED.
49.4.3 Main Concepts
49.4.3.1 Failure Modes. The failure modes to which the vessels
are likely to be subjected are classified into two types.
(a) Failure Modes of the Primary Type. Failure modes of the
primary type are modes for which the failure results from
the application or maintenance of a loading of a given inten-
sity as follows:
(1) gross plastic deformation
(2) plastic instability (bursting)
(3) elastic and elastic-plastic instability (buckling)
(4) creep rupture
(5) brittle fracture
(b) Failure Modes of the Secondary Type. Failure modes of the
secondary type are modes for which the failure results from
repeated variations in loadings as follows:
(1) incremental collapse
(2) fatigue cracking
49.4.3.2 Construction Categories. The concept of construction
categories enables the construction quality of a vessel to be adapted
and consistent with its future working conditions.
This concept, already used in the earlier editions of the Code,
has been significantly modified to be consistent with the concept
of PED hazard categories.
(a) In CODAP® 2000, the determination of the construction
category of a vessel is based on the following:
(1) The hazard category of the vessel obtained from the
PED (I, II, III, or IV).
(2) The assessment of the potential hazards of failure that
are governed by eight criteria; this assessment is com-
pleted by the assessment of the consequence of a failure
that are governed by five criteria.
These 13 risk assessment criteria (listed in Table 49.5 for a ves-
sel falling within the scope of the PED) must be evaluated one by
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FIG. 49.6 DETERMINATION OF HAZARD CATEGORY FOR A VESSEL CONTAINING A DANGEROUS GAS PS ⫽ MAXIMUM
ALLOWABLE PRESSURE (BAR) V ⫽ VOLUME (LITER)
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TABLE 49.5 RISK ASSESSMENT FOR PRESSURE VESSELS FALLING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE PED
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TABLE 49.6 RISK ASSESSMENT FOR PRESSURE VESSELS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE PED
one by the customer, who is the only one to know how the vessel
will be operated. From these individual evaluations, a global level
of risk assessment is obtained for the vessel, which may be low,
moderate, high, or very high.
For a vessel beyond the scope of the PED, in addition to the 13
criteria listed in Table 49.5, the four criteria given in Table 49.6
shall be assessed.
Table 49.7 shows how the combination of hazard category and
global level of risk assessment determines the construction cate-
gory A, B1, B2 or C (where applicable). Each construction cate-
gory is associated with a severity level of the various technical
requirements of the Code (e.g., material, design, and fabrication).
Category A corresponds to the highest severity level implying a
high level of quality. The fourth lowest, construction category D,
has been added in CODAP® 2000 to cover vessels falling below
hazard category I (covered by Article 3.3 of PED). All categories’
A, B1, B2 or C (where applicable) ensure the same reliability for
the pressure vessel. Category Ex (for exceptional) is the same as
category A with additional requirements from the Customer.
(b) The selection of the construction category has significant
consequences on the construction of the vessel, the most
important being the following:
(1) The type of certificate for the material (r1 ⫽ specific
testing; r2 ⫽ nonspecific testing)
(2) The safety factors applied on tensile strength and on
yield strength to obtain the nominal design stresses (see
Table 49.8).
(3) The weld joint efficiency: z ⫽ 1.0 (implying 100%
NDT); z ⫽ 0.85 (implying 20% NDT including nodes
or 10% including nodes); and z ⫽ 0.7 (implying visual
examination).
These requirements are summarized in Table 49.9.
49.4.4 Part Material
(a) This part is devoted to the materials that are covered in the
following sections:
(1) M2: rules applicable to nonaustenitic and nonstainless
steels
(2) M3: rules applicable to austenitic stainless steels
(3) M4: rules applicable to austenitic-ferritic stainless steels
(4) M5: rules applicable to ferrous and nonferrous material
clad steel plates
(5) M6: rules applicable to martensitic stainless steels
(6) M7: rules applicable to ferritic and semiferritic stainless
steels
(7) M9: rules applicable to steel bolting
(8) M12: rules applicable to nickel and nickel alloys
(9) M13: rules applicable to aluminum and aluminum alloys
(10) M14–Rules applicable to titanium and titanium alloys.
(b) The rules of these sections must be applied in addition to the
following general rules:
(1) M1: rules applicable to all ferrous materials
(2) M11: rules applicable to all nonferrous materials
(c) Section 10 covers welding consumables. According to the
grouping of materials defined in EN ISO/TR 15608: 2000,
the selection of a material and acceptance criteria depends on
the construction category and on the maximum permissible
thickness (see Table 49.11). Materials covered in European
Standard as well Materials covered by other specification
(i.e., ASTM) are considered by this new issues of CODAP.
These rules are completed by the following annexes:
(1) MA1: aging of nonstainless and nonaustenitic steels
(2) MA2: prevention of risk of brittle fracture based on
frac-ture mechanics
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202 • Chapter 49

TABLE 49.7 DETERMINATIN OF THE CONSTRUCTION CATEGORY IN CODAP® DIVISION 1 AND DIVISION 2

(3) MA3: behavior of steels in the presence of pressurized
hydrogen
(4) MA4: prevention of risks of corrosion
(5) MA5: product specification
(6) MA6: particular material appraisal for material recog-
nized as being safe
This Annex allows the use of materials not covered in
European Standards but covered in other recognized standards
(i.e., ASTM/ASME standards, French standards).
49.4.5 Part Design
The Code provides two complementary types of design rules:
specific design rules (DBF ⫽ design by formula; Division 1 and 2)
and general design rules (DBA ⫽ design by analysis; Division 2
only).
(a) The specific design rules cover the most usual components
and welded joints subject to common loadings (i.e. pres-
sure). The thickness of each component is determined by a
direct formula or the strength of the component is checked by
formulas or graphs. Only static loadings are taken into
account in the specific design rules, except for Section C8
dealing with expansion bellows. No other justification is
necessary if these rules are used in accordance with their
conditions of applicability.
The following components are covered by specific
design rules listed in Table 49.12.
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TABLE 49.8 NOMINAL DESIGN STRESS IN CODAP® 2000 (EXCERPT)

TABLE 49.9 PERMITTED TYPE OF ACCEPTANCE, DESIGN STRESS AND WELD JOINT EFFICIENCY ACCORDING
TO CONSTRUCTION CATEGORY OF A VESSEL (DIVISION 1 & DIVISION 2)
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204 • Chapter 49

TABLE 49.10 MATERIAL TABLES DIVISION 1 OR DIVISION 2 (EXCERPT)

(Category C is not applicable in Division 2 and the “greyish” grades are permitted only in division 2)
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 205

(b) The general design rules are intended to be used when the spe-
cific design rules do not apply. In these rules, which are cov-
ered in Section 10, the check of the strength is carried out by
complying with criteria regarding stresses or stress ranges.
Section C10 deals with stress analysis and permit the check of
the strength of the various components of a vessel subjected to
loadings mainly of static nature. Sections C11 permit the
check of the strength of the various components of a vessel
subject to variable loadings likely to lead to failure by fatigue
cracking. Sub-section C11.2 provides rules for simplified
fatigue analysis, sub-section C11.3 provides rules for detailed
fatigue analysis (Division 2 only). Use of rules C11.2 and
C12.3 need to perform the determination of the stresses either
numerically, analytically or experimentally.
Annexes complete these sections; Annex FA1 defines the per-
missible welded joints, which depend on the construction catego-
ry of the vessel (see Table 49.14).
49.4.6 Part Fabrication
This part deals with fabrication of pressure vessels or vessel
components made from ferrous or nonferrous materials according
to the following sections:
(a) F1: rules applicable to all ferrous materials
(b) F2: rules applicable to nonaustenitic and nonstainless steel
constructions
(c) F3: rules applicable to austenitic stainless steel construc-
tions

TABLE 49.11 MATERIAL TABLES DIVISION 1 OR DIVISION 2 (EXCERPT)

(Category C is not applicable in Division 2 and the “greyish” grades are permitted only in Division 2)
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206 • Chapter 49

TABLE 49.12 DESIGN RULES

(d) F4: rules applicable to austeniticferritic stainless steel con-
structions
(e) F5: rules applicable to fabrication of ferrous and nonferrous
metal clad steel plates
(f) F6: rules applicable to martensitic stainless steel construc-
tions
(g) F7: rules applicable to ferritic and semiferritic stainless steel
constructions
(h) F1 1: rules applicable to all nonferrous metals
(i) F12: rules applicable to nickel and nickel alloy construc-
tions
(j) F13: rules applicable to aluminum and aluminum alloy con-
structions
(k) F14: Rules applicable to titanium and titanium alloy con-
structions.
(l) F20: construction rules for tube sheet heat exchangers
Each section is divided into chapters that cover design of welded
joints, forming, welding, tolerances (see Table 49.13), and post-
welded heat treatment.
49.4.7 Testing and Inspection
The sections of this part define the testing and inspection oper-
ations to which the vessels must be subjected.
49.4.7.1 Testing. The testing shall be carried out by a testing
body or department independent of the production department of
the Manufacturer. The Manufacturer, under his responsibility, shall
define the testing type and extent, which shall meet as a minimum
the requirements provided for in the Code for the construction cat-
egory under consideration (see Table 49.15).
49.4.7.2 Inspection. The construction supervision shall be car
ried out by an inspection body appointed by the customer (named
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TABLE 49.13 TOLERANCES ON BRANCHES (EXCERPT)

Principal in CODAP). (c) a department of the Manufacturer in charge of performing

The inspection body may be any of the following: all or part of the supervision of the construction, under the
responsibility of the Manufacturer when a certified quality
(a) the inspection department of the Principal system of the Manufacturer is implemented and after agree-
(b) a specialized body selected by the Principal ment between the parties involved
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208 • Chapter 49
The procedure regarding the activities of the inspection body
shall be specified by the Principal in the order.
49.4.7.3 Conformity Assessment. The Code defines the spe-
cific requirements applicable to vessels that fall within the scope of
the PED. The conformity must be performed according to
Table IA5.9.2 of the Code (see excerpt Table 49.16).
Depending on the hazard category of the vessel, the conformity
assessment may be carried out by the Manufacturer or by a Notified
Body in accordance with one of the procedures given in Table 49.17.
49.4.8 Comparison to ASME BPVC Section VIII
CODAP® rules were originally based on a compromise
between Divisions 1 and 2 of ASME BPVC Section VIII. This
concept has changed in the 2000s with the enforcement of the
PED and the issuance of the Harmonized Standard EN 13445.
Contrary to ASME, CODAP® classifies pressure vessels in
construction categories linked to the essential safety require-
ments of the PED. A pressure vessel built in accordance with
CODAP® has a unique weld joint efficiency, contrary to ASME,
which allows for different weld joint efficiencies for the differ-
ent components of the vessel. Safety factors in CODAP® are
lower than in ASME, which leads to higher maximum allowable
stresses in CODAP.
CODAP® design rules devoted to Tubesheet Heat Exchangers
(Section C7) and Expansion Bellows (Section 8) have been devel-
oped in collaboration with ASME Subcommittee VIII. Accordingly,
they are in conformity with Part UHX and Appendix 26 of ASME
Section VIII Division 1.
49.4.9 Future Developments
(a) Specifications covering nickel and titanium alloys will be
added to meet PED criteria.
(b) A new subsection C10.3 in Part Design is in the course of
development to cover detailed fatigue analysis, which will
be partially based on EN 13445.
(c) Design rules concerning tubesheet heat exchangers
(Subsection C7.1) will be updated to be consistent with Part
UHX-12 of ASME BPVC Section VIII Division 1 and EN
13445-3 Chapter 13. Subsection C8 covering expansion bel-
lows will be reviewed to be in line with Appendix 26 of
ASME BPVC Section VIII Division 1 and EN 13445-3
Chapter 14.
(d) New rules covering the effects of supports (e.g., saddle,
shirt, and bracket) are in the course of preparation.
(e) Alternative procedure for checking bolted flange connec
tions: this new method, based on European Standard NF
EN 1591, will account for tightness criteria and loads due
to each operating condition including external loading.
(f) Regarding NDT, criteria for acoustic emission will be
included.
49.4.10 References
1. F. Osweiller: “Design criteria of the French Pressure Vessel CODAP
Code’’—6th ICPVT/ Session on “Design Criteria’’—Beijing-Sept. 1988.
2. F. Osweiller: “CODAP 2000: adaptation of the French Pressure Vessel
Code to the PED requirements’’ —9th ICPVT–Sydney-April 2000.
3. F. Osweiller, J.Desse, L. Poupet: “Mise en confomité du CODAP
2000 avec les spécifications de la DESP’’–ESOPE 2001-
Paris-October 2001.
49.5 PRESENTATION OF CODETI®
49.5.1 Scope
Originally published in 1947, CODETI® has been reissued four
times (in 1979, 1982, 1991, and 1995).
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This concept was maintained in the 2001 edition but new

European developments contained in the new European
Harmonized Standard for piping (EN 13480) were taken into con-
sideration to comply with PED requirements.
Division 1 applies to industrial metallic piping (i.e., intended
for an industrial plant) that is aboveground, ducted, or buried and-
covers the range of temperature below 800°C. This Division does
not contain the operation and maintenance rules intended to
ensure the required safety, which must be met by the user durin-
piping operation and which complete the construction rules. It
also does not provide rules regarding thermal exchange, thermo-
dynamics, and fluid mechanics.

49.5.2 Links with PED

CODETI® was entirely revised in 2001 by SNCT to comply
with the new common regulation adopted in the European Union
in May 2002 (PED). However, the rules of the Code apply also to
construction of vessels that are outside the scope of the directive
and subject to other regulations.
CODETI® has two sections: the first covers low and medium
pressures and the second covers high pressures. This structure,
based on earlier European developments (1951) in the field of
piping and on ASME B31.1 and B31.3, has been completed by
the concept of construction category (see para. 49.5.4).
(a) CODETI® 2001 is in full conformity with the PED due to
the following:
(1) Integration of PED hazard categories (Article 9, Article
10, and Annex II) in General
(2) Integration of PED conformity assessment procedures
(Article 10 and Annex III) in Testing and Inspection
(3) Conformity with PED essential safety requirements
(Annex I) in the relevant parts of CODETI®
(b) Regarding hazard categories, Figs. 6 to 9 given in Annex II
of the PED for piping have been included in § G6 of CODE-
TI® (see Fig. 49.7).
These figures define three hazard categories (I, II, and III in
ascending order) depending on the following four parameters:
(1) Nature of fluid (gas or liquid)
(2) Dangers of fluid (flammable, explosive, toxic, oxidizing)
(3) Nominal diameter, DN, of the piping (mm)
(4) Operating pressure, P (bar)
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TABLE 49.14 PERMISSIBLE JOINTS (EXCERPT–DIVISION 1)

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TABLE 49.14 PERMISSIBLE JOINTS (EXCERPT–DIVISION 2)

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212 • Chapter 49
Determination of the hazard category should not be considered
as a hazard analysis, which, in other respects, is required by
Annex I of the PED.
49.5.3 Main Concepts
49.5.3.1 Failure Modes. The following failure modes are taken
into account in the Code:
(a) brittle fracture
(b) gross plastic deformation
(c) plastic instability
(d) elastic and elastic-plastic instability (buckling), either local
or general
(e) creep rupture
(f) incremental collapse
(g) fatigue cracking
49.5.3.2 Construction Categories. The concept of construction
categories enables the construction quality of a piping to be adapt-
ed and consistent with its future working conditions. This concept,
already used in the earlier editions of the Code, has been signifi-
cantly modified to be consistent with the concept of PED hazard
categories.
(a) In CODETI® 2001, the determination of the Construction
Category of a piping is based on the following:
(1) the hazard category of the piping obtained from the PED
(I, II, III)
(2) the assessment of the potential hazards of failure (nine
criteria), completed by the assessment of the conse
quence of a failure (five criteria).
These 14 risk assessment criteria (listed in Table 49.18
for a piping falling within the scope of the PED) must be
evaluated one by one by the Customer, who is the only
one to know how the piping will be operated. From
these individual evaluations, a global level of risk
assessment is obtained for the piping which may be low,
moderate, high, or very high.
For a piping out of the scope of the PED, in addition
to the 14 criteria listed Table 49.18, the four criteria
given in Table 49.19 shall be assessed.
Table 49.20 shows how the combination of hazard
category and global level of risk assessment determines
the construction category A, B, C, or D of a piping. Each
construction category is associated with a severity level
of the various technical requirements of the Code (e.g.,
material, design, and fabrication). Category A corre-
sponds to the highest severity level implying a high level
of quality. In any case, all categories ensure the same
reliability for the piping. Category Ex (for exceptional)
is the same as Category A with additional requirements
from the Customer.
(b) The selection of the construction category has significant
consequences on the construction of the piping, the most
important being the following:
(1) the type of certificate for the material (specific testing,
nonspecific testing)
(2) the safety factors applied on tensile strength and yield
strength (Table 49.21)
(3) the weld joint efficiency (z ⫽ 1.0; 0.85; 0.7)
These requirements are summarized in Tables 49.22 and 49.23.
49.5.4 Part Material
Part M defines the minimum conditions to be fulfilled for the
selection of materials, conditions regarding the use of the prod-
ucts, drawing up of orders, supplying, possibilities of using prod-
ucts taken from stock, testing, and marking of products.
(a) Piping Within the Scope of the PED. The products intended
for the fabrication of piping or piping components shall be
defined by one of the following documents:
(1) a supporting harmonized European standard for materials.
(2) a material data sheet resulting from a European approval
for materials for pressure equipment.
(3) a particular material appraisal. For piping falling within
hazard category III, the particular appraisal shall be per-
formed by the Notified Body in charge of the conformity
assessment procedures for the piping.
For the products intended for the fabrication of a piping not
subject to the essential safety requirements of the above-
mentioned documents (piping not within the hazard cate-
gories), the rules of para. (b) apply.
(b) Piping Beyond the Scope of the PED. The products intend
ed for the fabrication of piping or piping components shall
be defined by referring to a standard or, in the absence of
such a standard, to a particular specification that attests that
these products are suitable for the intended use.
According to the grouping of materials listed in Table 49.24
(taken from EN 288-3), the selection of a material and
acceptance criteria are related to the construction category
and the maximum permissible thickness (see Table 49.25).
The following six annexes complete these rules:
(1) MA1: aging of nonstainless and nonaustenitic steels.
(2) MA2: prevention of risk of brittle fracture based on
fracture mechanics.
(3) MA3: behavior of steels in the presence of pressurized
hydrogen.
(4) MA4: prevention of corrosion risks.
(5) MA5: product specification.
(6) MA6: safe products intended for the manufacture of
piping subject to the essential safety requirements of the
European PED or the relevant French transposing regu-
lations (Decree 99-1046). This Annex allows the use of
materials that are not covered by European Standards
but that are covered by other recognized standards (i.e.,
French standards).
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TABLE 49.15 EXTEND OF NON-DESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION (EXCERPT–DIVISION 2)

49.5.5 Part Design
49.5.5.1 Section C1, General, deals with elementary loads, load-
ing conditions, and nominal design stresses (see Table 49.21).
In addition to time-independent nominal design stress, time-
dependent nominal design stress is defined in Chapter C1 as
follows:
S tRh
fF =
Cs
where
CS-safety factor that depends on the lifetime corresponding to
the stress specified by the material specification (Table 49.26; see
also (4) Table 49.23).
StR, h-the mean value of creep rupture strength, as indicated by
the standards, for the material in question at the considered tem-
perature, t, and for the considered lifetime h (in hours), whereby
the dispersion band of the results does not deviate by more than
20% from the mean value.
49.5.5.2 Section C2, Design, deals with calculations of pressure
components (see Table 49.27) subject to internal or external pres-
sure. Cyclic loading is also covered (⬎ 1000 full amplitude pres-
sure cycles).
49.5.5.3 Section C3, Analysis and acceptance criteria, covers
the design of piping intended to withstand all thermal or mechan-
ical loadings during their required lifetime.
In addition to the design requirements for pressure in Sections
C1 and C2, each piping system must be designed to withstand the
effects due to other thermal or mechanical loads during the
required lifetime. For this purpose, Section C3 deals with the stress
analysis to be performed and the corresponding criteria to be met
and states the requirements related to flexibility (Fig. 49.8).
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TABLE 49.16 INTERVENTIONS FOR CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT (EXCERPT)

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216 • Chapter 49
The following annexes complete this Section:
(a) Physical and mechanical properties of materials
(b) Recommendations for the installation of expansion joints
(Table 49.28)
(c) Recommendation for checking of metallic piping against
seismic events
(d) Allowable forces and moments on branches of pumps
49.5.5.4 Section C4, Supports, deals with design of the support-
ing system and with the calculation of supports (Fig. 49.9).
49.5.5.5 General annexes covering buried piping complete the
design chapter (Fig. 49.10).
49.5.6 Part Fabrication
This part provides fabrication rules for the various materials
covered by the Code according to the following sections:
(a) F1, rules applicable to all ferrous materials
(b) F2, rules applicable to nonaustenitic and nonstainless steel
constructions
(c) F3, rules applicable to austenitic stainless steel construc-
tions
(d) F4, rules applicable to fabrication of supports
Each section is divided into chapters that cover design of
–welded joints, forming, welding, tolerances (see Fig. 49.11 and
Table 49.29) and postwelded heat treatment.
Annexes complete these sections; Annex FA1 defines the per-
missible welded joints that depend on the construction category of
the piping (see Fig. 49.12).
49.5.7 Part Testing and Inspection
The chapters of this part define all the testing and inspection
operations to which piping is designed and manufactured in
accordance with Division 1 of the Code.
(a) Testing. The Manufacturer, under his responsibility, must
define the testing type and extent, which must meet the
requirements provided for in this Division of the Code for the
construction category under consideration (see Table 49.30).
Testing shall be carried out by a testing body or depart-
ment, independent of the production department of the
Manufacturer, in charge of performing the testing required by
the Division 1 of the Code and by the Technical Construction
data specified by the Purchaser. Regarding construction
category Ex, the testing shall be at least the testing provided
for in this Division for the construction category A.
(b) Inspection. The construction supervision shall be carried out
by a body or a department appointed by the Purchaser and
in charge of performing the contractual activities related to
the construction supervision that are required in the
Division 1 of the Code and in the construction technical data
specified by the Purchaser. Regarding construction category
Ex, the tasks to be carried out by the inspector shall be at
least those related to construction category A.
(c) Conformity Assessment. The specific requirements for pip-
ing that are within the scope of the PED and the conformity
of which must be assessed according to the procedures are
detailed (see Table 49.31).
49.5.8 Comparison to ASME B31.1 and B31.3
The main differences between CODETI® and ASME B 31.1
are as follows:
(a) The categories of piping are different.
(b) Guarantied properties given without additional require-
ments by the product standard (i.e., ASTM) are lower than
those given by European standards.
(c) Safety factors used in B31.1/B31.3 are higher than those
used in CODETI® (for time-independent conditions).
(d) Testing during and after fabrication is different in some
cases.
49.5.9 Future Developments
The principal development of Division 1 will address an alter-
native procedure for checking bolted flange connections. This
new method, based on the European Standard NF EN 1591, will
account for tightness criteria and loads due to each operating con-
dition including external loading.
Divisions 2 and 3 are in the course of preparation and will
cover the following:
(a) Division 2: pipeline transportation (aboveground or buried)
(b) Division 3: water transportation and steel penstock
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TABLE 49.17 SELECTION OF A CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE

In addition, specifications covering composite materials falling
or not within the scope of the PED are being prepared.
49.6 PRESENTATION OF COVAP®
49.6.1 Scope
COVAP® (Code for construction of steam boilers and super
heated water boilers) is published by SNCT. COVAP is based on
the French Standard Series NF E 32-100, which was withdrawn
when the new European regulation (PED) came into being. This
Code deals with steam boiler and superheated water boilers and
covers the two basic types of boilers. (firetube and watertube).
According to the Code, a boiler consists of all parts subject to
pressure from water inlet (including valves) to the steam or super
heated water header (including outlet valves, where relevant, or
the last welded joint or flange at outlet of the header). This covers
all reheaters, economizers, piping, and safety accessories connected
directly to the boiler without intervening valves (i.e., subject to
the risk of overheating).
The rules of this Code have been developed to cover equipment
that must comply with the requirements of the PED. They can
also be applied to boilers subject to other regulations.
49.6.2 Links with PED
COVAP® 2003 is in full conformity with the PED due to the
following:
(a) Integration of PED hazard categories (Article 9, Article 10,
and Annex II) in General
(b) Integration of PED conformity assessment procedures
(Article 10 and Annex III) in Testing and Inspection
(c) Conformity with PED essential safety requirements (Annex I)
in the relevant parts of COVAP®
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218 • Chapter 49
FIG. 49.7 DETERMINATION OF HAZARD CATEGORY FOR A PIPING CONTAINING A DANGEROUS GAS
Regarding hazard categories, Fig. 5 given in Annex II of the
PED for “fired or otherwise heated pressure equipment with the
risk of overheating intended for generation of steam or superheat-
ing water” has been included in Part G of COVAP(see Fig. 49.13).
Part G also provides figures for vessels and piping to cover
other equipment included in the concept of “assembly” defined by
the PED (“several pieces of pressure equipment assembled by a
Manufacturer to constitute an integrated and functional whole”).
These figures define four hazard categories (I, II, III, and IV in
ascending order) depending on four parameters as follows:
(1) nature of fluid (gas or liquid)
(2) dangers from fluid (flammable, explosive, toxic, oxidizing)
(3) volume of the vessel, V (liters)
(4) operating pressure, P (bar)
Determination of the hazard category of a boiler should not be
considered as a hazard analysis (which, in other respects, is
required by Annex I of the PED).
49.6.3 Main Concepts
49.6.3.1 Failure Modes. The failure modes to which the ves-
sels are likely to be subjected are classified into two types.
(a) Failure Modes of Primary Type. Failure modes of primary
type are modes for which the failure results from the
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TABLE 49.18 RISK ASSESSMENT FOR PIPING FALLING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE PED
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220 • Chapter 49

TABLE 49.19 RISK ASSESSMENT: ADDITIONAL CRITERIA FOR PIPING BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE PED

TABLE 49.20 DETERMINATION OF THE CONSTRUCTION CATEGORY IN CODETI®

application or maintenance of a loading of a given intensity (1) incremental collapse

as follows: (2) fatigue cracking
(1) gross plastic deformation
(2) plastic instability (bursting) 49.6.3.2 Construction Categories. The concept of construc
(3) elastic and elastic-plastic instability (buckling) tion categories enables the construction quality of a boiler to be
(4) creep rupture adapted and consistent with its future working conditions. This
(5) brittle fracture concept has been significantly modified to be consistent with the
concept of PED hazard categories.
(b) Failure Modes of the Secondary Type. Failure modes of the
secondary type are modes for which the failure results from (a) In COVAP® 2003, the determination of the construction cat-
repeated variations in loadings as follows: egory of a boiler is based on the following:
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TABLE 49.21 NOMINAL DESIGN STRESS

TABLE 49.22 PERMITTED COMBINATIONS OF THE DIFFERENT NOMINAL DESIGN STRESSES AND PIPING
CATEGORIES, FOR OPERATING CONDITIONS BEYOND THE CREEP RANGE OF THE MATERIAL
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222 • Chapter 49
TABLE 49.23 WELDED JOINT COEFFICIENT
(1) hazard category of the boiler (I, II, III, or IV) obtained
from the PED
(2) assessment of the potential hazard of failure
(3) the consequence of a failure
(b) The selection of the construction category has significant
consequences on the construction of the boiler. The most
important are the following:
(1) the type of certificate for the material (specific testing or
nonspecific testing)
(2) the safety factors applied on tensile strength and on
yield strength (see Table 49.32)
(3) the weld joint efficiency (z ⫽ 1.0; 0.85; 0.7)
These requirements are summarized in Table 49.33.
49.6.4 Part Material
Part M defines the minimum conditions to be fulfilled for the
selection of materials, conditions regarding the use of the
products, drawing up of orders, supplying, possibilities of using
products taken from stock, testing, and marking of products.
(a) Boilers Falling Within the Scope of the PED. The products
intended for the fabrication of boilers or boilers components
must be defined by one of the following documents:
(1) a supporting harmonized European standard for materials.
(2) a material data sheet resulting from a European
approval for materials for pressure equipment;
(3) a particular material appraisal. For piping falling within
hazard category III, the particular appraisal shall be per
formed by the Notified Body in charge of the conformi-
ty assessment procedures for the piping.
For the products intended for the fabrication of a
boiler not subject to the essential safety requirements
of the above-mentioned documents, the rules of para.
(b) below apply.
(b) Boilers Beyond the Scope of the PED. The products intend
ed for the fabrication of boilers or boilers components shall
be defined by referring to a standard or, in the absence of
such a standard, to a particular specification that attests that
these products are suitable for the intended use.
According to the grouping of materials listed in Table 49.34
(taken from EN 288-3), the selection of a material and acceptance
criteria are related to construction category.
The rules of this part are completed by the following six
Annexes:
(1) prevention of risk of brittle fracture based on fracture
mechanics.
(2) prevention of risks of corrosion.
(3) safe products intended for the manufacture of piping
subject to the essential safety requirements of the
European PED or the relevant French transposing regu-
lations (Decree 99-1046). This Annex allows the use of
materials that are not covered by European standards
but that are covered by other recognized standards (i.e.,
French or German standards).
49.6.5 Part Design
The Code provides two complementary types of design rules:
specific design rules (DBF ⫽ design by formula) and general
design rules (DBA ⫽ design by analysis).
(a) The specific design rules cover the most usual components
and welded joints subject to common loadings (i.e., pressure).
In these rules, the thickness of the component is determined by
a direct formula, or the strength of the component is checked
by formulas or graphs. Due to this type of pressure equipment,
special attention is paid to the determination of design temper-
atures. No other justification is necessary if these rules are
used in accordance with their conditions of applicability. The
following is covered by the specific design rules:
(1) cylindrical shell
(2) spherical shell
(3) rectangular header
(4) formed ends
(5) flat ends
(6) openings in cylindrical or spherical shells and in formed
ends
(7) water or steam pipes
In addition to the above rules, specific rules regarding fire-tube
boilers are provided (e.g., for tubesheet and furnace; see Fig. 49.14).
(b) The general design rules are intended to be used when the spe-
cific rule do not apply. In these rules, which are covered in
Annexes CA1 and CA2, the check of the strength is performed
by complying with criteria regarding stresses or stress ranges.
Determination of the required stresses shall be performed
either numerically, analytically, or experimentally.
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TABLE 49.24 MATERIAL GROUPING

49.6.6 Part Fabrication
This part deals with the fabrication of boilers or boiler compo-
nents. Two complementary sets of design rules are provided in the
following sections:
(a) F1, rules applicable to all ferrous materials
(b) F2, rules applicable to nonaustenitic and nonstainless steel
constructions
(c) F3, rules applicable to austenitic stainless steel construc-
tions
Each section covers the following topics: design of welded
joints, forming, welding, tolerances, and postweld heat treatment
(see Table 49.35).
Annexes complete these sections; Annex FA1 defines the per-
missible joints according to the construction category of the boiler
(see Table 49.36).
49.6.7 Testing and Inspection
The various sections of this part define the testing and inspec-
tion operations to which boilers must be subjected.
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224 • Chapter 49
TABLE 49.25 STEEL GRADES AND MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE THICKNESSES IN RELATION TO CONSTRUCTION
CATEGORIES
49.6.7.1 Testing. A testing body or department independent of
the production department of the Manufacturer shall carry out the
testing. The Manufacturer, under his responsibility, shall define
the testing type and extent, which shall meet as a minimum the
requirements provided for in the Code for the construction catego
ry under consideration (see Table 49.37).
49.6.7.2 Inspection. The construction supervision shall be car
ried out by a body department appointed by the Customer (named
“Principal”) in COVAP.
49.6.7.3 Conformity Assessment. The Code defines the specif-
ic requirements for boilers that are within the scope of the PED
The conformity assessment must be performed according to Table
I.10.4.3.1 of the Code (see excerpt, Table 49.38).
TABLE 49.26 SAFETY FACTORS
Depending on the hazard category of the vessel, conformity
assessment may be carried out by the Manufacturer or by a
Notified Body, in accordance with one of the given procedures
(see Table 49.39).
The inspection body may be any of the following:
(a) the inspection department of the Principal.
(b) a specialized body selected by the Principal.
(c) a department of the Manufacturer in charge of performing
all or part of the supervision of the construction; after agree-
ment between the parties involved, a certified quality system
of the Manufacturer is implemented under the responsibili-
ty of the Manufacturer.
The Principal in the order shall specify the procedure regarding
the activities of the inspection body.
49.6.8 Comparison to ASME BPVC Section I
The scope of COVAP® 2003 is similar to the scope of ASME
BPVC Section I, except that miniature boilers are not specifically
addressed and locomotive, portable, and traction service boilers
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TABLE 49.27 COMPONENTS

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226 • Chapter 49
TABLE 49.27 (Continued )
Section C2 is completed by Annexes. Annex C2.A1 provides
an alternative method to check large openings (d/D ⫽ 1) based on
recent developments (Elastic Compensation Method)
are not covered. Also, COVAP® 2003 covers only boilers fabricated
by welding. A specific part (Part E) deals with water quality.
49.6.9 Future Developments
Specific rules regarding thermal fluid boilers are in the course
of preparation. Also, repairs and modifications will be covered in
a specific part.
49.7 PRESENTATION OF RCC-M
49.7.1 Introduction and Scope
As indicated in para. 49.3, the RCC-M was initially based on
the ASME BPVC Section III design rules and the French industri-
al experience. Procurement, manufacturing, and examination
practices have since changed according to the evolution of
European and international standards. Design rules applicable to
classes 1 and 2 components have been updated to comply with
applicable regulations and to take into account service experience.
Less specific work was dedicated to class 3 components, and it is
FIG. 49.8 INSTALLATION OF EXPANSION JOINTS (EXTRACTED FROM ANNEX C3.A3)
anticipated that more and more will be done to applicable non-
nuclear industrial standards (and more particularly European har-
monized standards) in the near future, as agreed for application to
the Finland project. For this reason, the following paragraphs are
dedicated to classes 1 and 2 pressure components, with additional
information being provided for specific components such as reac-
tor pressure vessel internals, supports, and storage tanks. Further
comments are given in para. 49.7.10 on construction rules applic-
able to fast breeder reactor components and inservice surveillance
of pressurized water reactor equipment.
49.7.2 General Requirements
49.7.2.1 RCC-M Section A. General requirements are covered
in Section A of the code, which defines the following:
(a) In A. 1000, the structure of the Code, presented in para.
49.3, and a list of standards given in A. 1300 with their
applicable editions; Code paragraphs with references to
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228 • Chapter 49
FIG. 49.9 EXAMPLES OF SUPPORTS
standards are identified in A. 1400 to facilitate the updating
of the Code in case of standard evolution. Conditions of use
of components and materials procured under different edi-
tions of the Code are also covered in A. 1500.
(b) In A.2000, the responsibilities and the handling of non-
conformances; according to the Code, the applicable
edition, addenda, and modification sheets shall be indi cated
in the equipment specification. This may evolve through the
course of the project, subject to contractual agreement.
(c) In A.3000, the documents to be prepared in application of
the requirements of this Code (see Table 49.40); follow-up
documents are defined both in their initial production, and
final phases. The end of manufacturing report together with
the RCC-M applicable edition constitute a self-supported
documentation delivered to the owner.
(d) In A.4000, the components subject to the Code and the clas-
sification rules presented in para. 49.7.4 below; the RCC-M
2002 edition refers to the RCC-P, which deals with system
design and is not a public document. The RCC-P is no
FIG. 49.10 BURIED PIPING
longer maintained, and the current practice is to refer to the
Safety Report for the component safety classification.
(e) In A.5000, the Quality Assurance rules, which are based on
the ISO 9000 set of standards and supplemented where
appropriate.
The RCC-M does not include provisions for certification and
stamping of parts and components as the ASME Code does. It is
focused on technical aspects. Surveillance of activities by or for
the owner and the contractor or suppliers shall be covered in the
contractual documents.
Each time a technical regulatory demand may be generalized
independently of the context, it has been integrated in the main sec-
tions of the code. This is in particular the case for minimum (or
maximum) material properties. Each time a given demand is con-
text dependent, it has been integrated in non-mandatory appendices,
allowing, should the case arise, to issue equivalent provisions
adapted to different regulatory contexts. This approach allows flexi-
bility in adapting a RCC-M practice to various frameworks.
Some of A.1000 and A.2000 definitions have a regulatory char-
acter and shall apply in conformance with Appendices ZU or ZT
depending if the PED apply (in Europe), or the PED plus ESPN
order [34] (in France). A list of RCC-M appendices is given in
Table 49.7.6.
49.7.2.2 Provisions Related to Inservice Surveillance
Constructive requirements related to inservice inspections are pro-
vided in Appendix ZS of the RCC-M. This nonmandatory appen-
dix is to be applied where required by the equipment specification,
as far as its application depends on the surveillance program to be
applied. The definition of the surveillance program of irradiation
effects on RPV material properties is not yet covered in the
RCC-M, although a modification request is under review for the
integration of a future annex ZK, based on the ETC-M studies con-
ducted for the EPR project. Before it is included in the Code, the
program is covered by the equipment specification.
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FIG. 49.11 DIMENSIONAL TOLERANCES FOR PREFABRI-
CATED SPOOLS
The RCC-M shall be compatible with different inservice sur-
veillance practices. The surveillance programs for the French and
Chinese plants were based on the RSE-M, whereas the Korean
and Finland projects refer to the ASME BPVC section XI. Any
specific condition necessary to fulfill the corresponding needs are
integrated in specific complementary documents.
Each time a technical regulatory demand may be generalized
independently of the context, it has been integrated in the main sec-
tions of the code. This is in particular the case for minimum (or
maximum) material properties. Each time a given demand is
context dependent, it has been integrated in non-mandatory appen-
dices, allowing, should the case arise, to issue equivalent provisions
adapted to different regulatory contexts. This approach allows flexi-
bility in adapting a RCC-M practice to various frameworks.
TABLE 49.29 DIMENSIONAL TOLERANCES FOR PREFABRICATED SPOOLS
Some of A.1000 and A.2000 definitions have a regulatory char-
acter and shall apply in conformance with Appendices ZU or ZT
depending if the PED apply (in Europe), or the PED plus ESPN
order [34] (in France). A list of RCC-M appendices is given in
Table 49.7.6.
49.7.2.3 Main Differences From the ASME Code.
Differences from the ASME Code on organization result essen-
tially from the RCC-M Code’s more specific scope, allowing
more self-contained provisions and more explicit correspondence
between parts and applicable specifications. Welding and fabrica-
tion aspects are grouped in specific sections (4 and 5) in the RCC-
M. Tank design rules are grouped in one specific subsection (J)
and small components are identified and covered in another spe-
cific subsection (E). Structures of the RCC-M Code sections are,
nevertheless, similar to ASME BPVC Section III.
49.7.3 Links With PED
The European PED [7] has been issued to harmonize the regula-
tions applicable in the various European countries to pressure
equipment. According to the European agreements, Article 1, part
3.8 excludes “items specifically designed for nuclear use, failure of
which may cause an emission of radioactivity.” The interpretation
of this sentence is under the responsibility of the various European
countries, until other European directives cover this scope.
Consequently, the consequences of the PED transposition in the
national regulations may be different as far as nuclear equipment is
concerned. In France, it was decided to integrate nuclear equipment
in the December 13, 1999 PED transposition decree, which covers
construction and operation, and to indicate in this decree that Part 2
of the decree covering design and construction is not applicable to
nuclear components defined by a specific order.
The order, called “ESPN Order” was issued in France in
December 12, 2005. It defines those components which have to be
considered as nuclear-specific according to the PED. These com-
ponents are classified in three categories:
• N1 category includes equipment the failure of which is not
considered in the safety reports, and in any case the Main
Primary and Secondary Systems of light water reactors.
• N2 category includes equipments the failure of which would
lead to an activity release above a given threshold of 370 GBq.
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230 • Chapter 49
Small N1 primary (ⱕ DN50) and secondary (ⱕ DN100) piping
are subjected to the same technical requirements,
• N3 category includes nuclear equipment not classified N1 or
N2, which could lead to a radioactivity release larger than 370
MBq.
Nuclear specific requirements may be technical, such as mini-
mum material properties, or organizational, such as third parties
being agreed by the French Safety Authority.
For the application of the above rules, the order provides guid-
ance, in particular taking into account the nature of the radioac-
tive inventory. Inside these three groups, the PED categories,
which depend on fluid, pressure, diameter of pipe or vessel vol-
ume, apply. This means that the general method for conformance
evaluation applies also for nuclear pressure equipment, with the
following differences:
• ASN (the French Nuclear Safety Authority) plays the role of
the notified body for N1 equipment. ASN may nevertheless
ask for the intervention of a third party at its initiative.
• For N2 and N3 equipment, the PED approach is referred to,
except for a limitation of the applicable conformance evalua-
tion modules.
The December 12, 2005 Order covers construction and opera-
tion, referring for Main Primary and Secondary Systems operation
surveillance to the November 10, 1999 Order. The applicable tech-
nical prescriptions are the essential requirements of the PED, with
additional requirements resulting from the safety and radioactive
release objectives, which are significant for N1 equipment and
more limited for N2 and N3 equipment. Provisions cover:
• The hazards analysis, which has to be consistent with the
Safety Report,
• The design, which shall cover the various damage risks,
including irradiation effects,
• Material properties, which shall meet minimum (elongation at
fracture, toughness) or maximum (ultimate tensile strength)
values given for various material grades in appendices specif-
ic to each equipment group,
• Manufacturing which shall meet in particular stringent
requirements for N1 large part technical qualifications, in
order to provide guarantees on material properties, in case
risks of heterogeneity of chemical and mechanical properties
are identified,
(a) e2
g x
x et
(a) The corner shall remain visible locally g ≥ 0,25 e2 ; x ≥ 0,5 e2
FIG. 49.12 SET-ON BRANCHES WITH REINFORCING RING (EXTRACTED FROM ANNEX FA1)
• Surface and volumetric examinations, which shall cover
100% of surface and volume of N1 and N2 equipment,
As it is the case for the non-nuclear codes, specific appen-
dices have been included in the RCC-M to make the link
between each essential requirement of the PED or ESPN Order,
and the corresponding code provision. The appendix ZY is dedi-
cated to ESPN order and appendix ZZ to PED.
The order is still under discussion in France. It will define those
components that have to be considered as nuclear-specific accord-
ing to the PED. These components will be classified in three cate-
gories as follows:
(a) One covering the main primary and secondary systems,
above diameter thresholds; for these components, additional
essential requirements will be added to those of the PED.
(b) One covering small piping of main primary and secondary
systems, plus other components important from the radioac-
tive release prevention point of view; a reference to PED
provisions will be included, plus a limited number of
nuclear-specific provisions.
(c) One covering less important nuclear-specific equipment,
with essentially a reference to PED requirements.
Nuclear-specific requirements may be technical, such as mini-
mum material properties, or organizational, such as third parties
being agreed by the French Safety Authority.
An evaluation of RCC-M conformance to PED requirements is
being conducted. Topics not covered by the Code, for example on
inspection, are identified and covered by dedicated directives
issued by the Manufacturer. Technical aspects covered by the
Code are considered equivalent to those of the PED. Potential
evolutions resulting from the new nuclear-specific regulatory texts
will only be implemented in the Code after official issuing of this
regulation. As it is the case for the non-nuclear codes, a specific
appendix will then be included in the RCC-M to make the link
between each essential requirement of the PED, plus nuclear-
specific regulation, and the corresponding Code provision.
49.7.4 Structure and Construction Categories
A general presentation of the RCC-M structure and content is
given in para. 49.3. Some points are recalled in the following
paragraphs, with the goal of identifying differences between the
RCC-M and ASME Codes.
Classification of components is covered in A.4000. It takes into
consideration the component’s ESPN Safety class and safety
e2
A, B, C, D
g
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TABLE 49.30 EXTENT AND NATURE OF NONDESTRUCTIVE TESTING

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232 • Chapter 49
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 233
TABLE 49.31 CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES
function through the safety classification appearing in the Safety
Report (as it is the case where the ASME Code is applied). As a
consequence of the regulatory evolutions, classification rules in
the RCC-M have been updated to refer only to safety report
classification, and loading considerations (more particularly
fatigue risks) are now integrated where appropriate in the con-
cerned subsections, in C.3100 for class 2 components. The Main
Secondary Systems (MSS), which are generally classified Safety
class 2, and which are grouped in N1 category according to ESPN
order, may be built according to RCC-M Class 1 or to Class 2
rules, depending on the regulatory context.
The scope of Subsection E covering small equipment is
changed in the 2007 addendum to deal with equipments not cov-
ered by the PED, which are called “Category 0” by the ESPN
order. The scope of such set of components is defined in A.4000,
but additional provisions are given in appendices ZU and ZT.
49.7.5 Part Material and Procurement
49.7.5.1 General. Material provisions are covered in chapters
2000 of the various subsections of Section I. These chapters
include general rules on selection of grades according to inter-
granular corrosion susceptibility and cobalt content limitation,
and provide lists of applicable procurement specifications in
Section 2.
RCC-M-specified chemical compositions are generally in con-
formance with ASME BPVC Section II requirements for equiva-
lent grades. The differences concern essentially complementary
analyses and additional restrictions that are required by the
RCC-M to improve, in particular, the following properties:
(a) Ageing prevention and r corrosion resistance: limitation on
carbon content, increase of chromium minimum content,
and limi tation of delta ferrite content in castings.
(b) product toughness (limitation on S, P, and Si contents); a
min imum KV notch impact energy is required by the
RCC-M, which necessitates sufficiently low inclusions
content.
(c) weldability of stainless steels through a limitation of boron
content.
From the mechanical properties point of view, the requirements
of the RCC-M are equivalent to those of the ASME Code for
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234 • Chapter 49

FIG. 49.13. DETERMINATION OF HAZARD CATEGORY FOR A FIRED

OR THERWISE HEATED PRESSURE EQUIPMENT WITH THE RISK OF
OVERHEATING

TABLE 49.32 NOMINAL DESIGN STRESS IN COVAP® 2003 (EXCERPT)

TABLE 49.33 PERMITTED TYPE OF ACCEPTANCE, DESIGN STRESSES, AND WELDED JOINT EFFICIENCY ACCORDING
TO CONSTRUCTION CATEGORY OF A BOILER
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 235

TABLE 49.34 MATERIAL GROUPING

equivalent grades. The RCC-M specifies, in addition, the verifica-
tion at temperature of mechanical properties consistent with
ASME-tabulated values for design use. The RCC-M also speci-
fies, for low alloy steels, a verification of mechanical properties
after heat treatment for mechanical properties at room and elevat-
ed temperatures and not only after simulated stress-relief treat-
ment. Charpy KV tests are also specified for stainless steels when
the elongation at fracture is less than 45%.
Notably, the RCC-M, being dedicated to specific applications,
includes provisions that may be specified by the US contractors in
their equipment specifications. In particular, it is the only code
where product procurement specifications, are completed by dedi-
cated part specifications, with a precise correspondence between
parts and applicable specifications given in chapter 2000 tables of
the applicable subsections. From this point of view, the RCC-M
needs less complements and includes more self-contained pro-
curement specifications, avoiding the need for cross-references.
49.7.5.2 Structure of Section 2. Section II of the RCC-M
includes the following two parts:
(a) General provisions including part qualification according to
M.140; general provisions also cover prototype series of
exchanger tubes, with a view to compiling a defect cata
logue and defining the final production specification
(M.145), and prototype casting according to M.160 to more
precisely adjust the examinations to be conducted during
manufacturing of the series parts.
(b) Specifications classified in M.1000 to M.6000, depending
on material grades, as developed in Table 49.41. Every
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236 • Chapter 49
TABLE 49.34.A. MAIN REQUIREMENTS APPLYING TO MATERIAL PROPERTIES IN ESPN ORDER [34]
specification follows the same general structure, covering
melting process, chemical requirements, manufacture,
mechanical properties, surface examination, volumetric
examination, dimensional checks, marking, cleanliness,
packaging, transportation, and test reports.
For new materials and important pressure-retaining parts, with
a volume or weight above given thresholds, M.140 part qualifica-
tions intent to cover risks of heterogeneity of material properties
and consequently differences between actual part properties and
measurements made on procurement samples. The objective is to
ensure that acceptance operations and criteria are well selected for
quality surveillance.
The chemical composition values stated in this table corre-
spond to the maximum values specified for ladle analysis in the
relevant standard or specification defining the grade considered.
(2) Steels with a ferritic grain size index at least equal to 6 in
accordance with tests made to Euronorm 103.
Qualification is obtained according to a supplier’s workshop
qualification and a detailed manufacturing program, with fixed
major parameters, such as melting process, chemical composition,
FIG. 49.14 FIRETUBE BOILER: TUBESHEET
ARRANGEMENTS
weight and type of ingot, discard percentage, manufacturing
operations, ratio of reduction, thermal treatments, position of test
samples in the part, and position of test specimens within test
samples.
49.7.5.3 Original Features Compared with ASME Code. As
mentioned above, the RCC-M includes complete sets of rules gath-
ered in dedicated procurement specifications, with fewer require-
ments to be added in the equipment specification. Tables 49.42A
and 49.43A provide a comparison of specified chemical composi-
tion and impact tests for reactor vessel steel in RCC-M and ASME
Codes.
RCC-M mechanical properties are equivalent to those in the
ASME Code for equivalent material grades, with some additional
verification at temperature, consistent with ASME-tabulated val-
ues for design use and verification of properties after heat treat-
ment for mechanical properties.
Specified material grades evolve following return of experi-
ence. This includes the introduction of NC 30 Fe (690 alloy), the
limited use of NC 15 Fe (600 alloy), and the limited use of
molybdenum stainless steel casting grades to temperatures lower
than 250°C. Parts and products procurement refers more to
European standards (e.g., EN 10028 for plates, EN 10222 for
forgings, and EN 10213 for castings).
The 2007 edition was updated where necessary to be consistent
with the regulatory requirements in [34], which are given in Table
49.34A.
49.7.6 Part Design
49.7.6.1 Structure of Design Rules. RCC-M design rules were
first derived from the ASME Code provisions; the basic philoso-
phy of the ASME Code was kept. This means that RCC-M design
is generally compatible with ASME design. Simplifications in
structure and complementary requirements were introduced for
adaptation to French needs and regulation. This does not change
the above orientation.
The structure of Class 1 rules is given in Fig. 49.16; the list of
mandatory appendices is given in Table 49.42B.
Examples of simplification in structure include the following:
(a) the introduction in RCC-M 3000 chapters of weld design
provisions covered in ASME BPVC 4000 chapters
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 237
TABLE 49.35
(b) the integration in C.3200 rules for design by analysis of
class 2 pressure vessels of ASME BPVC Section III rules
covered in NC-3200 and Appendices XIII and XIV
(c) the modification of B.3500, C.3500, and C.3600 structures
to have a more harmonized and clear correspondence
between loading condition categories and applicable criteria
(d) the grouping of external pressure design in a dedicated
appendix (Z.IV)
(e) the integration of storage tanks design rules in a specific
subsection (J)
49.7.6.2 Class 1 Pressure Components.
(a) General. When the ASME BPVC Section III was applica-
ble to the first French 900 MWe and 1300 MWe plants,
documents were prepared to justify that these provisions did
fulfill the 1974 Order demands and, where necessary, com-
plements to ASME provisions were prepared. The RCC-M
Code was based on the discussion of these proposals with
the Safety Authority.
Firstly the B.3100 general chapter more explicitly introduces
the relation between the loading condition categories and the
various damage preventions, according to the requirements of
the 1974 Order [1]. It also groups in the same “Second
Category Conditions” the ASME normal and upset condi-
tions, with the same “level 0” criteria being specified. This
means that the 10% increase in allowable primary stresses
under pressure loading during upset conditions is not allowed
by the RCC-M Code. The design pressure shall not be
exceeded during normal and upset conditions according to
the 1974 Order; consequently, exceeding the design pressure
is a third category (emergency) condition. An allowance
appears, nevertheless, in the 1974 circular, which permits
exceeding the order of 20 occurrences for third-category con-
ditions during plant life, if this excess is only due to over-
pressure less than 5% of design pressure.
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238 • Chapter 49
TABLE 49.36 TESTING (EXCERPT)
Sizing methods are similar in the RCC-M and ASME
Codes. ASME BPVC Section III, NB-4000 provisions on
weld design are covered in RCC-M B 3000, with ASME
requirements completed to conform to the French regula-
tion. Reinforcement of opening rules are similar in the
RCC-M and ASME Codes; they are covered in Appendix
ZA of the RCC-M, with a nonmandatory status, the proof of
reinforcement being given by analysis in all cases. As a
result, the application of reinforcement rules does not
exempt the designer from calculating pressure stresses in
openings, as is the case in the ASME Code.
(b) Loading Conditions, Damage Prevention, and Stress
Criteria. The correspondence between loading conditions,
damage prevention, and safety margins in the 1974 Order is
given in Table 49.43. To satisfy this damage prevention,
appropriate criteria levels are specified in the various
loading conditions. As developed in RCC-M B.3100, each
criteria level corresponds to the prevention of a given set of
damages, with appropriate safety margins.
The correspondence between criteria levels and corre-
sponding damage prevention is also given in Table 49.43.
Due to the fact that level 0 criteria apply in design condi-
tion, envelope of normal and upset conditions, level A
criteria specified in normal and upset conditions are
restricted to damages, other than excessive deformation
and instability that may result from the cyclic nature of the
applied loading.
(c) Prevention of Excessive Deformation and Plastic
Instability. The allowable stresses in ASME B-3200 were
evaluated ahead of the above requirements, leading to limited
evolutions integrated in the RCC-M Code.
(1) Upset condition criteria are those applicable under nor-
mal conditions, as discussed above, leading to not using
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TABLE 49.37 TESTING (EXCERPT)

the ASME level B service limits. The variation in the
ASME Code is a potential 10% difference on allowable
pressure stresses in upset conditions.
(2) A 20% margin against excessive deformation is
required in third-category conditions (emergency),
whereas ASME criteria allow nearly reaching the
excessive deformation threshold. Due to this 1.2 safety
margin, RCC-M criteria are more stringent. For exam-
ple, in ASME BPVC Section III, NB-3600 Eq. (9) for
limitation of primary membrane plus bending stresses
in piping systems, the 2.25 Sm limit is replaced by a 1.9
Sm criterion, providing the additional 20% margin
needed.
The approach followed for establishing criteria is presented
elsewhere [9]. It starts from the definition of com-ponent
damages, from which stress classification results. The stress
limitations are justified in front of the safety objectives,
expressed as safety margins against damages. Stress classi-
fication shall consequently be justified according to the
RCC-M Code, taking into account the prevention of the
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240 • Chapter 49
TABLE 49.38 EXTENT OF NONDESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION (EXCERPT)
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 241

TABLE 49.39 SELECTION OF A CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE

concerned damages, according to the following correspon-
dence: primary stresses are limited to prevent excessive
deformation and instability damages; primary plus sec-
ondary stresses are limited to prevent progressive deforma-
tion; and total stresses and total stress ranges are considered
for fast fracture and fatigue prevention, respectively.
This justification necessity has led to suppressing the ASME
Code guidance rules for stress classification in the RCC-M
for class 1 components. For example, the classification of
expansion stresses in piping as secondary shall be substan-
tiated; nevertheless, these guidance rules are kept in C.3000
for class 2 components. Also, contrary to ASME BPVC
Section III, the sizing rules are not considered to be suffi-
cient demonstration for the regulatory requirements for
class 1 components, leading to — as said above for the par-
ticular case of opening reinforcement — a nonmandatory

TABLE 49.40 DOCUMENTS COVERED IN A.3000 OF THE RCC-M

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242 • Chapter 49

SAFETY CLASS MECHANICAL LOADING RCC-M CLASS

Class 1
Class 1
Section 1, Subsection B
Secondary part of
steam generators
Class 2
Class 2 Section 1, Subsection C

Pressure > 50 bar Small components

Temperature > 250°C Section 1, Subsection E
Cyclic loadings
Tanks
Section 1, Subsection J

Class 3 Class 3
Section 1, Subsection D
Pressure > 50 bar
Temperature > 250°C
Cyclic loadings

Pressure > 20 bar

Temperature > 110°C
Not safety Not subject to RCC-M
classified

FIG. 49.15 CORRESPONDENCE AMONG SAFETY CLASS, RCC-M CLASS, AND OPERATING CONDITIONS

status (Appendix ZA), the proof of resistance being provid-
ed in all cases by the stress analysis.
Faulted conditions are similar in both Codes. In case of
elastic-plastic analyses, a direct verification of the regulatory
safety margins against plastic instability has been included
in B 3243 of the RCC-M Code.
(d) Prevention of Elastic and Elastic-Plastic Instability. The
prevention of buckling under compressive loads is covered
in Appendix Z IV of the RCC-M Code. This Appendix is
applicable to classes 1, 2, and 3 pressure components and
includes criteria for all loading conditions. Provisions are
roughly equivalent to ASME rules and applicable dia-
grams are similar for materials of equivalent grades. For
materials for which diagrams are not available, and more
generally to facilitate numerical applications, analytical
expressions have been added to permit external pressure
design using specified mechanical properties.
These provisions have been presented [9]. For the partic-
ular case of shells characterized by a D/t ratio less than 10,
the formula giving the allowable pressure is modified and a
second condition is applied to limit the value of the com-
pressive stresses to an allowable value equal to the smaller

TABLE 49.41 STRUCTURE OF RCC-M SECTION 2

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TABLE 49.42A REACTOR VESSEL STEEL. COMPARISON OF CHEMICAL PROPERTIES

TABLE 49.42B LIST OF RCC-M MANDATORY APPENDICES

of 0.5 times the ultimate tensile strength and 0.9 times the
yield strength.
The Appendix Z IV also covers conical and spherical
shells and elliptical and torispherical heads, using equiva-
lences with cylindrical shells and spherical shells, respec-
tively. Cylinders under axial compression are also dealt with
and provisions relating to stiffening rings are included.
In case of elastic-plastic analyses, the possibility for a
direct verification of the safety margins against elastic or
elastic-plastic instability has been included in B 3243 of the
RCC-M Code.
(e) Prevention of Progressive Deformation and Rachetting.
Progressive deformation criteria are similar in the ASME
and RCC-M Codes. The main difference between Codes
concerns the integration of the through-thickness thermal
gradient (corresponding to the so-called ATI term in
Eq. (10) in piping systems). This is not strictly speaking
linked to the prevention of progressive deformation damage,
but it is related to plastic strain correction determination in
fatigue analyses. Where limits applicable to the range of the
sum of primary and secondary stresses (the 3 Sm rule) are
exceeded, a simplified elastoplastic analysis is permitted in
a similar way as in ASME Section III code, except for the
specific correction defined for thermal stresses [Eqs. (12)
and (13) in piping analysis rules are similar]. The thermal
stress ratchet rule (verification of Bree diagram) is also sim-
ilar in both Codes and shall be verified in any case accord-
ing to the RCC-M Code.
(f) Fatigue Prevention. Fatigue analysis requirements in the
RCC-M Code are basically similar to those of the ASME
BPVC Section III, with differences on transients combinations
(which are more developed in the RCC-M) and alternative
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244 • Chapter 49

TABLE 49.43A REACTOR VESSEL STEEL. COMPARISON OF IMPACT TESTS

TABLE 49.43B ESTIMATIONS REQUIRED BY THE FEBRUARY 26, 1974 ORDER

B.3100 General
B.3200 General rules Appendix ZD: Analysis of the fatigue behaviour of zones
for analyzing with geometric discontinuities
component Appendix ZF: Rules associated with level D criteria
behaviour Appendix ZG: Fast fracture resistance
Appendix ZH: Acceptable rules for determining usage factor

B.3300 Vessel design Appendix ZA: Rule for determining reinforcement of openings
in class 1 vessels
B.3400 Pump design
B.3500 Valve design
Appendix ZE: Other rules acceptable for analyzing class 1
B.3600 Piping design piping under conditions requiring compliance
with level A criteria
Appendix ZF: Rules associated with level D criteria

: Mandatory referenc
: Non mandatory reference

FIG. 49.16 STRUCTURE OF CLASS 1 DESIGN RULES AND RELATION WITH

NONMANDATORY APPENDICES
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 245
practices given in Appendix Z.H. Fatigue exemption rules
do not exist in the RCC-M class 1 section as a result of these
transient combinations rules; a transient that can be negligi-
ble when considered alone can become significant when
combined with another transient. It is agreed in practice that
fatigue exemption rules can be applied to subcycles that are
not likely to be combined with other transients.
The fatigue exemption rules shall not be confused with
RCC-M B.3624.4 provisions on rapid temperature fluctua-
tion effects in zones where fluids at different temperatures
can mix. These additional precautions result from the ser-
vice experience. Where temperature differences between
fluids before mixing exceed given thresholds, additional
precautions shall be considered to reduce the fatigue risk,
such as design changes, roughness and residual stress level
reduction, or improved inservice surveillance. This
approach results from the RCC-M philosophy, which is
based on fatigue usage factor determination in the low-cycle
fatigue range, and on avoiding (as far as possible stress)
fluctuations in the high-cycle fatigue region where calculat-
ed usage factors are of less significance.
Where the simplified elastoplastic analysis is applied, a
plastic strain correction factor Ke shall be applied to the
elastically calculated stress range to take account the lesser
degree of confinement of the plastic zones. The correction is
calculated from the primary plus secondary stress ranges
and applied to the total stress range. The integration of
through-thickness thermal gradient in this stress range is
likely to lead to too-severe corrections if the ASME Code
Ke correction of the “elastic follow-up” type is applied to
the complete mechanical plus thermal stresses. This has led
to improving the fatigue strain correction factors in the
RCC-M, with a correction function of the mechanical and
thermal parts of the primary plus secondary stress ranges
and corrections dedicated to each of these parts [10].
Similar proposals are known and discussed by ASME com-
mittees.
Another particular aspect of the RCC-M Code is the
fatigue analysis of crack-like discontinuities (e.g., partial
penetration welds), where a special approach was developed
that establishes a relation between the stress range very
close to the discontinuity tip and the number of allowable
cycles given by dedicated curves developed on representa-
tive configurations. Appendix ZD was prepared to cover this
approach. The development of this method was the result of
a lack of guidance in para. NB-3222.4 of the ASME Code,
which states “except for the case of crack-like defects... no
fatigue strength reduction factor greater than five need be
used.” Also, compared to ASME NB 3661.2 limitation of
Socket Weld joints up to DN50, the corresponding RCC-M
B 3661.2 limits its use to inside diameters less than 25 mm,
which are not subjected to the 1974 Order requirements.
In the previous editions, Appendix ZD only provided the
principle for such a fatigue evaluation in crack-like disconti-
nuities. A European synthesis [11] has compared the RCC-M
specific approach with the RCC-MR method, which uses a
Neuber correction in the singularity for the determination of
the local strain range to be used for the determination of a
usage factor (using standard S-N curves determined with a
corrected 2/1.5 margin on stress range instead of the normal
2 factor). This reduction takes into account the fact that some
effects covered by the factor 2 are considered in the detailed
analysis of local discontinuities. Following this comparison
between RCC-M and RCC-MR methods, specific material
fatigue curves applicable in crack-like discontinuities have
been included in the 2007 edition and an alternative approach
referring to conventional S-N curves is also permitted provid-
ed a plastic correction and a reduction factor are applied to
local stress ranges calculated near the discontinuity.
(g) Fast Fracture Prevention. Fast fracture is defined in the
1974 Order as covering not only brittle failure but also duc-
tile tearing. The rules in RCC-M Appendix ZG cover the
brittle to ductile transition and the upper shelf; general
requirements are given in B 3260 and acceptable methods
are in Appendix Z.G.
The previous edition of Appendix Z.G did include two
approaches:
• A first method, which takes into account a 1/4-thickness
defect, margins and toughness reference curve similar to
the ASME III Appendix G approach.
• A second approach considering an envelope defect and
the potential fatigue growth during plant life. Criteria
were defined so as to prevent the fast fracture risk with a
safety margin consistent with the margins against plastic
instability. This was developed as an answer to the lack of
guidance in the ASME code in faulted conditions.
The general orientations of this approach were presented in [12].
Following N4 and EPR studies, and taking into account European
comparisons [13], fast fracture prevention rules have been updat-
ed in the 2007 edition. Based on experience, criteria are given
which allow avoiding an explicit evaluation at design stages when
thresholds on materials and/or loadings are met. When an analysis
is conducted, criteria applied are consistent with those in the
November 10, 1999 order, i.e. 2 on instability risks in normal and
upset conditions, 1.6 in emergency conditions, 1.2 in faulted con-
ditions, these criteria being verified considering conventional
1 1
defects with a depth of 2 or 4 the wall thickness depending on wall
thickness, with an upper limit of 20 mm on defect depth. No
crack arrest is allowed at design stage following Decision [8].
(h) Design of Specific Components. Rules for valves and piping
are covered in B 3500 and 3600, respectively. The analysis
requirements are applicable to all piping and valves with an
internal diameter exceeding 25 mm. The correspondence
between damages, B 3200 criteria and B 3500 and B 3600
equations, is given in Table 49.44. The consistency between
piping and vessel criteria has been highlighted in particular
[9]. Further studies on the survey of conditions for cyclic
loading in shells, valves, and piping analyses have been pre-
sented [14, 15].
The consideration of seismic loads is discussed in [36].
The approach introduced in the RCC-M by the 2002 adden-
dum is the following. Before seismic (or other specified
reversible dynamic) loads are introduced in equation (9) of
B.3652 for class 1 and equation (10) of C.3654 for class 2
components, the primary part of the inertial part of the
resulting moments shall be identified. This primary part
may be directly taken as equal to the computed moment
when the damping ratio is higher than 10%, and a reduction
factor may be applied to the computed moment subject to
justification if the damping ratio is lower. There is conse-
quently a balance between the developments which may be
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246 • Chapter 49
TABLE 49.44 CORRESPONDENCE AMONG RCC-M B 3200, B 3500, AND B 3600 CRITERIA
undertaken to justify a higher value for the damping ratio
and the developments which can justify a less severe stress
classification rule. The two points of views are linked.
This applies if a linear response spectrum analysis is
used, as stress classification has only a meaning in the con-
text of elastic analyses. Another condition is given in the
code: such analysis shall use widely broadened spectra. If
the damping ratio ␰ is between 2 and 5%, the primary por-
tion ME of dynamic earthquake MDyn moment can be deter-
mined as follows:
M E = tM Dyn, with t = 20.1j, where ␰ is expressed in %.
The limitation of this rule to 5% was retained to be consistent
with designer needs, but it could be extended in the future to 10%,
as far as this rule leads to a correction factor of 1 for a damping
ratio of 10%, thus providing a continuity with the general rule
allowing applying a reduction factor below this threshold value.
One shall note that in case the damping ratio is close to 4 – 5%,
the above formula leads to a reduction factor applied to the loads
close to the factor on stress indices included in the ASME code,
thus providing similar guarantees.
In addition to the comments on piping rules given above, one
shall note the existence of an Appendix ZE, which provides an
alternative method for the verification of level A criteria (progres-
sive deformation and fatigue) with the possibility of combining
results obtained through detailed analyses and simplified analysis.
The applied stress indices are basically similar in the RCC-M and
ASME Codes. Provisions for rapid temperature fluctuations in
B.3624 and crack-like discontinuities have already been mentioned.
Compared to the ASME Code, the structure of the RCC-M
valve design rules was harmonized with the one for piping design
rules. The technical bases of both rules are similar, the considera-
tion of external loads on valves being slightly more severe in the
RCC-M Code following safety authority request. Detailed analy-
sis is required for valves with an internal diameter larger than
25 mm (compared to the ASME Code’s 4” ND), due to the scope
of the French 1974 Order. A critical examination of valve design
rules has been published [28].
Class 1 pumps covered in the RCC-M Code are restricted to the
type used for the primary pump. For this type, the RCC-M refers
to the rules applicable to vessels with limited supplementary pro-
visions, which are in practice equivalent to those in the ASME
Code.
49.7.6.3 Classes 2 and 3 Pressure Components Rules for
classes 2 and 3 components cover the same general provisions as
class 1 components, except they do not explicitly express the
objectives in terms of damage prevention. In the same way as in
ASME BPVC Section III, design by rules approaches may be
used. A difference with the ASME Code lies in the fact that, where
fatigue loading is considered significant according to C.3112
rules, a design by analysis shall be employed where applicable (in
the alternative C.3200 subchapter applies to vessels and heat
exchangers). For class 2 valves and piping, a reference to class 1
provisions is included to cover complementary analyses where
required by the equipment specification.
Following the N4 return of experience, recommendations rel-
ative to the fatigue risk in mixing zones of fluids at different
temperatures have also been included in the RCC-M 2000 edi-
tion for class 2 piping (C.3625). These recommendations are
also similar to those applicable to class 1 piping as mentioned
previously.
Following a comparative evaluation of manufacturing criteria
in RCC-M and ANSI B16.34 standard, the ANSI special class
has been retained for classes 1 and 2, and the standard class for
class 3 for establishing the pressure-temperature rating of valves.
Every useful provision was introduced in RCC-M C.3500, which
is more self-contained than the corresponding ASME BPVC
Section III subsection.
Concerning pump sizing, a dedicated study has been conducted
in the context of an agreement between AFCEN and the French
Association of Pump Manufacturers, leading to pressure sizing
rules and consideration of external loads on pump casings, which
are specific to the RCC-M Code. The bases of the pressure sizing
rules were presented previously [18]. These rules did involve the
consideration of manufacturer’s practices, finite element analyses,
and experimental extensometric measurements on pumps subjected
to pressurization cycles.
Class 2 piping rules are similar to those of ASME B31.1 and do
not take into account recent ASME BPVC Section III, NB-3600
changes to equations [29]. It is expected that future development
will lead to the RCC-M being closer to the current ASME BPVC
Section III.
Class 3 design rules refer to class 2 rules, a 0.85 factor being
included for the determination of allowable stresses in welded
joints other than girth weld joints between a cylindrical or conical
part, connection of a nozzle or branch, and joints subjected to
compressive stresses. This factor constitutes a weld efficiency
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 247
factor, which is consistent with the quality level achieved accord-
ing to the applicable manufacturing and examination rules. It cor-
responds to the fact that these welds are not 100% examined for
class 3 components. This is different from the ASME Code; as
manufacturing examination criteria are defined in the RCC-M, so
are the applicable weld efficiency factors.
49.7.6.4 Supports Supports are covered in Subsection H. ASME
provisions were considered together with AISC rules on which
ASME rules were based. NRC Regulatory Guides 1.124 and 1.130
were also considered for establishing stress criteria. Also, as a
general rule, a linear behavior is required for supports in accident
conditions. This constitutes a condition of validity of elastic sys-
tem analyses. Standard supports are covered by a specific chapter
(H.5000) permitting justification by tests.
49.7.6.5 Storage Tanks Storage tanks are covered by a specific
subsection (J), whereas the corresponding ASME design provi-
sions are included in Subsections NC and ND (3800 and 3900).
The objective was to obtain a more simplified structure. Provisions
are technically equivalent in the RCC-M Code and ASME BPVC
Section III.
49.7.6.6 Reactor Pressure Vessel Internals Internals can be
justified either by the RCC-M rules or by reference to the ASME
Section III Code. It’s the only place where a direct reference to the
ASME Code is included in the RCC-M. The RCC-M provisions
are restricted to weld configurations used in the projects. Taking
into account design evolutions in the EPR project, complements
are being examined, which will lead to a subsection closer to the
ASME Code.
49.7.6.7 Original Features Compared with ASME Code
Differences between RCC-M and ASME Section III Code on
design rules concern mainly the consideration of loading condi-
tions in component design approach, simplification in structure,
and the integration of constructive requirements related to ISI in
Appendix ZS.
Differences on technical requirements include the following:
(a) a more explicit reference to damages for stress classifica
tion in class 1 components
(b) primary stress criteria slightly more stringent in upset and
emergency conditions
Base metal Base metal acceptance
qualification
Workshop
qualification
Welding
S 6000
procedure
qualification
Welding Data S 3000
Package
S 1000
Filler materials Filler materials
qualification acceptance
S 5000
FIG. 49.17 KEY ASPECTS OF WELDING QUALIFICATION AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
(c) more detailed fatigue requirements, including the consider
ation of plastic strain correction factors, and crack-like dis
continuities
(d) weld design requirements conforming to French regulation
(e) detailed analysis required for valves above 25 mm ID
(f) pressure test conditions, which conform to European regu-
lation
(g) linear behavior specified for supports in faulted conditions
(h) rules for pressure sizing and consideration of external loads
introduced for Classes 2 and 3 pumps
(i) precautions specified in zones with mixing fluids
(j) complements on fast fracture prevention
The general approach and basic criteria are nevertheless similar
in the RCC-M Code and ASME BPVC Section III.
49.7.7 Part Fabrication
49.7.7.1 General. Manufacturing is covered in the 4000 chap-
ters of the applicable subsections. Chapters 4000 refer to Sections
IV and V. They cover the general requirements in chronological
order according to component manufacturing and include eventu-
al provisions specific to the type and class of component covered
by the subsection, or requirements specific to particular sets of
components, such as for class 2 components which are part of the
Main Secondary System.
49.7.7.2 Welding Section IV of the RCC-M deals with welding
and Section V to other manufacturing processes. As welding is a
key operation in manufacturing mechanical components, all aspects
of the welding process are presented. The scope of Section IV is
consequently wider than the one of Section IX of the ASME Code,
covering aspects contained in other ASME BPVC sections
(Sections II and III). The global logic for welding qualification and
acceptance criteria is shown in Fig. 49.17.
The objective in the RCC-M Code was to provide a single, homo-
geneous, and complete text including specific processes such as
weld overlay or friction welding. This Section covers the following:
(a) S.1000 gives the weldability and heat treatments of materi
als and the description of the Welding Data Package, which
is of prime importance in the use of the RCC-M Code,
because it contains all the welding procedures that are to be
applied to the manufacture of a given component.
Welders &
operators
Production welds
qualifications S 7000
S 4000
S 2000
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248 • Chapter 49
(b) S.2000 gives procurement and acceptance of filler materials.
This chapter defines standardized acceptance condi tions
and includes a collection of filler material data sheets. It
makes reference to NF EN ISO 14344 standard.
(c) S.3000 gives the qualification of welding procedures. In the
2007 edition, RCC-M self-contained provisions have been
replaced by a reference to NF EN ISO 15614-1 standard, sup-
plemented where needed by additional prescriptions to reach
an equivalent level of guarantee as the one obtained according
to the previous provisions. Qualification provisions based on
industrial experience have been maintained in the code on
aspects not currently covered by harmonized standards, in par-
ticular on cladding, tube to tube plate welding, canopy or
omega joints, socket welds in piping and friction welding.
(d) S.4000 gives the qualification of welders and operators, here
also referring to applicable EN 287-1 or EN ISO 9606-4
standards.
(e) S.5000 gives the qualification of filler materials with aspects
to be covered by the material supplier and others covered by
the manufacturer who uses the material.
(f) pressure test conditions, which conform to European regu-
lation.
(g) S.6000 gives the technical qualification of production work
shops, with the aim of evaluating their capacity and techni
cal resources for performing welding operations.
(h) S.7000 gives production welds, with all associated rules.
One difference with the ASME Code is the requirement to
manufacture production weld test coupons, which is a com
mon practice in Europe.
(i) S.8000 gives weld-deposited hardfacing. A complete revi-
sion of S.8000 was necessary to cover Cobalt-free process-
es, and was integrated in the 2005 addendum. The previous
edition did refer to the NF M 64-100 standard. The new edi-
tion is self-contained and integrates new Iron-based and
Nickel-based alloys grades, thus avoiding the risk of Cobalt
and consequently radioactive release during operation.
Also, appendices are included that cover mechanical tests
(Appendix S.I), classification of defects in welds (Appendix S.II
referring to EN 2650 standard), and recommended welded assem-
blies for pipes (Appendix S.III).
49.7.7.3 Original Features Compared with the ASME Code
Welding and brazing qualifications are covered in ASME
BPVC Section IX (part QW) but not in the RCC-M Code. Section
IX of the ASME Code primarily deals with qualifications, addi-
tional aspects being covered in the dedicated sections. In compari-
son, the RCC-M Section IV constitutes a more self-contained set
of rules and includes every requirement related to welding.
In particular, the RCC-M S.7000 chapter precisely defines the
following:
(a) the examinations to be made
(b) the stage where they shall be conducted (before, during, and
after welding)
(c) the methods to be used
(d) the extent of examination
(e) the acceptance criteria
As a result, the RCC-M necessitates fewer complementary
requirements in the specifications.
49.7.7.4 Other Fabrication Operations Section V of the RCC-
M Code is devoted to manufacturing. Some requirements are
included in the subsubsections 4000 of the NB, NC, and ND sub
sections of ASME BPVC Section III. RCC-M Section V provi
sions are minimum requirements that shall be completed by the
Manufacturer where necessary. Aspects covered are the following:
(a) marking procedures (chapter F.2000); this chapter describes
the precautions to be taken for marking, the gen eral rules
about identification being covered in B, C, or D.1300 chap-
ters.
(b) cutting and repair without welding (chapter F.3000).
(c) forming and dimensional tolerances (chapter F.4000),
including requirements for the qualification of forming pro
cedures above given thresholds, and tolerances for parts to
be joined by welding. Tube expanding qualification is also
covered in particular.
(d) surface treatment (chapter F.5000), including electrolytic
thin-plating and diffusion treatment (F.5500) and cadmium
coating (F.5600).
(e) cleanliness (chapter F.6000), with cleanliness classes
defined according to the types of systems and process flu
ids, and requirements defined on work areas, corrosion pre
vention, cleaning methods, and preservation of cleanliness,
taking into account feedback experience.
(f) mechanical joints (chapter F.7000).
(g) heat treatments (parts and components, chapter F.8000); this
chapter includes periodic checks of thermocouples and
inspections of heating and control systems. Measurements and
recordings are prescribed with time and temperature continu-
ously recorded, at least two thermocouples used, and temper-
atures measured on the load unless justification is provided.
49.7.8 Part Testing/Inspection
49.7.8.1 Inspection Inspections by the contractor, owner, or
third parties are not covered by the RCC-M Code, which is essen-
tially restricted to technical provisions. Consequently, these
aspects shall be covered by separate quality procedures.
Intervention of independent organizations should in any case be
covered in separate quality requirement appendices to the equip-
ment specification, as far as they are country dependent.
The non mandatory appendices covering the evaluation of con-
sistency with the PED and eventual supplementary regulatory
requirements will identify aspects covered by the Code and the
need for any additional provision.
49.7.8.2 Examination Methods and Associated Criteria
(a) Nondestructive examination methods are covered in
RCC- M Section III. This section covers the following:
(1) MC.1000 gives the mechanical, physical, physicochem-
ical and chemical tests.
(2) MC.2000 gives the ultrasonic examination methods.
(3) MC.3000 gives the radiographic examination methods.
(4) MC.4000 gives the liquid penetrant examination
methods.
(5) MC.5000 gives the magnetic particle examination
methods.
(6) MC.6000 gives the eddy current examination of tubular
products.
(7) MC.7000 gives the other examination methods (visual
examination, determination of surface conditions, leak
testing methods).
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(8) In MC.8000 gives the qualification and certification of
nondestructive examination personnel.
(9) In MC.9000 gives the terminology.
The MC1000 chapter includes mechanical tests such as tensile
test, impact test, Pellini test, RTNDT brittle to ductile transition
temperature determination, bend, flaring and flattening tests, and
physico-chemical tests such as ferrite content, accelerated inter-
granular corrosion, examination of metal structure, grain size, and
residual stress evaluation.
(b) Differences from the ASME Code are as follows:
(1) Impact testing machines that are consistent the Afnor
EN standard in the RCC-M Code, with a slightly small-
er radius leading to similar results but with less scat-
tered values according to the Afnor EN standard.
(2) The introduction in the RCC-M Code of European
stan dards for tensile and hardness tests, such as EN
10002-1 and EN 895 (tensile tests), EN ISO 6506
1-2-3 (HB test), EN ISO 6507 1-2-3 (HV test), EN
ISO 6508 1-2-3 (HRC test), and EN 1043-1 (HV 10
for welds).
(c) The examination to be made on products, parts, and compo-
nents (where, when, and criteria to be met) are included in
Section II for product and part procurement and in Section IV
for welding. The RCC-M approach for NDE is the following:
(1) The manufacturing conditions shall provide an appropri
ate quality level through precautions taken to limit the
risk of defect creation.
(2) The NDE are targeted to assess the required quality
level and to detect any deviation in manufacturing
process.
(3) In case unexpected defects appear, a three-step
approach is applied: understanding why such defects
appear, modifying affected manufacturing parameters,
and carrying dedicated NDE to ensure that these defects
don’t appear anymore.
(d) In the area of volumetric nondestructive examination, the
RCC-M Code gives a greater importance to ultrasonic
examination and asks for a double volumetric examination
(ultrasonic plus radiographic examination) for main class 1
primary components. UT and RT chapters structure include
the following:
(1) general provisions including certification of inspec-
tors, examination documents, examination equip-
ment, perfor mance conditions such as surface prepa-
ration or time of examination, examination report,
and special require ments (e.g., for UT automated
procedures)
(2) specific provisions on examination of specific parts:
castings (UT and RT), forgings (UT), and welds (UT
and RT)
Criteria may also be different; for example, in the case of
UT of plates, the ASME Code refers to back-wall echo for
calibration and acceptance criteria, whereas the RCC-M
Code refers to equivalent flat-bottom hole. RCC-M criteria
can be considered equivalent or more stringent.
(e) Each time a European standard appears, the RCC-M Code
is updated to refer to such standards, the associated criteria
being adjusted to reach an equivalent level of quality.
European standards used include:
(1) EN 571-1 for penetrant testing
(2) EN ISO 3452-2 for testing of penetrant materials
(3) EN 583 1-2-5 for UT examination, General principles
(4) EN 12668 1-2-3 for UT, characterization and verifica-
tion of equipment
(5) EN 12223 for UT, calibration blocs
(6) EN 10160 and EN 10307 for UT of flat products
(reflec tion method)
(7) EN 10246 6-7 for UT of tubes; detection of transverse
and longitudinal defects
(8) EN 1713 for characterization of the volumetric or
non-volumetric character of UT indications in welded
joints
(9) EN 584-1 for film systems used for radiographic
examination,
(10) EN 464 1-2 for penetrameters used for radiographic
examinations
Specific studies have led to definition of thickness ranges of use
for linear accelerators in relation with the energy of radiation, to
the requirement of using stainless steel intensifying screens for
welded joint examination using Co-60 radiation source [30], and
to the introduction of rules for the classification of the range of
liquid penetrant products by means of sensitivity tests [31]. Also,
following feedback of experience, examination of the processing
quality of radiographic films is conducted by the evaluation of the
thiosulfate ion content to ensure optimum storage conditions.
Qualification of nondestructive examination personnel refers to
European EN 473 practices. Nevertheless, the RCC-M Code
allows Manufacturers abroad to use personnel certification in
force in their own country, if it is delivered by an independent
organization and following an equivalent standard. The ASME
Code refers to recommended practice SNT-TC-1A (certification
delivered by the employer).
49.7.8.3 Pressure Tests Pressure tests are conducted according
to the Regulation. They constitute some “verification” of design
and construction. They should not have an impact on the sizing of
equipment. Test pressures and associated criteria in each code are
consistent from this point of view. In case different test pressure
could be applied, the code stress criteria should be re-evaluated
accordingly.
Pressure test provisions have been updated in the 2007 adden-
dum. Compared to the previous provisions, the minimum pressure
test value is increased (for class 1) and decreased (for class 2 and 3)
to 1.43 times the design pressure, according to European PED.
The second regulatory factor to be applied is equal to 1.25 multi-
plied by the ratio of the allowable stress at test temperature over
the allowable stress at design temperature. This second condition
may potentially lead to high test pressure values. In case of diffi-
culty, where the pressure test could govern the dimensioning of
the equipment, the consensus found in the context of the
European harmonized standards is applied, allowing reducing
the test pressure at a value consistent with the allowable stress of
the material.
49.7.9 Part Safety Devices
Safety devices were not covered previously by the RCC-M
Code, overpressure protection being considered an aspect to be
dealt with at a system level, with particular consideration of the
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250 • Chapter 49
automatic safety systems and operation procedures. The RCC-M
Code did limit itself to imposing allowable criteria in the various
loading conditions without indicating how these criteria may be
fulfilled at the system level.
In the 2007 edition of the RCC-M, new chapters B, C and
D.6000 on overpressure protection have been introduced. These
chapters cover a scope equivalent to the one in the ASME III
code, and are consistent with the French and European regula-
tions, referring where appropriate to European standards.
49.7.10 Fast Breeder and ITER Applications and
Inservice Surveillance
49.7.10.1 Presenting and Emphasizing Recent RCC-MR
Developments The fourth edition of the French RCC-MR Code
for Fast Reactors (FRs) that includes design rules for elevated tem-
peratures (⬎ 425°C) has been issued in 2007 [37]. This new edi-
tion (available in French and English) covers improvements result-
ing from more than 10 years of R&D activities in the domain of
fast reactors. The rules and requirements provided by this Code
are, however, not limited to FRs; RCC-MR is, therefore, the most
consistent set of rules applicable in the high-temperature domain.
It also covers the needs for design and construction of the ITER
vacuum vessel.
(a) The modifications of the 2002 edition are presented in [16].
The progresses achieved since 2002 are presented in [38]
and may be summarized as follows:
(1) Enlargement of the scope of the code to be applicable
not only to high temperature structures, but also to the
ITER vacuum vessel,
A18 Complementary and particular provisions for equipment subject to
regulation
A19 Specific provisions for ITER vacuum vessel
A20 Constructive requirements linked to in-service inspection
(2) Adaptation of the code to the European and interna-
tional standards evolution,
(3) Improvement of the creep-fatigue rules for shells and
pipes,
(4) Development of the “Class 2 Box” structures directly
applicable to the ITER vacuum vessel,
(5) Introduction of a specific appendix dealing with specif-
ic fabrication requirements of the ITER vacuum vessel,
(6) Extension of the scope of subsections devoted to bolts,
(7) Development of the chapter on laser welding,
Introduction of provisions conforming to the new
European Pressure Equipment Directive and its French
declination to nuclear pressure equipment (ESPN Order).
(b) Structure of RCC-MR. The general structure of the RCC-
MR Code was presented have in section 49.3. The general
organizational logic is similar to the one of the RCC-M
Code. Specific aspects are Subsection K on control and han-
dling mechanisms and specific technical appendices listed
in Table 49.45.
(c) Improvement of Material Properties to Be Used in Design.
The RCC-MR Code provides in Appendix A3 consistent
sets of material properties that are needed for the applica
tion of the design rules of Section I. Appendix A3 covers in
particular the following groups of materials:
(1) austenitic stainless steels: 316 or 316L(N), 304, 316L,
and 304L
(2) nickel iron alloy (alloy 800)
(3) carbon manganese steels
(4) chromium molybdenum steels: 2.25 Cr 1 Mo and 9 Cr
1 Mo V Nb grades
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 251
(5) precipitation-hardened austenitic steel for bolting (25
Ni 15 Cr Mo V Ti Al)
The material properties of Appendix A3 are applicable to
the base material. The allowable stresses of the welded
joints depend on the quality of the weld (type of joint, extent
of control) and on the material properties of the base and
weld metal. Appendix A9 provides weld factors that can be
used to determine the material properties of the welded
joints on the basis of the properties of the base material.
New definitions of mean and minimum values of charac-
teristics and allowable stresses have been introduced.
Consistency with European standards has also been estab-
lished for physical and mechanical properties.
Two sets of material data for carbon steels corresponding
to A42 and A48 materials (A3.11S and A3.12S, respective-
ly) are provided, with conventional yield strength at 0.2%
offset (Rp0.2), ultimate tensile strength (Rm), and values of
allowable stresses (Sm and S). The new values take into
account the new definitions of Sm and S for ferritic steels.
These consider at temperature a margin on Rm of 2.7 and
3.6 instead of 3 and 4, respectively, as in the previous edi-
tion. This corresponds to replacing Su (which may reach
110% of Rm according to the ASME Code) by Rm. Also,
these sets of material data have been completed by the addi-
tion of all the data needed for design against fatigue: cyclic
stress-strain curves and associated parameters Ke and Kv,
and design fatigue curves. Furthermore, a new set of mater-
ial data is given A37 type materials.
The new edition of the RCC MR Code also provides
updated values for high chromium alloy steel 9Cr 1MoVNb,
known as modified 9 Cr 1 Mo.
(d) Modifications Resulting From a Larger Use of References to
European Standards. RCC-MR reference material speci fica-
tions have been modified to take into account European stan-
dards. In particular, provisions have been updated regarding
location, direction of sampling and specified values in tensile
tests. Specified chemical contents have also been updated.
Sections related to welding procedure qualification and
qualification of welders and operators have also been updated
following the same approach as in the RCC-M, i.e. under
the form of complementary requirements to European or
international standards.
Sections describing testing and examinations have been mod-
ified to introduce European or international standards on
methods, equipment and calibration methods. Criteria and
thresholds of acceptable defects have also been updated.
(e) Improvement of Design Rules. Ratchetting (progressive defor-
mation) rules (RB 3260) have been significantly modified in
the 2002 edition to include the most recent results from R&D
work. The rules are still based on the efficiency diagram
method, but modifications are introduced to cover the special
case of an overstress of short duration, making the ratchetting
assess ment less conservative than if the overload was consid-
ered as permanent [20]. The special case of structures present-
ing secondary membrane stresses (e.g., cylinders subjected to
axial thermal gradients that vary with time and in space) has
also changed, primary stresses being calculated not only on
the basis of dead weight, pressure, or moment loads, but also
taking into account that a fraction of the secondary membrane
stresses acts as a primary stress [21].
Harmonization of design rules between classes 1 and 2
piping was introduced in the 2002 edition of the RCC-MR
Code, on the basis of class 1 (RB 3600) rules. Rules have
been modified to simplify the determination of elastic fol-
low-up factors, and class 1 criteria related to plastic insta-
bility and buckling replaced class 2 buckling rules. An
important parameter of buckling analyses is the value of
imperfection. The definition of imperfection for buckling
analysis can be based either on tolerances indicated on
drawings (as before) or tolerances defined in chapter RF
4200 (maximum values of shape tolerances for typical com-
ponents). A design method for creep buckling analysis of
316 austenitic stainless steel components was given [22].
Another improvement of the RCC-MR Code in relation
to buckling concerns Appendix A12, which provides rules
to determine minimum thicknesses for shells submitted to
external pressure or cylinders under axial compression.
These diagrams are identical to the corresponding ones in
the RCC-M Code. A method for evaluating B factor from
any particular tensile curve is provided.
Appendices A10 and A11, related to elastoplastic and
elasto-viscoplastic analysis of a structure subjected to cyclic
loading, have been rewritten to provide recommendations
for inelastic Analyses. These appendices provide informa-
tion on general principles for modeling and give a descrip-
tion of the most commonly used constitutive laws, from the
most simple one to the most sophisticated one with com-
bined strain hardening. They also provide recommendations
to engineers on the use of models according to the failure
mode analyzed. Also, Appendix A10 provides rules against
progressive deformation using simplified elastoplastic
methods. Two methods are proposed based on other publi-
cations [20, 21].
New rules on creep-fatigue have been introduced in the
2007 edition, based on several non linear calculations on
simple and realistic cases [39]. They remain in line with the
previous ones, but the designer has now the possibility of
choosing two different routes according to the relative posi-
tion of the dwell time with the maximum of the loading
cycle. Application of these modifications to realistic cases
have demonstrated the gain brought on damage evaluation.
(f) Guide for Leak Before Break Analysis. Appendix A16 pro-
vides a guide for leak-before-break (LBB) analysis and
defect assessment. The purpose of LBB analysis is to deter-
mine if it is possible to detect under inservice conditions the
leak flow of a structure containing a fluid (vessel, pipe) prior
to the defect that is at the origin of the leak leading to the
rupture of this structure. The LBB approach has been
revised to include the most recent improvements; an exten-
sive test program is to validate the A16 procedures on the
following aspects [23]: crack propagation and instability
under high cyclic load, leak rate and crack opening area, and
crack shape change up to and after wall penetration.
Appendix A16 provides a comprehensive set of formulas
for defect assessment and gives stress intensity and refer-
ence stress solutions for a wide range of geometry. The
defect assessment rules and associated material data are
consistent with those of the RSE-M Code.
(g) Specific ITER vacuum vessel development
Special rules for box type structures were developed for
special components of Fast Reactors: the carbon steel
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252 • Chapter 49
reactor roof and the austenitic steel core support structures,
both classified class 1. The geometry of the ITER vacuum
vessel with an inner shell and an outer shell suggested also
a subsection devoted to class 2 box structures.
Welded joints are classified in four categories, with dif-
ferent design and non destructive examination requirements.
Ultrasonic inspection is introduced as an alternative to radi-
ographic inspection. Photo Thermal Cameras surface exam-
inations may be proposed by the manufacturer instead of
liquid penetrant testing following R&D results.
A specific appendix A19 has been introduced in the 2007
edition to provide complementary requirements specific for
the design of the vacuum vessel. Classification of welded
assemblies is developed and special requirements are
defined for permanent attachments which are non-pressure
retaining and low load-carrying welds.
Modifications have been done on section 4 to introduce a
special chapter devoted to laser welding, with the following
sections:
• Specification of laser welding procedures,
• Test for qualification of laser welding,
• Inspection, examination and tests,
• Range of validity of the qualification.
49.7.10.2 Inservice Inspection Rules for Mechanical
Components (RSE-M). An historical introduction to the RSE-M
TABLE 49.46 LIST OF RSE-M APPENDICES
Code was given here in section 49.3. This Code integrates the French
operation practice, which presents the following particularities:
(a) It is consistent with a construction referring to a RCC-M
design and construction practice.
(b) It integrates the consequences of the French pressure equip-
ment regulation.
(c) It uses the consequences of the standardization of the
French nuclear plants used by a single operator, allowing for
a national experience feedback system leading to stan dard
files on inspection programs, repair techniques, or the inves-
tigation on repetitive deviations.
The content of the RSE-M Code is presented elsewhere [17].
The Code includes four sections dedicated to general rules applic-
able to various component classes (volume A), the particular
aspects being developed in volumes B, C, and D, corresponding
respectively to safety classes 1, 2, and 3 components. Mandatory
and nonmandatory appendices provide complements or accept-
able practices on aspects listed in Table 49.46. The first number of
the appendix reference is related to the numbering of volumes A,
B, C, and D developed hereafter.
The main aspects of the RSE-M Code are discussed below:
The general (A B C D 1000 chapters) parts of the Code deal
with the scope, which includes the safety classified systems
(according to the unit’s safety report) and defines technical scope
and responsibilities. Relationship with safety authorities is not
addressed.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 253
Chapters A B C D 2000 deal with hydrotests according to the
regulation.
Chapters A B C D 3000 cover inservice inspection programs,
referring to detailed sets of inspection programs included in
Appendices 3.1 I, II, and III, depending on component safety
class 1, 2, or 3.
Chapters A B C D 4000 deal with inservice inspection exami-
nation methods. These chapters may refer to RCC-M Section III
examination methods or to specific methods given in series 4
appendices. Three types of qualifications are defined for NDE
applications: conventional, general, or specific, depending on if
there is no defect suspicion, suspicion of having defects present-
ing a safety risk, or if real defects were observed in the zone
under consideration. These provisions are consistent with recom-
mendations issued for the European countries and correspond to
Appendix VIII of ASME BPVC Section XI.
Chapters A B C D 5000 cover processing of indications. The
methodology in the RSE-M Code is quite detailed and has been
extensively discussed with the Safety Authority. A large impor-
tance is given to the comparison with previous examinations, the
diagnoses of a defect’s nature and origin, and the verification of
safety margins consistent with regulatory demands. An important
work was conducted on the choice of the safety margins to be
applied, depending on the parameters to which they are applied
(defect size, load, or material properties) to be at a certain dis-
tance of the damage risk [24]. Consistent values of material prop-
erties have been integrated in Appendix 5.6 depending on materi-
al, component, and associated margins.
Chapters A B C D 6000 and 7000 cover in-operation monitor-
ing and methods used during operation monitoring, respectively.
Chapters A B C D 8000 deal with the implementation of a
maintenance task. Two aspects are more particularly covered: the
classification of maintenance operations to define the inspection
requirements and the need for a renewal of regulatory pressure
test and the technical requirements to be applied, which refer to
the RCC-M Code with any necessary adaptation for use on exist-
ing plants. Qualifications of operations and operators are covered.
Chapter A 9000 deals with quality system and is in compliance
with the French 1984 Order on Quality and ISO 9000 (or
European EN 29001) series of standards.
Current work mainly deals with risk-based maintenance opti-
mization methods, qualification of nondestructive examination
methods, statistical knowledge of the mechanical properties of
base materials and welds, simplified methods of fracture mechan-
ics, and the validation of acceptable defect tables.
49.7.11 Current Status and Committee Work Programs
A general presentation of the RCC-M Code was presented [19],
including comments on differences between the RCC-M and
ASME Codes. Recent developments included in the 2000 edition
of the RCC-M Code were presented [32], and a detailed presenta-
tion of the experience in applying French regulation and RCC-M
Code to the construction of LWRs has been given [33]. The 2007
edition is presented in [35].
The current Committee work program is governed by the appli-
cation needs and the consequences of the regulatory evolutions
under discussion.
The industrial needs include in particular the following:
(a) The updating of the Code to integrate the consequences of
the evolution of more than 200 standards, while maintain
ing an overall technical consistency
(b) The integration of the technical choices used for the EPR
project and prepared within the French-German ETC-M
rule preparatory work
(c) the preparation of equivalences to cover the possibility of
using other international procurement practices, including
ASME, with appropriate complements to maintain the
appropriate quality level
(d) the continuous integration of industrial and operation expe-
rience
The regulatory aspects depend on context and different appen-
dices may be prepared to cover complementary provisions to be
added to the RCC-M through the Equipment specification.
49.7.12 RCC-M References
1. Ministerial Order on Main Primary System of Light Water Nuclear
Boilers. Journal Officiel de la République Française, 1974.
2. RFS: Règle Fondamentale de Sûreté N°V.2.c. Rules Applicable to the
Construction of Mechanical Components. Ministry of Industry,
Revision 1, June 12, 1986.
3. Grandemange JM, Kreckel D, Frank HJ. Design and Construction Rules
Applied to the EPR Project: ETC-M (Paper 2488). 5th International
Conference on Nuclear Engineering (ICONE5), Nice, 1997.
4. Slama G, Valibus L. Continuous Improvement of French Design and
Construction Rules for PWR Components (RCC-M). International
Meeting on Pressure Vessel Technology and Nuclear Codes and
Standards. Seoul, April 26 – 28, 1989.
5. Journet J, O’Donnell WJ. Operating Nuclear Plant Feedback to
ASME and French Codes. ASME PVP-Vol. 339.
6. Hoffmann A. The AFCEN Consultative Scientific Committee. SFEN
Symposium on Nuclear Mechanical Components – French
Codification – European Prospects, Paris, November 23, 1989.
7. Directive 97/23/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
29 May 1997 on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States
Concerning Pressure Equipment. Official Journal of the European
Communities.
8. Décision DSIN-GRE/BCCN N° 01-0297 appended to DSIN Letter
DSIN-GRE/BCCN N°0820, July 10, 2001.
9. Heng C, Grandemange JM, Morel A. RCC-M (Rules for Design and
Construction of Nuclear Components). Nuclear Engineering and
Design 1987;98:265 – 277.
10. Grandemange JM, Héliot J, Morel A. Improvements on Fatigue
Analysis Methods for the Design of Nuclear Components Subjected
to the French RCC-M Code (WRC Bulletin 361). Welding Research
Council; 1991.
11. Framatome EE/S 98.317 Report, Reevaluation of Fatigue Analysis
Criteria. Common European report prepared by Framatome, Siemens,
AEA Technology, VTT, Ansaldo, Tecnatom.
12. Pellissier-Tanon A, Grandemange JM. Considerations on the Manner
of Accounting for Fast Fracture Risk in the Design of PWR Vessels.
International Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping 1986;25:
217 – 229.
13. Grandemange JM, Guichard D, Keim E, Schöpper A, Hooton DG,
France CC, Sharples JK. European Comparison of Fast Fracture
Analysis Rules. Application on PWR Reactor Pressure Vessel Case.
SMIRT 14, 1997.
14. Heng C, Pellissier-Tanon A. A coherent approach of light water reac
tor piping Analysis. 7th ICPVT, Dusseldorf, 1992.
15. Heng C, Champomier F. Survey of Conditions for Cyclic Loading in
Shell, Valve, and Piping Analyses. 8th ICPVT, Montreal, 1996.
ASME_Ch49_p191-256.qxd 6/3/09 10:17 AM Page 254
254 • Chapter 49
16. Riou B, et al. RCC-MR Code for Years 2000: Presentation
Emphasising Recent Design Improvements. SMIRT Conference,
August 17 – 18, 2003.
17. Remond A, et al. RSE-M Inservice Inspection Rules for the
Mechanical Components of PWR Nuclear Islands. Presentation of the
1997 Edition (Paper 2487). 5th International Conference on Nuclear
Engineering (ICONE5), May 26 – 30, 1997.
18. Aflalo C, Barbarulo R, Courcot M, de Marolles M, Douarin M,
Grandemange JM, Martin R. Sizing Rules for the Pressure Design of
Pump Casings. Nuclear Engineering and Design 1987;98:411 – 420.
19. Baylac G, Grandemange JM. The French Code RCC-M: Design and
Construction Rules for the Mechanical Components of PWR Nuclear
Islands. Nuclear Engineering and Design 1991;129:239 – 254.
20. Taleb L. Metallic Structures Subjected to Cyclic Loadings. II. A New
Approach to Assess the Steady State. International Journal of
Pressure Vessels and Piping 1997;759.
21. Cabrillat MT, Gatt JM, Lejeail Y. A New Approach for Primary
Overloads Allowance in Ratchetting Evaluation. SMIRT 13, Porto
Alegre, 1995.
22. Combescure A. Creep Buckling Design Methodology: Application to
316 SPH Steel, Internal Report n° 219. LMT-Cachan, 1998.
23. Deschanels H, Drubay B, Michel B, Cambefort P, Marie S. Leak
Before Break Procedure for High Temperature Applications —
Improvements and Validation. ICAPP, Cordoba, 2003.
24. Héliot J, Meister E. Ajustement des coefficients partiels de sécurité
dans les analyses de nocivité des défauts. SFM Bulletin. Revue
Française de Mécanique N° 1999 – 4.
25. RCC-M Design and Construction Rules for Mechanical Components
of PWR Nuclear Islands. AFCEN, 2002.
26. Inservice Inspection Rules for Mechanical Components of PWR
Nuclear Islands. AFCEN, 2000.
27. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. New York: American Society
of Mechanical Engineers; 2003.
28. Huet M, Dabrowski JF, Maurin N, Quere M. Critical Examination of
Valve Design According to Subsection B 3500 of the French Design
and Construction Rules for Mechanical Components of PWR Nuclear
Islands (RCC-M January 1985 Edition). International Journal of
Pressure Vessels and Piping 1989;37:279 – 299.
29. Heng C, Grandemange JM. Framatome View on the Comparison
Between Class 1 and Class 2 RCC-M Piping Design Rules (WRC
Bulletin 361). Welding Research Council.
30. Rigaud N, Tchilian JM, Relet JP. Optimization of Screens Used With
Linear Accelerator. 15th WCNDT, Rome, 2000.
31. Rigaud N, Tchilian JM. The Difficult Choice of Liquid Penetrant
Range of Products. 7th ECNDT, Copenhagen, 1998.
32. Lambs R, Grandemange JM, Paris D, Faidy C. Recent Evolutions of
French Design and Construction Rules. ICONE9 Conference, Nice, 2001.
33. Pellissier-Tanon A. Experience in Applying French Regulation and
the RCC-M Code to the Construction of the Reactor Coolant System
of Pressurized Water Reactors. 7 ICPVT, Dusseldorf, 1992.
34. Order dated December 12, 2005 applying to Nuclear Pressure
Equipment (ESPN). Official Journal of the French Republic N° 19,
January 22, 2006.
35. JM. Grandemange “The RCC-M Code 2007 Edition: Emphasis on
new technical and regulatory aspects”, Proceedings of PVP2008, July
27 – 31, 2008, Chicago, Illinois, USA.
36. C. Pétesch, JM. Grandemange, F. Le Breton, Y Gourdon “Stress clas-
sification in piping: case of seismic and thermal expansion loads”.
ESOPE 2007 Conference, AFIAP, October 2007, Paris.
37. RCC-MR. Design and Construction Rules for Mechanical compo-
nents of FBR Nuclear Islands and ITER Projects. AFCEN, 2007
Edition.
38. C. Escaravage, D. Bonne, O. Gelineau, M. Sperandio, B. Drubay, V.
Barabash “Recent developments of RCC-MR code for high temperature
reactor and ITER projects, PVP2008, July 27–31, 2008, Chicago, USA.
39. MN. Berton, MT. Cabrillat, O. Ancelet, S. Chapuliot “Propositions
of improvements of RCC-MR Creep-Fatigue Rules”, PVP2007,
July 22–26, 2007, San Antonio, USA.
49.8 CONCLUSIONS
49.8.1 CODAP®, CODETI®, and COVAP® Codes
CODAP , CODETI®, and COVAP® Codes are issued by SNCT
®
as private codes. They have been developed using the concept of
construction Categories.
Since 2000, they comply with the requirement of the PED.
These Codes incorporate several parts of EN 13445 dealing with
materials, design, fabrication, and testing inspection.
These Codes will still be updated to incorporate new industrial
practices so as to satisfy the user’s needs. The evolution of NDT,
such as TOFD or acoustic emission, will enable, as a complement
to design rules development, significant improvement of reliability
and safety of pressure component, while maintaining an accept-
able economical cost.
49.8.2 RCC-M Code
The RCC-M Code is a complete set of rules for the design and
construction of mechanical components of PWR nuclear islands.
Its general objectives and technical scope are similar to those of
the ASME BPVC Section III, Division 1 and related sections. The
comparison made shows that the RCC-M Code follows the gener-
al structure of the ASME Code. Both Codes give minimum
requirements that have to be supplemented by provisions specific
to the application. Due to its more specific scope, the RCC-M
Code may include more detailed technical requirements that are
part of the component specification in the US practice.
On the other hand, the ASME Code includes provisions that are
out of the RCC-M Code and, consequently, shall be addressed in
an another context, such as requirements applicable to the owner,
contractor agreement by ASME and verification by registered
professional engineers, ASME quality system certificates for
material manufacturers, and certification by Authorized
Inspectors. The emphasis placed in the RCC-M Code on technical
aspects allows its adaptation for use in countries with different
administrative and/or regulatory systems.
Some differences with the ASME Code have been highlighted.
The RCC-M Code uses some ASME material, particularly on the
design part, with the permission of ASME. Differences concern
changes in organization and some additional requirements coming
from discussions with clients and safety authorities. More precisely:
(a) From the design point of view, ASME requirements are cov
ered in the RCC-M Code, which also includes additional
requirements resulting from the applicable French Pressure
Vessel Regulation.
(b) Requirements on procurement are more precise, with addi
tional restrictions on chemical content, provisions on quali
fication of first important parts, defined in relation with
manufacturers, and verification of material properties at
temperature.
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(c) Requirements on welding procedure or welders qualifica 49.9
tions are generally more restrictive in the RCCs, which refer
to the European standards.
(d) Testing and examination methods are similar or equivalent, AFCEN
RCCs being based on European standards.
(e) Requirements on fabrication and examination criteria are
more self-contained in the RCC-M Code. AFIAP
The RCC-MR Code is a complete set of design and construc- AISC
tion rules for fast breeder reactor components and ITER vacuum CODAP
vessel. The changes to the RCC-MR in the 2007 edition are sup- CODETI
ported by more than 10 years of R&D work in France and COVAP
Europe, and this edition provides to the engineers a modern set of EC
rules applicable not only to fast reactors but more generally to EN
components either operating at elevated temperature or having EPR
geometrical features close to those of FRs (thin shells). PED
The RSE-M Code is used in France for the operation and main- RCC-C
tenance of 58 PWR units in operation. It is also used for the Daya
Bay and Ling Ao units in China. It is also used as an information RCC-E
reference for prenormative activities in the European Union.
Like the ASME Code, changes to RCC and RSE continual fol- RCC-G
low the evolution of industrial experience (new products or
processes), related standards, and R&D work and operational RCC-M
experience. To summarize, French nuclear codes are adaptations
of and ASME type of approach to the French and European RCC-MR
standardization context, with organizational aspects excluded to
permit their adaptation to projects abroad. Although the RCC and RSE-M
ASME Codes may retain different sets of requirements, they lead
to components of equivalent quality. SNCT
ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS
CHAPTER
French association for design, construction and
inservice inspection rules for nuclear island compo-
nents (develops codes for the nuclear sector)
Association Française des Ingenieurs en Appareils
a Pression
American Institute of Steel Construction
Code de construction des Appareils à Pression
Code de construction des Tuyauteries Industrielles
Code de construction des générateurs de VAPeur
European Community
Euro Norm
Evolutionary Pressurized water Reactor
Pressure Equipment Directive
Design and Construction Rules for Fuel Assemblies
of Nuclear Power Plants
Design and Construction Rules for Electrical
Equipment of Nuclear Islands
Design and Construction Rules for Civil Works of
PWR Nuclear Islands
Design and Construction Rules for Mechanical
Components of PWR Nuclear Islands
Design and Construction Rules for Mechanical
Components of FBR Nuclear Islands
Inservice Inspection Rules for Mechanical
Components of PWR Nuclear Islands
Syndicat National de la Chaudronnerie, Tôlerie et
ASME_Ch55_p425-432.qxd 6/3/09 11:57 AM Page 425
DECOMMISSIONING
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
“Energy, environment, education, and economy are inextrica-
bly linked.”
55.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents an editorial view of essential elements for
an effective D&D technology development program, and a com-
pendium of challenges and needs from the perspective of technol-
ogy end-users. The term “D&D” is used herein to describe a
formal project management process that involves removal of real
property from active or standby status and transition to a long-
term end state (such as an industrial brown-field or an unrestricted
green-field). Interim steps depend on the actual facility, and
include characterization, deactivation, decommissioning, deconta-
mination, demolition, waste management, and disposition or recy-
cling of excess facilities and equipment. Life-cycle-cost analyses
include surveillance and maintenance (S&M) while awaiting
completion of D&D.
The Environmental Management Program (EM) of the
Department of Energy (DOE) in the United States, and the Nuclear
Decommissioning Authority (NDA) in the United Kingdom,
manage the largest D&D programs in the world. Specific issue
programs, such as disposition of submarines, have technology
development components. Blurred lines of responsibility
[S&T 2004] contribute to negligible effort to remediate inten-
tional contamination.
The estimated cost to remediate the initial set of 19 facilities
for which the NDA is responsible, increased from £55.8 B in
2005, to £73.6 B in 2008. [NDA 2008a]
EM indicates similar uncertainty in its ability to deliver as
expected. The total estimated life cycle cost is envisioned to
increase by $50 B, of which $40 B is associated with existing
scope. [DOE 2007]
Programmatic risk, regulatory issues, litigation, expanding
scope, and unexpected technical complexity, all contribute to the
increasing cost estimates. At the NDA as well as at EM, forgone
opportunity is also a major contributing factor to the cost of delay.
Other influencing factors include non-productive expenditures,
bias against innovation, and limited incentives to accelerate tran-
sition to future missions.
D&D represents an increasing fraction of the cost of environ-
mental remediation, but progress has been disappointingly slow.
CHAPTER
55
Anibal L. Taboas
Unintended contractual biases against innovative technology
include (1) the assurance of profit, particularly when fixed as a
percentage of level of effort, and (2) the loss of competitive
advantage through early disclosure of innovative technology and
methods.
Funding for each component of D&D technology development
(basic, applied, short and long term) has dwindled as to primarily
support desk-type study. Fiduciary responsibility calls for contin-
uously demonstrating that resources consumed by industry and
government in the safe and compliant environmental remediation
of radiological and nuclear facilities remain commensurate with
the risks averted.
Reverting the funding trend requires integrated planning, strate-
gic action, and effective communication. This includes: (1) devel-
oping and presenting the business case; (2) investing in high visi-
bility projects of demonstrably high return for investment (ROI);
(3) meeting customer-identified expectations; (4) tracking leading
indicators and contractual incentives; (5) addressing key policy
issues; and (6) transparency of action.
In a global economy, demonstrating a compelling ROI requires
leveraging resources, such as through partnerships between DOE,
NDA, and other funding sources, as well as with regulators,
industry, and competing stakeholders.
Descriptions of D&D processes and of the state of the art on
technology are readily available. [ASME 2004] After much repe-
tition, little has actually changed [ITRC 2008] in the implementa-
tion of “authoritative” regulatory guidance.
55.2 NATIONAL EFFORTS
DOE issued a Cleanup Technology Roadmap identifying five
program areas for strategic R&D initiatives. [DOE 2008] These
are presented as Table 1: DEACTIVATION & DECOMMIS-
SIONING STRATEGIC INITIATIVES OF THE US DEPART-
MENT OF ENERGY. The roadmap emphasizes timely insertion
of existing commercially available technologies, buy-before-make
approach to innovative technology, and local case-by-case justifi-
cation for procurement. The designation of Savannah River
National Laboratory as “EM corporate laboratory” might be
indicative of renewed interest in interdisciplinary approaches.
A panel of the National Research Council (NRC), part of the
Academy of Sciences, provides technical and strategic advice in
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426 • Chapter 55

TABLE 1: DEACTIVATION & DECOMMISSIONING STRATEGIC INITIATIVES OF THE US DEPARTMENT OF

ENERGY [DOE 2008]

the development of a roadmap that identifies technology gaps in
the DOE program and a strategy to address them. [NRC 2008] In
an interim report, the highly credible panel indicated that is gener-
ally agreeable to the ongoing DOE effort, but that it does not rep-
resent an appropriate sense of urgency in resolving increasing
technological challenges to effective D&D.
Preliminary observations of the NRC panel include:
(1) The complexity and enormity of EM’s cleanup task require
the results from a significant, ongoing R&D program so
that EM can complete its cleanup mission safely, cost-
effectively, and expeditiously.
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(2) By identifying the highest cost and/or risk aspects of the
site cleanup program, the EM roadmap can be an impor-
tant tool for guiding DOE headquarters investments in
longer-term R&D to support efficient and safe cleanup.
In its conclusions, the committee highlighted that:
. . . According to the range of technology needs presented . . .
the committee judges that existing knowledge and technologies
are inadequate for EM to meet all of its cleanup responsibilities
in a safe, timely, and cost-effective way. Meeting current and
future EM challenges will require the results of a significant,
ongoing R&D program. [and] . . . the medium- and long-term
research component of EM’s program has largely disappeared.
Implementing the roadmap will require substantial and continu-
ing federal support for medium- and long-term R&D for tech-
nologies focused on high-priority cleanup problems.
TABLE 2: FOCUS OF R&D IN THE VARIOUS PHASES OF THE PROVISIONAL IMPLEMENTATION PLAN [NDA 2008B]
In the UK, the NDA issued a draft Proposed Research and
Development Strategy [NDA 2008a], which includes considera-
tion of concepts such as a National Nuclear Laboratory, coopera-
tion with the British Geological Survey, relationships with organi-
zations in other countries (including EM, Electricité de France,
and others), and the recent launching a National Nuclear Skills
Academy. Direct application to D&D technology development is
evident in Table 2: FOCUS OF R&D ON THE VARIOUS
PHAZES OF THE PROVISIONAL IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.
[NDA 2008b]
Technology development appears to have a greater role in pro-
curement competitions in NDA than in EM. NDA, however, tracks
private funding, which enables transparency in evaluating liabilities
and the costs of delay. The environmental mission of the NDA is
simpler than the EM mission, which contributes to the ability to
focus technology development and interaction with stakeholders.
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428 • Chapter 55
55.3 MANAGING RISK
A common presumption that baring special circumstances such
as “one-of-a-kind” facilities that require specific consideration,
the tried and true construction management processes are appro-
priate for D&D projects is without merit. The applicability of
rules originally established for construction-type projects merits
review. For example, the appropriate level of safety basis docu-
mentation for indefinite continued facility operation is intuitively
different than during short term de-construction.
Characteristics of exceptional projects include capture of best
management and practical lessons-learned, a well-supported base-
line, and strong scientific and regulatory competence. The voice of
science remains largely unheard in risk-management. For example,
significant investment to remediate small levels of tritium contami-
nation to current drinking water standards [EPA 2008] might be
fully compliant, but hardly a high-risk aversion or good science.
Therefore, developing technology to capture minute quantities of tri-
tium absorbed in reinforced concrete would not be of high priority.
On occasion, regulatory trends conflict with site-specific reality.
The emerging trend for mercury, for example, is to establish tar-
get levels for total maximum daily load (TMDL) in surface water
— the greatest risk being contaminant transport to surface water,
and uptake of methyl mercury by fish, plants, and other animal
life. The logic is remarkably simple and sound; meeting TMDL
eventually leads to a safe and clean environment. Reality at the
Y-12 National Security Complex, in Oak Ridge, TN, includes
~900 tons of mercury unaccounted for in buildings, soils, and
other facilities. It is advisable for D&D planners to understand
that remediation does not eliminate environmental liabilities, and
that the linkage between source reduction and emerging TMDL
stream protection standards exists only in a geological timeframe.
A comprehensive regulatory strategy is of utmost importance in
managing risk.
Mechanisms to identify and reduce technical risk and uncer-
tainty, presuming timely and effective follow-up, include:
• Ground Truth—Disciplined local self assessment, documen-
tation, and tracking of risk management actions
• Sponsor Assessments—readiness reviews that enable com-
mitment to a defined baseline (including overall approaches
and technology gaps)
• Independent (external) Peer Review—Aimed at facilitating
capture of best practices and lessons learned, and timely
incorporation of strategic decision-making
• External Assistance—Preferably, by best in class experts with
applicable execution experience in similar projects, and dedi-
cated to project enhancement.
The process of assessing technology needs and gaps, however,
is susceptible to myopic and self-serving influence. Review by
non-implementing independent peers is invaluable [TECH 2008],
particularly when appropriately involving regulators. Risk reduc-
tion through strategic application of innovative products requires
a demonstrable corporate level or “top down” commitment.
55.4 APPLIED D&D ENGINEERING
MANAGEMENT
Securing a corporate commitment for long-range investment in
D&D technology development requires demonstrated strategic
management. Effectiveness of technology development can be
quantified through valuation and tracking of changes in opera-
tional safety, schedule and cost, and averted risk. Influencing fac-
tors include:
• Technology development role in critical decisions
• Input to all D&D activities and funding priorities
• Countering the tendency to maintain infrastructure
• Accelerate/incentivize the disposition of real estate
• Investing in selective high payoff technology needs
• Application of Best Practices & Lessons Learned
• Transparency of action
• Independent assessment using Best Available Science
• Tracking few leading performance indicators
• Increased emphasis on overall risk management
• Re-capture missed regulatory opportunities
• Realize the economies of scale, e.g., conceptual design
• Implement appropriate contractual incentives
• Encourage multi-disciplinary approaches
55.5 TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
NEEDS
A logical grouping of challenges and needs, as indicated by
various sources of technology end-users appears in Table 3: A
COMPENDIUM OF PROJECTED D&D TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT NEEDS. Previous similar surveys indicate that
the stated needs have changed little over the last decade.
Expectations, however, change rapidly. There is a growing real-
ization that some policies need revision based on changing tech-
nology and better understanding of risk. Some sites require use of
web-based portals for hazards analyses that assure consideration
of facility characteristics based on historical archives.
A sampling of the type of issues whose resolution would facili-
tate an effective D&D program is presented as Table 4: OTHER
RELATED FACTORS AND POLICY ISSUES. The following
section highlights sample hypothetical development tasks, as illus-
trations of the intended interdisciplinary context of Tables 3 and 4.
55.5.1 Hypothetical Task: Asbestos
A large number of asbestos-containing buildings remain with-
out characterization because of the lack of fast and easy easily
methods to detect asbestos in air, surfaces, and building materials.
Current approaches include sampling and microscopic characteri-
zation for qualitative determinations.
The aim is to develop instrumentation and fixatives for reliable
field detection and or passivation of asbestos contamination.
Portable detection equipment would allow early determination on
trigger abatement methods. One concept for such detection would
be similar to spraying lumisol in order to detect the presence of
human blood under ultraviolet light.
Potential innovative technologies include conjugating an
asbestos binding small molecule [BIOTCH 2008] with simple
dyeing methods to detect chrysotile, [ENVRS&T 2008] the most
commonly used form of asbestos.
55.5.2 Hypothetical Task: Work Sequencing
Nearly all D&D activities require tradeoffs. The removal of an
intense source of radiation deep inside a facility may require trad-
ing varying levels of cumulative dose among different sets of
workers. Early removal may result in a cumulative dose, at the
expense of re-contamination of a clean zone. Insertion of tempo-
rary shielding may be effective in lowering dose, but at the
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TABLE 3: COMPENDIUM OF PROJECTED D&D TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT NEEDS

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430 • Chapter 55
TABLE 4: OTHER RELATED FACTORS AND POLICY ISSUES
expense of increased waste volume. A few established radiation
dose and shielding calculation models have demonstrated useful-
ness in sequencing work by helping to minimize overall dose and
maximize the continued availability of the workforce through
individualized limits.
Commercially available project management software are stan-
dard tools in work force loading, scheduling, and cost estimating,
and for defining a critical path to completion. Availability
includes models to create and manipulate virtual images that
replicate a facility’s geometry, structure, composition, and other
physical factors. Applications range from landscaping and kitchen
design, to finite-element stress analysis of three-dimensional
structures, including airplanes.
The aim is to integrate software applications (shielding/dose
calculation models, project management software, and modeling
of facility conditions) into a predictive tool. A few site-specific
parameters (e.g., geometry, radiation and contamination levels,
pathways, and shielding) could be leveraged into evaluating
options for sequencing, timing, and scheduling D&D, in a manner
that minimizes cost and maximizes sieverts averted.
Expanded potential applications include merging with existing
characterization tools [MARSIM], dynamic process hazard identi-
fication and analysis, and confirmation of successful completion
of decontamination, through an electronic process guide that
results in appropriate radiological instrumentation choices and
points for final status survey.
55.5.3 Hypothetical Task: Roofing Systems
Innovative application of low-technology concepts may add
value. Numerous deactivated facilities awaiting D&D have not
been subject of adequate S&M – including many arched metal
buildings, or “quansa” huts. Due to vintage, circa 1945, these
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 431
facilities frequently involve peeling lead paint, PCB, and electrical
wiring containing lead, asbestos, and other radioactive and/or
chemical contamination. Some locations curtail respirator type
work at these facilities to limit heat stress. Weather exposure accel-
erates emissions, which complicates environmental compliance.
The aim is to develop temporary roofing systems, and other
engineered caps and barriers that contribute to S&M perfor-
mance and minimization of effluents. Options to examine
include air filled/ pressure controlled shelters similar to those
used in winter for indoor golf courses, and tarps and other
weather shields, to mitigate weather exposure and related
migration. Large-scale temporary roofing may enable sequenc-
ing of demolition without maintaining the structural integrity of
pre-existing roofs, and simplify containment of dust and other
particulate emissions.
55.6 CONCLUSIONS
While basic and applied D&D engineering and technology
development have played a crucial role in many past successes, a
decade of cost creep and funding cuts has decimated ongoing
national programs.
55.7 REFERENCES
[ASME 2004] “The Decommissioning Handbook,” Edited by A. L.
Taboas, A. A. Moghissi, and T. S. LaGuardia,
ASME Press, Three Park Ave., New York, NY
10016. December, 2004. ISBN 0-7918-0224-8.
[BIOTCH 2008] “Detection of chrysotile asbestos by using a
chrysotile-binding protein,” A. Kuroda, T. Nishimura,
T. Ishida, R. Hirota, and K. Nomura, Biotechnology
and Bioengineering, Vol. 99, No. 2, 2008.
[DOE 2007] Department of Energy Five Year Plan, FY 2008 - FY
2012, Environmental Management, Office of the
Chief Financial Officer, Washington, D.C., February
2007.–http://www.em.doe.gov/pdfs/EMFYP%20
Final%204-06.pdf
[DOE 2008] Engineering and Technology Roadmap: Reducing
Technical Risk and Uncertainty in the EM Program,
US Department of Energy, Office of Environmental
Management, Washington, D.C., March 2008.
www.em.doe.gov/pdfs/FINAL%20ET%20Roadmap
%20_3-5-08_.pdf.
[EPA 2008] U S Environmental Protection Agency, National
Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 40 CFR 141,
Code of Federal Regulations, Government Printing
Office, Washington, DC, 2008.
[ES&T 2004] “Establishing Remediation Levels in Response to a
Radiological Dispersal Event (or “Dirty Bomb”),”
D. Elcock, G. Klemic, G., and A. L. Taboas,
Environmental Science & Technology, Vol. 38, No.
9, March 2004.
[ES&T 2008] “Novel selective dyeing method for chrysotile
asbestos detection in concrete materials,” Y. Oke,
Developing an integrated D&D technology development
roadmap is a useful component of a disciplined management
approach. Technology needs have not changed significantly; how-
ever, opportunities and expectations change rapidly.
Reverting the funding trend requires integrated planning, strate-
gic action, and effective communication. This includes: (1) devel-
oping and presenting the business case; (2) investing in high visi-
bility projects of demonstrably high return for investment (ROI);
(3) meeting customer-identified expectations; (4) tracking leading
indicators and contractual incentives; (5) addressing key policy
issues; and (6) transparency of action.
Society needs to know that it is getting is a reasonable ROI on
it’s investment in governance. The NDA planning effort yielded
greater understanding of the underlying cost and vulnerabilities,
but the effect of resulting management changes remains unclear;
therefore it maintains a current rating of “peer perform.” For vari-
ous reasons, the EM D&D Technology Development effort is
poised for optimism and greater efficiency; therefore, the current
rating changes from “underperform” to “perform.”
It is neither complicated nor counter-intuitive: globalization causes
energy, environment, education, and economy to remain inextricably
linked; and an earned corporate level “top down” commitment
remains essential for successful strategic R&D investment.
N. Yamasaki, GY Amamoto, K. Sasaki, N. Maeta,
H. Fujimaki, and T. Hashida, Environmental
Science, and Technology, 42(5), March 2008.
[ITRC 2008] Decontamination and Decommissioning of
Radiologically Contaminated Facilities, RAD-5,
Interstate Technology & Regulatory Council,
Radionuclides Team, ITRC, Washington, D.C.,
2008. www.irtcweb.org.
[MARSIM] Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site
Investigation Manual, US Environmental Protection
Agency. http://www.epa.gov/radiation/marssim/.
[NDA 2008a] The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority – Annual
Report 2007/08, August 2008. http://www.nda.gov
.uk/news/arac-0708.cfm.
[NDA 2008b] NDA Radioactive Waste Management Directorate,
Proposed Research and Development Strategy, The
Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, May 2008.
[NRC 2008] “Technical and Strategic Advice for the Department
of Energy, Office of Environmental Management’s
Development of a Cleanup Technology Roadmap:
Interim Report,” E. Przybylowicz and A. Croff,
Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board, letter to M.
Gilbertson, National Research Council, February
14, 2008.
[TECH 2008] “An Independent Peer Review Process Developed
by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers
for the US Department of Energy,” C. O. Velzy, E.
L. Daman, N. H. Hurt, A. L. Taboas, Y. Collazo, A.
A. Moghissi, B. R. Love, and S. R. Straja,
Technology, Vol. 11, 2008.
ASME_Ch56_p433-454.qxd 6/3/09 12:09 PM Page 433
SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL:
SELECTED CASE STUDIES OF
(A) WET STORAGE (B) ABOVE GROUND
VENTILATED STORAGE TECHNOLOGIES,
(C) METAL CASKS AND (D) UNDERGROUND
STORAGE MODULES*
56.1 INTRODUCTION
Spent nuclear fuel has been accumulating at power generation
sites for over a half a century; with an estimated 300,000 tons of
heavy metal discharged globally to-date. Spent fuel is highly
radioactive and contains isotopes having half-lives that span over
millennia, and management thereof requires a robust long-term
planning. There are principally two approaches available, namely,
(i) reprocessing and (ii) storage in a wet or dry state.
Reprocessing and recycling the spent nuclear fuel to save
resources and to generate well-conditioned waste products, a
naturally attractive idea has thus far been met with a mixed
reception. As a result, storing fuel in a safe and durable long-
term configuration has developed into a strong alternative.
Management of spent nuclear fuel across the globe has fol-
lowed different paths, guided by the socio-technical environment
in each country. Thus, while fuel reprocessing and fuel transport
has been a centerpiece of spent fuel management in several
European states and Japan, on-site storage has been virtually the
sole option available to the U.S. plants.
In this chapter, a basic overview of current fuel reprocessing tech-
nology is provided, followed by a critical appraisal of the issues and
challenges that confront the industry in making reprocessing a
viable and economical solution. This chapter also contains a concise
discussion of the evolution of storage technologies beginning with
storage in deepwater pools, followed by the increasing use of “dry”
passive storage in an inert gas environment over the past 20 years.
* Editor’s Note: This chapter describes one company’s experience
with the management of spent fuel, and is not intended to be a com-
plete overview of the topic.
CHAPTER
56
Tony Williams and K.P. Singh
While both routes represent feasible long-term solutions, the
industry must eventually find a means to sustainably dispose of
the waste (either in the form of spent fuel or as waste from repro-
cessing) in a permanent repository in order to gain sustained pub-
lic support. Undoubtedly, the technical challenges that confront
the global nuclear power industry to manage its spent nuclear fuel
lie at the heart of the industry’s recrudescence after decades of
stagnation.
56.2 THE ORIGINS OF REPROCESSING
Reprocessing is as old as nuclear energy itself, although not
very old at all. The first nuclear reactor in the world (Chicago
Pile-1), which came into operation in 1942, was built in the
United States to “breed” plutonium for nuclear weapons. To sep-
arate the resulting plutonium from the rest of the fuel, a simple
chemical process was developed, which formed the basis for pre-
sent-day civilian reprocessing technology. In other words, the
technology used today was not developed for civilian needs; for
instance, ease of recycling or optimization of waste streams were
not considered. Despite this somewhat accidental beginning,
civilian reprocessing became increasingly important in the 1960s
and 1970s. At that time, a pioneering spirit suffused the nuclear
energy program – the plan was to construct a large number of
reactors in the coming years and it was uncertain how long the
then known uranium resources would last. It was also taken for
granted that the future of nuclear energy lay with fast breeder
technology, for which large amounts of plutonium were needed,
and which initially could only be derived from the reprocessing
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434 • Chapter 56

TABLE 56.1 INDUSTRIAL REPROCESSING FACILITIES [1]

Owner/ Design capacity

Country Location operator Facility Fuel tHM/yr Years of operation
Belgium Mol Eurochemic Eurochemic oxide ⫹ metal 30 1966 – 1975
France Marcoule Cogema UP1 metal 400 1958 – 1997
CEA APM/TOR oxide (FBR) 6 1988 –
La Hague Cogema UP2 metal 400 1966 – 1987
oxide 400 1976 – 1993
UP2/HAO oxide (FBR) … 1979 – 1984
UP2-800 oxide 800 1994 –
UP3 oxide 800 1990 –
Germany Karlsruhe KfK/DWK WAK oxide 35 1971 – 1990
India Tarapur DAE PREFRE oxide 100 1982 –
Kalpakkam DAE KARP oxide 100 – 200 1996 –
Japan Tokai-mura PNC Tokai oxide 100 1977 –
Rokkasho-mura JNFS Rokkasho oxide 800 2007?
Russia Chelyabinsk-65 Minatom RT-1 oxide 600 1976 –
Krasnoyarsk-26 Minatom RT-2 oxide 1000 2015?
UK Windscale/ BNFL B205 metal 1500 1964 – 2014?
Sellafield B204/B205 oxide 300 1969 – 1973
THORP oxide 700 1994 –
Dounreay UKAEA D1206 oxide (FBR) 7 1958 – 1997
D1204 oxide (MTR) ⬍1 1959– 1997
USA West Valley NFS West Valley oxide ⫹ metal 300 1966 – 1972

of light water reactor (LWR) fuel.1 Plutonium was expected to
become a very valuable commodity and it was the intention of
many LWR operators to reprocess all spent fuel and market the
resulting plutonium, thereby financing their own operations. In
any case, there was originally no intention on the part of the
operators to use the plutonium as mixed oxide (MOX)2 fuel in
their own reactors.
Based on this forward-looking ideology, fast breeder programs
were launched in Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States,
France, Germany, India, Japan, and Belgium; reprocessing plants
were constructed in all these countries (see Table 56.1).
Because of the belief in reprocessing that prevailed in the
1970s, there was no need to construct large storage pools for
spent fuel in nuclear power plants (NPPs). This meant that sav-
ings could be made on investments; the fuel was in any case to be
transported for reprocessing after a brief cooling period. However,
the result was that most operators had thus ruled out the only
alternative to reprocessing and they were obliged to continue
down this road even after the “reprocessing bubble” later burst.
The signals given out in the 1970s led many into a dead end, the
1
The ‘Start-up’ of a 1000-MWe fast breeder requires around 15,000
kg of plutonium, which in turn requires the reprocessing of around
1,500 tons (equivalent to the fuel discharges over 7 years!) of LWR
fuel.
2 3
MOX: Mixed Oxide Fuel, a mixture of uranium and plutionium
oxide.
only way out being reracking of storage pools, costly construction
of new pools, or eventually dry storage facilities.
In particular, Western Europe and Japan chose the reprocessing
route. In Europe, Germany, Holland, Italy, Switzerland, Sweden,
Belgium, Spain, France, and the United Kingdom all decided in
favor of reprocessing their spent fuel. This ultimately led to the
situation where the two European countries, namely France and
the United Kingdom, with much experience in reprocessing were
put under pressure to construct and operate large commercial
reprocessing plants. Potential customers were prepared to meet all
development, investment, and operating costs, in addition to
paying a sizable fee. The result, between 1979 and 1983, was the
signing of the so-called baseload contracts which today still
regulate the commercial conditions applying to reprocessing.
Although at that time it was clear to the operators that the com-
mercial conditions were far from optimum,3 the hope was for so-
called post-baseload contracts, which would have reduced the
costs to a much lower level.
Of the approximately 300,000 tons of nuclear fuel burned in and
discharged from nuclear power plants since the 1950s, 70% of this,
or 200,000 tons, is currently being held in dry storage facilities or
storage pools. The remaining 30%, equivalent to 100,000 tons, has
been reprocessed (see Fig. 56.1).
The several hundred million dollar facilities had to be amortized
after 10 years or after 7000 tons of reprocessed fuel.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 435

separated from waste materials. As mentioned above, this

process was developed in the United States in the 1940s (see
Fig. 56.2). The individual steps are described in roughly chrono-
logical order in the following.

56.3.1 Transport of the Spent Fuel to the

Reprocessing Plant
After around three-years’ residence in the reactor storage pools,
the spent fuel can be transported for reprocessing. Compared with
dry storage,4 this very short time requires smaller transport con-
tainers for higher specific thermal loading than the containers
used for dry storage, which aim to accommodate a maximum
number of fuel elements. Fuel elements can also be transported in
a wet condition, which further increases the thermal dissipation
FIG. 56.1 SPENT FUEL ARISINGS AND STRATEGIES [2] rate and hence the loading capacity.
The customer transports the agreed amount of irradiated fuel to
the reprocessing plant. The fuel is described and characterized in
56.3 THE REPROCESSING PROCESS: detail, for example, weight, burnup, irradiation history in the reac-
PLUTONIUM AND URANIUM tor, residual amounts of uranium and plutonium produced in the
EXTRACTION reactor (so-called shipper’s data) and so on.

Reprocessing in Europe, Japan and around the world has been 56.3.2 Unloading of the Spent Fuel
based on the so-called Plutonium and Uranium Extraction Following unloading in the reprocessing plant, the fuel ele-
(PUREX) process, whereby reusable plutonium and uranium are ments are held for 4 – 5 years in large cooling pools. For example,

FIG. 56.2 THE PUREX PROCESS

4
UO2 fuel elements typically have to be cooled for at least five years before they can be loaded into a dry storage container.
ASME_Ch56_p433-454.qxd 6/3/09 12:09 PM Page 436
436 • Chapter 56
the pool at La Hague has a capacity of 7500 tons or around 375
reactor operating years. The purpose of this storage period is not
to allow further cooling of the fuel elements (according to a
French law, the fuel elements must be delivered in a condition
that would allow immediate reprocessing), but to provide a suffi-
cient buffer in terms of various fuel types and burnups, which
ensures smooth operation of the reprocessing plant.
56.3.3 Shearing and Dissolution of the Fuel
During reprocessing, the fuel is handled in campaigns, with the
volume of one campaign being several tons of heavy metal (tHM)
to more than 100 tHM, depending on operating conditions.
• The fuel elements are first “sheared” (removal of tops and
ends and chopping of the fuel rods into pieces around 5 cm
long) and then moved to the dissolver.
• The fuel is leached out of the cladding using boiling nitric
acid.
• The clarified solution with uranium, plutonium and, fission
products is transferred to a so-called “accountancy tank” and
samples are collected and measured (volume, density, con-
centration of uranium and plutonium). This gives an accurate
inventory of the fission products that can be compared with
the shipper’s data and can also be used for the requirements of
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards
Regime.
56.3.4 Chemical Separation of Reusable
Materials
In the PUREX process, an organic solvent with 30% tributyl
phosphate (TBP) in kerosene is used to separate the uranium and
plutonium from the fission products. The latter remain in the
aqueous phase (nitric acid), while the uranium and the plutonium
enter the organic phase. After this first separation, there is a fur-
ther step to separate the uranium and plutonium from one another,
followed in each case by a cleaning cycle. These separation
processes are called liquid – liquid extractions. The joint extrac-
tion of UPu in the organic phase is done using a high concentra-
tion of nitric acid (4M). The back extraction is carried out at a
lower concentration, whereby the plutonium is first changed to a
lower oxidation state using a suitable reagent and enters the aque-
ous phase. The uranium is then extracted from the organic phase
(solvent) and transferred to the aqueous phase.
56.3.5 Products and Resources
Finally, there are two products: uranyl nitrate, which is convert-
ed into uranium oxide and stored in the same way as normal nat-
ural uranium oxide (yellowcake), and plutonium dioxide that is
sealed in batches of 6 – 7 kg in special containers and stored in a
secure building. Both products are stored until the customer in
question decides how and where the material should be further
processed.
56.3.6 Waste
The separated highly active fission product solutions (in nitric
acid) are initially stored in cooled tanks. The solutions are then
heated and reduced to a powder by evaporation. This is then
mixed with molten borosilicate glass and poured into stainless
steel containers with a capacity of around 0.18 m3.
The structural components remaining after the dissolution of
the fuel are either compacted using ultra-high pressure and
loaded into containers similar to those for high-level waste
(HLW), or are mixed with concrete and filled into suitably engi-
neered drums.
Other secondary wastes such as contaminated protective cloth-
ing, ion exchangers, slurries, and so on arise in various facilities
and are either cemented or bitumenized and allocated to cus-
tomers on a pro rata basis for the purpose of repatriation.
In theory, all materials can be transported back to the customer
6 – 9 years after delivery and 7 – 12 years after unloading from the
reactor.
56.4 WASTES AND RESOURCES: MASS
AND VOLUME BALANCE
As already mentioned, the process known today as civilian
reprocessing was inherited from the military sector. Military
reprocessing serves only one purpose, namely, isolating plutoni-
um from the irradiated fuel, and the fact that uranium and a series
of waste products are generated is of secondary interest. When
reprocessing appeared in the commercial world, these issues still
needed to be solved. The detailed specifications and the allocation
of materials as resources and wastes were foreseen as part of the
baseload contracts. Even today, almost 30 years following the
signing of the reprocessing contracts, development in this area
continues.
56.4.1 Allocation of Wastes
The reallocation of waste and resources to the customer is not a
trivial subject. Customers deliver fuel over a wide time range with
a range of initial enrichments and discharge burnups. This fuel is
then reprocessed in mixed batches, and the resulting product
streams continue to decay and change their composition. The
development of an allocation process was therefore not trivial.
Since different reprocessing companies have somewhat different
approaches, the description given here has been kept general to
avoid specificities.
56.4.1.1 Highly Active Vitrified Waste A procedure has
been developed for specifying glass (high-level vitrified waste)
allocation – Neodymium (a fission product), which is in a fixed
ratio to the total amount of fission products, is used to represent the
amount of fission products. The basic glass volume, that is, the
volume equivalent to the amount of fission products contained in
the fuel, is calculated by assuming the average fission product vol-
ume (Nd volume) in the produced blend glasses.
56.4.1.2 Intermediate and Low-Level Waste Besides highly
active glasses, cemented, compacted, or bituminized intermediate-
and low-level waste are generated on the one hand for the struc-
tural (nonfuel) components and for the technological or process
waste (contaminated protective clothing, ion exchangers, slurries,
etc.) generated within the facility on the other. For most of these
wastes, there are now specifications that have been approved by
the customers and the relevant safety authorities.
56.4.1.3 Other Waste Streams This section would not be com-
plete without considering the other waste streams and emissions
arising from reprocessing. It is a known criticism of the process
that besides the wastes that are returned to the customers, it
releases an additional amount of radiotoxicity into the environ-
ment surrounding the reprocessing plant. It is not disputed that
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 437

radioactive emissions are released into the environment. Mainly
volatile fission products such as iodine and tritium that are
released during the dissolution process cannot be fully retained
and therefore have to be released in controlled amounts. These
emissions have however been reduced steadily over the years and
are well below official limits.
56.4.2 Material Flows: Beznau NPP
as an Example
The Beznau NPP, a 2365 MWe PWR plant, located in
Switzerland is taken as an example. Since 1973, the plant has dis-
patched 433 tons of heavy metal or 1,329 fuel elements to repro-
cessing and has already recycled practically all of the resulting
uranium and plutonium. For this example, we take the annual fuel
requirement for one of the two 365 MWe Beznau reactors. This
corresponds to around 32 fuel elements or 10.75 tons of heavy
metal (valid for the first 20 years of operation; today, with higher
burnup, only 24 fuel elements per year are required). The corre-
sponding volumes of delivered fuel, conditioned waste, and recy-
clable materials are shown in Fig. 56.3.
It can clearly be seen from Fig. 56.3 that reprocessing reduces
conditioned waste volumes. In particular, the volume of condi-
tioned highly active waste is reduced by two thirds (30 m3 of
spent fuel compared with 10 m3 of vitrified waste).
56.4.3 Recycling Uranium and Plutonium
It was expected in the early days of reprocessing that the valu-
able reusable materials (uranium (RepU) and plutonium (MOX))
would indeed be valuable. During the 1980s and 1990s, however,
56.4.4 Using Plutonium from Reprocessing as
MOX in LWRs
As the name implies, MOX is a mixture of PuO2 und UO2.
While UO2 fuel can, to some extent, be processed manually to
produce fuel elements in open facilities without particular radia-
tion protection measures, MOX has to be fabricated in a closed
system with remote handling in shielded glove boxes. The result
is that the necessary investments are orders of magnitude higher
than for conventional UO2 fabrication. Due to the complexity and
restricted spatial conditions, the capacity of MOX facilities is also
smaller than for UO2 facilities. These factors lead to the specific
costs for MOX being significantly higher than for UO2 fuel. To
achieve breakeven or parity with UO2, the savings on uranium
costs have to be sufficiently high to compensate for this cost
difference – a situation that is reached only when uranium prices
are several hundred dollars a pound. There are also other details
that need to be taken into consideration, apart from costs (see
Figs. 56.4 and 56.5):
• The trend toward higher burnups means that the plutonium
the customer receives back contains increasingly smaller
amounts of fissile plutonium. Because MOX fuel is very
expensive, this is a welcome trend as less MOX fuel elements
need to be fabricated per kg of available Pu per reprocessed
fuel assembly. However, from the viewpoint of conserving
resources, it is not particularly advantageous.
90.00%
Percentage of Isotopic in Pu

when these recycled materials first became available and the dream
80.00%
of fast breeders collapsed, the operators had no choice but to use
these resources in their own reactors. The possibility of saving con- 70.00%
ventional fuel (natural uranium) by using MOX and reprocessed 60.00% Pu-238
Pu-239 (fiss.)
uranium (RepU) fuel elements is very welcome from an idealistic 50.00% Pu-240
viewpoint. However, with a uranium price of less than $10 per 40.00% Pu-241 (fiss.)
Pu-242
pound – as it was at that time – and taking into account the costly 30.00%
and complex processing required for MOX and RepU, this has not 20.00%
been worthwhile to date. Not only the complex processes involved, 10.00%
but also the natural monopolies of the providers led to a dislike of 0.00%
RepU, and even more so of MOX. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Discharge Burnup GWd/Te

FIG. 56.4 BUILD-UP OF PLUTONIUM DURING REACTOR

35 OPERATION (10 YEARS AFTER UNLOADING FROM
REACTOR)
30

25
Volume in m3

6000
20
5000 Decay Heat 1tUO2
15 Decay Heat 1tMOX
4000
Watt

10 3000
5 2000

0 1000
m3 m3 m3
HLW Glas ILW BE 0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
FIG. 56.3 EXAMPLE OF VOLUME REDUCTION DUE TO Discharge Burnup GWd/Te
REPROCESSING (VOLUMES RELATE TO THE CONDI-
TIONED STATE AND ONE YEAR OF OPERATION OF A FIG. 56.5 DECAY HEAT OF UO2 COMPARED WITH MOX
365-MWe PLANT) FUEL
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438 • Chapter 56
• Because of the higher components of actinides (Cm, Am, Np)
in spent MOX fuel, the decay heat is a factor of 2 – 3 higher
for the same burnup history. This can have an influence on
interim storage and final disposal and the associated costs.
56.4.5 Using Uranium from Reprocessing in LWRs
Reprocessed uranium should be a valuable resource. With a fuel
discharge burnup of 40 GWd/tHM, the residual enrichment of RepU
from reprocessing is still more than 1% 235U (see Fig. 56.6). Higher
than natural uranium and free – is it? Not entirely. The composition
of RepU is not exactly the same as that of natural uranium. During
reactor operation, further uranium isotopes are produced that are
either not present in nature or are only in very small amounts, and
they cannot be separated by the chemical treatment of 235U (see Fig.
56.6). Of particular interest are 232U and 236U, which make up an
increasing component as burnup increases and have a significant
influence on the further possibilities for using RepU. 236U is a strong
neutron absorber and influences the reactivity of the fuel, whereas
232
U is a strong gamma emitter and thus has a negative influence on
the fabrication process in terms of radiation protection.
The problem of impurities becomes important only after enrich-
ment of the uranium. The component of 235U in RepU has to be
increased to 4 – 5% before it can be used in the reactor. In current
enrichment processes, mainly the lighter isotopes (235U) are enriched
and the heavier ones, namely, 238U, are depleted. However, 232U is
even lighter than 235U and is therefore more strongly enriched than
235
U itself. This means that the component of 232U is increased not
only in absolute terms, but also in a relative sense. This effect is even
stronger with a lower original enrichment of the RepU, which is a
function of unloading burnup of the reprocessed fuel. Although 236U
is less enriched than 235U, it is nevertheless present in considerable
amounts (see Fig. 56.6) and leads to a situation in which the RepU
fuel elements are less reactive and can achieve lower burnup levels
than “normal” fuel elements.
For very high burnups and residual enrichments of 0.6%,
conventional enrichment of RepU is practically impossible for the
above reasons. In such cases, there is only one solution, namely,
“blending” with highly enriched uranium (HEU). This is a type of
indirect enrichment as it uses the stored enrichment in the HEU.
This allows enrichments of 4–5% to be reached and, because HEU
contains no impurities, the undesirable isotopes 232U and 236U are
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
1.00E-01 U-232
1.00E-02 U-233
U-234
1.00E-03 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
U-235 (f)
1.00E-04
U-236
1.00E-05
U-238
1.00E-06
1.00E-07
1.00E-08
Discharge Buildup
FIG. 56.6 BUILD-UP OF 236U AND 232U AND OTHER URA-
NIUM ISOTOPES DURING REACTOR OPERATION
(10 YEARS AFTER UNLOADING FROM THE REACTOR)
diluted at the same time. This evidently good technical solution,
however, has a very limited availability at this time.
56.5 REPROCESSING: FROM
THE MICROSCOPIC TO
THE MACROSCOPIC SCALE
Without doubt, reprocessing has not become what it should
have become. As already mentioned, the high expectations of the
1970s regarding fast breeders were not realized and the available
alternatives, namely, the use of MOX fuel in light water reactors,
were more in the nature of a palliative to close the circle and use
the plutonium rather than a conscious strategic decision. The
result was that, in parallel with the commercial contracts, exten-
sive research and development work was necessary. Taking a
microscopic view of reprocessing, the daily challenges, the addi-
tional costs, the endless dealings, and the irksome details were a
considerable burden for the NPP operators. Also, because of the
somewhat one-sided contractual relationship between reprocessor
and NPP operator, and the correspondingly small room for negoti-
ation, the total costs could neither be predicted nor influenced.
As said above , such “small” problems are perhaps the price that
has to be paid for a sustainable fuel cycle because from the techni-
cal standpoint, reprocessing is a real alternative to direct disposal
and, from a global perspective, a meritorious solution, which
• allows reduction of the waste volumes for disposal by a factor
of up to 4,
• produces highly active glass that, compared with spent fuel,
does not fall under IAEA safeguards and presents no prolifer-
ation risk,
• saves resources; per 100 fuel elements that undergo repro-
cessing, sufficient resources are released to fabricate a further
12 MOX and 12 uranium fuel elements – a saving of about
one-fourth of the required resources.
However, there are still the costs that have been the Achilles’
heel of reprocessing. Although the situation looks somewhat bet-
ter for the future, there are still financial considerations that can-
not be ignored.
Comparing reprocessing with direct geological disposal requires
a global perspective. On the one hand, there is a saving of space
and therefore costs in terms of interim storage and final disposal of
spent fuel and a reduction in required resources. On the other
hand, expensive international transport campaigns are necessary
for reprocessing and expensive MOX has to be fabricated. This
comparison is not straightforward rather based on many assump-
tions regarding the timing and nature of final disposal.
• Compared with direct disposal, the lion’s share of reprocess-
ing costs is payable in the short term. This means losing the
significant accumulation of interest on the reserves in the
waste management fund in the case of disposal.
• Reprocessing today is not a replacement for deep geological
disposal because the long-lived, highly active vitrified waste
will anyway have to be emplaced in a deep repository.
• The reprocessing cost structure is variable, with a very low
fixed cost component. On the contrary, because of the signif-
icant costs of generic development, direct disposal involves a
large fixed component. This firstly makes a cost comparison
with reprocessing difficult and, secondly, leads to the point of
no return, where so much in the way of fixed costs has been
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 439
given out that competitive reprocessing cannot be financially
justified.
• For direct disposal, certain centralized facilities need to be
constructed (e.g., a fuel conditioning plant), the costs of
which are almost independent of the volume of fuel for dis-
posal. It could therefore be that reprocessing is viable only if
the entire spent fuel of a country is destined for reprocessing.
56.6 THE FUTURE OF REPROCESSING
Much has been said in this chapter about the drawbacks of
reprocessing. However, it has also been stated that reprocessing is
a relatively young technology. Is there any hope that there will be
development of new generations of reprocessing technology that
are better? From a technical viewpoint, the PUREX process has
several flaws that have already been discussed.
• The high-level wastes are very well conditioned and contain
very little plutonium, but because of the presence of so-called
minor actinides (Am, Cm, Np) that come from neutron cap-
ture and not from fission, they still have a half-life far above
the average of 30 years for the fission products. This leads to
the situation that the glasses are radiotoxic for around 10 –
100 times longer than if the glass had contained pure fission
products (see Fig. 56.7).
• Uranium with a typical residual enrichment of around 0.6% is
difficult to use today and, under certain circumstances, can
even have a negative value. In a study on the exploitation of
British stocks of uranium and plutonium from reprocessing
FIG. 56.7 EVOLUTION WITH TIME OF THE RADIOTOXICITY OF SPENT FUEL
[3], the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) comes to
the conclusion that it would be financially more prudent to
keep the stocks for an unspecified time until use in a fast
breeder becomes possible rather than using them now in light
water reactors.
• The separation of plutonium by reprocessing today can be a
proliferation issue under certain circumstances, despite the
fact that the isotopic composition of plutonium from civilian
reactors is not suitable for weapons production.
Operators have learned to live with these flaws and the
PUREX process has become a practicable technology. However,
it cannot be assumed that development of reprocessing has to
come to a standstill with the present-day situation. In the context
of the Generation IV International Forum Initiative, for exam-
ple, which is promoting the development of six advanced reactor
systems of the next generation, the use of advanced reprocessing
technologies is considered a necessity. Without this leap in
development, the ambitious GEN IV objectives in terms of pre-
serving resources and nonproliferation cannot be achieved.
Much is being said, for example, about the so-called UREX
process, in which only uranium is extracted. Pu is not isolated
but fabricated directly in the fuel together with the actinides
(Np, Am, Cm) and this can be used in the fourth generation
reactors. Another variant allows separation of long-lived fission
products from short-lived ones. The long-lived isotopes are then
transmutated in special fourth generation reactors until they also
have much shorter half-lives. This would reduce the half-life of
the vitrified waste to 30 years, which requires a monitoring time
of only around 300 years. It would theoretically be possible to
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440 • Chapter 56
do without deep geological disposal, which would have a signif-
icant impact on acceptance of nuclear energy and the competi-
tiveness of reprocessing.
As the foregoing discussion makes it abundantly clear, repro-
cessing does not entirely eliminate the need for storage of high-
level waste. In the remainder of this chapter, the methods to store
fuel (or its reprocessed by-product) are discussed.
56.7 WET STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR
FUEL: SELECTED CASE STUDIES
56.7.1 Overview
Spent fuel assemblies discharged from nuclear reactors have
been stored in pools since the inception of the nuclear power
industry. Every operating reactor has at least one adjacent spent
fuel pool filled with water, typically to a depth of approximately
40 ft. (13 m). The pressurized water reactor (PWR) installations
maintain a certain minimum boron (boric acid) concentration in
the pool to serve as a redundant neutron absorber source for the
(relatively large) PWR fuel assemblies. The boiling water reactor
(BWR) pools utilize only demineralized water.
The preeminent role of water as the storage environment for
nuclear fuel is not merely due to its natural abundance. The ther-
mophysical and neutronic properties of water are ideally suited
for its use in the storage of spent nuclear fuel. The hydrogen
in the water molecule is an excellent decelerator of neutrons.
Shielding against gamma radiation is accomplished with no more
than 8 – 10 ft. of water coverage. Finally, water provides an order
of magnitude (indeed, over 100 times) with more efficient removal
of decay heat produced by the spent fuel than air or an inert gas.
As a consequence, fuel assemblies can be stored in a very tightly
packed array in compact fuel pools without the danger of over-
heating the fuel rods. In fact, the spacing between the adjacent
fuel assemblies in the latest generation spent fuel racks approxi-
mates those in the reactor vessel. Largely because of the versatility
and safety afforded by in-water storage, typical spent fuel pools
originally sized to store less than two cores worth of fuel now are
equipped to store more than 10 cores. This increase in storage
capacity has largely come about without diminishing the margins
of safety. Rather, in many cases the key margins of safety have
been increased. In the wake of the U.S. government’s ban on fuel
reprocessing in 1977, the nuclear power industry discovered the
huge additional storage potential available in the fuel pools. Most
nuclear plants in the United States have exploited this in-pool
reserve to a considerable extent through reracking of their pools.
By an informal count, the nuclear power industry worldwide has
carried out over 120 rerackings (defined as replacing existing low
capacity rack arrays with a high capacity one) in the past three
decades. The technology breakthroughs that made such a signifi-
cant increase in storage capacity possible are briefly summarized
below.
The initial generation of replacement racks in the spent fuel
pools were of the fully restrained “nonpoison” variety. These
racks relied exclusively on water and their structural members as
the guarantor of subcriticality. Early on, neutron absorber materi-
als were seldom utilized to reduce the neutron multiplication
factor. (The neutron multiplication factor is the ratio of the rate of
neutron generation to the rate of neutron capture.) Further, the
rack modules were anchored to the pool slab (through anchor
bolts or welds). Additionally, support against lateral sidesway was
provided through lateral restraints in the form of snubbers, turn-
buckles, and the like. These restrained racks were typically of the
so-called end connected construction (ECC) [4]. These restrained
racks suffered from two key drawbacks: (i) nonoptimal as low as
reasonably achievable (ALARA) during installation and (ii) risk
of damage to a pool’s “container” (in contrast to structural)
integrity. Installing and anchoring racks into flooded pools with
stored active fuel required deployment of divers and the operation
usually entailed considerable radiation dose to the personnel. The
anchoring and lateral restraint placement operations in fuel pools
containing irradiated fuel were intrinsically at variance with the
canons of ALARA.
From the operational point of view, the anchors at the pool base
necessitated that they penetrate the pool liner. Anchoring the
metallic rack structures (aluminum or stainless steel) to a rein-
forced concrete pool set up the classical condition of differential
thermal induced state of thermal stress. The thermal stresses
threatened the integrity of the liner, in particular, the sealworthi-
ness of the anchor penetrations, and in the case of laterally
restrained racks, imposed considerable loadings on the pool as
well. A few fuel pools even experienced liner leakage problems.
The above drawbacks of the first generation racks were over-
come with the advent of the “poisoned” freestanding racks. The
neutron poison was used to bring the storage cells closer togeth-
er, thus increasing the storage capacity in the fuel pool. For a
typical PWR fuel pool, use of the neutron absorber allowed the
center-to-center distance (pitch) to be reduced from (approxi-
mately) 13 – 10.5 in.. This implied a capacity increase of over
50% [(13/10.5)2  1) * 100  53.3%]. Freestanding racks with
minimized cell-to-cell spacings began to be referred to as “high
density racks” – a terminology that has taken firm hold in the
industry in the past three decades.
The freestanding high-density racks accrued many benefits,
not the least of which was the facility to install and remove them
from the pool without much encumbrance. The racks could now
be treated as just another container in the pool, which could be
lifted out of the pool or emplaced in the pool with remotely actu-
ated rigging.
Unfettered from the burden of in-pool burning, grinding, fitting,
welding, bolting, and other time-consuming operations, the
nuclear plants began to view reracking as a routine procedure.
There was no longer the need to plan a major “plant mod” to
install a fuel rack. In fact the plant added racks to the pool as they
needed them, extending the budget outlays over a length of time.
In other words, reracking did not have to be a one-time major capi-
tal expense. Several U.S. utilities have taken advantage of this fact
by carrying out pool capacity expansions in multiple campaigns.
Even countries that have opted for reprocessing find wet stor-
age capacity expansion to be an essential component of their fuel
management program. This is mainly due to the ongoing shift to
extended fuel burnups, which requires that the fuel be “aged” in
wet storage for a longer period before it can be loaded in a trans-
port cask for shipment to the reprocessing facility. Thus, the high-
density fuel storage racks are expected to continue to be a valuable
option for the nuclear power plants in their backend fuel manage-
ment plan.
56.7.2 Design Considerations Germane to
High-Density Storage Racks
A high-density storage rack is a cellular structure with an array
of vertical storage cells arranged as closely to each other as possi-
ble (hence, the term high density). A typical high-density rack of
contemporary design for storing BWR fuel or well-burned PWR
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 441
FIG. 56.8 A NONFLUX TRAP HIGH-DENSITY FUEL RACK
MODULE
fuel is illustrated in Fig. 56.8. As can be seen from Fig. 56.8, the
storage cavities in the rack are separated by a single multilay-
ered wall. It is clearly not possible to pack the storage cells any
closer. These so-called nonflux trap racks feature fuel storage
spacings that rival those in the nuclear reactor, and as a result
must rely on an unfailingly effective “neutron absorber” to guar-
antee a permanently subcritical state of storage under all potential
scenarios. The neutron absorber, installed in the storage cavity
walls, is an indispensable component of a high-density fuel
rack: A rack’s ability to render its intended function hinges on
the continued integrity of the neutron absorber. The subject of
reliability of the neutron absorber in fuel rack applications is
taken up later in the chapter.
A single panel of neutron absorber, unfortunately, is not suffi-
cient to ensure subcriticality of fresh or slightly burned PWR
nuclear fuel of a high initial enrichment (say, over 4% w/o). In
such cases, it is necessary to place two panels of neutron absorbers
with a water gap between them. These so-called flux trap racks
evidently permit a relatively low density of storage.
The expansion of densified wet storage in PWR pools was
made possible by the USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.13 (1982),
which permitted the designer to recognize the depletion of 235U
and generation of actinides and fission products as the fuel burned
in the reactor. The so-called burnup credit allowed the PWR
fuel racks to be made of the “nonflux trap” (maximum density)
genre except for a small quantity of flux-trap-type storage cells to
store unirradiated fresh fuel (such as a reload batch for refueling).
Most PWR pools reracked since the early 1980s feature a layout
wherein all storage cells, except for a certain number needed to
support reactor refueling, are of the nonflux trap variety. Certain
U.S. plants (notably, Waterford, Sequoyah, D.C. Cook, Callaway,
and Wolf Creek) employ an even more advanced fuel manage-
ment strategy termed “Mixed Zone Three Region” storage to
achieve maximum storage densification in their pools.
Virtually all nuclear plants in the United States and a majority
of the spent fuel pools in South Korea, Brazil, Mexico, Taiwan,
and the United Kingdom have been reracked by Holtec
International in the past 30 years. This warrants an overview of
the technology underpinning their design.
Both flux trap and nonflux trap module Holtec designs share
certain essential attributes, namely,
(1) The storage cells are supported by a common “baseplate”
that is elevated above the pool liner to create a “bottom
plenum.” The support pedestals that elevate the baseplate
are typically equipped with the capability to remotely
adjust their height so that the rack can be leveled after
installation.
(2) A lightweight, aluminum material containing finely dis-
persed boron carbide is used for reactivity control.
(3) The storage cells are connected to each other along their
contiguous corners to create a honeycomb construction
(HCC). The extent of connectivity between the cells has
been utilized by the rack designers to reduce the kinematic
response of the racks under seismic events [4].
Minimizing the kinematic displacement of the rack modules
during an earthquake is a central challenge in freestanding fuel
rack design because it directly affects the intermodule spacings
and hence the total number of cells that can be installed in a pool.
Prognosticating the response of fuel racks under an earthquake event
is an extremely complicated problem, made more so by the sub-
mergence in water. Under an earthquake, each freestanding rack
module is free to execute a wide range of motions, including par-
tial lift-off, lateral translation, bending, twisting, bowing, while
the stored fuel assemblies standing loosely in each storage cavity
rattle against their cell walls. The rattling forces, the shear forces
transmitted to the rack at the rack pedestal/pool slab interface, and
the fluid coupling forces produced by the swirling of water
around the modules as they move relative to each other produce a
complex brew of loadings that determine the structural response
of the rack modules. The fluid coupling effect, in particular, effec-
tively entwines the movement of all of the racks in the pool,
requiring the seismic analysis of all rack modules to be carried
out in one coupled model. This whole pool multirack (WPMR)
analysis lies at the heart of fuel rack qualifications [7]. The signif-
icant role of fluid-coupling forces in shaping the dynamic motion
of racks was experimentally validated for an accurate WPMR
analysis [5].
The design and stress analysis of spent fuel racks is guided by
an obscure USNRC publication dating back to 1978 [6], portions
of which are incorporated in NUREG-0800 (Appendix D to SRP
3.8.4) [8]. The reference ASME Code for the spent fuel racks
is Subsection NF of Section III of the ASME Code. Racks are
treated as a “Class 3 linear structure” within the purview of
Subsection NF. The governing load combination for stress analy-
sis purposes is invariably the so-called Level D service condition
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442 • Chapter 56
that corresponds to the safe shutdown earthquake for the nuclear
plant.
In addition to the Whole Pool Multi-Rack analysis and ASME
Code qualification mentioned above, the licensing of a high density
fuel rack entails a whole array of analyses to demonstrate
thermal-hydraulic, subcriticality, radiological, mechanical, and
structural compliance with regulatory requirements, as summarized
below.
Thermal-Hydraulic Compliance: The plant’s spent fuel pool
cooling and clean-up system must be capable of maintaining the
bulk temperature of the pool water below its licensed maximum
value under the scenario of increased fuel inventory in the pool
due to the in-pool capacity expansion. Operationally speaking,
the limit on the bulk pool water temperature is the most signifi-
cant constraint to the plant, often setting the minimum number of
hours that the fuel must decay in the core before it can be trans-
ferred to the pool. In a few (exceptional) cases, nuclear plant
owners have had to upgrade the plant’s cooling system to deal
with the increased heat load in the pool.
Maintaining the stored fuel in a cooled state in the pool is, of
course, a principal function of the fuel rack. Fuel racks are typi-
cally equipped with appropriate flow passages to ensure that there
is no localized boiling around the fuel cladding. Secondary flow
passages are also incorporated to maintain cooling if the primary
flow path is blocked for any reason (such an accumulated pool
debris). The cooling of the fuel cladding is also required to be
demonstrated under the hypothetical scenario that a fuel assembly
is (accidentally) laid on top of a rack, partially blocking the circu-
lation of water. To predict the temperature fields in the fuel pool, a
3-D simulation of the physical problem using a computational
fluid dynamics code is required. Special attention must be paid to
evaluating the thermal state of the water in the rack’s flux trap
spaces which tend to be regions of relative stagnation.
Subcriticality Compliance: The fuel racks must be equipped
with sufficient quantity of the B-10 isotope in a suitably distrib-
uted and stable configuration to ensure that the maximum neutron
multiplication factor of the stored fuel array is less than 0.95
under the condition of optimal moderation. In PWRs, the credit
for boron in the pool water is permitted to a limited extent.
Likewise, limited credit for the gadolinia integral to the fuel is
allowed. Non-integral control components may not be credited for
criticality control.
Radiological Compliance: The impact of the increased han-
dling of fuel in the pool, of a larger fuel inventory leading to the
increased potential of fuel handling accidents, accumulation of a
greater quantity of activated matter in the pool crud, effectiveness
of the fuel building’s charcoal filters, etc., are among the radiolog-
ical considerations that must be addressed as a pre-condition to
the regulatory approval of reracking a fuel pool.
Mechanical Compliance: The regulatory guidance documents
define a number of plausible mechanical accidents in the fuel
pool. These include an accidental drop of a fuel assembly over the
top of the rack or a through-cell vertical free fall hitting the rack’s
baseplate. It is necessary to show that the criticality control capac-
ity of the rack module is not impaired.
The mechanical integrity analyses are typically performed
using an elasto-plastic dynamics code such as LS-DYNA.
Structural Compliance: The increased dead load on the pool
slab and walls due to the increased quantity of fuel stored in the
pool is a principal area of concern, especially under seismic
events. The Whole Pool Multi-Rack (WPMR) analysis, discussed
in the foregoing, provides the means to quantify the mechanical
loads from the oscillation of the racks and rattling of the fuel
within the storage cells. The WPMR analysis also provides the
fluid coupling loadings on the pool’s walls. While the fluid cou-
pling loads are limited to the bottom region of the pool’s walls
(where the racks are located), the top region is subject to slosh-
ing loads. Finally, the radiant (gamma) heating of the pool walls
due to fuel stored in close proximity must also be included as a
loading, in addition to the normal thermal gradient from the dif-
ference in the fluid medium temperatures across the pool’s struc-
tural members. The stress analysis of the pool structure must
consider the ACI “factored” load combinations that include all
inertial, mechanical, and hydrodynamic loads. A finite element
code such as ANSYS is typically used to perform the stress
analysis.
56.7.3 Neutron Absorber
The neutron absorber is the heart of a spent fuel storage system
because its continued regulatory compliance with respect to reac-
tivity control relies on the neutron absorber. The neutron absorbers
used in the wet storage have traditionally employed fine boron car-
bide powder uniformly dispersed in a “carrier” material. The B-10
isotope in boron carbide captures the thermalized neutrons, the
balance of the material in the neutron absorber serves to keep the
boron carbide in place. A competent material to serve as the carrier
is austenitic stainless steel. Unfortunately, the ability of stainless
steel to hold boron in the matrix is rather limited: Boron carbide
concentration in excess of 1.7% causes excessive drop in ductility.
Because of its high density and low level of boron concentration,
the Borated stainless steel presents a weight problem for fuel
racks, which must be kept as light as possible to prevent overload-
ing of the pool slab. The low boron concentration in stainless steel
also forces the neutron absorber panels to be made thick, resulting
in increased storage pitch or conversely, reduction in the total stor-
age capacity. Borated stainless steel is also known to be consider-
ably more susceptible to corrosion than pure austenitic stainless
steel. Because of the above limitations, Borated stainless steel has
not been approved as a structural material in the ASME Codes,
and its low boron content has precluded its wide use for reactivity
control in high-density fuel racks.
The material widely used to serve as the boron carrier in the
neutron absorbers is aluminum. The early method to impregnate
boron carbide into aluminum relied on heating a well-mixed
mixture of boron carbide and aluminum inside an “aluminum
box” to approximately 1000 °F and hot rolling it. Successive
heating and rolling cycles converted the box into a sandwich of a
compressed aluminum/ B4C matrix flanked by thin (0.007 – 0.012
in. thick) veneers of aluminum. This material, developed by the
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) over 50 years ago and sold
commercially under the tradename Boral™, suffered from occa-
sional reports of hydrogen generation, swelling, and matrix
degradation problems since its introduction in the 1970s in oper-
ating nuclear plants. These deficiencies remain an unsatisfactory
aspect of its performance even today. The rise of powder metal-
lurgy in the 1980s and its application to the manufacture of neu-
tron absorbers over the past 20 years has successfully eliminated
the above deficiencies of the compressed aluminum cermet, lead-
ing to the introduction of aluminum metal matrix composites
(MMCs) that have the consistency and properties of a solid metal
and contain essentially no porosities. This latest generation neu-
tron absorbers, typified by the aluminum metal matrix composite,
sold under the tradename Metamic® [9], have become the main-
stay of the wet and dry storage industries in recent years.
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Metamic has been manufactured and successfully used with a The DOE MPC specification had a profound effect on the course
B4C content of up to 33%, making it an effective neutron of dry storage development in the United States. By the year 2000,
absorber. In light of the trouble-free performance of Metamic in development of storage-only systems had become rare in the
the United States (and other equivalent MMCs in Europe and United States. At present, virtually all U.S. plants are loading multi-
Japan), it is likely that fuel rack designs that use Metamic for purpose canisters. The ventilated casks, in which the MPCs are
both structural and criticality control function will be introduced stored at the site, are principally of two varieties, namely,
in the near future to further reduce the overall weight of the fuel
rack modules. (1) the configuration in which the canister is stored with its
axis horizontal (see Fig. 56.9(a)) and
56.7.4 Evolution of the Dry Storage Industry (2) the configuration in which the canister is stored in the ver-
Storing spent nuclear fuel in dry storage begun in the mid-1980s tical orientation (illustrated in Fig. 56.9(b)).
in the United States and underwent a complete transformation a While the ventilated casks have dominated the U.S. spent fuel
decade later. The first generation of dry storage casks was storage- management industry, their application outside the United States
only or transport-only devices. The storage-only casks came in two thus far has been rather sparse, where metal casks housed in over-
types – metal and concrete. A metal cask with a fuel basket could head crane-bearing ventilated buildings have been heavily favored.
be taken into the fuel pool loaded with fuel, dewatered, vacuum This is due to the fact that cask shipment for reprocessing and
dried, backfilled with helium, and placed on a reinforced concrete away-from-reactor (AFR) storage has been an enduring element of
pad in a relatively straightforward set of operations. The metal European and Japanese spent fuel management programs. In the
casks, however, had to be less than 125 tons in total weight (in United States, large-scale shipment of commercial fuel has been a
some cases, even lighter) to meet the lifting capacity of the plant’s nonexistent due to the halting progress of the Yucca Mountain
crane, which meant that they afforded limited shielding protection repository program and stifled achievements of the industry initia-
against the stored fuel. They also relied on a bolted cover to main- tives, notably the Private Fuel Storage, LLC’s project to build an
tain isolation, an operational weakness that could develop as a AFR in Skull Valley, Utah [10].5 As a result, there has been little
problem as the gaskets in the bolted joint aged with time (as they incentive to package fuel in ready-to-transport metal casks that
did at a Virginia site in the late 1990s). Because of this, coupled cost three times (or more) as much as a ventilated cask system of
with cost and mediocre dose attenuation ability, the metal storage- equal capacity.
only casks saw sparse use in the United States. The bulk of the dry
storage in the United States utilized the so-called ventilated casks.
The ventilated casks were massive concrete structures that could
not be taken to the pool. Their large mass guaranteed that they
56.8 ABOVEGROUND VENTILATED
provided considerably better shielding than metal casks. They were STORAGE TECHNOLOGIES:
also relatively cheap. Their only drawback was that a “transfer SELECTED CASE STUDIES
cask” was needed to move the “fuel canister” from the spent fuel 56.8.1 Aboveground Ventilated Storage Modules
pool to the cask. The concrete casks, unlike the metal casks,
The selection of a storage system at a nuclear site is essentially
required that the fuel basket be contained in a welded-shut contain-
a two-step process for the user. In the first step, the user must
er. This way, the cask itself could be made with openings to permit
determine whether the Technical Specification for the candidate
cooling air to ventilate past the stored canister. As a result, the ven-
storage system fulfills the plant’s requirements. Among the principal
tilated casks were more effective at keeping the spent fuel cooler
criteria that a user considers to determine the prima facie usability
than the metal casks, which had to be made in the form of closed
of a storage system at a site consist of comparing the site’s essen-
pressure vessels (because the cask closure lid was also the sole clo-
sure for the fuel basket). The ventilated system had the advantage
of significantly greater shielding because the ventilated cask could
be made as thick-walled as necessary to absorb the radiation emit-
ted by the fuel; they essentially had no weight restrictions. Early
on, ventilated casks were the overwhelming choice of U.S. utilities.
Then came the 1990s when the U.S. Department of Energy began
to realize that storage pads across the country would be loaded with
tons of spent nuclear fuel in storage-only devices. All of this fuel
would have to be repackaged at a huge expense in radiation dose
and money at a later date. Cask designers could not develop a dual-
purpose (storage and transport) system unless clear acceptance cri-
teria were defined by the government. The DOE had the long-
standing federal assignment to develop a suitable specification for
multipurpose (storage, transport, and disposal) canisters (MPCs). In
1992, the DOE issued its long planned multipurpose canister speci-
(a) Horizontal storage (b) Vertical storage
fication, setting down requirements on welded canisters to make
them suitable for on-site storage, off-site transport, and eventually, FIG. 56.9 TYPICAL HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL VENTI-
permanent disposal in a repository. LATED MODULES

5
The PFS, LLC initiative to build an away-from-reactor dry storage facility in Utah’s Skull Valley remains administratively stymied despite regulatory
wins [10].
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444 • Chapter 56
tial parameters with the allowables set down by the USNRC in the
storage system’s Technical Specification. Typically, the compari-
son consists of ensuring that the Technical Specification:
i. Explicitly permits the storage of the plant’s spent fuel.
ii. Provides for the storage of fuel with maximum and mini-
mum initial enrichment needed by the user.
iii. Permits the storage of the plant’s inventory of “damaged”
fuel or fuel debris (damaged fuel and fuel debris are
containerized for dry storage to prevent uncontrolled
dispersion of fuel particulates inside the canister).
iv. Permits free standing deployment of the storage system,
which requires that the seismic accelerations on the storage
pad (including the effect of soil/structure interaction) in the
vertical and horizontal directions must be bounded by their
respective allowables in the Technical Specification.
v. The allowable heat load is greater than the heat generated
by the fuel to be stored in each system.
In addition to the above, it is necessary to ensure that the cross
sectional opening of the storage cells in the fuel basket is suffi-
ciently large to enable fuel distorted by irradiation in the reactor
to be stored. The minimum recommended cell opening for the
most commonly used PWR fuel (8.424” array cross section) is 8.8
inch. For storing BWR fuel, a minimum cross sectional opening
of 6.00 inch should be used.
Of the above criteria, the heat load limitation is the one that
determines whether a spent fuel has decayed sufficiently in the
fuel pool to be eligible for dry storage.
Thus a major challenge in the storage of spent nuclear fuel is
the substantial quantity of decay heat that the system must expel
to maintain the stored fuel below the threshold temperature Tmax
at which the fuel rods may suffer permanent damage. The latest
USNRC guideline for Tmax for Zircaloy clad fuel is 400 °C [11].
In the ventilated system, the cooling of the storage canister,
required to be entirely passive under the rules of the 10 CFR 72,
occurs by the gravity-induced flow of ventilation air, as illustrated
in Fig. 56.10 for a vertical system. Therefore, the canister is the
sole barrier against the leakage of the radiological contents under
FIG. 56.10 VENTILATION AIR FLOW IN A VERTICAL STOR-
AGE SYSTEM (VIZ., HI-STORM MPC SYSTEM BY HOLTEC
INTERNATIONAL)
all conditions of storage and is therefore a crucial safety matter
for a ventilated storage system.
In the second step of qualifying a certified storage system for
use at a site, the user must contend with an array of qualification
criteria which must be satisfied to make its deployment possible.
Common criteria in this category are:
i. Is the plant’s cask crane rated to handle the payload of the
transfer cask licensed with the storage system?
ii. Is the storage system capable of withstanding the extreme
environmental phenomena loadings postulated for the site?
The typical environmental loadings that warrant consideration are:
i. High wind, tornado, and tornado-borne missiles
ii. Lightning
iii. Snow
iv. Flood and Tsunami
v. Earthquake
vi. Burial under debris
U.S. regulations require the licensee to perform a safety evalua-
tion in accordance with the provisions of 10CFR72.212 to ensure
that the storage system will maintain the stored fuel in a safe and
retrievable configuration. In particular, the MPC must remain
leaktight and the fuel basket inside it must not be subject to sig-
nificant plastic deformation (which may alter its criticality control
capability.
Given the critically important role of the MPC as the confine-
ment device, it is not surprising that the canisters for ventilated
storage are designed to meet the highest pedigree of the ASME
B&PV Code (Section III, Division 3). Certain countries such as
Ukraine require the canister to be double-walled.
The loaded multi-purpose canister is treated as “leaktight” by
the USNRC (see Interim Staff Guidance #18), whether it is stored
in the vertical or horizontal orientation. It is intuitively obvious,
however, that a horizontally oriented canister would produce more
“skyshine” than a vertically oriented one. Furthermore, the act of
installing or removing a horizontally disposed canister must con-
tend with friction forces. Because of these factors, most world
suppliers of fuel storage systems offer some form of vertical
storage technology. The first vertical ventilated MPC storage
device licensed by the USNRC is the HI-STORM 100 system
(USNRC Docket No. 72-1014).
In the vertical ventilated storage (VVS) system, the canister
upright in the cask, providing a convective contact of the ventila-
tion air over the full height of the canister. The canister is
installed in the vertical ventilated module using a container fit-
tingly known as the “transfer cask”. The transfer cask, shown in
Figure 56.11, is typically a cylindrical weldment of steel and lead.
To provide adequate shielding protection, a modern loaded trans-
fer cask often weighs in excess of 100 tons. The transfer cask has
a retractable bottom lid that is secured to the bottom flange of the
cask to make a watertight joint. It is the transfer cask that carries
the empty MPC into the pool for loading the fuel. During its brief
visit to the pool, the external surfaces of the MPC must be pro-
tected against contamination by suitable means. An annular gas-
ket placed around the top of the MPC to close the annulus, along
with a well-sealed bottom plate, provide the assurance that the lat-
eral and bottom surfaces of the MPC will not be wetted by the
contaminated pool water. Evidently, the reliability of the bottom
lid seal and of the annular gasket is critical to prevent spread of
contamination.
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FIG. 56.11 A TYPICAL TRANSFER CASK WITH A REMOV-

ABLE BOTTOM LID FIG. 56.12 CANISTER TRANSFER IN A VERTICAL VENTI-
LATED MODULE IN A PLANT’S “TRUCK BAY”

Upon completion of fuel loading, the transfer cask is lifted structural competence under a larger, more energetic missile than
from the pool and staged at a suitable location where the top lid is an F-16.
welded, followed by dewatering, drying, and inertizing (by heli- The VVS module also features inlet ducts near the bottom of
um backfill) of the canister. The loaded welded canister is next the module and, therefore, is susceptible to blockage of the venti-
carried by the transfer cask to the location where it can be trans- lation air by flood water at a site located in a flood plain. The
ferred to the recipient storage module. The canister is installed in HI-STORM system overcomes this problem by ensuring that the
the storage cask by stacking the canister-bearing transfer cask and bottom end of the canister is wetted by the floodwater before the
lowering the canister in it. Thanks to gravity, there is no risk of inlet duct is fully blocked by the floodwater.
the canister’s rubbing or binding during the canister transfer in a
vertical ventilated module (Fig. 56.12).
Figure 56.12 shows a typical MPC transfer operation inside a
plant’s controlled radiological boundary (typically, the plant’s
truck bay).
The outdoors transfer of a loaded canister, if desired, can be
carried out using an in-ground canister transfer facility (Holtec
Patent No. 7,139,358B2), as illustrated in Fig. 56.13.
The VVS module design partially addresses the 9/11-loading
(i.e., a crashing aircraft) by utilizing a dual shell steel structure
and a dual plate steel lid structure (both filled with concrete), fas-
tened together by large bolts. An Atomic Safety Licensing Board
panel in Reference [10] found Holtec’s HI-STORM system (the
most widely used VVS in the world) to be capable of maintain-
ing canister integrity if hit by a crashing fuel-laden F-16.
However, there is no published demonstration of HI-STORM’s6

6
HI-STORM™, an acronym for Holtec International Storage
Module, is a registered trademark of Holtec International, 555 FIG. 56.13 MPC TRANSFER AT THE ISFSI USING THE
Lincoln Drive West, Marlton, New Jersey, USA. IN-GROUND CANISTER TRANSPORT FACILITY
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446 • Chapter 56

FIG. 56.14 THERMOSIPHON DRIVEN FLOW OF HELIUM IN
A HI-STORM MPC
The canister used in the HI-STORM module is also designed to
promote internal convection of contained helium by thermosiphon
action in the manner of a recirculating flow system generator in a
PWR (see Fig. 56.14). The heat in the helium sweeping past the
bottom region of the canister is extracted by the floodwater on the
outside, thus preventing overheating of the stored fuel. Quite evi-
dently, a proper design of the canister is crucial to a safe and
robust ventilated storage system, and as such a subject that will
engage our attention later in this chapter.
As matters stand at this time, the dry storage systems certified
by the USNRC are generally capable of handling the fuel previ-
ously discharged into the domestic PWR and BWR pools.
However, the presently licensed systems will not be able to deal
with the fuel being discharged at many sites because of two emerg-
ing trends, namely: (i) storage of newly discharged fuel assemblies
and (ii) storage of used fuel with high initial enrichment.
Because the radioactive decay and the concomitant heat gener-
ation rate in the fuel upon a reactor’s shutdown reduces rapidly
with increasing post-core decay time (PCDT), the U.S. utilities
are keen to move the high “specific heat” fuel assemblies from
their reinforced concrete fuel pools into the even more structural-
ly robust dry storage casks. The ability to transfer the high specif-
ic heat fuel to dry storage requires that the storage system be
capable of rejection a larger quantity of heat emitted by the fuel
than hitherto fore required. While the high heat rejection require-
ment is prompted by considerations of increased security, the
need to store fuel with ever higher initial enrichment is driven by
the trend in the industry towards longer fuel cycles by burning
high enrichment fuel.
The USNRC, however, does not recognize reduction in a fuel’s
reactivity due to accumulated burnup for on-site storage (one of
several technical anomalies in the state-of-the-art regulatory regi-
men). Therefore, the canister’s fuel basket must be designed to sat-
isfy the long established subcriticality limit (keff ⱕ 0.95) under the
assumption of zero burnup. Initial enrichments approaching 5%
are increasingly commonplace in PWRs and expected to be intro-
duced in BWRs in the near future. Therefore, the fuel baskets for
dry storage casks must be designed to meet the dual requirement
of high initial enrichment and high heat load. The latest generation
of casks designed to meet the above needs is the
HI-STORM FW system [56.18] shown in Figure 56.15 herein. The
fuel baskets used in HI-STORM FW are made entirely of
Metamic-HT, a nano-technology product that has over ten times
the thermal conductivity of stainless steel and contains a far
greater areal density of the B-10 isotope than is available in con-
temporary fuel baskets (the B-10 isotope captures thermalized
neutrons and maintains reactivity control). As a result, the HI-
STORM FW fuel basket is qualifiable to store fuel of initial
enrichment as high as 5%. The high thermal conductivity of
Metamic-HT also boosts the heat rejection capacity of the canister
by more than 50% over its stainless steel counterpart. MPC-37,
containing 37 storage slots, is the canister used to store PWR fuel.
Each storage cavity has 8.94 inch (nominal) square opening, which
is adequate to store used spent fuel distorted by extended irradia-
tion in the reactor or canisterized damaged fuel and fuel debris.
MPC-89, containing 89 square cavities, each 6.05 inch square,
is the BWR counterpart of MPC-37. Both MPC-37 and MPC-89,
thanks to the Metamic-HT basket and the thermosiphon-enabled
design mentioned previously, can reject over 50 kilowatt of heat
while meeting USNRC’s cladding temperature limit when stored
in the HI-STORM FW overpack. Thus, spent nuclear fuel with
PCDT as little as three years can be packaged and placed in dry
storage in HI-STORM FW.
It is reasonable to expect that a new generation of high enrich-
ment and high heat load capable storage systems, typified by HI-
STORM FW, will emerge in the coming decade to meet the
evolving needs of the commercial nuclear industry.
56.8.2 Portability of Spent Nuclear Fuel
Storing the fuel in a welded canister at a nuclear plant site with
full knowledge that the fuel will have to be retrieved and repack-
aged for off-site transport is a transparently unappetizing prospect
for any nuclear utility. Beginning in the early 1990s, the utilities
FIG. 56.15 THE HI-STORM FW VERTICAL VENTILATED
MODULE
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 447

began to insist that the cask suppliers provide “transportable”
storage canisters, a theme that rose to become a national policy as
the U.S. Department of Energy proposed a unified set of require-
ments for a new breed of canisters that it called the multipurpose
canister or MPC. The evolution of the MPC concept and its
consequences to the United States and by extension, to the global
dry storage and transport industry, which have been decidedly
profound, can be summarized as the rise of three principal imper-
atives in the management of spent nuclear fuel:
(1) The storage system must bottle up the radiation emanating
from the fuel to the maximum extent possible;
(2) The fuel must be stored in a leaktight container such that no
interaction of the environment in the container with the
external environment is possible.
(3) The container must be transportable.
In the United States, the preferred means to achieve the above
objectives, as stated previously, has been to package the fuel in an
all-welded canister and to store it inside a massive biological
shield (storage overpack described in the foregoing). The absence
of any gasketed joint in the canister and use of corrosion-resistant
alloy materials in the canister enclosure ensure that the confine-
ment space inside the canister is completely sequestered from the
surrounding environment.
The last criterion – transportability – is much more arduous to
meet as USNRC’s 10 CFR 71 (and its international counterpart,
IAEA TSR-1), places stringent requirements on the transport
package that do not apply to the storage system. Table 56.2 con-
trasts some of the key requirements under 10 CFR 71 (transport)
and 10 CFR 72 (storage) to illustrate the significantly greater
severity of requirements for mustering transport certification in
comparison to that for storage. As a result, several storage sys-
tems that have been certified for storage by the USNRC cannot be
licensed for transport [20].
56.8.3 The Multipurpose Canister
As mentioned above, the MPC was conceived by the U.S.
Department of Energy in the early 1990s as a single waste package
engineered to serve as a reliable confinement boundary during
interim dry storage, as a robust package during transport, and as an
environmentally rugged container in a long-term repository. Under
the shifting requirements of corrosion resistance, DOE’s initial tech-
nical guidance of triple duty for the MPC had to be stripped of its
long-term in-repository mission, making the MPC a de facto dual-
purpose canister. The term MPC, however, endures in the contempo-
rary technical literature and is accordingly used herein to refer to the
canisters licensed to store and transport spent nuclear fuel.
The MPC consists of two major components, namely, the enclo-
sure vessel and the fuel basket. The enclosure vessel is essentially
a pressure vessel with the unambiguous mission of providing an
absolute protection against the release of its contents, including
gaseous matter, under all potential storage and transport modes.
The material procurement, design, fabrication, inspection, and test-
ing of the MPC enclosure vessel is accordingly carried out under a
suitably rigorous ASME Code (Section III, Subsection NB). All
butt welds are volumetrically examined and a high-ductility, high-
fracture resistant, and corrosion-resistant material (typically
austenitic stainless steel) is used as the pressure part material.
Utmost structural ruggedness is an important goal in an MPC
design, which has been demonstrated to withstand a free fall from
25 ft. onto an essentially rigid target [14] without yielding its con-
tents despite the enormous mass (over 45 tons).
The Fuel Basket’s role as a component within the MPC is to
(i) provide locational certainty to the stored fuel, (ii) provide an
effective means to dissipate the fuel’s decay heat, (iii) ensure a
subcritical configuration in the worst case scenario of modera-
tion, and (iv) maintain structural integrity during all normal and
postulated accident scenarios.
To achieve maximum structural rigidity, state-of-the-art fuel
basket designs typically employ “egg-crate” configurations, as
illustrated by the PWR and BWR basket in the HI-STORM VVS
(USNRC Docket No. 72-1014) in Figs. 15 and 16, respectively.
Incidence of hydrogen ignition in certain painted carbon steel
baskets (due to zinc/borated water reactions) [12] eliminated
painted steel as a candidate basket material. Stainless steel, now
widely used, at merely one-third the thermal conductivity of car-
bon steel, presents the designer with a heat dissipation problem.
In the HI-STORM MPCs, the reduced conduction heat transfer
rate through the body of the stainless steel basket is overcome by
actuating a strong convective heat transfer through the ther-
mosiphon feature discussed earlier. Another approach to enhance
heat transfer is to make the basket entirely out of a borated
aluminum nano-alloy, such as Metamic-HT [13], which became

TABLE 56.2 COMPARISON OF DESIGN CRITERIA APPLICABLE TO STORAGE

AND TRANSPORT OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL

Area Storage (10 CFR 72) Transport (10 CFR 71)

1. Dose limit in the No specific limit on the cask; a limit on the dose received by an 200 mrem/h on the external surface
proximity of the individual at the “controlled area” boundary is specified in §72.104 of the package; 10 mrem/h at 2 m
loaded cask and §72.106; the regulator exercises discretion based on ALARA (§71.47).
in certifying the cask.
2. Structural strength Regulations limit the structural requirement to providing a The fuel basket must maintain
reasonable demonstration that the storage system will maintain criticality safety in the aftermath of
confinement of radioactive material under normal, off-normal, and a free fall of the cask from a height
credible accident conditions (§72.236). In practice, the USNRC has of 9 m onto an essentially rigid
required that the fuel basket satisfy an ASME Code stress limit or a surface (10 CFR 71.73).
deflection limit under a nonmechanistic tipover event at the storage pad.
3. Criticality Safety Based on the canister’s design features, the designer is permitted to Moderator intrusion is postulated
assume that moderator intrusion is precluded during storage. during normal transport.
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448 • Chapter 56

TABLE 56.3 THERMOPHYSICAL PROPERTIES

OF METAMIC-HT (FROM USNRC
DOCKET NO. 71-9325) [13]

Item Value
1. Minimum yield strength, y (ksi)
at 37 °C 26
at 200 °C 21
at 300 °C 15
2. Minimum tensile strength, u (ksi)
at 37 °C 30
at 200 s 22.5
at 300 °C 17
3. Minimum Young’s Modulus (elastic), Y (ksi)
FIG. 56.16 A HIGH-CAPACITY FUEL BASKET FOR PWR at 37 °C 12,000
FUEL (HOLTEC PATENT NO. 5,898,747) USED IN HOLTEC’S at 400 °C 8,000
MPC-32 4. Minimum elongation, (%)
at 37 °C 8
available in the last decade. The minimum certified thermophysi- at 200 °C 7
cal properties of Metamic-HT (see Table 56.3) have opened the at 300 °C 7
possibility of nanotechnology-based borated aluminum becoming
5. Minimum thermal conductivity, k (W/m-oK) 173
the material of choice for fuel baskets.
Combining the role of storage and transport in one canister has 6. Maximum creep rate as a function of stress , See Note 1
had a most direct effect on its size. The constraints that limit a temperature T, and time
below
canister’s size are as follows: 7. Minimum emissivity, . (dimensionless) 0.5
(1) The transport package diameter is controlled by the 8. B4C Content (wt. %) 9 (min.)
impact limiter (see Fig. 56.17), which must be less than 10 (max.)
128 diameter (IAEA rules) and also must be large enough E
to have sufficient crush stroke to absorb the impact energy Note 1: Creep Equation c   exp( )sinh(
)

RT
in the 9 m free drop event (see Table 56.2) without
permitting any part of the cask proper to be subject to a where: c is Creep Strain (%),  is stress (psi), T is temperature
direct impact. (K),
is time (h), and the constants are as follows:
(2) The transfer cask must not be more than 8 ft. in diameter to
1E-04 psi1
fit in the open space in many existing fuel pools.
(3) The transport cask must have a sufficient amount of shield-
ing (i.e., mass and spatial extent) to meet the dose limits in
Table 56.2, especially with rising fuel burnups that now
exceed  60 GWD/MTU for PWR fuel.
An MPC loaded with well-burned 32 PWR or 68 RWR, even
after 5 – 7 years of decay, may emit as much as 40 kW of heat
energy, which is intolerably high for the Yucca Mountain reposi-
tory, even if the MPC were to be “aged” for a decade or more out-
side the repository before its interment. The heat load concern has
led the DOE to redefine its canister specification with PWR and
BWR fuel populations fixed at 21 and 44, respectively. The new
canisters, referred to as Transport, Aging and Disposal (TAD), are
not yet designed. Their licensing schedule is intertwined with the
course of the repository program.
56.9 UNDERGROUND VENTILATED
STORAGE MODULE (HI-STORM
100 U): STUDY OF A UNIQUE
TECHNOLOGY
The heightened sense of safety in the wake of 9/11 gave a
renewed impetus to the industry’s long sought goal of storing
fuel in underground modules. The HI-STORM 100U vertical
ventilated module [17], shown arrayed in a rectangular grid
 1.7E03%/h
E 50,000 J/gmol-K  0.5
R 8.31 J/gmol-K
in Fig. 56.18, was developed by Holtec International with the
objective of fulfilling the emerging industry’s need to harden
spent fuel storage systems against threats on industrial targets
that are unique to the new century. As discussed in References
[15,17], its huge advantages are conspicuous, such as follows:
(1) Stored fuel is virtually inaccessible to attack from an air-
craft or a conventional missile.
(2) Extremely robust against a direct hit from a projectile of
any kind, making release of radiological matter virtually
impossible.
(3) Flood does not challenge the thermal performance of the
storage system.
(4) Natural hazards such as hurricanes, tsunami, or tornados do
not challenge the integrity of the storage system.
(5) Because the storage cavity is a closed bottom container,
combustion of flammable material placed in the cavity can-
not be sustained.
(6) Underground placement of fuel renders the dose from the
storage cavities to negligible values.
(7) Less occupational dose in loading the canister into the stor-
age cavity because of improved human factors and work
durations.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 449
FIG. 56.17 THE BWR FUEL BASKET FOR BWR FUEL
USED IN MPC-68 (HOLTEC PATENT NO. 5,898,747)
(8) Loading and shipment of canister out of storage is conve-
nient and efficient. The Part 50 infrastructure (crane, truck
bay, etc.) is not needed to package and ship the loaded
canisters.
(9) Surveillance of the storage facility to inspect the duct open-
ings is a physically trivial effort because the ducts are near
ground level and thus are readily visible by a person from
any location around the storage facility.
(10) The storage facility is essentially invulnerable to earth-
quake even under soil liquefaction scenarios.
For a balanced understanding, the above statements of merit
must be weighed against certain demerits, namely,
(1) If floodwaters rise enough to enter the storage cavity, then
cleaning the debris washed in by floodwater will take more
work than in an aboveground system.
(2) Substantial on-site construction work is required, in
contrast to the aboveground HI-STORM modules that
require little in the way of on-site resources (up to four
aboveground HI-STORMs have been filled with concrete
in one day).
(3) Sites with a high water table will require design measures
to keep the steel container of storage cavity from being per-
FIG. 56.18 PERSPECTIVE VIEW OF A TYPICAL HI-STORM
100U INSTALLATION (Courtesy of HOLTEC International)
FIG. 56.19 THE AL-STAR IMPACT LIMITER FOR THE HI-
STAR FAMILY OF TRANSPORT CASKS (USNRC DOCKET
NOS. 71-9261, 71-9325, AND 71-9336)
manently immersed in wet subgrade. A cathodic protection
system may be required at all sites except those with nonag-
gressive subgrades.
(4) Unlike the aboveground HI-STORM 100S overpack [16],
which is made of steel, and hence can in principle be
transported from one site to another for use, the under-
ground storage module (save for its closure lid) is immov-
able.
(5) Unlike the aboveground overpack that can be loaded in the
nuclear plant’s truck bay or at the storage facility, the under-
ground storage system must be loaded at the storage facility.
As said above, it should be noted that the vertical ventilated
underground module design is not canister-specific; it can, in
principle, be used to store a variety of canisters in use around the
world. In other words, the underground storage system can serve
as the universal vessel for storing all canisterized fuel produced
by reactors across the world, making it a meritorious candidate
for large autonomous storage sites such as the U.S. Department of
Energy’s planned Aging Facility.
The underground storage technology may also be suitable for
high seismic zone regions such as the Western United States,
Japan, and Taiwan, and in regions where nuclear plant sites are
constrained by paucity of excess land or those located close to
population centers, such as many in Europe.
56.10 METAL CASKS: SELECTED
CASE STUDIES
A metal cask combines the functions of both the storage
module and the transfer cask in a ventilated storage system:
The storage cask is also the cask that is submerged in the pool
and loaded with fuel. Upon completion of fuel loading in the
pool, the cask is moved to a location where the fuel cavity is
dewatered, dehydrated (dried), and filled with inert gas. Then
the cask can be either stored locally in the premises of the plant
or shipped off-site (if it is certified for transport). Most metal
casks are typically designed to provide both on-site storage and
off-site transport. Dual-purpose metal casks are offered with
both canisterized fuel (viz., HI-STAR 100 in USNRC Docket
Nos. 72-1008 and 71-9261) and with uncanisterized (bare bas-
ket) fuel (viz., TN-68 in USNRC Docket Nos. 72-1027 and 71-
9293) and HI-STAR 180 (USNRC Docket No. 71-9325). In the
ASME_Ch56_p433-454.qxd 6/5/09 1:27 PM Page 450
450 • Chapter 56
uncanisterized metal cask, the gasketed lid is the sole barrier
against leakage. As a result, certain regulatory authorities
require a dual lid system for bare basket metal casks in the
transport mode.
A metal cask that stores fuel in a bare basket (uncanisterized)
is the sole confinement and containment vessel for the radiologi-
cal matter. Therefore, it is required to be designed to the most
rigorous section of the ASME Code (ASME Code Section III,
Subsection NB). More recently, the ASME has published a trans-
port cask focused code (Division 3, Subsection “WB”) that paral-
lels Subsection NB.
The major benefit of an uncanisterized cask is the ease and con-
venience with which the fuel can be loaded. Two factors reduce
the time of loading of a bare basket metal cask:
(1) There is no canister lid to be welded.
(2) There is no need of transfer of canister from the transfer cask
to the storage cask because the metal cask itself can be taken
to the pool and loaded with fuel.
Reduced time for fuel loading is a major ALARA benefit associ-
ated with metal casks. However, this benefit must be weighed
against the risk of spread of contamination as the cask submerged
in the (contaminated) pool water is cleaned and taken outside the
plant’s radiologically isolated and controlled environment. However,
once the cask is packaged and loaded, it can be transported to an off-
site location without any further packaging or handling of fuel. The
ease and simplicity of use has been the principal reason for the
widespread use of metal casks in Europe and Japan, where utilities
prefer to store them inside a ventilated building. The building helps
further attenuate the dose from the metal casks, which tends to be
considerably more than their storage-only (ventilated) counterparts.
The increased dose accretion from a metal cask is unavoidable
because unlike a storage-only ventilated cask, the weight of the
metal cask must not exceed the plant’s crane capacity or the allow-
able payload on the transport vehicle.
The dose issue becomes more acute for metal casks as the fuel
burnup at discharge increases and MOX fuel joins the inventory
of used fuel. Because the rate of decrease of neutron and gamma
fluence from a high-burnup fuel decreases monotonically with
burnup, waiting for the fuel to decay sufficiently to get the dose
within transport limits (Table 56.2) can be a long one. As a result,
designers have been forced to develop ever more artful designs
[13] to meet the regulatory dose limits in casks intended to trans-
port high burnup (i.e., high-dose emitting fuel) and MOX fuel.
Until recently, the concomitant benefit of “high” burnup,
namely, reduced reactivity, was denied to transport packages.
Further, under normal transport conditions, the regulations
(10 CFR 71.55) require that the cask be assumed to be filled with
pure water at the optimal temperature to maximize reactivity
(4 °C). These onerous requirements forced the transport casks to
utilize baskets with a relatively low storage capacity. Figure
56.15 shows a “high capacity” PWR fuel basket for the HI-STAR
100 dual-purpose cask [19]. To achieve this capacity, it was nec-
essary to recognize the fact that a used fuel is substantially less
reactive than a fresh, unburned fuel. Until recently, the NRC’s
modus operandi (not grounded in any regulation) had been to
require all fuel to be treated as fresh. Quite naturally, the issue of
recognition of fuel’s burnup has been the subject of an intense
technical activity in recent years. The certification of the MPC-
32 high-capacity canister for transport in the HI-STAR 100 trans-
port cask (USNRC Docket No. 71-9261) (see basket in Fig.
56.15) in 2006 was a milestone development in this matter. The
acquiescence of other national regulatory authorities to limited
burnup credit is likely to occur in the coming years as (and if) the
record of safe shipment of transportation industry, already quite
substantial, continues to grow to provide an irrefutable evidence
of utmost safety.
To ensure that the transport cask will maintain its cargo (spent
fuel) in a safe configuration under a mechanical accident, the NRC
and IAEA regulations require that the package withstand a free fall
for 9 m (30 ft.) onto an “essentially rigid” surface. To meet this
requirement, the transport cask is equipped with “impact limiters”
that are engineered to limit the inertia forces sustained by the con-
tained fuel basket. Figure 56.17 shows a typical AL-STAR impact
limiter used in the HI-STAR 100 transport cask [19]. The outer
diameter of the impact limiter is limited to 128⬙ in most jurisdic-
tions for rail transport. This, as discussed in Section 56.8.3, con-
trols the maximum fuel payload capacity of the cask. Until now,
maximum capacities achieved in licensed designs are 32 and 68
fuel assemblies for PWR and BWR fuel types, respectively. More
efficient designs that utilize the high-strength Metamic® (see Table
56.3) have been developed that feature payload capacities of 37
(PWR) and 82 (BWR) fuel assemblies. Increasing the payload of
the transport cask is a key design imperative because of its evident
effect on the number of shipments required and the occupational
dose sustained by the personnel involved in the loading, transport,
and unloading operations.
56.11 DESIGN BASIS THREAT
Crashing of an aircraft on a nuclear plant’s containment has
been postulated in some countries since the early days of com-
mercial nuclear energy. As a result, technical interest in predicting
the response of large and massive nuclear structures under the
impact of aircraft predates 9/11 by several decades. In 1968, Riera
[21] developed a theoretical formulation to predict the impulse of
impact from the frontal normal collision of aircraft with a large
structure using the data from Haley et al. [22]. Riera’s formula-
tion, endorsed in a 1977 paper [23], became the foundation on
which the correlation of subsequent full-scale F-4 crash tests
sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy [24] were carried
out by other researchers [25]. Using DOE full-scale F-4 crash
tests, methodology for scaling test data to produce appropriate
interface force-time histories for different aircraft geometries, and
velocity was developed in a 1996 DOE report [26], which remains
the authoritative reference for quantifying the impact impulse
from the frontal collision of an aircraft with a globally rigid and
massive target that is anchored to the ground.
In what follows, the Riera formulation [21] and DOE correla-
tion [26] are extended to the case where the target is massive but
unfixed (viz., a freestanding cask) and the aircraft may sustain a
loss of mass through dismemberment (say, severing of its wing(s))
or accretion (the crushed portion of the aircraft becomes dynami-
cally attached to the target cask).
The mathematical formulation of the aircraft crash problem,
presented below, is based on the following assumptions:
(1) The impact is normal to the target, which is assumed to be
rigid, and an order (or more) magnitude more massive than
the aircraft.
(2) The aircraft crashes at the location of impact; the crushed
mass moves with the impacted target, while the uncrushed
portion of the aircraft steadily decelerates.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 451
56.11.1 Equations of Motion
Let us consider a collection of mass particles that add up to the
total mass of the impacting aircraft plus the target. The impacting
aircraft is assumed to advance toward a rigid target orthogonal to
the target’s surface. At any time t, the mass of this collection of
particles can be represented in terms of three quantities:
m(t)  uncrushed mass of aircraft
mc(t)  crushed mass of aircraft
M  mass of target
#
Let m (t)  rate of decrease in uncrushed aircraft mass m(t) at
time t
v(t)  velocity of uncrushed mass at time t
vT (t)  velocity of target plus crushed mass at time t
Total aircraft mass  MA  m(t)  mc(t)  constant (so that
# #
m  mc)
F(t)  Impact force at interface between target and aircraft
uncrushed portion at time t
To establish the appropriate equations of motion for the aircraft
uncrushed portion and for the target, first calculate the system
momentum at time t, and at time t  t.
At time t
Momentum(t)  m(t)v(t)  (mc(t)  M)vT(t)
At time t  t
#
Momentum(t  t)  (m  m t)(v  v)  (mc  M)
#
 (vT  vT)  mt(vT  vT)
To determine the desired equations of motion, we invoke an
overall system momentum balance for the system consisting of
the impactor and the target. Neglecting any current engine thrust
from the aircraft or any other external force, such as restraint
forces applied to the target, the net change in momentum for the
total system is zero over the interval t since the interface impact
force F(t) is internal to the system being considered.
Therefore,
# m(t)v  Fc(t)
[(m  mt)(v  v)  (mc  M)(vT  vT)
#
 mt(vT  vT)]  [mv  (mcM)vT]  0
is the equation for preservation of total linear momentum
Canceling appropriate terms gives
# #
mv  mtv  mtv  (mc  M)vT
# #
case, the impact force acts to oppose the motion of the uncrushed
portion of the aircraft. Equating the momentum change to the
impulse over the time t gives
# #
[(m(t)  m(t)t)(v(t)  v)  m(t)t(vT(t)
 vT)] – m(t)v(t)  F(t)t
or after canceling terms, dividing by t, and taking the limit,
# #
m(t) v  m(t)(v(t)  vT (t))  F(t) (56.2)
Equation (56.2) is the equation of motion for the aircraft
uncrushed portion. Using Eq. (56.2) in Eq. (56.1) produces the
equation for the target (plus crushed mass) as
(M  mc (t))vT  F(t) (56.3)
Should the target be fixed or subject to frictional resistance, the
right-hand side of Eq. (56.3) would include the additional resis-
tive force (which would come from its appearance in Eq. (56.1)).
In conclusion, for an unrestrained target, the target is acceler-
ated by F(t), and the target mass is continually increased by the
crushed mass from the aircraft. The motion of the uncrushed por-
tion of the aircraft is decelerated by the interface impact force, but
there is a “psuedo thrust force” that tends to accelerate the aircraft
#
of magnitude m(t)(v(t)  vT (t)).
The interface impact force F(t) has been postulated in
Reference [21], and verified in Reference [22] by full-scale crash
testing of an F4 jet fighter, to have the form
#
F(t)  Fc(t)  m(t)(v(t)  vT (t)) (56.4)
Where Fc(t) is the force required to statically crush the aircraft
at a specific location along the aircraft. Fc(t) is time varying
because the aircraft crush position, measured from the aircraft
nose, is a function of time.
Using Eq. (56.4) in Eq. (56.2) implies that the uncrushed air-
craft (having time varying mass) is decelerated in accordance with
the equation:
#
(56.5)
Equations (56.3) and (56.5) are the final equations of motion
for the target and the aircraft, respectively, with the interface force
acting on as given by Eq. (56.4). If (x(t)) is the mass per unit
length of the aircraft at the current location of crushing (measured
from the aircraft nose), then the experimental work [24] correlates
with
#
 mt vT  mtvT  0 m(t)  (x(t))(v(t)  vT (t)) (56.6)

Divide by t and go to the limit t, v, vT : 0 to obtain where  is defined as an effective mass coefficient defined to
# # # reproduce the total impulse of F(t) as determined by integrating
m(t)v  (mc(t)  M) v T  m(t)(v(t)  vT (t))  0 (56.1) the force-time history. Based on the comparison in Reference
Equation (56.1) is the consequence of conserving total system
momentum in the absence of any external force that produces an
impulse on the total system of aircraft plus target. If the target
were fixed to the ground or subject to friction forces, the right-
hand side would not be zero but would have a term representing
the impulsive reaction due to the external effects. To obtain a sec-
ond differential equation, it is necessary to isolate the uncrushed
mass of the aircraft and formulate the momentum balance. In this
[25], the DOE Standard [26] suggests that  need not exceed 0.9.
However, that choice was simply based on matching the total
impulse from the applied force, and not from the solution of any
dynamic problem.
The preceding development has been based on the assumption
that all of the crushed mass of the aircraft attaches to and remains
with the target for the remaining duration. If we look at the cross
sections of aircraft and casks, it is likely that only a small portion
of mass acts to influence the cask motion and any cask damage.
ASME_Ch56_p433-454.qxd 6/3/09 12:10 PM Page 452
452 • Chapter 56
For example, much of the post 9/11 studies consider only engines
of large aircraft as having any significant influence on cask dam-
age and subsequent motion. However, for small military “fast
movers,” it is likely that cask damage and subsequent motion may
be influenced by more than just the engine mass. Therefore, it
could be surmized that during the initial stages of the impact, all
of the mass of the aircraft participates, but at some instant, the air-
craft wings separate from the main body and do not participate in
any subsequent dynamics simulation. To consider this, while still
focusing on uncrushed aircraft and target plus crushed aircraft
behavior, we consider that the aircraft wings, plus any stores
attached to the wings that are outside the expected impact inter-
face area, become detached at some instant during the impact
process, but do not suffer any instantaneous change in velocity.
Based on this assumption, the aircraft mass distribution is broken
down as follows:
MA  m(t)  mc(t)  Mwing  constant
It is assumed that when separation occurs, the wing mass con-
tinues on with no change in velocity. Note that m(t) now repre-
sents the uncrushed mass of the aircraft exclusive of any mass
that may later separate from the aircraft and not become attached
to the target. For all times t, prior to the wings separating from
the main body of the aircraft, m(t) is replaced by [m(t)  Mwing]
in Eqns. (56.1) and (56.2), and consequently, in Eqns.
(56.3) – (56.5). For time t greater than the separation time, Eqns.
(56.3) – (56.6) have the form given above, with the proviso that
m(t) and (x(t)) do not include effect of the separated wing mass.
Therefore, the equations of motion must be formulated in two
distinct regimes; the same form of the equations apply, but m(t)
and the mass per unit length (x(t)) do not include the separated
mass.
The above formulation is an efficient means to quantify the
impact impulse from crashing of airplanes with casks in recent
years [10].
Finally, it should be emphasized that the above analysis
assumes that the target, except for some (inevitable) localized
deformation, remains intact. The solution provides the impact
impulse and the velocity time-history of the target. To determine
the extent of damage to the cask, it would be necessary to use a
suitable finite element code with the impulse computed from
above as the input.
A direct solution of the impact problem, wherein the entire
aircraft and the cask are modeled on a suitable elasto-plastic
impact code (a significantly more expansive technical effort),
has been carried out at the Sandia National Laboratory.
Unfortunately, much of the work remains unavailable to the
open literature.
Given the abiding imprint of 9/11 on the public psyche, it is
inevitable that additional research on prognosticating the response
of fuel storage and transport systems to impactive and impulsive
events will continue in the future, and simplified techniques to
design casks against postulated design basis threats of various
kinds will become available.
56.12 REFERENCES
1. Albright, D., Berkhout, F., and Walker, W., Plutonium and Highly
Enriched Uranium 1996 – World Inventories, Capabilities
and Policies, International Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 2, pp. 423 – 424,
1998.
2. AEA Nuclear Technology Review, Annex II, p. 57, 2006.
3. Uranium and Plutonium: Macro-Economic Study, Final Report, Nuclear
Decommissioning Authority Report Ref: KP000040, June 2007.
4. Soler, A.I. and Singh, K.P., Seismic Responses of Free Standing Fuel
Rack Constructions to 3-D Motions, Nuclear Engineering and
Design, Vol. 80, pp. 315 – 329, 1984.
5. Paul, B., Fluid Coupling in Fuel Racks: Correlation of Theory and
Experiment, Holtec Report HI-88243, 1988.
6. USNRC, OT Position for Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel
Storage and Handling Applications, dated April 14, 1978, and January
18,1979 amendment thereto.
7. Singh, K.P. and Soler, A.I., Seismic Qualification of Free Standing
Nuclear Fuel Storage Racks – the Chin Shan Experience, Nuclear
Engineering International, UK, 1991.
8. Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 3.8.4, Other Seismic Category
I Structures, Appendix D, Technical Position on Spent Fuel Racks.
9. EPRI Report 1003137, Qualification of Metamic for Spent Fuel
Storage Applications, The Electric Power Research Institute, Palo
Alto, CA, October 2001.
10. USNRC ASLB, Final Partial Initial Decision on F-16 Aircraft
Accident Consequences, Docket No. 72-22-ISFSI, ASLB# 97-732-
02-ISFSI, dated 2/24/2005.
11. SFPO-ISG-11, Revision 3, Cladding Considerations for the
Transportation and Storage of Spent Fuel, USNRC, Washington, DC,
2003.
12. USNRC Bulletin 96-04, Chemical, Galvanic or Other Reactions in
Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation Casks, July 5, 1996.
13. Safety Analysis Report, HI-STAR 180 Package, Holtec Report No.
HI-2073681, USNRC Docket No. 71-9325, 2007.
14. Singh, K.P. and Zhai, J., The Multi-Purpose Canister: A Bulwark of
Safety in the Post-9/11 Age, International High-Level Radioactive Waste
Management Conference, Las Vegas, Nevada, March 30 – April 2, 2003.
15. Singh, K.P., On the Essential Characteristics of Underground Storage
of Spent Nuclear Fuel in the HI-STORM 100 System, PATRAM
2007, Miami, FL, USA, 10/2007.
16. USNRC Docket No. 72-1014, The HI-STORM 100 MPC System,
USNRC, Washington, DC, 1996.
17. Singh, K.P., HI-STORM 100U, , Patent No. 7,330,526B2, February
12, 2008.
18. The HI-STORM FW Vertical Ventilated MPC Storage System,
USNRC document N. 72–1032.
19. HI-STAR 100 Dual Purpose Cask, USNRC Docket Nos. 72-1008
(originally licensed 10/4/1999)and 71-9261, (originally licensed
3/31/1999.
20. Shipping and Storage Cask Data for Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel,
JAI-582, JAI Corporation, Fairfax, VA, March 2005.
21. Riera, J.D., On the Stress Analysis of Structures Subjected to Aircraft
Impact Forces, Nuclear Engineering and Design, Vol. 8, North
Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam, 1968.
22. Haley, J.L. and Turnbow, J.W., Total Reaction Force due to an Aircraft
Impact into a Rigid Barrier, AVSER Final Report 68-3, Report pre-
pared by Dynamic Science, Pheonix, Arizona, for Gilbert Associates,
Inc., April 1968.
23. Wolf, J.P., Bucher, K.M., and Skrikerud, P.E., Response of Equipment
to Aircraft Impact, Nuclear Engineering and Design, Vol. 47, North
Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam, pp. 169 – 193, 1978.
24. von Riesemann, W.A., Parrish, R.L., Bickel, D.C., Heffelfinger, S.R.,
Muto, K., Sugano, T., Tsubota, H., Koshika, N., Suzuki, M., and
ASME_Ch56_p433-454.qxd 6/3/09 12:10 PM Page 453
COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 453
Ohrui, S., Full-Scale Aircraft Impact Test for Evaluation of Impact
Forces, Part 1: Test Plan, Test Methods, and Test Results, in: Hadjian,
A.H. (Ed.), 10th Structural Mechanics in Reactor Technology
Proceedings, Vol. J, pp. 285 – 292, 1989.
25. Muto, K., Sugano, T., Tsubota, H., Kasia, Y., Koshika, N., Suzuki, M.,
Ohrui, S., von Riesemann, W.A., Bickel, D.C., and Parrish, R.L., Full-
Scale Aircraft Impact Test for Evaluation of Impact Forces, Part 2:
Analysis of the Results, in: Hadjian, A.H. (Ed.), 10th Structural
Mechanics in Reactor Technology Proceedings, Vol. J, pp. 293 – 299,
1989. 26. DOE Standard, Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash into
Hazardous Facilities, DOE-STD-3014-96, U.S. Department of
Energy, 1996.
ASME_Ch57_p455-482.qxd 6/5/09 2:16 PM Page 455

CHAPTER

57
GENERATION III+ PWRs
Part A: AP1000 John T. Land
Part B: EPR Marty Parece
Part C: US-APWR Masahiko Kaneda
57.1 INTRODUCTION • AP1000
• EPR
From the commissioning of the first commercial nuclear reac- • US-APWR
tor more than 50 years ago, the nuclear power industry has been
developing and improving reactor technology with particular The outlines of these sections are as follows:
emphasis on reliability and safety. There are several generations
Section 57A AP1000
of reactors that have been developed or are being developed.
These reactors are generally categorized as Generation I, II, III, • AP1000 Plant Design
III+, and IV reactors. Figure 57.1 illustrates the technology dis- • AP1000 Operational Technology
tilled from 50 years of successful nuclear operating experience • Safety Features
that has led to the Generation III+ pressurized water reactors • Containment Design
(PWRs). • Modularization and Construction
Generation I reactors were developed in the 1950s and 1960s, • Operation and Maintenance
Generation II reactors were developed in the 1970s through the • ASME Code Aspects
1990s, and Generation III reactors were developed in the 1990s • Future Direction
and 2000s. Generation III reactors are considered to be evolution- • References
ary reactors such as the System 80+, and advanced pressurized • Nomenclature
water reactor (APWR). Generation III+ reactors are based on the
nomenclature from the Department of Energy, that is, Generation Section 57B EPR
III reactors with improved economics and safety. Generation IV • EPR Development
reactors are new technologies that are being developed for future • EPR Plant Design
reactors. • EPR Safety
The Generation III+ PWR reactors discussed in this chapter • Containment Design
have design features with more robust design improvements, • Construction
higher availability and longer operating life, extended fuel life, • Operation and Maintenance
and improved and innovative safety features over the currently • Code Aspects
operating reactors. The Generation III+ Boiling Water Reactors • Building Now
(BWRs) are discussed in Chapter 58. • References
Section 57C US-APWR

57.2 SCOPE OF COMMENTARY • US-APWR Plant Design

• Operational Technology
The scope of this commentary is to describe in some detail the • Safety Features
Generation III+ PWR plant design features, technology, safety and • Containment Design
reliability features, and the elimination or mitigation of degrada- • Modularization and Construction
tion issues associated with Generation I, and II PWR designs. • Operation and Maintenance
This chapter provides commentary on the following Generation • ASME Code Aspects
III+ PWRs that have received Design Certification approval or are • Future Direction on the US-APWR
in the process of receiving certification approval from the U.S. • References
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC): • Nomenclature
ASME_Ch57_p455-482.qxd 6/5/09 2:16 PM Page 456

456 • Chapter 57

TABLE 57A.1 AP1000 COMPONENT COMPARISON WITH

OPERATING 1000-MWe PLANT (SOURCE:
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, LLC)

Plant Simplification Yield Fewer Components, Cable,

and Building Volume
1000-MWe
Component Reference Plant AP1000
Pumps 280 180
Safety class valves 2,800 1,400
Safety class piping 110,000 19,000
Cable, million ft. 9.1 1.2
Seismic building
volume, million ft.3 12.7 5.6

FIG. 57.1 GENERATIONAL REACTORS

(Source: Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC)
57A AP1000
57A.1 INTRODUCTION
The commentary in this section on the AP1000 PWR is based
on public information documents [1–3].
The major design objectives of AP1000 are simplification of
the overall safety systems, improved reliability, and reduced costs
over Generations I, II, and III reactors.
The simplification of the safety systems is accomplished by
reductions in the number of components such as valves, cable,
and the seismic building volume. The reliability is accomplished
by improved technology with concomitant increases in safety
margins. The reduced costs are accomplished by minimizing the
number of components requiring inspection and modularization
and construction techniques that shorten construction and conse-
quent costs.
features were addressed during the Design Certification process.
The AP1000 is currently undergoing the Combined Operating
License (COL) process.
Simplification was a major design objective for both the AP600
and AP1000 plants. Simplifications in overall safety systems, normal
operating systems, the control room, construction techniques, and
instrumentation and control (I&C) systems are expected to provide
reduced costs over current operating plants. Plant simplification
yields fewer components, cable, and seismic building volume, which
increases savings in capital investment and lowers operational and
maintenance costs. Table 57A.1 summarizes the component differ-
ences between an existing 1000-MWe plant and the AP1000. Table
57A.1 shows that there are significant reductions in the number of
components between the AP1000 and a reference plant with about
the same electrical output power rating.
In addition to plant simplification improvements, the reactor
vessel and internals, steam generator (SG), fuel, and pressurizer
designs are improved versions of those found in currently operat-
ing Westinghouse-designed PWRs. Table 57A.2 summarizes the
operational technology incorporated into the AP1000.

57A.2 AP1000 PLANT DESIGN 57A.3 OPERATIONAL TECHNOLOGY

The AP1000 was the second PWR plant to receive Design
Certification from the NRC. The Design Certification process for
the AP1000 was assisted by the fact that a similar design, the
AP600, was previously certified by the NRC. The AP1000 was an
upgrade in power and consequently, the differences in the design
The AP1000 is a two-loop PWR with a power rating of 3415
MWt and a nominal net electrical output of 1117 MWe with a 157-
fuel assembly core for base load generation. The AP1000 is
designed for 24-month fuel cycles, with current plans to operate on
16 to 20-month alternating fuel cycles for optimum economics, with

TABLE 57A.2 AP1000 OPERATIONAL TECHNOLOGY

(SOURCE: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, LLC)

Component Prior Use of Technology

Reactor vessel and internals Doel 4, Tihange 3
CRDMs Westinghouse plants worldwide
Fuel South Texas 1&2, Doel 4, Tihange 3
Large Model F steam generators ANO-2, San Onofre, Waterford, Palo Verde
Canned motor reactor coolant pumps Fossil boilers and other industrial applications (inverted canned motor pumps)
Pressurizer 70 Westinghouse plants worldwide
ASME_Ch57_p455-482.qxd 6/5/09 2:16 PM Page 457
COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 457
FIG. 57A.1 AP1000 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEMS
(Source: Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC)
an expected availability goal of 93% over a 60-year design basis.
Refueling outage capability is estimated to be around 17 days.
Figure 57A.1 illustrates a rendering of the AP1000 reactor
coolant system (RCS) design and layout. Figure. 57A.1 shows the
primary equipment consisting of the reactor pressure vessel
(RPV), SGs, reactor coolant pumps (RCPs), and pressurizer.
Each loop consists of one hot leg outlet pipe and two cold leg
inlet pipes. Each SG has two seal-less RCPs mounted below the
cold leg outlet channel head of the SG. The reactor vessel and
reactor internals are similar in design to Westinghouse 3XL and
4XL 14-ft. fuel assemblies, with the core closest to the bottom of
the RPV.
The RCS flow rate and fluid temperatures are similar to oper-
ating Westinghouse plants. The cold leg temperature in the RPV
nozzle is 535F (279C) and the hot leg temperature at the RPV
outlet nozzle is 612F (322C). The AP1000 fluid system incor-
porates a low boron core design to increase safety margins for
accident scenarios such as anticipated transients without scram
(i.e., anticipated transients with the added failure of the reactor
trip function).
The AP1000 primary equipment and fuel are mostly evolved
from Westinghouse PWR designs but with some innovative
design features. Many of these improved design features are a
result of solving material degradation issues in existing
Generation I and II PWR plants. These material degradations
issues are discussed in Chapters 11, 43, and 44.
The AP1000 major primary equipment, fuel, and instrumenta-
tion design features are summarized below from Refs [1–3]:
Reactor Pressure Vessel
• Four inlet nozzles and two outlet nozzles
• Hot leg outlet nozzle located below the cold leg inlet nozzles
• Two safety injection nozzles
• Shortened hemispherical bottom head
• Penetrations for top-mounted in-core and T/C conduits
Reactor Internals
• Two hot leg outlet nozzles 180apart
• Two safety injection diverters 180apart
• Guide tubes with improved rodlet wear mitigation features
• Reduced-worth control rods (gray rods) to achieve daily load
follow without requiring changes to the soluble boron con-
centration
• Accommodation hardware for in-core and T/C instrumenta-
tion
• Welded core shroud to eliminate the concern for baffle–barrel
bolt cracking
• Bottom-head flow skirt to improve flow distribution into fuel
assemblies
CRDMs and Driveline
• CRDMs and driveline similar to 4XL design
Steam Generators
• Two large SGs with Delta-125 designation and triangular
pitch tubing
• Single vertical support column for SG
• Full-depth hydraulic expansion of tubes in tube sheets
• Stainless steel broached tube support plates
• Inconel 690 tubing to minimize stress corrosion cracking
• Upgraded antivibration bars to reduce wear
• Upgraded primary and secondary moisture separators
Pumps
• Two seamless pumps for each SG mounted under cold leg
outlet nozzle of each SG
• Elimination of pump shaft seals simplifies the auxiliary fluid
systems that support a canned motor pump, reduces mainte-
nance, and eliminates possible accidents involving seal fail-
ures
• Integration of pump suction at cold leg channel head elimi-
nates the crossover leg of coolant loop piping, reduces the
loop pressure drop, simplifies the foundation and support sys-
tem for the SG, and eliminates the potential for uncovering
the core during a small LOCA.
Pressurizer
• Larger than other Westinghouse designs with a volume of
59.5 cu m. (2100 cu ft.)
• Elimination of PORVs (pressure-operated relief valves)
Fuel
• 157 Fuel assemblies with zircaloy grids and removable top
nozzles
• 17  17 fuel assembly with 14-ft. core
• Longer burn up features
• Improved core hold-down spring design w/o bolts
• Margin of more than 15% from nuclear boiling limit
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458 • Chapter 57

In-core Instrumentation
• Fixed top-mounted in-core instrumentation

Thermocouple Instrumentation
• Thermocouples mounted in reactor internals similar to exist-
ing Westinghouse configuration with an improved sealing
system

Balance of plant (BOP) equipment features are discussed in

Section 57A.4.

57A.4 SAFETY FEATURES

The AP1000 provides multiple levels of defense for accident miti-
gation (defense-in-depth), resulting in extremely low core-damage
probabilities while minimizing the occurrences of containment
flooding, pressurization, and heat up. The AP1000 submitted a prob-
abilistic risk assessment (PRA) in accordance with NRC regulatory
requirements. Accident mitigation is reflected in the PRA results
from the benefits of both safety and nonsafety systems that actuate
following an event. Table 57A.3 compares the calculated AP1000
core damage frequency (CDF) events per year with the NRC goal,
current plant estimate, and the Utility Requirements Document
(URD) goals. The PRA was acceptable for certification purposes.
The mean estimates of the risk metrics are shown in Table 57A.3.
The unique safety feature of the AP1000 is the use of a passive
safety system. In the event of an accident, the use of natural
forces such as natural circulation, gravity flow, convection flow,
and compressed gas are used to maintain core cooling and con-
tainment integrity. The major design feature of the passive safety-
related system for the AP1000 is to provide safety injection from
the core makeup tanks (CMTs), accumulators, and in-containment
refueling water storage tank (IRWST) illustrated in Fig. 57A.2.
Heat removal is accomplished by the passive residual heat
exchanger removal system (PRHR HX) and the IRWST, as illus-
trated in Fig. 57A.3.
In addition, the RCS automatic depressurization system (ADS)
is located above the pressurizer, as illustrated in Fig. 57A.4.
FIG. 57A.2 CMTs AND ACCUMULATOR PIPING SYSTEM
(Source: Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC)
57A.4.1.1 Passive Safety Safety-Related Systems The passive
safety-related systems include the passive core cooling system
(PXS), containment isolation, passive containment cooling system
(PCS), and the main control room (MRC) emergency habitability
system.
Passive Core Cooling System (PXS) The PXS is designed to
perform two major functions: safety injection and reactor coolant
makeup and passive residual heat removal (PRHR). The safety
injection and reactor coolant makeup are used for the following
conditions: high-pressure safety injection with CMTs, intermedi-
ate pressure safety injection with accumulators, low-pressure reac-
tor coolant makeup from the IRWST, and long-term cooling for
containment recirculation.
The high-pressure safety injection with CMTs is used following
transients where the normal makeup system is inadequate or is
unavailable. Figure 57A.2 illustrates the CMTs and accumulator

57A.4.1 Discussion of Safety Features

The following safety features contribute to the defense-in-depth
of the AP1000:

• Passive Safety-Related Systems

• In-Vessel Retention of Core Damage
• Fission Product Release

TABLE 57A.3 AP1000 PROBABILISTIC RISK

ASSESSMENT METRICS (SOURCE: WESTINGHOUSE
ELECTRIC COMPANY, LLC)

NRC Current URD AP1000

PRA requirement plants requirement
CDFa 1  104 5  105 1  105 5  107
LRFb — — — 6  108
a
CDF – core damage frequency events per year FIG. 57A.3 AP1000 PASSIVE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL
b
LRF – large release frequency per year SYSTEM (Source: Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC)
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 459

IRWST is sufficient to overcome the small RCS pressure loss in

the injection lines.

Passive Residual Heat Removal System The PRHR system is

illustrated in Fig. 57A.3. The system includes the passive RHR
heat exchanger consisting of banks of tubes that are connected to
a natural circulation loop. The difference in water temperature
between the hot inlet water and the cold outlet water of the heat
exchanger drives the natural circulation loop. If the RCPs are run-
ning, the passive RHR heat exchange flow will be increased. The
IRWST is the heat sink for the passive RHR heat exchanger. The
IRWST water volume is sufficient to absorb decay heat for about
2 h before the water starts to boil. Thereafter, the steam from the
boiling IRWST condenses on the steel containment vessel walls
and then drains back into the IRWST.

Passive Containment Cooling System The function of the

AP1000 PCS is to prevent the containment from overheating and
exceeding the design pressure, which could result in a breach of the
containment and the loss of the final barrier to radioactive release.
The PCS is shown in Fig. 57A.5. The steel containment vessel
provides the heat transfer surface that allows heat to be removed
from inside the containment and rejected to the atmosphere. Heat
is removed from the steel containment vessel by a natural circula-
tion of air through the annulus formed by the outer shield building
and the steel containment vessel it houses. Outside air is pulled in
FIG. 57A.4 AP1000 AUTOMATIC DUS-DEPRESSURIZA- through orifices near the top of the shield building and pulled
TION SYTEMS (ADS) (Source: Westinghouse Electric down around the baffle and then it flows upward out of the shield
Company, LLC) building. The flow of air is driven by the chimney effect of air
heated in the containment vessel annulus and is exhausted up
through the central opening in the shield building roof. If needed,
additional air cooling can be supplemented by water evaporation
piping configuration for the AP1000. Two CMTs filled with borat- on the outside of the containment shell. The water is drained by
ed water in two parallel trains are designed to function at any RCS gravity from a tank located on top of the containment shield
pressure using gravity, with the temperature and height differences building. Three normally closed, fail-open valves will automati-
from the RCS cold leg as the driving force. The tanks are designed cally open if a high containment pressure is reached. The water
for full RCS pressure and are located above the RCS loop piping.
If the water level or pressure in the pressurizer reaches a set low
level, the reactor as well as the RCPs is tripped and the CMT dis-
charge isolation valves open automatically. The water from the
CMTs then flows naturally into the reactor vessel.
The intermediate pressure safety injection with the accumula-
tors, as with the current PWRs, requires accumulators for large
loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCA) to meet the immediate need for
higher initial makeup flows to refill the reactor vessel lower
plenum and downcomer and reflood the core following the RCS
blowdown. The accumulators are pressurized to 700 psig with
nitrogen gas. The pressure differential between the pressurized
accumulators and the dropping RCS pressure ultimately forces
open check valves that normally isolate the accumulators from the
RCS. Two accumulators in two parallel trains are sized to respond
to the complete severance of the largest RCS pipe by rapidly
refilling the vessel downcomer and lower plenum and reflooding
the core. The accumulators continue delivery to supplement the
CMTs in rapidly reflooding the core.
Low pressure reactor coolant makeup from the IRWST is sup-
plied by gravity from the large IRWST (see Fig. 57A.3), which is
located inside the containment at a height above the RCS loops.
This tank is at atmospheric pressure and, as a result, the RCS must
be depressurized before injection can occur. The AP1000 automat-
ically controls depressurization of the RCS to reduce its pressure FIG. 57A.5 AP1000 PASSIVE CONTAINMENT COOLING
near atmospheric pressure, at which point the head elevation in the SYSTEM (Source: Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC)
ASME_Ch57_p455-482.qxd 6/5/09 2:17 PM Page 460
460 • Chapter 57
flows from the top, outside, domed surface of the containment
shell and down the sidewalls allowing heat to be transferred and
removed from the containment by evaporation. The water tank
has sufficient capacity for three days of operation, after which
time the tank could be refilled.
Containment Isolation Containment isolation is provided to
prevent or limit the escape of fission products that may result from
postulated accidents. In the event of an accident, the containment
isolation provisions are designed so that fluid lines penetrating the
containment boundary are isolated. The containment isolation sys-
tem consists of the piping, valves, and actuators that isolate the
containment. Containment isolation is improved in the AP1000
because the number of normally open penetrations is reduced by
50%; penetrations that are normally opened are fail safe (fail in the
closed position); there is no recirculation of irradiated water out-
side of containment for design-basis accidents; and the steel con-
tainment is a high-integrity (steel) pressure vessel surrounded by a
concrete vessel.
Main Control Room Emergency Habitability System The
MCR can be isolated in case of high airborne radiation levels. The
MCR emergency habitability system is comprised of a set of com-
pressed air tanks connected to a main and an alternate air delivery
line. Components common to both lines include a manual isolation
valve, a pressure regulating valve, and a flow metering orifice. This
system is designed to provide the ventilation and pressurization
needed to maintain a habitable environment for up to 11 people in
the MCR for 72 h following the design basis accident.
57A.4.1.2 In-Vessel Retention of Core Damage The AP1000
is designed to mitigate a postulated severe accident such as core
melt. Figure 57A.6 is used in the explanation of this event. In this
event, the reactor cavity can be submerged with water from the
IRWST, submerging the reactor vessel. An insulating structure
surrounds the reactor vessel to provide the pathway for water
cooling to reach the vessel, flow around the bottom vessel head
and up the vessel insulation wall annulus, and to vent steam that
results from cooling the vessel from the reactor cavity. The cool-
ing is sufficient to prevent molten core debris in the lower head
from melting the steel vessel wall and spilling into the contain-
ment. Retaining the debris in the reactor vessel protects the
containment integrity by simply avoiding the uncertainties asso-
ciated with ex-vessel severe accident phenomena, such as ex-
vessel steam explosion and core concrete interaction with the
molten core material.
FIG. 57A.6 AP1000 IN-VESSEL RETENTION OF CORE
DAMAGE (Source: Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC)
57A.4.1.3 Fission Product Release Fuel cladding is the first
barrier that prevents the release of radiation in the event of an acci-
dent. The second barrier is the reactor pressure boundary that
includes the reactor pressure vessel and the reactor coolant piping.
Furthermore, in conjunction with the surrounding shield building,
the steel containment vessel provides the third additional protec-
tion barrier by establishing natural convection air currents to cool
the steel containment. The natural convection cooling is enhanced
with evaporative cooling by allowing water to drain from a large
tank located at the top of the shield building.
57A.4.2 Nonsafety Active Systems
Many of the active safety-related systems in existing and evolu-
tionary PWR designs are retained in the AP1000 but are designat-
ed as nonsafety related. Examples of nonsafety-related systems
that provide defense-in-depth capabilities are as follows:
• Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)
• Normal RHRS
• Start-up (Back-up) Feedwater System
These systems utilize nonsafety support systems such as the
standby diesel generators (DGs), the component cooling water
system (CCWS), and the service water system. The AP1000 also
includes other active nonsafety-related systems, such as the heat-
ing, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) system, which
removes heat from the I&C, cabinet rooms, and the MCR.
Although these are familiar systems that are used in current
PWRs for safety systems, the AP1000 uses these systems as sim-
plified nonsafety related first line of defense, which are backed up
by the passive safety grade systems already described.
57A.5 CONTAINMENT DESIGN
One of the major cost and safety improvements for the AP1000
is the use of a passive safety system. The economic benefit is that
less seismic category 1 building volume is required to house the
safety equipment (approximately 45% less than the typical reactor).
The modular construction design of AP1000 further reduces cost
with work shifted to factories with their better quality and cost con-
trol as well as labor costs that are less than those at the construction
site. This also allows more work to be done in parallel. The devel-
opment of heavy lift cranes enable an “open top” construction
approach, which is effective in reducing construction time.
The AP1000 by design has a smaller footprint than existing
nuclear power plants with similar generating capacity. Figure
57A.7 illustrates a comparison between the AP1000 and a
Generation II PWR nuclear island building configurations.
The AP1000 plant arrangement provides separation between
safety-related and nonsafety related equipment. Separation
between redundant, safety-related equipment trains and systems
provides confidence that the safety design functions can be per-
formed. In general, this separation is achieved by partitioning an
area with concrete walls.
The AP1000 plant, illustrated in Fig. 57A.8, is arranged with the
following principal building structures, each on its own base mat:
• Nuclear island (the only Seismic 1 Category structure)
• Turbine island
• Annex building
• DG building
• Radwaste building
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FIG. 57A.7 COMPARISON OF NUCLEAR ISLAND
BUILDINGS (Source: Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC)
The nuclear island consists of the steel containment, the con-
crete shield building, and the auxiliary building. The nuclear
island is designed to withstand the effects of postulated internal
events such as fires and flooding without loss of capability to per-
form safety functions. A description of the nuclear island struc-
tures and buildings are discussed below.
57A.5.1 Steel Containment
The containment vessel is a freestanding steel structure with a
wall thickness of 1.75 in. (4 cm) and a diameter of 130 ft. (40 m).
Ring sections and vessel heads are constructed at an off-site facili-
ty and shipped to the site for assembly and installation using a
large-capacity crane.
The primary containment prevents the uncontrolled release of
radioactivity to the environment. It has design leakage rate of 0.10
wt % per day of the containment air mass that was present at the
start of a design basis accident and the resulting containment
isolation.
FIG. 57A.8 AP1000 PLANT (Source: Westinghouse Electric
Company, LLC)
The AP1000 containment contains a 16-ft. (4.9 m) diameter
main equipment hatch and a personnel airlock at the operating
deck level, and a 16-ft. (4.9 m) diameter maintenance hatch and a
personnel airlock at grade level. These large hatches significantly
improve accessibility to the containment during outages. The con-
tainment hatches are located at two different levels, thereby
allowing activities occurring above the operating deck to be unaf-
fected by activities occurring below the operating deck.
The containment arrangement provides significantly larger lay-
down areas than most conventional plants at both the operating
deck level and the maintenance floor level. Ample laydown space
is provided for staging of equipment and personnel, equipment
removal paths, and space to accommodate remotely operated ser-
vice equipment and mobile units. Access platforms and lifting
devices are provided at key locations, as are service provisions
such as electrical power, demineralized water, breathing and ser-
vice air, ventilations, and lighting.
57A.5.2 Concrete Shield Building
The AP1000 containment design incorporates a shield building
that surrounds the primary containment vessel and forms the natural
convection annulus for containment cooling. This building is a
cylindrical, reinforce, concrete structure with a conical roof that a
supports the water storage tank and air diffuser of the PCS. It shares
a common base mat with the primary containment and auxiliary
building, and is designed as a seismic category 1 structure.
The two primary functions of the shield building during normal
operation are (1) to provide an additional radiological barrier for
radioactive systems and components inside the containment ves-
sel and (2) to protect the containment vessel from external events,
such as tornados and tornado-driven objects that might impinge
on it. Under design basis accident conditions, the shield building
serves as a key component of the PCS by aiding in the natural
convection cooling of the containment.
57A.5.3 Auxiliary Building
The auxiliary building is designed to provide protection and
separation for the seismic category 1 mechanical and electrical
equipment located outside the containment building. The build-
ing also provides protection for safety-related equipment against
the consequences of internal and external events. Specifically, the
auxiliary building houses the MCR, I&C systems, batteries, fuel
handling and spent fuel area, mechanical equipment areas, liquid
and gas radwaste areas, containment penetration areas, and main
steam and feedwater isolation valve compartments. Large staging
and laydown areas are provided outside the two equipment
hatches.
57A.5.4 Nonseismic Buildings
The nonseismic category structures contain no safety-related
equipment. They are designed for wind and seismic loads in
accordance with the Uniform Building Code (UBC). The follow-
ing are the nonseismic buildings:
(1) Annex Building. The annex building serves as the main per-
sonnel entrance to the power generation complex and houses the
health physics area, the nonclass AC and DC electric power system,
the ancillary DGs and their fuel supply, the technical support cen-
ter, and various HVAC systems. The annex building also provides a
large staging and laydown area outside the equipment hatches.
(2) Turbine Building. The turbine building houses the main
turbine, generator, and associated fluid and electrical system. It
also houses the makeup water purification system.
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462 • Chapter 57

(3) Diesel Generator Building. The DG building houses the TABLE 57A.5 AP1000 CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE
two diesel generators and their associated HVAC equipment. (SOURCE: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY LLC)
(4) Radwaste Building. The radwaste building contains facili-
ties for segregated storage of various categories of solid waste Site Preparation Site Start-Up and
prior to processing, for processing mobile systems, and for storing Construction Testing
processed solid waste in shipping and disposal containers.
18 months 36 months 6 months

57A.6 MODULARIZATION AND

CONSTRUCTION 57A.7 OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
The AP1000 has been designed to make use of modern, modu- The AP1000 design philosophy is to focus on plant operability
lar construction techniques. Modularization allows construction and maintainability. The passive safety features use a much small-
tasks that were traditionally performed in sequence to be complet- er number of valves than do the multiple trains of active pump-
ed in parallel. Factory-built modules can be assembled at the site driven systems, and therefore there are no safety pumps at all; so,
in a planned construction schedule from first concrete pour to fuel there is less in-service testing to perform. Also, the simplified
load. Table 57A.4 illustrates the number of AP1000 modules for safety systems are designed to reduce surveillance requirements,
the containment and auxiliary buildings. simplify technical specifications, and reduce the potential for
forced shutdowns.
TABLE 57A.4 ILLUSTRATION OF AP1000 BUILDING The variable speed canned motor RCPs mounted on the bottom
MODULES (SOURCE: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC of the SGs are designed to simplify plant start-up and shutdown
COMPANY LLC) operations. They are to be capable in providing varying RCP
speed to better control operating mode transitions. The RCPs
Typical Breakdown of AP1000 Modules operate at constant speed during power operation, thereby simpli-
Mechanical fying control actions during load shifts.
Structural Piping Equipment The digital I&C design should require less I&C surveillance
Location Mechanics Modules Modules Total testing and should simplify troubleshooting, repair, and postmain-
Containment 41 20 12 73 tenance testing. The plant includes automation of some cooldown
operations. The advanced control room is designed to improve
Auxiliary 42 34 29 105
operator interfaces and plant operation capabilities.
building
Plant layout ensures adequate access for inspection and mainte-
Turbine 29 45 14 88 nance. Laydown space provides for staging of equipment and per-
building sonnel, equipment removal paths, and space to accommodate
Annex 10 — — 10 remotely operated service equipment and mobile units. Access
building platforms and lifting devices are provided at key locations as are
Total 122 99 55 276 service provisions, such as electrical power, demineralized water,
breathing and service air, ventilation and lighting, and computer
data highway connections.
AP1000 modularization reduces the calendar time for plant The AP1000 incorporates radiation exposure reduction princi-
construction, thereby reducing the cost of money and the expo- ples to keep worker dose ALARA. Exposure length, distance,
sure risks associated with plant financing. Furthermore, the labor shielding, and source reduction are fundamental criteria that are
and specialized equipment costs are also greatly reduced because incorporated into the design, thereby resulting in the following
of the reduced amount of work required at the site. To achieve radiation protection improvements:
proper interfaces with the rest of the plant systems and structures,
interconnected piping between modules is represented in computer- • Minimized operational radiation releases
designed three-dimensional (3D) models. This eliminates the • Reduction in worker radiation exposure
interference concerns of typical field installations. Figure 57A.9 • Total radwaste volume minimized
illustrates modularization to reduce construction time and costs.
The AP1000 is designed for rated performance with up to 10%
The AP1000 construction schedule is estimated to be 5 years
of the SG tubes plugged and with a maximum hot leg temperature
from order placement with a goal of 3 years from the first con-
of 321°C (612°F). The plant is designed to accept a step-load
crete pour to fuel loading. Table 57A.5 illustrates the AP1000
increase or decrease of 10% between 25 and 100 % power with-
construction schedule.
out reactor trip or steam-dump system actuation, provided that the
rated power level is not exceeded. The AP1000 is designed to
accept 100% load rejection from full power to house loads with-
out a reactor trip or operation of the pressurizer or SG safety
valves.

2 WEEKS 1 MONTH 2 MONTHS 1 YEAR 2 YEARS 57A.8 ASME CODE ASPECTS

FIG. 57A.9 ILLUSTRATION OF AP1000 BUILDING The AP1000 is designed as per the 1998 Edition of the ASME
MODULARIZATION (Source: Westinghouse Electric Code up to and including the 2000 Addenda. The AP1000
Company, LLC) Design Certification Document (DCD) [4] and the ASME Code
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 463

TABLE 57A.6 AP1000 STRESS CRITERIA FOR ASME CODE SECTION III
CLASS 1, CORE SUPPORT STRUCTURES, AND COMPONENT SUPPORTS
(SOURCE: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, LLC)

Service Vessel/tanks/ Core Component

level pumps Pipe supports Valves support
NG-3221
NB-3221 NG-3222 NB-3520
A NB-3652 NF
NB-3222 NG-3231 NB-3525
NG-3232
NG-3223
B NB-3223 NB-3654 NB-3525 NF
NG-3233
NG-3224
C NB-3224 NB-3655 NB-3526 NF
NG-3234
NG-3225
D NB-3225 NB-3656 special NF
NG-3235

[5] correlation with primary equipment and piping components 57A.11 NOMENCLATURE
requirements are summarized in Table 57A.6.
ADS automatic depressurization system
ALARA as low as reasonably achievable
57A.9 FUTURE DIRECTION ON THE AP1000 ALWR advanced light water reactor
Future work on the AP1000 will involve submittal of the COL AP1000 Advance Passive 1000 MWe
to the NRC, release of drawings for manufacture, and some test- ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ing to qualify the design. The AP1000 complies with most of the CMF core melt frequency
requirements in the URD [6]. For those requirements where CMT core makeup tank
exceptions are taken, technical justification has been provided. In COL combined operating license
addition, Westinghouse’s European Passive Plant based on the DCD design certification document
AP1000 has received formal certification of compliance from the EPRI Electric Power Research Institute
European Utilities Requirements (EUR) organization [7]. ESP early site permit
Regulatory design approval in each country is underway. As of EUR European Utilities Requirements
the date of this revision, the AP1000 has received several orders I&C instrumentation and control
for domestic and international plants. The first international order HV&AC heating, ventilating, and air-conditioning
received was from China for four plants. The main challenges that IRWST in-containment refueling water storage tank
remain ahead for the AP1000 are additional plant orders and LRF large release frequency
achieving the design goals for a safe, reliable, and cost-effective LOCA loss of coolant accident
nuclear power plant. LWRs light water reactors
MCR main control room
MWe megawatt electrical
57A.10 REFERENCES MWt megawatt thermal
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
1. AP1000 Brochure Issued by Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC.
PCS passive containment cooling system
2. Cummins, W.E, Corletti, M.M, and Shulz, T.L., Westinghouse PRA probabilistic risk assessment
AP1000 Advanced Passive Plant, Proceedings of ICAPP ‘03, Paper PRHR passive residual heat removal system
3235, Cordoba, Spain, May 4-7, 2003. PRHR HX passive residual heat removal heat exchanger
3. Saiu, G. and Frogheri, M.L., AP1000 Nuclear Power Plant Overview, PWR pressurized water reactors
ANSALDO Energia S.p.A – Nuclear Division. PXS passive core cooling system
4. Westinghouse AP1000 Design Control Document RCP reactor coolant pumps
5. ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, 1998 Edition up to and includ- RPV reactor pressure vessel
ing the 2000 Addenda. SG steam generator
6. Electric Power Research Institutes, Utilities Requirements Document: SGTR steam generator tube rupture accident
Advanced Light Water Reactor Utilities Requirements Document T/C thermocouples
(URD), Volume 1, 1990. UBD uniform building code
7. European Utilities Requirements Document. URD Utilities Requirement Document
ASME_Ch57_p455-482.qxd 6/5/09 2:17 PM Page 464
464 • Chapter 57
57B EPR
57B.1 INTRODUCTION
The EPR is an evolutionary, 1600+ MWe (net) PWR design
based on experience from several thousand reactor years of opera-
tion of LWRs worldwide, primarily incorporating features of the
N4 and KONVOI reactors currently operating in France and
Germany, respectively. The design integrates the results of
decades of research and development programs performed around
the world. The EPR is safer and more economical to operate than
previous reactors, and it is being built now in Finland and France.
The EPR design is described in this chapter using information
predominantly from published sources [1, 2].
57B.2 EPR DEVELOPMENT
The French–German cooperation set up to develop the EPR
brought together power plant vendors, major utilities, and the safety
authorities from both countries. The design objectives for what was
to become the EPR were set early in the project by the collaborators:
• Evolutionary: The design should be based on existing PWR
construction experience, research and development, operating
experience, and “lessons learned.”
• Improved economics: Generation cost should be reduced by
at least 10% as compared with the latest operating reactors. In
addition, operations and maintenance should be simplified.
• Safer: Increase design margins, reduce reliance on operator
actions, increase diversity of safety functions, and significantly
reduce CDF. Furthermore, severe accidents (core melt scenar-
ios) and external hazards (including explosions and aircraft
hazards) must be accommodated with no long-term local pop-
ulation effect.
• Sustainability: Reduce occupational radiation exposure, ura-
nium usage, and generation of low-level radioactive waste.
The EPR design meets these development goals and more. The
designers considered the expectations of utilities as stated in the EUR
[3] document and the URD [4] issued EPRI. The U.S. version of
EPR has been assessed against operating experience compiled by
the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations in Report 06-001 [5]
and the relevant lessons learned have been incorporated.
57B.3 PLANT DESIGN
The EPR is a four-loop PWR with a power rating of 4300–4590
MWt and a nominal net electrical output of 1600–1650 MWe. The
net output depends largely on the type of condenser cooling and the
local ambient temperatures of the plant site. Plant structures and
components have a 60-year design life. As an evolutionary design,
a combination of active and passive safety systems is employed.
The availability factor over the life of the plant is expected to be
92–94 %, which is dependent upon whether a 12-month, 18-month,
or 24-month cycle length is employed by the owner.
57B.3.1 EPR Layout
Layout of the EPR offers unique resistance to external hazards,
especially earthquakes and airplane crashes. To withstand a major
earthquake, the entire nuclear island stands on a single, thick,
reinforced concrete base mat. Building heights have been mini-
mized and heavy components and water tanks are located at the
lowest possible levels. To withstand a large airplane crash, the
FIG. 57B.1 LAYOUT OF EPR POWER (Source: AREVA NP)
reactor building, spent fuel building, and two of the four safe-
guard buildings are protected by a shield building made of rein-
forced concrete. The other two safeguard buildings are protected
by geographical separation. Similarly, the emergency DGs are in
two geographically separate buildings to avoid common failures.
The footprint of the EPR is similar to a typical four-loop PWR.
Of course, the power output of the EPR is significantly greater for
the same land use. The general site layout of the EPR power
block is shown in Fig. 57B.1.
57B.3.1.1 Reactor Building The reactor building, located in
the center of the nuclear island, houses the main equipment of the
nuclear steam supply system (NSSS). It consists of a cylindrical,
post-tensioned concrete containment with a steel liner surrounded
by a reinforced concrete shield building.
57B.3.1.2 Fuel Building The fuel building, located on the same
common base mat as the reactor building and the safeguard buildings,
houses the fresh fuel, the spent fuel in an interim fuel storage pool, and
associated handling equipment. The fuel building is surrounded by a
reinforced concrete shield building to protect the spent fuel and fuel
building systems from external explosives or aircraft hazards.
57B.3.1.3 Safeguard Buildings Four safeguard buildings
house the safeguard systems, such as the safety injection system
(SIS) and emergency feedwater system, and their support systems.
Each safeguard building contains a separate, redundant safety divi-
sion that includes a medium-head SIS, a combined low-head SIS
and RHRS, CCWS, emergency feedwater system, and all support-
ing electrical supplies, instrumentation/controls, and HVAC. This
separation ensures that internal hazards, such as fire or flood, in
one building cannot propagate to the other buildings.
Two safeguard buildings are surrounded by a reinforced con-
crete shield building to protect the systems, structures, and com-
ponents (SSCs) from external explosions or aircraft hazard. The
MCR is in one of the shielded safeguard buildings. The safe shut-
down facility is in the other shielded safeguard building.
57B.3.1.4 Diesel Buildings The two diesel buildings shelter the
four emergency DGs and their support systems, which supply elec-
tricity to each safeguard train in the event of a complete loss of off-
site electrical power. Each building is placed on opposite side of the
nuclear island to minimize the likelihood that an external event
could affect the emergency power supplies of all the four divisions.
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57B.3.1.5 Nuclear Auxiliary Building The nuclear auxiliary
building (NAB) primarily houses systems that maintain reactor
coolant chemistry, dissolved gas content, and concentrations of
radioactive species within limits. Special laboratories for sampling
systems are at the lowest level. Upper levels, designed as a radio-
logical noncontrolled areas, provide maintenance and setdown
areas used during refueling outages.
57B.3.1.6 Waste Building The waste building is used to col-
lect, store, and treat liquid and solid radioactive waste.
57B.3.1.7 Turbine Building The turbine building houses all the
main components of the steam-condensate feedwater cycle. It con-
tains the turbine-generator set, the condenser, and their auxiliary
systems. The turbine/generator (T/G) design is optimized based on
regional variations in grid frequency and condenser cooling water
temperatures.
57B.3.1.8 Essential Service Water System Cooling Structures
The standard EPR design uses once-through cooling to remove the
heat from the CCWS. However, the EPR design employs safety-
related mechanical-draft cooling towers as the ultimate heat sink for
the essential service water. Each division has a dedicated cooling
tower and basin located within the protected area. The cooling tow-
ers are grouped in divisional pairs, with each pair located on oppo-
site sides of the power block to minimize the likelihood an external
event could affect the cooling of all the four divisions.
57B.3.2 Nuclear Steam Supply System
The EPR NSSS is of the well-proven four-loop design (see
Fig. 57B.2). EPR main reactor components – RPV, pressurizer,
and SGs – feature larger volumes than similar components from
previous designs to provide additional operational and safety mar-
gins. Larger water and steam volumes in the pressurizer smooth
the response of the plant to normal and abnormal operating tran-
sients, allowing extended time to counteract transients. The larger
volume of the SG secondary side results in an increased sec-
ondary water inventory, providing up to 30 min of core decay heat
removal in the event of total loss of feedwater. Some characteris-
tics of the EPR NSSS are listed in Table 57B.1.
FIG. 57B.2 EPR NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY
TABLE 57B.1 NSSS CHARACTERISTICS [4] (SOURCE:
AREVA NP)
Parameter Value
Design life, yr 60
Reactor power, MWt 4590
Hot leg temperature, F 624.5
Cold leg temperature, F 563.5
Reactor coolant flow per loop, gpm 124,730
Primary system operating pressure, psia 2250
Primary system design pressure, psia 2550
Steam generator exit pressure, psia 1109
Steam generator design pressure, psia 1450
Steam flow per loop, mLb/HR 5.11
Reactor coolant system volume, cu. ft. 16,245
Pressurizer volume, cu. ft. 2649
Steam generator secondary inventory, LBM 182,000
57B.3.2.1 Reactor Pressure Vessel and Internal Structures
The RPV contains the core. The closure head is fastened to the top
of the RPV by a set of studs, which allows removal of the closure
head for refueling the reactor.
The RPV is comprised of a number of large forgings of low
alloy carbon steel. This minimizes the number of welds, which
reduces the manufacturing cost and the time required for in-service
inspections. In-core instrumentation is introduced through the
closure head at the top of the RPV. Consequently, there are no pen-
etrations through the lower head of the RPV.
The RPV and its closure head are made of forged ferritic
steel – SA 508, Gr. 3, Cl. 1 – a material that combines adequate
tensile strength, toughness, and weldability. The internal sur-
faces of the RPV and the closure head are clad with stainless
steel for corrosion resistance. All materials are specified with a
low cobalt content to minimize the radiation source term from
corrosion products.
Significant safety margin against the risk of brittle fracture (due
to material aging under irradiation) is ensured over the entire
60-year design life. The ductile-brittle transition temperature
(RTNDT) of the RPV material remains lower than 86°F at the end
of the design life, thanks to a stainless steel neutron reflector sur-
rounding the core that reduces the fast neutron flux at the RPV.
The reactor pressure vessel internals (RPVI) support the fuel
assemblies and keep them properly aligned and spaced to ensure
free motion of the control rods and core cooling by the primary
coolant under any circumstances, including postulated accidents.
The RPVI allow insertion and positioning of the in-core instru-
mentation as well as protection against flow-induced vibrations
during reactor operation.
The base material of the internals is a low carbon–chromium-
nickel stainless steel. The various connectors (bolts, pins, tie rods,
etc.) are made of cold-worked chromium–nickel–molybdenum
stainless steel. At some locations, hard-facing materials are used
to prevent fretting wear.
57B.3.2.2 Reactor Core The reactor core contains the fuel
material in which the fission reaction takes place, releasing energy.
The core is cooled and moderated by light water at a pressure of
2250 psia and a temperature of approximately 594°F.
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466 • Chapter 57

The EPR core consists of 241 fuel assemblies. Fuel cycle length
can vary from 12 to 24 months, with UO2 fuel and mixed oxide
fuel. The main features of the core and its operating conditions
have been selected to obtain not only high thermal efficiency of the
plant and low fuel cycle costs, but also extended flexibility for dif-
ferent fuel cycle lengths and a high level of maneuverability.
Each fuel rod bundle consists of bottom and top nozzles, 24
guide thimbles, 10 spacer grids, and 265 fuel pins. The spacer
grids are vertically distributed along the assembly structure. Inside
the assembly, the fuel rods are vertically arranged in a square lat-
tice with a 17  17 array. The bottom nozzle is equipped with an
antidebris device that almost eliminates debris-related fuel failures.
The guide thimbles are used as locations for the absorber rods
of the rod cluster control assemblies (RCCAs) and, when
required, for fixed or moveable in-core instrumentation and neu-
tron source assemblies.
The EPR fuel design benefits from years of experience. Each
feature is currently in use in operator reactors.

57B.3.2.3 Core Instrumentation Core instrumentation con-

sists of ex-core , fixed in-core, and movable in-core instrumenta-
tion. Core power is measured using ex-core instrumentation that
measures the neutron flux outside the reactor vessel. The fixed in-
core instrumentation consists of self-powered neutron detectors
and thermocouples that measure the neutron flux distribution in
the core and the temperature distribution at the core outlet, respec-
tively. The output of the self-powered neutron detectors is cali-
brated to a reference 3D power distribution generated using the
movable in-core instrumentation or “aeroball” system. The in-
core instrumentation is inserted into the core through the RPV
closure head, eliminating instrument nozzle penetrations in the
lower RPV head.
57B.3.2.4 Control Assemblies The core has a fast shutdown
control system comprising 89 RCCAs. All RCCAs are of the same
type. Each RCCA consists of 24 identical absorber rods, fastened
to a common head assembly. These rods contain neutron-absorb-
ing materials, and when fully inserted in the core, ensure shutdown
of the fission chain reaction.
The U.S. EPR is equipped with HarmoniTM RCCAs, a proven
AREVA NP design. The neutron-absorbing components are bars
made of an Ag-In-Cd alloy. Each rod is composed of a stack of
Ag-In-Cd bars contained in a stainless steel cladding under a heli-
um atmosphere (for efficient cooling of the absorbing materials).
57B.3.2.5 Control Rod Drive Mechanisms The control rod
drive mechanisms (CRDMs) insert and withdraw the 89 RCCAs
over the entire height of the core and hold them in any selected
position so that core power may be controlled by the control sys-
tem or the operator. The other function of the CRDMs is to drop
the RCCAs into the core to shut down the reactor in a few seconds
by stopping the chain reaction, particularly in the case of an abnor-
mal situation. The CRDMs are of the same type as those used in
the KONVOI reactors, which have an excellent operating history.
The CRDMs are bolted to adapters welded to the reactor vessel
closure head. Each CRDM is self-contained and can be fitted or
removed independently of the others. The CRDMs do not need
forced ventilation of the coils, which saves space on the reactor head.
57B.3.2.6 Steam Generators The SGs are the interface
between the primary water heated by the nuclear fuel and the sec-
ondary water, which provides steam to the turbine generator. The
FIG. 57B.3 STEAM GENERATOR (Source: AREVA NP)
EPR SG is a vertical, U-tube, natural circulation heat exchanger
equipped with an axial economizer (Fig. 57B.3). It is an enhanced
version of the SG currently operating in the N4 units in France.
The EPR SG is comprised of two subassemblies:
• A lower section, or boiler, where the heat exchange process
between the primary water and the secondary water takes place
• An upper section where the steam–water mixture is mechani-
cally dried before it is routed to the turbine via the main steam
lines
Increased heat exchange area as compared with existing PWRs,
in conjunction with the axial economizer, make it possible to
reach an SG exit pressure of 1109–1120 psia. Heat transfer effi-
ciency is increased by an axial economizer that directs 100% of
the cold feedwater to the cold leg of the tube bundle and about
90% of the hot recirculated water to the hot leg. This increases
steam pressure by about 43 psi compared to a conventional SG,
while avoiding tube wear and water hammer experienced by early
PWRs with preheat-type SGs.
The tube bundle is made of thermally treated alloy-690, a
proven alloy resistant to stress corrosion. Tube support plates and
antivibration bars are made of stainless steel and meticulously
assembled such that significant tube wear is eliminated. The SG
bundle wrapper and shell are made of SA-508 steel. Extensive use
of forgings for the SG shell sections reduces the number of welds
requiring in-service inspection.
57B.3.2.7 Reactor Coolant Pumps The RCPs provide forced
circulation of water through the RCS. This circulation removes
heat from the reactor core to the SGs, where it is transferred to the
secondary system.
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The RCP design is an enhanced version of the model used in the
N4 reactors. This pump model is characterized by the very low
vibration level of its shaft line due to the hydrostatic bearing
installed at the end of the impeller. The pump capacity has been
increased to match the EPR operating point. In addition, a new safe-
ty device called a standstill seal has been added as shaft seal backup.
The pump contains three dynamic shaft seals made of advanced
face materials to minimize wear and extend seal life. The seals are
cooled by seal injection or by a low pressure water coil, each capa-
ble by itself to cool the seals. The standstill seal is a new design that
prevents leakage from the pump seals if there is a total loss of cool-
ing water, that is, seal injection and thermal barrier cooling are lost.
All parts of the RCP are replaceable. Pump internals can be
easily removed from the casing. The spool piece between the
pump shaft and the motor shaft enables rapid maintenance of the
controlled leakage seal with the motor in place.
57B.3.2.8 Main Coolant Lines The reactor main coolant lines
convey the reactor coolant from the RPV to the SGs and then to the
RCPs, which discharge it back to the reactor pressure vessel.
Materials and manufacturing processes were selected to yield a
high-quality tough product, improve inspectability, and signifi-
cantly reduce the number of welds. Already in use on the N4 reac-
tors at the Civaux site, the material is forged austenitic steel, which
exhibits excellent resistance to thermal aging and permeability for
ultrasonic testing. The hot leg is forged, with separate forged
elbows. The cold leg is made using “one-piece technology” with
an elbow machined out of the forging. The surge line also consists
of several segments. The surge line routing was designed to avoid
thermal stratification during steady-state operation.
Major advances in welding processes are being implemented.
For example, the homogeneous circumferential welds are made
using orbital narrow gap TIG welding technology. The weld is
made with an automatic TIG machine, which enables a large
reduction of the volume of weld metal and an enhanced quality
level. The bimetallic weld joining austenitic to ferritic parts (such
as RPV or SG nozzles) is made by direct automatic narrow gap
welding of alloy-52. Large nozzles are integral with the main
coolant lines and are machined from the forging of the piping,
which improves resistance to thermal fatigue.
57B.3.2.9 Pressurizer The pressurizer maintains the pressure
of the primary circuit within prescribed limits. It is part of the pri-
mary circuit and is connected through a surge line to the hot leg of
one of the four loops of that circuit.
The pressurizer contains primary water in the lower part and
steam in the upper part. Compared to previous designs, the vol-
ume of the EPR pressurizer is significantly increased to smooth
the response to operational transients. This improvement increases
equipment life duration and time available to counteract potential
abnormal situations in operation.
Relief and safety valves at the top of the pressurizer protect the
primary circuit against overpressure. Compared to previous designs,
the EPR features an additional set of motorized valves. In case of a
postulated accident with a risk of core melting, these valves provide
the operator an additional efficient means of rapidly depressurizing
the primary circuit and avoiding a high-pressure core melt situation.
A number of design features have been incorporated to improve
maintainability. In particular, a platform between the pressurizer
head and the relief valves reduces radiological dose during valve
service. All the pressurizer boundary parts, with the exception of
the heater penetrations, are made of forged ferritic steel with two
layers of stainless steel cladding. The steel grade is the same as
that for the reactor pressure vessel. Heater penetrations are made
of stainless steel.
57B.3.3 Anciliary Systems
57B.3.3.1 Chemical Volume and Control System The CVCS
performs several operational functions similar to existing PWRs:
• Continuously controls the water inventory of the RCS.
• Adjusts the RCS boron concentration to control power varia-
tions, start-up or shutdown the plant, or to compensate for
core burnup.
• Monitors the boron concentration of all fluids injected into the
RCS and controls the concentration of dissolved gases in the
reactor coolant.
• Enables the adjustment of the RCS water chemistry.
• Provides seal injection to the RCP seal system.
• Provides a pressurizer auxiliary spray, if the normal system
cannot perform its function
57B.3.3.2 Safety Injection System/Residual Heat Removal
System The SIS/residual heat removal system (RHRS) comprises
medium-head safety injection (MHSI) system , accumulators, low-
head safety injection system (LHSI) and the IRWST. The system
performs a dual function, both during the normal operating condi-
tions in RHR mode and in the event of an accident.
The system consists of four separate and independent trains,
each providing the capability for injection into the RCS by an
accumulator, an MHSI pump, and an LHSI pump, with a heat
exchanger at the pump outlet. While operating in residual heat
removal (RHR) mode, the system
• provides the capability for heat transfer from the RCS to the
CCWS,
• transfers heat continuously from the RCS or the reactor refu-
eling pool to the CCWS during cold shutdown and refueling
shutdown, and
• in the event of a postulated accident and in conjunction with
the CCWS and the essential service water system (ESWS),
the SIS in RHR mode maintains core cooling at RCS temper-
atures less than 350°F.
The four redundant and independent SIS/RHRS trains are
arranged in separate divisions in the safeguard buildings. Each
train is connected to one dedicated RCS loop and is designed to
provide the injection capability required to mitigate accident con-
ditions. This configuration greatly simplifies the system design. In
addition, the four divisions allow extended periods of online pre-
ventive maintenance or repairs because preventive maintenance
may be carried out on one safety train during power operation.
In safety injection mode, the main function of the SIS is to
inject water into the reactor core following a postulated LOCA. It
would be also activated during a SG tube rupture or during loss of
a secondary side heat removal function. The MHSI system injects
water into the RCS at a pressure (1400 psia) set to prevent lift
of the secondary side safety valves in the event of SG tube leaks.
The accumulators and the LHSI system also inject water into the
RCS cold legs when the primary pressure is sufficiently low (650
psia and 305 psia, respectively).
57B.3.3.3 In-Containment Refueling Water Storage Tank
The IRWST contains a large amount of borated water and collects
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468 • Chapter 57
water that might be discharged from the RCS to the containment.
Its main function is to supply water to the SIS, severe accident heat
removal system, and CVCS pumps and to flood the spreading area
in the event of a severe accident.
The tank is located at the bottom of the containment below the
operating floor, between the reactor cavity and the missile shield.
During the management of a postulated accident, the IRWST con-
tent is cooled by the LHSI system.
Screens are provided to protect the SIS, CHRS, and CVCS
pumps from debris that might be entrained with the IRWST fluid
under accident conditions.
57B.3.3.4 Emergency Feedwater System The emergency feed-
water system (EFWS) ensures that water is supplied to the SGs when
all other feedwater supply systems are unavailable. This system con-
sists of four separate and independent trains, each providing injection
capability through an emergency pump that takes suction from an
EFWS tank housed in the safeguard building. As the name denotes,
this system is only used for emergency conditions. For start-up and
operation of the plant, dedicated feedwater systems, separate from
EFWS, are provided for plant start-up and normal operation.
57B.3.3.5 Extra Borating System The extra borating system
(EBS) is a safety-related source of borated water to maintain shut-
down of the reactor chain reaction as the plant is cooled to cold
shutdown. This system consists of two separate and independent
trains, each capable of injecting the total amount of concentrated
boric acid required to reach the cold shutdown condition from any
steady-state power operation.
57B.3.3.6 Component Cooling Water The CCWS transfers
heat from the safety-related systems, operational auxiliary sys-
tems, and other reactor equipment to the ultimate heat sink via the
ESWS. The CCWS consists of four separate safety trains corre-
sponding to the four divisions of the safeguard buildings.
57B.3.3.7 Essential Service Water System The ESWS consists
of four separate safety trains that cool the CCWS heat exchangers
with water from the ultimate heat sink during all normal plant oper-
ating conditions and during incidents and accidents. This system
also includes two trains of the dedicated cooling chain for conditions
associated with the mitigation of postulated severe accidents.
57B.3.3.8 Other Systems The nuclear sampling system takes
samples of gases and liquids from systems and equipment inside
reactor containment. The vent and drain system collects gaseous
and liquid waste from systems and equipment so that it can be
treated. The steam generator blowdown system prevents build-up
of contaminants in the secondary side water and the waste treat-
ment system ensures the treatment of solid, gaseous, and liquid
wastes.
57B.3.4 Fuel Handling and Storage
The reactor core is periodically reloaded with fresh fuel assem-
blies. The spent fuel assemblies are moved to and stored under water
in the spent fuel pool, which resides in the fuel building. These oper-
ations are carried out using several handling devices and systems and
a fuel transfer tube that connects the containment and fuel buildings.
The temperature of the fuel pool water is controlled by the fuel
pool cooling system, which has two independent trains that
remove heat from the pool and transfers it to the CCWS. Water
quality of the fuel pool is maintained by the fuel pool purification
system, which is also used to purify the water in the in-contain-
ment refueling water tank, as needed.
57B.3.5 Instrumentation & and Control System
A nuclear power plant, like any other industrial facility, requires
a means of monitoring and controlling processes and equipment.
This is performed by the plant I&C system, which is comprised of
several systems and their electrical and electronic equipment.
The I&C system is composed of sensors to transform physical
data into electrical signals, programmable controllers to process
these signals, and the control actuators, monitors, and other
means of control by plant operators.
The EPR I&C system is completely computerized and supported
by the most modern digital technologies to provide operational flexi-
bility. However, the technology is far from first-of-a-kind. AREVA
NP uses a proven TELEPERM-XSTM technology for safety-related
applications and a diverse technology for standard plant controls that
is validated through use on industrial plants throughout the world.
57B.3.5.1 I&C Design Philosophy The I&C systems act in
accordance with the “defense-in-depth” concept:
• The control system maintains the plant parameters within
their normal operating ranges.
• In case a parameter leaves normal range, the limitation system
generates appropriate actions to prevent protective actions
from having to be initiated.
• If a parameter exceeds a protection threshold, the reactor pro-
tection system generates the appropriate safety actions (reac-
tor trip and safeguard system actuation).
57B.3.5.2 EPR I&C Architecture A multilevel I&C structure
is implemented that considers the different roles played by differ-
ent I&C systems. Level 0 is Process Interface, which comprises the
sensors and the switchgears. Level 1, or System Automation,
includes I&C systems that perform
• reactor protection,
• reactor control, surveillance, and limitation functions,
• safety automation, and
• process automation.
Level 2, Process Supervision and Control, consists of
• workstations and display panels, which are also called the
man-machine interface (MMI), and
• I&C systems that act as a link between the MMI and the “sys-
tem automation” level.
The I&C systems and equipment comply with the principles of
redundancy, division, and diversity applied to all of the EPR safety-
related systems. There are four redundant and independent I&C
channels, including power supplies and sensors. Processing
equipment for the I&C in each division is contained within the
corresponding safeguard building.
57B.4 EPR SAFETY
All light water reactors (LWRs) rely on well-established princi-
ples of protective barriers and defense-in-depth to safeguard the
health and safety of the public from radiological consequences.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 469
This is also true for EPR because the most important design con-
sideration was to base the EPR on experience feedback from the
96 reactors built by AREVA NP around the world and avoid the
risk of unproven technologies.
However, additional goals were applied to the design to signifi-
cantly enhance the safety of the EPR as compared with previous
generations of LWRs:
• Enhance the defense-in-depth approach, including redundancy
and diversity of safety functions, to significantly reduce the
probability of core melt
• Provide protection of critical systems from external hazards
such as tornado missiles, explosions, or military airplane
crash (recently extended to large commercial aircraft)
• Provide design features to mitigate severe accident scenarios
and limit potential consequences
57B.4.1 Internal and External Hazards
The design of safeguard systems and civil works minimize the
risks arising from various hazards (earthquake, flooding, fire, air-
craft crash, or explosion).
The safeguard systems are generally designed on the basis of
quadruple redundancy for mechanical systems, electrical sup-
plies, and the I&C that actuate and control the systems. This
means that each system is comprised of four subsystems or
“trains,” each capable of fulfilling the safeguard function. The
four redundant trains are physically separated, each contained
within a separate safeguard building (Fig. 57B.4). Each division
includes the following:
• LHSI and MHSI for borated water safety injection into the
reactor vessel in case of LOCA
• An SG emergency feedwater system, including water tank
inside the safeguard building
• The electrical systems and I&C linked to these systems
The containment building, fuel building, and safeguard buildings
are given special protection against external hazards such as earth-
FIG. 57B.4 QUADRUPLE REDUNDANCY WITH PHYSICAL
SEPARATION OF DIVISIONS (Source: AREVA NP)
quakes and explosions. This protection is further enhanced against
an airplane crash. The containment building, fuel building, and two
safeguard buildings are surrounded by a reinforced concrete shield
building with sufficient strength to absorb the impact of a military or
large commercial aircraft. The shielded safeguard buildings contain
the MCR and remote shutdown station, which are only used if the
MCR is not habitable. The other two safeguard buildings that are not
protected by a shield wall are remote from each other and separated
by the reactor building, which shelters them from simultaneous
damage. In this way, should an aircraft crash occur, at least three of
the four divisions of the safeguard systems would be preserved.
57B.4.2 Simplification, Redundancy, and Diversity
The main safety systems and their support systems feature four
trains, each train in a separate division. Emergency power is assured
by use of emergency diesel generartors, one for each division.
Quadruple redundancy allows each train to connect to a single reac-
tor coolant loop (RCL), minimizing cross-connects and reducing the
length of pipe and number of valves compared with earlier PWRs.
Furthermore, emergency feedwater and MHSI are only called
to operate during accidents or incidents, which simplifies operation
(only one operating mode) and reduces maintenance (reduced
wear and tear). Operation of SISs during postulated loss of
coolant accidents is simplified by use of the in-containment refu-
eling water storage tank, which is the sole source of injection
water. This eliminates the need for the operator to switch suction
sources when an external tank is dry, which is the case for
Generation II PWRs.
RHR is provided by the four trains of the low-head portion of
the SIS, which are configured to remove the residual heat in a
closed loop (suction via the hot legs, discharge via the cold legs).
Safety injection remains available for action in the event of a leak
or break occurring in the RCS.
The design of the EPR provides diverse, backup functions in
the case of total loss of the redundant safety systems. Some exam-
ples of this approach are as follows:
• In the event of a loss of all feedwater sources, RCS cooling
can be performed by “feed and bleed” cooling, using primary
depressurization valves and safety injection.
• In the event MHSI is not available to mitigate loss of reactor
coolant, SG heat removal, accumulator injection, and LHSI
can replace MHSI.
• Similarly, complete loss of the LHSI system is backed up by
the MHSI system and containment heat removal system.
• Loss of off-site power with coincident failure of the emer-
gency DGs (Station Blackout or SBO) is backed up by two
diverse SBO DGs that provide power to critical loads in two
safeguard divisions.
57B.4.3 Increased Reliability of Operator Action
Safety enhancements at all levels are included in the U.S. EPR,
and the MMI is a primary example. Advanced digital I&C systems
are used to automate most plant functions and reduce the burdens
on the plant operators. The designs of the control and protection
systems are such that no operator action is required prior to 30 min
to mitigate any plant upsets. Furthermore, the plant components
have been sized to slow the response to upset conditions, support-
ing this design objective. Relieving the time pressure from the
operator significantly enhances the overall safety of the plant
by reducing error-likely situations. Furthermore, unlike other
Generation III reactors that use passive safety features that cannot
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470 • Chapter 57
TABLE 57B.2 EPR PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT
(SOURCE: AREVA NP)
NRC
Gen II URD/IAEA EPR
Requirement
CDF 1  104 5  105 1  106 6  107
CDF, Core damage frequency, events per year
be turned off once they actuate, the operator maintains a certain
level of control in EPR to recover the plant from complex events
through use of emergency operating procedures.
57B.4.4 Reduced Probability of Core Melt
Although the probability of core melt for Generation II reactors
is extremely small (approximately 5  105 per reactor year), a
primary design objective for EPR is to significantly reduce this
value. This is consistent with the EPRI URD and IAEA [6]
requirements for advanced reactors. Specifically, the design goal
for EPR is CDF less than 106 per reactor year for all internal
events, which is a significant reduction compared with most mod-
ern reactors in operation.
Accomplishing this goal requires detailed probabilistic safety
assessments that
• consider a broad range of at-power and shutdown events, with
special attention paid to shutdown states,
• augment deterministic defense-in-depth evaluations to add or
modify equipment capabilities to reduce the likelihood that
abnormal conditions deteriorate into a core damage scenario,
leading to many of the plant features described previously in
this chapter, and
• include enhanced reliability of operator actions due to
increased automation and improved grace periods.
The detailed Level 1 PRA (Table 57B.2) shows that the design
objective was obtained and that the EPR design represents a sig-
nificant safety improvement compared with operating Generation
II LWRs. Furthermore, the sum of the CDFs for all events occur-
ring during shutdown states is only 10% of the total CDF.
57B.4.5 Mitigation of Severe Accidents
As early as 1993, French and German safety authorities intro-
duced a new safety model for future nuclear power plants.
Notwithstanding the extremely low likelihood of core melt scenar-
ios, the safety authorities require features to mitigate consequences
of a core melt accident. Therefore, features were incorporated into
the EPR design to practically eliminate situations that could lead
to large early radiological releases. Furthermore, even if a low-
pressure core melt is postulated with ex-vessel progression, the
approach ensures the integrity of the reactor containment by
retaining and stabilizing the corium inside containment and by
cooling the corium.
57B.4.5.1 Prevention of High-Pressure Core Melt In addition
to the usual RCS depressurization systems in other reactors, the
EPR is equipped with valves dedicated to preventing high-pressure
core melt in the event of a severe accident. The relieving capacity
ensures the primary system is depressurized long before the corium
can melt through the vessel.
57B.4.5.2 Prevention of High-Energy Corium/Water
Interaction Design of the corium retention and cooling systems
preclude the possibility of an energetic corium water interaction.
57B.4.5.3 Containment Design with Respect to the Hydrogen
Risk In the unlikely case of a severe accident, hydrogen could be
released in large quantities inside containment. Consequently, the
post-tensioned concrete containment building is designed to with-
stand the pressure that could result from the combustion of hydro-
gen. In addition, passive autocatalytic hydrogen recombiners are
installed inside the containment to keep the average concentration
below 10% at all times to avoid any risk of detonation.
57B.4.5.4 Corium Retention and Stabilization The reactor pit
is designed to collect the corium in case of ex-vessel progression and
to transfer it to the corium spreading and cooling area. The reactor
pit surface is protected by “sacrificial” concrete, which mixes with
the corium, cooling it and decreasing the viscosity of the melt.
Transfer of the corium from the reactor pit to the spreading
area would be initiated by a passive melt “plug” that opens the
channel between the two areas. After the corium spreads in the
spreading area, the corium is passively cooled by gravity injec-
tion of water from the in-containment refueling water storage
tank. The containment base mat remains cool because the cool-
ing water is directed under the spreading area before it is directed
to cooling the corium by direct contact. The arrangement of the
reactor pit and corium spreading area are shown in Fig. 57B.5.
57B.4.5.5 Containment Heat Removal Steam generated by
cooling the corium during a postulated severe accident would cause
the containment building pressure to increase. To prevent the con-
tainment from losing long-term integrity, a dedicated spray system
is provided with heat exchangers and dedicated heat sink. This
spray can cool the containment atmosphere and prevent pressure
increase. Passive containment design features, such as the large
containment air volume and concrete heat sinks, allow a long grace
period of at least 12 h before operators must start the spray system.
A second mode of operation for the containment heat removal
system enables the water to flow into the spreading area instead of
into the spray system, providing active, forced cooling of the cori-
um in the spreading area.
FIG. 57B.5 GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF RV, IRWST,
REACTOR PIT AND CORIUM RETENTION (Source:
AREVA NP)
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57B.5 CONTAINMENT DESIGN
The EPR containment building is a post-tensioned concrete
building, approximately 4.3 ft. thick, surrounded by a reinforced
concrete shield building that protects the containment building
and all internal systems from external hazards such as explosions
or aircraft hazards. A 0.25-in. thick steel liner covers the internal
wall of the containment building to ensure a leak-tight barrier in
case of radiation release from the reactor. The design pressure of
the containment building is 62 psig, ensuring structural integrity
following postulated design basis accidents or severe accident
(core melt) scenarios.
A “two-room” concept is used to separate the NSSS equipment
from the rest of containment. The major NSSS components inside
the equipment space reside in separate compartments. In fact,
concrete walls are erected between the individual coolant loops
and between the hot leg and cold leg piping of each loop.
Other equipment is contained in the service compartments.
Locating ancillary equipment separate from the equipment space
allows personnel entry to the containment at any time during
power operation to perform maintenance or prepare for refueling
outages. Personnel hatches are provided for that purpose.
Air temperatures and air quality are maintained by a nonsafety
related HVAC system during normal operation. During postulated
pipe rupture scenarios, the containment pressure is maintained by
way of passive condensation of vapor on concrete and steel struc-
tures and by long-term cooling by the RHRS. There are no safety-
related fan coolers or spray systems inside containment.
Nonsafety related sprays are available for containment cooling in
case of a severe accident scenarios. A number of other features,
including the reactor pit, corium retention area, and passive auto-
catalytic hydrogen recombiners already described in this chapter,
were incorporated into the containment design to mitigate severe
accident scenarios without a breach of containment.
57B.6 CONSTRUCTION
EPRs are currently under construction in Finland and France.
Experience gained from those projects regarding construction, pro-
curement, and engineering are factored into the standard EPR
approach such that the construction time of EPR rivals the top decile
performance of Generation II and III reactors worldwide. This pro-
vides certainty necessary for investors in such large projects.
Generally, several techniques may be employed to construct an
EPR, including “open-top” construction. Modular construction is
employed where there is a clear advantage to the construction
schedule. Other labor-saving techniques are employed such as
bending pipe to fabricate a piping system, which eliminates a
large number of welds. Because EPRs are under construction
now, a well-established supply chain is in place, which ensures
the certainty of equipment and commodities for future EPR pro-
jects. The latest engineering processes, including detailed 3D lay-
out tools and associated equipment catalogs and part lists, stream-
line construction by eliminating layout conflicts and allowing for
pre-engineered time-saving construction techniques.
57B.7 OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
A main objective of the EPR design process was to provide a
plant with an electricity generation cost at least 10% less than the
current generation of operating units. This is approached in two
ways. First, improve the capacity factor of the unit to maximize
power generation. Second, reduce the operation and maintenance
costs.
Extensive operating experience was used to ensure that design
features were incorporated in the U.S. EPR to improve reliability
of systems and components, reduce unwanted reactor trips,
reduce refueling outage duration, and improve the overall plant
availability goal to greater than 94% average.
Single-point vulnerabilities that can lead to power reductions or
reactor trips have been eliminated by increasing redundancy or
diversity. EPR can accommodate a wide range of plant upsets,
including partial or full load rejection, without tripping the reac-
tor. Self-diagnostic features of the digital I&C reduce spurious
reactor trips from sensor or controls failures. Use of the latest
materials and technologies, proven by operation in reactors, elimi-
nates the degradation, breakdowns, or failures that require long
shutdowns experienced by Generation II reactors for augmented
inspection and repairs.
Most important, quadruple redundancy of the safeguard sys-
tems allows online maintenance and testing of the equipment in
each division, one division at a time. Eliminating maintenance of
emergency DG, emergency feedwater pumps, SISs, and support-
ing systems from the refueling outage window allows a standard
refueling outage of less than 15 days.
With respect to plant maintenance, several features were incor-
porated to simplify activities and reduce costs. The majority of
the cost to maintain the plant resides in the nonsafety-related
steam conversion systems; so, the following principles were
applied to both the nuclear island and turbine island buildings.
The first principle is to procure reliable equipment, with a
proven track record, to eliminate the time and expense of perform-
ing corrective maintenance (repairs) and to minimize preventative
maintenance. Furthermore, equipment or technology that mini-
mizes the time to perform necessary inspections is incorporated
into the design. For example, welds in Class 1 and 2 systems are
minimized to reduce in-service inspection time and self-checking
digital I&C will reduce manual testing and troubleshooting.
Second, plant layout ensures adequate access for inspection and
maintenance of all plant equipment. Floors or permanent platforms
are provided at key locations. All components except the reactor
vessel can be removed and replaced using pre-engineered haul
paths and lifting devices for that purpose. Regardless, laydown
space is provided for in situ maintenance or repairs of equipment,
including space to allow temporary storage of components.
The largest portion of the nonfuel operating and maintenance
(O&M) costs of a plant is salaries and benefits for the operating
staff, which include operations, maintenance, testing, training,
chemistry, human resources, radiation protection, procurement,
engineering, security, and administration personnel. Staffing for
an EPR is projected to be significantly less than that for an exist-
ing 1000-MWe unit. Of course, due to the large output of EPR
(1600 MWe), O&M costs will be significantly less than the previ-
ous generation of reactors when based on a per MWe basis.
The ALARA principle was applied to the EPR design to reduce
radiation exposure to workers and to maintain operational radia-
tion releases well within limits. Significant reductions in cobalt
content of components, strict design rules to eliminate hideouts or
deposits within equipment, permanent shielding of key process
components, and separation of “harsh” and “mild” environments
inside buildings allow EPR to meet a safety goal on average year-
ly collective dose to plant personnel of less than 0.5 man-Sv
(50 man-Rem).
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472 • Chapter 57

57B.8 CODE ASPECTS
The EPR design accommodates various mechanical, electri-
cal, and civil codes and standards around the world. For exam-
ple, EPR nuclear steam supply components have been designed
to the French RCC-M and ASME Codes. The U.S. version of
the EPR is designed to the 2004 Edition of the ASME Code,
with no addenda.
An application for design certification has been submitted to the
U.S. NRC and four applications for combined construction and
operating licenses are under preparation using the EPR technolo-
gy. Commercial operation of the first EPR in the United States is
targeted for 2015. In addition, the design is being reviewed by the
safety authority in the United Kingdom under its generic design
assessment process.

57B.9 BUILDING NOW 57B.10 REFERENCES

As of the time of this writing, EPRs are under construction in
Finland (Olkiluoto 3, shown in Fig. 57B.6) and France (Flammanville
3), and two EPRs are under contract for the Taishan site in China.
1. U.S. EPR, ©February 2007, AREVA NP.
2. U.S. EPR Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 0, ©2007, AREVA
NP, Inc.
3. European Utilities Requirements (EUR) Document, ©1994–2004,
British Energy plc, Electricité de France, Fortum, Iberdrola, NRG,
Rosenergoatom, SOGIN (Società Gestione Impianti Nucleari),
Swissnuclear, Teollisuuden Voima Oy, Tractebel, Vattenfall, VGB
Powertech.
4. Electric Power Research Institute, Advanced Light Water Reactor
Utilities Requirements Document (URD), Volume 1, 1990.
5. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Operating Experience To
Apply To Advanced Light Water Reactor Designs Report 06-001,
September 2006.
6. International Atomic Energy Commission, Safety Series No. 110,
Safety of Nuclear Installations, 1993.

Photo Courtesy of Teollisudden Voima Oy

FIG. B57.6 CONSTRUCTION OF OLKILUOTO3

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57C US-APWR
57C.1 INTRODUCTION
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) has designed the US-
APWR as an APWR, which meets U.S. regulatory requirements.
Basic design of the US-APWR is the same as that of the
Japanese APWR whose design has completed. The design of the
Japanese APWR is based on the conventional four-loop plant
technologies, with which MHI has accumulated significant oper-
ating experience, scaled up to achieve higher electrical outputs in
Japan. In addition to adopting these proven technologies, modifi-
cations are also made on the Japanese APWR to improve econo-
my, safety, reliability, operability, and maintainability. The US-
APWR has been developed as a larger-scale version of the
Japanese APWR, aiming at higher electrical outputs and
improved economics, by modifying some design features of the
Japanese APWR without increasing core thermal output.
The US-APWR DCD [1] was submitted on December 31, 2007
and docketed on February 29, 2008.
57C.2 US-APWR PLANT DESIGN CONCEPT
For the advancement of the nuclear power technology in Japan,
the Japanese APWR has been developed. Newly developed
Japanese APWR technologies are fully tested, well verified, and
well established.
The US-APWR is fundamentally based on the established
Japanese APWR plant with its latest technologies to improve
plant efficiency, such as the employment of large SGs and tur-
bines, and other minor modifications to meet the U.S. utility
requirements. With an increased plant safety, reliability, and per-
formance, construction costs are being reduced due to the benefit
of economy of scale resulting from an increase in capacity. The
Japanese APWR output of 1538 MWe is produced from the large
capacities of the reactor core and other major components such as
the SG, RCP, and turbines. The US-APWR plant performance
exceeds that of the Japanese APWR plant by 10%, that is, a 1700
MWe output, due to its high performance and larger capacity SG
and the higher performance turbine system with the low pressure
turbines having 70-in. class last stage blades.
Table 57C.1 shows the main differences between the current four-
loop (1180 MWe) plant, the Japanese APWR (1538 MWe) plant,
and US-APWR (1700 MWe) plant features. The major differences
between the US-APWR and current four-loop plant are the thermal
and electrical outputs, the number of fuel assemblies and trains of
safety systems, and the active fuel lengths. The major differences
between the US-APWR and the Japanese APWR are the electric
outputs, the active fuel lengths, and the number of electrical trains of
safety systems. The adoption of the four-train safety system aims to
perform online maintenance assuming single failure criteria.
57C.3 OPERATIONAL TECHNOLOGY
The US-APWR is a four-loop PWR with a power rating of
4451 MWt and a nominal gross electrical output of 1700 MWe.
The US-APWR core consists of 257 fuel assemblies and has the
active fuel length of approximately 14 ft. The fuel assemblies
are surrounded by a stainless steel radial reflector designed to

TABLE 57C.1 US-APWR FEATURE COMPARISON WITH THE JAPANESE APWR AND CURRENT
FOUR-LOOP PLANT (SOURCE: MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD.)

Current Four-
Design Parameter Loop PWR Japanese APWR US-APWR
Electric output 1,180 MWe 1,538 MWe 1,700 MWe class
Thermal output 3,411 MWt 4,451 MWt 4,451 MWt
Core 12 ft. Fuel 12 ft. Fuel 14 ft. Fuel
193 Assys 257 Asseys 257 Assys
SG heat 52,400 ft.2/SG 70,000 ft.2/SG 91,500 ft.2/SG
transfer area
Thermal design flow 88,500 GPM 113,000 GPM 112,000 GPM
rate per loop
Turbine last 44 in. 54 in. 70 in.class
Stage blades
Containment vessel PCCV PCCV PCCV
Safety systems Electrical: Electrical: Electrical:
2 trains 2 trains 4 trains
Mechanical: Mechanical: Mechanical:
2 trains 4 trains 4 trains
HHSI  2 HHSI  4 HHSI  4
Accumulator  4 Advanced Advanced
Accumulator  4 Accumulator  4
LHSI  2 No LHSI No LHSI
I&C Safety System analog Full digital Full digital
Control system:
digital
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474 • Chapter 57

U.S current
four loop plant APWR U.S. APWR

193 F/As 257 F/As 257 F/As

Large Low
output power
12 ft. 12 ft. 14 ft.
density

3565 MWt 4451 MWt 4451 MWt

5.7 kW/ft. 5.3 kW/ft. 4.6 kW/ft.

FIG. 57C.1 IMPROVEMENT OF REACTOR DESIGN

(Source: Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.)

improve neutron utilization, which reduces fuel cycle cost and

reactor vessel irradiation compared to the conventional PWRs.
Figure 57C.1 shows a comparison of the core size for different
type PWRs. Both the US-APWR and the Japanese APWR have
much larger thermal outputs than the conventional PWRs. The
introduction of 14-ft. fuel to the US-APWR is achieved without
changing the reactor vessel size of the Japanese APWR. The
resulting low linear power density, 4.6 kW/ft., allows 24-month
operation with 2-batch fuel management as an equilibrium cycle
under constraints of 5 wt% U-235 enrichment at the maximum
and also at the well-proven maximum fuel rod burnup of 62
GWd/t.
The US-APWR employs the top-mounted in-core instrumenta-
tion system instead of the bottom-mounted in-core instrumentation
system used in the conventional plants to eliminate nozzles
attached on the reactor vessel bottom dome. Sensors are inserted
using peripheral nozzles attached on the reactor vessel closure
head by thimble guide assemblies. The illustration of top-mounted
in-core instrumentation is depicted in Fig. 57C.2.
The basic configuration of RCS, described in Fig. 57C.3, is the
same as a currently operating four-loop plant that has been
proven through long-term operating experience and enhanced
FIG. 57C.3 US-APWR REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEMS
(Source: Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.)
reliability. The main components of the RCS are enlarged in size
corresponding to the large thermal output and improved plant
efficiency. The pressurizer volume is increased with a larger mar-
gin to achieve a more efficient transient response. The SG design
is also improved, thus realizing high efficiency and reliability.
The tubes are 3/4 in. in diameter, smaller than the 7/8-in. tubes
used in the existing plants. This results in a more compact SG
with resistance to earthquakes, and so on The SG tubes are made
of thermally treated alloy 690. The design of the antivibration
bars in the U-bend area has also been improved to reduce the
flow-induced vibration risk of the tubes. Water and steam separa-
tion efficiency with the high-performance moisture separators is
less than 0.1%.
One HP turbine and three LP turbines are provided in the
US-APWR secondary system. Longer blades with 70 in. class for
the LP turbines contribute to improvement in higher turbine
efficiency. Figure 57C.4 depicts the US-APWRs turbine generator.
The moisture separator and reheater is adopted to remove the
moisture and to reheat the steam between the HP turbines and the
LP turbines. Seven-stage feedwater heaters are provided to heat
the feedwater to the SGs.

Top-mounted in-core
instrumentation guide
assembly

Eliminate nozzles on the

reactor vessel bottom dome

FIG. 57C.4 US-APWR HIGH-EFFICIENCY AND HIGH-

FIG. 57C.2 IMPROVEMENT OF REACTOR DESIGN RELIABILITY TURBINE GENERATOR (Source: Mitsubishi
(Source: Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.) Heavy Industries, Ltd.)
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 475

• ZIRLOTM* cladding tube demonstrates high corrosion resis-

Large display panel tance under demanding conditions. *ZIRLOTM is trademark
of Westinghouse Electric COMPANY, LLC.
• An antidebris bottom nozzle with a built-in filter enhances
debris-trapping capability.
Conventional Operator The fuel assembly design for the US-APWR adopts the above
HSI console features to ensure high reliability.

57C.3.2 Enhanced Fuel Economy

Pellet density of 97% theoretical density (TD) greater than the
Safety VDU conventional 95% TD improves fuel cycle cost by increasing the
Alarm VDU Operational VDU
amount of uranium in the core.
(Nonsafety)

57C.3.3 Flexible Core Operation

FIG. 57C.5 US-APWR COMPUTERIZED MAIN CONTROL
ROOM (Source: Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.)
core operation to achieve higher burnup. Furthermore, a larger rod
plenum volume can produce potential margin for a rod internal
The fully digital system is applied to the I&C system of the
pressure increase caused by FP gas release, especially under high
US-APWR, including both safety and nonsafety systems. The
power operation at high burnup.
same digital platform has been developed and applied to PWR
plants with excellent experiences in Japan, including the Japanese
listed below:
APWR. Figure 57C.5 shows the picture of MCR employing fully
digital I&C system.
This proven digital system provides significant benefits to the
safety of nuclear power, such as reduction of operations and main-
tenance workload, which reduces the potential for human error.
The design features of the I&C system includes redundancy,
defense-in-depth and diversity, self-diagnosis, and online
maintenance.
The major design modifications of fuel assembly, depicted in
Fig. 57C.6, from the Japanese APWR to the US-APWR are the
fuel active length from 12 ft. to14 ft. and the number of grids
from 9 to 11. All the advanced technologies incorporated into the
current 17  17 fuel assembly for higher burnup are applied to
the US-APWR fuel assembly. The fuel assembly design for the
US-APWR is based on the Mitsubishi 17  17 fuel assembly that
has demonstrated high reliability through significant irradiation
experience in Japan. This fuel design improves reliability,
enhances fuel economy, and enables flexible core operation.
57C.3.1 Improved Reliability
• Grid spring design and adoption of an 11-grid design result in
high grid fretting resistance. This grid design concept has
been proven with long-term no-leakage records in Japanese
PWRs for approximately13 years.
Improved fuel economics Higher reliability
Corrosion-resistant
Higher density pellet cladding material
(97%TD*)
Grid fretting-resistance design
(Grid design and arrangement)
Enable flexible core
operation
Higher gadolinia content Debris filter
pellet (10 wt%) (Higher debris trapping
capability)
Larger plenum volume
(reduction of internal TD; Theoretical density
pressure)
FIG. 57C.6 US-APWR FUEL ASSEMBLY
(Source: Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.)
A higher gadolinia content of up to 10 wt% enables flexible
The main design features of the RCS major components are
• Reactor Pressure Vessel:
1. Support and encloses the reactor core internals
2. Four inlet nozzles
3. Four outlet nozzles
4. Four direct vessel injection (DVI) nozzles
5. Upper-mounted in-core instrumentation penetrations to
eliminate penetration below the top of the reactor core
• Reactor Internals:
1. Four hot leg outlet nozzles similar to the conventional
plants
2. Integrated lower core support plate similar to the conven-
tional 14-ft. fuel plants
3. Perforated metal ring blocks neutron reflector to eliminate
bolts in high fluency region
4. Top-mounted in-core instrumentation system to eliminate
reactor vessel bottom dome nozzles
5. Diffuser plates in lower plenum to stabilize core inlet flow
• CRDMs and Driveline:
1. CRDMs are proven magnetic jack type
2. Travel length of the RCCA complies with 14-ft. fuel
• Steam Generators
1. Four SGs employing triangular pitch tubing
2. Alloy 690 thermally treated tube material to improve cor-
rosion resistance
3. Hydraulically expanded tubes in the tube sheet to reduce
stress
4. Stainless steel broached tube supports to minimize corro-
sion and denting
5. Advanced antivibration bar design in U-bends to minimize
vibration and wear
6. Improved moisture separators
• Reactor Coolant Pumps
1. The US-APWR RCP has achieved a larger capacity and
higher efficiency (over 85%) by improving the impeller
and diffuser configuration.
2. Leakage along the RCP shaft is normally controlled by
three shaft seals arranged in series so that any reactor
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476 • Chapter 57

coolant leakage to the containment is essentially reduced 3. Containment isolation (in-containment refueling water stor-
to zero. age pit)
3. The advanced seal design of the US-APWR RCP con- 4. Full digital I&C system
tributes to its longer life and stabilization of No.1 seal 5. MCR emergency habitability system
leakage characteristics. 6. Core debris cooling under severe accident condition
4. The pump shaft, seal housing, thermal barrier, main flange, 7. Fission product release
and impeller of the RCP can be removed from the casing
as a unit without disturbing the reactor coolant piping. 57C.4.1 Four-Train Safety Injection with Advanced
5. All parts of the pump in contact with the reactor coolant Accumulator
are made of stainless steel except for the seals, bearings,
and special parts. 57C.4.1.1 Four Mechanical Trains The engineered safeguard
features of the US-APWR employs the four-train system to per-
• Pressurizer
form required safety functions following an accident assuming a
1. The largest type of the Mitsubishi design (2900 cu ft.)
single failure in one train with a second train out of service for
2. Enhanced plant control with greater margin for transients
maintenance. The four-train DVI system configuration increases
• Fuel redundancy and independency and enhances safety and reliability.
1. 257 fuel assemblies with zircaloy grids The DVI system brings about a simple and compact safety system,
2. 14-ft. 17  17 fuel assembly enabling it to reduce the capacity of each train from 100% to 50%.
3. Higher burnup features Interconnecting piping between each train is also eliminated.
4. Antidebris bottom nozzle
57C.4.2 Advanced Accumulator System and
• In-core Instrumentation Elimination of Low-Head Safety Injection
1. Top-mounted in-core instrumentation System
The accumulator system consists of four advanced accumulators
• Thermocouple Instrumentation and the associated valves and piping, one for each RCS loop. Figure
1. Thermocouples provided in reactor internals similar to 57C.8 illustrates the US-APWR advanced accumulator. The system
conventional Westinghouse plants. is connected to the cold legs of the reactor coolant piping and injects
borated water when the RCS pressure falls below the accumulator
operating pressure. The system is passive. Pressurized nitrogen gas
57C.4 SAFETY FEATURES
forces borated water from the tanks into the RCS. The advanced
The US-APWR incorporates the following safety features (Fig. accumulators incorporate internal passive flow dampers, which
57C.7): function to inject a large flow to refill the reactor vessel in the first
stage of injection and then reduce the flow as the water level in the
1. Four independent safety trains, both mechanical and electrical accumulator drops. When the water level is above the top of the
2. Advanced accumulator system and elimination of LHSI standpipe, water enters the flow damper through both the top of
pumps the standpipe and the side of the flow damper and thus water is
injected at high flow rates. When the water level drops below the top
SIP SIP of the standpipe, water enters the damper only through the side inlet
CS/RHRP CS/RHRP
and water is injected at relatively low flow rates. The advanced accu-
mulators perform large flow injection to refill the reactor vessel and
a succeeding small flow injection during core reflooding in associa-
RWSP tion with the safety injection pumps. The refueling water storage pit
C/L C/L (RWSP) in the containment acts as a continuous suction source for
H/L H/L
SG SG
ACC ACC
Spray Spray Nitrogen Nitrogen
RV header
header
ACC ACC

SG SG
H/L H/L Injection Main stand pipe Injection
C/L C/L
water water
Side inlet

Flow damper Flow damper

CS/RHRP CS/RHRP Side inlet
SIP SIP

FIG. 57C.7 US-APWR DISTINCTIVE SAFETY SYSTEM RV,

REACTOR VESSEL; SG, STEAM GENERATOR; ACC, Large flow rate Reduced flow rate
ADVANCED ACCUMULATOR; SIP, SAFETY INJECTION
PUMP; CS/RHRP, CONTAINMENT SPRAY/RESIDUAL, HEAT FIG. 57C.8 US-APWR ADVANCED ACCUMULATOR
REMOVAL PUMP; (Source: Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.) (Source: Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.)
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the safety injection pumps. The combined performance of the accu-
mulator system and the high-head injection system eliminates the
need for a conventional LHSI.
57C.4.2.1 Containment Spray System The containment spray
(CS) system consists of four independent trains, each containing a
CS/ RHR heat exchanger, a CS/RHR pump, spray nozzle, and
valves. The CS/RHR heat exchangers and the CS/RHR pumps are
used for both CSS and RHRS functions. The CSS is automatical-
ly actuated on receipt of a containment spray signal. When the sig-
nal is received, the CS/RHR heat exchanger outlet valves open and
the CS/RHR pumps start. The CS/RHR pump motor is connected
to a safety bus, so that the gas turbine generator (GTG)can supply
electrical power in case of a loss of off-site power. The CS/RHR
pumps take suction from the RWSP and the stop valve at the inlet
line is always open during reactor operation. The water in the pit
is cooled by the CS/RHR heat exchangers and is delivered to the
spray headers located at the top of the containment vessel.
The refueling water storage pit in the containment provides a
continuous suction source for the CS/RHR pumps, thus eliminat-
ing the conventional realignment from the RWSP to the contain-
ment sump.
57C.4.2.2 Four-Train Electrical Safety System and Gas
Turbine Generator Safety-related electrical systems consist of
four 50% systems. That is, only two trains are required for safely
shutdown the plant. Each safety-related load is connected to a
Class 1E bus. This configuration with four Class 1E systems
allows online maintenance of the GTG.
There are several advantages to select a GTG in lieu of a DG,
which include easy maintenance, small footprint, and fewer auxil-
iary systems. The GTG can be applied to US-APWR because the
advanced accumulator with LHSI allows a starting time consistent
with GTG performance.
57C.4.3 Containment Isolation
Containment isolation is needed to decrease and limit the
release of fission products following LOCA. Figure 57C.9 illus-
trates the US-APWR RWSP. The fluid lines that penetrate the
containment vessel are in general provided with containment iso-
Strainer
RWSP
Recirculation sump
FIG. 57C.9 US-APWR IN CONTAINMENT REFUELING
WATER STORAGE PIT (RWSP) (Source: Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries, Ltd.)
lation valves. Each line that is neither part of the reactor pressure
boundary nor connected directly to the containment atmosphere
and is not closed outside containment is provided with one con-
tainment isolation valve inside and outside containment. Each line
that is neither part of the reactor pressure boundary nor connected
directly to the containment atmosphere is provided with one con-
tainment isolation valve outside containment.
The containment isolation valves are designed not to fail open
upon loss of actuating power after closing. In addition, the con-
tainment isolation valves that close automatically upon receiving
an isolation signal are designed not to open automatically if the
isolation signal is removed. Containment isolation valves are
designed for both functional and leakage tests.
The RWSP of the US-APWR is located at the lowest part of
containment and four recirculation sumps are installed at the bot-
tom of the RWSP. This configuration provides a continuous suc-
tion source for the SI pumps and CS/RHR pumps, thus eliminat-
ing the conventional realignment from the RWSP (outside
containment) to the containment recirculation sump.
57C.4.4 Full Digital I&C
The US-APWR utilizes a fully digital I&C system with design
features that improve the plant reliability and operability.
• Four-train separation is completely applied to the safety and
safety-related systems.
• Nonsafety visual display units (VDUs) are used for control of
safety systems and components (multichannel operator station).
• Defense-in-depth and diversity features include systems,
which provide the countermeasures for common mode fail-
ures (CMF) of the digital safety systems as necessary to meet
the U.S. regulations.
57C.4.5 Main Control Room Emergency Habitability
System
The MCR HVAC system that includes MCR emergency filtration
system allows an operator to stay safe inside the control room enve-
lope (CRE) both in the normal and accident conditions. In the emer-
gency pressurization mode, this system establishes the CRE pressure
higher than that of adjacent areas during a radiological accident.
Depending on the radiological concentration in the air intake, the
MCR operator may select the train of MCR emergency system that
would minimize exposure to the CRE. The CRE consists of leak-
tight equipment, so that unfiltered leakage is restricted to a low value.
57C.4.6 Core Debris Cooling under Severe Accident
Condition
The US-APWR is designed to mitigate hypothetical severe acci-
dents such as reactor vessel failure. The fundamental concept of
the US-APWR for severe accident mitigation is to flood the reactor
cavity with coolant water and to keep the molten fuel within the
reactor cavity. To achieve this, the US-APWR provides reliable
reactor cavity flooding system, which consists of two diverse inde-
pendent coolant water supply systems. Molten fuel behavior under
postulated reactor vessel failure was analyzed using a computa-
tional code. The calculation result shows that the molten fuel
spreads out on the flooded reactor cavity floor and the debris
deposition is adequately thin and evenly distributed. It can there-
fore be considered that the core debris coolability is sufficient for
severe accident mitigation. Analysis was also made on the chal-
lenge to containment integrity due to a postulated ex-vessel steam
explosion. It is concluded through the study that containment
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478 • Chapter 57
TABLE 57C.2 US-APWR PROBABILISTIC RISK
ASSESSMENT METRICS (SOURCE: MITSUBISHI HEAVY
INDUSTRIES, LTD.)
Requirement NRC URD US-APWR
CDF 1  104 1  105 1  105
integrity is maintained with a considerable safety margin and the
risk associated with the challenge to containment integrity is negli-
gibly small and acceptable.
57C.4.7 Fission Product Release
The US-APWR has many functions provided by fuel pellet,
fuel cladding, and reactor coolant boundary and containment to
prevent fission product release in the event of an accident and also
have equipment to reduce fission product release.
When an accident that involves a large release of radioactive
materials into the containment (ex-LOCA) occurs, some radioac-
tive nuclides in the containment atmosphere are removed by the
CS system.
Numerous NaTB (sodium tetraborate decahydrate) baskets are
placed in the containment to maintain the desired postaccident pH
conditions in the recirculation water. This equipment helps to pre-
vent resuspension of iodine.
Furthermore, if containment leakage occurs, fission products
will be filtered as they are released through the annulus emer-
gency exhaust system.
The result of calculation for the US-APWR CDF meets the
NRC goal and the URD goal (Table 57C.2).
57C.5 BUILDING CONFIGURATION
The equipment layout within the US-APWR buildings is deter-
mined to facilitate plant operation and maintenance and minimize
personnel radiation exposure. Provisions including redundant
train separation and segregation barriers have been made to assure
that the functions of the safety-related systems are maintained in
the event of postulated incidents such as fires, floods, and high-
energy pipe break events. Within the buildings, access control
zonings are established to restrict access to radiation areas and to
define the required radiation shielding and monitoring during
operation, shutdown, and accident conditions.
The US-APWR plant has the following principal buildings, as
shown in Fig. 57C.10.
• Reactor building (seismic category I)
• Power source buildings (seismic category I)
• Auxiliary building
• Access building
• Turbine building
Only the reactor building and the small power source buildings are
designed and constructed as safety-related structures to the require-
ments of seismic category I, as defined in RG 1.29 [2]. The symmetri-
cal arrangement for safety equipment efficiently reduces the required
space in the buildings. These design features provide less building vol-
ume and cost improvement compared to conventional PWR plants.
Radioactive equipment and piping in all buildings is arranged
and shielded to minimize radiation exposure. Pathways through
the plant are designed to accommodate equipment maintenance
and equipment removal from the plant. The size of the pathways
is determined by the largest piece of equipment that may have to
Plant north
Reactor building
Turbine
(Containment building
vessel)
Auxiliary building
Access control building Power source building
FIG. 57C.10 US-APWR COMPACT ARRANGEMENT OF
POWER BLOCK (Source: Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.)
be removed or deployed after initial installation. Where required,
lay-down space is provided for disassembling large pieces of
equipment to facilitate the removal or installation process.
Adequate space is provided for equipment maintenance, laydown,
removal, and inspection. Hatches, monorails, hoists, and remov-
able shield walls are provided to facilitate maintenance.
The containment facility is comprised of the prestressed con-
crete containment vessel (PCCV) and the annulus enclosing the
containment penetration area, and provides an efficient leak-tight
barrier and radiation protection under all postulated conditions
including LOCA. The PCCV is designed to withstand the peak
pressure under LOCA conditions. Access galleries are provided
for periodic inspection and testing of circumferential and axial
prestressing tendons. Figure 57C.11 shows a sectional view of the
US-APWR power block buildings.
For ease of access during operation, maintenance, repair, and
refueling, the following means to access the PCCV are also estab-
lished: two personnel airlocks at different elevations and a large
equipment hatch on the operating floor of the containment. The
dimensions of the equipment hatch are determined to allow the
future replacement of SGs without cutting through the contain-
ment. These features significantly improve the maintainability of
equipment and accessibility to the containment during outages.
The US-APWR safety-related structures, systems, and compo-
nents (SSCs) are designed as required by GDC 2 of 10 CFR 50,
Appendix A [3] to withstand the effects of natural phenomena,
including earthquakes, without jeopardizing the plant safety. The
SSCs are assigned to one of the three seismic categories (seismic
FIG. 57C.11 US-APWR PLANT
(Source: Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.)
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 479
category I, seismic category II, or nonseismic) depending on the
nuclear safety function of the particular SSC. The US-APWR
standard plant seismic design is based on the SSE and the OBE.
The certified seismic design response spectra (CSDRS) define the
site-independent SSE for the seismic design of the US-APWR
standard plant. The PGA of the CSDRS is 0.3 g ground accelera-
tion for the two horizontal directions and the vertical direction.
The PGA of the OBE is set at 1/3 of the SSE (CSDRS), and then
no design analysis is required to address the OBE loads for the
seismic category I SSCs.
The CSDRS are derived from RG 1.60 [4] spectra by scaling
the spectra contained in RG 1.60 from 1.0 g to 0.3 g zero period
acceleration (ZPA) values. The RG 1.60 spectral values are based
on deterministic values for earthquakes in the western United.
States. However, recent seismic research, including recently pub-
lished attenuation relations, indicate that earthquakes in the
central and eastern United States have more energy in the higher
frequency range than those in the western United States. Thus, the
RG 1.60 spectra control points have been modified by shifting the
control points at 9 Hz and 33 Hz to 12 Hz and 50 Hz, respective-
ly, for both the horizontal and the vertical spectra, as shown in
Fig. 57C.12. The modified RG 1.60 spectra used for the CSDRS
are expected to cover many sites in the central and the eastern
United States to apply the US-APWR standard plant design as
widely as possible.
The seismic analysis and design of the reactor building, PCCV,
containment internal structure, and their common base mat are
based on a model that couples a detailed RCL system lumped mass
stick model with a combined reactor building-PCCV-containment
internal structure lumped mass stick model. The site-independent
soil-structure Interaction (SSI) analyses are conducted considering
four generic subgrade conditions: (1) Soft soil site with shear wave
velocity Vs ⫽ 1000 ft./sec, (2) rock site (medium 1) with Vs ⫽ 3500
ft/sec, (3) rock site (medium 2) with Vs ⫽ 6500 ft./sec, and (4) hard
rock site with Vs ⫽ 8,000 ft./sec (as a fixed base condition). For each
one of the subgrade conditions, the analyses are performed where
each one of the three components of the earthquake horizontal (H1,
H2) and vertical (V) are applied separately to the model in the stan-
dard plant in N–S, E–W, and vertical direction, respectively, and are
combined using the direct integration time history method.
For seismic analysis of seismic category I subsystems, modal
response spectra analysis, time history analysis, or equivalent stat-
ic load analysis methods are used.
The functions of each building are described herein.
1.0
U.S. - APWR
RG 1.60
Acceleration (g)
0.5
0.0
0.1 1.0 10.0 100.0
Frequency ( Hz )
FIG. 57C.12 THE CSDRS (HORIZONTAL. DAMPING 5%)
(Source: Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.)
57C.5.1 Reactor Building
The building contains the PCCV and equipment important to
safety, except the emergency power sources. The equipment
includes safety-related pumps, heat exchangers, control room, and
associated electrical, I&C panels.
57C.5.2 Power Source Buildings
These buildings are freestanding on reinforced concrete mats,
and each building contains two identical emergency power
sources, which are separated from each other by physical barriers.
The electrical, I&C and heating, ventilation and air-conditioning
equipment related to the emergency power sources are also con-
tained in these buildings.
57C.5.3 Auxiliary Building
The building contains the main components of the waste dis-
posal systems and the nonsafety-related electrical area. This area
is normally a nonradioactive zone and is completely separated
from the radioactive zones of the building.
57C.5.4 Access Building
The building houses the access control facilities, the chemical
sampling, and laboratory area.
57C.5.5 Turbine Building
The building houses the nonsafety-related equipment of the
turbine generator and its auxiliary systems (main condenser,
feedwater heaters, moisture separator reheaters, etc.). The build-
ing is principally made of steel structure, which is designed to
withstand all loads including the load of the overhead traveling
crane. The foundation of the building is a reinforced concrete
structure.
57C.6 MODULARIZATION AND
CONSTRUCTION
MHI has constructed 23 PWR nuclear plants over a period of
the last 30 years in Japan. MHI was responsible for the construc-
tion of both the nuclear island and the conventional island. MHI
has gained valuable experience, which has enabled us to reduce
the construction period target to 41 months from the first concrete
to the first core loading.
The construction period of Ohi Unit 3 commercial operation
(C/O: Dec, 1991) was less than 42.5 months from the first con-
crete to fuel loading.
The main features of these innovative construction methods to
be used at the Japanese APWR are as follows:
• Use of super heavy duty crane (1000 ton class)
• Application of SC structure in all parts of internal concrete
structure
• Large PCCV liner block (one piece for dome liner and two
pieces for cylinder liner)
• Direct carry-in of heavy components inside CV by super
heavy duty crane
• Large equipment module
The construction period of the US-APWR is expected to be 41
months from the first concrete to the first core loading by applica-
tion of these innovative construction methods.
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480 • Chapter 57

TABLE 57C.3 STRESS CRITERIA FOR ASME CODE SEC-

TION III, CLASS 1, COMPONENT AND SUPPORTS AND
CLASS CS CORE SUPPORTS (SOURCE: MITSUBISHI
HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD.)

Vessel/
Service tanks/ Core Component
level pumps Piping supports Valves supports
A NB- NB- NG-3221 NB- NF
3221 3652 NG-3222 3520
NB- NG-3231 NB-
3222 NG-3232 3525
B NB- NB- NG-3223 NB- NF
3223 3654 NG-3233 3535
C NB- NB- NG-3224 NB-
FIG. 57C.13 ILLUSTRATION OF US-APWR STEEL
3224 3655 NG-3234 3526
CONCRETE STRUCTURE MODULE (Source: Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries, Ltd.) D NB- NB- NG-3225 special NF
3225 3656 NG-3235

(b) SG-MR III, a robot tube eddy current test (ECT)

machine, the inspection speed becomes twice compared
with the conventional type machine.

It is estimated that these US-APWR’s O&M features will reduce

occupational radiation exposure to approximately half of that in
the current PWRs.

57C.8 ASME CODE ASPECTS

FIG. 57C.14 ILLUSTRATION OF US-APWR LARGE EQUIP-
MENT MODULE (Source: Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.)
Examples of steel concrete structures for the inner concrete and
large equipment module for the main steam line and feedwater
line piping are in Figs. 57C.13 and 57C.14, respectively.
The US-APWR offers features as described below to improve
plant operability and maintainability.
57C.7 OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
1. Online maintenance afforded by 4  50% safety trains. It
results in about a 30% reduction in total work hours during
refueling outage.
2. Fully digital I&C contains redundancy, diversity, self-diag-
nostics, and online repair capabilities. These will substan-
tially reduce I&C maintenance costs.
3. The US-APWR adopts the unique ISI devices described
below and these can shorten the ISI work time.
(a) A-UT machine, an advanced ultrasonic testing machine
for reactor vessel.
The US-APWR is designed to the 2001 Edition, Section III of
the ASME Code up to and including the 2003 Addenda. The cor-
relation of the US-APWR Design Control Document [1] stress
criteria with the ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code [5] stress
criteria is summarized in Table 57C.3.
57C.9 FUTURE DIRECTION ON THE
US-APWR
The US-APWR technology, with its emphasis on proven evolu-
tionary improvements in safety, economics, and reliability should
have broad appeal in the United States. The future direction cur-
rently being pursued involves obtaining Design Certification from
the U.S. NRC and applying the standard design to as large a fleet
of power stations as possible. In the longer term, there may be
minor variations driven by specific site conditions through the
COL process and continuing careful evolution may lead to further
improvements in the standard design.
57C.10 REFERENCES
1. US-APWR Design Certification Document (US-APWR DCD).
2. Regulatory Guide 1.29, Seismic Design Classification.
3. 10CFR Part50 Appendix A General Design Criteria for Nuclear
Power Plants, Criterion 2.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 481

4. Regulatory Guide 1.60, Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design I&C instrumentation and control
of Nuclear Power Plants. LOCA loss-of-coolant accident
5. ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, 2001 Edition up to and includ- LP low pressure
ing the 2003 Addenda MCR main control room
MHI Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.
NaTB sodium tetraborate decahydrate
57C.11 NOMENCLATURE O&M operation and maintenance
APWR advanced pressurized water reactor OBE operating-basis earthquake
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers PCCV prestressed concrete containment vessel
BOL beginning-of-life PGA peak ground acceleration
CDF core damage frequency PWR pressurized water reactor
C/O Commercial operation RCCA rod cluster control assembly
COL Combined license RCL reactor coolant loop
CRDM control rod drive mechanism RCP reactor coolant pump
CRE control room envelope RCS reactor coolant system
CS containment spray RG Regulatory Guide
CS/RHR containment spray/residual heat removal RHR residual heat removal
CSDRS certified seismic design response spectra RWSP refueling water storage pit
CSS containment spray system
CV control valve SG steam generator
DCD Design Control Document SI safety injection
DG diesel generator SSC structure, system, and component
DVI direct vessel injection TD theoretical density
ETC eddy current test URD Utility Requirement Document
GTG gas turbine generator UT ultrasonic examination method
HP high pressure VDU visual display unit
HVAC heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning ZPA zero period acceleration
ASME_Ch57_p455-482.qxd 6/5/09 2:17 PM Page 482
ASME_Ch58_p483-504.qxd 6/3/09 12:14 PM Page 483
NEW GENERATION OF BWRS
Hardayal S. Mehta and Daniel C. Pappone
58.1 INTRODUCTION
Nuclear energy plays a major role in meeting the world’s
energy needs. At the end of 2005, there were 443 nuclear power
plants operating in 32 countries, with 25 more units under con-
struction. These plants account for 17% of world’s electricity. In
a nuclear power plant, steam to turn the turbine and in turn the
generator to produce electricity is produced through a controlled
nuclear fission reaction. The steam producing part of a nuclear
power plant, including the supporting systems, is called the
nuclear steam supply system (NSSS). Beyond the NSSS, the
remaining part of a nuclear power plant, the turbine/generator
and remainder of the steam cycle, is called the balance of plant
(BOP). In a boiling water reactor (BWR) NSSS, the steam is
directly produced in the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). In the
pressurized water reactors (PWRs), the steam is produced in
steam generators that are connected to RPV. Both the BWRs and
PWRs are classed as light water reactors (LWRs) since they use
light water (as opposed to heavy water, D2O) as coolant and
moderator. In the United States and many countries of the
world, the RPV and the most of the NSSS components are
designed, fabricated, tested, and inspected during service using
the rules of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code. Specifically,
Section II (for material selection and allowable stresses),
Section III (for design and analysis), Section IX (for welding),
and Section XI (for in-service inspection) of the Code are used.
The overall objective of this chapter is to provide a description
of the evolution of the BWR product line, including the current
offerings (the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor, ABWR, and the
Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor, ESBWR), along
with the discussion on the role of ASME Code in the material
selection, fabrication, design, and in-service inspection (ISI) of
the BWR NSSS system.
The first section provides a general background of the devel-
opment of the BWR product lines. This includes the description
of the reactor and reactor system design, safety system design,
and the containment design [1, 2]. The next section deals with
the key features of the ESBWR, including the natural circulation
design, operating domain, and passive safety features [3]. The
ASME Code aspects are covered next, including the ASME Code
versions, treatment of environmental fatigue issues, material
selection, and others. Future directions in terms of fabrications,
modularization, and others are discussed next. The last section
provides a summary.
CHAPTER
58
58.2 EVOLUTION OF BWR PRODUCT LINE
FROM BWR/1 THROUGH ESBWR
The BWR nuclear plant, like the PWR, has its origins in the
technology developed in the 1950s for the U.S. Navy’s nuclear
submarine program. The first commercial BWR nuclear plant to
be built was the 5-MWe Vallecitos plant (1957) located near San
Jose, California. The Vallecitos plant confirmed the ability of the
BWR concept to successfully and safely produce electricity for a
grid. The first large-scale BWR, Dresden 1 (1960), then followed.
The BWR design has subsequently undergone a series of evolu-
tionary changes with one purpose in mind – simplify.
The BWR design has been simplified in two key areas – the
reactor systems and the containment design. Table 58.1 chronicles
the development of the BWR.
58.2.1 General Progression of BWR Designs
Figure 58.1 illustrates the evolution of the reactor system
design. Interestingly enough, Dresden 1 was not a true BWR. The
design was based upon dual steam cycle, not the direct steam
cycle that characterizes BWRs. Steam was generated in the reac-
tor but then flowed to an elevated steam drum and a secondary
steam generator before making its way to the turbine. The first
step down the path of simplicity that ultimately led to the
ESBWR was the elimination of the external steam drum by intro-
ducing two technical innovations – the internal steam separator
and the steam dryer (KRB, 1962). The first large direct cycle
BWRs (Oyster Creek and Nine Mile Point Unit 1) appeared in the
mid-1960s and were characterized by the elimination of the steam
generators and the use of five external recirculation loops to pro-
vide forced circulation flow through the core. Later, reactor sys-
tems were further simplified by the introduction of jet pumps
inside the vessel for driving the core flow. The use of internal jet
pumps allowed two external recirculation loops to drive the core
flow, down from the five loops used in the large BWR/2 plants,
thus reducing the associated piping, valves, pumps, and large
vessel nozzles. This change first appeared in the Dresden 2
BWR/3 plant.
The use of reactor internal pumps in the ABWR design took this
process of simplification another step further. By using internal
pumps attached directly to the vessel itself, the jet pumps and the
external recirculation systems, with all the associated large pumps,
valves, piping, and snubbers, have been eliminated altogether. The
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484 • Chapter 58

TABLE 58.1 EVOLUTION OF THE GE BWR

First Commercial Representative Plant/

Product Line Operation date Characteristics

BWR/1 1960 Dresden 1

Initial commercial-size BWR
Dual cycle

BWR/2 1969 Oyster Creek

Plants purchased solely on economics
Large direct cycle
Forced circulation
Variable speed pumps for recirculation
flow control

BWR/3 1971 Dresden 2

Internal jet pump application
Improved ECCS: spray and flood capability

BWR/4 1972 Vermont Yankee

Increased power density (20%)

BWR/5 1977 Tokai 2

Improved ECCS
Valve flow control

BWR/6 1978 Cofrentes

Compact control room
Solid-state nuclear system protection system

ABWR 1996 Kashiwazaki-Kariwa 6

Reactor internal pumps
Fine-motion control rod drives
Advanced control room, digital and
fiber optic technology
Improved ECCS: high/low pressure flooders

ESBWR Under review Natural circulation

Passive ECCS

development of the ABWR took place during the 1980s under the
sponsorship of Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). In 1988,
TEPCO announced that the next Kashiwazaki-Kariwa units (K-6
and 7) to be constructed would be ABWRs. The licensing activi-
ties for the K-6 and 7 were conducted with the Japanese regulatory
agency, Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), in
parallel with the review of the ABWR in the United States by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). K-6 entered commercial
operation in 1996 and K-7 in 1997. Two more ABWRs entered
commercial operation in Japan – Hamaoka-5 in 2005 and Shika-2
in 2006. In addition to these four units in Japan, two more ABWRs
are being constructed for the Taiwan Power Company (TPC) at
TPC’s Lungmen site.
In the United States, the ABWR First-of-a-Kind Engineering
(FOAKE) program was completed in September 1996. FOAKE rep-
resented a major step toward one of the U.S. industry’s goals - to
have a certified design that is 90% engineered prior to the start of
construction. The ABWR Design Certification was signed into law
on May 2, 1997 by the then Chair of the NRC, Shirley M. Jackson.
In September 2007, NRG Energy submitted to the NRC a combined
construction permit – operating license application (COLA) to build
two ABWR units at the South Texas Project site in Texas.
The ESBWR and its smaller predecessor, the Simplified Boiling
Water Reactor (SBWR), took the process of simplification to its
logical conclusion with the use of a taller vessel and a shorter core
to achieve natural recirculation without the use of any pumps.
Following the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, there was sig-
nificant interest in developing a reactor with passive safety features
and less dependence on operator actions. Utilities also took this
opportunity to request a reactor that was simpler to operate, had
fewer components, and no dependence on diesel generators for
safety actions. GE began an internal study of a new BWR concept
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 485
Dresden 1
Oyster Creek
Dresden 2
FIG. 58.1 EVOLUTION OF THE BWR REACTOR SYSTEM DESIGN [2]
based on these principles and the SBWR was developed in the
early 1980s. This concept attracted development support from the
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), EPRI, and a number of U.S.
utilities. Key new features, such as the gravity-driven cooling sys-
tem (GDCS), depressurization valves (DPV), and leak-tight wet
well/dry well vacuum breakers were tested. As interest grew, an
international team was formed to complete the design, and addi-
tional separate effects, component and integrated system tests, par-
ticularly of the innovative new feature, the passive containment
cooling system (PCCS), were run in Europe and Japan. A Design
Certification Program was begun in the late 1980s with the objec-
tive of obtaining a standardized license, similar to that obtained for
ABWR. However, as more of the design details became known, it
became clear that at 670 Mwe, the SBWR was too small to gener-
ate the right economics for a newly build project. The certification
program was stopped, but efforts continued to make the SBWR
attractive for power generation. With European utility support, the
SBWR was uprated gradually to its current power level of approxi-
mately 1550 Mwe. This was made possible by staying within the
RPV size limit established by the ABWR and by taking advantage
of the modular approach to passive safety afforded by isolation
condensers (ICs) and PCCS.
The Design Certification application for the ESBWR was sub-
mitted to the U.S. NRC in August 2005 and was formally accepted
for docketing in 3 months. The NRC’s new plant review and
licensing process has been improved, including allowance for par-
allel review of both the Design Certification and the COLA, with
a focus on standardization and reducing and eliminating re-
reviews of the same open items. GE is working with a number of
customers who have selected the ESBWR technology and is par-
KRB
ABWR
ESBWR
ticipating in the U.S. Department of Energy’s Nuclear Power
2010 program, which was established by the DOE to act as a cata-
lyst for the newly built nuclear energy in the United States.
58.2.2 Reactor System Design
The first LWRs were pressurized to prevent the water from
boiling in the core or turning to steam. The conventional wisdom
was that steam bubbles would somehow affect the behavior of the
neutrons and cause the reactor to behave erratically and possibly
overheat. Samuel Untermyer, a scientist at Argonne National
Laboratory, postulated that if water bubbled or steamed in an
overheating reactor core, the chain reaction would slow down [4].
This concept of a negative void reactivity coefficient proved to be
fundamental to the successful design and operation of the BWRs.
Untermyer initiated the Boiling Water Reactor Experiment
(BORAX) series of test reactors at the National Reactor Testing
Station in Idaho. In 1953, the first test reactor in the series,
BORAX-1, demonstrated two theories: (1) boiling water in a
reactor was a stable condition, and (2) the void coefficient can
control the power increases. Argonne modified the BORAX reac-
tor design several times while conducting experiments to develop
an understanding of the parameters necessary for operating a
BWR safely.
Argonne’s ultimate goal was to evolve a reactor useful for
electrical generation. The early experiments with the BORAX
reactors demonstrated the inherent safety and stability of the
BWR. Using a turbine generator scrounged from an old sawmill,
the BORAX-III reactor lit the town of Arco, Idaho, on July 17,
1955 with nuclear power for the first time in history. The first
BWR power plant, EBWR (Experimental BWR), built by
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486 • Chapter 58
Argonne Laboratory, was designed for 20 MWe. The plant ran
from 1956 to 1967, gradually increasing its power level and reli-
ability from the point where it supplied electricity to the entire
Argonne Lab.
The main characteristic of the BWR is the fact that bulk boiling
takes place in the reactor core. Three configurations have been
used for the power cycle design of the BWR plant. In the direct
cycle BWR, the simplest design, the steam is passed directly from
the reactor vessel to the turbine. In the indirect cycle design, the
steam–water mixture passes through a steam generator; the steam
produced on the secondary side of the steam generator is then
passed to the turbine. The indirect cycle design has the advantage
of isolating the radioactive contaminants within the primary sys-
tem; however, this advantage is offset by the increased cost and
maintenance associated with the steam generators. The dual cycle
design is a combination of both the direct and indirect cycles, with
high-pressure steam being passed directly to the high-pressure end
of the turbine and lower pressure steam from the steam generator
entering the turbine at an intermediate stage. The dual cycle com-
bined reliability, stability, a fairly high power density, and a well-
controlled reactor response to changes in load demand. The BWR
designs can be further classified by the means used to drive the
coolant through the core. In a forced circulation design, the core
flow is driven by pumps external or internal to the reactor vessel.
In a natural circulation design, the difference in density between
the single-phase fluid in the downcomer region and the two-phase
mixture in the core provides the driving force [5].
GE selected the BWR as the most promising nuclear power
concept because of its inherent advantages in control and design
simplicity. GE established an atomic power equipment business in
1955 to offer the BWR commercially. The first GE BWR, the
Vallecitos BWR, was built in 1957. This 1000-psi reactor pow-
ered a 5-MWe generator and provided power to the Pacific Gas
and Electric Company grid through 1963. The VBWR was con-
structed so that it could be operated in either a direct cycle mode
or a dual cycle mode using either forced or natural circulation.
The advantages of the BWR compared to the PWR are as
follows:
• The reactor vessel and associated components operate at a
substantially lower pressure (about 1000 psig) compared to a
PWR (about 2200 psig).
• There are no steam generators and no pressurizer vessel.
• Lower risk (probability) of a rupture causing loss of coolant
compared to a PWR, and lower risk of a severe accident
should such a rupture occur. This is due to fewer pipes, fewer
large diameter pipes, fewer welds, and no steam generator
tubes.
• The distance between the core and the vessel wall is greater;
therefore, the pressure vessel is subject to significantly less
irradiation compared to a PWR and so does not become as
brittle with age.
• The fuel operates at a lower temperature.
• The single reactor vessel makes emergency conditions sim-
pler to diagnose and emergency actions simpler to execute.
• A BWR may be designed to operate using only natural circu-
lation so that recirculation pumps are eliminated entirely.
The disadvantages of a BWR are as follows:
• The core nuclear and thermal hydraulic calculations are more
complex when considering two-phase flow.
• The RPV is much larger than that of a PWR of similar power.
However, the overall cost is reduced because a modern BWR
has no main steam generators or pressurizers.
• The primary coolant passes through the turbine, contaminat-
ing it with short-lived activation products. Therefore, radia-
tion exposure must be managed in the vicinity of the steam
piping and turbine.
The first commercial BWRs were small demonstration plants
for evaluating various approaches to reactor and containment
design and for demonstrating key system design features. These
plants are referred to as the BWR/1 product line, even though
they were custom designs. Dresden 1 was the first commercial
BWR. Dresden 1 was based upon dual cycle design and used
forced circulation. The plant used a spherical dry containment.
Steam was generated in the reactor but then flowed to an elevated
steam drum and a secondary steam generator before making its
way to the turbine. The dual steam cycle system was employed to
assure overall plant stability between the reactor and turbine gen-
erator during normal operation and operational transients.
Dresden 1 was the model for several other dual cycle plants
(Garigliano, KRB, Tarapur). Humboldt Bay and Big Rock Point
were the first commercial direct cycle plants.
Table 58.2 provides a comparison of the key features of the
commercial BWRs. The first standardized BWR design was the
BWR/2 (Oyster Creek and Nine Mile Point 1). The BWR/2 direct
cycle design used the internal steam separator and steam dryer
demonstrated at KRB. This simplified the reactor design by elimi-
nating the external steam drum and steam generator pressure ves-
sels. The steam separator and dryer assemblies are removed to
allow access to the core during refueling. The control blades enter
the core from the bottom of the vessel. Control rod entry from the
bottom of the core provides the best axial flux shaping and resul-
tant fuel economy for the BWR. The bottom entry drives do not
interfere with refueling operations. The piston drive and high-
pressure scram accumulators provide high scram forces and
ensures rapid rod insertion.
The BWR/2 design also standardized the use of forced recircu-
lation core flow. Oyster Creek and Nine Mile Point 1 passed the
entire core flow through five external recirculation loops with
pumps. Forced recirculation core flow provides a second means of
controlling core power in addition to the control rods. Forced
recirculation allows the core power to be controlled by changing
recirculation flow by exploiting the negative void reactivity char-
acteristics of the BWR core design. An increase in the core flow
increases the liquid in the core, which increases the neutron mod-
eration and power generation. The core stabilizes at a higher
power level. The ability to change power gradually by using core
flow also reduces the thermal mechanical duty on the fuel. The
control rod drives (CRDs) move the control blades in finite incre-
ments, which may result in a significant local power increase near
the tip of the control blade. Varying the core flow also varies the
boiling boundary in the core. This allows spectral shift core man-
agement schemes to be employed. Early in the cycle, the core
flow is kept at low, lowering the axial flux shape and boiling
boundary in the core, which increases the voiding in the top of the
core. This voiding hardens the neutron spectrum in the upper part
of the core resulting in the breeding of plutonium. At the end of
the cycle when the reactivity in the lower part of the core is
exhausted, the core flow is increased, shifting the axial flux shape
upward and burning the plutonium generated in the upper part of
the core early in the cycle. Thus, the ability to control core power
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TABLE 58.2 COMPARISON OF KEY FEATURES OF GE BWRs

Parameter BWR/2 BWR/4 BWR/6 ABWR ESBWR

Power (MWt/MWe) 1930/670 3293/1098 3900/1360 3926/1350 4500/1550

Vessel height/diameter (m) 19.5/5.4 21.9/6.4 21.8/6.4 21.1/7.1 27.7/7.1

Fuel bundles, number 560 764 800 872 1132

Active fuel height (m) 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.0

Power density (kW/L) 40.5 50 54.2 51 54

Recirculation pumps 5 (external) 2 (external) 2 (external) 10 (internal) 0

Number/type of CRDs 137/LP 185/LP 193/LP 205/FM 269/FM

Safety system pumps 12 9 9 18 0

Safety diesel generators 2 2 3 3 0

Alternate shutdown 2 SLC 2 SLC 2 SLC 2 SLC 2 SLC

pumps pumps pumps pumps accumulators

Control and Analog Analog Analog Digital Digital

instrumentation single single single multiple multiple channel
channel channel channel channel

Core damage (freq/yr) 105 105 106 2  107 3  108

Safety bldg vol (m3/Mwe) 110 120 170 180 130

using recirculation flow ultimately results in better fuel cycle eco-
nomics for the plant.
The next significant simplification introduced in the reactor
system was the internal jet pump in the BWR/3 design. These
pumps sufficiently boosted recirculation flow so that only two
external recirculation loops were needed. This change was first
incorporated in the Dresden 2 plant. The use of internal jet pumps
resulted in the elimination of several of the recirculation lines and
pumps used previously in the BWR/2 reactors. Savings in invest-
ment for recirculation lines and pumps were partially offset by the
higher power requirements due to the lower efficiency of the jet
pump. More notably, the use of jet pumps gives some safety
advantages in that the number and size of major nozzle penetra-
tions on the vessel is reduced and the reactor internal arrangement
allows the capability of reflooding the vessel and maintaining
coolant level in the core even if there is a complete severance of
the recirculation line. Increased natural circulation capability was
also gained with the jet pump system.
The basic jet pump BWR design was carried through most of
the plants comprising today’s BWR operating fleet. The BWR/4
design (Browns Ferry and Peach Bottom) introduced improved
ECCS and higher core power densities. The BWR/5 design (Tokai 2)
introduced constant speed recirculation pumps and flow control
valves used to control the reactor core flow and improved ECCS.
The change from variable speed recirculation pumps to constant
speed pumps with valve control allowed the plants to follow more
rapid load variations and reduced the capital cost of the overall
control system. The BWR/6 design (Cofrentes) incorporated a
five-hole nozzle design in the jet pump that increased the pump-
ing efficiency and allowed the use of smaller jet pumps. With
smaller jet pumps, the size of the core could be increased, increas-
ing the reactor output for the same size vessel.
The ABWR design (Kashiwazaki-Kariwa 6) incorporated reactor
internal pumps to drive the core flow. By using pumps attached direct-
ly to the vessel itself, the jet pumps and the external recirculation
systems, with all their pumps, valves, piping, and snubbers, have
been eliminated altogether. With the elimination of the large external
recirculation piping, there were no large pipes attached to the vessel
below the top of the core. This allowed the ABWR to be designed to
keep the core submerged and cooled during the break of any pipe
forming the reactor coolant pressure boundary. Fine motion CRDs
permit small power changes, improved start-up times, and improved
power maneuvering.
The ESBWR design uses natural circulation to provide the dri-
ving force for the core flow, eliminating the recirculation pumps
altogether. Building on the basic ABWR vessel design, the height
of the vessel has been increased to provide the additional driving
head necessary to achieve the core flows and power levels neces-
sary for a modern reactor. Variable feedwater temperature control
has been added to provide a second means of reactivity control in
addition to the fine motion CRDs. Figure 58.2 shows the direct
cycle power conversion system used in most BWRs.
58.2.3 Safety System Design
The loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) has dominated the design
of the safety systems for BWRs. A LOCA is defined as a breach in
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488 • Chapter 58
the primary coolant system pressure boundary. The design basis
accident (DBA) was specified to be the instantaneous double-ended
guillotine break of the largest pipe attached to the RPV. However,
the safety systems must also be designed to mitigate the conse-
quences of the full spectrum of potential break sizes and locations
anywhere in the primary coolant piping, as well as equipment fail-
ures such as a stuck-open relief valve that result in a an uncon-
trolled loss of primary system coolant. The emergency core cooling
system (ECCS) is designed to provide cooling water to the core ter-
minating any heat up of the core and to provide long-term removal
of the core decay heat. The containment provides the final barrier to
prevent the release of fission products from the fuel. The suppres-
sion pool in the containment provides a heat sink and internal water
source for core cooling. The containment heat removal systems
transfer the decay heat to the ultimate heat sink. In addition to pro-
viding for core and containment cooling, the incorporation of the
LOCA affected the structural design of the plant. The vessel and
piping structures had to be designed to withstand the jet reaction
and pipe whip forces from the broken pipe. Structures and systems
had to be protected against the impingement of the jet from the bro-
ken pipe. Systems had to be designed to mitigate the hydrogen gen-
erated by the reaction of the zirconium fuel cladding with steam at
high temperatures. The ECCS, containment, and supporting sys-
tems designed for mitigating the consequences of a LOCA have
resulted in a network of safety system with the capacity and redun-
dancy to handle a wide range of transient and accident events.
The BWR ECCS design has evolved along with the BWR
product generations. The first generation of BWRs were designed
without ECCS, but rather made use of highly reliable feedwater
systems. With the increase in core power associated with the first
commercial scale reactors (the BWR/2 design), concerns were
raised with respect to providing adequate core cooling during a
LOCA and preventing a core meltdown that would threaten con-
tainment integrity. In the late 1960s, the Report of the Advisory
Task Force on Power Reactor Emergency Cooling led to the
FIG. 58.2 ESBWR STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM [2]
requirement that all nuclear plants must have ECCS [6]. Some
forms of emergency core cooling, typically a core spray and high-
pressure coolant injection (HPCI), were retrofit to the BWR/1s.
The BWR/2s, BWR/3s, and BWR/4s were under design and con-
struction during this time frame and a separate ECCS were incor-
porated into those reactor designs.
The BWR/2 recirculation loop design took water from the
downcomer region and pumped it into the lower plenum region of
the vessel. The limiting pipe break LOCA for the BWR/2 was in
the recirculation discharge pipe where it attached to the vessel. A
break at this location would leave a large rupture in the bottom of
the system that would prevent reflooding the vessel. Therefore, it
was decided that the best means of cooling the core would be
with a spray system that would wet and cool the fuel from above.
The core spray consisted of ring spargers around the periphery of
the core, just above the top of the fuel bundles. The ring spargers
do not interfere with the core flow during normal operation or fuel
bundle movement during refueling. Two completely separate sys-
tems (electrical power, pumps, valves, piping, etc.) were provided
for redundancy. Because the core spray system was designed for
the large break LOCA, the core spray pumps are low-pressure,
high-flow capacity pumps. These pumps cannot inject into the
vessel at normal operating pressures. To address breaks that are so
small that the vessel will not depressurize through the break, logic
was added to some of the vessel pressure relief valves. When the
logic detected the LOCA conditions, low reactor water level and
high containment drywell pressure, and sensed that the core spray
pumps were running, the logic would open the relief valves and
depressurize the vessel, effectively making the small break into a
large break. This logic is known as the automatic depressurization
system (ADS). For the long-term recovery from the accident, provi-
sions were made to flood the containment to a level above the top
of the core. In addition to the ECCS network, the BWR/2 design
includes ICs to provide decay heat removal from the vessel in the
event that the main steam line isolation valves are closed and the
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 489
main condenser is unavailable as a heat sink. The ICs are simply
passive heat exchangers located in pools of water above the vessel
and outside the containment. Steam from the reactor vessel is
passed through the heat exchanger tubes, condensed, and the con-
densate is returned to the vessel. The water on the shell side of the
heat exchange is boiled and vented to the atmosphere.
The BWR/2 plant design also marked the standardization of the
pressure suppression containment design. In the pressure suppres-
sion containment design, steam released from the reactor vessel is
directed into the suppression pool where it is condensed. The con-
tainment cooling system, which takes water from the suppression
pool, passes it through a heat exchanger where it is cooled, then
returns the cooled water to the containment, either back to the pool
or through sprays in the drywell and suppression chamber airspace.
The ECCS network design used for the BWR/3 and BWR/4
product lines are similar. The two core spray systems and the
ADS system were carried forward from the BWR/2. The jet pump
design introduced in the BWR/3 eliminated the large recirculation
pipe connection to the bottom head of the vessel. It now became
possible to reflood the core region of the vessel up to the top of
the jet pumps. The containment cooling system described above
grew in scope and became the residual heat removal (RHR) sys-
tem. The RHR system was connected to the reactor vessel to pro-
vide decay heat removal when the reactor is shut down. During
the beginning portion of the accident, the flow from the four RHR
pumps is directed into the recirculation discharge lines and inject-
ed through the jet pumps into the core shroud region of the vessel.
This mode is called the low pressure coolant injection (LPCI)
mode. Once the core is reflooded, the RHR pumps are realigned
into the containment cooling mode. The two core spray systems
are dedicated to core cooling. In addition, a turbine-driven large-
capacity HPCI pump was added to the ECCS network. This pump
provides inventory makeup for small breaks with the vessel at
operating pressure. The improved core cooling provided by the
ECCS network allowed larger plants with higher power cores to
be designed. With the higher core powers, however, the size of the
IC became impractical. In place of the ICs, the later BWR/3s and
all the BWR/4s used a second nonsafety turbine-driven injection
pump to provide inventory makeup when the vessel is isolated.
The reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system is similar to the
HPCI but smaller in capacity because it is sized to make up only
the boiloff due to decay heat. The control valves and instrumenta-
tion for the HPCI and RCIC systems are powered from the station
emergency batteries, allowing them to function in station blackout
situations where no power is available from off-site or the station
emergency diesel generators.
At the time the BWR/2, BWR/3, and BWR/4 ECCS were
designed, there were no regulations defining the ECCS perfor-
mance acceptance criteria. The design intent of the ECCS was to
prevent the fuel cladding from melting and to keep the core in a
coolable geometry during a LOCA. GE designed the ECCS for
these plants to limit the peak cladding temperature below 2700 °F,
which provided some margin to the melting point of approximately
3400 °F. In 1973, 10CFR50.46 was issued, which defined the
ECCS performance acceptance criteria. In these new regulations,
the peak cladding temperature was limited to 2200 °F. More
sophisticated analytical models, combined with a transition in fuel
design from a 7  7 lattice to an 8  8 lattice with the fuel rods
operating at lower powers, allowed the plants to minimize the
impact of the new regulations on the plant power output.
The BWR/5 product line was designed during the time frame
when the ECCS performance issues were being raised. The ECCS
network incorporated in the BWR/5 product line improved the
performance and reliability of the ECCS over the BWR/3 and
BWR/4 designs. The network consists of three electrical divi-
sions, of which two divisions contain two ECCS pumps each, an
RHR pump that can be used for LPCI injection or containment
cooling and either a low-pressure core spray system or a second
LPCI pump dedicated to vessel injection. The third electrical divi-
sion has a high-pressure core spray (HPCS) system powered by a
dedicated diesel generator, which replaces the turbine-driven
HPCI. The HPCI turbine would trip off when the vessel depres-
surized below about 100 psi, whereas the electrically driven
HPCS operates through the full vessel pressure range. Also, the
HPCI injects water through the feedwater line into the vessel
downcomer region. With a large recirculation line break, the
water injected by the HPCI would be lost through the break and
not reach the core region. The HPCS injects directly into the core
region through one of the two core spray spargers. The LPCI flow
path was rerouted from the recirculation discharge line to dedicat-
ed lines allowing the LPCI to inject directly into the core region
inside the core shroud. In the earlier BWR/3 and BWR/4 designs,
a break of the recirculation discharge line also disabled the injec-
tion flow path for the LPCI injecting into that division. The RCIC
was retained to provide makeup when the vessel is isolated and
for station blackout events. The BWR/5 design was carried for-
ward into the BWR/6 product line with the capacities increased to
accommodate the higher BWR/6 core power levels. The ECCS
network design was able to meet the requirements imposed by
10CFR50.46 without any impact on plant operations.
The internal recirculation pumps in the ABWR eliminated the
large external recirculation loop piping. The ABWR was the first
BWR designed after the adoption of the 10CFR50.46 limits. With
the elimination of the large pipes attached to the lower section of
the vessel, it was now possible to design the ECCS so that the
core would remain covered during the design basis LOCA, thus
assuring adequate core cooling throughout the event. It was possi-
ble to significantly downsize ECCS equipment as a result of elim-
inating large vessel nozzles below the top of the core. Capacity
requirements are sized based on operating requirements – tran-
sient response and shutdown cooling – rather than on the need for
large reflood capability. Inside the reactor vessel, core spray
spargers were eliminated, since no postulated LOCA would lead
to core uncovery. For transient response, the initiation water levels
for RCIC and the high-pressure core flooder were separated so
that there is reduced duty on the equipment relative to earlier
BWRs. There are three complete shutdown cooling loops, includ-
ing dedicated vessel nozzles. Complex operating modes of the
RHR systems, such as steam condensing, were eliminated.
Finally, heat removal, in addition to core injection, was automated
so that the operator no longer needs to choose which mode to per-
form during transients and accidents.
Like the ABWR, the ESBWR is designed to keep the core cov-
ered and cooled during a LOCA. However, the ESBWR core and
containment cooling systems represent a radical departure from
those of the earlier BWR product lines in that the cooling systems
are passive and do not rely on electrically driven pumps. The
ESBWR passive safety systems are discussed in more detail in
Section 58.3.3.
58.2.4 Containment Design
The containment is essentially a pressure vessel housing the reac-
tor that provides a safety barrier to protect personnel and the public in
the event of a reactor accident. Figure 58.3 illustrates the evolution of
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490 • Chapter 58
Dry
Mark II
Mark III
ABWR
FIG. 58.3 EVOLUTION OF THE BWR CONTAINMENT DESIGN [2]
the BWR containment from the earliest versions to today’s ESBWR
design. Most of the initial BWR/1 plants used spherical dry contain-
ments. The containment vessel was sized to be able to hold the sensi-
ble energy content of the steam and hot water in the reactor coolant
system and limit the pressure rise to within the design value of the
vessel. Larger reactor sizes could be accommodated by increasing the
volume of the containment vessel and by increasing the pressure rat-
ing of the vessel. However, because of the higher energy content in
the BWR vessel as compared to a similar PWR, dry containments
could not be designed that were economically competitive with
PWRs. Therefore, GE selected the pressure suppression containment
for the standard BWR plants [7].
Table 58.3 provides a comparison of the key features of the
pressure suppression containments used in the BWR plants. In
a pressure suppression containment, the reactor and primary sys-
tem piping are contained in one chamber, the drywell, and the sup-
pression pool is contained in a separate chamber, the wetwell. A
system of vents provides a flow path from the drywell to the
wetwell, with the vents discharging below the surface of the sup-
pression pool. In the event of a LOCA, the steam and water from
the vessel, as well as the air in the drywell, are driven through the
vents into the suppression pool where the water in the pool
quenches the steam. The advantages of a pressure suppression
containment are as follows:
• High heat capacity
• Lower design pressure
• Superior ability to accommodate rapid depressurization
• The pool has the ability to filter and retain fission products
• A large source of readily available makeup water in the case
of accidents
• Simplified, compact design
Mark I
ESBWR
The Mark I containment was the first of the pressure suppres-
sion containment designs. The Mark I design has a characteristic
light bulb configuration for the drywell, surrounded by a steel
torus that houses a large water pressure suppression pool. The
light bulb design came from the need to have a removable clo-
sure at the top for reactor servicing and refueling and sufficient
room at the bottom for the recirculation piping. The torus design
provided a large surface area for the vents. The structural analy-
ses of the drywell and the torus were also simplified because
closed-form solutions were available for these simple shapes (the
Mark I design was developed in an era of limited computing
power). The drawbacks of the Mark I design was the difficulty of
its construction and the construction of the reactor building
around it and the limited room inside the drywell for construc-
tion of the primary system piping and maintenance of compo-
nents. The Mark I containment was used with the BWR/2,
BWR/3, and BWR/4 product lines.
The Mark II over-under configuration was designed to address
the construction issues associated with the Mark I design. The
main advantages of the Mark II design were (1) more volume in
the drywell to allow better access to the steam and ECCS piping,
(2) simpler vent configuration using straight pipes, (3) the poten-
tial to use different construction materials, and (4) a smaller reac-
tor building. The Mark II containment design was introduced with
the BWR/5 product line but was also used for a couple of the late
BWR/4 plants.
The Mark III containment design, introduced with the BWR/6
product line, represented a major improvement in simplicity. Its
containment structure is a right circular cylinder that is easy to con-
struct, and provides access to equipment and ample space for main-
tenance activities. The large volume allowed a reduction in the
design pressure. Other features of the Mark III include horizontal
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TABLE 58.3 COMPARISON OF KEY FEATURES OF GE BWR CONTAINMENTS

Parameter Mark I Mark II Mark III ABWR ESBWR

Power level (MWe) 1100 1100 1220 1371 1600

Reactor pressure vessel

inside diameter (m) 6.4 6.4 6.0 7.1 7.1

Drywell
Free volume (m3) 4672 7872 7929 7350 7206
Design pressure (MPa) 0.43 0.31 0.17 0.31 0.31

Wetwell
Free volume (m3) 4834 5318 32904 5960 5467
Water volume (m3) 3480 3268 4332 3580 4383
Design pressure (MPa) 0.43 0.31 0.10 0.31 0.31

Vents
Orientation Vertical Vertical Horizontal Horizontal Horizontal
Size (m) 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7
Number 76 70 117 30 30

vents to reduce overall loss-of-coolant (LOCA) dynamic loads and
a freestanding all-steel structure to ensure leak tightness.
The ABWR containment is significantly smaller than the Mark
III containment because the elimination of the recirculation loops
translates into a significantly more compact containment and
reactor building. The structure itself is made of reinforced con-
crete with a steel liner from which it derives its name – reinforced
concrete containment vessel (RCCV). The ESBWR containment
is similar in construction to the ABWR, but slightly larger to
accommodate the passive ECCS systems.
58.3 KEY FEATURES OF ESBWR
58.3.1 Natural Circulation Design
Natural circulation in BWRs is a proven technology [8, 9]. Some
of the early GE BWRs employed natural circulation. These were
small plants (e.g., Dodewaard at 183 MWt and Humboldt Bay at
165 MWt), but they clearly demonstrated the feasibility of the
BWR and provided valuable operating data and experience. GE
moved to forced circulation plants to achieve higher power ratings
in a compact pressure vessel. Pressure vessel fabrication capability
at the time was a factor in this decision. Now, after several decades,
GE is returning to natural circulation for the ESBWR.
Natural circulation provides major simplification by removal
of the recirculation pumps and associated piping and heat
exchangers and controls. It is also synergistic with two other
requirements that GE considered to be important in the design of
a new reactor: large safety margins with a very reliable passive
ECCS and avoidance of safety/relief valve (SRV) opening for
pressurization transients such as turbine trips or main steam line
isolation events. Both of these features need a tall pressure vessel
with large water volumes. The tall vessel leads to enhanced nat-
ural circulation flow, so the natural circulation capability comes
with no additional cost.
The ESBWR builds on the design features of operating BWRs.
Figure 58.4 shows a cutaway of the ESBWR RPV. Most compo-
nents in the ESBWR are standard BWR components that have
been operating in the field for years (steam separators, control rods
and guide tubes, core support structure, etc.). The core consists of
conventional BWR fuel bundles, shortened from 12 ft. to 10 ft. to
improve pressure drop and stability characteristics. The absence of
hardware in the downcomer (jet pumps or internal pumps) reduces
flow losses and further enhances natural circulation. The main dif-
ference is the taller reactor vessel with the addition of a partitioned
chimney above the core and a correspondingly taller downcomer
annulus. The fluid in the taller downcomer provides the additional
driving head for natural circulation flow through the core, as well
as a large water inventory for a LOCA. Steam in the chimney also
provides a cushion to dampen void collapse in the core during
pressurization transients, leading to a softer response with no SRV
discharges.
58.3.2 Operating Domain
Valuable operating experience was gained from the early nat-
ural circulation BWRs. It was demonstrated that BWRs could
operate in natural circulation without problems. The plants were
extremely stable and presented no unusual characteristics relative
to noise in the instrumentation. Power was raised by control rod
withdrawal. The ESBWR will also adjust output using control
rods, but with electrically driven CRDs that move slower and
have finer positioning capability than the locking piston design
for conventional BWRs. Because of its size, ESBWR will not
normally be operated in a load follow mode. The FMCRDs can
accommodate a duty corresponding to daily load following
cycles for 10 years. Variable feedwater temperature control has
been added to provide a second means of reactivity control in
addition to the fine motion CRDs.
The present-day BWRs can operate at about 50% of rated power
in natural circulation; however, stability considerations prevent
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492 • Chapter 58
FIG. 58.4 ESBWR REACTOR ASSEMBLY [2]
steady operation in this region. There have been recirculation
pump trip events in operating plants, which led to a natural circula-
tion state at around 50% of rated power. The operating conditions
in the present-day BWRs (power, flow, power distribution) in nat-
ural circulation following the pump trip were well predicted by the
calculational models used for ESBWR performance analysis.
The operating parameters for the ESBWR, such as the power
density, steam quality, void fraction, and void coefficient are within
the range of operating plant data. Figure 58.5 shows a comparison
of the ESBWR power–flow operating map with those of operating
BWRs. This figure is based on the power per bundle and flow per
bundle so that a meaningful comparison can be made. The power
per bundle and flow per bundle for the ESBWR are both lower
than for a modern jet pump plant at rated operating conditions,
but the ratio of power to flow is similar to that for an uprated
BWR at Maximum Extended Load Line Limit Analysis Plus
(MELLLA+) conditions. This means that the core exit steam
quality (ratio of steam flow to core flow) is also similar.
58.3.3 Passive Safety Features
The ESBWR safety systems design incorporates four redundant
and independent divisions of the passive GDCS, the ADS and a
PCCS. These systems are shown in Fig. 58.6. Heat removal and
inventory addition are also provided by the isolation condenser
system (ICS) and the standby liquid control system (SLCS).
The RPV has no external recirculation loops or large pipe noz-
zles below the top of the core region. This, together with a high
capacity ADS, allowed the incorporation of an ECCS driven solely
by gravity, not needing any pumps. The water source needed for
the ECCS function is stored in the containment upper drywell,
with sufficient water to insure core coverage to 1 m above the top
of active fuel as well as flooding the lower drywell.
The PCCS heat exchangers are located above and immediately
outside of containment. There is sufficient water in the external
pools to remove decay heat for at least 72 h following a postulated
design basis accident, and provisions exist for external makeup
beyond that, if necessary.
As a result of these simplifications in the ESBWR safety sys-
tems, there is an increase in the calculated safety performance
margin of the ESBWR over earlier BWRs. This has been con-
firmed by a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for the
ESBWR, which shows that the ESBWR is a calculated factor of
about 5 lower than ABWR and 50 better than BWR/6 in avoiding
possible core damage from degraded events.
58.3.3.1 Gravity-Driven Core Cooling System The GDCS is
composed of four divisions. A single division of the GDCS con-
sists of three independent subsystems: a short-term cooling (injec-
tion) system, a long-term cooling (equalizing) system, and a del-
uge line. The short-term and long-term systems provide cooling
water under force of gravity to replace RPV water inventory lost
during a postulated LOCA and subsequent decay heat boiloff. The
deluge line connects the GDCS pool to the lower drywell. A
schematic of the GDCS is shown in Fig. 58.7.
Each division of the GDCS injection system consists of one
200-mm pipe exiting from the GDCS pool. A 100-mm deluge line
branches off and is terminated with three 50-mm squib valves and
deluge line tailpipes to flood the lower drywell. The injection line
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FIG. 58.5 COMPARISON OF ESBWR OPERATING POWER/FLOW MAP WITH OPERATING BWRs [2]

FIG. 58.6 ESBWR KEY SAFETY SYSTEMS [2]

11
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FIG. 58.7 ESBWR GRAVITY-DRIVEN COOLING SYSTEM [2]
continues after the deluge line connection from the upper drywell
region through the drywell annulus where the line branches into
two 150-mm branch lines, each containing a biased-open check
valve and a squib valve.
Each division of the long-term system consists of one 150-mm
equalizing line with a check valve and a squib valve, routed
between the suppression pool and the RPV. All piping is of stain-
less steel and rated for reactor pressure and temperature. The RPV
injection line nozzles and the equalizing line nozzles all contain
integral flow limiters.
In the injection lines and the equalizing lines, there exists a
biased-open check valve located upstream of the squib-actuated
valve. The GDCS squib valves are gas propellant-type shear valves
that are normally closed and which open when a pyrotechnic boost-
er charge is ignited. During normal reactor operation, the squib
valve is designed to provide zero leakage. Once the squib valve is
actuated, it provides a permanent open flow path to the vessel.
The check valves mitigate the consequences of spurious GDCS
squib valve operation and minimize the loss of RPV inventory
after the squib valves are actuated and the vessel pressure is still
higher than the GDCS pool pressure including (its gravity head).
Once the vessel has depressurized below the GDCS pool surface
pressure and its gravity head, the differential pressure opens the
check valve and allow water to begin flowing into the vessel.
The GDCS deluge lines provide a means of flooding the lower
drywell region with GDCS pool water in the event of a postulated
core melt sequence that causes failure of the lower vessel head
and allows the molten fuel to reach the lower drywell floor. A
core melt sequence would result from a common mode failure of
the short-term and long-term systems, which prevents them from
performing their intended function. Deluge line flow is initiated
by thermocouples, which sense high lower drywell region base-
mat temperature indicative of molten fuel on the lower drywell
floor. Squib-type valves in the deluge lines are actuated upon
detection of high basemat temperatures. The deluge lines do not
require the actuation of squib-actuated valves on the injection
lines of the GDCS piping to perform their function.
The deluge valves are opened based on very high temperatures
in the lower drywell, indicative of a severe accident. Once the del-
uge valve is actuated, it provides a permanent open flow path
from the GDCS pools to the lower drywell region. Flow then
drains to the lower drywell via permanently open drywell lines.
This supports the BiMAC core catcher function.
The GDCS check valves remain partially open when zero dif-
ferential pressure exists across the valve. This is to minimize the
potential for sticking in the closed position during long periods of
nonuse.
Suppression pool equalization lines have an intake strainer to
prevent the entry of debris material into the system that might be
carried into the pool during a large break LOCA. The GDCS
pool airspace opening to DW is covered by a mesh screen or
equivalent to prevent debris from entering pool and potentially
blocking the coolant flow through the fuel. A slosh guard is
added to the opening to minimize any sloshing of GDCS pool
water into the drywell following dynamic events.
The GDCS equalizing lines perform the RPV inventory control
function in the long term. By closing the loop between the sup-
pression pool and the RPV, liquid inventory that is transferred to
the suppression pool either by PCCS condensation shortfall or by
steam condensation in the drywell (which eventually spills back
to the suppression pool) can be added back to the RPV.
58.3.3.2 Passive Containment Cooling System The PCCS
maintains the containment within its pressure limits for DBAs. The
system is designed as a passive system with no components that
must actively function, and it is also designed for conditions that
equal or exceed the upper limits of containment severe accident
capability. The PCCS consists of six low-pressure, totally inde-
pendent loops, each containing a steam condenser (passive con-
tainment cooling condenser), as shown in Fig. 58.8. Each PCCS
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FIG. 58.8 ESBWR PASSIVE CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM [2]
condenser loop is designed for 11-MWt capacity and is made of
two identical modules. Together with the pressure suppression
containment, the PCCS condensers limit containment pressure to
less than its design pressure for at least 72 h after a LOCA without
makeup to the IC/PCC pool and beyond 72 h with pool makeup.
The PCCS condensers are located in a large pool (IC/PCC pool)
positioned above, and outside, the ESBWR containment (DW).
Each PCCS condenser loop is configured as follows. A central
steam supply pipe is provided, which is open to the containment
at its lower end and it feeds two horizontal headers through two
branch pipes at its upper end. Steam is condensed inside vertical
tubes and the condensate is collected in two lower headers. The
vent and drain lines from each lower header are routed to the DW
through a single containment penetration per condenser module
as shown in the diagram. The condensate drains into an annular
duct around the vent pipe and then flows in a line that connects to
a large common drain line, which also receives flow from the
other header, ending in a GDCS pool.
The noncondensable vent line is the pathway by which drywell
noncondensables are transferred to the wetwell. This ensures a
low noncondensable concentration in the steam in the condenser,
necessary for good heat transfer. During the periods in which
PCCS heat removal is less than decay heat, excess steam also
flows to the suppression pool via this pathway.
The PCCS loops receive a steam–gas mixture supply directly
from the DW. The PCCS loops are initially driven by the pressure
between the containment DW and the suppression pool during a
LOCA and then by gravity drainage of steam condensed in the
tubes, so they require no sensing, control, logic, or power-
actuated devices to function. The PCCS loops are an extension of
the safety-related containment and do not have isolation valves.
Spectacle flanges are included in the drain line and in the vent
line to conduct postmaintenance leakage tests separately from
Type A containment leakage tests. Located on the drain line and
submerged in the GDCS pool, just upstream of the discharge
point, is a loop seal. It prevents backflow of steam and gas mix-
ture from the DW to the vent line, which would otherwise short
circuit the flow through the PCCS condenser to the vent line. It
also provides long-term operational assurance that the PCCS con-
denser is fed via the steam supply line.
Each PCCS condenser is located in a subcompartment of the
IC/PCC pool, and all pool subcompartments communicate at their
lower ends to enable full use of the collective water inventory inde-
pendent of the operational status of any given IC/PCCS subloop. A
valve is provided at the bottom of each PCC subcompartment that
can be closed so that the subcompartment can be emptied of water
to allow PCCS condenser maintenance.
Pool water can heat up to about 101 °C (214 °F); steam formed,
being nonradioactive and having a slight positive pressure relative
to station ambient, vents from the steam space above each PCCS
condenser where it is released to the atmosphere through large-
diameter discharge vents. A moisture separator is installed at the
entrance to the discharge vent lines to preclude excessive mois-
ture carryover and loss of IC/PCC pool water. IC/PCC pool make-
up clean water supply for replenishing level is normally provided
from the makeup water system.
Level control is accomplished by using an air-operated valve in
the makeup water supply line. The valve opening and closing is
controlled by water level signal sent by a level transmitter sensing
water level in the IC/PCC pool. Cooling and cleanup of IC/PCC
pool water is performed by the fuel and auxiliary pools cooling
system (FAPCS). The FAPCS provides safety-related, dedicated
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makeup piping, independent of any other piping, which provides
an attachment connection at grade elevation in the station yard
outside the reactor building, whereby a post-LOCA water supply
can be connected. There have been extensive qualification tests of
the PCCS, including full-scale component tests and full height
scaled integral tests.
58.3.3.3 Standby Liquid Control System The SLCS provides
a backup method to bring the nuclear reactor to subcriticality and
to maintain subcriticality as the reactor cools. The system makes
possible an orderly and safe shutdown in the event that not enough
control rods can be inserted into the reactor core to accomplish
shutdown in the normal manner. The SLCS is sized to counteract
the positive reactivity effect of shutting down from rated power to
cold shutdown condition. It also adds additional inventory to the
RPV after confirmation of a LOCA.
The SLCS is automatically initiated in case of signals indica-
tive of LOCA or anticipated trips without scram (ATWS). It can
also be manually initiated from the main control room to inject
the neutron-absorbing solution into the reactor.
The SLCS is a two-division passive system using pressurized
accumulators to inject borated water rapidly and directly into the
bypass area of the core. Each division is of 50% capacity.
Injection will take place after either of two squib valves in each
division fires upon actuation signal from the SSLC. Figure 58.9
illustrates the SLCS configuration.
In addition to the accumulators and injection valves, supporting
nonsafety grade equipment includes a high-pressure nitrogen
charging system for pressurization and to make up for losses and
a mixing and boron solution makeup system. The boron absorbs
thermal neutrons and thereby terminates the nuclear fission chain
reaction in the fuel. The specified neutron absorber solution is
sodium pentaborate using 94% of the isotope B10 at a concentra-
tion of 12.5%. This combination not only minimizes the quantity
of liquid to be injected, but also assures no auxiliary heating is
needed to prevent precipitation of the sodium pentaborate out of
solution in the accumulator and piping. At all times, when it is
FIG. 58.9 ESBWR STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM [2]
possible to make the reactor critical, the SLCS will be able to
deliver enough sodium pentaborate solution into the reactor to
assure reactor shutdown.
Upon completion of injecting the boron solution, redundant
accumulator level measurement instrumentation using two out of
four logic closes the injection line shut-off valve in each SLCS
division. Closure of these valves prevents injection of nitrogen
from the accumulator into the reactor vessel that could interfere
with ICS operation or cause additional containment pressuriza-
tion. As a backup, the accumulator vent valves are also opened at
the same time.
58.3.3.4 Isolation Condenser System The primary function of
the ICS is to limit reactor pressure and prevent SRV operation fol-
lowing an isolation of the main steam lines. The ICS, together with
the water stored in the RPV, conserves sufficient reactor coolant
volumes to avoid automatic depressurization caused by low reac-
tor water level. The ICS removes excess sensible and core decay
heat from the reactor, in a passive way and with minimal loss of
coolant inventory from the reactor, when the normal heat removal
system is unavailable. The ICS is designed as a safety-related sys-
tem to remove reactor decay heat following reactor shutdown and
isolation. It also prevents unnecessary reactor depressurization and
operation of ECCS, which can also perform this function.
The ICS consists of four totally independent trains, each con-
taining an IC that condenses steam on the tube side and transfers
heat to a large IC/PCCS pool positioned immediately outside the
containment, which is vented to the atmosphere as shown in
the ICS schematic (Fig. 58.10). The IC, connected by piping to
the RPV, is placed at an elevation above the source of steam
(vessel) and, when the steam is condensed, the condensate is
returned to the vessel via a condensate return pipe. The steam
side connection between the vessel and the IC is normally open
and the condensate line is normally closed. This allows the IC
and drain piping to fill with condensate, which is maintained at
a subcooled temperature by the pool water during normal reac-
tor operation. The IC is brought into operation by opening
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FIG. 58.10 ESBWR ISOLATION CONDENSER SYSTEM [2]
condensate return valves and draining the condensate to the
reactor, thus causing steam from the reactor to fill the tubes that
transfer heat to the cooler pool water. Each IC is made of two
identical modules.
The steam supply line (properly insulated and enclosed in a
guard pipe that penetrates the containment roof slab) is vertical
and feeds two horizontal headers through four branch pipes. Each
pipe is provided with a built-in flow limiter, sized to allow natural
circulation operation of the IC at its maximum heat transfer
capacity while addressing the concern of IC breaks downstream
of the steam supply pipe. Steam is condensed inside vertical tubes
and condensate is collected in two lower headers. Two pipes, one
from each lower header, take the condensate to the common drain
line that vertically penetrates the containment roof slab.
A vent line is provided for both upper and lower headers to
remove the noncondensable gases away from the unit during the
IC operation. The vent lines are routed to the containment through
a single penetration.
A purge line is provided to assure that during the normal plant
operation (IC system standby conditions), the excess of hydrogen
(from hydrogen water chemistry control additions) or air from the
feedwater does not accumulate in the IC steam supply line, thus
assuring that the IC tubes are not be blanketed with noncondens-
ables when the system is first started. The purge line penetrates
the containment roof slab.
Containment isolation valves are provided on the steam supply
piping and the condensate return piping.
Located on the condensate return piping just upstream of the
reactor entry point is a loop seal and a parallel-connected pair of
valves: (1) a condensate return valve (motor-operated, fail as is) and
(2) a condensate return bypass valve (nitrogen piston-operated, fail
open). These two valves are closed during normal station power
operations. Because the steam supply line valves are normally
open, condensate forms in the IC and develops a level up to the
steam distributor, above the upper headers. To bring an IC into
operation, the motor-operated condensate return valve is opened,
whereupon the standing condensate drains into the reactor and the
steam—water interface in the IC tube bundle moves downward
below the lower headers to a point in the main condensate return
line. The fail-open nitrogen piston-operated condensate return
bypass valve opens if power is lost or on low reactor water level
signal.
The loop seal assures that condensate valves do not have hot
water on one side of the disk and ambient temperature water on
the other side during normal plant operation, thus affecting leakage
during system standby conditions. Furthermore, the loop seal
assures that steam continues to enter the IC preferentially through
the steam riser, irrespective of water level inside the reactor, and
does not move countercurrent back up the condensate return line.
During ICS normal operation, any noncondensable gases col-
lected in the IC are vented from the IC top and bottom headers to
the suppression pool. During ICS standby operation, discharge of
noncondensable gases is accomplished by a purge line that takes a
small stream of gas from the top of the IC and vents it downstream
of the RPV on the main steam line upstream of the MSIVs.
Radiation monitors are provided in the IC/PCC pool steam
atmospheric exhaust passages for each IC loop. The radiation
monitors are used to detect IC loop leakage outside the contain-
ment and cause either alarms or automatic isolation of a leaking
IC. The IC has undergone engineering development testing using
a prototype to demonstrate the proper operability, reliability, and
heat removal capability of the design.
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58.4 MATERIALS, FABRICATION, AND
APPLICABLE ASME CODE EDITION
This section describes the thought process and the technical
basis used in selecting materials and fabrication processes used in
GE-designed ABWR and ESBWR. Additionally, the ASME Code
edition applicability is briefly discussed.
58.4.1 RPV Design
Figure 58.4 shows the ESBWR reactor assembly. The materials
and fabrication techniques mostly are common for ABWR and
ESBWR. The RPV closure head is elliptical in shape and is fabri-
cated of low alloy steel, as per ASME SA-508, Grade 3, Class 1.
It is secured to the RPV by 80 sets of fasteners (studs and nuts).
The studs are fabricated from SA-540 B23 or B24. The nuts are
tightened in groups of (typically) four at a time, using an automatic
or semiautomatic four-stud tensioner device.
There are three feedwater nozzles for each of the two feedwater
lines, which utilize double thermal sleeves welded to the nozzle.
The double thermal sleeve protects the vessel nozzle inner blend
radius from the effects of high frequency thermal cycling. A
schematic of the feedwater nozzle is shown in Fig. 58.11.
The vessel supports are of the sliding block-type geometry and
are provided at a number of positions around the periphery of the
vessel. Multiple vessel supports along with the corresponding
pedestal RPV support brackets provide
FIG. 58.11 ABWR/ESBWR RPV FEEDWATER NOZZLE [1, 2]
• openings to permit water to pass from the upper to lower
drywell
• access for ISI of the bottom head weld
The vessel bottom head consists of a spherical bottom cap,
made from a single forging, extending to the toroidal knuckle
between the head and the vessel cylinder and encompassing the
CRD penetrations. With a thickness of approximately 260 mm, the
bottom head meets the ASME Code allowables for the specified
design loads. The main advantage of using a single forging for the
bottom head is that it eliminates all RPV welds within the CRD
pattern, thus reducing future ASME Section XI ISI requirements.
Both the ABWR and ESBWR RPVs utilize rings forged from
low alloy steel, adjacent to and below the core belt line region. The
flanges and large nozzles are also low alloy steel. The shell rings
above the core belt line region and the RPV closure head are made
from low alloy steel forgings or plate as per ASME SA-533, Type B,
Class1. The required reference nil ductility temperature, RTNDT, of
the vessel material is 20 C. Figure 58.12 shows one of the forged
RPV shell rings during fabrication of an ABWR vessel.
58.4.2 Materials Selection and Water Chemistry
Controls
From the experience gained from the operating BWR fleet, the
understanding of both the materials of construction and the degra-
dation mechanisms has increased significantly. This understanding
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FIG. 58.12 ABWR RPV FORGED STEEL RING [1]
has been used to make ABWR/ESBWR materials selection. The
ABWR/ESBWR makes use of austenitic stainless steels and
nickel-base alloys as well as low alloy and carbon steel for all the
major components. The plant design takes into account the poten-
tial effects of stress corrosion cracking (SCC), irradiation embrit-
tlement, erosion/corrosion, and radiation buildup in the careful
application of these materials. This application of materials is
made in conjunction with good fabrication practice and strict
operating control of the coolant environment chemistry to mini-
mize the potential for long-term degradation and radiation
buildup. A more detailed explanation of each area is given in the
next section.
58.4.2.1 Austenitic Stainless Steel Materials for Internals and
Components Austenitic stainless steels, because of high general
corrosion resistance, high toughness, ease of fabrication, and accept-
able strength, have been commonly used for reactor internals and
some piping systems. In the ABWR, the primary consideration in
the use of these materials is the development of resistance to inter-
granular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) both in low and high flu-
ence locations. Based on field and laboratory efforts, this resistance
is tied to the control of the material’s composition, control of the fab-
rication processes, and control of the coolant environment.
The extensive understanding has now thoroughly demonstrated
that reduction of carbon content in austenitic stainless steel
reduces susceptibility to IGSCC. Three main austenitic materials
are being used: Type 316NG/316L wrought material, CF3M cast
materials, and XM-19 high strength stainless steel.
For the majority of the reactor internal structures, resistance to
sensitization for the ABWR is achieved by using a special Type
316NG (nuclear grade). This alloy has carbon restricted to a max-
imum 0.020% by weight to prevent sensitization, has nitrogen
additions up to a maximum of 0.12% to maintain the desired
strength levels, and has specific fabrication and processing con-
trols to increase the resistance to any crack initiation. Alternately,
where design does not need the mechanical strength of Type 316,
Type 316L is used with the same carbon limit and controls on fab-
rication processes.
Types 308L/316L weld metal and CF3M austenitic stainless
steel castings are also used in the reactor as well as for many of
the complex-shaped components such as valve body castings.
These alloys have a duplex microstructure that has been found to
have very high resistance to IGSCC. Their resistance is maxi-
mized by again limiting carbon content to less than 0.03%, while
requiring a minimum ferrite levels (greater than 8%) to assure
adequate resistance to IGSCC.
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For any highly irradiated stainless steel in-core components
such as control blades and instrument tubes, it is desirable to pro-
vide additional potential for the component to reach the intended
design life. Consequently, for the ABWR, both the component
design and materials of construction have been altered to provide
this higher resistance against irradiation-assisted stress corrosion
cracking for IASCC. The ABWR designs are crevice-free and
incorporate control of trace element chemistry such as sulfur and
phosphorus that provide this resistance.
The final material selected for specialized ABWR applications is
XM-19. This is a high chromium, high manganese austenitic stain-
less steel alloy that is strengthened with specific nitrogen addition
(as opposed to carbon). It has an established record of excellent
performance in very demanding applications in BWR service
where both high strength and extremely high resistance to IGSCC
are required. Example applications in the ABWR include compo-
nents in the FMCRD as well as core plate and top guide bolting.
58.4.2.2 Nickel Base Alloys for ABWR/ESBWR Application
Nickel base alloys, particularly Alloy 600 and X-750, are also
used extensively in BWRs. In addition to their excellent corrosion
resistance, nickel alloys have a thermal expansion coefficient
more similar to the low alloy steel used in the construction of the
RPV and nozzles. This feature has led to the application of Alloy
600 for several parts of the core internals, including the shroud
support structure as a transition material placed between the alloy
steel reactor vessel and the stainless steel internals. The other
desirable feature of Alloy 600 is that it is resistant to stress corro-
sion crack initiation in the postweld heat-treated condition, thereby
allowing attachment to low alloy steel prior to stress relief. For
the ABWR, to add margin against IGSCC, these alloys and their
weld metals have been modified with stabilizing additions of nio-
bium to reduce the potential for chromium depletion. For the
wrought structures, the ABWR employs an Alloy 600 (designated
as 600M) that has a niobium content on the order of 1-3%. For
weld metal, Alloy 82 with high stabilizing ratios is used, leading
to high IGSCC resistance as well.
Alloy X-750 is also used to a limited extent in the ABWR
where high strength is required. Alloy X-750 is a precipitation
hardening high strength nickel-base alloy that will perform well
in the ABWR environment under the proper application. To
improve SCC resistance for the ABWR, both the heat treatment
and stresses of Alloy X-750 are controlled, based on the extensive
operating plant experience and material understanding.
58.4.2.3 Component Fabrication and Design Considerations
Aside from selection of materials that are intrinsically resistant to
IGSCC, the fabrication of components will be controlled to ensure
that this high resistance is maintained in the finished part. Low
heat input welding processes are used to decrease the likelihood of
any sensitization due to the welding process. The margin of
IGSCC resistance will be reduced even for the intrinsically resis-
tant materials by abusive fabrication practices such as excessive
cold working. Postmanufacturing surface processing such as pol-
ishing can be applied to the weld heat-affected zones to remove
surface cold work and residual stresses and strains, thereby further
increasing the resistance to IGSCC initiation. Contamination with
in-process materials having high levels of species such as chlorine,
fluorine, and sulfur can degrade performance. Consequently, to
protect the high level of resistance obtained by using materials
such as described above for the ABWR, the entire fabrication and
installation process is controlled to prevent detrimental practices.
A final consideration in control of IGSCC is the design itself.
Crevices have been eliminated where possible and the number of
welds has been reduced. The top grid structure, for example, is
manufactured from a single solution annealed plate, thereby
eliminating the risk of IGSCC. The core shroud is constructed
in a manner to locate all welds away from the highest fluence
locations.
58.4.2.4 Water Chemistry Control With respect to materials
performance in the BWR, a substantial body of data now exists that
shows that water chemistry is a key factor in material degradation as
well as radiation buildup processes, especially for core internal com-
ponents. It has become very clear that the presence of oxidizing
species in the high purity coolant (such as oxygen and hydrogen per-
oxide), as well as anionic species that contribute to the coolant con-
ductivity, can be correlated with incidence of IGSCC cracking as
well as the rate of progression of any initiated cracks. Events such as
resin intrusions can also reduce the resistance to SCC initiation. The
benefits of operating with good water chemistry are very clear and
the owners of operating BWRs (even plants that have not experi-
enced severe degradation in water chemistry such as resin intru-
sions) have adopted practices to obtain low conductivity. Thus, the
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) has developed guidelines
for water chemistry control that provide specific recommended lim-
its on overall conductivity as well as specific species. For the
ABWR, recommended water chemistry is applied such that the units
operate at or below a target conductivity of 0.1 S/cm whenever the
reactor system is greater than 200F (93C).
These guidelines also recommend the application of hydrogen
water chemistry (HWC) when possible. The main function of
HWC is to inject sufficient hydrogen into the condensate to
reduce oxidizing species and maintain the electrochemical poten-
tial (ECP) of the reactor water below –0.23 V standard hydrogen
electrode (SHE). The addition of hydrogen has been documented
to effectively control SCC. Although HWC can result in additional
main steam line radiation, the use of noble metal technology such
as noble metal chemical addition (NobleChemTM) can reduce the
hydrogen needed for SCC control through catalytic action while
limiting any steam line radiation issues.
58.4.2.5 Material Considerations for 60-Year Design Life
The reactor vessel is also a very important component where 30
years of BWR operating experience and materials understanding
have been used in the ABWR. The vessel draws from the under-
standing of material degradation mechanisms and fabrication
experience. Of key interest are the effects of neutron irradiation
over the life of a reactor vessel beltline region (the region imme-
diately around the core), which results in a progressive loss of
fracture toughness. This shift in NDT to higher temperatures can
influence reactor operation with respect to such items as bolt-up
temperature and hydrostatic test temperature. Consequently, it is
advisable to start with a low NDT and use material resistant to
neutron radiation damage. Copper and phosphorus have been
identified as detrimental elements in alloys steels with respect to
neutron damage, and nickel is considered to also be a factor. The
corrosion behavior of reactor vessel steels is also well understood.
There is significant experience with these steels to assure that
there is high resistance to any SCC processes under the ABWR
operating coolant environment.
For the ABWR reactor vessel, high toughness and retention of
that toughness in service is provided. Strict controls are specified
on initial fracture toughness of vessel components. Reactor vessel
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 501
shell courses are required to have RTNDT of –20°C or less. In addi-
tion, copper content is controlled to 0.05% maximum for base
metal and weld metal. Phosphorus is limited to 0.006 and
0.008%, respectively. With these very low levels of copper, the
shift in NDT for the ABWR vessels is expected to be very small
over the operating life of the units. The estimated shift in RTNDT is
estimated to be less than 11°C over a 60-year operating life.
Low alloy steels are also used in many piping applications. The
reduced corrosion rates make it attractive for several systems.
However, the ABWR also employs carbon steel piping in some
systems. This selection has been made to aid in plant fabrication
while taking advantage of the steel’s inherent toughness.
Although erosion–corrosion in carbon steel power plant piping
systems has been experienced in some units, oxygen injection is
used for the ABWR to minimize this concern. Corrosion
allowances for 60 years operation are included in the piping
design.
58.4.3 Environmental Fatigue Rules
Since the early 1980s, the effects of high temperature water on
the fatigue cyclic life of LWR components have been extensively
discussed by numerous researchers. References [10]–[12] are
some of the examples. The Subgroup on Fatigue Strength of the
ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code is currently working on a
Code Case that would provide procedures for incorporating the
reactor water environmental effects in the fatigue evaluation con-
ducted as per the guidelines in Section III Paragraphs NB-3200
and NB-3600 [13].
Recently, the NRC has published Regulatory Guide 1.207 to
provide guidance for determining the acceptable fatigue life of
ASME pressure boundary components, with consideration of
LWR environment [14]. The associated detailed guidance docu-
ment is NUREG/CR-6909 [12]. NUREG/CR-6909 adopted the
environmental fatigue correction factor method or Fen method to
account for the environmental fatigue effects. Fen is defined as the
ratio of fatigue initiation life in air at room temperature to that in
reactor water at the service temperature. The regulatory guides are
FIG. 58.13 SCHEMATIC OF AN ABWR FEEDWATER PIPING SYSTEM [15]
not mandatory. However, the NRC is likely to ask applicants for
certification of new reactor designs for the technical approach
they plan to follow to address environmental fatigue effects.
Reference [15] describes the results of the application of
Regulatory Guide 1.207 methodology to an ABWR plant piping
system. The system chosen was feedwater piping inside the con-
tainment. This system is typically classified as Class 1 as per the
ASME Code classification.
Figure 58.13 schematically shows the feedwater piping system.
The piping system delivers the feedwater to the reactor. It also
receives water from RHR and RCIC systems. The portion of the
piping between the reactor nozzle and the header at the contain-
ment penetration is designed as per ASME Class 1 requirements.
Piping thickness is as per Schedule 80. The specified design pres-
sure and temperature for this piping are 1250 psi and 550°F,
respectively. The feedwater temperature during normal operation
is 420°F.
Table 58.4 provides a summary of the calculated values of
cumulative fatigue usage factors at two locations. For the feedwa-
ter nozzle location, usage factors are provided for both the nozzle
side (low alloy steel) and the safe end side (carbon steel). It is
seen that there is a modest impact on the calculated fatigue usage
factors when reactor water environmental effects are factored in.
At the safe end location, the reduction in air fatigue usage through
the use of NUREG/CR-6909 S–N curves essentially offset the
increase due to the use of Fen.
The increase in calculated fatigue usage when environmental
fatigue effects are taken into account was modest for the feedwater
piping considered in this evaluation. One of the reasons is that the
normal operating temperature for the feedwater line (240C) is
comparatively lower than the typical operating temperatures for the
primary piping in LWRs. In the case of carbon and low alloy steel
piping systems, the increase due to the use of Fen is significantly
offset by the advantage gained through the use of air S–N curves
provided in NUREG/CR-6909. This would not be the case for
stainless steel piping systems where the air S–N curves in
NUREG/CR-6909 predict higher usage factor than the Code curve.
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502 • Chapter 58
TABLE 58.4 CURRENT CODE AND ENVIRONMENTAL FATIGUE USAGE
FACTORS FOR AN ABWR FEEDWATER LINE [15]
Node/location/material Fatigue usage by
current code
Node 26/header/CS 0.083
Node 48/nozzle/LAS 0.085
Node 48/safe end/CS 0.085
In general, one would expect several fold increase in the calcu-
lated fatigue usage factor when Fen is used. This would have
implications in terms of number of locations where hypothetical
pipe breaks need to be postulated. Currently, the NRC Branch
Technical Position MEB 3–1 [16] is used for postulation of
breaks in high energy lines. MEB 3–1 requires postulation of a
break at an intermediate locations if the fatigue usage at a loca-
tion exceeds 0.1 or the primary plus secondary stress range
exceeds 2.4 Sm. The calculated primary plus secondary stress
range is not impacted by the use of Fen but the fatigue usage fac-
tor is. The use of Fen results in more locations where cumulative
fatigue usage factor would exceed 0.1. More break locations
means more pipe whip restraints to meet the requirements of
General Design Criterion 4 of 10CFR50 [17]. However, the pres-
ence of more pipe whip restraints adversely affects the ability to
conduct piping ISIs and thus have a negative impact on piping
reliability during operation. The 0.1 fatigue usage threshold was
based on engineering judgment and perhaps can be revised
upward to say 0.4 or 0.6 to avoid this situation. The revision
could be justified through a piping reliability analysis somewhat
similar to that conducted in support of revised Appendix L in
ASME Section XI Code [18].
58.4.4 Applicable ASME Code Edition
For ABWR, 1989 Edition of Section III of ASME Code was
used for plant design and fabrication. The ESBWR uses two dif-
ferent Editions of Section III. The 2001 Edition including
Addenda through 2003 Edition is used for all of the plant designs
except for building construction. For building construction, 2004
Edition is used.
The ASME Section XI Edition committed to the ESBWR
Design Certification Document (DCD) is 2001 Edition with
Addenda through 2003. For licensing for specific site, the plant
owner would select based on the permit date.
58.5 FUTURE DIRECTION – FABRICATION
AND MODULARIZATION
Modularization techniques are implemented to reduce costs and
improve construction schedules. These techniques are applied to
such reactor fuel building items as (1) building reinforcing bar
assemblies, (2) structural steel assemblies, (3) steel liners for the
containment and associated water pools, (4) selected equipment
assemblies, and (5) drywell platform and piping supports.
Fatigue usage by
NUREG/CR-6909
0.117
0.302
0.086
58.6 SUMMARY
The ESBWR represents an entirely new approach to the way
nuclear plant projects are undertaken, modeled after the successful
process used for ABWR. The ABWR was licensed and designed in
detail even before construction began. Once construction did begin,
it proceeded smoothly from start to finish in just 4 years.
Natural circulation is a proven technology that provides numer-
ous benefits. Natural circulation allows the elimination of several
systems, including recirculation pumps and associated piping,
valves, heat exchangers, motors, adjustable speed drives, and con-
trollers. The larger RPV employed for natural circulation provides
synergy with the use of passive ECCS and improves the response
to operational transients and increased safety margins. Flow tran-
sients resulting from recirculation pump anomalies are not pre-
sent; that is, no runbacks or trips that would challenge stability.
The successful design, licensing, construction, and operation of
the ESBWR nuclear power plant will usher in a new era of safe,
economic, and environment-friendly nuclear electricity. The
ESBWR is the first of a new generation of nuclear plants
equipped with advanced technologies and features that raise plant
safety to new levels, which significantly improve the economic
competitiveness of this form of generation.
58.7 REFERENCES
1. The ABWR Plant General Description, GE Brochure, October
2006.
2. The ESBWR Plant General Description, GE Brochure,
October 2006.
3. Hinds, D. and C. Maslak, Next-Generation Nuclear Energy:
The ESBWR, Nuclear News, Vol. 49, No. 1 2006, pp. 35–40.
4. Stacy, S.M., Proving the Principle, U.S. Department of Energy,
2000.
5. Lahey, R.T., Jr. and Moody, F.J., The Thermal-Hydraulics of a
Boiling Water Nuclear Reactor, American Nuclear Society, 1977.
6. Levy, S., 50 Years in Nuclear Power, A Retrospective,
American Nuclear Society, 2007.
7. Wade, G.E., Evolution and Current Status of the BWR
Containment System, Nuclear Safety, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1974, pp.
163–173.
8. Nissen, W.H.M., van der Voet, J., and Karuza, J., The Startup
of the Dodewaard Natural Circulation BWR – Experiences,
Nuclear Technology, Vol. 107, 1994, pp. 93–102.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 503
9. Shiralkar, B., Marquino, W., Klebanov, L., and Cheung, Y.K.
Natural Circulation in ESBWR, Paper No. ICONE15-10439,
Proceedings of 15th International Conference on Nuclear
Engineering, Nagoya, Japan, April 2007.
10. Mehta, H.S. and Gosselin, S.R., Environmental Factor
Approach to Account for Water Effects in Pressure Vessel and
Piping Fatigue Evaluations, Nuclear Engineering and Design,
Vol. 181, 1998, pp. 175–197.
11. Mehta, H.S., An Update on the Consideration of Reactor
Water Effects in Code Fatigue Initiation Evaluations for
Pressure Vessels and Piping, ASME PVP, Vol. 410(2), 2000,
pp. 45–51.
12. Chopra, O.K. and Shack, W.J., Effect of LWR Coolant
Environments on the Fatigue Life of Reactor Materials,
NUREG/CR-6909, Final Report, February 2007.
13. Letter from Subcommittee on Nuclear Power (Bill O’Donnell)
to Richard Barnes, Chairman Subcommittee III, dated February
9, 2007, Subject: Implementation of February 1, ’07 Plan to
Resolve Environmental Fatigue Issue for Nuclear Power Plants.
14. Regulatory Guide 1.207 (Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1144),
Guidelines for Evaluating Fatigue Analyses Incorporating the
Life Reduction of Metal Components Due to the Effects of the
Light Water Reactor Environment for New Reactors; U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 2007.
15. Mehta, H.S. and Hwang, H.L., Application of Draft
Regulatory Guide DG-1144 Guidelines for Environmental
Fatigue Evaluation to a BWR Feedwater Piping System, Paper
No. PVP2007-26143, ASME Pressure Vessel and Piping
Division Conference, San Antonio, Texas, July 2007.
16. Standard Review Plan Section 3.6.2 of NUREG-0800, Branch
Technical Position MEB 3-1, Postulated Rupture Locations in
Fluid System Piping Inside and Outside Containment,
Revision 2, June 1987.
17. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 4,
Environmental and Missile Design Basis.
18. Materials Reliability Program: Recommended Improvements
to ASME Section XI Appendix L (MRP-82), EPRI, Palo Alto,
CA, and U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., 2002.
ASME_Ch59_p505-518.qxd 6/3/09 12:20 PM Page 505
FUTURE CODE NEEDS FOR
VERY HIGH TEMPERATURE
GENERATION IV REACTORS
William J. O’Donnell and Donald S. Griffin
ABSTRACT
This chapter: (1) identifies the structural integrity issues in the
ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, including Section II,
Section III, Subsection NH (Class 1 Components in Elevated
Temperature Service), Section VIII, and Code Cases that must be
resolved to support licensing of Generation IV (Gen IV) nuclear
reactors, particularly very high temperature gas-cooled reactors;
(2) describes how the Code addresses these issues; and (3) identi-
fies the needs for additional criteria to cover unresolved structural
integrity concerns for very high temperature service.
59.1 BACKGROUND
In the late 1960s, the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) rec-
ognized that structural design methods used for light water reactor
(LWR) systems would not be adequate for the licensing of high-
temperature liquid metal reactor systems. Although non-nuclear
systems such as chemical process plants operate routinely at high
temperatures, they do not have the demonstrated reliability
required for long-term nuclear service with limited inspection. A
program was thus initiated by the DOE and continued for about
15 years to develop the basis for high-temperature structural
design and licensing of liquid metal fast breeder reactor
(LMFBR) systems.
A key feature of the program is that it was carried out simulta-
neously with design and construction of the fast flux test facility
(FFTF) plant and with design of the Clinch River breeder reactor
(CRBR) plant. Project design needs were factored into the devel-
opment program continuously and the results were used in ongo-
ing design and evaluation.
Since design temperatures of LMFBR systems are significantly
above those of the LWR systems more familiar to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC), close scrutiny was given to ele-
vated temperature effects as they relate to structural integrity and
safety. The NRC identified a number of concerns in two major
areas: (1) Code design limits and (2) design evaluation procedures.
Specific development programs were identified to be completed
CHAPTER
59
prior to issuance of a plant operating license. The review, which
included input from U.S. national laboratories, manufacturers, and
independent consultants, represented essentially an open forum
assessment of the state-of-the-art elevated temperature structural
design. As a result of the extensive review and with a plan agreed
upon for resolution of the NRC concerns, NRC and Advisory
Committee for Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) formally recommend-
ed issuance of a construction permit for CRBR.
Subsection NH [1] of Section III was originally developed to
provide structural design criteria and limits for elevated tempera-
ture design of LMFBR systems and some gas-cooled systems.
The U.S. NRC and its ACRS reviewed the design limits and pro-
cedures in the process of reviewing the CRBR for a construction
permit in the late 1970s and early 1980s and identified issues that
needed resolution. Since then, the NRC, DOE, and various con-
tractors have evaluated the applicability of the ASME Code and
Code Cases to high-temperature reactor designs, such as the very
high temperature gas-cooled reactors (VHTGRs), and identified
issues that need to be resolved to provide a regulatory basis for
licensing.
59.2 SUMMARY
Since the 1980s, the ASME Code has made numerous improve-
ments in elevated temperature structural integrity technology.
These advances have been incorporated into Section II, Section
VIII, Code Cases, and particularly Subsection NH of Section III
of the Code, “Components in Elevated Temperature Service” [1].
The current need for designs for very high temperature reactors
and for Gen IV systems requires the extension of operating tem-
peratures from about 1400⬚F (760⬚C) to about 1742⬚F (950⬚C),
where creep effects limit structural integrity, safe allowable oper-
ating conditions, and design life.
Materials that are more creep and corrosive-resistant are need-
ed for these higher operating temperatures. Material models are
required for cyclic design analyses. Allowable strains, creep-
fatigue and creep-rupture interaction evaluation methods are
needed to provide assurance of structural integrity for such very
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506 • Chapter 59
high temperature applications. Current ASME Section III design
criteria for lower operating temperature reactors are intended to
prevent through-wall cracking and leaking.
Section 59.7 describes the U.S. NRC and ACRS work on ele-
vated temperature structural integrity licensing issues subsequent
to CRBR. Source documents for the NRC and NRC sponsored
work are References [15]–[21], [23], and [24] of this chapter.
NRC has issued a number of definitive reports (see References
[16]–[19], [23], and [24]). Oak Ridge National Laboratory
(ORNL), Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), and Idaho
National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL)1
have performed the other studies and evaluations cited herein.
DOE sponsored an Independent Technical Review Group (ITRG)
of Technology alternatives for meeting the functional objectives
of the next generation nuclear plant (NGNP)[22]. A list of materi-
als and design basis issues cited in a 1993 ORNL Report [15] is
given in Section 59.6.1.
ANL provided two reports in 2003, describing a review and
assessment of the material behavior issues, and the Codes and
Procedures for high-temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTGRs).
They state that Subsection NH is considered to be applicable to
HTGR components that will operate at relatively low tempera-
tures, and that the scope of Subsection NH needs to be expanded
to include materials with higher allowable temperatures and other
materials of interest. They cite Alloy 617, 9 Cr-1M0-V steel, and
Hastelloy X as candidates for core support structures and vessel
internals. Their major findings are given in Sections 59.6.4 and
59.6.5.
DOE authorized INEEL to conduct a review of technology alter-
natives for the NGNP. Their report-Reference–[22]–was published
on June 30, 2004. Their recommendations are relevant to structural
design criteria and code development. The NGNP is to be designed,
constructed, licensed, and operated by no later than 2020, with a
target date for initial operation of 2017. INEEL believes that meet-
ing these objectives will require technology stretch, and warns
against attempting too great a stretch. Several nuclear system con-
cepts for a very high temperature reactor (VHTR) for the NGNP
were reviewed. These include the helium-cooled prismatic reactor,
the helium-cooled pebble bed reactor, and the molten salt-cooled
prismatic reactor. Based on construction time objectives and mater-
ial development requirements, INEEL recommended that maxi-
mum metal temperatures be limited to 900⬚C (1652⬚F). This corre-
sponds to a maximum core average outlet temperature of
900-950⬚C (1652-1742⬚F). Even at 900⬚F (1652⬚F) metal tempera-
ture, they state that some reactor core subassemblies might require
replacement during the 60-year design plant life.
The NRC prepared a presentation on “NGNP Technical Issues
Safety Research Needs” in June 2006 [23]. This presentation,
described in Section 59.6.7, discusses the licensing framework
and related components, qualifications, fabrication, and testing
issues. The major metallic component technical issues, as quoted,
still requiring resolution include the following:
• Fatigue, creep, and creep-fatigue interaction
• Coolant impurities and crevice concentration impacts
• Metal carburization, decarburization, and oxidation
1
On February 1, 2005, the Idaho National Engineering and
Environmental Laboratory and Argonne National Laboratory-West
became the Idaho National Laboratory (INL).
• Sensitization of austenitic steels
• Alloy aging behavior at elevated temperatures
• The adequacy of in-service inspection
• The applicability/adequacy of the ASME Code database
The design lifetime of Gen IV Reactors is expected to be
60 years. Additional materials including Alloy 617 and Hastelloy
X need to be fully characterized. Environmental degradation
effects, especially impure helium and those noted herein, need to
be adequately considered. Since cyclic finite element creep
analyses will be used to quantify creep rupture, creep fatigue,
creep ratcheting, and strain accumulations, creep behavior mod-
els and constitutive relations are needed for cyclic creep loading.
Such strain- and time-hardening models must account for the
interaction between the time-independent and time-dependent
material response.
The manner in which structural integrity and licensing issues
for the structural design of VHTR and Gen IV systems are
addressed in the current ASME Subsection NH and Code Cases
is described in Section 59.7. The material creep behavior, creep
fatigue, and environmental effects are addressed in Subsection
NH and Code Cases largely in terms of design criteria and allow-
able stress and strain values. The detailed material properties
needed for cyclic finite element creep design analyses are gener-
ally not provided in the Code. The minimum strength properties
given in the Code are used as anchor values for the more
comprehensive material suppliers’ average properties. The NRC
perspective is that the Code and/or Code Cases currently do not
adequately cover the material behavior under cyclic loads in the
creep regime and creep-fatigue-creep-rupture damage interaction
effects.
Subsection NH has rules for the design of welded joints sepa-
rated into Categories A–D. The permissible types of welded joints
and their dimensional requirements are specified. Paragraph NH-
3353 provides analysis requirements for the design and location
of all pressure-retaining welds operating at temperatures where
creep effects are significant. Reduction factors for creep stress
rupture are given as a function of time and temperature.
Permissible weld metals are limited and special examination
requirements are imposed.
Probably the most restrictive Subsection NH requirements for
welds are that the inelastic accumulated strains are limited to one-
half the allowable strain limits for the base metal. This has forced
designers to keep welds out of high-stress areas. The allowable
fatigue at weldments is limited to one-half the design cycles
allowed for the base metal. The allowable creep rupture damage
at weldments is limited in NH by requiring that the rupture
strength be reduced by the weld strength reduction factor when
determining the time to rupture. The Code also imposes addition-
al examination requirements on Categories A–D welded joints.
The adequacy of these and other Code weldment structural design
requirements, and even for the temperatures currently covered,
which are lower than the VHTR and Gen IV high-temperature
systems, has been questioned by the NRC.
Section 59.8 herein describes the material models, design crite-
ria, and analyses methods, which the NRC has indicated need to
be covered in the ASME Code under Regulatory Issues for Very
High Temperature Service. These needs for which Code technical
committees must be involved are listed hereunder—:
1. Material cyclic creep behavior, creep-rupture–creep-fatigue
interaction, and environmental effects
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 507
2. The structural integrity of welds
3. The development of extended simplified design analysis
methods (to avoid dependence on “black box” finite element
analysis (FEA) for cyclic creep)
4. Test verification of 1, 2, and 3
59.3 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY
EVALUATION APPROACH
59.3.1 Modes of Failure
Elevated temperature CRBR systems and components were
designed to meet the limits of the ASME Boiler & Pressure
Vessel Code, Section III, Case N-47 (1981) [2], the forerunner
of Subsection NH, which applies for ferritic steels at tempera-
tures above 700⬚F (371⬚C) and for austenitic stainless steels
above 800⬚F (427⬚C). Failure is prevented by (1) identifying
each possible failure mode, (2) determining the damage criterion
for each failure mode, and (3) establishing design rules that
appropriately separate design limits from initiation of failure.
Other rules rely on control of geometry, design rules to specify
details, and design factors based on experience to avoid failure,
but do not treat each failure mode explicitly.
Code Case N-47 is based primarily on design by analysis since it
was not possible to develop simple, generally applicable formulas
to represent the time-dependent response of complex structures.
However, it did include a number of simplified limits and bounding
methods. The latter were based on elastic and short-time plastic
analyses, which, although generally conservative, if satisfied, could
avoid more detailed, time-dependent, inelastic, and creep analyses.
The cost of analysis was a consideration. The modes of structural
failure considered in CRBR design include the following:
• Ductile rupture from short-term loads
• Creep rupture from long-term loads
• Creep fatigue failure
• Gross distortion due to incremental collapse and ratcheting
• Loss of function due to excessive deformation
• Buckling due to short-term loads
• Creep buckling due to long-term loads
59.3.2 Stress Categories
In Code Case N-47, stresses and strains are categorized as pri-
mary (P), secondary (Q), or peak (F), and in applying the limits,
distinction is made between two types of quantities: (1) load-con-
trolled and (2) deformation-controlled. The load-controlled quanti-
ties result from equilibrium with applied loads during plant opera-
tion. Primary stress intensities are load-controlled quantities.
Deformation-controlled quantities are stresses, strains, and defor-
mations that result from deflection and/or strain compatibility.
These quantities generally vary both with time and applied loads,
and creep effects may be a major influence. Thus, accurate, analyt-
ical evaluation of deformation-controlled quantities generally
requires inelastic stress analysis when creep effects are significant.
59.3.3 Materials Representations
Modeling of time-dependent materials behavior in multidimen-
sional states of stress is fundamental to the accurate prediction of
component response to service loads and to comparison with
design limits.
For CRBR, the materials models (constitutive equations) were
developed by the ORNL and are described in Reactor Development
& Technology (RDT) Standard F9-5T [3]. The constitutive rela-
tions [4] are based on observations largely from uniaxial test data
for Type 304 stainless steel and are applicable to 304 SS, 316 SS,
and 21⁄4 Cr-1 Mo steel. For time-independent, elastic-plastic calcula-
tions, the von Mises yield criterion, its associated flow rule, and the
linear kinematic hardening rule were used. For consistency, this
requires use of an assumed bilinear uniaxial stress-strain relation-
ship. Creep behavior is represented in the form of a creep law that
includes both primary and secondary creep. This includes all the
basic elements (elastic, plastic, primary, and secondary creep
strains) and the effects of plastic yielding and flow, cyclic plasticity,
plastic strain hardening, creep strain hardening, and creep load
reversal.
Small strain theory was used since the Code strain limits essen-
tially limit design strains to the range where small strain theory is
valid. The effects of prior plastic deformation on subsequent
creep were neglected, and, except for hardening due to prior creep
strains, the effects of prior creep deformation on subsequent elas-
tic-plastic behavior were neglected.
59.4 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY
EVALUATION METHODS
At the time the CRBR was designed, the finite element method
of structural analysis was already well established. Solutions for
linear elastic problems could be obtained readily and accurately
for relatively complex (three-dimensional) geometries and load-
ing conditions. The solution of nonlinear elastic–plastic creep
problems was less well established. It was impractical to do a full
three-dimensional inelastic analysis of a complete reactor system.
However, neither was it necessary to do detailed analysis over
extended regions of the system. Only part of the system operates
at elevated temperatures, and many components see elevated tem-
peratures only for brief periods. Also, for the components that
operate at elevated temperatures, the magnitude of inelastic strain
accumulation is critical only in local regions, such as nozzles,
elbows, flanges, connections, and so on. So the general approach
to design analysis was to determine interaction loads by equilibri-
um and compatibility considerations, and then analyze the highly
stressed local regions in significant detail.
59.4.1 Simplified Analysis Method
Simplification in structural analyses took the form of simplifi-
cation of geometry, material model, loading conditions, or some
combinations thereof. For the solution of nonlinear, elastic-plastic
creep problems, a number of special purpose computer programs
were written to implement the ORNL materials models for specific
geometries such as one-dimensional and plane (two-dimensional)
thick cylinders and axisymmetric and two-dimensional nozzles [5,
6]. Programs were written using simplified material models to
address specific failure modes such as creep ratcheting and creep
buckling. The ORNL materials models were also incorporated into
the general purpose finite element programs, MARC and ANSYS,
to address more complex geometries and loading conditions [7].
59.4.2 Detailed Analysis of Localized Areas
For CRBR, the design evaluation process proceeded from sim-
ple to complex. The design Code Case N-47 includes the so-
called screening rules that give limits for controlled quantities cal-
culated elastically. The rules are very conservative in most cases
but if they can be met, more detailed inelastic analysis is not
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508 • Chapter 59
required. A large part of the design was confirmed using the
screening rules. If the screening rules cannot be met, then inelas-
tic analysis is required. However, a “simplified” inelastic analysis
may suffice. It may be possible to show, using simplified repre-
sentations of the structure, that stresses or strains are bounded and
within design limits. If “simplified” methods fail, a “detailed”
analysis is necessary. But the detailed analysis could generally be
limited to very localized regions when proper account was taken
of the gross behavior of the structure. It is not necessary, for
example, to do an inelastic analysis of a complete pipeline when
only the elbows are loaded inelastically [8].
59.4.3 Models and Tests
To validate the combination of material model, geometrical
approximation, and computer implementation, a number of model
and full-scale tests were run and analyzed using simplified and
detailed analyses [9]. Full-scale tests were run on piping elbows,
nozzle to cylinder attachments, and cylinders rotated between two
opposing sodium jets [10]. The elbows were loaded to measure
time-dependent plastic buckling, creep deformation, creep ratch-
eting, creep relaxation, and creep buckling. The nozzle [FFTF
intermediate heat exchanger (IHX) nozzle] was loaded to measure
creep ratcheting and creep rupture. The rotating cylinder was also
loaded to measure response to thermal striping. Tests on models
included nozzles, cylinders, spheres, and plates (thermal striping).
The test results were used to sharpen the analytical techniques
and to gain expertise with their use in structural analysis of
CRBR.
59.5 REGULATORY ISSUES
59.5.1 NRC Licensing Review
In the Safety Evaluation Report, NUREG-0968 [11], related to
construction of the CRBR, the NRC described the complicating
effects of elevated temperature service as follows:
Systems and components in service at elevated temperatures
are subjected to larger temperature variations and differen-
tials than LWR hardware. Moreover, the materials have lower
strength at elevated temperatures. The resulting higher ther-
mal strain ranges and increased inelastic strain concentra-
tions tend to accelerate fatigue damage. In addition, the
materials are susceptible to creep-rupture damage that
results from both applied and residual stresses persisting
after transient conditions. Relaxation of such stresses tends to
cause ratcheting on subsequent load cycles. The effective
microscopic ductility of many of the materials and product
forms is reduced by concentration of creep strains in grain
boundaries. Consequently, cracking can occur at accumulat-
ed strain levels that would cause no problems at temperatures
below the creep regime.
59.5.2 Structural Integrity Licensing Concerns
Based on a review of the material presented by the CRBR
Project, the NRC (with ACRS) identified concerns in nine areas:
1. Weldment cracking
2. Notch weakening
3. Material property representation for inelastic analysis
4. Steam generator tube sheet evaluation
5. Elevated temperature seismic effects
6. Elastic follow-up in piping
7. Creep fatigue evaluation
8. Plastic strain concentration factors
9. Intermediate piping transition weld.
59.5.2.1 Weldment Cracking Weldment cracking, particularly
in components subjected to repeated thermal transient loads, was
identified by the NRC as the foremost structural integrity concern
for CRBR. It is well known that when structural failure occurs, it
is generally at weldments.
The design approach to weldment integrity was primarily to
ensure that weldments are at least as strong as the parent metal.
Weldment configuration and processes were controlled, and the
amount of delta ferrite that may transform into a brittle sigma
phase was limited. In addition, reduced strain limits were speci-
fied that encouraged the placement of weldments in lower
stressed regions. Code Case N-47 specified the use of parent
metal properties to represent weldment behavior in life assess-
ment procedures, the complex interaction between stress and
strain at weldments was not taken into consideration.
The NRC assessment was that because of the importance of
weldment cracking as a failure mode, the designer should have a
better understanding of the metallurgical interactions that take
place in weldments and their effects on weldment life.
Specifically, the NRC was concerned with (1) early crack initia-
tion at the inside wall surface in the heat-affected zone (HAZ)
where the weldment is exposed to thermal cycling; (2) the effects
of large variations in material properties within the weldment on
creep-fatigue and creep-rupture damage; and (3) the effects of
time rate, cycle rate, and hold time on the propagation of long
shallow cracks in the HAZ of a weldment. The NRC was also
concerned about creep enhancement of crack growth in a cracked
weldment, specifically, enhanced creep in the remaining
uncracked wall caused by residual stress and thermal cycling, and
effects of creep on stability of the remaining uncracked wall liga-
ment. The NRC felt that as a minimum, these effects must be con-
sidered and quantitatively evaluated to determine the safety mar-
gins of weldments in elevated temperature components.
The basic requirements identified by NRC were as follows:
• Evaluate potential for premature crack initiation at weld-
ments due to thermal fatigue, residual stresses, and damage
caused by the welding process.
• Confirm adequacy of creep rupture and creep fatigue damage
evaluation procedures at weldments.
• Assess growth behavior of cracks in the HAZ of weldments.
• Evaluate consequences of enhanced creep in uncracked liga-
ments.
• Assess stability of uncracked ligaments for creep conditions.
• Define effects of long-term elevated temperature service on
crack initiation.
• Evaluate effects of loading sequence on creep fatigue behavior.
It was required that these investigations be completed prior to
issuance of a plant operating license.
59.5.2.2 Notch Weakening Cracking at notches and other local
structural discontinuities in components was another area of major
concern to the NRC. The situation is similar to that at weldments
where material discontinuities lead to high local stresses. In the
case of notches, the geometrical configurations lead to local stress
concentrations and the potential for inelastic strain concentrations
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that may exhaust material ductility. Notches, small radius fillets,
and localized structural discontinuities are regions observed in
practice, besides weldments, where cracks tend to initiate.
The CRBR approach to avoid cracking was to avoid use of
sharp geometrical discontinuities and to place structural transi-
tions in low stress regions. There were no special rules in Code
Case N-47 that apply to notches. They were not considered in
application of the load-controlled limits but were considered in
application of the Appendix T Strain Limits (T-1300) and the
Creep Fatigue Limits (T-1400). Separate limits were provided for
elastic and inelastic analysis. If the elastic limits could be met,
then inelastic analysis was unnecessary. However, for the CRBR,
most regions with significant structural discontinuities had to be
modeled inelastically. In fact, most of the inelastic analysis per-
formed for the CRBR plant was to ensure compliance with Code
Case N-47 Appendix T rules at structural discontinuities.
The major concern of the NRC was that the design limits for
fatigue and creep rupture were based on tests of smooth-sided
specimens that did not include possible effects of stress gradients
in notches. The NRC was also concerned about loss of ductility
under long-term loads due to prior cyclic and monotonic strain-
ing. The NRC concerns are described as follows in the Safety
Evaluation Report, NUREG-0968 [11]:
The basic allowable stress limits of the Code are based on
unnotched creep specimen test data. Stress raisers influence
the creep behavior of the entire wall in two basic ways. They
introduce a constraint against inelastic flow by inhibiting slip
line development. This is manifested in a reduction in the
average stress intensity in the net section (a notch strength-
ening effect). Stress raisers also introduce a site where creep-
rupture damage could cause early crack initiation and more
rapid crack propagation (a notch weakening effect). Although
the combined effect is notch strengthening in most cases, an
evaluation is needed to determine what geometric, loading,
and material parameters could cause significant notch weak-
ening, particularly for long-term loads at elevated tempera-
tures. Loading conditions such as transverse shear do not
introduce any notch strengthening and have contributed to
weldment cracking at structural discontinuities.
A confirmatory program was developed jointly between the
NRC and the CRBR project to address these concerns. The basic
elements of the program are summarized as follows:
• Extend the elastic-constraint damage evaluation method to
include cyclic and bending loads.
• Implement effects of material ductility in the damage evalua-
tion procedure.
• Apply the extended method to “worst case” geometric notch-
es in CRBR components.
• Compare effects of tensile stress versus stress intensity on
creep rupture.
• Develop cyclic creep strain concentration factors for notches
in creep fatigue and perform trial applications.
It was required that these investigations be completed prior to
issuance of a plant operating license.
59.5.2.3 Material Property Representation for Inelastic
Analysis The NRC reviewed analysis methods and applicable
design criteria used for CRBR design. Concerns were expressed
on the impact of new technology developments on safety, the
verification of computer programs for use in inelastic analysis, and
use of alternative strain limits in the DOE Office of Nuclear
Energy (NE) Standard F9-5T. These were resolved by project
commitments to assess the potential CRBR safety implications of
new developments, provide verification and qualification of com-
puter programs used in the design, and to avoid the use of strain
limits based on elastic analysis in the final design justification.
An NRC issue that required a confirmatory program to be
completed prior to application for an operating license concerned
the suitability of using material average properties for inelastic
analysis.
The CRBR project approach to inelastic analysis followed the
guidance provided by NE Standard F9-4T, which states that
When inelastic analysis is used in preparation for a creep-
fatigue or inelastic strain evaluation, the plasticity and ther-
mal creep properties used in the analysis shall be average (or
conservative). It is intended that the results of analysis based
on “average” properties be compared to the Code supplied
stress-rupture and fatigue limits.
This applies to the strain and creep fatigue limits of Code Case
N-47, but not to the buckling limits where the use of minimum
strength properties is required. The rationale, which was estab-
lished and affirmed by a strong national consensus, was that it is
impractical to determine the worst case combination of minimum
and/or maximum strength and deformation properties for each
load combination. Nor would it be representative of actual materi-
al behavior because worst case combinations are not physically
consistent. It was considered that material variations from the
“average” are covered by Code design margins.
The NRC concern was that creep rupture damage calculated
using average properties may be too low when compared to the
considerable strain and cyclic hardening that occurs during fabri-
cation and operation, and that the fatigue damage and accumulat-
ed strains may be too low if the actual yield strength is below the
average value used in design analysis.
The confirmatory program identified to resolve these concerns
required an evaluation of the significance of material property
variations, where inelastic analysis is used to evaluate elevated
temperature components containing radioactive sodium. The fol-
lowing requirements were imposed:
• Minimum yield strength and minimum creep deformation
strength (80% of the average isochronous plots) properties
shall be used to evaluate fatigue damage, as represented by
the use fraction, and the accumulated inelastic strains.
• The fatigue damage fraction and the creep rupture damage,
represented by the time fraction, are to be reported to the
NRC for both minimum and average material properties
using the method of Code Case N-47.
• The creep portions of the total accumulated inelastic strains
(membrane, bending, and peak) are to be reported using the
method of Code Case N-47.
• Structural adequacy of the components shall be demonstrated
using these calculated values of damage and inelastic strain.
• Minimum and average properties shall be considered in per-
forming the other confirmatory programs on Weldment
Safety Evaluation, Notch Weakening, and the Steam
Generator.
59.5.2.4 Steam Generator Tube Sheet Evaluation The NRC
review of the CRBR steam generator design procedures was
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510 • Chapter 59
conducted prior to project completion of design evaluation. The
planned evaluation included mechanical property, feature, and pro-
totypic tests to verify and supplement analysis methods and Code
design procedures. As part of the confirmatory program, the pro-
ject committed to completion of the planned test program, includ-
ing an hydraulic test model, large leak tests, tube tests, departure
from nuclear boiling tests, tube support wear tests, modular steam
generator tests, single-tube performance tests, stability and inter-
action tests, tube-to-tube sheet weld tests, scaled hydraulic model
feature tests, and flow-induced vibration tests.
The major NRC concern relative to the steam generator was
assurance of adequacy of the tube sheet for the design life of the
component. Specifically, the concern was adequate calculation of
the highly localized, inelastic stress in the outer row of ligaments
due to radial thermal gradients and bulk temperature difference
between the perforated and unperforated regions. Section III of
the ASME Code provides a simplified method of analysis based
on the equivalent solid plate concept. However, this method was
not applicable for the CRBR steam generator tube sheet, where
the loading is dominated by large thermal gradients and deforma-
tions are inelastic. The CRBR project plan was to use detailed
inelastic finite element analysis of sectors of the tube sheet in con-
junction with the strain and creep fatigue limits for inelastic
analysis in Code Case N-47 for elevated temperature design.
The NRC had concerns with this approach because of the diffi-
culties in modeling ligaments and the complex thermal-structural
interaction with the rim and the tubes. Their approach essentially
was to extend the Section III design procedure based on the
equivalent solid plate concept to include the effects of thermal
gradients, plasticity, and creep.
The specific confirmatory program that the project agreed to
carry out was stated as follows:
• Develop effective properties of the perforated region for use
in design inelastic analysis.
• Evaluate the effects of thermal gradients and equivalent mate-
rial property variations on ligaments near the periphery of the
perforated region.
• Extend existing Appendix A-8000 Code methods for calcu-
lating the linearized membrane, shear, and in-plane bending
stresses in the ligaments using the equivalent solid plate
stresses. Include all of these nominal stresses in the compari-
son with allowable primary membrane plus bending and pri-
mary plus secondary allowables.
• Develop methods of evaluating local cyclic plastic and creep
strain concentration effects based on equivalent solid plate
stresses for use in the fatigue evaluation.
• Evaluate elastic follow-up in the outermost ligaments: (1)
reclassify the portion of the discontinuity stresses caused by
pressure and mechanical loads as “primary” in accordance
with the associated amount of elastic follow-up that occurs
during thermal transients, and (2) reclassify the portion of
thermal stresses as “primary” in accordance with the amount
of elastic follow-up that occurs during thermal transients.
• Develop ratcheting evaluation methods for the outermost lig-
aments based on elastic equivalent solid plate stresses reclas-
sified as above and including nominal membrane, shear, and
in-plane bending stresses.
• Develop creep rupture damage evaluation methods for the
outermost ligaments based on equivalent solid plate stresses.
The effects of elastic follow-up will reduce the amount of
stress relaxation and increase the creep rupture damage.
• Perform detailed tube-to-tube sheet joint analysis for tubes in
the high radial thermal gradient region at the periphery of the
perforated region and include local thermal effects.
This extensive program was to be completed prior to issuance
of a plant operating license.
59.5.2.5 Elevated Temperature Seismic Effects This issue
concerns the possible enhancement of creep strain accumulation
and creep rupture damage resulting from seismic events.
Code Case N-47 imposed limits on accumulated inelastic strain
and creep fatigue damage, but did not provide guidance on cyclic
load history modeling of combined events. Seismic events impose
short-term primary stresses on structures that affect the inelastic
strain accumulation by changing residual stress distributions.
Seismic loads may also produce plastic strain accumulation by
ratcheting if the event is sufficiently severe. Relaxation of the
increased residual stresses that exist after a seismic event may
produce enhanced creep during subsequent service at elevated
temperatures. Consequently, the sequence of loading becomes
important in the creep regime.
This issue was resolved by a project commitment to take into
account any enhanced creep (ratcheting) and any creep rupture
damage resulting from residual stresses at local stress raisers fol-
lowing seismic events. This was accomplished practically using an
approximate procedure to simulate dynamic seismic loading as an
equivalent static load for inelastic analysis. The procedure, devel-
oped under the LMFBR Program and reported in ASME Paper 82-
PVP-28 [13], utilizes the results of a linear seismic response spec-
trum analysis to calculate external loads. These statically
equivalent loads are selected such that they produce internal forces
and moments comparable to those predicted by the linear response
spectrum analysis. The equivalent static load for the seismic event
is applied after the first system heat-up, when it is most damaging
because the stresses have not yet relaxed during creep hold time.
This procedure accounts conservatively for enhancement of accu-
mulated strain and creep rupture damage due to seismic loads.
59.5.2.6 Elastic Follow-Up in Piping This issue concerns cate-
gorization of thermal expansion stresses as secondary for evalua-
tion of hot leg piping. During creep relaxation, a portion of the
elastic strain is converted to creep strain. Areas of piping that are
more highly stressed are subjected to additional cyclic strain and
strain accumulation resulting from elastic follow-up. To provide
adequate safety margins, Code Case N-47 required that secondary
stresses with a large amount of elastic follow-up be treated as load-
controlled quantities. However, Code Case N-47 did not provide
criteria that determine when elastic follow-up is considered large.
This issue was resolved by agreement between the NRC and
the project on a method for quantifying elastic follow-up and a
criterion for determining the portion of thermal expansion stress
to be treated as primary. A simplified elastic analysis procedure to
estimate the amount of elastic follow-up due to thermal expansion
stress in a thin-walled piping system was developed under the
LMFBR program and reported in Reference [14]. The reduced
elastic modulus concept was used to represent creep, and elastic
follow-up was quantified relative to the Code Case N-47 primary
stress limit. The simplified method was validated by comparison
with results of detailed inelastic analysis.
59.5.2.7 Creep Fatigue Evaluation The NRC identified three
concerns relative to creep fatigue evaluations. The first was a
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modification of the creep fatigue damage rule of Code Case N-47
when applied to austenitic stainless steel types 304 and 316 for
components not to be Code stamped. The Code required that
creep damage during compressive hold periods be taken equal to
the creep damage during tensile hold periods for stresses of equal
magnitude. The project modification took creep damage in com-
pressive hold to be 20% of that in tensile hold. This was accepted
by NRC upon proper documentation of the experimentally based
justification.
The second NRC concern was the treatment of high-cycle
fatigue due to thermal fluctuations and flow-induced vibrations
that require evaluation beyond the Code Case N-47 design curve
limit of 106 cycles for stainless steels. The project extrapolated
the fatigue curve beyond 106 cycles using a slope of ⫺0.12 on
cycles for load-controlled situations and developed a special pur-
pose high-cycle fatigue criterion for strain-controlled situations.
The concern was resolved by demonstration that the extrapolation
is more conservative at 800⬚F (427⬚C) than the high-cycle fatigue
design curve up to 1011 cycles adopted by the Code in 1982 and
by implication from additional elevated temperature data. The
project also provided data to support the special limit used for
strain-controlled situations.
The third concern was fatigue design limits for 21⁄4 Cr-1 Mo
steel, which was resolved by a commitment to meet the elevated
temperature fatigue design limits that had been recently approved
by the ASME Code Committees.
59.5.2.8 Plastic Strain Concentration Factors For simplified
elastic-plastic analysis, Section III of the Code allows the plastic
strain concentration factor, Ke, to be taken as unity until the range
of primary plus secondary stress intensity exceeds 3 Sm. The NRC
concern was that this factor actually begins to exceed unity when
the local maximum stress range, including the elastic stress con-
centration factor, exceeds 2 Sy. Also, strain multipliers for the
concentration of plastic strain on the weaker side of a product
form or material interface are not included in formulas for Ke in
the Code.
This concern was resolved by a commitment to determine the
actual plastic strain concentration, or to use a conservative
approximation of concentration effects and the resulting fatigue
design life when the local maximum stress range exceeds 2 Sy .
59.5.2.9 Intermediate Piping Transition Weld The intermedi-
ate heat transport system transition weld reference design was a
trimetallic joint consisting of Type 316H stainless steel, Alloy
800H, and 21⁄4 Cr-1 Mo steel. Due to its complexity, the transition
weld was evaluated in detail using the procedures of Code Case N-
47 and applicable DOE Standards. The effects of creep, residual
stress, and differences in properties between the component mate-
rials were modeled using inelastic analysis.
Although demonstration of design life had not been completed,
the NRC was concerned about the minimum expected carbon
content of 0.05% at 936⬚F (502⬚C), the importance of variation in
properties between the different materials, and the possible
increase in creep rupture damage resulting from the higher yield
strength properties produced by hardening in a multipass welding
process.
Resolution of the NRC concern was achieved by commitment
to perform analyses using the methods and criteria to be devel-
oped under the confirmatory programs to address issues relating
to weldment cracking and material property representation for
inelastic analysis.
59.6 CURRENT REGULATORY ISSUES
FOR STRUCTURAL DESIGN OF VHTR
AND GEN IV SYSTEMS
Since the NRC and DOE licensing review of the CRBR during
the late 1970s and early 1980s, NRC and DOE have continued to
identify and investigate safety issues relative to structural design
of high-temperature advanced reactor systems.
59.6.1 Materials and Design Bases in ASME Code
Case N-47, NUREG/CR-5955
In anticipation of next generation advanced power reactors for
utilities, NRC sponsored an ORNL evaluation of the design
bases (principally ASME Code Case N-47) for the design and
operation of reactors at elevated temperatures where the time-
dependent effects of creep are significant and must be consid-
ered in the design process [15]. The reactor systems contemplat-
ed include advanced liquid-metal reactors, gas-cooled reactors,
and possibly the Canada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reac-
tors. This evaluation was not design specific, nor did it address
specific reactor components such as transition joints, tube
sheets, and bellows. Its main objective was to identify and sum-
marize the issues that must be resolved to avoid the creep-
induced failure modes of creep rupture, creep fatigue, creep
ratcheting, and creep buckling.
A total of 23 issues were identified and described. They are
characterized and classified by (1) type–safety or economical; (2)
bases–material and database, design bases, or both; and (3) level—
used to further delineate the issues into six categories based on a
number of factors, depending on considerations of plant safety,
plant economics, expected cost to resolve the issue, expected cal-
endar time required to resolve the issue, whether Code rules must
be extended if they are to be used as the design bases for future 60-
year high-temperature plants, and so on. All but two of the issues
were safety related. The 23 issues are listed here, and the 10 con-
sidered most important are identified by an asterisk:
1. Lack of material property allowable design data/curves for
60-year design life*
2. Degradation of material properties at high temperatures due
to long-term irradiation*
3. Degradation of material properties due to long-term ther-
mal aging
4. Degradation of material properties due to corrosion phe-
nomena*
5. Lack of property allowables based on current melting and
fabrication practices
6. Degradation effect of small cyclic stresses
7. Creep-induced failures at temperatures below Code Case
N-47 limits
8. Use of average versus minimum material properties in
design
9. Lack of a design methodology for Modified 9 Cr-1 Mo steel
10. Lack of understanding/validation of effects of short-term
overload events on subsequent material properties
11. Lack of validated thermal striping materials and design
methodology*
12. Lack of reliable creep fatigue design rules*
13. Difficult, overly conservative ratcheting design rules
14. Lack of a validated weldment design methodology*
15. Lack of flaw assessment procedures*
16. Uncertainty of multiaxial stress state effects
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512 • Chapter 59
17. Uncertainty of nonradial (non-proportional) loading effects
18. Lack of understanding/validation of notch weakening
effects*
19. Lack of conservatism in Code rules for simplified fatigue
evaluation based on plastic strain concentration factors
20. Lack of validated rules/guidelines to account for seismic
effects at elevated temperatures*
21. Lack of inelastic design procedures for piping*
22. Overly conservative buckling rules
23. Need for thermal stratification design guidelines
All issues except numbers 9 and 13 are considered to be safety
related. The issues were described and elaborated but detailed
plans for their resolution were not offered.
59.6.2 Safety Evaluation of the Power Reactor
Innovative Small Module (PRISM)
Liquid-Metal Reactor
The PRISM reactor design proposed by DOE was for a small,
modular, pool-type, liquid-metal (sodium)-cooled reactor produc-
ing 471 MWt power. The standard plant design consists of three
PRISM modules with a total electrical output rating of 1395
MWe. The primary and intermediate sodium outlet temperatures
are 905⬚F (485⬚C) and 830⬚F (443⬚C), respectively, but under cer-
tain transient conditions, the reactor vessel wall may reach core
outlet temperatures that increase to between 1100⬚F (593⬚C) and
1300⬚F (704⬚C). Thus, the design temperatures are not signifi-
cantly greater than for CRBR. However, the design life was for 60
years compared to 30 years for CRBR, which introduced some
additional material degradation issues.
The NRC staff performed a preapplication safety evaluation of
PRISM and published their findings in NUREG-1368 [16] dated
February 1994. The objective was to provide at least the level of
safety that is required for current generation LWRs. The
Preapplication Safety Evaluation Report did not result in design
approval, but identified key safety issues and assessed the adequa-
cy of the applicant’s research and development programs. The
overall conclusion was that there are no major impediments to
licensing of the design.
Safety issues identified by NRC requiring resolution concerned
primarily inelastic and limit analysis, Code Case N-47 (forerunner
of Subsection NH) and other elevated temperature Code Cases,
load combinations, and environmental effects associated with
extrapolation of Code Case N-47 applicability from 34 to 60
years. It was pointed out that the NRC staff has not endorsed
Code Case N-47 and, in general, has not accepted the application
of inelastic stress and deformation limits in the initial design eval-
uations. Further review and justification are needed for the defini-
tion of load combinations, the application of inelastic and limit
analysis in conjunction with the dynamic analysis, and the consid-
eration of all types of time-dependent failure modes detailed in
Code Case N-47.
Environmental effect issues included stress corrosion, flowing
sodium effects, and neutron embrittlement. Stress corrosion was
considered an issue because Type 316, used for the reactor vessel,
is an austenitic sensitized stainless steel and subject to stress corro-
sion cracking (SCC) at the higher temperatures associated with cer-
tain transients. An area of particular concern was the weld between
the core support structure and the reactor vessel. In a dynamic sodi-
um environment, the concern was that the vessel could experience
two types of degradation: erosion-corrosion and property changes.
Erosion-corrosion decreases the effective load-carrying thickness
and property changes can decrease time-independent and time-
dependent strength properties. Neutron embrittlement was a con-
cern because the reactor vessel is designed for a 60-year lifetime
and exposed to neutron irradiation, which decreases ductility and
fracture resistance.
To meet a design life of 60 years, the elevated temperature
Code Cases N-47, N-201, and perhaps N-48, N-49, N-50, and N-
51, will have to be extrapolated from the present 34-year lifetime.
59.6.3 Material Engineering Research Needs for
Advanced Reactors—ACRS, USNRC/RES,
and ORNL
Several presentations were made by Dr. Joseph Muscara of NRC
in 2002 at coordination meetings with ACRS, USNRC Office of
Nuclear Regulatory Research (USNRC/RES), and ORNL to review
material engineering needs for advanced (high-temperature) reactor
design [17–19]. The major issues concern the applicability of struc-
tural design codes–Section III, Subsection NH, and Code Cases N-
201 and N-499—to high-temperature applications. These Codes are
based primarily on studies and data gathered in the 1970s and
1980s for design of LMFBRs with maximum temperatures in the
range of 1100⬚F (593⬚C) to 1500⬚F (816⬚C). There is a need to
extend these Codes, particularly in the areas of creep, creep fatigue,
and environmental effects, to cover higher temperatures and include
databases developed in recent years.
Safety issues identified for high-temperature (unspecified)
structural design of metallic components include the following:
• Lack of appropriate databases for calculating fatigue, creep,
creep fatigue, and SCC lifetimes, including environmental
effects
• Effects of impurities including oxygen on degradation
• Aging behavior of alloys
• Sensitization of austenitic alloys and weldments
• Degradation by carburization, decarburization, and oxidation
• Treatment of connecting pipe as a vessel for code application
NRC research under way in 2002 included the following:
• Review and evaluation of current national and international
engineering design codes for components in HTGRs, includ-
ing Codes and methodology developed in Germany, Japan,
China, the United Kingdom, and France
• Review of existing literature and studies on HTGR materials
and environmental effects on various degradation mechanisms
• Development of NUREG/CR-6824 [21], Material Behavior in
HTGR Environments
59.6.4 Review and Assessment of Codes and
Procedures for HTGR Components,
NUREG/CR-6816, June 2003 [20]
The objective of this work was to review and evaluate currently
available national and international Codes and procedures to be
used in the design of HTGRs, including, but not limited to, the
pebble bed modular reactor (PBMR) and the gas turbine-modular
helium reactor (GT-MHR) designs. The evaluation is based on the
materials that have been used or recommended for HTGRs, taking
into account the HTGR operating environments. The ASME
B&PV Code sections review included Section III, Subsections
NB and NH, Code Cases N-499-1 and N-201-4, and a Draft Code
Case for Alloy 617 for very high-temperature design.
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The major findings of the evaluation were as follows:
• Most of the materials needed for HTGR are not included in
the Code Cases. New code cases will be needed.
• The maximum temperature permitted by the Code and Code
Cases for materials acceptable for HTGR components is lower
(760⬚C/1400⬚F) than the maximum temperature (ⱖ850⬚C/
1562⬚F) that these components may experience during opera-
tion. The Code therefore needs to be expanded to include
materials and limits for higher temperatures.
• The Codes and Code Cases do not provide specific guidelines
for environmental effects, especially the effect of impure heli-
um on the high-temperature behavior (e.g., fatigue, creep, and
creep fatigue) of the materials considered. High-temperature
fatigue life may be influenced more by environment than by
creep damage for some materials.
Subsection NB is considered to be applicable to those HTGR
components (e.g., pressure vessel) that will operate at relatively
low temperatures.
Subsection NH provides design rules for construction of out-
of-core nuclear structures fabricated from only five materials.
This is potentially the biggest obstacle to its use in the design of
HTGR components. The scope of Subsection NH needs to be
expanded to include materials with higher allowable temperatures
and other materials of interest. The candidate materials for core
support structure and vessel internals include Alloy 617, 9Cr-
1Mo-V steel, and Hastelloy X.
There are other concerns with the use of Subsection NH for
design of HTGR components. Its rules are written for materials
that follow a classical creep curve consisting of primary, sec-
ondary, and tertiary creep. However, many of the materials being
considered (e.g., Alloy 617) do not show any evidence of primary
or secondary creep. New rules are needed for such materials.
Subsection NH does not require inelastic stress analysis to be
conducted with rate-dependent, high-temperature unified constitu-
tive equations (no distinction between creep and plastic strain),
which are necessary when components operate at temperatures
above 1200 ⬚F (649 ⬚C). At the higher temperatures, the tensile
stress-strain relations depend on strain rate and the classical dis-
tinction between plasticity and creep becomes untenable. Thus,
strain rate effects need to be included in Code design analyses for
very high temperatures. Subsection NH states that the combined
effects of exposure to elevated temperature, contacting fluid, and
nuclear radiation on material properties shall be considered.
However, the Code does not provide specific guidelines for con-
sidering environmental effects. The conclusion is that more mech-
anistically based predictive methods are needed to handle the var-
ious material-specific damage mechanisms in different
environments.
The scope of Code Case N-499-1 should be expanded to include
9 Cr-1 Mo-V steel, which is specified for an uninsulated reactor
vessel with an operating temperature of about 500⬚C (932 ⬚F). The
effects of helium environment, including impurities, on the elevat-
ed temperature fatigue design curve, isochronous stress-strain
curves, stress rupture curves, and the creep fatigue damage enve-
lope need to be evaluated to further assess the applicability of this
Code Case to low-alloy steel pressure vessel materials.
Code Case N-201-4 provides design rules for construction of
core support structures fabricated from the same five materials
covered in Subsection NH. The maximum temperature permitted
by this case for the materials acceptable for use in HTGR is 760 ⬚C
(1400⬚F). Since the GT-MHR core support structures may experi-
ence temperatures of 850⬚C (1562⬚F) or higher, the scope of the
Code Case needs to be expanded to include materials with higher
allowable temperatures. The candidate materials for core support
structures and vessel internals are Alloy 617 and 9Cr-1Mo-V
steel. As with Subsection NH, the deleterious effects of primary
coolant and nuclear radiation need to be considered.
The Draft Code Case for Alloy 617 was patterned after relevant
portions of Subsection NH and limited to Alloy 617, a temperature
of 1800⬚F (982⬚C), and a maximum service life at temperatures
above 800⬚F (427⬚C) of 100,000 h. Most of the design rules
addressed by the Draft Code Case are similar to those provided by
NH. Some design rules are different because the Code Case con-
siders higher temperature and a different material. At the very high
temperatures of interest, Alloy 617 exhibits unique material behav-
ior that includes (1) lack of clear distinction between time-inde-
pendent and time-dependent behavior, (2) high dependence of flow
stress on strain rate, and (3) softening with time, temperature, and
strain. One result is that the Case specifies that inelastic analysis
for temperatures above 1200⬚F (649⬚C) must be based on unified
constitutive equations that do not distinguish between time-inde-
pendent plasticity and time-dependent creep.
The Draft Code Case for Alloy 617 is a work in progress and
its completion requires further development of the Code Case,
material database and structural design methodology. In the Code
area, Alloy 617 must be added to the low-temperature rules of
Section III; and weldment stress rupture factors, thermal expan-
sion coefficients, and isochronous stress-strain curves for the tem-
perature range 427⬚C (800⬚F)–649⬚C (1200⬚F) must be added to
the Code Case. In the material area, weldment fatigue data and a
more complete creep fatigue database are needed. Also, the syner-
gistic effects of aging, environment, loading, and temperature
need to be better understood and the effects of aging on toughness
must be characterized. Relative to structural design methodology,
the unified constitutive model needs to be further developed, sim-
plified ratcheting evaluation procedures are needed at tempera-
tures above 649⬚C (1200⬚F), and very high-temperature structural
model tests are needed to validate the design methodology.
Probably the greatest need is to develop a more suitable damage
theory to replace the use of the linear damage fractions as the
basis for the creep fatigue rules.
59.6.5 Material Behavior in HTGR Environments,
NUREG/CR-6824, July 2003 [21]
The objective of this work was to review and evaluate available
information on performance and long-term behavior of materials
in environments that are typical of high-temperature helium-
cooled reactors. The availability and adequacy of design codes,
rules, and procedures for component structural design are dis-
cussed in the companion report, NUREG/CR-6816 [20], described
previously. However, the results presented here are pertinent
because they provide the current state of knowledge on candidate
structural materials that must be treated in the Code for nuclear
structural design.
The primary helium coolant in the gas turbine-based HTGRs is
expected to be at temperatures in the range of 850-900⬚C (1562-
1652⬚F), and the selected materials should have adequate perfor-
mance over the long service life at temperatures in the range of
900-950⬚C (1652-1742⬚F). Among the materials, 21⁄4 Cr-1 Mo and
modified 9 Cr-1 Mo ferritic steels are considered for application
in reactor pressure vessels. Fe-Cr-Ni alloys such as Alloy 800H
and austenitic stainless steels are considered for recuperators and
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514 • Chapter 59
reactor internals. Alloy 617, Hastelloy X, and Hastelloy XR are
considered for components that will be exposed to helium coolant
at temperatures up to 900⬚C (1652⬚F). The key technical issues
addressed were:
• Baseline mechanical property data
• Effects of helium coolant chemistry on material degradation
• Corrosion effects on mechanical properties of candidate mate-
rials
• Fission product release and its effect on materials
• Corrosion–erosion due to particulate-laden gas flow.
The major findings of this task concern environmental effects
on material properties. Some pertinent conclusions are as follows:
• The primary materials for high-temperature application in
HTGRs that have been studied in detail are Alloys 800H and
617 and Hastelloy X. Among them, Alloy 800H is Code cer-
tified for temperatures up to 760⬚C (1400⬚F) for use in nuclear
systems. A substantial database has been developed for both
Alloys 800H and 617 and a limited database exists for
Hastelloy X.
• Even though helium by itself is inert toward the materials, it
is often contaminated by small amounts of gaseous impuri-
ties. The gas chemistry and the thermodynamic activity for
carbon and oxygen in the gas phase are difficult to ascertain
because of the nonequilibrium nature of the gas mixture.
Also, most studies on gas chemistry simulations were per-
formed close to atmospheric pressure, whereas the system
pressure in the reactor is on the order of 7 MPa.
• Structural alloys can be significantly corroded by the
gaseous impurities in helium at elevated temperatures.
Corrosion of heat-resistant materials such as austenitic
stainless steels and Alloys 800H and 617 may involve oxi-
dation, carburization, and decarburization. Furthermore, the
corrosion process is “dynamic” in that it is dictated by the
exposure time, gas chemistry variations, integrity of the cor-
rosion product scales, and pressure of particulates in the gas
phase.
59.6.6 Design Features and Technology Uncertainties
for the Next Generation Nuclear Plant,
INEEL/Ext-04-01816, June 30, 2004 [22]
The U.S. DOE authorized the INEEL to have the ITRG con-
duct a review of technology alternatives for meeting the function-
al objectives of the NGNP.
The results of the review do not necessarily represent the con-
cerns of NRC. However, the ITRG is a broadly experienced group
and has offered conclusions, observations, and recommendations
that are relevant to structural design code development.
The high-level functional objectives of NGNP include demon-
strating an economically viable nuclear system, licensable in the
United States, with commercially attractive production capabili-
ties including high-efficiency power conversion, effective utiliza-
tion of process heat (e.g., for production of hydrogen), and intrin-
sic safety. The NGNP is to be designed, constructed, licensed, and
operated by no later than 2020, with a target date of 2017 for ini-
tial operations. Meeting these objectives will require technology
stretch, but if the stretch is too great, the NGNP may become
solely an exercise in research and development and would fail to
accomplish the broader demonstration mission.
The ITGR reviewed several nuclear system concepts for a
VHTR for the NGNP including the helium-cooled prismatic reac-
tor, the helium-cooled pebble bed reactor, and the molten salt-
cooled prismatic reactor. Results and recommendations of the
review that are pertinent to structural design code development
are summarized here:
• Few choices exist for metals for use at VHTR design condi-
tions, and lifetime requirements may restrict the maximum
operating temperature. The development of new materials
(e.g., oxide dispersion-strengthened metals or refractory met-
als, or ceramics and carbon-based materials) would not be
compatible with construction time objectives.
• For high-temperature applications, there are several undevel-
oped components, including the IHX, the hot gas isolation
valves, the reactor pressure vessel, selected reactor internals, the
reactor inlet/outlet pipes, the helium circulator, the insulation
systems, and instrumentation for high-temperature application.
• Definition of design basis conditions for a helium-cooled
reactor system.
• Based on material development considerations, it is recom-
mended that maximum metal temperature be limited to 900⬚C
(1652⬚F). This corresponds to a maximum core average out-
let temperature of 900-950⬚C (1652–1742⬚F). Even at this
metal temperature, some reactor core subassemblies might
require replacement during the 60-year design plant life. A
reactor outlet temperature of 1000⬚C (1832⬚F) would require
material development and testing well beyond the metals cur-
rently used in high-temperature design.
• It is recommended that the temperature of the irreplaceable
primary reactor coolant pressure boundary be limited such
that time-dependent (creep) deformation is insignificant.
Creep deformation and configuration change would cause
excessive uncertainty and risk over a 60 year design life.
59.6.7 NGNP Technical Issues Safety Research
Needs, June 2006 [23]
This USNRC presentation provided an overall summary of
research and application needs for licensing of the NGNP project.
It includes safety R&D arenas, licensing framework, probability
risk assessment, nuclear analysis, thermal-fluid analysis, metallic
components, nuclear graphite, fuel performance, qualification,
fabrication, and testing.
Technical issues identified for metallic components that need
resolution include the following:
• Fatigue, creep, and creep–fatigue interaction
• Coolant impurities and crevice concentration impacts
• Metal carburization, decarburization, and oxidation
• Sensitization of austenitic steels
• Alloy aging behavior at elevated temperatures
• Adequacy of in-service inspection plans and methods
• ASME Code Case and database applicability/adequacy
• PRA failure probabilities for vessels, pipes, and components.
59.6.8 Framework for Development of a Risk-
Informed, Performance-Based Alternative to
10 CFR Part 50, NUREG-1860, July 2006 [24]
The purpose of this report is to document the technical basis to
support the development of a risk-informed and performance-based
process for the licensing of future nuclear power plants (NPPs). As
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 515
such it documents an approach, scope, and criteria that could be
used by the NRC staff to develop a set of regulations that would
serve as an alternative to 10 CFR 50 for licensing future plants.
This report provides very broad guidance for safety review. It
does not provide specific guidance for codes and standards because
it is expected that most codes and standards will be associated with
design-specific features. However, the evaluation approach
described in this report relies heavily on probabilistic risk assess-
ment (PRA), which could have implications to high-temperature
structural design codes. For example, the barrier integrity strategy
provides isolation features that protect the primary radionuclide
inventory from release. One feature is barrier structural integrity.
PRAs are used to demonstrate that the frequency of radionuclide
release is low enough, with adequate consideration of uncertainty.
Therefore, uncertainties associated with barrier degradation, for
example, corrosion, erosion, aging, chemical interactions, and other
material issues need to be modeled. This does not necessarily imply
that the structural design code must be based on PRA, but it
appears that the code assessment results should be in a form that
will allow PRA of barrier structural failure.
59.7 HOW STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY
ISSUES ARE ADDRESSED BY
CURRENT ASME CODE? INCLUDING
CODE CASES AND SECTION III,
SUBSECTION NH, “CLASS 1
COMPONENTS IN ELEVATED
TEMPERATURE SERVICE”
Subsection NH of Section III evolved from prior Code Cases
originally intended for CRBR. The CRBR was designed to operate
at temperatures in the range of 1000⬚F (538⬚C)–1100⬚F (593⬚C)
with low-pressure, relatively thin-walled sodium-containing com-
ponents–reactor vessel, tanks, piping, heat exchangers, steam gen-
erators, pumps, and valves. At these temperatures and loading con-
ditions, the structural materials exhibited limited creep. As a result,
it was possible to make extensive use of simplified analysis and
bounding methods such as the O’Donnell-Porowski bounds for
creep ratcheting. The major thrust of the confirmatory programs
was to insure that the effects of creep were bounded. Although a
great deal of detailed inelastic analysis was performed, basically
they were used to confirm the validity of simplified analysis meth-
ods for conditions dominated by cyclic thermal stresses.
While Subsection NH has evolved substantially since CRBR,
the design and operating conditions of VHTR and Gen IV systems
are quite different. There are a number of different design concepts
being considered and temperatures of interest are in the range of
1600⬚F (870⬚C)–1700⬚F (925⬚C). Although there will be an effort
to put the more highly stressed structural elements in cooler
regions, the primary loads for many of the components will be
higher than those encountered in CRBR. At these very high tem-
peratures, there will be a significant change in material behavior as
well as structural response. Environmental effects will be more
significant. Creep and the effects of creep on component integrity
are expected to be limited and will have to be analyzed in detail.
Creep rupture damage, creep fatigue, and potential creep crack
growth are of particular concern. Material models will probably
have to include tertiary creep as well as multiaxial states of stress.
Although Subsection NH has the basic structure to handle elevated
temperature structural design, it will have to be extended and vali-
dated to handle the additional materials, higher temperatures, and
creep damage mechanisms anticipated for these reactors.
59.7.1 Material Creep Behavior, Creep Fatigue, and
Environmental Effects
Section III, Subsection NH, and the Code Cases for elevated
temperature design require further development to make them
applicable for structural design and evaluation of HTGR and Gen
IV systems. The temperature limits of code applicability need to
be extended from 760⬚C (1400⬚F) to a maximum temperature of
950⬚C (1742⬚F). The design lifetime limit of 34 years needs to be
extended to 60 years. Subsection NH currently provides design
limits for five materials up to 760⬚C (1400⬚F). Additional materi-
als such as Alloy 617, 9 Cr-1 Mo-V steel, and Hastelloys X and
XR need to be added for temperatures up to 950⬚C (1742⬚F).
Mitigating solutions are needed for environmental effects, includ-
ing the degradation effects of impure helium, and the constitutive
models for predicting inelastic and creep behavior of materials
need to be developed. This must include the tertiary creep behav-
ior exhibited very early by Alloy 617, and cyclic creep behavior at
operating temperatures.
NRC foresees the need for increased focus on VHTR Licensing
structural integrity issues not currently covered by the ASME
Code and Code Cases, including
• Material behavior characterization for cyclic loads at very
high temperatures
• Adequacy of structural analysis methods for cyclic loads at
very high temperatures.
• Fatigue, creep, and creep-fatigue interaction
• Coolant impurities and crevice concentration impacts
• Metal carburization, decarburization, and oxidation
• Sensitization of austenitic steels
• Alloy aging behavior at elevated temperatures
59.7.2 The Structural Integrity of Welds
The structural integrity of welds in elevated temperature ser-
vice is a major regulatory concern requiring increased attention at
elevated temperatures. Details of the regulatory concerns are
described in Section 59.5.2.1. Subsection NH has rules for design
of welded joints that are separated into Categories A–D. The per-
missible types of welded joints and their dimensional require-
ments are also described.
NRC has expressed concern for the limited ductility of weldments
at elevated temperatures and strain concentrations (both metallurgi-
cal and geometric) in the HAZs. Paragraph NH-3353 provides
analysis requirements for the design and location of all pressure-
retaining and other primary structural welds subjected to metal tem-
peratures where creep effects are significant. Special examination
requirements are included for welded joints. Permissible weld mate-
rials are limited. Creep stress rupture reduction factors for weld-
ments are given as a function of temperature and time.
Subsection NH contains special limits on inelastic strains accu-
mulated in the weld regions. These weld strain limits are one-half
the strain values permitted for the parent material. The weldment
strain limits are as follows:
1. Strains averaged through the thickness ⫽ 0.5%
2. Strains at the surface due to an equivalent linear distribution
of strain through the thickness ⫽ 1%
3. Maximum local strains at any point ⫽ 2.5%
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516 • Chapter 59
Subsection NH also reduces the allowable number of design
cycles for weldments to one-half of the parent metal. It reduces
the allowable time for creep rupture damage by multiplying the
stress by the weld strength reduction factor when determining the
time to rupture.
Subsection NH also imposes additional examination require-
ments on Categories A–D vessel weld joints.
The adequacy of these and other weldment structural design
requirements in Subsection NH has been questioned by the NRC
even for the temperatures currently covered, which are lower than
VHTR and Gen IV high-temperature systems. Accordingly,
Section 59.8, which covers the material models, design criteria,
and analysis methods needed in the ASME Code to cover regula-
tory issues for very high-temperature service, includes further dis-
cussion of these weldment issues.
59.7.3 Development and Verification of Simplified
Design Analysis Methods
The NRC sees the use of simplified methods of performing
creep ratcheting, creep fatigue, and creep rupture damage analy-
ses, such as the O’Donnell-Porowski bounds, as a way of verify-
ing the “black box” of cyclic creep finite element analyses. The
latter have not seen extensive safety-related applications.
Simplified methods are now used extensively in Subsection NH.
However, their derivation and verifications are based on simplifi-
cations and approximations such as thermal through-wall stresses
being essentially linear, bending stresses being essentially sec-
ondary, weldments having essentially homogeneous properties, no
metallurgical notches, and so on.
59.7.4 Verification Testing
Because VHTR design analysis methods do not have a long
history of successful application and require complex thermal
cyclic finite element creep analysis, the NRC would like to see
confirming tests verifying the material models and structural fea-
tures analyses. Cyclic material models including strain hardening
and time hardening require verification. Is primary creep repeated
under cyclic load conditions and is it recoverable? The cyclic
behavior of representative key structural features is also an issue.
The Code does not explicitly require verification testing, but as
an American National Standard Safety Code, the Code Committees
have an obligation to meet the verification criteria thereof and to
satisfy NRC licensing requirements to prevent the need for supple-
mentary NRC requirements.
59.8 MATERIAL MODELS DESIGN
CRITERIA AND ANALYSIS METHODS
NEEDED IN THE ASME CODE FOR
VERY HIGH-TEMPERATURE
SERVICE
59.8.1 Material Creep Behavior, Creep Fatigue, and
Environmental Effects
Refer to Sections 59.6.1–59.6.5 for descriptions of current
Code coverage of regulatory needs for very high-temperature ser-
vice. These needs are heavily material-oriented and involve the
Subcommittee on Materials (SC-II), the Subcommittee on
Nuclear Power (SC-III), Subcommittee on Pressure Vessels (SC-
VIII), and Subcommittee on Design (SC-D), as well as the
Subgroup on Elevated Temperature Design. In addition to these
generic materials coverage Code needs, there are more specific
needs related to weldments, the development and verification of
simplified design methods, and test verification of material
models and representative structural features. These needs are dis-
cussed in the following paragraphs.
59.8.2 The Structural Integrity of Welds
Because of the importance of potential elevated temperature
cracking of weldments, NRC wants the designer to account for
potential creep strain concentrations due to metallurgical notch
effects. Subsection NH does not include methods for analyzing
the effects of varying properties between the base metal, weld
metal, and HAZ, or even how to determine these properties after
welding and postweld heat treating. Moreover, NRC expressed
concern with potential early crack initiation at the inside wall sur-
face in the HAZ, how crack propagation can be quantified, and
the stability of the remaining uncracked wall section. Methods of
evaluating such weldment integrity issues and the corresponding
safety margins are needed in the ASME Code to satisfy regulatory
concerns. These methods will require material models, cyclic
creep analysis methods, crack growth analyses, and remaining lig-
ament-enhanced creep stability analysis methods. Such methods
essentially parallel Section XI flaw evaluation methods, which are
only applicable below the creep regime. The NRC has also
requested confirmation of the creep rupture, creep fatigue, and
interaction evaluation procedures at weldments, accounting for
load sequence effects. These confirmations were required by
ACRS before they would issue a plant operating license for
CRBR, a matter that became mute when Congress terminated this
demonstration project.
These issues involve the Subcommittee on Nuclear Power
(SC-III), the Subcommittee on Materials (SC-II), the Subcommittee
on Welding (SC-IX), the Subcommittee on Pressure Vessels
(SC-VIII), and the Subcommittee on Nondestructive Examination
(SC-V), as well as the Subgroup on Elevated Temperature Design.
59.8.3 Development and Verification of Simplified
Design Analysis Methods
Existing simplified design analysis methods have proven to be
valuable in providing assurance of structural integrity in the mod-
erate creep regime and have been used in France, Germany,
Japan, and the United States for this purpose. These methods can
be further developed to include higher temperatures, where creep
effects control the design margins and where structural disconti-
nuity notches, and defects need to be evaluated. Cyclic finite ele-
ment creep analysis results are difficult to trust without having
comparative results of simplified design analysis methods.
These needs involve the Subcommittee on Nuclear Power
(SC-III), the Subcommittee on Pressure Vessels (SC-VIII), and
the Subcommittee on Design (SC-D), and are focused in the
Subgroup on Elevated Temperature Design. The TF Elastic-
Plastic Finite Element Analyses could be expanded to include
creep, the SG Design Analysis could verify and develop these
rules, and/or the SG Elevated Temperature Design could reinstate
their TF on creep analyses.
59.8.4 Verification Testing
Verification testing was carried out on representative structural
features of CRBR as part of the licensing effort. VHTR tempera-
tures are much higher than the CRBR temperatures, as previously
discussed. Consequently, additional verification testing is desired
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 517
by ACRS and NRC to validate the elevated temperature designs
of VHTRs. Such tests include validation of the material models
needed to perform cyclic creep analyses, validation of the finite
element software capabilities to handle cyclic creep at structural
discontinuities, elastic follow-up, creep rupture at notches, weld-
ment behavior, and possibly flaw tolerance evaluation methods.
The development and delineation of such test needs come
under the purview of the Subgroup on Elevated Temperature
Design. However, material testings are generally in the domain of
the Subcommittee on Materials (SC-II). The testing of NPP com-
ponents is under Subcommittee III and design adequacy comes
under the Subcommittee on Design (SC-D).
59.9 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This chapter is part of work sponsored by the U. S. Department
of Energy via the ASME Standards Technology, LLC (ASME ST-
LLC) for the Generation IV (Gen IV) Reactor Materials Project.
59.10 REFERENCES
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2. ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Cases, Case N-47, Class 1
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3. RDT Standard F9-5T, Guidelines and Procedures for Design of
Nuclear System Components at Elevated Temperature, September
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4. Pugh, C.E., Constitutive Equations for Creep Analysis of LMFBR
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5. Clinard, J.A. and Crowell, J.S. ORNL User’s Manual for CREEP-
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the LMFBR, 1976 ASME-ANS International Conference on Advanced
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10. Griffin, D.S., Dhalla, A.K., and Woodward, W.S. Validation of
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15. Huddleston, R.L., and Swindeman, R.W., Material and Design Bases
Issues in ASME Code Case N-47, NUREG/CR-5955 ORNL/TM-
12266, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN, April 1993.
16. Preapplication Safety Evaluation Report for the Power Reactor
Innovative Small Module (PRISM) Liquid-Metal Reactor, Final
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USNRC, Washington D.C., February 1994.
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Rockville, MD, July 8, 2002.
19. Muscara, J., Interaction on Materials Engineering Research Needs for
Advanced Reactors between USNRC/RES and ORNL, Oak Ridge,
TN, November 14, 2003.
20. Shaw, V.N., Majumdar, S., and Natesan, K., Review and Assessment
of Codes and Procedures for HTGR Components, NUREG/CR-6816
(ANL-02/36), Argonne National Laboratory, prepared for the Office
of Nuclear Regulatory Research, USNRC, Washington D.C., June
2003.
21. Natesan, K., Purohit, A., and Tam, S.W., Materials Behavior in HTGR
Environments, NUREG/CR-6824 (ANL-02/37), Argonne National
Laboratory, prepared for the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research,
USNRC, Washington D.C., July 2003.
22. Design Features and Technology Uncertainties for the Next
Generation Nuclear Plant, INEEL/EXT-04-01816, Independent
Technology Review Group, Coordinator J.M. Ryskamp, Idaho
National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, Idaho Falls, ID,
June 30, 2004.
23. Rubin, S.D., NGNP Technical Issues Safety Research Needs, Office
of Nuclear Regulatory Research, USNRC, Washington D.C., June 7,
2006.
24. Framework for Development of a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based
Alternative to 10 CFR Part 50, NUREG-1860, Working Draft and
Appendices, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, USNRC,
Washington D.C., July 2006.
25. Natesan, K., Majumdar, S., Shankar, P.S., and Shah, V.N., Preliminary
Materials Selection Issues for the Next Generation Nuclear Plant
Reactor Pressure Vessel, ANL/EXT-06-45, September 2006.
ASME_Ch60_p519-534.qxd 6/3/09 12:21 PM Page 519
RISK-INFORMED LICENSING,
REGULATION, AND SAFETY
MANAGEMENT OF NPPS IN FINLAND
Reino Virolainen and Kaisa Simola
60.1 INTRODUCTION
There are four operating nuclear power plant units in Finland.
The TVO power company has two 840 MWe BWR units sup-
plied by Asea-Atom at the Olkiluoto site. The Fortum corpora-
tion (formerly IVO) has two 500 MWe VVER 440/213 units at
the Loviisa site. Seawater is used as the ultimate heat sink at
both plants. All the units were commissioned between 1977 and
1982.
In addition a 1600 MWe European Pressurized Water Reactor
(EPR) supplied by AREVA NP (formerly the Framatome ANP –
Siemens AG Consortium) is under construction at the Olkiluoto site.
Current international safety requirements and especially French and
German operating experience have been used in the design. Finnish
requirements and operating experience have also been used, espe-
cially regarding site-specific features. Severe accident management
and protection against collision of a large passenger airplane are
implemented in the plant design.
In Finland, risk-informed applications are formally integrated
in the regulatory process of NPPs that are already in the early
design phase and these are to run through the construction and
operation phases through the entire plant service time.
Living probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) models have been
developed for both the Olkiluoto 1/2 and Loviisa 1/2 NPPs. The
PRA studies include level 1 and level 2 models. Level 1 com-
prises the calculation of severe core damage frequency (proba-
bility per year) and level 2 the determination of the size and
frequency of the release of radioactive substances to the envi-
ronment. At the moment, level 1 studies for full power operation
cover internal events, area events (fires, floods), and external
events such as harsh weather conditions and seismic events.
The shutdown and low power states of level 1 PRA cover inter-
nal events, floods, fires, harsh weather conditions, and seismic
events.
Special attention is devoted to the use of various risk-informed
PRA applications in the licensing of Olkiluoto 3 project such as
RI-ISI, RI-TechSpecs, RI-IST, and safety classification of SSCs.
In this context this chapter makes several references to the ASME
standards on RI-ISI and the European Network for Inspection and
Qualification, (ENIQ) and its RI-ISI related activities.
CHAPTER
60
60.2 RISK-INFORMED REGULATORY
FRAME
60.2.1 PRA in Nuclear Safety Legislation
In Finland, the structure of the legal pyramid for the regulation
of the nuclear power plants (NPPs) is comprised of the following
levels:
• Nuclear Energy Act
• Nuclear Energy Decree
• Government Decree on nuclear safety requirements
• Nuclear regulatory guides
• Other regulatory requirements to the licensee.
The Nuclear Energy Act deals with the nuclear energy at
high, nontechnical level. The Nuclear Energy Decree provides
the major technical requirements on how to ensure an adequate
safety level of the use of nuclear energy. Accordingly it requires
that the licensee has to submit PSAR/FSAR and PRA in con-
junction with the application for the construction and operating
licensees. The Government Decision sets forth the basic, high
level requirements for the use of safety analysis tools like
design basis analysis and probabilistic analysis. Finally the
nuclear regulatory guides set forth the detailed requirements of
specific applications and how these applications have to be
applied.
The general objective of acts and decrees is to provide regula-
tion on the responsibilities and set forth the requirements to fulfill
those responsibilities. The nuclear regulatory guides are formally
less obligatory than the acts and decrees. Accordingly the licensee
can choose an optional solution for the safety requirements set
forth in the regulatory guides.
60.2.2 Risk-Informed Regulation – General Policy
The essence of the risk-informed regulation and safety man-
agement is that PRA works as an interactive communication plat-
form between the licensee and STUK. Accordingly a PRA
model, prepared by the licensee and reviewed by STUK, is used
for resolution of safety issues by both parties. For this purpose
the licensees provide STUK with the PRA model in electronic
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520 • Chapter 60
form and regularly maintain and update it. STUK accepts the
models after a thorough review process.
In the regulatory process the deterministic and probabilistic
approaches work in parallel. In addition, the deterministic and
probabilistic approaches interact. First of all, the results of deter-
ministic assessment provide necessary input for models and data
used in PRA. Secondly, PRA provides insights on adequacy of
design requirements and design basis and thirdly, PRA provides
assessment on the need to improve the reliability of safety func-
tions and plant systems.
Examples of safety issues for which the PRA insights give an
improved basis for decisions are approvals of plant modifications
and resolution of testing, in-service inspection, and maintenance
programs. PRA insights are of value in assessing requirements
based on traditional engineering judgment and do not form an
essential part of the defense-in-depth concept. Examples of such
requirements are details of safety classification and many
Technical Specification requirements.
In the course of the years, the use of risk information has
evolved with experiences accumulated over time, and today the
use of PRA is aimed at running through the design, construction
and operation phases over the entire service period of a NPP.
STUK is in progress of training inspectors to make them under-
stand and use the PRA insights while planning the regulatory
inspection programs and conducting the inspections at site. A spe-
cial PRA Info system was developed to provide a selected, well
organized PRA information package to non-PRA experts. PRA
Info system is aimed to provide the inspectors with qualified PRA
insights to upgrade their risk perception and demonstrate the
importance of most significant accident sequences.
60.3 PRA IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS
60.3.1 Development of PRA Requirements for NPPs
In Finland, the regulatory authority (STUK) and licensees have
introduced PRA as a widely used method in the nuclear safety
regulation and safety management. The possibilities of probabilis-
tic methods in nuclear safety management were recognized by the
Finnish authorities and licensees in the early 1970s while the
Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs were under construction. STUK for-
mally required the Finnish licensees to perform PRA studies in
1984. The first PRA studies were submitted to STUK in 1989.
STUK’s requirement included that the licensee personnel per-
forms the PRA studies as an in-house project. External consul-
tants were to be utilized only in support of methodological issues.
The goal was a living PRA model, which is easy to use and keep
constantly up-to-date. The underlying idea of this approach was
to make the plant personnel well committed to the efficient use of
PRAs. These decisions laid the foundation for the present use of
PRA in risk-informed regulation by the authority (STUK) and in
risk-informed safety management by the licensees. Risk-informed
regulation implies an approach in which both the PRA results and
the deterministic criteria combined with engineering judgment are
considered and they complement each other in the regulatory
decision making. The general aim of the risk-informed methods is
to use the available resources in the most efficient way to main-
tain and increase the nuclear safety.
Accordingly, an identical, reviewed PRA model is used for res-
olution of safety issues both by the licensee and by STUK. The
use of the identical PRA model gives a common basis for discus-
sions between the authority and the licensees on risk-related
issues. A prerequisite for the use of a common model is a thor-
ough in-house review of the PRA models by the authority.
The risk-informing of regulatory and risk management activi-
ties is a step by step process. STUK has promoted the use of PRA
in regulation and safety management of NPPs since 1987 when
the regulatory guide [5] on the use of PRA was issued. The first
edition of the guide set forth several requirements to the licensees
on how to use PRA in the safety management of the NPPs. The
1996 edition of guide YVL 2.8 [3] extended the use of PRA to
further applications and the 2003 edition extended its scope [1].
The regulatory guide YVL 2.8 [1] includes general guidelines for
ensuring the quality of PRA. A condensed scheme of the require-
ments set forth in the guide YVL 2.8 is given in Table 60.1.
As a preparation for further regulatory requirements in the reg-
ulatory guide YVL 2.8 (for edition 2003), STUK conducted a
pilot study on risk-informed in-service inspection (RI-ISI) in
1999 [15, 18]. The pilot study included two safety systems both
from Loviisa (VVER-440) and Olkiluoto (BWR) NPPs. The
study discusses the findings obtained during the pilot study on
RI-ISI of piping and produced essential insights of the applied
method. Furthermore, the study gave guidance to extract items for
further development. Based on these results and overall experi-
ence the general suitability of the method for further applications
is evaluated. As a consequence, the revised regulatory guide YVL
2.8 “Probabilistic safety analysis in safety management of nuclear
power plants” (issued in 2003) [1] set forth a new requirement
such that RI-ISI applications are mandatory while drawing up the
ISI programs for piping of operating NPPs and new designs. The
ASME XI code cases [12, 13, 14] and ENIQ’s development work
on RI-ISI and Risk-Informed Qualification practices [24] formed
a well-established basis for those requirements. Finnish licensees
are running RI-ISI projects for their risk-informing in-service
inspection programs. RI-ISI approach is also being used in the
context of the ongoing Olkiluoto 3 NPP project.
In the same way as with the RI-ISI pilot application, STUK
also conducted a pilot study on risk-informed graded quality
assurance (Graded QA) [35] in cooperation with the licensees and
backed up by VTT [36] before STUK set forth such a regulatory
requirement to the licensees in the regulatory guide YVL 2.8
(edition 2003).
60.3.2 PRA in the Licensing Process of New Designs
In the Finnish regulatory guides the Living PRA is formally
integrated in the regulatory process of NPPs (that are) already in
the early design phase as a part of the licensing documentation; it
is to run throughout the construction and operation phases of the
plant service time, as shown in Table 60.2.
In Finland, a necessary prerequisite for the construction of a
new NPP unit is that an applicant submits a decision in principle
to the Government. The “decision in principle” is to be made by
the Government and ratified by the Parliament. The “decision in
principle” is a statement by the Government that a nuclear facility
is “in line with the overall good of the society”. Two important
prerequisites for making the “decision in principle” are (1) the
municipality where the nuclear facility is planned to be located is
in favor of the facility in its statement and (2) no factors indicat-
ing a lack of sufficient compliance with the safety requirements
have arisen. The requirement (2) is judged mainly on the basis of
a preliminary safety assessment made by STUK.
A plant specific, design phase level 1 and level 2 PRA is
required as a prerequisite for issuing a positive statement for an
application of the construction license for a new NPP design and
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 521

TABLE 60.1 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR RISK-INFORMED APPLICATIONS

(SOURCE: refs [1, 8, and 29])

Risk-informed Regulation Risk-informed Safety

(STUK) Management

(LICENSEE)

Utilization of living PRA

Use of PRA for design and construction Plant operation and maintenance Strategic SAM Planning
(PRA level 1) (PRA level 2)

Design and construction Issues Long term issues • Uncertainty issue

• Assurance of adequacy of Design Basis e.g. against • Main risk contributors Quantification Techniques
External Hazards • Recognition of critical
• Compliance with safety objectives
• Compliance with safety objectives sequences and phenomena
• Personnel training
• Safety classification of SSC • Evaluation of significance
• Plant changes and backfitting of critical phenomena and
• Program for Technical Specifications human factor
• Disturbance and emergency operat-
• Program for In-service Testing/Inspection ing procedure improvements • Evaluation of mitigation
• Program for On-Line PM • Analysis of Technical measures
Specifications
• D&EO Procedures
• In-service Inspection (RI-ISI)
• In-service Testing (RI-IST)
• Maintenance planning
• Graded QA
Short term issues
• Exemption from Technical
Specifications
• Analysis of Safety Margins during
Incidents
Precursor studies
• PRA based event analysis (incl.
risk follow-up of licensee events
and precursor studies)

a complete level 1 and level 2 PRA for issuing a positive state-
ment for an application of a operating license. The plant-specific
level 1 and level 2 PRA includes internal initiators, fires, flooding,
harsh weather conditions, and seismic events for full power
operation mode and for low power and shutdown mode. The regu-
latory guide YVL 2.8 includes general guidelines for ensuring the
quality of PRA. STUK will review the PRA and makes an assess-
ment of the acceptability of the design phase and construction
phase PRAs prior to giving a statement about the construction
license and operating license applications, respectively.
Table 60.2 gives an idea of the conceptual licensing process.
The vendor (AREVA) and the applicant for the license (TVO)
submitted the level 1 and level 2 design phase PRA to STUK in
conjunction with the application of the construction license of OL
3 NPP, European pressurized water reactor (EPR) 1600. The
development work continues for the construction phase level 1
and level 2 PRA, which is to be submitted to STUK in conjunc-
tion with the application of the operating license.
60.3.2.1 Risk-Informed Applications for a Construction
License For building a new plant unit the applicant for a construc-
tion license has to submit level 1 and level 2 design phase PRAs to
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522 • Chapter 60
TABLE 60.2 PRA IN LICENSING PROCESS OF NEW DESIGNS (Source: refs [1and 20])
Decision in Principle on the Construction of a Nuclear Power Plant
Performing of Design phase PRA
Application for a Construction Licence
Submission of level 1 and level 2 design phase PRA to STUK (incl. safety classification of SSCs)
Evaluation of the acceptability of design phase PRA by STUK
(Upgrade of PRA and/or the plant design)
Construction License and construction
Supplementation of design phase PRA (Applications such as RI-ISI, RI-IST, RI-TS, RI-PM, Training,
Procedures, Safety classification of SSC)
Application for an Operating License
Submission of level 1 and level 2 PRA to STUK
Evaluation of the acceptability
(Upgrade of PRA and/or the plant)
Operating Licence
Utilization of PRA during operation (Plant modifications, RI-ISI, RI-IST, RI-TS, RI-PM, Training, Procedures,
Incident, and Event Analysis)
STUK. These analyses have to meet the requirements for PRA
scope, methods, and quality set forth in the regulatory guide.
One purpose of a design phase PRA is to ensure that the plant
safety is in compliance with the numerical design objectives. The
following high level design objectives are set forth in the
Regulatory Guide [1]:
– mean value of a core damage frequency, as estimated from a
comprehensive Level 1 PSA, is less than 1.0E-5/yr
– mean value of a large radioactive release frequency (more
than 100 TBq Cs-137), as estimated from a comprehensive
level 2 PSA, is less than 5.0E-7/yr.
The safety classification document has to be submitted to STUK
in conjunction with the application for a construction license. The
safety classification has to be assessed with the help of PRA. The
probabilistic review of the safety classification has to be submitted
to STUK in conjunction with the safety classification document.
The safety classification document is an integral part of the appli-
cation for a construction license to be submitted to STUK.
In addition, the licensee has to indicate by means of the design
phase PRA that the foundation of the plant design and the design
requirements used are adequate. This is especially applicable to
events such as harsh weather or other exceptional environmental
conditions and seismic events, the frequencies and consequences
of which may comprise large uncertainties.
TVO submitted the OL3 EPR design phase PRA to STUK in
conjunction with the application for the construction license.
STUK reviewed the design phase PRA and made the assessment
of the acceptability of the design phase PRA prior to giving a pos-
itive statement about the application for the construction licence.
60.3.2.2 Risk-Informed Applications for Operating License
The applicant has to submit a level 1 and level 2 construction phase
PRA to STUK in conjunction with the application for an operating
license. The purpose of the level 1 and level 2 construction phase
PRAs is to ensure the conclusions made in the design phase PRA
on the plant safety and to set a basis for the risk-informed safety
management during the operation phase of the plant.
The technical specifications must be reviewed by the aid of PRA
in such a way that the coverage and balance of technical specifica-
tions are ensured. The review must cover all operating states of the
plant. Especially such failure states, in which the change of operat-
ing state of the plant may result in a greater risk than the repair of
the plant during operation, should be reviewed with PRA. The
results of review must be submitted to STUK in conjunction with
the application for an acceptance of technical specifications.
The results of PRA must be applied in the review of safety
classification as in the design phase, if extensive changes are
performed in the plant design in the construction phase. Further
the results of PRA must be applied in outlining programs of
safety significant systems relating to testing and preventive
maintenance during operation, and in addressing disturbance
and emergency operating procedures. Further the insights from
PRA must be used in outlining and developing the inspection
programs of piping. Combining the information from PRA and
the damage mechanisms of pipes and the secondary impacts of
damages, the inspections are focused in such a way that those
are weighted on those pipes whose risk significance is greatest.
Although working up the risk informed inspection program, the
systems 1,2,3,4 and noncode safety classes must be considered
comprehensively. Similarly, the extent radiation doses can be
reduced by focusing on inspections and optimizing inspection
periods must be considered.
TVO in cooperation with AREVA is in process of conducting
the aforementioned PRA applications for the operating license of
OL3 EPR.
60.3.2.3 Risk-Informed Applications During Operation
Plant-specific level-l and level-2 PRA studies are a regulatory
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 523
requirement for the operating nuclear power plants. These studies
are being used in the living models, both at the utilities and STUK.
Plant-specific living PRAs have been completed for all operating
Finnish plants, including internal initiators, fires, flooding, harsh
weather conditions, seismic events for operation mode, and inter-
nal events, fire and flooding for low power mode.
Applications for Risk-Informed Safety Management
During Operation The licensee has to prepare and regularly
update the level 1 and level 2 PRA corresponding to the operat-
ing experience. In addition, the PRA model must be always
updated when a substantial change is made in the plant design or
in the procedures or when a new substantial risk factor is found.
The licensee has to provide the PRA model in a computerized
form for the use of regulator. The licensee has to maintain a data-
base of the reliability of safety related components, initiating
events and human errors. STUK reviews the updates of PRA and
evaluates their acceptability.
Living PRA models have been developed for both the
Olkiluoto and Loviisa NPPs. The PRA studies include level 1 and
level 2 models. Level 1 comprises the calculation of severe core
damage frequency (probability per year) and level 2 the determi-
nation of the size and frequency of the release of radioactive sub-
stances to the environment. At the moment, level 1 studies for full
power operation cover internal events, area events (fires, floods),
and external events such as harsh weather conditions and seismic
events. The shutdown and low power states of level 1 PRA cover
internal events, and area and external events. The Level 2 studies
include internal initiating events, flooding and harsh weather con-
ditions in full power state.
Plant Changes PRA insights have to be applied to the upgrade
of safety and to the demonstration of needs for plant changes and
to the evaluation of their priority. Accordingly the licensee has to
submit to STUK a probabilistic assessment of the impact of the
change on the plant safety in conjunction with the preliminary
inspection document. A proposal for a safety class has to be sub-
mitted to STUK in conjunction with the preliminary inspection
document of a system modification. In conjunction with extensive
changes concerning the entire systems, the safety class has to be
re-evaluated with PRA, as in the design phase.
PRA has got an important role in the evaluation of needs for
plants modifications of operating plant units. The licensees have
provided STUK with the assessment of safety significance of each
proposed modification. The risk assessment has to be submitted to
STUK independent of the safety class of the systems to be
changed. For example, in the course of past several years the esti-
mate of the core damage frequency of the Loviisa plant has
decreased by a factor of ten, thanks to a number of plant modifi-
cations conducted.
Technical Specifications The insights of PRA must be applied
to the assessment of needs for changes in the technical specifica-
tions in conjunction with extensive plant changes, in a way
corresponding to the construction phase. In similar manner, the
needs for changes of technical specifications must be evaluated, if
new unidentified risk factors are found. Further, the PRA has to
be used for identifying such situations in which the plant shut
down may cause higher risk than continuing power operation and
fixing the failures. The preliminary inspection document for a
plant modification should include a preliminary proposal for the
change of Technical Specifications.
Certain inconsistency of AOTs in comparison with the
respective risk impact has been identified between various safety
systems. Risk assessment has also questioned the traditional
conclusion that in all faulted states the shutdown of the plant
would be the safest course of action. If systems used for decay
heat removal are seriously degraded (CCF), it may be safer to
continue plant operation than to shut down the plant immedi-
ately. Hence, the licensees have to reevaluate the relevance of
allowed outage times (AOT) of the most important front line
safety systems and to figure out those failure states of the plant
when it is safer to continue operation than to shut down the
plant immediately.
Exemption of Tech Specs If a licensee applies for an exemp-
tion of Tech Specs the licensee has to submit a risk analysis to
STUK and indicate that the risk from the exemption is insignifi-
cant. STUK reviews the licensees’ analysis and makes its own
risk assessment using comparisons as needed. The licensees have
applied for an exemption of Tech Specs, typically two or three
times a year.
Condition of Systems, Structures, and Components PRA
can be used to effectively optimize the test intervals and proce-
dures of those components and systems that contain the major
risk reduction potential. PRA can also be used for the identifica-
tion of potential failures and common cause failures.
The testing program of safety significant systems and compo-
nents that is set forth in context of technical specifications must
be argued by the aid of risk assessment and the results of analysis
have to be submitted to STUK for information. The testing pro-
gram must be regularly evaluated on risk basis during operation
of the plant.
The online maintenance of safety significant systems and com-
ponents is allowed during operation in accordance with the
restrictions set by the technical specifications. If the preventive
maintenance is performed during operation, an estimate of risk
significance of the maintenance must be analyzed and submitted
to STUK.
STUK accepts online preventive maintenance during power
operation provided that the deterministic safety criteria are ful-
filled (e.g., single failure criterion) and the risk contribution is
small. According to the first Olkiluoto PRA study in 1989, the
risk contribution of online preventive maintenance was about 5%
of the total core damage frequency. When the maintenance sched-
ule was optimized with PRA, the risk contribution of online pre-
ventive maintenance could be reduced to 1% of the total core
damage frequency [8].
The basis of PRA must be outlined and developed in the
inspection programs of piping. While drawing up the risk
informed inspection program, the systems of classes 1,2,3,4 and
noncode must be regarded as a whole. Extent of radiation doses
can be reduced by focusing on inspections and optimizing inspec-
tion periods. Pilot projects on in-service inspections of piping
both in a pressurized water reactor plant (Loviisa) and a boiling
water reactor plant (Olkiluoto) have been completed by STUK in
cooperation with the licensees. Risk-informed procedure of
STUK combines both the plant-specific PRA information and the
traditional insights in support of the system specific detailed in-
service inspection program planning. Finnish licensees have
shown progress in RI-ISI programs. RI-ISI approach is also used
in the context of the ongoing EPR project.
Reporting of Operating Events The regulatory guide YVL
2.8 [1] does not require the licensee to set up a special program
for analyzing operational events with PRA techniques. Instead the
licensee has to provide qualified information of the operational
events and submit the information to STUK. STUK performs the
PRA based event analyses itself.
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524 • Chapter 60
In the area of operational events, PRA is a standard tool to
assess the safety significance of component failures and inci-
dents. Today risk follow-up studies are a common practice at
STUK. Since 1995 STUK has performed systematic risk follow-
up studies on the annual basis for each Finnish nuclear power
plant unit.
Disturbance and Emergency Operation Procedures In order
to ensure the coverage of disturbance and emergency operating
procedures PRA must be used to determine those situations for
which the procedures shall be drawn up. Accordingly, should
shortages in the coverage appear, the licensees have to write new
Disturbance and Emergency Operation Procedures (DEOP) to
better manage the accident sequences of high risk importance.
Personnel Training The results of PRA must be taken into
account in the planning of personnel training. In the training of
control room crew, the most important accident sequences and
significant operator actions, in terms of risk, have to be at least in
a period of three years used in planning. In the planning of main-
tenance crew training, attention needs to be paid to risk significant
measures identified in context of PRA. STUK evaluates the train-
ing programs of the personnel inter alia in context of the inspec-
tion program of operation control.
60.3.3 Review Process of PRA
A thorough Regulatory Review is a regulatory requirement for
using Living PRA for decision making in Finland. STUK reviews
the in-house PRAs and makes an assessment of the acceptability
of the PRA. STUK uses its own review guide for internal events
PRA reviews that are mainly based on “PRA Review Manual”
NUREG/CR 3485 [37]. In addition to the review guide, it is a
standard practice to also apply other state-of-the-art guides such
as IAEA Regulatory review of Level 1 PRA TEC-DOC 1135
[38], IAEA Regulatory review of Level 2 PSA, TEC-DOC 1229
[39], Swiss regulatory guidelines for the Regulatory Review of
Human Reliability Analysis in PRA [40], in addition to STUK’s
own experience and expertise.
Current practice is to divide the review into two main parts:
1. General Review (conducted by 1–2 experts)
• assess the scope and adequacy of documentation
• verify if the documentation and quality of PRA is adequate
for the detailed review
2. Detailed Review
• set up a review team and identify need for external experts
• set the objectives and details of review depending on pre-
vious reviews and the scope of PRA
• describe the scope of review, prioritization of review
issues, and resource allocation in the review plan
• main objective is to assess PRA’s scope, validity, and lim-
itations
• The review team should be comprised of an extensive set
of experts such as
– Systems analyst, familiar with the design of reactor
safety systems, containment systems, and Level 1 and
Level 2 interface
– Accident analyst (thermal-hydraulic etc.) and expert in
accident progression and plant response to various IEs
– Experts in severe accident phenomena and analyses
– Structural specialists, for example, performance of the
containment following the loadings imposed by a severe
accident and the failure modes that could occur
– I&C expert
– PRA specialists to address the modeling and quantifica-
tion of the analysis and the associated uncertainties
– HRA expert: EOPs, severe accident management mea-
sures, off-site emergency arrangements (Level 3 PRA)
and so on
– Fire protection expert and expert in layout issues.
Review process is documented in a review report, the aim of
which is to provide a concise presentation of major findings and
all open issues. Background information and recalculations are
usually described in separate documents. Results and open issues
are dealt with an official review meeting together with licensee’s
experts. Once the open issues are discussed in the review meeting,
STUK will decide if further actions or reanalyses are required.
The necessary actions are recorded in the final report, which is
sent to the licensee as a supplement to an official letter. The offi-
cial letter includes the requirements of necessary improvements to
the PRA model or to the plant (Fig. 60.1).
60.4 EXAMPLES OF RISK-INFORMED
APPLICATIONS
60.4.1 Examples of Risk-Informed Applications of
Operating Plants
Examples of safety issues, for which the PRA insights give
an improved basis for decisions, are approvals of plant modifi-
cations and resolution of testing, in-service inspection, and
maintenance programs. PRA insights are also of value in
assessing meaningfulness of requirements that are based on tra-
ditional engineering judgment but do not form an essential part
of defense-in-depth concept. Examples of such requirements
are details of safety classification and many Technical
Specification requirements [2, 4, 6, 7, 8]. As a part of the
preparation for further regulatory requirements, STUK conduct-
ed a pilot study on risk-informed in-service inspection (RI-ISI)
in cooperation with the licen-sees in 1998–1999 [15] The pilot
study included two safety systems both from Loviisa (VVER-
440) and Olkiluoto (BWR) NPPs. The paper discusses the find-
ings obtained during the pilot study on risk-informed ISI of
pipes. The study produced essential insights of the applied
method. Furthermore, the study gave guidance to extract items
for further development. Based on these results and overall
experience the general suitability of the method for further
applications is evaluated [18, 19]. As a consequence, the
(revised) current regulatory guide YVL 2.8 “Probabilistic safe-
ty analysis in safety management of nuclear power plants”
(issued in 2003) set forth a new requirement such that RI-ISI
methods are mandatory while working out the ISI programs
both for operating NPPs and new designs. The ASME Section
XI related code cases and ENIQ`s development work on RI-ISI
and RI-Qualification practices provided a well established basis
for RI-ISI application. Finnish licensees Fortum and TVO are
running RI-ISI projects for their risk informing in-service
inspection programs. RI-ISI approach is also used in the con-
text of the ongoing EPR project.
60.4.2 Experiences of Loviisa RI-ISI Project
At the VVER-440 Loviisa Unit 1, the existing ISI program for
10 year period from1998 to 2007 is based on rules and guide-
lines given in ASME Code Section XI. The new Finnish regu-
latory guides, however, require that the licensees shall utilize
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Other technical units

General
review Review
Modifications request
Site
inspections PRA Plant
Preliminary
report
General
review
report Final
report
Other technical units

PRA Other technical units

application: Analysis
Quick review

STUK Decision
process
Meeting
Licensee
process
Comments PRA Plant
modifications modification
PRA process
update

New
PRA revision PSA-application

Licensee PRA-process, Living PRA: Safety improvements, Plant modifications...

FIG. 60.1 REVIEW PROCESS OF PRA (Source: REFERENCE [30])

risk-informed methodology while planning ISI- programs for
the next period.
A pilot project for risk-informed in-service inspection method-
ology was launched during the spring, 2005. In the pilot project
two systems, one primary and one secondary system were consid-
ered. A plan for utilizing the risk-informed methodology for
Loviisa Unit 1 piping was prepared during the summer and
autumn, 2005 and was submitted to the Finnish Nuclear
Regulatory Authority (STUK) for review and approval. STUK
accepted the supplemental plan in July, 2006.
In the Loviisa RI-ISI project the risk assessment is applied for
the whole unit, that is, for safety classes 1, 2, 3, 4 as well as for
nonnuclear safety class classified piping [21]. The risk-informed
selection process as described in ASME XI Supplement R,
Method B was chosen as a basic approach for the new ISI
program.
An independent expert panel evaluates all selected systems and
reviews the basis of the risk classification in order to guarantee
that the final RI-ISI program will be planned in a proper way. The
panel is also to review the final ISI program.
60.4.2.1 Consequence Categorization System risk assess-
ments are based on the Loviisa full scope level 1 and level 2 PRA
models and the failure consequences (side effects from pipe fail-
ures) to other systems are considered as they are taken into account
in the PRA model. The existing PRA model was comprehensive
and detailed enough for this work, because the consequences of
different kinds of leakages have been studied in the flood and inter-
nal event PRA. Accordingly the first screening and selection of the
piping segments was made on the basis of the existing PRA, which
covers internal and external events and full, low and nonpower
states. The flood PRA covers leakages that submerge equipment in
large areas causing an initiating event and also failing safety com-
ponents that would be needed in case of such an initiating event.
The internal event PRA covers small leakages, water, and steam
jets that can cause localized wetting of single electric equipment.
A systematic identification and mapping of flood sources and
spreading routes as well as equipment vulnerabilities to external
effects have been done in the PRA. As required, secondary effects
of increase in temperature and humidity have been analyzed in the
PRA.
Systems and piping segments, which can cause a core damage
probability larger than 10⫺6 or a large early release probability
larger than 10⫺7 are selected for further studies. The other sys-
tems and piping have only minor effect on the core damage risk
and are screened out. The ratio between these probabilities was
selected to be 10 because such a ratio has been used in other safe-
ty related decisions made at the plant.
The consequence assessment is based on the Conditional Core
Damage Probability (CCDP) and Conditional Large Early Release
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526 • Chapter 60
Probability (CLERP) received from the Loviisa full scope level 1
and level 2 PRA. The failure assessment is performed on a qualita-
tive basis by a group of company experts familiar with Loviisa
NPP associated materials integrity and in-service activities. Pipe
seg-ments that exceed the screening level are divided into three
categories on the basis of their CCDP or CLERP values:
low: 1.0E-6  CCDP  1.0E-5,
medium: 1.0E-5  CCDP  1.0E-4 and
high: CCDP  1.0E-4.
The high limit value was selected to be the same as in the
ASME Section XI Supplement R. The CLERP limits are one
order of magnitude lower than the CCDP limits.
60.4.2.2 Failure Potential Categorization As given in the
method B of the ASME Section XI Supplement R the failure
potential categorization is performed on the qualitative basis. On
the contrary, there were long operation histories from both Loviisa
units, experiences with failures from own plant and other VVER-
plants and experience with similar work during many years relat-
ed to PLIM (Plant Life Management).
For determination of the potential failure mechanisms the sys-
tems of the plant were divided into three parts:
(1) structures and components in contact with primary coolant
(2) secondary circuit systems
(3) seawater cooled systems.
Potential failure mechanisms for the Austenitic Stainless Steel
piping in contact with primary water are Fatigue and Stress
Corrosion Cracking (SCC).
Potential failure mechanisms for the piping in contact with sec-
ondary water is Fatigue in case of Austenitic Stainless Steel and
Erosion Corrosion in case of CS and LA Steel piping.
In the seawater systems failure mechanisms vary depending on
piping materials and coatings applied. Thermal fatigue and
mechanical fatigue including vibrations are also considered.
Other possible cyclic loadings are evaluated on a case by case
basis. If the validity of the LBB concept is justified the reliability
of existing leak detection system is considered.
The most important secondary systems at Unit 1 have been
modeled on the computer software predicting wall thinning of the
piping. Predicted wall thinning is used as a failure classification
criterion for the systems modeled. Parameters affecting erosion
corrosion like pH, temperature, geometry, and material are used
as classification criteria for those systems, which are not modeled.
SCC is considered to be a potential failure mechanism only in
case of leakage or wetting of the outside surface of the piping.
60.4.2.3 Risk Categorization and the New RI-ISI Program
for the Main Coolant Piping After risk categorization of the seg-
mented systems, an internal RI-ISI Review Team consisting of
PRA, materials integrity, ISI and process experts reviews results of
risk categorization before presenting them to the Advisory Panel.
Results of the risk categorization are saved on the excel files con-
taining the sheets of consequence and risk categorization, includ-
ing failure potential categorization
60.4.2.4 Comparison of the New Risk-informed ISI Program
for Piping with the Existing Program The new Risk-Informed
approach will bring several new features compared to the existing
ISI program. New aspects can be seen in the scope of new program:
– Many totally new systems and new portions of the systems of
the existing program are included.
– Small diameter instrumentation piping of the primary systems
to be inspected (new methods and techniques to be devel-
oped).
– Consequence differences of parallel redundant safety system
and system portions can often be discovered (mostly due to
fire and flood).
The new Risk-Informed ISI program will include a wide range
of different inspection objects with different degradation mecha-
nisms and inspection targets. This will be managed by separate
and different programs (such as earlier at the site with ASME,
piping condition monitoring, and site walk down program):
– The systems with postulated cracking failures will be includ-
ed into Risk-Informed ISI program. Inspection system (pro-
cedure, personnel, equipment) shall be qualified according to
regulatory guide YVL 3.8 [28]. Inspection Company and
NDE examiners shall have the acceptance of Finnish
Regulator. Ultrasonic examiners and data analysts will be
qualified using blind test pieces with cracks in addition to
level 2 qualification of EN 473.
– The systems with erosion corrosion, corrosion and outside
surface failures will be included in the piping condition mon-
itoring program. Inspection Company shall have EN accredi-
tation and NDE examiners shall be qualified to level 2 of EN
473.
– The systems with possible impact of outside failures and leak-
ages (typically small size piping) will be included in the walk
down program of the power plant with typical VT-2 and VT-
3 visual examination.
As a practical example of the comparison between old ISI and
new RI-ISI risk categorization is the main coolant piping. The
main coolant piping with six loops is totally included in the old
program with pipe size rules of ASME Section XI (full scope
instead of 25% requirement). Piping blocks are made of stabilized
austenitic stainless steel. The total amount of objects of main
coolant piping (DN500) (a) in the existing ISI program and (b) in
the new RI-ISI program, with selected scope and different risk
categories (RC) are as follows:
– (a) 12 circular butt welds to RPV in the existing ISI program
and (b) 3 butt welds (RC2 - thermal transients, mechanical
fatigue) in the new RI-ISI program.
– (a) 86 circular butt welds and (b) 9 circular butt welds (RC4–
thermal transients, mechanical fatigue).
– (a) 24 longitudinal welds of elbow and (b) 6 longitudinal
welds (RC2– thermal transients, mechanical fatigue).
– (a) 34 nozzle welds and (b) 10 nozzle welds (RC2– thermal
fatigue).
– (a) 55 small size pressure measurement piping and (b) 7 lines
(RC4– vibration, damages caused during outage).
– (a) 48 small size temperature measurement nozzles and (b) 8
nozzles (RC4– crevice corrosion).
The reduction of inspection scope can be seen especially in the
amount of circular butt welds of the coolant piping to be inspected.
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Small size temperature measurement nozzles and pressure mea-
surement piping are the new objects in the program.
Selection of structural elements for inspection for the new
Risk-Informed ISI program will be completed by the end of 2007.
The selection of inspection areas of the main coolant piping
(DN500) has been carried out so far. New potential failure areas
confirmed by online measurements will be considered and added
into program if necessary. Risk-informed approach is one of tools
to reduce the risk of through inspections.
60.5 EXPERIENCES OF OLKILUOTO 3 NPP
RISK-INFORMED LICENCING
60.5.1 EPR Safety Features
Olkiluoto 3 NPP is the first unit to be built according to the
French-German EPR concept. The planned thermal power is 4300
MW and net electric power output is approximately 1600 MW.
Olkiluoto 3 has been designed to comply with the current interna-
tional safety principles, the Finnish regulatory requirements and
the European utility requirements, including a management strategy
for core melt accidents [20].
The EPR design is based on experience from French and German
PWRs, especially the N4 and Konvoi designs. Systematic use of the
well-known design principles of redundancy, diversity, and separa-
tion is an essential factor to meet the safety goals. Probabilistic
insights have been used to support the design of safety systems and
to improve the provisions against internal and external hazards.
The safety systems design is based mainly on four redundant
subsystems with 100% nominal capacity. Regarding emergency
cooling systems the use of four redundancies is compatible with
the N2 design criterion. Design criterion N2 implies that one
redundancy may be in maintenance and another out of order and
still two operative redundancies left provide adequate system
function. To minimize the effect of common cause failures, diver-
sity is used for both the most important safety systems and the
safety functions. Some examples of functional diversity are given
below in Table 60.3.
TABLE 60. 3 EXAMPLES OF SAFETY SYSTEM DIVERSITY IN OL3 (Source: ref. [20])
Safety-grade Systems Diverse System Functions
Emergency feedwater Primary side
system bleed via
 secondary relief pressurizer
safety valves
Emergency core cooling Fast
with the medium head depressurization
safety Injection system via secondary
side
Emergency diesel SBO diesels
generators
Systematic physical separation has been applied in the EPR
design. Each of the four trains of the safety systems is located in a
separate safeguards building. Olkiluoto 3will be protected against
a collision of a large passenger jet and a fighter plane. The reactor
building, fuel building, and two out of four safety system build-
ings are protected by thick double concrete walls. The other two
safety system buildings and some support system buildings are
protected by distance separation.
60.5.2 Risk-Informing Construction and Operating
License
In Finland, PRA is formally integrated in the regulatory
process of NPPs already in the early design phase and it is to run
through the construction and operation phases through the entire
plant service time. A plant specific, design phase level 1 and
level 2 PRA is required as a prerequisite for issuing the construc-
tion license and a complete level 1 and level 2 PRA for issuing
the operating license. The plant specific level 1 and level 2 PRA
includes internal initiators, fires, flooding, harsh weather condi-
tions, and seismic events for full power operation mode and for
low power and shutdown mode. In each licensing phase, PRA
has to be used to demonstrate that the following probabilistic
design objectives will be met:
– mean value of the core damage frequency is less than
1.0E-5/yr
– mean value of a large radioactive release frequency (more
than 100 TBq Cs-137) is less than 5.0E-7/yr.
The design has to be improved in case these objectives are not
met. The role of PRA in the licensing of NPPs in Finland is pre-
sented in Table 60.2.
60.5.3 Design Phase PRA
The plant supplier conducted a design phase PRA for OL3. The
level 1 analyses for full power operation covered internal events,
fires, floods, and external events. However, there were some short-
ages in the scope of the analysis. For example, seismic risks were
 Feed with medium
head safety
injection system
 Accumulator  Low head
injection safety
system injection
system
On-site gas
turbines
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528 • Chapter 60
not included in the design phase PRA. In addition, low power and
shutdown states risk analysis and level 2 PRA covered only inter-
nal events. Therefore, the plant supplier was required to provide
credible qualitative justification that the risks associated with the
missing parts will not increase significantly the total results. PRA
and a qualitative justification together demonstrated that safety
objectives will be met.
60.5.3.1 PRA Review Findings Although the design phase
PRA was in progress the detailed design of SSCs was still incom-
plete. Hence the comprehensive analyses concerning system
dependencies and common cause failures for all systems, particu-
larly electrical and I & C systems were lacking. There were also
deficiencies in the coverage of plant-specific initiating events,
which are natural at the design stage when detailed information of
structures, systems, and components is lacking.
The risk from fire and flood was assessed in the design phase
analysis. The analysis demonstrated that the contribution of fires
and floods to the total core damage frequency is small and that
there are no remarkable design flaws left in the plant design that
would dominate the risk. While performing the design phase
PRA, not all design details were known that means that expert
judgment and conservative assumptions were used. Detailed fire
and flood risk analysis is to be made in the construction stage of
OL3 when the design is finalized.
The design phase PRA has been used to ensure the adequacy
of the plant design basis and adequacy of the design require-
ments related to external events (weather phenomena etc.). The
OL3 PRA includes a screening analysis of external phenomena
covering weather phenomena (wind, temperature, lightning,
rain) and seawater-related phenomena, such as variations in sea-
water level, temperature of seawater, and blockage-causing phe-
nomena (algae, mussels, frazil ice, oil spills). The analysis of
external events also covers risks connected with industrial activ-
ities, transport, and other normal human activities in the vicinity
of the plant site, but not activities deliberately aimed at damag-
ing the plant.
To withstand a blockage of the essential service water system
(loss of ultimate heat sink) and a loss of residual heat removal and
component cooling functions some precautions have been made.
These include a design of cleaning systems and return of warm
main cooling water to the intake to avoid frazil ice. The plant
design is to withstand a total loss of ultimate heat sink for 72 h.
Since the emergency diesel generators are air cooled, the loss of
seawater systems does not endanger emergency AC power supply.
Two safety trains of the emergency feedwater system and emer-
gency core cooling systems are also equipped with air cooled
chillers to ensure cooling during a loss of seawater cooling.
Snowstorm has the potential to cause simultaneously a loss of off-
site power and blockage of diesel generator cooling and/or com-
bustion air intakes. The prevention of a blockage of air intakes
with snow has been taken into account while redesigning the
diesel generator systems.
Seismic activity in Finland is quite low. During the construc-
tion of the operating Finnish NPP units there were no specific reg-
ulatory requirements on seismic design. Later, however, seismic
PRA revealed significant seismic risks due to inadequate supports
of electric cabinets and batteries, so that some improvements had
to be implemented.
No quantitative seismic risk analysis was submitted in connec-
tion with the OL3 construction licence application as sufficiently
detailed design information was not yet available. However, the
plant supplier presented an assessment claiming that it will be
possible to demonstrate that the plant unit meets probabilistic
design objectives with adequate safety margin for earthquake
risks, provided the plant unit is implemented according to the
principles of earthquake design stated in the Preliminary Safety
Analysis Report.
The frequency of occurrence of the design response spectrum is
1.0E-5/yr and the quantitative requirements are less than 1.0E-
5/yr for core damage frequency, and 5.0E-7/yr for a large release.
Therefore, a detailed seismic risk analysis with fragility curves is
required to demonstrate that the quantitative risk targets will be
reached.
Level 2 PRA analyzed the physical progression of sequences
leading to severe reactor accident and the timing of release in acci-
dents that threaten the structural integrity of the containment or its
functional tightness, or in which a release from the primary circuit
occurs through systems located outside the containment building
(containment bypass). The results of level 2 PRA indicated that the
frequency of exceeding the release limit for a severe accident is
smaller than 5E-7/yr, which is set forth as a safety objective in the
regulatory Guide.
60.5.3.2 Some Examples of Plant Design Changes Several
modifications to the original EPR design were made during the
licensing process based on the Finnish regulatory requirements
and local conditions, and as a result of the regulatory review of
construction license documentation (PRA and PSAR). Many safety
significant design modifications were based on PRA insights. The
design modifications required were mostly related to the improve-
ment of the reliability of safety significant systems by adding
diversity, redundancy, or separation.
Regarding the separation requirements of the electrical sys-
tems, safety classified electrical cables were to be physically sep-
arated from the nonsafety cables. Separations of electric supply of
the design basis accident (DBA systems from systems dedicated
to severe accidents were improved. In addition, a gas turbine plant
to be built on site will provide independent AC power to all units.
Some modifications were required due to Finnish weather phe-
nomena. For example, the air intakes of the emergency diesel
generator and the cooling systems had to be protected against
snow blocking and external fire. In addition alternative air intake
for station blackout (SBO diesels (diverse diesel generators for
two safety trains) has to be designed. Further seawater intake
coarse bar screens have to be protected with electrical heating
against frazil ice blocking.
For reducing fire risks, cables of different redundancies will be
separated by fire barriers in all safety critical locations and verti-
cal and horizontal additional fire walls have to be constructed in
the annulus area of the containment to separate redundancies from
each other.
In the containment separation by distance, structures and insu-
lation are improved and Main Coolant Pump (MCP) design
changes are implemented to limit oil leak volume. Cable spread-
ing space below the main control room (MCR) is to be equipped
with a fire extinguishing system (manual from the MCR).
The flooding risk is reduced by preventing flood spreading in
safety buildings and from service water pumping station between
redundant rooms. Watertight walls and doors between trains,
drainage, leak detection sensors, and pump trip and isolation sig-
nals are supposed to reduce the additional flooding risk.
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The capacity of filtered venting system will be increased in
order to provide more diversity to decay heat removal in case of
accident situations.
Some changes were made for the safety classification of com-
ponents and systems based on PRA insights. The component
cooling water system and essential seawater system safety classi-
fication were upgraded from SC3 to SC2 and reactor coolant
pump trip breakers from SC4 to SC2. The safety classification
document was reviewed previously in conjunction with the appli-
cation for a construction licence. However if substantial design
modifications are performed, the safety classification has to be
assessed with PRA also in the construction phase.
60.5.4 Risk-Informed Applications for Operating
Licence
Several PRA applications are required in Regulatory Guides in
conjunction with the application for a construction and operating
licenses. The insights of PRA must be applied in drawing up a
program for Technical Specifications. The testing program of
safety significant systems and components, which is set forth in
the context of technical specifications, shall be argued with the
aid of PRA. Accordingly, PRA has to be used to effectively opti-
mize the test intervals and procedures of components and sys-
tems that contain the major risk reduction potential. The rele-
vance of AOT of safety systems has to be evaluated with PRA as
well. For example, if systems used for decay heat removal are
degraded, it may be safer to continue operation than to shut down
the plant immediately. Accordingly, the PRA has to be used for
identifying such situations in which the plant shut down may
cause higher risk than that of continuing power operation and fix-
ing the failures.
The insights of PRA must be applied in drawing up a program
for the online preventive maintenance. Accordingly, if the
licensee wants to perform preventive maintenance work during
operation, an acceptable estimate of risk significance of preven-
tive maintenance must be completed.
In order to ensure the coverage of disturbance and emergency
operating procedures PRA must be used to determine those
situations for which the procedures shall be drawn up.Accordingly,
should shortages in the coverage appear, the licensees have to write
new Emergency Operation Procedures (EOP) to provide guidance
for operators to better manage certain accident sequences that the
PRA indicated to be of high importance to risk.
The results of PRA must be taken into account in the planning
of personnel training. The most important accident sequences and
significant operator actions in terms of risk have to be trained at
least in a three year period. In the planning of training of mainte-
nance crew, attention needs to be paid to risk significant measures
that are identified in context of PRA.
The applicant has submitted to STUK their risk-informed plan-
ning methods on the programs of the Technical Specifications,
RI-IST, online Preventive Maintenance, RI-ISI and is drawing up
corresponding risk-informed programs.
The insights of PRA must be used in outlining and developing
the inspection programs of piping (RI-ISI). While drawing up
the risk informed inspection program, the systems of classes
1,2,3,4 and nonnuclear must be regarded as a whole. Combining
the information from PRA and the damage mechanisms of pipes
and the secondary impacts of damages, the inspections are
focused on those pipes whose risk significance is greatest.
Similarly, the extent radiation doses can be reduced by focusing
on inspections and optimizing inspection periods must be
considered.
Acceptable RI-ISI methods are described in a standard, ASME
Code, Section XI Nonmandatory Appendix R [34]. Acceptable
application guidelines are given in a European Union report,
ENIQ Report nr23. European Framework Document for Risk-
informed In-service Inspection [24].
While drawing up the risk-informed in-service inspection pro-
gram, the results must be evaluated by an expert panel. In addition
to power operation, low power and shutdown states and the trans-
fers between them shall be considered in the RI-ISI approach.
While determining the degradation class the fatigue, stress corro-
sion and erosion corrosion must be regarded as degradation mech-
anisms. Water hammer and other exceptional loading situations
must also be regarded (ASME Section XI, “Non-mandatory
Appendix R, Risk-informed Inspection Requirements for Piping,
Table R-S2-1, and Degradation Mechanisms”). If application of
LBB criterion is claimed, existence of a leak detection system is
required.
If computer programs of structural reliability are used for esti-
mating the failure probability of piping [structural reliability
model (SRM)codes, ENIQ RP9, EUR 22228 EN], the results
must be evaluated by expert judgment methods. The incomplete-
ness and possible unanticipated and unknown degradation mech-
anisms associated with RI-ISI methods must be taken into
account in the uncertainty analysis. Uncertainty analyses must be
used in context of expert judgments and SRM codes. Screening
of very small failure frequencies is unacceptable if the conse-
quences of failures are severe. Such situations must be regarded
on a case-by-case basis. In such cases the uncertainty analyses
are of importance.
The qualification of nondestructive testing (NDT) methods
aimed at ensuring the integrity (levels of qualification) must be
evaluated by risk-informed methods and the uncertainty associat-
ed with the NDT inspections must be taken into account as well.
While drawing up a risk-informed in-service inspection pro-
gram for new designs without earlier inspection program, the risk
resulted from pipe failures must be used as the basis for the selec-
tion of structural elements for inspection. Preservice inspections
(PSI) must be utilized while drawing up the risk-informed in-
service inspection program.
While outlining (drawing up) the risk-informed in-service
inspection program, the traceability of selection of the struc-
tural elements for inspection must be ensured with a detailed
documentation.
60.6 EUROPEAN ORIENTATION TO RISK-
INFORMED INSPECTIONS- ENIQ
The Finnish regulatory guides setting requirements for risk-
informed inspections (YVL 2.8 and YVL 3.8) make several refer-
ences to the work of the ENIQ. This section describes in more
detail the ENIQ and especially its RI-ISI related activities.
60.6.1 European Network for Inspection and
Qualification
The European Network for Inspection and Qualification is a
network driven by European nuclear utilities and managed by the
European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) of Petten.
ENIQ was set up in 1992, as the importance of the issue of
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530 • Chapter 60
qualification of NDE inspection systems (procedures, equipment,
and personnel) used in ISI programs for NPPs was identified.
ENIQ was meant to be a network in which the available resources
and expertise could be pooled at European level. The parties
involved in ENIQ also recognized that harmonization in the field
of codes and standards for inspection qualification would repre-
sent important advantages for all, with the ultimate goal of
increasing the safety of European NPPs. ENIQ has a Steering
Committee (SC) with one voting member for each European
Union member country with nuclear plants, and for Switzerland.
A significant milestone was reached with the publication in 1995
of the first issue of the European Methodology for Qualification of
non-destructive tests. The European Qualification Methodology
Document (EQMD) [22] contains guidelines for the qualification of
NDT. Qualification as defined in that document is a combination of
technical justification, which involves assembling all supporting
evidence for NDT system’s capability (results of capability evalua-
tion exercises, feedback from site experience, applicable and vali-
dated theoretical models, physical reasoning), and test piece trials
using deliberately defective test pieces. ENIQ has also produced a
series of Recommended Practices, that is, documents supporting
the high level EQMD with more specific guidance.
60.6.2 ENIQ Task Group Risk
In 1996, ENIQ recognized the importance of addressing at
European level the issue of optimizing inspection strategies on the
basis of risk. For this reason, ENIQ set up a subgroup (originally
called Task Group 4, or TG4) in order to homogenize the different
activities on RI-ISI for nuclear reactor safety and to develop a
harmonized European approach to RI-ISI. In 1999, the ENIQ
TG4 produced a discussion document [23] that represented a first
attempt at defining a European framework on RI-ISI.
At the end of 2001, ENIQ members emphasized the need to
strengthen the risk-related activities and to promote the full inte-
gration of RI-ISI into ENIQ. In connection with the reorganization
of ENIQ working groups, TG4 became the Task Group on Risk
(TGR). At the kickoff meeting of TGR, it was decided that the task
group would aim at establishing a common European framework
on RI-ISI. Currently, TGR has about 20 members representing
European nuclear utilities, research organizations, and consultants.
As a result of the work of the TGR, the European Framework
Document for Risk Informed In-Service Inspection [24] was pub-
lished in 2005. It is intended to serve as guidelines for both devel-
oping own RI-ISI approaches and using or adapting already estab-
lished approaches to European environment taking into account
utility-specific characteristics and national regulatory requirements.
Since the publication of the Framework Document, the TGR has
been working on drafting more detailed documents on several spe-
cific issues related to risk-informed in-service inspections.
The activities of TGR have been complementary to the Task
Force of RI-ISI set up by Nuclear Regulators Working Group
(NRWG). The NRWG is an advisory expert group to the European
Commission and is made up of representatives from nuclear safety
authorities and technical support organizations from EU member
and candidate countries, with Switzerland participating as observ-
er. In 2004 the NRWG published a document summarizing the
common views of the European Regulators on RI-ISI [25].
60.6.3 European framework document for RI-ISI
The European Framework Document [24] provides guidelines
about the definition of a risk-informed in-service inspection
program. The scope of the document is limited to setting out the
principles that a body carrying out RI-ISI should follow. The
decision on whether a risk-informed approach should or should
not be applied to devising an inspection strategy is a matter for
agreement between the parties involved.
The document was developed specifically for RI-ISI planning in
the nuclear industry, but the general principles can be adapted to
other industrial fields as well. Although the main application area is
envisaged to be piping systems, RI-ISI application to the reactor
pressure vessel (RPV) and internals are not excluded. However, in
the case of the reactor pressure vessel and internals, the use of PRA
in consequence analysis is somewhat different from the applica-
tions related to other passive components and piping systems.
The document identifies the key principles that any RI-ISI
approach needs to meet, regardless of the level of quantification in
the assessment of failure probabilities and consequences.
However, purely qualitative methods that do not use the PRA in
order to define the consequences, or any form of structural assess-
ment to determine the probability of failure, are not considered in
the document. The document is intended to be flexible so that dif-
ferent countries can use it to develop RI-ISI programs that are
consistent throughout Europe but that also meet their different
national legal, regulatory, and technical requirements.
The following key elements constituting the process of risk-
informed inspection planning are identified in the Framework
Document:
1. assurance of the long-term commitment of senior manage-
ment to the risk-informed methodology;
2. formation of the RI-ISI assessment team;
3. definition of the scope of the equipment/structures to be
considered in the application;
4. collection and analysis of the information required to carry
out the risk assessment;
5. definition of the level of the evaluation;
6. assessment of the probability of failure for all the compo-
nents included in the scope of the application;
7. assessment of the consequences of failure for all the com-
ponents included in the scope of the application;
8. ranking the risk associated with all the components;
9. carrying out sensitivity studies to determine the impact of
changes in key assumptions or data;
10. choice of the components to be inspected according to cho-
sen criteria;
11. assessment of implication on inspection qualification;
12. feedback of the information obtained after completing the
inspection.
The European Framework Document for RI-ISI can be down-
loaded from the ENIQ website.
60.6.4 ENIQ documents supporting the RI-ISI
framework document
As in the case of the European Methodology for Qualification of
Nondestructive Tests document, the RI-ISI Framework Document
is to be supported with more specific guidance and discussion
documents.
Currently the documents published by ENIQ are categorized in
three document types:
Type 1 – Consensus Document A consensus document con-
tains harmonized principles, methodologies, approaches and pro-
cedures, and stresses the degree of harmonization on the subject
among ENIQ members.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 531
Type 2 – Position/Discussion Document A position/discussion
document may contain compilations of ideas, expressions of opin-
ion, reviews of practices, or conclusions and recommendations
from technical projects.
Type 3 – Technical Report A technical report is a document
containing results of investigations, compilations of data, reviews,
and procedures without expressing any specific opinion or valua-
tion on behalf of ENIQ.
In the following subsections two published documents and one
in finalization phase are described. In addition, a discussion docu-
ment on the application of risk-informed in-service inspection
methodology on the RPV is under preparation.
60.6.4.1 ENIQ Recommended Practice 9: Verification and
Validation of Structural Reliability Models and Associated
Software to be Used in Risk-informed in-Service Inspection
Programs The recommended practice on verification and vali-
dation of structural reliability models and associated software to
be used in RI-ISI programs [26] is a Type 1 consensus document.
Structural reliability models and associated software are essential
tools in the evaluation of failure probabilities for components in
nuclear power plants, and thus it is essential to verify and vali-
date any SRMs used in the evaluation of failure probabilities.
The document lists following criteria that the SRM software
should meet:
1. The basic programming can be shown to have suitable qual-
ity assurance documentation.
2. The scope, analytical assumptions and limitations of the
modeling capability are well defined.
3. The analytical assumptions in (2), above are well grounded
and based on theory that is accepted as representative of the
situations considered by the given SRM.
4. The model is capable of reproducing the data on which its
analytical assumptions are based and examples are provided
that demonstrate its general agreement with available exper-
imental data.
5. Attempts have been made to show how the model compares
with the world or field data, accepting the inherent limita-
tions of this data.
6. The model has been benchmarked against other SRMs within
the same field or scope with differences adequately explained.
60.6.4.2 ENIQ TGR Discussion Document on the Role of
In-service Inspection Within the Philosophy of Defense in
Depth The discussion document on the role of ISI within the phi-
losophy of defense-in-depth [27] is a Type 2 position/discussion
document. The document is intended as a basis for discussion on
how to apply defense-in-depth concepts within a RI-ISI framework.
The report discusses the role of the RI-ISI program (and related
activities) within the entire reactor safety program, with a special
focus on the defense-in-depth philosophy for reactor safety. The
report deals with such issues as:
• role of ISI within the defense-in-depth concept;
• tools and the processes used to determine pipe break
frequencies;
• perspective on pipe break frequency’s contribution to core
damage frequency.
60.6.4.3 ENIQ Recommended Practice on Guidance on
Expert Panels in RI-ISI The recommended practice on guidance
on expert panels in RI-ISI is under final review, and it will be pub-
lished in 2008 as a Type 1 consensus document. The document is
meant to assist a user involved in a RI-ISI application on how to
form, prepare, and facilitate an expert panel as a part of a RI-ISI
process. The main objectives of the document are to give guid-
ance on:
– Responsibilities of the expert panel.
– Composition of the expert panel.
– Planning and preparation of the expert panel.
– Conduit of the expert panel.
– Documentation of the expert panel.
It is important to recognize that an expert panel can have a dif-
ferent role and composition, depending on the organization and
resources of the RI-ISI project. An expert panel can be an inde-
pendent review body, as described in the Framework Document
[24] in relation to the possible management structure, which so
far largely consists of members external to the RI-ISI project. On
the contrary, an expert panel can also be formed for an internal
review of the failure probability and consequence analyses, with-
out large external involvement. In such a case, it is a forum to
ensure a systematic review of the analyses and a balanced utiliza-
tion of information and expertise from several disciplines in the
decision-making process.
Although the guidance offered in the document is mainly tar-
geted to an expert panel aimed at reviewing the risk ranking, a
similar approach can be adopted to form and conduct a panel
aimed at making the final selection of structural elements for
inspection. Further, an expert panel can be used for reviewing and
approving periodic reassessments and for assessing the impact of
PRA updates on the RI-ISI program.
60.6.5 Other Activities Within ENIQ TGR
60.6.5.1 RISMET RI-ISI Benchmark In 2005, a project for
benchmarking RI-ISI methodologies was initiated by ENIQ TGR
together with the European Commission Joint Research Centre
and OECD/NEA. This RISMET project is coordinated jointly by
JRC and OECD/NEA, and has more than 20 participating organi-
zations from Europe, United States, Canada, and Japan. More than
half of the participants are also members of the TGR.
The overall objective of the project is to apply various RI-ISI
methodologies to the same case, namely, four selected piping sys-
tems in one nuclear power plant. The analyzed systems are the
Reactor Coolant System, the Residual Heat Removal System, the
Main Steam System, and the Condensate System. These have
been selected so that they represent a good variety in safety
classes, failure mechanisms, and consequences of pipe breaks.
The comparative study aims at identifying the impact of the dif-
ferences in methodologies on the final results, that is, the defini-
tion of the risk-informed inspection program. Further, the selec-
tion of structural elements for inspection based on deterministic
criteria is compared to the risk-informed approaches. The results
of the RISMET project will be published in 2008. The results of
the benchmark will be used to identify possible future activities
within ENIQ TGR and need for further guidance in the form of
ENIQ documents.
60.6.5.2 Link Between RI-ISI and Inspection Qualification
The link between inspection qualification that complies with the
European Qualification Methodology [22] and a RI-ISI program
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532 • Chapter 60
has been identified by the TGR as an issue needing further
research efforts. In 2006, a separate project on this topic was initi-
ated with the funding from several European nuclear utilities.
The project investigates and demonstrates approaches to pro-
vide some objective measure of confidence that comes from
inspection qualification that allows risk reduction associated with
a qualified inspection.
The objectives of the project are to:
1. investigate approaches for quantifying the confidence associ-
ated with inspection qualification;
2. produce guidelines on how to relate inspection qualification
results, risk reduction, and inspection intervals;
3. apply the guidelines in practice via a pilot study, and modify
them as required based on the experiences from the pilot
study; and
4. provide a forum for focused discussion and agreement on the
approaches and guidelines
The work will be completed in 2008, and the guidelines should
be published as an ENIQ document.
60.7 EXTENSION OF RISK-INFORMED
ACTIVITIES
60.7.1 Analysis of Oil Spills
The number of marine oil transportation has been rapidly
increasing from Russia to Europe. An oil tanker accident in the
Finnish Gulf may threaten the safety of Finnish NPPs given that big
amount of oil is drifting from the transportation route to the coast of
Finland. The oil spills from tanker accidents can range from thou-
sands to hundred thousand tons of oil. The large amount of oil get-
ting into the inlet channel of service water system may seriously
increase the accident rate of the plant [31]. The oil spills contribute
to the risk mostly during the annual refueling period when the
residual heat removal is entirely based on the function of service
water system. During the power operation the risk from oil spills is
pretty small due to different means to remove the residual heat.
Further research in the behavior and drifting of oil in the sea-
water useful in order to ensure the frequency of initiating event in
PRA is reduced.
60.7.2 Probabilistic Fire Simulation
A new probabilistic fire simulation method (PFS-TMMC com-
puter code) has been developed in the SAFIR nuclear safety
research programme 2003–2006 [32]. This method is capable of
computing the probability of damage of a component with a pilot
fire in the proximity of the target component. The method analyses
the growth of pilot fire and the possible spreading of it to the target
component and the probability that the target component will be
damaged in a given time period. The fire alarm, actions of fire
brigade and operation of possible extinguishing systems are inte-
grated in the method as random variables. Pilot application of the
fire spreading in a cable tunnel between two redundant cable trays
is done, as well as the fire spreading between redundant instrumen-
tation cabinets in a large instrumentation room [33]. The integration
of the PFS-TMMC program into the PRA models is to be imple-
mented in the new nuclear safety research programme 2007–2010.
60.7.3 Risk-Informed Regulatory Inspections
STUK is in the process of training inspectors to understand and
use the PRA insights while planning the regulatory inspection
programs and conducting the inspections at site. A special PRA
Info system has been developed in order to use the insights of PRA
for training the inspectors, to upgrade their risk perception, and to
demonstrate the importance of most significant accident sequences.
60.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Consideration of severe accidents beyond the traditional design
basis, including full core meltdown accidents, has become an
important ingredient of regulatory process in Finland. The regula-
tory authority (STUK) and licensees have introduced PRA as a
widely used method in the nuclear safety regulation and safety
management. The possibilities of probabilistic methods in nuclear
safety management were recognized by the Finnish authorities and
licensees in the early 1970s while the Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs
were under construction. In 1984, STUK formally required the
Finnish licensees to perform PRA studies. STUK’s requirement
included that the licensee personnel perform the PRA studies as an
in-house project. The goal was a living PRA model, which is easy
to use and keep constantly up-to-date. The underlying idea of this
approach was to make the plant personnel well committed to the
efficient use of PRAs. These decisions laid the foundation for the
present use of PRA in risk-informed regulation by the authority
(STUK) and in risk-informed safety management by the licensees.
Risk-informed regulation is interpreted as an approach where both
the PRA results and the deterministic criteria combined with engi-
neering judgment are considered and they complement each other
in regulatory decision-making. The general aim of the risk-
informed methods is to use the available resources in the most effi-
cient way to maintain and increase the nuclear safety.
Living PRA models have been developed for both the
Olkiluoto and Loviisa NPPs. The PRA studies include level 1 and
level 2 models. Level 1 comprises the calculation of severe core
damage frequency (probability per year) and level 2 the determi-
nation of the size and frequency of the release of radioactive sub-
stances to the environment. At the moment, level 1 studies for full
power operation cover internal events, area events (fires, floods),
and external events such as harsh weather conditions and seismic
events. The shutdown and low power states of level 1 PRA cover
internal events, floods, fires (being studied for Loviisa NPP),
harsh weather conditions, oil, and seismic events. The LO level 2
studies include internal events, flooding, and weather in full
power state and are being extended to cover fires as well as low
power and shutdown states. The OL level 2 study includes the
same initiators as level 1 PRA.
The guidelines for applying Living PRA and its applications
are set forth in the Regulatory Guide YVL 2.8 issued by STUK in
1987 and renewed in 1997 and 2003 . Living PRA is formally
integrated in the regulatory process of NPPs, which are already in
the early design phase and it is to run through the construction
and operation phases through the entire plant service time. The
life cycle model of PRA depicted in the Guide YVL 2.8 forms the
concept of risk-informed regulation and safety management. In
the life cycle model the risk-informed regulatory and safety man-
agement activities are closely connected.
PRA insights are supposed to provide an improved basis for the
resolution of typical safety issues such as approvals of plant modifi-
cations and resolutions of testing, inspection, and maintenance
strategies. Accordingly some specific risk-informed applications
such as ISI, IST, Graded QA and details of Technical Specifications
have already been introduced or are in process for the operating
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 533
plant units. As to the new designs, level 1 and level 2 design phase
PRA was developed for the application of construction license of
OL 3 EPR. STUK reviewed the PRA and made an assessment of
the acceptability of the design phase PRA prior to giving a state-
ment about the construction license application.
Both the deterministic and probabilistic analyses provided
valuable insights contributing effectively to the review process of
the construction license of OL 3 EPR unit. The assurance of ade-
quate level of safety was based on both qualitative and quantita-
tive aspects of PRA modeling and assessment of design principles
presented in PSAR and other licensing documents because the
detailed design of the plant was still ongoing. After the construc-
tion license was granted for OL3, STUK has continued regulatory
review process including reviews of aforementioned PRA appli-
cations such as Risk-Informed ISI/IST, Graded QA, safety classi-
fication, and Technical Specifications.
PRA has been established as a useful tool to support the deci-
sion making of the new nuclear power plant unit. The possibilities
and limitations of risk analysis are well understood. Accordingly
many PRA applications are well established for a use in the
licensing process.
60.9 REFERENCES
1. Guide YVL. 2.8, Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) in the
Regulation and Safety Management of NPPs, Finnish Centre for
Radiation and Nuclear Safety (STUK), Helsinki 2003.
2. Julin, A. and Virolainen, R., PRA Based Event Analysis of Incidents
and Failures at TVO BWR, PSA’96- International Topical Meeting on
PSA, Moving toward Risk-Based Regulation, Park City, Utah,
September 29–October 3, 1996.
3. Guide YVL. 2.8, Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) in the Licensing
and Regulation of Nuclear Power Plants, Finnish Centre for Radiation
and Nuclear Safety (STUK), Helsinki 1996.
4. Reiman, L., Expert Judgment in Analysis of Human and Organizational
Behavior at Nuclear Power Plants, (Doctor Thesis), STUK-A118,
Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety, December 1994.
5. Guide YVL. 2.8, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) in the Licensing
and Regulation of Nuclear Power Plants, Finnish Centre for Radiation
and Nuclear Safety (STUK), Helsinki 1987.
6. Sandberg, J., Virolainen, R. and Niemelä, I., On the Regulatory Review
of the TVOI/II, Low Power and Shutdown Risk Assessment,
Proceedings of ESREL’96 - PSAM-III, June 24-28, 1996, Crete, Greece.
7. Vaurio, J, and Jänkälä, K., Safety Management of a VVER Plant by
Risk Assessment, PSA’96- International Topical Meeting on PSA,
Moving toward Risk-Based Regulation, Park City, Utah, September
29–October 3, 1996
8. Julin, A, Niemelä, I. and Virolainen, R., Risk informed regulation and
safety management of NPP’s– STUK’s policy and decision making,
the 6th International Conference on Probabilistic Safety Assessment
and Management, 23-28 June 2002, Caribean Hilton Hotel, San Juan,
Puerto Rico, USA
9. Julin, A., Niemelä, I. and Virolainen, R. Use Of Living PSA In
Regulatory Decision-Making , PSA’99, Washington DC,USA, 1999.
10. Regulatory Guide YVL. 3.8, Pressure Components, Non Destructive
Tests, Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety (STUK),
Helsinki, 2003.
11. NUREG-1602, Use of PRA in Risk Informed Applications, USNRC,
1998.
12. ASME Code Case N-560, Alternative Examination Requirements for
Class 1, 1996.
13. ASME Code Case N-577, Risk-Informed Requirements for Class 1, 2,
and 3 Piping, Method A, 1997.
14. ASME Code Case N-578, Risk-Informed Requirements for Class 1, 2
and 3 Piping, Method B, 1997.
15. Mononen, J., Niemelä, I., Virolainen, R., Rantala, R., Julin, A.,
Valkeajärvi, O., Hinttala, J., A Pilot Study on Risk Informed In-Service
Inspection, PSAM5, Proceedings of the 5th International Conference
on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management held on
November 27–December 1, 2000, Osaka, Japan.
16. Gosselin, S. R., EPRI’s new inservice inspection programme, Nuclear
News, November 1997.
17. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.178, An Approach For Plant-Specific Risk-
informed Decision making Inservice Inspection of Piping, July 1998.
18. Simola, K., Pulkkinen, U., Mononen, J. and Virolainen, R., Expert Panel
Approach for Supporting RI-ISI Evaluation, PSAM5, Proceedings of the
5th International Conference on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and
Management held on November 27–December 1, 2000, Osaka, Japan.
19. ASME PRA standard. ASME RA-S-2002, Standard for Probabilistic
Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications. New York;
American Society of Mechanical Engineers; 2002
20. Ari Julin, J. Marttila, J. Mononen, I. Niemelä, J. Rantakivi, J. Sandberg,
R. Virolainen, K. Valtonen, International Topical Meeting on
Probabilistic Safety Analysis, PSA'05, Sir Francis Drake Hotel, San
Francisco, USA, September 11–15, 2005.
21. Hietanen, O., Jänkälä, K., Bergroth, N., Paussu, R., Nikula, V., Risk-
Informed Methodology of New ISI Program for Unit 1 of Loviisa
NPP, Budapest, 2007.
22. ENIQ, European Methodology for Qualification of non-Destructive
Tests ( second issue), EUR 17299 EN, 1997,
23. ENIQ , Discussion Document on Risk Informed In-service Inspection
of Nuclear Power Plants in Europe, EUR 19742 EN, 2000.
24. Chapman, O. J. V., Gandossi, L., Mengolini, A., Simola, K., Eyre, T.,
and Walker, A. E., (Eds.), European Framework Document for Risk
Informed In-Service Inspection, EUR 21581 EN, 2005.
25. NRWG,Report on the Regulatory Experience of Risk-Informed In-
service Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components and Common
Views, Final Report,” EUR 21320 EN, 2004.
26. ENIQ , ENIQ Recommended Practice 9– Verification and Validation
of Structural Reliability Models and Associated Software to be used
in Risk-informed In-service Inspection Programmes,” EUR 22228
EN, 2007.
27. ENIQ, ENIQ TGR Discussion Document on the Role of In-service
Inspection Within the Philosophy of Defense in Depth, EUR 22230 E,
2007.
28. Guide YVL 3.8, Nuclear Power Plant Pressure Equipment. In-service
Inspection With Non-destructive Testing Methods, Finnish Centre for
Radiation and Nuclear Safety (STUK), Helsinki, 2003.
29. Virolainen, R. and Sandberg, J., Risk Informed Licensing, Regulation
and Safety Management of Nuclear Power Plants In Finland,
International Conference on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and
Management– PSAM7/ ESREL04, Berlin, Germany, June 14–18 , 2004.
30. STUK YTV– Manual, Guide YTV 4.3.2, PSA analysis ( in Finnish),
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), 1.12.2006.
31. Nici, M. S., Bergroth, K., Jänkälä, E. and Ovsienko, S., Oil Spill Risk
Assessment for Loviisa Power Plant, the 8th International Conference
on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management, New Orleans,
Louisiana, USA, May 14–18, 2006.
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534 • Chapter 60

32. Hostikka, S., Keski-Rahkonen, O. and Korhonen, T,, Probabilistic EOP Emergency Operating Procedure
Fire simulator. Theory and User’s Manual for version 1.2. Espoo, EPR European Pressurized Reactor
VTT Building and Transport. 72 p.  app. 1p. 2003. VTT ISI In-service Inspection
Publications; 503 IST In-service Testing
33. Hostikka, S., Probabilistic Fire Simulation of Cable Room. Research JRC Joint Research Centre-European Union
Report, No VTT-R- 01101-07, May 23, 2007. LBB Leak before Break
34. ASME Code, Section XI, Nonmandatory Appendix R, Risk-Informed NDT Non Destructive Testing
Inspection Requirements for Piping, Addenda July 1, 2005. NPP Nuclear Power Plant
NRWG Nuclear Regulatory Working Group of European
35. Mononen, J., Virolainen, R., Niemelä, I. and Julin, A., Graded Quality Commission
assurance and safety Classification of Components, Systems and
OECD/NEA Organisation for Economic, Co-operation and
Services, Memorandum, Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority
(STUK), Nuclear Reactor Regulation, April 19th, 2002, (in Finnish). Development / Nuclear Energy Agency
OL3 EPR Olkiluoto 3 NPP unit
36. Holmberg, J., A Risk-Informed graded quality system – Principles and PFS-TMMC Probabilistic Fire Simulator- Two Model Monte
literature review. Espoo: VTT Industrial Systems, 2002. 33p. (Report Carlo
BTUO62-021029)
PSI Pre-service Inspection
37. PRA Review Manual, NUREG/CR-3485, USNRC, 1985. RC Risk Category of RI-ISI
38. Regulatory Review of Probabilistic Safety Assessments (PSA) Level 1
RC2 Risk Category 2 of RI-ISI
(IAEA-TECDOC-1135) Vienna. (in co-operation with NEA/OECD), RI Risk-Informed
2000. RI-PM Risk-Informed Preventive Maintenance
RI-TS Risk-Informed Technical Specification
39. Regulatory Review of Probabilistic Safety Assessments (PSA) Level 2 RISMET Research project by ENIQ for benchmarking RI-
(IAEA-TECDOC-1229) Vienna. (in co-operation with NEA/OECD),
ISI methods
2001.
RPV Reactor Pressure Vessel
40. Reer, B., Dang, V. and Hirshberg, S., Guidelines for the Regulatory SAFIR Finnish Nuclear Safety Research Program
Review of Human Reliability Analysis in PSA, Rep. HSK-AN-3584, SAM Severe Accident Management
Villigen (2000). SC2 Safety Class 2 of RI-ISI
SCC Stress Corrosion Cracking
ACRONYMS SSC Systems, Structures and Components
STUK Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK)
AOT Allowed Outage Time TG4 Task Group 4
AREVA NP (earlier Framatom ANP) is French-German TGR Task Group on Risk
Nuclear company (Siemens owns 34%) TVO Teollisuuden Voima Oy (Industrial Power Com-
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers pany) Finnish nuclear generating company
BWR Boiling Water Reactor VT-2 Visual examination to detect evidence of leakage
CCDP Conditional Core Damage Probability of pressure retaining components
CCF Common Cause Failure YVL Abbreviation of Finnish word “ydinvoimalaitos”
CLERP Conditional Large Early Release Probability (Nuclear power Plant)
EN473 Title of Standard -Non Destructive Testing YVL2.8 Regulatory Guide YVL2.8 “Probabilistic Safety
ENIQ European Network for Inspection and Quali- Analysis (PSA) in the Regulation and Safety
fication Management of NPPs”
ASME_Ch61_p535-552.qxd 6/3/09 12:48 PM Page 535
BELGIUM PRESSURE
EQUIPMENT REGULATION
61.1 INTRODUCTION
Belgium has been an important actor in the applications of
nuclear energy since the beginning. Very early, the availability of
uranium from the former Belgian colony has contributed to the
birth of both military and civil aspects of the same in the United
States. After the Second World War, scientists and industrialists
participated to the development of the peaceful aspects of this new
industry; the Belgian utilities own and operate today seven nuclear
power plants, which produce 55% of the electricity in the country.
Belgium has made the choice in 1975 to follow the United
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) rules for the
construction of the latest four units (Doel 3 and 4, Tihange 2 and
3); it was also ruled that some accidents of external origin (i.e.,
aircraft crash, gas explosion, toxic gases, large fire) ought to be
considered in the design.
The whole design and safety analysis of these units have been
done applying the U.S. rules and all the associated documentation
(Regulatory Guides, Standard Review Plans, ASME Code, IEEE
Standards, ANSI, ANS, etc.) in order to ensure a consistent
approach.
This chapter describes the rulemaking process, the major rules,
and their application for repair and replacement activities.
61.2 BELGIUM PRESSURE EQUIPMENT
REGULATION
Historically, the basic frame of reference applicable in Belgium
for the construction of the currently operating nuclear power
plants1 has been the “Règlement Général pour la Protection du
Travail”2 (General Rules for Protection at Work) [1]. This docu-
ment has been initiated by a Belgian law dated 1888, issued and
enforced by Regent Decrees of February 11, 1946 and September
27, 1947, and complemented or modified through Royal Decrees
and Ministerial Decrees3 (RDs, MDs). It constituted since then
1 4
Between 1975 and 1985
2
RGPT
3
Individual references will be given in the text below whenever appro-
priate.
CHAPTER
61
Luc H. Geraets
the coordinated text of all general and regulatory rules concerning
health and safety of the workers. The RGPT did specify the meth-
ods to be used to ensure security and health at work; in order to
meet the requirement of the law, the employer had to apply the
rules of the RGPT.4
The rulemaking process is made of the RGPT and the Royal
Decrees of Authorization for Installation and Operation (see Section
61.3). The RGPT is made of various parties grouped in five titles as
follows:
Title 1: Regime for dangerous, insalubrious, or bothersome
establishments
Title 2: General rules applicable to work hygiene and health
and safety at work
Title 3: Peculiar rules applicable to specific industries
Title 4: Steam components specific rules
Title 5: Conclusions
61.2.1 RGPT Title 1
The rules mentioned here have led to the award of RDs of
Authorization for Installation and Operation (see Section 61.3).
Chapter II of Title 1 lists installations, equipment and compo-
nents, and so on to be considered as dangerous, insalubrious, or
bothersome, with associated numbering (e.g., 38: pressure com-
ponents; 196: gas compression installations, and others). The RDs
of Authorization list those components explicitly and exhaustively
for each nuclear power unit.
61.2.2 RGPT Title 2
This chapter describes general rules for environmental, health,
and safety protection of workers; it applies to all sorts of indus-
tries and businesses.
Since 1993, the RGPT is progressively integrated into a broader pur-
pose set of laws and decrees addressing the well-being of workers at
work and based on a prevention philosophy: the best knowledge of
the risks linked with the techniques applied in a business lies in the
company itself, and hence also the methods to prevent the same.
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536 • Chapter 61
61.2.3 RGPT Title 3
Title 3 regroups requirements specific to some components,
installations, and processes, among which are some rules specific
to the following equipment:
• Start-up tanks of internal combustion engines
• Pressurized, liquefied, or dissolved gas vessels
Start-up tanks must be equipped with manometers, purging sys-
tems, safety valves, and their setting pressure; it also imposes
requirements on materials (selection, allowable stress, minimal
thickness, welding, and associated tests).
Pressurized, liquefied, or dissolved gas vessels requirements
apply only to mobile vessels with a pressure higher than 1.0 bar
(100 kPa), which need to be transported outside of the establish-
ment for refill. Accordingly, the corresponding liability is on the
bottled gas (nitrogen, oxygen, etc.) suppliers.
61.2.4 RGPT Title 4
Title 4 regroups requirements applicable to steam components;
those avail of a specific regime.
Steam components are sorted as follows:
• Steam generators, including
• Fixed boilers: components such as the reactor vessel, the
steam generators, and the pressurizer of a pressurized water
reactor (PWR) belong to this category
• Mobile boilers: for reference only (not relevant in a nuclear
plant)
• Low pressure steam generators: for reference only (not rele-
vant in a nuclear plant)
• Autoclave sterilizers and similar components in copper plates:
for reference only (not relevant in a nuclear plant)
• Steam vessels
• Steam engines
• Fixed engines: the main steam turbine and the turbines of the
main and auxiliary feedwater systems belong to this category
• Mobile engines: for reference only (not relevant in a nuclear
plant)
Title 4 of the RGPT identifies design and construction require-
ments (including tests), overpressure protection rules (safety
valves and manometers), and rules for operation and maintenance
(annual inspection by an authorized agency).
In consideration of the technical evolution, the rulemaking
body has replaced in 1991 the rules for pressure equipment
(RGPT Title 4) with a new two-part regulation:
• A Royal Decree dated October 18, 1991 for technical rules [2]
• A Ministerial Decree dated October 28, 1991 for application
rules [3]
The RD classifies pressure components into five categories:
• Steam generators: any pressure equipment larger than 0.025
cum aimed at
• producing steam above 0.5 bar (50 kPa) or water above
111ºC, or
• overheating steam through supply of heat
• Low pressure generators: any pressure equipment larger than
0.100 cum aimed at producing steam through supply of heat
at a pressure between 0 and 0.5 bar
• Steam storage vessels: any pressure equipment larger than
0.300 cum aimed at receiving or storing steam at a pressure
above 0.5 bar (50 kPa) or water at a temperature above
111ºC
• Heat exchangers: any pressure equipment with two separate
sides, aimed at heating or cooling a fluid circulating on one
side with a fluid circulating on the other side, and the thermal
exchange happening through tubes or plates
• The primary side contains the fluid abandoning heat; the
secondary side receives heat
• Heat exchangers meet the following criteria
– the primary side contains a fluid other than fumes
– the secondary side is larger than 0.025 cum in volume
and contains steam above 0.5 bar or water above 111ºC
• The primary side of an exchanger will be considered as a
steam storage vessels if:
– the primary side is larger than 0.300 cum and contains
steam above 0.5 bar or water above 111ºC
– the secondary side contains something else than steam
above 0.5 bar or water above 111ºC; in such a case, the
secondary side is not subject to technical rules
• Other fixed steam components are as follows:
• Steam generators smaller than 0.025 cum (save for batteries
with a cumulated capacity larger than 0.025 cum)
• Heat exchangers with a secondary side smaller than
0.025 cum
• Steam (pressure above 0.5 bar) and water (temperature
above 111ºC) piping systems
• Steam piston engines and steam turbines with a capacity
above 1 kW.
These definitions are important as they cover not only unclassi-
fied components, but also classified equipment. Accordingly, any
Class B, C, D, or D-augmented component corresponding to
those definitions shall be considered as a steam component
according to the Derogation MD (see below).
61.2.5 RGPT Title 5
Title 5 applies not only to pressure equipment, but also to other
components (handling and lifting devices, electrical equipment);
it defines the conditions for authorization of authorized agencies
and of their inspectors, and so on.
61.2.6 Pressure Equipment Directive
In order to cope with the obsolescence of some rules and require-
ments, publication, and enforcement of European Directives by the
European Commission, the legislator has superseded the RGPT
with other rules.
A first change happened with the RD of February 1, 1980 [4],
related to pressure equipment originating from or to be routed to a
country of the European Union. This rule change has no impact
on construction, repair/replacement, and in-service inspection of
nuclear-related pressure equipment.
For steam components, Title 4 of the RGPT has been partially
modified by a RD dated October 18, 1991 [2] and its associated
MD dated October 28, 1991 [3] (see Section 61.2.4).
Those decrees have in turn been replaced in 1999 by the RD
on pressure equipment dated June 13, 1999 [5], which endorses
the Pressure Equipment Directive 97/23/CE (the PED) of the
European Union [6]. The field of application of the latter goes far
beyond the steam components.
It must be noted that
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 537
• The PED is not a construction code; it defines basic safety
rules that can be met using various ways:
• Application of “horizontal norms” (set of EN norms similar
to a construction code, e.g., EN 13445 for unfired pressure
vessels [7])
• Application of a construction code integrating the require-
ments of the PED (e.g., CODAP, Ed. 2000, for vessels [8])
• Application of a recognized construction code (e.g., ASME
VIII for vessels) with the demonstration that the require-
ments of the PED are met
• The construction follow-up is performed by a Notified
Organization selected by the Vendor (the Owner cannot
impose the same)
• The component shall be CE stamped by the Vendor at the end
of the construction, and the Vendor shall deliver the PED cer-
tificate of conformance
• Nuclear systems (items specifically designed for nuclear use,
the failure of which may cause an emission of radioactivity)
are excluded from the PED.
61.3 THE DEROGATION
None of the regulations mentioned above has ever addressed
explicitly the generation of steam by a nuclear reactor – nor
explicitly excluded either, at least for the RGPT and the Decrees
of 1991 [1–3].
In application of the choice made by Belgium (see Section
61.1) to follow the USNRC rules for the construction of the latest
four units (Doel 3 and 4, Tihange 2 and 3), the whole design and
safety analysis of these units have been done applying the U.S.
rules and all the associated documentation (Regulatory Guides,
Standard Review Plans, NUREGs, ASME Code, IEEE Standards,
ANSI, ANS, etc.) in order to ensure a consistent approach.5 For
pressure vessels that are part of the nuclear installation, a deroga-
tion (the Derogation) [9] has been established in order to replace
Belgian pressure vessel regulations described above (RGPT and
later the PED) with the U.S. rules (ASME Code Sections III and
XI). Transpositions of the ASME Code have been written to cover
organizational aspects such as the definition of an inspector, the
Authorized Inspection Agency (AIA), and others [10, 11]
61.3.1 Nuclear Boiler and Steam Components
The Derogation applies to the following:
• Nuclear Steam Supply System made of
• the primary system and its branch lines up to the second iso-
lation component inclusively,
• the secondary (main steam) system up to the first isolation
component inclusively.
– Note: The isolation component notion is linked neither to
a “open/closed” criterion, nor to a component type: it can
be an isolation valve, a check valve, or a flow restrictor
(see Section 61.4).
5
For Doel 1–2 and Tihange-1, commissioned in 1975, ASME Section
III, Ed. 1968, has been used for vessels; the draft issued end 1968 has
been used for pumps and valves; the ANSI B31.7, Ed. 1969, precur-
sor of the ASME Code Section III, Division 1, Subsection NB 3600
(where it was introduced in the 1974 edition), has been used for an ex
post justification of Class 1 piping systems.
• Nuclear equipment, that is, the components of the nuclear
systems covered by the Regulatory Guides6 R.G. 1.26 [12]
and R.G. 1.143 [13] of USNRC,7 defining the quality groups
with respect to system functions and recommending associat-
ed construction standards, subject to the Royal Decree of
October 18, 1991 on steam components [2] .
Accordingly, the Derogation applies to the main components of
the nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) (reactor vessels, steam
generators, primary pumps, pressurizers, piping and valves)
together with nuclear components that would be covered under
the RD of 1991.
61.3.2 Construction Codes
The rulemaking process requires that the various aspects of the
construction, that is, design, materials and fabrication, safety
measures, controls and inspections, repairs and replacements,
modifications, and the associated documents, meet the require-
ments of the following codes:
• ASME, Sections III, VIII, and XI, Division 1
• Note: Section III refers to Sections II, V, and IX, which
become applicable in turn.
• ANSI B31.1
The relationship between safety classes and construction codes
is presented hereafter (Section 61.4).
61.3.3 Transpositions
The following concepts and notions specific to the application
of the ASME Code Section III are transposed in the Belgian envi-
ronment [10].
• Registered Professional Engineer: In Belgium, graduated engi-
neer from a Belgian university or technical engineering college;
abroad, graduated engineer from a university or equivalent.
• Authorized Inspection Agency: Mandated Organization (MO),
a Belgian organization officially empowered to control steam
components (see RD of 1991).
• “Certificate of Authorization,” “Letter of Authorization,” or
“Interim Letter of Authorization” is delivered by the Owner or
its Engineer, based on the report from the Mandated Organiz-
ation issuing a positive advice after the qualification audit.
• “N-Stamps” and “U-Stamps” are replaced by hallmark
stamps from the Mandated Organization.
• Subject to prior approval by the Mandated Organization,
rules and controls required by the codes (Section 61.2.2) may
be replaced by alternates providing for warranties at least as
good as the former: they shall be identified and justified in
the documentation of the component. The Mandated
Organization shall verify the equivalence and issue the cor-
responding certification.
• Note: This statement introduces the derogation request.
• The Owner coordinates with the Mandated Organization to
set up the list of editions, modifications, and addenda to be
used, in order for the Mandated Organization to be able to
perform its verification.
6
R.G.
7
USNRC: United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
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538 • Chapter 61

• After each in-service inspection, and for any modification,
repair, or replacement, the Mandated Organization delivers a
certificate stating the conformance of the work with the
requirements of the Derogation.
• For each major repair, modification, or replacement, a notifi-
cation shall be submitted to the relevant ministry prior to the
implementation; a copy of the conformance certificate men-
tioned above shall be forwarded to the ministry prior to the
return to service of the system.
• Note: There is no definition of a “major” modification: the
same will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis by the
Owner and the Mandated Organization.
61.3.4 Application
Additional rules for application of the MD specify how the
requirements of the RD of 1991, not addressed in the construction
codes mentioned in Section 61.3.2, and the control of which is per-
formed by the Class 1 Approved Organization (AO-1), are handled
through the nuclear regulatory process. These requirements are
mainly of general type; they address among others the following:
• design and protection of systems from the instrumentation
and control standpoint (about level of measurements)
• construction (e.g., check of data reports and stress reports by
the MO)
• return to service and its notification
• operation and maintenance (e.g., qualification of operators)
• periodical controls, repairs, replacements, modifications, and
others
• Data Report of the component
• operating conditions of pumps and valves
61.4 QUALITY GROUPS, CLASSES,
AND APPLICABLE CODES
Quality Groups are defined by the U.S. regulation, namely, the
Code of Federal Regulations 10 CFR 50 and the R.G. 1.26 and
1.143.
The following additional Belgian concepts have been added to
the existing groups:
• Safety classes are indicated on Process Flow Diagrams
(PFDs), Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs), pip-
ing isometrics, and so on, and derive from the application of
the relevant regulation. Note that a transition from Class 1 to
Class 2 can happen at a Ø 3/8⬙ restrictor, limiting the prima-
ry leak to a level acceptable for the cooling of the core.
• R.G. 1.26 and 1.143 clarify that for safety-related components
not covered by the ASME Code, the ANSI B31.1 Code, and
others, the Owner shall define technical requirements com-
patible with the function expected to be performed. This
yields usually into material requirements (valid certificates),
qualified welding procedures performed by operators quali-
fied in accordance with acceptable rules (e.g., ASME IX),
welding inspection correctly sized, in accordance with cor-
rectly defined criteria and accepted welding procedures (e.g.,
ASME V).
• D-augmented equipment is submitted in accordance with R.G.
1.143 to a limited Quality Assurance (QA) program. This
requirement has been imposed way before the generalization
by most suppliers of the deployment of QA systems in accor-
dance with ISO 9000; since 2007, a Letter of Authorization is
required also for D-augmented components.

TABLE 1 QUALITY GROUPS AND CODES AND STANDARDS FOR THE DESIGN
OF SYSTEMS, STRUCTURES, AND COMPONENTS [12,13]

Quality Group Components Construction Code

A Primary system up to the second isolation valve ASME III – NB (Class 1 components)
B Secondary and auxiliary systems required to ASME III – NC (Class 2 components)
bring the nuclear reactor to cold shutdown
C Auxiliary systems connected to Category A and ASME III – ND (Class 3 components)
Category B systems
D Potentially radioactive systems not included ASME VIII (vessels and tanks)
in Quality Groups A, B, and C ANSI B 31.1 (piping)
D (augmented) Waste treatment systems ASME VIII (vessels and tanks)
ANSI B 31.1 (piping) + Limited QA
LS Safety-related nonpressure equipment Owner specifications
(safety related) (ASME Code does not apply), such as fuel + legal requirements (SRP, NUREG)
storage pools, nuclear polar crane, pipe + QA
whip restraints
NC Nonsafety-related pressure equipment Owner specifications
(unclassified) from non-nuclear pressurized systems + legal requirements (RD and MD
(feedwater and steam systems outside of 1991, PED), if any
containment and containment isolation,
fire protection, demineralized water,
nitrogen, and other fluids)
Nonsafety-related nonpressure equipment Owner specifications
(handling equipment, steelworks) + legal requirements (European
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 539
• Table 1 does not show all sections and subsections of the
ASME Code; some of them are called upon automatically by
Section III or are only variants applicable to specific compo-
nents (e.g., containment penetrations.).
61.5 REPAIRS, REPLACEMENTS,
AND MODIFICATIONS
61.5.1 Introduction
In parallel with Section III for design, a transposition of Section
XI, Division 1 of the ASME Code (Rules for Inspection and
Testing of Components of Light-Water Cooled Plants) has been set
up [11].
Section XI is applicable whenever all requirements of the con-
struction code are met (i.e., signature of the Data Report –
Manufacturing Data Report or N5 Data Report). Article numbers
hereafter refer to the Edition 1992 of the ASME Code Section XI,
the one used in the latest interval and is likely to be used in the
next one.8
Article IWA-4110 (b) of the Code specifies the notion of
“replacements” and the corresponding criteria for which Section
XI does not apply. If those criteria are met, the corresponding
construction shall happen in accordance with Section III and its
Belgian Transposition (see Section 61.3).
Technical aspects of the Code will not be addressed here; they
are handled in specific articles of the Safety Analysis Report or
Technical Specifications of the Relevant Unit, or on a case-by-
case basis with the competent authority.
61.5.2 Competent Authorities
Competent authorities in Belgium for the responsibilities of the
“Inspector” identified in the Code are
• The Mandated Organization, a Belgian organization officially
empowered to control steam components (see RD of 1991).
The Class 1 Approved Organization competent for the in-
service inspection of nuclear installations.
If the Owner delegates the execution of a control (NDE) to a
Mandated Organization, the latter shall perform by itself the
supervision defined by the Code (Article IWA-2110), without
additional intervention of a third party of the same nature.
The split of tasks between the two organizations (MO and AO-1)
is given in Articles IWA-2110 and IWA-2111 of the transposition.
61.5.3 Repair and Replacement
If Section XI is applicable, it sends back in turn (IWA-4000) to
the construction code for repair and replacement (and the corre-
sponding procurement).
Rules applicable to those operations are defined in Appendix
IX of this document.
In particular, the transposition of Section III used for the con-
struction of new components [10] does not apply in this case.
61.5.4 Derogations
In the “Belgian” application of Section XI, it is acceptable to
replace ASME rules with rules ensuring at least the same level of
safety.
8
The 10-yearly safety revision process (see Section 61.14.1) allows the
review of the ASME XI edition applicable for the next interval.
To be able to do so, the Owner shall obtain the positive advice
from the MO and/or the AO-1 in accordance with their relevant
authority.
• Alternate rules mentioned in the Final Safety Analysis Report
(FSAR) of each unit remain applicable, such as
• FSAR rules for in-service inspection of Class 1, 2, and 3 systems
• FSAR rules for containment leak testing (A-type tests)
• Limits on operating conditions, mandatory actions, and
inspections of the technical specifications
• FSAR mandatory inspections of
• Safety valves
• Steam generator tubes
• Snubbers
• Containment penetrations tested in accordance with 10
CFR 50, Appendix J
• Structural integrity of the inner containment vessel
• Rules for locating components on drawings and in real during
the fingerprint
• FSAR rules applicable to QA in operation
The documentation about preoperational and in-service
inspections is set up according to the 1980 edition of the Code
and will not be modified. The whole documentation does not
need to be revisited because of the use of a posterior version of
the Code.
61.5.5 Transposition of ASME Code Section XI,
Ed. 1992
Introductory pages I to XXV (Forewords, Statements of Policy,
Personnel) are documentation for reference only.
Subsection IWA “General Requirements,” transposed as fol-
lows, defines the responsibilities of the various organizations
under consideration.
Modifications to the original text are marked using the corre-
sponding paragraph number. Any reference in this document to a
code article refers automatically to the corresponding article of
the transposition.
61.6 SUBSECTION IWA – GENERAL
REQUIREMENTS
61.6.1 Article IWA-1000: Scope and Responsibility
IWA-1310: Components Subject to Inspection and Testing
To be modified as follows:
“…subject to review by the Class 1 Approved Organization and
the Mandated Organization.”
IWA-1400: Owner’s Responsibility
To be modified as follows:
(c) “… and submittal of these plans and reports to the Class 1
Approved Organization and the Mandated Organization.”
(f) Possession of an arrangement with a Class 1 Approved
Organization, a Mandated Organization to provide inspec-
tion services. Separate arrangements may be concluded for
repairs and replacements.
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540 • Chapter 61
61.6.2 Article IWA-2000: Examination and Inspection
Article IWA-2110 to be replaced by the following IWA-2110
and IWA-2111.
IWA-2110: Duties of the Mandated Organization Inspector
(a) It is the duty of the Mandated Organization Inspector:
(1) to perform a detailed review of the inspection plan and
schedule (IWA-2420 (a) and (b)) prior to the start of pre-
service inspection and each inspection interval. Shop
and field preservice examinations (IWB-2200 (b), IWC-
2200 (b) and IWE-2200 (c)); these are exempt from
prior review by the Mandated Organization Inspector.
Review of the inspection plan shall cover any features
that are in the frame of the Mandated Organization duty
(cf. Ministerial Decree V.4.087) and shall include the
following:
(a) examination categories and items,
(b) test and examination requirements,
(c) examination methods,
(d) percentage of parts selected for examination,
(e) in-service test quantities,
(f) disposition of test results,
(g) test frequency,
(h) system pressure test, and
(i) sequence of successive examinations;
(2) to verify the required examinations (IWB, IWC,
IWD, IWE, IWF) and system hydrostatic test, where
applicable;
(3) to verify that the required visual examinations VT1,
VT2, and VT3 (IWA-2210) have been performed and
the results recorded (scope of IWB, IWC, IWD, IWE,
IWF);
(4) to verify that the system pressure tests, other than the
system hydrostatic test, where required for Class 1,
Class 2, and Class 3 components, have been conducted
and the results recorded.
(b) The Mandated Organization Inspector shall also make any
additional investigations necessary to verify that all applic-
able requirements of IWA-2110 (a) have been met.
(c) It is the duty of the Mandated Organization Inspector to
verify that the in-service tests required on safety valves
(IWV) and component supports (IWF) have been complet-
ed and the results recorded.
(d) It is the duty of the Mandated Organization Inspector to ver-
ify that the non-destructive examination methods used fol-
low the techniques specified in this Division. The Mandated
Organization Inspector shall also verify that the examina-
tions are performed in accordance with written qualified
procedures and by personnel employed by the Owner or the
Owner’s agent and qualified in accordance with IWA-2300.
(e) The Mandated Organization Inspector may require at any
time re-qualification of any procedure or operator if the
Mandated Organization Inspector has reason to believe the
requirements are not met.
(f) The examination records shall be certified by the Mandated
Organization Inspector only after verifying that the require-
ments have been met and that the records are correct.
(g) The Mandated Organization Inspector shall verify that
repairs are performed in accordance with the requirements
of the Owner’s repair program. Therefore, he shall review
the involved aspects of the Quality Assurance Program and
their implementation.
IWA-2111: Scope of Work of the Class 1 Approved Organi-
zation
(a) The scope of work of the Class 1 Approved Organization is:
(1) to perform a detailed review of the inspection plan
(IWA-2420 (a)) prior to the start of preservice inspec-
tion and of each inspection interval. Review of the
inspection plan shall cover any feature of the inspection
plan that is affected by the requirements of this
Division, as applicable, and shall include the following:
(a) examination categories and items,
(b) test and examination requirements,
(c) examination methods,
(d) percentage of parts selected for examination,
(e) in-service test quantities,
(f) disposition of test results,
(g) test frequency,
(h) system pressure tests, and
(i) sequence of successive examinations;
(2) to review any revision to the inspection plan during the
preservice inspection or the inspection interval;
(3) to approve the items of the inspection plan identified in
IWA-2111 (a) (1) and (2) and the deviations related to
nuclear safety;
(4) to verify the required examinations (IWL);
(5) to verify that the visual examinations (IWL) have been
performed and the results recorded;
(6) to verify that all system pressure, where required for
class MC and class CC components, have been con-
ducted and the results recorded.
(b) The Class 1 Approved Organization Inspector shall also
make any additional investigations necessary to verify that
all applicable requirements of IWA-2111 (a) have been
met.
(c) The Class 1 Approved Organization shall verify that the
in-service tests required on pumps and valves (IWP and
IWV) have been completed and the results recorded.
(d) The Class 1 Approved Organization shall verify that the
entire inspection plan has been carried out.
(e) The Class 1 Approved Organization shall approve the exam-
ination records according to its usual formalities.
IWA-2120: Qualification of Authorized Inspection Agencies,
Inspectors, and Supervisors
To be replaced by IWA-9000 and Article IX-1000.
IWA-2300: Qualification of Non-Destructive Examination
Personnel
To be modified as follows:
“… SNT-TC-1A and the additional requirements of this section
or equivalent.”
This modification is valid for the whole Section XI of the Code.
IWA-2311: NDE Methods Listed in SNT-TC-1A
To be modified as follows:
(b) “… shall also comply with the requirements specified in
appendix VII or equivalent.”
IWA-2410: Application of Code Edition and Addenda
To be replaced by Paragraph 61.5.1 above.
IWA-2441: Section XI Codes Cases
To be modified as follows:
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 541
(c) “… is filed with the Class 1 Approved Organization and
the Mandated Organization” … .
(f) “to acceptance by the Class 1 Approved Organization and
the Mandated Organization.”
IWA-2641: Layout of Component Reference Points
To be replaced by:
“The Owner shall provide to the approval of the Mandated
Organization an identification system of the different welds of
components to allow the recording without ambiguity of the
examination results.”
61.6.3 Article IWA-3000: Standards for Examination
Evaluation
IWA-3100: Evaluation
To be modified as follows:
(b) “… review by the AO-1 and the Mandated Organization.”
61.6.4 Article IWA-4000: Repair and Replacement
IWA-4110: Scope
To be complemented as follows:
(a) “… or metal removal. This article does not apply to main-
tenance activities.”
IWA-4140: Repair / Replacement Program and Plan
To be modified as follows:
(c) “… to review by the Class 1 Approved Organization and
the Mandated Organization.”
IWA-4170: Code Applicability
To be modified as follows:
(a) “… are acceptable to the Class 1 Approved Organization
and the Mandated Organization.”
(b) “… and Code Cases may be used. Alternatively, other con-
struction Codes may be used subject to the conditions
identified in IWA-4170 (e) or (f). If repair … .”
(e) Alternatively, repairs, installation of replacement items and
corresponding items, replacements may meet the require-
ments of the code accepted by the French authorities for
construction of nuclear equipment (RCCM) provided that
(1) the requirements of IWA-4170 (d) (1) to (3) are met;
(2) the Appendix IX is applied.
(f) Alternatively, repairs, installation of replacement items
and corresponding items, may meet the requirements of
another national or international code or of a specific and
coherent set of rules defined by the Owner, provided that
(1) the proposed code or set of rules is reviewed and
accepted by the AO-1 and the Mandated Organisation;
(2) the requirements of IWA-4170 (d) (1) to (3) are met;
(3) the Appendix IX is applied.
IWA-4310: Defect Removal Procedure
To be modified as follows:
“… of either the Construction Code, or Section III, when the
Construction Code was not Section III, or alternate Construction
Codes (IWA-4170 e or f) … .”
IWA-4910: Reports and Records
To be replaced by:
(b) (5) “Manufacturer’s Data Report or Compliance Certificate
to the Owner’s specification.”
IWA-4920: Stamping for Installation
To be replaced by:
“The application of stamp is not required for installation.”
61.6.5 Article IWA-6000: Records and Reports
IWA-6210: Owner’s Responsibilities
To be complemented as follows:
(d) “… and their support. He uses his own adapted NIS-1
form.”
(e) “… Form NIS-2. He uses his own adapted NIS-2 form.”
IWA-6240: Summary Report Submittal
To be modified as follows:
“… submitted to the Class 1 Approved Organization and the
Mandated Organization.”
61.6.6 Article IWA-9000: Glossary
To be complemented or modified:
Steam Components
Components being part of:
• the nuclear reactor vessel, the primary piping system and its
branch connections up to and including the second isolation
valve, the secondary steam generation systems up to and
including the first isolation;
• nuclear components as per R.G 1.26 of USNRC and subject
to the Belgian RD of October 18, 1991 on steam components.
Authorized Inspection Agency (AIA)
Belgian Mandated Organization (see hereafter) for the inspec-
tion of steam components, or independent organization as defined
in Appendix X of this document for the applicable domain there-
by defined.
Authorized Inspector, Inspection Specialist, Authorized
Nuclear Inspector, Inspector, Authorized Nuclear In-service
Inspector, Authorized Supervisor, ASME Designee, Observer
Inspector from the AO-1 or MO defined hereunder.
MO representatives are not subject to examination by ASME
nor the “National Board” nor U.S. States nor Canadian Provinces.
The AO-1 Inspector does not need to be a Class 1 Expert but
shall work under supervision of such an Expert.
Class 1 Approved Organization
Class 1 Approved Organization competent for the in-service
inspection of nuclear installations, in accordance with the Belgian
RD of February 28, 1963 and its revisions (Appendix D to the
RGPT).
Commercial Service
Commercial operation of the NSSS system, or, if the same is
not declared, 6 months after the beginning of the power ramp.
Derogation
Authorization not to meet one or more contractual technical
requirements. It can be the resolution of a non-conformance
report.
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542 • Chapter 61

Nota Bene: Administrative derogations can also exist, when
documents linked with a technical delivery (construction code,
Owner requirements) include administrative clauses.
Enforcement and Regulatory Authorities
Means the competent Belgian Authorities, including the
Belgian Ministries competent according to the Royal Decree of
October 18, 1991, the Ministerial Decree of October 28, 1991 and
the Royal Decree of February 28, 1963. The corresponding mis-
sions are delegated to the AO-1 and the MO.
Mandated Organization (MO)
Belgian Mandated Organization for the inspection of steam com-
ponents, in accordance with Article 1, § 2 of the Royal Decree of
October 18, 1991.
Nonconformance
Realization not compliant with the applicable technical docu-
ments.
Nota Bene: Administrative nonconformances can also exist,
when documents linked with a technical delivery (construction
code, Owner requirements) include administrative clauses.
Owner
Organization responsible for the Class 1 installation, in accor-
dance with the Royal Decree of February 28, 1963 and its revisions.
Owner’s Agent
Organization performing tasks under delegation and responsi-
bility of the Owner.
IWB-3134: Review by Authorities
(a) and (b): To be replaced by:
“The repair program, the re-examination results and their
evaluation shall be subject to review by the Class 1 Approved
Organization and the Mandated Organization.”
IWB-3144: Review by Authorities
(a) and (b): To be replaced by:
“The repair program, the re-examination results and their
evaluation shall be subject to review by the Class 1 Approved
Organization and the Mandated Organization.”
IWB-3610: Acceptance Criteria for Ferritic Steel Components 4
in. and Greater in Thickness
To be modified as follows:
“… to approval by the Class 1 Approved Organization and the
Mandated Organization.”
IWB-3630: Acceptance Criteria for Steam Generator Tubing
To be modified as follows:
“… acceptable to the Class 1 Approved Organization and the
Mandated Organization.”.
IWB-3640: Evaluation Procedures and Acceptance Criteria
for Austenitic Piping
To be modified as follows:
“… to approval by the Class 1 Approved Organization and the
Mandated Organization.”

Owner’s Report for In-Service Inspection IWB-3650: Evaluation Procedures and Acceptance Criteria
Owner Certification countersigned by an MO. for Ferritic Piping
Registered professional engineer / professional engineer / To be modified as follows:
responsible engineer “… to approval by the Class 1 Approved Organization and the
In Belgium, graduated engineer (University or Technical Mandated Organization.”
University level); abroad, university-level engineer or equivalent. The last statement:
Repair Organization “The evaluation shall be submitted to the enforcement authori-
Organization performing repairs or replacements according to ties having jurisdiction at the plant site.”
the Owner Quality Assurance Program (QAP). to be deleted.
Repair / Replacement Program IWB-3720: Unanticipated Operating Events
Program of operations to be performed by repair organization To be modified as follows:
in case of repair or replacement (see IWA-4140). This program
includes the applicable requirements from the QAP of the Owner. (c) “… to approval by the Class 1 Approved Organization and
the Mandated Organization.”

IWB-3730: Fracture Toughness Criteria for Protection

61.7 SUBSECTION IWB – REQUIREMENTS Against Failure
FOR CLASS 1 COMPONENTS OF To be modified as follows:
LIGHT-WATER COOLED PLANTS (b) “… to approval by the Class 1 Approved Organization and
61.7.1 Article IWB 3000: Acceptance Standards the Mandated Organization.”

IWB-3114: Review by Authorities 61.8 SUBSECTION IWC – REQUIREMENTS

(a) and (b): To be replaced by: FOR CLASS 2 COMPONENTS OF
“The repair program, the re-examination results and their
evaluation shall be subject to review by the Class 1 Approved
LIGHT-WATER COOLED PLANTS
Organization and the Mandated Organization.” 61.8.1 Article IWC 3000: Acceptance Standards

IWB-3124: Review by Authorities IWC-3114: Review by Authorities

(a) and (b): To be replaced by: (a) and (b): To be replaced by:
“The repair program, the re-examination results and their “The repair program, the re-examination results and their
evaluation shall be subject to review by the Class 1 Approved evaluation shall be subject to review by the Class 1 Approved
Organization and the Mandated Organization.” Organization and the Mandated Organization.”
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 543

IWC-3125: Review by Authorities
(a) and (b): To be replaced by:
“The repair program, the re-examination results and their
evaluation shall be subject to review by the Class 1 Approved
Organization and the Mandated Organization.”
“Alternatively, repairs may meet the requirements of another
national or international code, or a specific and coherent set of
rules defined by the Owner provided the same conditions are as
defined in IWA-4170 (e) or (f).”

IWC-3134: Review by Authorities

61.11 APPENDIX II – OWNER’S REPORTS
(a) and (b): To be replaced by: FOR IN-SERVICE INSPECTIONS
“The repair program, the re-examination results and their The Owner uses its own documents “form NIS-1” et “form
evaluation shall be subject to review by the Class 1 Approved NIS-2” (see. IWA-6210). Templates to be used are given in
Organization and the Mandated Organization.” Appendix A.

61.9 SUBSECTION IWE – REQUIREMENTS 61.12 APPENDIX IX – APPLICATION RULES

FOR CLASS MC AND METALLIC OF THE ASME CODE SECTION III
LINERS OF CLASS CC COMPONENTS OR OTHER REGULATIONS
OF LIGHT-WATER COOLED PLANTS FOR REPAIR OR REPLACEMENT
61.9.1 Article IWE 3000: Acceptance Standards OF COMPONENTS IN OPERATING
NUCLEAR UNITS
IWE-3115: Review by Authorities 61.12.1 Article IX-1000: Introduction
(a) and (b): To be replaced by: This Appendix defines the conditions for manufacture (in the
“The repair program, the re-examination results and their frame of a replacement) or reparation under the ASME Code or
evaluation shall be subject to review by the Class 1 Approved other rules (IWA-4170).
Organization and the Mandated Organization.”
61.12.2 Article IX-2000: Application of ASME
IWE-3122.4: Acceptance by Evaluation
To be modified as follows:
Code Section III
A component may be manufactured or repaired under a trans-
(c) “The engineering evaluation shall be subject to review by posed version of ASME Section III, according to Article IX-5000
the Class 1 Approved Organization and the Mandated hereafter.
Organization.” Components not covered by the documents hereafter may be
manufactured or repaired in the United States or elsewhere, in strict
IWE-3125: Review by Authorities compliance with the ASME Code and according to the U.S. com-
To be replaced by: mon practice (i.e., by a “Manufacturer” availing of a “N Stamp”
“The repair program, the re-examination results and their under control of an ASME certified “Authorized Inspector”):
evaluation shall be subject to review by the Class 1 Approved
Organization and the Mandated Organization.” • Ministerial Decree V.4.087 on the nuclear boiler and the
steam components;
61.9.2 Article IWE 5000: System Pressure Test • Royal Decree of Installation and Operation of each nuclear
unit, imposing specific requirements on, AO
IWE-5221: Leakage Test – pressure vessels and components (pressure higher than 1
To be modified as follows: bar and capacity larger than 0.300 cum) not submitted to
“… by the modification. The measures of leakage from this test regulatory requirements,
shall be included in the report to the Class 1 Approved Organiz- – compressed air storage vessels.
ation. The acceptance criteria. …”
This rule does not require any transposition.
61.10 SUBSECTION IWL – REQUIREMENTS 61.12.3 Article IX-3000: Application of Other Rules
FOR CLASS CC CONCRETE Than Those of ASME Code
COMPONENTS OF LIGHT-WATER A component may be manufactured or repaired under alternate
COOLED PLANTS rules and in compliance with conditions of Article IWA-4170 (e)
and (f), according to the following rules.
61.10.1 Article IWL 3000: Acceptance Standards
IX-3110 – Manufacturer Qualification
IWL-3320: Review by Authorities Qualification is awarded by the Owner in accordance with its
To be replaced by: Quality Assurance Program, and based on a positive audit by the
“The engineering evaluation report shall be subject to review AIA. The report documenting the basis for this qualification is
by the Class 1 Approved Organization.” available to the AO-1.
61.10.2 Article IWL 4000: Repair Procedures IX-3120 – Code Equivalence Report
The Code or set of rules selected for the items under considera-
IWL-4220: Repair of reinforcing steel tion (identified exhaustively) are evaluated by the Owner through
To be complemented with: comparison with the ASME Code (docket edition).
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544 • Chapter 61
This evaluation yields the equivalence report addressing mainly:
• compatibility conditions as per Article IWA-4170 (d) (1) to
(3) (for reference only);
• compatibility with inspection requirements of ASME Code
Section XI (emphasis on acceptable non-compliances);
• for ferritic steel, the protection against brittle fracture;
• overpressure protection analysis (and comparison with exist-
ing protections);
• test pressure definition.
This report is presented to the AO-1.
For the use of a non-French construction code (Article IWA-
4170 (f)), prior acceptance of the AO-1 and the MO is required.
Additional requirements yielding from the evaluation shall be
integrated into the Owner equipment specification.
IX-3130 – Acceptance Program
A component acceptance program defined by the Owner shall be
included or attached to the Owner’s Specification (IWA-4130 (b)).
This program specifies the inspections to be performed in
accordance with the selected code (or set of rules) together with:
• additional inspections proposed as a consequence of the eval-
uation according to IX-3120;
• the intervention points of the AIA if any.
The acceptance program is made available to the AO-1.
At the end of the manufacturing, the Compliance Certificate
(IWA-4910 (b) (5)) is signed by the AIA.
IX-3200 – Additional Rules Applicable to the Components
Under IX-2000
For components under Article IX-2000, the following require-
ments shall be needed in addition to Article IX-3100.
IX-3210 – Manufacturer Qualification
Qualification is awarded by the Owner in accordance with its
Quality Assurance Program and based on a positive audit by the
MO. The report documenting the basis for this qualification is
available to the AO-1.
IX-3220 – Code Equivalence Report
This report is submitted to the MO for approval.
IX-3230 – Acceptance Program
Procurement from the shelf is not allowed without additional
investigation.
The program shall open room for interventions by the MO sim-
ilar to those provided for in the ASME Code. Interfaces between
the Owner, the Manufacturer and the MO shall be defined.
The acceptance program is submitted to the approval of the MO.
At the end of the manufacturing, the Compliance Certificate
(IWA-4910 (b) (5)) is signed by the MO.
61.12.4 Article IX-4000: Derogations
and Nonconformances
IX-4100 – Derogation
Practical application of the selected code or set of rules may
require some requirements of the latter to be replaced with rules
offering the same level of assurance.
In order to do so, the Owner shall present for approval a non-
conformance request:
• to the AIA in every case;
• to the AO-1 for potentially safety-related issues.
IX-4200 - Nonconformance
If an anomaly with respect to the selected code or set of rules is
noticed during manufacture or erection of a component, the
Owner shall notify the nonconformance:
• to the AIA in every case;
• to the AO-1 for potentially safety-related issues.
IX-4300 - Exceptions
If the Owner does not comply with the ruling of the AIA, the
latter shall demur in the “Manufacturing Data Report” or the
“Compliance Certificate” (IWA-4910 (b) (5)).
If the Owner does not comply with the ruling of the MO, the lat-
ter shall demur in the “Installation Data Report” or the “Owner’s
Report for Repairs or Replacements” (NIS-2/IWA-4910 (d)).
61.12.5 Article IX-5000: Transposition of ASME Code
Section III
Section XI of the ASME Code sends back to Section III for
repairs and replacements. The use of ASME Section III in the
strictly limited frame of those operations requires replacing in the
applicable subsections of the various terms with their correspon-
dents as defined into Article IWA-9000.
Additionally, the following notions shall apply:
• The term “National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors” is for documentation only.
• The term “Society” shall not be transposed: quality assur-
ance audits are performed by the AIA, “Certificates of
Authorization” and “Interim letters” are awarded by the
Owner or its engineer based on the positive opinion of the
AIA.
• If the quality assurance program is fully or partly replaced
with a specific follow-up program, the “Certificate of
Authorization” is replaced with a “Letter of Authorization”
awarded in similar conditions. Such authorization is valid for
one single order.
Appendix B includes templates for those certificates and letters.
Those documents can be used in other frameworks than ASME
Section III (components manufactured in accordance with other
construction codes or rules).
The “Quality System Certificates for Materials” are awarded by
the Mandated Organization.
Material procurement may take place under the responsibility
and in accordance with the QAP of the Manufacturer or the
Owner with no need for a “Quality System Certificate for
Materials.”
• The qualification of the NDE personnel is made in accordance
with “SNT-TC-1A” or equivalent as accepted by the AIA.
• No certificate is required for the Owner nor the Owner’s
Agent. Manufacturing follow up contracts executed with the
AIA shall include the Code-required interventions at the for-
mers’ premises.
Owner’s Contractors and all their direct and indirect sub-
contractors shall obtain individually the above-mentioned autho-
rizations.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 545
The Owner executes with the AIA a Contractors’ follow-up
contract for themselves and all their direct and indirect subcon-
tractors, covering the whole of their supply.
• “Foreword” and “Statement of Policy on the use of Code
Symbols in advertising” are for documentation only.
• Data Reports are used with the above-mentioned transposi-
tions, the deletion of the terms “as required by the Provisions
of the ASME Code Rules” in the title, and the use of state-
ment in Appendix A instead of the corresponding statement
of the Code Data Reports.
A translation of the Data Reports in the local language at the
site is authorized.
61.12.6 Article IX-6000: General Requirements for the
Use of RCC-M Code
General requirements for the use of RCC-M Code are defined
elsewhere.
61.13 APPENDIX X – AN INDEPENDENT
BODY DISTINCT FROM THE
MANDATED ORGANIZATION
PERFORMING THE AIA ROLE
61.13.1 Article X-1000: Introduction
This Appendix describes the field of application and the condi-
tions for an independent body to play the role of an AIA as pro-
vided for by the ASME Code.
61.13.2 Article X-2000: Field of Application
The Owner may entrust an independent body with the AIA role
only in the framework of repairs and replacements of Class 2 and
Class 3 components not covered by:
• the Ministerial Decree V.4.087 on the nuclear boiler and the
steam components;
• the Royal Decrees for Installation and Operation of the units,
mentioning specific requirements applicable to:
– pressure vessels and components (pressure higher than 1
bar and capacity larger than 0.300 cum) not covered by
Code regulatory requirements;
– compressed air storage vessels.
This clause does not apply to site activities wherein only the
MO may act as the AIA.
61.13.3 Article X-3000: Independent Bodies
Independent bodies mentioned hereafter may be entrusted with
the AIA mission if the corresponding conditions are met.
Article X-3100: Authorized Inspection Agency
The AIA mission may be delegated to an Authorized
Inspection Agency as per ASME Code Section III, Article NCA-
5121.
Article X-3200: Mandated Organization
The AIA mission may be delegated to an Authorized
Organization from one of the European Union (the “EU”) Member
States. In application of the Council Directive dated July 27, 1976
on the reconciliation of Member States rulemaking systems relative
to the common rules for pressure equipment and their inspection,
the EU has issued a list of Authorized Organizations for the atten-
tion of the Member States. This Mandated Organization shall act
only in the State where it has been registered, and shall have a suffi-
cient practice of the codes and rules applicable to nuclear equip-
ment and components.
Article X-3300: Inspection Service
The AIA mission may be delegated to the inspection service of
the Owner or its Engineer if:
• there is an identified structure of the inspection service, with
reporting lines and methods inside the mother organization
emphasizing and warranting it being unbiased;
• the inspection service is free from commercial, financial, or
any other pressure susceptible of biasing its judgment. It shall
not be responsible for design, fabrication, delivery, erection,
or operation of the component it is due to inspect, nor be
involved in any activity incompatible with the required inde-
pendence, freedom of judgment and integrity of its inspection
activities;
• the people in charge of inspection shall avail of:
– a significant professional experience of the whole set of
assessment and verification operations delegated to the
AIA,
– a thorough knowledge of the rules applicable to the inspec-
tions to be performed, and a living practice of the surveil-
lance of those inspections,
– the required ability to establish certifications, minutes and
reports documenting the inspections performed;
• the inspection service is organized in such a way that its abil-
ity to perform its functions is duly maintained in un accept-
able way.
Terms and conditions for the inspection service to intervene are
described in its Quality Assurance Program. The correct applica-
tion of the same shall be assessed by the AO-1.
61.13.4 Article X-4000: Documentation
The Owner shall submit to the MO for signature, the Owner’s
reports, NIS-1 and NIS-2 relative to repairs and replacements.
For signing, the MO will rely on documents and reports issued
for and during the work performed. These documents are listed in
the following table; the table indicates responsibilities of the
various bodies in their establishment and approval. Documents
requiring notification to the MO are mentioned also.
61.14 EVOLUTION OF THE RULES
61.14.1 Evolution of the Rules During Operation
Besides the rules followed during design and construction, the
Royal Decree of Authorization for Installation and Operation (see
Section 61.3) of each nuclear unit makes it mandatory to conduct
10-yearly safety reviews. These reviews must “compare on the one
hand the conditions of the installation and the implementation of
the procedures that apply to them, and, on the other hand, the regu-
lations, codes and practices in force in the United States and in the
European Union. The differences found must be highlighted,
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546 • Chapter 61

TABLE 2 DOCUMENT TYPES AND RESPONSIBILITIES [11]

Document Types (1) Owner (2) Contractor AIA MO

Evaluation report E N N A
Repair and replacement program A E N A
Equipment specification (5) E N N N (3)
Code equivalence report E A N (3)
Technical follow-up documents A E A (4) N (3)
(specifications, procedures, Quality Plans, CMTRs,
Requests for derogation, Overpressure Protection
Report, nonconformance reports)
Owner’s Review of Design Report E N N (3)
Manufacturing Data Report (N…) (6) E A N (3)
Installation Data Report (N5) (6) E A
Owner’s Reports NIS-1 and NIS-2 E A

(1) E ⫽ Establishment
A ⫽ Approval and/or signature
N ⫽ Notification
(2) The Owner may delegate the establishment of the mentioned documents.
(3) The notification happens through the final documentation.
(4) According to the procedure for circulation and handling of technical documents issued by Contractors.
(5) The equipment specification includes the acceptance program requirements (Articles IX-3130 and
IX-3230).
(6) or Compliance Certificate.

together with the necessity and possibility of remedial action and,
as the case may be, the improvements that can be made and the
time schedule for their implementation.”
New rules, codes, and practices at the international level will be
examined, and it will be decided on whether each of those ought
to be considered in the 10-yearly safety reviews.
The feedback of operational experience of nuclear plants at the
international level is also considered; “Bulletins” and “Generic
Letters” of the USNRC are examined (if their follow-up has not
been required yet in the frame of the permanent supervision dur-
ing operation of the installation).
An example of new topics corresponding to international prac-
tices introduced in the 10-yearly safety reviews is the analysis of
severe accidents. As a consequence of the introduction of this
topic in the 10-yearly safety reviews, it has become an obligation
to install autocatalytic recombiners in all Belgian plants.
regulator if Belgium security of supply would be threatened by
closing the plants.
Until such event happens, there will be no reason to question
about the rules that would be imposed for design and construc-
tion. If it happens, and new plants are built in Belgium, it is likely
that the same philosophy as used for the currently operating
plants be applied, with the selection of a recent version of
ASME Code Section III (and the other Sections called upon by
ASME III) and Section VIII, Division 1. Transpositions would
be revised, but the general framework and the actors would
remain the same: the owner and its representative (Owner’s
Engineer), a body in charge of safety (Nuclear Agency or other),
a body controlling the respect of the Belgian law (Mandated
Organization), and someone verifying the (correct) application
of the ASME Code (AIA).9 This system has shown its workabil-
ity and efficiency.

61.14.2 Future Trends

61.15 ACKNOWLEDGMENT
By means of the Federal Act of January 31, 2003 [14], Belgium
has decided to abandon the use of fissile nuclear energy for industri- The author acknowledges and appreciates the help, the support,
al electricity production. This law prohibits the building of new and the precious contributions from Jacques Weverbergh of
nuclear power plants and limits the operational period of existing Tractebel Engineering in Brussels (Belgium).
nuclear power plants to 40 years. The operation of research facilities
is not affected, and fusion as a future technology is not ruled out.
The phaseout can only be overridden by new legislation or by a
9
government decision based on recommendations from the grid May be the same as the MO.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 547
61.16 REFERENCES
1. Règlement Général pour la Protection du Travail/Algemeen Reglement
voor ArbeidsBescherming, Belgian Government, Brussels, 1947.
2. Arrêté royal concernant les appareils à vapeur, Oct. 18, 1991, Belgian
Government, Brussels, 1991.
3. Arrêté ministériel portant exécution de l’arrêté royal du 18 octobre
1991 concernant les appareils à vapeur, Oct. 28, 1991, Belgian
Government, Brussels, 1991.
4. Arrêté royal relatif aux appareils à pression en provenance ou à des-
tination d’un des Etats membres de la Communauté économique
européenne, Feb. 1st, 1980, updated on March 14, 2002, Belgian
Government, Brussels, 2002.
5. Arrêté royal portant exécution de la directive du Parlement européen
et du Conseil de l’Union européenne du 29 mai 1997 relative au rap-
prochement des législations des Etats membres concernant les
équipements sous pression, June 13, 1999, Belgian Government,
Brussels, 1999.
6. European Pressure Equipment Directive (PED) 97/23/EC, 1997.
7. EN 13445, Unfired Pressure Vessels, edited by CEN, 2002.
8. CODAP, French Code for the Construction of Pressure Vessels, edit-
ed by SNCT and AFIAP, 2000.
9. Arrêté ministériel de dérogation à la réglementation applicable aux
appareils à vapeur (V 4.087), June 06, 1993, Belgian Government,
Brussels, 1993.
10. DOCGEN 4DE 111 001, Transposition sur le plan Belge des Aspects
Réglementaires de la Section III – Division 1 du Code ASME, Rev. 0,
Tractebel, Brussels, 1993.
11. DOCGEN 4DE 117 001, Transposition sur le plan Belge des Aspects
Réglementaires de la Section XI – Division 1 du Code ASME, Rev. 1,
Tractebel, Brussels, 1997.
12. USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.26, Quality Group Classifications and
Standards for Water-, Steam-, and Radioactive- Waste-Containing
Components of Nuclear Power Plants, Rev. 3, 1976.
13. USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.143, Design Guidance for Radioactive
Waste Management Systems, Structures, and Components Installed in
Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants, Rev. 2, 2001.
14. Act on the Phase-out of Nuclear Energy for the Purposes of Industrial
Production of Electricity, Jan. 31, 2003, Belgian Government,
Brussels, 2003.
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548 • Chapter 61

61.17 APPENDICES

61.17.1 Appendix 61.A [11]

Transposition of “Data Reports”

and “Owner’s Reports” (forms NIS-1 and NIS-2)
Templates to be used

A.1. Window to be completed by the Manufacturer (Data Reports) or the Owner (Owner’s Reports)

Certificate of shop/field compliance

We certify that the statements made in this report are correct and that this…. (1) ……. conforms to the rules of
construction of the ……………….. (2) …………. amended by the document “Belgian Transposition of the
requirements of the ASME Code Section XI – Division 1 (Ed 92).”

Signed ………….. by …… (3) ……

Certificate of Authorization …………….. (6)

Delivered by ……………………. (6)

Expiration date ……………………. (6)

A.2. Window to be completed by the AIA

Certificate of shop/field inspection

I, ….. (3)….., the undersigned, employee at …… (4) ……, acting as Authorized Inspection Agency according to
document “Belgian Transposition of the requirements of the ASME Code Section XI – Division 1 (Ed 92)” have
inspected this ……. (1)……. described in this ….. (7) ….. on ……. (5) …….., and I state to the best of my
knowledge and belief, that the Manufacturer has constructed this ……. (1) …….. in accordance with the ……….
(2) …. amended by this transposition.

By signing this certificate, neither the inspector nor his employer makes any warranty concerning the …… (1) ……
described in this Report.

Date ………………. Signature ………………..

1: Component
2: Applicable code
3: Name
4: Designated AIA
5: Date for Data Report or period for Owner’s Report
6: Not applicable for the Owner
7: Data Report or Owner’s Report
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61.17.2 Appendix 61.B [11]

1/4 Certificate of Authorization

2/4 Interim Letter of Authorization
3/4 Letter of Authorization
4/4 Quality System Certificate (Materials)

CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORIZATION
Nr. 000

This is to certify that

company, location

is hereby authorized1 to act as

Manufacturer installer services repair organization

in accordance with the applicable rules of

10 CFR 50 Appendix B, ASME III Subsection NCA, and ASME XI

and the document (Transposition sur le plan belge des aspects réglementaires de la section III, division 1, du code ASME)

This authorization is granted on the basis of their Quality Assurance Manual ### which scope and implementation have
been reviewed and accepted by ### on ### (see audit report no. ###, ref. XXX) for the design, procurement, manufacturing,
installation, examination, testing, handling, packaging, storage, shipping of

Product, Class

at the above location only from ### until ###

Signature Signature

Qualification Manager Nuclear Executive Vice-President Nuclear

ASME_Ch61_p535-552.qxd 6/3/09 12:48 PM Page 550

550 • Chapter 61

INTERIM LETTER OF AUTHORIZATION

Nr. 000

This is to certify that

company, location

is hereby authorized1 to act as

Manufacturer installer services repair organization

in accordance with the applicable rules of

10 CFR 50 Appendix B, ASME III Subsection NCA, and ASME XI

and the document «Transposition sur le plan belge des aspects réglementaires de la section III, division 1, du code ASME»

This authorization is granted on the basis of their Quality Assurance Manual ### which scope and implementation have been
reviewed and conditionally accepted by ### on ### (see audit report no. ###, ref. XXX) for the design, procurement, manufacturing,
installation, examination, testing, handling, packaging, storage, shipping of

Product, Class

at the above location only from ### until ###

This authorization is subject to the holder’s agreement to achieve the implementation of his Quality Assurance program and to have
it reviewed and accepted by the Owner prior to the expiration date of his Interim Letter, and prior to the issuance of a Certificate of
Authorization.

Signature Signature

Qualification Manager Nuclear Executive Vice-President Nuclear

ASME_Ch61_p535-552.qxd 6/3/09 12:48 PM Page 551

COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 551

LETTER OF AUTHORIZATION
Nr. 000

PROJECT: XXXX Nuclear Power Plant

PURCHASE ORDER NO:

CONTRACTOR:

MANUFACTURER:

LOCATION OF WORK:

AUTHORIZED ACTIVITY1: manufacturer installer repair organization

SCOPE: design, procurement, installation, examination, testing, packaging, storage, handling, shipping

PRODUCT: product

class

REFERENCE STANDARD: ASME III Subsection NCA, 10 CFR 50 Appendix B

and the document (Transposition sur le plan belge des aspects réglementaires de la section III,
division 1, du code ASME)

SPECIFIC QA PROGRAM:

DATE OF ISSUE: ###

Signature Signature

Qualification Manager Nuclear Executive Vice-President Nuclear

ASME_Ch61_p535-552.qxd 6/3/09 12:48 PM Page 552

552 • Chapter 61

QUALITY SYSTEM CERTIFICATE (MATERIALS)

Nr. 000

This is to certify that the

of the

has been reviewed and accepted and that this Quality System Certificate (Materials) is granted by the inspection

Agency

The holder is hereby authorized to manufacture:

– for equipments subject to legal regulations for the Belgian nuclear plants

for which

act as the agent of the Owner.

– in accordance with the applicable rules of the Boiler Pressure Vessel Code of the American Society of Mechanical

Engineers and more particularly the ASME Section III and the “Transposition sur le plan belge des aspects

réglementaires de la section III - division 1 du code ASME.”

– for the following scope of work within the following limits

The holder of this certificate has agreed that this certificate will be used according to the rules of ASME Section III and the

“Transposition” and that the Certificate could be withdrawn by the Inspection Agency in case of nonconformity.

Date of issue :

This certificate expires on:

INSPECTION AGENCY

THE MANAGER
ASME_Ch62_p553-562.qxd 6/3/09 12:52 PM Page 553
BOILER AND PRESSURE
VESSELS IN GERMANY
62.1 INTRODUCTION
The Pressure Equipment Directive (PED) (97/23/EC) [1] was
adopted by the European Parliament and the European Council in
May 1997. Initially came into force on November 29, 1999, from
May 29, 2002 the Pressure Equipment Directive was obligatory
throughout the European Union.
Germany as a member of the European Union had to respect
the Directives issued by the EU and to transfer these to national
law, so the PED came into effect.
As background information an extract of the official reference
of the EU home page is available [2].
The Directive appears in the European Community’s Program
for the elimination of technical barriers to trade and is formulated
under the “New Approach to Technical Harmonization and
Standards” [3]. Its purpose is to harmonize national laws of
Member States regarding the design, manufacture, testing, confor-
mity assessment, and assemblies of pressure equipment. It there-
fore aims to ensure the free placing on the market and putting into
service equipment concerned within the European Union and the
European Economic Area. Formulated under the New Approach,
the Directive provides for a flexible regulatory environment that
does not impose any detailed technical solution. This approach
allows European industry to develop new techniques thereby
increasing international competitiveness. The pressure equipment
directive is one of a series of technical harmonization directives
for machinery, electrical equipment, medical devices, simple pres-
sure vessels, gas appliances, and so on.
The Directive concerns manufacturers of items such as vessels
pressurized storage containers, heat exchangers, steam generators,
boilers, industrial piping, safety devices, and pressure accessories.
Such pressure equipment is widely used in the process industries
(oil and gas, chemical, pharmaceutical, plastics and rubber, and
the food and beverage industry), high temperature process indus-
try (glass, paper, and board), energy production utilities, heating,
air-conditioning, and gas storage and transportation.
Excluded from the scope of the PED according to Article 1 are:
3.8. Items specifically designed for nuclear use, failure of
which may cause an emission of radioactivity.
For Nuclear Power Plant Licensing in Europe the application
limits of the PED and the Nuclear Codes have to be agreed with
the National Nuclear Licensing Authorities, there is no harmo-
nization process agreed in the European Union.
CHAPTER
62
Dieter Kreckel
In Germany the acceptance of Nuclear Energy was formulated
with the decree of 2002, “Gesetz zur geordneten Beendigung der
Atom- energienutzung zur Stromerzeugung” [4]. As a conse-
quence of the political agreement with the German Utilities,
German Nuclear Power Plants that operate the plants are allowed
to stretch the plant life up to defined production periods. The
nuclear power plant (NPP) operation activities may end in 2022,
so that the updating of the codes and standards for nuclear appli-
cation may have minimal need.
The German Nuclear Power Plants in operation are licensed by
the German Codes and Standards for Pressure Vessels effective
from the construction time as defined in the operation license.
These identify the potentials for the application of the Codes and
Standard, as the state of the art.
The effort spent in Germany for the development of the new
Generation 3 of NPP, for example, the European Pressurized
Water Reactor (EPR) or the SWR1000 with respect to the code
and standard evolvement cannot be applied in Germany, since
there is no chance to build a new NPP in the near future.
62.2 EUROPEAN DIRECTIVE (PED) AND
GERMAN LEGAL ADAPTATIONS
Since May 29, 2002 the Pressure Equipment Directive
(97/23/EC) was obligatory throughout the European Union. Since
November 1999, this European Directive 97/23/EC (PED)
became a national law in Germany via various legislative steps,
such as GSG and “14. GSGV” that has been updated from March
10, 2002 to “14. GPSGV” [6], which is within the scope of GPSG
[5]. The decree rules apply to introducing of the new pressure
equipment to the market.
Since March 10, 2002 the maintenance and the OH&S rules
contained in the BertrSichV [7] apply to the operating pressure
vessels already installed and new installed pressure vessels have
to conform to the mandatory PED category levels in addition.
The presumption of conformity to the PED is ruled by the
Harmonized Standards used as a benchmark. (see Table 62.1 [8]
and Fig. 62.3 [11]).
In Germany the conformity to PED is alternately ruled by the AD
2000 Code [9] (see Table 62.2), which is adapted to the Harmonized
Standards and conservatively evolved from the earlier AD Code.
ASME_Ch62_p553-562.qxd 6/3/09 12:52 PM Page 554

554 • Chapter 62

TABLE 62.1 PED ANNEX I AND HARMONIZED STANDARDS PROVIDING

PRESUMPTION OF CONFORMITY

PED ANNEX I Nationalized Harmonized Standards (DIN Substituted by e.g., AF, BS, SF, or . . .)
Essential Safety Unfired Pressure
Requirements Vessel Industrial Piping Harmonized Supporting Standards
General DIN EN 13445-1 DIN EN 13480-1
General General
Design DIN EN 13445-3 DIN EN 13480-3 DIN EN ISO 9001 Quality management systems
Design Design and
Calculation
Manufacturing DIN EN 13445-4 DIN EN 13480-4 DIN EN ISO 9001 Quality management systems
Manufacturing Manufacturing and and approval by Notified Body
Routing DIN EN 287-1 Approval Testing of Welders -
Fusion Welding- Steel
DIN EN 288-1, Welding Procedure
-2, -3
DIN EN 13445-5 DIN EN 13480-5 DIN EN 473 Qualification and certification of
Inspection and Examination NDT personal
Examination DIN EN 12062 NDE of Fusion Welds
DIN EN 1289,
1291, 1435, 1712,
1713, 1714, etc.
Materials DIN EN 13445-2 DIN EN 13480-2 DIN EN ISO 9001 Quality management systems -with
Materials Materials specific evaluation-
DIN EN 10204 Types of Certificates
DIN EN 10028 Plates
DIN EN 10213 Casting
DIN EN 10222 Forging of Steel
DIN EN 10216 Seamless pipes
DIN EN 10217 Welded Steel Pipes
(Source: ref. [8])

The AD 2000 Code contains the safety requirements for service
conditions of pressure vessels that apply to Europe.
The manufacturer of the pressure equipment can choose
between the two options, Harmonized Standards or AD 2000.
The equipment quality is displayed by the certificate of confor-
mity and the application of the CE marking as shown in Fig.
62.1 [11].
The goal of the EU New Approach has been achieved for
Germany that includes all activities of marketing such as national
import or export of pressure vessels. The surveillance by the
Notified Body according to PED Article 12 assures the document-
ed quality of the equipment as defined in the PED Appendix mod-
ules, Fig. 62.2 [12].
62.3 NUCLEAR REGULATIONS OF
PRESSURE VESSELS APPLICABLE
TO GERMAN NPP
The German Nuclear Power Plants in operation are licensed
with the German Codes and Standard for Pressure Vessels in
effect at construction time and defined in the operation license.
The German Utilities and the Licensing Authorities agreed on an
updating process of these Codes and Standards by voluntary
updating of component specifications to the need for mainte-
nance, back fitting, or upgrading of plant safety or efficiency con-
sistent with the state-of-the-art. The KTA Code [13] and Standard
adaptation is ongoing according to the evolvement.
In Germany it was always required that the specific nuclear
design has to adhere to the basic requirements of the pressure
vessel code, although an exclusion was formally expressed in
the conventional rules (as DruckbehV now replaced by 14.
GPSGV) [6].
Almost the same exclusion for the scope of the PED according
to Article 1 is provided by:
3. The following are excluded from the scope of this Directive:
3.8. Items specifically designed for nuclear use, failure of
which may cause an emission of radioactivity; Illustration is
shown in Fig. 62.5 “Example of Grading Requirements in
German NPP Component Classes”.
For orientation to the ASME user the ASME Sections corre-
sponding German Code KTA [13] is shown in the Table 62.3.
In addition the Component Specifications for the set of pressure
equipment provides the detailed requirements for procurement.
Owing to the specific German situation on the acceptance
of Nuclear Energy as formulated in the decree of 2002:
ASME_Ch62_p553-562.qxd 6/3/09 12:52 PM Page 555

COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 555

TABLE 62.2 PED ANNEX I AND AD RULES PROVIDING CONFORMITY

PED ANNEX I GERMAN AD 2000 Code

Essential Safety Harmonized Supporting Standards (DIN Substituted
Requirements Index Sections by e.g., AF, BS, SF, or . . .)
General Fundamentals Equipment, G Series
installation and marking of A Series
pressure vessels Additional notes Z Series
Design Design General verification of B Series DIN EN ISO 9001 Quality management systems
stability for pressure vessels S Series
Manufacturing Manufacture and testing HP Series DIN EN ISO 9001 Quality management systems and
approval by Notified Body
DIN EN 287-1 Approval Testing of Welders -
Fusion Welding- Steel
DIN EN 288-1, Welding Procedure
-2, -3
Special pressure vessels HP Series DIN EN 473 Qualification and certification of
NDT personal
DIN EN 12062 NDE of Fusion Welds
DIN EN 1289,
1291, 1435, 1712,
1713, 1714 etc.
Materials Metallic materials W Series DIN EN ISO 9001 Quality management systems -with
specific evaluation-
DIN EN 10204 Types of Certificates
DIN EN 10028 Plates
DIN EN 10213 Casting
DIN EN 10222 Forging of Steel
DIN EN 10216 Seamless pipes
DIN EN 10217 Welded Steel Pipes
Pressure vessels made of N Series
nonmetallic materials
(Source: ref. [10])

“Gesetz zur geordneten Beendigung der Atomenergienutzung
zur Stromerzeugung” [4] (see Fig. 62.4) the activities of updat-
ing the codes and standards for nuclear application have mini-
mum necessities.
62.4 NUCLEAR REGULATIONS FOR
PRESSURE VESSELS APPLICABLE TO
NEW NPP FOR POTENTIAL EXPORT
The Nuclear Industry and the Manufacturers in Germany are
globally active in the nuclear market. Therefore they act accord-
ing to the client requirements, as defined in the bid.
A detailed review of the ASME III, RCC-M [15] and KTA
codes [13] has been carried out in various studies in relation to
materials, design, and manufacturing requirements to ensure the
structural integrity and safety of pressure components of pressur-
ized water reactor (PWR) systems.
The overall conclusion is that the established ASME Section
III, RCC-M and KTA codes provide comprehensive procedures
for the design and manufacturing of such components, which are
broadly equivalent, when associated specifications and procedures
are considered.
There are some detailed variations, particularly relating to man-
ufacture and surveillance procedures in the United States, France,
and Germany. The differences are between regulatory require-
ments and they reflect the manufacturing practices in the respec-
tive countries.
All these codes would need to be augmented to meet the addi-
tional structural integrity related requirements specified for the
various NPP circuits. However, evidence from PWR vendors is
that the importance of some of these supplementary requirements
in relation to improved assurance of structural integrity is being
recognized and incorporated in the specifications of advanced
PWR designs.
In the United States, great emphasis is placed on the ASME
code, supplemented by additional licensing requirements imposed
by the regulatory body, United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (USNRC). In Japan, MITI Notification 501 is used
for the structural design and manufacture of nuclear power plant
components. In France, the basis is the RCC-M code, while in
Germany the primary circuit design is embodied within the rules
and criteria of the KTA safety standards. In the United Kingdom,
the Sizewell B PWR was designed according to ASME Section
III but with significant supplementary requirements specified by
the utility to satisfy licensing.
ASME_Ch62_p553-562.qxd 6/5/09 2:38 PM Page 556
556 • Chapter 62
FIG. 62.1 PED ARTICLE 5 PRESUMPTION OF CONFORMITY SOURCE [11]
62.4.1 Nuclear Regulations of Pressure Vessels
Applicable to New NPP for Potential Export
Within European Union
The Nuclear Industry and the Manufacturers in Germany are
globally active in the nuclear market. In the frame of European
Licensing a variation of Nuclear Regulations is taken into account
(see Fig. 62.5 [16]). As a minimum they are orientated to the
mandatory PED requirements. As Fig. 62.6 (Source [19]) shows
the main orientation is coming from the higher categories III and
IV of PED.
The suppliers act according to the customer’s requirements, but
the established requirement profile is settled as a benchmark
according to the supplier’s main activities in their home market
Figure 62.7 [17] indicates these interactions.
The nuclear requirements are graded according to the potential
effect on environmental contamination by release of radioactivity.
The safety classes are defined according to the International
Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) classification system and
requirements are assigned to these as shown in the Fig. 62.8 [18].
In the view of the availability of experienced suppliers, the fol-
lowing orientations are retained in Europe:
• QC 1 Equipment
• Construction according to RCC-M code (+ EPR specific
provisions)
• QC 2 Equipment
• Application of nuclear codes RCC-M or ASME III, or KTA
• Piping considered a single equipment submitted to RCC-M
• QC 3 Equipment
• Designed and manufactured according to EN standards
– EN 13445 for vessels
– EN 13480 for piping
• Nuclear-specific provisions included in the equipment
specification
The evolutionary development of the European Pressurized
Water Reactor merges the French and German developments to a
common design, based on the French N4 Plus and the German
KONVOI technologies.
As part of this project, an intensive work program on the com-
parison of the French code RCC-M and the German code KTA
was undertaken between 1990 and 1999 to identify the harmo-
nization potential for a common product. This was based on
detailed review of the ASME III, RCC-M, and KTA codes carried
out in various studies in relation to the materials, design, and
manufacturing requirements to ensure the structural integrity and
safety of primary circuit components of advanced PWR systems.
At the end of 1999 the complete set of the RCC-M code improve-
ments were identified to be applied in any future EPR project.
This has an accepted status to reflect the state-of-the-art for a
LWR to be built in Europe.
An analysis performed about the pressure vessels in the typi-
cal LWR and the dedicated categories of PED is shown in
Fig. 62.6 (Source [19]) and presents the main orientation to the
higher categories III and IV of the PED. According to the results
of this study, the decision of basic requirement Category III in the
nuclear application for pressure vessels is obvious. The nuclear
design enforces in addition, the Nuclear Code requirements such
ASME_Ch62_p553-562.qxd 6/3/09 12:52 PM Page 557

COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 557

PED MODULES
DUTIES OF INVOLVED PARTIES (M, RA)

Module D E1 G H H1
⫹BB1 ⫹H
Duties of Manufacturer

Affixes the CE marking M M M M

Draw up a written declaration of conformity M M M M

Draw up the technical documentation M M M ⫹

Draw up the technical docu for the EC type examination

Assessment of the conformity (design, manufacture) M M M

Final assessment of the pressure equipment M M M M

Affixes the identification number M M M M

Lodge an application for EC design examination with RA M

Must lodge an application for assessment of the quality system M M M

Duties of the Notified Body (RA) and

Surveillance of SUPPLIER

Assess the quality system RA RA RA

Carries out periodic audits with a full reassessment every 3 y RA RA RA

May pay unexpected visits (two visits during the first year) RA RA

Perform appropriate tests RA RA RA

Examine technical documentation RA RA RA RA

Issue an EC type examination certificate RA

Issue and EC design examination certificati RA RA

Pays unexpected visits for monitoring of final assessment RA

Manufacturer affix the Id-number of RA to the CE marking RA RA RA RA RA

MA Manufacturer
RA Responsible Authority according to PED (Article 12, 13 or 14)
FIG. 62.2 PED APPENDIX MODULES DUTIES OF INVOLVED PARTIES SOURCE [12]

as Material Selection, nondestructive examination (NDE), and
Structure Analysis.
62.4.2 Nuclear Regulations of Pressure Vessels
Applicable to new NPP for Potential Export
Within U.S. Oriented Markets
The Nuclear Industry and the Manufacturers in Germany are
globally active in the nuclear market.
The Suppliers act according to the client requirements, but the
established requirement profile is settled as a benchmark accord-
ing to the supplier’s main activities in their home market.
The Licensee defines the Codes and Standards to be applied.
This might result in a full scope of ASME application (Section
I to XI) or in a mix as shown in Fig. 62.8. In any case the
national Licensee will be involved in the approval and surveil-
lance process. The full scope of ASME is mandatory in the
United States only. Some German suppliers are getting fully
qualified according to ASME requirements to be accepted for
such procurement.
62.5 CONCLUSIONS
The application of the PED together with the Harmonized
Standards or AD 2000 is well established. The environment con-
ditions for the Manufacturer of Pressure Equipment and the acting
ASME_Ch62_p553-562.qxd 6/3/09 12:52 PM Page 558

558 • Chapter 62

FIG. 62.3 EXAMPLE OF GRADING OF SAFETY REQUIREMENTS IN

GERMAN NPP COMPONENT CLASSES SOURCE [14]

TABLE 62.3 COMPARISON OF STRUCTURE ASME CODE AND GERMAN CODES KTA

ASME Section Subject Correspondence

Section I Power boilers PED and EN 13445
Section II Material specifications KTA 3201.1 / KTA 3211.1 / EN 13445
Section III NCA General requirements KTA 3201.1 / KTA 3211.1
Division1 NB Class 1 components KTA 3201.2 / KTA 3201.3
NC Class 2 components KTA 3211.2 / KTA 3211.3
ND Class 3 components Specification / EN 13445
NE Class MC components KTA 3401.1 / KTA 3401.2
NF Component supports KTA 3205.1 / KTA 3205.2
NG Core support structure KTA 3204
Appendices See tables ./.
Division 2 Concrete reactor vessels ./.
and containment
Section IV Heating boilers EN standards
Section V Nondestructive examination KTA 3201.2 / KTA 3201.3
KTA 3211.2 / KTA 3211.3
EN standards
Section VI Operation of heating boilers None (regulatory texts)
Section VII Care of power boilers None (regulatory texts)
Section VIII Pressure vessels (nonsafety related) PED or EN
Section IX Welding and brazing qualification ISO / EN Standards
Part QW Welding ISO / EN Standards
Part QB Brazing ISO / EN Standards
Section X Fiberglass-reinforced plastic PV Not used in NPP
Section XI In-Service inspection of NPP KTA 3201.4 / KTA 3211.4
BetrSichV
(Source: ref. [13])
ASME_Ch62_p553-562.qxd 6/3/09 12:52 PM Page 559

COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 559

Beginn des
Reststrommengen kommerziellen
ab 1.1.2000 Leistungs-
Anlage (TWh netto) betriebs

Obrigheim 8,70 1. 4. 1969

Stade 23,18 19. 5. 1972

Biblis A 62,00 26. 2. 1975

Neckarwestheim 1 57.35 1. 12. 1976

Biblis B 81,46 31. 1. 1977

Brunsbüttel 47,67 9. 2. 1977

Isar 1 78,35 21. 3. 1979

Unterweser 117,98 6. 9. 1979

FIG. 62.5 OVERVIEW ON NUCLEAR AND CONVEN-
Philippsburg 1 87,14 26. 3. 1980 TIONAL SAFETY CODES AND DEGREES SOURCE [16]

Grafenrheinfeld 150,03 17. 6. 1982

Krümmel 158,22 28. 3. 1984

Gundremmingen B 160,92 19. 7. 1984

Phillippsburg 2 198,61 18. 4. 1985

Grohnde 200,90 1. 2. 1985

Gundremmingen C 168,35 18. 1. 1985

Brokdorf 217,88 22. 12. 1986

Isar 2 231,21 9. 4. 1988

Emsland 230,07 20. 6. 1988

Neckarwestheim 2 236,04 15. 4. 1989

Summe 2516,06
FIG. 62.6 OVERVIEW ON NUCLEAR AND CONVEN-
Mülheim-Kärlich*) 107,25 TIONAL REQUIREMENTS IN EUROPE SOURCE [17]
Gesamtsumme 2623,31

FIG. 62.4 DECREE FOR A CONTROLLED TERMINATION

OF ELECTRICAL ENERGY PRODUCED IN NPP OVERVIEW
SOURCE [4]
of the Responsible Authority according to PED Articles 12, 13, or
14 are in a process that will lead to conformity to the PED and
adequate levels of confidence.
For the export oriented German Industry these international
Directives and Standards are fruitful for the level of benchmark in
the public safety.
The effort spent in Germany for the development of the new
Generation 3 of NPP, for example, the EPR or the SWR1000 with
the corresponding code and standard evolvement cannot be
applied for the German region, since there is no chance to build a
new NPP in the near future.
Nevertheless in the operating NPP, the application of the state-
of-the-art standards increase safety in production with improve-
ment in quality. The human factor in the qualification profiles is
taken into account.
The worldwide activities on declining the climate change
caused by CO2 gas expulsion cannot neglect the emission free
Nuclear Power production. Let us help to save our environment
with state-of-the-art technologies.
In the international market the renaissance of Nuclear Power is
notable. For this global demand, Europe has developed the
Generation 3 types that facilitate benefits from the following goals:
• The PED issued an order to suppress trade barriers
• Nuclear specific equipment excluded from the PED
• Gives the right to countries to issue additional safety
regulations
ASME_Ch62_p553-562.qxd 6/3/09 12:52 PM Page 560

560 • Chapter 62

FIG. 62.7 EXAMPLE OF GRADING OF SAFETY REQUIREMENTS IN NPP SOURCE [18]

FIG. 62.8 ORIENTATION OF PRESSURE VESSELS CATEGORIES IN THE SCOPE OF A NPP SOURCE [19]
ASME_Ch62_p553-562.qxd 6/3/09 12:52 PM Page 561
COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 561
• Consensus on applying the PED approach to nuclear
equipment
• Keep technical practices consistent with standards and
possibilities of potential suppliers
• Restrict specificities to those justified for safety reasons
• Choices made for French and Finnish EPR
• Class 1: specific practice for primary equipment: RCC-M
• Class 2: open attitude toward use of international nuclear
codes: RCC-M, ASME III, KTA
• Class 3: general reference to harmonized standards: EN
• Compatibility with ASME III ensured for U.S. application
• Evolution of equipment specifications are required
• Compatibility with in-service surveillance practices
ensured.
62.6 REFERENCES
1. The Pressure Equipment Directive (PED) (97/23/EC).
2. EU home page at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/pressure_equipment/
ped/index_en.html
3. EU home page, New Approach to Technical Harmonization and
Standards.
4. Gesetz zur geordneten Beendigung der Atomenergienutzung zur
Stromerzeugung, April 22, 2002.
5. Gerätesicherheitsgesetz (GSG) 1999 replaced 2004 by Geräte- und
Produktsicherheitsgesetz, GPSG (BGBl. I S. 2 ff.).
6. Druckgeräteverordnung - 14. GPSGV 2002 (BGBl. I S. 3777, 3806).
7 Betriebssicherheitsverordnung BetrSichV 2005 (BGBl. I S. 3758, 3813).
8. PED Annex I and Harmonized Standards Providing Presumption of
Conformity
9. AD 2000 Code (2004). AD 2000-Regelwerk - Aufbau, Anwendung,
Verfahrensrichtlinien www.druckgeraete-online.de
10. PED Annex I and AD 2000 Rules Providing Conformity
11. PED Article 5 Presumption of Conformity
12. PED Appendix Modules Duties of Involved Parties
13. KTA Standards Der Kerntechnische Ausschuss (KTA) http://www
.kta-gs.de/
14. Example of Grading of Safety Requirements in German NPP
Component Classes K1 to K5
German Nuclear Safety classification:
K1 Primary Circuit Systems
K2 Main Secondary Systems
K3 Nuclear Auxiliary Systems
Non-Nuclear Safety classified
K4 Conventional Systems (PED)
K5 Low pressure systems (non-PED)
15. RCC-M Règles de Conception et de Construction des Matériels
Mécaniques des Ilots Nucléaires REP http://www.afcen.com/
16. Overview on Nuclear and Conventional Safety Codes and Decrees
National references addressed
17. Overview on Nuclear and Conventional Requirements in Europe
18. Example of Grading of Safety Requirements in NPP
19. Orientation of Pressure Vessels Categories in the Scope of a NPP
62.7 FURTHER READINGS
• Grandemange, J. M., Kreckel, D., and Frank, H. J.,
Design and Construction Rules Applied to the EPR Project:
ETC-M, AFIAP, October 1995 Paris/France,
ICON, May 5, 1997 Nice/France.
• Kreckel, D.,
Review and Approval of Software and Hardware,
STUK, September 1991 Helsinki.
• Kreckel, D.,
– Preparation of Specifications and Structure and Contents of
Specifications,
– Codes and Standards for Procurement of Mechanical Components,
– Conversion of Specifications Requirements into Purchase Orders,
Egyption Atomic Energy Authority February 1987 Cairo.
• Kreckel, D. and Becker, D.,
Role of Nuclear Codes and Standards in Their Practical Application,
IAEA, October 1985 Karlsruhe.
• Kreckel, D.,
Einfluß der Druckgeräterichtlinie (97/23/EG) -14. GSGV- auf die
Komponenten eines KKW, atw 43Jg (1998) Heft 11 - November.
• Kreckel, D. and Reijnders, R
Application of Specifications Based on Nuclear Codes and Standards,
Approval Documents and Quality Documentation,
RWE, April 1999 Essen, EON, from 2003 in various NPP.
• Grandemange, J. M., Lambs, R., Kreckel, D., Faidy, C., and Paris, D.,
The Current Developments of Codes for Nuclear Pressure Equipment,
AFIAP ESOPE 2001, October 2001 Paris, France,
AFIAP ESOPE 2004, September 2004 Paris, France.
• Kreckel, D.,
EPR Use of EN,
EPERC 9th AGM November 22, 2004 London.
• Kreckel, D.,
ASME Prague Workshop, June 27–29, 2006.
ASME_Ch63_p563-576.qxd 6/3/09 1:13 PM Page 563
PRESSURE EQUIPMENT REGULATIONS,
CODES, AND STANDARDS IN SPAIN
63.1 INTRODUCTION
This Chapter presents the regulation of pressure equipment in
Spain, in the nonnuclear industry as well as the activities in the
codes and standards in the nuclear field. In both cases, emphasis
is placed on periodic inspections and testing.
The basic Spanish regulation on pressurized equipment in the
nonnuclear industry may be found in the Regulation on
Pressurized Apparatus, published by the Ministry of Industry and
Energy in 1979 [1]. The regulation consists of a set of general
standards and leaves the specifics to a set of Complementary
Technical Instructions.
Following Spain joining the European Community in 1986, a
process of modification of this regulation began, with a view to
bring it in line with those of the other Member States to facilitate
the trade of goods and services within the European Union. An
important milestone in the process of European harmonization
was the Pressure Equipment Directive (PED) 97/23/EC issued by
the European Parliament and Council.
The purpose of this Directive is to harmonize the national
laws of the European Union Member States regarding the
design, manufacture, testing, and conformity assessment of
pressure equipment and assemblies of pressure equipment.
Since May 29, 2002 the pressure equipment directive has been
obligatory throughout the European Union. The PED was
applied to the Spanish Legislation through Royal Decree R.D.
769/1999 [2]. This decree superseded the provisions of the
Regulation on Pressurized Apparatus relating to the design and
manufacturing.
In the nuclear field, and in the absence of a national regulation,
the codes and standards of the countries of origin of the design of
each reactor are applied. The Spanish nuclear fleet is currently
made up of 7 pressurized water reactor (PWR) and boiling water
reactor (BWR) of U.S. design and one German designed PWR
(see Section 63.3). As a result, Section III of the ASME Code has
been applied in the design and construction of the Spanish nuclear
power plants, except in the case of the German designed PWR,
for which the KTA rules were used. On the other hand, the rules
of Section XI of the ASME Code are applied to all the plants for
In-Service Inspection (ISI).
CHAPTER
63
Carlos Cueto-Felgueroso
63.2 SPANISH REGULATION IN THE
NONNUCLEAR INDUSTRY
63.2.1 Design and Construction
As stated above, the design, fabrication, and conformity assess-
ment of pressure equipment are currently regulated in Spain
according to PED.
The main provisions of the PED are summarized, and are
covered in detail in Chapter 47.
63.2.2 Inspections and Tests
The basic requirements regarding the inspection and testing
of pressurized equipment are to be found in the Regulation
on Pressurised Apparatus and its Complementary Technical
Instructions. The following are particularly significant:
(a) ITC-MIE-AP1 [3]: referring to boilers, economizers, water
preheaters, superheaters, and steam reheaters
(b) ITC-MIE-AP2 [4]: referring to piping for fluids relating to
boilers
(c) ITC-MIE-AP6 [5]: relating to oil refineries and petro-
chemical plants
(d) ITC-MIE-AP10 [6]: referring to cryogenic tanks
(e) ITC-MIE-AP16 [7]: relating to thermal power generation
plants using solid, liquid or gaseous fossil fuels of any
type and quality. Nuclear power plants are excluded.
The following sections summarize the inspection and testing
requirements for fossil fuel power generation plants, and oil
refineries and petrochemical plants respectively.
63.2.2.1 Fossil Fuel Power Plants.
The requirements of ITC-MIE-AP16 [7] relating to inspection
and testing are summarized below.
(a) Classification for inspection and testing. Pressure systems
and apparatus are classified through a combination of the
concepts of hazard potential and fluid characteristics, as
defined below.
The hazard potential is defined as the product of design
pressure Pd in kg/cm2 by volume V in m3. The classification
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564 • Chapter 63

of pressurized apparatus in accordance with this concept is TABLE 63.4 CATEGORIES OF PRESSURE EQUIPMENT
shown in Table 63.1. All boilers located in fossil power (EXCERPT FROM ITC-MIE-AP16) [7]
plants, both main and auxiliary, shall be classified in hazard
potential Group 1. Fluid Characteristics
Hazard Potential A B C
TABLE 63.1 HAZARD POTENTIAL GROUPS [7] 1 Category I Category I Category II
2 Category II Category II Category III
Group Hazard Potential (Pd . V) 3 Category III Category III Category IV
1 Pd ·Di  1000 4 Category IV Category IV Category V
2 300  Pd . Di  1000 5 Category V Category V Category V
3 25  Pd . Di  300
4 10  Pd . Di  25
5 Pd . Di  10 (2) On site. This consists of a dimensional control, if not
already performed in the workshop or if there has been
any anomaly in transport making it advisable. A hydro-
In the case of piping, hazard potential is defined as the static test should also be performed if not already car-
product of maximum service pressure Pms in kg/cm2 by the ried out in the workshop.
inner diameter of the pipe Di in centimeters. The applica- (c) Periodic inspection and testing. The inspections are aimed
ble groups are shown in Table 63.2. at gaining insight into damage caused in service with
respect to corrosion, cracking and the state of welds. They
consist basically of visual inspections, checks by the sam-
TABLE 63.2 HAZARD POTENTIAL GROUPS
pling of thicknesses and whatever nondestructive tests are
FOR PIPING [7]
considered necessary.
The pressure or alternative tests consist of a hydraulic
Group Hazard Potential (Pms . Di) test or any special alternative test that has been previously
authorized. In the specific case of piping, examinations
1 Pms . Di  3000 should be carried out by means of nondestructive testing.
2 2000  Pms . Di  3000 The frequency of and competence for the different period-
3 1000  Pms . Di  2000 ic inspections and tests for the different categories of appa-
ratus are indicated in Table 63.5.
4 500  Pms . Di  1000 (d) Testing conditions:
5 Pms . Di  500 (1) Pressure values for the initial test. Except in the case of
boilers, the pressure should be such that 90% of the
yield strength of the material is not exceeded at the test
temperature, and furthermore the provisions of the
The classification of pressurized apparatus in accor- Design Code shall be applicable. By default the
dance with fluid characteristics is shown in Table 63.3. hydraulic test pressure shall be as follows:
Pp  1.5 . Pd
TABLE 63.3 FLUID CHARACTERISTICS GROUPS where
(ITC-MIE-16) [7]
Pd is the design pressure.
Group Fluid Characteristics d is the allowable stress in design conditions.
p is the allowable stress in test conditions.
A Fuel Toxic, acid, or caustic liquid gases Hydrogen
In the case of boilers, the hydraulic test pressure shall
B Steam water Innocuous or inert gases Air be as follows:
C Water at temperature  85 C and pressure  10 kg/cm2 p
Pd  1.25 . Pd . —
 d

For straight-through forced circulation boilers with a

Table 63.4 summarizes the different categories of pres- variable point of vaporization and pressurized parts
surized apparatus. designed for different levels of pressure along the
(b) Inspection and testing prior to entry into service: water-steam flow path, the test pressure shall be the
(1) At the manufacturer’s workshop. These consist of visu- highest of the following values:
al inspection and dimensional control of the apparatus,
including the connections required for safety and con- Pp  1.5 . Pms-s
trol elements, along with hydrostatic testing. The latter or
may be carried out on site when this is technically jus-
tified and is contemplated in the design manual. Pp  1.25 . Pms-e
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 565
TABLE 63.5 FREQUENCY OF PERIODIC INSPECTIONS AND TESTS
(EXCERPT FROM ITC-MIE-AP16) [7]
Periodic Inspections and Tests
Category of the Equipment Inspection
I 6 years (by External
Inspector)
II 8 years (by External
Inspector)
III 10 years (by External
Inspector)
IV 12 years (by Own
Inspector)
V Not required
Where Pms-s is the maximum service pressure permit-
ted at the outlet of the superheater and Pms-e is the
maximum service pressure permitted at the economiz-
er feedwater inlet.
(2) Subsequent test pressure values. Following major
repairs, as defined in paragraph (e) below, or the required
periodic tests, the provisions of the Design Code will be
fulfilled. If not specified, the test pressure for pressure
apparatus or systems, other than boilers, shall be:
p
Pd  1.1 . Pd . —
 formed is greater than 2% of those in the system for
d
For boilers, the test pressure value shall be:
Pp  1.25 . Pd
For straight-through forced circulation boilers with a
variable point of vaporization and pressurized parts
designed for different levels of pressure along the water-
steam flow path, the test pressure shall be as follows:
Pp  1.1 . Pms-e
Following any repairs not having a scope defined as
constituting a major repair, the only requirement will be a
leak test of a value equal to the maximum service pres-
sure, Pms.
(e) Major repairs. These are defined as those affecting to
apparatus belonging to Categories I, II, III, and IV in
accordance with the extent established below:
(1) In boilers, when a surface area of the shroud of more
than 2% has been replaced. Also, when drums or head-
ers are affected by the repair whatever the number of
welds affected or a heat treatment has been required
during the repair.
The cutting of tubes or removal of header plugs to
inspect the conditions of the interior of the boiler are
not considered to constitute major repairs. One hun-
dred percent of the welds performed for these reasons
shall be inspected by nondestructive testing techniques.
Repairs affecting the reheater are not considered to
constitute a major repair for the purposes of hydraulic
testing, although in their place the radiographic inspec-
tion of 100% of the welds is required.
Pressure Test
9 years (by External
Inspector)
12 years (by External
Inspector)
15 years (by External
Inspector)
18 years (by Own
Inspector)
18 years (by Own Inspector)
(2) In the case of heat exchangers, except condensers,
when the length of the affected weld whatever the
chamber in question exceeds 10% of the total. Also,
when heat treatments have been performed or more
than 10% of the tubes have been replaced, this shall
also be considered as constituting a major repair.
Repairs affecting the condenser are not considered
to constitute a major repair for the purposes of
hydraulic testing.
(3) In piping systems, when the number of welds per-
Categories I and II, and greater than 10% for
Categories III and IV.
63.2.2.2 Oil Refineries and Petrochemical Plants
The requirements of ITC-MIE-AP6 [5] relating to inspection
and testing are summarized below.
(a) Classification for the purposes of inspection and testing.
Pressurized systems and apparatus are classified through a
combination of the concepts of hazard potential and fluid
characteristics, as defined below.
Hazard potential is defined as the product of the design
pressure Pd in kg/cm2 by volume V in m3, as indicated in
Table 63.1.
As regards fluid characteristics, the classification of
pressure apparatus is shown in Table 63.6.
Table 63.7 summarizes the different categories of pres-
surized apparatus.
(b) Inspections and testing prior to entry into service. The
requirements are similar to those indicated in Section
63.2.2.1 paragraph (b).
(c) Periodic inspections and testing. With the exception of
piping, the scope of the periodic inspections and tests is as
follows:
(1) Exterior inspection. This will consists at least of a visu-
al inspection of the areas subjected to the highest
stresses and corrosion, of the checking of thicknesses
by means of ultrasonic techniques and of any nonde-
structive test considered necessary, as long as the con-
ditions of the process allow. In order to perform this
inspection it will not be necessary to remove the appa-
ratus or system to be inspected from service.
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566 • Chapter 63

TABLE 63.6 FLUID CHARACTERISTICS GROUPS
(ITC-MIE-6) [5]
Group Fluid Characteristics
A Flammable fluids in vapor, gas, or liquid phase and
their mixtures at temperature equal to or
higher than 200 C; gases and liquids
of elevated toxicity; hydrogen at any temperature.
B Flammable fluids in vapor, gas ,or liquid phase
and their mixtures at temperature lower
than 200 C; and toxic liquids, acidic
or caustic at any temperature.
C Water steam (gas phase), inert or innocuous
gases and air.
D Water at temperature  85 C
(2) Interior inspection. This will consist at least of a com-
plete visual inspection of all parts subjected to pres-
sure, along with whatever nondestructive tests are con-
sidered necessary. Whenever an interior inspection
cannot be performed for reasons of physical impossi-
bility, it shall be replaced with a pressure test.
(3) Pressure test. This will consist of a hydrostatic test or
any special alternative test previously authorized, and
will be combined to the extent possible with interior
inspection.
The frequency of and the competence for the different peri-
odic inspections and tests for the different categories of
apparatus are indicated in Table 63.8.
In the case of piping, nondestructive testing inspections
shall be carried out every 10 years by an own inspector.
(d) Testing conditions. For the first pressure test the following
minimum requirements shall in all cases be met, in addi-
tion to those established in the design manual and referring
to these values:
(1) Pressurized apparatus or systems. The hydrostatic test
pressure shall be as follows:
p
Pp  1.25 . Pd . —
d
During pressure testing, and other than in exceptional
cases duly justified in the design manual, the value of
90% of the yield strength of the material at the test
temperature shall not be exceeded for the primary
membrane stresses.
For subsequent pressure tests, the test pressure value
shall be at least that indicated for the initial test.
(2) Apparatus or systems subjected to vacuum. The test pres-
sure value shall be that defined in the design manual.
(e) Inspection and testing following repairs. After a major
repair (as defined below), a visual inspection of the repaired
area and a pressure test shall be carried out. The test pres-
sure will be equal to that of the first pressure test.
Major repairs are defined as those affecting repaired
apparatus belonging to Categories I, II, III, and IV with the
scope indicated below:
(1) Columns, tanks, and reactors:
– When the length of the affected weld calculated
in percentage of the total length of the equipment
is equal to or greater than the values indicated in
Table 63.9.

TABLE 63.7 CATEGORIES OF PRESSURE EQUIPMENT (EXCERPT FROM ITC-MIE-AP6) [5]

Fluid Characteristics
Hazard Potential A B C D
1 Category I Category I Category I Category II
2 Category I Category II Category II Category III
3 Category II Category III Category III Category IV
4 Category III Category IV Category IV Category V
5 Category IV Category V Category V Category V

TABLE 63.8 FREQUENCY OF PERIODIC INSPECTIONS AND TESTS (EXCERPT FROM ITC-MIE-AP6) [5]

Periodic Inspections and Tests

Category of the Equipment External Inspection Internal Inspection Pressure Test
I 3 years (by Own 6 years (by External 12 years (by External
Inspector) Inspector) Inspector)
II 4 years (by Own 8 years (by External 16 years (by External
Inspector) Inspector) Inspector)
III 5 years (by Own 10 years (by External Not required
Inspector) Inspector)
IV 6 years (by Own 12 years (by Own Not required
Inspector) Inspector)
V 7 years (by Own Not required Not required
Inspector)
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TABLE 63.9 MAJOR REPAIRS IN COLUMNS, TANKS, – The welding procedure includes heat treatment
AND REACTORS WELDS [5] or the thickness of both pipes to be joined exceeds
12 millimeters.
Type of Weld
Category Longitudinal Circumferential
63.3 CODES AND STANDARDS IN THE
I Any Any
NUCLEAR INDUSTRY
II Any Any
III 15% 30% In the nuclear field, and in the absence of a national regulation,
IV 20% 40% the codes and standards of the countries of origin of the design of
each reactor are applied. The Spanish nuclear fleet is currently
made up of 7 PWR and BWR of U.S. design and one German
– In apparatus or systems subjected to vacuum, except designed PWR. The main characteristics of these plants are sum-
for those containing incombustible fluids or fluids marized in Table 63.11, which also includes the José Cabrera
not forming explosive mixtures. Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) (also known as Zorita after the village
(2) Heat exchangers. The conditions indicated in para- near which it is located), which was disconnected from the grid in
graph (1) above apply for the shell side and distributor. April 2006 after 38 years of operation and is currently in the dis-
(3) Air-coolers. Any replacement of tubes or weld repairs mantling process. Section III of the ASME Code was applied to
to headers. the design and construction of this plant for the first time in Spain,
(4) Furnaces. When the length of tubes replaced exceeds and subsequently Section XI was applied for in-service inspec-
of 10% of the full length of the complete drum circuit. tion, following its publication in 1971.
(5) Boilers and steam producing equipment. When the Before the start of the NPP construction programme in Spain,
length of tubes replaced exceeds of 10% of the full nuclear power was considered in the 1961 Rules on Uncomfortable,
length of the tube circuit. Unhealthy, and Dangerous Activities (now overruled by Law
(6) Piping. In this case, major repairs are defined as all those 34/2007 on Air Quality and Atmosphere Protection) [8] as an
fulfilling the following conditions simultaneously: industrial activity that required the enforcement of the specific mea-
– The number of pipe joining welds performed exceeds sures laid down by the competent Technical Bodies, and that urged
those indicated in Table 63.10. the Ministerial Departments with competence in the above areas to
issue the required provisions.
TABLE 63.10 MAJOR REPAIRS IN PIPING Fundamentally, the legal bases were established in 1964 Law
WELDS [5] on Nuclear Energy [9] adopting the Nuclear Act and Decree dated
July 21, 1972 on the Order of Nuclear and Radioactive
Category Number of Welds Installations [10]. The scope of the 1964 law cover the application
of nuclear power for peaceful purposes and its safety objectives
I Any
are the protection of life, health, and property. This law sets out
II 4 the framework for the definition of international agreements, des-
III 8 ignates the Ministry of Industry as the body responsible for the
IV 16 nuclear permits and designates the Junta de Energía Nuclear

TABLE 63.11 NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN SPAIN

Commercial Current
Plant Type NSSS Supplier Capacity (MWe) Operation Operation Permit
Almaraz I PWR Westinghouse 977 05/1981 06/2000

Almaraz II PWR Westinghouse 980 10/1983 06/2000

Ascó I PWR Westinghouse 1033 12/1984 10/2001

Ascó II PWR Westinghouse 1027 03/1986 10/2001

Cofrentes BWR/6 General Electric 1092 03/1985 03/2001

José Cabrera PWR Westinghouse 150 07/1968 Decommissioned

(Zorita)

Santa María de BWR/3 General Electric 466 05/1971 07/1999

Garoña

Trillo PWR Siemens/KWU 1066 08/1988 11/2004

Vandellós II PWR Westinghouse 1087 03/1988 07/2000
[Source: Spanish Nuclear Industry Forum (www.foronuclear.org)]
ASME_Ch63_p563-576.qxd 6/3/09 1:13 PM Page 568
568 • Chapter 63
(JEN) as the body responsible for the assessment of matters deal-
ing with safety, inspections, and surveillance of nuclear and
radioactive installations. In 1980 the Law [11] creating the
Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear (CSN) was passed and this body
was assigned the tasks previously carried out by the JEN, the
development of regulations in this field, the definition of nuclear
safety-related research plans and international coordination. The
CSN is independent of government administration and is directly
responsible to Parliament.
Apart from these basic laws there is additional applicable leg-
islation such as the Regulations on Protection from Ionising
Radiations, Seismic Resistance, and Protection of the Environment
among others.
The legislation is completed by specific requirements in the
licensing process, which is similar to the one used in the United
States and consists of three main stages [12]:
(1) Prior authorization of the site and of the objectives of the
installation.
(2) Authorization for construction including the Preliminary
Safety Study.
(3) Authorization for startup of commercial operation.
Before the authorization of the construction, the CSN evaluates
the Safety Study and forwards its evaluation to the Ministry of
Industry and Energy along with a conditional permit that defines
the safety limits and conditions to be incorporated in the project
or justifying studies to be provided by the applicant.
The conditional permit issued by the CSN establishes the
Licensing Bases and rarely establishes requirements in addition to
those stipulated in the nuclear safety Laws and Regulations or in
the codes and standards applicable in the country of origin. Some
differences do, however, exist in the applicability of Code Cases
in respect to the validity dates or specific regulatory requirements
that aim to harmonize the requirements of different countries of
origin of the nuclear reactor for the power plants of different
designs existing in Spain. For instance, the authorities required
the German designed PWR plant to comply with the ISI require-
ments of the ASME Code Section XI. This represents a differen-
tial treatment with respect to the In-Service Inspection Manual
applicable to similar German NPPs.
Certain differences may be underlined, for example, the in-ser-
vice hydrostatic testing of the primary circuit at a German
designed PWR plant, where the regulator established in the
licensing basis that this should be performed in accordance with
the KTA rules with respect to test pressure (1.3 times the design
pressure) and temperature (not less than RTNDT  33 C, nor
higher than RTNDT  55 C), but with a frequency of 10 years, as
in the case of ASME Code Section XI, instead of the eight years
established in the KTA rules.
Furthermore, the CSN monitors the safety of the plants during
their operating life by means of Periodic Safety Reviews (PSR)
carried out every 10 years. Basically, the scope of the PSR covers
[13]:
(1) Applicability of new regulations.
(2) Operating experience.
(3) Safety of design modifications.
The following sections summarize the national projects on ISI.
63.3.1 Qualification of NDT for ISI
63.3.1.1 Background As a consequence of the international
Programme for the Inspection of Steel Components (PISC) funded
by the OECD-NEA and completed in 1992, the European organiza-
tions related to ISI and the nuclear utilities constituted the European
Network for Inspection Qualification (ENIQ) to develop an harmo-
nized qualification methodology as a recommendation to be imple-
mented at national level in the different European countries. The
methodology was published in 1995 and revised later in 1997 [14].
Several technical documents, named Recommended Practices that
support this methodology have also been elaborated.
On the contrary, the European Nuclear Regulators constituted
in 1995 the “Nuclear Regulators Working Group” (NRWG-
TF-NDTQ) to analyze their position in relation to nondestructive
examination (NDE) qualification and to evaluate the proposed
methodology elaborated by ENIQ. In 1996 they issued the docu-
ment “Common Position of European Regulators on Qualification
of NDT systems for Pre- and In-Service Inspection of Light Water
Reactors Components,” revised later in 1997 [15]. In general
terms, their position is coincident with the ENIQ methodology.
Both the Spanish Utilities and the CSN, the Spanish Nuclear
Regulator, agreed that in Spain, the European NDE qualification
methodology should be implemented, but in the framework of ISI
scope of ASME Section XI.
As a consequence, UNESA, the Spanish Nuclear Association
of Utilities, in 1996 started a project to develop the Spanish NDE
methodology based on ENIQ qualification principles within the
ISI scope of ASME Section XI. This methodology was completed
in 1999 and it was presented to the CSN for evaluation to regulate
in the near future the NDE qualification approach proposed.
The regulator and the utilities agreed to perform a pilot project
to verify the qualification process and the technical requirements
defined in the methodology [16]. The pilot project, named
VENDE, started in 2000 and it was completed by the middle of
2002. It was jointly funded by the nuclear utilities throughout
UNESA and the CSN.
The inspection components in the pilot project were the output
nozzles of a PWR pressure vessel and the feedwater nozzles of a
BWR pressure vessel. The inspection areas were in both cases the
nozzle to shell weld, the inner radius, and the adjacent nozzle
body. For both components ultrasonic mechanized inspection
were used, but the PWR nozzle was inspected from the inside sur-
face and the BWR nozzle from the outside surface.
(a) Organisation of the pilot project. All parties involved in the
qualification process were created, by constituting working
groups. The NPP group, responsible of the ISI, had two
coordinators from the two pilot plants and representatives
of all other plants. The Independent Qualification Body
(IQB) group, responsible of the evaluation and certification
of the qualification, had also two coordinators from the two
pilot plants and representatives of all other plants.
Observers from the CSN participated in each working
group. A Quality group was also created with the same
structure as the other two groups. On the contrary,
Tecnatom acted as the ISI vendor to be qualified in this
exercise.
(b) Qualification input data. According to the methodology,
the qualification input data was defined for each inspection
area including:
(1) Inspection area description
(2) Definition of type of qualification defects: postulated
and specific, which were the cases applicable to these
areas
(3) Definition of qualification defects sizes
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(4) Defect detection rate in practical demonstrations (accord-
ingly probability of detection and confidence level)
(5) False call detection rate in practical demonstrations
(accordingly probability of false call and confidence
level)
(6) Definition of measurements uncertainties
Tecnatom prepared detailed eight inspection procedures for
detection and defect sizing according to the input data defini-
tion and the requirement of the methodology
(c) Qualification documentation. The following documents
were elaborated within the project:
(1) Qualification ISI Objectives report for each area.
(2) Essential Variables report for each area, to define the
essential variables of component, defects, equipment,
procedures, techniques, and so on.
(3) Technical Justifications for each area for the postulated
defect cases, including analysis of worst-case defects
in each area by simulation modeling.
(4) Specification for defect manufacturing in PWR
and BWR test specimen for open and blind qualifi-
cations. A total of 38 fatigue crack defects were
manufactured.
(d) Qualification performance demonstrations. Open demon-
strations for inside surface inspection procedures qualifi-
cation were performed for PWR nozzle to shell weld,
inner radius, and adjacent nozzle body. The inner radius
area had a specific defect case and the other two had com-
ponent design postulated defect cases. In the first case the
practical demonstration was a requisite, but after analysis
of technical justification the NPP group and the IQB
group concluded that additional performance demonstra-
tion had also to be performed in the postulated defect
cases.
Open demonstrations for outside inspection procedures
qualification were performed for BWR nozzle to shell
weld, inner radius, and adjacent nozzle body. All areas had
component design postulated defect cases, but after analy-
sis of technical justification the NPP group and the IQB
group concluded that additional performance demonstra-
tion had also to be performed in the postulated defect
cases.
Blind practical demonstrations were performed for data
qualification of analysts in the case of specific defect.
(e) Final qualification reports. A Final Qualification report
was prepared for all the inspection areas with the conclu-
sions on the qualification exercises and also the lessons
learned on the application of the methodology and the
technical guidelines during the performance of the pilot
project.
(f) Revision of the Spanish ISI qualification methodology.
After completion of the pilot project, a revision of the
methodology took place, with the aim of including the
practical experiences of the qualification exercise. The
main document and the seven technical guidelines were
revised and this activity was completed by the middle of
2003. The revision was made by the UNESA qualification-
working group that held periodic meetings with the Nuclear
Regulator for consensus in the modifications. The revised
methodology was sent to the CSN for final approval and
ruling, which was completed in March 2004. As general
criteria for the evaluation of the methodology, the CSN
used also the document “Report on Regulator’s Experience
on NDT Qualification for In-Service Inspection of LWR
Components” [17].
Immediately after that, UNESA started a joint effort to
perform the required NDE qualification of the inspection
systems in a Qualification Programme that will last until
the end of 2008.
63.3.1.2 Description of the Spanish NDE Qualification
Methodology The methodology [18] is described in a main docu-
ment where the objectives, scope, principles of qualification, func-
tions, and responsibilities of the parties are defined. Additionally,
seven technical documents develop all technical aspects of a qual-
ification process:
(a) Guideline for the definition of ISI qualification objectives
(b) Guideline for the definition and analysis of essential
variables
(c) Guideline for the definition of objectives and content
description of technical justifications
(d) Guideline for the specification of test specimens for practi-
cal demonstrations
(e) Guideline for the definition of rules for the performance of
practical demonstrations
(f) Guideline for the definition of the final qualification report
contents
(g) Guideline for the definition of management and quality
system for the qualification process
These guidelines constitute an alternative to the qualification
requirements for ultrasonic examinations in ASME Section XI
Appendices VII and VIII. The main features of the guideline
are described below:
(a) Scope. The basic scope is Section XI of ASME Code, but
also other areas requiring NDE examinations by the regu-
lator, on basis to operating experience, etc.
The methodology is applicable to the ultrasonic inspec-
tions as well as to other NDE methods with capabilities for
defect detection and through wall depth sizing, such as
eddy current techniques applied to the inspection of steam
generator tubes.
(b) Definition of qualification defects. Consistent with the
ENIQ methodology, for each inspection area a qualifica-
tion defect shall be defined. The qualification requirements
are based on the type of the qualification defect.
(1) Specific defect case. It is applicable when a defect has
been observed in a given area/component in the plant.
The defect to be detected, characterized and sized is
known in location and morphology and a “fit-for-pur-
pose” inspection procedure can be elaborated.
(2) Postulated defect case. Applicable when there is a pos-
tulated defect due to component design requirements.
Degradation experiences in other similar NPP can be
considered as postulated defects, if the situation is
extendable to the component or area. The exact charac-
teristics of the postulated defect are not known and they
must also be postulated.
For piping segments classified as High Safety
Significance in the framework of a Risk-Informed
Inspection (RI-ISI) program according to the Spanish
RI-ISI methodology (see Section 63.3.2), the applica-
ble qualification requirement are those corresponding
to the postulated defect case.
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570 • Chapter 63
(3) Undefined defect case. Applicable when none of the
above cases exist in the component or inspection area.
(c) Qualification principles. As per ENIQ methodology,
inspection qualification can be achieved by combination
of the following elements:
– Practical Demonstration (nonblind and blind).
– Technical Justification.
(d) Requisites for qualification of inspection equipment and
procedures. These are a function of the qualification defect
case:
(1) Specific defect case. An open practical demonstration
is required on test specimen containing the specific
defects. Also, a technical justification must be prepared
to generalize and complete the results of the practical
demonstrations.
(2) Component or area with postulated defect case. A tech-
nical justification must be prepared to analyze in depth
the inspection techniques, the procedure and the equip-
ment performance and all the essential variables must
be evaluated by physical reasoning, theoretical and
practical experiences, validated mathematical and sim-
ulation modeling, and so on.
In case the technical justification presents all the
needed evidences, a practical demonstration will not be
carried out. On the contrary, for the essential variables
that cannot be properly justified, a practical demon-
stration will be performed on test specimens that repro-
duce the essential variables under analysis.
(3) Component or area with undefined defect case. A sim-
plified technical justification must be prepared to
demonstrate that the inspection is performed according
to written instructions, standards, or codes. The techni-
cal justification will include a demonstration of the
sensitivity of the inspection techniques according to
the applicable codes and standards.
(e) Requisites for qualification of inspection personnel. All
inspection personnel must be in possession of their valid
Nondestructive Testing (NDT) Certification according to the
inspection procedure requirements, and as a minimum req-
uisite, must be certified as Level II or III through Spanish
Standard UNE EN 473 [19] or equivalent. Additionally, the
inspection personnel must accomplish with the following
qualification requisites defined as a function of the qualifica-
tion defect case.
(1) Specific defect case. All inspection personnel perform-
ing equipment calibration and data acquisition must
perform the open practical demonstration for equip-
ment and procedures qualification.
All data analysts must perform a blind practical
demonstration on test specimen containing the specific
defects. Previously acquired data can be used for data
analyst qualification. In all cases, selection of data to
be analyzed shall be selected by the Independent
Qualification Organisation.
(2) Component or area with postulated defect case. All
inspection personnel performing equipment calibration
and data acquisition must perform the open practical
demonstration for equipment and procedures qualifica-
tion, when it was necessary to be performed.
All data analysts must perform a blind practical
demonstration on test specimen containing the essen-
tial variables, when it was necessary to be performed.
(3) Component or area with undefined defect case. No
additional requisites are needed in this defect case.
(f) Parties involved in the qualification process:
(1) Nuclear Power Plant. It has the responsibility of
preparing the specification of input data and NDT qual-
ification objectives. It has also the responsibility of
revising and the approval of all documents required for
qualification (inspection procedures, technical justifi-
cations, test specimen specification, practical demon-
stration results, etc.).
(2) Independent Qualification Body. An IQB, as per
Standard UNE EN 45004 type B Body [20], will be set
within the organizational structure of the nuclear power
plant. A quality system will guarantee its full indepen-
dence. It has the responsibility of evaluating all qualifica-
tion documents and that all qualification activities are
performed according to the Spanish NDT Qualification
Methodology, and of the certification of the qualification.
(3) ISI Vendor. It has the responsibility of preparing the
inspection procedures, technical justifications, and of
performing all required practical demonstrations.
(4) Nuclear Regulator (CSN). In relation to qualification,
the CSN approve the methodology and will rule its
application in Spain. Then, the Nuclear Regulator
function will include NDT qualification follow-up as
part of their general evaluation of safety requirement of
the nuclear power plant installations.
63.3.1.3 Implementation of the Methodology The Spanish
nuclear power plants decided to work together in a joint project to
perform the initial NDT qualifications. The objective is to optimize
the resources to be dedicated to qualification from the viewpoint of
technical experts, test specimens, ISI vendors, and so on, given the
important synergy existing among the components in operating
nuclear power plants in Spain.
A working group was set up in 2002 with the participation of
all the ISI managers in the plants, which was named GRUVAL, a
Spanish acronym for ’Group on Validation’. The function of this
group is to co-ordinate and to supervise the qualification activities
defined in the methodology. In parallel, another working group
named GROIV was set up in 2003 with the participation of the
IQB managers of each plant to co-ordinate and evaluate the quali-
fication activities. GROIV is the Spanish acronym for ’Group of
Independent Validation Bodies’. The organisation organization
flow chart of the joint qualification project is shown in Fig. 63.1
Several activities were performed by GRUVAL and GROIV
since 2003. In relation to the definition of the organization and
responsibilities of GRUVAL and GROIV, a Management Manual
was elaborated. There, the final responsibilities of qualification of
each plant and its individual IQB, GRUVAL, and GROIV are stat-
ed; the mission is to coordinate, manage, and evaluate the joint
qualification exercises. Each nuclear plant and its IQB must later
approve all documents and activities produced by GRUVAL and
GROIV to officially assume the qualifications in each plant.
In relation to the technical activities, GRUVAL decided to cre-
ate Qualification Groups for all the inspection areas of the nuclear
plants that required qualification of the ISI performed based on
the synergy existing among them. Four technical documents were
elaborated for this purpose:
(1) Definition of the grouping criteria
(2) Definition of all Qualification Groups
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 571
NPP1
ISI1 IQB1 ISI2
GRUVAL
(NPP ISI Working Group)
Methodology Engineering
support Companies
FIG. 63.1 ORGANIZATION FLOW CHART OF THE JOINT QUALIFICATION PROJECT
[16]. (NOTE: DOTTED LINE MEANS ADMINISTRATIVE LINK ONLY).
(3) Identification of inspection areas of all NPP in each
Qualification Groups
(4) Calendar for all qualification activities
For the definition of grouping criteria several types of informa-
tion were needed: component geometries and dimensions, base
material and weld materials, basic NDE methods, qualification
defect cases, access to the areas, inspection requirements, and so
on. A total of 53 Qualification Groups were defined encompass-
ing ferritic, austenitic and dissimilar metal welds in piping, reac-
tor pressure vessel areas, including control rod drive mechanism
(CRDM) penetrations in PWR vessel heads and control rod drive
housing (CRDH) penetrations in BWR bottom heads, steam gen-
erator tubes, and so on. More than 10,000 inspection areas were
assigned to the Qualification Groups.
For those welds in the ferritic, austenitic and dissimilar metal
Qualification Groups inspected using manual ultrasonic proce-
dures, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Performance
Demonstration Initiative (PDI) qualified generic procedures have
been selected for application to Spanish plants. Practical demon-
strations have been carried out at the EPRI facilities in Charlotte,
NC using the existing PDI mock-ups. Further, the EPRI PDI per-
sonnel also developed the technical justifications to analyze those
essential variables of the inspection procedures that could not be
properly reproduced during the practical demonstrations.
63.3.2 RI-ISI Applications for Piping
63.3.2.1 Background Taking into account the U.S. develop-
ments regarding Risk-Informed ISI, the Spanish utilities and the
Nuclear Regulator (CSN) have shown an increasing interest in any
possible optimization of the ISI programs. Within this framework,
a pilot study on risk-informed ISI was arranged in a cooperative
R&D project between the CSN and UNESA (Spanish Utilities
Group).
The objectives of the project were as follows:
(a) To define the main characteristics of a suitable methodolo-
gy to define a risk-informed ISI program for piping, using
as reference, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(USNRC) regulation.
(b) To apply the developed methodology to a Spanish NPP,
defining the scope of systems to be included in the program
NPP2 NPPn
IQB2 ISIn IQBn
GROIV
(Working Group)
Technical
support
and analyzing the different cases that might occur, to define
the necessary steps to be followed and to identify and solve
the potential problems that might arise during the definition
of a full scope RI-ISI program for piping.
(c) To define the minimal requirements for the documentation
to be submitted and the basic steps of the CSN staff evalu-
ation process, to allow for an agile implementation process
for future applications.
The project consisted of three main activities:
(a) Revision and analysis of all the applicable and available
documentation, to define the framework for the project for
the Spanish approach. This activity was completed in
December 1998.
(b) Definition of a generic guideline applicable to Spanish
NPPs, for the establishment of an RI-ISI program for pip-
ing. This guideline was issued in its first consensus draft in
May 1999 and later revised to include the lessons learned
from the pilot studies.
(c) Application of the guideline defined to one or two pilot
plants. The objective of this activity was to check the tech-
nical consistency of the guideline. The pilot plants were
Ascó I (PWR) and Santa María de Garoña (BWR). In both
cases, only the quantitative approach was used. The scope
of the Ascó I study was all the Class 1 piping and selected
portions of Class 2, 3, and Nonclass piping systems. In the
case of Santa María de Garoña, the scope covered selected
portions of Class 1, 2, and Nonclass piping systems.
The Ascó I Class 1 piping application [21] was later
submitted to and approved by the CSN with slight modifi-
cations in September 2001, becoming the first RI-ISI
application licensed in Europe.
63.3.2.2 Description of Spanish RI-ISI Guideline for Piping
The Guideline RI-ISI-02, rev. 0 [22] was issued in May 2000.
The guideline develops general criteria for a risk-informed appli-
cation in nuclear class piping and particular criteria related to the
quantitative and the qualitative methods. The guideline, is mainly
based on USNRC Reg. Guides 1.174 and 1.178, NUREG-0800
Chapters 19 and 3.9.8; this guideline also considers methods from
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572 • Chapter 63

WCAP-14572, rev. 1-NP-A (for quantitative approach) and EPRI- TABLE 63.12 CLASS 1 PIPING SEGMENTS
TR-112657, rev. B (for qualitative approach) as well as ASME CLASSIFICATION FOR PWR PLANTS [24]
Section XI Code Cases N-560, N-577, and N-578; it is also based
on the conclusions and recommendations of the report EUR Number of Segments
19153 EN [23]. Plant Region In Region Total
The guideline has the following structure:
Ascó I 1 HSS/HFI 28
(a) A methodological part defining the general approach to be 2 HSS/LFI 23
applied, taking into account both quantitative and qualita- 102
3 LSS/HFI 9
tive approaches. 4 LSS/LFI 42
(b) A documentation requirement part defining the documen- Almaraz II 1 HSS/HFI 20
tation that should be maintained at the plant and the docu- 2 HSS/LFI 4
mentation to be submitted to the Nuclear Regulator as the 86
3 LSS/HFI 28
“Final Report.” 4 LSS/LFI 36
(c) An evaluation part that includes the process that is to be
Almaraz I 1 HSS/HFI 23
adhered to by the CSN Staff to review and approve an RI-
2 HSS/LFI 5
ISI program. All the activities that should be reviewed, and 86
3 LSS/HFI 30
the acceptance criteria for each, are included in this part of
4 LSS/LFI 28
the document.
(d) Attachments: One with the details of the quantitative Ascó II 1 HSS/HFI 19
methodology, another with details of the qualitative method- 2 HSS/LFI 28
102
ology, and a third with the type of report that has to be sub- 3 LSS/HFI 22
mitted. Each of these attachments develops the details of the 4 LSS/LFI 33
general body of the guideline.
HSS: High Safety Significant
The approach for the Spanish guideline is not to limit the scope LSS: Low Safety Significant
of the program only to Section XI but to attempt to include all the HFI: High Failure Importance
ISI programs (e.g., IGSCC, FAC) in place at the NPP, on a volun- LFI: Low Failure Importance
tary basis.
Another characteristic of the Spanish guideline is that it
includes the technical approach and the evaluation process in the
same document, due to its having been developed through cooper-
ative action. (b) NDT testing of a sample of piping segments greater than
NPS 3 located in Region 4.
63.3.2.3 RI-ISI Applications at Spanish NPPs Concerning the (c) Improvements in the level of confidence required in the sta-
Spanish PWR plants, following Ascó I application, Almaraz II, tistical analysis for determining the number of inspections
Almaraz I, and Ascó II NPPs submitted and get licensed their RI- required in a given segment, raising it from 95 to 99%.
ISI programs for Class 1 piping [24]. (d) Use of qualified NDT procedures capable of detecting and
The degradation mechanisms applicable to the piping included sizing cracking due to thermal stratification, thermal strip-
in the scope are as follows [25]: ping, or SCC in segments prone to these mechanisms.
(e) Inclusion of all, or at least a representative sample of
(a) Thermal stratification in zones of possible mixing of water
welds showing a possibility of SCC degradation mecha-
at different temperatures
nisms, such as nozzle-to-pipe Alloy 82/182 welds in RCS
(b) Thermal fatigue due to normal heatup and cooldown
components (RPV, steam generators, and pressurizer).
(c) Vibrations in small piping close to the source of vibration
(d) Water hammer in the pressurizer auxiliary spray line when The final classification of segments for each plant is shown in
not prevented by the operating procedure in place Table 63.12. In addition, Table 63.13 shows the comparison
(e) Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) in areas containing sus- between the number of inspections required by the ASME Section
ceptible material XI programs and the corresponding RI-ISI programs.
Despite the significant reduction achieved in the number of
The results of failure probability due to these degradation
inspections, all RI-ISI programs resulted in slight reductions of
mechanisms have been as expected. Logical differences have been
risk in comparison with the previous ISI programs, both in terms
encountered between twin units, among other reasons, due to the
of the Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and of the Large Early
age of the plant, the results obtained from stress analysis (differ-
Release Frequency (LERF).
ences in piping supports, etc.) and the results of the inspections
On the contrary, the RI-ISI application of Cofrentes BWR plant
performed to date.
[26] shows differences in the scope with respect to the above PWR
In addition to the results obtained from the application of the
applications, since the latter cover only Class 1 piping whereas the
quantitative methodology, in accordance with the requirements of
scope of the former encompasses both Class 1 and 2 piping. Also,
the Spanish guideline, various locations have been selected for
the Cofrentes NPP application does not cover dissimilar metal
inspection to fulfill the defense in depth criterion. Other criteria
welds between the RPV nozzles and safe-ends and between the
that have been applied are as follows:
safe-end and extensions (ASME Section XI Category B-F welds).
(a) Relocation in Region 3 (LSS/HFI segments) of segments The total number of segments in the scope amounts to 728,
initially located in Region 4 (LSS/LFI), due to snubber from which only 182 belong to Class 1 piping. The total number
failure potential or water-hammer potential. of welds in the scope amounts to 6458.
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TABLE 63.13 INSPECTION AREAS RESULTING FROM ASME SECTION XI

AND RI-ISI PROGRAMS FOR CLASS 1 PIPING IN PWR PLANTS [24]

Areas in ASME Section XI Program

Plant B-F welds B-J welds Total Areas in RI-ISI Program Reduction (%)
Ascó I 42 178 220 103 53
Almaraz II 42 241 283 59 79
Almaraz I 42 233 275 76 72
Ascó II 42 178 220 82 62

Beside the fatigue, the Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking
(IGSCC) degradation mechanism was postulated for austenitic
stainless steel piping in contact with the reactor coolant.
Consideration was given in the evaluation of failure probabilities
to the mitigation measures implemented in these welds. Also, the
Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) mechanism was postulated for
the carbon steel piping in the steam and feedwater lines. The FAC
mechanism was accounted for in the evaluation of the failure
probabilities, although the plant’s FAC program will continue to
be governed basically by determinist criteria. This process identi-
fied High Safety Significant (HSS) segments due to the FAC
degradation all of which deserve special consideration in the
future implementation of the FAC program.
By contrast with the FAC program, other augmented inspection
programs such as those of IGSCC and High Energy Line Breaks
are included in the RI-ISI application.
In addition to the large number of segments, it is worth noting
the effort dedicated to the development of criteria for the evalua-
tion of failure probabilities for small bore piping that lacked a for-
mal stress analysis since the design was based on guidelines. On
the contrary, special emphasis was placed on the evaluation of
indirect effects (flooding, jet effects, and pipe whipping) due to
9 and the reduction of the LERF is
piping failures in the Break Exclusion Zone.
10.
The analyses showed a significant influence of the FAC and
IGSCC degradation mechanisms in the failure probabilities. In
general, segments affected with either mechanism resulted in the
High Failure Importance regions. In terms of risk, the contribution
of the FAC degradation to the CDF amounts to 51% of total CDF,
whereas the contribution of the IGSCC degradation amounts to
23% of total CDF.
To fulfill the defense in depth criterion, the regulator required
during the licensing process to include at least one location to
monitor those systems that did not warrant inspection according
to the RI-ISI program but had been required for inspection
according to the Section XI program.
The final segment classification and the number of elements
selected for inspection in each region are shown in Table 63.14. It
can be observed that 81% of HSS segments belong to Class 1 pip-
ing. These segments cover 93% of the total CDF.
Table 63.15 shows a comparison between the number of
inspections according to RI-ISI and Section XI programs. Despite
the significant reduction on the number of inspections achieved
(59%), the RI-ISI program resulted in being risk neutral in com-
parison with the previous deterministic ISI program, since the
CDF reduction is 9.84 10
3.22 10

TABLE 63.14 CLASS 1 AND 2 PIPING SEGMENTS CLASSIFICATION AND NUMBER

OF INSPECTIONS FOR THE COFRENTES BWR PLANT [26]

Number of Segments Number of Inspections

Piping Region In Region Total In Region Total
1 HSS/HFI 39 116
2 HSS/LFI – 182 – 130
Class 1
3 LSS/HFI 51 7
4 LSS/LFI 92 7
1 HSS/HFI 7 7
2 HSS/LFI – 546 – 21
Class 2
3 LSS/HFI 124 4
4 LSS/LFI 415 10
1 HSS/HFI 46 123
2 HSS/LFI – 728 – 151
Class 1 & 2
3 LSS/HFI 175 11
4 LSS/LFI 507 17

HSS: High Safety Significant

LSS: Low Safety Significant
HFI: High Failure Importance
LFI: Low Failure Importance
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574 • Chapter 63
TABLE 63.15 INSPECTION AREAS RESULTING FROM ASME SECTION XI AND RI-ISI
PROGRAMS FOR CLASS 1 AND 2 PIPING FOR THE COFRENTES BWR PLANT [26]
Areas in ASME Section XI Program Areas in RI-ISI Program
Existing Selected Existing
2840 365 6458
63.4 CONCLUSIONS
In Spain the basic regulation of the nonnuclear industry is
included in the Regulation on Pressurized Apparatus, published in
1979, and in its Complementary Technical Instructions, published
in later years. Following Spain joining the European Community
in 1986, the regulation underwent a series of modifications with a
view to bringing it into line with those of the other European
Union countries. This regulation remains in force for in-service
testing and inspections, while aspects relating to the design, man-
ufacturing, and conformity assessment of pressure equipment are
governed by the PED.
In the nuclear field, and in the absence of a national regulation,
the codes and standards of the countries of origin of the design of
each reactor are applied, with certain modifications aimed at har-
monizing requirements among the country’s different facilities.
This is the case, for example, as regards in-service inspection,
where Section XI of the ASME Code is applied in all cases.
For the qualification of NDT tests applied for in-service
inspection, the Spanish industry developed a methodology based
on the ENIQ principles, as in other European countries. It should
be pointed out, however, that in implementing this methodology
for the manual ultrasonic inspection of piping, the generic EPRI
PDI procedures have been used, the practical demonstrations
having been carried out at this institute’s facilities and using its
mock-ups.
Furthermore, in Spain the nuclear industry and the regulator
have jointly developed a guideline for the application of the risk-
informed methodology to the in-service inspection of piping,
which is based mainly on the U.S. regulations and on ASME
Code Cases N-577 and N-578.
On the European stage, the Spanish industry and regulator have
contributed to the definition of a common framework for the appli-
cation of the RI-ISI methodology through their respective partici-
pations in the drawing up of the ENIQ’s European Framework
Document for Risk-Informed In-service Inspection [27] and the
NRWG’s Report on Regulatory Experience on Risk-Informed
In-Service Inspection of Nuclear Power Plants Components and
Common Views [28].
REFERENCES
1. Rules on Pressure Apparatus, issued by the Ministry of Industry and
Energy, Decree R.D. 1244 dated April 4, 1979 (BOE 128, May 29,
1979); R.D. 1504 dated November 23, 1990 (BOE 28-11-1990 and
BOE 24-1-1991. Modified by Decree R.D. 473 dated March 30, 1988
(BOE 20-5-1988) and R.D. 1495/1991 (BOE 15-10-1991).
2. Pressure Equipment Directive 97/23/CE, transposed by Decree R.D.
769/1999 dated May 7, 1999 (BOE 31-5-1999).
Reduction (%)
Selected
151 59
3. ITC-MIE-AP1, Boilers, Economisers, Water Preheaters, Super-
heaters and Steam Reheaters, issued by the Ministry of Industry and
Energy, Orders O. 17-3-1982 and O. 28-3-1985.
4. ITC-MIE-AP2, Piping for Fluids Relating to Boilers, issued by the
Ministry of Industry and Energy, Order O. 6-10-1980.
5. ITC-MIE-AP6, Oil Refineries and Petrochemical Plants, issued by the
Ministry of Industry and Energy, Order O. 30-8-1982 and O. 11-7-1983.
6. ITC-MIE-AP10, Cryogenic Tanks, issued by the Ministry of Industry
and Energy, Order O. 7-11-1983 and O. 5-6-1987.
7. ITC-MIE-AP16, Fossil Power Generating Plants, issued by the
Ministry of Industry and Energy, Order O. 11-10-1987.
8. Rules on Uncomfortable, Unhealthy and Dangerous Activities, Decree
dated November 30, 1961 (now superseded by Law 34/2007 on Air
Quality and Atmosphere Protection, BOE 16-11-2007).
9. Law 25/1964 dated April 29 on Nuclear Energy (BOE 4-5-64), mod-
ified by Law 40/1994 dated December 30, 1994 for the Development
of the National Electric System (BOE 31-12-94).
10. Decree Law 2869/1972 dated July 21, issued by the Ministry of
Industry and Energy, approving the Bylaw on Nuclear and
Radioactive Facilities (BOE 24-10-72).
11. Law 15/1980 dated April 22 on the Creation of the Consejo de
Seguridad Nuclear (BOE 25-5-80).
12. Colinet, M., Frank, H.-J., Morel, A., Hevia Rupérez, F. and Smith,
N.G., Survey of European Design Codes and Regulatory Requirements
Relating to the Structural Integrity of ALWR Nuclear Power Plants -
Final Report, AEAT-1506 for the CEC DG-XI, September 1997.
13. CSN Safety Guide 1.10, Periodic Safety Reviews in Nuclear Power
Plants, December 1995.
14. European Methodology for Qualification, EUR 17299 EN, Rev. 2,
prepared by the European Network on Inspection Qualification
(ENIQ), 1997.
15. Common Position of European Regulators on Qualification of NDT
Systems for Pre-Service and In-Service Inspection of LWR
Components, EUR 16802 EN, Rev. 1, prepared by the Task Force of
Nuclear Regulators Working Group (NRWG), 1997.
16. Francia, L., Bollini, G., Figueras, J.M., and Castelao, C., Spanish
Experience on NDT Qualification. Nuclear Industry and Regulator
Views, OECD/CSNI Symposium on International Developments and
Cooperation on RI-ISI and NDT Qualification, Stockholm, 2004.
17. Report on Regulator’s Experience on NDT Qualification for
In-Service Inspection of LWR Components, EUR 20819 EN, prepared
by the Task Force of Nuclear Regulators Working Group (NRWG),
2003.
18. Qualification Methodology for Non-Destructive Examination Systems
Applied in the In-Service Inspection of Spanish Nuclear Power Plants,
UNESA CEX-120, Rev. 2, April 2003.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 575
19. Qualification and Certification of Personnel That Perform Non-
Destructive Examinations, UNE EN 473, AENOR, April 1993.
20. General Criteria for the Performance of the Several Types of
Organizations That Carry Out Inspection, UNE EN 45004, AENOR,
December 1995.
21. López Ansorena, J.L., Ulloa, L., and Canton, M., Risk-Informed
In-Service Inspection of Piping. Application to Ascó Nuclear Power
Plant, XXVI Annual Meeting of the Spanish Nuclear Society, León
(Spain), October 2000.
22. Guide for the Development and Evaluation of Risk-Informed
In-Service Inspection Programs, RI-ISI-02, Rev. 0, CSN-UNESA,
May 2000.
23. Report on Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection and Testing, EUR
19153 EN, European Commission. Nuclear Safety and Environment,
June 1999.
24. Bros, J. and Francia, L., Experience of RI-ISI Applications in Spanish
NPPs. Results and Impact on ISI Programs, OECD/CSNI Symposium
on International Developments and Cooperation on RI-ISI and NDT
Qualification, Stockholm, 2004.
25. Castelao, C., Mendoza, C., and Figueras, J.M., Lessons Learned
from the Assessment and Review of Applications to Use RI-ISI
in Spanish NPP, OECD/CSNI Symposium on International
Developments and Cooperation on RI-ISI and NDT Qualification,
Stockholm, 2004.
26. Gutiérrez, E., Pérez Tejedor, P., García Sicilia, J., Gallego, F., Martín-
Serrano, C., Godoy, J., and Cueto-Felgueroso, C., Risk-Informed ISI
Program for Cofrentes NPP, XXXII Annual Meeting of the Spanish
Nuclear Society, Tarragona, Spain, October 2006.
27. European Framework Document for Risk-Informed In-service
Inspection, ENIQ Report Nr. 23, EUR 21581 EN, March 2005.
28. Report on Regulatory Experience on Risk-Informed In-Service
Inspection of Nuclear Power Plants Components and Common Views,
EUR 21320 EN, European Commission. Nuclear Safety and
Environment, August 2004.
ASME_Ch64_p577-588.qxd 6/3/09 1:14 PM Page 577
64.1 SHORT HISTORY
AND INTRODUCTION
Nuclear power plants (NPPs) in Jaslovske Bohunice (440 MW)
in Slovakia and Dukovany (440 MW) and in Temelín (1000 MW)
in the Czech Republic (both in former Czechoslovakia) were built
with an agreement between the former Czechoslovakia and Soviet
Union in context of mutual cooperation in building NPPs. Within
this agreement, understanding was to use Soviet design and pro-
duction standards and rules [1, 2] as far as it was possible, while
following the entire NPP design. Thus, for this case only,
Government decisions in 1978, 1980, and 1985 defined these
rules. Early in the eighties, extended project of the technical stan-
dard documentation of NPPs was organized by the International
Economic Association “Interatomenergo” in Moscow. The associ-
ation was set up to cooperate in the field of nuclear power between
individual member states of the Council of Mutual Economical
Co-operation (CMEA). After accident in the Chernobyl NPP, the
whole project was managed by the “Gosatomenergonadzor”
(GAEN) of the Soviet Union. Under control of the GAEN, the
entire complex of technical standard documentation ended in
1990, when GAEN finished the whole project at international level
and consequently also in the Soviet Union.
The most fundamental problem from the start of the project
was a question of legal obligation to CMEA standards. No satis-
factory and acceptable agreement was reached in this area. Last
version of legal obligation of the whole complex of technical
standards at the level of former member states of the CMEA was
to provide rules: Elaboration of obligatory position of state regu-
latory bodies among the members of the CMEA was done. This
facilitated the possibility in determining the application of techni-
cal standards documentation in the form of legal-agreement rela-
tions. From the point of view of the international relations, the
procedure could be considered as sufficient; but from the stand-
point of Czech NPPs, the effectiveness of utilizing these standard
complexes was at zero point, since effective steps were not orga-
nized to bring them into action.
Moreover, neither Soviet standards nor CMEA-contained rules
were directly applied for operating plants; CMEA rules and stan-
dards practically contained only documents similar to the former
Soviet ones issued around 1973. Activities in preparation of these
CMEA rules resulted in upgrading of the Soviet rules and standards
CHAPTER
64
CZECH AND
SLOVAKIAN CODES
Milan Brumovsky
and were in most cases incorporated into new set of Soviet rules
and standards issued around 1989. These rules and standards
existed for service lifetime assessment of reactor components and
were limited only to design and manufacturing; in very special
cases these rules were for operation also but not from the lifetime
evaluation point of view. Thus, assessment of defects, found dur-
ing in-service inspection, has to be based on acceptance levels
valid for manufacturing and on special procedures, prepared by
the Nuclear Research Institute (NRI) Rez and manufacturers of
components; for case by case application, these had to be accepted
by the Czech State Office for Nuclear Safety (SONS).
64.2 SONS REQUIREMENTS FOR
LIFETIME EVALUATION
In 1993, the SONS initiated a project “Requirements for
Lifetime Evaluation of WWER Main Components”; (WWER are
Water Energetical Reactors). Water Energetical Reactor is of pres-
surized water reactor type but designed and manufactured in
accordance with former Soviet codes and rules). Within the scope
of this project, preparation of regulatory requirements for lifetime
evaluation of reactor components, including all aspects of integrity
and degrading processes of these components, was performed.
Responsibility of this project was given to the NRI Rez. These
requirements focused on reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and reactor
internals and issued as a SONS document with recommendations
that included Operational Safety Reports. In this document, no
practical procedure for lifetime evaluation was given; only general
and some detailed technical requirements for evaluation of these
two components were described.
64.3 NTD ASI CODE FOR WWER
REACTOR COMPONENTS
Approximately during the same time, a second activity was ini-
tiated by the Czech Association of Mechanical Engineers (ASI),
which decided that a set of codes for reactor components, namely,
Normative Technical Documentation (NTD) was needed for
Czech nuclear industry. A plan for preparation of such codes was
discussed, accepted, and put into action.
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578 • Chapter 64
A standard procedure for a preparation of this set of require-
ments was developed that included three-step revisions and public
discussion between SONS, utilities, expert organizations, as well
as manufacturers. Also, a four-year revision plan has been accepted
and implemented.
To assure an effective and high-level expertise for the code
preparation, similar structure as in the ASME was accepted and
accomplished: main committee for Code preparation, then com-
mittees for individual sections, and also committees for special
cases. These committees include practically all the main experts
available in the field in the Czech Republic; they represent
Technical Support Organizations (TSO), manufacturers, designers,
and also SONS.
Financing of individual parts of these Codes was different; for
example, some of them were supported by the SONS (Section IV),
other by the Czech Power Company (CEZ) (Sections I and II), or
by NRI and SKODA Nuclear Machinery plc (Section V).
Preparation of this code was initiated due to several facts and
reasons:
• Necessity for updating of former Soviet/Interatomenergo
codes for WWER reactors
• Absence of Codes for NPP under operation
• Necessity for including also Czech/foreign materials besides
only Soviet ones
This Code was planned and realized in six sections, specifically
Section I - Welding and brazing of components and piping of
WWER type NPPs
Section II- Characteristics of materials for components and
piping of WWER type NPPs
Section III- Strength assessment of components and piping of
WWER type NPPs
Section IV- Evaluation of residual lifetime of components and
piping of WWER type NPPs
Section V- Material testing procedures and evaluation
Section VI- Air condition systems for WWER type NPPs
It was accepted that the proposal of individual sections should
follow the conventional format used for pressurized water reactors
(PWRs) where the specific features of the WWER reactors and
their materials are taken into account. Thus, in principle, it is not
possible to use any PWR rules or standards in their entirety – in
all cases it must be taken in account that WWER components
TABLE 64.1 COMPARISON OF SAFETY FACTORS OF DIFFERENT CODES BASED ON YIELD AND
ULTIMATE TENSILE STRENGTH
n0.2 (Safety Factor Based on
Code Yield Strength)
Soviet “Rules . . .”
PN AE G-7-008-89 [1]
VERLIFE,
Section III
Version 2001 [3]
ASME, Section III, NB-6221 [4]
were designed and manufactured by different standards and rules
that are not fully compatible with PWR ones. Later on, some-
what different safety rules, safety factors, as well as safety
approaches were used for WWER reactors and this fact cannot
be neglected. Preparation of these rules has to be based on the
former Soviet and CMEA rules and standards [1, 2] with maxi-
mum possible implementation of PWR approaches without los-
ing latter’s advantages and larger safety factors if they can be
defined and accomplished.
The main problems of the first two sections are focused on the
fact that only Soviet-type materials were allowed for use in
WWER NPPs according to the former Soviet Codes. At the pre-
sent time, some of these materials are not produced any more by
domestic factories and their import is sometimes complicated or
even impossible. Thus, change of some materials manufactured
according to Soviet standards into Czech or replacing these by
other foreign ones is necessary.
Section III is practically fully consistent with the Soviet
“Standard for Stress Analysis of Components and Piping in NPPs
(1989)” as all components in Czech NPPs were designed and
manufactured according to this Standard. Some small improve-
ments were included, for example, in fatigue calculations and in
the definition of pressure during pressure hydrotests.
The principal differences of Sections I, II, and III of the
WWER in comparison with corresponding Sections of the ASME
Code are as follows:
• Structural materials of WWER RPVs, piping, steam genera-
tors, pressurizers, and so on. are not included in the ASME
Codes – generally they have different chemical composition
(alloying base) and higher strength properties.
• No nickel-based alloys are allowed in primary reactor
circuit.
• Both Codes are based on slightly different assumptions, mainly
regarding allowable stresses; stress intensities substantially
differ due to different safety factors, n0.2 and nm (with respect
to yield and ultimate tensile strength, respectively), and also
absolute values of tensile properties in PWR and WWER
RPV materials (Table 64.1).
Thus, allowable stresses (stress intensities) in PWR RPVs are
generally lower than for WWER RPVs and are independent of
test temperature (Table 64.2).
(␴)1, stress intensities calculated from the general membrane
stress components; (␴)2, stress intensities calculated from the sum
nm (Safety Factor Based on Ultimate
Tensile Strength)
1.5 2.6
1.5 2.6
1.5 3.0
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 579

TABLE 64.2 ALLOWABLE STRESS INTENSITY LIMITS FOR WWER REACTOR PRESSURE VESSELS (RPVs) AND
BOLTING JOINTS [1]

Components Regimes (␴)1 (␴)2 (␴)3W (␴)4W (␴)RV

Normal operating (2.5 – RP0.2T/ RmT)
conditions [␴] [␴] – – RP0.2T
Reactor
pressure vessels Upset conditions 1.2[␴] 1.6[␴] – – –
Emergency conditions 1.4[␴] 1.8[␴] – – –
Normal operating [␴]w – 1.3[␴]w 1.7[␴]w –
conditions
Bolting joints Upset conditions 1.2[␴]w – 1.6[␴]w 2.0[␴]w –
Emergency conditions 1.4[␴]w – 1.8[␴]w 2.4[␴]w –

of the general or local membrane and bending stress components;
(␴)3W, stress intensities calculated from the sum of the mean ten-
sile stresses in a bolted section, including the tightening loads and
effect of temperature; (␴)4W, stress intensities caused by mechani-
cal and temperature effects, including tensioned bolt loading and
calculated from stress components of tension, bending, and twist-
ing in bolts, while the stress intensity ranges for RPV are defined
as follows: (␴)RV, the maximum stress intensity range calculated
from the sum of the general and local stress components, the gen-
eral and local bending stresses, the general temperature stresses,
and the compensation stresses; RP0.2T, yield strength of the materi-
al at temperature T; RmT, ultimate tensile strength of the material
at temperature T.
• WWER Codes requires two steps of calculations:
– Calculation of basic dimensions dealing with the procedure
for choosing the component wall thickness, which provides
strength decrease coefficients and hole reinforcement values.
Further, formulas for analysis of flange and bolting joints are
also given.
– Validating calculations are the most important part of the
Code. These detailed calculations contain rules for the classi-
fication of stresses as well as steps for stress determination.
Further, detailed calculations for different possible failure mech-
anisms are required and their procedures and criteria are given:
(1) calculation of static strength,
(2) calculation of stability,
(3) calculation of cyclic strength (fatigue),
(4) calculation of long-term cyclic strength (creep-fatigue) (not
applicable for WWER RPV)
(5) calculation of resistance against brittle fracture,
(6) calculation of long-term static strength (creep) (not applica-
ble for WWER RPV),
(7) calculation of progressive form change (not applicable for
WWER RPV),
(8) calculation of seismic effects, and
(9) calculation of vibration strength (ultra-high frequency
fatigue).
• WWER structural materials are not characterized by RTNDT
(nil-ductility reference temperature) reference temperature
but by Tk (critical temperature of brittleness) reference tem-
perature based only on Charpy impact tests (and depending on
material yield strength), which means that different design
fracture toughness curves are applied (Fig. 64.1).
• Integrity of WWER components is based on initiation
approach only (i.e., no crack in initiation is allowed), where-
as ASME allows some initiation if arrest can be assured.
Comparison of the allowable WWER fracture toughness curves
for low-alloy steels with the KIC and KIR reference fracture tough-
ness curves in the ASME Code [KIC]1 is the allowable fracture
toughness for normal operating conditions, [KIC]2 is the allowable
fracture toughness for hydraulic testing, and [KIC]3 is the allow-
able fracture toughness for emergency conditions.
• WWER RPV integrity and lifetime is based on deterministic
calculation of integrity during pressurized thermal shock
(PTS) events in comparison with PWR where probabilistic
approach is applied.
• Fatigue evaluation in WWER reactors is based on formulas
for tensile properties and reduction of area, whereas ASME is
based on design fatigue curves.
• Safety factors in fatigue calculation of WWER components
are based on fatigue lower boundary curve with safety factors
n␴ ⫽ 2 and nN ⫽ 10, whereas ASME is based on mean curve
and safety factors n␴ ⫽ 2 and nN ⫽ 20.
• Evaluation of aging of WWER components includes irradia-
tion damage, thermal aging, and fatigue damage, whereas
ASME takes into account only irradiation damage.
The proposed procedure in Section IV was fully elaborated as a
new material, based on the SONS “Requirements for Lifetime
Evaluation of WWER Main Components,” but at the same time it
represents a maximum harmonization of WWER and PWR Codes
for component integrity evaluation; the procedure, of course, is
based on Soviet Code “Standard for Stress Analysis of Components
and Piping in NPPs (1989).” The procedure deals with the main
parts of component integrity evaluation and its first version was fin-
ished in 1998.
Section V has been already finalized and will be issued at the
end of 2008. This section summarizes all necessary test procedures
for lifetime and integrity assessment of components and piping,
that is, not only different nondestructive methods but also specific
testing of mechanical properties, such as fracture toughness,
ASME_Ch64_p577-588.qxd 6/3/09 1:14 PM Page 580
580 • Chapter 64
250
200
KIC, KIR, MPa.m0.5
150
100
50
0
–100 –75 –50 –25 0 25
Reference temperature,
T-Tk, T-RTNDT, °C
FIG. 64.1 COMPARISON OF ALLOWABLE STRESS INTENSITIES (ALLOWABLE FRACTURE TOUGHNESS VALUES) AS A
FUNCTION OF REFERENCE TEMPERATURES (T-TK FOR WWER RPVs OR T- RTNDT FOR ASME RPVs) [1, 3, 4] ([KIC]1, allow-
able fracture toughness for normal operating conditions [1]; [KIC] 2, allowable fracture toughness for hydraulic testing [1]; [KIC]3, allow-
able fracture toughness for emergency conditions [1]; KIC(ASME), reference static fracture toughness curve according to ASME
Code, Section II, Appendix G [4]; KIR(ASME), reference arrest fracture toughness curve according to ASME Code, Section II,
Appendix G [4]).
fatigue, crack growth rate, corrosion resistance, and so on. Thus, it
replaced not only ASME Section XI, but also some American
Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) Standards and U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guides.
It was felt that for such a new procedure as Section IV, an inter-
national cooperation would be useful and effective and experts
from other WWER-operating countries, at least within the
European Union (EU), should be incorporated and their experi-
ence and views should be taken into account.
64.4 VERLIFE PROCEDURE
A proposal for the European Union 5th Framework Programmes
was prepared and accepted with the aim to use proposals of the
Section IV as the first document to be discussed, changed, upgraded,
enlarged, and finally accepted.
The main goal of the project was in the preparation, evaluation,
and mutual agreement of a “Unified Procedure for Lifetime
Assessment of Components and Piping in WWER Type Nuclear
Power Plants.” This procedure had to be based on former Soviet
rules and codes as WWER components were designed and manu-
factured in accordance with requirements of these codes and from
prescribed materials. Then, critical analysis of possible applica-
tion of some approaches used in PWR-type components was
performed and such approaches have been incorporated into the
prepared procedure as much as possible with the aim of harmo-
nizing the WWER and PWR codes and procedures.
Preparation of a Unified Procedure for WWERs operating in
Finland, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary, and Bulgaria
can increase the level of lifetime/integrity evaluation in these
countries and will help to elaborate a unified approach with fully
compatible results between the individual plants and countries.
[KIC]1
[KIC]2
[KIC]3
KIC-ASME
KIR-ASME
50 75 100
Further, harmonization with PWR codes allows results that will be
comparable, reliable, and more sophisticated as similar approaches
will be used in both types of reactors.
The project was realized as the Concerted Action with a net-
work of the safety managers and experts of the plants, together
with experts from TSO and national regulatory bodies. This was
created to oversee the operation of WWER-type reactors within
the European Union during the first decades of this century.
The project duration was planned and completed in 24 months;
the project was finished on September 30, 2003. The work was
organized along technical tasks.
The Concerted Action was based on the partners’ meetings that
were the main method of sharing the status of procedures for life-
time assessment of individual components and piping in WWER
NPPs in member-countries.
The consortium was coordinated in such a way as to include
the following:
• Group of experts from TSOs that are incorporated in the
WWER component lifetime assessment in Finland, Czech
Republic, Slovak Republic, and Hungary. These included FOR-
TUM Nuclear Services Ltd. in Finland, Nuclear Research
Institute Řež plc and Institute of Applied Mechanics in Czech
Republic, VÚJE (Research Institute for NPPs) Trnava a.s. in
Slovak Republic, AEKI Atomic Energy Research Centre in
Hungary, and Institute of Metal Science in Bulgaria.
• Experts from nuclear regulatory bodies that are connected
with evaluation of such assessments and/or their acceptance,
such as State Office of Nuclear Safety of Czech Republic and
Nuclear Regulatory Office of Slovak Republic.
• Specialists from NPPs that are responsible for component
lifetime assessment and/or plant life management, such as
FORTUM Nuclear Services Ltd. for Loviisa NPP in Finland,
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 581
ČEZ a.s. for NPP Dukovany and for Temelin NPP in Czech
Republic, Slovenske elektrárne a.s. for NPP Jaslovske
Bohunice and Mochovce in Slovak Republic, and NPP Paks,
AEKI.
• Use in components design, stress analysis, lifetime evalua-
tion, and manufacturing, the experience of ŠKODA JS a.s. in
Czech Republic (main manufacturer for WWER components
for Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, and Hungary, respec-
tively, and also former Germany Democratic Republic,
Poland, and Bulgaria).
The practical work was carried out in principle in meetings of
Task Groups. A common kick-off meeting of all partners started
the work and reviewed the current status. In the kick-off meeting,
the structure of the Unified Procedure and expected results were
proposed, discussed, and agreed. For evaluation of the Unified
Procedure, Task Groups of experts have been organized in the
following manner:
• Fracture – Application of fracture mechanics to ascertain
integrity and lifetime defect allowance
• Corrosion causing mechanical damage, including corrosion
problems related to integrity and lifetime assessment
• Fatigue including mechanical and thermal fatigue evaluation
based on design and real operating regimes
• Material aging, including definition, material testing, and
damage evaluation;
• Reactor dosimetry, including determination of neutron flu-
ences by calculations and measurements.
To ensure that Task Groups work proceeds according to the
common aim of the participating organizations, a midterm review
meeting was scheduled. The objective of the meeting was to
(1) discuss eventual needs to reorient the Task Group work and
(2) discuss eventual reorganization of the Concerted Action by
inviting new members. As a result, enlargement of the project by
inclusion of three new organizations from Czech Republic and
Bulgaria was successfully agreed.
Four meetings of all Task Groups were carried out; they com-
pleted their work in discussion and agreement on text of individual
parts of the Procedure. Their results were collected in the Final
Draft of the Unified Procedure and it was agreed in the final project
meeting in the beginning of September 2003. Thus, the Unified
Procedure was taken as accepted by all participants and was pro-
posed to individual national nuclear regulatory authorities for their
acceptance and approval as a basis document for lifetime evaluation
and preparation of Periodic Safety Reports. At the same time, this
document was released for public use by all of the parties.
Workshop on the scope and approach of the Unified Procedure
was prepared and organized at the end of September 2003 for
end-users of the Procedure such as plant owners and operators,
TSOs, and regulatory bodies in participating countries. This
workshop was held for organizations from the Czech Republic,
Slovak Republic, Hungary, Finland, and Bulgaria.
In preparation of the Unified Procedure, the following princi-
ples and inputs have been agreed upon:
• WWER components were designed and manufactured in
accordance with former Soviet rules and standards [1]
• IAEA activities in the field of WWER components integrity
assessment [2]
• Approaches applied in PWR components integrity and life-
time evaluation
• Latest developments in fracture mechanics and their applica-
tion to component integrity
Large-scale effort was focused on the creation and critical
analysis of material databases of main WWER component materi-
als such as fracture toughness, crack growth rate, corrosion resis-
tance, and radiation damage. On the basis of these databases, nec-
essary design curves for individual material properties have been
proposed and put into the Unified Procedure [12-18].
Main difference between original Soviet rules [1] and the
Unified Procedure can be found in the strict application of “Master
Curve” approach for component integrity assessment, since real
material properties are used without a need for any empirical cor-
relations between different types of test results (traditional transi-
tion temperatures based on Charpy impact test data are allowed as
a secondary alternative). More than 1200 data for WWER-440
RPV materials and more than 700 data for WWER-1000 RPV
materials from different WWER countries were collected.
Such advantage can be seen from a comparison of data; for
example, considering base metal of 15Kh2MFA-type steel for
RPV of WWER-440 units. Figure 64.2 shows large scatter of
fracture toughness data based on critical temperature of brittle-
ness, Tk (based on Charpy impact test data), whereas Fig. 64.3
shows the same data but correlated directly with reference tem-
perature, T0, using Master Curve approach. More than 1200 data
from different WWER countries were collected.
Analysis of this database showed that the so-called specific
design fracture curves, as defined for individual RPV materials in
Ref. [1], are not conservative as they cover no more than 90% of all
experimental data. Thus, if design fracture toughness curves in con-
nection with the transition temperature Tk are used, only generic
curves are reliable as they cover practically all experimental data.
Database on corrosion mechanical damage was also created,
mainly for crack growth rate in primary water environment. Such
formulas are given for the following materials for air and primary
water environment:
• Steels 15Kh2MFA and 15Kh2MFAA and their welding joints,
• Steels 15Kh2NMFA and 15Kh2NMFAA and their welding
joints,
• Steel 22K and its welding joints,
• Austenitic steels of 08Kh18N10T type and their welding joints
In the document, the following procedures were developed and
given:
• Procedure for evaluation of surveillance specimens test data
for their use in integrity assessment, which is the first attempt
for WWER-type RPVs
• Procedure for assessment of material damage by radiation
damage, thermal aging, and fatigue damage; also necessary
data were given
• Procedure for determination of design fracture toughness
curves and Master Curves
Necessary material data were collected and analyzed and uni-
fied material properties for temperature and stress fields of RPVs
were summarized to make RPV integrity calculations more reli-
able and comparable for the following:
• Temperature dependencies of Young modulus, Poison ratio,
thermal expansion coefficient, thermal conductivity, specific
heat, and density (specific mass) for base metals, weld metals,
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582 • Chapter 64

400

350

B = 10
300 B = 16
B = 25
250 B = 30
KCJ, MPa.m0.5

B = 37.5/40
200 B = 50
B = 75
150 B = 100
B = 125
100 B =150
[KIC]3-G
50

0
–300 –250 –200 –150 –100 –50 0 50 100 150 200
T - Tk0, °C

FIG. 64.2 TEMPERATURE DEPENDENCE OF STATIC FRACTURE TOUGHNESS DATA OF 15KB2MFA-TYPE STEEL (BASE
AND WELD METALS) FOR WWER-440 REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL CORRELATED WITH TRANSITION TEMPERATURE
TK0 [5] (B, specimen thickness; [KIC]3, generic design fracture toughness curve).

and cladding materials of WWER-440 and WWER-1000 however, it shall be also used for safety related components of other
RPVs, since these data are mostly missing in the document [1] circuits as well.
as well as in other available materials for PWR-type RPVs.

In the Unified Procedure, the following principal changes in
comparison with original rules [1] have been implemented:
• Size of the postulated defect for fast fracture evaluation as
well as for fatigue-and corrosion-induced mechanical damage
is defined in correlation with in-service inspection methods
and qualification.
• Method for evaluation of allowance of defects found during
in-service inspections is given.
• Allowable sizes of defects found during in-service inspections
are calculated on the bases of fracture mechanics and materi-
al properties.
• Method for transformation of indications found during in-
service inspections into calculated defects is described.
• Procedure for evaluation of surveillance specimens test data
for their use in integrity assessment is given.
• Method for evaluation of corrosion-induced mechanical dam-
age in some specific components is described.
• Material properties (crack growth rates) in primary water
environment are summarized.
• Unified material properties for temperature and stress fields of
RPVs are summarized.
This Unified Procedure has been prepared for pressurized com-
ponents of primary circuit of WWER-440 and WWER-1000 units;
64.5 COVERS CONTINUATION
In 2005, a new project within the EU 6th Framework Pro-
grammes was opened:COVERS – WWER Safety Research that
has also been coordinated by the NRI. In this project, WP 4
deals with the upgrading and updating of the VERLIFE proce-
dure to assure that the experience obtained as well as new
developments will be appropriately included in the new ver-
sion. Experts from nine countries are taking part in this project,
in addition to WWER-operating countries such as Czech
Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Finland, Spain, The
Netherlands, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine, as well as from
EU-JRC IE (Joint Research Center – Institute of Energy in
Petten, The Netherlands) and ISTC (Institute for Scientific and
Technical Cooperation).
Within this project, some improvements and upgrading/updating
have been prepared and discussed in regular technical meetings
twice a year. The main changes of the VERLIFE procedure can
be described as under:
• PTS evaluation including effect of shallow crack, biaxial
loading, and warm prestressing
• Improved procedure for evaluation of underclad-type postu-
lated defects in PTS calculations [based on results from
PHARE (European project for support of new members) project
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 583

500 B = 10
B = 16
B = 25
400 B = 30
B = 37.5/40
B = 50
KCJ-1T, MPa.m0.5

300 B = 75
B = 100
B = 125
200 B = 150
KCJ(mean)
KCJ(5%)
100 KCJ(1%)
KCJ(95%)
KCJ(99%)
0
–200 –150 –100 –50 0 50 100 150 200
T - Tk0, °C

FIG. 64.3 TEMPERATURE DEPENDENCE OF STATIC FRACTURE TOUGHNESS DATA ADJUSTED TO 1-IN. THICKNESS OF
15KB2MFA-TYPE STEEL (BASE AND WELD METALS) FOR WWER-440 REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL CORRELATED WITH
REFERENCE TEMPERATURE T0 IN ACCORDANCE WITH MASTER CURVE APPROACH [5] (B, specimen thickness).

and WWER Cladded Reactor Pressure Vessel Integrity
Evaluation with Respect to Pressurized Thermal Shock
Events]
• Integral approach in PTS calculations using Master Curve
approach
• Improved procedure for evaluation of defect allowance in
components other than RPV Evaluation of P–T curves
• New procedure for probabilistic assessment of integrity of
WWER RPVs
• Fatigue damage calculation for components and piping during
operation
• Corrosion-induced mechanical damage of components
• Crack growth rate in water environment
• Improved formulas for radiation embrittlement of WWER-440
materials (based on International Atomic Energy Agency –
IAEA Co-ordinated Research Project 7 results) and of
WWER-1000 materials [based on Technical Aid to the
Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) project
results]
• Evaluation of Tk and T0 from surveillance specimen sets
• Evaluation of trend curves for radiation damage
• Neutron dosimetry including neutron fluence determination
by calculation and measurements
• Correction of unified data of material properties for PTS cal-
culations (based on results from PHARE project and WWER
Cladded Reactor Pressure Vessel Integrity Evaluation with
Respect to Pressurized Thermal Shock Events)
New version of the VERLIFE procedure has been finalized
and accepted by the participants by March 2008; thereafter,
standard procedure for acceptance of the code as NTD ASI has
initiated.
Thus, this upgraded/updated Procedure will be in good agree-
ment with the state-of-the-art knowledge in the field. At the same
time, some efforts are undertaken for a continuation of this activity,
either under IAEA umbrella as a regional project or within a free-
VERLIFE club.
64.6 CONCLUSION
The VERLIFE procedure is now fully accepted as a main regu-
latory document for lifetime assessment of WWER components
in the Czech Republic and Slovakia and partially in Hungary and
Finland. Negotiations are now in progress for its use in Ukraine
and also in China.
64.7 COMMENTS
There are several manufacturing companies in the Czech
Republic and Slovakia that obtained (and periodically renew)
ASME Certification for manufacturing reactor (and also nonreactor
components in accordance with ASME Section VIII) components
for export to other countries where ASME Codes are required.
64.8 REFERENCES
1. Standard for Strength Calculations of Components and Piping in
NPPs, PNAE G-7-002-86, Energoatomizdat, Moscow, 1989.
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584 • Chapter 64

2. Guidelines on Pressurized Thermal Shock Analysis for WWER SECTION I – WELDING OF COMPONENTS
Nuclear Power Plants, IAEA-EBP-WWER-08, Vienna, 1997. AND PIPING IN WWER TYPE NPPs [6]
3. VERLIFE – Unified Procedure for Lifetime Assessment of
Components and Piping in WWER NPPs During Operation, Prague, 1. Preface
2003. 2. Introduction
3. Principal definitions
4. ASME Code, Section III.
3.1. Declaration of the consistency
5. Brumovsky, M., Master Curve Application to WWER Reactor Pressure 3.2. Area of the use
Vessels, ASME Pressure Vessels and Piping Conference, 2000. 3.3. Symbols, abbreviations, definitions
6. NTD ASI, Section I, Welding of Components and Piping in WWER- 3.4. Connected standards and documents
Type NPPs, Prague, 2005. 3.5. Related standards, documents, and documentation
4. Welding technology and weld heat treatment
7. NTD ASI, Section II, Characteristics of Materials and Welds for
Components and Piping in WWER-Type NPPs, Prague, 2001. 5. Qualification of the manufacturer
5.1. Purpose
8. NTD ASI, Section III, Evaluation of Strength of Components and 5.2. Qualification requirements
Piping in WWER-Type NPPs, Prague, 2001. 5.3. Checking of the qualification
9. NTD ASI, Section IV, Evaluation of Residual Lifetime of 5.4. Validity and loss of the qualification
Components and Piping in WWER-Type NPPs, Prague, 2004. 6. Qualification of the welding personnel
10. NTD ASI, Section V, Material Testing, Prague, 2006. 6.1. Qualification of the welding supervisors
6.2. Qualification of welders
11. NTD ASI, Special Cases, Prague, 2006. 6.3. Qualification of personnel for heat treatment
12. Brumovsky, M., Unified Procedure for Lifetime Assessment of 6.4. Validity and loss of the qualification
Components and Piping in WWER NPPs (VERLIFE), ASME 7. Qualification of welding procedure
Pressure Vessel and Piping Conference, 2004. 7.1. General approach
13. Brumovsky, M., VERLIFE – Unified Procedure for Lifetime 7.2. Approval of the WPS for base welding joints
Assessment of Components and Piping in WWER NPPs, 13th 7.3. Approval of the WPS for specific welding joints
International Conference on Nuclear Engineering (ICONE-13), 7.4. Approval of the WPS for welding of austenitic and
2005. nickel-base cladding
14. Brumovsky, M., Derivation of Design Fracture Toughness Curves for 7.5. Qualification of the WPS for repair of welding joints
WWER-Type Reactors, International Conference on Pressure Vessel and cladding
Technology, ICPVT-9, 1999. 7.6. Qualification of the WPS for welding joints of tempo-
rary and helping parts
15. Brumovsky, M., Master Curve Application to Embrittled RPVs of
WWER-Type Reactors, ASME Pressure Vessel and Piping 7.7. Qualification of technological procedure of welding
Conference, 2001. of nuclear components
8. Welding materials
16. Brumovsky, M., Check of Master Curve Application to Embrittled 8.1. Choice of welding materials
RPVs of WWER-Type Reactors, IAEA Specialists’ Meeting on
8.2. Original welding materials
Master Curve, Prague, 2001.
8.3. Replacement of original welding materials
17. Brumovsky, M. and Ballesteros, A., Application of Master Curve 8.4. New welding materials
Approach to WWER-1000 RPV Materials, ASME Pressure Vessel 8.5. Repeating tests
and Piping Conference, 2002. 8.6. Storage and manipulation with welding materials
18. Ballesteros, A., Bros, J., and Brumovsky, M., Application of the 9. Manufacturing and assembling welds
Master Curve Approach to Irradiated Steels, 12th International 9.1. Welding surfaces
Conference on Nuclear Engineering (ICONE-12), 2004. 9.2. Assembling of the welded component
9.3. Stitching
9.4. Helping and temporary parts
9.5. Manufacturing and assembling welds
64.9 STRUCTURE OF NTD ASI 9.6. Manufacturing weld testing coupon
9.7. Heat treatment regime of welding
Final version of the VERLIFE procedure in Czech translation 9.8. Heat treatment of welds
was accepted as a new version of the Section IV of the NTD ASI. 9.9. Checking of welding joints
Czech SONS accepted NTD ASI Sections I, II, III, and IV in 9.10. Repair of welding joints
2005 and recommended them for their use in the chosen safety 9.11. Documentation of manufacturing and assembling
important components in NPPs. welds
Similar situation is in the Slovak Republic, where Sections I 9.12. Identification of weldments and marking of welding
and II are practically identical (prepared by the Welding Institute joints
of Slovakia, but in cooperation with the Welding Institute of the 10. Repair by welding
Czech Republic) and were accepted by Slovak Office for Nuclear 10.1. General approach
Regulation. 10.2. Repair of faulted welding surfaces
Structure of the Sections I, II, and III is similar to the appropri- 10.3. Repair of faulted manufacturing and assembling
ate Sections of the ASME Code, Sections I, II, and III, and the welds and claddings
structure of the Sections IV and V is fully new. 10.4. Repair of operated components
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 585

11. Special regulations Attachment A

11.1. Disputes
11.2. Revision of NTD ASI Section I
12. Attachments
SECTION II – CHARACTERISTICS OF
MATERIALS AND WELDS FOR
COMPONENTS AND PIPING
IN WWER TYPE NPPs [7]
1. Introduction
2. Principal definitions
2.1. Area of the use
2.2. Extent of the use
2.3. Classification of components
2.4. Used symbols
2.5. Abbreviations of definitions and organizations
2.6. Definitions related to characteristics of materials
3. Requirements to manufacturers and suppliers of materials
3.1. General requirements
3.2. Documentation´
4. Requirements to the choice of base material for manufactur-
ing, repair, and reconstruction of component parts and piping
4.1. General requirements
SECTION III – EVALUATION OF STRENGTH
4.2. Requirements to quality checking of material semi-
products
5. Condition for inclusion of a new material into the list of
allowable material standards for use
5.1. General requirements
5.2. General data about material
5.3. Physical and base mechanical properties
5.4. Characteristics of material resistance against brittle
fracture
5.5. Fatigue characteristics
5.6. Characteristics of corrosion resistance
5.7. Evaluation of results from qualification tests
6. List of material marks allowed to use and their conventional
mechanical properties
Table 6.1. List of base material marks allowed for the use
Table 6.2. Carbon structural steels – conventional mechani-
cal properties
Table 6.3. Alloyed steels – conventional mechanical properties
Table 6.4. Cr-Mo-V type alloyed steels – conventional
mechanical properties
Table 6.5. Si-Mn type alloyed steels – conventional
mechanical properties
Table 6.6. High Cr alloyed steels – conventional mechanical
properties
Table 6.7. Austenitic Cr–Ni alloyed corrosion resistant
steels – conventional mechanical properties
Table 6.8. Fe–Ni type alloys – conventional mechanical
properties
7. List of steel marks allowed to use and their equivalents
according to EN standards, respectively ČSN EN standards
Table 7.1. Carbon steels
Table 7.2. Alloyed steels
Table 7.3. Cr–Mo–V type alloyed steels
Table 7.4. Si–Mn type alloyed steels
Table 7.5. High alloyed steels (with high content of Cr)
Table 7.6. Austenitic Cr–Ni type corrosion resistant steels
Table 7.7. Fe–Ni type alloys
A.0. Known physical properties of chosen steel marks and pro-
cedure for determination of their physical properties by
calculation or by estimation
A.1. Values of coefficients of thermal extension ␣T of groups
of base materials allowed for use
A.2. Modulus of elasticity E of groups of base materials
allowed for use
A.3. Known physical properties of material marks
A.4. Estimation of physical properties by comparison of chem-
ical composition
A.4.1. Carbon steels
A.4.2. Low alloyed steels
A.4.3. High alloyed steels with high content of Cr
A.4.4. Austenitic Cr–Ni type corrosion resistant steels
A.5. Calculation of heat transfer coefficient ␭
A.5.1. Carbon steels
A.5.2. High alloyed steels with high content of Cr
A.5.3. Austenitic Cr–Ni type corrosion resistant steels
A.5.4. Dependence of heat transfer coefficient on temper-
ature
A.6. Physical properties of structural phases in steel
OF COMPONENTS AND PIPING IN
WWER-TYPE NPPs [8]
Comments to the issuing of NTD ASI
1. Introduction
2. General principles, terminology and definitions
2.1. Area of the use
2.2. Classification of components
2.3. Base marking
2.4. General terms
2.5. Terms related to stress analysis
3. General requirements to the strength calculations
3.1. Operational conditions and limits
3.2. General regulations to strength calculations
3.3. Documentation
3.4. Quality assurance system
4. Allowable stresses
4.1. General principles
4.2 Components excluding bolting joints
4.3. Bolting joints
5. Proposal of base dimensions of cylindrical, conical, spheri-
cal, elliptical, torospherical, and flat components loaded by
internal and external pressure
5.1. General principles
5.2. Cylindrical and conical vessel shells and bottoms
loaded by internal and external pressure
5.3. Cylindrical collectors, nozzles, tubes, and elbows
5.4. Circular flat covers and bottoms
6. Proposal of base dimensions of flanges, pressed rings, and
connected parts
6.1. General principles
6.2. Choice of the sealing
6.3. Determination of forces in bolting joints
6.4. Determination of dimensions of flange joints
6.5. Bending moments
6.6. Height of the flange
6.7. Checking of specific pressure on the sealing
ASME_Ch64_p577-588.qxd 6/3/09 1:14 PM Page 586
586 • Chapter 64
7. Proposal of base dimensions, opening reinforcement, and
coefficients of strength for openings and welding joints
7.1. Marking
7.2. Decrease of the strength by alone opening
7.3. Decrease of the strength by a row of openings
7.4. Coefficient of decrease of the strength by welding joints
8. Checking calculation, categories of stresses
8.1. Marking
8.2. Procedure of checking calculation
8.3. Stress categories and groups of stress categories
8.4. Loading blocks
8.5. Reduced stress
8.6. Stress amplitude
8.7. Fictive stress in notch
8.8. Stress cycles
9. Checking calculation for static strength
9.1. General principles
9.2. Reduced stresses
9.3. Limits for groups of stresses
10. Checking calculation of strength during cyclic loading
10.1. General principles
10.2. Components excluding bolting joints
10.3. Bolting joints
10.4. Bi-frequencies loading
10.5. Damage cummulation
10.6. Experimental verification of strength during cyclic
loading
10.7. Simplified calculation of strength during cyclic loading
11. Checking calculation of resistance against sudden (non-
stabile) failure
11.1. General principles
11.2. Stress intensity coefficients
11.3. Critical temperature of brittleness
11.4. Allowable values of stress intensity coefficients
11.5. Normal operating conditions
11.6. Minimum allowable component temperature during
hydraulic (pneumatic) pressure tests
11.7. Abnormal operation conditions and emergency
conditions
12. Checking calculation of strength during vibrations
12.1. General principles
12.2. Design period
12.3. Start-up period and operation period
12.4. Stresses during vibrations
12.5. Influence of vibrations on strength during cyclic
loading
13. Checking calculation of stability
13.1. General principles
13.2. Cylindrical shell loaded by external pressure
13.3. Cylindrical shell loaded by axial force
13.4. Cylindrical shell loaded simultaneously by external
pressure and axial force
13.5. Bottom loaded by external pressure
13.6. Conical interpart loaded by external pressure
13.7. Conical interpart loaded by axial force
13.8. Conical interpart loaded simultaneously by external
pressure and axial force
14. Checking calculation of strength of seismic event effects
14.1. General principles
14.2. Requirements to strength calculations of seismic
event effects
14.3. Limits for groups of stress categories, translations,
velocities, and accelerations
Appendices
A. Piping systems
B. Supports of components and piping
C. Anchoring of components and piping into civil structures
D. Special requirements recommended for calculations of thin
structures and tanks
E. Active components, pumps, and valves
F. Reassembling joints
G. Comparison of NTS ASI Section III with ASME Code,
Section III
SECTION IV – EVALUATION FO RESIDUAL
LIFETIME OF COMPONENTS AND
PIPING IN WWER – TYPE NPPs [9]
1. Introduction
2. General principles
2.1. Area of use
2.2. List of main symbols and abbreviations
2.3. General terms
2.4. Terms related to evaluation of residual lifetime
3. General requirements to calculation of residual lifetime
3.1. Operational conditions and limits
3.2. Damage mechanisms in materials
3.3. General principles of calculation of residual lifetime
3.4. System of quality assurance
4. Procedure for evaluation of component residual lifetime
4.1. General principles
4.2. Evaluation of residual lifetime of the component from
point of view of resistance against sudden failure (for
“postulated defect”)
4.3. Evaluation of residual lifetime of the component from
point of view of fatigue
4.4. Evaluation of residual lifetime of the component from
point of view of resistance against corrosion-mechani-
cal damage
4.5. Evaluation of residual lifetime of the components with
non-homogeneities found during in-service inspections
5. Evaluation of component resistance against sudden failure
5.1. General principles
5.2. Temperature and stress fields
5.3. Stress intensity coefficients
5.4. Material transition temperatures
5.5. Procedure for determination of neutron fluence on
reactor pressure vessel
5.6. Allowable values of stress intensities
5.7. Calculated defects
5.8. Evaluation of normal operating conditions
5.9. Evaluation of allowable temperatures of pressure tests
5.10. Evaluation of emergency conditions and abnormal
operating conditions
5.11. Evaluation of residual lifetime of the component
with respect to resistance against sudden failure
(with calculated defect)
6. Residual lifetime of the component with respect to resis-
tance against fatigue damage
7. Residual lifetime of the component with respect to resis-
tance against corrosion-mechanical damage
8. Evaluation of allowance of non-homogeneities found dur-
ing in-service inspections and residual lifetime of the com-
ponent with such non-homogeneities
9. Summary evaluation of residual lifetime
ASME_Ch64_p577-588.qxd 6/3/09 1:14 PM Page 587
COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 587
ATTACHMENTS
I Structure of the report with evaluation of component
residual lifetime
II Procedure for determination of neutron fluence in reactor
pressure vessel
III Evaluation of degradation of material properties
IV Determination of stress intensity coefficients KI
V Determination of reference/design curves of temperature
dependence of fracture toughness including “Master
Curve” approach
VI Requirements to choice of regimes of pressurized thermal
shock and thermal hydraulic calculations
VII Residual lifetime of the components with fatigue damage
created by operational loading
VIII General requirements for temperature measurements in
piping and components
IX Evaluation of corrosion-mechanical damage in materials
X Schematisation of non-homogeneities
XI Tables of allowable sizes of non-homogeneities found
during in-service inspections
XII Tables of allowable non-homogeneities in components
XIII Calculation evaluation of allowance of non-homogeneities
in piping from austenitic steels
XIV Calculation evaluation of allowance of non-homogeneities
in piping from carbon steels
XV Material properties used for calculations of temperature
and stress fields in the framework of evaluation of resis-
tance of reactor pressure vessel against sudden failure
3. Non-destructive tests
SECTION V — MATERIAL TESTING [10]
1. Introduction
2. General principles
2.1. Area of use
2.2. Extent of use
2.3. Prescription of tests during manufacturing, assem-
bling and repair
2.3.1. Choice of tests during manufacturing, assem-
bling and repair
2.3.2. Design and manufacturing documentation
2.3.3. Choice of test locations
2.3.4. Choice of individual tests
2.4. Prescription of tests before start-up and during operation
2.4.1. Choice of tests before start-up and during
operation
2.4.2. Inspection programme
2.4.3. Periodicity of in-service inspection
2.5. Used tests
2.5.1. Used destructive tests
2.5.2. Used non-destructive tests
2.6. Authorisation for test performance
2.7. Quality assurance during test performance
2.8. Used symbols, terms, and definitions
2.8.1. Abbreviations of terms and organisations
2.8.2. Terms related to material characteristics
2.9. Requirements to test laboratories, test equipment cali-
bration, and personnel qualification
2.10. Test block and test specimen cutting from ferritic steel
materials
2.10.1. Requirements to heat treatment
2.10.2. Procedures for test block and test specimen
cutting from quenched and tempered materials
2.11. Testing during manufacturing and assembling
2.11.1. Determination of chemical composition
2.11.2. Base mechanical properties
2.11.3. Determination of critical temperature of brit-
tleness Tk
2.11.4. Metallographical tests
2.11.5. Test of susceptibility to intercrystalline corro-
sion
2.11.6. Technological tests of tubes
2.11.7. Welding joints
2.11.8. Determination of ␦-ferrite in austenitic steels
2.12. Supplementary tests of materials
2.12.1. Fracture toughness
2.12.2. Fatigue crack growth rate
2.12.3. Methods for determination of critical temper-
ature of brittleness shift as a result of thermal
ageing
2.12.4. Methods for determination of critical temper-
ature of brittleness shift as a result of fatigue
damage
2.12.5. Radiation embrittlement
2.12.6. Low-cycle and high-cycle fatigue
2.12.7. Corrosion-mechanical tests
2.13. Test for evaluation of operational degradation
2.13.1. Evaluation of results of surveillance specimen
testing
2.13.2. Testing by instrumented hardness
2.13.3. Methods for penetration tests
3.1. Abbreviations, marks, and definitions for nondestruc-
tive tests
3.2. Documentation of non-destructive tests (NDT)
3.2.1. Procedures and instruction of NDT
3.2.2 Qualification and certification of NDT operators
3.2.3. Qualification of methods and technical equip-
ments of NDT
3.2.4. Documentation of performance and results
of NDT
3.3. Evaluation of allowance of found indications and non-
homogeneities
3.3.1. Evaluation of found indications
3.3.2. Evaluation of found non-homogeneities
3.4. Visual test (VT)
3.4.1. Classes of visual tests
3.4.2. Direct visual test
3.4.3. Indirect visual test
3.4.4. Czech standards for VT
3.5. Ultrasonic tests for finding non-homogeneities (UT)
3.5.1. UT of rolled semi products and products
3.5.2. UT of forged semi products and products
3.5.3. UT of welding joints from pearlitic class of
steels
3.5.4. UT of austenitic welds
3.5.6. Documentation of performance and results
of UT
3.5.7. Czech standards for UT
3.6. Ultrasonic tests for determination of wall thickness
3.6.1. Performance of UT for determination of wall
thickness manually
3.6.2. Performance of UT for determination of wall
thickness automatically by remote control
3.6.3. Evaluation of UT results for determination of
wall thickness
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588 • Chapter 64
3.6.4. Documentation of performance and results of
UT for wall thickness determination
3.6.5. Czech standards for UT determination of wall
thickness
3.7. Eddy current tests for finding of non-homogeneities
(ET)
3.7.1. ET of rods (during manufacturing)
3.7.2. ET of tubes (during manufacturing)
3.7.3. ET of tubes during operation
3.7.4. ET of tubes of other heat exchangers during
operation
3.7.5. ET of surfaces of operated components
3.7.6. Documentation of performance and results
of ET
3.7.7. Czech standards for ET
3.8. ET for determination of ferritic phase
3.8.1. Performance of ET for determination of ferritic
phase
3.8.2. Documentation of performance and results of
ET for determination of ferritic phase
3.9. Dye-penetrant test (PT)
3.9.1. PT of component surfaces during manufacturing
3.9.2. PT of component surfaces during operation
3.9.3. Documentation of performance and results of
PT
3.9.4. Czech standards for PT
3.10. Test of magnetic powder methods (MT)
3.10.1. MT of surfaces during manufacturing
3.10.2. MT of surfaces during operation
3.10.3. Documentation of performance and results
of MT
3.10.4. Czech standards for MT
3.11. X-ray tests (RT)
3.11.1. RT of steel castings
3.11.2. RT of welding joints
3.11.3. RT of other type of welds
3.11.4. Documentation of performance and results
of RT
3.11.5. Czech standards for RT
3.12. Tightness tests (LT)
3.12.1. Methods of LT
3.12.2. Sensitivity of LT
3.12.3. Local LT
3.12.4. Integral LT
3.12.5. Czech standards for LT
3.13. Acoustic emission tests (AE)
3.13.1. Finding of non-homogeneities by AE
3.13.2. Finding of leakage by AE
3.13.3. Standards and other rules for AE measurements
3.14. Test of passage by calibre
3.14.1. Performance of the test by passage of calibre
3.14.2. Evaluation of the test of passage of calibre
3.14.3. Documentation of performance and results of
tests by calibre passage
3.15. Test of dryness
3.15.1. Performance of test of dryness
3.15.2. Evaluation of test of dryness
3.15.3. Documentation of performance and results of
tests of dryness
3.15.4. Regulations for test of dryness
3.16. Pressure hydraulic tests (HT)
3.16.1. General requirements to hydraulic pressure
tests
3.16.2. Responsibilities and work safety
3.16.3. Manufacturing test
3.16.4. Pressure test
3.16.5. Evaluation of pressure test
3.16.6. Documentation of pressure test
3.16.7. Czech standards for HT
3.17. Test by measuring vibrations
3.18. Dynamic test of foundations of turbines and other
rotating machines
3.18.1. Performance of dynamic test
3.18.2. Evaluation of dynamic test
3.18.3. Documentation of performance and results of
dynamic test
3.18.4. Standards and other rules for dynamic tests
NTD ASI – SPECIAL CASES (I – VI) [11]
ASME_Ch65_p589-600.qxd 6/3/09 1:32 PM Page 589
COMPREHENSIVE ADAPTATION OF THE
ASME CODE AT PAKS NPP, HUNGARY
Peter Trampus and Peter Pal Babics
65.1 INTRODUCTION
65.1.1 Regulatory Framework
Paks, Hungary’s sole Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) consisting of
four Russian designed VVER-440 model 213 units, was commis-
sioned in the mid-80s with a design life of 30 years. Water-
cooled, water-moderated energy reactors (VVERs), 440 refers to
the original nominal electric capacity in MW, model 213 means
that it is the second generation of the VVER-440s.
In Hungary in accordance with the Act of Atomic Energy, the
control and supervision of the safe application of nuclear energy is
a governmental task, which is performed through the Hungarian
Atomic Energy Authority (HAEA). Since 1990 there have been
significant changes in the Hungarian regulations. The HAEA had
to answer to the technical challenges such as safety upgrading,
power uprating, license renewal, but the changes in the political-
economical environment have also been as important. In this sense
the accession of Hungary to the European Union has to be men-
tioned. In 1999, the Western European Nuclear Regulators’
Association (WENRA) established a Reactor Harmonization
Working Group (RHWG). Since 2003 Hungary has also been tak-
ing part in the activity of the RHWG and has been planning to
adopt its recommendations to the Hungarian regulations. The struc-
ture of the regulation (Act – Government Decree – Nuclear Safety
Regulation – Guidelines) is up-to-date, and in the forthcoming
rulemaking process the regulator will focus more on the impor-
tance of nuclear safety aspect. The safety regulations are open and
make it possible to adopt advanced requirements, for example,
Western European and International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA)safety recommendations or ASME Code ISI requirements.
Based on the authorization, the Director General of the HAEA
issues Guidelines for practical methods in the implementation of
the Nuclear Safety Regulations. It is recommended that those
concerned should meet the Guidelines but this is not compulsory.
An ongoing activity of the HAEA is to ensure continuous devel-
opment of its regulatory activities and periodical review and
updating of Guidelines that have already been issued. This activity
is also related to ASME Code adaptation.
65.1.2 Context and Objectives
The owner of Paks NPP is now intensively preparing the opera-
tional life extension of the individual units up to 50 years. The
Hungarian regulation’s licensing procedure of the extended period
[1] shows a vast similarity to the United StatesNuclear Regulatory
CHAPTER
65
Commission (USNCR) approach in license renewal according to
10 CFR 54. To ensure the consistency with this approach as well
as to strengthen Europe-wide acceptability of the life extension
program the plant owner decided to adapt the ASME Code
requirements for those operations and inspection/maintenance
activities where it is logical and objectively possible. The adapta-
tion’s most fundamental objectives are to review and adjust the
plant’s In-Service Inspection (ISI) and In-Service Testing (IST)
programs to meet the ASME Code requirements. ISI and IST in
conformance with ASME requirements will
(a) provide an opportunity to compare these activities with
worldwide acceptable safety requirements,
(b) allow to extend the current four-year inspection interval (for
Class 1 components) up to an eight-year one, which will
contribute to a more cost-efficient operation and mainte-
nance regime.
As a consequence of the ASME adaptation it is firmly assumed
that structural and functional integrity assessment of long-lived
and passive as well as of active components will achieve an
internationally acceptable level. Apart from this, the target ISI
and IST system will create the basis for a proper ageing man-
agement program in the operations period beyond the design
life.
65.2 MOTIVATION OF THE ASME CODE
ADAPTATION IN HUNGARY
65.2.1 Operational Life Extension of Paks NPP
As it was mentioned earlier that the four units of Paks NPP
were put into operation between 1983 and 1987. Taking into
account the design lifetime of 30 years of the units, they should
be shut down between 2013 and 2017. In possession of the cur-
rent technical knowledge in general, and in relation to VVER
NPPs long-term operation in particular, it can be considered as a
real goal to extend the operational life of the units, that is, to oper-
ate them beyond their design lifetime. It requires a comprehensive
life management strategy, including systematic safety enhance-
ment, as well as the insurance of proper operating, maintenance,
and ageing management activities.
In terms of technology, the operational life of the power plant is
determined by the technical life of those heavy components that
are vital for safe operation and are not replaceable [e.g., the
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590 • Chapter 65
Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV)] or only replaceable at such high
cost, which is not reasonable (e.g., turbines). It has to be noted
that replaceability and good operating conditions are not only a
question of technology but also economy and business. For exam-
ple, although a large number of steam generators have already
been replaced successfully worldwide, it is very improbable that
the 24 steam generators in the Paks NPP would ever be replaced.
From practical aspects this seems baseless and therefore the steam
generators belong to the group of components that also limit the
plant technical life. Nevertheless, the factors that have an influ-
ence on or determine the operational life of the plant can be fol-
lowed, inspected and with proper tools controlled and thus the
maximum possible lifetime can be achieved by appropriate strate-
gies for operation, maintenance, renewal, and so on.
The safety of the plant is an absolutely necessary but not suffi-
cient condition of the life extension. The plant owner has a goal to
implement a comprehensive safety enhancement program. In this
way the safety criteria of continuous operability will be ensured.
An important factor in the safety aspects of operational life exten-
sion is also taken into account: the safety requirements of the
2020s will have to be fulfilled if the units are operated after the
design lifetime.
There are many economic aspects of life extension, as well. As
an example the possible reduction of the decommissioning costs
may be mentioned. By extending the operational life of the units,
the net present value of decommissioning might be decreased.
In spite of the expected legal and other problems and difficul-
ties, it is very probable that the licensing of the life extension of
the Paks NPP will be easier than the licensing of a new nuclear
power plant would be.
There is a good chance that the Paks NPP will remain a pre-
dominant factor in the Hungarian electricity generation market as
a competitive alternative, since Paks has been a successfully oper-
ated NPP with a continuously high and stable energy availability
factor. It can be operated safely and is fulfilling all the require-
ments for many years ahead. It is therefore believed that, as a
clean source of energy, the plant is the most important factor in
completing the global environment and climate protection obliga-
tions of the country.
65.2.2 Regulatory Aspects
The ASME Code is a systematic and logical structure of the
requirements. Its logic is based on that the components inspected in
accordance with its Section XI, and tested in accordance with the
OM Code during operations, were constructed in-line with other
Code sections mainly Section III requirements. To apply ISI and
IST requirements for an NPP, which was constructed according to
different codes, will require a systematic and in-depth review of the
operational licensing conditions, and a comparative assessment of
the relevant ASME Code requirements and the existing ones.
The Hungarian regulatory rules [1] do not explicitly determine
the applicable codes and standards neither for plant construction
nor for ISI and IST. The only statement is that codes and stan-
dards must be “authoritative.” The Hungarian regulatory practice
is based on the former Soviet regulatory document OPB-73 [2]
and the relevant Normative Technical Documents (NTDs) [3–5]
issued in early seventies. The document OPB can be considered
as an equivalent to 10 CFR 50, and the NTDs as the equivalent
documents to the relevant sections of the ASME Code. The NTDs
contain requirements for design, manufacturing, commissioning,
and operation, mainly from nuclear safety point of view. No docu-
ment, however, deals with the evaluation of integrity of pressur-
ized components and piping during operation. Also no periodic
revision and upgrading of the NTDs (Soviet Codes) were foreseen
and realized1; thus they do not follow the development in the
areas of fracture mechanics and nondestructive examination
(NDE) that are necessary for integrity evaluation. Based on these,
it is hard to say that the current Hungarian rules are “authorita-
tive.” The ASME Code obviously meets this criterion.
This fact gives, on one hand, a clear opportunity for the plant
owner because the regulatory rules [1] do not exclude the use of
any codes and, on the otherhand, a moral pressure for the owner
underlying his plan to adapt the requirements of ASME a code
being “authoritative.” Using the term of adaptation refers to the
ASME requirements fitted in a special situation because Paks
NPP has not been constructed, commissioned, and operated up to
now in-line with the relevant sections of ASME Code. Special
situation means another code replaces meeting a certain code
requirement. This procedure is not unique in the world, however,
it is far from being routine and can not be applied for each code
criterion as well (e.g., selection of structural materials or manu-
facturing processes).
Basic regulatory principles related to ASME adaptations are as
follows:
(a) The first step of the adaptation is based on Section XI edi-
tion 2001, the decision regarding later edition is made after
the assessment of experience.
(b) The ISI program interval under execution must utilize cur-
rent requirements, the modification can be implemented
afterwards.
(c) Pressure vessels and pipelines, which are critical from the
point of view of structural and functional integrity, must
demonstrate the strength for design, operational, emergency,
and test conditions.
(d) The adaptation of ISI program and the requirements are
based on strength analysis according to Section III. If the
compliance cannot be verified because of VVER character-
istics or other reasons, the ASME Code cannot be used for
the ISI requirements (acceptance flaw size, inspection peri-
od, etc.) but extra requirements shall be developed and
applied. It may be the former ISI program requirement, or a
new program based on the ASME that justifies the safety
requirements.
(e) Hungary does not apply the Appendix VIII of Section XI
(performance demonstration) as a mandatory requirement.
The qualification of ISI/NDE systems (procedures, equip-
ment, and personnel) is carried out according to the
methodology developed by the European Network for
Inspection and Qualification (ENIQ) [6] as well as related
IAEA document [7].
(f) The certification of NDE personnel shall conform to the
requirements of the European standard EN 473 [8], but
additional requirements are applicable, for example, Eddy
Current Inspectors of steam generator heat exchanger tube
shall take an EPRI QDA examination.
(g) The adaptation of ASME Code makes its necessary to intro-
duce a transition period in case of some components. The
1
A second set of the NTDs was published between 1987 and 1990 but
VVER-440 type reactors (including Paks NPP) were practically
designed in accordance with the first set.
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reason for this is that new ISI program may consists of new
examinations or the new examinations may be used together
with the old ones. For example, the UT Examination of the
RPV cylindrical part had to be performed from outside
according to the previous ISI program however according to
ASME it shall be done from inside. If the examination from
both outside and inside will be performed the results should
be harmonized.
(h) The safety classification of the component according to the
Hungarian regulation and that of the Section III should be
assessed and, in a borderline case, individual evaluation is
necessary.
(i) International experience related to the application of the
ASME requirements should be reviewed.
(j) A systematic training program shall be developed prior to
the application of ASME requirements.
65.2.3 Current Status of the Works
In parallel with the systematic and in-depth analysis of the legal
and regulatory aspects, which is currently in progress, in some of
the technical areas the works conducted by technical support
organizations and consultants have already been approaching their
final stage. As a result of these works, the necessary modifications
were proposed on the relevant documents (programs, procedures,
etc.), and also new documents were elaborated. The document
proposals have continuously been reviewed by competent inde-
pendent consulting bodies, and the necessary corrections have
been added. The experts of the regulator are involved into the
process as observers. An application for the approval is expected
in the first half of 2008.
65.3 MAIN FEATURES OF THE CURRENT
HUNGARIAN ISI SYSTEM
65.3.1 General Aspects
NPPs with VVER type reactors were fully designed in accor-
dance with former Soviet rules and standards. These documents
were developed practically independently from that of PWR ones
even though main safety principles are similar. Of course, differ-
ences in the level of science, safety approaches, technical, and
manufacturing capabilities and possibilities had a strong influence
on their development. Moreover, some special technical approach-
es, mainly in integrity evaluation, were based on specific structure
and independence of the Soviet research and design institutes.
Thus, even some principal differences between the Soviet rules
(NTDs) and the ASME Code exist that result in smaller or larger
nonconsistency either in approaches and/or in final solutions.
The currently used Hungarian ISI program differs both in its
structure and technical parameters from that of the Section XI. Its
scope is narrower: it covers the planning, scheduling and imple-
mentation of the inspections, and recording and evaluation of the
results. Other items such as IST, repair and replacement are
included in different regulations and plant procedures in accor-
dance with the Hungarian regulatory rules. The Hungarian ISI
program consists of three major components:
(a) Periodic NDE,
(b) Structural Examination,
(c) System Pressure Test.
Periodic NDE and System Pressure Test do not need further expla-
nation; the Structural Examination may be equivalent to the VT-3
type Visual Examination in Section XI. There is no single Section
XI like framework document at Hungary; instead individual docu-
ments for the various systems entitled Technical Inspection Plans
and a specific set of documents for the Periodic NDE exist.
65.3.1 ISI/NDE Program
The roots of the initial ISI (more precisely the Periodic NDE)
program at Paks NPP go back to early 1980s, which was the
period of the construction and commissioning of the units. First
version of the program was summarized in a set of documents
consisting of two main parts. Part One was practically the NDE
program itself, and Part Two was a complementary document to
the program describing the NDE methods used. Actually the
entire program (Part One) consisted of 10 individual subprograms
(called Frame-programs) as follows:
(1) Reactor Pressure Vessel
(2) RPV Upper Unit
(3) RPV Internals
(4) Main Coolant Piping
(5) Steam Generator
(6) Pressurizer
(7) Hydro-accumulator
(8) Primary Piping
(9) Containment Boundary
(10) Secondary Piping.
The Part Two document entitled Methodology and Criterion
Document was not yet a step-by-step procedure but included all
important setting and calibration parameters, which were neces-
sary for ensuring the reproducibility of the examinations. It also
contained the acceptance criteria for each inspection area and NDE
method. These ISI/NDE rules had been applied during the validity
of the first Atomic Energy Act. The Frame-program and the
Methodology and Criterion Document were subjected to the
approval of regulatory authority, and had to be revised annually.
After issuing the second, modified Atomic Energy Act in 1996, the
regulator issued a guidance for Periodic Material Testing (focusing
on NDE) [9] requiring the restructuring of the existing NDE docu-
ments in three parts: NDE Program, Acceptance Standards, and
NDE Procedures. Thus the NDE instructions became separate vol-
umes with unified form and structure. These NDE procedures had
also an extended and more detailed content in comparison with the
former ones. According to the latest version of the regulatory rules
(in force since 2005) it is not necessary for the NDE procedures to
be approved any more.
One of the biggest differences between the Hungarian ISI/NDE
rules and the Section XI lies in the conceptual difference of the
acceptance standards. For UT, which has the primary importance
within the ISI/NDE, the most significant difference is shown.
Section V and XI define a Primary Reference Response (PRR),
which may be either a Side-Drilled Hole (SDH) or a notch. In
ASME Code editions before 1989, the recording level was 50%
PRR, after 1989 this value, as a consequence of the PISC2 results
[10], was reduced to 20% PRR. Exceeding this level a sizing is nec-
essary. The 1995 and latter issues of Section XI require a qualified
UT procedure. The fundamental difference between the Hungarian
approach and the ASME lays in that Section XI acceptance
2
Plate Inspection Steering Committee, Later Programme for Inspection
of Steel Components.
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592 • Chapter 65
criteria are determined for direct application in fracture mechanics
evaluation.
In Hungary, as a consequence of adoption of the Soviet approach,
evaluation of UT has been based on a comparison between the
amplitude and the amplitude given by a reference reflector. It is
based on the fact that the relevant NTD [5] was originally developed
for plant construction. The reference reflectors are usually Flat
Bottom Holes (FBHs). Thus, the acceptance level is characterized
by an equivalent FBH diameter. The registration level is usually
equal to that of the construction (component manufacturing); in the
beginning the acceptance level was equal to the reference level, and
later, this level was increased by 12 dB. According to experimental
results this increased level (plus 12 dB on FBH basis) is roughly
equal to the 100% PRR (on SDH basis). Only if the UT signal
amplitude exceeds this acceptance level a sizing and fracture
mechanics evaluation have to be performed.
This process shows an agreement with the process described in
Subsection IWB-3000 of Section XI and suggests that the accep-
tance levels in both systems are the same. However, the agreement
is only a virtual one because there is just little if not any phys-
ical content behind the amplitude-based acceptance level (equiva-
lent FBH diameter) and, thus, it is not compatible with fracture
mechanics, being the tools of structural integrity assessment. This
method may be called an “analogue” method referring to the anal-
ogy between the amplitudes as well as expressing its limitations. A
real acceptance level has to be formulated in the language of frac-
ture mechanics (namely in crack size), which would exclude the
usage of the amplitude-based method. This simply means that
there is no acceptance level according to ASME terminology in the
current Hungarian ISI/NDE rule. The aforementioned are shown
in Fig. 65.1. In case of Class 1 components, the ISI interval takes
four years, in case of lower safety classes it takes eight years.
65.3.2 Technical Inspection Plans
The Technical Inspection Plans consist of the conditions and
parameters of the so-called “Structural Examinations” and the
System Pressure Tests. These documents just refer to the periodic
Current approach
Repair/replacement, or
fracture mechanics analysis
Indication size
+12 dB
Recording
„analogue”method
100% PRR (FBH)
Evaluation based
on flaw
characteristics
FIG. 65.1 DIFFERENT EVALUATION CONCEPTS OF THE CURRENT
HUNGARIAN ISI / NDE RULES AND SECTION XI [11]
NDE, and assume their prior accomplishment and results meeting
the acceptance criteria. Structural Examinations contain the docu-
mentation control, and the visual examination of the accessible out-
side and inside surfaces of the component or piping. Its objective is
to check the general structural condition of the component or piping.
Some differences appear in the qualification of NDE personnel
doing the Structural Examination (VT-3) as well as System Pressure
Test (VT-2), namely the current Hungarian rules do not require a
certification of the qualifications for these operations.
There are differences in the pressure test parameters, too.
Pressure values of the system leakage and the hydrostatic tests, test
condition holding time, and instrumentation parameters somewhat
differ. In general, pressure values currently used in Hungary are
higher than the values given by the Section XI. The biggest differ-
ence is that there is a periodic hydrostatic test for Class 1 compo-
nents (in fact the primary coolant pressure boundary) after every
four-year inspection cycle, in an extremely high test pressure. Until
1992 the value of the test pressure was 19.1 MPa while the opera-
tions pressure is 12.3 MPa. In 1993 the regulatory body approved
the decrease of this value up to 16.4 MPa with an on-ine acoustic
emission test during the hydrotest.
Neither the ISI/NDE Frame-programs, the Methodology and
Criterion Document nor any of the Technical Inspection Plans
have a clear procedure for those situations when NDE and other
examination/test results exceed acceptance criteria. They only say
that in case of a nonconformance the Outage Commission (a com-
mission steering outage implementation) should decide upon.
65.4 INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES
As it was mentioned before, a prerequisite expressed by the regu-
lator was to survey and analyze international practical experience
on usage of ASME requirements. The survey concentrated on
European experience, and covered countries both with NPPs in
operation designed and inspected/tested in accordance with ASME
Code, and with NPPs designed in accordance with another (former
ASME approach
LEVELS Critical
Not-allowable
(IWB-3600)
Acceptance level
Flaw size
(fitness-for-service)
Allowable
(IWB-3500)
sizing
Acceptance level 100% DAC (SDH)
(quality control)
Reference level
(recording level)
20% DAC (SDH)
Registration level
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 593
Soviet) code, where Section XI requirements have been introduced
in a later stage of the operation. In the group of the “homogeneous”
ASME application, experiences of Belgium, Switzerland and Spain
were analyzed. More relevant and valuable information could be
collected in case of Finland and the Czech Republic.
In Finland, the Section XI requirements were adapted to the
pressurized components and piping ISI in Loviisa NPP (two units
of VVER-440) from the beginning of the operation (late seventies).
It was originally required by STUK, the Finnish Radiation and
Safety Authority, through its nuclear safety guide YVL 3.8 [12].
This guide states that the ISI basic requirements shall be according
to Section XI, and deviations from the Code shall be justified. In
the early stage of the plant operation, comparative calculations
were carried out for the primary coolant piping as well as some
analyses were done for the secondary pipelines to check their flexi-
bility but without a complete fatigue analysis. The guide YVL 3.5
gives the requirements for the strength analyses [13], which refers
to the chapters of Section III. The main coolant pumps in Loviisa
NPP differ from the Russian design, and their design basis was in-
line with ASME requirements. In 1996, the pressurizer safety
valves were reconstructed and, in that connection, the pipelines
from the pressurizer to the relief tank were redesigned and analyzed
in accordance with Section III. In case of the RPV, Pressurized
Thermal Shock (PTS) analysis and a fatigue evaluation of the noz-
zles were carried out and compared with the Russian design
requirements. In a few cases, in which the ASME Code require-
ments could not be fulfilled, STUK requested additional justifica-
tion (detailed calculations) and issued special approval.
The qualification of ISI systems , in accordance with the YVL
3.8, shall follow the European methodology for qualification [6]
as the minimum requirement level. Consequently, the Appendix
VIII of Section XI is not used. In the qualification process, the
critical crack sizes for technical justifications have been assessed,
however, in accordance with the Appendices A, C, and H of
Section XI. Qualification of Welding Procedure Specifications
(WPS) is carried out following the principles of Section IX weld-
ing regulations (essential welding parameters, test coupons, sam-
pling, test specimens, testing requirements, and qualification
areas). However, testing procedures and qualification of welders
are based on European standards (EN).
In the former Czechoslovakia, the NPPs in Dukovany (four
units of VVER-440) and in Temelín (two units of VVER-1000)
were built under the agreement with the former Soviet Union in
context of a mutual cooperation in building nuclear power plants.
Within this agreement, the main tendency was to use Soviet
design and manufacturing standards and rules [14, 15], as far as it
was possible. In the early 1980s, there was an attempt under the
umbrella of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(COMECON) to develop technical standards for NPPs. A funda-
mental problem of this project was the unsolved legal status of
these standards and the extremely low effectiveness of their uti-
lization. Moreover, neither Soviet standards nor COMECON ones
contained rules directly applicable for operating plants. For exam-
ple assessment of flaws, found during ISI, had to be based on
acceptance standards valid for manufacturing, and on special pro-
cedures, prepared by Technical Support Organizations (TSOs)
and component manufacturers, and accepted by the Czech State
Office for Nuclear Safety (SONS) in a case-by-case basis.
Thus, in 1993, SONS initiated a project “Requirements for
Lifetime Evaluation of VVER Main Components.” Within this
project, a preparation of regulatory requirements for lifetime eval-
uation of reactor components, including all aspects of integrity
and degradation processes, was performed. These requirements
were then concentrated into RPV and RPV internals and were
issued as a SONS document. In this document no practical proce-
dure for lifetime evaluation was given, only general, and some
detailed technical requirements were described. About in the
same time, a second activity was initiated by the Czech
Association of Mechanical Engineers (ASI) that decided that a set
of Codes for Reactor Components was necessary for the Czech
nuclear industry. To assure an effective and high level expertise of
the code preparation, a structure similar to ASME was accepted
and implemented: main committee for code preparation, commit-
tees for the individual sections, and also committees for special
cases. These committees included practically all main experts in
the field that were available in the Czech Republic (TSOs, manu-
facturers, designers, and also SONS). This ASI Code was planned
to be prepared in six sections, specifically:
• Section I: Welding and brazing of components and piping
of VVER type NPPs,
• Section II: Characteristics of materials for components and
piping of VVER type NPPs,
• Section III: Strength assessment of components and piping
of VVER type NPPs,
• Section IV: Evaluation of residual lifetime of components
and piping of VVER type NPPs,
• Section V: Material testing procedures and evaluation,
• Section VI: Air condition systems for VVER type NPPs.
It was accepted that the individual sections should follow the
conventional format used for PWRs, where the specific features
of the VVERs and their structural materials were taken into
account. The first two sections primarily concentrate on the fact
that only Soviet type materials were allowed for use in VVER
NPPs according to the former Soviet Codes. Change of some
materials manufactured according to Soviet standards into Czech
or other foreign ones was necessary. The Section III was practi-
cally fully consistent with the Soviet standard [15] as all compo-
nents in Czech NPPs were designed and manufactured according
to this standard. The proposed procedure in Section IV was fully
elaborated as a new procedure based on the SONS “Requirements
for Lifetime Evaluation of VVER Main Components” but, at the
same time, it represented a maximum harmonization of VVER
and PWR Codes for component integrity evaluation. Section V is
still under the process of finalization with the aim to issue it at the
end of 2007.
Then it was felt that for such a new procedure as in Section IV,
an international cooperation would be useful and effective as
experts from other VVER operating countries, at least within the
European Union, should be incorporated and their experience and
views should be taken into account. Within the European
Commission’s 5th Framework Program, a document entitled
“Unified Procedure for Lifetime Assessment of Components and
Piping in VVER NPPs – VERLIFE” was elaborated [16]. This
procedure had to be based on former Soviet rules and codes, as
VVER components were designed and manufactured in accor-
dance with requirements of these codes and from prescribed mate-
rials. A critical analysis of applicability of some approaches used
in PWR components was performed, and such approaches have
been incorporated into the prepared procedure as much as possible
with the aim of a harmonization of VVER and PWR Codes and
procedures. The VERLIFE project was realized in a network of the
safety managers and experts of the plants together with experts
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594 • Chapter 65

from TSOs and also from national regulatory bodies of Finland,
Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary, and Bulgaria [17].
The examples of Finland and the Czech Republic showed dif-
ferent approaches of introducing new codes during the NPP oper-
ating period. In Finland the regulator decided to adapt ASME
requirements; the Czech approach was a joint effort of the regu-
lator and the domestic nuclear industry. In Finland Sections III
and XI are in use and in Czech Republic the newly introduced
code shows a strong similarity in format as well as in content to
ASME Code while retaining the technical features of VVER.
Both approaches provide lessons learned for the ASME adapta-
tion process in Hungary.
(Operation and Maintenance Code Case Acceptability, ASME
OM Code) were analyzed.
The aforementioned documents were compared with their equiv-
alent documents of the Hungarian legislative and nuclear regulatory
system, mainly the Act of Atomic Energy, and the Government
Decree in the procedure of the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority
regarding nuclear safety regulatory matters and the Nuclear Safety
Regulations [1] that are annexes to the Government Decree. The
relevant orders issued by HAEA were also assessed. The compara-
tive assessment has underlined the feasibility of the adaptation from
the legislative as well as regulatory point of view.

65.6 ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

65.5 COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT
OF THE U.S. AND HUNGARIAN
LEGISLATIVE/REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK
The preparatory works started with studying parts of the U.S.
legal system, which rule the ASME Code application. It included
the relevant parts of the Atomic Energy Act, the Energy
Reorganization Act, the Administrative Procedure Act and the
National Environmental Policy Act;, and the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) with special regard to 10 CFR Part 50. Also
relevant Regulatory Guides of the USNRC such as R.G. 1.26
(Quality Group Classifications and Standards for Water-, Steam-,
and Radioactive-Waste-Containing Components of NPPs), R.G.
1.84 (Design, Fabrication, and Materials Code case Acceptability,
ASME Section III), R.G. 1.147 (In-service Inspection Code case
Acceptability, ASME Section XI, Division 1), and R.G. 1.192
OF INDIVIDUAL DOCUMENTS
65.6.1 Development of the New ISI System
Figure 65.2 shows the scheme of this part of the project. It can
be seen that basically two sets of documents were created: back-
ground studies and documents of the new ISI program. The back-
ground studies cover the comparative assessment of the existing
Hungarian ISI program and those relevant to Section XI; the fea-
sibility studies deal with the introduction of a risk-informed ISI
(RI-ISI) and the development and implementation of inspection
qualification. The new ISI program documents include the modi-
fied ISI plans, the acceptance standards, a set of qualification tar-
get flaw configurations, and the NDE procedures.
The Section XI refers to Section III group classification criteria.
The NCA-2110(c) states, however, that a detailed classification
can be determined in accordance with the system level criteria of
the regulatory authority (USNRC in the USA, and HAEA in

BACKGROUND
ISI PROGRAM
STUDIES

Acceptance Qualification ISI Plans

standards Requirements

Comparison of
RPV
current and
ASME based Qualification
Level1 Objectives RPV Upper Unit
ISI program
(current
standards) RPV Internals
RPV belt line
region Main Coolant Piping
Feasibility of
piping RI-ISI Main coolant Steam Generator
program Level 2 piping
(ASME Pressurizer
standards) SG collector
Hydro-accumulator
ligament
Inspection Primary Piping
qualification
plan SG tubing
Containment Boundary

Secondary Piping
NDE procedures

FIG. 65.2 THE SCHEME OF THE ASME ADAPTATION IN ISI / NDE PROGRAM [11]
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 595
Hungary). This system level classification is the responsibility of
the plant owner, and the classification results have to be included
in the system design specifications. Accordingly, these criteria are
written in the USA in 10 CFR 50.55a, and in Hungary in the
Nuclear Safety Rules [1] and their relevant regulatory guideline
[18]. The Hungarian classification was developed on the basis of
the IAEA Safety Guide 50-SG-D1 [19]. Having thoroughly com-
pared all the information in both Section III and XI as well as in
References [1] and [18], it can be concluded that no remarkable
difference between them exists. As a consequence of this the
ASME Class 1, 2, and 3 are considered to be in compliance with
Safety Classes 1, 2, and 3 in the Hungarian classification scheme.
The containment ISI requirements in Hungary differ, however, sig-
nificantly from the Section XI requirements as a consequence of
the significantly different design of VVER-440 NPPs (active pres-
sure-suppression function, without reinforced concrete). ISI of
pump casings and valve bodies are currently included in the scope
of a predefined maintenance work bank (except for the main cool-
ing pump and main gate valve3).
A comprehensive analysis and evaluation of both Section XI
and the relevant Hungarian documents (ISI/NDE program,
Methodology and Criterion Document, Technical Inspection Plans,
various maintenance procedures, etc.) have been conducted by the
plant’s contractors and consultants. As a result of this work the rele-
vant documents were modified, and also new documents were
elaborated. The documents have been reviewed by competent inde-
pendent consulting bodies, and necessary corrections were added.
The ISI/NDE subprograms did not require a complete rewrite.
The necessary amendments such as inserting examinations of
pump casing, valve bodies, and of welded attachments were
completed. While doing their modifications to the relevant
requirements in Subsection IWB, IWC, IWD-2500 of Section XI
the results of component ageing assessment (and ageing manage-
ment in general) were taken into consideration. Instead of the
original four-year ISI cycle, an eight-year cycle was considered,
which is not contradictory to the Section XI inspection schedule,
and to which the transition from the current system can easily be
done.
Preparation of the new NDE procedures needed a greater effort.
In the course of their revision the main goal was not only to adapt
the Section V requirements but also to create a completely uni-
form set of documents in terms of format, structure, and concept.
Also the following requirements have been set up as basic aspects
for the smooth transition from the old system to the new one:
(a) The NDE results had to be fully comparable with the
results of examinations performed when using previous
procedures.
(b) The coordinate systems used by preceding versions of pro-
cedures could not be changed.
(c) The new procedures had to completely fulfill all applicable
internal regulations at Paks NPP.
(d) The environmental and technological conditions of the
given inspection should remain the same.
(e) The certification of NDE personnel should conform to the
requirements of the relevant Hungarian standard, which is
fully identical with the European standard EN 473 [8].
3
Main gate valve is a specific VVER feature; each loop contains two
isolation valves with an isolation function mainly during maintenance
outage.
All revised NDE procedures contain the same type of informa-
tion under the same chapters and subchapters with the same
degree of details and also with same quality of wording. In the
previous version acceptance standards were an inherent part of
the procedures, which have been maintained within the new ones
because of the NPP request. Besides the former criteria the accep-
tance standards given in IWB, IWC, IWD-3500 of Section XI
have also been introduced. Another new element of the revised
procedures is the application of different visual inspection cate-
gories (VT-1, 2 and 3) according to Section XI, which was not
taken into account before in Hungary.
Regardless of the introduction of Section XI acceptance stan-
dards, Paks NPP decided on continued use of the original accep-
tance level (pertaining to quality control level, see Fig. 65.1). The
idea means that NDE results would first be evaluated against cur-
rent criteria (Level 1) and, only if the results could not meet the
criteria, they had to be evaluated according to the Section XI
(Level 2). This concept has been underpinned by the feasibility
studies that state that Section XI acceptance standards are usually
less rigorous than Hungarian ones.
Due to the fact that Section V uses SDHs as reference reflectors
for UT calibration, a series of laboratory experiments was done.
The PRR values based on FBH were compared with the ones
based on SDH. The results intended to validate the equation for
converting the different types of reference reflector to each other:
DFBH ⫽ 0.67 2l 1DSDH *S (65.1)
where
DFBH ⫽ equivalent reflector diameter, FBH (mm),
DSDH ⫽ equivalent reflector diameter, SDH (mm),
␭ ⫽ wavelength (mm),
s ⫽ sound path (mm).
Equation (65.1) is valid for s ⬎ 0.7 N (N ⫽Dp2Ⲑ4␭, length of
near field in mm), Dp ⫽ effective probe diameter in mm, and DSDH
⬎ 1.5 ␭. Experimental results showed however that the validity
condition s ⬎ 0.7 N seems too rigorous and, thus, it often leads to
inaccurate results. On the contrary, literature data says that results
with a sound path three to five times near field length are reason-
able [20, 21].
Test blocks from carbon steel with model reflectors (SDH
diameters of 3 mm and 6.3 mm; FBH diameters of 5 mm, 7 mm,
and 10 mm) were used for the UT measurements. The validity of
equation (65.1) could be justified for the range of FBHs ⫽ 5–7
mm, and s ⬎ N, using 2 MHz and 0⬚ probes, and Distance–
Amplitude Correction (DAC). In other ranges of FBH, due to the
randomly variable influencing factors, instead of the exact
results, it was better to evaluate the tendencies using DAC con-
version according to equation (65.1) for large FBH reflectors (10
mm) that resulted in smaller than real diameters. Measurements
of FBH reflectors based on DGS (Distance-Gain-Size) are cor-
rect; however, the conversion to SDH diameters shows larger
than real values. The conversion does not seem to be correct
(some times even extremely incorrect) but results always remain
on the safer side. In case of both types of sensitivity calibration,
the measured and converted values with increasing sound path
tended to approach the real values.
Based on the results of these experiments and evaluating real UT
data according to Section XI, it was concluded that a good confor-
mity with ASME requirements can be achieved for the Level 1
evaluation if the reference level of 100% PRR (FBH) considered.
ASME_Ch65_p589-600.qxd 6/3/09 1:32 PM Page 596
596 • Chapter 65
65.6.1 Structural Examinations
The Section XI does not speak about “structural examinations”
but the requirements of VT-3 visual examinations actually seem
to be equivalent to the requirements of the structural examina-
tions. Taking this into account it was decided to leave the institu-
tion of “structural examinations” as it was in the past. Those visu-
al examinations where VT-1 requirements are prescribed, and
which previously were part of the structural examinations (in
practice VT-3), will require NDE personnel having EN 473 certi-
fication (welded attachments for vessels, piping, pumps and
valves, category D-A according to IWD-2500).
65.6.2 Pressure Tests
Leakage tests are traditionally not parts of the Technical
Inspection Plans; they are conducted by operations personnel dur-
ing restart of the units. The fundamental change is in the applica-
tion of Section XI hydrostatic pressure test values with special
regard to the test of primary coolant pressure boundary. Until
1993 the test pressure value was 19.1 MPa (operations pressure at
nominal power is 12.2 MPa), which is extremely high, and does
not correspond to any safety rules, not even [3]. In 1993, the value
was allowed by the regulator to reduce to 16.6 MPa, which was
still high enough compared with that of Section XI. This is
planned in the new ISI system, in line with the concept of ASME,
which gives the preference to NDE against unnecessary compo-
nent overloading with pressure test, that hydrostatic test of prima-
ry coolant pressure boundary will not be carried out unless any
repair or replacement occurs. This concept will be adapted in a
later phase of following ASME requirements.
65.6.3 Repair and Replacement Activities
As it was previously mentioned repair and replacement was
organized differently at Paks NPP from ASME approach.
Procedures for the various activities (defect removal, welding
repair, etc.) exist but Section XI like repair/replacement program
and plan do not apply. To be in harmony with Section XI require-
ments, a unified structure for repair procedures were developed
using the existing ones as a basis. Also OM Code requirements
have been taken into consideration when updating the relevant
procedures.
65.7 DESIGN REVIEW OF SELECTED
COMPONENTS
1).
IWA-1200 of Section XI states that its application begins
when the requirements of the Construction Code have been sat-
isfied. Therefore, it is necessary to justify the compliance with
the design, material selection, manufacturing, quality assurance
criteria in accordance with Section III, and other relevant
ASME sections. Since the Paks NPP used [3] a basis instead of
ASME Code, thus an absolute compliance cannot be achieved.
As an acceptable approach, the equivalence of the requirements
has been assessed. To support the systematic performance of a
comparative assessment of the construction requirements in the
U.S. and Hungarian system, the HAEA recently issued a spe-
cial regulatory guide on strength analysis of operating pressur-
ized components [22].
As noted previously the Hungarian regulatory system is open
and receptive. This recent guidance [22] refers explicitly first to
ASME Code. The STUK Guides YVL 3.5 [13] and YVL 3.8 [12]
show strong similarity, see Section 65.4. These documents refer to
USNRC regulations and ASME BPVC as “basic regulations.”
The significant difference in the content of the Hungarian guide-
line compared to YVL 3.5, covering new power plant facilities, is
that [22] supports only analyses relating to modification and sub-
stantiation of operating life extension of nuclear facilities.
Therefore, in guideline [22] questions arising in connection with
matching of more than 30 years old construction (based on Soviet
Codes and Standards) with the current U.S. safety requirements,
may gain wider ground.
In case of selected components (reactor coolant pressure bound-
ary, main steam line, feedwater system, residual heat removal sys-
tem, chemical and volume control system, emergency core cooling
system, and primary circuit purification system), a design review
process is now in progress covering the following aspects:
• Justification of strength calculation for design, operation,
maintenance and test, and accident loading.
• Justification of brittle fracture resistance by means of fracture
mechanics calculations (for relevant components).
• Justification of overpressure protection values.
• Fatigue calculations for critical components for the entire 50
years of operation taking into consideration a power upgrade
(for relevant components).
• Determination of operational monitoring parameters when
possible.
As an example for the currently ongoing design review process,
the comparison of Fatigue Strength Reduction Factors (FSRF) for
welds in pressure vessels and piping is shown. The Russian
(Soviet) Codes [14, 15] contain FSRF of different types of weld-
ing joints. According to this the allowable stress amplitude of
welding joints – except in the case of non full-penetration weld-
ing joint is specified by the following formula (eq. 65.2)
[aF]s  s [aF]s (65.2)
where
[aF]s – postulated elastic stress allowable amplitude, specified
by Wöhler curve, or by a formula related to the base metal at a
given cyclic number,
s – factor that depends on the base metal, the welding process,
and the post weld heat treatment (s
The values of FSRF related to a given welded joint are listed in
Table 65.1.
If the s value is not known, the data from Table 65.2 are
applicable.
The ASME Codes does not give detailed guidance to specifica-
tion of FSRF, so the WRC (Welding Research Council) reports
shall be considered to be applicable. According to these reports
there is a relationship between the NDE and the applied FSFR
factors. The WRC Bulletin 432 [24] showed one of these relation-
ships. A matrix of FSRFs was developed based on welding type
(full- or, partial-penetration, and fillet welds) versus the NDE that
is applied. The basis of the WRC report is the requirement that
mechanical properties of the welding joint cannot be worse than
those of the base metal. (it is fully adequate to the Russian
requirements). That is, according to the requirement FSRF would
be 1.0 in the case of full-penetration butt welds. The question is,
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 597

TABLE 65.1 WELDING FATIGUE REDUCTION FACTORS [23]

Base Metal Welding Procedure Welding Material Post-Weld-Heat-Treatment s

Steel
12Ch2MFA, Manual Welding electrode: Annealing 1.0
15Ch2MFA, N-3, N-6, N-10
15Ch2MFA-A
Mechanized fusion Welding rod and wire:   0.7 if
welding Sv-10ChMFT, (aF)  500 MPa;
Sv-10ChMFTU  1.3410.241g(F)
if 70
(aF)  500
MPa;
  0.9
if (aF)  70 Mpa
Mechanized overlay Welding rod and wire Annealing 0.8
welding, strip Sv-07Ch25N13,
electrode with flux Sv-08Ch19N10G2B
Manual overlay Welding electrode: Annealing 0.8
welding with ZI0-8, EA-898/21B
electrodes
Stainless steel Manual Welding electrode: Without PWHT 1.0
EA-395/9
Argon arc welding Welding electrode: Annealing 0.8
EA-400-10U,
EA-898/21B, ZI0-8
Welding rod and wire: Without PWHT,
SZv-04Ch19N11M3 Annealing 1.0

with which NDE method and in which volume the weld should be
inspected.
The WRC document classifies the welds based on the follow-
ing three main criteria:
• Type of welding joint (butt, fillet, penetration full-partial)
• Weld surface machined (chipping, grinding)
• Nondestructive examination.
The method of PWHT is not discussed in WRC document. The
document claims that if there is no Post-Weld-Heat-Treatment
(PWHT) fatigue stress may be reduced. The Russian documents
suggest the PWHT for other consideration as well, for example,
to reduce stress when welding of valve connection by cladding
material is applied. FSFR values are in Table 65.3.
The results of the influence factors comparison can be seen in
Table 65.4. The relationship of the two systems cannot be estab-
lished on the basis of this comparison. In the Hungarian practice
the determination of the quality level is necessary, if the WRC
documents are applied. For this, the design data and the NDE
documents are available.
Assessing the Russian standard, it can be stated:
• whether the welding process is mechanized or manual,
considerably influences the form of weld, the undercut,
the irregular surface and the weld preparation angle, and so
on,
• the characteristic of the welding material are weld ripples, the
narrow weld run, the welding position and the weaving, and
so on.

TABLE 65.2 WELDING FATIGUE REDUCTION FACTORS [23]

Welding Fatigue Reduction Factors, 

Base Metal (Steel) Annealing Without Annealing
Carbon-, manganese- 0.75 0.75
and alloy steel, RTm
380 Mpa
Steel alloy, 380
RTm  520 MPa 0.70 0.65
Steel alloy, 520
RTm  700 MPa 0.6 0.5
Austenitic steel 0.70 0.60
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598 • Chapter 65

TABLE 65.3 CRITERIA FOR WELDS FSRF [24]

FSRF Quality Level Definition

1.0 1 Machined or ground weld that receives a full volumetric and a surface (MT/PT)
and a VT
1.0–1.2 1 As-welded weld that receives a full volumetric and a surface (MT/PT) and a VT
1.2–1.5 2 Machined or ground weld that receives a partial volumetric and a surface
(MT/PT) and a VT
1.3–1.6 2 As-welded weld that receives a partial volumetric and a surface (MT/PT) and a
VT
1.5 3 Machined or ground weld that receives a surface (MT/PT) and a VT, but the
weld receives no volumetric NDE
1.7 3 As-welded weld that receives a surface (MT/PT) and a VT, but the weld receives
no volumetric NDE
2.0 4 Weld has received a partial or full volumetric and the surface has received VT,
but no MT/PT.
2.0–2.5 5 VT only of the surface, neither volumetric nor MT/PT examination.
2.5–3.0 6 Volumetric only.
3.0–4.0 7 Weld backsides that are nondefinable and/or receive no inspection.

In the former Soviet Union it was the task of the Leading
Scientific Institute to select the welding materials and processes
and to certify them. The manufacturers had to prepare “control
welding joint tests” to demonstrate the adequacy of the welded
joints. The ASME Code is based on the welding procedure speci-
fication and qualification and manufacturers’ responsibility. The
selection of welding materials and processes is the manufacturers’
task.
Conclusion of the comparison of the FSRFs as given in WRC
[24] and Russian documents [14, 15, 23] on representative weld-
ing joints of pressure vessels and pipelines at Paks NPP is that, in
case of WRC, FSRFs are between 1 and 2.5 (the typical value is 1
– 1.2 – 1.6). The Russian documents approach the FSRFs of pres-
sure vessels and piping welds in a totally different way, the
FSRFs are between 1.0 and 0.6, based on Tables 65.1 and 65.2.
Therefore it can be justified that if FSRF  1s, the results of 1
to 1.6 can be considered as equivalent.
TABLE 65.4 INFLUENCE FACTORS ACCORDING TO
RUSSIAN AND WRC DOCUMENTS
65.8 CONCLUSIONS
As a result of this large scale project upgrading to Section XI
and OM Code compatible ISI and IST program has been com-
piled. As a basis for the new ISI program it was decided to keep
the main structure of the Technical Inspection Plans because it
basically justified its applicability and was able to accommodate
the Section XI requirements. The Technical Inspection Plans were
renamed to ISI Plans, which gives a greater emphasis on their
ageing management function and, at the same time, refers to
the evolution of these documents. The new ISI Plans contain all
periodic NDE, structural examinations, and pressure tests, which
were previously done in the framework of the Technical
Inspection Plans and the Section XI requirements as well.
An important issue is the transition from the current ISI system
to the new one. Crucial thing is to keep all licensing condition
always valid, which means that a smooth transition without loos-
ing any examination is necessary. Since the Hungarian regulator
is expecting an overall concept on ASME adaptation, in which ISI
plays the substantial role, Paks NPP has to work on this, and the
regulatory approval of the new system is expected only afterwards
including the way of transition.

FSRF Influence Factor Russian Documents WRCB 432

Welding procedure 65.9 REFERENCES
(manual, mechanized., etc.) ✓ 1. Nuclear Safety Regulations, Volumes 1–4, Hungarian Atomic Energy
Welding material ✓ Authority, Budapest, 2005 (in Hungarian).
2. OPB-73, Basic Regulation on NPP Safety Assurance, Gosgortechnadzor,
Penetration of weld
Moscow, 1973 (in Russian).
(full, partial, backsides) ✓
3. Rules for Construction and Safe Operation of NPP Pressurized
PWHT ✓ Components, Gosgortechnadzor, Moscow, 1972 (in Russian).
Machined or ground weld ✓ 4. OP-1513-72, Basic Rules for Welded Joints and Overlay Welding of
NDE techniques and volume ✓ NPP Pressurized Components, Gosgortechnadzor, Moscow, 1972 (in
Russian).
ASME_Ch65_p589-600.qxd 6/3/09 1:32 PM Page 599

COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 599

5. PK-1514-72, Rules for Control of Welded Joints and Overlay Welding 15. PNAE G-7-002-86, Standard for Strength Calculations of
of NPP Pressurized Components, Gosgortechnadzor, Moscow, 1972 Components and Piping in NPPs, Energoatomizdat, Moscow, 1989
(in Russian). (in Russian).
6. European Methodology for Qualification of Non-Destructive Testing 16. VERLIFE, Unified Procedure for Lifetime Assessment of Components
(third issue).; EUR 17299 EN, Luxembourg; 2007. and Piping in WWER NPPs, Version 5 – Final; 2003.
7. IAEA-EBP-WWER-11, Methodology for Qualification of In-Service 17. Brumovsky, M.: private communications.
Inspection Systems for WWER Nuclear Power Plants, IAEA, Vienna,
18. Regulatory Guide No. 3.1 Rev. 2, Basic Principles for the Safety
1998.
Classification of NPP Systems and Components, Hungarian Atomic
8. EN 473, Nondestructive testing – Qualification and Certification of Energy Authority, Budapest, 2007 (in Hungarian).
NDT Personnel – General Principles, CEN, Paris, 2000.
19. 50-SG-D1, Safety Functions and Component Classification for BWR,
9. Regulatory Guide No. 4.1, In-Service Inspection of NPP Components PWR, and PTR, Safety Guide, IAEA, Vienna, 1979.
(Material testing), Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority, Budapest,
20. Ermolov, I. N., The reflection of ultrasonic waves from targets of sim-
1997 (in Hungarian).
ple geometry, Non-destructive testing, April 1972, p. 87–91.
10. Summary of the Three Phases of the PISC Programme, PISC-Report
21. Walte F: Personal communication, IZFP, Saarbrücken, 2005.
No. 17; 1992.
22. Regulatory Guide No 3.25, Strength Analysis of Operating
11. Trampus, P., Janosi, B. A., Pammer, Z., Ratkai S. and Somogyi, G.,
Pressurized Components, Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority,
Adaptation of ASME Requirements for ISI/NDE at Paks NPP,
Budapest, 2007 (in Hungarian).
Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on NDE in Relation
to Structural Integrity for Nuclear and Pressurized Components, San 23. PNAE G-7-008-89, Rules for Design and Safe Operation of
Diego, CA, USA, 2006. Components and Piping in Nuclear Power Installations,
Energoatomizdat, Moscow, 1990.
12. YVL 3.8 Rev. 3, Nuclear Power Plant Pressure Equipment, In-service
Inspection With Non-destructive Testing Methods, STUK, Helsinki, 24. Hechmer, J. L. and Kuhn, E. J., Fatigue Strength Reduction Factor for
2003. Welds Based on NDE, Welding Research Council, Bulletin 432, New
York, 1998.
13. YVL 3.5, Ensuring the Strength of Nuclear Power Plant Pressure
Devices, STUK, Helsinki, 2002.
14. Standards for Strength Calculations of Components, Steam
Generators, Pressure Vessels and Piping of NPPs and Research
Reactors, Gosgortechnadzor, Moscow, 1972 (in Russian).
ASME_Ch66_p601-624.qxd 6/3/09 2:07 PM Page 601
SOME ASPECTS OF RUSSIAN
REGULATION AND CODES IN
NUCLEAR POWER
Victor V. Kostarev and Alexander V. Sudakov
66.1 BRIEF HISTORY OF REGULATORY
ACTIVITY AND BOILER CODES IN
RUSSIA
A first known historical example of safety regulation activity in
Russia took place in the beginning of 18th century. On December 10,
1719, Emperor Peter first founded a special Berg Board for regu-
lation of booming mining business in Russia [1]. All state and pri-
vate business units were subjected to regulation procedures,
including safety issues of manpower and taxes. Before that
responsibility for mining with different requirements and proce-
dures was on local authorities. In 1804 Russian Empire was divi-
ded into five mining administrative districts with Berg Inspectors
as chief district officers. In 1734 an outstanding Russian geograph-
er and captain of artillery Vassily Tatishchev and mining expert I.
Bijuer prepared first Mining Regulatory Guide that was used in
regional districts up to 1804 when it was officially approved by
the capital Saint-Petersburg City Administration.
In the middle of 19th century, an extensive development of
boiler technology started and caused a lot of accidents every-
where in the world. Since 1843, a requirement for a special boi-
ler inspection came into force. Earlier it was a responsibility of
local province engineers. Only in 1894 the Boiler Inspection
became a separate body in the Russian Ministry of Trade and
Industry. During last decade of 19th century, special rules for
design and operation of boilers were developed. To protect boil-
ers from explosions, it was prescribed, for example, to make
inspection of boiler externals every two years and of internals.
Every 6 years Until 1901, the State was vested with the respon-
sibility of boilers inspection. In 1901, in Warsaw (Poland that
time was a part of Russian Empire), a Society of Steam Boilers
and Engine Engineers was founded and then in 1902 a Boiler
Owners Utility Group appeared. Since that time safety problems
of boilers became a responsibility of Boiler Society and Utility
Group with elimination of State obligations. Thereafter, in 1910
the Society and Utility Group began to give permissions for
boilers operation with controlling of inspection process to local
workshop inspection engineers all over the Russian Empire. One
can notice that the development of boilers’ regulation activity in
CHAPTER
66
Russia in the 18th and the beginning of 19 th centuries was in
agreement with European and American practice and followed
their main steps. As known, the American Society of Boiler
Engineers (ASME) was organized in 1880 and the first boiler
code appeared in 1907 in Massachusetts and thereafter in other
American states.
After the 1917 revolution, the Boiler Inspection that was a part
of the State Mining Regulatory Body became inefficient due to
poor management and organizational problems, including local
problems in districts and parallel divisions, in many of the Soviet
ministries. For example, until 1954 common rules for inspection
and operation of boilers were not developed and did not exist.
This implies that situation in the USSR in the beginning of 1950s
in respect to safety regulation, particularly in boilers regulation,
was similar to what existed in Russia before 1899. It was only in
1954 that by a special decree of Soviet Government the All
Union State Gosgortechnadzor (State Mining and Technical)
Inspection was founded. As a State Department it became
responsible for safety in mining industry as well as for boilers
inspection and regulation.
In 1950s the nuclear power age became a reality and thus
demanded a new approach in safety regulation of such systems.
Initially, all nuclear safety problems were considered by a special
State Control Service created on the basis of Laboratory No. 2.
This laboratory marked the beginning of the All Russian Nuclear
Scientific Center, “Kurchatov Institute.” Until 1983, a safety regu-
lation in nuclear industry had been performed by different depart-
ments of the “Minsredmash” Ministry (USSR analogue of US
DOE). In July 1983, the State Committee for Safety Regulation in
Atomic Power was created that was formally independent from
design and manufacturer suppliers and authorities.
In the1990s minor organizational changes were made in the
Russian nuclear safety regulation, with renaming of one state
authority to another (USSR “Gosatomenergonadzor,” then USSR
“Gospromatomnadzor,” RF “Gosatomnadzor,” and Federal
Service for Nuclear Regulation) until the new Federal
Commission for Ecology, Technology and Nuclear Regulation
“Rostechnadzor” was founded in 2006 with a department for
nuclear safety regulation.
ASME_Ch66_p601-624.qxd 6/3/09 2:07 PM Page 602
602 • Chapter 66
66.2 SYSTEM AND A LIST OF STANDARDS
RELEVANT TO THE STATE SAFETY
REGULATION IN NUCLEAR POWER
The provisions of Russian Nuclear Standards have changed
many times due to political developments in Russia during the
past 20 years. Later, this was regulated by a special normative
document, Regulatory Guide RD-03-42-97 [2]. This Guide states
that the provisions of all normative documents approved by the
Nuclear Regulatory Body are meant for providing nuclear and
radiological safety of nuclear power installations. The objective is
to protect the personnel of nuclear installations, population, and
environment from radiation impact.
The Russian Nuclear Codes and Standards set forth the require-
ments for the safe use of atomic power. It is imperative that such
requirements are met when operating any activity related to the
atomic energy application. The federal standards and amendments
laid down in Regulatory Guide should be approved by the
Russian Federation Government.
The Russian Federal Statute on Use of Nuclear Power No.
170-F3 states that all atomic energy codes and standards are
developed and affirmed in accordance with the procedure estab-
lished by the Russian government [4]. This procedure provides
for publication of the standards in the official journals or newspa-
pers, for example, Nuclear and Radiation Safety Magazine,
issued by NTC YaRB. Recommendations of recognized interna-
tional bodies, for example, International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), and leading nuclear states should also be considered.
Unfortunately, at the moment there are no effective and unified
engineering societies in Russia as it existed during the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries. In contrast, ASME is now able to initi-
ate, perform, and maintain a normative activity as well as a
steady procedure for its development. Usually drafts of new doc-
uments are prepared by a limited group of experts nominated by
Regulatory Body or other Russian authorities. Sometimes new
documents are prepared without consulting recognized experts
from different engineering fields and interested social groups,
which results in lack of significant details that may have influ-
ence on its efficiency.
After approval by Government authorities, Codes and Standards
are officially published. These are mandatory for all organizations,
authorities, institutes, companies, and individuals of the Russian
Federation involved in the use of nuclear energy. An example of
the Russian power plants (NPPs) enforcing Nuclear Codes and
Standards is the State-owned organization named FGUP Concern
Rosenergoatom, a division of a U.S. merger Rosatom. An index of
main standards regulating the safe operation of power units and the
NPP’s entire life cycle–site selection, design, construction, opera-
tion, and decommissioning is affirmed and put into effect by a spe-
cial order of this Concern. In all, 1789 regulations are included in
the index. About 535 regulations relate to maintenance and repair
procedures; 114 to materials technology and metal sensing; 61 to
modification, improvement, and lifetime extension; and only 4 reg-
ulations deal with decommissioning. The index contains regula-
tions of different levels, beginning from the most important
Federal-level documents and ending with specific guidelines (RD)
and instructions issued by operational organization. For example,
one such document required currently for the existing NPPs is RD
EO 01 86-00, “Procedure of Power Units’ Vessels Technical State
and Residual Life Assessment,” that regulates procedures for eval-
uation of NPPs residual life. This is the most relevant issue for
Russian NPPs for consideration of their total operating time.
The whole system and structure of Russian nuclear normative
basis consists of the following three principal levels of documents:
• Federal Norms and Rules in the Area of Nuclear Power
• Safety Guidelines
• Guideline Documents
The Federal Norms and Rules (NP) outlines the general princi-
ples, criteria, and requirements for nuclear and radiological safety
of nuclear installation for its entire life cycle.
The Safety Guidelines (RB) consists of approaches and meth-
ods for performing and fulfilling the Federal Norms and Rules
requirements.
The Guideline Documents (RD) contains organizational prin-
ciples for any activity undertaken by technical and regional
departments of Nuclear Regulatory Body and also includes its
responsibility, interaction, and cooperation.
A complete list of all normative acts and normative documents
relating to nuclear regulation was published in 2007 [3].
The list consists of several principal chapters:
A. Major Regulation Acts (International Acts, Russian Federal
Laws, Presidential and Government Decrees).
I. Nuclear Installations and Complexes with Experimental and
Investigation Reactors and Test Rigs (ship-based reactors,
space, and other transport installations)
II. Nuclear Power Plants
III. Fuel Cycle and Reprocessing Facilities, Transportation of
Fuel and Radiation Materials, and Industrial Reactors.
IV. Radiation Sources, Storage Facilities, and Radiation Waste
V. Nuclear Security for Nuclear Installations, Storages, and
Radiation Materials
The total number of documents from Chapter A to I-V consists
of 320 issues; Chapter A has 82 documents of international and
national character, Chapter I has 136 documents, and Chapter II
has161 documents.
The Federal Norms and Rules (NP) consists of 85 principal
documents, the Safety Guidelines (RB) has 59 documents, and the
Guideline Documents (RD) has 49 books.
Of the documents, the most important ones relate to Nuclear
Power Plants, especially those related to design procedure and
analysis of pressure vessels, piping, and components for NPPs,
such as
• RF Federal Statute on Use of Atomic Power No. 170-F3,
November 21, 1995 [4]
• Federal Statute on Technical Regulation, No. 184-F3,
December 27, 2002 [5]
• General Provisions for Safety of Nuclear Power Plants, OPB-
88/97 (PNAE G-01-011-97/NP-001-97), Gosatomnadzor RF,
1997 [6]
• NPPs Siting, Basic Safety Criteria and Requirements, NP-
032-01, Gosatomnadzor RF, 2001 [7]
• Analysis of External Natural and Man-Caused Events on
NPPs, NP-064-05, Rostechnadzor, 2005 [8]
• Norms for Seismic Design of NPPs, NP-031-01, Gosato-
mnadzor RF, 2001 [9]
• General Provisions for Quality Assurance Program for NPPs,
NP-011-99, Gosatomnadzor RF, 1999 [10]
• Nuclear Safety Rules for Reactor Installations of NPPs, PBYa
RU AS-89 (PNAE G-1-024-90), USSR Gospromatomnadzor,
1990, Gosatomnadzor RF, 1999 [11]
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 603
• Norms for Strength Analysis of Equipment and Piping of
Nuclear Installations, PNAE G-7-002—87, USSR Gosatomen-
ergonadzor, 1986 [12]
• PNAE G-7-009-89 Equipment and Piping of Nuclear Power
Plants. Welding and Hard-Facing. Fundamentals (as amend-
ed of 1999, N 1) [13]
• PNAE G-7-010-89 Equipment and Piping of Nuclear Power
Plants. Weld Joints and Hard-Facing. Control Rules (as
amended of 1999) [14]
• Rules for Design and Safety Operation of Equipment and
Piping of Nuclear Installations,” PNAE G-7-008-89, USSR
Gosatomenergonadzor, 1989, RF Gosatomnadzor RF, 1999,
Rostechnadzor RF, 2006 [15]
In addition, these documents deal with design and analysis of
systems, components, equipment, and piping of nuclear power
plants and correspond to ASME BPVC, Section III, that will be
discussed in detail.
66.3 DEVELOPMENT AND ACTUAL STATE
OF NUCLEAR CODES FOR DESIGN
AND ANALYSIS OF NPPs EQUIPMENT
AND PIPING
The first Russian (USSR) Boiler Code draft was developed by
Central Boiler and Turbine Institute (CKTI) in 1937 and was
affirmed by the State Department Glavkotlturboprom (Boiler
Industry Department) in 1939 [16].
The first edition published post-World War II in 1950 was
Codes of Boilers Strength Analysis, CKTI edition, Vol.17.
Following versions were issued by CKTI and approved by regula-
tory body Gosgortechnadzor (Mining and Industrial Regulation)
in 1956 and 1965, respectively [17].
These codes were used in the development of the USSR power
industry in the 1930s through 1950s. It was therefore quite natural
to involve these codes in the design of the first NPP piping and
equipment and its strength analysis. Actually the design of the
first nuclear facilities in the USSR in 1950s and 1960s was based
on boiler and industrial codes valid at that time for equipment,
piping, and building codes for structures.
The first specific USSR nuclear pressure vessel and piping code
with the name “Norms for strength analysis of reactor elements,
steam generators, vessels and piping for nuclear power plants,
experimental and investigation nuclear facilities” was issued by
the Moscow Metallurgy Press in 1973. It was approved by State
Committee for Nuclear Power and the regulatory body
Gosgortechnadzor [18].
The technical background for developing of norms was a com-
bination of USSR national standards and design practice with
ideas and approaches obtained from the 1964 and 1969 editions
of ASME B&PV Code. The norms in USSR nuclear design prac-
tice first installed general requirements and approaches for stress
analysis, system of allowable stresses, load combinations, and
some service-level conditions for design procedure.
The fundamentals of safety, regulations of equipment and device
production, codes of equipment and piping strength analysis, basic
standards for welding, hard rules for welded joints, and other docu-
ments were included therein. Research and Design Institution for
Energy Technology (NIKIET) was assigned as developer of NPP
equipment strength analysis codes. The entire previous experience
gained in thermal power engineering, research development, pilot
plants, industrial reactors, as well as study of first prototype nuclear
power plants had been instrumental in developing these new
nuclear design codes. For example, leading research institutions in
the field of material science – CNII KM “Prometey” and CNIIT-
MASH – were also engaged in that work. CKTI was responsible
for preparing the first draft of codes for selection of basic dimen-
sions (design by rules), buckling analysis, piping analysis, as well
as allowable stress limits and material behavior. The 1973 norms
had no recommendations to deal with seismic and other external
extreme dynamic events that impact NPP’s safety.
Initial USSR information concerning seismic events in NPP
design was issued by USSR Power Industry Ministry as a
“Temporary Norms for Design of Nuclear Installations for
Seismically Active Zones” – BCH15-78 [19]. Due to a limited
experience and access to recognized international experience,
these norms had some controversial statements that raised a hot
discussion and disagreement in engineering society.
In 1981 appeared an Information Bulletin of Gosgotechnadzor
Technical Department No.8 (656)-81, “Norms for a Seismic
Analysis of Equipment and Piping of PWR (VVER) Nuclear
Power Plants,” approved by State Committee of Nuclear Power as
an Addendum to the Nuclear Norms 1973 [20]. It was the first
official document with reference to extreme dynamic loads in
NPP design developed by experts of NIKIET and CKTI Institutes.
A regulatory guide, RTM 108.020.37-81 “PWR (VVER) NPPs
Power Equipment and Piping Seismic Analysis,” NPO CKTI,
1982, with Addendum No.1, 1985 [21], was issued by USSR
Ministry for Power and Heavy Industry in 1981. This guide con-
tained some new approaches that are applied even now, especially
to seismic design of bigger turbines and rotational machines.
Subsequent to publication of the first edition of NPP equipment
strength analysis codes in 1973, a principal new version of NPP
equipment and piping strength analysis codes (PNAE G-7-002-
86) was issued in 1986 and approved in 1987 [12]. Leading
experts from all over the USSR and from many industries were
involved in the nuclear code creation. The Chairman of the Code
Group was Olga Schtaskaya from NIKIET and the main experts
in the group were E. Rivkin, V. Filatov (NIKIET), B. Zverkov,
D. Kostovezki (CKTI), A. Schariy (OKB Hydropress), and others
including authors of this paper. These codes were enforced in
1987. Unlike the 1973 edition, this edition also covered the fast
neutron reactors with core coolant’s temperature up to 873ºK.
Besides, this version gave much more attention to the dynamic
loads, including seismic effects, based on [20] and [21].
It is worth noting that centralized industrial control in the
USSR made it possible with relative ease to manage the works on
codes and standards development and updating at the expense of
relevant ministries’ budgetary funds. By way of example, we refer
to the aforementioned PNAE codes development, particularly
strength analysis codes.
As already noted, NIKIET was assigned by Minatom as a main
executor. Financial backing was obtained at the expense of
Ministry’s budgetary fund. In addition to Minatom, other leading
institutions took part in development of codes and standards with
their own budgetary funds.
Member organizations were engaged in working out the drafts
of codes and standards to assigned divisions, distributing them on
approval to the bodies and persons concerned, processing
responses and comments, preparing follow-up editions, and sum-
marizing references.
The prepared revised versions were examined at the conciliatory
meetings that took place in NIKIET. The entire work was carried
ASME_Ch66_p601-624.qxd 6/3/09 2:07 PM Page 604
604 • Chapter 66
out under the control and with the participation of regulatory body
Gosatomnadzor.
The foundation for analytical procedures accepted in PNAE
Regulations is an assessment by the following ultimate conditions
[12]:
(1) Short-term fractures (ductile and brittle)
(2) Static loading creep fracture
(3) Plastic strain throughout the section of a component
(4) Ultimate creep strain accumulation
(5) Unallowable change in the dimensions or quasi-static
fracture under cyclic plastic strain accumulating
(6) Initiation of macrocracks under cycling loading
(7) Buckling (loss of stability)
There are three main parts of the codes, namely,
• general principles,
• basic dimensions choice analysis (design by rule), and
• design stress analysis (design-by-analysis),
and 12 enclosures, of which 2 enclosures are mandatory (proper-
ties of materials and test procedures of mechanical properties) and
10 are recommended enclosures, such as stress analysis proce-
dure, component progressive form changing analysis, standard
joint calculation, long-term strength analysis, long-term cycle
stress analysis, vibration stress analysis, seismic effects analysis,
flange and fastener basic dimensions choice, bend wall thickness
increase estimation, and cycle stress shortcut calculation.
When approaches accepted in Russian Stress Regulations are
compared with those used in other national codes and standards, it
becomes apparent that actually only ASME Code covers the
seven ultimate states mentioned above. In spite of some differ-
ences in terms, the main analytical procedures referred in Russian
Regulations and ASME Code are closely related. Yield stress
safety factor for austenitic stainless steels is 1.35 times higher in
Russian Regulations than in ASME Code, whereas load safety
factor is 1.05–1.15 times higher in ASME Code than in Russian
Regulations. Besides, bolt section choice safety factor is 1.5 times
higher in ASME Code than in Russian Regulations [22, 23].
There are some differences both in selection of main dimen-
sions and assessment of cyclic strength. However, both docu-
ments are more or less similar. At the same time Russian
Regulations usually set forth more conservative requirements.
Sometimes, the ASME Code requirements may be considered as
more conservative. In practice, the differences mentioned do not
give rise to any regular overload equipment failures of nuclear
power units designed either by Russian Regulations or by ASME
Code. This ensures on the one hand enough safety margins by the
regulating documents and the possibility for differentiation in
approaches and analysis of ultimate safety factors on the other;
this is apparent both in the extension of lifetime of operating
equipment and development of equipment with lifetime of 50–60
years.
Nuclear power plants operating in Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania,
Armenia, Eastern European countries, Finland, and China have
been designed and developed as per the Russian Regulations and
they even currently follow them. Even now the Russian regulatory
documents are used as a basis in the construction of nuclear
power plants in India and other countries, as well as new genera-
tion of NPP in Russia.
Unfortunately, upon the transition to a market economy with a
loss of centralized industrial control, federal regulating documents
have not been revised (primarily because of lack of funds). For
several years all the required documents (for the most part
Rosenergoatom Regulations and Working Instructions) had been
developed at the level of Federal Atomic Energy Agency and then
approved by Gosatomnadzor. It was not until recent years that
Federal Atomic Energy Agency entered into discussion for devel-
opment of the special-purpose program, Regulations for Power
Units Integrity Assurance. This program called for preparing a
relevant Codes and Standards Sheet (SPiR) in the form of Federal
Law, “About the Technical Regulation.”
From the mid-2003 the Federal Law No. 184-FZ, About the
Technical Regulation (hereinafter referred to as Law) has come
into force in Russia [24]. The Law has brought dramatic changes
in the system of standardization, safety and quality assurance, and
competitive capacity of production and governed for long a new
line in development of Russian economy.
According to the Law of Technical Regulation, relationships in
the field of development, use, and fulfillment of the mandatory
requirements, products, process of production, operation, storage,
transportation, realization, recovery, rendering of services, and
quality conformance are all regulated.
The Law has been developed in compliance with routine prac-
tices of countries with advanced market economy and demands
set by international economic bodies, including World Trade
Organization (WTO). This is considered a necessary term for
Russia to be integrated in the world economic process. The Law
meets basic regulations of the “Agreement on Technical Barriers
in Trade” laid by WTO. Technical regulations for safety and qual-
ity of products and services in Russia up to July 1, 2003 could not
have been considered as a system of interrelated measures aimed
at products’ safety and quality assurance. The Law is revolution-
ary in character. It lifts remaining tools of administrative regula-
tion of economy in regard to products (services), production
process, and utilization. It sets fundamentally new codification
and documentation systems and radically alters role and concern
of codes and standards. The Law fully substitutes Russian laws on
certification and standardization that have lost their validity since
the Law came into force. In the context of the Law adoption, it
becomes necessary to change a number of federal legislative acts
including scores of federal laws and codes.
The Law provides for the following sorts of regulations:
• Technical regulations (general, special, and mandatory
requirements for the products, production process, operation,
storage, transportation, use, and recovery)
• State standards
• Standardization rules and regulations
• Classifications applicable in accordance with established pro-
cedure, and All-Russian class indexes of techno-economic
and social information
• Standards of organizations
It may be concluded that from the viewpoint of Codes and
Standards, including Nuclear Codes, Russia has now entered a
period of essential but not a simple transition. As to date, the fol-
lowing ongoing steps and efforts should be noted:
(1) The Law has come to effect and the reforms are going on in
compliance with requirements set by the Law and subordi-
nate legislative acts of the Russian Government and
Gosstandart (Russian State Standardization Organization).
(2) All former Soviet Union and Russian state (GOST R) and
intergovernmental (GOST) standards valid as of July 1, 2003
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 605
are considered state and mandatory safety requirements and
standards.
(3) State standard requirements listed for a range of products
and services that are liable to mandatory certification also
retain validity.
(4) Mandatory certification of services is canceled
(5) Forms of conformity attestation are substantially defined,
including conformity declaration and mandatory and volun-
tary certifications
(6) Fundamentals of the State audit for standards compliance at
the market circulation stage are determined. Those products
that definitely meet the requirements of technical regula-
tions should be specially identified.
Development of new Russian nuclear codes and standards
based on these new principles of standardization and best recog-
nized international practices and safety regulations is in progress.
The upgraded versions of the Russian Nuclear Codes should
appear in the near future, consistent with the demand of the
nuclear power renaissance in the world. However, the old Russian
nuclear codes [4–15] and others are still in force and will be used
for years in NPPs design. That is why it is so important to make
practical comparison analysis of different national and interna-
tional nuclear codes for its future harmonization. The results of
such a study are presented in the following section.
66.4 COMPARISON OF RUSSIAN
NUCLEAR STANDARD PNAE WITH
ASME BPVC IN APPLICATION TO
SEISMIC ANALYSIS OF A PRIMARY
LOOP OF PWR (VVER) REACTOR
The international cooperation in safety and seismic upgrading of
existing and new nuclear power plants design leads to necessity of
clearer understanding of the criteria and standards used in different
countries in earthquake protection design. On the other hand, since
the breakup of the Soviet Union, there has been a considerable
concern for the world community and international organizations
regarding the safety, capacity, and, particularly, seismic capacity
of Soviet (Russian)-designed reactors and NPPs in general.
Sometimes this concern is substantiated and sometimes it is not.
Previously, there were many attempts to compare different
national nuclear safety standards. Among these, one of the first
research units made in 1979 and in early 1980s deserves mention
[25, 26]. These and other efforts deal primarily with the contents
of the Guides and Standards only [27, 28]. The most effective way
is to make comparative analysis of similar NPP representative sys-
tem using the given criteria, material properties, formulas, and
methodology of national or international codes and guides [29].
This chapter has two comparative calculations of the PCLS
(Loop No. 4) of the Russian design PWR NPP: WWER-1000
MWt Unit. These analyses are based on the application of two
national codes: Russian PNAE and American ASME BPVC with
some references to Japan JEAG 4601 [30]. The comparison of
seismic analysis and calculation methodologies has been per-
formed only for piping systems classified as PNAE Category I,
ASME Class 1, and JEAG 4601 classes. All of these have identi-
cal importance in their respective classification system.
Only sustained (pressure and weight) and seismic loads were
considered in present analysis. The seismic excitation was chosen
as MRZ (Maximal Design Earthquake) according to PNAE, SSE
(Safe Shutdown Earthquake) in terms of ASME BPVC, and S2
(Extreme Design Earthquake) as in JEAG 4601. All these levels
of design earthquakes are roughly equivalent.
All analyses presented in this chapter have been carried out by
the application of the most widespread design practice called
RSMAM method.
Thus, the intention of this comparative dynamic analysis of the
PCLS using PNAE Code and ASME BPVC is to show the actual
differences in procedures and to get an idea of the margins pro-
vided by using different codes.
66.4.1 Documentation of Guidelines for the Seismic
Analysis of NPP Systems
The requirements for seismic analysis and capacity evaluation
of NPP systems are contained in the Russian normative docu-
ments and standards [9, 12].
The design and analysis of NPP systems in the United States
are performed according to ASME BPVC, Section III. The main
requirements for these procedures are given in the following sub-
sections and these have not changed much since 1993 through
2006 editions:
• NB-3600 – Design and analysis for Class 1 pipes. This sub-
section covers Class 1 pipes of primary loop system [31].
• NC-3600 – Design and analysis for Class 2 pipes. This class
includes the safety-related systems that are not attached to the
Class 1 piping and are operational, for example, in accident
cooling of protection systems, steam and feedwater pipes, and
so on [32].
• ND-3600 – Design and analysis for Class 3 pipes. For exam-
ple, a system of balance of plant water should be included in
this class [33].
• The special requirements for piping supports design and
strength analysis are contained in the ASME BPVC,
Subsection NF-3600 – Design Rules for Piping Supports [34].
Recommendations and requirements concerned with seismic
analysis of safety-related NPP piping systems are given in detail
in the following Appendices:
• Appendix N – Dynamic Analysis Methods [35].
• Appendix F – Rules for Evaluation of Service Loading with
Level D Service Limits [36].
• Additionally, for the main parts of ASME BPVC, there are
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) documents, such as
Regulatory Guide (RG) and Standard Revenue Plan (SRP).
These documents provide specification of requirements for
equipment classification and load combinations and describe
analysis methods. Until now, NRC has issued more than
21 RG and 11 SRP regarding seismic analysis of piping sys-
tems [37–46].
In Japan, the rules for seismic design of Class As piping are
given in JEAG 4601 [30].
66.4.2 Equipment Classification
In PNAE as well as in ASME BPVC, all NPP equipment and
piping systems are divided into Groups A, B, and C and Safety
Classes 1, 2, and 3. The basis for such classification is of impor-
tance for nuclear safety of these systems [42, 47]. Taking into
account these circumstances, the current consideration contains
the seismic comparative analysis of WWER-1000 PCLS, which is
classified as Class 2 of PNAE and as Class 1 of ASME BPVC.
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606 • Chapter 66

Russian Nuclear Code PNAE divides NPP equipment and pipes
into two seismic Categories I and II.
In contrast with PNAE, ASME BPVC contains only one seis-
mic Category I. This category includes all components and equip-
ment designated to maintain their functionality, if an SSE occurs.
In JEAG, all major equipment is divided into four classes of
Aseismic importance: Classifications As, A, B, and C.
The following table illustrates various classifications of the
considered PCLS according to different codes.
Code Group Class Category
PNAE B 2 I For further consideration, only the Level D service limits will
ASME A 1 I
According to JEAG 4601, PCLS belongs to the highest As Class.
66.4.3 Piping Components Strength Analysis
Both PNAE (for all classes) and ASME BPVC (for Class 1)
require performing of strength analysis by checking the primary
stresses on the basis of maximum shear stress theory of failure.
These primary stresses consist of the general membrane stresses,
local membrane stresses, and bending stresses. The significant
aspect of primary stresses is that they are not self-limited and are
caused by external loads such as internal pressure, inertial and
weight loads, seismic inertial loads, and so on.
Taking into account that the strength analysis, as per ASME
BPVC, is performed only on the basis of membrane stresses and gen-
eral bending stresses, the comparative seismic strength analysis dis-
cussed here has been carried out only for (s)2 PNAE stress category.
Table 66.1 shows the nominal allowable stresses applied for
pipe elements [12, 48]. The JEAG allowable nominal stresses Sm
are roughly the same as in the ASME BPVC.
It should be noted that the values of allowable stresses, cal-
culated according to ASME BPVC, may be independent of
service temperature (as in the case, when (Sm = ST>3); thus,
comparative results are valid only for given material and ser-
vice temperature.
The main difference between ASME BPVC and PNAE is iden-
tification in accordance with ASME BPVC that has four levels of
service limit loads for each component or support. These service
limits may be designated in the Design Specification and defined
as different levels (Levels A, B, C, and D). It should be pointed
that seismic loads are considered in strength analysis only for
Levels B and D (Appendix A, SRP 3.9.3 [46]).
be applied for seismic analysis of PCLS. The NCA-2142.4 gives
the following definition of these service limits:
Level D Service Limit. Level D service limits are the sets of lim-
its that must be satisfied for all Level D service loadings identified
in the Design Specification for which these service limits are des-
ignated. These sets of limits permit gross general deformations
with some consequent loss of dimensional stability and damage
requiring repair, which may require removal of the component
from service. Therefore, the selection of these limits shall be
reviewed by the owner for compatibility with established system
safety criteria (NCA-2141).
The PNAE does not postulate levels of service limits that per-
mit some damage of equipment and piping for a given set of
design loading. Different combinations of loading sets are
defined in PNAE (NUE, NNUE, AS) as well as in ASME BPVC
(SL, LOCA, DBPB, MS/FWPB). So, in this discussion, only
influence of seismic loading (MRZ or SSE) will be considered
further. Table 66.3 gives the comparison of allowable stresses
for pipes.

TABLE 66.1 ALLOWABLE NOMINAL STRESSES TABLE 66.3 ALLOWABLE STRESSES

Code Symbol Allowable nominal stresses Code Level Class Category Loading Sa

PNAE [s] for all steels – min {RTm>2.6; R Tp 0.2>1.5} PNAE — 2 I NUE+MRZ 1.8[s]

ASME D 1 I SL+SSE 3.0 Sm

ferrous steels min {ST>3; 1.1S TT>3; S TY>1.5}
ASME Sm JEAG — As SL+S2 3.0 Sm
austenitic steel min
{ST>3; 1.1STT>3; SY>1.5; 0.9STY}(1) The comparison of allowable stress values for different materi-
Note: als in accordance with ASME BPVC and PNAE is presented in
Table 66.4.
(1) Choosing of allowable stress according to this expression may result
in a permanent strain of as much as 0.1%. When this amount of defor-
mation is not acceptable, the designer should reduce the allowable
stress to obtain an acceptable amount of deformation. TABLE 66.4 ALLOWABLE STRESSES, MPa
Material PNAE ASME ASME/PNAE
The values of stresses defined above, for different materials, are St. 20 234 390 1.67
presented in Table 66.2.
15GS 270 450 1.67
TABLE 66.2 ALLOWABLE NOMINAL STRESSES, MPa
08H18N10T 212 354 1.67
Material T ºC [ s] Sm
Table 66.4 shows that the level of allowable stresses calculated
St. 20 250 130 130
according to PNAE (Category 1) are essentially lower than the
15 GS 300 150 150 corresponding values obtained from ASME BPVC.
08H18N10T 300 118 118 Table 66.5 contains the formulas for stress calculations for
PNAE and ASME BPVC.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 607

TABLE 66.5 FORMULAS FOR PIPING scp scp 2 scp

STRESS CALCULATIONS ° = 1.0 - 0.0284a b - 0.29a b if 0 … a b … 1
[s] [s] [s]

CODE Stress Piping For Tee Pipe Elements, the Values of Stress (s)2 Category
category elements Formulas Should be Considered for Three Cross Sections: A-A, Б-Б,
B-B (see Fig. 5.1 of Addenda to PNAE [12]).
Straight (␴)2 ⫽ ␴equiv For cross sections A-A and B-B,
PNAE (␴)2 pipes and ␴equiv ⫽ ␴3 – ␴1
bends sz = s0zMN + 0.7s0zMN(s)K (s) + szp
Curve pipes For cross section Б-Б,
Æ 2M x + M y + M z
with 2 2 2
sc = scp ; 0.7sozMN(s)K (s)
l Ú 1.4 (s)2 =
c W
sz = sozMN + szp
ASME Sss Straight
pipes and PDo Do
Sss = B1 + B2 Mi K(s) – local bending stress intensity coefficient for tee elements.
bends 2t 2I It is defined according to chapter 2.7 of Appendix 5 PNAE [12].
Longitudinal stresses in the run pipe of tee sozMN and in
the branch pipe of tee sozMN(s) are calculated by the following
66.4.4 Formulas for Piping Stress Analysis According formulas:
to PNAE and ASME BPVC
The following formulas are given as a reference and only for M x sin £ - M y cos £ Nz
sozMN = +
the purpose of codes comparative analysis. W As

66.4.4.1 PNAE Code G-7-002-86 2M 2x + M 2y ƒ Nz ƒ

sozMN(s) = +
W As
Principal Stresses in the Pipe Cross Section.
where:  is angle that defined the branch position (see Fig. 5.1

0.5 C sc + sz + - sz)2 + 4t2 D

of Addenda to PNAE [12]).
2(sc
L sr M
s3 = max 0.5 C sc + sz - 2(sc - sz)2 + 4t2 D 66.4.4.2 ASME BPVC, NB-3650, Equation (9)

Resulting Moment from Static and Dynamic Loads.

0.5 C sc + sz + 2(sc - sz)2 + 4t2 D M i = 2M 2xi + M 2yi + M 2zi

Ls M
s1 = min 0.5 C sc + sz - 2(sc - sz)2 + 4t2 D For Tee Elements, Equation (9) is Written in the Following
r Form (NB-3683.1 ASME BPVC).
PDo Mb Mr
where: sc = scp SSS = B1 + B2b + B2r
2Tr Zb Zr
2M 2x + M 2y Nz
sz = szp ⫾ + where:
W As
Tr ⫽ nominal wall thickness of designated run pipe
Mz Mr, Mb ⫽ resulting internal moments in the run and branch
t = pipes, respectively
2W
P Zr, Zb ⫽ approximate section modulus of designated run and
sr = - attached branch pipes, respectively
2
Tangent and Longitudinal Stresses from Internal Pressure. Stress Indices B1 and B2 are Defined by the Table
P C Do - 2(s - c) D NB-3681(a)-1.
scp = For straight pipes: B1 ⫽ 0.5 and B2 ⫽ 1.0
2w(s - c) For curved pipes: B1 ⫽ ⫺0.1 ⫹ 0.4 h if 0.0 ⬍ B1 ⬍ 0.5
P C Do - 2(s - c) D 2
2
B2 = 1.30>h3 if B2 ⬎ 1.0
szp =
4(Do - s + c)(s - c) For tee elements, B2b and B2r are defined in accordance with
NB-3683.8 and NB-3683.9 /3/.
The values of Æ and ° are Defined by Tables in Addenda 5:
Ï.5.1 and Ï.5.2 of PNAE [12]. 66.4.4.3 Characteristic Bend’s Parameter of a Curved Pipe
Also, these values may be calculated using following approxi- (Elbow)
mate expressions: t nR
ASME BPVC: h = 2 .
r
0.93 sR
Æ = when l Ú 0.05 PNAE: l = 2
l0.755 r
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608 • Chapter 66

TABLE 66.6 PIPING ELEMENTS OF THE PCLS

Pipeline Element Do, mm s, mm c, mm R, mm Q ,N/mm

PCLS Straight pipe 990 70 3.5 – 21.82
Bend 995 73 3.65 1340 22.91
PCLS-Pressurizer Straight pipe 426 40 2 – 5.05
Bend 426 40 2 1700 5.05

The design parameters of internal medium: Design Pressure P = 18 MPa; Design Temperature: T = 350°C. The pipes are manufactured from
10GN2MFA steel.

For further consideration, it is useful to define the expressions
for limit resulting moments Mi. Such formulas can be obtained
from Table 66.5. For example, Mi for bending elements may be
presented as under:
M i (PNAE) = k 1 # C s D # W #
°
Æ
P # Do
ak b
2#I # # #
Mi (ASME) = 2 S m - B1
B2 # Do 2#t
where: k1 and k2  coefficients that corresponded to the level of
allowable stress.
The numerical comparison of the limit allowable resulting
moment Mi ,which met the strength requirements for both codes,
has been carried out for PCLS. The main characteristics and para-
meters of PCLS are given in Tables 66.6 and 66.7.
Figure 66.1 shows the comparison between values of limit allow-
able resulting moments calculated for straight pipes and bends with
the assumption that values of allowable stresses for both codes are
equal (k1  k2  1.8). One can recognize from these facts that level
of resulting moments for both codes is practically identical.
The other result from this stage of analysis is that for sharp-
bend pipe elements (short-radius elbow), the value of resulting
moment calculated in accordance with PNAE is about 20–30%
higher than corresponding value for ASME BPVC. It can be
explained by differences in formulas used for stress calculations
for these piping elements.
Thus, it can be concluded that formulas for stress calculation
according to PNAE and ASME BPVC give practically the same
result in the range of service pressures in spite of their slight dif-
ferences detailed in Appendix.
However, the ratio between resulting moment values becomes
less than 1 when the differences between allowable stresses are
taken into account (k1  1.8, k2  3) (Fig. 66.2). For example,
when the pressure value P is equal to 0 MPa, the ratio between
resulting moments is defined by allowable stress ratio (340/540 
0.63). For P  18 MPa, the minimum level of resulting moments
ratio is equal to 0.58.
The difference between PNAE and ASME BPVC allowable
stresses level results in about 70% increase of allowable moment
Mi (ASME) in comparison with Mi (PNAE). It means that piping
systems analyzed according to ASME BPVC have less conserva-
tive capacity and may withstand up to 70% higher than design
earthquake level.
66.4.5 Definition of Seismic Loads
The ASME BPVC has several subsections, especially oriented to
seismic analysis and design. One of the most important subsections
among them is the Appendix N, Dynamic Analysis Methods,
which contains the article “Seismic Analysis” [35]. In this article
there are the following items:
N-1210 – Earthquake description This chapter contains the
detailed description and recommendations about applied input seis-
mic excitation in terms of the Response Spectrum and Time History.
N-1220 – Methods of dynamic analysis This chapter gives a
full range of dynamic modeling and analysis technique descrip-
tions such as Time History Analysis (THA) and Response
Spectrum Method.
N-1230 – Damping The recommended damping values for dif-
ferent types of constructions are presented in this article. Also, the
various methods of incorporating the damping in structural
dynamics are given.
It should be noted that the main influence in dynamic response
of system, when all other conditions are identical (i.e., seismic
excitation, analysis method), is the level of system damping
adopted for analysis.
The PNAE postulates for piping systems and equipment damp-
ing ratio equal to 2%. This value is not dependent upon piping
diameter/design or the level of seismic excitation [12].
Contrary to PNAE, the ASME BPVC provides different values
of damping that depend upon the seismic excitation level and pipe
output diameter. In Japan, in JEAG 4601, the damping values
depend on the type of piping, number of supports, and insulation
parameter and vary from 0.5% to 2.5%.

TABLE 66.7 MECHANICAL PROPERTIES AND ALLOWABLE STRESSES FOR 10GN2MFA STEEL, MPa

Material T,°C Rp0.2 Rm E [] 1.8[] S*m 3.Sm

10GN2MFA 20 343 540 2.14e5 208 375 180 540
350 294 491 1.94e5 189 340 180 540
*
Sm  St/3
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STRAIGHT PIPE ELEMENTS BEND PIPE ELEMENTS

1.03 1.4
426/40 426/40
990/70 990/70
1.3

Mi(PNAE)/Mi(ASME)
Mi(PNAE)/Mi(ASME)

1.01
1.2

1.1
0.99

0.97 0.9
0 5 10 15 20 0 5 10 15 20
P, MPa P, MPa

FIG. 66.1 COMPARISON OF RESULTING MOMENT VALUES, WHEN ALLOWABLE STRESSES ARE EQUAL [29]

STRAIGHT PIPE ELEMENTS BEND PIPE ELEMENTS

0.64 0.85
426/40 426/40
990/70 0.8 990/70
0.62
Mi(PNAE)/Mi(ASME)
Mi(PNAE)/Mi(ASME)

0.75
0.6
0.7
0.58
0.65

0.56 0.6

0.54 0.55
0 5 10 15 20 0 5 10 15 20
P, MPa P, MPa

FIG. 66.2 COMPARISON OF RESULTING MOMENT VALUES, WHEN ALLOWABLE STRESSES ARE DIFFERENT [29]

Table 66.8 demonstrates this influence of the damping ratio val- the allowable level of the design seismic excitation, when all
ues recommended for seismic analysis in PNAE and ASME BPVC. elements of piping system meet the requirements of correspond-
Application of the Case N-411-1 may significantly reduce the ing code.
seismic response up to 30–35% in comparison with values origi-
nally used in ASME BPVC. 66.4.6.1 Brief Description of PCLS The main coolant
pipelines connect the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) with four hor-
66.4.6 Results of Comparative Analysis of PCLS by izontal steam generators (SG) and form four circulation loops.
PNAE and ASME BPVC Basically, all these loops are identical in arrangement and length.
The main goal of the comparative dynamic analysis of the Each of the loops consists of the hot and the cold legs.
PCLS with ASME BPVC and PNAE is to identify and compare Arrangement of loops differs from each other only in the con-
nected auxiliary pipelines.
TABLE 66.8 DAMPING VALUES FOR PIPES To provide coolant circulation between SGs and RPV, the cold
ACCORDING TO ASME BPVC leg of each loop is equipped with the main cooling pump (MCP).
Circulation loop equipment (MCP and SG) is supported by the
Pipe Level B Level D Case N-411-1 rolling-contact (spherical) bearings permitting free movements in
the horizontal plane and taking up the equipment weight.
OBE SSE 0–10 Hz 10–20 Hz >20 Hz
Due to methodological character of this approach, the PCLS
D > 305 mm 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05 – 0.02 0.02 without any seismic upgrading devices has been adopted.
The main properties of PCLS pipelines are presented in
D < 305 mm 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.05 – 0.02 0.02
Table 66.9.
Note: Case N-411-1 is recommended for seismic analysis when The design parameters of internal medium: Design Pressure
RSMAM is used. P  18 MPa; Design Temperature: T  350
C. The pipes are
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610 • Chapter 66

TABLE 66.9 PIPING ELEMENTS OF PCLS

Pipeline Element Do, mm s, mm c, mm R, mm Q, N/mm

PCLS Straight pipe 990 70 3.5 — 21.82

Bend 995 73 3.65 1340 22.91

Straight pipe 426 40 2 — 5.05

PCLS-Pressurizer
Bend 426 40 2 1700 5.05

manufactured from 10GN2MFA steel. The mechanical properties
of this steel are given in Table 66.10.
66.4.6.2 PCLS Dynamic Analysis Model The dynamic calcu-
lation model of the Loop No. 4 consists of the hot and cold
pipelines of PCLS, SG, MCP, and pipeline between hot leg and
pressurizer.
The finite element approximation of the pipelines and the
attached equipment components have been used to create the cal-
culation model of this piping system. The maximum length of
pipe elements is defined by the requirements of an accurate mod-
eling of dynamic behavior of the system. All pipes have been
modeled by the straight (run) and the curved (bend) pipe finite
elements. The SG has been modeled by means of the straight pipe
element with output diameter 4000 mm, wall thickness 110 mm,
and corresponding lumped masses located at the center of gravity.
It should be noted that for modeling of MCP, the equivalent beam
analytical model has been used. Boundary conditions for piping
systems (piping supports and anchorage) are modeled by the sup-
port and spring elements.
Figure 66.3 shows the dynamic calculation model of the Loop
No. 4 of PCLS.
66.4.6.3 Input Seismic Excitation The input seismic excita-
tion for seismic analysis of PCLS has been chosen in terms of
Response Spectra given in ASME BPVC, Appendix N, N-1211.
The considered spectra have been modified according to damping
values for applicable codes (Fig. 66.4). The plot with 2% damping
corresponds to PNAE case. For ASME BPVC, Case N-411-1 has
been used.
Horizontal direction Vertical direction
The ratio between vertical and horizontal components of seis-
mic excitation according to ASME BPVC is equal to 2/3 [11, 14].
The PNAE does not specify the ratio between seismic vertical and
horizontal components. However, PNAE contains items that
defined this ratio for building structures as 0.5 [5].
According to ASME BPVC, the following scaling coefficients
of response spectra were applied for comparative analysis: the
horizontal direction  0.6 and the vertical direction  0.4. Thus,
for considered response spectra, the ZPA values for the PCLS
floor level were adopted as ZPAh  0.6g (the horizontal direction)
and ZPAv  0.4g (the vertical direction).
66.4.6.4 ASME BPVC Seismic Analysis The seismic calcula-
tions based on the ASME BPVC NB-3600 requirements have been
performed using the “dPIPE” computer program developed by
CKTI-Vibroseism [52].
The internal seismic loads for pipeline and equipment of PCLS
were calculated using RSMAM with
– SRSS rule for summation of mode shapes and spatial compo-
nents of response;
– cut-off-frequency at 33 Hz; and
– missing mass effect.
The PCLS pipeline stress values have been obtained from
Equation (66.9) of NB-3650.
The following output results have been obtained from analysis
performed according to ASME BPVC:
– natural frequencies and modal properties;
– nodal dynamic displacements and accelerations;
– stress values for the straight pipe, bend, and tee elements;
– dynamic loads in piping and equipment supports and nozzles;
and
– resulting static and dynamic internal element loads.
Figure 66.5 shows the stress values of weakest elements of the
PCLS Loop No. 4. The strength of these elements is critical for
seismic capacity of PCLS.
66.4.6.5 PNAE Seismic Analysis The seismic calculations
according to PNAE G-7-002-86 requirements have also been per-
formed using the same “dPIPE” computer program.

TABLE 66.10 MECHANICAL PROPERTIES AND ALLOWABLE STRESSES FOR 10GN2MFA STEEL, MPa

Material T,
C Rp0.2 Rm E [] 1.8[] S(1)m 3.Sm

10GN2MFA 20 343 540 2.14e5 208 375 180 540

350 294 491 1.94e5 189 340 180 540

Note:
(1) Sm  St/3
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4P6
4G7
4G1 X Y
SG
4G4
4P5 4G3

4G9 4GS1
4P8 4H6
MCP 4H5
4G12
Pressurizer
4P1
4P9 4G6 YP15
4P10 4GS2
4C0
4GS3 4P3 4H4 4H3

4C7
4C8 4H2
YP0
4G12
YP13 4C9 4H1
4GS4

4C1 YP11 4C10 R_1

4C5
YP2
4C11 RPV
4C4 YP10 YP8
R_2
YP4
4C3
YP6

FIGURE 66.3 DYNAMIC ANALYSIS MODEL OF THE WWER-1000 PCLS [29]

The methodology used for determination of PCLS seismic is much higher than corresponding values from ASME BPVC.
response is based on ASME BPVC recommendations (see The calculated dynamic stress levels essentially exceed the levels
Section 66.4.6.4). of allowable stress.
The dynamic and static stresses of the PCLS pipe elements
have been calculated in accordance with PNAE, Appendix 5,
Chapter 2, requirements [12]. 66.4.6.6 Comparison of Analysis Results
Figure 66.6 shows the stress values of the weakest elements for The following parameters were chosen for comparative seismic
the PCLS Loop No. 4. The strength of these elements is critical analysis:
for seismic capacity of PCLS. It should be noted that for both
cases, according to different codes, these elements are the same. – dynamic displacements;
However, the level of stress values, obtained according to PNAE, – dynamic loads for supports and nozzles;

HORIZONTAL DIRECTION VERTICAL DIRECTION

3.00 DAMPING 2.00 DAMPING
FACTOR, % FACTOR, %
2 (PNAE) 2 (PNAE)
2.50 N-411-1 N-411-1
ACCELERATION, g

1.50
ACCELERATION, g

2.00

1.50 1.00

1.00
0.50
0.50

0.00 0.00
2 3 4 5 6 7 89 2 3 4 5 6 789 2 3 4 5 2 3 4 5 6 7 89 2 3 4 5 6 789 2 3 4 5
1 10 1 10
FREQUENCY. Hz FREQUENCY. Hz
FIGURE 66.4 DESIGN RESPONSE SPECTRA [29]
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612 • Chapter 66

900
800 782

STRESSES, MPa
700
600 590 556
540 540 540
500
400
300
200
100 68 75
14
0
Str. Pipe(4H1-4H2) Bend(4H4-4H5) Tee(Node 3)

Ssl Sss Sa

FIGURE 66.5 STRESS VALUES FOR SELECTED HIGH-LOADED PIPE ELEMENTS OF PCLS (ASME BPVC) [29]
(Sa, allowable stress; Ssl, operation loading stress; Sss, resultant seismic + operation loading stress)

– stress level in the weakest elements; and
– values of seismic margin capacity.
The response of pipeline strongly depends upon acceleration
level taken from the input response spectra. At the same time,
response spectra acceleration depends on damping values accep-
ted for the analysis. Thus, for identical seismic excitation, the
response of piping system may be quite different when different
damping values are chosen. For example, the ratio between maxi-
mal dynamic displacements (node 4p2, X-direction) calculated
according to PNAE and ASME BPVC, respectively, is equal to
D max(2%)/Dmax(5%)  431/320  1.35
It should be noted that this ratio for given system and seismic
excitation corresponds to the ratio between spectral accelerations
at frequency 2.5 Hz from PNAE and ASME curves.
The higher stress value for PNAE in comparison with ASME
BPVC is explained by higher magnitude (about 36%) of the
response spectra in the resonance frequency domain.
The ratio between maximal calculated stress values and allow-
able stresses for the weakest PCLS elements are shown in Fig. 66.8.
For PNAE case, these values are about two times higher than the
corresponding values for ASME BPVC (2.65/1.45  1.83).
In recent years the Seismic Margin Assessment Approach
(SMA) is used worldwide in the engineering practices and even
in Russian PWR (VVER) plants designed since 1992 [50, 51].
This methodology is based on the analysis of probability of fail-
ure for safety-related structures, systems, and components. On the
basis of conservative deterministic failure margin (CDFM), the
values of high confidence low probability failure (HCLPF) seis-
mic capacity have to be estimated in terms of maximum earth-
quake level. For the pipeline system considered, this value may be
defined according to the following equation:

A2.5(2%)/A2.5(5%)  4.25/3.13  1.35 Sa - Ssl

Table 66.11 contains the comparative data of seismic loads for
supports and nozzles.
The ratio between dynamic load values for supports and noz-
zles depends only upon the intensity of the given response spectra
and, as was mentioned above, is equal to 1.35.
Figure 66.7 shows the comparison of stress values for weakest
PCLS elements.
HCLPF (CDFM) = * ZPA
Sss - Ssl
In this expression, the value of HCLPF (CDFM) defines the
level of seismic excitation corresponding to the low probability
of pipeline failure. ZPA is the maximum intensity of seismic
excitation on the pipeline floor level (only for consideration of
comparative purposes, the value of ZPA is used here instead of
ZPGA value of traditional SMA).

1000
902 870
900 806
800
STRESSES, MPa

700
600
500
400 340 340 340
300
200 123 123
100 3,3
0
Str. Pipe(4H1-4H2) Bend(4H4-4H5) Tee(Node 3)

Ssl Sss Sa

FIGURE 66.6 STRESS VALUES FOR SELECTED HIGH-LOADED PIPE ELEMENTS OF PCLS (PNAE) [29]
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 613

TABLE 66.11 DYNAMIC LOADS FOR SUPPORTS AND ATTACHED EQUIPMENT [29]

Element of PCLS Damping Fz, kN MMx, NN•m My, N•m Mz, N•m
0.02 8070 4220 43400 2770
Hot leg nozzle
Case N-411-1 5950 3120 32100 2040
0.02 1970 2370 31400 821
Cold leg nozzle
Case N-411-1 1480 1800 23300 609
0.02 106 337 816 257
Pressurizer nozzle
Case N-411-1 79.3 250 639 191
0.02 1170 4030 8780 –
MCP support
Case N-411-1 1090 2970 6470 –
0.02 4110 – – –
SG support (4GS1)
Case N-411-1 3040 – – –
0.02 4310 – – –
SG support (4GS2)
Case N-411-1 3190 – – –
0.02 3940 – – –
SG support (4GS3)
Case N-411-1 2920 – – –
0.02 3740 – – –
SG support (4GS4)
Case N-411-1 2770 – – –

Figure 66.9 shows the HCLPF values of seismic capacity for
weakest elements of PCLS.
For both code cases, the minimum HCLPF seismic capacity is
lower than input ZPA level equal to 0.6 g, which means that the
seismic capacity of PCLS for considered analysis is insufficient.
However, the seismic capacity of system analyzed by ASME
BPVC is more than two times higher in comparison with values
obtained by PNAE (0.41/0.17  2.41).
It can be stated that the basic principles of ASME BPVC,
Section III, Subsection NB and Russian PNAE Code are identical.
However, the principal distinctions between two codes are the val-
ues of allowable stresses and damping ratios for seismic analysis.
The numerical value of results and ratios mentioned in this study
can vary significantly depending on material properties, service
temperature, pressure, class and type of piping and piping ele-
ments. Thus, for every specific case, it is necessary to carry out
individual analysis to arrive at definitive conclusions about rela-
tive degree of conservatism contained in each code.
In Europe and other countries, for nuclear and conventional
power plants viscoelastic damper technology (HVD) has some
benefits for seismic and vibration piping and components protec-
tion. It was shown that necessary seismic capacity of PWR/VVER
PCLS could be achieved either by installation of snubbers or less
number of high viscous dampers [53, 54].

1000 902
900 870
806 782
800
STRESSES, MPa

700
600 590 556
500
400
300
200
100
0
Str. Pipe(4H1-4H2) Bend (4H4-4H5) Tee (Node 3)

PNAE ASME

FIGURE 66.7 COMPARISON OF STRESS VALUES FOR WEAKEST PCLS ELEMENTS [29]
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614 • Chapter 66

3
2,65 2,56
2,5 2,37

Sss/Sa
1,5 1,45
1,1 1,03
1

0,5

0
Str. Pipe (4H1-4H2) Bend (4H4-4H5) Tee (Node 3)

PNAE ASME

FIGURE 66.8 RATIO BETWEEN MAXIMAL SSS AND ALLOWABLE SA STRESS VALUES FOR THE WEAKEST ELEMENTS
OF PCLS [29]

0,6 0,6 0,58 0,6

0,6 0,54
ACCELERATION, g

0,5
0,41
0,4
0,3
0,19 0,22 0,17
0,2
0,1
0
Str. pipe (4H1-4H2) Bend (4H4-4H5) Tee (Node 3)

PNAE ASME ZPA

FIGURE 66.9 HCLPF VALUES OF SEISMIC CAPACITY FOR SELECTED ELEMENTS OF PCLS (ZPA ⴝ 0.6G) [29]

Figures 66.10 and 66.11 show an example of installation of
dampers at PCLS (the same as shown in Fig. 66.3) and influence
of dampers on stress distribution in the system. Due to dampers,
the level of stresses drops down several folds.
Since 2007 high viscous dampers are included in the ASME
Section III, Subsection NF, standard support classification. That is
FIGURE 66.10 INSTALLATION OF HVD AT THE PCLS OF
PWR/VVER-1000 [54]
why some additional explanation of this new technology for
North America is quite appropriate.
66.5 EUROPEAN HIGH VISCOUS
DAMPERS APPROACH IN
PROTECTING NPP PRIMARY AND
SECONDARY SYSTEMS FROM
SEISMIC LOADS AND OPERATIONAL
VIBRATION
66.5.1 Background
Viscoelastic piping dampers, also known as High Viscous
Dampers (HVD) have been extensively used since the mid-1980s
in the seismic upgrading of nuclear power stations in Europe and
are currently being used in new nuclear power plant installations
in China and India [55–58].
In addition to their use as seismic dynamic restraints they have
been widely used throughout the world as a means to control and
reduce vibrations in piping systems during normal steady state
and transient operation. They have also been used to accommo-
date impulse and impact loads due to water and steam hammer or
postulated pipe break.
HVDs have recently been added to the types of dynamic
restraints (November 2007) covered by ASME BPVC, Section
III-Subsection NF. Hence, there is a need to address their preser-
vice and in-service inspection examinations and testing qualifica-
tion requirements.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 615

FIGURE 66.11 STRESS DISTRIBUTION IN PCLS SUBJECTED TO SEISMIC LOADS:

LEFT WITHOUT HVD, RIGHT WITH HVD [54]

66.5.2 HVD General Operational Characteristics
As a dynamic restraint, HVD is a device that works in a softer
manner than snubbers do, providing to the system essential addi-
tional damping rather than stiffness. High damping in the device
is a result of deformation of a special extremely high viscous
liquid that is located in the space between damper’s piston and
housing (Fig. 66.11).
HVD does not carry static loads and should be installed in a
vertical position. It works under atmospheric pressure. HVD has
nonlinear damping and stiffness parameters against frequency of
excitation (Fig. 66.12). There are two principle types of HVD:
VES type with temperature-dependant grease and VD type with
low temperature-dependant grease (Tables 66.12 and 66.14).
General features of HVD are following:
• Reliable operation without dead band. Absence of internal
high pressure, seals, friction, and corrosion-sensitive surfaces
in operation
• 6 DOF operation: dampening all system’s modes at the point
of damper installation
• High damping ability (up to critical damping values) provi-
ded to a system suppressing operational vibration, water and
steam hammers, seismic, wind, tornado, blast, impulse, and
vehicle impact loads
• Low maintenance, inspection requirement and costs, and
unlimited service life
• Capable of Extending the service life of the distribution sys-
tems and components it supports by reducing fatigue-type
stress in piping systems during operation
• Green design: High temperature and radiation stability, using
nontoxic materials, effective reduction of vibration, and noise
to the environment
A number of verification tests of HVDs have been implemented
to define its dynamic characteristics and behavior under different
dynamic loads, for example, operational vibration and seismic
excitation. Figure 66.12 shows typical experimental characteris-
tics of HVD with nonlinear dependence on the frequency and
analytical model of HVD developed on a basis of extensive test
program. This model could be converted into a structural model

FIGURE 66.12 TYPICAL VISCOELASTIC PIPEWORK DAMPER: OUTSIDE VIEW AND CROSS SECTION (Courtesy of GERB
Vibration Control Systems, Inc., Lisle, IL, www.gerb.de)
ASME_Ch66_p601-624.qxd 6/3/09 2:07 PM Page 616
616 • Chapter 66
TABLE 66.12 GENERAL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN SNUBBERS AND HV DAMPERS
Snubbers
• Operates only in one direction at the point of attachment
• Tends to have dead bands that increase in a vibration
environment
• Limited increase in system damping
• Hydraulic
• Have seals which that can leak
• Have small orifices that which can plug
• Mechanical
• Can lock up
• Can corrode internally
by standard FEM software or using special piping programs, for
example, dPIPE [52].
The verification tests on a shaking table have been performed
to obtain properties of dampers for operational vibration and seis-
mic excitation (Figs. 66.13 and 66.14). The tests have shown that
dampers cut off all resonance of the piping system and eliminate
significantly any amplification of piping system under seismic
loads (Fig. 66.15).
Figure 66.16 shows a method for modeling of operational
vibration of NPP feedwater piping using dPIPE software
(PWR/VVER-440 Loviisa NPP). The results of analysis both in
amplitudes and in spectra domain are quite close to experimental
ones [60].
The model itself with two dampers on line is shown in Fig.
66.17a, while Fig. 66.17b gives results to predict efficiency of
dampers and its actual efficiency by a test at the plant in opera-
tional conditions [60].
The general distinctions between snubbers and dampers are
given in Table 66.12. It should also be noted that HVD as a
dynamic restraint device is much closer to the gap support pre-
sented in the ASME Subsection NF and QME/QDR rather than
snubbers. But due to a high viscous liquid in a gap between piston
and housing, it provides very high damping to the system, limit-
ing its displacements and acceleration without shocks in some
proportion to relative velocity of damper’s piston and housing.
Typical examples of damper’s installations at NPP primary and
secondary systems are shown in Figs. 66.18–66.22. It should be
K1 K2
B1 B2
(K1, K2 – elastic springs
B1, B2 – ideal dampers)
FIGURE 66.13 DYNAMIC PROPERTIES OF A TYPICAL HIGH VISCOUS DAMPER AND ITS ANALYSIS MODEL [53]
HV Dampers
• Effective in 6 degrees of freedom at the point of
attachment
• Continuously active
• High system damping
• No seals
• No orifices
• Incapable of lock up
• Any corrosion can be observed and does not effect
operation
remembered that different configuration of placing dampers could
exist.
For example, dampers housing could be attached to structural ele-
ments (wall, floor and so on), as shown in Fig. 66.18 (upper middle
picture) as well as Figs. 66.19 and 66.20. Damper’s housing could
also be placed just at the piping, as shown in Figs. 66.18 (upper left
picture) and 66.22. In addition, damper could also be located in the
space between two piping systems using their different dynamic
properties and damping of both piping systems (Fig. 66.21).
Figure 66.18 also provides overall dimensions of dampers as
shown in Tables 66.13 and 66.14.
The effectiveness of dampers against operational vibration of
NPP piping is demonstrated by Fig. 66.23.
Typical results of dampers’ influences on operational vibration
state of the piping in terms of PSD spectra are shown in Fig. 66.23.
HVD can also be used in vibration and seismic isolation sys-
tems and dampening of different structures by connecting them
by dampers [61].
Figure 66.24 illustrates such a possibility for PWR NPP. This
approach could essentially decrease design spectra from seismic,
explosion, and plane crash loads.
Since HVD has a wide range of sizes they have different capac-
ities and could be installed on different structures and piping
diameters: 25–820 mm (1–32 in.).
Table 66.13 consists of the main parameters of VES-type
dampers and Table 66.14 shows the same characteristics for VD
dampers.
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FIGURE 66.14 VERIFICATION TESTS OF HVD AT IHI 35 TONS SHAKING TABLE [59] (courtesy of IHI, Japan)

20 0.6
0.5
18
0.4
16 0.3
14 0.2
12 0.1
10 0.0
–0.1
8
–0.2
6 –0.3
4 –0.4
2 –0.5
0 –0.6
4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5

AQ1: FIGURE 66.15 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS OF VERIFICATION TESTS OF HVD AT IHI 35 TONS SHAKING TABLE WITH TWO
DAMPERS INSTALLED AT THE MODEL OF BWR PIPING (FIG. 66.13) UNDER SINUSOIDAL SWEEP EXCITATION AND SEIS-
MIC IMPACT [59] (Courtesy of IHI, Japan)

25.0 0.45

Measurements 0.40
20.0 Analysis Measurements Analysis
RMS Vibrovelcities, mm/sec

PSD Vibrovelocities, mm^2/s

0.35

0.30
15.0
0.25

0.20
10.0
0.15

5.0 0.10

0.05
0.0 0.00
2512 2516 2504 2508 2518 2520 2523 2526 2534 2538 2540 2542 2545 2554 2558 2560 2562 2565 2569
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Nodes/Measurement Points Frequency, Hz
a) vibration distribution along the piping b) PSD spectra in the control point

FIGURE 66.16 EXPERIMENTAL AND ANALYSIS RESULTS OF PIPING VIBRATION [60]

66.6 CONCLUSION
Finally, it may be concluded that HVD technology provides to • Vibration
NPP distribution systems and components an extended life and • Rotating equipment unbalanced loads
protection from earthquake cyclic operational vibration, impulse, • Pulsating equipment loads
and impact loads in service listed below: • Flow- induced loads
• Sudden valve operation
• Seismic induced loads • Pipe break loads
• Water and steam hammer • Blast and vehicle impact response loads
ASME_Ch66_p601-624.qxd 6/5/09 3:11 PM Page 618

Em.Sup.
602
20.0
Em.Sup.
Without dampers

RMS of vibrovelocity, mm/sec

603
18.0
8 7
6 16.0 With dampers
5 14.0 (predicted)
4a
12.0 With dampers
Em.Sup.
604 10.0 (actual)
1N08 DMP RL76N2
Em.Sup. 3 8.0
503
6.0
1N07 2
Em.Sup.
4.0
605 DMP RL76N1
Z 2.0
18 0.0
Y
1N06 Em.Sup.
1N06 1N07 1N08
606
X 1 Nodes / Measurement Points

(a) (b)
FIGURE 66.17 LAYOUT OF THE FEEDWATER RL76 PIPING IN THE CONTAINMENT LO2 WITH DAMPERS LOCATION (a) AND
ANALYTICALLY PREDICTED AND ACTUAL INFLUENCE OF DAMPERS ON THE PIPING VIBRATION (b) [60]

FIGURE 66.18 TYPICAL HVD INSTALLATION AND GENERAL DIMENSIONS (Courtesy of GERB, GmbH, Berlin, GERB
Vibration Control Systems, Inc., Lisle, IL, www.gerb.de)

FIGURE 66.19 VES DAMPER AT THE RL76 IN REACTOR FIGURE 66.20 VD DAMPER AT THE RA11 IN TURBINE
BUILDING LO2 (DAMPER’S PISTON AT THE PIPING, AND HALL (DAMPER’S PISTON AT THE PIPING, AND HOUSING
HOUSING AT THE RB WALL) [60] AT THE TH HORIZONTAL FLOOR) [60]
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 619

FIGURE 66.22 VES DAMPER AT RA10 LINE IN TURBINE

FIGURE 66.21 CONNECTION BY VD DAMPER OF TWO RA
HALL (DAMPER’S HOUSING AT THE PIPING, AND PISTON
LINES WITH DIFFERENT DYNAMIC PROPERTIES [60]
AT THE WALL) [60]

66.7 NOMENCLATURE RTm , STT – minimum tensile strength at temperature, MPa

2 SY, ST – minimum yield strength and minimum tensile
As – piping cross-sectional area, mm
strength at room temperature, MPa
C – total additional wall thickness, mm
Sa – allowable stress, MPa
Do – nominal outside diameter of pipe, mm
Sm – allowable design stress intensity, MPa
E – Young Modulus, MPa
Ssl – operation loading stress, MPa
I – piping cross-sectional moment of inertia, mm4
Sss – resultant seismic + operation loading stress, MPa
Mi, Mx, My, Mz – internal bending and torsion moments, N•mm
S,t – nominal wall thickness, mm
W – section modulus of pipe, mm3
Ns – internal axial force due to weight loading, N
 – strength-reducing coefficientt
Q – piping weight per length, N/mm
[] – nominal allowable stress, MPa
P – internal Design pressure, MPa
()2 – group of reduced stresses due to mechanical and
R – bend radius, mm
seismic loading. Defined as combination of
RTp0.2, STY – minimum yield strength at temperature, MPa
membrane and total bending stresses, MPa
Transducer 1
6.00

5.00

Without Dampers (RMS=11.5 mm/s)

PSD of Vibrovelocity, mm^2/s

4.00
With Dampers (RMS=3.4 mm/s)

3.00

2.00

1.00

0.00
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
Frequency, Hz
FIGURE 66.23 PSD SPECTRA OF RA10 PIPING VIBRATION BEFORE AND AFTER DAMPERS INSTALLATION [60]
ASME_Ch66_p601-624.qxd 6/3/09 2:07 PM Page 620

FIGURE 66.24 INTERCONNECTION OF STRUCTURES BY DAMPERS AND OVERALL EFFECT ON ELEVATION SPECTRA
UNDER DESIGN SEISMIC EXCITATION, EXPLOSION AND PLANE CRASH EXTREME LOADS [61]

TABLE 66.13 (Courtesy of GERB, GmbH, Berlin www.gerb.de)

The physical characteristics and the rated dynamic load capacities of GERB VES pipework dampers

Dimensions max. Displacements Service A Service D

Damper type B E D S Lo Vertical Horizontal Capacity Capacity Capacity
[mm] [+/-mm] [KN] [KN [Kips]]
VES-2,5/V40/H40 190 145 14 8 240 40 40 2.5 3.0 0.7
VES-2,5/V80/H40 225 180 14 10 380 80 40 2.5 3.0 0.7
VES-5/V40/H40 205 160 14 8 240 40 40 5.0 6.1 1.4
VES-5/V40/H100 374 290 26 16 320 40 100 5.0 6.1 1.4
VES-10/V40/H40 257 200 18 10 240 40 40 10.0 12.1 2.7
VES-10/V50/H50 317 245 22 13 280 50 50 10.0 12.1 2.7
VES-20/V40/H40 317 245 22 13 280 40 40 20.0 24.3 5.5
VES-20/V40/H60 436 330 32 20 350 40 60 20.0 24.3 5.5
VES-20/V40/H80 480 410 22 15 305 40 80 20.0 24.3 5.5
VES-20/V50/H50 374 290 26 16 320 50 50 20.0 24.3 5.5
VES-20/V80/H50 330 250 26 20 410 80 50 20.0 24.3 5.5
VES-30/V40/H40 374 290 26 16 320 40 40 30.0 36.4 8.2
VES-30/V40/H80 500 420 26 15 320 40 80 30.0 36.4 8.2
VES-40/V40/H40 394 310 26 18 335 40 40 40.0 48.6 10.9
VES-40/V40/H80 480 410 22 15 365 40 80 40.0 48.6 10.9
VES-50/V40/H40 436 330 32 20 350 40 40 50.0 60.7 13.6
VES-50/V40/H120 645 545 32 20 375 40 120 50.0 60.7 13.6
VES-75/V40/H40 491 365 38 25 390 40 40 75.0 91.1 20.5
VES-75/V40/H90 565 450 38 25 410 40 90 75.0 91.1 20.5
VES-75V40/H120 675 565 38 25 395 40 120 75.0 91.1 20.5
VES-100/V40/H40 511 385 38 30 405 40 40 100.0 121.4 27.3
VES-100/V40/H80 650 550 38 30 470 40 80 100.0 121.4 27.3
VES-300/V40/H40 745 565 62 50 580 40 40 300.0 364.3 81.9
VES-300/V80/H40 745 565 62 50 690 80 40 300.0 364.3 81.9
ASME B&PVC Section III Service Level D is based on Ultimate Load Capacity 1/1.4
ASME B&PVC Section III Service Level A and Design Load is based on Ultimate Load Capacity 1/1.7
1kip = 4.448kN
1kN = 0.225kips
620
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 621

TABLE 66.14 (Courtesy of GER, GmbH, Berlin, www.gerb.de)

The physical characteristics and the rated dynamic load capacities of GERB VD pipework dampers

Dimensions max. Displacements Service A Service D

Damper type B E D S Lo Vertical Horizontal Capacity Capacity Capacity
[mm] [+/-mm] [KN] [KN [Kips]]
VD 108/57-3 130 106 14 8 152 13 13 1,4 1,8 0,4
VD 159/76-3 180 150 18 10 197 25 27 3,1 3,8 0,9
VD 159/76-7 180 150 18 10 197 25 25 6,7 8,1 1,8
VD 219/108-3 238 200 22 15 236 24 41 5,9 7,2 1,6
VD 219/108-7 238 200 22 15 236 24 39 12,8 15,5 3,5
VD 219/108-15 238 200 22 15 236 24 31 25,5 31,0 7,0
VD 219/159-3 238 200 22 15 236 24 15 8,2 10,0 2,2
VD 325/159-3 342 286 33 20 333 40 67 13,2 16,0 6,6
VD 325/159-7 342 286 33 20 333 40 64 28,0 34,0 7,6
VD 325/159-15 342 286 33 20 333 40 58 56,0 68,0 15,3
VD 325/219-3 342 286 33 20 333 40 37 17,3 21,0 4,7
VD 325/219-7 342 286 33 20 333 40 34 37,9 46,0 10,3
VD 325/219-15 342 286 33 20 333 40 22 74,2 90,0 20,2
VD 426/219-3 434 368 39 25 378 45 87 22,2 27,0 6,1
VD 426/219-7 434 368 39 25 378 45 84 47,8 58,0 13,0
VD 426/219-15 434 368 39 25 378 45 78 98,9 120,0 27,0
VD 426/325-3 434 368 39 25 378 45 34 29,7 36,0 8,1
VD 426/325-7 434 368 39 25 378 45 31 65,9 80,0 18,0
VD 426/325-15 434 368 39 25 378 45 19 123,6 150,0 33,7
VD 630/325-3 646 542 60 35 556 74 134 49,4 60,0 13,5
VD 630/325-7 646 542 60 35 556 74 13 107,1 130,0 29,2
VD 630/325-15 646 542 60 35 556 74 122 214,2 260,0 58,5
VD 630/426-3 646 542 60 35 556 74 84 65,9 80,0 18,0
VD 630/426-7 646 542 60 35 556 74 80 144,2 175.0 39,3
VD 630/426-15 646 542 60 35 556 74 72 288,4 350,0 78,7

ASME B&PVC Section III Service Level D is based on Ultimate Load Capacity 1/1.4
ASME B&PVC Section III Service Level A and Design Load is based on Ultimate Load Capacity 1/1.7
1kip=4.448kN
1kN=0.225kips

66.8 GLOSSARY PNAE – Rules and Standards in Atomic Energy

Industry
AS – Emergency Situation RF Russian Federation
ASME – American Society of Mechanical Engineers RG – Regulatory Guides
ASME BPVC – ASME Boiler and & Pressure Vessel Code RPV – Reactor Pressure Vessel
CDFM – Conservative Deterministic Failure Margin RSMAM – Response Spectrum Modal Analysis Method
DBPB – Design Basis Pipe Breaks SG – Steam Generator
HCLPF – High Confidence Low Probability Failure SL – Sustained Loads
IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency SMA – Seismic Margin Assessment
LOCA – Loss of Coolant Accident SRP – Standard Review Plan
MCP – Main Coolant Pump SRSS – Square Root of Sum of Squares
MRZ – Maximum Design Earthquake SSE – Safe Shutdown Earthquake
MS/FWPB – Main Steam and Feedwater Pipe Breaks THA – Time History Analysis
NNUE – Violation of Normal Operating Conditions WWER – Water–Water Energetic Reactor
NPP – Nuclear Power Plant YEU – Nuclear Energetic Unit
NRC – Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USA) ZPA – Zero Period Acceleration
NUE – Normal Operating Conditions ZPGA – Zero Period Ground Acceleration
PCLS – Primary Coolant Loop System USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
ASME_Ch66_p601-624.qxd 6/3/09 2:07 PM Page 622
622 • Chapter 66
66.9 REFERENCES
1. History of Mining and Industry Inspection in Russia. The Federal
Service Board for Ecological, Technology and Industrial Inspection.
Available at www.gosandzor.ru
2. RD-03-42-97, The System of Normative Documents of Russian
“Gosatomnadzor, February 1, 1998.
3. Federal Service for Ecology, Technology and Atomic Regulation, List
of Normative Acts and Documents, P-01-01-2007, Chapter 2, State
Regulation of Safety in Nuclear Power, Moscow, 2007, Nuclear and
Radiological safety Magazine, Vol. 3, No. 45, NTC YRB, 2007.
4. RF Federal Statute on Use of Atomic Power, No. 170-F3, November
21, 1995.
5. Federal Statute on Technical Regulation, No. 184-F3, December 27,
2002.
6. General Provisions for Safety of Nuclear Power Plants, OPB-88/97
(PNAE G-01-011-97/NP-001-97), Gosatomnadzor RF, 1997.
7. NPPs Siting. Basic Safety Criteria and Requirements, NP-032-01,
Gosatomnadzor RF, 2001.
8. Analysis of External Natural and Man-Caused Events on NPPs, NP-
064-05, Rostechnadzor, 2005.
9. Norms for Seismic Design of NPPs, NP-031-01, Gosatomnadzor RF,
2001.
10. General Provisions for Quality Assurance Program for NPPs, NP-
011-99, Gosatomnadzor RF, 1999.
11. Nuclear Safety Rules for Reactor Installations of NPPs, PBYa
RU AS-89 (PNAE G-1-024-90), USSR Gospromatomnadzor, 1990,
Gosatomnadzor RF, 1999.
12. Norms for Strength Analysis of Equipment and Piping of Nuclear
Installations, PNAE G-7-002-87, USSR Gosatomenergonadzor, 1986.
13. PNAE G-7-009-89, Equipment and Piping of Nuclear Power Plants.
Welding and Hard-Facing. Fundamentals (as amended of 1999, N 1).
14. PNAE G-7-010-89, Equipment and Piping of Nuclear Power Plants.
Weld Joints and Hard-Facing. Control Rules (as amended of 1999).
15. Rules for Design and Safety Operation of Equipment and Piping of
Nuclear Installations, PNAE G-7-008-89, USSR Gosatomenergonadzor,
1989, RF, Gosatomnadzor RF, 1999, Rostechnadzor RF, 2006.
16. Boiler Code of Central Boiler and Turbine Institute (CKTI),
Glavkotlturboprom (USSR Boiler Industry Department), 1937–1939.
17. Codes of Boilers Strength Analysis, CKTI Edition, Vol.17,
Gosgortechnadzor (Mining and Industrial Regulation) 1950, 1956 and
1965 Editions.
18. Norms for Strength Analysis of Reactor Elements, Steam Generators,
Vessels and Piping for Nuclear Power Plants, Experimental and
Investigation Nuclear Facilities, Approved by USSR State Committee
for Nuclear Power and Gosgortechnadzor, Metallurgy Press issue,
Moscow, 1973.
19. Temporary Norms for Design of Nuclear Installations for Seismically
Active Zones, BCH-15-78, USSR Power Industry Ministry, 1979.
20. Norms for a Seismic Analysis of Equipment and Piping of PWR (VVER)
Nuclear Power Plants, Approved by State Committee of Nuclear Power
as an Addendum to the Nuclear Norms 1973, Information Bulletin of
Gosgotechnadzor Technical Department No. 8 (656)-81, 1981.
21. Kostarev, V., Vetoshkin, V., Schukin, A., Kostovezkiy, D., Reinov, A.
Regulatory Guide of USSR Ministry for Power and Heavy Industry,
RTM 108.020.37-81, PWR (VVER) NPPs Power Equipment and
Piping. Seismic Analysis, NPO CKTI, 1981–1982, with Addendum
No. 1 in 1985.
22. Filatov, V.M. and Rivkin, E.Y., NPP Structures Strength: Russian Strength
Regulations and ASME and ASME Code, ASME/JSME 4th International
Conference on Nuclear Engineering, Vol. 5, pp. 337–344, 1996.
23. Stevenson, J.D., Kostarev, V., Bercovky, A., Schukin, A., Masopust,
R. Comparison of Russian PNAE, ASME BPVC and Japan JEAG
4601 Regulations for Seismic Design of NPP’s Piping Systems.
SMIRT 15, Seoul, paper K7-B1, 1999.
24. Russian Federation Federal Law No. 184-FZ, About the Technical
Regulation, 2003.
25. Stevenson, J.D., Standards–Status and Development in the Nuclear
Industry, Proceedings of ASCE Specialty Conference on Design of
Nuclear Plant Facilities, Boston, April 1979.
26. Stevenson, J.D. and Thomas, F.A., Selected Review and Evaluation of
U.S. Safety Research Vis-a-Vis Foreign Safety Research for Nuclear
Power Plants, NUREG/CR-3212, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, March 1983.
27. Hofmayer, C.H., Park, Y.J., Costello, J.F., Understanding Earthquake
Design Criteria Used in Japan, Proceedings of the Fifth Symposium,
Orlando, Florida, December 1994; North Carolina State University,
Raleigh, NC27695-7908/USNRC/EPRI.
28. Minematsu, A., Seismic Design of Equipment and Piping Systems for
NPPs in Japan, International Symposium on Seismic Safety Relating
to NPPs, Kobe, Japan, 1997.
29. Kostarev, V., Masopust, R., Bercovsky, A., and Schukin, A., Former
Soviet Regulations for Seismic Design of NPPs and Comparison with
Current International Practice, International Symposium on Seismic
Safety Relating to NPPs, Kobe, Japan, 1997.
30. Technical Guidelines for Aseismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants,
JEAG 4601-1987, Japan Electric Association, 1987.
31. ASME BPVC, Section III, Division 1, Subsection NB-Class 1,
Nuclear Power Plant Components, ASME, 1993.
32. ASME BPVC, 1992 Edition, Section III, Division 1, Subsection
NC-Class 2, Nuclear Power Plant Components, ASME, 1993.
33. ASME BPVC, 1992 Edition, Section III, Division 1, Subsection
ND-Class 3, Nuclear Power Plant Components, ASME, 1993.
34. ASME BPVC, 1992 Edition, Section III, Division 1, Subsection
NF-Supports, Nuclear Power Plant Components, ASME, 1993.
35. ASME BPVC, 1992 Edition, Section III, Division 1, Appendix N,
Dynamic Analysis Methods, ASME, 1993.
36. ASME BPVC, 1992 Edition, Section III, Division 1, Appendix F,
Rules for Evaluation of Service Loading with Level D Service Limits,
ASME, 1993.
37. RG 1.29, Seismic Design Classification, Rev. 3, 9/78.
38. RG 1.60, Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear
Power Plants, Rev. 1, 12/73.
39. RG 1.61, Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power
Plants, Rev. 1, 10/73.
40. RG 1.92, Combining Modal Responses and Spatial Components in
Seismic Response Analysis, Rev. 1, 2/76.
41. SRP 3.2.1, Seismic Classification, Rev.1, 6/81, Report NUREG-0800.
NRC, Washington, 1989.
42. SRP 3.2.2, System Quality Group Classification, Rev.1, 6/81, Report
NUREG-0800. NRC, Washington, 1989.
43. SRP 3.7.1, Seismic Design Parameters, Rev.2, 8/89, Report NUREG-
0800, NRC, Washington, 1989.
44. SRP 3.7.2, Seismic System Analysis, Rev.2, 8/89, Report NUREG-
0800, NRC, Washington, 1989.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 623

45. SRP 3.7.3, Seismic Subsystem Analysis, Rev.2, 8/89, Report 54. Berkovski, A., Kostarev, V., and Schukin, A., Seismic Analysis of the
NUREG-0800, NRC, Washington, 1989. Safety Related Piping and PCLS of the WWER-440 NPP,
Transactions of the 14th SMiRT, Lyon, France, August 1997.
46. SRP 3.9.3, ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 Components, Components
Supports, and Core Support Structures, Rev.1, 6/81, Report NUREG- 55. Safety Standard of the Nuclear Safety Standards Commission, KTA
0800, NRC, Washington, 1989. 3205.3 (06/90), Component Support Structures with Non-integral
Integral Connections, Part 3, Series–Production Standard Supports.
47. PNAE G-7-008-89, The Rules for Safety Design and Operation of
NPP Components and Piping, Energoatomizdat Issue, Moscow, 56. Reinsch, K.-H. and Barutzki, F., Dampfung von Schwingungen in
1990. Rohrleitungssytemen, Hand-buch Rohrleitungstechnik–6, Ausgabe,
1994, S. 142–147, Vulkan-Verlag Essen.
48. ASME BPVC, 1992 Edition, Section II, Materials, Part D, Properties,
ASME, 1993. 57. Katona, T., Ratkai, S., Delinic, K., and Zeitner, W., Reduction of
Operational Vibration of Feed-Water Piping System of VVER-
49. ASME BPVC, Case N-411-1, Alternative Damping Values for
440/213 at PAKS, Proceedings of the 10th European Conference on
Response Spectra Analysis of Class 1, 2 and 3 Piping, Section III,
Earthquake Engineering, pp. 2847–2852.
Division 1, 1986.
58. Masopust, R., Hueffmann, G., and Podrouzek, J., GERB Viscous
50. Berkovski, A.M., Kireev, O.B., Schukin, A.J., Analysis and Control
Dampers in Applications for Pipelines and Other Components in
Calculations of the Test Pipeline, Stevenson and Associates, Rep.
Czechoslovak Nuclear Power Plants, ASME PVP, Vol. 237, No. 2,
13-95.pks, Plzen, 1995.
Seismic Engineering, pp.17–22.
51. Masopust, R., Guidelines for Seismic Qualification of Technological
59. Ochi, Y., Kashiwazaki, A., and Kostarev, V.V., Application of High
Equipment of NPP Paks, Stevenson and Associates, Rep.09–92.pks,
Viscous Damper on Piping System and Isolation Floor System,
Plzen, 1992.
Proceedings of the 9th ECEE, Moscow, 1990.
52. Computer Software Code for Piping Dynamic Analysis dPIPE,
60. Kostarev, V., Tuomas, A., and Reinsch, K.-H., Resolving of Steam and
Verification, Manual Report No. co06-96x.vvk, St. Petersburg,
Feed-Water Piping Vibration Matter at Loviisa NPP, SMiRT 19,
1997.
Toronto, 2007.
53. Kostarev, V., Berkovski, A., and Schukin, A., Upgrading of Dynamic
61. Kostarev, V., Petrenko, A., Vasiliev, P., Reinsch, K.-H., Adaptation of
Reliability and Life Extension of Piping by Means of High Viscous
High Viscous Dampers (HVD) for Essential Decreasing of In-
Damper Technology, Transactions of PVP ASME Conference,
Structure Response Spectra, SMiRT 18, Beijing, 2005.
Boston, 1999.
ASME_Ch67_p625-634.qxd 6/3/09 2:08 PM Page 625
CODES AND STANDARDS USED IN THE
NUCLEAR INDUSTRY IN THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
Malcolm J. Europa, Paul J. Brinkhurst, John Fletcher, and Neil Broom
67.1 INTRODUCTION
An overview of the codes and standards for pressurized equip-
ment as used in the South African nuclear industry is presented.
The applicable legislation, regulatory requirements, and the roles
of the respective regulatory bodies governing the use of pressur-
ized equipment will be discussed.
Two pressurized water reactor (PWR) units of Westinghouse
design but constructed under license from Framatome are com-
mercially in operation in the country. A historical perspective of
the construction, licensing, and operational phases is given, with
emphasis on the design and quality rules used and risk considera-
tions allowed by the licensing framework. The nuclear and non-
nuclear codes used will be presented and the approach to and
deviations from the in-service inspection code requirements will
be explained.
A pebble bed modular reactor (PBMR) is to be constructed for
Eskom, the owner and licensee, by PBMR (Pty) Ltd, a largely
state-owned and funded nuclear design company.
The PBMR is a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR)
and is one of the next- generation nuclear power plants (NGNP),
characterized as a high temperature (900°C, 1832°F), helium-
cooled, graphite-moderated, pebble-fuelled, direct-power conver-
sion cycle nuclear power plant. The PBMR is designed according
to the ASME Section III Codes, utilizing light water reactor
(LWR) service conditions and materials. This has imposed certain
constraints on the design and required innovative design features,
such as the hot gas duct, to accommodate 900°C gases within
LWR metal service conditions.
This paper will highlight some of the challenges encountered in
both design and licensing and how these have been addressed via
a formal code selection process. It will also report on the Section
XI, Division II, Code rewrite for HTGRs, which has been initiated
in response to an in-service inspection requirement identified by
PBMR for HTGRs.
In conclusion, the paper discusses the stated intentions of the
South African Government in terms of the expansion of the
nuclear industry and the implications thereof. It will also review
the changes being made to the regulatory frameworks, the need
for change, and the implications with respect to code and stan-
dards usage in the industry.
Chapter
67
67.2 REGULATORY CONTROL OF
PRESSURIZED EQUIPMENT USED
IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY
67.2.1 Regulatory Authority
67.2.1.1 The National Nuclear Regulator In the initial period
of the development of nuclear technology in South Africa, the
Atomic Energy Board (AEB) performed the nuclear regulatory
function under the Atomic Energy Act [1]. This legislation pro-
vided the legal framework for the licensing of the Koeberg Nuclear
Power Station.
The National Nuclear Regulator Act (NNRA) [2] currently pro-
vides for the regulation of nuclear activities. The NNRA deals
exclusively with the regulation of the nuclear industry and pro-
vides for the separation of the nuclear industry regulatory func-
tion from the state nuclear research and development activities in
South Africa. The nuclear research and development aspects of
nuclear activities in South Africa are legislated by the Nuclear
Energy Act No. 46 of 1999 [3] that provides for the establishment
of the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation (Necsa), which
is a public company wholly owned by the State. Necsa carries out
a range of activities that includes industrial nuclear research and
storage of radioactive waste and irradiated nuclear fuel. Necsa
operates two licensed sites. In addition to a number of research
laboratories and fuel facilities, a 20-MW tank, in pool-type
research reactor, SAFARI-l is in operation at the Pelindaba site,
northwest of Johannesburg. Necsa also operates a nuclear waste
depository for low and intermediate levels of waste at the
Vaalputs site in the west of the country (refer to Fig. 67.1).
The South African National Nuclear Regulator (NNR) regu-
lates nuclear activities in accordance with the NNRA that confers
upon the NNR the responsibility of, inter alia, providing technical
and administrative requirements for nuclear authorizations that
include the exercising of regulatory control related to safety over
the design, construction, operation, and manufacture of compo-
nent parts of nuclear installations.
The NNR licensing requirements documents specify the sub-
mission of a safety case in support of an application for a nuclear
authorization. As a requirement, the safety case must demonstrate
the adequacy of the plant design and operational procedures through
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626 • Chapter 67
formalized safety analyses. One aspect of the demonstration of
safety adequacy that is assessed by the NNR is the appropriate
use of codes and standards in the design, manufacture, construc-
tion, operation, inspection, modification, and repair of structures,
systems, and components.
The NNR does not specify the use of any specific design code
or standard. There are also no specific design codes and standards
developed in the Republic of South Africa for the safety of impor-
tant components used in the South African nuclear industry. In
principle, any design, construction, and inspection code or stan-
dard that is internationally accepted for application at nuclear
facilities can be proposed for design and construction. However,
the codes and standards must be justified in terms of application
and must be applied consistently, without omission of conditions
or embedded requirements. Alternatively, new or modified codes
and standards can be developed, justified, and proposed for
approval by the relevant authority. While the NNR does not autho-
rize or regulate the use of specific equipment or components, the
NNR performs assurance-compliance-related monitoring activities
with respect to the applicant’s code of choice from a list of codes
as contained in the relevant regulations (refer to 67.2.1.2) and as
agreed to by the NNR. This includes performing detailed assess-
ments of plant component and system design related material for
structural adequacy during the review of safety cases.
67.2.1.2 The Department of Labour The use of codes and stan-
dards is regulated through the Occupational Health and Safety Act
[4]. It provides for the promulgation of regulations that are necessary
or expedient in the interest of the health and safety of persons at work
or the health and safety of persons in connection with the use of plant
or machinery. In this respect, the Vessels under Pressure Regulations
of 1996 (VUPR) [5] provides the regulations for the design, con-
struction, and use of pressurized equipment in industry. The main
purpose of the VUPR is to provide the essential safety requirements
with respect to the use of pressurized equipment or systems; hence,
the legal obligations and responsibilities of manufacturers and own-
ers in respect of design, manufacture, registration, operation, inspec-
tion, and maintenance are contained in the document. The VUPR
does not provide design criteria, but rather incorporate a list of
approved health and safety standards or codes that are required to be
used for the design and construction of approved vessels under pres-
sure. By definition, vessels under pressure regulations includes pres-
surized systems. As it is the role of the Department of Labour under
South African Government to regulate occupational safety under the
Occupational Health and Safety Act, it is also its role to regulate
pressurized systems and equipment both in nuclear and other
conventional applications through the registration of boilers and
pressure vessels, approval and regulation of approved inspection
authorities, and enforcement of the regulations. Currently, the only
nuclear code listed in the VUPR is the ASME III Code. At the time
of writing, however, the draft Pressure Equipment Regulations
(PER) [6] was under review that would, when promulgated, replace
the VUPR. In this paper, therefore, all references to regulations
governing activities on pressure equipment refer to the draft PER.
67.2.1.3 The South African Bureau of Standards The South
African Bureau of Standards (SABS) is a statutory body that was
initially established in 1945. It currently operates in terms of the lat-
est edition of the Standards Act [7] as the national institution for the
maintenance and publication of South African national standards
on a variety of topics. The SABS is responsible for the development
of technical regulations, monitoring, and enforcing of the technical
regulations published. SANS 1-1:2003 [8] describes the underlying
principles of the preparation of national standards and serves as a
guide for standards development.
Draft South African Standards is developed and established by
consensus in technical committees of experts on the subject mat-
ter, who are representatives of the national interest and are drawn
from industry, government, labor, professional, or technical orga-
nizations, and regulatory bodies. The aim of the standards is
the promotion of optimum community benefits, and the standards
are based on the results of science, proven technology, and experi-
ence. Participants may constitute the technical committees as a
participative member with full voting rights or as an observer who
may participate in various committee activities but without voting
rights. The draft standards are subject to public enquiry and com-
ment after acceptance by the technical committee. Comments
received from the public are reviewed and resolved as appropriate
by the technical committee. Thereafter, where substantial techni-
cal changes are required, the public comment on draft standards
are again obtained. However, in cases where no technical changes
are introduced, the standards are approved and forwarded to the
Standards Approval Committee for ratification after which the doc-
uments are released for publication. The SABS participates actively
in a number of international standardization organizations as a
member body. Where appropriate, International Organization for
Standardization (ISO), International Electrotechnical Commission
(IEC), and certain other international, regional, and national stan-
dards may be adopted as South African standards. In certain cases,
the use of specific national standards may be declared as compulso-
ry specifications that must be complied with. As an example, the
draft PER [6] incorporates SANS 347 [9] (refer to 67.2.2.1) into the
Regulations as a compulsory standard applicable to design, manu-
facture, operation, repair and modification, maintenance, and
inspection and testing of pressure equipment.
67.2.1.4 South African National Accreditation System The
Occupational Health and Safety Act defines Approved Inspection
Authority (AIA) as “an inspection authority approved by the Chief
Inspector.” The draft PER requires the intervention of AIA in a
number of activities within the scope of the Regulations.
The South African National Accreditation System (SANAS) is
the government-endorsed national accreditation body. Through its
accreditation process, it provides independent, third-party formal
recognition to an authoritative body to carry out specific tasks within
the regulatory domain. The criteria for bodies performing inspection
in terms of the PER are contained in SANS/ISO 17020 [10] and
SANS 10227 [11]. Once a certificate of accreditation is achieved,
approval may be conferred by the Chief Inspector to operate as an
approved body if no additional requirements have been set.
67.2.2 Regulations and Standards Applicable to
Pressurized Equipment
67.2.2.1 The Pressure Equipment Regulations (Draft) and
SANS 347 The PER will (when promulgated) provide mandatory
requirements for the design, manufacture, operation, repair, modi-
fication, maintenance, and testing of pressure equipment where the
design pressure of the equipment is equal to or greater than 50 kPa.
While there are a number of exclusions from the scope of applica-
tion, the Regulations are geared to include items such as vessels,
piping systems, steam generators, pressure, and safety accessories.
The PER specifies the duties of manufacturers, importers and sup-
pliers, users, and approved inspection authorities and invokes the
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application of SANS 347 in terms of categorization and conformi-
ty assessment of pressurized equipment and the requirements of an
applicable health and safety standard incorporated into SANS 347.
This presents one improvement of the PER over the VUPR. As
indicated previously, the VUPR incorporates a list of approved
health and safety standards or codes in an appendix to the VUPR.
Due to the difficulty in updating the Regulations, this list has
become outdated. This is somewhat resolved by incorporating a
list of health and safety standards to a Standard that can be updat-
ed with significantly less effort. In addition to ASME Section III,
the French RCC-M Code has been incorporated into the Annex of
SANS 347, providing a second nuclear code that may be used for
pressurized equipment in nuclear use. In principle, the approach
taken in the PER and SANS 347 is derived from the European
Pressure Directive. Pressurized equipment is categorized into
hazard categories on the basis of the following:
• fluid characteristics,
• the product of the design pressure, and nominal diameter for
piping and
• the product of the design pressure and volume for steam gen-
erators and vessels
The conformity assessment criteria applied is then in commen-
suration with the hazard category of the equipment. The approach
is discussed in detail in Chapter 47 and will not be reproduced
here. It is, however, important to note that the requirements of the
applicable health and safety standard should also be complied.
67.2.2.2 SANS 10227: 2007 and SANS/ISO 17020: 1998 The
PER [6] and SANS 347 [9] require the intervention of an
Approved Inspection Authority in the assessment of adequacy of
pressurized equipment, both during manufacturing and operation
of the equipment.
The criteria for bodies performing inspection in terms of the PER
are contained in SANS/ISO 17020 [10] and SANS 10227 [11].
These criteria include the applicable administrative requirements,
requirements on independence, impartiality, integrity, quality
systems and confidentiality, and others. SANS/ISO 17020 is a
European standard that has been adopted for use in South Africa. It
is supplemented by SANS 10227 that provide the specific accredi-
tation criteria to meet the South African Regulatory requirements
that include the approval process (of inspection authorities), the
scope of activity, and the qualification requirements of personnel.
As is discussed in Section 67.3.1.5, except for a period during
the first inspection interval at Koeberg Nuclear Power Station,
the role of the AIA has been fulfilled by the Eskom Corporate
and the National Nuclear Regulator Inspectorate. However, given
the future outlook of the nuclear industry in South Africa (refer to
Section 67.4), discussion has taken place between the Department
of Labour, SANAS, and the NNR that resulted in the compilation
of requirements for the accreditation and approval of AIA to oper-
ate in the nuclear industry. These requirements pertain specifically
to the qualification of Authorized Nuclear Inspectors and
Authorized Nuclear Inspector Supervisors and the qualification
and duties of Authorized Inspection Agencies, and follow the
principles of ASME QAI-1:2003. It is expected that these new
requirements will be included into the next revision of SANS
10227. While the focus is on the PBMR currently, other nuclear
installations such as Koeberg and any new reactors will be subject
to AIA approval to operate in the nuclear industry. There remains
some debate on how to minimize the area of overlap between the
NNR oversight function and the future “nuclear AIA,” but it is
expected that the NNR will provide credit for the AIA function
during its compliance-related monitoring activities.
67.3 NUCLEAR CODE AND STANDARDS
USAGE IN REPUBLIC OF
SOUTH AFRICA
The South African nuclear industry, although small, dates back to
the early 1960s. Currently the number of commercial nuclear autho-
rizations granted by the NNR exceeds 100. Most of these authoriza-
tion holders are from the mining industry where the handling of
naturally occurring radioactive material requires authorization in
terms of the NNRA. Other current authorization holders include the
South African Nuclear Energy Corporation (Necsa), a public com-
pany that operates the SAFARI-1 research reactor, and Eskom, the
South African electricity utility company that operates two 900-
MWe PWR units at Koeberg near Cape Town (refer to Fig. 67.1).
However, currently, the PBMR company and Koeberg Nuclear
Power Station are the only users of nuclear codes in South Africa.
67.3.1 Koeberg Power Station
67.3.1.1 Historic Information and Description South Africa is
characterized by a geographically uneven distribution of fossil
fuels and by a dearth of the readily transportable fossil fuels such
as oil. As a result of these circumstances, the South African utility
Eskom (Electricity Supply Commission) decided in the mid-1970s
to construct Africa’s first commercial nuclear power station, 30 km
(19 miles) north of Cape Town on the South Atlantic coast. Cape
Town is the major urban area in the Western Cape province, and is
situated nearly 1500 km (930 miles) away from the major coal
deposits in South Africa (refer to Fig. 67.1).
Areva (at that time Framatome), as part of a French consor-
tium, constructed two 922-MWe PWR units at Koeberg Power
Station under a turnkey contract. The design of the two Koeberg
PWRs was based on the existing EDF CP-1 units; Tricastin units
1 and 2 in France being the reference station. The nuclear steam
supply system (NSSS) design that was used was based on the
design of the Westinghouse units at North Anna in Virginia, USA.
The two Koeberg units went into commercial operation in 1984
(unit 1) and 1985 (unit 2).
67.3.1.2 Licensing and Authorization The initial licensing of
Koeberg was overseen by the then AEB of South Africa in terms
of Section 3 of the Atomic Energy Act (Act 90 of 1967) [1]. The
AEB issued the first permit (KKS1) for Eskom to “produce nuclear
or atomic energy by means of a nuclear power station” in June
1977. The provisions of this permit were based primarily on IAEA
requirements.
Later Licenses KTL5, KL1, and variations (revisions) thereof,
issued by the Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) in terms of the
Nuclear Energy Act (1982), gave Eskom permission to store fuel
on site, load fuel, perform precriticality testing, and authorized
subsequent power operation.
The NNR was established in terms of the NNRA of 1999 [2] to
regulate nuclear activities in South Africa. The NNR issued the cur-
rent operating license (authorization) for Koeberg (NL-1) in terms
of the NNR Act. Although the NNR did not explicitly approve the
use of specific codes for the design of Koeberg, the application of
established codes with the requisite pedigree was an important
aspect in presenting a sound case for the licensing of the plant.
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FIG. 67.1 MAP OF CURRENT AND PROPOSED NUCLEAR SITES IN SOUTH AFRICA
67.3.1.3 Use of ASME Section III and the CPFC The design
and manufacture of the large nuclear components for Koeberg
began in the second half of the 1970s. Based on the considerations
outlined in the previous clause, ASME Section III was applied in
the design of the Koeberg NSSS mechanical components. Also,
Framatome, the NSSS vendor, had already designed around a
dozen virtually identical units in France using ASME Section III.
Most of the safety class components of the Koeberg NSSS were
designed according to the 1971 Edition of ASME Section III, with
Addenda up to 1972 or 1973 [12].
In line with French practice, alternate rules were applied during
construction for the requirements related to materials, fabrication,
and examination. In place of subsections Nx 2000, Nx 4000, and
Nx 5000 of Section III, the rules of the EDF document Cahier des
Prescriptions de Fabrication et de Contrôle (CPFC) [13] were
applied during manufacture and fabrication. With regard to mater-
ial requirements, this did not represent a significant deviation to
Section III requirements as the French material grades corre-
sponded to equivalent Section II material grades, with, in many
cases, supplementary requirements. Even the deviation to Nx 4000
and Nx 5000 represents alternate practice details, rather than any
fundamental difference in requirements.
Currently, Koeberg apply the requirements of Section III, Nx
2000, Nx 4000, and Nx 5000 when performing plant interventions
such as modifications.
67.3.1.4 ASME Section III Administration Requirements
The services of an AIA were not utilized during the construc-
tion of Koeberg. However, the services of an experienced quality
assurance (QA) contractor with extensive nuclear experience were
used to give Eskom an appropriate level of confidence in the man-
ufacture and construction activities.
For the vessels installed at Koeberg, nameplates were applied
in compliance with the South African Vessels under Pressure
Regulations; nameplates in compliance with the B&PV Code were
not used, and hence the Code symbol stamps were not applied. In
any case, most manufacturers were not ASME accredited.
Similarly, data reports, as required by the B&PV Code were not
completed; however, independent design reviews were completed
and a comprehensive QA data package exists for each vessel.
The future role of inspection agencies in the South African
nuclear industry is currently being debated, and is discussed in
more detail in Section 67.2.2.2.
67.3.1.5 Use of ASME Section XI Prior to the operational
phase, Koeberg Eskom needed to develop an appropriate approach
for preservice and in-service inspection. Eskom wished to use an
established, well-documented set of rules, a view supported by the
South African Regulator. Accordingly, ASME Section XI [14],
1980 Edition, was applied for preservice inspection (PSI) and for
the first inspection interval (ISI). The services of an AIA were used
initially to provide an ANII; however, around the middle of the first
inspection interval, the Eskom corporate engineering organization
assumed the code interpretation role, with the corporate QA func-
tion taking on the assurance role for ISI activities. This situation has
continued basically unchanged, with Eskom still utilizing an inter-
nal system of assurance of code compliance, with the NNR also
performing independent regulatory inspections of ISI activities.
Along with the scope and periodicity specified in ASME
Section XI (basic scope), ISI at Koeberg also includes examination
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requirements based on integrity concerns and/or appropriate oper-
ating experience. This is based primarily on EDF operating expe-
rience and feedback on the equivalent units in France.
As part of the adoption of Section XI, IWA 4000 is applied for
repair and replacement activities at Koeberg.
Certain enhancements were also made to Section XI require-
ments, for example, as part of the implementation strategy for the
ultrasonic examination of weldments. Eskom applied an
increased examination sensitivity, utilizing 3% rather than 10%
notches.
For the second inspection interval, Eskom adopted the 1992
Edition (A1993) of Section XI. In order to better document
the details of Section XI, as it had been transposed for use at
Koeberg, an In-service Inspection Requirements Manual
(ISIPRM) was written and endorsed by the NNR. Although 1992
(A1993) was the most recent edition and addenda of Section XI
available at the time, it had not been approved by the NRC. This
was not seen as a major obstacle as Eskom had already elected,
with the support of the NNR, to adopt the ENIQ methodology for
the qualification of UT systems, rather than the rules of
Appendix VIII.
For the third inspection interval, Eskom has proposed the 2001
Edition (A2003) of Section XI. This request is currently being
assessed by the NNR.
Nuclear Code Cases can be applied at Koeberg if approved by
the NRC in Regulatory Guides 1.84 and 1.147.
67.3.1.6 Use of Other Codes and Standards In the 1980s,
CPFC was superseded by the RCC-M [15], which is a complete
code for the design and fabrication of the mechanical components
of nuclear power stations. A number of components designed and
manufactured to RCC-M have been installed as replacements at
Koeberg. Formally, such replacements are dealt with by reconcili-
ation of code requirements in accordance with IWA 4000.
Codes such as ASME Section VIII and ANSI/ASME B31.1
have been used for nonnuclear components at Koeberg.
FIG. 67.2 LAYOUT OF PBMR HELIUM PRESSURE BOUNDARY
67.3.1.7 Deviations from ASME XI In circumstances where it
is necessary to deviate from ISIPRM requirements, a waiver and
exemption process is used for temporary and permanent changes,
respectively.
Circumstances where areas of noncompliance to Section XI are
already apparent at the start of the interval, these are included as
deviations in the ISIPRM that include appropriate justification for
the noncompliance.
67.3.1.8 Approach to Risk-Informed Decision Making As
discussed above, for the ISI third interval at Koeberg, Eskom have
proposed the use of the 2001 Edition (A2003) of Section XI, with
a risk-informed selection for pipework welds, based on Code Case
N-578 and the applicable EPRI topical reports.
67.3.2 The Pebble Bed Modular Reactor
67.3.2.1 PBMR Origin and Description A PBMR is to be con-
structed for Eskom, the future Owner and Licensee, by PBMR
(Pty) Ltd., a largely state-owned and funded nuclear design com-
pany. The PBMR is a HTGR and is one of the Generation IV
nuclear power plants characterized as a high temperature 900°C,
helium-cooled, graphite-moderated, pebble-fuelled, direct-power
conversion cycle nuclear power plant (~165 MWe). Figure 67.2
shows the layout of the primary components of the recuperative
Brayton cycle that collectively form the helium pressure boundary
(HPB).
The PBMR main power system (MPS) utilizes a recuperative
Brayton cycle with helium as the working fluid. Once the Brayton
cycle is established, it becomes self-sustaining, thereby driving
the helium coolant around the cycle. The helium coolant flow path
that constitutes the Brayton cycle is described as follows. The
helium enters the reactor unit at 500°C, 9 MPa from the recupera-
tor outlet, where it is heated to 900°C, 8.5 MPa in the pebble bed
reactor core. Thereafter, the helium is channeled by the hot-gas-
ducted gas cycle piping (GCP) to the single stage helium power
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630 • Chapter 67
turbine. The helium exits the power turbine at 500°C, 5 MPa
through ducted GCP, and enters the recuperator, where it reheats
pressurized cold helium returning to the reactor.
On exiting the recuperator, the helium is precooled, compressed
by the low pressure compressor, intercooled, and compressed by
the high pressure compressor to 9 MPa at 100°C, and returned to
the recuperator. The power turbine, high and low pressure com-
pressors, and generator are driven by a single shaft at 6000 rpm.
There is a reduction gearbox between the power turbine and the
electrical generator.
The HPB is analogous to the primary pressure boundary in a
LWR. The primary safety function of the HPB differs, however,
from that of the LWR with consequences of a break being differ-
ent. The prevention of the loss of the primary helium coolant is
not the primary safety function, rather it is the prevention of a
release of activity that may result in dose in workers or public
and the prevention of air ingress that may corrode the graphite
core structures and fuel pebbles. A large leak in the pressure
boundary will cause the loss of all the helium together with the
entrained fission and activation products normally circulating
through the system. The fission products originate from a small
percentage of the several billion individual coated particles that
may have some manufacturing faults. This will allow certain fis-
sion products that are highly mobile to escape the coated particle
and enter the gas stream. They settle to a large extent on graphite
dust distributed in the main system and this dust is partly resus-
pended in a depressurization event and trapped in a dust filter in
the stack. It is conceivable that a large double-ended guillotine
break (DEGB) of the main piping would allow air to circulate
through the core and cause corrosion of the fuel pebbles and/or
the supporting graphite structures. The circulating radioactive
products and helium impurities such as CO2, H2O, CO, and CH4
are maintained at a low level by ensuring good quality fuel dur-
ing operations by a helium purification system that provides the
required degree of helium purity by bleeding off a partial flow of
helium and removing chemical gaseous contaminants from the
primary coolant by the use of catalysts, adsorbers, and so on.
Graphite dust is generated within the pebble bed by friction
between fuel spheres and friction between moving spheres and
the stationary core-facing graphite blocks of the center and side
reflectors.
The PBMR is inherently safe by design. These design charac-
teristics include the following:
• the fission products retained in coated particles;
• the reactor geometry facilitates heat removal to heat sinks;
• the entire core and moderator are ceramic or carbon-based
material and hence tolerant to high temperatures and oxidation
resistance;
• the strong negative temperature coefficient limits reactivity
excursions;
• helium is chemically inert and serves only as a coolant for
normal operation – no neutron absorber functionality; and
• passive heat removal – the core cannot melt.
67.3.2.2 Design Approach in Terms of Codes and Standards
and Regulatory Framework The PBMR is designed according to
the ASME Section III Codes, with corresponding pressure, tem-
perature limits, and materials analogous to LWRs.
Table 67.1 lists the codes and code cases that have been select-
ed for the components that constitute the HPB.
In both the design and materials selection process, PBMR
applies the following general approach, which is summarized in
order of preference:
• use of materials within the limits of a code or standard that the
NRC has accepted, or
• use of materials within the limits of a code or standard that
has been accepted by a standards body but which the NRC has
not yet accepted, or
• use of materials that are not incorporated in a code at this time
and design from first principles using sound engineering prac-
tices with appropriate supporting qualification programs.
Section III nuclear codes were written on the basis of LWR
requirements and did not consider HTGRs. Consequently, PBMR
has faced a number of challenges in identifying appropriate
codes, often for components not found in a LWR primary pres-
sure boundary such as turbine and compressor casings. The South
African NNR does not prescribe the design codes that the PBMR
design must comply to; however, selected codes are required to be
internationally recognized, state of the art, conservative in
approach, accepted for application at nuclear facilities and inte-
grated in an overall self-contained concept. For all structures, sys-
tems, and components (SSC) for which a code or standard has
been selected, PMBR must provide a formal justification demon-
strating the appropriateness of the selection. The code or standard
selection is done via a formal code selection justification process.
Where no appropriate code or standard exists, the process identi-
fies the need to compile an “in-house” design methodology, or
where a code or standard cannot be applied in full, exceptions and
deviations are noted that can result in the identification of the
need for a code case or a code inquiry or ultimately in the creation
of new code such as the In-service Inspection Rules for HTGRs,
which are discussed subsequently.
The questions most often raised and least understood by LWR
practitioners are how PBMR is able to manage helium at 900°C
within LWR service conditions and why creep and creep fatigue
are not damage mechanisms of concern?
In those sections of the HPB where vessels or piping are poten-
tially exposed to helium at temperatures greater than 371°C, the hot
helium is prevented from coming into contact with the HPB by spe-
cial design features. These SSC features for are discussed below:
• GCP
• Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV)
• Core Barrel Assembly (CBA)
• Recuperator
The sections of the gas cycle pipes that carry the 900°C helium
are constructed as double pipes with an insulated liner (refer to
Fig. 67.3). The 900°C helium is constrained to flow within the
Incoloy 800H liner, while the HPB is cooled by a contraflow of
helium in the annulus between the HPB and the inner pressure
pipe. The pressure differential between the annular flow and the
liner is such that any leak in the inner pressure pipe will result in
an inward flow of cool high-pressure helium, thereby protecting
the HPB from any large temperature excursions. The sections of
GCP that are constructed as double pipes include the reactor out-
let to turbine inlet pipe (900°C), turbine outlet to recuperator inlet
pipe (500°C), and the recuperator outlet to reactor inlet pipes
(500°C).
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TABLE 67.1 SELECTED CODES FOR PBMR HPB

Component Materials Applicable ASME design code

Reactor pressure vessel (RPV) SA-508 Grade 3, Class 1 forgings, Section III, Subsection NB (to 371°C) ⫹
SA-533 Type B, Class 1 plate, SA-540 ASME Code Case N-499-2 (above 371°C)
Grade B24 bolting

Core barrel assembly (Internal to RPV) 316H Section III, Subsection NH (to 371°C) ⫹
ASME Code Case N-201-5 (above 371°C)

Reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and SA-36 and SA-533 Section III, Subsection NF
power conversion unit (PCU) supports

Core conditioning system (CCS) vessel SA-508 Grade 3, Class 2 forgings, Section III, Subsection NB
SA-533 Type B, Class 2 plate,
SA-197 B7 bolting

Core barrel conditioning system (CBCS) SA-335 Grade P1, Class 2 Section III, Subsection NB
vessel

Precooler and intercooler vessels SA-508 Grade 3, Class 2 forgings, Section III, Subsection NB
SA-533 Type B, Class 2 plate,
SA-193 B7 bolting

Recuperator vessel SA-533 Type B, Class 2 forgings, Section III, Subsection NB

SA-533 Type B, Class 2 plate,
SA-193 B7 bolting

Turbine vessel SA-217 Grade WC9 casting Section III, Subsection NB ⫹ Section XI
Appendix G

Intercooled high- and low-pressure SA-217 Grade WC9 casting Section III, Subsection NB ⫹ Section XI
compressor vessel Appendix G

HPB Pipes connecting SA-335 Grade P1 seamless pipe Section III, Subsection NB
PCU components (to  600 mm) SA-672 Grade J90
welded pipe (made from SA-533 Type B,
Class 2 plate)

Within the RPV, the 500°C helium that enters the reactor
through the two core inlet pipes is constrained to rise within
riser channels in the graphite side reflector. The entire core, con-
sisting of the pebble bed, the center and side reflectors, and the
top and bottom reflectors, is contained within the CBA that is
supported on a bearing at the bottom and by seismic restraints at
the top. The CBA is separated from the RPV by an annulus con-
ditioned by cooled helium. After being heated in the pebble bed,
the 900°C helium exits the graphite core and is conveyed into
the hot gas duct of the core outlet pipe by the core connection, a
component that facilitates the sealing of the metal duct to the
graphite core. The RPV is not insulated in the beltline region to
facilitate passive heat removal from the core via radiation and
convection cooling, as schematically illustrated in Fig. 67.4. The
RPV is an essential link in the passive decay heat removal path.
For this link to function as designed, it is necessary that the sur-
faces of the RPV (internal and external) maintain an emissivity
level of at least 0.85. Although this is not typically a difficult value
to obtain on steels, it does require that a thermal or chemical
treatment be applied to produce an oxidized surface with a high
emissivity level.
The function of the reactor cavity conditioning system (RCCS)
is to remove all waste heat from the reactor cavity during normal
operation, thereby maintaining the concrete surfaces of the
citadel below the design temperature limit of 65°C. The core bar-
rel conditioning circuit (CBCS) shown in Fig 67.2 operates dur-
ing normal operation, and consists of a blower and a cooler and
serves to apply forced helium cooling to the annulus between the
RPV and the CBA to maintain a uniform temperature distribution
around the RPV and core barrel sides during normal operation.
During upset conditions such as a loss of forced cooling, the
RPV wall temperature can rise up to 515°C and Code Case 499-2
is invoked to provide limited temperature excursions above
371°C. The function of the CBA is to locate and support the core
structure ceramics (CSC) to maintain the geometry of the pebble
bed and to act as a thermal barrier to the RPV by preventing hot
gas from the core from overheating the RPV. Higher pressure in
the RPV volume ensures that any leak through the CBA will be
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632 • Chapter 67
FIG. 67.3 GAS CYCLE PIPE SHOWING OUTER HPB PIPE, INNER PRESSURE PIPE, AND LINER
from the cold gas region adjacent to the RPV to the hot gas of the
reactor core.
The CBA also forms part of the passive heat transfer path by
providing material and emissivity properties that ensure a suffi-
cient heat transfer path. ASME Section III, Subsection NG, pro-
vides design rules for the construction of core support structures to
temperatures of up to 371°C for most ferritic steels (e.g., 21⁄4Cr-
1Mo) and to 427°C for all of the austenitic alloys, including Type
316 stainless steel. The normal maximum operating temperature
for the CBA is 480°C on a conservative basis; however, peak
temperatures approaching 600°C can be projected for limited peri-
ods of time during the enveloping depressurized loss of forced
cooling transient. Code Case N-201-5 is invoked to accommodate
these temperature excursions.
The two PBMR recuperators consist of diffusion-bonded com-
pact heat exchanger cores enclosed by Section III NB pressure
vessels. The principal function of the recuperator is to increase
cycle efficiency by transferring heat energy available in the gas
stream, which leaves the power turbine (500°C), to the gas stream
entering the reactor. Enclosing the heat exchanger cores in a pres-
sure vessel is driven by the requirement to provide a high integrity
FIG. 67.4 PASSIVE HEAT TRANSPORT PATH FROM CORE TO HEAT SINK
helium pressure boundary. Section III does not currently provide
appropriate design rules or materials for intermediate heat
exchangers (IHX). The heat exchanger cores will be designed
from first principles with appropriate supporting qualification
programs.
67.3.2.3 Challenges Encountered by Following the Above
Approach The PBMR is a HTGR and does not fit into the LWR
mould. As such we cannot directly map LWR code selection crite-
ria onto HTGR regime. What follows are some of the challenges
encountered in establishing a set of code selection rules for
HTGRs.
• Knowledge of the history of the evolution of the codes to pro-
vide an explanation for their existence and guidance for their
appropriate use.
• Ingrained perceptions regarding the safety of nuclear versus
nonnuclear codes and between the different code classes of
Section III and Section VIII, Divisions 1 and 2.
• Section III nuclear codes were written on the basis of LWR
requirements and could not have considered HTGRs.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 633
• Lack of specific HTGR design codes for metallic components
and graphite. The solution is to develop new codes.
• Lack of suitable code-permitted materials with elevated tem-
perature properties.
• No precedence for the application of “nonnuclear codes”
when most are suitable for proposed “nuclear” application.
• Strong U.S. Regulatory Framework for LWRs, which influ-
ences all code selection arguments.
• Embedded U.S. jurisdictional requirements within the code.
67.3.2.4 Proposed Codes and Standards, Code Cases,
Deviations, and Identified New Standards
67.3.2.5 ASME B&PV Code Involvement to Address the
Development of New Standards PBMR chairs the Section XI
Special Working Group (SWG) on HTGR that has the Project
Charter to develop a plan for a rewrite of Division 2 of Section XI
to address in-service inspection, evaluation, and repair/replace-
ment activities for next generation HTGRs.
The SWG has developed a methodology to provide a basis for
the identification of Reliability and Integrity Management Program
(RIM). The purpose of a RIM Program is to select the combina-
tion of design, fabrication, inspection, surveillance, operation, and
maintenance requirements, which meet the reliability goals in an
efficient and cost-effective manner. The RIM process includes
• identifying the safety and economic reliability goals;
• defining candidate combinations of design, fabrication, inspec-
tion, surveillance, operation, and maintenance procedures,
which may be able to achieve and maintain the reliability
goals;
• assessing the reliability of these combinations to determine
the combinations that provide an efficient and cost-effective
means to achieve the reliability goals, and
• selecting, implementing, and updating the final RIM strate-
gies that will provide the desired level of reliability in an
efficient and cost-effective manner and provide assurance that
the reliability performance will be maintained throughout the
lifetime of the plant.
The RIM methodology has been tested as a pilot study on
PBMR. A limited scope of SSC, but representative in nature, was
chosen to apply the steps of the methodology and develop insights
to assist the writing of the rules of the code for the RIM Program
for HTGRs. The RIM methodology comprises of the following
steps:
• Step 1: Determine scope of SSCs for RIM Program
• Step 2: Evaluate SSC damage mechanisms
• Step 3: Determine plant and SSC level reliability and capa-
bility requirements
• Step 4: Evaluate RIM strategies to achieve reliability targets
• Step 5: Evaluate uncertainties in reliability performance
• Step 6: Determine scope and parameters of RIM Program
• Step 7: Monitor SSC reliability performance and update RIM
Program
67.4 FUTURE OUTLOOK
The South African Government in a draft energy policy docu-
ment [16], released for comment in July 2007, has expressed
the intent to undertake an ambitious nuclear build program over
the next two decades. The implementation of this program
should see up to 20,000 MW of nuclear generating capacity
added to the South African electricity grid, comprising both the
nationally developed PBMR technology and latest PWRs. In
addition to the existing Koeberg site, four other potential sites
for nuclear units have been identified. These include two sites
(Brazil and Schulpfontein) on the west coast, and two (Bantamsklip
and Thyspunt) on the south coast of South Africa (refer to
Fig. 67.1).
A number of policy principles are contained in the document,
not the least of which is the following excerpt, “South Africa shall
strive to acquire technology know how and skill to enable design,
development, construction and marketing of its own nuclear reac-
tor and fuel cycle systems. To this end an industrial support base
for the nuclear sector shall be developed as appropriate, taking
into account the scale of the national programmes. Technology
transfer shall be optimised in any procurement of nuclear related
equipment.”
The policy document describes three phases in terms of the
approach to meet its objectives. The main aspects of the first four-
year phase from 2007 to 2010 include the acceleration of skills
development initiatives to support the expanding nuclear industry,
the continuation of research into advanced nuclear energy sys-
tems, and the promotion of uranium exploration and mining. A
second five-year phase from 2011 to 2015 includes the construc-
tion of new nuclear infrastructure and new power plants and the
initiation of local nuclear equipment and component manufactur-
ing. An already well-developed nonnuclear industrial base exists,
making this objective one that is reasonably achievable. The main
obstacle is the successful transition of this industrial base to the
use of internationally acceptable nuclear design codes and quality
standards. In this regard, the PBMR company together with
industry have initiated certain forums to promote this transition.
At the time of writing, this effort is very much in the initial
stages, with active participation from both industry and the vari-
ous regulatory bodies.
67.5 REFERENCES
1. Atomic Energy Act, Act 90 of 1967.
2. National Nuclear Regulator Act Act 47 of 1999.
3. Nuclear Energy Act Act 46 of 1999.
4. Occupational Health and Safety Act Act 85 of 1993.
5. Department of Labour, Vessels under Pressure Regulations, 1996.
6. Department of Labour, Pressure Equipment Regulations (Notice of
Draft Amendment), 2007.
7. Standards Act, Act 29 of 1993.
8. SANS 1-1, Standards for Standards. Part 1: The Development of
National Standards and Other Normative Documents, Standards
South Africa, 2003.
9. SANS 347, Categorization and Conformity Assessment Criteria for
all Pressure Equipment, Standards South Africa, 2007.
10. SANS 17020/ISO/IEC 17020, General Criteria for the Operation of
Various Types of Bodies Performing Inspection, International
Standard, 1998.
11. SANS 10227, Criteria for the Operation of Inspection Authorities
Performing Inspection in Terms of the Pressure Equipment
Regulations, Standards South Africa, 2007.
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634 • Chapter 67

12. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, 1971 Edition 15. RCC-M, Règles de Conception et de Construction des Matériels
(1972/1973 Addenda) American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Méchaniques des Îlots Nucléaires PWR, 1983 – 2000 Editions.
New York.
16. Department of Minerals and Energy, Nuclear Energy Policy and
13. CPFC, Cahier des Prescriptions de Fabrication et de Contrôle, 1971. Strategy for the Republic of South Africa (Draft Document for Public
Comment), July 2007.
14. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, 1980, 1992, and
2001 Editions, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, New
York.
ASME_Ch68_p635-654.qxd 6/3/09 2:26 PM Page 635
DESIGN OF INDIAN
PRESSURIZED HEAVY WATER
REACTOR COMPONENTS
H.S. Kushwaha, K.K. Vaze, and K.B. Dixit
68.1 INTRODUCTION
The Nuclear Power Program in India at present is based mainly
on a series of Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs).
Starting from Rajasthan Atomic Power Station, comprising of two
units of 200 MWe Canadian-designed PHWRs in 1973, the pro-
gram has come a long way with 15 PHWR units (which includes
two units of 540 MWe PHWRs) in operation and 3 units under
construction. Narora Atomic Power Station commissioned in
1991 marked major indigenization and standardization of PHWR
designs. The current design plans include 700 MWe capacity
units. The choice of PHWRs in the current stage of India’s
nuclear power program is based on long-term objectives to be
achieved in the available uranium resources and industrial infra-
structure. These reactors use natural uranium as fuel and heavy
water as moderator and coolant. The nuclear power stations in
India are generally planned as twin-unit modules, sharing com-
mon facilities such as service building, control building, turbine
building, spent fuel storage bay, and so on.
The Indian PHWR design has evolved through a series of
improvements over the years in progressive projects. Such
improvements have been driven by, among others, evolution in
technology, feedback from experience in India and abroad,
including lessons learnt from incidents and their precursors,
evolving regulatory requirements, and cost considerations.
Valuable experience gained in design, manufacture, construction,
operation, maintenance, and safety regulation has enabled contin-
ual evolution, improvement, and refinement in the PHWR concept
in a progressive manner.
In Indian PHWRs, the design, fabrication, testing, and inspec-
tion of all mechanical components basically follow the require-
ments of appropriate sections of the ASME Boiler & Pressure
Vessel Code (ASME B&PV Code).
Other international codes used are (1) Canadian Code CAN/
CSA N285.4-05 and IAEA Safety Guide 50-SG-02 for ISI and
(2) French Code RCC-G for containment design. This chapter
first provides a general overview of the Indian PHWR design and
its evolution. The design approach, material selection, and fabri-
cation practices are described for major components such as
calandria, headers, steam generators, and piping. Details are
CHAPTER
68
provided of the development and the use of leak-before-break
(LBB) criterion to eliminate the need for installation of pipe
whip restraints. Results of experiments conducted to determine
load-carrying capacity of cracked pipes and the results of fatigue
crack growth rate tests in support of LBB criteria are discussed.
As a further example of the research and development work con-
ducted in India related to nuclear power plant applications, the
development of a modified B2 stress index (used in NB-3600-
type stress analyses) for pipe elbows and curved pipes and quan-
tification of additional safety factors to account cyclic tearing in
LBB assessment are discussed.
68.2 INDIAN PHWR
68.2.1 Introduction to Indian PHWR [1]
The first PHWRs at Rajasthan Atomic Power Station #1 and 2
and Madras Atomic Power Station #1 and 2 were of Canadian
design (based on Douglas Point). When design work for the third
PHWR station, Narora Atomic Power Station #1 and 2, was taken
up in the early 1970s, major modifications were incorporated with
the objectives of upgrading the designs in line with the interna-
tionally evolving safety standards and to cater to the seismic load-
ing. Narora Atomic Power Station design was the first opportunity
to apply India’s operating experience with PHWRs, including
aspects such as ease of maintenance, in-service inspection (ISI)
requirements, improved constructability, increased availability,
and standardization of the unit. In Narora Atomic Power Station,
some of the new designs were incorporated with the objective to
serve as stepping stones for the design of subsequent larger 540
MWe PHWR.
Some of the significant design improvements made in Narora
Atomic Power Station included adoption of an integral calandria
(reactor vessel) and end shields assembly, two independent fast
acting reactor shutdown systems, a high-pressure Emergency
Core Cooling System, and a double containment with suppres-
sion pool.
Subsequent to Narora Atomic Power Station, Kakrapar Atomic
Power Station #1 and 2, Kaiga Atomic Power Station #1 and 2,
and Rajasthan Atomic Power Station #3 and 4 saw further
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636 • Chapter 68

TABLE 68.1 DESIGN FEATURES: IPHWR – 220 MWe [1]

Design data
A. General
(i) Rated output thermal 756 MWt
(ii) Rated output electrical 220 MWe
(iii) Fuel Natural UO2
(iv) Moderator and reflector Heavy water
(v) Coolant Heavy water
(vi) Type Horizontal pressure tube
B. Reactor
(i) Calandria shell Horizontal stepped cylinder
welded to extensions of end
shield
(ii) Calandria shell material SS-304L
1. Calandria shell 11. Main shell assembly
(iii) End shields Cylindrical box-type
2. Overpressure relief device(OPRD) 12. Tube sheet F/M side
structure integral with 3. Shutdown system #1 13. Tube sheet cal. side
calandria shell 4. Shut down system #1 14. Lattice tube
(iv) End shield material SS-304L 5. Moderator inlet 15. End-shield support plate
(v) Calandria tubes 6. Moderator outlet 16. End shield cooling inlet pipes
7. Vent pipe 17. End fitting assembly
(a) Quantity 306 8. Coolant channel assembly 18. Feeder pipes
(b) Material Zircaloy-2 9. End shield 19. Outer shell
(vi) Coolant tubes 10. End shield support structure 20. Support lug
assembly
(a) Quantity 306
(b) Material Zirconium–2.5% niobium FIG. 68.1 INTEGRAL ASSEMBLY OF CALANDRIA AND END
alloy SHIELD (CUT-AWAY VIEW OF REACTOR) [1]
C. Steam generators
(i) No. of steam generators 4
(ii) Type Vertical U-tube with The calandria is housed in a steel-lined vault filled with light
integral steam drum water that serves as shielding as well as provides cooling to the
(mushroom-shaped) calandria.
(iii) Material Incoloy-800 The Primary Heat Transport (PHT) system uses heavy water
(iv) Steam pressure 3.923 MPa under forced circulation in a figure-of-eight loop. Figures 68.2
(v) No. of tubes per SG 1834 and 68.3 show the schematic of the system.
(vi) Total steam flow 370 kg/s The main circuit of 220 MWe units has four branches on
to turbine each side.
For the latest 220 MWe units, PHT system is valveless.
(vii) Steam temperature 25 ⬚C Elimination of these valves along with general reduction in the
(viii) Maximum moisture 0.25% number of components has helped to decongest the layout in the
content pump room, facilitating better maintenance approachability, less
maintenance, and lesser manrem.
The primary heat transport system pressure control in 220
MWe units is based on the “feed and bleed” concept. During nor-
mal operation, the average pressure of both outlet headers is con-
improvements leading to standardizations in design and layout for trolled at a set pressure of 8.53 MPa to keep the system “solid,”
220 MWe PHWRs. Table 68.1 lists the design features of Indian that is, no bulk boiling is permitted. Operational transients such
standard 220 MWe PHWR. as turbine trip, load rejection, boiler feed pump trip, reactor
power setback, and so on cause “swell” or “shrinkage.” The feed
68.2.2 Description IPHWR or bleed control valves actuate to counter these swells/shrink-
The reactor consists of a low-pressure horizontal reactor vessel ages. Though the system is ‘solid’ there is some finite compress-
(calandria) containing heavy water moderator at near ambient ibility of the system, which keeps the pressure changes within a
pressure and temperature. The calandria (Fig. 68.1) is pierced by fairly narrow band. The feed is provided by two feed control
a large number (306 in 220 MWe and 392 in 540 MWe PHWR) of valves located on the discharge side of primary pressurizing
coolant tubes, which contain the fuel bundles, and through which pumps, which take suction from storage tank. Two bleed control
pressurized heavy water coolant circulates. The calandria houses valves are connected to reactor inlet header. The hot bleed is
all reactivity and reactor shutoff devices in the low-pressure, low- depressurized, cooled and returned back to storage tank via
temperature environment. purification system.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 637
FIG. 68.2 PHWR SIMPLIFIED FLOW DIAGRAM [1]
In 540 MWe PHWR, a pressurizer has been introduced for pri-
mary heat transport system pressure control, while feed and bleed
is retained for inventory control.
Current Indian PHWRs use a double containment principle. The
annular space between the primary and secondary containment
envelopes is provided with a purging arrangement to maintain a
negative pressure in the space. This arrangement significantly
reduces the ground-level releases to the environment during acci-
dents involving radioactivity release into the primary containment.
Figure 68.4 shows the schematic of containment.
The containment structures are made of concrete. The primary
containment is a prestressed concrete structure, consisting of a
perimeter wall topped by a prestressed concrete dome. The outer
or secondary containment is a reinforced concrete cylindrical wall
topped by a reinforced concrete dome. The primary containment
uses epoxy coating as liner on the inner surface for enhanced
leak-tightness and ease while decontamination. Because of the
use of double containment, incorporation of a steel liner is not
considered necessary.
68.2.3 Design Codes
The design, fabrication, testing and inspection of all mechanical
components are as per the appropriate sections of ASME ASME
B&PV Code [2, 3].
The design philosophy of the containment structure is based
on limit state concept where the response of the structure under
FIG. 68.3 PERSPECTIVE VIEW OF STEAM GENERATOR
AND PHT SYSTEM [1]
load combinations pertaining to both limit state of serviceability
and limit state of strength is checked. The various limit states
specified in the French Code RCC-G [4] along with the support-
ing documents BPEL [5] and BAEL [6] are adopted for design-
ing the structural elements of the inner and outer containment
structures.
68.2.4 Regulatory Structure [7]
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) is the national author-
ity to ensure safety of nuclear power plants (NPPs). AERB fulfills
its mission by stipulating and enforcing rules and regulations
concerned with nuclear and radiological safety. AERB has devel-
oped safety documents that lay down requirements for meeting
safety criteria for activities related to nuclear energy and provide
guidance on methods for fulfilling the requirements.
Safety documents published by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) and regulatory bodies of other countries
are appropriately used as reference material for the purpose.
Safety Codes establish objectives and set minimum require-
ments that have to be fulfilled to provide adequate assurance for
safety in nuclear and radiation facilities. Safety Guides provide
guidelines and indicate methods for implementing specific
requirements as prescribed in the codes.
As on date, AERB has published 5 Safety Codes and 45 Safety
Guides concerning various aspects of NPPs and 51 other safety
support documents. Several other documents are under various
stages of preparation. All these safety documents are being exten-
sively utilized in developing designs, operating procedures and in
regulation activities including safety reviews by AERB. A short
list of documents related to NPPs is given in Table 68.2.
For design of mechanical components such as vessels, pumps,
and piping, use of appropriate ASME Codes is permitted.
ASME_Ch68_p635-654.qxd 6/3/09 2:26 PM Page 638
638 • Chapter 68
FIG. 68.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING [1]
68.3 DESIGN OF INDIAN PRESSURIZED
HEAVY WATER REACTOR
COMPONENTS
68.3.1 Calandria End Shield Assembly
The calandria end shield assembly consists of calandria vessel
with main shell and small shell connected by an annular plate.
The vessel houses 306 coolant tubes, reactivity mechanisms, and
shutdown assemblies. At the two ends, the calandria vessel is con-
nected with end shields. The end shields limit the radiation dose
in the fuelling machine vaults adjoining the calandria vault. They
also support and locate the calandria tubes and primary coolant
channel assemblies in which the fuel resides. In the original
design of end shield (Rajasthan Atomic Power Station #1 and 2
and Madras Atomic Power Station #1), the end-shield material of
construction was 3.5% Ni-steel. However, it was found that nil
ductility transition temperature (NDTT) crossed the operating
temperature within a short period of operation. While the stability
of the end shields in this condition is assessed in detail; from the
second unit of Madras Atomic Power Station onward, the end-
shield material has been changed to SS-304L, which is resistant to
radiation embrittlement due to fast neutrons.
In the current design (Narora Atomic Power Station onward)
(Fig. 68.1), the calandria and two end shields constitute an integral
assembly, supported from the reactor vault walls, unlike earlier
designs wherein the calandria and end shields were separately sus-
pended by support rods. This design allows common tube sheet
between calandria and end shield. It also simplifies alignment
requirement between calandria tubes and end-shield lattice tubes,
and is more suited to conditions at seismic site.
68.3.2 Main PHT System Components
The main PHT system consists of steam generators, primary
circulating pumps, pressurizer (for 540 MWe PHWR), headers,
feeders, and interconnecting piping.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 639
TABLE 68.2 PARTIAL LIST OF REGULATORY DOCU-
MENTS RELATED TO NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS [7]
S. No. Title of Safety Document
1. Code of practice on quality assurance for safety in
nuclear power plants
2. Code of practice on design for safety in pressurized
heavy water reactor-based nuclear power plants
3. Code of practice on safety in nuclear power plant operation
4. Code of practice on safety in nuclear power plant siting
5. Code of regulation of nuclear and radiation facilities
6. Safety classification and seismic categorization of
Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs)
7. Design basis events for pressurized heavy water reactors
8. Primary heat transport system
9. Loss of coolant accident analysis for pressurized
heavy water reactors
10. Safety guide for quality assurance in the design of
nuclear power plants
11. Safety guide for seismic studies and design basis
ground motion for nuclear power plant sites
12. Civil engineering structures important to safety of
nuclear facilities
13. Design of concrete structures important to safety of
nuclear facilities
14. Design, fabrication, and erection of steel structures
important to safety of nuclear facilities
15. Design, fabrication, and erection of embedded parts and
penetrations important to safety of nuclear facilities
68.3.2.1 Steam Generator The steam generator (SG) design is
of mushroom type. This design has the advantage of a single inte-
gral unit with provisions of manholes on primary head to enable
in-service inspection of the tubes. Four identical steam generators
transfer heat from the heavy water reactor coolant on the primary
side to the ordinary feedwater on the secondary side. The steam
generators consist of an integral inverted vertical U-tube bundle in
shell. Moisture separators and driers are housed in the upper end
of the shell.
The primary side of the steam generator consists of primary
head, the primary side of the tube sheet and the primary side of
the tube bundle. A partition plate separates the inlet half of the
primary head from the outlet half. The U-tubes are welded to the
primary side of the cladded carbon steel tube sheet and rolled into
the tube sheet. The steam generator primary shell and head are
made of low alloy steel.
The secondary side of the steam generators consists of the
shell, moisture separators and driers, the tube bundle shroud, the
secondary side of the tube sheet, the secondary side of the tube
bundle, and tube support egg-crate grids. Low alloy carbon steel
is the principal material of construction.
The SG tubes are of 19-mm outer diameter (OD) and incoloy-
800 material. The 19-mm tubes, when compared to 16-mm tubes
of 220 MWe PHWR SG, offer advantages in ease of fabrication,
reduction in manufacturing time and lower D2O side pressure
drop. The shell of SG is provided with a manway. Secondary side
of the tube sheet is provided with suitable holes to blow off and
remove concentration of impurity in the secondary side water.
Both primary and secondary sides of the steam generators are
designed and manufactured to the requirements of the ASME
B&PV
Code Section III, Subsection NB, Class-1 components.
68.3.2.2 Primary Coolant Pumps The primary coolant pumps
(PCP) are vertical, single stage, single suction, double discharge,
centrifugal pumps. Each pump is driven by a vertically, totally
enclosed, air and water cooled, squirrel cage induction motor.
A spacer type rigid coupling connects the pump shaft to the
motor shaft. Each motor is supplied with a single piece flywheel
so that the total rotational energy of pump motor unit prolongs the
operation of the pump after loss of motor power and the rate of
flow approximately matches the power run down following a
reactor trip.
The pump has capability to operate without external injection
(gland coolant external injection) but with process water available
from high pressure cooler. During hot standby condition when the
pumps are unavailable, high pressure coolers which are located at
an elevation higher than the seal location provide necessary ther-
mosyphon flow to ensure that temperature in seal areas do not
increase.
The pump casing design is in accordance with the requirements
for class-1 components of ASME B&PV Code Section III.
Primary circulating pump motor unit is a vertical assembly, with
dead weight being supported at two locations; 80% on two spring
hangers located on boiler room floor and 20% on pump room
floor through straight pipe piece attached to suction elbow. To
reduce stresses in heavy water pipes under operating conditions,
sliding support has been provided at the bottom of pump suction
elbow. To mitigate large displacements of pump motor unit under
earthquake, two horizontal snubbers each of 100 Te safe shut-
down earthquake (SSE) rating have been provided at pump motor
C.G. location in two mutually perpendicular directions. The pump
bottom support is designed to resist vertical loads during the
earthquake.
68.3.2.3 Pressurizer In 500 MWe PHWRs pressurizer is incor-
porated into the PHT main circuit to reduce onerous demand on feed
and bleed system to control inventory and pressure of the system. In
these reactors, feed and bleed system mainly acts as inventory con-
trol system and backup for pressure control when pressurizer is not
available. Pressurizer is connected to Reactor Outlet Header (ROH)
of each loop through one common isolation valve and two isolating
valves, one for each loop. The flow path is from ROH to steam gen-
erator to Primary Circulating Pump and then to Reactor Inlet Header
(RIH). Pressurizer is located in the pump room.
The heat transport medium is kept in a pressurized liquid state
by a pressurizer (surge tank) backed up by control valves, which
feed or bleed heavy water from the system including pressurizer.
Pressurizers are fabricated and machined from carbon steel
forgings with nonintegral nozzles for piping connections. The
forgings of the vessel conform to SA 508 Cl.3 and in-house speci-
fication, and are made from vacuum degassed, Electro Slag
Remelted (ESR), killed fine grained steel. The forgings are deliv-
ered in normalized heat-treated and fully machined condition. The
in-house specification imposes special requirements on chemical
composition and notch toughness for these forgings. Pressurizer is
ASME_Ch68_p635-654.qxd 6/3/09 2:26 PM Page 640
640 • Chapter 68
in accordance with the requirements for Class-1 components of
ASME B&PV Code Section III, Subsection NB.
68.3.2.4 Headers In 540-MWe reactor there are four outlet
headers, two in each loop of PHT main circuit. Each outlet header
receives flow from 98 outlet feeders and directs the flow to the
steam generator via two inlet pipes. There are also four inlet head-
ers, two in each loop of PHT main circuit. Each inlet header
receives flow from the primary coolant pump and distributes the
flow to 98 inlet feeders.
Headers in 540-MWe PHWR are machined from single-piece
carbon steel forgings with integral nozzles for feeders and other
piping connections, and the ends are closed by ellipsoidal caps.
The single-piece forgings are made from the material conforming
to SA 350 LF2 and in house specification. Also, these are made
from vacuum degassed, Bohler Electro Slag hot topping process
(BEST) killed fine grained steel forgings and are delivered in nor-
malized heat-treated and fully machined condition. The in-house
specification imposes special requirements on chemical composi-
tion and notch toughness for these forgings. Reactor headers are
designed to meet the requirements for Class-1 components of
ASME B&PV Code Section III, Subsection NB.
In principle the reactor outlet headers are floating assemblies
and govern the design/behavior of the rest of the circuit. Each out-
let header is mainly suspended through two steam generator inlet
(SGI) lines connected to SG’s inlet nozzle and resting on sliding
guide supports. Each of the reactor inlet headers is suspended
through two pump discharge lines (PDL) connected to discharge
nozzles of main circulating pump.
To reduce large displacement due to inertial loading under
earthquake, two snubbers each of 200 KN capacities have been
provided at each outlet header.
68.3.3 Feeders
There are 784 feeders in all, 392 at each end of the reactor, in
540-MWe PHWR. The 392 feeders at each end of the reactor run
from the fuel channels vertically up the face of the reactor and
thereafter horizontally across and above the fuelling machine area
to the reactor headers.
In order to achieve uniform outlet temperature, the feeders
range in four sizes, namely, 80-mm Nominal Bore (NB), 65- mm
NB, 50-mm NB, and 40-mm NB. These are inside diameter (ID)-
controlled pipes.
The feeders are of seamless carbon steel pipes conforming to
SA 333 Gr.6 material and in accordance with the requirements for
Class-1 components of the ASME B&PV Code Section III,
Subsection NB.
The feeder pipes are arranged in banks, with a maximum of 10
feeders in a bank. The feeders are connected to end fittings by
high-pressure pipe couplings at lower end and are welded to
header stubs at upper end. On the basis of analytical studies car-
ried out on feeders, it is observed that maximum stress occurs, in
general, either at elbow after the coupling or at the pipe bend
location near header end. Thus, to take care of higher seismic
load, the elbows at these ends have been strengthened by increas-
ing the wall thickness.
68.3.4 Piping
All of the piping in the main primary heat transport system is
of seamless carbon steel, ASME SA 333 Gr. 6, and designed and
fabricated in accordance with ASME B&PV Code Section III,
Subsection NB requirements. SA 333 Gr.6 seamless carbon
steel pipes are intended even for the low-temperature application
and have been preferred over SA 106 Gr. B piping used in
NAPP and earlier reactors because of inherent fracture tough-
ness property.
In all standardized 220-MWe and 540-MWe PHWRs, the three
important segments of PHT piping are running from ROH to SG
inlet nozzle; SG outlet nozzle to suction nozzle of PCP, and from
discharge nozzle of PCP to RIH. The dead weight of outlet head-
er, feeders, and heavy water SG inlet pipes would cause undue
large moments on SG inlet nozzle because of offset between SG
and outlet header along N-S axis. To reduce these moments,
sliding guide supports resisting vertical loads have been incorpo-
rated in heavy water pipes connecting outlet header to SG inlet
nozzles.
68.3.4.1 Design Philosophy All the components of main PHT
system are categorized as Class I components and hence have been
designed in accordance with ASME Section III, Division I NB.
Detailed design by analysis approach has been adopted for all
Class I components. All the components have been designed for
six sets of conditions. These six service levels and the loads con-
sidered for each of them are summarized below:
Design Conditions Internal pressure ⫹ Dead weight (cold
flooded)
Level ‘A’ Service Loadings (Normal Operation) Internal
pressure ⫹ Thermal loads ⫹ Operating cycles.
Level ‘B’ Service Loadings (Up-set Condition) Internal pres-
sure ⫹ Thermal loads ⫹ operation basis earthquake (OBE)
(inertial) ⫹ OBE (Seismic anchor movement) loads ⫹ oper-
ating cycles. Operation basis earthquake inertial and OBE
seismic anchor movement loads have been combined on
absolute sum basis.
Level ‘C’ Service Loadings (Emergency Condition) Internal
pressure ⫹ Dead weight
Level ‘D’ Service Loadings (Faulted Condition) Internal
pressure ⫹ Dead weight ⫹ SSE Inertial load.
Test Conditions Test pressure ⫹ Dead weight
68.3.5 Coolant Channel Assembly
Coolant channel assemblies house the fuel bundles and contain
the hot pressurized heavy water coolant flowing through them.
Each coolant channel assembly consists of a Zr-2.5% Nb coolant
tube, two martensitic stainless steel end fittings–one each at either
end, and associated hardware. The coolant tube is rolled to end
fittings at both ends. Each coolant tube is thermally isolated from
cold heavy water present in the calandria vessel by a seamless- or-
seam-welded concentric Zircaloy-4 calandria tube, which is rolled
into the tube sheet of the end shield assembly at both ends.
Calandria tube envelops coolant tube forming an annulus space
between the two tubes. Calandria tubes are manufactured out of
Zircaloy-4 material either by seamless route involving hot extru-
sion and cold pilgering or by seam welding cylindrically formed
tubes from strips. Both types of tubes would meet the specified
longitudinal and transverse mechanical properties such as ulti-
mate tensile strength (UTS), yield strength (YS), and elongation
percentage. Calandria tubes are vacuum annealed to minimize
residual stresses.
Coolant tubes that are the most important structural components
in the reactor core are manufactured from Zr-2.5% Nb alloy.
ASME_Ch68_p635-654.qxd 6/3/09 2:26 PM Page 641
COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 641
Coolant tube is attached at either end to a stainless steel (type AISI-
403 modified) end fitting by a roll-expanded joint. These joints are
of zero-clearance type and this feature helps in controlling the
residual stresses in the joint region to a low level, providing neces-
sary safeguard from delayed hydride cracking of coolant tube.
Coolant tubes are seamless tubes produced by hot extrusion
and cold pilgering followed by stress relieving (autoclaving) in a
steam atmosphere. The ends of the coolant tubes require special
finishing operations to obtain stringent dimensional control neces-
sary for zero-clearance rolled joints. The inlet and outlet end of
coolant tube is roll expanded to end fittings made of martensitic
stainless steel (type 403 modified) solid forgings. End fitting is an
open-ended tubular body of approximately 164 mm outside diam-
eter and 2516 mm length. It has an integral side opening (feeder
hub) to which the feeder pipe is attached.
Although zirconium alloys are not ASME Code approved
materials, attempts have been made to follow all the requirements
of the ASME Code for each component. Rolled joints are also not
covered by ASME Code. However, detailed development work
and evaluation have been carried out to qualify these joints for
reactor application and to establish that these joints satisfy all
design requirements.
68.3.5.1 Calandria Tube The ends of calandria tubes are joined
with calandria side tube sheet of end shield assembly by means of
a special type of rolled joint called sandwich rolled joint. This joint
is developed for a thin tube and low-pressure conditions. If the
calandria tube is directly rolled into a plain or grooved tube sheet,
the joint would not develop the required seating pressure and hence
the required leak tightness. Due to this limitation, a sandwich type
of joint is adopted where calandria tube is squeezed (sandwiched)
between an inner-landed sleeve insert of stainless steel Type 410 in
a full annealed condition and the outer stainless steel tube sheet.
The ends of the calandria tubes are flared to a larger diameter to
accommodate the landed sleeve insert and to provide design clear-
ances between the coolant and calandria tubes anywhere along
the channel axis. Joint configuration with PIWR (percentage insert
wall reduction) of 6.5 – 7.5 is selected after development work.
Calandria tube rolled joints have a minimum pullout load of
31 metric tons and a leak tightness of 3 ⫻ 10⫺6 cm3/s.
During normal operation, calandria tubes are subjected to a
temperature of 75 oC and maximum external pressure of 1.45
Kg/cm2, corresponding to the lowermost row of calandria tubes in
the calandria vessel (hydrostatic head of 0.85 Kg/cm2 ⫹ modera-
tor helium cover gas pressure of 0.6 Kg/cm2) . In addition, calan-
dria tube is subjected to (i) garter spring loads, (ii) Buoyancy
force, (iii) direct pressure load on the tube sheets causing a tensile
loading on all tubes, and iv) stresses due to differential thermal
expansion of calandria tubes and calandria shell.
Calandria Tube Collapse Pressure. The calandria tubes are
designed on the basis of neutron economy and collapse due to
external pressure. The wall thickness is set at a minimum value,
satisfying the requirement of stability against collapse pressure.
The design also caters for postulated accident conditions where
overpressure of the calandria vessel is assumed. Calandria tube
collapse pressure works out to be 2.85 Kg/cm2.
68.3.5.2 Coolant Tube The temperatures and pressures at the
inlet and the outlet considered in design are as follows:
Coolant tube inlet pressure 124.18 Kg/cm2
Coolant tube inlet temperature 260 ⬚C
Coolant tube outlet pressure 115.82 Kg/cm2
Coolant tube outlet temperature 304 ⬚C
Since the pressure and temperature vary along the length of the
coolant tube, the design condition is established by evaluating
stresses at several locations along the length to determine which
location requires the largest wall thickness. Minimum required
coolant tube wall thickness calculated on this basis works out to
4.3 mm, inclusive of corrosion and wear allowance of 0.2 mm,
with critical section of the tube being the inlet end.
Coolant tubes are designed in accordance with the intent of
ASME Section III, Subsection NB requirements. As per ASME
Code, design stress intensity for coolant tubes should be the
lowest of
(a) 1/3 of the specified minimum UTS at room temperature,
(b) 1/3 of UTS at temperature,
(c) 2/3 of the specified minimum YS at room temperature, and
(d) 2/3 of YS at temperature.
Of the above criteria, the governing quantity deciding coolant
tube design stress is the 1/3 UTS at operating temperature.
Neutron-irradiation-enhanced creep deformation is one of the
important factors deciding the life of coolant tube in PHWRs.
Based on the present level of understanding, the coolant tube
is estimated to undergo a diametric creep strain of the order
of 3% and an axial elongation of 2.5% during the life of the
reactor. The potential life limiting concerns due to creep are as
follows:
(a) Diametral expansion causing bypass of coolant flow around
the fuel bundles, and
(b) Relative sag between coolant tube and calandria tube caus-
ing possible contact.
Corrosion and Hydriding. Zr-2.5% Nb alloy has good corro-
sion resistance in high temperature water as long as oxygen con-
tent is held extremely low. The predicted corrosion rate is expected
to be about 0.1 mm over the operating life of the reactor. A corro-
sion and wear allowance of 0.2 mm is provided on the coolant
tube. Moreover, finished tubes are autoclaved in steam atmosphere
at 400 ⬚C for 24 h to form a protective layer on the tube surface.
The presence of 1% oxygen in the circulating annulus gas moni-
toring system helps in maintaining a constant oxide layer thickness
at the tube OD.
The more complex part of the corrosion reaction is the absorp-
tion of hydrogen evolved in the oxidation reaction of heavy water
with zirconium. Hydrogen is evolved in this reaction and a portion
of this hydrogen is absorbed by the zirconium alloy; this phenome-
non is termed “hydrogen pickup” by the alloy. If the hydrogen
concentration in the tube exceeds the solubility limit, then it pre-
cipitates as zirconium hydrides.
The solid solubility of hydrogen in zirconium alloys is very low
– below 150 ⬚C. Hence, more zirconium hydrides will be present
at lower temperatures. Hydrogen when in solid solution in zirco-
nium alloys can be driven in directions of thermal stress and con-
centration gradients. Hydrogen in excess of solubility limits pre-
cipitates as zirconium hydrides. As zirconium hydrides are brittle,
this can lead to failure of coolant tube by initiation and propaga-
tion of a crack in the radial axial plane due to phenomenon of
delayed hydride cracking. Delayed hydride cracking is the
process of formation of hydrides and their cracking aided by the
presence of tensile hoop stress (including residual stress) and
defects in the tube.
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642 • Chapter 68

Following remedial measures have been implemented in the
design of a coolant tube against embrittlement effects and hydriding:
(1) Zero-clearance rolled joints, which will significantly
reduce the tensile residual stresses in the neighborhood of
rolled joint region.
(2) Stringent Inspection and quality control, consisting of both,
angle beam and normal beam ultrasonic examinations as
well as a supplementary eddy current examination.
(3) Control of impurities, such as hydrogen, chlorine, phos-
phorous, and carbon.
(4) Autoclaving of coolant tube that produces hard adherent
oxide layer of about 1 ␮m thick on the tubes, which acts as
a barrier for hydrogen ingress from annulus gas side.
(5) Addition of oxygen in the annulus gas to avoid deteriora-
tion of the oxide film.
(6) Avoidance of cold pressurization to improve the flaw toler-
ance at low system temperatures.
Leak-Before-Break Methodology. Achieving leak before
break depends on the difference between the time available to
detect a leaking crack and time required to detect a leaking crack.
The time available to detect a leak is estimated from
Time available Ta (in hours) is given by
(C ⫺ 7W )
Ta ⫽
2V
where C is the critical crack length (CCL), 7 W is the leakage size
crack and V is the delayed hydrogen cracking velocity in the axial
direction.
During service, CCL reduces and the DHC velocity increases
and the time available to detect a leaking crack decreases. If
hydrides are present and a defect does initiate DHC, then the time
available to detect the leak would be in the range of 11 – 12 h.
Thus, a sensitive leak detection system called annulus gas moni-
toring system is implemented in the design that enables leak
detection and safe shutdown in less than 5 h.
68.3.5.3 End Fittings End fittings are manufactured out of
AISI-403 (modified) stainless steel. coolant tube and end fittings
are connected by means of a rolled joint. To have a leak tight rolled
joint at all temperatures, end fittings need to have coefficient of
thermal expansion as close as possible to that of the coolant tube.
End fittings also require comparable values of mechanical proper-
ties such as hardness with respect to coolant tube and liner tube for
rolled joint integrity. AISI-403 (modified) material can be heat
treated to attain the required mechanical properties.
Results of fast neutron irradiation damage on AISI 403 materi-
al at 304 ⬚C show that there is a change of NDTT from 40 ⬚C to
about 100 ⬚C during the life of the reactor. The presence of trace
elements such as copper, vanadium, antimony, aluminium, and
arsenic can increase the shift in NDTT. Hence, these trace ele-
ments are controlled to the extent possible in the end-fitting
material. Presence of trace elements such as copper, vanadium,
antimony, aluminium, and arsenic are controlled to a maximum
of 1450 ppm out of which copper alone is controlled to a maxi-
mum of 600 ppm.
End-fitting material is specified with the following impact
properties:
Longitudinal: 2.8 Kg/min at 20 ⬚C
Transverse: 2.1 Kg/min at 66 ⬚C
68.4 DEVIATIONS FROM ASME CODE
All the Indian PHWR components are, in general, designed, fab-
ricated, commissioned, and tested as per the ASME Code require-
ments. However, there are some areas in PHWRs where deviation
from the ASME Code requirements is unavoidable due to the basic
design of the reactor. Still, in such areas, the basic intent of the
ASME Code is maintained. The following are such areas:
68.4.1 Calandria
68.4.1.1 Material of Calandria Tubes Material of calandria
tubes is Zircaloy-2/ Zircaloy-4. This material has not been
approved by ASME Code Section III as Class I material. Since the
calandria tubes are present in reactor core, due to neutron econo-
my, choice of material for calandria tubes is restricted to
Zirconium alloys. ASME B&PVCode Section III has been devel-
oped for PWRs and boiling water reactors (BWRs) designed and
built in the United States. These reactors do not have calandria
tubes. For heavy water reactors, calandria tubes are inherently pre-
sent, and thus this violation of code is unavoidable. However, the
design, manufacturing, and inspection follow Section III, Class I
philosophy.
68.4.1.2 Rolled Joints Between Calandria Tubes and
Calandria Side Tube Sheets This type of joint is not approved by
ASME Code Section III for Class I components. The reason for
using this type of joint is that Zircaloy-2 cannot be easily welded
to stainless steel. This violation of code also takes place due to
presence of calandria tubes and thus is unavoidable. However, this
joint has been so developed that its pullout strength is at least equal
to tensile strength of calandria tube. Moreover, this joint is so
designed that it is not falling on boundary of heavy water–light
water. Moreover, this joint has been experimentally proven satis-
factory for strength and leak-tightness requirements.
68.4.1.3 Use of Rupture Disc for Overpressure Relief
Overpressure in calandria develops when rupture of a coolant
channel occurs in calandria vessel. During this condition, prima-
ry coolant that operates at high temperature and high pressure
gets liberated in moderator that operates at low temperature and
pressure. This results in pressurization of calandria vessel. Four
relief pipes having diameter of 500 mm are provided on calandria
vessel for relieving the pressure. The ends of these pipes are
closed by rupture disc assemblies. In case of a coolant channel
rupture in calandria, these rupture discs break open and over-
pressures in calandria are restricted.The use of rupture discs as
the primary pressure relief device is not allowed by ASME
B&PVCode Section III, Subsection NB. As per this subsection,
the rupture disc may be used in conjunction with safety valves.
However, for the accident condition described above, the flow
rate required for the pressure relief is so large that use of safety
valves is not adequate.
It may be mentioned here that the reactors that are mainly
addressed by ASME Code are light water reactors (LWRs). In
these reactors, the functions of moderator and coolant are per-
formed by the same fluid. There are no coolant channels in these
reactors, so that the type of accident that is being considered for
PHWR calandria is not relevant for these reactors. Overpressures
in the reactor vessels of these reactors occur mainly due to system
transients, and these can be relieved using safety valves and thus
the use of rupture disc is not necessary in these reactors.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 643
Normal operating pressure of the helium cover gas that is at the
top of the calandria is low, that is, 0.3 kg/cm2(g). There is a relief
valve in the system, which opens when the system pressure rises
above 0.5 kg/cm2(g). This relief valve has a capacity of 2348 stan-
dard lpm, which is sufficient to take care of changes in volume of
moderator due to swelling or other minor causes. The rupture disc
set pressure is 1.4 kg/cm2(g), which is not close to the relief valve
setting.
So, the OPRDs come into action only when there is an accident
involving coolant tube rupture. The size of opening is such that
one OPRD is sufficient to relieve the pressure in calandria in case
of coolant tube rupture accident. For redundancy, four identical
rupture discs have been provided for each calandria.
The sample rupture disks are tested in shop for burst pressure
and cycle testing. The accepted range of burst pressure is 1.26–1.40
kg/cm2(g).
68.4.2 End Shields
68.4.2.1 Tri-Junction Welds The design of end shield meets all
requirements of ASME Code Section III, Class 2 in all respects
except for inspection of joint among lattice tubes, baffle plates, and
calandria side tube sheet. However, ultrasonic technique has been
developed for this purpose. In addition to ultrasonic examination,
dye penetrant (DP) examinations are carried out after each weld-
ing pass. Mock-up weld passes are carried out everyday before
start of welding to ensure good quality. These mock-ups are sec-
tioned and inspected if found necessary.
68.4.2.2 Monitoring of Intermetallic Joint (Diaphragm
Plates) Diaphragm plates are provided in the calandria side tube
sheet and the fuelling machine tube sheet. The diaphragm plates
have lower thickness compared to the tube sheets to provide the
flexibility required to allow thermal expansion of the calandria
tubes. There are weld joints between the diaphragm plates and the
tube sheets. Total thermal neutron flux at this joint is 1.08 E11
n/cm2/s. This is not expected to cause embrittlement of the material
over a period of 30 FPY. Stress analysis shows that stress level in
this zone is very low. Quality control procedure assures no defect in
this joint (100% radiography in addition to root pass DP). Thus, no
failure is expected during service. The water level in expansion tank
and makeup rate are monitored continuously.
68.4.3 Coolant Channel Components
Material of Coolant Tubes. Zirconium–Niobium alloy has not
been used as a material for the pressure-retaining components in
LWRs. Here also, the intent of ASME Code is followed in the
design, manufacture, inspection, and testing of the tubes.
Rolled Joint Between Coolant Tubes and End Fittings. The
reasons for using rolled joint here are same as those for the joint
between calandria tube and the calandria tube sheet.
Material of End Fitting. Material of end fittings is marten-
sitic stainless steel AISI 403 (modified), hardened and tempered.
The essential elements of modification are (i) controlled range of
C and Cr to achieve consistent mechanical properties with same
heat treatment parameters and (ii) low level of residuals to
reduce the shift in ductile to brittle transition temperature due to
irradiation.
This material has been approved by ASME, vide Code Case
No. N-4-11 (approval date 13.7.81), as a pipe material, where the
toughness requirement as per NB-2332 applies. Accordingly, this
material is required to exhibit a lateral expansion (LE) of 25 mils
(0.65 mm) minimum in a Cv test conducted at lowest service tem-
perature (LST).
A series of tests were conducted jointly by Nuclear Power
Corporation (NPC) and Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic
Research (IGCAR) to obtain data on this aspect of unirradiated
end fitting material. From the results, it is clear that this material
is capable of meeting this code requirement at temperatures above
60 ⬚C. Nil ductility transition temperature of this material in unir-
radiated condition corresponding to 15 ft. lb. absorbed energy in
Cv test is 40 ⬚C. The shift in NDTT due to irradiation effect gets
saturated at a fluence of about 6.5E19 n/cm2. The maximum shift
is about 55 ⬚C. Further, a test was conducted at low temperature
to simulate radiation damage, in which an artificially produced
[electrical discharge machining (EDM)] notch defect in the high-
ly stressed rolled joint area was extended by fatigue and the end
fitting was tested up to burst. The end fitting could withstand
nearly three times the design pressure.
Therefore, end-fitting material is safe for all conditions of reac-
tor operations, as it always operates at 265 ⬚C. However, as a pre-
caution, hydro-test during manufacture and at precommissioning
stage is conducted at a minimum temperature of 65 ⬚C and also
cold pressurization is prohibited in the reactor, where during start-
up, pressurization starts at a temperature of 130 ⬚C.
Inspection of End Fittings. There are some areas of end fitting
(at the top of the nozzle and some portion of side) that are not
covered by bidirectional ultrasonic examination during manufac-
ture. At these places only straight beam technique is used.
68.4.4 Inaccessibility for In-Service Inspection
The reactor components such as end shields and calandria are
not accessible to periodic ISI. However, during design and fabri-
cation stage, all precautions are taken to see that no regular ISI is
needed for this component. Stress analysis for all the components
has been done as required by the code.
68.5 SEISMIC QUALIFICATION,
LEAK-BEFORE-BREAK, ISI,
CONTAINMENT DESIGN
68.5.1 Seismic Qualification
The various structures, systems, and components in NPP are
classified into three categories [8]. Category I systems are those
whose failure could lead to release of activity into containment or
in the environment (e.g., reactor containment structure, PHT sys-
tem and so on) and are designed for S1 (equivalent to OBE)- and
S2 (equivalent to SSE)-level earthquakes [9]. Category II struc-
tures (e.g., waste management building) are designed for S2-level
earthquake and Category III structures (e.g., turbine building,
turbo-generator and so on) are designed for earthquake resistance
as per national practice [10].
Due to the numerical difficulties associated with use of
plate/shell elements for complex geometries, the present practice
is to carry out separate analysis for the entire reactor building
using 3D stick model, in which the inner containment (IC) is
modeled using a separate 3D stick connected to the reactor build-
ing raft. In this method, the structure is modeled using 3D beam
properties based on strain energy equivalence between 3D finite
element model and 3D beam model. Lateral torsional coupling
and the effect of flexibility of floors, offset, and partial support of
walls are accounted for. In this method, the beams are located at
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644 • Chapter 68

OCW
ICW 10
1 9
1 4
2 24 8

Damping Ratio
6 VT
3 8 EW 7
5 6
10
7 5
12 NS 4
9 14 3
11 19 2
13 24 IS
1
18 28 17 0
LINK 44700 16 45
23 35 20 0 10 20 30 40
15 21 25 Frequency in Hz
27 40 26 29
11 34
34 30 CV FIG. 68.6 FREQUENCY DEPENDENT DAMPING VALUES
46 36 49
37 41 33 (ASME CODE CASE N 411-1)
39 71
56 50
42 48 38
45 30000
47 50 44
62 51
55 52 51 57 54
58
The floor-mounted equipment and piping are analyzed using
72 52 64 24000 60
61
67 66 63 74 floor response spectra. For this purpose, time history of the floor
59 70
71 78 58 81 82 motion is generated by performing a time history analysis of the
73
69 65
75 80
19000 76 RCB. The resulting spectra are broadened ⬰15% for use in equip-
77 58 83 86
88 79 57 ment design.
84 89 92
87 59 14250 For active equipment, such as electrical relays, switches, con-
94 85 60 95 101 tacts, shut-off rod drives and others, whose functioning solely
93 90 96
91 99 63 104 107 depends on the actuation of some parts within them, it is neces-
103 97
98 7500 81 sary to demonstrate their operability during an earthquake event
102 100 64 110
105 116
109 106 112 FLEXURAL CENTRE by testing on shake table. In addition, the equipment must with-
108 111 113
114 119 stand the effects of a number of OBEs prior to the SSE. The pro-
117 118 115 120 AREA CENTRE
cedures given in IEEE-344, 1987 for the assessment of integrity
23 44 121 69 126 000
122 NODES and operability are adopted for testing. For heavy equipment such
123 124 82
130
70
127 129 as primary heat transport pumps, it is acceptable to qualify by
RAFT 83 128 xxx ELEM detailed finite element analysis wherein the bearing stiffness, gap
131
between the casing and the impeller, and so on, must be consid-
FIG. 68.5 BEAM MODEL OF PHWR BUILDING ered in a mathematical model.

68.5.2 In-Service Inspection Philosophy

shear centers [11, 12] and the masses ate located at mass centers
with a rigid link joining the two (Fig. 68.5). Beam models are
used for obtaining the global seismic responses.
These are finally applied on the 3D finite element model for
evaluating the design stresses. The seismic analysis model was
supplemented by an axisymmetric model to evaluate the stresses
at the shell/dome interface. In the current design being carried out
for 700 MWe project, the seismic forces on the containment struc-
ture will be computed from a detailed 3D FE model developed
using beam/shell/solid elements.
For aspects such as soil–structure interaction, decoupling crite-
ria, and damping in concrete structures, guidelines of ASCE are
followed. The application of the decoupling criteria has resulted
in a model of the reactor containment building, which includes
beam elements representing calandria vault, calandria, and the
end shields.
The application of the decoupling criterion to the complex
structure such as containment structure is not straightforward.
Modifications have been suggested [13] that make the criteria applic-
able to the complex structure such as reactor containment structure.
This criterion is also not applicable for multiconnected equipment.
A new criterion [14, 15] was developed that can be used for checking
the decoupling requirement of multiconnected equipment.
For damping in piping, higher values such as the PVRC damp-
ing [16], as shown in Fig. 68.6, are also used.
As an integral part of quality assurance during operation, a
periodic program of in-service inspection has been instituted to
cover all critical items important to safety [17]. This program has
been formulated on the basis of guidelines given in IAEA Safety
Guide 50-SG-02 entitled “In-service Inspection for Nuclear
Power Plants” [18] and the Canadian Code CAN/CSA N285.4-05
and 8-05 [19, 20].
In formulating this program, the following special characteris-
tics of PHWRs have been taken into consideration:
• Use of a large number of coolant channel assemblies (306 for
235 MWe unit and 392 for 500 MWe unit) in place of a reac-
tor pressure vessel and leading to a multicomponent primary
cooling system.
• Use of a variety of material requiring different kinds of exam-
ination techniques.
• Strict requirements in limiting leakage of primary coolant
from the point of view of safety and economy.
• On-power refueling, which reduces the frequency of outages.
Examples of the components and methods of examination nor-
mally considered for the ISI program are listed in Table 68.3.
The inspection areas and degree of inspection required for each
system or component are determined by the inspection category,
which in turn is based on two factors: stress intensity (SI) ratio
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 645

TABLE 68.3 COMPONENTS AND METHODS

Low Medium High
OF EXAMINATION [17]
Fatigue Fatigue Fatigue
Factor Factor Factor
Items to be Examined Methods

Stress Intensity Ratio, RS

High
Vessel and piping Visual, volumetric, and integrative
C1 B A Stress
Pump and valve. Intensity
– weld Visual, volumetric, and integrative Medium
– interior surface Visual and surface (if material is sub- C1 B B Stress
jected to stress corrosion or erosion) Intensity
Support Low
– weld Visual, surface, and volumetric C2 C1 C1 Stress
– others Visual Intensity

Rotating machinery Visual, surface, and volumetric 0 0.01 0.1 1.0

Mechanical couplings Fatigue Usage Factor

– bolt Visual, surface, volumetric, and
integrative FIG. 68.7 DETERMINATION OF INSPECTION CATEGORY [17]
– stud
– nut
All components procedures adopted are generally in conformance with ASME
– corrosion UT Thickness gauging Section V and XI Codes.
– erosion The results of the preservice inspection (PSI) of the compo-
nents prior to the start of operation of the plant establish the base
Heat exchangers/steam line data required for comparison during subsequent ISI. This
generator examination is carried out using the same methods and techniques
– shell Visual, surface, and volumetric and types of inspection instruments as those, which are planned to
– tube Volumetric be used for in-service inspection. In the case of many components
and systems, the inspection data collected during manufacture
Coolant tube PT–CT Gap, Garter spring location,
serve as baseline data. PSI is performed either
volumetric, dimensional, and
hydrogen pickup (a) after the hydrostatic pressure test but before start up of the
reactor; or
Feeder pipe Visual, feeder gap, volumetric, and
(b) before the hydrostatic pressure test provided that a confir-
thickness
matory examination is performed after the component
hydrostatic pressure test and the results indicate no signifi-
cant change.
In order to minimize the radiation exposure of inspection per-
(Rs) and fatigue usage factor. There are three levels of stress
sonnel and keeping in view the fact that a large number of compo-
intensity, namely, high (ⱖ 2/3), medium, and low (ⱕ1/3).
nents used are identical, a sampling approach has been taken for
working out the inspection program. For identical welds of identi-
Calculated SI
cal components, the number of welds to be inspected may be
reduced to FA. The value FA is taken from Fig. 68.8.
SI Ratio (Rs) =
The in-service inspection intervals are chosen such that any dete-
Allowable SI rioration occurring in systems and components is detected well
before any failure takes place. The first inspection is carried out
Similarly, there are three levels of fatigue usage factor, namely, commencing from the end of the first year to the end of the fifth year
low (ⱕ0.01), medium, and high (ⱖ 0.1). Based on different after going into commercial operation with the examinations spread
combinations of stress intensity ratio and fatigue usage factor, as evenly as practicable over the period. The subsequent in-service
four levels of inspection categories A, B, C1, and C2 in the inspections are scheduled at intervals of 10 years (Table 68.4).
decreasing degree of examination requirements have been arrived Acceptance Standards for Visual, Surface, and Volumetric
at (Fig. 68.7). Examinations are Same as Those in ASME Code Section XI.
Inspection category A requires examination of all welded While the components of primary heat transport system do
points and adjacent base metal. Category B requires examination receive the inspection commensurate with their importance, the
of at least one-third of the inspection areas. For Category C1, no major challenges faced by the Indian PHWRs are (i) Life man-
examination is required if the metal is ductile and creep resistant agement of coolant channels, and (ii) thinning of feeders and sec-
and the effects of neutron irradiation are not significant. For cate- ondary side piping due to flow accelerated corrosion (FAC).
gory C2, no examination is required. The inspection methods are These challenges have been successfully met through ISI and
of non-destructive type such as visual, dye penetrant, ultrasonic, maintenance/replacement strategies. The coolant channels suffer
radiography, acoustic emission, and hydro and leak testing. The from degradation due to irradiation creep resulting in increase in
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646 • Chapter 68

As far as replacement is concerned, India has successfully

100 completed en masse coolant channel replacement in four reactors
where Zircaloy-2 pressure tubes were used. Also, feeder replace-
Number of Identical
Components/Welds

ment has been successfully completed in three reactors.

10 68.5.3 Leak-Before-Break
Leak-before-break approach has been applied to primary heat
transport system piping of 500-MWe Indian PHWR as per
NUREG-CR-1061, Vol.3 [21], and IAEA TECDOC-710 [22].
Parallel to these analyses, a comprehensive Component Integrity
1 Test Program has been initiated to address some of the issues in
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
the fatigue and fracture analyses. These issues include the trans-
Number of Components to be inspected
ferability of the specimen fracture parameters to the component
level, the effect of cyclic/ dynamic load (that may occur during an
FIG. 68.8 INSPECTION SAMPLE FOR IDENTICAL COMPO- earthquake) on fracture properties, the effect of system compli-
NENTS/WELDS [17] ance on the load-bearing capacity of piping components and so
on. For in-depth understanding of these issues, 70 fatigue/fracture
tests have been conducted so far on full-scale piping components.
TABLE 68.4 INSPECTION SCHEDULE FOR PRESSURIZED
Apart from these, probabilistic methodology has also been used to
HEAVY WATER REACTOR
address the uncertainty associated with the input parameters used
in the LBB analysis. The present paper discusses the LBB qualifi-
Inspection period cation of PHT system piping of 500 MWe Indian PHWR and
indicated as Minimum addresses some of the issues not considered in LBB concepts by
calendar year of percentage of Maximum above standards.
plant service from examinations percentage of The LBB concept is basically demonstrated through fracture
Inspection commencement of required to be examinations mechanics analysis that there is negligible chance of catastrophic
Interval operation completed credited break of PHT pipes without giving prior indication of leakage. This
1st 0–2 16 34 involves detailed fracture mechanics studies of different piping
(5 years) 2–5 100 100 components such as straight pipe, elbow and branch tee. Leak-
before-break is ensured by demonstrating three levels of safety
2nd 5–8 16 34
assessment against sudden double-ended guillotine break (DEGB).
(10 years) 8–12 50 67
Level 1 is inherent in the design philosophy of ASME Code
12–15 100 100
Section III [2], which is normally followed in piping design.
3rd 15–18 16 34 Ductile and tough materials are widely used in nuclear power plant
(10 years) 18–22 50 67 piping due to their high resistance against nonductile rupture. The
22–25 100 100 design is done with a well-defined factor of safety of code- speci-
fied 95% exceedance probability on strength. It does not permit the
4th 25–28 16 34
presence of any defect larger in size than allowed in ASME Code
(10 years) 28–32 50 100
Section III for girth welds. The demonstration of Level 2 safety
32–35 100 100
consists of postulating a surface crack mostly in the weld, which
Note Plant life is assumed to be 40 years. may go undetected during the nondestructive examination. It is then
shown that there is insignificant crack growth of this surface crack
during the entire life period of the reactor. In this crack growth
study, one should consider all the possible crack growth mecha-
diameter and sag; deuterium pickup resulting from corrosion nisms such as corrosion, erosion, fatigue, creep, flow-induced
reaction lead to loss of fracture toughness. The ISI program for vibration, and so on, whichever may be operative for the particular
coolant channels consists of the following: piping system. From the operating experience of various PHWRs, it
has been observed that under the controlled environment of PHT
(a) Nondestructive examination for flaws including flaws in
piping system, fatigue is the only crack growth mechanism which
the rolled joint region.
cannot be totally ruled out. Hence, one should perform the fatigue
(b) Channel CT–PT gap, wall thickness, axial elongation,
crack growth study of the postulated surface flaw in the PHT pipes.
channel sag, and so on.
In the Level 3 safety assessment, a through-wall crack is postulated
(c) Eddy-current detection for location of garter springs.
at the maximum stress location with the worst material properties.
(d) Measurement of gap between coolant tube and calandria
The size of the crack is chosen so as to ensure the predicted leakage
tube.
is detected by the leak monitoring devices. Finally, it is shown that
(e) Sliver sampling for measurement of hydrogen content.
this crack will withstand the maximum credible load that may act
BARC In-service inspection System (BARCIS) and sliver sam- during a safe shutdown earthquake.
pling scraping tools are some of the important tools developed for
ISI of coolant channels. 68.5.3.1 Fatigue Crack Growth Tests Fatigue crack growth
Flow accelerated corrosion has become another focused area tests [23] have been conducted on pipes till the crack depth has
following some recent incidents. Thickness measurement is regu- reached through-wall. During the tests, crack depth and number of
larly carried out at a large number of locations. cycles have been recorded. Maximum crack depth and number of
ASME_Ch68_p635-654.qxd 6/5/09 3:01 PM Page 647
COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 647
FIG. 68.9 MAXIMUM CRACK DEPTH VERSUS NUMBER
OF CYCLES FOR DIFFERENT INITIAL CRACK DEPTH AND
R ⴝ 0.5 [23]
406MM OD Pipe and pipe weld
20 PBSC16-1
PBSC16-2
PBSC16-3
14 PBSC16-4
PBSC16-5
PBSC16-6
2C/a
12
8 68.5.3.3 Compliance Effect on Load Carrying Capacity of
4
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
a/t
FIG. 68.10 VARIATION IN ASPECT RATIO WITH CRACK-
GROWTH FOR 324-MM OUTER DIAMETER PIPE [23]
cycles for given stress ratio (R) and initial crack depth in pipes
have been shown in Fig. 68.9. Maximum crack depth and number
of cycles calculated analytically have also been shown in Fig. 68.9
and shows a good comparison. Figure 68.10 shows that crack
growth in depth direction is more rapid compared with circumfer-
ential direction and the limiting value of the aspect ratio is between
2.5and 5. This is essential for verification of Level 2 LBB.
68.5.3.2 The Cyclic Loading Effect on Load-Carrying
Capacity of Piping Components Leak-before-break assessment
is based primarily on the monotonic fracture tearing instability.
The effect of cyclic loading has generally not been considered in
the fracture assessment of nuclear power plant piping. The pipe
fracture analysis used in present LBB considers the seismic load-
ing as a one-time applied load of magnitude equal to peak load at
the postulated flaw location during the earthquake event. The
assessment of pipe with flaw (or crack) is based on the monotonic
tearing instability or Net Section Collapse (NSC). There is no
explicit consideration of the cyclic damage or the number of
applied load cycles during earthquake event.
An experimental and analytical investigation [24] was carried
out by conducting tests on full-scale circumferential through- wall
cracked pipe under reversible cyclic loading conditions. The
experiments covers a wide range of pipe sizes (NPS: 6⬙, 8⬙, 12⬙,
16⬙), crack sizes (2␪: 60⬚, 90⬚, 120⬚), material (low carbon man-
ganese steel, stainless steel), crack location (base, weld), loading
mode (load controlled, displacement controlled), and loading para-
meters (load ratio, load amplitude, displacement increment etc.).
The cyclic test results have been compared with the corresponding
monotonic pipe fracture test results to quantify the damage (loss in
load-carrying capacity) due to cyclic loading as a function of num-
ber of load cycles, and a simplified master curve has been generat-
ed to include the cyclic tearing damage in LBB assessment. The
master curve is a plot of the cyclic load amplitude (given as per-
cent of maximum load recorded in corresponding monotonic frac-
ture test) versus number of load cycles to failure (Nf) as shown in
Fig. 68.11. Few available results on similar tests (on 4⬙-pipe,
STS410 Japanese carbon steel) from literature of Central Research
Institute of Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI), Japan [25] have also
been plotted in the master curve and are in good agreement with
the results of the present tests series. The curve is independent of
crack sizes as well as pipe sizes since all experiment data lie with-
in a narrow scatter band.
This curve gives the load reduction factor as a function of num-
ber of load cycles and is applied on the monotonic critical load.
The curve suggests an additional safety factor “␤c” of 4/3 for SSE
loading and 3/2 for OBE loading over the monotonic critical load
for LLB assessment. For an OBE, the factor is relatively higher in
view of its higher frequency of occurrence than a SSE.
Piping Components A phenomenon mitigating the effect
described in the preceding section is the role of system compliance.
It means the stiffening effect of the connected piping on the cracked
section is negligible. Moreover, in these analyses the LBB assess-
ment is based on the maximum load, irrespective of the location at
which they are acting. However, in the real situation, the local com-
pliance of the cracked section and the global residual compliance of
the piping system may have significant effect on the load-carrying
capacity of the cracked pipe. These compliance effects must be
included while evaluating the safety margins. This is due to the fact
that the load acting on the cracked section changes, during crack
growth, because of indeterminacy of the piping system. Thus, a
purely load-controlled condition, representing the case of a piping
system with infinite compliance, changes into a mixed mode, that
is, partly load-controlled and partly displacement-controlled. As a
result the crack section sheds some of the load during the crack
growth, and this load is picked up by the connecting piping system.
The load redistribution may increase safety margin. For simplified
fracture mechanics calculation, an analytical expression is pro-
posed [26, 27] to evaluate actual moment at the cracked section in
a 3D piping system equation:
Mu c 1 + L d
Lc
eff
Mc =
c1 + d
Lc I
L eff Ieff
Here Mu is the uncracked moment and Mc is the actual moment at
the cracked section. Lc and Ieff are the length and effective
moment of inertia of the equivalent piping element used to simu-
late crack. The Leff is the equivalent length of the pipe modeled
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648 • Chapter 68

Basis of βc factor in Proposed LBB Design Criteria

95
QCSP-8-60-L3-CSB Load Controlled Cyclic Tearing Tests
QCSP-6-60-L2-SSB

C-4 (2θ=60) 90

Cyclic Tearing : Load Amplitude (Given as %

SA333 Gr.6 Carbon Steel

of Monotonic Experimental Fracture Load)

QCSP-8-60-L2-CSB
QCSP-6-60-L3-SSW Base Metal
QCSP-16-120-L1-CSB
C-1 (2θ=30°) SA333 Gr.6 Carbon Steel 85
Weld Metal
QCSP-8-60-L2-CSW QCSP-12-90-L6-CSB
QCSP-6-60-L1-SSB STS410 Japanese Carbon
QCSP-6-60-L3-SSW C-6 (2θ=60°)
Steel Base Metal 80
QCSP-8-60-L4-CSW QCSP-6-60-L4-SSB
QCSP-8-90-L6-CSB SS 304 L Stainless Steel
QCSP-8-60-L1-CSW C-2 (2θ=30°) Steel
βc = 0.75 QCSP-8-60-L5-CSB
75
C-6 (2θ=30°)

QCSB-8-60-L4-CSB
QCSP-6-60-L3-SSB
70
Safe LBB
Design 67
25 Tests were conducted on Straight
65
Pipes: 6 ″, 8 ″, 12 ″, & 16 ″ NB Pipes of
Carbon and Stainless Steel Material
60
0 20 50 80 100 120 140 160 180

FIG. 68.11 MASTER CURVE FOR CYCLIC TEARING ASSESSMENT [24]

with fixed-end conditions, which simulates piping system com- Load-Displacement Plot
pliance at the crack element. The I is moment of inertia of the 1
pipe. Crack initiation load
Actual tests were performed on reactor grade pipes to validate 0.8
theoretical studies regarding the effects of system compliance on System Test
fracture integrity. Seven fracture tests have been conducted in 0.6
P/Po

which system compliance was simulated by fixed ends and it was
varied in terms of L/R parameters. The main conclusions of this
experimental study can be summarized as follows:
• Fracture load of a piping system having even very large
crack size is very near the collapse load of an uncracked pip-
ing system (as shown in Fig. 68.12), thereby proving that
large plastic straining occur at uncracked ends before the
system collapse.
• A large margin was observed between crack initiation load
and the maximum load that the piping system has sustained.
It is worth noting that in conventional fracture tests (infinite
compliance), crack initiation load is usually very near to the
maximum collapse load.
68.5.3.4 LBB ASSESSMENT of 500 MWe PHWR PIPING
Fatigue Crack Growth Analysis of 500 MWe TAPP 3&4
PHT Piping (Level 2). A part-through semi-elliptical circumfer-
ential flaw at the inside surface of pipe is postulated. The depth
of flaw is conservatively assumed to be 25% of wall thickness of
pipe based on ASME Code Section III, Appendix G recommen-
dation. The flaw aspect ratio is assumed to be six, which is repre-
sentative of typical flaw found in service. Cyclic loading due to
normal operating condition (Service Levels A and B) is consid-
ered to calculate the fatigue crack growth. Paris power law as
Component Test
0.4
0.2
Crack initiation load
0
0 50 100 150 200 250
Actuator Disp. (mm)
FIG. 68.12 COMPARISON OF COMPONENT AND SYSTEM
LOAD DISPLACEMENT BEHAVIOUR (PO REFERS TO LIMIT
LOAD OF UNCRACKED COMPONENT/SYSTEM)
given in ASME Section XI [3] is used. Table 68.5 shows the var-
ious transient events and the number of excursions of each event
postulated for the entire design life period of the reactor. It was
seen that the fatigue crack growth is very small (original crack
depth of 25% increased to 27%) over the entire design life period
of the reactor.
Fracture Assessment (Level 3). The fracture assessment of
PHT system pipes, with postulated through-wall circumferen-
tial and axial flaws, was carried out using the concept of a
two-criteria failure assessment diagram (FAD) [28], which
describes the interaction between fracture and collapse and is
documented as the R-6 procedure. The results obtained have
been used to qualify leak-before-break criteria of PHT pipes.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 649
TABLE 68.5 VARIOUS TRANSIENT EVENTS POSTULATED
FOR ENTIRE DESIGN LIFE OF 500 MWe TAPP 3&4
Sl. No. Event No. of cycles
1 Operation basis 50 (5 events, each
earthquake causing 10 cycles)
2 Heat-up from cold 1000
shutdown to hot standby
3 Start-up from hot 3500
standby to full power
4 Power maneuvering 15,000
at full power
The R-6 method was also used to perform sensitivity analysis
for reserve margins with respect to different input parameters
such as material properties, material test temperature, initial
crack length and so on.
The margins (FL ⫽ critical load/applied load) obtained for the
different piping segments using R-6 method and accounting for
the cyclic loading effect, range from 1.7 to 3.4 against a minimum
required value of √2.
68.5.3.5 General Limit Load and B2 Stress Index Equation
for Pipe Bends under In-Plane Bending The limit load assess-
ment is essential to prevent the pipe or pipe bends to fail by
excessive deformation or collapse. Currently available limit load
equations have a limited range of applicability and do not cover
the wide range of bend geometries that are used in power plant
piping. Ideally, the elbow limit load equation should approach
straight pipe limit load with increasing pipe bend radius. Keeping
this fact in mind, finite element analyses of around 65 elbows
having different geometric parameters were performed. The
parameters considered were elbow bend radius (rb) to mean
radius (R) ratio (2, 3, 6, 9, 12, and 18) and pipe radius (R) to
thickness (t) ratio (5, 7.5, 10, 15, 20, and 30).
One quarter of elbow was modeled using three-dimensional 20
nodded brick elements and elastic perfectly and a plastic analysis
was performed, which included the geometric nonlinearity. The
analyses have been carried out for both in-plane closing and open-
ing bending, and limit load for each case was determined using
the twice elastic slope method. A relational study was performed
to understand the dependence of limit load on the R /t, rb /R and
elbow characteristic h. The study addressed the weakening factor
(Wf ), that is, the normalized limit loads (ratio of limit load of
elbow to limit load of corresponding pipe). A simple expression
for weakening factor (or limit load) is proposed [29] for “closing
bending,” which covers the entire domain of the parameters and
provides a good prediction of limit load for nonstandard elbows.
A margin consistent definition [30] for B2 index defines it as the
ratio of the pipe collapse load to the collapse load of correspond-
ing elbow.
M LElbow = Wf , M Pipe
L = Wf (4R2 ␴o)
Limit moment of an equivalent pipe 1
B2 = = mation. In order to obtain the stresses in the discontinuity areas
Limit moment of the elbow Wf
0.2
= 1 + (68.1)
h1.028 + 0.95rb /R
The Section III of ASME B&PV Code allows for design by sim-
plified analysis (NB-3600) using stress indices. The B2 index is used
for calculating the primary stress intensity due to bending load.
Using margin consistent definition, the ASME Code expression
⫺2
for B2 can easily deduced as 1.3␭ /3 from the lower bound in-
plane limit moment expression for the elbow as 0.8␭0.6MLPipe given
by Spence and Findlay [31]. However, The ASME Code has typi-
cally defined B2 as two-third of C2 index. Thus, the stress index
value of 1.3 for B2 in the ASME Code is equal to 2/3 of 1.95. The
ASME Code C2 index is based on Dodge and Moore [32] investi-
gations on the stress intensities in curved pipe under combinations
of in-plane, out-of-plane, and torsional moments. He found that a
C2 index of 1.95/(h2/3) would conservatively predict the maximum
stress intensity for any resultant moment.
ASME B2 index is found to be in good agreement for extra
large bend-radius elbows. However it is very conservative for
standard elbows (rb /R ⫽ 2 and 3). Based on these investigations,
a new B2 index (Eq. 68.1) is proposed, which eliminates undesir-
able conservatism in the present ASME B2 index equation and it
can be used for elbows of any bend radius. Figure 68.13 shows
the conservatism of present B2 index equation as well as com-
pares the limit load equation with other literature equations as
Caladine [33], Touboul [34], Chattopadhyay [35], and Kim [36].
Similar equations are also proposed for opening bending, clos-
ing, and opening bending for elbow with circumferential through-
wall crack.
68.5.4 Containment Design
The containment design has evolved from single containment
in Rajasthan Atomic Power Station to full double containment in
all the current designs with the provision of openings in the dome
of reactor building for erection of steam generator. The design
follows the guidelines of French Design Code RCC-G [4].
68.5.4.1 Design Against Membrane Stresses The major loads
considered for the design of containment structure are dead load,
prestress loads with appropriate losses, internal pressure on account-
postulated design basis accident scenario, temperature loads under
test, normal operating and design basis accident conditions, envi-
ronmental loads, namely, seismic (both operating basis earthquake
and safe shutdown earthquake) and wind loads. Appropriate live
loads under normal operating condition as well as during construc-
tion process are also considered while carrying out the design of
containment structure.
The prestress loads that are imparted on the structure to counter
the tensile stresses generated during design basis accident condi-
tion vary both spatially as well as in time domain on account of
short-term and long-term losses. The short-term losses are due to
friction and wobble effect, anchorage draw-in, and elastic short-
ening of concrete structure due to stagewise stressing of cables
during the process of prestressing. Shrinkage and creep of con-
crete and relaxation (creep) of prestressing steel contribute toward
the long-term losses of prestress loads.
Finite element analysis is carried out in order to evaluate the
membrane forces due to various types of loads for the inner con-
tainment structure. Normally, the IC structure can be modeled
using thick shell elements, which can take care of the shear defor-
more accurately due to irregular geometry and also discrete
anchorage forces because of prestress cable, the IC ring beam is
modeled using 8-noded 3D solid brick elements. The effect of the
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650 • Chapter 68

1.9

1.7 rb/R = 6
rb/R = 3 rb/R = 18
R/t = 5 R/t = 10 rb/R = 12
R/t = 20 R/t = 30
l = 0.6 l = 0.6
l = 0.6 l = 0.6
Collapse Load of Eqv. Pipe
Collapse Load of Elbow
1.5
rb/R = 9
R/t = 15
l = 0.6
1.3

1.1 Elastic Perfectly Plastic FEM Solution

Propsed Equation

0.9
Iso 'λ' Lines ASME B2-Index [1]
forλ = 0.6
Calladine [2]
Touble [3]
0.7
Chattopadhaya [4]
Y. J. Kim [5]
0.5
0 5 10 15 20
Elbow Bend Radius / Mean radius (rb/R )

FIG. 68.13 COMPARISON OF FEM AND PROPOSED EQUATION WITH THE

LITERATURE EQUATIONS [29]

duct openings and the reinforcing/prestressing steel is accounted
for appropriately at the design stage.
The design of the prestressed concrete inner containment struc-
ture is checked both under limit state of serviceability as well as
under limit state of strength (also called as ultimate limit state) as
per the provisions of RCC-G. It is ensured that a membrane com-
pressive stress of at least 1 MPa is available under accident condi-
tion. Presence of voids in the concrete section due to cable duct
openings led to development of special computer programs for
carrying out the design check under limit state of serviceability
and limit state of strength.
The entire inner containment is checked against the require-
ment of limit state of strength. In general, the load factor for the
permanent loads is 1.35 and that for the variable loads 1.5.
68.5.4.2 Design Against Radial Stress in IC Dome The nor-
mal stress in the thickness direction, also called as radial stress, is
generated in the inner containment structure due to (i) Curvature
effect, in which the curved prestressed cables embedded inside the
concrete exert pressure toward the center of curvature at the bot-
tom of the cable sheath leading to development of radial stress, (ii)
Transition effect, arising at locations where the shell thickness
changes rapidly within a short distance, and (iii) Stress concentra-
tion effect, in which the in-plane membrane compressive stresses
in the IC dome also generate radial tensile stress around the cable
duct openings.
Normally, the radial stresses in the prestressed concrete inner
containment structure are maximum during the construction period
since the prestress forces are maximum. With time, long-term
losses take place and thus, the residual prestress is reduced. In
view of this, the design against radial stress is carried out for the
loads under construction stage. Working stress method of design
is adopted for this.
In order to control cracking of concrete, the radial stresses are
limited to 0.67 times the tensile strength of concrete. The allowable
radial tensile stress is further reduced in order to take into account
the effect of membrane compressive stress field. The radial tensile
stress generated due to all the phenomena are considered for lim-
iting the concrete tensile stress except that due to the effect of
stress concentration, since the radial stress generated due to this
phenomenon is secondary in nature and is balanced by the adja-
cent compressive stress field.
The radial reinforcements in the IC dome are designed to carry
the radial tensile force resulting from the curvature effect and
transition effect where the cable spacing is sufficiently large.
However, where the cable spacing is close, reinforcements are
provided to take care of the local tensile force due to stress con-
centration effect also.
A reduced value of permissible stress is considered while
designing the reinforcements to limit cracking in the concrete.
The deflection and strains at certain locations in the IC are
recorded during proof testing mainly to compare the deflection as
well as strains obtained from analytical study. The strain mea-
surements are also necessary to monitor the development of stress-
es in the IC structure at different stages of prestressing during
construction.
The strains are measured using vibrating wire strain gauges
(VWSG) connected to automatic data-logger at locations covering
the entire IC in order to capture both membrane as well as radial
stresses. Based on the recorded data the stresses developed in the
IC are compared with the specified allowable stress limits of the
design code RCC-G.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 651
68.5.4.3 Equivalence Study with Respect to ASME Code
Section III, Division 2 As discussed in the preceding sections,
the design of containment structures of Indian PHWRs has been
based on the methodology evolved considering the Indian con-
struction practices. The design methodology is mainly based on
the principles of the French Code RCC-G as the containment
system adopted for the Indian PHWRs is a double containment
without metallic liner, similar to the one adopted in the French
containments of PWRs. However, an attempt has been made to
study the equivalence of the various provisions of design of pri-
mary (inner) containment structure being followed in India with
respect to those adopted in various international standards in
order to assess the level of its safety under design basis accident
scenario. The study has been carried out to establish the equiva-
lent partial safety factor for accident pressure (Pa) in factored
load combination under limit state of strength. For this purpose,
a detailed design check has been carried out for some typical ele-
ments located in different regions of inner containment structure,
such as (i) IC dome thickened area near SG opening, (ii) IC dome
general area, (iii) IC wall raft junction, (iv) IC wall general area,
and (v) IC dome springing area under accidental load combina-
tion as per the provisions of various international standards,
namely, Canadian Standard,ASME Section III, Division 2 and
RCC-G.
Based on the equivalence study, the following conclusions are
drawn:
(i) Though the design philosophy and partial safety factors for
material and loads, prestress loss computation, and others
are different in various international standards (such as
Canadian, ASME and RCC-G), the design provisions and
the associated design parameters suggested by various
international codes pertaining to design of containment
structure are laid down in such a balanced way that the
final design lies in the same range.
(ii) In general, it is noticed that the load combination involving
accident pressure along with the design philosophy sug-
gested in RCC-G is equivalent to the design provisions
adopted in the Canadian standard as well as the ASME
Code.
68.6 ORGANIZATION OF DESIGN,
FABRICATION, CONSTRUCTION,
OPERATION, AND ISI OF NPPS
IN INDIA
68.6.1 Design
India started its nuclear power program with two BWRs, which
were constructed on turnkey basis by General Electric, USA
in 1969. Later on, India had collaboration with Canada for two
220 MWe PHWRs. First PHWR was designed and constructed by
Canadians. However, during the construction of second reactor,
the collaboration ended and India took over the remaining con-
struction work. Subsequent to the end of collaboration with
Canada, India has built 11 ⫻ 220 MWe PHWRs and 2 ⫻ 540
MWe PHWRs. Three more 220 MWe PHWRs are in the final
stages of completion. Design, construction and operation of
all these reactors are totally done in India. All the PHWRs
are being designed, constructed, and operated by Nuclear
Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL), a Government of
India Enterprise, under the Department of Atomic Energy. Civil
structures design is by consultants such as M/s. STUP, Develop-
ment Consultants Private Limited, Tata Consulting Engineers, and
others and quality assessment is done by NPCIL.
NPCIL has developed a very high expertise in design of small-
and medium- sized PHWRs. It has its own R&D facilities where
new and innovative designs are developed and tested. Besides this,
NPCIL gets support from its sister concerns such as Bhabha
Atomic Research Centre (BARC), Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic
Research (IGCAR), and Raja Ramanna Centre for Advanced
Technology (RRCAT) in the field of research and development. It
has a strong team of design engineers who look after all the design
aspects starting from conceptual design to detailed structural design
and analysis, process design, and electrical, civil, and instrumenta-
tion design of NPPs. International codes such as ASME, IEEE,
RCC, and others are followed for design of nuclear power plants.
Further, safety codes and guides issued by IAEA, USNRC, and
AERB are also followed.
Design of fast breeder reactors (FBRs) is done by IGCAR.
They have all the facilities for design, analysis and R&D of FBRs.
FBRs are totally looked after by IGCAR with the help of other
sister organizations such as BARC, NPCIL, RRCAT and others.
One fast breeder test reactor is under operation. One Prototype
Fast Breeder Reactor of 500 MWe capacity is under construction
by Bhartiya Vidyut Nigam (BHAVINI).
Design and development of thorium-based reactors, including
all the engineering, analysis, and related R&D activities, is done
by BARC. A 300-MWe Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR)
is being designed by BARC.
68.6.2 Fabrication
India is one of the few countries in the world that has acquired
expertise in the entire range of nuclear fuel cycle activities. As
these activities are of special nature and did not form a part of
the general industrial domain of the country, Department of
Atomic Energy (DAE) established facilities for carrying them out
in a proper phased manner. Over the years, significant efforts
were put by DAE/NPCIL to develop indigenous manufacturing
capability to fabricate various equipment/components conform-
ing to stringent quality standard of nuclear power plants.
Indigenous industrial infrastructure for nuclear power plants is
well developed. Indian industry has gained valuable experience
and reached a stage of maturity in manufacturing components for
these reactors. Indian industries are fully capable of manufactur-
ing all the components, including large-size components such as
calandria, end shields, steam generators, turbine, condenser, and
others. These Indian industries have developed capabilities to
manufacture all the nuclear as well as secondary side compo-
nents. All the Class I, II, and III nuclear components are fabricat-
ed, inspected, and tested as per applicable ASME Codes. Raw
materials are procured to meet the ASME specifications.
Inspection is done by the Quality Assurance Group of these
industries. NPCIL has its own QA group, which does the surveil-
lance job at the shops of manufacturers. Expertise for carrying
out all the nondestructive examinations has been developed by
NPCIL as well as the manufacturers.
68.6.3 Construction
Over the years, India has developed expertise in the construc-
tion of nuclear power plants. At present India is constructing
nuclear power plants in less than five years. Advanced project
management techniques are being followed to cut down the
gestation period. Further, the following improvements have been
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652 • Chapter 68
made in the construction methodology to cut down the gestation
period.
• Concept of mega packages has been introduced
• Vendor’s participation in analysis and decision making has
been increased.
• Integrated action plans are evolved to resolve issues related to
design, material, and construction activities.
• Targets and expectations are fully defined.
• Open top construction, increased mechanization, and parallel
civil and mechanical erection are implemented.
• Round the clock construction work is practiced.
• Use of project management tools, increased use of informa-
tion technology for prompt decision making and timely mid-
course corrections and revision of construction sequence have
been successfully implemented.
There are a large number of civil construction companies in
India, which take care of full construction of civil structures.
Prominent among them are M/s. Engineering Construction and
Contracts (ECC), M/s. Gammon India Ltd., M/s Hindustan
Construction Co., and others. In the early reactors, mechanical
erection was done by NPCIL. But now there are many companies
that undertake engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC)
contracts. Now, the construction of NPPs is being carried out
through mega packages. On the secondary side, mostly, there are
EPC packages. On the nuclear side, there are PC packages. This
has reduced the construction time drastically.
68.6.4 Operation
At present India has 2 ⫻ 200 MWe BWRs, 13 ⫻ 220 MWe
PHWRs, and 2 ⫻ 540 PHWR NPPs in operation. All operations
are done indigenously by NPCIL. Each twin station unit has
around 600 operating manpower, including Operation and
Maintenance (O&M) personnel. At each station, there are four
operating crews, one for each operating shift and one extra crew
for exigencies. All the engineers are trained and licensed and their
licenses are periodically updated. All the reactors are operated as
per their operating technical specifications, which cover all the
operating limits as per IAEA safety standards. The technical spec-
ifications are duly reviewed and approved by Atomic Energy
Regulatory Board.
NPCIL is a member of World Association of Nuclear Operators
(WANO), CANDU Owners Group (COG), and International
Atomic Energy Agency. The peer reviews by expert teams of
WANO has been recognized internationally as major tool for
sharing the best practices in operation and performance improve-
ment. Such reviews have been completed for all the reactors.
These reviews indicate that the condition and performance of sta-
tions matched with those at the world level. WANO members reg-
ularly visit our plants and review the operation and safety aspects.
In the recent reactors, even preoperation reviews have been car-
ried out by WANO before the criticality of newly constructed
reactors. Regular seminars/meetings are held among members of
COG, during which the challenges faced in various PHWRs are
shared and discussed. This helps in upgrading the safety standards
further.
India has experience of 265 reactor operating years. Till now
there has not been any significant event wherein radioactivity is
released to the public domain and no nuclear accident, as defined
by International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) of IAEA, has
occurred.
Indian PHWRs have very high availability factor over the entire
lifetime. This is made possible by strict scheduled outage for main-
tenance and in-service inspections. Biennial shutdown is taken only
for 18– 20 days. All the in-service inspections, containment testing,
and so on are done within this time. Unscheduled outages have
totally reduced and downtime is very much controlled. On redun-
dant systems, preventive maintenance is performed on power.
Radiological protection is enhanced by choosing cobalt-free materi-
als, providing adequate shielding thickness, and by optimized
design and layout of components and systems.
A comprehensive radiological surveillance program around
each NPP is pursued by well-equipped environmental survey lab-
oratories (ESLs). The basic objective of these laboratories is to
assess the radiation doses to the public due to operation of NPPs
and to demonstrate the compliance with the applicable regulatory
limits set by national and international authorities.
The environmental survey laboratories at site periodically col-
lect and analyze various environmental matrices, including
dietary items such as water, cereals, pulses, meat, fish, milk, eggs
and others for their radioactivity contents. Environmental sam-
ples are collected on regular basis from various locations sur-
rounding the nuclear facility up to a distance of 30 km. The sam-
pling locations are selected on the basis of wind pattern,
utilization of environment, and population clusters around the
facility. The type of samples are selected on the basis of potential
pathways to man. Annually about 2500 environmental samples
are being collected and analyzed by ESL at each nuclear site.
The samples are analyzed for various biologically important
radionuclides. The data thus obtained are processed statistically
and used to evaluate the dose annually to the members of public
residing around NPPs.
The well-defined and executed environmental radiological sur-
veillance program around each nuclear power plant shows that
radioactive contamination is insignificant. It also demonstrates
that the NPP releases are well within the prescribed regulatory
limits. It is observed that the annual radiation doses at the site
boundary of the respective nuclear power plant are less than 7%
of the annual regulatory limit of 1000 µSv during the period of
operations. On comparing with the naturally occurring back-
ground radiation of 2400 µSv/yr, it is almost negligible.
The release of radioactivity to environment from the nuclear
power stations is in very small quantities and in any case well
within the limits stipulated by AERB. For monitoring the compli-
ance to the prescribed regulatory requirements, environmental
survey and meteorological laboratories are set up at each plant
site. These laboratories analyze samples of food, air, water,and so
on up to an area of 30-km radius from the plant to assure environ-
mental security.
68.6.5 In-Service Inspection
In-service Inspection at all the operating plants is carried out peri-
odically as per station ISI program. Based on ISI documents, ISI
program is finalized, which meet the intent of ASME Section XI.
India has developed all the special tools required for ISI of coolant
channels and steam generators. BARCIS and Sliver sampling scrap-
ing tools are some of the important tools developed for ISI for pres-
sure tubes. Life management of coolant channels, flow accelerated
corrosion mainly on secondary side, and feeder thinning are the
major challenges faced by the Indian PHWRs. These challenges
have been successfully met through ISI and maintenance.
India has successfully completed en masse coolant channel
replacement in four reactors where Zircaloy-2 pressure tubes
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 653
were used. All the tools and techniques were developed indige-
nously. Also, feeder replacement has been successfully completed
in three reactors.
During the evolution of main circuit design, effort has been
made at minimizing the weld joints and in turn the in-service
requirement of such joints. This has been achieved by adopting
integral forging for the headers with pullout nozzles, main circuit
piping with hockey stick combination for large pipe spools. The
steam generator shells have also been specified as ring forging to
eliminate longitudinal joints.
68.6.6 Development of Codes, Guides, and
Standards
In order to fulfill its mission of stipulating and enforcing rules
and regulations concerned with nuclear and radiological safety,
AERB is in the process of developing codes and guides for vari-
ous aspects of nuclear reactor design. These guides will borrow
appropriate elements from ASME, ASCE, ACI, Canadian and
French Codes and incorporate India’s experience in their usage,
Indian materials, and construction practices. One such effort aims
at developing a safety standard for “Design of Nuclear Power
Plant Containment Structures” and is currently in draft stage [37].
This is based on ASME Code Section III, Division 2 [38], ACI
349 [39], RCC-G [4], CSA-N287.3 [40], and the Indian Code IS
456 [41]. Another guide in draft stage is the one for “Seismic
Qualification of Structures, Systems and Components of
Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors” [42]. This guide builds on the
Indian experience gained during seismic design of reactor struc-
tures and is based on ASCE [43], IEEE [44] JAEG 4601 [45],
IAEA NS-G-1.6 [46], and IS 1893 [10].
68.7 CONCLUSIONS
1. Design of Indian PHWRs is based on ASME B&PV Code
Section III.
2. In those cases where the code rules could not be met in let-
ter, they have been met in spirit by carrying out the required
material characterization and component qualification tests.
3. Indian PHWR program depends on leak-before-break crite-
rion for eliminating pipe whip restraints. Leak-before-
break has been demonstrated by carrying out extensive tests
on specimens, pipes, and elbows.
4. The tests have demonstrated adequate margins with respect
to failure by fracture even when leakage size crack is present.
5. The R&D program has explored effects of cyclic loading
and presence of connected piping on fracture behavior of
piping.
6. A new B2 index is proposed which eliminates undesirable
conservatism in the present ASME B2 index equation and it
can be used for elbows of any bend radius.
7. In-service program follows a combined philosophy of
ASME Code Section XI and the Canadian Code CSA/
N281.5-05.
8. Design of concrete containment is based on French Code
RCC-G.
9. In order to avoid a mixture of codes, a need has been felt to
write our own codes and a beginning has been made in this
respect. AERB has published 5 Safety Codes and 45 Safety
Guides concerning various aspects of NPPs and 51 other
safety support documents. A few others are in various stages
of preparation.
68.8 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors gratefully acknowledge the contribution of Vivek
Bhasin, Rohit Rastogi, P.K. Singh, Suneel K. Gupta, and Imran
Ali Khan of Reactor Safety Division of BARC, and K.P. Dwivedi,
A.G. Chhatre, Raghupati Roy, and Santosh Kumar of Nuclear
Power Corporation (NPC).
68.9 REFERENCES
1. Bajaj, S.S. and Gore, A.R., The Indian PHWR, Nuclear Engineering
and Design, Vol. 236, Nos 7–8, pp. 701–722, April 2006.
2. ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section III; also, Appendix G,
1995.
3. ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, American Society
of Mechanical Engineers, 1995.
4. RCC-G (English Translation), Vols I & II, Design and Construction
Rules for Civil Works of PWR Nuclear Islands, Drawn-up by
Electricite De France (EDF), July 1988.
5. BPEL-83 (English Translation by AFNOR, Association Francaise de
Normalisation), Technical Rules for the Design of Prestressed
Concrete Structure Using the Limit State Method. 1983.
6. BAEL-83 (English Translation by AFNOR, Association Francaise de
Normalisation), Technical Rules for the Design and Calculation of
Reinforced Concrete Structures and Buildings Using Limit State
Method. 1983.
7. Koley, J., Harikumar, S., Ashraf, S.A.H., Chande, S.K., and Sharma,
S.K., Regulatory Practices for Nuclear Power Plants in India, Nuclear
Engineering and Design, Vol. 236, Nos 7–8, pp. 894–913, April 2006.
8. AERB/SG/D-1, Safety Classification and Seismic Categorization for
Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors, Atomic Regulatory Board,
Mumbai, India, 2000.
9. AERB/SG/S-11, Seismic Studies and Design Basis Ground Motion
for Nuclear Power Plants Sites, Atomic Regulatory Board, Mumbai,
India,1990.
10. IS: 1893, Criteria for Earthquake Resistance Design of Structures,
BIS, New Delhi, 1984.
11. Reddy, G.R., Kushwaha, H.S., and Kakodkar, A., Seismic Analysis of
Calandria End shield Assembly of 500 MWe Pressurised Water
Reactor, Proceedings of ASME Pressure Vessel and Piping
Conference, Vol. 237, pp. 115–120,1992.
12. Reddy, G.R., Kushwaha, H.S., Mahajan, S.C., Kelkar, S.P., and
Karandikar; G.V., Development of 3-D Beam Model for Seismic
Analysis of 500 MWe Reactor Building, BARC/1996/I/004, 1996.
13. Reddy, G.R., Vaze, K.K., Kushwaha, H.S., Tandale, J.V.,
Subramanian, K.V., and Kelkar, S.P., Procedure of Applying
Decoupling Criteria for a Complex Primary and Secondary System,
Proceedings of ASME Pressure Vessel and Piping Conference, Vol.
272, No.1, pp.129–139, 1994.
14. Neelwarne, A., Kushwaha, H.S, and Kakodkar, A., Seismic
Qualification of Nuclear Equipment under Multiple Support
Excitations, Proceedings of 11th SMiRT, Japan, 1991.
15. Reddy, G.R., Kohei, S., Kushwaha, H.S., and Mahajan, S.C.,
Decoupling Criteria for Multi-Connected Equipment, Journal of
Pressure Vessel Technology, Vol.120:, pp. 93–98, 1999.
16. ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Code Case N-411-1,
Alternative Damping Values for Response Spectra Analysis of Class
1, 2 and 3 Piping, Section III, Division 1, American Society of
Mechanical Engineers, New York, February 20, 1986.
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654 • Chapter 68

17. AERB Safety Guide AERB/SG/O-2, In-Service Inspection of Nuclear
Power Plants.
18. IAEA Safety Guide 50-SG-02 entitled In-Service Inspection for
Nuclear Power Plants.
19. CAN/CSA N285.4-05, Periodic Inspection of CANDU Nuclear
Power Plant Components, Canadian Standard Association, 2005.
20. CAN/CSA N285.8-05, Technical Requirements for In-Service
Evaluation of Zirconium Alloy Pressure Tubes in CANDU Reactors,
Canadian Standard Association, 2005.
21. Report of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Piping
Review Committee, Evaluation of Potential for Pipe Breaks,
NUREG/CR-1061, Vol.3, 1984.
22. International Atomic Energy Agency, Applicability of Leak-Before-
Break Concept, Report of the IAEA Extra Budgetary Programme
on the Safety of WWER-440 Model 230 Nuclear Plants, IAEA
TECDOC-710, 1993.
23. Singh, P.K., Vaze, K.K., Bhasin, V., Kushwaha, H.S., Gandhi, P., and
Murthy, D.S.R., Crack Initiation and Growth Behaviour of
Circumferentially Cracked Pipes under Cyclic and Monotonic
Loading, International Journal of Pressure Vessel and Piping, Vol. 80,
No. 9, pp. 629–640, September 2003.
24. Gupta, S.K., Bhasin, V., Vaze, K.K., Ghosh, A.K., and Kushwaha,
H.S., Experimental Investigations on Effects of Simulated Seismic
Loading on LBB Assessment of High Energy Piping, ASME-
Journal of Pressure Vessel and Technology, Vol.129, February
2007.
25. Miura, N., Fujioka, T., Kashima, K., Kanno, S., Hayashi, M.,
Ishiwata, M., and Gotohm, N., Low Cycle Fatigue and Ductile
Fracture for Japanese Carbon Steel under Dynamic Loading, Nuclear
Engineering and Design, Vol.153, pp. 57–69, 1994.
26. Gupta, S.K., Bhasin, V., Vaze, K.K., and Kushwaha, H.S., Ductile
Fracture Assessment of Piping Systems Including the Compliance
Effects, Paper # 1427, SMiRT 16, Washington DC, August 2001
Transactions.
27. Khan, I.A., Bhasin, V., Vaze, K.K., Ghosh, and A.K., Kushwaha, H.S.,
Significance of Finite Compliance of a Connected Piping System on
Fracture Integrity Assessment, American Society of Engineering
Pressure Vessel and Piping Conference (ASME-PVP-2005),
Colorado, USA, July 2005.
28. Rastogi, R., Bhasin, V., and Kushwaha H.S., Qualification of PHT
Piping of Indian 500MW PHWR for LBB, Using R-6 method, Bhabha
Atomic Research Centre, External Report, BARC/1997/E/026, India,
1997.
29. Gupta, S.K., Bhasin, V.,. Vaze, K.K, Ghosh, A.K., and Kushwaha,
H.S., General Limit Load and B2 Stress Index Equation for Pipe
Bends under In-Plane Bending, Paper # B04/5, SMiRT-19, Toronto,
Canada, August 12–17, 2007.
30. Tan, Y., Experimental and Nonlinear FEA Investigation of Elbow
Leading to a new definition of the B2 Stress Index, [PhD Thesis, with
Vernon C. Matzen], Civil Engineering Department, North Carolina
State University, Raleigh, 2001.
31. Spence, J. and Findley, G.E., Limit Load for Pipe Bends under In-
Plane Bending Proceedings of 2nd International Conference on
Pressure Vessel Technology, San Antonio, Texas, pp. 393–399,1976.
32. Dodge, W.G. and Moore, S.E., Stress Indices and Flexibility Factors
for Moment Loadings on Elbows and Curved Pipes, Welding
Research Council Bulletin No. 179, December 1972.
33. Caladine, C.R., Limit Analysis of Curved Tubes, Journal of
Mechanical Engineering Science, Vol. 16, pp. 85–87,1974.
34. Touboul, F., Ben Djedidia, M., and Acker, D., Design Criteria for
Piping Component Against Plastic Collapse: Application to Pipe
Bend Experiments, Proceedings of 6th International Conference on
Pressure Vessel Technology, Beijing, China, pp.73–84,1989.
35. Chattopadhyay, J., Tomar, A.K.S., Dutta, B.K., and Kushwaha, H.S.,
Closed Form Collapse Moment Equation of Through Wall
Circumferentially Cracked Elbows Subjected to In-Plane Bending
Moment, ASME Journal of Pressure Vessel Technology, Vol.126, pp.
307–317,2004.
36. Kim, Y.J. and Chang, S.O., Closed Form Plastic Collapse Loads of
Pipe Bends under Combined Pressure and In-Plane Bending, Journal
of Engineering Fracture Mechanics. Vol. 73, Issue 11, pp. 1437–1454,
July 2006.
37. AERB/SS/CSE-3, Design of Nuclear Power Plant Containment
Structures (draft).
38. ASME Code Section III, Division 2.
39. ACI 349, Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety Related Concrete
Structures.
40. CSA-N287.3-1983, Design Requirements for Concrete Containment
Structures for CANDU Nuclear Power Plant, Canadian Standard
Association.
41. IS 456-2000, Plain and Reinforced Concrete – Code of Practice.
42. AERB Safety Guide No. AERB/SG/D-23, Seismic Qualification of
Structures, Systems and Components of Pressurised Heavy Water
Reactors (draft).
43. American Society of Civil Engineers, Seismic Analysis of Safety-
Related Nuclear Structures and Commentary, ASCE 4-98, Virginia,
USA, 2000.
44. IEEE Standard 344-1987, IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic
Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Generating
Stations,1987.
45. Japan Electric Association, Technical Guidelines for Aseismic Design
of Nuclear Power Plants, JEAG-4601, 1987.
46. International Atomic Energy Agency, Seismic Design and Component
Qualification for Nuclear Power Plants, IAEA Safety Guide NS-G-1.6,
Vienna, Austria, 2003.
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KOREAN REGULATORY
SYSTEM AND CODES OF
NUCLEAR BOILER AND
PRESSURE VESSELS
69.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes the nuclear regulatory organizations,
aspects of the regulatory authority including licensing, status of
nuclear installations, Korean nuclear reactor regulatory framework
and regulations referring to domestic and/or international industri-
al codes and standards in the area of pressure vessels and piping,
and status of Korean Electric Power Industry Codes (KEPIC) that
covers standards for design, manufacturing, operation, mainte-
nance, and testing and inspection of nuclear and non-nuclear
mechanical components, including pressure vessels and piping. A
comparative assessment of the U.S. and Korean codes is also
addressed. Besides, a comparison between the KEPIC code and its
reference to codes of other foreign countries is also provided.
The dependency of electricity production on nuclear energy is
expected to increase continuously worldwide during next few
decades, at least until some available and economically competitive
alternative energy sources and/or production technologies are
secured. Also, in the near future, the nuclear energy may take up an
important position as a safe, environment-friendly, economically
affordable, and sustainable energy source owing to various efforts
to develop new evolutionary reactors that are underway in several
countries. Since 1970s, Korea has been promoting the nuclear ener-
gy industry to produce electricity needed for the rapidly expanding
industry and enhancing quality of human life. As a result of the
intensive national program for nuclear energy promotion, at present
there are 20 nuclear power reactors in operation, 4 reactors under
construction, and another 4 reactors under consideration for con-
struction in Korea. The reactor types and vendors are diverse and
especially the first three units, Kori Units 1 and 2 of pressurized
water reactors (PWRs) by Westinghouse Co. and Wolsung Unit 1
of pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR) by Atomic Energy of
Canada Limited (AECL), were supplied in the form of a turnkey
system. To cope with this expected regulatory environment, the
Korean nuclear regulatory authorities have been making effort to
improve nuclear safety regulatory framework to establish new regu-
latory requirements, as necessary, and to streamline regulations.
CHAPTER
69
Jong C. Jo and Howard H. Chung
In the early stage of the introduction of reactors into Korea, as
there was no well-established domestic regulatory framework for
the safety regulation of operating reactors, the technical safety
requirements and safety standards of the countries from which a
reactor was sourced were applied to the reactor concerned, as nec-
essary. Since then, the Korean regulatory authority has made an
effort to establish its own effective and streamlining regulatory
framework by making its own rules and regulations applicable to
domestic nuclear reactors and by amending them.
As a result of this effort, Korea has developed and issued, as of
December 2005, the following rules and regulations, the number
of articles contained in each of these rules and regulations are
shown in parenthesis:
• Atomic Energy Act (122)
• Enforcement Decree of the Act, Presidential Decree (337)
• Enforcement Regulation of the Act (137);
• Enforcement Regulation Concerning the Technical Standards
of Reactor Facilities (101)
• Enforcement Regulation Concerning the Technical Standards
of Radiation Safety Management (122)
• 26 cases of Notices by the Minister for Science and
Technology for the reactor regulation
Some Notices of the Minister of Education, Science and
Technology (MEST) concerning the reactor regulation have been
prepared by adopting or referring to the U.S. NRC’s technical
safety requirements as well as the Nuclear Safety Standards of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As is well known,
the detailed technical requirements of the reactor regulation are
referred to or endorsed to some proper industrial codes and stan-
dards such as ASME B&PV codes in the United States, RCC-M
codes in France, JSME B&PV codes in Japan, and others.
Korea applied, as needed, the technical safety requirements and
safety standards of the countries from which the reactors and/or
technologies-related design, construction, and operation were
imported. Since the type and suppliers of these reactors are
ASME_Ch69_p655-678.qxd 6/3/09 2:29 PM Page 656
656 • Chapter 69
diverse and the supplying countries are different, it was hard to
consistently apply same detailed regulatory requirements to these
reactors. This caused the designers, builders, and operators of
nuclear power plants (NPPs) in Korea to be perplexed. To resolve
this issue, a set of KEPIC for the application to the design, con-
struction, and operation of electric power facilities including
NPPs, has been developed on the basis of the prevailing U.S.
codes and standards by Korea Electric Association (KEA).
The first edition of KEPIC was published in 1995 and the
Notice of the Minister of Education, Science and Technology
“The Guidelines for the Application of the Korea Electric Power
Industry Code Issued by the KEA as the Technical Standards
Related to the Construction and Operation of Nuclear Power
Reactor and Related Facilities,” defined in Articles 12 and 22 of
the Atomic Energy Act, was notified publicly in 1996. KEPIC
was initially started to be applied to the design and construction
of Ulchin NPP Unit 5 and 6 in 1997 and its application has been
extended to all NPPs either in operation, or in construction, or in
contemplation of construction in Korea. Accordingly, since the
execution of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)
in 1995, the international trend of industrial codes and standards
has been changing. To line up with the tendency of changing
international environment, KEA has been putting a great deal of
effort into the project of improving and expanding KEPIC. As a
part of this effort, the 2005 Edition of KEPIC has been published
to be retrofitted according to the ISO/IEC Guide 21 for the adop-
tion of international standards as regional or national standards.
69.2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY
ORGANIZATIONS
Nuclear safety regulatory organizations of Korea are mainly com-
posed of the MEST with the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) as
a safety regulatory authority and Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety
(KINS) as a safety regulatory expert body, as shown in Fig. 69.1.
MEST, the nuclear safety regulatory body, has full independent
authority and responsibility for the safety regulations, including
the issuance of permits and licenses for nuclear installations. The
Minister, as an official member of the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC), participates in making decisions on major
national policies related to the development and utilization of
nuclear energy.
As shown in Fig. 69.1., NSC, under the jurisdiction of the
Minister of Education, Science and Technology, is responsible for
deliberating and making decisions on important matters concern-
ing nuclear safety. The Vice Minister and the Director General in
charge of the Atomic Energy Bureau are on a vertical organiza-
tion under the Minister.
KINS pursues matters on nuclear safety regulation as entrusted
by MEST in accordance with “Atomic Energy Act.” KINS also
bears responsibility for various activities such as the development
of nuclear safety regulatory technology, technical support to
MEST for policy development and radiation protection, informa-
tion management on safety regulation, and the monitoring and
evaluation of environmental radioactivity.
69.2.1 Ministry of Education, Science and
Technology (MEST)
The primary mission of MEST is to ensure adequate protection
of the public health and the environment against radiation hazards
that are associated with the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
The authority and responsibilities of the governmental regula-
tory body MEST are prescribed in the Atomic Energy Act and the
Enforcement Decree of the National Government Organization
Act as follows:
• To issue, amend, and revoke licenses for the construction and
operation of nuclear installations and to take the necessary
regulatory enforcement actions on the cases where regulatory
requirements are not met or regulations are violated.
• To conclude agreements with other domestic governmental or
nongovernmental bodies and to delegate tasks to other organi-
zations, where such delegation is directly essential for the per-
formance of the regulatory body’s responsibilities.
• To obtain documents and opinions from public or private orga-
nizations or persons, which are necessary and appropriate.
• To maintain contact with foreign regulatory bodies and rele-
vant international organizations.
• To access, at any time, premises of any nuclear installations
licensed or under review.
MEST is responsible for the establishment of the acceptance
criteria for constructing and operating nuclear installation and
technical standards for operational safety measures and for the
assurance of compliances with regulations at every stage of the
selection of sites, design, construction, commissioning, operation,
and decommissioning of nuclear installations.
69.2.2 Nuclear Safety Commission
NSC is established under the jurisdiction of MEST to deliber-
ate and decide on important matters concerning nuclear safety,
pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act.
NSC is chaired by the Minister of Education, Science and
Technology and consists of nine members, including eight mem-
bers appointed or commissioned by the Minister. NSC organizes
the Special Committee on Nuclear Safety to technically investi-
gate and deliberate issues and concerns under its jurisdiction.
The Commission deliberates and decides on the following
matters:
• Consolidation and coordination of matters concerning nuclear
safety control
• Matters concerning the regulation of nuclear materials and
reactors
• Matters concerning the protection against hazards due to radi-
ation exposure
• Matters concerning the plan for estimation and allocation of
expenditures for nuclear safety control
• Matters concerning the formulation of tests and research for
nuclear safety control
• Matters concerning the fostering and training of researchers
and engineers in the area of nuclear safety control
• Matters concerning the safety management of radioactive
waste
• Matters concerning the measures against radiation accidents
• Other matters deemed important by the chairman
69.2.3 Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety
KINS was founded in December 1981 and initially operated
under the name of “Nuclear Safety Center” (NSC), which had
been attached to Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI).
It started to function as an independent expert organization
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 657

Ministry of
Nuclear Safety
Education, Science
Commission
and Technology
(NSC)
(MEST)

Su
r

bm
to

R
eq
se mi

its es
en er

ue re

ev ults
r
r
lic r p

se it o

st vie

al
s
fo

ua
en rm

te w
s

tio
ch
lic pe
ie

n
pl

ni
es
Ap

ca
su

l
Is

Applies for inspection

Korea Institute of
Nuclear Industries
Nuclear Safety (KINS)
Inspection

FIG. 69.1 WORKING MECHANISM OF NUCLEAR SAFETY REGULATION

in February 1990 according to “Korea Institute of Nuclear
Safety Act.”
The following main technical activities for the MEST’s nuclear
safety regulations have been entrusted to KINS:
• Safety reviews in relation to the licensing and approval of
nuclear installations
• Regulatory inspections during manufacturing, construction,
and operation of nuclear installations
• Research and development of the technical standards of safe-
ty regulation for nuclear installations
• License examinations for the handling of nuclear materials
and radioisotopes, and the operation of nuclear installations
• Receive and process notifications relevant to licensing for-
malities
• Quality assurance examination and inspection
69.3 LEGISLATION SYSTEM
The main legislation governing the safety of nuclear facilities
in Korea is shown in Fig. 69.2. The figure shows the associated
statutory provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, the Enforcement
Decree, the Enforcement Regulations, and the Notice of the
Minister of Education, Science and Technology.
The Atomic Energy Act enacted in 1958 (as amended) defines
fundamental issues and the general principles including require-
ments concerning the development, utilization, and safety regula-
tion of nuclear energy. All provisions of nuclear safety regulation
and radiation protection are prescribed in the Atomic Energy Act
that was established as the main law concerning safety regulations
of nuclear installations. It also includes provisions of the AEC,
the NSC, nuclear energy promotion program, Construction Permit
(CP) and an Operating License (OL) of nuclear installations, and
others. Table 69.1 shows the contents of the Atomic Energy Act
of Korea.
The Enforcement Decree of Atomic Energy Act (presidential
decree) provides administrative matters and specific (technical)
requirements necessary to enforce Atomic Energy Act.
The Enforcement Regulation of the Act (the MEST Ordinance
including Enforcement Regulations Concerning the Technical
Standards of Reactor Facilities, and the Radiation Safety
Management) provides particulars including the detailed proce-
dure, format of documents, and technical standards, as entrusted
by the Atomic Energy Act and the Enforcement Decree.
The Notice of the Minister of Education, Science and
Technology prescribe the detailed rules and procedural require-
ments for regulatory actions, specific regulations, technical codes
and standards, and regulatory guidelines on the implementation of
regulatory requirements, as entrusted by the Atomic Energy Act,
the Enforcement Decree, and the Enforcement Regulation. Table
69.2 shows the list of 26 Notices of the Minister of Education,
Science and Technology applicable for the design, construction,
operation, inspection, testing, and so on of reactor facilities. The
Notices of the Minister of Education, Science and Technology
and Regulatory Guidelines may endorse or incorporate the indus-
trial codes and standards developed by professional societies,
such as KEPIC Code, ASME B&PV Code, CSA/CAN3
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658 • Chapter 69

The Act provides the bases and the

Atomic fundamental matters concerning the
Energy development and utilization of atomic
Act energy and safety regulations

Enforcement The Decree provides the particulars

Decree of the Act entrusted by the Act, which are
(Presidential Decree)
necessary for the enforcement of the
Act

Enforcement Regulation
of the Act

Enforcement Regulation
Concerning the Technical The Regulation provides the technical
Standards of Reactor Facilities, standards and particulars entrusted by the
etc.
Act and the Decree such as detailed
Enforcement Regulation procedures and format of documents
Concerning the Technical
Standards of Radiation Safety
Management, etc.

Notice of the Minister

of Education, Science and The Notice provides detailed particulars
Technology
for the technical standards and guidelines

Codes and Standards for materials, design,

Industrial Codes and Standards test, and inspection of components and
equipment

FIG. 69.2 LEGISLATION SYSTEM [1, 2]

(Canadian Standards Association/ CANDU3), as detailed techni-
cal requirements for the design, operation, and inspection and
testing of reactor pressure vessels and piping components.
Finally, the Regulatory Guidelines on safety reviews and regu-
latory inspections developed by KINS and then endorsed by
MEST for their use for regulatory purpose provide advice for the
preparation of a license application and present acceptable imple-
mentation methods of regulations, regulatory evaluation tech-
niques for specific problems, and data needed by the KINS staff
in its regulatory safety reviews.
69.4 LICENSING SYSTEM AND SAFETY
ASSESSMENT
69.4.1 Licensing System
The licensing process of nuclear installations consists of two
steps including issuance of a CP and an OL, which are prescribed
in the Atomic Energy Act; the early site approval system is con-
sidered as a preparatory step of the CP application, as shown in
Fig. 69.3.
69.4.1.1 Standard Design Approval Standard Design
Approval (SDA) system can be applied to a standard design of
NPP with an enhanced level of safety to improve the efficiency of
licensing process. The SDA system will ensure the validation of
approved standard design without imposing additional regulatory
requirements for the multiple CP applications of the same design
of NPP applied within 10 years of the SDA issuance, and the same
portions of NPP design that are approved as standard design will
be excluded in the process of safety review for the following CP
applications.
69.4.1.2 Early Site Approval To obtain an early site approval
(ESA) with which a limited construction work on a proposed site
can be started prior to the issuance of a CP, an application for the
ESA with a site survey report and a radiological environmental
report shall be filed with the Minister of Education, Science and
Technology. Based on the results of the safety review by KINS of
the ESA application, the Minister will give an official approval.
The objective of the safety review is to evaluate the adequacy of
the proposed nuclear site and the radiological impacts on the envi-
ronment surrounding the nuclear installation. The Ministry of
Environment (MOE) is in charge of reviewing nonradiological
environmental impacts.
69.4.1.3 Construction Permit for Nuclear Installation To
obtain a CP for nuclear installation, a CP application with the radi-
ological environmental report, the preliminary SAR, and the qual-
ity assurance program for design and construction shall be filed
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 659

TABLE 69.1 CONTENTS OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT [2, 3]

Title Major Contents

Chapter 1 General Provisions
Chapter 2 Atomic Energy Commission and
Nuclear Safety Commission
Chapter 3 Establishment and enforcement
of the overall nuclear energy
promotion program, research
and development, etc., of
nuclear energy
Chapter 3-2 Nuclear energy research and
development fund
Chapter 4 Construction and operation of
nuclear power reactors and
related facilities
Section 1 Construction of nuclear power
reactors and related facilities
Section 2 Operation of nuclear power reac-
tors and related facilities
Section 3 Construction and operation of
nuclear research reactors, etc.
Chapter 6 Nuclear fuel cycle enterprise and
use, etc., of nuclear materials
Section 1 Nuclear fuel cycle enterprise
Section 2 Use of nuclear materials
Chapter 7 Radioisotopes and radiation gen-
erating devices
Chapter 8 Disposal and transport
Chapter 9 Personnel dosimetry service
Chapter 10 License and examination
Chapter 11 Regulation and supervision
Chapter 12 Supplementary provisions
Chapter 13 Penal provisions
Addenda
Purpose of this Act and definitions of the terminology used in this Act
Establishment, functions, and composition of the Atomic Energy Commission
and the Nuclear Safety Commission
Establishment and enforcement of the comprehensive promotion plan for nuclear
energy, nuclear energy research and development institution, burden of cost for
nuclear energy research and development work
Establishment, management, and operation of the fund
Criteria for permit (license), licensing procedures, license application documents
to be submitted, regulatory inspection, records and keeping, appointment
(dismissal) and obligation of responsible persons for nuclear reactor operation,
notification of suspension or disuse of operation, transfer and inheritance,
measure for suspension, decommissioning and penalty surcharge
Criteria for permit (license), licensing procedures, license application documents
to be submitted, regulatory inspection, records and keeping, appointment
(dismissal) and obligation of responsible persons for nuclear reactor operation,
notification of suspension or disuse of operation, transfer and inheritance,
measure for suspension, and decommissioning
Criteria for permit (license), licensing procedures, license application documents
to be submitted, regulatory inspection, records and keeping, appointment
(dismissal) and obligation of responsible persons for nuclear reactor operation,
notification of suspension or disuse of operation, transfer and inheritance,
measure for suspension, and decommissioning
Criteria for permit (license), licensing procedures, license application documents
to be submitted, regulatory inspection, records and keeping, appointment
(dismissal) and obligation of responsible persons for nuclear reactor operation,
notification of suspension or disuse of operation, transfer and inheritance,
measure for suspension, and decommissioning
Criteria for permit (license), licensing procedures, license application documents
to be submitted, and regulatory inspection
Criteria for permit (license), licensing procedures, license application documents
to be submitted, and regulatory inspection
Criteria for permit (license), licensing procedures, license application documents
to be submitted, and regulatory inspection
Criteria for permit (license), licensing procedures, and regulatory inspection
Permit for construction and operation of disposal facilities, and regulatory
inspections
Registration of personnel dosimetry service and regulatory inspection
License examination and certificate of license
Establishment of exclusion area and preventive measures against radiation hazards
Conditions for permit or designation, approval of report on specific technical
subjects, hearing, protection for the individual in charge of safety manage-
ment, education, and training
Penal provisions, fine for negligence, and joint penal provisions
Enforcement date, transitional measures, and relations with other laws

with the Minister of Education, Science and Technology. KINS The KINS review of the CP application is performed to confirm
reviews the CP application with submittals, including Preliminary if the site and the preliminary design of the nuclear installation
Safety Analysis Report. Then the CP is issued by the Minister after comply with the relevant regulatory requirements and technical
NSC deliberation of the KINS review results. guidelines. It addresses the design principle and concept of the
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660 • Chapter 69

TABLE 69.2 NOTICES OF THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY APPLICABLE
TO REACTOR FACILITIES [2, 4]

Numbers of
Notice no. Title Amendments
00-08 Technical Standards of the Location, Structures and Installation of Reactor Facilities 1
05-08 Regulation on Other Facilities Related to Nuclear Reactor Safety 3
05-04 Guidelines for the Application of the Korea Electric Power Industry Codes to the Technical 2
Standards of Reactor Facilities
05-19 Regulation on Preparation, etc. of Radiation Environmental Report of Nuclear Power Utilization 4
Facilities
04-17 Regulation on Survey and Evaluation of Environmental Radiation in the Vicinity of Nuclear Power 3
Utilization Facilities
01-38 Technical Standards for Safety Valve and Relief Valve of Reactor Facilities 1
01-39 Standards for Performance of Emergency Core Cooling System of the Pressurized Water Reactor 1
01-40 Pressure Integrity Test Criteria for Major Components of Reactor Facilities 2
04-15 Standards for Leak Rate Test of Reactor Containment 1
01-43 Regulation on Disposition and Management of Inspection Findings from Nuclear Facilities 4
05-07 Regulation on the Reporting and Public Announcement of the Accident and Incident for Nuclear 4
Facilities
01-46 Standard for Preparation of Operational Technical Specification 2
01-47 Detailed Standards for Quality Assurance of Reactor Facilities 0
05-09 Regulation on Pre-Service Inspection of Reactor Facilities 1
02-05 Regulation on the First Review Schedule for the Periodic Safety Review of Reactor Facilities 0
04-13 Regulation on In-Service Inspection of Reactor Facilities 3
04-14 Regulation on In-Service Testing of Safety-Related Pumps and Valves 0
02-21 Regulation on Safety Classifications and Applicable Codes & Standards for Reactor Facilities 1
05-03 Material Surveillance Criteria for Reactor Pressure Vessel 3
03-11 Technical Standards for Investigation and Evaluation of the Meteorological Conditions of Reactor 0
Facility Sites
03-12 Technical Standards for Investigation and Evaluation of the Hydrological and Oceanographic 0
Conditions of Reactor Facility Sites
05-10 Regulation on Items and Method of Periodic Inspection for Reactor Facilities 0
03-19 Regulation on Establishment and Implementation of Fire Protection Program 0
03-20 Technical Standards for Fire Hazards Analyses 0
06-05 Subjects to be Discussed According to Installation of Industrial Facilities etc. around the Nuclear 0
Facilities
07-18 Guidelines on the Application of Technical Standards for Evaluating the Continued Operation of 0
Nuclear Facilities

nuclear installation, the implementation of the regulatory criteria,
the evaluation results of the effects of construction on the environ-
ment, and a proposal for minimizing those effects.
A radiological environmental report submitted for the CP appli-
cation or the ESA application should contain the public opinions
from residents of the area surrounding the nuclear installation
through a public hearing, if necessary.
Education, Science and Technology. Based on the KINS review
results of the OL application and preoperational inspections, the
Minister issues the OL after deliberation by the NSC.
The safety review of the OL application is conducted to confirm
if the final design of the nuclear installation complies with the rele-
vant regulatory requirements and technical guidelines and if the
nuclear installation can continue to operate throughout its lifetime.

69.4.1.4 Operating License (OL) for Nuclear Installation To
obtain an OL for a nuclear installation, the OL application should
have the operational technical specifications, the final SAR, the
quality assurance program for operation, and the radiological
emergency plan. The application shall be filed with the Minister of
69.4.1.5 Amendment to the OL for Nuclear Installation To
make modifications to the specifics for which the OL has been
given, such as changes in the operational technical specifications
or in the design that may affect the safety of operating nuclear
installations, it is necessary to obtain approval from the Minister of
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 661
Korea Hydro & Nuclear
Power Co. Ltd. Company
(KHNP)
Apply for early Site
approval (ESA)
Construction permit Stage
Launch foundation work
Apply for construction
permit (CP)
Commence construction
work
<Nuclear Safety Commission Review>
Apply for preoperational
inspections (POIs)
Operating license stage
Apply for operating license
(OL)
Load fuel
<Nuclear Safety Commission Review>
Start-up test
Commence commercial
Commercial operation
operation
stage
Reload fuel and apply for
periodical inspections (PI)
Power operation
FIG. 69.3 REACTOR LICENSING AND REGULATION SYSTEM
Education, Science and Technology. The procedure for the
approval for an amendment to the OL is the same as the applica-
tion for an OL. A safety evaluation is performed to confirm if the
amendment to the OL affects the operational safety of nuclear
installation.
69.4.1.6 Approval for Decommissioning of Nuclear
Installation In case where the operator (licensee) of a nuclear
installation intends to decommission it, to obtain an approval of
the Minister of Education, Science and Technology, a decommis-
sioning plan shall be submitted.
Ministry of Education, Korea Institute of
Science and Technology Nuclear Safety
(MEST) (KINS)
Request safety review for
Conduct safety review
ESA
Submit safety review
Grant ESA
report
Request safety review for
Conduct safety review
CP
Submit safety review
Issue CP
report
Request POIs Conduct POIs
Request safety review for
Conduct safety review
OL
Submit safety review
report
Issue OL
Submit POIs report
(construction,
performance)
Submit POI report
(Start-up test)
Inform the POI results
Request PI Conduct PI
Inform PI results Submit PI report
KINS conducts a safety review for the application of decommis-
sioning approval. The review includes safety evaluations of the radi-
ation protection during decommissioning, the radiological impacts
on the environment surrounding the nuclear installation after decom-
missioning, and the proposal for minimizing the impacts.
69.4.2 Regulatory Inspections
Regulatory inspections for a nuclear installation include the pre-
operational inspection for nuclear installations under construction,
the periodic inspection for operating nuclear installations, the qual-
ity assurance audit, the daily inspection by resident inspectors, and
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662 • Chapter 69

Korea Hydro & Nuclear Korea Institute of Ministry of Education,

Power Co. Ltd. Company Nuclear Safety Science and Technology
(KHNP) (KINS) (MEST)

Submitting application Receiving Application

document for inspections document and reviewing

Reviewing and adjusting

Preparing inspection plan
inspection plan

Receiving inspection plan

Informing inspection plan
and preparing inspections

Holding Premeeting Resident Inspector

Attending premeeting (inspection items and attending premeeting to
method) comment

Conducting inspections

Reporting findings of Receiving and reviewing

inspections Findings of inspections

Corrective actions and Requesting corrective

reporting actions

Reviewing corrective Requesting review of

actions results corrective action results

Informing whether results

If unsatisfactory, re-action
are satisfactory

Preparing and submitting Receiving and reviewing

review report review report

Planning corrective actions Formally informing results

including any corrective
and reporting results actions

Closing after confirmation

FIG. 69.4 REACTOR INSPECTION PROCESS

the special inspection pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act. The
general inspection procedure is given in Fig. 69.4.
69.4.2.1 Preoperational Inspection for the Nuclear
Installations under Construction The preoperational inspec-
tion for the set up of nuclear installations is conducted to verify
if the nuclear installation is properly constructed in conformity
with the conditions of the CP and if the constructed nuclear
installation can be operated safely throughout its lifetime. It is
conducted for the construction quality and the operational
performance of the facilities by means of a document review and
a field inspection.
69.4.2.2 Periodic Inspection for Operating Nuclear
Installations The periodic inspection for a nuclear installation
in operation is conducted to confirm if the nuclear installation
has been properly operating in conformity with the OL condi-
tions, if it can be maintained to be continuously competent for
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 663
the high pressure and radiation conditions or other operating
environments, and if the performance of the installation main-
tains license-based conditions. To do this, a document review
and a field inspection are performed for a PWR plant during the
refueling outage period and for a PHWR plant during the peri-
odic maintenance.
69.4.2.3 Quality Assurance Audit The quality assurance audit
is performed to verify if all activities affecting the quality at every
stage of the design, construction, and operation of a nuclear instal-
lation are being performed in conformity with the quality assur-
ance program approved by the regulatory body. It is performed
periodically for nuclear installations in operation.
69.4.2.4 Daily Inspection by Resident Inspectors The main
purpose of the daily inspection is to daily check the nuclear instal-
lations either under construction or in operation. It consists of a
field inspection on the surveillance tests, an investigation on the
measures taken when the reactor comes to reach an abnormal state,
and a verification of the adequacy of the operator’s activity regard-
ing the radiation control.
69.4.2.5 Special Inspection When a serious or potentially seri-
ous safety issue is identified or encountered, the special inspection
consisting of an examination of the issue and an in-depth field
investigation is performed to obtain a resolution for preventing any
potential accidents or recurrence of the occurred accidents.
69.4.3 Enforcement
If the safety review results confirm that the CP application
complies with the relevant requirements, the Minister of
Education, Science and Technology will issue a CP. The Minister
may impose additional conditions on the issuance of CP to the
minimum, if judged necessary to secure safety. If any violation is
identified in the process of the regulatory inspection, the Minister
may order the license holder to take appropriate corrective mea-
sures in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act.
The Minister of Education, Science and Technology is autho-
rized to order the operators (licensees) to submit the needed docu-
ments concerning their business and supplemental materials, if
considered necessary for the enforcement of the regulations. The
Minister may also conduct a regulatory inspection to verify if the
documents comply with the field conditions and order the opera-
tor to take appropriate corrective measures, if any, on the basis of
the inspection results.
The Minister of Education, Science and Technology may order
the revocation of the permit (or license) or the suspension of busi-
ness during a period of not exceeding one year, if one or more of
the following cases are applicable:
• The case where the installer or operator has modified any mat-
ters concerning the permit (or license) without approval.
• The case where the installer or operator has failed to meet the
criteria for permit (or license).
• The case where the installer or operator has violated an order
of the Minister of Education, Science and Technology issued
to take corrective measures on the basis of the results of reg-
ulatory inspection for the construction or operation of a
nuclear installation.
• The case where the installer or operator has violated any of
the permit (or license) conditions or regulations on safety
measures during the operation of a nuclear installation.
It is prescribed in the Atomic Energy Act that any violation of
the relevant provisions specified in the Act shall cause a penalty
and/or a fine according to its seriousness of violation.
69.5 LOCATIONS OF THE NUCLEAR
POWER PLANTS IN KOREA
The status of the nuclear installations in Korea is shown in Fig.
69.5. As of January 2008, there are 20 units of NPPs in operation,
which produce about 40% of the total electricity generation, 4
units under construction, and another 4 units under consideration
for construction.
The 20 operating units consist of 16 PWR-type units and 4
PHWR-type units, while all 8 units under construction or under
consideration for construction are of PWR type. Kori Unit 1, the
first NPP in Korea, started its commercial operation in April
1978. The reactor types, total installed capacity, and reactor sup-
pliers of operating NPPs in Korea are shown in Table 69.3.
69.6 INTRODUCTION TO THE NOTICES
OF THE MINISTER OF THE
EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY RELATED TO
NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR BOILER
AND PRESSURE VESSELS IN KOREA
Among the 26 Notices of the Minister of Education, Science
and Technology applicable for the design, construction, operation,
inspection, testing, and so on of reactor facilities, the following 5
Notices are related to the reactor boiler and pressure vessels,
including piping, pumps, valves, and heat exchangers. These
endorse or refer to publicly authorized industrial codes and stan-
dards such as detailed technical requirements or standards.
• Notice No. 02-21, “Regulation on Safety Classifications
and Applicable Codes & Standards for Reactor Facilities”
(issued in 1994 and amended in 2002) applied the ASME
B&PV Section III for the PWR plants and the CAN3/CSA-
N285.0 and N285.1 for the PHWR plants in prescribing the
safety classification for the structures, systems, and compo-
nents important to safety and the applicable codes and stan-
dards in accordance with Article 12(1) of the Regulations on
Technical Standards for Nuclear Reactor Facilities, etc.
• Notice No. 00-08, “Technical Standards of the Location,
Structures and Installation of Reactor Facilities” (issued in
1983 and amended in 2000) applied the ASME B&PV Code,
Section III, Subsections NCA, NB, NC, and ND as the stan-
dards for safety valves and relief valves installed at the nuclear
facilities, which was later replaced with the Notice No. 01-38,
“Technical Standards for Safety Valve and Relief Valve of
Reactor Facilities” (issued in 2000 and amended in 2001).
• Notice No. 05-03, “Material Surveillance Criteria for
Reactor Pressure Vessel” (issued in 1992 and amended in
2000, 2003, and 2005) referred to the term “reference nil-duc-
tility transition temperature (RTNDT)” defined in the ASME
B&PV Code, Section III, NB-2330.
• Notice No. 04-13, “Regulation on In-Service Inspection of
Reactor Facilities” (issued in 1995 and amended in 1998,
2002, and 2004) applied the inspection standards provided in
the ASME B&PV Code, Section XI, Division 1, “Rules for
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664 • Chapter 69

Russia

: in operation
: under construction
: under consideration of
construction

China

East Sea

Seoul
Yellow Sea Ulchin 1,2,3,4,5,6
Shin-Ulchin 1,2

Daejeon

Wolsong 1,2,3,4
Daegu Shin-Wolsong 1,2
Yonggwang 1,2,3,4,5,6 Gwangju Kori 1,2,3,4
Shin-Kori 1,2,3,4
Busan

Jeju Island

FIG. 69.5 LOCATIONS OF COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN KOREA (AS OF JANUARY 2008)

In-Service Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components for Education, Science and Technology, which endorsed or referred
the PWR Plants” and the CAN/CSA-N285.4, “Periodic to the ASME B&PV and/or the CAN/CSA Codes as discussed
Inspection of CANDU Nuclear Power Plant Components” and above, are being amended to incorporate the KEPIC instead of the
CAN/CSA-N285.5, “Periodic Inspection of CANDU Nuclear corresponding ASME B&PV Codes or alternatively to apply the
Power Plant Containment Components” for the PHWR plants. ASME B&PV and/or the CAN/CSA Codes.
• Notice No. 04-14, “Regulation on In-Service Testing of
Safety-Related Pumps and Valves” (issued in 1995 and
amended in 1998, 2002, and 2004) applied the testing standards 69.7 GUIDELINES FOR THE APPLICATION
provided in the ASME B&PV Code, Section XI, Subsections OF THE KOREA ELECTRIC POWER
IWP (for pumps) and IWV (for valves) or ASME Operation and INDUSTRY CODES TO THE
Maintenance Code, ISTB (for pumps) and ISTC (for valves). TECHNICAL STANDARDS OF
REACTOR FACILITIES (NOTICE
Prior to the issue of each of the above five Notices, the regula-
tions and safety standards of the countries from which a reactor
OF THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION,
was supplied were applied to the subject reactor, as necessary. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
The Notices endorsed or incorporated the ASME B&PV Code for NO. 05-04)
the PWR plants and the CAN/CSA and ASME B&PV Codes for The full text of the Notice No. 05-04 “Guidelines for the
the PHWR plants until the Notice of the Minister of Education, Application of the Korea Electric Power Industry Codes to the
Science and Technology No. 05-04 “Guidelines for the Technical Standards of Reactor Facilities” amended in 2005 is
Application of the Korea Electric Power Industry Codes to the discussed below:
Technical Standards of Reactor Facilities” became effective.
Since the Notice No. 05-04 of the Minister of Education, Notice of the Minister of Education, Science and Technology
Science and Technology was issued in 1996 for the first time and No. 2005-04 (MEST Reactor 021) The Guidelines for the
amended in 2000 and 2005, the Notices of the Minister of Application of the Korea Electric Power Industry Code issued by
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 665

TABLE 69.3 COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN KOREA (AS OF JANUARY 2008)

Issuance of
Reactor Capacity Operator NSSS Construction Initial First Commercial
Station name Type (MWe) (Owner) Supplier Permit Criticality Power Operation Status
Kori-1 PWR 573 KHNP WH 1972-05-31 1977-06-19 1977-06-26 1978-04-29 in operation
Kori-2 PWR 637 WH 1978-11-18 1983-04-09 1983-04-22 1983-07-25
Kori-3 PWR 963 WH 1979-12-24 1985-01-01 1985-01-22 1985-09-30
Kori-4 PWR 967 WH 1979-12-24 1985-10-26 1985-11-15 1986-04-29
ShinKori-1 PWR 960 DOOSAN 2005-07-01 - 2010-08-01 2010-12-31 under
construction
ShinKori-2 PWR 960 DOOSAN 2005-07-01 - 2011-08-01 2011-12-31
ShinKori-3 APR 1400 DOOSAN - - - - construction
planned
ShinKori-4 APR 1400 DOOSAN - - - -
Ulchin-1 PWR 939 FRAM 1983-01-25 1988-02-25 1988-04-07 1988-09-10 in operation
Ulchin-2 PWR 937 FRAM 1983-01-25 1989-02-25 1989-04-14 1989-09-30
Ulchin-3 PWR 994 KHI/KAERI/CE 1993-07-16 1997-12-21 1998-01-06 1998-08-11
Ulchin-4 PWR 993 KHI/KAERI/CE 1993-07-16 1998-12-14 1998-12-28 1999-12-31
Ulchin-5 PWR 994 DOOSAN 1999-05-17 2003-11-28 2003-12-18 2004-07-29
Ulchin-6 PWR 991 DOOSAN 1999-05-17 2004-12-16 2005-01-07 2005-06-01
Wolsong-1 PHWR 578 AECL 1978-02-15 1982-11-21 1982-12-31 1983-04-22
Wolsong-2 PHWR 684 AECL/KHI 1992-08-28 1997-01-29 1997-04-01 1997-07-01
Wolsong-3 PHWR 682 AECL/KHI 1994-02-26 1998-02-19 1998-03-25 1998-07-01
Wolsong-4 PHWR 685 AECL/KHI 1994-02-26 1999-04-10 1999-05-21 1999-10-01
ShinWolsong-1 PWR 1000 DOOSAN 2007-06-04 - - - under
construction
ShinWolsong-2 PWR 1000 DOOSAN 2007-06-04 - - -
Yonggwang-1 PWR 945 WH 1981-12-17 1986-01-31 1986-03-05 1986-08-25 in operation
Yonggwang-2 PWR 939 WH 1981-12-17 1986-10-15 1986-11-11 1987-06-10
Yonggwang-3 PWR 985 KHI/KAERI/CE 1989-12-21 1994-10-13 1994-10-30 1995-03-31
Yonggwang-4 PWR 988 KHI/KARI/CE 1989-12-21 1995-07-07 1995-07-18 1996-01-01
Yonggwang-5 PWR 987 DOOSAN 1997-06-14 2001-11-24 2001-12-19 2002-05-21
Yonggwang-6 PWR 993 DOOSAN 1997-06-14 2002-09-01 2002-09-16 2002-12-24
AECL, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited; CE, Asea Brown Boveri-Combustion Engineering; DOOSAN, Doosan Heavy Industries Co.; FRAM, Framatom;
KAERI, Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute; KHI, Korea Heavy Industries Co.; KHNP, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co.; WH, Westinghouse
Electric Co.

the Korea Electric Association as the technical standards related to
the construction and operation of nuclear power reactor and related
facilities, defined in Articles 12 and 22 of the Atomic Energy Act,
are hereby notified publicly as follows:
March 22, 2005
Minister of Education, Science and Technology
Guidelines for the Application of Korea Electric Power
Industry Code (KEPIC) as Technical Standards of Nuclear
Reactor Facilities (Table 69.4) Article 1 (Purpose) The purpose
of this notice is to prescribe the necessary requirements related to
scope, method, etc., in applying Korea Electric Power Industry
Code as the technical standard for the nuclear power reactor and its
related facilities (hereinafter referred to as “nuclear reactor facili-
ties”) defined in Articles 12 and 22 of the Atomic Energy Act.
Article 2 (Definitions of Terms) Definitions of the terms used in
this notice shall be as follows:
1. The term “technical standards for nuclear reactor facilities”
means the technical standards used to confirm safety of
nuclear reactor facilities by the Minister of Education,
Science and Technology, which are based on the standards of
construction permit and operating license provided in Articles
12 and 22 of the Atomic Energy Act and the technical
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666 • Chapter 69

TABLE 69.4 KEPIC TO BE APPLIED AS TECHNICAL STANDARD OF NUCLEAR REACTOR FACILITIES

Area Category Title Reference Standards Remarks

QAP Nuclear Quality Assurance ASME NQA-1

(‘1994 Edition 1995 Addenda)
QA QAI Authorized Inspection ASME QAI-1 KEPIC shall be prior
(Quality assurance) (1995 Edition 1996 Addenda)
QAR Certificate of Registered ASME Appendix XXIII KEPIC shall be prior
Professional Engineer (1996 Addenda)
MNA General Requirements ASME III NCA
(1995 Edition 2000 Addenda)
MNB Class 1 Components ASME III Div. 1 NB
(1995 Edition 2000 Addenda)
MNC Class 2 Components ASME III Div. 1 NC
(1995 Edition 2000 Addenda)
MND Class 3 Components ASME III Div. 1 ND KEPIC shall be prior for
MN MNA
(1995 Edition 2000 Addenda)
(Nuclear mechanical
components) MNE Class MC Components ASME III Div. 1 NE
(1995 Edition 2000 Addenda)
Table 2 shall be applied
MNF Component Supports ASME III Div. 1 NF
(1995 Edition 2000 Addenda)
MNG Core Support Structures ASME III Div. 1 NG
(1995 Edition 2000 Addenda)
MNZ Appendices ASME III Div. 1 NZ
(1995 Edition 2000 Addenda)
MI MIA General Requirements ASME XI Div. 1 IWA Table 2 shall be applied
(In-service inspection (1995 Edition 2000 Addenda)
of nuclear power MIB Class 1 Components ASME XI Div. 1 IWB
plant components) (1995 Edition 2000 Addenda)
MIC Class 2 Components ASME XI Div. 1 IWC
(1995 Edition 2000 Addenda)
MID Class 3 Components ASME XI Div. 1 IWD
(1995 Edition 2000 Addenda)
MIE Class MC and CC ASME XI Div. 1 IWE
Components (1995 Edition 2000 Addenda)
MIF Class 1, 2, 3, and MC ASME XI Div. 1 IWF
Component Supports (1995 Edition 2000 Addenda)
MIL Requirements for Class CC ASME XI Div. 1 IWL
Concrete Components (1995 Edition 2000 Addenda)
MIZ Appendices ASME XI Div. 1 Appendix
(1995 Edition 2000 Addenda)
MO MOA General Requirements ASME OM-ISTA Table 2 shall be applied
(In-service testing of (1995 Edition 1999 Addenda)
nuclear power plant MOB In-Service Testing of ASME OM-ISTB
components) Pumps (1995 Edition 2000 Addenda)
MOC In-Service Testing of Valves ASME OM-ISTC
(1995 Edition 2000 Addenda)
MOD In-Service Testing of ASME OM-Appendix I
Pressure Relief Devices (1995 Edition 2000 Addenda)
MOE In-Service Testing of ASME OM-lSTD
Snubbers (1995 Edition 2000 Addenda)
MOF Performance Testing of ASME OM-Part 2
Closed Cooling Water (1994 Edition 1999 Addenda)
Systems

(continued)
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 667

TABLE 69.4 Continued

Area Category Title Reference Standards Remarks

MOG Vibration Testing of Piping ASME OM-Part 3

Systems (1994 Edition 2000 Addenda)
MOH Performance Testing and ASME OM-Part 13
Monitoring of Power-Operated (1994 Edition 2000 Addenda)
Relief Valve (PORV)
Assemblies
MOI In-Service Testing and ASME OM-Part 16
Maintenance of Diesel (1994 Edition 1999 Addenda)
Devices
MON Code Cases ASME OMN Code Case
(1998 Edition 2000 Addenda)
MFA General Requirements ASME QME-1 Section QR
MF (1997 Edition 1998 Addenda)
(Functional MFB Functional Qualification of ASME QME-1 Section QP
qualification of mechan- Active Pump Assemblies (1997 Edition)
ical equipment used in MFC Functional Qualification of ASME QME-1 Section QV
nuclear power plants) Active Valve Assemblies (1997 Edition 2000 Addenda)
EN ENA General Requirements ANSI/ANS 51.1-1983
(Nuclear electrical (R1988)
components) ENB Design IEEE 279 (1971, R78), 308 (1991),
352 (1987, R93), 379 (1994, 2000),
384 (1992, R97), 420 (1982), 494
(1974, R9), 497 (1981), 577 (1976,
R92), 603 (1998), 7-4.3.2 (1993),
1023 (1988, R95), ANSI/ISA
S67.04 (1994, 2000)
END Qualification IEEE 323 (1983, R96), 344 (1987),
420 (1982), 627 (1980, R96)
ENF Periodic Surveillance Testing IEEE 338 (1987, R93)
SNA General Requirements ASME III, NCA KEPIC shall be prior
(1995 Edition 2000 Addenda)
SN SNB Concrete Containment ASME III, Div.2 CC (1995 Edition
(Nuclear structures) 2000 Addenda)
SNC Concrete Structures ACI 349 (1997)
SND Steel Structures AISC N690 (1994)
STA Design Loads ASCE 7 (1998)
Load criteria and interpretation
for architecture issued by the Table 2 shall be applied
ST Architectural Society of Korea
(Structure general) (2000)
STB Seismic Analysis ASCE 4 (1986), IEEE 344 (1987),
ASME QME-1 (1997), KEPIC shall be prior
ANSI/ANS-2.2 (1988)

standards provided in Articles 3 through 85 of the
Regulations on Technical Standards for Nuclear Reactor
Facilities, etc;
2. The term “Korea Electric Power Industry Code” (KEPIC)
means the industrial technical standards developed and main-
tained by the Korea Electric Association for applying to the
electrical industry; and
3. The term “reference standards” means the technical stan-
dards used as technical basis in developing KEPIC as defined
in the column of “reference standards” of Table 1.
Article 3 (Scope of Application)
1. This notice may be applied to the safety-related facilities
classified in accordance with “Regulation on Safety
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668 • Chapter 69

Classification and Applicable Codes and Standards for
Nuclear Reactor Facilities.”
2. The whole or partial portion of the KEPIC defined in this
notice may be applied optionally to the specific nuclear reac-
tor facilities. In this case, the details such as applicable date,
scope of application, etc. of the KEPIC shall follow the licens-
ing conditions or the related regulations for the facilities.
3. KEPIC applied as the technical standards of nuclear reactor
facilities in accordance with this notice shall be limited to
those corresponding standards in KEPIC 2000 Edition, 2001
Addenda, 2002 Addenda and 2003 Addenda to the reference
standards of Table 1. However, Paragraph 2 may apply to the
technical standards, which are not included in Table 1.
Article 4 (Application Method) Method of application of the
KEPIC to the technical standards for nuclear reactor facilities shall
follow Articles 5 through 8.
Article 5 (Interpretation of Standard) If there is an argument
among the related parties on the interpretation of KEPIC as tech-
nical standard for nuclear reactor facilities, the interpretation of the
Minister of Education, Science and Technology shall prevail.
Article 6 (Application of Technical Contents Verified) The
KEPIC contents, which have been verified as suitable to assure the
safety of domestic or foreign nuclear reactor facilities shall be
applied as the technical standards of nuclear reactor facilities as
follows:
1. The reference standards shall be applied in case there are any
differences in technical contents between KEPIC and refer-
ence standards. Provided, that KEPIC shall be applied when
the priority of KEPIC is stipulated in Remarks of Table 1 or
when the Minister of Education, Science and Technology
deems KEPIC as applicable; and
2. The technical contents of reference standards which are not
included in KEPIC may be applied as the technical standards
of the nuclear reactor facilities when the Minister of
Education, Science and Technology deems it necessary for
the safety of nuclear reactor facilities.
Article 7 (Application of Technical Contents Unverified)
1. The contents of KEPIC which have not been used in domestic
or foreign nuclear reactor facilities, nor verified as suitable to
assure the safety may be applied only in case the Ministry of
Education, Science and Technology approves its suitability.
2. The limitations defined in Table 2 shall be followed for the
application of KEPIC (Table 69.5).
Article 8 (Report)
1. The Korea Electric Association shall report the status of
development and maintenance of KEPIC, operation status
of certification system, etc. semi-annually to the Minister of
Education, Science and Technology. The Minister may
request the corrective action for the reported contents.
2. The Korea Electric Association shall take a corrective action for
the request of Paragraph 1 unless there is any special reason.
Addenda Article 1 (Enforcement Date) This notice shall be
effective on the date of its promulgation.
Article 2 (Relationship with Other Existing Notices)
Relationship between this notice and the other existing notices
shall be as follows, in spite of the enforcement of this notice.
1. The KEPIC issued before this notice may be applied only if
such KEPIC meets requirements of this notice.
2. The detailed requirements for “Safety Classification and
Applicable Codes and Standards,” “In-Service Inspection,”
and “In-Service Test” shall be defined independent of this
notice.
Article 3 (Repeal of Notice) Notice of the MEST No.2000-17
“Guidelines for the Application of KEPIC as the Technical
Standards of Nuclear Reactor Facilities” is repealed at the time
this notice becomes effective.

TABLE 69.5 LIMITATIONS FOR APPLICATION OF KEPIC 2000 EDITION AND 2001/2002/2003 ADDENDA

Area Limitations

Common (1) The requirements of KEPIC, which are not consistent with the quality assurance requirements of the
Atomic Energy Law and its subordinate law, shall not be applied.
(1) Weld leg dimensions
Licensees shall not apply Paragraph MNB-3683.4(3)(A), the equation of footnote (7) in
Figure MNC-3673.2-1 and Figure MND-3673.2-1.
MN (2) Seismic design
(Nuclear mechanical Licensees shall use Articles MNB-3200, MNB-3600, MNC-3600, and MND-3600 up to and
components) including the 1995 Edition. Licensees shall not use these Articles in the 1996 Edition through
the latest edition and its addenda.
(3) Independence of inspection
Licensees shall not apply MNA 4200.10(1).
(1) Licensees shall not apply the reference standards in MIA-1600-1.
(2) Licensees shall apply re-certification period of 3 years only for levels I and, II instead of 5 years
for levels I, II, and III defined in MIA 2314.
(3) The authorized inspector in MIA 4410, which allows the other procedure of welding material
control in case of acceptance by the authorized inspector, shall be changed to “regulatory agency.”
(4) The sentence of exemption of the periodic system pressure test for the penetrating piping
of containment vessel defined in MIA 5110(3) shall be deleted.
(continued)
ASME_Ch69_p655-678.qxd 6/3/09 2:29 PM
Area
(5) The in-service inspection program for steam generator tubing is governed by the relevant
MI (6) Examination of concrete containment structure.
(In-service inspection
of nuclear power
plant components)
(7) Examination of metal containments and the liners of concrete containment licensees applying
MI
(In-service inspection
of nuclear power plant
components)
Page 669
COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 669
TABLE 69.5 Continued
Limitations
requirements in the technical specifications for operation, etc.
For the applications of MIL of KEPIC 2001/2002/2003 Addenda, the licensee shall apply the
following additionally.
(A) For Class CC applications, the licensee shall evaluate the acceptability of inaccessible areas
when conditions exist in accessible areas that could indicate the presence of or result in
degradation to such inaccessible areas. For each inaccessible area identified, the licensee
shall provide the following in the ISI Summary Report required by MIA-6000
(1) A description of the type and estimated extent of degradation, and the conditions that
led to the degradation.
(2) An evaluation of each area and the result of the evaluation.
(3) A description of necessary corrective actions.
(B) Personnel who examine containment concrete surfaces and tendon hardware, wires,
or strands shall meet the qualification provisions in MIA 2300. The “owner-defined”
personnel qualification provisions in MIL 2310(4) are not approved for use.
Subsection IWE, KEPIC 2001/2002/2003 Addenda, shall satisfy the followings additionally.
(A) For Class MC applications, the licensee shall evaluate the acceptability of inaccessible areas
when conditions exist in accessible areas that could indicate the presence of or result in
degradation to such inaccessible areas. For each inaccessible area identified, the licensee
shall provide the following in the ISI Summary Report as required by MIA-6000:
(1) A description of the type and estimated extent of degradation, and the conditions
that led to the degradation.
(2) An evaluation of each area, and the result of the evaluation.
(3) A description of necessary corrective actions.
(B) The following requirements may be used as an alternative to the requirements of IWE-2430:
If the examinations reveal flaws or areas of degradation exceeding the acceptance standards
of Table MIE-3410-1, an evaluation must be performed to determine whether additional
component examinations are required. For each flaw or area of degradation identified, which
exceeds acceptance standards, the licensee shall provide the following in the ISI Summary
Report required by MIA-6000:
(1) A description of each flaw or area, including the extent of degradation, and the
conditions that led to the degradation.
(2) The acceptability of each flaw or area, and the need for additional examinations to
verify that similar degradation does not exist in similar components.
(3) A description of necessary corrective actions.
(4) The type and number of additional examination to verify the similar degradation.
(C) A general visual examination must be performed once each period.
When performing remotely the visual examinations, the maximum direct examination
distance specified in Table MIA- 2210-1 may be extended and the minimum illumination
requirements specified in Table MIA- 2210-1 may be decreased provided that the
conditions or indications for which the visual examination is performed can be detected
at the chosen distance and illumination.
(D) VT-1 and VT-3 examinations must be conducted in accordance with MIA-2200. Personnel
conducting examinations in accordance with the VT-1 or VT-3 examination method shall be
qualified in accordance with MIA-2300. The “owner-defined” personnel qualification
provisions in MIE-2330(1) for personnel who conduct VT-1 and VT-3 examinations are not
approved for use.
(E) The VT-3 examination method shall be used for the examinations in Items E1.12 and E1.30
of Table MIE-2500-1, and the VT-1 examination method shall be used for the examination
in Item E4.11 of Table MIE-2500-1. An examination of the pressure-retaining bolted con-
nections in Item E1.11 of Table MIE-2500-1 shall be conducted once each period using the
VT-3 examination method. The “owner-defined” visual examination provisions in MIE-
2310(1) are not approved for use for VT-1 and VT-3 examinations.
(F) Containment bolted connections that are disassembled during the scheduled examinations in
Item E1.11 of Table MIE-2500-1 shall be examined using the VT-3 examination method.
(continued)
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670 • Chapter 69

TABLE 69.5 Continued

Area Limitations

Flaws or degradation identified during the VT-3 examination must be examined using the
VT-1 examination method. The criteria in the material specification or MIB-3517.1 shall be
used to evaluate containment bolting flaws or degradation. As an alternative to performing
VT-3 examinations of containment bolted connections that are disassembled during the
scheduled performance of Item E1.11, VT-3 examinations of containment bolted connec-
tions may be conducted whenever containment bolted connections are disassembled for
any reason.
(G) The ultrasonic examination acceptance standard specified in MIE-3511.3 for Class MC
pressure-retaining components shall also be applied to metallic liners of Class CC
MI
pressure-retaining components.
(In-service inspection (H) Following items shall be examined additionally:
of nuclear power plant (1) Circumferential welds of flued head and bellows seal penetration shall be examined in
components) addition to the item E1.10 of Table MIE 2500-1.
(2) Sealants, gaskets, dissimilar metal welds, and bolt connections shall be examined in
accordance with items E5.10, E5.20, E7.10, and E8.20 in Table MIE 2500-1 of KEPIC
2000 Edition, respectively.
(8) Class 1 piping
Licensees may not apply MIB-1220, “Components Exempt from Examination,” of KEPIC and
shall apply IWB-1220, 1989 Edition of ASME Code Section XI.
(9) Underwater Welding
The provisions in MIA-4660 “underwater welding” of KEPIC MI are not approved for use on
irradiated material.
(10) Flaws of Class 3 piping
ASME Code Case N-513 (Rev. 0), “Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in
Class 3 Piping,” and N-523-1, “Mechanical Clamping Devices for Class 2 and 3 Piping” may be
applied. For the applications of Code Case N-523-1, the licensee shall apply all the requirements
of this Code Case. For the applications of Code Case N-513, the licensee shall apply all the
requirements of this Code Case on the following conditions.
(A) For the applications of Code Case N-513, specific safety factors of Article 4.0 shall be met.
(B) Code Case N-513 may not be applied in the following cases:
MI (1) Components other than pipe and tube, such as pumps, valves, expansion joints, and heat
(In-service inspection exchangers.
of nuclear power plant (2) Leakage through flange gasket
components) (3) Nonstructural seal-welded threaded connections to prevent leakage (integrity of thread
shall be maintained even thought leak path of seal weld is not a structural flaw).
(4) Failed socket weld.
(11) MIZ, Appendix VIII personnel qualification
All personnel qualified for performing ultrasonic examinations in accordance with Appendix
VIII shall receive 8 h of annual hands-on training on specimens that contain cracks. Training
must be completed no earlier than 6 months prior to performing ultrasonic examinations at a
licensee’s facility. Training time requirement may not be applied in case that the personnel con-
tinuously performs ultrasonic examination continually.
(12) MIZ, Appendix VIII specimen set requirements
(A) When applying Supplements 2, 3, and 10 to Appendix VIII, the following
examination coverage criteria requirements must be used.
(1) Piping must be examined in two axial directions, and when examination in the
circumferential direction is required, the circumferential examination must be performed
in two directions, provided access is available. Dissimilar metal welds must be exam-
ined axially and circumferentially.
(2) Where examination from both sides is not possible, full coverage credit may be claimed
from a single side for ferritic welds. Where examination from both sides is not possible
on austenitic welds or dissimilar metal welds, full coverage credit from a single side
may be claimed only after completing a successful single-sided Appendix VIII demon-
stration using flaws on the opposite side of the weld. Dissimilar metal weld qualifica-
tions must be demonstrated from the austenitic side of the weld and may be used to per-
form examinations from either side of the weld.

(continued)
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TABLE 69.5 Continued

Area Limitations

(B) The following provisions must be used in addition to the requirements of Supplement 4
to Appendix VIII:
(1) Related to Paragraph 3.1 (Detection acceptance criteria) of Supplement 4, personnel are
qualified for detection if the results of the performance demonstration satisfy the
detection requirements of Appendix VIII, Table VIII-S4-1 and no flaw greater than 0.25
in. through wall dimension is missed.
(2) Related to Paragraph 1.1(5) (Detection test matrix) of Supplement 4, flaws smaller than
the 50% of allowable flaw size, as defined in MIB-3500, need not be included as detec-
tion flaws. For procedures applied from the inside surface, use the minimum thickness
specified in the scope of the procedure to calculate a/t. For procedures applied from the
outside surface, the actual thickness of the test specimen is to be used to calculate a/t.
(C) When applying Supplement 4 to Appendix VIII, the following provisions must be used:
(1) A depth sizing requirement of 0.15 in. RMS must be used in lieu of the requirements in
Subparagraphs 3.2(1) of Supplement 4, and a length sizing requirement of 0.75 in. RMS
must be used in lieu of the requirement in Subparagraph 3.2(2).
(2) In lieu of the location acceptance criteria requirements of Subparagraph 2.1(2) of
MI Supplement 4, a flaw will be considered detected when reported within 1.0 in. or 10%
(In-service inspection of the metal path to the flaw, whichever is greater, of its true location in the X and Y
of nuclear power plant directions.
components) (3) In lieu of the flaw-type requirements of Subparagraph 1.1(5)(a) of Supplement 4, a min-
imum of 70% of the flaws in the detection and sizing tests shall be cracks. Notches, if
used, must be limited by the following:
(a) Notches must be limited to the case where examinations are performed from the
clad surface.
(b) Notches must be semielliptical with a tip width of less than or equal to 0.010 in.
(c) Notches must be perpendicular to the surface within ± 2 deg.
(4) In lieu of the detection test matrix requirements in Paragraphs 1.1(5)(b) and 1.1(5)(c) of
Supplement 4, personnel demonstration test sets must contain a representative
distribution of flaw orientations, sizes, and locations.
(D) The following provisions must be used in addition to the requirements of Supplement 6
to Appendix VIII:
(1) With regard to Paragraph 3.1(Detection Acceptance Criteria) of Supplement 6, the
following provisions must be met for the detection qualification of personnel:
(a) No surface-connected flaw greater than 0.25 in. through wall has been missed.
(b) No embedded flaw greater than 0.50 in. through wall has been missed.
(2) With regard to Paragraph 3.1(Detection Acceptance Criteria) of Supplement 6, all flaws
within the scope of the procedure are detected for procedure qualification.
(3) With regard to Paragraph 1.1(2) of Supplement 6, flaws smaller than the 50% of
allowable flaw size, as defined in MIB-3500, need not be included as detection flaws.
Flaws that are less than the allowable flaw size, as defined in MIB-3500, may be used as
detection and sizing flaws.
(4) Notches are not permitted.
(E) When applying Supplement 6 to Appendix VIII, the following provisions must be used:
(1) A depth sizing requirement of 0.25 in. RMS must be used in lieu of the requirements of
Subparagraphs 3.2(1), 3.2(3)(b), and 3.2(3)(c) of Supplement 6.
(2) With regard to the location acceptance criteria requirements in Subparagraph 2.1(2) of
Supplement 6, a flaw will be considered detected when reported within 1.0 in. or 10% of the
metal path to the flaw, whichever is greater, of its true location in the X and Y directions.
MI (3) In lieu of the length sizing criteria requirements of Subparagraph 3.2(2) of Supplement
(In-service inspection 6, a length sizing acceptance criteria of 0.75 in. RMS must be used.
of nuclear power plant (4) In lieu of the detection specimen requirements in Subparagraph 1.1(5)(a) of Supplement
components) 6, a minimum of 55% of the flaws must be cracks. The remaining flaws may be cracks
or fabrication-type flaws, such as slag and lack of fusion. The use of notches is not
allowed.
(5) With regard to Paragraphs 1.1(5)(b) and 1.1(5)(c) detection test matrix of Supplement 6,
personnel demonstration test sets must contain a representative distribution of flaw ori-
entations, sizes, and locations.
(continued)
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672 • Chapter 69

TABLE 69.5 Continued

Area Limitations

(F) The following provisions may be used for personnel qualification for combined
Supplements 4 and 6 to Appendix VIII. Licensees choosing to apply this combined
qualification shall apply all of the provisions of Supplements 4 and 6 including the
following provisions:
(1) For detection and sizing, the total number of flaws shall be at least 10. A minimum of 5
flaws shall be those from Supplement 4, and a minimum of 50% of the flaws shall be
those from Supplement 6. At least 50% of the flaws in any sizing must be cracks.
Notches are not acceptable for Supplement 6.
(2) Examination personnel are qualified for detection and length sizing when the results of
any combined performance demonstration satisfy the acceptance criteria of Supplement
4 to Appendix VIII.
(3) For examination of reactor pressure vessel nozzle-to-shell welds conducted from the
outside of the vessel.
(a) The clad to base metal interface and the adjacent metal to a depth of 15% T (thick-
ness measured from the clad to base metal interface) must be examined from one
radial and two opposing circumferential directions using a procedure and personnel
qualified in accordance with Supplement 4 to Appendix VIII, as modified by
(B) and (C) of (12) in this limitations, for examinations performed in the radial
direction, and Supplement 5 to Appendix VIII, as modified by (J) of (12) in this
limitations, for examinations performed in the circumferential direction.
(b) The examination volume not addressed by [(K)(3)(a)] in this paragraph must be
examined in a minimum of one radial direction using a procedure and personnel
qualified for single-sided examination in accordance with Supplement 6 to
Appendix VIII, as modified by (D), (E), (F), and (G) of (12) in this limitations.
(4) Table VIII-S7-1, “Flaw Locations and Orientations,” of Supplement 7 to Appendix VIII,
shall be modified as follows:

Table VIII S7-1 Flaw Locations and Orientation

Group Parallel to weld Perpendicular to weld

Inner 15 percent O O
OD Surface O
Subsurface O

MI (L) As a modification to the requirements of Supplement 8, Subparagraph 1.1(3) to Appendix

(In-service inspection
of nuclear power plant
components)
(13) MIZ, Appendix VIII single side ferritic vessel and piping and stainless steel piping examination.
(14) Certification of NDE personnel
VIII, notches may be located within one diameter of each end of the bolt or stud.
(M) When implementing Supplement 12 to Appendix VIII, only the provisions related to the
coordinated implementation of Supplement 3 to Supplement 2 performance demonstrations
are to be applied.
(A) Examinations performed from one side of a ferritic vessel weld must be conducted with
equipment, procedures, and personnel who have demonstrated proficiency with single side
examinations. To demonstrate equivalency to two-sided examinations, the demonstration
must be performed to the requirements of Appendix VIII as modified by this paragraph and
(B) through (G) of (12) in this limitations, on specimens containing flaws with nonoptimum
sound energy reflecting characteristics or flaws similar to those in the vessel being exam-
ined.
(B) Examinations performed from one side of a ferritic or stainless steel pipe weld must be con-
ducted with equipment, procedures, and personnel that have demonstrated proficiency with
single side examinations. To demonstrate equivalency to two-sided examinations, the
demonstration must be performed to the requirements of Appendix VIII as modified by this
paragraph and (A) of (12) in this limitations.
(A) Level I and II nondestructive examination personnel shall be recertified on a 3-year interval
in lieu of the 5-year interval specified in MIA-2314 (1) and (2).

(continued)
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 673

TABLE 69.5 Continued

Area Limitations

MI (15)
(In-service inspection
of nuclear power plant
components)
(16)
(17)
MI
(In-service inspection
of nuclear power plant
components)
ST
(Structure general)
(B) Paragraph MIA-2316 may only be used to qualify personnel that observe for leakage during
system leakage and hydrostatic tests conducted in accordance with MIA-5211(1) and (2).
(C) When qualifying visual examination personnel for VT-3 visual examinations under
Paragraph MIA-2317, the proficiency of the training must be demonstrated by administering
an initial qualification examination and administering subsequent examinations on a 3-year
interval.
Alternative nondestructive examination methods
The provisions for the substitution of alternative examination methods, a combination of
methods or newly developed techniques defined in MIA-2240 in KEPIC 2000 must be applied.
The provisions in MIA-2240 of KEPIC 2001 Addenda (including its later addenda) are not
approved for use. The provisions in MIA-4520(3), allowing the substitution of alternative
examination methods, a combination of methods or newly developed techniques for the
methods specified in the Construction Code are not approved for use.
System leakage tests
When performing system leakage tests in accordance with MIA-5213(1), a 10-min hold time
after attaining test pressure is required for Class 2 and 3 components that are not in use during
normal operating conditions. No hold time is required for the remaining Class 2 and 3 compo-
nents provided that the system has been in operation for at least 4 h for insulated components or
10 min for un-insulated components.
Table MIB-2500-1 examination requirements
(A) The provisions of Table MIB-2500-1, Examination Category B–D, Full Penetration Welded
Nozzles in Vessels, Items B3.120 and B3.140 (examination plan B) in the KEPIC 2000
Edition, must be applied when using the KEPIC 2002 Addenda (including its later edition
and addenda). A visual examination with enhanced magnification that has a resolution sensi-
tivity to detect a 1-mil width wire or crack, utilizing the allowable flaw length criteria in
Table IWB-3512-1, may be performed in lieu of an ultrasonic examination.
(B) The provisions of Table IWB-2500-1, Examination Category B–G-2, Item B7.80 in the
ASME 1995 Edition, are applicable only to reused bolting.
(C) The provisions of Table IWB-2500-1, Examination Category B–K, Item B10.10, in the
ASME 1995 Addenda must be applied.
(1) Motor-operated valve testing shall be performed in accordance with the requirements of in-ser-
vice operating test for category A, B defined in MOC 4200, KEPIC 2000, or the requirements of
valve testing defined in MOC 3500, KEPIC 2001/2002/2003 Addenda. And a program to ensure
that motor-operated valves continue to be capable of performing their design basis safety func-
tions shall be established.
(2) Code Cases except MON-1 “Alternative Requirements for pre-service and in-service testing
of motor-operated valve assemblies used in nuclear power plants” may be applied through such
procedures as approval of relief request.
(3) When applying Appendix I, “Check Valve Condition Monitoring Program” of the MOC, follow-
ing requirements shall be satisfied.
(A) Valve opening and closing functions must be demonstrated when flow testing or examina-
tion methods (nonintrusive, or disassembly and inspection) are used.
(B) The initial test interval may not exceed two fuel cycles or 3 years, whichever is longer. Any
extension of this interval may not exceed one fuel cycle per extension with the maximum
interval not to exceed 10 years. Trending and evaluation of existing data must be used to
reduce or extend the time interval between tests.
(C) If the condition monitoring program is discontinued, then the test requirements of MOC
4510 through 4540, KEPIC 2000 Edition, or MOC 3510/3520/3540/5221, KEPIC
2001/2002/2003 Addenda must be applied.
(4) MOE “In-service testing for Snubbers” instead of the requirements of Snubbers defined in MIF
5200(1), (2) and MIF 5300(1), (2) may be applied by making appropriate changes to their
technical specifications or licensee-controlled documents.
(5) Manual valves shall be tested at 2 year interval instead of 5 year interval defined in MOC 3540,
KEPIC 2002 Addenda.
(1) STA 2000, STA 3270, STA 4000s for design load, which are standards for commercial facil-
ities, are not approved for use in nuclear reactor facilities.
ASME_Ch69_p655-678.qxd 6/3/09 2:29 PM Page 674
674 • Chapter 69
69.8 INDUSTRIAL CODE IN KOREA:
KOREA ELECTRIC POWER
INDUSTRY CODE (KEPIC) [5, 6]
69.8.1 Background and Status of KEPIC Development
Since 1970s, Korea has been promoting the nuclear energy
industry to secure a stable, economical, and environment-friendly
energy needed for the rapidly growing industry for increasing the
standard of living, which demands a lot of energy. In the early
stage of 1970s, when Kori Unit 1 and Wolsong Unit 1 were
imported and constructed on a turnkey basis, Korea had neither a
matured technology needed for the design, construction, and
operation of electric power plant nor had their own detailed regu-
latory technical codes and standards.
During 1980s, as an engineering self-reliance program for elec-
tric power plant systems and components was established, Korea
firstly accomplished the system standardizations of 500 MWE
class for fossil power and 1000 MWE class for nuclear power. In
the process, some action plans were devised and one of them was
to develop Korean codes and standards with a detailed approach
toward the engineering self-reliance in power plant materials and
components.
Korea Electric Power Corporation started a feasibility study
of the program for developing a set of Korean codes and stan-
dards for power plant materials and components in 1987, at the
request of the Korean Government. As a result of the feasibili-
ty study, the title of the Korean codes and standards under con-
sideration for development was proposed as Korea Electric
Power Industry Code (KEPIC) and the following key princi-
ples were suggested to be applied as the bases of the code
development.
• The scope of KEPIC should cover the safety and reliability-
related materials and components.
• The part of KEPIC for the safety-related system of nuclear
power unit should be based on those applied for the construc-
tion of Younggwang nuclear power units 3 and 4.
• The part of KEPIC for the fossil power system should be
based on those applied for the construction of Tae-An fossil
power Units 1 and 2.
• The part of KEPIC for the nonsafety-related system of nuclear
unit should be applicable for the fossil power facilities.
• The technical requirements of KEPIC are basically the same
as those of the authorized foreign and/or international indus-
trial codes and standards selected as references such as ASME
B&PV Code, IEEE Code, and so on.
• The administrative requirements of KEPIC should be suit-
able for the existing administrative elected systems of
Korea by modifying the authorized foreign and/or interna-
tional industrial codes and standards that are selected as
references.
• The structure of KEPIC concerning electricity and power
facilities shall match with the existing codes and standards
that had been endorsed or referred in the regulations.
In 1992, the development of KEPIC was initiated on the basis
of the above key principles. The first edition of KEPIC Codes
composed of five parts in 33 volumes was published in 1995 by
KEA. KEA was founded in 1965 for the purpose of promoting
and advancing the technologies in the fields of electric power gen-
eration, equipment manufacturing and construction, and electrical
safety.
In accordance with the Notice No. 05-04 of the Minister of
Education, Science and Technology, which was issued in 1996,
part of KEPIC Code was initially applied for the construction of
Ulchin Nuclear Units 5 and 6 from the year of 1997. The Notice
was amended in 2000 and 2005 to endorse the application of later
editions of KEPIC Code to all phases of nuclear power project
such as the subsequent constructions of NPPs as well as to the
designs of new reactor systems such as the SMART-P, an integral-
type PWR. KEPIC is also being applied to the design, construc-
tion, and operation of fossil power plants.
Pursuant to the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBT) in 1995, the international trend of codes and standards has
been changing rapidly. To keep abreast of such international envi-
ronment, the KEA has been trying to amend the KEPIC Code
continuously (Table 69.6).
69.8.2 Contents of the KEPIC
The KEPIC consists of two main areas, technical requirements
and administrative requirements. Technical requirements are
based on the U.S. codes and standards. They are same as the cor-
responding standards except for the use of KEPIC’s own number-
ing system. The administrative requirements of each standard
have been developed by modifying the ASME Section III, NCA
General Requirements to be suitable for the industrial circum-
stances and situation of each technical sector in Korea. The ISO
9001 quality management system and the authorized inspection
system are adopted for the non-nuclear safety sector. The contents
of KEPIC developed so far, with the corresponding reference
codes on which each KEPIC provisions are based, are given in
Table 69.4.
While the subparts for nuclear structures, systems, and compo-
nents of KEPIC are applicable to all items and activities related to
nuclear safety, those for non-nuclear structures, systems, and
components of KEPIC are applicable to nonsafety items of NPPs
or fossil power plants. Both nuclear- and non-nuclear-related sub-
parts can be identified respectively with the second letter, “N or G
if any,” of two capital-lettered symbols representing the titles of
KEPIC subparts (area). For example, MN denotes the subpart for
nuclear mechanical components, whereas MG denotes the non-
nuclear mechanical components. Other subparts of the KEPIC
Code, such as MD (materials), ME (nondestructive examination),
MQ (welding and brazing qualification), SW (structural welding),
and ST (extra provisions for structure) are applicable to either
nuclear or non-nuclear items that are common to N or G. The sub-
part ET for the transmission, transformation, and distribution
standards are partially applicable to switchyard items at power
plants.
69.8.3 Development Procedure of the KEPIC
The first step of the KEPIC development process is to prepare a
preliminary draft of code, which is conducted by the working
groups comprised of technical experts from the industry pertain-
ing to corresponding areas. The draft is reviewed by the subcom-
mittees, consisting of experts from the industry, academia,
research sectors, and authorities; opinions and comments on it
from the relevant industry are also sought. The corresponding
subcommittee revises the draft by considering or reflecting the
review comments and opinions and refers it to the relevant techni-
cal committee. The final revised draft becomes effective on
approval by the technical committee.
Figure 69.6 shows the organization chart of KEPIC committees.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 675

TABLE 69.6 COMPARISON BETWEEN KEPIC CODE AND REFERENCED FOREIGN OR INTERNATIONAL CODES AND
STANDARDS FOR THE MECHANICAL COMPONENTS AND STRUCTURES (1/2)

Area Category Title Reference Standards

QA QAP Nuclear Quality Assurance ASME NQA
(Quality assurance) QAI Authorized Inspection ASME QAI-1
QAR Certificate of Registered Professional Engineer ASME Appendix. XXIII
MNA General Requirements ASME Section .III NCA
MNB Class 1 Components ASME Section III, Div. 1 NB
MN MNC Class 2 Components ASME Section III, Div. 1 NC
(Nuclear mechanical MND Class 3 Components ASME Section III, Div. 1 ND
components) MNE Class MC Components ASME Section III, Div. 1 NE
MNF Component Supports ASME Section III, Div. 1 NF
MNG Core Support Structures ASME Section III, Div. 1 NG
MNZ Appendices ASME Section III, Div. 1 NZ
MGA General Requirements ASME Section III NCA
MG MGB Pressure Vessel ASME Section VIII, Div. 1
(General mechanical MGC Heat Exchanger HEI, TEMA
components) MGD Storage Tank API 650
MGE Piping ASME B 31.1
MGF Pump HI
MGG Valve ASME B 16.34
MGH Condenser HEI
MGI Feed water Heater HEI
MC MCN Crane for Nuclear Power Plants ASME NOG-1
(Crane) MCF Crane for Fossil Power Plants CMAA-70
MHA General Requirements ASME AG-1, Div.I
MH MHB Air Cleaning and Conditioning ASME AG-1, Div.II
(Air cleaner and con- MHD Testing Procedure ASME
ditioner) MDF Ferrous material ASME Section II, Part A
MDN Non ferrous metal ASME Section II, Part B
MD MDW Welding Rods, Electrodes, and Filler Metals ASME Section II, Part C
(Material) MDP Allowable Stress ASME Section II, Part D
MEN Non destructive Examination ASME Section V
ME (NDE) MQW Welding Qualification ASME Section IX, Part QW
MQ MQB Brazing Qualification ASME Section IX, Part QB
(Welding) MIA General Requirements ASME XI, Div. 1 IWA
MIB Class 1 Components ASME XI, Div. 1 IWB
MI MIC Class 2 Components ASME XI, Div. 1 IWC
(In-service inspection MID Class 3 Components ASME XI, Div. 1 IWD
of NPP compo- MIE Metallic Containment & Metallic Liner ASME XI, Div. 1 IWE
nents) MIF Class 1, 2, 3, and MC Component Supports ASME XI, Div. 1 IWF
MIL Class CC Concrete Containment Structure ASME XI, Div. 1 IWL
MIZ Appendices ASME XI, Div. 1 Appendix
MOA General Requirements ASME OM Subsection ISTA
MO MOB Pump ASME OM Subsection ISTB
(In-service testing of MOC Valve ASME OM Subsection ISTC
NPP components) MOD Pressure Relief Device ASME OM Mandatory Appendix 1
MOE Snubber ASME OM Subsection ISTD
MOF Cooling System Performance Test ASME OM S/G Part 2
MF MOG Piping System Vibration Test ASME OM S/G Part 3
(Functional qualifica- MOH Motor-Operated Pressure Relief Valve ASME OM S/G Part 13
tion of nuclear MOI Diesel-Driven Equipment ASME OM S/G Part 16
mechanical compo- MIA General Requirements ASME QME-1 Section QR
nents) MIB Active Pump Assembly ASME QME-1 Section QP
MIC Active Valve Assembly ASME QME-1 Section QV
MB (Boiler) MBB Boiler ASME Section I
MT MTG Turbine/Generator RRC-TA
(Turbine/Generator) SNA General Requirements ASME Section III NCA
SN SNB Containment Structure ASME Section III Div. 2
(NPP Structure) SNC Steel-Concrete Structure ACI 349, ACI 318
SND Steel Structure AISC-N690
(continued)
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676 • Chapter 69

TABLE 69.6 Continued

Area Category Title Reference Standards

SGA General Requirements ASME Section III NCA

SG SGB Steel-Concrete Structure ACI-318
(Structure general) SGC Steel Structure-Allowable Stress Design Method AISC-ASD
SGD Steel Structure-Load Resistance Coefficient
ST Design Method AISC-LRFD
(General rules of struc- STA Design Loads ASCE 7
ture) STB Seismic Analysis ASCE 4
SW SWS Steel Structure AWS D 1.1
(Structure welding) SWT Thin Steel Plate Structure AWS D 1.3
FP FPC Common Requirements NFPA 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 24
(Fire protection) FPN Fire Protection of Nuclear Power Plants NFPA 20, 803, 804
FPF Fire Protection of Fossil Power Plants NFPA 850
ND (NPP Design) NDA Design of Nuclear Power Plants ANS-51.1
NF (Nuclear fuel) NFA Nuclear Fuel RCC-C
NR (Radiation) Radiation ANS
EN Class 1E Equipment IEEE, ANSI, ISA, etc.
KEPIC-E EM Measuring & Control Equipment IEEE, ISA, IEC, etc.
(Electrical) EE Electric Equipment NEMA, IEC, ANSI, etc.
EC Cables & Raceways ASTM, NEMA, IEEE, etc.
ET Transmission, Transformation, and Distribution IEC, IEEE
RRC-TA, French NPP Code-Turbine & Generator; RCC-C, French NPP Code- Nuclear Fuel.

69.8.4 Conformity Assessment System authorized inspectors /supervisors, registered Professional

It is required in the KEPIC that qualified organizations and
individuals should perform their appropriate functions to achieve
the safety and reliability goals of the NPPs. This conformity
assessment system includes accreditation for nuclear safety-relat-
ed organizations and the qualification for personnel, such as
Engineers (RPEs), and NDE personnel.
The nuclear certification system including the N-type certifi-
cate, authorized nuclear inspection and pressure relief testing lab-
oratory, and so on. is also very similar to that of ASME except
that KEPIC includes the organizations related to class 1E items

Steering Committee

Quality Assurance Nuclear Mechanical Structural Electrical Fire Protection

Technical Committee Technical Committee Technical Committee Technical Committee Technical Committee Technical Committee

Subcommittee (1) Subcommittee (3) Subcommittee (8) Subcommittee (4) Subcommittee (5)

Quality system NPP design Nuclear mechanical Concrete Nuclear electrical

Nuclear fuel components containment Induced & rotating
Radiation Boiler & pressure Reinforced equipment
vessel concrete structure I&C
Materials Steel structures Breakers & isolators
Welding Seismic design Cables & raceways
NDE
T/G
Fluid components
Auxiliary
components

FIG. 69.6 KEPIC COMMITTEES

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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 677

Description ASME Section.III, Div.1 KEPIC - MN

Components
1 1N

Parts &
appurtenance
3 3NP

Installation

2 2NC

FIG. 69.7 CODE SYMBOL STAMPS OF ASME AND KEPIC

and seismic category I structures. KEPIC specifies that every
organization including the owner, designer, manufacturer,
installer, and material organization shall obtain a certificate from
KEA according to the general requirements of each nuclear stan-
dard. Especially, the nuclear mechanical items need the code data
report and stamping. The code symbol stamps of ASME Section
III, Div.1 and KEPIC-MN are shown for comparison in Fig. 69.7.
KEPIC-MN (nuclear mechanical) and KEPIC-SNB (concrete
containment) require that pressure-retaining items shall be
inspected at both phases of manufacturing and site installation by
authorized nuclear inspectors, who are affiliated with the autho-
rized inspection agency accredited by KEA in accordance with
the requirements of KEPIC-QAI (authorized inspection). Both
authorized nuclear inspectors and authorized nuclear inspector
supervisors shall be qualified by KEA. Pressure relief devices,
such as safety valves, relief valves, rupture disks, and so on, shall
comply with the requirements for overpressure protection of
KEPIC-MN, and shall be tested at the place, wherever testing
facilities, methods, procedures, and authorized observers are
required to meet the requirements of ASME PTC-25. KEA has
certified Framatome-ANP in Germany as a KEA’s designee and
pressure relief device testing laboratory. The design drawings and
all test results of pressure relief devices shall be submitted to
KEA or any of KEA’s designees for review and acceptance.
69.9 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has covered the Korean nuclear regulatory organi-
zations, aspects of the regulatory authority including licensing,
status of nuclear installations, nuclear reactor regulatory frame-
work and regulations that pertain to domestic and/or international
industrial codes and standards in the area of pressure vessels and
piping. This chapter has also addressed the status of Korean
Electric Power Industry Codes (KEPIC), which covers standards
for design, manufacturing, operation, maintenance, and testing
and inspection of nuclear and non-nuclear mechanical compo-
nents including pressure vessels and piping.
69.10 REFERENCES
1. Jo, J. C., Kim, H. J., Oh, K. M., and Cho, D. Y., Current Status of In-
service Testing Program Development and Implementation in Korea.
The 5th NRC/ASME Symposium on Valve and Pump Testing, 1998,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission: NUREG/CP-0152: 3B/25-
3B/37.
2. C.W. Cho, Y.S. Kim, S.B. Kim, H.D. Chung (Ministry of Education,
Science and Technology); Y.S. Eun, Y.W. Park, C.B. Kim, K.S. Choi,
D.K. Park, H.S. Chang, S.W. Kim, W.S. Kim, S.N. Choi, W.T. Kim,
S.H. Yang, G.T. Kim, C.H. Hyun, J.B. Lee, B.S. Lee, D.I. Kim, S.H.
Lee (Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety); Y.S. Park, H.B. Cho, K.N.
Kim and B.R. Park (Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co., Ltd.); K.H.
Chang (Korea Power Engineering Company); S.K. Kim, J.D. Kim
(Doosan Heavy Industry Co., Ltd.); S.C. Chang (Korea Atomic
Energy Research Institute), The 3rd National Report for the
Convention on Nuclear Safety, The Republic of Korea, 2004.
3. The Statute Book including the Atomic Energy Act, Enforcement
Decree of Atomic Energy Act, Enforcement Regulation of the Act,
Enforcement Regulation Concerning the Technical Standards of
Reactor Facilities, and others., and the Enforcement Regulation
Concerning the Technical Standards of Radiation Safety
Management, and so on., Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, 2006.
4. The Collection of Notices of the Minister of Education, Science and
Technology, Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, 2005.
5. Kim, J. H. and Kim, N. H., Status of Korean Nuclear Codes and
Standards, Proceedings of the 18th KAIF/KNS Annual Conference,
2003.
6. Park, T. J. and Ahn, Y. T., KEPIC Development Status and
Application of ISO/IEC Guide 21, Proceedings of the KSME Spring
Conference, KSME 05S001: 3189-3194, 2005.
ASME_Ch70_p679-686.qxd 6/3/09 2:30 PM Page 679

CHAPTER

DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR
BOILER AND PRESSURE
VESSELS IN TAIWAN
Yi-Bin Chen, Shin Chang, and Ting Chow
70.1 INTRODUCTION
70.1.1 Historical Background
To support peaceful applications of atomic energy and to coor-
dinate international cooperation on nuclear energy, the Atomic
Energy Council (AEC) in Taiwan was founded in 1955 at the
ministerial level under the highest national administrative authori-
ty, Executive Yuan[1]. In 1961, an open-pool research reactor
built by National Tsing Hua University reached its first criticality.
The Atomic Energy Law was then enacted and the Institute of
Nuclear Energy Research (INER) was founded in 1968.
In 1974, the Taiwan Radiation Monitoring Station (TRMS) was
established under AEC. Four years later, the state-owned power
utility Taiwan Power Company (TPC) connected its first nuclear
power plant (NPP) to the grid and started its commercial opera-
tion. In 1981, Radwaste Administration (RWA) was formed
under AEC with an aim to regulate radioactive waste manage-
ment. TRMS and RWA were then renamed as the Radiation
Monitoring Center (RMC) and the Fuel Cycle and Materials
Administration (FCMA), respectively, in 1996. In 1999, AEC
issued a construction permit to TPC for its fourth nuclear power
(Lungmen) project.
With six nuclear units in operation, two units under construc-
tion, and other peaceful applications of nuclear and radiation
technology expanding at great pace, AEC’s mission has been
70
shifted to nuclear reactor safety regulation, radiation protection,
RWA, environmental monitoring, and R&D for technology devel-
opment and other civilian nuclear applications.
70.1.2 Existing Nuclear Facilities
There are four NPPs, each with two reactor units, in Taiwan.
These include six power units in operation and another two units
under construction. Table 70.1 [1] shows the basic design features
of the aforementioned power plants. Among the three operating
NPPs, Maanshan has two three-loop pressurized water reactors
(PWRs) with nuclear steam supply systems (NSSS) supplied by
Westinghouse, whereas the other two plants, Chinshan and
Kuosheng, each has two boiling water reactors (BWRs) with
NSSS supplied by General Electric (GE). Among these four
BWRs, two Chinshan units are BWR-4 with Mark I contain-
ments, whereas the other two Kuosheng units are BWR-6 with
Mark III containments. The Lungmen power plant is under con-
struction and will have two advanced BWRs with their NSSS
supplied by GE. Since the first nuclear reactor Chinshan Unit 1,
which was connected to the grid and started commercial operation
in 1978, all the six reactors in operation have been operated over
20 years by TPC. Figure 70.1 shows the locations of these exist-
ing nuclear installations in Taiwan. The real-time nuclear power
operational status can be found on AEC website as shown in
Fig. 70.2.

TABLE 70.1 BASIC DESIGN FEATURES OF THE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN TAIWAN

Plant Chinshan Kuosheng Maanshan Lungmen

Reactor BWR-4 BWR-6 PWR ABWR
Turbine Westinghouse Westinghouse General Electric Mitsubishi
Large, dry Reinforced concrete
Containment Mark-I Mark-III post-tensioned containment vessel
Thermal 1775 MWt 2894 MWt 2785 MWt 3926 MWt
Electric 636 MWe 985 MWe 951 MWe 1350 MWe
Commercial
Unit 1 12/6/1978 12/28/1981 7/27/1984 7/15/2009
Unit 2 7/16/1979 3/15/1983 5/18/1985 7/15/2010
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680 • Chapter 70

Kuosheng NPP
Chinshan NPP
Lungmen NPP (under
construction)

FIG. 70.2 REAL-TIME NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONAL

STATUS ON AEC WEBSITE

The five departments and three offices, working directly under

Maanshan NPP
FIG. 70.1 LOCATIONS OF NPPs IN TAIWAN
70. 2 ROLE OF REGULATORY AUTHORITY
The AEC consists of more than 10 commissioners, mostly rep-
resentatives of relevant ministries or agencies within the
Executive Yuan and experts from academia [2]. The Chairman
presides over the Council with the assistance of two Vice
Chairmen and Secretary General to oversee the Council affairs.
Directly under their supervision are five departments, three
offices, and three affiliated agencies. The Council also has five
advisory committees on nuclear policy and safety.
the Council’s administration, include the technical units such as
the Department of Planning, Department of Nuclear Regulation,
Department of Radiation Protection, and Department of Nuclear
Technology and also the administrative units such as the
Department of General Administration, Office of Personnel,
Office of Accounting, and Office of Security. The Office of
Congressional Liaison is another mission-oriented unit separated
from these departments.
The three affiliated agencies are the INER, FCMA, and RMC.
The major advisory committees are the Advisory Committee on
Nuclear Facility Safety, the Advisory Committee on Ionizing
Radiation Safety, the Advisory Committee on Radioactive
Materials Safety, the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety for
the Fourth Nuclear Power Station, and the Advisory Committee
on Nuclear Legislation. The organizational structure is shown in
Fig. 70.3 [1].
According to the Administrative Procedural Law, relevant
safety rules and regulations have been looked over again.
Revision and/or development have been done continually since
2002.

FIG. 70.3 ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE OF THE AEC IN TAIWAN

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Director
Deputy Director
Nuclear Chinshan Kuosheng
Safety Regulatory Regulatory
Supervisory Task Force Task Force
Section
FIG. 70.4 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR REGULATION OF THE AEC IN TAIWAN
70.2.1 Responsibility of the Department of Nuclear
Regulation
The Department of Nuclear Regulation is the one responsible
to implement safety regulations for design, construction, and
operation of nuclear reactors and other nuclear facilities. The
major tasks include review and inspection of the design, construc-
tion, transport, operation, maintenance, and dismantling of
nuclear reactors; review of safety analysis of reactor design, con-
struction, and operation; issuance of nuclear reactor licenses;
review of reactor system design modifications, equipment
changes, and revision of technical specifications; issuance of
licenses to nuclear reactor operators; review of nuclear fuel reload
safety analysis; review, regulation, and inspection of nuclear reac-
tor decommissioning; and other regulatory tasks related to nuclear
energy. The organizational structure of the Department of Nuclear
Regulation is shown in Fig. 70.4.
70.2.2 Responsibility of the Department of Radiation
Protection
The primary responsibility of the Department of Radiation
Protection is to ensure radiation safety of nuclear facilities, envi-
ronment, medical, and nonmedical applications of radioactive
material and equipment capable of producing ionizing radiation.
Its major tasks include radiation protection and environmental
radiation control of nuclear reactors; radiation protection and
environmental radiation control of radioactive waste storage and
disposal sites; license issuance for radioactive material and equip-
ment capable of producing ionizing radiation and operating per-
sonnel; regulation of radiation safety for radioactive material and
equipment capable of producing ionizing radiation; inspection of
ionizing radiation site and its environmental radiation; regulation
of the safe transport of radioactive material; development of regu-
lations for radiation safety; issuance of radiation detection and
measurement documents; regulation and assessment of nation-
wide radiation dose and background radiation; review of radiation
safety assessment reports; evaluation of the proficiency in radia-
tion protection of radiation workers, handling, and investigation
of radiation incidents; and other assigned responsibilities.
70.2.3 Responsibility of the Department of Nuclear
Technology
The primary responsibilities of the Department of Nuclear
Technology are the evaluation and analysis of the nuclear reactor
Maanshan Lungmen Lungmen
Regulatory Regulatory Commissioning
Task Force Task Force Test Regulatory
Task Force
performance, regulation and inspection of the implementations
of Nuclear Emergency Response Act, serving as the secretariat of
the National Nuclear Emergency Management Committee, and
nuclear information management. The major tasks include inves-
tigation and evaluation of abnormal reactor events; analysis and
evaluation of nuclear power station operation; development of
regulations for nuclear emergency response; planning and evalua-
tion of nuclear emergency preparedness and exercises; operation
and maintenance of National Nuclear Emergency Response
Center; coordination and integration of nuclear and radiological
emergency; operation and maintenance of Nuclear Safety
Monitoring Center; management and security of nuclear informa-
tion; and other assigned responsibilities.
70.2.4 Responsibility of the FCMA
FCMA is responsible for the safety regulation of the treatment,
storage, transport, final disposal of radwastes and the import,
export, storage, and transfer of nuclear source materials and
nuclear fuels. Its major tasks include licensing and certification of
facilities associated with the design, construction, operation, and
decommissioning/closure of installations for radwaste treatment,
storage, and disposal; regulation and inspection of the treatment,
storage, transport, disposal, import, and export of radwaste; regu-
lation and inspection of the import, export, storage, utilization,
discard, and transfer of nuclear source materials; regulation and
inspection of the import, export, storage, discard, and transfer of
nuclear fuels; development of regulations and technical standards
for the radioactive material; international cooperation with respect
to radioactive material regulation; education and public communi-
cation with respect to radioactive material regulation; policy and
strategy development for the management of radioactive material;
promotion of the research and development on radwaste manage-
ment technologies; and other matters related to radioactive mate-
rial management.
70.3 SEISMIC DESIGN
Taiwan is located at a complex juncture between the Eurasian
plate and Philippine Sea plate [3], where earthquakes occur
frequently. Figure 70.5 shows the tectonic plates around
Taiwan. Due to the process of collision of these two plates, the
eastern part of Taiwan moves toward northwest at a rate of about
2.5-8.0 cm/year based on actual GPS measurement starting from
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682 • Chapter 70
FIG. 70.5 TECTONIC PLATES AROUND TAIWAN ISLAND
(After Angelier 1986) [3]
1993. Hence, seismic design/qualification of structures, systems,
and components of NPPs in Taiwan is an important issue. The fol-
lowing sections focus on some important aspects of seismic con-
sideration of Taiwan’s NPPs.
70.3.1 Design Earthquakes
Since all the current eight (6⫹2) nuclear units are of U.S.
origin, all the regulatory rules and guides used for design and
review are based on the U.S. NRC-related documents. There are
two design earthquakes, the operating basis earthquake (OBE)
and safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). All the structures, systems,
and components (SSC) designed against the OBE must be in the
elastic range, whereas the safety-related SSCs should be designed
against the SSE without losing the intended functions by allowing
plastic deformation of the structural materials. The SSE is the
maximum potential earthquake of the selected site and the OBE
will be decided accordingly, usually OBE will be half of the SSE
although there is a conditional relaxation to the OBE/SSE ratio.
The determination of design earthquake for the NPP is based on
the requirement set forth in 10CFR100 Appendix A. Table 70.2 is
the summary of the design earthquakes of Taiwan’s NPPs. It is
noted that control point of the design earthquake is the free sur-
face of the reactor foundation location.
70.3.2 Earthquake Experiences and Installation of
Automatic Seismic Trip System
Despite Taiwan’s proneness to earthquakes, its NPPs have not
experienced any earthquake until now that has challenged the
TABLE 70.2 DESIGN EARTHQUAKES OF THE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN TAIWAN
Plant Chinshan Kuosheng
OBE 0.15g 0.2g
SSE 0.3g 0.4g
Design response Housner & Based on
spectrum shape Newmark western U.S. data
V/H ratio 2/3
seismic design of the plants. Even the Chi-Chi earthquake of
magnitude 7.3, the severest earthquake during the past 100 years,
which occurred on September 21, 1999, had very little impact on
the existing three NPPs because the hypocenter distance (more
than 175 km) was not in proximity, as shown in Fig. 70.6. The
only earthquake that had any significance to the existing NPPs in
Taiwan was the Hengchun earthquake, which occurred on
December 26, 2006 in the southwestern seabed. Figure 70.7
shows the recorded earthquake data in nearby Maanshan NPP
(34 km away from the epicenter). From the response spectrum, it
can be seen that the striking earthquake almost reached the OBE
level in the frequency range of 1–2 Hz.
Distinct from the Japanese Decree that requires all the nuclear
units to install automatic seismic trip system (ASTS), all of the
Taiwan’s NPPs followed the U.S. regulation, which requires
orderly shutdown when the striking earthquake exceeds the
design earthquake OBE. Based upon the U.S. and Japan seismic
shutdown experiences, it took at least 3 months and even longer
for the inspection and review process. To avoid unnecessary plant
shutdown, the parameter called cumulative absolute velocity
(CAV) calculated from the earthquake acceleration histogram had
been introduced and adopted as one of the seismic shutdown
criteria [4].
Since every Japanese NPP unit as well as the two NPPs (Diablo
Canyon and San Onofre) in California have installed the ASTS, it
was the disastrous Chi-Chi earthquake that prompted Taiwan’s
nuclear authority AEC to request TPC to install the ASTS in all
the six existing nuclear units to further ensure the plant safety
following the Japanese practices, and it was the Hengchun earth-
quake and recently Japan’s Niigataken Chuetsu-oki earthquake
experiences that really hastened the installation of the ASTS.
There are three subunits in the ASTS, seismic sensors, data
processors, and trip control module. Seismic sensors are installed
on both basemat floor and operating floor in reactor and auxiliary
buildings. The number of seismic sensors on each floor depends
on plant’s reactor protection system (RPS) trip logic, four at each
floor for the BWR and three for the PWR. The trip threshold
value is OBE’s ZPA value minus 0.05 g. Once the seismic sensors
pick the filtered low pass filter of 10 Hz by a seismic wave that is
higher than the threshold value and pass the trip logic tree, then
the RPS will be initiated and shutdown the reactor immediately.
Installations and tests of ASTS were completed for all the six
operating units in November 2007 and have been put into service
ever since.
70.3.3 Probabilistic Risk Assessment
and Seismic Hazard
Taiwan launched its first full-scope Probabilistic Risk
Assessment (PRA) in 1982, and completed all the three existing
NPP PRA in 1985, 1987, and 1991, respectively. In addition, liv-
ing PRA for all the three existing NPPs and shutdown PRA for
Maanshan Lungmen
0.2g 0.2g
0.4g 0.4g
RG 1.60 Plant specific
2/3 1/1 1/1
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 683

10.00
Damping ratio: 5 %

1.00 KS NPP site observed (N–S)

KS NPP site observed (E–W)

Spectral acceleration (g)

Spectral acceleration (g)
KS NPP design earthquake

1.00

Damping ratio: 5 %

KS NPP site observed (V)

0.10 KS NPP design earthquake

0.10

0.01 0.01
0.10 1.00 10.00 100.00 0.10 1.00 10.00 100.00
Frequency (Hz) Frequency (Hz)

FIG. 70.6 1999 CHI-CHI EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE SPECTRUM IN KUOSHENG NPP

Maanshan NPP were also accomplished in 1995 and 1996, scheme D. Seismic risk contributing to the total risk is listed in
respectively. In 2000, INER and TPC developed a PC-based risk Table 70.3.
monitor “TIRM” (Taipower Integrated Risk Monitor) to assist
configuration risk evaluation and management for the operating 70.3.4 Seismic Dedication of Commercial Grade
NPPs. In the mean time, AEC contracted INER to develop a com- Items for the Replacement Items in the
puterized tool (PRiSE) for phase-2 significance determination Existing NPPs
process (SDP) to timely assess the safety significance of inspec- Since there is no new construction of NPP in the United States
tion findings. Until now, applications of PRA to regulatory deci- for several decades, most of the original manufacturers or suppli-
sions have been used in various issues such as fire barrier exemp- ers either no longer exist or cannot survive to maintain the
tion by risk-informed fire analysis, online maintenance for 10CFR50 Appendix B quality assurance program. There was a
selected systems, safety significance determination of inspection need to find a solution for the replacement of safety-related items in
findings, allowed outage time extension for start-up transformer the existing NPPs. Acceptance procedure and technical evaluation
replacement, and so on. process described in EPRI NP-5652 [6] and called Commercial
Seismic PRA is a part of external event in PRA study. The seis- Grade Item Dedication turned out to be an alternate solution.
mic PRA adopted the so-called Zion method, which mainly relied Seismic dedication is a key portion in technical evaluation. INER
on the existing seismic design/qualification documents and generic
earthquake test/experience fragility data. One set of seismic haz-
ard curves for the four NPPs are shown in Fig. 70.8; these curves
were derived on the basis of Taiwan’s earthquake catalog from 1E+000
1900 to 2007, using Campbell’s attenuation equations and zoning
Chin Shan
Kuosheng
1E-001 Maanshan
Annual probability of exceedance

Lungmen

1E-002

1E-003

1E-004

1E-005
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
Peak ground acceleration (g)
FIG. 70.7 RECORDED VERSUS DESIGN RESPONSE
SPECTRUM (20061226 Hengchun Earthquake) in Maanshan FIG. 70.8 ONE EXAMPLE OF SEISMIC HAZARD CURVE IN
NPP at Reactor Basemat Floor (NS Direction) TAIWAN’S NPP SITES (Earthquake Data up to February 2007)
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684 • Chapter 70
TABLE 70.3 CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY OF THE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN TAIWAN [5]
Plant Chinshan
Seismic contribution 23.5%
Total CDF
(per reactor year) 2.1E-5
therefore established its dedication center in 1994, and a depen-
dent biaxial shake table system was also established for that pur-
pose. The table size is 3 ft., ⫻ 3 ft., 45-degree -inclined actuator is
17 in. double amplitude stroke with 20250 pounds rated dynamic
force and two variable pumps each of which can supply 60 gpm
flow at 3000 psi. Since then, more than hundreds of small to
medium mechanical components such as motor, transmitters,
pumps, as well as electrical devices such as printed circuit boards,
relays, and so on have been used in the existing NPP for the
replacement of their original items through the dedication
process. In conjunction with the shake table testing, EPRI’s
G-STERI (Generic Seismic Technical Evaluation for Replacement
Items) document is also frequently used as a seismic evaluation
reference.
70.3.5 Fatigue Analysis in License Renewal
Applications
Similar to most utilities of NPPs in the United States, TPC is
currently working on the extension of another 20 years of plant
life in its existing Chinshan NPP and Kuosheng NPP (both have
operated for more than 20 years) as per 10CFR54 Requirements
for Renewal of Operating Licenses for NPPs. Fatigue analysis is
one of the approaches to ensure the piping system and mechanical
components safety due to aging effect caused by cyclic loads such
as transient and seismic loads. Since all the class I piping stress
analyses in Chinshan NPP followed ANSI B31.1 and B31.7
power piping code, the fatigue usage factor calculation must be
analyzed to fulfill the requirement in the ASME NB section. We
also anticipate that Kuosheng NPP will be facing the similar situ-
ation if the existing piping analyses cannot demonstrate the extra
50% margin. The BWR inherit hydrodynamic pool swell loads
(the so-called new loads) will complicate the load pair combina-
tion when calculating fatigue usage factor.
70.4 PRESSURE BOUNDARY INTEGRITY
TPC conducts in-service inspection (ISI) programs as per the
ASME Section XI for the operating units during each scheduled
outage to ensure the integrity of the SSCs. The scope of the
inspection embodies the safety- and nonsafety-related compo-
nents. If any flaw is detected during the refueling outage, licensee
must conduct the safety evaluation and/or repair/replacement
depending upon the condition. Recently, more attention has been
focused on the intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) in
BWRs and primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) in
PWRs especially at the dissimilar metal (DM) welds connecting
vessel nozzle to austenitic stainless steel piping. This is also the
operating experience of both foreign and domestic NPPs.
70.4.1 PWR Pressure Boundary Integrity
Several instances of PWSCC of nickel-based metal degradation
of U.S. PWR plants have prompted intense inspections of the
Kuosheng Maanshan Lungmen
26.5% 13.9% 87.9%
5.3E-5 6.0E-5 3.5E-6
Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundaries at Maanshan. Items
include reactor vessel head CRDM penetration nozzles, reactor
vessel bottom-mounted instrumentation (BMI) penetrations,
steam generator tubes, pressurizer penetrations and steam space
piping connections, reactor vessel nozzle hot & cold leg welds,
and steam generator nozzle welds. Current inspection results
show the following:
(1) Based on ECT, UT, and VT exams, no flaw indications in
vessel head penetrations are shown.
(2) Based on VT exams, no leakage of the vessel BMI penetra-
tions is shown.
(3) Based on ECT and UT exams, the plugging rate of the
steam generator tubes is less than 1.78%.
(4) Based on UT, PT, and RT exams, flaw indications are not
shown in pressurizer penetrations weld.
(5) Based on UT exams, flaw indications in reactor vessel hot
& cold leg weld are not shown.
(6) Based on VT exams, no leakage of the steam generator noz-
zle weld is shown.
Inspections of weld overlay on DM welds of pressurizer noz-
zles (spray nozzle, PSV nozzle, PORV nozzle, and surge line noz-
zle) and RPV cold leg/hot leg nozzles are planned to be conduct-
ed in the follow-up outages. Inspections of the pressurizer nozzles
(total of 12 for two units) will be completed during the two refuel-
ing outages in the period of 2009–2012. Inspections of the RPV
nozzles (total of 12 for two units) will be completed during the
five refueling outages in the period of 2013–2020.
During the Maanshan-2 16th refueling outage and Maanshan-1
17th refueling outage, some minor axial cracks were identified on
69 and 34 steam generator tubes at the bottom 4 in. region of tube
sheet, respectively. TPC submitted a one-time basis technical
specification change to AEC for approval to restart unit without
plugging those 69 or 34 tubes. For the succeeding Maanshan-2
17th refueling outage, a similar JCO was submitted by TPC too.
However, AEC did not approve the JCO due to lack of some sup-
porting information. In addition, in accordance with the PWR
Containment Recirculation Sump Strainer modifications (GSI-
191) as per the requirement of GL 2004-02 in the United States,
Maanshan is scheduled to complete its sump modifications during
the 18th refueling outage in 2009.
70.4.2 BWR Pressure Boundary Integrity
Cracks were found on BWR recirculation piping from 1980s in
Taiwan. Since 1995, TPC established augmented ISI plans
according to GL 88-01 and NUREG-0313 Rev.2. All the relevant
welds in the recirculation piping were generally inspected every
two refueling cycles.
In 2005 and 2006, the TPC revised its ISI plans for both BWRs
by following NUREG-0313 Rev.2, citing EPRI BWRVIP-75-A
[7] and considering the past inspection results. To mitigate
IGSCC problems, the major betterment work included conducting
IHSI for part of the welds, weld overlay for the cracked weld, and
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TABLE 70.4 APPLICATIONS OF POWER UPRATE
No. Plant %Uprate
1 Kuosheng 2 1.70 (0.5)a
2 Kuosheng 1 1.70 (1.5)a
3 Chinshan 2 1.65b
4 Chinshan 1 1.65b
5 Maanshan 2 1.7b
6 Maanshan 1 1.7b
a
Number in parenthesis means actual % uprate; b means tentative.
replacement of risers for Chinshan and Kuosheng. Besides, the
personnel who perform ultrasonic examinations must meet the
requirements of Appendix VIII of Section XI of the ASME
B&PV Code following the past requirements [8].
During the recent scheduled refueling outages for both plants,
crack indications were found at the DM welds connecting vessel
nozzle to austenitic stainless steel piping of the reactor recircula-
tion piping system of Chinshan Unit 1 and Kuosheng Unit 2 in
addition to the cracks seen at austenitic stainless steel piping
welds.
In response to crack indications, TPC usually uses weld overlay
reinforcement method to repair the welds. AEC has paid great
attention to the inspection results during outages. Generally, when
the crack was found, TPC was requested to conduct parallel
expansion for examining similar locations. In responding to the
cracks found at the DM welds and the related foreign experience,
TPC was requested to review the adequacy of inspection frequency
and technique. After conducting weld overlay reinforcement, the
primary shrinkage stress evaluation must be performed before
restart of the unit to ensure the structural integrity.
70.5 POWER UPRATE AND LICENSE
RENEWAL
TPC has launched a power uprate project for its three NPPs.
The power uprate considered is the measurement uncertainty
recapture (MUR) type and up to 1.7% rated thermal power
increase for license application. According to the current sched-
ule, all the units will implement power uprate from the beginning
of the cycle after a refueling outage except Maanshan Unit 2,
which may involve power uprate in midcycle. The applications
are shown in Table 70.4. Both Kuosheng units have implemented
MUR power uprate in 2007. Chinshan 2 installed UFM in March
2008 and power ascension test is scheduled in June 2008.
Maanshan 2 installed UFM in April 2008. But, safety analysis is
still under review. Chinshan 1 and Maanshan 1 are going to install
UFM respectively in October 2008 and May 2009. Besides the
MUR project, TPC is also working on the preliminary feasibility
study of a stretched power uprate.
According to “Regulation on the Review and Approval of
Applications for Operating License of Nuclear Reactor Facilities”
in Taiwan, time line for license renewal (LR) application is from
5 to 15 years before the expiration of the operating license.
The operating license of the first (Chinshan) NPP in Taiwan has
been issued for over 29 years. So TPC organized an LR task force
in July 2005. LR applications for Chinshan, Kuosheng, and
MWt Date approved Type
49 (14)a May 9, 2007 MUR
49 (43)a September 6, 2007 MUR
29b 3. March 21, 2008 MUR
29b September 30, 2008 MUR
47b October 30, 2008 MUR
47b April 27, 2009 MUR
Maanshan may be submitted sequentially in the near future,
depending on the development of the domestic energy policy.
70.6 RADIOACTIVE WASTE
MANAGEMENT OF NPPs
The radioactive waste management policies include minimiza-
tion of waste generation, reduction of waste volume, and on-site
temporary storage for all radioactive waste except that having it
sent to Lan-Yu storage facility. The current policy for spent
nuclear fuel management strategy in Taiwan is “storage in spent
fuel pools for near term, on-site dry storage for medium term, and
final deep geological disposal for long term.” The final disposal
site may be selected within the domestic area or through an inter-
national cooperation program. Radioactive waste management-
related acts and enforcement rules and various regulations have
been issued by AEC to enhance the safety management of spent
fuel and radioactive waste [9].
The application submitted by TPC for the construction permit
of interim storage facility on Chinshan site is still under review.
Before any interim storage facility to be constructed is allowed,
the on-site spent fuel storage pools are the existing facilities for
the spent fuel management at the NPPs. The spent fuel storage
pools were constructed as part of reactor facilities and have been
reracked with the neutron-poisoned high-density racks. AEC has
reviewed and accepted the safety analysis of the spent fuel storage
pools during the licensing application of reracking work. Follow-
up inspections also show that the storage pools met the safety
standards. Nevertheless, for continued or extended operation of
the existing NPPs, the interim dry storage issue needs to be
resolved in the near future.
70.7 REFERENCES
1. Atomic Energy Council, Executive Yuan Taiwan, Republic of China,
http://www.aec.gov.tw/
2. Atomic Energy Council, Executive Yuan Taiwan, Republic of China,
The Republic of China National Report for the Convention on Nuclear
Safety, September 2004.
3. Angelier, J., Preface. Geodynamics of the Eurasia-Philippine Sea
Plate Boundary. Tectonophysics, 125(Special Issue), IX-X, 1986.
4. U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.166, Identification & Characteri-
zation of Seismic Sources & Determination of SSE Ground Motion,
1997.
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686 • Chapter 70

5. Kao, T.M., Introduction to PSA Applications in the Nuclear and
Petrochemical Industries, PSAM9 Pre-Conference Workshop, Taipei,
May 15–16, 2008.
6. EPRI NP-5652, Guideline for the Utilization of Commercial Grade
Items in Nuclear Safety-Related Applications, 1988.
7. BWRVIP-75-A, BWR Vessel and Internals Project Technical Basis
for Revisions to Generic Letter 88-01 Inspections Schedules, EPRI,
2005.
8. Kao, B., Chang, S., and Chen, Y. B., Recent Regulatory Experiences
on BWR Recirculation System Inspection Findings in Taiwan, Pacific
Basin Nuclear Conference (PBNC) 2006, Sydney, Australia, October
2006.
9. Atomic Energy Council, Executive Yuan, Taiwan, Republic of China,
Taiwan National Report under the Joint Convention on the Safety of
Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste
Management, June 2007.
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INDEX

Additional page numbers with information about individual ASME Specifications (SA and SB numbers) can be found under the headings
“American Society of Mechanical Engineers Ferrous Material Specifications” and “American Society of Mechanical Engineers
Nonferrous Material Specifications.” Referrals to Code Paragraphs and Sections can be located by their alphabetical code (NA, NB, etc.).

A1 and A2 values, radioactive material packaging, 348, 350, 351 AE. See Aging effect.
Q-system for calculation of, 345, 350, 353, 356 AEA. See Atomic Energy Act.
Abrasion, of pressure equipment, 153 AEC. See U.S. Atomic Energy Agency.
AC. See Alternating current. Aerospace Material Specifications, materials standards, 163
Accelerated intergranular corrosion test, French codes, 249, 253 A0 factor, 275
Acceptance criteria, of age management program, 58 AFCEN. See French association for design, construction and
Access door, in pressure equipment, 152 inservice inspection rules for nuclear island components.
Accident sequence analysis, 93 AFCEN Quality Manual, 197
Accreditation, of Canadian organizations developing standards, 160 AFIAP. See Association Française de Ingenieurs en Appareils à
Accredited standards-developing organizations (SDOs), 160 Pression.
Acetylene gas, compressed, 260 AFNOR. See French Standardization Organization.
ACI. See American Concrete Institute. AGA. See American Gas Association.
Acoustic circuit analyses, 6 Aging
Acoustic emission, 254 fitness-for-service rules (Japan), 276
CODAP future specifications, 208 indicators, 58
ACR®. See Advanced CANDU® Reactor. managing the effects of, 35
ACRS. See Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. pressure equipment conformance, 142
Active component failure rate, 96 preventative action, 35
Active power plant structures/components, surveillance and Aging degradation, 58–59
maintenance programs, 31 Aging effect (AE), 58–59
ACVG. See Alternating current voltage gradient method. environmental, 38
Addenda to the Code Aging management, of pressurized water reactor (PWR) vessel
1972 Addenda to Section III, Appendix G, 44 internals, 57–60
1983 Addenda to Section XI, 116 Aging management program (AMP), 21, 30–31, 33–35, 39, 41, 58–59
1988 Addenda to Section XI, 7, 118 audits, 33–34, 36–37
1994 Addenda (2004 Edition as revision), 296, 298, 299 during extended operation, 38
1999 Addenda, 271, 307, 666, 667 elements, 35, 57
2001 Addenda, 298, 668, 673 environmental aging effect and, 41
2002 Addenda to Section XI, 118, 119, 121, GALL Report and, 33–34
Section XI, Appendix C, 19–20, 21, 22, 118, 126 license renewal and, 32
2003 Addenda, 668 plant-specific, 37–38, 57
Adjustment factor (Ke factor), 273. See also Ke factor. Aging management review (AMR), 30–35, 38, 41, 57
AD Merkblätter code, 316, 329, 330 Aging management strategies, 59–60
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA), 338, 594 AI. See Authorized Inspector.
AD 2000, 139, 553, 554, 555, 557, 561, AIA. See Authorized Inspection Agencies.
Advanced CANDU® Reactor (ACR®), 188 Air environments
Advisory Committee for Energy, Nuclear and Industrial Safety austenitic stainless steels fatigue crack growth rate, 21
Subcommittee, 259 ferritic steels fatigue crack growth rate, 21
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), 505 Air conditioning, Japanese codes, 261
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 350 Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute, cooling equipment
Advantica (formerly BG Technology), 400 standards, 163
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688 • Index
Air transport, of radioactive materials, 347, 352, 353
AISC. See American Institute for Steel Construction.
ALARA. See As Low as Reasonably Achievable.
ALARP. See As Low As is Reasonably Practical region.
Allowable flaw depth, 9, 118
Allowable pressure
brittle fracture and, 55
equation for, 49
Allowable pressure operating curve, 48–49
Allowable pressure temperature (P-T) limits, 49, 51
Allowable stresses, 149
austenitic stainless steel, PED and U.K., 310–311
French codes, 191, 193, 196, 253, 653
ferritic materials, U.K., 310
in pressure equipment, 139, 143, 151–152, 157
pressure equipment, Japanese codes, 44, 257, 258, 259
pressure equipment, PED and European codes, 148, 314
pressure vessels, EN 13445, 326–327
pressure vessel, French codes, 191, 193, 196, 253, 653
seismic design, Japanese codes, 44, 257, 258, 259
transport tanks, 365, 366, 368
welded joints, French codes, 246
Alloy ductile iron castings, for pressure equipment, French codes, 242
Alloy steels
for pressure equipment, French codes, 252
for pressure equipment, Japanese codes, 286
Alternating current (AC), loss of power, 33, 42, 395
Alternating current voltage gradient (ACVG) method, for pipeline
system assessment, 395
Alternating stress intensity
of containment vessels for radioactive materials, 346–347
of pressure vessels, PD 5500 (U.K.), 321–324
Aluminum
allowable stresses, pressure equipment, 139
non-alloyed, allowable stresses in pressure equipment, 157
in pressure equipment, 157
for pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 311
for pressure vessels, French codes, 201, 202, 205, 208
for pressure vessels, Japanese codes, 263–264, 286
Aluminum alloys
allowable stresses, pressure equipment, 139
in pressure equipment, 157
for pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 311–312
for pressure equipment, PED codes, 311
for pressure vessels, French codes, 201, 202, 205, 208
for pressure vessels, Japanese codes, 263–264, 286
Aluminum/nitrogen2 ratios, minimum values for pressure equipment,
143
Aluminum piping, Canadian standards, 172
American Gas Association (AGA), 395
American Institute for Steel Construction (AISC), AISC N-690,
Subsection NF, 247, 255, 667, 675, 676
American National Standards Institute (ANSI), 162–163. See also
American Society of Mechanical Engineers Codes and
Standards, specific types.
/ASQCZ1.4, 188
B16.34, 246
K61.1/CGAG-2.1, 188,
N14.1, 351
NB-23, 366
NGV2-2000 (Basic Requirements for Compressed Natural Gas
Vehicle (NGV) Fuel Containers), 170
American National Standards Institute/American Society of
Mechanical Engineers B31 G Manual, 376, 397–398, 401
B31 G assessment criterion, 398–401
American National Standards Institute Committee N14, 61, 351
American Nuclear Society (ANS)
ANSI/ANS-56.8-2002 (Containment System Leakage Testing
Requirements), 186, 189
Nuclear Risk Management Coordinating Committee (NRMCC)
with ASME and NRC, 108, 110
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Standards, 108, 109, 110
risk-informed safety classification efforts, 108
Risk-Informed Standards committee (RISC), 103, 109
PRA standards development, 109, 110
RISC-2, 103
Seismic and External Events Standard, 104
Subcommittee 28, 107
American Nuclear Society (ANS) Standards, specific types
53.1 (Nuclear Safety Criteria for the Design of Modular Helium
Cooled Reactor Plants), 109
58.21, 110, 112
American Petroleum Institute (API), 162
American Petroleum Institute (API) Pressure Vessel Inspection Code
standards, specific types
API 530, 162, 170, 188
API 579, 121
API 1104 (Acceptance Standards of Production Welds), 400
API 1160 (Managing System Integrity for Hazardous Liquid
Pipelines), 377, 380
American Society for Nondestructive Testing (ASNT), 148, 264,
ASNT TC 1A (Personnel Approval), 148
Master Curve test method, 43
materials for pressure equipment construction, 147
steels, toughness conformance, 147
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) Special
Technical Publication (STP)
STP514, 127, 128
STP 536, 127
STP 668, 127
STP 803 (Deformation Plasticity Failure Assessment Diagram
Approach to Flaw Evaluation), 27, 127, 127
STP 803, Vol. 2, 27, 127, 128
STP 896 (Deformation Plasticity Failure Assessment Diagram),
114, 119, 123, 128, 648
STP 1046, 25
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) Subcommittee,
E 10.02, 54
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) test methods,
specific types
A 240, 311
B 350, 177
B 353, 177
C 597-02 (Pulse Velocity through Concrete), 186, 189
C 805-02 (Impact/Rebound Hammer Tests), 186, 189
E-208 (Drop Weight Test), 360
E 208-87a (Drop Weight Test), 50
E 370-88a (Charpy V-Notch Test), 50
E 399 (Cleavage Fracture Toughness), 52
E 813-81 (Standard Test Method for Fracture Toughness), 114, 127
E 900-02 (Guide for Predicting Radiation-Induced Transition
Temperature Shift in Reactor Vessel Materials), 54–55, 61
E 900-87 (Standard Guide for Predicting Neutron Radiation
Damage to Reactor Vessel Materials), 54, 61
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E 1921, 53
E 1921-97, 61
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), 162, 163
Class 1 ferritic piping, flaw evaluation procedures, 118
Code cases, 103, 104, 106, 107, 108
nameplate, removal of, 366
safety factor, 149
specifications, for steel, 149
Subcommittee VIII, 208
Subcommittee XII, Transport Tanks, 357
American Society of Mechanical Engineers Board on Nuclear Codes
and Standards (BNCS), 103, 107, 109, 189
Code cases, 109–110, 112
Committee on Nuclear Risk Management (CNRM), 90, 108
environmental fatigue effects and, 21
Independent Decision-Making Panels, 110
non-mandatory appendices, revising risk-informed, 228, 358
Nuclear Air and Gas Treatment Equipment Committee, 107
Nuclear Codes and Standards (NS&S) Task Team, 107, 108, 109,
110, 112
Nuclear Cranes Committee, 107
Nuclear Quality Assurance Committee, 107
Nuclear Risk Management Coordinating Committee (NRMCC),
108, 110
Qualifications of Mechanical Equipment Committee, 107
RIP-50 TG (Risk-Informed Part 50 Task Group), 107
risk-informed ISI and IST implementation, 90, 95
risk initiatives, 110, 112
Risk Management Strategic Plan, 107, 108, 109
Standards Committees and, 107
Subcommittee, Nuclear Accreditation, 107
Subcommittee, Section III (Nuclear Power), 108
Subcommittee Section III, Division 1, 108
Subcommittee Section III, Division 2, 108
Subcommittee Section III, Division 3, 108
Subcommittee XI (Inservice Inspection), 107, 109, 111, 112
Working Group on Implementation of Risk-Based Examination
(IRBE), 94, 97
Working Group on Optimization, 97
Working Group on Risk, 97
American Society of Mechanical Engineers Board on Pressure
Technology Codes and Standards (BPTCS), 107
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code (Code), 25, 143, 168, 171, 181,
adoption by USNRC, 353–354
allowable crack depth, 24
alternate inspection method for nozzle inner radii, 10
canister design requirements for radioactive materials, 349
comparison of code structure with French codes, 196
comparison with Pressure Equipment Directive, 144, 192
design fatigue curves, 34, 42
environmental fatigue effects, 21
identification for Canadian pressure equipment, 169
initiatives, 108, 110
Master Curve test method, 43
pressure equipment directive perspectives, 129–157
vs. RCC-M French code, 228–230, 233, 236–243, 246
reactor vessel inspection requirements, 71–72
requirements quantifying U.S. Type B transportation requirements,
334
risk-informed code cases, 107
stresses permitted in radioactive material packaging, 340, 341
weld-overlay-type repairs, 18
weld repair criteria, 13
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Committee, Risk-Informed Code Cases, 90
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Standards Committee, 159, 324
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC) Working Group on Flaw
Evaluation, 22, 127
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Codes and
Standards, 107
B 16.5, 316
B 31G, 376, 397–400
B 31.1 (Power Piping), 34, 42, 103, 170, 172, 188, 191, 209, 246
vs. CODETI, 216
vs. Japanese codes, 270–271
B 31.3 (Process Piping Code), 170, 188,
vs. CODETI, 216
vs. EN 13445, 208
Table 326.1, 169
B 31.4 (Pipeline System Repairs), 170, 188, 395, 405–406
B 31.5 (Refrigeration Piping and Heat Transfer Components), 170,
188
B 31.8 (Pipeline Repairs), 377, 395, 403, 405–406, 422
B 31.8S (Managing System Integrity of Gas Pipelines), 376–377,
403, 422
B 31.9 (Building Services Piping), 170, 188
NQA, 101, 102, 108, 109
NQA-1, Appendix (Risk-Inform), 101, 102, 108
RA-S, 110
RA-S-2002, 90, 106–107, 110, 111
Addenda-2003, 106
RA-S-2003, 106, 110
RA-Sa-2003, 110
Table 1.3-1, 91
RA-Sa-2003 Addenda (PRA Standards), 91, 110, 111. See also
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Standards.
SNT-TC-1A (Certification of NDE Personnel), 249
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Codes and
Standards Redesign Process, 90
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Section
XI Working Group on Flaw Evaluation, 46, 118
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Section
XI Working Group on Operating Plant Criteria, 45
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Commission paper
COMNJD-002 (On Probabilistic Risk Assessment [PRA]), 108
COMNJD-03-0002 (On PRA Quality), 108
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) construction
code, 169
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Council on
Codes and Standards, 90
Project Team, to develop PRA Standard, 90–91
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Ferrous
Material Specifications (SA specifications), specific types
SA 240, 142
SA 312, 142
SA 370, 359
SA 503 Cl.3 (Reactor Vessel Steel Composition), 243
SA-508-2, 44
SA-508-CLI, 19
SA-533-B1, 44
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690 • Index
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Innovative
Technologies Institute, 110
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Nonferrous
Material Specifications (SB specifications), SB-166,19
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Operations and
Maintenance Code for Nuclear Power Plants (O&M Code)
Appendix II (Check Valve Condition Monitoring Program), 105
Code cases, 109
Inservice Inspection (ISI) code, 108
Inservice Testing (IST) code, 103, 109
OMN-Code 1995 Edition-1996 Addenda, 105
OMN-1, 105
OMN-3 (Risk Categorization), 103, 104, 105, 106, 112
OMN-4 (Treatment of Check Valves), 103–106, 112
OMN-4 White Paper, 105, 112
OMN-7 (Treatment of Pumps), 103–106, 112
OMN-10 (Snubbers), 103–106, 112
OMN-11 (Treatment of Motor-Operated Valves), 103–106, 112
OMN-12 (Treatment of Pneumatic and Hydraulic Valves),
103–106, 112
risk-informed Code Cases, 90, 94, 106, 108, 109, 112
Subsection ISTC, code test, 105
Subsection ISTC, LSS check valve code test, 105
Subsection ISTD (Inservice Testing of Dynamic Restraints
[Snubbers] in Light-Water Reactor Power Plants), 106
Subsection ISTE, 103
testing strategies for HSS/LSS components, 103
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Operations and
Maintenance Code for Nuclear Power Plants (O&M Code)
Code Committee, 103–104, 109
Task Group on Component Importance Ranking, 103
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Performance
Test Codes, PTC25, Section 2, 359
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Probabilistic
Risk Assessment (PRA) Standard, 89–92, 107–110, 112
Addenda to, 107
Addendum b, 111
content additions, 109
evolution of, 90–91
Figure 3.1-1 (Flow Chart for Evaluating PRA Capability), 93
for external events, 110
flow chart for evaluating capability, 93
Independent Decision-Making Panel, 94, 100, 110
integrate into other ASME risk-informed Codes and Standards, 107
for internal events, 110, 112
Level 1, 91, 96
Level 2, risk-informed, 91, 96, 110
Level 3, risk-informed, 110
objectives of, 90, 91
potential new standards, 162
quality assurance of PRAs, 95
scope, 108, 110
Section 1 (Introduction/Scope), 92
Section 2 (Acronyms, Terms), 91
Section 3 (Application of), 91–92
Section 4 (Technical Requirements), 91–92
Section 5 (Configuration Control), 92
Section 6 (Peer Reviews), 92
Table 1.3-1 (Capability Categories for PRA), 91
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Pressure Vessel
Research Council (PVRC) Workshop on the Environmental
Effects on Fatigue Performance, 20
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Research Task
Force on risk-Based Inservice Testing Guidelines, CRTD-Vol.
40-2, 103, 108
American Society of Mechanical Engineers PVHO-1 (Safety
Standard for Pressure Vessels for Human Occupancy), 169,
188
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section
Subgroup on Range, 124
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) website
(www.asme.org), 107
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Working Group
on Check Valves, 103
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Working Group
on Codes Strategy, 258
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Working Group
on Motor-Operated Valve, 103
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Working Group
on Pumps, 103
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Working Group
Pressure (WGP), Standing Committee, 131
guideline for PED, 144
American Welding Society (AWS), 163
AMP. See Aging management program,
AMR. See Aging management review.
Anhydrous ammonia service, pressure vessels, 170
ANI. See Authorized Nuclear Inspector.
ANII. See Authorized Nuclear Inservice Inspector.
Annex Z, 147, 149, 193
Annulus spacers, 164
ANS. See American Nuclear Society.
ANSI. See American National Standards Institute.
Anticipated transients without scram (ATWS), 31, 42
APA. See Administrative Procedure Act.
API. See American Petroleum Institute.
Appliances burning gaseous fuels, New Approach Directive, 145
Approval of Type B Quantity and Fissile Material Packagings,
341–342, 344
Architectural Institute of Japan, stress analysis of concrete structures,
288–289
Argonne National Laboratory, 21–23, 86
Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 nuclear power plant, 97
Arrhenius equation, 76
Asada, Yasuhide, 112, 257, 276, 292
Asbestos removal, 428, 431
As Low As is Reasonably Achievable (ALARA), 440, 447, 450, 462,
463, 471
As Low As is Reasonably Practical (ALARP) region, 385
ASME. See American Society of Mechanical Engineers.
Asme Code at Paks Npp, Hungary 589
ASNT. See American Society for Nondestructive Testing.
Asphalt enamel coatings, for pipeline systems, 409, 412–413
Assemblies, in Pressure Equipment Directive, 130, 151, 153, 155
Assembly, definition, 218
Association Française de Ingenieurs en Appareils à Pression
(AFIAP), 255
ASTM. See American Society for Testing and Materials.
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), 29, 338, 341, 343, 591, 594, 625,
627, 633, 655–659, 662–663, 665, 677
Atomic Energy Control Board, Ottawa, Canada, 188
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, 187
Atomic Industrial Forum, 89
Attachment weld, 13, 72, 367
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ATWS. See Anticipated transients without scram. reactor pressure vessel (RPV) outlet nozzle butt weld
Audits, age management program/review (AMP/AMR), 34, 36–39 leakage, 70
Austenitic-ferritic stainless steels repair, 81
for industrial piping, French codes, 142, 191, 553, 554 as small leaks, 73, 96
for pressure equipment, French codes, 252, 253 through-wall, in Alloys 82/182 butt weld, 69–70
for pressure vessels, French codes, 205, 208 Axial shell welds, reactor pressure vessel inservice inspection, 8
for pressure vessels, Japanese codes, 263, 264 Axial shrinkage, in weld repairs, 18
Austenitic stainless steels Axial tension, of cylinders, 115
for calandria material, 163
chloride attack susceptibility, 63 Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) designed PWR power plants, 64–66
for containment vessels, 348 Back-wall echo criteria, 249
for containment vessels for radioactive materials, 345, 346 Bar, definition, 131
for cryogenic portable tanks, 367 Barenblatt model, 113
dissimilar metal welds, 19, 72 Barlow equation, 401
environmental fatigue effects, 21, 28 Baseline Assessment Plan, pipeline systems, 376
fatigue crack growth rate in air environments, 5, 21 Base metal, welds, examination of, 52
fatigue crack growth rate in water environment, 4–6, 9, 21–22, 24, Basic Safety Standards (BSS), 290
28 Batelle, 387, 398, 422
flaw evaluation, FFS code (Japan), 281–282 Beam flexural tests, 186
for industrial piping, French codes, 217, 222, 226, 229, 230 Beam lift-off tests, 186
irradiation embrittlement of, 59 Beltline material, 16
mechanical properties, 63 Bending moment, 4
piping flaw evaluation, 116–118, 121, 124 of cylinders, 116–117
piping, fracture evaluation method, Japanese codes, 281, 283 of supports, PD 5500 (U.K.), 319
piping, intergranular stress corrosion cracking, 25 Bending rupture energy, in pressure equipment, 157
piping, safety factors for evaluating flawed, 19–20 Bending stresses, 46, 116
piping, structural factors, 118 of containment vessels for radioactive materials, 345
for pressure equipment, French codes, 224, 229, 230, 234, 250 French codes, 191, 193, 196, 253, 653
for pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 311–320, 322–330 nuclear power plant piping, 296, 299
for pressure vessels, French codes, 224, 237, 253 nuclear pressure vessels, PD 5500 (U.K.), 324
for pressure vessels, Japanese codes, 263–264, 266–268, 271 Bending stress intensity factor, 46
primary system pressure boundary piping, repair of, 19 Bend test
similar metal weld overlays, 19 French codes, 253
stress corrosion cracking (SCC) analysis, 2, 63 pressure vessel, Japanese codes, 263–264
wrought, crack extension and plastic collapse, 117 Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory
Austenitic steels WAPD-BT-16, 85
allowable stresses, pressure equipment, 139, 157 WAPD-TM-944, 85
in pressure equipment, 157 B factor, 251
Authorized Inspection Agencies (AIA), 101, 366 BG Technology. See Advantica, British gas.
CANDU® nuclear power plants, 172, 175 Bidirectional exercise test, 105
Authorized Inspectors (AI), 365–637 Biofouling, 33
certification, 254 Blowoff systems, 169
Authorized Nuclear Inservice Inspector (ANII), 102 Blowoff vessels, 169
Authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANI), 541, 627, 677 BMI. See Bottom-mounted instrument nozzle.
Automobiles, high-pressure cylinders for on-board natural gas fuel BNCS. See American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
storage, Canadian standards, 168, 170 Board on Nuclear Codes and Standards.
Automotive propane vessels, Canadian standards, 168 BNQ. See Bureau de normalization du Québec.
Aviation and Transportation Act (2001), 420 Boilers. See also Pressure vessels.
AWS. See American Welding Society. Canadian non-nuclear standards, 162
Axial flaws (cracks), 14–15, 17–18, 49, 74, 118 Canadian standards, 160–163, 168
applied stress intensity factor for pressure loading, 49 failure modes, French codes, 198, 218
causes of, 67 French codes, 191, 193, 196, 253,
in circumferential welds, 49 inservice inspection, Canadian, 181–187
in control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) nozzles, 76 in scope of PED, 130–131
deterministic crack growth rates, 76 Boiling water reactor (BWR)
leakage in boiling water reactor (BWR), 74 vs. CANDU® design, 163
nondestructive testing to determine, 72 control rod drive stub tube cracking, 12
piping, safety/structural factors, 118 feedwater nozzle, 8–10, 12
in plate material, 15 ferritic stainless steel fatigue crack growth, 22
in pressurized water reactor (PWR) inlet/outlet nozzles, 74 fitness-for-service code (Japanese), 280
in primary water SCC in alloy 600 CRDM nozzle, 69 inclusion criteria (Level A) for high-safety significant (HSS)
propagation, 69 snubbers, 106
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692 • Index

Boiling water reactor (BWR) (continued) Bolted connections

In-Core Housing, 12 alloy 286 failures, 59
intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) issue, 74, 81, 83, torqued, 59
85, 94, 97, 106 Bolted flange connections
internals, 1–6 CODAP future specifications, 208
jet pump recirculation system, 1, 4–7, 13, 24 CODETI future development, 216
licensing, 15 Bolting, for pressure equipment, 138
nozzles, 11, 17, 19 Bolt preload, 45
pressure boundary piping, service-induced degradation in, 24 Bolts, 129
shroud, 24 Boric acid
steam dryer, 14–15, 24 accumulation, from CRDM nozzle leakage, 69
stress corrosion cracking growth rate, 2–3, 13–14, 24–26, 28, 33, corrosion, 63, 69, 74
57, 59, 63 corrosion, cross-section of Davis-Besse reactor vessel head, 70, 72,
weld overlay, 1 74–75, 84
weld overlay repairs of dissimilar metal welds at nozzles, 81 deposit due to leakage, 72
Boiling water reactor (BWR) environment preexisting deposits, 71, 75
austenitic stainless steel, fatigue crack growth rate in, 21–22 wastage, 84
ferritic steels, SCC growth rate relationship, 23 wastage in large leaks, 71
Boiling water reactor/2 (BWR/2) material, 12–16 Boron
Boiling water reactor/2 (BWR/2) plant, shroud support geometry, 14 alloy presence and PWSCC, 67
Boiling water reactor/3 (BWR/3) material, 15–16 in primary coolant water in PWR plants, 68
Boiling water reactor/4 (BWR/4) material, 15–16 Boron corrosion, from stub tube cracking leakage, 12
Boiling water reactor/5 (BWR/5) material, 15–16 Borosilicate glass, 436
Boiling water reactor/6 (BWR/6) material, 15–16 Bottom-mounted instrument (BMI) nozzles, 65
Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Owners Group effect of temperature on PWSCC, 82
analysis, 16 examination of, 70
flaw evaluation guidelines, 22 inspections, 71
objectives, 15 partial penetrations welds, 72
pipe cracking in boiling water reactors, 17 PWSCC leakage, 70–71
Topical Report, 15–16, 26, 41 strategic planning for PWSCC, 84
NEDO-32205, Revision 1, 25–26 Boundary collocation methods, 45
weld-overlay studies, 18 Bounding assumptions
Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Owners Group Intergranular Stress for crack growth due to IASCC, 60
Corrosion Cracking Research Program, 17 for loss of toughness due to irradiation, 60
Boiling water reactor (BWR) plant, 16 Bounding crack growth evaluation, 24
design basis for, 20–21 Bounding curve, 53
personnel radiation exposure, 53 Bounding locations, in fatigue monitoring program, 37
plant safety, 53 BPTCS. See American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
use of alloy 600 base metal, 63 Board on Pressure Technology Codes and Standards.
Boiling water reactor (BWR) vessel, 1–6, 16 Branch Technical Position RSB 5-2, 45, 60
attachment weld cracking, 13–14 Brazing
hydrostatic test temperature, reference temperature, 45 code compliance, 80
service-induced degradation in, 24 joints, 140
Boiling Water Reactor Vessels and Internals Project (BWRVIP), 1–6, repair/replacement, 96
24 Brazing procedures, registration, Canadian, 169
BWRVIP-03, 25 Breaking pin devices, 359
BWRVIP-5 Report (BWR Reactor Pressure Vessel Shell Weld British Central Electricity Generating Board’s (CEGB) R-6
Inspection Recommendations), 7–8, 10–11, 25 two-criteria failure assessment program, 119, 128
BWRVIP-14 (Evaluation of Crack Growth in BWR Stainless Steel British Gas (BG technology), 387, 397
Internals), 2–3, 23, 25, 28 British R-6 method, 114, 119, 121
BWRVIP-17, 26 British Standards (BS), specific types, 259
BWRVIP-59, 23 1113 (water-tubesteam generating plant), 311, 314, 316
BWRVIP-60, 23, 26 1500 (fusion-welded pressure vessels for general purposes), 309,
BWRVIP-99, 25 314, 330
BWRVIP-100, 25 1501, 310–311
BWRVIP-108, 11, 26 1501-224-490A or 490B, 310
crack growth rate relationship, 23 1501-304-S61, 311
enhanced visual (VT) examinations for managing aging effect in, 1503, 311
60 1515, 309, 314–315, 330
flaw evaluation, 24 1560, 316
inspection systems, 7 2790 (shell boiler of welded construction), 311
roll expansion repair document, 13 3915 (steel vessels for primary circuits of nuclear reactors), 315
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4504, 316 large-diameter piping, deterministic crack growth rate predictions,

4975 (prestressed concrete pressure vessels for nuclear 77–78
engineering), 311 large diameter piping, residual stress in, 83
4994 (vessels and tanks in reinforced plastics), 311 large-diameter PWR pipe-to-nozzle, circumferential cracking, 74
5169 (fusion-welded steel air receivers), 311 nozzle-to-safe end, 72
5500 (unfired fusion-welded pressure vessels), 309, 311, 321, 324, outlet nozzle, 69–70
330–331 piping, PWSCC in, 74
7005 (carbon steel vessels for use in vapor compression PWR reactor vessel inlet/outlet, cracks/leaks in, 63, 66
refrigeration systems), 311 residual stress, 83
EN 286 (simple unfired pressure vessels designed to contain air or strategic planning for PWSCC, 83
nitrogen), 311, 314 weld shrinkage, 67
British Standards Guide, BS 7910, 121 BWR. See Boiling water reactors.
British Standards Institution (BSI), 309 BWRVIP. See Boiling Water Reactor Vessels and Internals Project.
Brittle fracture
allowable pressure-temperature and, 55 CAA. See Clean Air Act.
boilers, French codes, 222 Cadmium coating, French codes, 248
codes and regulations for prevention, 44–50 Calculation pressure, 325
at embrittled vessel beltline region, 55 Calculation temperature, 325
ferritic steels at lower shelf, 113 Calandria, 163–164
French codes, 253 assembly, CANDU® nuclear power plants, 174–175
industrial piping, French codes, 253 vessel, 174
of packaging of radioactive materials, 339 Californium-252, 343, 351
of pressure equipment, 156 Call before you dig (First call) program, 416
of pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 312 Canadian Boiler and Pressure Vessel Standards, 159–160
of pressure vessels, 200 Category A, 182
of pressurized water reactor vessels, 43, 49–50 class 1 components, 175–176, 195–196
prevention, Japanese codes, 270 class 1C components, 178
temperature and, 50 class 2 components, 176
toughness conformance of pressure equipment, 147 class 2C components, 178
Browns Ferry Unit 1, 29 class 3 components, 176
BS. See British Standard. BSI. class 3C components, 178
See British Standards Institution. class 4 components, 176
BSS. See Basic Safety Standards. development and implementation, 160
Buckling, 352 Figure 48.1 (CSA Standard-Developing Process), 160–161
containment vessels for radioactive materials, 346, 348 Figure 48.2 (CANDU® Primary Heat Transport System), 164
dished ends, and PD 5500 (U.K.), 312 Figure 48.3 (CANDU® Primary Heat Transport System), 165
French codes, 191, 193, 196, 253, 653 Figure 48.4 (CANDU® 6 Fuel Channel Assembly), 164–165
interstiffener, 313–314, Figure 48.5 (Simplified Schematic of CANDU® Fuel Channel
light stiffeners for shells, 318 Assembly), 164–165
nuclear pressure vessels, PD 5500 (U.K.), 323 Figure 48.6 (Schematic Overview of CANDU® Online Refueling
overall, 313 System), 176
as pipeline failure mode, 374 Table 48.1 (CSA B 51 Standard: Classification of Pipe Fittings), 169
pressure vessels, 200 Table 48.2 (CSA N285.5 and N287.7 Interfaces-Requirements for
pressure vessels, PD 5500 (U.K.), 313–321, 323–330 Inspection and Testing of Containment System Components),
of radioactive material packaging, 340–341 172, 174, 176
Buckling strain, theoretical, for a perfectly circular cylinder, 314–315 Canadian Boiler and Pressure Vessel Standards, specific types
Bugey 3 nuclear power plant, 69 A series (Construction Materials), 163
Bulk low specific activity materials, 347 B series (Tolerance Specifications and Pressure Boundary
Bureau de normalization du Québec (BNQ), 160 Standards), 163
Bureau of Explosives (Association of American Railroads) permits B51-03, Part 2, 170
for radioactive materials packages, 340 B51-03, Part 3, 170
Burnishing, to reduce potential PWSCC, 82 C series (Electrical Codes and Standards), 163
Bursting G series (Structural Steel Specification), 163
boilers, French codes, 222, 253 S Series (Construction and Structural Specifications), 163
nuclear pressure vessels, PD 5500 (U.K.), 323 W series (Welding Specifications), 163
pressure vessels, 200 Z series (Quality Assurance Programs), 163
Buttering, 65 CAN/CSA-B51 (Boilers, Pressure Vessels, and Pressure piping),
Butt welds, 63 162, 168, 172
Alloys 82/182, 66, 69 subcommittees for, 168
CRDM nozzles, examination of, 75 CAN/CSA-B51-03 (Pressure Vessel Design and Construction),
dissimilar metal, inspection requirements, 73 159, 162, 168, 172
inlet/outlet nozzle, examination of, 74 CAN/CSA-B52 (Mechanical Refrigeration Code), 162, 170
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694 • Index
Canadian Boiler and Pressure Vessel Standards,
specific types (continued)
CAN/CSA-B149.1 (Natural Gas and Propane Installation Code),
162, 170
CAN/CSA-B 149.2 (Propane Storage and Handling Code), 162,
169–170,
CAN/CSA-B 149.5 (Installation Code for Propane Fuel Systems
and Tanks on Highway Vehicles), 162
CAN/CSA-N285(A) (Pressure-Retaining Components), 163
CAN/CSA-N285(B) (Periodic Inspection), 163
CAN/CSA-N285.0 (Nuclear Boiler and Pressure Vessel Design
and Construction), Classes 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 1C, 2C, 3C, 172, 179
CAN/CSA-N285.0, revision, 162
CAN/CSA-N285.0-95 (General Requirements, Classification,
Registration, and Reporting), 159
CAN/CSA-N285.1 (Classes 1, 2, and 3 Components), 171
CAN/CSA-N285.2, 172, 174, 175, 179
CAN/CSA-N285.2-99 (Mobile Online Refueling Machines
Guidelines), 169
CAN/CSA-285.3 (Requirements for Containment System
Components in CANDU® Nuclear Power Plants, 171, 176
CAN/CSA-N285.3-88 (CANDU® Containment Systems), 159
CAN/CSA-N285.4 (Periodic Inspection of CANDU® Nuclear
Power Plant Components, 174, 181–185, 187
CAN/CSA-285.4-94 (Periodic Inspection of Primary Nuclear
Systems), 159
CAN/CSA-N285.5 (Periodic Inspection of CANDU® Nuclear
Power Plant Containment Components), 174, 176, 181, 184,
185, 187
CAN/CSA-N285.5-M90 (Periodic Inspection of Containment
Components, Metallic and Plastic), 184
CAN/CSA-N285.6 Series (Reactor Core Internals, Material
Fabrication and Testing), 159
CAN/CSA-N285.6 (Material Standards for Reactor Components
for CANDU® Nuclear Power Plants), 174, 176–177
CAN/CSA-N285.6, revision, 177
CAN/CSA-285.6.1 (Pressure Tubes for Use in CANDU® Fuel
Channels), 177, 187
CAN/CSA-N285.6.2 (Seamless Zirconium Alloy Tubing for
Reactivity Control Units), 177
CAN/CSA-N285.6.3 (Annealed Seamless Zirconium Alloy Tubing
for Liquid-Injection System (LISS) Nozzles), 177
CAN/CSA-N285.6.4 (Thin-Walled, Large-Diameter Zirconium
Alloy Tubing), 177
CAN/CSA-N285.6.5 (Zirconium Alloy Wire for Fuel Channel
Spacers), 177
CAN/CSA-N285.6.6 (Nondestructive Examination Criteria for
Zirconium Alloys), 176
CAN/CSA-N285.6.7 (Zirconium Alloy Design Data), 176–177
CAN/CSA-N285.6.8 (Martensitic Stainless Steel for Fuel Channel
End Fittings), 177
CAN/CSA-N285.6.9 (Materials for Supports for Pressure-Retaining
Items), 177
CAN/CSA-N285.8 (Flaw Evaluation of CANDU® Zirconium
Alloy Pressure Tubes), 159, 181, 187
Annex A, 186
Annex B, 186
Annex C, 186
Annex D, 186
Annex E, 186
CAN/CSA-N286 Series (Quality Assurance Program
Requirements), 159, 163, 177–178
CAN/CSA-N286.0, 174, 177
CAN/CSA-N286.1 (Procurement Quality Assurance Program
Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants), 174, 177
CAN/CSA-286.2 (Design Quality Assurance for Nuclear Power
Plants), 177
CAN/CSA-N286.3 (Construction Quality Assurance for Nuclear
Power Plants), 177
CAN/CSA-N286.4 (Commissioning Quality Assurance for
Nuclear Power Plants), 177
CAN/CSA-N286.5 (Operations Quality Assurance for Nuclear
Power Plants), 177
CAN/CSA-N286.6 (Decommissioning Quality Assurance for
Nuclear Power Plants), 177
CAN/CSA-N286.7 (Quality Assurance of Critical Computer
Programs, Nuclear Power Plants), 177–178
CAN/CSA-N287 (CANDU® Concrete Containment Structures and
Systems), 163, 171, 176, 178
CAN/CSA-N287.1 (General Requirements), 178
CAN/CSA-N287.1-M82 (CANDU® Concrete Containment
Systems), 159
CAN/CSA-N287.2 (Material Requirements), 178
CAN/CSA-N287.3 (Design Requirements), 178
CAN/CSA-N287.4 (Construction, Fabrication, and Installation
Requirements), 178
CAN/CSA-N287.5 (Examination and Testing Requirements), 178
CAN/CSA-N287.6 (Preoperational Proof and Leakage Rate
Testing Requirements), 178, 186
CAN/CSA-N287.7 (Inservice Examination and Testing
Requirements for Concrete Containment Structures for
CANDU® Nuclear Power Plants), 178–179, 184, 185–186
Appendix (Annex) A, 186
Appendix (Annex) B, 186
Appendix (Annex) C, 186
Appendix (Annex) D, 186
CAN/CSA-N287.7-96 (Periodic Inspection of Containment
Components, Concrete and Structural), 159
CAN/CSA-N288 (Environmental Radiation Protection), 163
CAN/CSA-N289 (Seismic Qualification of CANDU® Nuclear
Power Plant Structures and Systems), 159, 163, 171, 179
CAN/CSA-N289.1 (General Requirements for Identification and
Qualification), 179
CAN/CSA-N289.2 (Ground Motion Determination), 179
CAN/CSA-N289.3 (Design Procedures), 179
CAN/CSA-N289.4 (Testing Procedures), 179
CAN/CSA-N289.5 (Instrumentation, Inspection, and Records), 179
CAN/CSA-N290 (Safety and Safety-Related Systems), 163
CAN/CSA-N291 (Safety-Related Structures), 163
CAN/CSA-N292 (Waste Management), 163
CAN/CSA-N293 (Fire Protection), 163
CAN/CSA-N294 (Decommissioning), 163
CAN/CSA-Z180.1 (Compressed Breathing Air and Systems), 162,
170
CAN/CSA-Z299 (Canadian Quality Control Program), 168
CAN/CSA-Z305.1 (Nonflammable Medical Gas Piping Systems),
162, 170
CAN/CSA-Z305.3 (Pressure Regulators, Gauges, and Flow-Metering
Devices for Medical Gases), 170
CAN/CSA-Z662 (Oil and Gas Pipeline Systems), 162, 170, 403,
405–406
Appendix N, 376–377
CAN/CSA-Z662-03 (Oil and Gas Pipeline Systems), 159, 170–171
Appendix K, 400
ASME_IND_III_p687-746.qxd 6/5/09 4:33 PM Page 695
COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 695
CAN3-Z305.4 (Qualification Requirements for Agencies Testing
Nonflammable Gas Piping Systems), 170
CAN/ULC-S603.1 (Galvanic Corrosion Protection Systems for
Underground Steel Tanks), 169, 189
RMA IP-2 (Rubber Manufacturer’s Association), 170
Canadian Deuterium Uranium (CANDU®) reactor design and
licensing basis, 159
CANDU® Owners Group (COG), 187
CANDU® 6 reactor, 163–165, 169
concrete containment structures, 178
design, 163
fuel channel assembly, 164–165
power reactors, 171
Canadian General Standards Board (CGSB), 160
testing and construction materials standards, 162–163
Canadian non-nuclear standards, 162
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), 159, 171
Canadian nuclear standards, 163
Canadian Registration Numbers (CRNs), 159, 169
Canadian standards
NRCC 38726 (National Building Code of Canada), 179, 189
NRCC 38727 (National Fire Code of Canada), 189
Canadian Standards Association (CSA), 160
annexes, nonmandatory and mandatory, 162
boiler and pressure vessel standards development, 161
CSA-SDP-2.1-99, 188
CSA-SDP-2.2-98, 188
format and structure of standards, 161–162
headquarters address, to obtain standards, 168
non-nuclear boiler, pressure vessel, and piping design and
construction standards, 168–171
nuclear boiler and pressure vessel design and construction
standards, 171–181
nuclear boiler and pressure vessel inservice inspection standards,
181–187
nuclear standards, 161–162
Nuclear Strategic Steering Committee (NSSC), 163
publications and updates, 162
standards developing process, 160–161
technical committees (TCs), 160
CSA N285B Technical Committee, 181
CSA N287 Technical Committee, 180, 185
Web site and headquarters address, 160
Canadian Transportation Safety Board, 372
CANTEACH Web site, 166, 189
Capacity certification test report, 173
Carbides, 16–17
PWSCC and density of, 68
Carbon, alloy presence and PWSCC, 67
Carbon-manganese steels
fast breeder reactor material, 251
for industrial piping, French codes, 223–224
for pressure equipment, French codes, 201–202, 236–237
for pressure equipment PD 5500 (U.K.), 311–312
Carbon steels
boiling water reactor piping, 16
for containment vessels for radioactive materials, 346
dissimilar metal welds, 63
environmental fatigue effects, 21
fatigue life in high-temperature reactor water, 21
for industrial piping, French codes, 223–224
J estimation, 114–115
piping, circumferential flaws, 118–119
piping, flaw evaluation, 118, 127
pressure equipment, EN 13445, 328
for pressure equipment, French codes, 201–202, 236–237, 242, 250
for pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 311, 324, 329
for pressure equipment, U.K. and PED codes, 311
for pressure vessels, Japanese codes, 282–283, 287, 297
reactor vessel head, 84
for transport tanks, 359, 365
weldments, piping, circumferential flaws, 118–119
Carbon steels, specific types
SA-106, Grade B, 16
SA302Bmod, 16
SA 302B, plates, 16
SA-333, Grade 6, 16, 115
SA-376 304N, 81
A508, 28
SA-508 class 2, 81
SA-516, Grade 70, 16
A533B, 28
SA533B, plate, 16
Carlsbad, New Mexico pipeline incident, 371, 374
Carrier, 337
Cask code, Japanese codes, 289–290
Cask design
for Type B radioactive materials, 348
Casks, shipping, for radioactive materials, 340, 343–345, 347
CASS. See Cast austenitic stainless steel.
Cast austenitic stainless steel (CASS)
irradiation embrittlement in, 59
thermal aging embrittlement in, 59
Castings, European standards, 236
Cast stainless steel, piping, fracture evaluation (Japanese codes), 281,
284
Cast steel, in pressure equipment, 157
Categorization of components strategy, 59
Category 0, 131, 133, 134
Category I, 131, 133–136, 138, 143, 147, 153
Category II, 131–138, 140, 143, 147, 152, 154
Category III, 133–138, 140, 142-143, 147, 152, 154
Category IV, 133–138, 140, 142–143, 145, 152, 154
Cathodic protection
for pipeline system assessment, 391–394
for pipeline systems, 413, 410–411, 412–414
for pipeline systems, calculation of resistance values, 413–414
for pipeline systems, monitoring of, 415–416
CAVS. See Crack arrest/advance verification system.
CCDP. See Core damage probability.
CCV. See Concrete containment vessels.
CDA. See Copper Development Association.
CDF. See Core damage frequency.
CE. See Combustion Engineering.
CEA. See Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique.
CEDM. See Control element drive mechanism.
CEGB. See British Central Electricity Generating Board.
CEN (European Standardization Body for Mechanical Equipment),
144, 150
represented in Working Group Pressure Standing Committee, 144
standard, 324
Central Electricity Generating Board Reports
R/H/R6, 114, 127
R/H/R6, Revision 3, 121, 127
ASME_IND_III_p687-746.qxd 6/5/09 4:33 PM Page 696
696 • Index
CERCLA. See Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act.
Certificate of Authorization (ASME), 169
Certificate of Compliance (CoC), 350–355
Certificate of Conformity, 136, 144, 156
Certification, CANDU® nuclear power plants, 174
Certified Individual (CI), 365–366
CFER Technology, 384, 385
CFR. See United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC)
Code of Federal Regulation.
CGR. See Crack growth rate.
CGSB. See Canadian General Standards Board.
Change-in-risk evaluation, 96
Charpy energy curve, 125
Charpy KV tests, pressure equipment, French codes, 235
Charpy V-notch (CVN) absorbed energy, 118
Charpy V-notch (CVN) impact test, 54
carbon steels, PD 5500 (U.K.), 312
fracture toughness transition due to temperature, 50
monitoring changes in fracture toughness, 45
of pressurized water reactor vessel materials, 44
surveillance data, 50–51
transport tanks, 359–360
Charpy V-notch (CVN) upper shelf energy (USE), 15, 121, 124
pipeline systems, 397, 400
Check valves
high-safety significant (HSS), testing strategy for, 100
low-safety significant (LSS), 100
RI-IST, 100
Chemical attack, of pressure equipment, 153
Chemical plants, 110, 168
Chemical resistance, pressure equipment conformance, 143
Chemical testing, 248
Chemical Volume and Control System (CVCS), risk-informed safety
significance, 100
Chinese Daya Bay 1 and 2 contract, 193–194
Chinese nuclear power plants, 193–194, 293
Chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking, 63–64
Chromium, solution heat treatment (SHT) and, 17
Chromium alloys, for use in PWR vessels, 63–64
Chromium carbide, 66
boundary deposition in PWHT, 63
Chromium concentration, susceptibility to PWSCC and, 66–67
Chromium-molybdenum steels
fast breeder reactor material, 251
for industrial piping, French codes, 222–223
for pressure equipment, French codes, 201–203,
236–237, 241
Chromium-molybdenum-vanadium steels
for industrial piping, French codes, 222
for pressure equipment, French codes, 201–203, 236–237, 251
Chromium steels, for pressure equipment, Japanese codes, 287
CI. See Certified Individual.
Circumferential cracks (flaws), 4, 15, 18, 49, 69–70, 118–120
in boiling water reactor (BWR), 74
crack growth predictions for, 76–77
on control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) nozzles, 69
flaw size for nozzle failure, 79
nondestructive testing to determine, 73
in plate material, 15
in PWR RPV CRDM nozzles, 74–75, 77–78
in PWR RPV inlet/outlet nozzles, 74
tensile strength causes, 67
in top head nozzles, 72–73
Circumferential reference flaw, 48–49
Circumferential welds
assumed axial flaws in, 49
BWR reactor pressure vessel examination requirements, 8
BWR reactor pressure vessel failure frequency, 8
BWR shroud cracking, 2
Civil Aeronautic Law, 260
Cladding, 52, 56, 65, 66, 153, 460
alloy 65, 66, 69
alloys 82/182 crack detection, 70
alloys 82/182 used for, 65
corrosion-resistant, 17
stainless steel, on inside of pressurized water reactor vessel top
head, 74
stress corrosion cracking initiation, 25
Class 1 components, 174
ASME Code requirement development, 103
austenitic stainless steel piping, 26
BWR intervals, 1
design control provisions, 102
as high-safety significant (HSS), 100–101
piping, flaws and continuing service, 18
piping, RI-ISI requirements, 94–97
piping, Section XI inspections, 94
piping, structural factors, 118
reactor coolant pressure boundary structures, systems, and
components, 99
transport tanks, 366–367
Class 2 components
ASME Code requirements development, 103
austenitic stainless steel piping, 26
high-safety significance, 101
piping, RI-ISI requirements, 94–97
piping, structural factors, 118
reactor coolant system SSC makeup, 99
transport tanks, 366–367
Class 3 components
ASME Code requirement development, 103
austenitic stainless steel piping, 26
high-safety significance, 101
piping, RI-ISI requirements, 94–97
piping, structural factors, 118
reactor coolant system, SSC function of removing heat from
support system, 99
transport tanks, 366–367
Class CC (concrete containment) components, 99
Class MC (metal containment) components, 99
Cleanliness, French codes, 253
Cleanup cost, crude oil pipeline break, 371
CLERP. See Conditional large early release probability.
Cleavage crack, from local brittle zone, 52
Clock Spring(tm) repair, 404–405
Closure plugs, 174
CNRM. See American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
Committee on Nuclear Risk Management (CNRM).
CNSC. See Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.
Coal tar enamel coatings, for pipeline systems, 409–413
Coatings, 143, 409–413
for pipeline systems, property tests, 411–412
pressure vessels, PD 5500 (U.K.), 319
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 697

CoC. See Certificate of Compliance. 1514, 44

CODAP. See Code de Construction des Appareils à Pression. 2260, 362
Code. See American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and OMN-1, 106
Pressure Vessel Code. OMN-3 (Risk Categorization), 103–106, 112
Code allowable stress, 113 OMN-4 (Treatment of Check Valves), 103–105, 112
Code Cases, 197 OMN-7 (Treatment of Pumps, Alternative Requirements for Pump
on environmental fatigue effects, 21 Testing), 103–106, 112
evaluation and repair of stainless steel pipe cracking, 21 OMN-10 (Snubbers), 103–106, 112
French codes, 197 OMN-11 (Treatment of Motor-Operated Valves), 103–106, 112
proposed, environmentally assisted fatigue crack growth in a BWR OMN-12 (Treatment of Pneumatic and Hydraulic Valves),
environment, 22 103–106, 112
risk-informed, 90 Code de construction des Appariels à Pression (CODAP), 138, 139,
Code Cases, specific types 190, 191, 195–198, 201–203, 207–208, 254–255, 314, 316
N-47, 193 Code de construction de générateurs de VAPeur (COVAP), 191–193,
N-XXX (Alternative Acceptance Criteria and Evaluation 195, 217–218, 220, 224, 226, 234, 254–255
Procedure for Ferritic Steel Component Flaws, Upper Shelf Annexes, 201, 222
Range), Revision 4, 124, 128 links with PED, 217, 229
N-432, 19, 27 nominal design stress, 213, 221
N-463, 118, 127 Part G, overheating risk of boilers, 217
N-494, 119, 121, 128 vs. Section I, 224
N-504-2, 27, 86 (Revision 3), 21 Code de construction de Tuyauteries Industrielles (CODETI), 139,
N-512, 15–16, 26 191–193, 195–220, 254–255
N-560 (Alternative Examination Requirements for Class 1, annexes, 212
Category B-J Welds), 94, 95, 111 Category A, 212, 220–222
Method B (Risk-Informed Process), 95 Category B, 212, 220–222
Table of Examining Categories for Category B-J, Class 1 Piping, Category C, 212, 220–222
96 Category D, 212, 220–222
N-560-1, Method A (Risk Ranking of Pipe Segments), 94 Category Ex, 212, 216, 220–222
N-560-2 (Alternative Examination Requirements for Class 1, conformity assessment procedures, 222, 233
Category B-J Welds), 94, 106 design, 208, 213, 215–223
N-577 (Risk-Informed Requirements for Classes 1, 2, & 3 Piping, Division 1, 216
Method A), 94–97, 99, 100, 106, 111 Division 1, scope, 209, 210
Table of Risk-Informed Piping Examinations, 97 Division 2, 216
N-577-1 (Appendix I), Method A, 94–97, 106, 111 Division 3, 216
N-578 (Risk-Informed Requirements for Classes 1, 2, and 3 fabrication, 216, 229
Piping) materials, 212, 223, 228
Method B, 94, 95, 97, 111 Pressure Equipment Directive links, 209, 217
N-578-1 (Risk-Informed Requirements for Classes 1, 2 and 3 Testing and inspection, 223–224, 231–232
Piping) CODETI. See Code de construction de Tuyauteries Industrielles.
Method B, 94, 97, 106, 111 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). See United States Nuclear
N-578-1 (Appendix 1), Method B, 97 Regulatory Commission (USNRC) Code of Federal
N-588, 61 Regulations (CFR).
N-606-1, 13, 26 Code of Record of ASME Section III (Nuclear Vessels), design
N-629, 53–54 risk-informed safety classification, 108
N-631, 53–54 Code stamped devices, on Code Stamped Transport Tanks, 359
N-638, 19, 27 Code year, 174
N-640, 51, 53, 61 COG. See CANDU® Owners Group.
N-641, 50 Cold leg temperatures, 67, 83
N-643, 22, 28 Cold springing stress, 18
N-648-1, 10, 26 Cold work, and Alloy 60 susceptibility to PWSCC, 68
N-660 (Risk-Informed Safety Classification for Use in Collapse, 403
Risk-Informed Repair/Replacement Activities), 98, 99, 100, by limit load, 113
108, 109, 112 of radioactive material packaging, 340–341
N-662 (Alternative Repair/Replacement Requirements for Items Collars, 131
Classified in Accordance with Risk-Informed Processes), Combination impact group assessment, 95
98–103, 113 Combined tension and bending, of cylinders, 115–116
N-662(3)(a), 101 Combustion Engineering (CE)-designed PWR plant, 64–66
N-720, 108 Combustion Engineering (CE) Marking, 129–131, 133–134, 136,
N-722 (Additional Examination for PWR Pressure-Retaining 138, 141, 143, 149
Welds in Class 1 Components Fabricated with Alloys Commercial grade classification, 98
600/82/182 Materials), 71 Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique (CEA), 193, 195
N-722, para. 44.5.1, 72 Committee of Enquiry into the Pressure Vessel Industry (U.K.), 309
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698 • Index

Competent Authority, regulation of hazardous material transportation, Construction specifications, Canadian standards, 163
334 Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear (CSN), 568
Component Contact damage, causing pipeline incidents, 373
categories, 104 Containment boundary, definition, 185
failure, consequences of, 99 Containment building, 165, 461, 469, 528, 638, 644
failure potential, 99 Containment performance assessment, 95
metal fatigue of reactor coolant pressure boundary, 21 Containment surfaces, liner plate, 31, 34
Component designer, CANDU® nuclear power plants, 172 Containment system, 348, 351, 502, 524, 651
Component risk categorization, 104 Containment vessels
Component safety categorization, 104 ferritic steel shipping containers, fracture toughness,
Companion, 25, 41, 333, 347, 355, 513 348, 356
Composite coatings, for pipeline systems, 409–414, 416, 422 for radioactive materials, 345–346, 355
Composite wrap repairs, pipeline systems, 404 structure, cutting access openings, 84
Compressive residual stress, 84 Contaminated material, 339
Compressive stress(es), 67, 83 disposal of, 438, 681
French codes, 246 earth, transportation of, 348
Computational fluid dynamics analysis, 6 Contamination, 355
Computational pipeline monitoring, 416 identifying sources of, 507, 523, 529, 531, 630
Computer programs, quality assurance, for CANDU® nuclear power incidents in European countries, 434, 568, 604
plants, 177–178 Continued crack growth condition, 115
CONCAWE. See Conservation of Air and Water Environment. Continuous venting, prohibition for radioactive material packages,
Concrete components 336, 352–353, 355
load and resistance factor design (LRFD)/risk-informed methods, Control element drive mechanisms (CEDM)
108–109, 112, 400 location, 65
use of load and resistance factor design methods, 108 nozzle, 64, 71
use of risk-informed methods, 110 Control rod drive (CRD), 31, 63, 65, 169
Concrete casks, 269–270, 290, 443 boiling water reactor, cracking, 8
Japanese codes, 44, 257–259 boiling water reactor, return line nozzles, 9–10
Concrete containment, tendon prestress, 31, 34 stub tube design, 12
Concrete containment vessels (CCV), Japanese codes, 269–270, Control rod drive mechanism (CRDM), replacement, 84
287–288 Control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) nozzles
Conditional large early release probability (CLERP), 100 alloy 600 use, 63
Condition monitoring programs, 59 in Babcock & Wilcox, Westinghouse-designed power
effects of aging and, 56, 58–59 plants, 65
Conductivity, crack growth rate and, 24 boric acid leakage from, 69
Confidence/tolerance bound, 53 butt welds, examination of, 71
Confirmatory direct assessment, pipeline systems, 376 circumferential cracks, 67, 69, 70, 72
Conformity assessment modules, 131, 135–136, 310 examination methods, 71
without quality assurance, 137, 172, 177, 178, 380 leak, 69
with quality assurance, 137, 172, 177, 178, 380 nickel-based alloys used, 63–64
Conformity assessment procedures, 129–131, 133, 135–137s partial penetration welds, 72
boilers, French codes, 224, 253 probabilities of leakage and failure, 79–80
industrial piping, French codes, 142, 191, 554 PWSCC in, 69
manufacturer responsibility, 138–140, 144, 168 severe volume leakage,70, 73–74
Conical shells, 312–313 small volume leakage, 69, 72–73
EN 13445 vs. PD 5500 (U.K.), 328–330 top head, PWR vessel PWSCC, 63
Consequence assessment, ranking, 328 type of cracking observed, 71–73
Conservation integrals, 328 Control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) nozzle-to-head welds,
Conservation of Air and Water Environment (CONCAWE), 372 PWSCC of, 69
Constant amplitude stress, pressure vessels, PD 5500 (U.K.), 320 Coolant
Construction for CANDU® reactor, 159–160
boilers, French codes, 222 in hypothetical accident conditions, 288, 292, 336, 338, 339, 341,
industrial piping, French codes, 142, 191, 553–554 345
nuclear boiler and pressure vessels, Canadian standards, 168, 171, Coordinated Research Project (CRP) of IAEA, 352
253, 337, 655, 679 Copper
Construction code, 101 content, probability of vessel failure and, 55
alternatives, 102 content, upper shelf life and, 15
fracture toughness requirement, 102 for pressure equipment, Japanese codes, 258–259
technical requirements of replacement, 102 for pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 311
Construction materials, Canadian standards, 163 transition fracture toughness temperature shift, 54
Construction of spent nuclear fuel storage, 268–269, 345 Copper-64, 363
Construction products, New Approach Directive, 145 Copper-67, 363
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Copper alloys pipeline system breaks, 372

for pressure equipment, Japanese codes, 258 reporting minimal changes vs. preparing license amendments, 387
for pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 311 COVAP. See Code de construction des générateurs de VAPeur.
Copper Development Association (CDA), 162 Covers, 131
Core damage Crack. See also Flaws.
assessing risk of, 84 hydrogen water chemistry for, 17
reducing risk, 83 stress improvement remedies for, 17
Core damage frequency (CDF), 8 through-wall circumferential in pipe, 115–117
component high-safety significance and, 100 Crack arrest, 53, 69, 245
estimating, 99 Crack arrest/advance verification system (CAVS), 24
Level 1 PRA analysis for, 96 Crack detection, in boiling water reactors, Japanese codes, 278
probabilistic risk-assessment (PRA) Standard, 111 Crack driving force J, 115, 122–123
ranking according to contribution to, 90 Crack growth, 115–116
Core damage probability (CCDP), 100, 525 attachment weld to vessel material, 13
Core flow, 6 BWR evaluations, 6
predicted crack lengths for, 6 changes in pH and, 68
Core meltdown due to cyclic loading, 33, 647
initiators, 89 due to irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking
from loss of coolant accident, 89 (IASCC), 60
operator error, 89 due to SCC, 5, 22
from transients, 89 dynamic, 52–53
Core plate, BWR reactor intervals, 1, 6 environmentally-assisted, 22, 28
Core reactivity control, 74 in feedwater nozzle, 8-9
Core spray safe end to safe-end extension weld overlay, 19 fracture mechanics analysis, 24
Core support attachments, 66 hydrogen concentration, 67–68
Core weld, BWR shroud designations, 3 lithium concentration, 68
Correction factor, 34, 37–38 predicting, 84, 126, 397, 450
Corrective maintenance, 84 PWSCC in alloy 600 in PWRs, 69, 79
Corrosion vessel-to-shroud support weld, 14
age evaluation of, 33 welding residual stress contributing to, 77–78
CANDU® nuclear power plant components, 173 Crack growth rate (CGR)
causing pipeline incidents, oil and gas pipelines, 419, 421 in alloys 82/182 reactor vessel outlet nozzle butt welds, axial
piping failure, 96 cracks, 70
pressure vessels, EN 13445, 324 in BWR jet pumps, 4
pressure vessels, PD 5500 (U.K.), 319 BWR stainless steel intervals, 2–3
zirconium alloys, 159 in BWR water environment, 2–3
Corrosion allowance, in pressure equipment, 152 effect of hydrogen on PWSCC, 80
Corrosion control effect of lithium on, 82
Canadian standards, 172, 405-407, 409, 423 effect of temperature reduction on, 82
Pipeline systems, 405–407, 409, 423 effect of zinc on PWSCC, 83
Corrosion defects, in pipeline systems, assessment, 395–400, 403 irradiation and, 1
Corrosion fatigue monitoring, 24
as pipeline failure mode, 387, 507, 511–513 and plant monitoring, 20
of pressure vessels, 11 prediction model, 22
Corrosion inhibitors, 372 probability of PWSCC on alloy 600 in PWRs, 86
Corrosion protection, for pressure vessels, 169 reduction in, 23
Corrosion-related cracking, CANDU® nuclear power plant Cracking
components, 181 from aging, 57-58
Corrosion resistance causing pipeline incidents, 373
of alloy 600 in high temperature water environments, 63 detecting effects of, due to aging, 59
of pressure equipment, 151 Crack initiation, 9, 20, 25, 33, 55, 67–68, 113, 303
pressure equipment conformance, 142 compared to P-T limits for normal cooldown transient, 55
Corrosion-resistant cladding (CRC), of stainless steel piping, 17 in feedwater nozzles, 9
Cost modeling software, 87 irradiation embrittlement and, 59
Costs and primary water stress corrosion cracking, 63, 86-87, 94, 684
certificate of compliance holders, for recordkeeping and reporting P-T limit and deterministic analysis of conditional vessel failure,
regulations, 354 56
of Davis Besse RPV head wastage, 84 rate in alloy 82/182 PWSCC in butt welds, 70
of decommissioning a nuclear facility, 439, 590, 661 residual stresses and, 67
of NRC to monitor certificate holders and applicants, 354 steam-dryer-support-bracket, 14
pipeline corrosion damage, 399 Crack length, 115, 126, 396
pipeline system assessment methods, 386, 395-396 Crack-like discontinuities, French codes, 245–247, 264, 266
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700 • Index

Crack mouth opening displacement, 115 Cyclic loading, 20

Crack propagation, 4, 25, 28, 77, 509, 516 crack initiation/growth, 33
due to fatigue in low alloy and stainless steels, 69 for nuclear reactor vessels, 65
dynamic loading and, 51 Cyclic pressure tests, 397
fatigue, 4 Cylinders, circumferential through-wall flaws, 115–116
to through-wall, 73 Cylindrical shells
Crack stability, 44, 74, 122, 123 PD 5500 vs. EN 13445, 327
Crack tip as pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 299, 300
plastic deformation, 66
strain rate, 22-23 D&D. See Decontamination and decommissioning.
Crack tip opening displacement (CTOD), 113–114, 400 Dampers, 169
Crack tip stress intensity factor, 44 Damping constant, 295, 300
Crack tip temperature, 124 Dangerous goods, definition, 357
Creep, 139, 152, 157, 159, 186, 448 Data analysis, 93
Creep design, pressure vessels, EN 13445, 324 Davis Bacon Act (DBA), 202, 222, 326, 488, 494, 528
Creep regimes Davi-Besse nuclear power plant
French codes, 252 costs of RPV head wastage, 84
Japanese codes, 275 cross-section through reactor vessel head, 75
Creep rupture top head boric acid corrosion, 69–70, 73–76
boilers, French codes, 212 Daya Bay nuclear power plant, China, 193–194, 255
industrial piping, French codes, 198 DBA. See Davis Bacon Act.
pressure vessels, 188 DBA. See Design by analysis.
Creep rupture strength, industrial piping, French codes,213, 220 DBE, 32
Creep rupture stress, French codes, 312 DBF. See Design by formula.
Creep-strain laws, French codes, 251 DC. See Direct current.
Crevice corrosion, age evaluation, 33 DCRC. See Design and Construction Rules Committee.
Crevice corrosion cracking, 17 DCVG. See Direct current voltage gradient method.
Critical flaw size, 59 DE. See Designated equipment.
feedwater nozzle, 9 Deactivation (or Transition) Plan, for decommissioning, 425
Criticality safety, 342, 350, 351, 353, 447 Dead weight loading, 67
Criticality Safety Index (CSI), 350, 351, 353 Declaration of Conformity, 311
Critical stress, ferritic steels at lower shelf, 113, 374 Decommissioning, definition, 661
Critical zones, of pressure equipment, 152 Decommissioning of nuclear facilities, 656, 661
CRC. See Corrosion-resistant cladding. characterization planning, 428
CRD. See Control rod drive. clearance criteria, 642
CRDM. See Control rod drive mechanism. decontamination, 637
CRN. See Canadian Registration Numbers. demobilization, 390
CRP. See Coordinated Research Project. demolition of nonradioactive structures, 479
Crush test, 350, 353 evaluation of alternatives, 681
for Type B radioactive materials packaging, 345–350, 447, 478, evaluation of technologies, 388
681 facility characterization, 428
Cryogenic Cargo Tanks, 358 license termination, 420
Cryogenic portable tanks, 358, 361, 364, 367 life cycle factors, 425
Cryogenic temperatures, fusion reactors, Japanese codes, 293 management team, 428, 430–431
CSA. See Canadian Standards Association. operations phase, 344
CSA Info Update, 158 operations phase, NRC license termination plan, 344–345
CSI. See Criticality Safety Index. operations phase, work scope activities, 344
CTOD. See Crack tip opening displacement. phase of, 344
CUF. See Cumulative usage factor. post-decommissioning, 425
Cumulative usage factor (CUF), 20, 34, 180, 306 pre-planning, 378
Curies, 342–344 pre-planning regulatory requirements, 378–379
Current licensing basis (CLB), 32–33, 35, 39 public and stakeholders participation program, 357–358
design load, 58 quality assurance requirements, 352
detection of aging effects under, 58 plan, decommissioning cost planning, 590
extended operation maintenance and, 58 plan, decommissioning project plan (DP), 643, 661
Cushion tanks, Canadian standards, 169–170 plan, identification of detailed activities, 523
CVCS. See Chemical Volume and Control System. plan, preparation of, 531
CVN. See Charpy V-notch upper-shelf energy (USE). plan, project schedule, 530
CVN. See Charpy V-notch energy. plan, project scope, 530
CWA. See Clean Water Act. planned decommissioning details, 590
Cyclic bending stress, 14 records, 541
Cyclic events, design specifications and fatigue, 20 removal/dismantling, 567
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risk analysis, 533 Design and Construction Rules for Civil Works of PWR Nuclear
Security program, 421 Island (RCC-G), 191, 194, 255
site restoration, 257 Design and Construction Rules for Electrical Equipment of Nuclear
Table 55.1 (NRC and OSHA Regulatory Delegations), 299 Islands (RCC-E), 191, 194, 255
transition planning, 511 Design and Construction Rules for Fire Protection (RCC-I), 194
waste management, 685 Design and Construction Rules for Fuel Assemblies of Nuclear
worldwide liability, 655 Power Plants (RCC-C), 191, 194, 255
Decommissioning Operations Contractor (DOC), 659 Design and Construction Rules for Mechanical Components of FBR
Decommissioning Plan (DP), 590, 659 Nuclear Islands (RCC-MR), 191–196, 245, 250–253, 255
Decommissioning Trust Fund (DTF), 681 appendices, 243
DECON alternative, 636 Appendix A10, 251
DECON plan, 637 Appendix A11, 251
Decontamination, of nuclear facilities, 590, 656, 661 Appendix A1 2, 251
Decontamination and decommissioning (D&D), 590, 656, 661 Appendix A1 6, 251
Deep water immersion test, radioactive material packaging, 390, 425, class 1 pressure components, 251
590, 656, 661 class 2 pressure components, 251
Defect removal, 101 Design and Construction Rules for Mechanical Components of PWR
Defense-in-depth principles, 58 Nuclear Islands (RCC-M), 253–254
Deformation, weld-induced PWSCC of alloy 600, 66 vs. American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code, 254, 264,
Deformation plasticity-based J-integral analysis, 126 281
Deformation plasticity failure assessment diagram (DPFAD) method, ANNEX ZK (Inservice Surveillance Modification), 228
114, 118–121, 123 Appendix S.I, 248
Defueling, as part of decommissioning of nuclear facilities, 656, 661 Appendix S.II, 248
De-gas line nozzle, 65 Appendix S.III, 248
Degradation mechanisms of piping, 96 Appendix Z IV, 243
inservice inspection, 94 Appendix ZA (Reinforcement of Opening), 238, 242
piping classification and active, 94 Appendix ZD, 244, 245
piping segments, 97 Appendix ZE, 244, 245–246
Degradation predictions, 76–78 Appendix ZF, 244
DEIR. See Designated equipment inspection regulations. Appendix ZG, 244, 245
Delayed hydride cracking, 175, 183–184, 187 Appendix ZH, 244–245
Delivery pipeline, 372 Appendix ZS (Inservice Surveillance Provisions), 228, 247
Delta ferrite class 1 pressure components, design, 226, 237–247
content, thermal aging embrittlement and, 59 class 2 pressure components, 226, 233, 242, 246–247
requirements in weld reinforcement, 18 class 3 pressure components, 226, 233, 242, 246–247
Demands for Information, 392 design and construction rules, 191–192, 194–197, 226, 255
Demolition, of nonradioactive structures, 479 documents covered in A.3000, 241
Dents, in pipeline systems, assessment, 396–397 fabrication of parts, 247–248
Department of Public Safety, New Brunswick, Canada, 168 1974 Order, 237–238, 239, 244–246
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (U.K.), 309 vs. PED, 248
Department of Transportation Act, 338–343 Design and Construction Rules for System Design, French Codes
Design (RCC-P), 194, 228
boilers, French codes, 217, 222-224, 225 Designated equipment (DE), 261, 263
Canadian oil and gas pipeline systems, 170 Classes 1 and 2, 261
CANDU® nuclear power plants, 172–174, 176 Designated equipment inspection regulations (DEIR), 259, 261, 267
CANDU® nuclear power plants, seismic qualification, 179 Design basis, analysis, 104
criteria for the facility, 33 acceptance criteria of AMP taken directly from, 58
expansion bellows, 208 component requirements, 105
explicit safety factor of PWR reactor vessels, 43 events, 33, 173
EN 13445, 324–329 for pressurized water reactors, 43
fast breeder reactors, French codes, 250 Design-by-analysis, 20, 202, 222, 246
French pressure equipment, 191–192, 208 calculation of loads of shells, PD 5500 (U.K.), 320
industrial piping, French codes, 209, 226 concrete casks, 289
nuclear boiler and pressure vessels, Canadian standards, 168, 171, concrete casks, Japanese codes, 290
181 EN 13445, 326–327
pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 310, 312–318, 320–323 Nuclear pressure vessels PD 5500 (U.K.), 323
pressure tubes, 174 Design by formula (DBF), 202, 222
pressure vessels, Japanese codes, 253–254, 257–260 Design-by-rule method, 314
of pressurized water reactor vessels, 43 PD 5500 (U.K.), 312
transport tanks, 360–364 Design damping constant, 294–295
tubesheet heat exchangers, 208 Design documentation, CANDU® nuclear power plants, 172
Design and Construction Rules Committee (DCRC), 193 Design factor (Japanese), 267, 269, 271, 275, 287, 307
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702 • Index

Design fatigue analysis, 35 DOC. See Decommissioning Operations Contractor.

Design fatigue usage factor, 35
Design pressure, 314, 316–317, 325
Design of indian pressurized heavy water reactor components 316
Design specification, 20
use for dismantling planning,
Design stress, 314, 315
ferritic piping, 119
PD 5500 vs. EN 13445, 327
Design stress intensity
of containment vessels for radioactive materials,
pressure equipment, Japanese codes, 286–287
Design temperature, 325
Design tensile strength, pressure equipment, Japanese codes, 287
Design tensile stress, pressure equipment, Japanese codes, 286–287
Design transients, 35
Design yield strength, pressure equipment, Japanese codes, 286–287
Destructive examination
CANDU® nuclear power plant components, 187
of commercial reactor pressure vessel welds, 52
joint coefficients allowed, 139, 159
Destructive failure analysis, of alloy 82/182 butt weld leak, 69
Deterministic fracture mechanics (DFM), 11
as alternative nozzle weld evaluation, 11–12
predicting PWSCC on Alloy 600 in PWRs, 76–78
Deterministic insights
for component safety categorization, 103
low-safety significance classification, 100–103
Det Norske Veritas (DnV), 400
DnV RP-F101 method, 400
Deuterium ingress, zirconium alloys, 159
DFM. See Deterministic fracture mechanics.
DIAL. See Differential Absorption LIDAR.
Differential Absorption LIDAR (DIAL), 417
Differential thermal expansion
allowable stresses for reactor vessel components/structures, 67
clad-base metal, 51
Diffusion treatment, French codes, 248
Dimensionless parameter h1, 115
DIN standards, 259
Direct assessment, pipeline systems, 376–377, 385, 393
Direct current (DC) potential technology, 24
Direct current voltage gradient (DCVG) method, for pipeline system
assessment, 395
Directive (97/23/CE). See Pressure Equipment Directive.
Direct use of spent pressurized water reactor fuel in CANDU®
(DUPIC), 163
Discontinuities, welds, PD 5500 (U.K.), 323
Discontinuity formation, CANDU® nuclear power plant components,
185
Discontinuity stresses, 124
Dished ends, 312, 317
EN 13445, 327–328
Dissimilar metal welds (DMW)
butt weld inspection requirements for, 72
examination methods, 72
inspection of, 81, 83
MSIP applied to PWR vessel nozzle, 83
weld overlays,
Distribution pipeline, DMW. See Dissimilar metal weld.
DN. See Nominal diameter.
DnV. See Det Norske Veritas.
Documentation
justification of solutions adopted for ESRs, 147
material certification of pressure equipment, 143
DOD. See United States Department of Defense.
DOE. See United States Department of Energy.
DOE/OCRWM. See United States Department of Energy, Office of
Civilian Radioactive Waste Management.
Donnell’s formula for cylindrical shells, 262–263
DOT. See United States Department of Transportation.
Double containment rule
for plutonium, 344
for plutonium, proposed rule elimination (1997), 349–352
for plutonium, rule elimination (1998), 349–350
for plutonium vitrified high level waste, elimination (1998 final
rule), 349–350
DP. See Decommissioning Plan.
DPFAD. See Deformation plasticity failure assessment diagram.
DTF. See Decommissioning trust fund.
DTI. See Department of Trade and Industry.
Dual-purpose packages, 354–355
Ductile cast iron, for metal casks, Japanese codes, 289
Ductile collapse, 113
Ductile crack extension, 122–123, 124–125
Ductile fracture, of pressurized water reactor vessels, 48
Ductile overload, 113
Ductile tearing, 125–126
Ductility
of pressure equipment, 143, 156
temperature and, 50
Dugdale elastic plastic strip yield model, 398
DUPIC. See Direct use of spent pressurized water reactor fuel in
CANDU®.
Dupont, E.I., Savannah River Plant, 425
Dye penetrant testing, 72
Dynamic/arrest fracture toughness, crack propagation and, 51
Dynamic crack, 53
Dynamic crush test, 353. See also Crush test.
of Type B radioactive material packages, 342, 345, 355
Dynamic loads
crack propagation and, 51
of transport tanks, 357–359, 365, 366, 368
Dynamic load test, bend of pipe, 297
EA. See Environmental Assessment.
EAF. See Environmentally assisted fatigue evaluation.
EAM. See European Approval of Materials.
Earthquake(s)
piping seismic design codes, 294
PRA Standards and, 110
Earthquake loads, public health risk, 14, 90
EC. See European Commission.
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, 333
ECP. See Electrochemical corrosion potential.
Eddy current inspection/examination, CANDU® nuclear power plant
components, 177
French codes, 252
as surface examination, 72
of wetted surface of each J-groove weld and RPV head penetration
nozzle, 72
zirconium alloy components, 170–171
EDF. See Electricit È de France.
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EDM. See Electrodischarge machining. Reactor Internals Issue Task Group (RI-ITG), 57, 59
EDYs. See Effective degradation years. Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Nondestructive (NDE)
Effective crack size, 113 Center, 72
Effective degradation Years (EDYs), 72 Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Piping and Fitting
“Effective” fatigue life correction factor, 37 Reliability Program (PFDRP), 295, 296, 298
Effective flaw depth, 120 Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Pressurized Water Reactor
Effective full-power years (EFPY), 72 (PWR) Primary Water Chemistry Guidelines, 82
Effective stress intensity factor, 120 Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Reports, 115
Efficiency diagram method, 236, 237 EPRI 1003557, 26
EFPY. See Effective full-power years. EPRI NP-719-SR (Flaw Evaluation Procedures), 61, 127
EFR. See European Fast Reactor studies. EPRI NP-1406-SR, 126
EGIG. See European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group. EPRI NP-1931, 127
EJMA (Expansion Joint Manufacturers Association, Inc.) Standard, EPRI NP-2431, 128
264 EPRI NP-2671-LD, 25
Elastic analysis of nuclear reactor vessels, 509 EPRI NP-3319, 61
Elastic compensation method, 226 EPRI NP-3607 (Advances in Elastic-Plastic Fracture Analysis),
Elastic component of J, 115 127
Elastic instability pressure, 314 EPRI NP-4273-SR, 26
Elastic-plastic analysis, 119, 272–275, 511 EPRI NP-4443, 27
of nuclear reactor vessels, 113–126 EPRI NP-4665S-Sr, 85
of piping, 295–296 EPRI NP-4690-SR (Flaw Evaluation in Austenitic Steel Piping),
Elastic-plastic ductile tearing, 118 127
Elastic-plastic fracture mechanics (EPFM), 113 EPRI NP-4767, 25
austenitic stainless steel piping, Japanese codes, 281 EPRI NP-4824M (Evaluation of Flaws in Carbon Steel Piping),
evaluation, 117 127
flow diagram, 119–120 EPRI NP-4824SP (Evaluation of Flaws in Carbon Steel Piping),
techniques, 124–125 127
Elastic stress analysis EPRI NP-5151, 61
methods for design analysis of concrete containment vessels, 287–288 EPRI NP-5596 (Cylinders, Elastic-Plastic Fracture Analysis of
nuclear pressure vessels, PD 5500 (U.K.), 309 Flaws), 127
Elastic stress intensity factor for an effective crack size, 115 EPRI NP-6045 (Evaluation of Flaws in Ferritic Piping), 127
Elastomer degradation, age evaluation, 33 EPRI NP-6301-D (Circumferential Throughwall Cracks), 25, 61,
Elastoplastic analysis, French pressure equipment, 243, 251 127
Electrical codes and standards, Canadian standards, 163 EPRI NP-6927-D, 26
Electrical equipment, New Approach Directive, 145 EPRI NP-7085-D, 27
Electrical equipment, nuclear power plant, environmental EPRI NP-7103-D, 27
qualifications, 31, 34 EPRINP-7492, 128
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), 22 EPRI NP-7493, 86
categorizing systems and components for inservice inspection (ISI) Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Technical Reports
programs, 100 EPRI TR-100251 (White Paper), 61
conditions causing high boric acid corrosion, 74, 75 EPRI TR-100852, 86
evaluation of draft radiation embrittlement trend equations, 54 EPRITR-101971, 28
NPV economic modeling software developed, 84 EPRITR-103345, 85
pipe cracking in BWRs, 17 EPRITR-103566, 86
piping reliability study, 294 EPRITR-103696, 86
primary water stress corrosion cracking causal testing, 68 EPRITR-103824, 86
probable rate of corrosion of low-alloy steel by boric acid, 74 EPRI TR-104030, 86
researching effect of zinc on crack growth, 80 EPRI TR-105396 (PSA Applications Guide), 111
risk-informed inservice testing, pilot program for snubbers, 100 EPRI TR-105406, 86
testing mechanical remedial measures for PWSCC of alloy 600 EPRITR-105696, 25
nozzles, 83 EPRITR-105873, 25
weld overlay repair studies, 18 EPRI TR-106589-VI (PWR Steam Generator Examination
white paper (Reactor Vessel Integrity Requirements for Levels A Guidelines, Revision 4, Vol.1: Guidelines), 189
and B conditions), 46 EPRITR-106712, 26
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Boric Acid Corrosion EPRI TR-108390-RI (Application of Master Curve Fracture
Guidebook, 74 Toughness Methodology for Ferritic Steel), 61
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Ductile Fracture Handbook, 48 EPRI TR-108709, 26
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)/General Electric (GE) EPRITR-110356, 28
project, 21, 22, 24 EPRI TR-112657 Rev. B-A (Revised Risk-Informed ISI
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) J estimation scheme, 114 Procedure), 96–97, 111, 572
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Materials Reliability Electric Utility Industry Law, 258–260, 263–264, 266, 268
Program (MRP) Ordinance 51, 268
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704 • Index

Electrochemical corrosion potential (ECP), 3, 17, 23–24, 67 Equivalent margin, review summary, 16
Electrode boilers, 156 Equivalent margin analysis, 15–16
Electrodes, 17, 188, 286, 395, 597, 675 ERDA. See Energy Resource and Development Agency.
Electrodischarge machining (EDM), skim cutting, as remedial Erosion
measure for PWSCC, 83 of pressure equipment, 153
Electroless nickel plating, as remedial measure for PWSCC, 83 provision for, 102
Electrolytic plating, French codes, 253 Erosion/corrosion, fuel channel feeder pipes, 183
Electromagnetic compatibility, New Approach Directive, 145 ES&H. See Environment, safety, and health.
Electro mechanical nickel brush plating, as remedial measure for ESRs. See Essential safety requirements.
PWSCC, 83 Essential safety requirements (ESRs), 129–130, 142–144, 147
Electroslag, 15–16 compliance with, 149–156
Elevated temperatures of Pressure Equipment Directive, 130–131, 133–134, 137–138
boilers, French codes, 237 ETC-M (EPR Technical Code-Mechanical Components), 193, 228
concrete containment vessels, 287 Ethylene oxide, 260
conformance of pressure equipment, 148 EU. See European Union.
fast breeder reactors, French codes, 250 Euler’s formula for tubes, 262–263
Japanese fast breeder reactor, 275 Euro Norm (EN), 255
pressure equipment conformance, 143–144, 149 Euro Norm (EN) Standards, 192, 255
Elongation after rupture, in pressure equipment, 157, 311 revisions and new developments, 330
Embrittlement, 50–51, 57 for steel, 149
Embrittlement trend curve prediction, 43, 54–55 Euro Norm (EN) Standards, specific types
Emergency/faulted conditions, structural factor, 118 EN 286, 314
Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP), 100 EN 287 (Personnel), 140, 148, 312, 330
Emergency responders, 352 EN 287-1, 248
EN. See Euro Norm. EN 288 (Procedures), 330
Enbridge Pipeline, 388 EN 288 Part 3 (Procedure Testing for Steels), 212, 222
End fittings, 164–165, 174, 177 EN 473 (Qualification of NDE Personnel), 140, 249, 526, 570,
Energy release rate, 114 590, 595, 596
Energy Resource and Development Agency (ERDA), 334 EN 571-1 (Penetrant Testing), 249
Enhanced immersion test, 323 EN 583 1-2-5 (Ultrasonic Testing/Examination (UT)), 249
Enquiry Case, 311 EN 895 (Tensile Tests), 249
Envelope defect, 245 EN 1043-1, 249
Environmental effects EN 1092, 316
causing PWSCC, 66–68, 77–78 EN 1418, 326
concrete casks, Japanese codes, 290 EN 1591 (Piping Flanges), 208, 216, 329
concrete containment vessels, Japanese codes, 287 EN 1594 (Functional Requirements for Pipeline Incident
on fatigue life, 39 Statistics), 372
fuel-handling equipment, CANDU® nuclear power plants, 176 EN 1713 (Ultrasonic Examination, Welded Joints), 249
on high-CUF components, 37 EN 1759, 316
to initiate PWSCC in PWR, 76 EN 2650, 248
Japanese codes, 276 EN 10002-1, 249
pipeline systems, 372–374 EN 10028 (Flat Products Made of Steels for Pressure Purposes,
of reactor coolant on components, 34–35, 37 French Codes), 142, 236, 310, 311, 554, 555
seismic design, Japanese codes, 290, 294–296, 298 EN 10160 (Ultrasonic Examination), 249
water and fatigue of pressure vessels, 212 EN 10204, 143, 554, 555
Environmentally-assisted cracking EN 10204: 2004-3.1, 143
fatigue crack initiation/growth, 24 EN 10204: 2004-3.2 Inspection Report, 143
as pipeline failure mode, 375, 390, 409 EN 10213, French codes, 236
of pressurized water reactor (PWR) vessels, 44 EN 10216, 142
stress-corrosion cracking, 24, 67–68 EN 10222 (Steel Forgings for Pressure Purposes) (French codes),
Environmentally assisted fatigue (EAF) evaluation, 35, 37 236, 310
Environmental Standard Review Plan, 31 EN 10246 6-7 (Ultrasonic Examination, Tube Defects), 249
EOP. See Emergency Operating Procedure. EN 10307 (Ultrasonic Examination, Flat Products), 249
EPA. See United States Environmental Protection Agency. EN 12223 (Ultrasonic Examination), 249
EPFM. See Elastic-plastic fracture mechanics. EN 12668 1-2-3 (Ultrasonic Examination), 249
EPR studies (project), 23, 193, 228, 245, 247 EN 12952, 142, 311
ETC-M (Paper 2488), 253 EN 12953, 142, 311
EPRG. See European Pipeline Research Group. EN 13445, 142, 208, 254, 309, 310, 314, 316, 320, 324–330, 537,
EPRI. See Electric Power Research Institute. 556, 558
EPU. See Extended power uprate. Annexes B and C, 326
Equivalency recommendation, 393 Annex G, 329, 330
Equivalent flat-bottom hole criteria, 249 Annex J, 329
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Annex K, 329 Executive Summary of the Reactor Safety Study, 89

Annex Z, 325 Expansion bellows
EN 13445-2, 326 EN 13445 standard, 329
EN 13445-3, 208, 312, 326 French code design rules, 206–208
EN 13480 (European Harmonized Standard for Piping), 142, 209, Expansion joints, 131, 216, 226, 262–264, 267
556 Explosive atmospheres, equipment and protective systems, New
EN 15614-1 (Procedure Testing for Steels), 148 Approach Directive, 146
EN 29001, 253 Explosives for civil uses, New Approach Directive, 145
EN 45004, 138, 570 Extended operation
EN 45012, 138 existing nuclear facilities, 679
EN ISO 3452-2 (Testing of Penetrant Materials), 249 age management programs (AMPs) and, 58, 59
EN ISO 6506 1-2-3, 249 license renewal application for, 29, 57
EN ISO 6507 1-2-3 test, 249 standards to evaluate programs, 41
EN ISO 6508 1-2-3, 249 Extended power uprate (EPU), 6
EN ISO 9000, 136, 137, 228, 253, 538 External events, 91, 104
EN ISO 9001, 554, 555 probabilistic risk assessment for treatment of, 105
EN ISO 9606-4, 248
EN NF 287-1, 248, 554, 555 Fabrication
EN NF 288-1, 554, 555 CANDU® nuclear power plants, 174
EN NF 288-3, 212, 222 failure due to defects in, 102
EN NF 10028-2 (Pressure Vessel Steels), 236 industrial piping, French codes, 228–229
NF EN 1591, 216 inspections, Canadian standards, 169
NF EN 9606-4, 248 pressure equipment, EN 13445, 330
European Approval of Materials (EAM), 139, 142–144, 148, 310 pressure vessels, French codes, 206–208
European Parliament and Council, 131, 563 shipping containers for radioactive materials, 347
European Network for Inspection Qualification (ENIQ)519, 520, 524, transport tanks, 358, 365
529–532, 568–570, 574, 590, 629 FAC. See Flow-assisted corrosion.
European Commission (EC), 130, 138, 142, 144, 375, 529, 530, 531, Factor MF, 122
536, 593 FAD. See Failure assessment program.
chairing Working Group Pressure Standing Committee, 144 Failure analysis, 69, 96, 264, 265
Guiding Principles issued by, 142 Failure Assessment Diagram Procedure, 121
Web site, 130 Failure Assessment Program (FAD), two-criteria (CEGB), 117
European Commission (EC) Declaration of Conformity, 133, 144 Failure modes
European Commission (EC) Design Examination Certificate, 136, pipeline systems, 374
137 pressure vessels, PD 5500 (U.K.) (EN 13445), 326
European Commission (EC) Type Examination Certificate, 136, 557 Faraday’s Law, 23
European Commission (EC) unit verification, 136 Fast breeder reactors (FBR), 59, 193
European consortium of gas pipeline companies (GERG), 417 French codes,193, 226, 250–253
European Court, legal authority for implementing PED Guidelines, rules on design and construction (Japanese), 275
144 Fast fracture, French codes, 245, 247
European Data Sheet, 310 Fatality rate, from pipeline incidents, 371–373, 421
EU 6th Framework Programmes, 582 Fatigue, 33, 34, 124
European Fast Reactor (EFR) studies, 193 crack propagation in low alloy and stainless steels, 69
European Federations, represented in Working Group Pressure environmental effects, 21, 34, 39
Standing Committee, 144 nozzles, PD 5500 (U.K.), 314
European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group (EGIG), 372 as pipeline failure mode, 374
European Pipeline Research Group (EPRG), 397 in pressure equipment, 152
European Union (EU), 129–131, 133, 138, 148, 149, 310, 545, 553 of pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 310, 323
New Approach concept, 129 of supports, PD 5500 (U.K.), 319
Examination categories, specific types Fatigue analysis, 34, 37
B-A (Vessel Welds), 6, 96–98 of containment vessels for radioactive materials, 346, 347
B-D (Full Penetration Welded Nozzles in Vessels), 10, 11, 673 French codes, 208, 243–245, 251
B-F (Pressure-Retaining Dissimilar Metal Welds in Vessel Japanese codes, 271, 275, 287–289
Nozzles), 72, 96–98, 572, 573 seismic design, nuclear power plant piping, 296, 298
B-J (Pressure-Retaining Welds in Piping), 94–98, 573 Fatigue crack growth, 24
B-N-1 (Interior of Reactor Vessel), 72 in boiling water reactor jet pumps, 4–5
B-N-2 (Core Support Structures), 1 vessel-to-shroud support weld, 14
B-N-3 (Removable Core Support Structures), 60 Fatigue crack growth analysis
B-O (Control Rod Housing Welds), 72 evaluation methods, 5–6
B-P (Pressure Retaining Components), 72, 98 reference curves: austenitic stainless steels in air environment, 21
C-F-1, 96, 97, 98 reference curves: austenitic stainless steels in water environment,
C-F-2, 96, 97, 98 21–22
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706 • Index

Fatigue crack growth analysis (continued) in pressure equipment, 157

reference curves: ferritic stainless steels in air environment, 22 for pressure equipment, French codes, 223–224
reference curves: ferritic stainless steels in water environment, 22 Finite element analysis, 296, 323, 507, 510, 644, 649
Fatigue crack growth model, 402 of boiling water reactor steam dryer failure, 6
Fatigue crack growth rate, 5–6, 9, 281 for calculating semi-elliptical crack depth, 47
Fatigue cracking for calculating stresses of high-pressure vessels, 47
boilers, French codes, 212 vessels, PD 5500 (U.K.), 323
CANDU® nuclear power plant components, 177 for nuclear reactor vessels, 67
fitness-for-service code evaluation of BWR (Japan), 280, 286 of pipeline systems, 400–402
industrial piping, French codes, 198 Finite element models (FEM), 5, 18, 35, 644
pressure vessels, 198, 205 Finland nuclear power plants, surveillance programs, 229
Fatigue crack initiation, 20–24 Finland Olkiluoto 3 project, 193
Fatigue failure, 6, 20, 102 Fire conditions, 91
Fatigue life, 34, 37, 141 damage-limitation requirements, pressure equipment, 154
EN 13445 standard, 330 fire protection equipment, 30, 32–33, 104
piping, Japanese codes, 295–297 probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) standard, 92
pipeline systems, 397 public health risk, 89–90
pressure vessels, PD 5500 (U.K.), 310, 323 Fired-heater pressure coils, 168, 170
reactor component, 15, 21 Fired or otherwise heated equipment, categorization, 134
Fatigue life correction factor, 37 Fired pressure vessels, 157
Fatigue monitoring program (FMP), 35, 37–38 Firetube boilers, French codes, 217, 222, 236. See also COVAP.
Fatigue reduction factor, pressure vessels, PD 5500 (U.K.), 322 Fissile Classes, 336–338
Fatigue strain correction factors, 245 Fissile Class I, 338
Fatigue strength, of containment vessels for radioactive materials, Fissile Class II, 336, 337
346–347 Fissile Class III, 336, 337
Fatigue strength/life-property curves (S/N curves), pressure vessels, Fissile material, 335–338, 341,–342, 344, 347, 349–350, 352–354, 356
PD 5500 (U.K.), 320–321 Fissile-to-nonfissile mass ratio, 354
Fatigue strength reduction factor, 245, 596 Fitness-for-service code (Japanese Nuclear Safety), 276–281
Fatigue usage, 21, 34, 37, 245 Fitness-for-service demonstrations, of pressurized water reactor
Fatigue usage factor vessel internals, 59
calculation of, 34–35 FIV. See Flow-induced vibration.
seismic stress limiting requirements, 295, 298 Ferritic steels
FAVOR Code, pressurized thermal shock events, 56 allowable membrane stress, 144
FBE. See Fusion bonded epoxy coatings. allowable stresses, pressure equipment, 139
FBR. See Fast breeder reactor. dynamic or crack arrest condition, 53
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 339 flaws in components operating in upper shelf range, 125
Federal Aviation Administration, 339 fracture toughness, 45, 50, 53
Federal Aviation Agency, 336–337 in pressure equipment, allowable stresses, 157
Federal Aviation Regulations, 339 for pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 311
Federal Highway Agency, corrosion costs and effects study in U.S., radiation embrittlement, 43
407 shipping container fracture toughness, 339
Federal Register. See United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission stress corrosion crack growth rate relationships, 26
(USNRC) Federal Register(FR). Ferritic stainless steels
Feedwater nozzle, 8–9, 11–12, 24 environmental fatigue crack growth rate, 22
Feedwater System (FWS), 99 failure mechanism prediction, 116
Ferrite content, French tests for, 249 flaw evaluation, FFS code (Japan), 114
Ferritic-austenitic stainless steels, for industrial piping, French codes, for industrial piping, French codes, 191
203 piping, default material properties and Z factor, 212
Fiber-optic sensors, 417 piping, dissimilar metal weld overlays, 19
50 ft.-lb. regulatory requirements, 121 piping, flaw evaluation, 123
Fillet weld, 322 piping, Japanese codes, 243
Filling stations, Canadian standards, 168 piping, structural factors, 118
Film/rupture model, 23 for pressure equipment, French codes, 181
Film thickness measurement, coatings and liners of CANDU® for pressure equipment, U.K. codes, 135
nuclear power plant components, 186 for transport tanks, 366
Filters, in scope of PED, 131 Ferrous materials
Final assessment/inspection, of pressure equipment, 154 for industrial piping, French codes, 191
Final safety analysis report (FSAR), 30, 32–33, 58–59, 539 for pressure equipment, French codes, 202
Financial planning, for decommissioning, for pressure equipment, Japanese codes, 258
Fine-grained steels Flanges, 66, 131, 286, 312, 316, 317, 319, 329, 359, 363, 405, 416
allowable membrane stress, 144 bolted joints, PD 5500 (U.K.), 316, 319, 324
for industrial piping, French codes, 212 EN 13445 standard, 324
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reactor vessel lower closure, use of alloy 600, 63–66 Forge welding, 365
welded to alloy 600 nozzle, 65, 72, 82, 83 Forgings, European standards, 236
Flapper wheel surface polishing, as remedial measure for PWSCC, Form NIS-2 (Owner’s Report for Repair/Replacement Activity), 102,
83 541, 543
Flaring test, French codes, 249 Forms, sample, Canadian standards (Annex D), 163
Flat ends, EN 13445 standard, 329 Form X, 311
Flat plates and covers, for pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 317 FR. See United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC)
Flattening test, French codes, 249 Federal Register.
Flaw (crack) Fracture, as pipeline failure mode, 374
allowable flaw size, 56, 78, 116, 280 Fracture design analysis, based on J integral, 114
axial, 14, 15, 17, 18, 49, 74, 118, 648 Fracture design handbook, 114
axial, leakage from, 17 Fracture mechanics analysis, 8, 9, 55, 400, 592, 646
axial, repair of, 81 for crack growth due to IASCC, 60
axial, through-wall in alloys 82/182 butt weld, 69, 73 flaw tolerance evaluation, 9
circumferential, 4, 15, 18, 49, 72, 74, 79, 118–120, 279, 281, 648 for loss of toughness due to irradiation, 60
crack growth rate monitoring, 24 plant-specific, 9
critical size, component failure and, 73 of pressurized water reactor vessels, 45
depth, 9, 13, 47, 55, 118, 122, 123, 400 Fracture resistance, 113, 121, 124, 512, 596
distribution, 12, 80 “Fracture-safe” design, 43
effect on integrity of PWR vessels, 66 Fracture test specimen geometries, 114
elliptical, 265, 401 Fracture toughness
end-of-life size, 45 determining median, 53
evaluation methods, 24, 46, 112 of ferritic steel, 53, 348
evaluation methods of Section XI, 46, 76 French codes, restrictions, 230
fatigue crack growth, 4 irradiation and, 1–3, 45, 57, 59, 60
inspection and, 258, 263 in light-water reactors, 45
length, 3, 4, 11, 49, 451, 452 lower bound curves, 52–54
as predicted failure mechanisms, 82 Master Curve approach, 43, 53, 581, 583
reference, 44–49, 55, 56, 59, 262 monitoring changes in, 45
semi-elliptical surface, 44–46 of nuclear pressure vessel steels, 114
shape factor, 48 pressure vessels, Japanese codes, 281
size, 44, 51, 53, 56, 59, 72, 77, 112, 114, 115, 116, 118, 120, 124, protection against pressurized thermal shocks, 33
175, 262, 263, 448, 452 reduction in, due to aging, 57
surface, 10, 15, 47, 48, 50, 52, 56, 78, 120, 444 static loading and, 51
through-wall, 4, 9, 114–116, 262, 450 temperature dependent, 50
Flaw acceptance criteria and evaluation, 10, 15, 124, 280 testing, 53
of carbon steel piping, 16, 573 transition temperature, 44, 53
Class 1 ferritic piping, 118 Fracture toughness curve index, 44
of ferritic piping, 118, 125, 281 Fracture toughness curves, referenced, 50–53
Japanese nuclear power plant components, 269 Framatome-ANP, 677
of stability/instability, 126 Framatome-EDF teams, 194
Flaw removal, 80 Freeze plugging, 405
Flexure forces, concrete containment vessels, 269, 270, 287–288 French association of design, construction, and inservice inspection
Flow-assisted corrosion (FAC), ISI programs for, 89 rules for nuclear island components (AFCEN), 191, 193–197,
Flow-induced vibration (FIV), 4–6 246
Flow-sensitization, of piping failure and, 96 working groups, 197
Flow stress, 4, 18, 113, 117, 118, 265, 281, 374, 396, 398, 399, 400, French codes dealing with pressure equipment, 191
513 Annex FA 1 (Permissible welded joints), 205
definition, 118 design, 193
ferritic piping, 119 Figure 49.1 (CODAP Committee Structures), 192
Fluence, 3, 12, 15, 43, 45, 51, 54, 55, 57, 124, 499, 500, 643 Figure 49.2 (Initial Pragmatic Approach for Establishing RCC-M),
crack tip, 59, 124 193
embrittlement and prediction-trend curves, 43, 50 Figure 49.3 (Organization of French Nuclear Codes), 194
neutron, 45, 55, 450 Figure 49.4 (AFCEN Structure), 195
Fluoride-induced stress corrosion cracking (SCC), 2–5, 13, 20, 22, Figure 49.5 (Structure of Subsections of RCC-M and Relations
23, 24, 57, 63, 64, 83, 160, 161, 278–281, 290, 373, 374, 386, among Sections), 196
387, 499, 500, 512, 526, 572 Figure 49.6 (Hazard Category Determination of a Vessel
Flux welds, failure mechanism, 118 Containing Dangerous Gas), 199
FMP. See Fatigue monitoring program. Figure 49.7 (Hazard Category Determination for Piping
Folias factor M (MT), 396, 398, 401, 402 Containing a Dangerous Gas), 218
“For a Use of Nuclear Energy in 21st Century of Japan”, 257 Figure 49.8 (Installation of Expansion Joints (Extracted from
Foreign national competent authority, 342, 343 Annex C3.A3)), 226
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708 • Index

French codes dealing with pressure equipment (continued) Table 49.35 (Materials for Boilers, Elevated Temperature
Figure 49.9 (Supports, Industrial Piping), 228 Considerations), 237
Figure 49.10 (Buried Piping, Industrial Piping), 228 Table 49.36 (Testing, Boilers), 238
Figure 49.11 (Dimensional Tolerances for Prefabricated Spools), Table 49.37 (Testing, Boilers), 239
229 Table 49.38 (Nondestructive Examination, Boilers), 240
Figure 49.12 (Set-on Branches with Reinforcing Ring), 230 Table 49.39 (Conformity Assessment Procedure, Boilers), 241
Figure 49.13 (Hazard Category for Heated Pressure Equipment, Table 49.40 (RCC-M: Correspondence Among Safety Class,
Overheating Risk), 234 RCC-M Class, and Operating Conditions), 241
Figure 49.14 (Firetube Boiler: Tubesheet Arrangements), 236 Table 49.41 (RCC-M Section 2 Structure), 242
Figure 49.15 (RCC-M Section 2 Structure), 242 Table 49.42a (Reactor Vessel Steel Comparison of Chemical
Figure 49.16 (Class 1 Design Rules and Nonmandatory Properties), 243
Appendices), 244 Table 49.42b (RCC-M Mandatory Appendices), 243
Figure 49.17 (Welding Qualification and Acceptance Criteria), 247 Table 49.43a (Reactor Vessel Steel Comparison of Impact Tests),
links with PED, 198 244
surveillance programs, 229 Table 49.44 (Correspondence among RCC-M B 3200, B 3500, and
Table 49.1 (French Pressure Equipment Codes), 192 B 3600 Criteria), 246
Table 49.2 (RCC-M Structure), 195 Table 49.45 (RCC-MR Technical Appendices), 250
Table 49.3 (Comparison of ASME Code Structure and French Table 49.46 (RSE-M Appendices), 252
Codes), 196 testing and inspection, 216
Table 49.4 (Contents of the RCC-MR Code), 197 French Association of Pump Manufacturers, 246
Table 49.5 (Risk Assessment for Pressure Vessels Falling Within French-German ETC-M rule, 253
the Scope of the PED), 200 French 1984 Order on Quality, 253
Table 49.6 (Risk Assessment for Pressure Vessels Beyond PED French Pressure Vessel Regulation, 254
Scope), 201 French Safety Authority, 193
Table 49.7 (Determination of the Construction Category in Fundamental Safety Rule, 197
CODAP), 202 Fundamental Safety Rule RFS V.2.C, 193
Table 49.8 (Nominal Design Stress in CODAP® 2000 (Excerpt)), Safety Authority Decision, 197
203 French Standardization Organization (AFNOR-Association Française
Table 49.9 (Weld joint Efficiency, Pressure Vessels), 203 de Normalisation), 192
Table 49.10 (Material Grouping), 204 AFNOR/SNCT Codes, 195
Table 49.11 (205), 205 French Standard Series NF E 32-100, 217
Table 49.12 (Design Rules), 206 French transposing regulations, Decree 99-1046, 222
Table 49.13 (Tolerances on Branches), 207 FSAR. See Final safety analysis report.
Table 49.14 (Permissible Joints (Exerpt)), 210 Fuel bundle design, 163
Table 49.15 (Extent of Nondestructive Examination), 213 Fuel channels, 174
Table 49.16 (Conformity Assessment Interventions), 214 Fuel cladding, 164
Table 49.17 (Conformity Assessment Procedure Selection), 217 Fuel deposit, reduction in, 83
Table 49.18 (Risk Assessment for Piping Falling Within the Scope Fuel fabrication plants, 343
of PED), 219 Fuel reprocessing, 343
Table 49.19 (Risk Assessment: Additional Criteria, Industrial Full penetration welds, 52
Piping, Beyond PED Scope), 220 Functionality analysis, as aging management strategy, 60
Table 49.20 (Construction Category Determination in CODETI), Fuse holder, age management program (AMP), 39
220 Fusion bonded epoxy (FBE) coatings, for pipeline systems, 410
Table 49.21 (Nominal Design Stress, Industrial Piping), 221 Fussell-Vesely (FV), 106
Table 49.22 (Nominal Design Stress/Piping Categories, Beyond FV. See Fussell-Vesely.
Material Creep Range), 221 FWS. See Feedwater System.
Table 49.23 (Welded Joint Coefficient, Industrial Piping), 222
Table 49.24 (Material Grouping, Industrial Piping), 223 Gadolinium-159, 475
Table 49.25 (Steel Grades and Maximum Permissible Thickness in GALL Report. See Generic Aging Lessons Learned Report.
Relation to Construction Categories), 224 Galvanic corrosion
Table 49.26 (Safety Factors), 224 age evaluation, 33
Table 49.27 (Components, Industrial Piping), 225 as pipeline failure mode, 374
Table 49.28 (Flexibility Characteristic, and Flexibility and Stress pressure equipment conformance, 143
Intensification Factors), 227 GAO. See Government Accounting Office reports.
Table 49.29 (Dimensional Tolerances for Prefabricated Spools), Gas, in sense of PED, 133
229 Gas distribution systems, Canadian standards, 171
Table 49.30 (Nondestructive Testing, Industrial Piping), 231 Gaskets, 131
Table 49.31 (Conformity Assessment Procedures), 233 Gas pipeline systems, 170
Table 49.32 (Nominal Design Stress in COVAP), 234 Gas Research Institute (GRI), 395
Table 49.33 (Boiler Acceptance, Design Stresses, and Welded Joint Gas tungsten arc welding (GTAW), 18
Efficiency by Category), 234 Gas Utility Industry Law, 258
Table 49.34 (Material Grouping, Boilers), 235 Gathering system, definition, 372
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 709

GE. See General Electric. Harmonized European Product Standard, 139

GEIS. See Generic Environmental Impact Statement. Harmonized standards, 129, 137–142, 147, 150
General corrosion, as pipeline failure mode, 407 Annex Z, 147
General Electric (GE), 27 definition, 150
Pipeline Solutions, 388 Hazard analysis, 140
General Electric (GE) Reports Hazard categories
GEAP-24098, 28 boilers, French codes, 208, 212, 217, 222–224
GE-NE-523-A71-0594-A, Revision 1, 26 industrial piping, French codes, 191
NEDE-20364, 25 Hazard classes, transport tanks, 358
NEDO-21000, 26 Hazard identification, 138
NEDO-21821-A, 26 Hazardous material, 340
General Electric (GE) Service Information Letter 644, disposal of, 438
Supplement 1, 27 Hazardous Materials Regulations of the Department of
General Instruction (Canadian publication), 162 Transportation (49CFR171–178), 339
General membrane stress, of pressure equipment, 157 Hazardous Materials Transportation Regulations (49CFR170–190),
Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL) Report (USNRC), 21, 338
28–30, 42, 57, 61. See also United States Nuclear Regulatory Hazardous Material Transportation Act of 1990 (HMTA), 350
Commission (USNRC) Regulatory Guides, NUREG 1801 Hazard zone radius, 384
(GALL Report). HB test, 249
age management programs, 33, 35–38 HCAs. See High consequence areas.
age management review (AMR), 32, 35 Heads
Appendix X.M1, 28 reactor pressure vessel bottom head, 73, 86
elements, 58-59 reactor pressure vessel top-head, boric acid corrosion, 86, 114
exceptions to, 33 reactor pressure vessel top-head, PWSCC cracking issue, 86, 124
purpose, 41 replacement, 84
reactor coolant environment effects on component fatigue Head vent nozzle, 65
life, 34, 37 Health physics (HP), 461
second GALL Report, 30 Heat-affected zone (HAZ)
system groupings, 32 cracked welds and, 18
Vol. 2 System, 38 cracking, 1-2
Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS) for License impact testing, 249
Renewal of Nuclear Plants, 31 joining procedure qualifications, 140
Geographic information systems (GIS), database, 379 local brittle zones, 52
Geometry (deformation, caliper or band pigs), for pipeline system stress corrosion cracking initiated in cladding, 25
assessment, 391 toughness properties of circumferential welds, 49
Geotechnical issues, causing pipeline incidents, 373 weld sensitization in., 16
GERG. See European consortium of gas pipeline companies. of welds of pressure vessels, 26
German KTA provisions, 193 Heaters for chemical processes, 156
Girth weld, 17, 49 Heat exchanger examination, 108
GIS. See Geographic information systems. GL. See United States Heat exchangers
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) Generic Letter. Canadian standards, 187
Glass, structural factors, 125 design, EN 13445, 324
Gouges, in pipeline systems, assessment, 396–397 Japanese codes, 257
Grain size, French codes, 249 for pressure vessel components, French codes, 329
Grandfather clauses, radioactive material packaging, 340 in scope of PED, 131, 147
for special form radioactive material encapsulation, 340 Heat exchanger tubesheets
TS-R-1 provisions, 349–353, 355 EN 13445 standard, 329
GRI. See Gas Research Institute. Japanese codes, 257
Grinding, for removal of surface flaws, 80 Heat-sink welding (HSW), of stainless steel piping, 17
Ground storage vessels, compressed natural gas, Canadian standards, Heat treated steel, 144
168, 170 Heat treatments
Group 1 gas, 133 French codes, 253
Group 2 gas, 133 of pressure equipment, 138, 141
Group VII transport group, 340 of pressure vessels, Japanese codes, 257–261, 263
GTAW. See Gas tungsten arc welding. Heatup/cooldown limit curves, for pressurized water reactors, 43, 49–51
Guidance Documents, 333 High alloy steels, 360, 365
Guiding Principles, 142 for pressure vessels, Japanese codes, 259
Half-pipe coils, 318 High consequence areas (HCAs), of pipeline rupture, 375
Hanford and West Valley, 434 High consequence assessment, 100
Hardness testing High cycle fatigue, 6, 245
CANDU® nuclear power plant components, 181 High-fatigue lines, limiting welds, 38
French codes, 253 High-level requirements (HLR), PRA Standards, 93
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710 • Index

High-level waste (HLW) borosilicate glass, 349, 356 Hydrogen cyanide, liquefied, 260
High-level waste (HLW) containing plutonium, 349, 355–356 Hydrogen-induced cracking, 140
High Level Waste (HLW) Packages, 355 Hydrogen to fissile material atomic ratio (H/X), 335
High-pressure cylinders, for on-board storage of natural gas fuel for Hydrogen water chemistries (HWC), 3, 17
automobiles, Canadian standards, 168 Hydropneumatic tanks, Canadian standards, 169
High-pressure gases, definition, Japanese codes, 260 Hydrostatic pressure, PWR test limits, 45, 103, 155
High-Pressure Gas Safety Law (HPGSL), 258, 260 CANDU® nuclear power plant components, 184
High Pressure Institute of Japan, 271 in pressure equipment, 157
High-pressure polyethylene units, reactors for, 261 pressure vessels, Japanese codes, 263
High-safety significant (HSS) components, 90, 96 Hydrostatic testing, 45, See also Hydro testing.
High-strength steels, for pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 312 detecting PWSCC, 69
High temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTGR), 505–506 pipeline systems, 376, 393
High-yield strength steels, 224 transport tanks, 366
HLR. See High-level requirements. Hydro testing, 376
HLW. See High-level waste. French codes, 253
HMR. See United States Hazardous Materials Regulations. pipeline systems, 376, 379, 393
HMTA. See Hazardous Material Transportation Act of 1990. of pressurized water reactor vessel, 45
Holiday, pipeline systems, 395 Hypothetical accident conditions, radioactive material incidents, 336,
Homeland security, risk-informed methods for protection, 89 338, 341
Homeland Security Act of 2002, 420 Hypothetical Accident Condition test, 339n
Hoop stress, 67, 315, 402 Hysteresis tests, piping, Japanese codes, 296
pipeline systems, 413
Hopper diagram, 324 IAEA. See International Atomic Energy Agency.
Hot cell test, 60 IASCC. See Irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking.
Hot cracks, as PWSCC initiators, 67 IATA. See International Air Transport Association.
Hot isostatic pressing unit, 261 ICAO. See International Civil Aviation Organization.
Hot-leg nozzle, weld overlay repair, 81 ICC. See Interstate Commerce Commission.
Hot-leg pipe, 69 ICDA. See Internal corrosion direct assessment.
Hot leg welds, 72 ICI. See Incore instrument nozzle.
Hot-water boilers, 156 ICRP. See International Commission on Radiological Protection.
New Approach Directive, 144 ID. See Inside diameter examination.
Hot-water generators, 156 Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) Oversight Program,
Hot-water tanks, Canadian standards, 169 506
HP. See Health physics. IDCOR. See Industry Degraded Core Rulemaking program.
HPGSL. See High-Pressure Gas Safety Law. Identification, for Canadian standards, for pressure
HRC test, 249 equipment, 169
HSA. See Historical Site Assessment. IDP. See Integrated decision-making panel.
HSS. See High-safety significant segments. IEC. See International Electrotechnical Commission.
HSW. See Heat-sink welding. IEC. See International Energy Consultants, Inc.
HTGR. See High temperature gas-cooled reactor. IEEE. See Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.
Human factors, 104 IGSCC. See Intergranular stress corrosion cracking.
Human reliability analysis, 93 Inhibitors, for pipeline systems, 416
Hungary’s sole Nuclear Power Plant 589 IHSI. See Induction heating stress improvement.
Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority (HAEA).589 ILI. See In-line inspection.
Hungarian regulatory rules 590–591 Immersion tests, of radioactive material packaging, 416
HV 10 for welds test, 249 Immersion-type electrically heated boilers, 156
HV test, 249 IMP. See Integrity management plan.
HWC. See Hydrogen water chemistries. H/X. See Hydrogen to fissile Impact limiters, 345
material atomic ratio. Impact resistance, pressure equipment conformance, 141–142
Hybrid containment vessels, Japanese codes, 288 Impact strength, pressure equipment conformance, 149
Hydraulic pressure test Impact testing, 144
EN 13445 standard, 329 French codes, 253
Japanese codes, 257 pressure vessels, Canadian standards, 169
of pressure vessels, PD 5500 (U.K.), 319 pressure vessels, Japanese codes, 263–264, 266
Hydraulic valves, inservice testing using risk-insights, 105 radioactive material packaging, 292, 350–356
Hydride blister formation, 183, 187 transport tanks, 365
Hydride cracking, 159 Imperfection, RCC-MR code, 251
Hydrogen Inaugural inspection, CANDU® nuclear power plant components, 182
crack growth rate and concentration, 67–68 INCO. See International Nickel Corporation.
pressurized water reactor primary coolant concentration, 85 Inconel alloys, 17, 63, 85. See also Nickel alloys, specific types;
refrigerated, hazard class, 358 Nickel-chromium alloys; Weld metals, specific types.
use in dissimilar metal weld overlays, 19 Incore instrument (ICI) nozzles, 65
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 711

Incremental collapse Inservice Inspection Rules for Mechanical Components of PWR

boilers, French codes, 222 Nuclear Islands (RSE-M), 254–255
industrial piping, French codes, 209 appendices, 251–252
pressure vessels, 200 classes 1, 6, components, 251
Indirect assessment, pipeline systems, 380, 386 Inservice testing (IST), 677
Indian phwr 635 plant-specific risk-informed decision making, 94, 106
Industrial code in korea:korea electric power industry code (kepic) of pumps, 108
674 risk-informed, 90–92, 94–96, 98–112
Individual plant examination (IPE), for severe accident of snubbers, 105–106
vulnerabilities, 33 of valves, 105
Individual plant examination of external events (IPEEE), 33 Inspection
Induction heating stress improvement (IHSI), 17 of boilers, French codes, 217, 222–224
as remedial measure for IGSCC in boiling water reactors, 83 of boiling water reactors, 10
Industrial hazards, Japanese codes and standards Canadian requirements, 170
preventing, 259 effects on probability of crack growth leakage to failure, 79
Industrial piping French codes, 253
buried, French codes, 216, 228 improved capability by using weld overlay repair, 81
design, French codes, 213, 216, 221–222 industrial piping, French codes, 191
failure modes, 212 nuclear boilers and pressure vessels, Canadian, 181
French codes (CODETI), 197–198, 212, 218, 220 of nuclear reactor vessels, 86
materials, French codes, 216, 222 PD 5500 (U.K.), 319
nominal design stress, French codes, 213, 221 pressure equipment, EN 13445, 331
risk assessment, French codes, 212 pressure vessels, French codes, 205
in scope of PED, 147 transport tanks, 365–366
Industrial Safety and Health Law, 267 Inspection frequency
Industry Degraded Core Rulemaking (IDCOR) program, 89 feedwater nozzle, 9
INEL. See Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. future Section XI changes, 94
INGAA. See Interstate Natural Gas Association. Inspection interval, 13, 96
Initiating event impact group assessment, 95 alternate inspection frequency, 11
Inlet/outlet nozzles CANDU® nuclear power plants, 184–185
primary water stress corrosion cracking in, 79 for feedwater nozzle/sparger, 10
projected repair weld cracking, 81 for high susceptibility plants, 73
In-line inspection (ILI), of pipeline systems, 374, 378, 387, 401 for low susceptibility plants, 73
Inside diameter (ID) examination, of boiling water reactors, 7 for moderate susceptibility plants, 73
Inservice inspection (ISI), 110 and probability of leakage from a top-head nozzle, 79–80
access problems, 7 socket welds, 95
as aging management strategy, 60 Inspection personnel radiation dose expenditure, CANDU® nuclear
of boiling water reactor jet pump, 10 power plants, 185
CANDU® nuclear power plants, 171 Inspection schedules, 97
code, 108 Instability criterion, 116
and crack growth rate monitoring, 24 Installer, CANDU® nuclear power plants, 172
French codes, 253 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 110
French pressure equipment, 252 Institute of Universality of Japan, 109
Frequency/coverage, 59 Instrument nozzles, with PWSCC, 63, 68
implementation, 95 Instrument selection guide (ISG), 186
Japanese codes, 257–259 Instrument Society of America, 163
nuclear boiler and pressure vessels, Canadian, 181 Integrated decision-making panel (IDP), 100
as part of age management program (AMP), 57 Integrated plant assessment (IPA), 30, 32
of piping, 108 Integrity management plan (IMP), 380
plant-specific, risk-informed decision-making, 103, 106 development steps, 378
of pressure-retaining RPV shell welds, 6–7, 9 elements of, 378–379
of pressurized water reactor nozzles, 10 Integrity Management Program, pipeline systems, 407
primary water stress corrosion cracking detection, 79 Intelligent (smart) pig tool, 387
probabilistic risk assessment, 111 Interferometry, 418
of reactor pressure vessel axial shell welds, 8 Intergranular corrosion, French codes, restrictions, 233
of reactor pressure vessel nozzles, 11 Intergranular corrosion test, French codes, 249
of reactor pressure vessel-to-shroud support plate weld, 13 Intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC), 16
for reactor vessel nozzles, 11 boiling water reactor issue, 10
risk-informed (RI-IST), 90–92, 94–96, 98–112 initiation and propagation, 17, 66
of small bore piping, 39 inservice (ISI) inspection program for, 94
transport tanks, 358–359, 366, 368 piping, cracking conditions, 16–18
piping, remedial measures, 17, 82
ASME_IND_III_p687-746.qxd 6/5/09 4:33 PM Page 712
712 • Index
Intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) (continued)
repair/replacement/mitigation of, 17
stainless steel for resistance to, 4
stub tube, 12
weld overlay repair, 18, 81
Interim staff guidance (ISG), 40
Interim storage facilities, 685
Internal components of BWR vessels, 1–2, 6
Internal corrosion direct assessment (ICDA), 395
Internal events, 104
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) standard for, 111
Internal initiators, 90,
Internal pressure, allowable stresses for reactor vessel
components/structures, 67
Internal pressure test, radioactive materials, 338
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 333–334, 338–341,
349–353, 355–356
10CFR71 (1988 proposed changes), 347–348
guidance documents, 42
labeling system for radioactive materials, 339
no double-containment requirement, 355
revision cycle of two years, 355
Safety Series No. 6 (‘Regulations for the Safe Transport of
Radioactive Materials’), 338, 350, 352–353, 356
Safety Series No. 6 (Cross Index to Present and Proposed
Regulations), 338
Appendix II, 543
Appendix I, 180
TS-G-1.1 (Advisory Material for the Regulations for the Safe
Transport of Radioactive Material), 338, 341
TS-R-1 (ST-1) standard, 349, 350–353, 355–356
Appendix A, 351
International Atomic Energy Agency certificate, 342
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 353
International Conference on Nuclear Engineering (8th), Proceedings,
ICONE-8, 26
International Congress on Advances in Nuclear Power Plants,
Proceedings, ICAPP03, 25
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), Canadian
participation, 160
International Energy Consultants, Inc. (IEC), 349
International Nickel Corporation (INCO), 63
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), 162
Canadian participation, 160
special form radioactive materials, 335
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) Registrar,
160, 162
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards,
specific types
7195 (Packaging of Uranium Hexafluoride for Transport), 351
9000 (Quality Assurance Rules of French Codes), 228,
9001 (Quality Control Program), 169
11439: 2000 (Gas Cylinders—High-Pressure Cylinders for
On-Board Storage of Natural Gas for Automobiles), 170
17020, 138
/DIS 2694 (International Pressure Vessel Standard), 309, 312
International System of Units (SI), 350–351
International Thermo-Nuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) Code, 269
Committee, 269
project, 269
International Trade and Industry Ministerial Ordinance 51
(MITI MO 51), 270
International Trade and Industry Ministerial Ordinance 123 (MITI
MO 123), 271–272
International Trade and Industry Ministry, Notification 501, 272–273
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), 334–338, 340–341
Notice No. 58 in Docket No. 3666, 338
Order No. 70, 339
Order No. 74, 339
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) Regulations, 338
Interstate Natural Gas Association (INGAA), 420
Iodine-131, 437
Iodine-133, 478
IPA. See Integrated plant assessment.
IPE. See Individual plant examination.
IPEEE. See Individual plant examination of external events.
Iron castings, for pressure equipment, French codes, 252
Irradiated fatigue curves, 174
Irradiated metals, risk of piping failure and, 124
Irradiated steels, 5, 44–45, 50
Irradiation, 1–3
loss of toughness due to, 60
personnel exposure, 13
shift in nil ductility, reference temperature due to, 51
Irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC, 1, 57, 59
Irradiation embrittlement, 15, 45, 126
as aging mechanism, 57
Irradiation-enhanced stress relaxation, as aging mechanism, 59
Irradiation-induced void swelling, as aging mechanism, 59
Irwin plastic zone correction, 113
ISG. See Instrument selection guide.
ISG. See Interim staff guidance.
ISI. See Inservice inspection.
ISMS. See Integrated safety management system.
ISO. See International Organization for Standardization.
IST. See Inservice testing.
ITER. See International Thermo-Nuclear Experimental Reactor.
Jacketed vessels, as pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 318
JAERI. See Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute.
James A. Fitzpatrick nuclear power plant, 97
Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (IAERI), 291
Japan Electrical Association (JEA), 294
Technical Guidelines for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plant,
294
Supplement (1984), 294–295
Japan Electrical Association Code (JEAC 4205-2000), 294
Japan Electrotechnical Standards and Codes Committee (JESC), 271
Japanese boiler and pressure vessel codes and standards, 259
class 1 components, flaw evaluation, 246
class 2 components, 247
class 3 components, 247
Figure 50.1 (Laws/JIS under the Mandatory Laws [Pressure Vessel
Standards]), 266
Figure 50.2 (Organization of JSME Committee on Power
Generation Facilities Codes), 269
Figure 50.3 (JSME Design and Construction Code Structure), 273
Figure 50.4 (Plastic Analysis Results for Nuclear Power Plant
Components), 274
Figure 50.5 (JSME Fitness-for-Service Code Structure), 276
Figure 50.6 (Flow Chart of Rules on Inspection and Flaw
Evaluation), 277
Figure 50.7 (Flow Chart to Determine the Extent of Ultrasonic Test
in ISI for General Inspection), 278
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 713

Figure 50.8 (Extent of Examination and Inspection Period,
Determination of), 279
Figure 50.9 (Minimum Required Cross-Sectional Area, Fitness-for
Service), 279
Figure 50.10 (Flow of Flaw Evaluation), 280
Figure 50.11 (Flaw Evaluation Procedure for Ferritic Vessel), 282
Figure 50.12 (Fracture Evaluation Method Selection for Pipe), 283
Figure 50.13 (Relation Between Design/Construction Codes and
Welding Codes), 284
Figure 50.14 (Test Apparatus Sketches [Testing of Bend in Pipe]), 297
nuclear power plant components, 268
nuclear-specific material specifications, 286
seismic design codes, 290
Table 50.1 (Suggested Codes), 258
Table 50.2 (Publication of JIS on Construction of Pressure Vessel),
267
Table 50.3 (Publication of JSME Committee on Power Generation
Facility Codes), 270
Table 50.4 (Comparison Between MO 51 and JSME Code on
Power Boilers), 271
Table 50.5 (Comparison Between MO 123 and JSME Code on
Power Boilers), 272
Table 50.6 (Ultrasonic Examination in the JSME FFS Code), 278
Table 50.7 (Loads Posed on Concrete Portions), 288
Table 50.8 (Classification of Major ITER Components), 293
Table 50.9 (ITER Metallic Components, Requirements and
Technical Rules), 294
Table 50.10 (Technical Guidelines for a Seismic Design of Nuclear
Power Plant Allowable Stress of Piping), 296
Table 50.11 (Philosophy for the Future Revision of the Piping
Allowable Stress Standards), 299
welding, 262–264, 266–270
Japanese Industrial Standards (JIS), 257, 259, 266
Japanese Industrial Standards, specific types
B 8265-2000 (Pressure Vessel Structure), 261–264
class 2 vessels, 267
class 3 vessels, 366
B 8265-2003, 266, 286
B 8266 (Construction of Pressure Vessels, Requirements),
267–268, 286–287
class 1 vessel, 266–267
B 8270-1993 (Pressure Vessels, Basic Standard), 266–267
class 1 vessels, 266–267
class 2 vessels, 267
class 3 vessels, 366
B 8271 (Pressure Vessel Shell and End Plate), 267
B 8273 (Bolting Flange of Pressure Vessel), 267
B 8274 (Pressure Vessel Tube Plate), 267
B 8275, 267
B 8277-1993 (Expansion Joint for Pressure Vessels), 267
B 8278 (Horizontal Pressure Vessel with Saddle Type Support), 267
B 8279 (Pressure Vessel Jacket), 267
B 8280 (Noncircular Shell Pressure Vessel), 267
B 8281, 267
B 8282, 267
B 8283, 267
B 8284 (Pressure Vessel Head Cover Quick Closing Mechanism) , 267
B 8285-1993 (Pressure Vessel Welding Procedures Qualification
Tests) , 267
class 1 vessel, 267
class 2 vessel, 267
class 3 vessel, 366
G 3106-1999, 262, 264
G 3114-1998, 264
G 3115-2000, 264
G 3126-2000, 264
Z 3014 (Radiographic Testing and Classification of Steel Welds),
263–264
Z 3801-1997 (Qualification Procedure for Manual Welding
Technique), 263–264
Z 3805-1997 (Welding Technique of Titanium), 264
Z 3811-2000 (Welding Technique of Aluminum and Aluminum
Alloys), 264
Z 3821-2001 (Welding Technique of Stainless Steel), 264
Z 3841-1997 (Semiautomatic Welding Procedure), 264
Japan Maintenance Standard, 22–23
Japan Power Engineering and Inspection Cooperation (JAPEIC),
fitness-for-service code, 280
Japan Society of Mechanical Engineers (JSME), 258
code and rule endorsement by government, 258
Codes Committee, 258
Committee on Power Generation Facilities Codes, 268–269
Concrete Containment Vessel Code, 287
Design and Construction Rules, 268–270, 272–273
Guideline on the Approval of new Materials (Nuclear Materials
Code), 286
Nuclear Materials Code Appendix 1, 286
Power Generation Facility Codes, 268–270, 272, 276
Rules on Concrete Casks, Canister Transfer Machines, Canister
Transport Casks for Nuclear Fuel, 289–290
Rules on Concrete Containment Vessels for Nuclear Power Plants,
287
Rules on Construction of Nuclear Power Plant Components, 286
“Rules on Design and Construction for Nuclear Power Plants”,
268, 270, 272
Rules on Design and Construction for Thermal Power Generation
Facilities, 286
Rules on Fitness-for-Service for Nuclear Power Plants (2000), 268
Rules on Materials for Nuclear Use, 287
Rules on Metal Casks, 289
Rules on Nuclear Design and Construction, 269
Rules on Nuclear Power Generation Facilities, 268
Rules on Thermal Power Generation Facilities, 268, 270, 286
Rules on Transportation/Storage Packaging for Spent Nuclear
Fuel, 269
Subcommittee on Fusion Power Generation Facilities, 268
Subcommittee on Fusion Reactors, 291–292
Subcommittee on Nuclear Codes, 276
Subcommittee on Nuclear Power Generation Facilities, 268, 276
Subcommittee on Thermal Power Generation Facilities (SC-TP),
268–269
Subgroup on Environmental Fatigue, 275
Subgroup on Materials (SG-M), 270
Subgroup on Structures Design (SG-SD), 270
Subgroup on Welding (SG-W), 270
thermal and nuclear plant component codes, 268
Welding Technical Standard, 281–282
Japan Society of Nondestructive Inspection, 267
Japan Standard Association, 268
JAPEIC. See Japan Power Engineering and Inspection Cooperation.
J applied, evaluation procedure for calculation, 122
J-controlled crack growth, 115
JEA. See Japan Electrical Association.
JEAC. See Japan Electrical Association Code.
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714 • Index

JESC. See Japan Electric Standards Committee.
Jet pump, 4
boiling water reactor internals, 10
J-groove welds, 65
PWSCC detected, 65
J integral, 15
J integral estimation method, 114
J -integral fracture resistance curve equation, 124
J -Integral Material Resistance Curve, 126
J -Integral/Tearing Modulus Curve, 123
J -Integral/Tearing Modulus Methodology, 114
J -Integral/Tearing Modulus (J-T) Procedure, 114
J -integral testing, 113
JIS. See Japanese Industrial Standards.
Joining personnel, 140
Joining procedures, 148
materials for pressure equipment, 212
Joining procedures qualifications, of pressure equipment, 140
Joint coefficients, 139
French codes, 253
in pressure equipment, 157
Joint efficiency, pressure vessels, Japanese codes, 262
Joint efficiency factor, 312
Joints
for boilers, testing, French codes, 224
bolted flanged, PD 5500 (U.K.), 316
brazed, 140
French codes, 253
lattice tube-to-calandria tubesheet, 175
mechanical, French codes, 248
oil and gas pipeline systems, Canadian, 170
permanent, 140
in pressure equipment, 157
pressure vessels, French codes, 205
pressure vessels, Japanese codes, 263
soldered, for air piping, 170
welded joint coefficient, industrial piping, French codes, 222
welded, PD 5500 (U.K.), 318
Joint tensile test, pressure vessels, Japanese codes, 264
JR curve, 115
J-R curve, 15
J-R curve Crack Driving Force Diagram Procedure, 123
J-R curve test, 122
JSME. See Japan Society of Mechanical Engineers.
J-T. See J-Integral/Tearing Modulus Procedure.
KI, stress intensity factor, 46
KIA, reference fracture toughness curve, 53. See also KIR reference
fracture toughness curve.
as lower bound, 51–53
KIC, reference fracture toughness curve, 53
lower bound, 52
KIm, applied pressure stress intensity factor, 49
KIR, reference fracture toughness curve, 53
index for, 44
lower bound curve and high-rate loading, 53
KIt, applied thermal stress intensity factor, 46
KJC, reference static fracture toughness curve, 51
KAPA spread sheet, 400
Ke coefficient, piping, Japanese codes, 300
Ke factor (simplified elastic-plastic analysis method), 269
Ke’ factor, 275
Ke501 factor in Notification 274
KeA0, 275
Kellogg Company method, 264
KHK. See Koatsu Gas Hoan Kyokai.
Koatsu Gas Hoan Kyokai (KHK), 260
Korean nuclear power plants, surveillance programs, 229
Korean regulatory system and codes of nuclear boiler and pressure
vessels 655
Korean Ulchin 9–10 project, 193
allowable release limit in a hypothetical accident, 336
Labeling, of pressure equipment, 141
Labeling system, for radioactive materials packages, 340
Labor cost, of decommissioning a nuclear facility, 460
Lamellar iron castings, for pressure equipment, French codes, 252
Lame’s equations, 312
Large-diameter butt welds, 77
Large early release, definition, 91
Large early release frequency (LERF), 8
piping, failure probability/PRA consequence, 96
PRA Standards for, 90
probabilistic risk-assessment (PRA) Standard, 107
Large quantity, 335
“Large quantity”, of licensed material, definition, 335
Large quantity shipments, radioactive materials, 345
Laser cladding, 83
Laser weld repair, 83
Last-pass heat sink welding (LPHSW), 17
LBB. See Leak-before-break analysis. LCM. See Life cycle
management. LDM. See Low Dispersible Material.
Lead-201, allowable release limit in a hypothetical accident, 348
Lead shielding, 345
Leakage, 9
boiling water reactor stub tube cracking, 12
boric acid, 69
bottom-head nozzles PWSCC crack in, 70
from control rod drive housing, 26
from CRDM nozzle PWSCC, 87
radioactive soil and water remediation, 486
probabilistic analysis to determine PWSCC behavior in alloys
600/82/182, 70
top head, from flange gaskets, 73
Leak-before-break (LBB) analysis, 9
of CANDU® nuclear power plants, 170
fast breeder reactors, French codes, 250
French pressure equipment, 252
fusion reactors, 292
Leak testing (LT), 45
of boiling water reactor components, 45
of CANDU® nuclear power plants, 185
French codes, 253
pressure vessels, Japanese codes, 263
of pressurized water reactor components, 263
risk-informed initiatives, 45
as Section XI provision, 45
Leak tightness, 329
of radioactive material packaging, 356
Leckie/Penny calculation, 320
Leckie/Penny formulation, 316
LEFM. See Linear-elastic fracture mechanics.
LEFM/EPFM. See Linear-elastic fracture mechanics/elastic plastic
fracture mechanics analysis.
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 715

LER. See Licensee event report. inservice testing (IST), 104–105

LERF. See Large early release frequency. Japanese codes, 257–259
Level 1 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), 89 PRA Standard for, 90–92, 95, 97
Level 2 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), 91 RI-IST of check valves, 105
Level 3 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), 110 Limit load, 3, 113, 115–119, 121, 125
Level of confidence, maximum, 148 Limit load analysis, 113, 116, 279, 329–330
Levels A, B, C, D. See Service Level A, Service Level B, Service austenitic stainless steel piping, Japanese codes, 280–281
Level C, Service Level D. Limit load equation, 3–4
LFRD. See Load and Resistance Factor Design methodology. Limpet coils, 318
License applications, 336 Linalog magnetic flux leakage (MFL) pigs, 387
Licensee event reports (LERs), 30, 32 Linde 0091 flux, 54
License-exempt contractors, 342 Linde 80 weld material, 121
License renewal Linear elastic analysis, of containment vessels for radioactive
age management program and, 58–59 materials, 345–346
aging effects, 57 Linear-elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM), 3, 12, 55, 113–114, 116,
environmental review, 29, 31 118–119, 124
guidance documents, 29, 40–41 assessing flaws effects on nuclear components, 113
requirements, 31 evaluation, 124
TLAA identification/update, 31–32, 34, 35, 38, 41 methodology, 114
License renewal application (LRA), 29–35, 37–38, 41, 57 predicting conditions for brittle failure, 55
aging management program, 30–32, 35, 58 pressure vessels, Japanese codes, 257
aging management review (AMR), 30–32, 57 technique, 113
Appendix A (Final Safety Analysis Report Supplement), 32 Linear elastic fracture mechanics/elastic plastic fracture mechanics
Appendix B (Aging Management Programs and Activities), 32 (LEFM/EPFM) analysis, of irradiated stainless steel fracture
final safety analysis report (FSAR), supplement, 38 toughness, 3
guide for, 41 Linearized stress method, 46–47
requirements list, 31 Line loads, EN 13445 standard, 329–330
reviewing process, 39–40 Liners, 153
safety assessments for, 30 Ling Ao nuclear power plant, China, 255
scoping and screening methodology, 31–33 Ling Ao 1 and 2 contract, 193
Section 2.0 (Identifying Structures/Components Subject to Aging Linings, 143
Management Review), 31 pressure vessels, PD 5500 (U.K.), 311
Section 3.0 (Aging Management Review Results), 32 Liquefied gases, 170, 260
Section 4.0 (Time-Limited Aging Analyses), 32 Liquid, in sense of PED, 138
Table 3.X.1 (“Further Evaluation Recommended” and Liquid-injection system (LISS) nozzles, 177
“Discussion” Columns), 38 Liquid natural gas systems, 159, 168
USNRC review, 40–42 Canadian standards, 168
License renewal guidance (LRG) document, 40–41 Liquid penetrant test (PT)/examination, 400
License termination, 428 CANDU® nuclear power plant components, 159, 163–167,
License Termination Order, 428 171
License Termination Plan (LTP), 428 of feedwater nozzle/sparger, 10
Licensing requirements, 21 French codes, 196, 253
transfer of responsibilities from DOT to AEC, 341 pressure vessels, Japanese codes, 257, 264
Licensing restrictions, plutonium air transport, 352 transport tanks, 366
LIDAR. See Light Detection and Ranging. for vessel-to-shroud support weld cracking, 13
Life cycle management (LCM) approach, 84 zirconium alloy components, 176–177
Lifting and tiedown device requirements, radioactive materials, Liquids rule, 376
336 LISS. See Liquid-injection system nozzles.
Lifting attachments, radioactive materials, 338 Lithium, 68, 82
Lifting eyes, 329–330 LLS. See Low level solid radioactive material.
Lifts, New Approach Directive, 147 LLW. See Low level waste.
Ligament, evaluation with multiple indications, 3 LMFBR reactors, 193
Ligament efficiency factor, 316 Load
Light Detection And Ranging (LIDAR), 417 pressure vessels, EN 13445 (PD 5500, U.K.), 309–310
Light-water reactor (LWR), 104–105 stress on welds, PD 5500 (U.K.), 309
construction, French codes, 253 Load and resistance factor design (LRFD)
environment effects on fatigue crack growth rate, 21–22 for concrete components, 108
fitness-for-service code, 264 Level 2 analysis, 91
monitoring changes in fracture toughness, 45 methodology, 400
piping systems, flaw evaluation, ferritic piping, 118–119 reliability based, for piping, 108, 112
use of alloy 600 base metal, 63 use for nuclear service concrete components, 108
Light-water reactor (LWR) nuclear power plant with risk-informed safety classification, 108
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716 • Index

Load capacity, 173 LSA-II, 353

of pressurized water vessels, 43 LSA-III, 353
replacement component, requirements and, 104 Low temperature(s), for industrial piping, French codes, 223
Load capacity ratings, 53 Low-temperature overpressure (LTOP) protection system
Load category system, Japanese codes, 288 pressure-temperature (P-T) limits, 49
Load line displacement, 115 pressurized water reactor, 45, 60, 63, 85, 99
Load per unit thickness, 115 setpoints, 49–50
LOCA. See Loss of coolant accident. transient, 8–9, 14–15, 49, 51
Local brittle zones, 52 Low upper shelf energy (USE) evaluation, 15, 26, 121, 128
Localized corrosion, piping failure, 96 Low upper-shelf toughness, 121, 124–126
Log-normal distributions, in predicting initiation of PWSCC in Low voltage directive, 138, 141
PWRs, 76 Low water cut-off, 169
Log-normal model, 76 LPHSW. See Last-pass heat sink welding.
Log secant model, 398 LPSCC. See Low potential stress corrosion cracking.
Longitudinal flaw sizes, piping, 118 LRA. See License renewal application.
Longitudinal upper-shelf energy (USE), 15 LRFD. See Load and resistance factor design.
Longitudinal welds, 48 LRG. See License renewal guidance.
Long-lived structures/components, 31–32, 41 LSA. See Low specific activity material.
Loss of alternating current power, 33 LSS. See Low-safety-significance. LT. See Leak testing.
Loss of coolant accident (LOCA), 80, 89, 172 LTOP. See Low-temperature overpressure.
determining consequence categories, 100 LTP. See License Termination Plan.
large break, 99 LWR. See Light-water reactor.
small-break, 99
Loss of material, from aging, 57 Machinery directive, 136, 141
Lost production, 84 New Approach Directive, 129, 131, 137–138, 144
Low-alloy steel, 69 Machining
boric acid wastage, 74, 84 for removal of surface flaws, 81
butt welding, 65–66, 69 of repair surface for nondestructive examination (NDE), 94
for containment vessels for radioactive materials, 269 Magnesium-molybdenum-chromium-nickel steels, for industrial
corrosion rate by high temperature borated water onto a hot piping, French codes, 223
surface, 74 Magnesium-molybdenum steels
dissimilar metal welds, 19, 72 for industrial piping, French codes, 223, 224
fatigue effects, 13, 21, 69 for pressure equipment, French codes, 129, 130, 131, 133–141,
for pressure equipment, French codes, 234 Magnetic flux leakage (MFL), 387–388
for pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 311, 325 Magnetic particle examination, 248, 263
for pressure vessels, Japanese codes, 263–264 CANDU® nuclear power plant components, 181
for reactor coolant piping, 66 French codes, 253
repair/replacement/mitigation for IGSCC in, 17 pressure vessels, Japanese codes, 263
SCC initiated in cladding, 24 transport tanks, 366
for transport tanks, 358, 366 Maintenance, 90
weld cracking, 13 Maintenance pigging, 390
Low-carbon stainless steel, 1 Management Board, French codes, 191
Low consequence assessment, 99 Manganese-nickel-molybdenum steels, for pressure equipment,
Low-cycle fatigue, 245, 269, 296 French codes, 129
Japanese codes, 257 Manhole, sizing minimum, 169
Low-cycle fatigue tests, piping, Japanese codes, 296, 298 Manufacturer. See also Certificate of Conformity.
Low Dispersible Material (LDM), 350, 352 accreditation by ASME for meeting PED requirements, 149
Lower bound fracture toughness curves, 51 achieving overall level of safety, 138
Low level solid (LLS) radioactive material, 350–351 application to Notified Body, 152
Low-level waste (LLW), 436 assembly of pressure equipment, 131
Low potential stress corrosion cracking (LPSCC), 64 conformity assessment categories in PED, 310
Low power, probabilistic risk-assessment standard and, 91 conformity assessment modules without QA, 136
Low-safety significance (LSS) component classification as, 90, conformity assessment modules with QA, 136
96–97, 104–105 conformity assessment of pressure vessels, French codes, 320
components, testing requirements for, 105 conformity assessment procedures for pressure equipment, 154
exclusion criteria (Level B) for snubbers, 106 data report detailing inspections, for Canadian regulating authority,
non class, 101 181
piping segments, 95–97, 100 defining testing type and extent, pressure vessels, French codes, 253
repair/replacement codes and, 96 drawing up technical documentation, 137
safety-related items having, 100 industrial piping, testing and inspection, French codes, 142, 223
Low-specific activity (LSA) material, 340, 347 inspection of boilers, French codes, 260, 253
LSA-I, 353 material specifications of pressure equipment, 141
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 717
New Approach principles for pressure equipment, 147
non-nuclear-specific equipment, French codes, 230
PED requirements, 148
pressure equipment manufacturing procedures, final assessment,
marking, labeling, and operating instructions, 154
product quality assurance, 137
responsibility for design manufacture and conformity assessment,
pressure equipment, 144
self certification, 136
testing definition and extent, boilers, French codes, 224
Manufacturers Standardization Society of the Valves and Fitting
Industry (MSS), 162,
MAOP. See Maximum allowable operating pressure.
Marine Self Defense Force, 260
Market surveillance, 144
MARSSIM. See Multi-Agency Radioactive Site Survey and
Investigation Manual.
Martensitic stainless steel
for containment vessels for radioactive materials, 346
for end fitting material, 642
for fuel channel end fittings, 177
for industrial piping, French codes, 191
for pressure equipment, French codes, 212
Master Curve reference fracture toughness, 44, 53
Material certification, 143
Material fatigue, primary water stress corrosion cracking, 63
Material flow stress, 118. See also Stresses.
Material manufacturer, of pressure equipment, 139, 153
Material reference fracture toughness, 43
Material Reliability Program (MRP) (EPRI sponsored), 57
MRP-86
Materials
for boilers, French codes, 224, 253
for construction, PED vs. ASME code, 147
industrial piping, French codes, 191, 253
PD 5500 (U.K.), 311
for pressure equipment, 156
pressure equipment, Japanese codes, 259
for pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 264, 311
for pressure vessels, French codes, 191, 201
transport tanks, 365
Material specifications, of pressure equipment, 141
Material surveillance program, monitoring changes in fracture
toughness, 45
Material Tables and Allowable Stress Tables (Japanese codes), 275
Material transition temperature, 53
MAWP. See Maximum Allowable Working Pressure. Maximum
allowable bending stress, of pressure vessels,
Japanese codes, 262
Maximum allowable buckling stress, of pressure vessels,
Japanese codes, 262
Maximum allowable longitudinal compressive stress, pressure
vessels, Japanese codes, 262
Maximum allowable longitudinal stress, of pressure vessels,
Japanese codes, 257
Maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP), 397
Maximum allowable tensile stress, pressure vessels, Japanese codes, 263
Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP), 368
of transport tanks, 366
Maximum elastic stress, nozzle reinforcement, 316
Maximum membrane stress, 139
Maximum normal operating pressure (MNOP), 488
Maximum shear stress theory, 320
Maximum transport index, 351
MC. See Metal containment vessels,
MDMT. See Minimum Design Metal Temperature.
Mean fracture toughness curve, 53
Measured material toughness, 44
Measuring instruments, New Approach Directive, 147
Mechanical stress improvement (MSIP), 17
as remedial measure for IGSCC in boiling water reactors, 83
as remedial measure for PWSCC in PWRs, 76
Mechanical testing, 283
Medium consequence assessment, 99
Medium voltage underground cable testing, 39
Membrane stress, 46–49. See also Stresses.
circumferential reference flaw, 48, 49
computing for pressure and thermal loading, 45, 122
concrete containment vessels, 31
nozzle reinforcement, 315
of pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 330, 331
Membrane stress intensity factor (Mm factor), 47
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) (7/2/79), 337
between Interstate Commerce Commission and Atomic Energy
Commission, 338
Mercury 428
Metal fatigue, 9, 21, 28, 34, 35
environmental impact on nuclear power plant components, 42
Metallography, crack detection by, 13
Metallurgical analysis, 14
Metal cracks, Japanese codes, 258, 259
Metal containment (MC) vessels, Japanese codes, 288
Metal structure examination, French codes, 249
Methane, detection near pipeline systems, 417
Methyl-bromide, liquefied, 260
METI. See Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.
Metrication Policy, 351
MF factor, 124
Mm factor. See Membrane stress intensity factor.
MFL. See Magnetic flux leakage.
MIC. See Microbial influenced corrosion.
Microbial influenced corrosion (MIC), as pipeline failure mode, 408
Microcleavage pop-in, 53
Midland reactor pressure vessel, 61
Milliroentgen per hour or equivalent, 337
Miner’s Rule, 320
Mine Safety Law, 260
Minimum Design metal Temperature (MDMT), transport tanks, 360
Minimum holding temperatures, Japanese codes, 263
Minimum holding time, Japanese codes, 263
Ministerial Council on Economic Measures (Japan), 266
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), 258
Notification 97
Notification 408 (Technical Standards on Structure for Concrete
Reactor Containment), 287
Notification 97, 147, 258, 162, 187, 260, 261, 266
Ordinance 258
Ordinance 270 (Technical Standards for Nuclear Power
Generation), 270
Ordinance 287
Ordinance 287, 288
Standard Department, 258
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology,
fusion reactor safety, Japanese codes, 292
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718 • Index
Mitigation programs, effects of aging and, 58
MITI MO 51. See International Trade and Industry Ministerial
Ordinance 270.
MITI MO 123. See International Trade and Industry Ministerial
Ordinance 272.
Mitigation programs, effects of aging and, 58, 59
Mixed waste, classification of, 519
Mixers, 141
MNOP. See Maximum normal operating pressure.
Model PAT-1 package, 334
Modulus of elasticity, of containment vessels for radioactive
materials, 363
Molybdenum-250, 236, 351
Molybdenum stainless steel casting grades, for French pressure
equipment, 236
Molybdenum steels
for industrial piping, French codes, 191
for pressure equipment, French codes, 212, 222
Moment loading, 320
Monitoring, of age management program, 34
Monitoring devices, for pressure equipment, 153
Motor-operated valves (MOV), esting requirements for HSS and
LSS, 105
MOU. See Memorandum of Understanding.
MOV. See Motor-operated valves.
MRP. See Material reliability program.
MSIP. See Mechanical stress improvement process.
MSS. See Manufacturers Standardization Society of the Valves and
Fitting Industry.
Multi-Agency Radioactive Site Survey and Investigation Manual
(MARSSIM), 431
Multiple flaw indications, 3–4. See also Flaws.
N4 studies, 245
N289 Technical Committee (TC), 180
Nameplate, 169, 366
NASA. See national Aeronautics and Space Administration.
National Accreditation Body, 138
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), predicting
effect of small component failures, 89
National Association of Corrosion Engineers Standards,
RP05052–2002 Item No. 21097 (Pipeline External Corrosion
Direct Assessment Methodology), 394, 422
National Board Inspection Code, 366
National Board Inspection Code (ANSI/NB-23), 366
National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors (Canada),
162
National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors in the United
States, 168
National Board Owner/User “R” Certificate of Authorization, 366
National Board “R” Stamp, 366–367
National Building Code (Canada), 163, 179, 189
National Energy Board (NEB) (Canada), 374, 376
National Energy Board, Canada’s Safety and Performance Indicators,
annual report, 372
National Energy Board Act (Canada), 420
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 31
National Fire Code (Canada), 163, 189
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), 162
National Fire Protection Association Fire Code, 163
National Regulations, 129–130
National Standards of Canada, 160–161
Natural gas fuel, high-pressure storage cylinders, automotive,
Canadian storage, 168
Natural gas liquids, 170
NB. See Notified Bodies.
NCT. See Normal conditions of transport.
NDE. See Nondestructive evaluation/testing.
NDT. See Nil-ductility temperature.
NDTT. See Nil-ductility transition temperature.
NEB. See National Energy Board (Canada).
NEI. See Nuclear Energy Institute.
NEPA. See National Environmental Policy Act; National
Environmental Protection Act.
Net positive suction head (NPSH), 45, 50
Net present value (NPV) cost, 84–85
Net present value (NPV) economic modeling software, 84
Net-section collapse, 84
prediction, 116–117
Neuber correction, 245
Neutron efficiency, 164
Neutron embrittlement, 31, 34, 50, 512
pressure vessels, Japanese codes, 281
of PWR vessel materials, 50, 55
Neutron fluence, 59
New Approach concept, 129
New Approach Directives, 138, 144–145
New Approach to Technical Harmonization and Standards, 129
fundamental principles, 129
New/one-time inspections, detecting aging effects, 58
NFPA. See National Fire Protection Association.
NG18 surface flaw equation, 396
Nickel
embrittlement prediction-trend curves, 50–51, 54–55
for pressure equipment, Japanese codes, 286
for pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 311
for pressure vessels, French codes, 203–206
Nickel 201, EAM approvals issued, 310
Nickel alloys
CODAP future specifications, 208
EAM approvals issued, 310
for industrial piping, French codes, 222–223
for pressure equipment, Japanese codes, 286, 295
for pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 311
for pressure vessels, French codes, 203–206
Nickel alloys, specific types
alloy 142, 201, 287, 311, 500. See also Nickel-chromium alloys,
specific types; Weld metals, specific types.
alloy 600 (NC 15 Fe), 12, 15, 19–20, 23, 28, 85, 236
alloy 600, applications, 63–66
alloy 600, coordinated maintenance program, 84
alloy 600, inspection methods/requirements, 71–72
alloy 600, locations in PWR vessel, 64–65
alloy 600, primary water stress corrosion cracking of, 39, 63–64,
66, 68–69, 76–78
alloy 600, properties, 63
alloy 600, properties compared to austenitic stainless steel, 63
alloy 600, related weld materials, 63–64
alloy 600, repair processes for PWSCC, 80–82
alloy 690 (NC 30 Fe), 64, 67, 84, 236
alloy 690, for pressure equipment, Japanese codes, 287
alloy 690, resistance to PWSCC, 67
alloy 800, 64, 250
SB-166, 16
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Nickel-base alloys joints, 139–140, 152, 154–155, 157

for fast breeder reactor material, 251 personnel, 137–138
irradiation embrittlement, 59 mechanical components, French codes, 252
for pressure equipment, French codes, 242 of piping segments, 100
Nickel-chromium-iron alloys personnel approval in PED, 147
chromium content and PWSCC, 66 personnel qualification and certification, French codes, 248
for containment vessels for radioactive materials, 346 of pressure vessels, French codes, 205, 213
fatigue curve, 14 pressure vessels, Japanese codes, 264–267, 281
intergranular stress corrosion cracking, 1 reference flaw size, 44, 56
Nickel-chromium-iron alloys, specific types requirements, 102
alloy 52, 19–20 of RPV nozzles, 71, 72
alloy 82, 19–20. See also Weld metals, specific types. selection, 95
alloy 182, 12–15, 17, 19, 26, 28. See also Weld metals, specific types. transport tanks, 358, 364–366
alloy 600, 12, 15, 19–20, 23, 28, 39, 63–66, 68–69, 71–72, 76–80, of weld replacement repair, 82
236. See also Nickel alloys, specific types. welds, EN 13445, 326–327
Nickel-chromium-molybdenum steels, for pressure equipment, zirconium alloy components, CANDU® nuclear power plants, 176
French codes, 242 Nondimensional tearing moduli, 116
Nickel-chromium steels, for pressure equipment, French codes, 242 None consequence assessment, 99
Nickel steels, for pressure vessels, Japanese codes, 262, 286 Nonferrous materials
Nil ductility reference temperature, 44, 48–51, 53, 55 for pressure equipment, Japanese codes, 262–263
Nil-ductility reference temperature index, 43–44 for pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 311, 324
Nil-ductility temperature (NDT), steel containers for radioactive for pressure vessels, French codes, 203–205
materials, 346 for transport tanks, 365
Nil-ductility transition temperature (NDTT), 50 Non-Linde 80, 16
Niobium, alloy presence and PWSCC, 67 Non-nuclear boilers, Canadian standards, 168
Niobium alloys, UNS R60901, for pressure tube material, 164 Non-nuclear pressure vessels, Canadian standards, 168
NISA. See Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency. Non safety related (NSR) classification, low-safety significance
Nitric acid, 436 (LSS), 100
Nitrogen, addition to stainless steel for structural strength, 1 Non-stainless alloy steels, for industrial piping, French codes, 212,
NKK, 388 214, 221
Nobel metal, addition to mitigate cracking, 3 Non-stainless steels
Nominal design strength, of pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 312 for pressure equipment, French codes, 224, 234
Nominal design stress for pressure vessels, French codes, 201–204
boilers, French codes, 222, 234 Notified Bodies (NB), 129–131, 133, 136–139, 146, 149
industrial piping, French codes, 212, 221 appraisal of material for boilers, French codes, 212
Nominal diameter (DN), 132, 134 approval of design procedures of pressure equipment, 139–140,
Nominal pipe size (NPS), 4, 72 144, 148, 152
NON. See Notices of Nonconformance. conformity assessment of boilers, French codes, 224, 241
Non-alloy quenched-tempered steels, for industrial piping, French conformity assessment of pressure vessels, French codes, 208,
codes, 223 214–216
Non-alloy steels conformity assessment procedure, industrial piping, French codes,
for industrial piping, French codes, 221, 223 212
for pressure equipment, French codes, 203–204, 234–235 experimental design approval of pressure equipment, 139–140,
Nonaustenitic stainless steels 142, 147, 156
for pressure equipment, EN 13445, 327 identification number, 136–137, 141
for pressure equipment, French codes, 203–206, 224, 234 lists, and their scope of approval, 138
Non-austenitic steels, for industrial piping, French codes, 212, 216, monitoring by, 136–137
223 represented in Working Group Pressure Standing Committee, 144
Non-class classification, 101, 103 Web site providing lists and scope of approval, 138
Non-Cryogenic Portable Tanks, 358 Normal Conditions of Transport, 337–338
Nondestructive examination/testing (NDE), 85, 95, 101 of containment vessels for radioactive materials, 346–347
of alloys 600/82/182 locations, 71 Normal form, 343
boilers, French codes, 224, 240 of radionuclides, Type A package limits, 334
of BWR nozzles and their welds, 11 Normalized steel
of crack depth, 3 allowable membrane stress, 144
to detect vessel flaws, 55 in pressure equipment, 157
of effects of fatigue on nuclear power plant components, 38 for pressure vessels, French codes, 201–202
French codes, 240, 253–254 Normal operation/upset conditions (Levels A/B conditions), 14
frequent, to prevent boric acid corrosion, 84 structural factors, 118
future Section XI changes, 94 North Anna Unit 2 nuclear power plant, 74–75
industrial piping, French codes, 223, 231–232 NOV. See Notices of Violation.
information in technical documentation, 137 Novatome, 193–194
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720 • Index

Novetech, N 14–3, 61 Section 4.1 (Identification of Structures and Components

Nozzles, 68, 131, 320 Subject to an Aging Management Review and Intended
alloy 600 use in PWR vessels, 65 Functions), 32–33
bottom-mounted instrument, 63, 65 USNRC endorsement, 33
control-element drive mechanism, 65 Nuclear industry, risk-informed codes and standards, 107
control rod drive mechanism, 63, 65 Nuclear power plants (NPPs), 433
cracking, 8–10, 22, 74 Nuclear Power Engineering Corporation (NUPEC), 295–297
de-gas line, 65 Nuclear power plant
dissimilar metal weld overlay, 19 aging research, NRC, 29–30
effect of temperature on PWSCC, 82 detection of age effects in, 58
ejection danger, 74, 77–78, 82 extended operation period, 29–31
examination methods, 9–12, 71–72 license renewal, 40, 58
head vent, 65 maintenance program, 30–31
improved thermal sleeve design, 11 onsite NRC inspectors, 30
incore instrument (ICI), 65 outage extension, 63
inlet/outlet, 63–64, 66, 74, 78 plant shutdown, 63, 69, 83, 99–100, 104–106, 112–114, 165
J-groove welds for, 65 seismic design guidelines, Japanese codes, 290–300
liquid-injection shutdown system, 175 Nuclear Power Plant Components (ASME BPV Code Section III)
mechanical remedial measures for PWSCC, 82–83 age management program (AMP), 33–37
predicting time to PWSCC, 84 age management review (AMR), 33–35
probabilities of leakage and failure, 79 flaw evaluation during inservice inspection, 113–128
reinforcing, PD 5500 (U.K.), 314–316 indications evaluated from inservice inspection, 113–128
repair/replacement, 80–82 metal fatigue, 34–35
residual stresses and crack initiation, 67 passive/long-lived structures/components, 32
stainless steel, SCC in BWRs, 64 repair/replacement, 37–38
subsequent leakage following repair, 82 time-limited aging analysis, 31
thermocouple, 65 Nuclear reactor core, 164–165
top-head, 63, 84 irradiation embrittlement and, 59
water-jet conditioning, 84 Nuclear reactors
Nozzle to safe end socket welds, examination methods, 72 internal loose-parts monitoring program, 39
Nozzle-to-safe end butt welds, surface method plutonium recovery from fuel, 343
examinations, 72 risk analysis and security of, 110
NPS. See Nominal pipe size. Nuclear reactor vessels
NPSH. See Net positive suction head, 45 beltline welds, examination of, 72
NPV. See Net present value. flaw evaluation during inservice inspection, 113–128
NQA. See American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) indications evaluated from inservice inspection, 113–128
BNCS Nuclear Quality Assurance Committee. low upper-shelf energy evaluation, 121–124
NRC. See United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. time-limited aging analysis and, 31, 34
NRMCC. See American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). See United States Nuclear
Nuclear Risk Management Coordinating Committee. Regulatory Commission.
NSC, 79 “Nuclear Regulators Working Group” (NRWG-TF-NDTQ) 530,
NSNRC, installation of LTOP systems, 49 568, 574
NSR. See Non safety related classification. Nuclear Risk Management Coordinating Committee (NRMCC),
NSSC. See Canadian Standards Association, Nuclear Strategic 108, 110
Steering Committee. Nuclear power plants in Spain, 567, 570
NTD ASI Code for VVER Reactor Components, 577 NUPEC. See Nuclear Power Engineering Corporation.
Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), 258–259 NWC conditions, boiling water reactor crack growth rate,
Nuclear regulatory organizations, 655 23–24
Nuclear boilers and pressure vessels, inservice inspection, Canadian, NWPA. See Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982.
181–187 NYSEARCH group of the North East Gas Association, 417
Nuclear cranes, 107, 109, 112–113
Nuclear energy, history, 29–30 Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), 506
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), 110 finite element stress analyses, 48
NEI-00–02 (Peer Review Process), 107 ORNL/NRC/LTR-93/15, 61
NEI-00–02, Rev. A3 (Probabilistic Risk Assessment Peer Review ORNL/NRC/LTR-93/33, Revision 1, finite element analysis for
Process Guidance), 91, 111 inside surface flaws, 61
NEI-00–04 (Draft-Rev. D), 10CFR50.69 SSC Categorization ORNL/NRC/LTR-94/26, 61
Guidelines, 98, 112 testing for microcleavage pop-ins, 53
NEI-95–10 (License Renewal Rule Guidance Document), 29, updated FAVOR code, 56
31–32, 41–42 Obrigheim steam generators, U-bend cracking, 68
Section 3.0 (Identify the SSCs Within the Scope of License Oconee Unit 2 nuclear power plant, 73
Renewal and Their Intended Function), 32 Office of pipeline Safety (OPS), 373–376
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Office of the Federal Register, 26, 42 PAT. See Plutonium Air Transport package.
Official Journal of the European Communities, 138, 142, 146, 148, 310 PCCV. See Prestressed concrete containments vessels.
97/23/EC, 130 PD 5500. See Published document (PD) 5500.
Offshore steel pipelines, Canadian standards, 171 PDD-63. See Presidential Decision Directive 63.
Oilfield steam distribution pipelines, Canadian standards, 171 Peak stress, 125–126
Oil pipeline systems, 170–171 welds, PD 5500 (U.K.), 322–323
Oil spill, 528 Peak stress strength, piping, Japanese codes, 300–301
Oil Refineries and Petrochemical Plants, 565 Pearson method, 395
On-power refueling, 165 PED. See Pressure Equipment Directive.
Onshore Piping Regulations (OPR) (Canada), 376 Peer review process, 92, 104
Operability, requirements for LTOP protection and, 50 Pellini test, French codes, 249
Operating condition stress/fabrication residual stress leading to Penalty factors, 117–118
PWSCC, 67 Penetrant testing (PT), 9, 72
Operating heatup and cooldown limit curves, 49–51 Penetration assembly, sleeve fatigue, 31, 34
Operating instructions, 148 Performance monitoring programs, 104
of pressure equipment, 141, 155 effects of aging and, 57–58
Operating pressure, use in predicting crack growth rate, 77 Performance testing, static and dynamic, of motor-operated valves,
Operating temperature 105
effect in predicting crack growth rate, 77, 79 Permanent joints, pressure equipment, 154
PWSCC in pressurized water reactors, 79–80, 83 Personnel
Operating time joining, qualified, 140
corrections for predicting time to PWSCC, 83 radiation exposure, 53, 182, 352, 355–356
and probability of nozzle cracking/leakage in RPV head, 79 Petroleum Association for the Conservation of the Canadian
Operating transients Environment (PACE), 162
design fatigue analysis and, 34 Petroleum gas, liquefied, 170, 260
level A, static load conditions, 51 Petroleum plants, fired-heater pressure coils, 168
level B, static load conditions, 51 PFM. See Probabilistic fracture mechanics.
level C, static load conditions, 51 PGE. See Portland General Electric Company.
level D, static load conditions, 51 pH
Operational insights, for component safety categorization, 104 crack growth rate and changes in, 68
OPR. See Onshore Piping Regulations. of PWR primary coolant, 82
OPS. See Office of Pipeline Safety. Phased array ultrasound, 388
Order on Life Cycle Asset Management, U.S. Department of Energy, Phosphorus
485 alloy presence and PWSCC, 67
ORNL. See Oak Ridge National Laboratory. causing hot cracks, 67
OSHA. See Occupational Safety and Health Administration. PHTS. See Primary heat transport system.
Overlay weld metal, 17–18 PHWR. See Pressurized heavy water reactor.
Overpressure protection, French codes, 249 Physical testing, 248
Overpressure Protection Devices, Canadian standards, 168 Physicochemical testing, 248
Overpressure Protection Report, 15, 172 Pigging, 386
CANDU® nuclear power plants, 172 Pipe fittings, Canadian standards, 168–169
“An Overview of R6 Revision 4”, 121, 128 Pipeline security, 371–410
Owner/Licensee Pipeline systems, 371–410. See also Piping.
CANDU® nuclear power plants, 172, 174 assessment methods, 386–394
repair program, 103 cathodic protection, 391–394, 409, 410–411, 413–415
Owner’s Design Specification, fatigue, 20 coatings, 409–414
Oxygen service, cryogenic portable tanks, 364 corrosion control, 405–408
defect assessment methods, 395–402
PAA. See Price Anderson Indemnification Act. defect assessment models, 384, 395–402
PACE. See Petroleum Association for the Conservation of the direct assessment, 376, 386, 390, 394–395
Canadian Environment. emergency response plans, 421
Paris law crack growth model, 401 environmental protection, 372–374
Partial penetration nozzles, examination method, 72 event tree model, 384–385
Partial penetration welds, 67 environmental protection, 372–374
for BMI nozzles, 73 failure modes, 373–374, 377
for control rod drive mechanism nozzles, 73 Figure 54.1 (Gas Pipeline Explosion in Carlsbad, N.M., August
Particular Material Appraisal (PMA), 137, 142–143, 146, 310 2000), 371
Part wall defect, 310 Figure 54.2 (Natural Gas System Network), 372
Passivation, 23 Figure 54.3 (Pipeline Construction [by decade]), 373
Passive power plant structures/components, 41 Figure 54.4 (Causes of Pipeline Incidents on U.S. Pipelines in
aging management, 31, 57 2000), 373
identification, 31–32 Figure 54.5 (Buckling, Gouging and Denting, Corrosion), 374
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722 • Index
Pipeline systems (continued)
Figure 54.6 (Frequency of Occurrence of Various Threats to Gas
Pipelines), 375
Figure 54.7 (Integrity Management Process Flow Diagrams
[ASMEB31.8S]), 377
Figure 54.8 (API 1160 Managing System Integrity for Hazardous
Liquid Pipelines), 377
Figure 54.9 (Simplified Risk Hierarchy), 381
Figure 54.10 (Example of Relative Ratings of Potential Threats),
382
Figure 54.11 (Risk Matrix), 383
Figure 54.12 (Risk Assessment and Mitigation Process Template),
383
Figure 54.13 (Calculating the Failure Probability from a Limit
State Analysis), 384
Figure 54.14 (Simple Event Tree to Predict Ignition Probability
Following Rupture), 384
Figure 54.15 (Possible Scenarios Following a Gas Pipeline
Rupture), 385
Figure 54.16 (ALARP Figure), 385
Figure 54.17 (Effect of Three Integrity Strategies on Risk
Reduction), 386
Figure 54.18 (Hydrotest Aftermath for Driving Out SCC), 386
Figure 54.19 (Defect Assessment Curve), 387
Figure 54.20 (Magnetic Flux Leakage), 387
Figure 54.21 (Ultrasonic Tool in a Liquid Batch), 388
Figure 54.22 (Four-Step Direct Assessment Process), 389
Figure 54.23 (Part Wall [A] and Through Wall [B] Defects), 389
Figure 54.24 ([a]Dimensions of a Longitudinal and [b]a
Circumferential Through Wall Crack Defect), 394
Figure 54.25 (Dents Under Pressure), 396
Figure 54.26 (Method of Determining Longitudinal Extent of
Localized Corrosion and Interaction Distances), 396
Figure 54.27 (Determination of Nondimensional Variable B), 397
Figure 54.28 (Simplified and Detailed RSTRENG Profiles), 398
Figure 54.29 (Profile of Corrosion Depth Along the “River
Bottom” Path), 399
Figure 54.30 (Remaining Strength Assessment Representation of
Metal Loss), 399
Figure 54.31 (Type A and Type B Sleeves), 400
Figure 54.32 (A Composite Wrap Repairs), 402
Figure 54.33 (Clock Spring(tm) repair), 403
Figure 54.34 (Stopple(tm) Bypass Repair Method), 404
Figure 54.35 (Schematic Showing a Differential Corrosion Cell on
a Pipeline Surface), 404
Figure 54.36 (Factors Affecting Corrosion), 405
Figure 54.37 (Timeline of Coating Development), 407
Figure 54.38 (Special Purpose Multilayer Coatings), 409
Figure 54.39 (Cause of Pipeline Coating Breakdown in Australian
Pipelines), 409
Figure 54.40 (Vertical Anode Arrangement), 410
Figure 54.41 (Helicopter-Borne LIDAR Used for Surface
Topography and Leak Detection), 410
Figure 54.42 (Buried Fiberoptic Detection Device), 415
Figure 54.43 (Synthetic Aperture Radar Scanning Swaths from
Orbiting Satellites), 417
Figure 54.44 (Vandalized Attack on the Alyeska Pipeline Causing
Millions of Dollars of Environmental Damage), 418
Figure 54.45 (Gas Pipeline System Dependencies Source Argonne
national Laboratories), 419
hydro testing, 376, 386–392
inhibitors for protection, 409, 416
integrity assessment methods, 386–395
integrity management plans, 375–378
line marking and locating, 416
liquid hydrocarbon, 372
long-term repairs to pressure boundary piping, 19
magnetic flux leakage for assessment, 387–389
natural gas, 372
pressure boundary risk, 19, 96
probability of segment failure, 96
ranking process, 95
regulations, 374–377
remote sensing of encroachment, 417–418
remote sensing of leaks, 416–417
repair, 402–406
right of way patrols, 416
risk assessment of failures, 376, 378–384
risk-informed-inservice inspection (RI-ISI) process, 95
risk mitigation, 384–386
safety, 372–374
security management programs, 418–420
Table 54.2 (Fatality Rate by Mode, 2000), 373
Table 54.3 (Major Threats to Transmission Pipelines ASME
B31.8S), 377
Table 54.4 (Index Methods for Rating Annual Probability of
Occurrence), 382
Table 54.5 (Matching Risk Severity with Level of Response), 383
Table 54.6 (Defect Detection Capability of Various Inspection
Tools), 388–389
Table 54.7 (Attributes of Various Pipe Protection Methods),
390–393
Table 54.8 (Methods for Assessing Corrosion), 401
Table 54.9 (Codes and Standards for Making Repairs, Gas
Pipelines and Oil Pipelines), 403
Table 54.10 (Permissibility of Corrosion Repair Technique), 405
Table 54.11 (Permissibility of Crack Repair Technique), 406
Table 54.12 (Permissibility of Mechanical Damage Repair
Technique), 406
Table 54.13 (Pipeline Corrosion Prevention), 408
Table 54.14 (Galvanic Series of Common Commercial Metals and
Alloys in Brine [approx. 25°C]), 408
Table 54.15 (Advantages and Disadvantages of Pipeline Coatings),
412
Table 54.16 (Classification of Pipeline Coating Tests), 413–414
third party damage awareness and control, 416–418
ultrasonic testing, 388–389, 391, 394, 400
Pipeline Research Council International (PRCI), 395
pipeline repair manual, for gas pipeline repairs, 403
pipeline repair manual, oil pipeline repairs, 403
Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002, 374, 419
Pipeline transportation, advantages and purposes, 371–372
Pipe rupture, circumferential cracking and, 74
Pipe steel
J estimation, 115
NRC/BCL 4111–1, 115
Pipetronix, 388
Pipe welds
class 1, 96–97
class 1, Category B-F, 96–97
class 1, category B-J, 94–97
class 1, category C-F-1, 96–97
class 1, category C-F-2, 96–97
class 2, 96–97
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class 2, category B-F, 96–97 ultrasonic examination in FFS code (Japan), 278–279
class 2, category B-J, 96–97 welded, joining procedure qualifications, 140
class 2, category C-F-1, 96–97 weld overlay repair, 81–82
class 2, category C-F-2, 96–97 Piping and Fitting Dynamic Reliability Program, 294
class 3, 96–97 Piping element tests, Japanese codes, 297
large-diameter PWR pipe-to-nozzle butt weld, circumferential Piping seismic evaluation methodology, Japanese codes, 269
cracks in, 74 Pitting corrosion
repair/replacement/mitigation activities, 17 age evaluation, 33
Piping. See also Pipeline systems. as pipeline failure mode, 390–391, 395, 405–408
alloy 600 maintenance program, 84 Plane strain, in elastic component of J, 115
austenitic steel, flaw evaluation, 121 Plane stress, in elastic component of J, 115
austenitic steel, IGSCC, 17 Plant expert panel, 95, 104–106
austenitic stainless steel, flaw evaluation, 116–118 Plant overall safety, 53
austenitic stainless steels, weld overlay repair as long-term, 19 Plastic collapse, 116–118, 387
axial flaws, safety/structural factors, 18–19, 118 Plastic deformation, 113, 198
butt welds, cracks/leaks, 63 industrial piping, French codes, 212
Canadian standards, 162, 166–167, 171 prevention, French codes, 243
carbon steels, flaw evaluation, 118, 127 Plastic instability
categorization, 134 boilers, French codes, 222
circumferentially flawed, stress ratio, 118 bursting, pressure vessels, 198
crack growth rates, 22, 24 industrial piping, French codes, 209
degradation mechanisms, 96 Plasticity theory, 323
design, load and resistance factor design use, 108 Plastic load line displacement, 115
environmental fatigue effects in a BWR, 21 Plastic pipelines, Canadian standards, 171
failure rate, 96, 99 Plastic strain correction factor (Ke), 245
ferritic stainless steel, flaw evaluation, 118–119, 127 French codes, 247
of ferritic stainless steel, structural factors, 117 Plastic zone size, 47–48, 113, 122
fracture evaluation, Japanese codes, 281–284 Plastic zone size correction, 113
fracture evaluation method selection, Japanese codes, 281, 284 Plate-and-shell theory, 317
fuel channel feeder, 183 Plates
hazard categories if containing a dangerous gas, 133–134 center-cracked, loaded to failure, 113–114
high-consequence category, 100 construction materials, 149
high-safety significant classification, 100 European standards, 236
inservice inspection standards, 94 J-R curve parameters, 124
intergranular stress corrosion cracking with stainless steels, 1 for pressure equipment, Japanese codes, 263
load and resistance factor design, 109 Plutonium
longitudinal flaw sizes, allowable, 118 double containment, 343–348, 354–355
low consequence category, 96 double containment rule elimination petition (1998), 349–350
managing internal corrosion, 59–60 double containment rule elimination proposed (1997), 349–352
medium consequence category, 96 double containment rule for high level waste, elimination (1998
nominal diameter (DN), 134 final rule), 349–354, 349
none consequence category, 100 packaging of fissile material, 341
pressure boundary, 19, 24, 35, 96 sea transport, 352
primary water stress corrosion cracking in butt welds, 74 shipment and quality assurance, 343–348
probabilistic EPFM, 125–126 solid exemptions from double containment requirements,
probability of crack growth propagating to through-wall, 78 344–345
reactor coolant, 66 vitrified high level waste (1997 proposed rule), 349–352
risk-informed applications, 109 Plutonium isotopes, 337
risk-informed-inservice inspection, 98–100 Plutonium nitrate, 342–347
reliability-based load and resistance factor design, 108, 111 Plutonium oxide, 343
remedial measures for IGSCC in BWRs, 83 PMA. See Particular Material Appraisal.
remedial measures for PWSCC in PWRs, 83 Pneumatic testing, 141
residual stress in large diameter butt welds, 83 transport tanks, 366
risk-informed classification and exam requirements, 108 Pneumatic valves, inservice testing using risk insights, 105
in scope of PED, 130–131, 133–134, 142 P-No. 3, weld procedure, 13
segment degradation risk categories, 96 Poisson effect, 396
seismic design, Japanese codes, 290–300 Polyethylene tape coatings, for pipeline systems, 409–413
small bore, inservice inspection, 40 Portable tanks, 357–367
stainless steel, 17–18, 69, 116–117 Postulated flaw size, 122
submerged arc weld, crack instability, 117 Post-weld heat treatment (PWHT), 13
through-wall circumferential crack calculation, 115–117 for low-alloy steel parts, 63
true-stress true-strain curve, 115 of pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 312
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724 • Index
Post-weld heat treatment (PWHT) (continued)
pressure vessels, Japanese codes, 262
of welded components, 12, 17, 19
Power boilers, Japanese codes, 271
Power Generation Facilities Codes Committee, 258
Power uprate and license renewal, 685
PRA. See Probabilistic risk assessment/analysis.
PRA Standard. See American Society of Mechanical Engineers
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Standard.
PRCI. See Pipeline Research Council International.
PRDs. See Pressure relief devices.
Precipitation-hardened austenitic steels, fast breeder reactor material,
251
Precipitation hardening alloys, in pressure equipment, 157
Precracked specimen tests loaded to failure, 44
Predicted instability load, 116–117, 125
Predicted time to crack initiation, 84
Predictive model, in determining PWR component performance, 60
Preheating, requirements of welds, 19
Preliminary Safety Analysis (PSA) Applications Guide, 96, 106
Preload, 57, 59
Preservice examination, 103
Presidential Commission, to investigate Three Mile Island, 89
Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63), 420
Pressure
of cylindrical shell, 313–314
designing for fluctuations in, 20–21
low upper-shelf energy evaluation, 122
maximum allowable (PS), 132, 134
Pressure accessories, 134
in scope of PED, 130–132
Pressure-area method, 314, 316, 329
Pressure boundary piping, 1, 35, 55, 100
Pressure coils, fired-heater, 168
Pressure cookers, in scope of PED, 133, 154
Pressure equipment
components included, 310
European system vs. U.S. System, 149
hazard, level of, 131–133, 135
Pressure Equipment Directive (PED) ((97/23/EC), 129–155,
183–184, 196, 199, 206, 217–218, 220–221, 308,
310, 321
Annex I (Essential Safety Requirements), 130–131, 133, 138–143,
147, 151, 157, 198, 209, 212, 218, 259, 310, 554
basic principles, 135, 138, 599, 613
design, 138–139, 151–154
manufacturing, 139, 154, 173, 187, 226
Annex II (Conformity Assessment Tables), 131, 133, 134, 198,
209, 217, 218, 310, 452,
Annex III (Conformity Assessment Procedures), 130, 131, 135,
198, 209, 217
Annex IV (Criteria of the Notified Bodies), 138
Annex V (Criteria of the User Inspectorates), 144
Annex VI (CE marking), 144
Annex VII (Declaration of Conformity), 144
Annex Z, 147, 149, 193, 310, 325
annexes, 131, 133, 153, 271, 361, 364, 368, 665, 668
Article 1 (Scope and Definition), 131, 133, 153, 153, 271
Article 2 (Market Surveillance), 131, 260, 271, 272, 665
Article 3 (Technical Requirements), 131, 134, 138, 156, 201, 271,
310, 368, 667, 668
Article 4 (Free Movement), 131, 171, 368, 369, 668, 670
Article 5 (Presumption of Conformity), 131, 138, 270, 271, 272,
368, 369, 561, 668
Article 6 (Committee on Technical Standard and Regulations),
271, 668
Article 7 (Committee on “Pressure Equipment”), 271, 272, 668
Article 8 (Safeguard Clause), 131, 271, 668
Article 9 (Classification of Pressure Equipment), 131, 133, 198,
209, 217, 271
Article 10 (Conformity Assessment), 131, 135, 198, 209, 217
Article 11 (European Approval for Materials), 131, 142, 156
Article 12 (Notified Bodies), 131, 554, 557, 663
Article 13 (Recognized Third-Party Organizations), 154, 272
Article 14 (User Inspectorates), 271, 272
Article 15 (CE Marking), 155
Article 16 (Unduly Affixed CE Marking), 272
Article 17 (Appropriate Measures), 272
Article 18 (Decisions Entailing Refusal or Restriction), 272
Article 19 (Repeal), 272
Article 20 (Transposition and Transitional Provisions), 131, 272
Article 21 (Addressees of the Directive), 272
articles, 272
category A, 201
category B, 201
category C, 201
category D, 201
category Ex (Exceptional), 201
classification of pressure equipment, 131
comparisons with ASME Code, 147
conformity assessment categories (I to IV), 310
conformity assessment modules, 131, 135, 136, 310
conformity assessment procedures, 129, 130, 131, 133, 135, 136,
137, 156, 198, 209, 212, 217, 222, 310
definition, 146
development of, 324
and EN 13445, 129
Figure 47.1 (PED Flow chart), 131, 132
Figure 47.2 (Hazard Categories for a Vessel Containing a
Dangerous Gas), 134
Figure 47.3 (Determination of Hazard Category for a Piping
Containing a Dangerous Gas), 134, 135
final assessment and proof test, 141
flow chart, 120, 277, 278, 380, 570,591
Fluid Group 1, 310
Fluid Group 2, 310
vs. French codes, 191, 193, 196, 253, 653
guidelines, 144
hazard categories, 133, 134, 138, 198, 209, 212, 217, 218, 220,
627
industrial piping, 142, 191, 553, 554
industrial piping risk assessment, 219
link with COVAP, 217
link with codes and standards, 192, 193
material specifications, 141, 143, 148, 163, 177, 188
New Approach Directives, 129, 131, 138, 144, 145, 147
Notified Bodies, 129, 137, 138, 142, 310
objectives and requirements, 130
vs. published document (PD 5500 (U.K.)), 309, 531
vs. RCC-M, 248
risk assessment of pressure vessels, 320
scope, equipment covered, and exclusions, 137
technical documentation, 136
Table 47.4 (Selection of Conformity Assessment Procedures), 136
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Table 47.5 (List of New Approach Directives (as of January in CANDU® design, 163
2005)), 144, 145, 146 environmental fatigue effects, 21–22
Table 47.6 (European System vs. U.S. System Pressure “feed and bleed” items, safety significance of, 95
Equipment), 148–149 flaw effect on integrity of nuclear components, 43–50, 53, 55
Web site, 130 French codes, 226
Pressure Equipment Regulations 1999, 309, 330 hydrogen concentration in primary coolant, 82
Pressure excursions, 45 inclusion criteria (Level A) for (HSS) high-safety significant
Pressure Equipment Directive (PED) 97/23/EC, 547, 553, 561, 563 snubbers, 106
Pressure gauges, in scope of PED, 129, 148, 191, 259, 308 large-diameter pipe weld repair, 81
Pressure hazard level, 131, 133 lithium concentration and pH of primary coolant, 82
Pressure limiting devices, in pressure equipment, 141, 157 LTOP for brittle fracture protection, 43, 49
Pressure load, 44, 47, 49 nozzle cracking, 10
Pressure piping, Canadian standards, 162, 168, 170, 288, 422 operating cycle, 74
Pressure regulations, in scope of PED, 626, 628, 633 passive structural components, 57
Pressure relief devices (PRD), 169, 192, 357, 358,, 368, 370, 666, pressure-temperature heatup and cooldown curves, 43, 45–49
677 primary water stress corrosion cracking and, 69, 73, 78
Canadian standards, 160 primary coolant water chemistry, 67, 78
Pressure stress intensity factor, 47, 49 reactor coolant water chemistry changes, 67, 80
Pressure Systems Safety Regulations 2000, 310 risk-informed process, 98
Pressure-temperature (P-T), rate of temperature change affecting, 49 top-head nozzles, repairs, 81–82
Pressure-temperature (P-T) limit, 49 zinc added to coolant, 82
Pressure-temperature (P-T) limit curves, 49 Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) Owner’s Group,
pressurized water reactor heatup and cooldown curves, 45, 60, 63 aging mechanism study programs effects, 57
Pressure test, minimum internal, 249 Pressurized water reactor plant
Pressure testing, 18, 108, 148, 153, 171, 283, 308 personnel radiation exposure, 53
Canadian standards, 160 plant safety, 53
French codes, 191, 193, 196, 253 use of alloy 600 base metal, 63
pipeline systems, 372 Pressurized water reactor (PWR) vessel(s)
risk categories and, 96, 526 absence of inner surface flaws, 51–52
risk-informed initiatives, 107, 108 alloy 600 applications, 63–66
transport tanks, 357, 358 beltline material, 44–45, 49
Pressure tube, 159 beltline region, brittle failure at, 43, 55
containing pressurized coolant in CANDU® design, 163 beltline weld, 48
Pressure vessel degradation predictions of PWSCC, 76–79
boiling water reactor, 10, 25 embrittlement, 50
boiling water reactor probabilistic fracture mechanics for failure/fracture, 43–44
inspection exemption, 10 Figure 44.1 (Locations with Alloys 600/82/182 Materials in
burial, Canadian standards (Annex A), 159, 160 Typical PWR Vessel), 63–64
Canadian non-nuclear standards, 162 inspection methods of PWSCC and requirements, 71–72
Canadian standards, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 168 integrity analysis, 50, 54–55
categorization, 134 primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC), 63, 66–68
French codes, 191, 193, 196, 253, 653 primary water stress corrosion cracking of alloy 600 material,
hazard categories if containing a dangerous gas, 133 operating experience, 68–71
inservice inspection, Canadian,181 probability of failure as a function of pressure temperature, 55
inspection, French codes, 206 remedial measures of PWSCC, 80–81
Japanese codes, 257, 258, 259 repairs of PWSCC, 79–82
multilayer, Japanese codes, 262 safety considerations of PWSCC, 73–74
nondestructive examination, French codes, 240 strategic planning for PWSCC, 83–84
risk assessment, French codes, 198 surveillance program, 50
in scope of PED, 130, 131, 133, 134 top head insulation, 74, 75
Pressure Vessel Research Council (PVRC), EPRI/GE methodology, toughness level of plates, 50
adoption of, 21 Pressurized water reactor (PWR) vessel internals
Pressure Vessel Research Council (PVRC) Task Group, 54 aging management of, 57–60
Pressure Vessel Research Council Task Group on Toughness aging management strategies, 59–60
Requirements, 44 aging mechanisms, 57
Pressurized food processing equipment, 156 enhanced visual (VT) examinations, 60
Pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR), 163 irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking, 59
Pressurized thermal shock (PTS), 30, 32, 44, 51, 56 irradiation embrittlement, 59
fracture toughness requirements, 33 stress corrosion cracking, 59
Pressurized water reactor (PWR), 1 stress relaxation, 59
austenitic stainless steel, fatigue crack growth rate, 21–22 structure/component, loss of material due to aging, 58
brittle fracture protection, 45, 49–50 support, in event of structural failure, 66
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726 • Index

Pressurized water reactor (PWR) vessel internals (continued) capability category II, 92–93
thermal aging embrittlement, 59 capability category III, 92–93
void swelling, 59 codes and standards guiding, 102–103, 106–107
Pressurizer heater sleeve, 84–85 component ranking, plant specific, 104
use of alloy 600, 63, 68 to determine allocation of resources, 89
Pressurizer welds, 73 to determine inservice activities, 89, 94, 107–108
Prestressed concrete containment vessels (PCCV), Japanese codes, to determine risk importance, 89
287 impact, 92
Primary bending stress, 18, 118–119, 121. See also Stresses. of Level 1, 106
containment vessels for radioactive materials, 346–347 Level 2, 106
transport tanks, 362 Level 3, 106
Primary bending stress intensity, 272 limitations, 100
Primary coolant system piping system examinations, 96–97
alloy 600/82/182 cracks/leaks, 63 plant-specific to determine safety significance of SSCs, 99
boron added in PWR plants, 73 ranking measures, 104
hydrogen concentration, 82 RI-IST and, 104
leaks, 63, 69, 72 shutdown, 104, 106, 114
lithium concentration and pH, 82 for valves, 115
zinc addition, 82, 84 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Standard. See American
Primary heat transport system (PHTS), 163–165, 174, 177 Society of Mechanical Engineers Probabilistic Risk
Primary loading, 109 Assessment Standard.
Primary membrane stress, 18, 118–119, 121. See also Stresses. Production from a well, measurement of, 372
French codes, 242, 253 Production weld test coupons, 248
nuclear power plant piping, 295, 299 Product verification, 135–136
nuclear pressure vessels, PD 5500 (U.K.), 324 Proof test, 141, 148
Primary membrane stress intensity, 273 for cast iron boilers, 169
Primary stress, 125 pipe fittings, 169
Primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC), 64 of pressure equipment, 154–155
of alloys 600/82/182 in PWR plants, 63–82 transport tanks, 366
as axial, 67 Property damage, from pipeline incidents, 371–374
causes: environmental, 66–68 PS. See Pressure, maximum allowable.
causes: material susceptibility, 66–67 PSA. See Preliminary safety analysis.
causes: tensile stresses, 66–67 PSAR. See Preliminary Safety Analysis Report.
conditions of PWSCC susceptibility, 68 PSDAR. See Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report.
crack arrest, 69 PT. See Liquid penetrant examination.
crack growth, 67 PT. See Penetrant testing.
crack growth behavior in alloy 600, 79 P-T. See Pressure-temperature.
cracking issue in pressurized water reactors, 74 PTS. See Pressurized thermal shock.
crack initiation, 67, 76, 79 Public Law 104, 358
description, 66 Public Law 104–113 (National Technology Transfer and
inspection methods/requirements to identify, 71–72 Advancement Act), 354–355
predicting time to crack initiation, 76, 84 Published Document (PD) 5500 (United Kingdom), 138–139,
in PWR RPV inlet/outlet nozzles, 74 309–314
remedial measures, 82–84 Annex A, 317, 320, 323–324
repair of RPV alloy 600 components, 80 Annex B, 313
resistant materials, 84 Annex C, 319–325, 330
small cracks, 73 Annex D, 325
susceptibility of alloys 81/182, 66 Annex G, 319–320, 324, 329–330
Principal (CODAP), 207 Annex G.2, 320
Principal, for boilers, French codes, 224 Annex G2.5, 315
Probabilistic EPFM, 126 Annex K, 312
Probabilistic failure mechanics (PFM), 94 Annex M, 313–314
Probabilistic fracture mechanics (PFM) analysis, 7, 55, 79 Annex Z, 310
as alternative for assessing margins in Appendix G method, 56 Appendix F, 316
code, VIPER, 11 bolted flanged joints, 316–317
for inspection exemption, 6 design, 312, 316–317
predicting PWSCC on Alloy 600/82/182 in PWRs, 76, 79 design for fatigue, 320–321
Probabilistic risk assessment analysis (PRA), 33 Enquiry case 5500/116, 329
applications, piping systems, 95 Enquiry case 5500/122, 330
to assess risk of leaks, 84 Enquiry case 5500/126, 318
background, 89 Enquiry case 5500/128, 318
capability category I, 92–93 Enquiry case 5500/130, 329
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Enquiry case 5500/133 (Rectangular, Narrow-Faced and Pure water stress corrosion cracking. See Primary water stress
Full-Faced Flanges), 317 corrosion cracking (PWSCC).
Figure 51.1 (Values of Coefficient _ for Cone/Cylinder Intersection PVE/Pressure Vessels, 309
without Knuckle), 313 PVE/1, Pressure Vessels (technical committee), 309
Figure 51.2 (Buckling Forms for Stiffener Cylindrical Shells), PVE/1/15 Design Methods, 309
313–314 PVRC. See Pressure Vessel Research Council.
Figure 51.3 (Theoretical Buckling Strain e as a Function of Shell PVRUF reactor pressure vessel, 52
Length, Radius, and Thickness), 314–315 PWHT. See Postweld heat treatment.
Figure 51.4 (Nondimensionalised Allowable External Pressure vs. PWR. See Pressurized water reactor.
Theoretical Collapse Load), 314, 316 PWSCC. See Primary water stress corrosion cracking.
Figure 51.5 (Jacketed Vessel Types), 318 Pyrophoric liquids, 340
Figure 51.6 (Limpet Coil Arrangement), 318
Figure 51.7 (Limpet Coil Arrangement for Use in Stiffening for QA. See Quality assurance.
External Pressure Loading), 318 QAPP. See Quality Assurance Program Plan.
Figure 51.8 (ASME-Based/Old BS 5500 Fatigue Design Curve), QC. See Quality control specialists.
321 QI. See Qualified Inspectors.
Figure 51.9 (Fatigue Design Curves from Annex C of PD 5500), QIO. See Qualified Inspection Organization.
321–322 Qualification of welders, oil and gas pipeline systems, Canadian, 170
Figure 51.10 (Annex A Stress Categories and Limits of Stress Qualified Inspectors (QI), 366
Intensity-Hopper Diagram), 324 Qualified Inspection Organizations (QIO), 366
Figure 51.11 (Dished End Thicknesses Compared for 2:1 Qualification of NDT for ISI, 568
Ellipsoidal Form), 328 Quality assurance (QA), 135–136, 144
Figure 51.12 (Dished End Thicknesses Compared for 10% focusing in CDF-vulnerable components, 90
Torispherical Form), 328 French codes, 229, 233–234, 241
Figure 51.13 (Dished End Thicknesses for 6% Torispherical Form pipe fittings, 169
Compared), 328 plutonium shipments, 343–345
flat plates and covers, 317 of pressure equipment, 156
Form X, 311 pressure vessels, Japanese codes, 268
inspection, 319 radioactive material packagings, 343–344, 345
jacketed vessels, 318 Quality assurance program, 101
loads, local, 319–320 Canadian standards, 163
materials, 311–312 CANDU® nuclear power plants, 171, 173, 177–178
nozzle reinforcing, 314–316 radioactive material packaging, 349–350
sections and appendices, 311 Quality Assurance Program (Z series), 162
shells under external pressure, 313–316 Quality Assurance Requirements for Transport Packages, 1978
shells under internal pressure, 312–313 effective rule, 345
supports, 319 Quality control
Table 51.1 (Comparison of the Bases of ASME and PD 5500 licensee of fissile material shipments, 338
Fatigue Methods), 321 spent fuel storage containers and transportation casks, 452
Table 51.2 (Fatigue Design Curves, Details of), 322–323 Quality Control Program, Canadian standards, 168–169
Table 51.3 (Nominal Design Stresses), 326 Quality Control Program Manufacturers of Fittings, Canadian
Table 51.4 (Testing Groups for Steel Pressure Vessels), 327 standards, 168
testing, 319 Quality Management Systems (CAN/CSA-ISO-9001-00), 162
tubesheets, 324 Quantitative risk analysis, of pipeline failure possibility, 382
Published Document (PD) 6439 (Stress Calculation Methods for Quenched and tempered non-alloy steels, for pressure vessels, French
Local Loads and Attachments of Pressure Vessels), 313 codes, 223–224
Published Document (PD) 6497 (Stresses in Horizontal Cylindrical Quenched and tempered steels
Pressure Vessels), 311, 319, 330 for industrial piping, French codes, 224
Published Document (PD) 6550 (Supplement to BS 5500), 311, 313, for pressure equipment, French codes, 223
324, 330–331
PUC. See Public Utility Commission. Radial/shear stress, concrete containment vessels, 288
Pumps Radial shrinkage, in weld repairs, 18
cavitation, 45 Radiation damage, on pressurized water reactor vessel materials, 43
group A, 105 Radiation embrittlement, 43, 54, 125
group B (standby), 105 Radiation exposure, 339
high-safety significant (HSS) category, 105 employees, 53
low-safety significant (LSS) category, 104, 108 Japanese codes, 292–294
OMN-Code testing program, 105 Off-site, 30
Risk-informed IST application, 103 Radiation shielding, 335
seal, 50 Radiation unit, 337
Pump sizing, French codes, 246–247 Radioactive materials, responsibility for cleaning up spills, 340
Puncture/tearing test, 336 Radioactive release, risk assessment of, 90
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728 • Index

Radiographic inspection failure probabilities, 55–56

Canadian standards, 171 ferritic steels, local brittle zones, 53
CANDU® nuclear power plant components, 184, 185, 187 integrity limits, 54–56
French codes, 240, 249 lowering head temperature, 84
pressure vessels, Japanese codes, 264–265 nozzles, 9–11, 65, 72, 77–79, 83
welds in calandria assemblies, Canadian, 175 pressure boundary, 57
zirconium alloy components, 176–177 repair/replacement activity, 78–80, 84
Radiography, 400 top head, 65, 69, 72, 84
Radiological exposure hazard models, 292 top head insulation, 72
Radiological impacts, fusion reactors, Japanese codes, 292–294 top head nozzle leak, 72–73, 80–82, 84
Radiotoxicity of isotope, 436 top head PWSCC, 69, 83
Radium, shipments of, 342 upper shelf energy, 15, 124
RAI. See Request for additional information. vessel-to-shroud support weld cracking, 13
Ramberg-Osgood curve, 114 wastage (Davis Besse) of low-alloy steel, 69
Ramberg-Osgood model, 121 weld examinations, 6–7, 69
Ramberg-Osgood parameters, 119 Reactor pressure vessel internals, French codes, 247
Ramberg-Osgood stress-strain equation, 121 Reactor pressure vessel outlet nozzle butt welds, 69–70
RAMSES committee, 193 Reactor Safety Study, 89
Random (sample) testing, joint coefficients allowed, 139 Redundancy principles, 58
Ratcheting Reference fracture toughness curves, 50–55, 59
nuclear pressure vessels, PD 5500 (U.K.), 323 Reference limit load bending stress, 118
prevention, French codes, 243, 251 Reference load, 115
thermal, in cylindrical containment vessels, 345 Refined hydrocarbon product, types, 371
Ratcheting fatigue, 299–300 Refineries, risk analysis and security of, 110
low-cycle, 299–300 Refrigeration, Japanese codes, 261
piping failure during earthquakes, Japanese codes, 295 Refrigeration equipment, Canadian standards, 168
seismic shakedown, Japan, 295–296 Refueling outage, 84
RAW. See Risk achievement worth. inservice examination during, 8, 71–72
RCC-C. See Design and Construction Rules for Fuel Assemblies of repair/replacement during, 13, 84
Nuclear Power Plants. Refueling station pressure piping systems, 170
RCC-E. See Design and Construction Rules for Electrical Equipment Registration
of Nuclear Islands. Canadian standards, 168–169
RCC-G. See Design and Construction Rules for Civil Works of PWR CANDU® nuclear power plants, 172, 174
Nuclear Islands. Registration numbers
RCC-I. See Design and Construction Rules for Fire Protection. Canadian, 169–170
RCC-M. See Design and Construction Rules for Mechanical CANDU® nuclear power plants, 174
Components of PWR Nuclear Islands. regulation of pressure equipment in Spain, 563
RCC-MR. See Design and Construction Rules for Mechanical Regulation on Pressurized Apparatus, 563
Components of FBR Nuclear Islands. Re-heaters, 156
RCC-P. See Design and Construction Rules for System Design, Reinforced concrete containments vessels (RCCV), Japanese codes, 287
French Codes. Reliability methods, first- and second-order, 126
RCCV. See Reinforced concrete containments vessels. Relief valves, 45
RCRA. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. repair guidelines, Canadian standards, 168–169
RCS. See Reactor coolant system. Remedial measures for PWSCC test program, 75, 82
Reactivity control units, CANDU® nuclear power plants, 175 Repair, 84
Reactor building, 165–166 of boiling water reactors, 1
Reactor coolant cost of, 84
environmental impact on components, 34–35, 37 of flaws, 17–19, 80–81
temperature, LTOP setpoint and, 50 of intergranular stress corrosion cracking in stainless
Reactor coolant system (RCS) steel piping, 17
aging mechanisms, 57 pipeline systems, 375, 402–407
levels of corrosion products in, 63 of pressurized water reactors, 79–82, 85
metal fatigue, 21 of primary water stress corrosion cracking, 63, 79–82
piping, 31 weld overlay, 81–82
pressure boundary, integrity, 30, 98–99, 104 weld replacement, 81–82
primary coolant system cracks/leaks, 63 Repair/replacement activities, 97, 100–101
PWSCC occurrences, 68 in age management programs, 59
Reactor pressure vessel (RPV), 1 plan document, 102
beltline materials, 126 of pressure boundary components, 80
bottom head, 65, 71–73, 77 reactor vessel heads, 65
end-of-life value, 55 RI-ISI programs, 95
environmental fatigue effects, 21 risk-informed, 98
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 729

structural integrity treatment, 101 Risk studies, 90–91

technical requirements, 101–102 RMA. See Rubber Manufacturers Association.
Reportable incident, defined, 373 Roll expansion repair, 12–13
Request for additional information (RAI), 33, 36–37, 39 Role of regulatory authority, 83
Re-rounding, 397 Roll peening, to reduce potential PWSCC, 59
Residual stress, 22, 24, 125, 140 Root cause determination, 35, 59
from fabrication, 69 of component aging, 35
French codes, 253 RPV. See Reactor pressure vessel.
hoop, 67 R ratio, 5
reversing, 83 environmentally assisted fatigue crack growth in BWR
surface, from machining or grinding, 80, 83 environment, 22
susceptibility to PWSCC and, 66–67, 69 RRM, risk-informed, 109
from welds, 17–18, 51, 55, 73, 77, 81 RSE-M. See Inservice Inspection Rules for Mechanical Components
welds, PD 5500 (U.K.), 322–323 of PWR Nuclear Islands.
Residual stress improvement processes, as remedial measure for R-6 methodology, 114, 121
PWSCC, 83 “R” Stamp, 366–367
Residual stress improvement program, as remedial measure for RSTRENG, 376, 399–400
IGSCC, 83 RTNDT brittle to ductile transition temperature determination,
Response analysis method, 299–300 French codes, 249
RI-ISI. See Risk-informed inservice inspection. RTPO, 148
RI-IST. See Risk-informed inservice testing. approval of joining procedure qualifications, 140
Ring forgings, 49–50 approval of NDE examiners, 148
Ringhal 3 nuclear power plant, 70 Rubber Manufacturers Association (RMA), 162
Ringhal 4 nuclear power plant, 70 Rubber Manufacturers Association standards, RMA IP-2, 170
Ring stiffeners, 313–314 Rules on Design and Construction for Nuclear Power Plants, 275
RISC. See ANS Risk-Informed Standards Committee. Rules on Fitness-for-Service for Nuclear Power Plants
Rise-time-based model, for environmental fatigue effects, 22 (Japan, 2000), 275
Risk achievement worth (RAW), 106 Rules on Thermal Power Generation Facilities, 259
Risk assessment, 89 Rupture, 83–84
industrial piping, French codes, 212, 219–220 of radioactive material packaging, 352–353, 354
pipeline failure, 380–386 Rupture disks, 359
pipeline systems, 376 Russian Regulation and Codes in Nuclear Power, 601
pressure vessels, French codes, 198, 200–201
Risk-based criteria, 159 Sacrificial cathodic systems, 169, 189
Risk categorization, 96, 101 Safe-end welds, 17, 19, 24
of pipe segment risk evaluation, 95 Safeguard action, 144
Risk-informed (RI) analysis, 90 Safe operation, 145
applications, 103 Safe shutdown, 30, 98
capability of PRA to support application, 91–94 Safety
decommissioning of nuclear facilities, 425 different classes of packages of special nuclear material, 334
future plans for, 107–110 emergency response plans of pipeline companies, 421
HSS classification and, 100 identifying concerns using PRA, 89
IST application, 103 Japanese codes and standards, 259
preservice, 103 plant overall, 53
repair/replacement requirements, 97, 101, 108 RCC-M French codes, 228–229, 249
risk category and, 97 risk from boric acid corrosion, 74
safety classification, 98–100, 103, 108 Safety accessories, 134
security applications, 89, 110 in scope of PED, 130–131, 139, 153–154
standard for use of PRA, 90–93 Safety analysis, 32
in testing mechanical equipment, 103 Safety analysis report (SAR), 418
Risk-informed (RI) decision-making, PRA Standard application, 91 Safety classification, 100
Risk-informed (RI) fracture mechanics evaluations, 126 of HSS/LSS component categories, 100, 106
Risk-informed-inservice inspection (RI-ISI), 95, 96, 100 risk-informed, 96, 98–100, 103, 109–110
current scope, 93 safety-related (SR) vs. no safety related (NSR) classification, 100
future applications, 108 Safety coefficients, 151–152
overall process, 95 Safety devices
of piping, 99, 100 French codes, 249
reevaluation, 96 on pressure equipment, inspection, 141, 155, 168, 249
Risk-informed inservice testing (RI-IST), 103–105 Safety evaluation (SE), 32–33
Risk management, 107 of BWR stainless steel internals, 2–3
definition, 381 Safety evaluation report (SER), 33–34, 37, 39
Risk neutral situation, 97 Safety factors. See Structural factors.
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730 • Index

Safety functions Secondary bending stress, 118–119. See also Stresses.

core damage protection, 96 Secondary stresses, 124–125
large early release frequency, 96 in containment vessels for radioactive materials, 346
during shutdown, 104 membrane, French codes, 251–252
Safety hazards, radioactive material accidental release, 181 nuclear power plants, Japanese codes, 294–295
Safety lock, fuel-handling equipment, CANDU® nuclear power nuclear pressure vessels, PD 5500 (U.K.), 324
plants, 175 Section I (Power Boilers), 147, 169–170, 188, 258–259, 364
Safety margins, 100 vs. COVAP (French Boiler Code), 224
French codes, 238–239, 245 vs. Japanese codes, 268–270
of nuclear reactors, 43, 49–51 Section II (Materials), 267, 286
overall plant safety and, 53 Appendix 1, 287
pipeline systems, 384 Appendix 2, 287
for pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 321 Appendix 5, 287
of pressurized water reactor vessels, 43 vs. French codes, 230
probability fracture mechanics used, 56 vs. Japanese codes, 268–269, 286–287
Safety measures Part A (Materials: Ferrous Material Specifications), 169, 188
fusion reactors, Japanese codes, 292–294 PartB (Materials: Nonferrous Material Specifications), 169, 188
Japanese codes, 260–261 Part C (Materials: Specification for Welding Rods, Electrodes and
Safety objectives, 129–130, 138 Filler Materials), 169, 188
Safety related (SR) Part D (Materials: Properties), 169, 188, 275, 359, 362–363
definition, 98 Table U, 311
structures, systems, and components (SSC), special treatment, 98 vs. PD 5500 (U.K.), 311
Safety-related (SR) classification, 100 Section III (Power Piping Codes), 118, 124, 193
Safety/relief devices, Canadian standards, 169 Addenda, 295
Safety Report, French codes (RCC-M), 215, 230, 250 allowable stresses for reactor vessel components, 67
Safety requirements, 147–151 for Canadian nuclear construction standards, 159
Safety reviews, for license renewal, 30–31 Class 1 systems, 1, 6, 346
Safety significance categories Class 2 systems, 108
HSS (high-safety significance) as, 104 Class 3 systems, 108, 293, 295
LSS (low-safety significance) as, 104 Code cases, 108
Safety systems developing reliability-based load and resistance factor design
effects of aging on, 58 methods for piping, 107
low-safety significance of, 100 fatigue design curves, 21
Safety valves, 141 Figure 42.1 (Audit of AMPs Consistent with the GALL Report),
French codes, 249 36
repair guidelines, Canadian standards, 168 Figure 42.2 (Audit of Plant-Specific AMPs), 37
Sample package, 336 Figure 42.3 (AMP Review Process, Consistent with GALL
Sample size, 58 Report), 38
Sampling, as inspection method, 58 Figure 42.4 (AMR Review Process, Consistent with Precedent), 39
SAR. See Safety analysis report. Figure 42.5 (Interim Staff Guidance Process Flow Chart), 40–41
SAR. See Synthetic aperture radar imaging. Figure 43.8 (Charpy V-Notch Surveillance Data Showing RTNDT
SARA. See Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act. Shift Due to Irradiation), 50–51
Satellites-optical systems, 418 Figure 44.1 (Locations with Alloys 600/82/182 Materials in PWR
surveillance of pipeline systems, 418–419 Vessel), 64
SAW. See Submerged arc welding. Figure 44.2 (Typical Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM)
SBC. See Systems-Based Code. Nozzle), 65
SCADA. See Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition. Figure 44.3 (Bottom-Mounted Instrument (BMI) Nozzle), 65
Scale model testing, 6 Figure 44.4 (Typical Reactor Vessel Inlet/Outlet Nozzle), 66
SCC. See Standards Council of Canada. Figure 44.5 (Typical Core Support Lug), 66
SCC. See Stress corrosion cracking. Figure 44.6 (Alloy 600 Crack Growth Rate at 338°C Plotted vs.
SCO. See Surface contaminated object. Hydrogen Concentration), 67–68
Scoping methodology, 41 Figure 44.7 (Effects of Hydrogen Concentration on PWSCC
for license renewal, 32 Initiation and Growth), 68
review process, 32–33 Figure 44.8 (Typical Small Volume of Leakage from CRDM
SCRAM (rapid reactor shutdown), 20–21, 31, 32–33 Nozzle), 69, 71
Screening methodology, 41, 59 vs. French codes, 226, 229, 236–237, 246–247
for license renewal, 32 intergranular stress corrosion cracking, 1
review process, 32–33 vs. Japanese codes, 272–273, 275, 284
SCV. See Steel containment vessels. joint design with American Concrete Institute, 400
SDO. See Standards-developing organizations. material fracture toughness requirements, 348
SDWA. See Safe Drinking Water Act. nuclear requirements, 102
SE. See Safety evaluation. pressure-retaining components, 20
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 731

pressurized water reactor vessel design requirements, 43 Section III, Division 2 (Code for Concrete Reactor Vessels and
service-induced degradation in BWR vessels, internals, and Containments), 171–172, 189
pressure boundary piping, 24 Class MC, components, provisions for, 172
Table 42.1 (Consistent with GALL Report Classification), 33–34 vs. Japanese codes, 270, 287, 289
Table 42.2 (Elements of an Aging Management Program), 35 Subsection NCA, 172–173
Table 44.1 (Factors on Crack Initiation and Growth Time at NCA-2142, 173
Typical PWR Temperatures), 67, 76 NCA-2143, 173
Task Group, environmental fatigue effects, 21 NCA-3250, 173
Section III, Division 1 (Rules for Construction of Nuclear Power NCA-3550, 173
Plant Components), 34, 42, 171–173, 188, 194, 259 NCA-3800, 102
Appendix I, 358 Section III, Division 3 (Containment Systems for Transport
Appendix III, 45 Packaging), 174
Appendix XIII, 237 adoption by USNRC, 354, 353
Appendix XIV, 237 vs. Japanese codes, 268–269
Appendix A, 37 Section III, Division 4, vs. Japanese codes, 291
Appendix B, 173 Section IV (Heating Boilers), 169
Appendix C, 173 Section V (Nondestructive Examination), 169, 177,
Appendix G (Protection Against Nonductile Failure), 43–46, 60, 183, 188
113, 124, 245 vs. Japanese codes, 270
Figure 43.9 (ASME Code’s KIR Toughness Curves), 51 Section VIII, 138–139, 317
G-2120 (Maximum Postulated Defect), 56 canister design requirements for radioactive materials,
KIR curve, 53 349
vs. EN 13445, 327 vs. Japanese codes, 270
fatigue design procedure, 20 nuclear requirements, 102
Figure 19.2 (Fatigue Design Curve for Ni-Cr-Fe), 14 pressurized water reactor vessel design requirements, 43
maximum postulated defect, related to allowable surface Section VIII, Division 1 (Rules for Construction of Pressure Vessels),
indications (Section XI), 44 147, 169–170, 258–259, 347, 360, 364
vs. RCC-M, 254 compared to CODAP rules (French codes), 208
required weld overlay thickness, 20 vs. EN 13445, 328–329
Subsection NA, 347 vs. Japanese codes, 259, 272
Article III–2000, 347 production tests, 264
Subsection NB, 1, 172, 189, 248, 290, 347 Subsection A (General Requirements for All Methods of
NB-2300, 44, 60 Construction and All Materials), 151
NB-2330, 44 Part UD, 359
NB-2331, 50 Part UG, 359–360
NB-3000, 18 UG-22, 361
NB-3200, primary stress intensity limits, 20, 175, 238 Figure UG-31, 262
NB-3222.4, 245 UG-44, 169
NB-3228.5, 274 UG-46, 179
NB-3600, 239, 246 UG-90, 365
NB-3650, 18 UG-93, 366
NB-3661.2, 245 Section VIII, Division 1, Subsection B (Requirements Pertaining to
NB-4000, 238 Methods of Fabrication of Pressure Vessels)
Subsection NC, 172, 176, 236 Part UW, 365–367
NC-3200, 175, 237 UW-2, 364
NC-3300, 175 UW-3, 364
NC-3352.4(d), 175 Table UW-12, 262
NC-3671.2, 175 UW-40, 365
NC-3800, 247 UW-50, 366
NC-3900, 247 UW-51, 366
Subsection ND, 172, 248, 347 UW-52, 366
vs. Japanese codes, 294 Section VIII, Division 1, Subsection C
ND-3671.2, 175 Part UCS (Requirements for Pressure Vessels Constructed of
ND-3800, 247 Carbon and Low-Alloy Steels)
ND-3900, 247 Table UCS-23, 262–263
Subsection NE, 171, 176 UCS-56, 365
Subsection NF, 174, 347 UCS-85, 262
NF-2000, 177 Part UHA (Requirements for Pressure Vessels Constructed of
NF-3200, 175 High-Alloy Steel)
NF-3300, 175 Table UHA-23, 262–263
Subsection NG, 1, 347 Part UHX, 208
Subsection NH, 275 UHX-12, 208
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732 • Index

Section VIII, Division 1, Subsection C (continued)
Part UNF (Requirements for Pressure Vessels Constructed of
Nonferrous Materials)
Table UNF-23, 262–263
Section VIII, Division 1, Appendices 1–32
Appendix 1, vs. PD 5500 (U.K.), 312
Appendix 13, 329
Appendix 26, 208
Appendix L, 363
Appendix EE, 318
Section VIII, Division 2 (Alternate Rules for Pressure Vessels), 20,
169,188–189, 288
class 1 vessel, 266–267
compared to CODAP rules (French codes), 208
Section VIII, Division 2, Mandatory Appendices
Appendix 4, 362
Appendix 5, 362
Section VIII, Division 3, 169, 188, 261
Section IX (Welding and Brazing Qualifications), 169, 188
brazing and welding procedures, Canadian, 169
vs. French codes, 253
vs. Japanese codes, 264, 270
Part QW, 248
welding requirements, 148
Section X (Fiber-Reinforced Plastic Pressure Vessels), 169, 188
Section XI (Inservice Inspection of Nuclear Reactor Cooling
Systems), 4, 87, 103, 127, 181, 187–188
Addenda (2002 Edition), 118–119, 121
allowable surface indications, related to maximum postulated
defect (Section III), 56
BWR requirements, 1
BWR steam dryer assembly/steam flow path, 6–7
CANDU® equivalent, 159
Class 1 components
fabricated with Alloys 600/82/182 materials, 71
high-safety significance (HSS) items, 95
piping, 98
Class 2 components
high-safety significance items, 95
piping, 98
systems, 108
Class 3 components
high-safety significance items, 95
piping, 89, 98
systems, 108
Code Cases, 94–106, 108, 109
code requirements for safety relation, 95
conditional consequence of failure, 93
Figure 41.1 (Overview of BWR Pressure Vessel and Internal
Components), 1–2
Figure 41.2 (BWR Core Shroud Weld Designations), 3
Figure 41.3 (A Distributed Ligament Length Example), 3
Figure 41.4 (Typical Geometry of a BWR Jet Pump), 5
Figure 41.5 (Sample of Stress Time History at Cracked Location),
5, 9
Figure 41.6 (Crack Lengths for Core Flow Levels), 6
Figure 41.7 (BWR Steam Dryer Assembly), 7
Figure 41.8 (Steam Dryer Damage), 8
Figure 41.9 (Feedwater Nozzle with Cracking Location), 9
Figure 41.10 (Improved Sleeve Design and Temperature
Variation), 11
Figure 41.11 (Fracture Mechanics Results for BWRs), 9, 12
Figure 41.12 (BWR Feedwater Nozzle Inspection Zones), 12
Figure 41.13 (BWR Set-in CRD Stub Tube Design), 12
Figure 41.14 (Stub Tube Narrow Groove Welded Partial Design), 13
Figure 41.15 (BWR-2 Shroud Support Geometry), 14
Figure 41.16 (Calculated Values of Total K and the Polynomial
Fit), 14
Figure 41.17 (Predicted Crack Growth as Function of Operating
Hours), 14
Figure 41.18 (Steam Dryer Support Bracket Crack), 14–15
Figure 41.19 (Temperature-Time Variations during Automatic
Blowdown Transient), 15–16
Figure 41.20 (Assessment for Level C Conditions), 15–16
Figure 41.21 (Weld Overlay Repair), 17
Figure 41.22 (Dissimilar Metal Weld Overlay), 19
Figure 41.23 (Design versus Actual Number of Transient Events),
21
Figure 41.24 (Severity of Transient Actual Temperature Change
versus Percentage of Design Basis), 21
Figure 41.25 (Effect of Loading Conditions on Environmentally
Assisted Fatigue Crack Growth and Comparison with ASME
Section XI Curves), 22, 24
Figure 41.26 (Crack Growth Rate Prediction Model), 22–23
Figure 41.27 (Comparison of BWRVIP-14 and Japan Maintenance
Code Predictions), 23
Figure 41.28 (BWRVIP-60 Stress-Corrosion Cracking Deposition
Lines), 23
Figure 41.29 (Crack Length versus Total Time-on-Test), 24
Figure 41.30 (Predicted Crack Growth in Safe End), 24
Section XI, Division 1, Nonmandatory Appendices
Figure 43.1 (Mm Factor for Membrane Stress Intensity Factor), 46
Figure 43.2 (Mt Factor vs. Thickness for Bending Stress Intensity
Factor), 46
Figure 43.3 (Linearized Representation of Stresses for Surface
Flaws), 46–47
Figure 43.4 (Examples of 50°F/hr. Cooldown Curves), 48
Figure 43.5 (Assumed Axial Flaws in Circumferential Welds), 49
Figure 43.6 (Circumferential Flaws in Girth Welds), 49
Figure 43.7 (Fixed LTOP Setpoint Affects Operating Window), 50
Figure 43.8 (Charpy V-Notch Surveillance Data Showing RTNDT
Shift Due to Irradiation), 50
Figure 43.9 (ASME Code KIC Toughness Curves), 51
Figure 43.10 (Static Fracture Toughness Data (KJC) Now
Available, Compared to KIC), 52
Figure 43.11 (Original Reference Toughness Curve, with
Supporting Data), 52
Figure 43.12 (KIC Reference Toughness Curve with Screened Data
in the Lower Temperature Range), 52
Figure 43.13 (Original ASME KIC Data and New Variable TKIC-T),
53
Figure 43.14 (Original KIC Toughness Data versus T-T0), 54
Figure 43.15 (Fracture Toughness Data Normalized to 1T and
Compared to Code Case N-629 Curve), 54
Figure 43.16 (Comparison of Residuals from ASTM E 900-02 and
Recent NRC Embrittlement Trend Curve Equations), 55
Figure 43.17 (Estimates of Crack Initiation Compared to P-T
Limits for Normal Cooldown Transient), 55
Figure 43.18 (Relationship Between Maximum Postulated Defect
and Allowable Surface Indications), 56
Figure 43.19 (Framework for Implementation of Aging
Management Using Inspections and Flaw Evaluation), 59–60
Figure 44.8 (Typical Small Volume of Leakage from CDRM
Nozzle), 69, 72
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 733
Figure 44.9 (Large Volume of Wastage on Davis-Besse Reactor
Vessel Head), 70, 74
Figure 44.10 (Through-Wall Crack and Part-Depth Circumferential
Crack in V.C. Summer Reactor Vessel Hot-Leg Outlet
Nozzle), 70
Figure 44.11 (Leak from South Texas 1 BMI Nozzle), 71–73
Figure 44.12 (Schematic of RPV Top-Head Nozzle Geometry and
Nature of Observed Cracking), 74
Figure 44.13 (Plan and Cross-Section through Corroded Part of
Davis-Besse Reactor Vessel Head), 74–75
Figure 44.14 (Cross-Section through Davis-Besse Reactor Vessel
Head), 75
Figure 44.15 (Distribution of Log-Mean CGR Power Law
Constant for the 26 Heats of Alloy 600 Material with
Log-Normal Fit to the Data), 77
Figure 44.16 (Typical Crack Growth Predictions for a
Circumferential Crack in a Steep Angle RPV Top-Head
(CRDM) Nozzle), 78
Figure 44.17 (Crack Growth Predictions for a Postulated
Circumferential Crack in a Large-Diameter Nozzle Butt
Weld), 78
Figure 44.18 (Effect of Inspections on Probability of Nozzle
Failure for Head Operating Temperature Ranges), 79
Figure 44.19 (Probability of Leakage from a Top-Head Nozzle),
79–80
Figure 44.20 (Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Top-Head Nozzle
Flaw Embedment Repair), 81
Figure 44.21 (Weld Overlay Repair Applied to RPV Outlet
Nozzle), 81
Figure 44.22 (RPV Top-Head Nozzle Weld Replacement Repair),
82
Figure 44.23 (Typical Results of Strategic Planning Economic
Analysis for PPV Head Nozzles), 85
Figure 45.2 (Overall Risk-Informed ISI Process), 90
Figure 45.3 (Potential Evolution to Nuclear Systems Code), 109
Figure 46.1 (Effect of Fracture Toughness on the Governing
Failure Mechanism), 113–114
Figure 46.2 (The EPRI J Estimation Scheme), 115
Figure 46.3 (True-Stress True-Strain Curve for A333 Grade 6 Base
Material in NRC/BCL 4111-1 Pipe), 115
Figure 46.4 (Fully Plastic J Integral for Circumferential
Through-Wall Flaws in Cylinders), 115–116
Figure 46.5 (Determination of Instability J, T, and Associated Load
for Load Control EPFM Analysis), 116–117
Figure 46.6 (Net-Section Collapse Load vs. Estimation Scheme
Maximum Load for Axially Loaded 304SS Pipe with
Through-Wall Circumferential Crack), 117
Figure 46.7 (Determination of J and T at Crack Instability for
Austenitic SAW at 550°F), 117
Figure 46.8 (DPFAD for Failure Mode Screening Criterion), 119
Figure 46.9 (Elastic-Plastic Fracture Mechanics Flow Chart for
Screening Criteria), 119–120
Figure 46.10 (Ferritic Material J-T Curves used in EPFM
Evaluation), 119–120
Figure 46.11 (Instability Point Determination in DPFAD Space),
121
Figure 46.12 (Ductile Crack Growth Stability Evaluation), 123
Figure 46.13 (DPFAD for a 1/4T Flaw), 123
Figure 46.14 (J Integral-Tearing Modulus (J-T) Procedure),
123–125
flaw evaluation procedures, 81, 113–128
vs. French codes, 229
future inspection requirements of dissimilar metal butt welds, 72
inspection requirements for alloy 600 components, 72
inspection requirements for alloys 82/182 welds, 72
inspection sample sizes, 182
intergranular stress corrosion cracking, 1
vs. Japanese codes, 276, 278–280
Section XI (Inservice Inspection of Nuclear Reactor Cooling
Systems)
Main Committee, alternate inspection frequency, 11
pressure testing, leakage, 108
reactor pressure vessel inside surface flaws and, 51
repair and replacement, 97–99
RI-ISI, 97
risk inform code design rules, 89
risk inform code requirements for inservice testing, 89
service-induced degradation in BWR vessels, internals, and
pressure boundary piping, 24
special treatment requirements, 98
structural margins for crack growth, 24
Table 41.1 (Jet Pump FIV Stress Range vs. Cycle Data), 6
Table 41.2 (Feedwater Nozzle/Sparger Inspection
Recommendations), 10
Table 41.3 (BWR RPV Equivalent Margin Review Summary),
15–16
Table 41.4 (Comparison of Required Thickness of Weld Overlay
Repair), 20
Table 46.1 (Fully Plastic .3Integral for Circumferential
Through- Wall Flaws in Cylinders), 115, 117
Table 46.2 (Safety/Structural Factors for Circumferential and Axial
Flaws), 118
Table 46.3 (Default Material Properties and Z Factors for Ferritic
Piping with Circumferential Flaws), 117
Table 46.4 (Z Factors for Circumferential Flaws in Ferritic Piping),
120–121
Table 46.5 (Appendix K Requirements), 122
Table H-4211–1 (46.3)(Material Properties for Carbon Steel Base
Metals and Weldments), 119
Table H-5310-1, 119
Table H-5310-2, 120
Table H-6310-1 (Load Multipliers for Carbon Steel Base Metals
and Weldments), 119–120
Table H-6310-2 (Load Multipliers for Carbon Steel Base Metals
and Weldments for User-Specified Data), 119–120
Table H-6320, 120
Task Group for Piping Flaw Evaluation, flaw evaluation in
austenitic steel piping, 127
Task Group of Subgroup on Welding, 19
Task Group on Risk-Based Examination, 94
2001 Edition, 20
volumetric examination of RPV pressure-retaining shell welds, 7
White Paper (Reactor Vessel Integrity Requirements for Levels A
and B Conditions), 13, 55
Working Group on Flaw Evaluation, 15, 20, 118
Working Group on Implementation of Risk-Based Examination, 95
Working Group on Operating Plant Criteria, 49–50, 55
Section XI, Division 1 (Revision 13), 26
Section XI, Division 1, Subsection IWA (General Requirements)
IWA-1400 (n), (Documentation of Quality Assurance Program),
101
Table IWA-2210-1, 60
IWA-3300, 125
IWA-4000 (Repair/Replacement Activities), 101–102
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734 • Index

Section XI, Division 1, Subsection IWA Section XI, Division 1, Nonmandatory Appendices
(General Requirements) (continued) Appendix C (Evaluation of Flaws in Austenitic Piping), 16, 21–22,
IWA-4110 (Scope), 101 119, 125–126
IWA-4120 (Applicability), 101 BWR shroud flaw evaluation guideline, 2
IWA-4130 (Alternate Requirements), 101 Figure C-3210-1 (Air Fatigue Crack Growth Rate Curves for
IWA-4131, 101 Austenitic Stainless Steel), 5
IWA-4140 (Responsibilities), 101 flaw evaluation guidelines, 6
IWA-4142, 101 flaw sizes allowable (2004 Edition), 118
IWA-4150 (Repair/Replacement Program), 102 limit load equations, 3, 4
IWA-4160 (Alternative Provisions [Similar to] Verification of source equations, 18–19
Acceptability), 102 2002 Addenda, 19–20
IWA-4170 (Inspection), 102 Appendix E (Evaluation of Unanticipated Operating Events), 8
IWA-4180 (Documentation), 102 Appendix G (Fracture Toughness Criteria for Protection Against
IWA-4200 (Items Used for Repair/Replacement Activities), 102 Failure), 15, 43, 46–47, 60, 113, 121–122, 128
IWA-4211(b), 103 determining LTOP setpoint, 50
IWA-4220 (Code Applicability), 103 excess conservatism in, 53
IWA-4300 (Design), 102 fracture toughness-based reference temperature, 45–49
IWA-4411, 102 future need for probabilistic P-T limit curves, 56–57
IWA-4411(e), 102–103 future need to reduce reference flaw size, 56
IWA-4411(f), 102 G-2120 (Reference Flaw Size), 48, 56
IWA-4422, 102 G-2215, 50
IWA-4460, 103 heatup and cooldown limit curves, 55
IWA-4500 (Examination and Test), 103 KIA, lower bound fracture toughness curve for high-rate
IWA-4520(c) 103 loading, 53
IWA-4600 (Alternative Welding Methods), 103 KIC curve, 53
IWA-5250(a)(3), 12 1996 Code Change, 49
IWA-6210(e) (Owner’s Report for Repair/Replacement Activities), for pressure stresses, 47–48
101 for thermal stress distribution, 48
Section XI, Division 1, Subsection IWB (Requirements for Class 1, vessel cooldown limits, 56
2, 3, MC and CC Components and Supports) Appendix H (Evaluation of Flaws in Ferritic Piping), 118–119, 127
Table IWB-2500-1 (Examination Category B-D), 6, Appendix K, 15, 128, 124–125, 128
10–11, 72 Appendix L, 21
Figure IWB-2500-7(a) (Surface M-N), 10 flaw tolerance evaluation, 9
Figure IWB-2500-7(b) (Surface M-N), 10 Appendix R (Risk-Informed Inspection Requirements for Piping),
Figure IWB-2500-7(c) (Surface M-N), 10 97
Figure IWB-2500-7(d) (Surface M-N), 10 Section XII (Transport Tank Code), 357–367
IWB-3142.2, 10 Section XII, Mandatory Appendices I-XII, 358
IWB-3142.3, 10 Appendix V, 366
IWB-3142.4, 10 Appendix VI, 366
Table IWB-3510 (Allowable Flaw Indication), 56 Appendix IX, 366
Table IWB-3510-3, 10 Section XII
Table IWB-3512-1, 11 fabrication and inspection rules, 364–367
IWB-3514.2, 127 marking certification, 358–359
IWB-3520.1, 60 Modal Appendices, 364–370
IWB-3520.2, 60 Modal Appendix 1 (Cargo Tanks), 358
IWB-3600 (Conditionally Acceptable Flaws), 1, 2, 13, 113, 116 Modal Appendix 2 (Rail Tank Cars), 358
IWB-3600 plus Appendix A, 124 Modal Appendix 3 (Portable Tanks), 358, 367
IWB-3610(d)(2), 18 Article 1 (Cryogenic Portable Tanks), 358, 361, 364
IWB-3611 (Normal/Upset Conditions), 9 Article 1, Table 1-5.2 (Fatigue Loads), 364
IWB-3640, 18–20, 27, 116 Article 2 (Non Cryogenic Portable Tanks), 358
IWB-3740, 21 Modal Appendix 4 (Ton Tanks), 358
Section XI, Division 1, Mandatory Appendices Non-Mandatory Appendices A-G, 358
Appendix VIII (Performance Demonstration for Ultrasonic Part TD (Design Requirements), 358
Examination Systems), 56, 253 TD-101 (Minimum Thickness Design Requirements of
Section XI, Division 1, Nonmandatory Appendices Transport Tanks), 360
Appendix A (Analysis of Flaws), 14, 22, 46–47, 113, 124 TD-102 (Thickness Tolerances of Plates and Piping), 360
A-3000, 46, 60 TD-103 (Thickness Tolerances of Plates and Piping), 360
fatigue crack growth in water environment, 9 TD-104 (Dimensional Symbols Representing Geometry in
ferritic stainless steel crack growth rates, 21 Corroded Condition), 360
KIA lower bound fracture toughness curve for high-rate loading, TD-140 (Maximum and Minimum Design Temperatures), 360
53 TD-150 (Design Pressure and Maximum Allowable Working
Table A-3320-1, 47 Pressure), 360
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 735
TD-160 (Maximum Allowable Working Pressure), 360
TD-200 (Loadings of Transport Tanks), 360–362, 364
TD-210 (Maximum Allowable Stresses for Internal and External
Pressure), 362–363
TD-301 (Internal Pressure Design), 362
TD-312 (Design of Formed Heads under Internal Pressure),
362–364
TD-312-1 (Torispherical Heads), 362
TD-312-2 (Torispherical Heads), 362
TD-312-3, 362
Table TD-312 (M Values), 362
Table TD-312.1 (K Values), 363
TD-313 (Ellipsoidal Heads), 362–363
TD-314 (Hemispherical Heads), 362–363
TD-315 (Crown and Knuckle Radii), 363
TD-400 (External Pressure Design), 363
TD-500 (Flat Heads and Covers), 363
Figure TD-500, 363
TD-603 (Welded and Brazed Connections), 364
TD-650 (Rules on Strength of Reinforcement), 363
TD-680 (Minimum Nozzle Neck Thickness), 364
Table TD-680 (Minimum Nozzle Neck Thickness), 364
Article TD-6 (Nozzle Reinforcement Rules and Strength Path
Determination), 363
Part TE (Examination Requirements), 366, 364–367
TE-120.1 (Testing Personnel Qualification and Certification),
366
Article TE-1 (NDE Personnel and NDE Examination), 366
Article TE-2 (Rules for the Examination and Acceptance of
Welds), 366
Table TE-230.2 (Radiography of Butt Welded Joints), 366
TE-250 (Acceptance Criteria), 366
Part TF (Fabrication Requirements and Repairs of Materials,
Vessels, and Vessel Parts), 363, 364–365
Article TF-1 (General Requirements for Fabrication), 365
Article TF-2 (Requirements for Welding Fabrication), 365
Article TF-3, 365
Article TF-4, 365
Article TF-5, 365
Article TF-6, 365
Article TF-7 (Post Weld Heat Treatment), 365
Article TF-8 (Requirements for Vessels Lined for
Corrosion/Erosion Control), 365
Part TG (General Requirements), 358–359
TG-100 (Definitions), 358
TG-102, 363
TG-110.2, 365
TG-130, 363
Table TG-130, 364
TG-320 (Manufacturer’s Responsibilities), 365
TG-330 (Inspector’s Duties), 365
TG-430, 366
TG-440, 366
Article TG-1 (Boundaries of Section XII), 358
Article TG-2 (Organization of Section XII), 358
Article TG-3 (Requirements on Responsibilities and Duties of
the Owner, User, and Manufacturer), 358, 365
Article TG-4 (General Rules for Inspection), 358, 365–366
Table 53.2 (Vessel Classification), 365–366
Part TM (Material Requirements), 358
Article TM-2 (Rules on Toughness Requirements), 359
TM-110 (Nonpressure Parts), 359
TM-111 (CVN Impact Test Method), 359
TM-112, 359
TM-113, 359
TM-114, 359
TM-115, 359
TM-116 (Unidentified Materials), 359
TM-117, 359
TM-118 (Bolts and Studs), 359
TM-119, 359
TM-120, 359
TM-121, 359
TM-132, 359
Table 132.1 (Carbon and Low-Alloy Steels for Transport Tanks),
359
Table 132.2 (High-Alloy Steels for Transport Tanks), 359
Table 132.3, 359
Table 132.4, 359
Table 132.5, 359
Table 132.6, 359
Table 132.7, 359
TM-212 (Impact Test Specimens), 359
TM-221 (CVN Acceptance Values), 359
Figure TM-221, 359
TM-222 (Rules on Lateral Expansion Requirements), 359
TM-241 (CVN Exemption Rules for Carbon and Low-Alloy
Steel), 359
Figure TM-241 (Allowable MDMT for a Given Material and
Thickness), 359–360
Figure TM-241.2, 359
TM-243 (Allowable Temperature Reduction in Design
Temperature), 359
TM-244 (Impact Test Exemption Guidelines for Carbon Steels),
359–360
TM-250 (Toughness Rules on High Alloy Steels), 360
TM-260 (Ferritic Steels for Transport Tanks), 360
TM-262, 360
Part TP (Requirements for Repair, Alteration, Testing and Inspection
for (Continued Service), 358, 366–367
TP-100, 367
TP-200, 366
Article TP-1 (General Requirements and Responsibilities), 366
Article TP-2 (Use of National Board Inspection Code), 366
Article TP-3 (Rules for When Vessels Inspected), 366
Article TP-4 (Inspections and Tests for Transport Tanks), 366–367
Article TP-5 (Acceptance Criteria for Tests and Inspections), 367
Article TP-6 (Reports and Records from Inspections and Tests),
367
Part TR (Rules for Pressure Relief Devices), 358
Article TR-1 (Regulations on Set Points and Capacity), 358
Article TR-2 (“UV” Valves as Alternative to “TV” Valves), 358
Article TR-3 (Nonreclosing Pressure Relief Devices), 358
Article TR-4 (Capacity Certification), 359
Article TR-5 (Marking and Certification), 359
Part TS (Stamping and Certification Requirements, Manufacturer’s
Data Reports and Other Records), 358–359
Article TS-1 (Content and Method of Stamping), 359
Article TS-2 (Obtaining and Applying Code Symbol Stamps), 359
Article TS-3 (Data Reports), 359
Article TS-4 (Special Requirements), 359
Part TT (Testing Requirements), 358, 366
Article TT-1, 366
Article TT-2 (Pneumatic and Hydrostatic Testing), 366
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736 • Index

Part TT (Testing Requirements) (continued) Service Level C (Emergency Conditions)

Article TT-3 (Proof Testing for Maximum Allowable Working analysis procedures, 15–16
Pressure), 366 inservice inspection of nuclear boilers and pressure vessels, 181
Article TT-4 (Spark Testing on Vessels with Elastomeric Lining), vs. Japanese seismic operation states, 294
366 static loading, fracture toughness and, 51
Part TW (Welded Construction Requirements), 358, 364–365 weld overlay thickness criterion, 20
TW-100.1 (Requirements for Specific Fluid Service), 364–365 Service Level C/D, 124, 126
Figure TW-100.1, 364 structural factor, 118
TW-130.3 (Weld Joint Categories), 364 Service Level D
TW-130.4 (Weld Joint Efficiencies), 364 analysis procedures, 15
Table TW-130.4, 364 French pressure equipment, 242
TW-130.5 (Rules on Weld Details, Shells and Flat Plates), 364 inservice inspection of nuclear boilers and pressure vessels, 181
Figure TW-130.5, 364 vs. Japanese seismic operation states, 294
Figure TW-130.5-1, 367 Service Limits, faulted conditions, 346
Figure TW-130.5-2, 364 static loading, fracture toughness and, 51
Figure TW-130.5-3, 364 stress allowable limit, Japanese codes, 273–274
TW-130.7 (Nozzle Attachment Rules), 364 Service load, of operating PWR plant, 59
Table TW-134, 362 Set-in stub tube design, 12–13
TW-140 (Nozzle Attachment Rules), 364 Severe Accident Management Guidelines, 100
Article TW-1 (General Requirements for Tanks Fabricated by Severe Accident Safety, 89
Welding), 357–359 SF. See Structural factor.
pressure relief devices, 357–359 SGHWR. See Steam-generating heavy-water reactor.
reports and records, 357–359 Shakedown, 124
requirements, 357–359 of containment vessels for radioactive materials, 346
rules on design requirements, 360–364 Shakedown factors, 316, 320
rules on materials requirements, 359–360 Shakedown limit, 320, 323
stamping, 357, 359 Shakedown loads, 320
Table 53.1 (Design Load Factors for Normal Operations in Shear stress, welds, PD 5500 (U.K.), 323
Specified Transportation Modes), 361 Shell welds, reactor pressure vessel, 6-8
Security seal, 340 Shielded metal arc welding (SMAW), 15, 17, 65, 117
Seismic block, 14 upper shelf energy evaluation, 15–16
Seismic Design Review Guidelines, Japanese codes, 290–298 Z factor value, 117–118
Seismic design, 67, 104 Shielding, loss of, 336, 338
reliability-based load and resistance factor design, 108 Shipper, 340–341
Seismic Ordinance 515 (Seismic Design Standards for High-Pressure Shipping containers
Gas Equipment), 264–265 ferritic steel containment vessels, fracture toughness, 348–350
Self-assessment, 107 for radioactive materials, fabrication criteria, 346–347
Semi-ferritic stainless steels welding criteria for fabrication, for radioactive materials, 356–357
for industrial piping, French codes, 221, 223 Shipping paper, for radioactive materials, 340–341
for pressure equipment, French codes, 235 Ship Safety Law, 260
for pressure vessels, French codes, 203–204 Shot peening, 82
Sensitization, postweld heat treatment of Alloy 600, 63 Shroud, boiling water reactor internals, 13
SEP. See Sound engineering practice. core weld designations, 3
SER. See Safety evaluation report. flaw evaluation guideline, 1–4
Service level(s), limits, deformation, and plastic instability, 241 repair/replacement, 4
Service Level A, 45–46, 55, 60 support structure, 1–2, 24
evaluation procedures, 15–16 SHT. See Solution heat treatment.
French codes, piping, 245–246 Shutdown, 33, 63, 69, 100
French pressure equipment, 243 PRA analysis, 104
inclusion criteria for HSS snubbers, 106 PRA Standards and, 107–108
Service Limits, normal conditions, 346 probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and, 104, 106
static loading, fracture toughness conditions, 51 reducing dose rates, 82
stress allowable limit, Japanese codes, 273–274 safe shutdown condition, 30, 99
Service Level A/B, 14, 124–125 safety functions during, 104
structural factor, 118 Shutdown system, CANDU® 6 reactor, 165
Service Level B (Upset Condition), 45–46, 55, 60 SI. See International System of units.
evaluation procedures, 15–16 Siemens, discontinuation of use of alloy 600, 64
exclusion criteria for low-safety significant snubbers, 106 Simple pressure vessels, New Approach Directive, 145
required weld overlay thickness values from acceptance criterion, Simplified elastic-plastic analysis (Notification 501), 272–273
20 SIN-TAP, 121
static loading, fracture toughness, 51 SKI Report TR 89:20 (Research Project 87116), 121, 128
stress allowable limit, Japanese codes, 273–274 Slenderness ratio, 262–267
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Small bore piping, inservice inspection, 40 crack growth rate, 2, 23

Small-scale yielding (SSY) condition, 113, 119, 120–121 crack propagation due to fatigue, 69
zone, 113, 120 fracture toughness of irradiated, 3
SMAW. See Shielded metal arc welding. SNCT. See Syndicat intergranular stress corrosion cracking, 1, 17
National de la Chaudronnerie Tôlerie et Tuyauterie. L-Grade, SCC, 25
SNM. See Special nuclear material. piping, 1, 16–17, 116–117
Snubbers pressure equipment, EN 13445, 327
component classification, 100, 105 for pressure equipment, Japanese codes, 263–265, 286
evaluating piping, 19 for pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 311–312,
inservice testing, 103, 105 327, 329
supporting requirements, 106 for transport tanks, 361, 365
Socket welds, 95–96 weldability, French codes, 233–234
Solution heat treatment (SHT), of stainless steel piping, 17 Stainless steels, specific types
Sound engineering practice (SEP), in PED, 310 304, crack growth rate monitoring, 24
South African Koeberg 900 MWe plant, 193 304, fast breeder reactor material, 1–2, 12, 25, 27, 250
South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Company, 99 304, intergranular stress corrosion cracking, 16
South Texas Project (STP) Unit 1, 71–73, 83, 100 304, nuclear grade, 17
Sparger design, 9–10 304, pipe, predicted instability loads, 116–117
Spark test, 365–366 304, pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 311
Special form, 340, 342, 344 304L, fast breeder reactor material, 1–2, 16, 250
capsule requirement, 344 304LN, 1
of licensed material, definition, 335 304LN, piping, 16
of radionuclides, Type A package limits, 346 316, fast breeder reactor material, 1, 250, 251
Special Metals Corporation, 63 316, nuclear grade, 17
Special Permit No. 5000, for 6M package, 340 316, piping, 16–17
Special Permit No. 5300 for 7A package, 340 316, pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 311
Special Permit No. 5400, 340 316L, fast breeder reactor material, 1, 4, 16, 28, 250
Special Permit No. 5417, transportation of radioactively 316L(N), fast breeder reactor material, 1, 16, 250
contaminated items, 340 321, pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 311
Special treatment, of LSS items, 100–101 347, pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 311
Specification 2R, 341 Stakeholder
Specification 6L, 341 definition, 380
Specification 6M, 340 roll in decommissioning a nuclear facility, 380–382
Specification 7 A, 340 Standards Council of Canada (SCC), 160–162
Specification 55, 340 Standards-developing organizations (SDOs), 109, 110
Specification packages, 334–335, 337, 342, 340–341 risk-informed safety classification, 161
Spent nuclear fuel, 433, 350 supporting risk-informed approach, 109
storage, risk analysis and security of, 110 Standards Steering Committee (SSC), 160
Spot radiography, pressure vessels, Japanese codes, 262 Startup/shutdown events, 9, 20–21
Spring back, 397 Startup testing, of BWR jet pump, 5
SR. See Safety related. “State Plan” states, 425
SR. See Supporting requirements. Static cycling test, bend of pipe, 297–298
SRM. See Staff Requirements Memorandum. Static fracture toughness, 52–54
SRP-LR. See United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Static loading, 51
Standard Review Plan for review of License Renewal Station blackout, 30, 32
Applications for nuclear power plants. Steady state secondary stress, 18
SSC. See Standards Steering Committee. Steam, as group 2 fluid, 133
SSC. See System, structure, or component supports. Steam boilers, 156
SSY. See Small-scale yielding. French codes, 191, 217–218. See also COVAP.
Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) Steam dryer
00-0117, 349–350 boiling water reactor internals, 1, 6–8, 24
SECY-98-300, 98–99 support bracket cracking, 14–15
Option 1 (Risk-Informed Changes on a Case-by-Case Basis), 98 Steam flow path, BWR, 6–7
Option 2 (Risk-Informed Regulation Initiative), 98 Steam-generating heavy-water reactor (SGHWR), fracture resistance
Option 3 (Direct Risk-Inform the Technical Requirements in assessment, 121
10CFR50), 98 Steam generators, 82, 156
SECY-99-200, 350 piping, maintenance program, 83
Stainless steels Steam generator tubing, 39, 183
boiling water reactor piping cracks, 16 PWSCC cracks, 68, 73
butt welding, 65–66 use of nickel alloys in, 63–64
cladding, 12, 73, 83 Steel bolting, for pressure vessels, French codes, 201–202
crack arrest and, 69 Steel containment vessel (SCV), Japanese codes, 288
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738 • Index

Steel plates, ferrous and nonferrous material clad, for pressure of austenitic stainless steel, in BWR plants, 63–64
vessels, French codes, 201–202, 206 boiling water reactor, and fitness-for-service (Japanese), 277–279
Steels, for pressure vessels, Japanese codes, 262, 264 in boiling water reactor jet pumps, 5–6
Stiffeners, 313–314 Spanish Regulation in the Nonnuclear Industry, 563
light, 318 Spanish NDE Qualification Methodology, 569
Stiffener tripping, 314 caustic, 63
Stirrers, 141 chloride-induced, 63–64
Stoomwezen, 329 concrete casks, Japanese codes, 290
Stopple(tm) bypass repair method, pipeline systems, 405 controlled by hydro testing assessment, 386–387
Storage tanks crack growth rate relationship, 2–4, 20, 22–24, 281
French codes, 246 crack initiation/growth, 24, 33
Strain cycling, pressure vessels, PD 5500 (U.K.), 320 environmentally-assisted, 24
Strain hardening, 114 fatigue protection, nuclear power plants, 34
Strain-hardening exponent, 114 fluoride-induced, 64
Strain-rate, of local brittle zones, 53 intergranular, of piping, 66, 85, 233, 249, 499, 573, 684
Strategic planning as pipeline failure mode, 374
economic analysis, 81–82 Stress Corrosion Cracking in Pipelines (1996, Canada),
for RPV head nozzle PWSCC, 81 Stress function method, 45
Stray current corrosion, as pipeline failure mode, 407–408 Stress intensity, 20, 35
Stress of containment vessels for radioactive materials, 345, 348
and alloy 600 susceptibility to PWSCC, 68 limit, 273
alloy 600 resistance to, 68 nuclear pressure vessels, PD 5500 (U.K.), 44, 127, 159
bending, 46, 116, 117–118, 121, 239 Stress intensity factor (KI), 4, 44, 76, 118
cladding, 14, 24, 51, 55 calculating, 45, 46
Code allowable, 113 in circumferential crack growth predictions, 76, 77
compressive, 67, 83–84, 246 Code guidance, 18
critical, 113 due to pressure, 45, 47
flow, 113, 116–117, 399 industrial piping, French codes, 191, 553, 554
formula, 47 maximum value, 51
French codes, 242, 246–247, 248–249 for membrane, 45
hoop, 67, 315, 403 pressurized water reactors, 45
improvement remedies for cracks, 17 thermal, 45–49
limits, 124, 273 Stress intensity parameter, nonlinear, 114
membrane, 45–49, 288, 316, 312–313, 319 Stress ratio, 118
operating stresses above thresholds, 59 Stress reduction factor, 317
on pipeline systems, 115, 117, 395–396 Stress relaxation, 57, 59, 510
pressure, 14, 47, 55 irradiation enhanced, 57, 59
pressure equipment, EN 13445, 327 Stress risers, vibration stress at crack, 5
pressure equipment, French codes, 245 Stress strain, 114, 119
pressure equipment, Japanese codes, 263–264, 269, 271–272, 330 Strip yield model, 114
pressure vessels, PD 5500 (U.K.), 321–324 Structural factor (SF) (safety factor), 118
primary, in weld overlay repair, 18 boilers, French codes, 253
primary water stress corrosion cracking, 68, 76 CODAP (French codes), 208
residual, 14, 22, 24, 51, 84 circular cylinder, 314, 490
shrinkage, due to weld overlay, 18 fatigue stress intensity factors, 6, 96, 125, 529, 597
of supports, PD 5500 (U.K.), 319 industrial piping, French codes, 142, 191, 553, 554
sustained, 22–23 PD 5500 (U.K.), 312
thermal, 9, 14, 23, 45–47, 55, 75, 124–125, 245, 287 pressure vessels, French codes, 224
through wall, 47 pressure vessel, PD 5500 (U.K.), 319
Stress analysis, 314 Structural failure probabilities, for piping systems ranking, 95
industrial piping, French codes, 213, 224–225 Structural integrity treatment requirements, LSS safety-related items
local loads on cylindrical shells, PD 5500 (U.K.), 320 for, 101
Stress concentration factor Structural reliability model, risk evaluation, 95
of containment vessels for radioactive materials, 346–347 Structural reliability theory, 126
nozzle in a cylindrical vessel, 315–316 Structural specifications, Canadian standards, 163
PD 5500 (U.K.), 312 Structural steel specifications, Canadian standards, 163
pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 321 Stub tube, 12, 13, 24
pressure vessels, PD 5500 (U.K.), 321–323 Submerged arc welding (SAW), 15
spherical shells, PD 5500, 314–315 failure mechanism in welds, 117
Stress corrosion cracking (SCC), 140 Z factor value in welds, 117
as aging mechanism, 57, 59 Sulfur, 67
alloy 182 welds, 13 Superheated water boilers, French codes, 191, 217. See also COVAP.
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Super-heaters, 156 pressurized water reactor operation, 45

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), 393, 417, 420, of radioactive materials, packaging, 339, 348, 352
421 of radioactive materials, restrictions, 337–338
Supporting requirements (SR), 92, 94 rate of PWSCC initiation and growth, 67
defining, 94 reduction, as remedial measure for PWSCC, 82
PRA capability requirements for, 89 snubber service life and, 105–106
Supports stress intensity factor of safety, 45
CANDU® nuclear power plants, 172 transients, effect on fatigue life, 35
CODAP future specifications, 207 upper-shelf, 113
EN 13445 standard, 330 Temperature-dependent material properties, 15, 53
French codes, 246 Temperature indexing, 44
Japanese codes, 258 Temperature monitoring devices, in pressure equipment, 154
for pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 319 Temper-bead welding, ambient temperature, 19
Surface corrosion profiling, of pipeline systems, 325 TENPES. See Thermal and Nuclear Power Engineering Society.
Surface examination, 72, 98 Tensile strength, PED limit, 310–311
for detecting aging effects, 41, 58 Tensile stresses, 66–67, 288
of reactor pressure vessel welds, 51 Tensile testing, 249
Surface treatment piping, Japanese codes, 297
French codes, 191 of pressure equipment, 157
As remedial measure for PWSCC, 63–68 10th International Conference on Nuclear Engineering (ICONE 10-
Surry Power Station Unit 1, 100 22733), 98, 112
Surveillance program, French codes, 229 10-year in-service inspection outages, 72
Surveillance sample coupons, 43 Terrorism, acts of, risk-informed analysis to counter, 110
Sustained stress intensity factor, 23 Testing, 90
Swedish SKI Report TR 89:20 (Research Project 87116), 121 boilers, French codes, 223–224, 236–237
Syndicat national de la Chaudronnerie, Tôlerie et Tuyauterie (SNCT) French codes, 249
(French organization of pressure vessel and piping of motor-operated valves (MOVs), 105
manaufacturers association), 191–193, 195, 198, 209, 217, PD 5500 (U.K.), 319
254 pressure equipment, EN 13445, 330
description and purpose, 191 pressure vessels, French codes, 206, 240
headquarters address, 193 pressure vessels, Japanese codes, 263–264
Web site, 193 Testing programs, inservice testing (IST) program guidance, 104
Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imaging, 418 Test interval, 105
System, structure or component (SSC), 92, 162 Test pressure, of pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 319
System-based code (SBC), using risk insights, 109 T0 fracture toughness reference temperature, 43, 53, 54
System classification list, CANDU® nuclear power plant, 174 TGL Standards (Germany), 328
System designer, CANDU® nuclear power plants, 172 Theoretical buckling pressure, 314
Thermal activation energy model, 83
Tadotsu Technical Test Center of NUPEC, 297 Thermal and Nuclear Power Engineering Society (TENPES)
Tangential shear stress, concrete containment vessels, 288 Committee for Environmental Fatigue Evaluation
Taylor Forge method, 317 Guidelines, 21
TCs. See Technical committees. Thermal and Nuclear Power Engineering Society (TENPES)
Tearing instability, 121, 647 Guideline, 275, 258
Tearing moduli, 116 Thermal and Nuclear Power Engineering Society (TENPES) (Japan),
Technical committees (TCs), 168 273–274, 276–277, 291
French codes, 191, 192 Thermal embrittlement, as aging mechanism, 57, 59
Technical documentation, of pressure equipment, 137 Thermal environments, of light-water reactors (LWR), 45
Technical Guidelines for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plant, Thermal expansion, 55, 63, 116
294, 295, 298 Thermal fatigue, piping failure, 96
Technical Standards and Safety Authority (TSSA), 168 Thermal fluid boilers, French codes, 181, 226
Technical Standards on Thermal Facilities for Electricity Generation, Thermal fluid heaters, 169
270 Thermal loading, 15, 122
TEMA Standard, 262, 263 Thermal ratchetting, 346
Temperature Thermal shock, fracture toughness requirements for protection
corrosion rate of hot concentrated aerated boric acid on hot low- against pressurized, 30, 32
alloy steel surface, 74 Thermal sleeve bypass leakage detection system, 9
effect on PWSCC in hydrogen concentration variables, 67 Thermal stress(es), 14, 43, 45–47, 122–123, 245. See also Stresses.
ferritic steel fracture toughness and, 53 of containment vessels for radioactive materials, 346, 347
fluctuations in, 21 feedwater nozzle, 9
lowering RPV head, 79 Japanese codes, 287
lower range, fracture toughness and, 51 use in predicting crack growth rate, 76
potential for age-related degradation of internals, 57, 59 from vessel heatup/cooldown, 55
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740 • Index

Thermal stress intensity factor (KIT), 47–49 requirements for reduction of risk from, 33
Thermal stress ratchet rule, 243 selection for evaluation, 15
Thermal test, 336 Transient conditions, 14
Thermocouple nozzle, 63, 65 steam-dryer-support-bracket, 14
Thermo-mechanically treated steels Transient events, 20–21, 51, 648
for industrial piping, French codes, 202 Transient monitoring, effect on critical locations, 35
for pressure vessels, French codes, 203–205 Transient operation, 8, 9, 614
Thiosulfate ion content, radiographic film processing quality Transient temperature, 53
evaluation, 249 Transmission line, 170, 372, 373
Third party damage (TPD) index, 382 Transportable cylinders, Japanese codes, 261
Thorium-231, 651 Transportation of Explosives and Other Dangerous Articles Act, 335,
3-D influence coefficients, 48 337, 341
Three-layer polyolefin coatings, for pipeline systems, 409–414 Transportation Security Administration (TSA), 420, 421
Three Mile Island (TMI), 89 Transport Canada, regulating transportation of dangerous goods, 168
Three Mile Island Unit 1 nuclear power plant, 81 Transport Groups, radioactive materials, 342
3 Sm rule, 243 Transport Index (TI), 351, 352
Threshold level, distribution of times to occurrence at, 76 Transport tanks, 357. See also Section XII (Transport Tank Code).
Through-wall circumferential crack Transport unit, 337
calculation, 115–116 Transverse flux, for pipeline system assessment, 391
stainless steel pipe, predicted instability loads, 116–118 Transverse upper-shelf energy (USE), 15, 16, 121, 124, 318, 388
Through-wall cracks, 3–4, 6, 9, 76–77, 117, 396 To reference fracture toughness transition temperature, 44
pressure equipment, Japanese codes, 293 Trend curve prediction, for shifts in nil-ductility reference
Through-wall stress, 47 temperature, 43
Through-wall temperature gradient, 17–18 Trending, 58
TI. See Transport Index. Tresca yield criterion, 316
TIG. See Tungsten inert gas welding. Trigger-point temperature, 125
Time-history analysis, stress analysis at crack location, 5–6 Triple thermal sleeve design, 9
Time-limited aging analysis (TLAA), 30–32, 34–35, 38, 41 Tripping, stiffener, 314, 471
Titanium Tritium, total package limit, 172, 428, 437
for pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 311 Trunk line, 372
for pressure vessels, Japanese codes, 265, 286 TRVP. See Trojan Reactor Vessel Package.
Titanium alloys TSA. See Transportation Security Administration.
CODAP future specifications, 208 TSCA. See Toxic Substances Control Act.
for pressure equipment, Japanese codes, 286 TS-R-1. See International Atomic Energy Agency, TS-R-1.
TLAA. See Time-limited aging analysis. TSSA. See Technical Standards and Safety Authority.
TMI. See Three Mile Island. “T” Stamp, 367
TOFD, 254 Tsuruga-1 nuclear power plant, 13
Tokamak-type D-T facility (ITER) for fusion reaction, 291–293 stress-corrosion cracks in alloy 182 welds, 13–14
Tolerance specifications and pressure boundary standards, Canadian Tsuruga-2 nuclear power plant, 70
standards, 163 Tubes and tubing
Ton Tanks, 358 Alloy 600, crack initiation in, 68
Torqued bolts, 59 Japanese codes, 44, 257–259
Torsional stress, piping, Japanese codes, 300 steam generator, 63, 64
Toughness Tubesheet
at crack extension onset, 118 EN 13445 standard, 325
pressure equipment conformance, 147, 169 pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 325
Toughness tests, of pressurized water reactor (PWR) vessels, 44 Tubesheet heat exchangers, French code design rules, 208
Total applied stress intensity factor, 14 Tuboscope, 387
Total displacement, 115–116 Tungsten inert gas (TIG) welding, 65
“Towards the Performance-Based Technical Code of Nuclear “TV” mark, 359
Facilities and Utilization of Voluntary Standards”, 259 Two-parameter method, fracture evaluation of piping, Japanese
Tpc has launched a power, 685 codes, 281
TPD. See Third party damage index. 2004 ICONE-12 conference, 84
Traceability, 140 Type A(F) radioactive materials,
of pressure equipment components, 154 Type A radioactive materials, quantities allowed in packaging, 334,
Transient 340, 342, 343
accidents caused by, 89 Type A-Type B quantity provisions of IAEA regulations, 340
critical pressure, effect on fatigue life, 35 Type B containers, 342, 354
critical temperature, effect on fatigue life, 35 Type B(DP) dual-purpose packages, radioactive material, 339
heatup/cooldown, 48 Type B fissile shipping containers, 339
operating, 35 Type B(F) radioactive materials,
reduction of risk from anticipated, 31, 32 Type B(M)F radioactive materials, 346
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 741

Type B(M) (Multilateral) packaging standards, 346 manual, 342

Type B quantity, definition, 342
Type B radioactive materials, quantities allowed in packaging, 334,
340, 342, 345, 355
Type B(U)F radioactive materials,
Type B(U) (Unilateral) packaging standards, 346, 348
Type C packages, 350, 352, 353
U Certificate of Authorization, 264
ULC. See Underwriters’ Laboratories of Canada.
Ultimate strength, of pressure equipment, 157
Ultimate stress, piping, 118
Ultimate tensile strength (UTS)
French codes,
PED limit, 310
and plastic collapse of pipe, 387
of pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 311–312
Ultrasonic test (UT) (examination), 59, 72
of BWR jet pump cracked weld, 6
of BWR shrouds, 3
calandria assembly, CANDU® nuclear power plants, 175
Canadian standards, 170
CANDU® nuclear power plant components, 183, 184, 188
as condition monitoring program, 59
and crack growth rate monitoring, 24
of dissimilar metal weld overlays, 19
feedwater nozzles, 9
French codes, 191, 193, 196
interval factor, 10
in Japanese fitness-for-service code, 276–278
of pipeline systems, 388–389, 390, 395, 400
pressure vessels, Japanese codes, 262–263, 290
of RPV head penetration nozzle, 72
of RPV-to-shroud support plate weld, 13
transport tanks, 366
zirconium alloy components, 176–177
Uncracked ligament length, 115
Underground cable, testing, 39
Underwriters’ Laboratories of Canada (ULC), 160, 162
Unfired vessels, 133–134
Uniform Building Code, 461
Unified Procedure,
Uniform dose basis, 351
United Kingdom (U.K.) See also British standards, specific types
unfired pressure vessel rules, 309–330
United Kingdom Pipeline Regulator, 375
United Kingdom’s Pipeline Safety Regulations, 375
United Nations, 365
labeling systems for radioactive materials, 364
United Nations Hazard Classifications
2.1 (flammable gas), 365–366
2.3 (toxic gas), 365–366
6.1 (toxic materials), 365–366
United Nations Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous
Goods, Model Regulations, 357
United Nations Sub-Committee of Experts on the Transport of
Dangerous Goods, 357
United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 341, 343
United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 339
Directorate of Licensing, 344
Directorate of Regulatory Operations, 344
Division of Materials Licensing, 342
Reactor Safety Study, 89
United States Bureau of Statistics, pipeline incidents and property
damage, 372
United States Coast Guard, 339
United States Code, sections 552 and 553, 341, 343
United States Competent Authority, 340, 350, 357
for transport tanks, 357
United States Department of Defense (DOD), 89
United States Department of Energy (DOE), 425, 443, 447, 449, 450
decommissioning plan to remove radioactive material, 661
nuclear waste disposal, 685
United States Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive
Waste Management (DOE/OCRWM), 349
United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 260
United States Department of Homeland Security, 110
United States Department of Labor, 260
United States Department of Transportation, 357, 358
Hazardous Materials Regulations, 339–341, 357
hazardous (including radioactive) material transportation, 350
National Response Center
pipeline system assessment requirements, 390
special permit, 340–343
transport tank code, 357, 359
United States Department of Transportation Office of Pipeline Safety,
property damage from oil pipeline incidents, 371
United States Department of Transportation/Pipeline and Hazardous
Material Safety Administration (USDOT/PHMSA), 357
United States Department of Transportations, Research and Special
Programs Administration (USDOT/RSPA), 357, 358
United States Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR), 357
United States National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 30
United States National Pipeline Mapping System initiative, 378
United States Navy, refuel and defuel U.S. nuclear powered warships,
43, 483
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) (USNRC), 3,
306, 440, 441, 444, 446, 447, 448, 450, 512, 514
acceptable long-term repair, 19, 81
acceptance of weld overlay repairs, 17, 19
adoption of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 357
Advanced Notice of Public Rulemaking (2000), 98
aging management program (AMP), 21, 32
allowable crack depth, 14
AMP/AMR audits, 34
approval of IST pilot programs, 103
approval of weld overlay repair application, 19
boiling water reactor flaw evaluation, 23
boiling water reactor inspection, repair methods, 1, 3
boiling water reactor RPV equivalent margin review summary, 16
bounding crack growth rates for flaw evaluation, 22
defining decommissioning, 471–485
draft radiation embrittlement trend equations, 54
evaluating crack length direction, 2
evaluation of existing plant AMPs, 58
Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL) Report, 21, 41
inspection plans for PWSCC of alloy 600 base materials, 63, 68,
69, 83
inspection program to manage effects of fatigue, 38
inspection requirements for reactor pressure vessel (RPV) top head
nozzles, 72
letter to STP Nuclear Operating Company, 100
license renewal guideline updates, 41
ASME_IND_III_p687-746.qxd 6/5/09 4:33 PM Page 742

742 • Index

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Subpart B, 336

(USNRC) (continued) Subpart C, 336
license renewal process, 29, 30, 38 Subpart D, 336, 353
Metrication Policy, 351 Subpart H, 352–354
nuclear industry risk-informed activities, 107 Subpart I, 354
pressurized thermal shock (PTS) reevaluation study, 56 10CFR71 (31FR9941) (Packaging), 341
Proposed Rule for Public Comment (2003), 98 10CFR71 (33FR750), 339, 341,
regulatory process, 30 10CFR71 (33FR14918), 341
risks from nuclear power, 89 10CFR71 (36FR22184), 342
safety evaluation report (SER), 33 10CFR71 (38FR20482), 344
special inspections, 662, 663 10CFR71 (48FR35600) (Packing and Transportation of
standard review plans, 40 Radioactive Material), 350
Web site: www.nrc.gov, 42 10CFR71 (60FR50248), 350
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) (USNRC) 10CFR71 (61FR31169), 351
Bulletins, 3, 441, 444 10CFR71 (62FR5907) (Fissile Material Shipments), 341, 349
2003-02 (Leakage from Reactor Pressure Vessel Lower Head 10CFR71 (63FR8362), 349
Penetrations and Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary 10CFR71 (64FR72633), 350
Integrity), 73 10CFR71 (65FR44360), 349, 350
2003-02, Temporary Instruction 2515/152 (Reactor Pressure 10CFR71 (67FR21395-21396), 351
Vessel Lower Head Penetration Nozzles), 73 10CFR71.31, 337, 338
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) (USNRC) 10CFR71.53, 338, 354
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 10CFR71.61, 352
10CFR, 489, 502, 682–684 10CFR71.63, 354, 355
10CFR30 (30FR15748), 337, 338 10CFR71.88, 351
10CFR40 (Licensing of Source Material), 335 10CFR72 (Protection Against Radiation in the Shipment of
10CFR40(28FR2111), 335 Irradiated Fuel Elements), 334, 337
risk-inform plans, 107 10CFR72 (26FR8982), 335, 337
Appendix B, 98, 101, 683 10CFR72 (28FR2142), 335, 337
Appendix G (Fracture Toughness Requirements for Nuclear 14CFR103 (Hazardous Materials Regulations Applicable to
Power Reactors), 44 14CFR103 (33FR750), 339, 341
Appendix H (Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program 49CFR, 334, 335, 339–341, 351, 361, 366, 369, 390–393
Requirements), 44 49CFR (60FR50291), 350
10CFR50.48 (Fire Protection Regulations), 31 49CFR78, 335
10CFR50.49 (Environmental Qualifications), 31 49CFR170 (Rules of Procedure for the Hazardous Materials
10CFR50.54(f) (Individual Plant Examination (IPE) for Severe Regulations Board), 338, 339
Accident Vulnerabilities), 33 49CFR170 (33FR750), 339, 341
10CFR50.55 (Augmented Examination of Reactor Vessel), 7 49CFR171 (33FR750), 339, 341
10CFR50.61 (Pressurized Thermal Shock), 31 49CFR172 (33FR750), 339, 341
10CFR50.62 (Anticipated Transients Without Scram), 31 49CFR173, 334
10CFR50.63 (Station Blackout), 31 49CFR173 (33FR750), 339, 341
10CFR50.65 (Maintenance Rule), 30, 102 49CFR173.393, 339, 340
10CFR50.69 (Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of 49CFR173.417, 351
Structures, Systems, and Components for Nuclear Power 49CFR174, 334
Plants), 98, 102, 107, 108, 110 49CFR174 (33FR750), 339, 341
10CFR51 (Environmental Protection Regulations), 31 49CFR175, 334
10CFR54 (Renewal of Operating Licenses for Nuclear Power 49CFR175 (33FR750), 339, 341
Plants), 589 49CFR176, 334
10CFR54.3, 32 49CFR176 (33FR750), 339, 341
10CFR54.4, 32 49CFR177, 334
10CFR54.21, 35, 38, 59 49CFR177 (33FR750), 339, 341
10CFR71 (Packaging of Radioactive Material for Transport), 343–345 49CFR178, 334
10CFR71 (1983 Final Rule), 346 49CFR178 (33FR750), 339, 341
10CFR71 (1988 Proposed Rule, Major Changes),347, 348 49CFR178 (Revisions), 339
10CFR71 (1995 Final Rule), 348 49CFR179, 361
10CFR71 (2002 Proposed Rule), 349, 350 49CFR179 (33FR750), 339, 341
10CFR71 (2004 Final Rule), 350, 355 49CFR179.400-13, 361
Appendix B (Hypothetical Accident Conditions), 336, 341, 345, 49CFR180 (33CFR750), 339, 341
348, 354 49CFR181-185 (33FR750), 339, 341
exemptions, 341, 349 49CFR186-190 (33FR750), 339, 341
fabrication criteria for shipping containers, 347 49CFR192 (Subpart O) (Pipeline Integrity Management), 375
Issue 15 (Change Authorization Issue), 354 49CFR195 (Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Operators), 375
quality assurance requirements, 343–345 49CFR195.428 (Pipeline System Assessment, SCADA), 393
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United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) Document NUREG/CR-6260 (Component Fatigue Life), 21, 34, 35, 38
Control Desk, 594 NUREG/CR-6583 (Carbon and Low Alloy Steel Environmental
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) Draft Life), 21, 34, 37
Regulatory Analysis (Draft RA), 441 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) Regulatory
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) Draft Guides, 441
Regulatory Guide, DG-1.121, 594 risk-informed ISI and IST implementation, 90
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) Federal RG 1.26, 99
Register (FR), 350 RG1.99, 124
revisions of 10CFR71, 450 RG 1.147, 106, 594, 629
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) Generic RG 1.150, 52
Letters (GL), 546 RG 1.161, 15, 124
GL 81-11, 9 RG 1.174 (Using PR A in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-
GL 88-20 (Individual Plant Examination (IPE) for Severe Accident Specific Basis), 8
Vulnerabilities), 33 RG 1.175 (Plant-Specific Risk-Informed Decisionmaking:
GL 92-01, 15 Inservice Testing), 104
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) RG 1.178 (Plant-Specific Risk-Informed Decisionmaking: ISI of
Information Notices, 30 Piping), 94, 106, 571
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) Issuance of RG 1.192 (Operation and Maintenance Code Case Acceptability),
Order, EA-03-009 (Establishing Interim Inspection 106, 594
Requirements for Reactor Pressure Vessel Heads at RG 1.200, 107
Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR)), 72, 73 Appendix (Endorsement of NEI 00-02 Peer Review Process and
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) Self-Assessment Plans), 107
Maintenance Rule, 94 RG 7.4 (Leakage Tests on Packages for Shipment of Radioactive
plant expert panel, 96 materials), 335
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) Metrication RG 7.6, 345
Policy, 351 RG 7.6, Revision 1, 345
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) Operations RG 7.11 (Fracture Toughness of Base Material for Ferritic Steel
Center, 355 Shipping Cask Containment Vessel, Maximum 4 Inches
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) Regulatory Thick), 348
Guides (NUREGs), 333, 355, 537 RG 7.12 (Fracture Toughness Criteria), 348
NEI guidance document endorsement, 31 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) Safety
NUREG draft (results of PTS reevaluation study), 56 Goals, 8
NUREG-XXXX (Fracture Analysis of Vessels—Oak Ridge United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) Special
NUREG 1.124, 27 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC)
NUREG 1.130, 247 Standard Review Plan for Review of License Renewal (SRP-
NUREG-0224 (Reactor Vessel Pressure Transient Protection for LR) applications, 41
Pressurized Water Reactors), 45 Appendix A, 33
NUREG-0313, 3, 17, 22, 684 Renewal Applications for Nuclear Power Plants, 57
NUREG-0313, Revision 2, 684 Section 2.1.3, 34
NUREG-0360 (Qualification Criteria to Certify a Package for Air Section 5.2.2, 45
NUREG-0619, 9 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) TAC
Generic Letter 81-11, 9 numbers
Table 41.2 (Feedwater nozzle/sparger inspection TAC M89871/TAC M89493,
recommendations), 10 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC)
NUREG-0744, 15, 121 Technology-Neutral Framework, 109
NUREG-1150, 90 United States Office of Pipeline Safety, 371, 374, 374
NUREG-1800 (Standard Review Plan for Review of License Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-11 (USIA-11), 121
Renewal Applications for Nuclear Power Plants), 57 low-temperature overpressure (LTOP), 8, 43, 45, 49, 50
NUREG-1801 (Generic Aging Lessons Learned [GALL] Report), USI-A26, 45
58 Upper-shelf Charpy energy, 121
NUREG/CRs, 333, 346, 355 Upper-shelf energy (USE), 15
NUREG/CR-1815 (Protection Against Brittle Fracture Failure in end of life values, 55
Ferritic Steel Shipping Containers up to Four Inches Thick), Upper-shelf operation, 121–124
346, 348 Upper-shelf temperature, 113, 124–126
Table 1 (Radioactivity Limits for Each of Three Categories), 348 Upper-shelf trigger temperature, 125
NUREG/CR-3019 (Welding Criteria for Use in the Fabrication of Uranium
Shipping Containers for Radioactive Materials), 346–348 enriched, 340
NUREG/CR-3854 (Fabrication Criteria for Shipping Containers), natural, 163, 436, 437, 635
346–348 natural and depleted, 437
NUREG/CR-5704 (Austenitic Stainless Steel, Environmental unirradiated, 441
Life), 21, 34, 37 Uranium-233, 438
NUREG/CR-5999 (Interim Fatigue Curves), 34 Uranium-235, 351, 437, 438, 440, 474
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744 • Index

plus plutonium, 337, 343–345 of sparger, 9, 10

Uranium fuel pellets, 478 steam generator tubes,
Uranium hexafluoride, 350, 351 of vessel-to-shroud support weld cracking, 13
Uranium isotopes, 438 zirconium alloy components, 176–177
Uranium metal, 351 VNIR. See Visible spectrum and in the very near infrared. Void
Uranyl nitrate solutions, 436 swelling, irradiation-induced
URN 99/1147 (DTI Guidance Booklet on PED Requirements), 309 Volumetric examination, 10
Usage factor, French codes, 245 of BMI nozzles, 71
USDOT/PHMSA. See United States Department of to detect aging effects, 58
Transportation/Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety inservice use and, 56
Administration. of partial penetration nozzles, 72
USDOT/RSPA. See United States Department of Transportation, of permanent joints, 140
Research and Special Programs Administration. of reactor pressure vessel (RPV) shell welds, 7
USE. See Upper-shelf energy. of reactor pressure vessel welds,
USI. See Unresolved Safety Issue. risk category and, 97
“U” Stamp, 367 VR stamp, 359
UT. See Ultrasonic test (UT) (examination). VT-1 examination
UTS. See Ultimate tensile strength. as aging management strategy, 59–60
U-tubes, Japanese codes, 263 of BWR steam dryer, 6
“UV” mark, 359 character recognition height, 60
V. See Volume, internal, of chamber. enhanced, 59–60
Vacuum box testing, CANDU® nuclear power plant components, 181 of inner radii surface of nozzles, 10
Vaccum vessel (VV), Japanese codes, 292 maximum direct examination distance, 60
Valve(s) of welds in beltline region, 72
inservice testing (IST), 99 VT-2 examination
pressure-temperature rating, 246 as aging management strategy, 59–60
probabilistic methods in qualification standards, 109 of low-safety-significant (LSS) piping segments, 96
probabilistic risk assessment for, 519 of reactor vessel pressure-retaining boundary during the system
risk-informed IST application, 104 leak test, 72
in scope of PED, 129 VT-3 examination
Valve design rules, French codes, 246 as aging management strategy, 59-60
V.C. Summer nuclear power plant, 69 enhanced, 60
alloy 82/182 butt weld axial crack leakage, 70, 71 maximum direct examination distance, 60
VDEs. See Vertical displacement events. of welds outside the beltline region, 72
Vertical displacement events (VDEs), 292, 293 VV. See Vacuum vessel.
Vessel attachment, weld cracking, 13–15 WASH-1400 study, 89
Vessel design life, 15, 45 WASRD. See Waste Acceptance System Requirements Document.
Vessel-to-shroud support, weld cracking, 13 Waste Acceptance System Requirements Document (WASRD),
Vibration Waste disposal containers,
of snubbers, 106 Waste-heat boilers, 156
startup, 5 Waste incineration boilers, 156
stress range, steps in calculating, 5 Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Land Withdrawal Act,
Vibration tests, piping, seismic influences in Japan, 295, 296 Water chemistry
Visible spectrum and in the very near infrared (VNIR), 418 changes affecting PWSCC rate, 82
Visual examination/testing (Examination Level: VT-1, VT-2, VT-3), to mitigate piping internal corrosion, 59
72. See also VT-1 examination; VT-2 examination; VT-3 Water environment, 2–3
examination alloy 600 corrosion resistance in high temperature, 63
alloys 82/182 butt weld leakage, 70 austenitic stainless steels fatigue crack growth rate, 21–22
bare metal, 71–73 effects on reduction of fatigue life of light-water reactor
bare metal for PWSCC, 71, 75 components, 21
bare metal of BMI nozzles, 71 ferritic steels fatigue crack growth rate, 21
bare metal of RPV head surface, 71 high-temperature primary, alloy 600 SCC in, 64
of BWR shrouds, 3 high-temperature pure, alloy 600 SCC in, 64
CANDU® nuclear power plant components, 163 intergranular stress corrosion cracking of stub tube, 12
of crack repair, 15 Water gauges, visibility, 169
to detect aging effects, 58 Water hammer, and piping failure, 96
enhanced, as aging management strategy, 60 Water heaters, Canadian standards, 169–170
French codes, 250 Water-jet conditioning, 84
joint coefficients allowed, 139 Water-moderated reactors, long-term operation safety aspects, 42
of low-safety-significant (LSS) pipe segments, 90, 96, 100 Watertube boilers, French codes, 216–217. See also COVAP.
NRC requirements, 11 WBS. See Work Breakdown Structure.
as Section XI provision, 103 Weibull statistical distribution, 53, 79
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COMPANION GUIDE TO THE ASME BOILER & PRESSURE VESSEL CODE • 745

in predicting initiation of PWSCC in pressurized water reactors vessel-to-shroud support cracking, 13–14
(PWRs), 74–76 water-jet conditioning of, 82
Welds(s). See also Weld metals, specific types. Weldability
attachment, 72 French codes, stainless steels, 233
axial, 8 Weld-deposited hardfacing, French NF M 64-100 standard, 248
base metal, 52 Welded joint(s)
BMI, 72 defects during construction, 102
boric acid leakage, 69–71 efficiency, pressure vessels, French codes, 203
butt, alloy (82/182), 65 fracture evaluation, Japanese codes, 281
butt, outlet nozzle, through wall axial crack, 69–70 French codes, 252
Canadian standards, 170 In pressure vessels, design of, 65
circumferential, 7, 8, 48 Transport tanks, 364
CRDM, 74 Welded joint coefficient
crevice, 17 EN 13445 vs. PD 5500, 309, 310, 312
defects in pipeline systems, 400 French codes, 252
dissimilar metal, 19, 72, 83 industrial piping, French codes, 212
dissimilar metal, flaw evaluation, 277–279 Welded structures, fracture analysis, 114
fitness-for-service flaw evaluation, Japanese, 276–278 Weld efficiency factor, French codes, 246
flat ends and covers, PD 550 (U.K.), 317–318 Welding, 17–20. See also Gas tungsten arc welding; Shielded metal
full penetration, 52, 66 arc welding; Tungsten inert gas welding.
full penetration double bevel, ambient temperature temper-bead, 19
generic J-integral fracture resistance curve equation constants, 124 code compliance, 80
girth, 17, 49 cold temperatures and, 17
on high-fatigue lines, 38 criteria for fabrication of shipping containers for radioactive
hot-leg, 69 materials, 347
impact testing, 144 distortion avoidance, 65
inservice inspection of HSS segments, electroslag, 15
inspection in pressure coils exposed to direct radiant heat, field, 17
Canadian standards, 168 filler metals, 14
J-groove, 65, 69 French codes, 252
joint coefficients, 139 gas tungsten arc welding, 18
joint coefficients, industrial piping, French codes, 218 oil and gas pipeline systems, Canadian, 170–171
joint efficiency, pressure vessels, French codes, 201 postweld heat treating, 19
joint factors, U.K. rules, 309 preheating, 19
joints, 139–140 of pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 312
joints, PD 5500 (U.K.), 318–319 pressure vessels and piping, Japanese codes, 262, 268, 281
joints, pressure equipment, Japanese codes, 263, 264, 282, 290 repair/replacement, 110
laser repair, 83 residual stresses, 22, 77
local brittle zone, 52–53 shielded metal arc welding, 65
longitudinal, 48–49 submerged arc welding, 15
nozzle-to-safe end socket, 72 temper-bead, 19
permissible joints in pressure vessels, French codes, 210–211 transport tanks, 358, 359, 365, 366, 368
pipe-to-nozzle, 17 of weld overlay repairs, 17–20, 81
pipe-to-pipe, 17 Welding consumables, for pressure equipment, 143, 144, 201
postweld heat treatment requirements, 19 Welding Data Package, French codes, 247
preparations, 65 Welding Procedure Qualification Test (WPQT), 262, 263, 264
pressure boundary, 55 Welding procedures, registration, Canadian, 172
in pressure equipment, 157 Welding Research Council (WRC), 308
pressurizer, 73 Bulletin 175, 45
repair, 13, 17–18, 45, 74 Bulletin 404,
repair, cracking of, 78–79 Bulletin 413, 15, 122, 123
residual stress, 16–17, 51 Welding specifications, Canadian standards, 162, 163
RI-ISI of, 94 Welding Specifications, W series, 162, 163
safe-end, 17, 24 Weld joint efficiency, 201, 203, 208, 212, 222, 290, 363
shell, 6–8 boilers, French codes, 212, 234
socket, 96 pressure vessels, Japanese codes, 262
stresses, PD 5500 (U.K.), 322–323 Weldments, piping, carbon steel, circumferential flaws, 119
stub tube, 24 Weld metal
thickness measurement, 49 cladding with duplex, 17
toughness levels, 50 crack growth data, 21, 76
vertical, 8 in dissimilar metal weld overlay, 19
vessel attachment cracking, 13 requirements for weld overlay repairs, 18
ASME_IND_III_p687-746.qxd 6/5/09 4:33 PM Page 746

746 • Index

Weld metals, specific types use of alloy 82/182 butt welds, 65

alloy 52, 81, 82
in PWSCC-resistant repairs, 82
resistance to PWSCC, 81
alloy 82, 63, 65, 66, 67, 70–74, 76, 77,
bare metal visual inspection of butt welds, 71
butt weld leak, 69
chromium concentration, 66
composition, 65
crack growth behavior in PWSCC, 77
crack growth rate testing, 76
crack initiation behavior in PWSCC, 79
inspection methods/requirements, 71–72
location in PWR Vessel, 64
primary water stress corrosion cracking of, 63
PWSCC cracks in CRDM nozzles, 70
PWSCC cracks in inlet/outlet nozzle butt welds, 69–70
PWSCC in, 66, 69
uses, 64–66
weld overlay repair, 81
alloy 152, 65
resistance to PWSCC, 67
alloy 182, 17, 65, 66, 69, 76, 77
bare metal visual inspection of butt welds, 73
butt weld leakage, 69
chromium concentration, 66
composition, 65
crack growth behavior in PWSCC, 77
crack growth rate testing, 76
crack initiation behavior in PWSCC, 79
inspection methods/requirements, 71–72
location in PWR Vessel, 64
primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) of, 63
PWSCC cracks in CRDM nozzles, 70
PWSCC cracks in inlet/outlet nozzle butt joints, 69–70
PWSCC in, 66, 69
uses, 64–66
visual inspection, 71
weld overlay repair, 81
Weld overlay repair (WOR), 17–20, 25, 81
Weld replacement, as a PWSCC repair, 81–82
Weld shrinkage, 67
Westinghouse, 193
Westinghouse designed PWR power plants, 456
bottom-mounted instrument (BMI) nozzle, 65
CRDM nozzles in, 65
Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG), 68
WCAP-14572 Rev. 1-NP-A (Topical Report Applying
Risk-Informed Methods to Piping ISI), 97, 572
Method A application, 97
WGM. See Working Group Materials.
WGP. See Working Group Pressure.
WIPP. See Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.
WOG. See Westinghouse Owner’s Group.
WOL. See Weld overlay.
WOR. See Weld overlay repairs.
Working Group Materials (WGM), 142
Working Group Pressure (WGP), 131, 143, 144
Guideline 7/17, 143
Guideline 7/24, 143
World Health Organization, 365
WPQT. See Welding Procedure Qualification Test.
WRC. See Welding Research Council.
WTO/TBT Agreement, 257, 259, 260
Yield (plastic collapse), as pipeline failure mode, 374
Yield strength
French codes, 252
and irradiated stainless steel fracture toughness, 3
of nuclear pressure vessel steels, 3
of nuclear reactor vessels, 66
PED limit, 310
of pressure equipment, PD 5500 (U.K.), 311–312
PWSCC susceptibility and, 67, 68
of steels for pressure vessels, French codes, 202
Yield stress, piping, 118
Young’s modulus, 115, 123, 139, 304, 314, 448
Z factors, 117–120
ferritic piping, 118–120
for shielded metal arc welds, 65, 117
for submerged arc welds, 117
Zick method, 330
Zinc
addition to primary coolant, 84, 118
addition to reactor coolant, 104, 118
Zircaloy, for liquid-injection shutdown system nozzles, 175
Zircaloy-2, for calandria tubes, 636, 642
Zirconium alloys
for CANDU® components, 172, 177
for fuel channel pressure tubes, 174, 177, 182, 183
for pressure tubes, 164, 183, 652