RULE 30: Rules of Admissibility
If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
A. Object (Real Evidence)
People vs. Rullepa y Guinto
G.R. No. 131516, March 5, 2003
J. Carpio Morales
Facts:
 On complaint of Cyra May Francisco Buenafe, accused-appellant Ronnie
Rullepa y Guinto was charged with Rape
 Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.
 From the testimonies of its witnesses, the prosecution established the
following facts, that accused rape the 3 year old Cyra Mae
 RTC rendered finding accused RONNIE RULLEPA y GUINTO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape, and he is accordingly sentenced to death.
 It was already proved before the SC that the crime committed by accused-
appellant is not merely acts of lasciviousness but statutory rape since Dr.
Preya, found abrasions in the labia minora, which is directly beneath
the labia majora, proving that there was indeed penetration of the vagina,
not just a mere rubbing or scrubbing of the penis against its surface.
 The issue now is whether death penalty should be impose since The victims
age is relevant in rape cases since it may constitute an element of the
offense. Death penalty shall be impose if the child is below 7 years old
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in imposing the penalty of death upon the accused
Held:
YES. In the case of People v. Pruna, it established a set of guidelines in appreciating
age as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, to wit:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified
true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as
baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim
would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims
mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified
to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 7 years old;
b.
that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of
the victims mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants
testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended
party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age
shall not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.
Several cases suggest that courts may take judicial notice of the appearance of the
victim in determining her age as held in People vs Javier which provides that the
presentation of the certificate of birth is at all times necessary to prove minority. The
minority of a victim of tender age who may be below the age of ten is quite manifest
and the court can take judicial notice thereof.
On the other hand, a handful of cases holds that courts, without the requisite hearing
prescribed by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, cannot take judicial notice of
the victims age.
But As Tundag puts it, it is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly
take and act on without proof because they already know them. Rule 129 of the Rules
of Court, where the provisions governing judicial notice are found, is entitled What
Need Not Be Proved. When the trier of facts observes the appearance of a person to
ascertain his or her age, he is not taking judicial notice of such fact; rather, he is
conducting an examination of the evidence, the evidence being the appearance of
the person. Such a process militates against the very concept of judicial notice, the
object of which is to do away with the presentation of evidence.
.A person’s appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same
being addressed to the senses of the court as sanctioned by Section 1, Rule 130. This
practice of inspection by the court of objects, things or persons relevant to the fact in
dispute, has its roots in ancient judicial procedure. There can be no question,
therefore, as to the admissibility of a person’s appearance in determining his or her
age.
As to the weight to accord such appearance, especially in rape cases, Pruna laid down
guideline no. 3. Under the guideline, the testimony of a relative with respect to the
age of the victim is sufficient to constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt in cases (a),
(b) and (c) above. In such cases, the disparity between the allegation and the proof of
age is so great that the court can easily determine from the appearance of the victim
the veracity of the testimony.
As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the persons’ appearance,
as object evidence of her age, loses probative value. Doubt as to her true age
becomes greater and, following Agadas, supra, such doubt must be resolved in favor
of the accuse since he victims mere physical appearance is not enough to gauge her
exact age. For the extreme penalty of death to be upheld, nothing but proof beyond
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be
substantiated.
In the present case, the prosecution did not offer the victims certificate of live birth or
similar authentic documents in evidence. The victim and her mother, however,
testified that she was only three years old at the time of the rape
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age
sought to be proved (below twelve years), the trial court would have had no difficulty
ascertaining the victims age from her appearance. No reasonable doubt, therefore,
exists that the second element of statutory rape, i.e., that the victim was below
twelve years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, is present.
Whether the victim was below seven years old, however, is another matter. Here,
reasonable doubt exists. A mature three and a half-year old can easily be mistaken for
an underdeveloped seven-year old. The appearance of the victim, as object evidence,
cannot be accorded much weight and, following Pruna, the testimony of the mother
is, by itself, insufficient.
Therefore, as it has not been established with moral certainty that Cyra May was
below seven years old at the time of the commission of the offense, accused-
appellant cannot be sentenced to suffer the death penalty. Only the penalty
of reclusion perpetua can be imposed upon him.
BPI vs. Reyes
G.R. No. 157177, Feb 11, 2008
J. Austria Martinez
Facts:
 Plaintiff Jesusa Reyes with her daughter, Joan Reyes, went to BPI to open an
ATM account, she being interested with the ongoing promotions of BPI
entitling every depositor with a deposit amounting to P2,000.00 to a ticket
with a car as its prize to be raffled every month.
 They were entertained by Capati, employee of the bank and in charge of the
new accounts and time deposits and were made to sit at a table occupied by
a certain Liza.
 Plaintiff informed Capati that they wanted to open an ATM account for the
amount of P200,000.00, P100,000.00 of which shall be withdrawn from her
exiting savings account with BPI bank which is account no. 0233-2433-88 and
the other P100,000.00 will be given by her in cash
 On December 14, 1990, Mrs. Jesusa received her express teller card from
said bank.
 Upon returning to Manila, she was made aware by her statement of account
sent to her by BPI bank that her ATM account only contained the amount
of P100,000.00 with interest.
 Plaintiff then asked the bank manager why the deposit slip was validated,
whereupon the manager assured her that the matter will be investigated
into.
 A meeting was held resulted to the bank promising that Capati will be
submitted to a lie detector test.
 Plaintiff, however, never learned of the result of said test. Plaintiff filed this
instant case.
 RTC ruled in favor of private respondents. CA affirmed
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in sustaining the RTC's finding that respondent Jesusa made an
initial deposit of P200,000.00 in her newly opened Express Teller account
on December 7, 1990.
Held:
Yes. After a careful and close examination of the records and evidence presented by
the parties, we find that respondents failed to successfully prove by preponderance of
evidence that respondent Jesusa made an initial deposit of P200,000.00 in her Express
Teller account.
Respondent Jesusa and her daughter Joan testified that at the outset, respondent
Jesusa told Capati that she was opening an Express Teller account for P200,000.00;
that she was going to withdraw and transfer P100,000.00 from her savings account to
her new account, and that she had an additional P100,000.00 cash. However, these
assertions are not borne out by the other evidence presented.
Notably, it is not refuted that Capati prepared a withdrawal slip for P200,000.00. This
is contrary to the claim of respondent Jesusa that she instructed Capati to make a
fund transfer of only P100,000.00 from her savings account to the Express Teller
account she was opening. Yet, respondent Jesusa signed the withdrawal slip. We find
it strange that she would sign the withdrawal slip if her intention in the first place was
to withdraw only P100,000.00 from her savings account and deposit P100,000.00 in
cash with her.
Moreover, respondent Jesusa's claim that she signed the withdrawal slip without
looking at the amount indicated therein fails to convince us, for respondent Jesusa, as
a businesswoman in the regular course of business and taking ordinary care of her
concerns, would make sure that she would check the amount written on the
withdrawal slip before affixing her signature. Significantly, we note that the space
provided for her signature is very near the space where the amount of P200,000.00 in
words and figures are written; thus, she could not have failed to notice that the
amount of P200,000.00 was written instead of P100,000.00.
Further, the teller's tape reflected various transactions involving different accounts
on December 7, 1990 which included respondent Jesusa's Savings Account No.
233243388 and her new Express Teller Account No. 235076748. It shows that
respondent Jesusa's initial intention to withdraw P200,000.00, not P100,000.00, from
her Savings Account No. 233324299 was begun at 3 o'clock, 12 minutes and 45
seconds as shown in Exhibit 1-c.
In addition, Respondent Jesusa's bare claim, although corroborated by her daughter,
that the former deposited P100,000.00 cash in addition to the fund transfer
of P100,000.00, is not established by physical evidence. While the duplicate copy of
the deposit slip was in the amount of P200,000.00 and bore the stamp mark of teller
Torneros, such duplicate copy failed to show that there was a cash deposit
of P100,000.00. An examination of the deposit slip shows that it did not contain any
entry in the breakdown portion for the specific denominations of the cash
deposit. This demolishes the testimonies of respondent Jesusa and her daughter Joan.
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in
our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. We have, on many occasions, relied principally
upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth. Where the physical evidence on
record runs counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses, we
consistently rule that the physical evidence should prevail
Ricalde vs People
G.R. No. 211002, January 21, 2015
Facts:
 A criminal case for rape through sexual assault committed against a 10-year-
old boy. Accused Richard Ricalde (Ricalde) was charged with rape as
described under the second paragraph of Section 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code
 Petitioner argues the existence of reasonable doubt in his favor. First, the
medico-legal testified that he found “no physical signs or external signs of
recent trauma [in XXX’s] anus,” or any trace of spermatozoa. He contends
that physical evidence “ranks high in [the court’s] hierarchy of trustworthy
evidence.”
 RTC convicted him. CA affirmed
Issue:
Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt petitioner Richard
Ricalde’s guilt for the crime of rape through sexual assault
Held:
YES. Petitioner’s reliance on the medico-legal’s finding of no recent trauma in XXX’s
anal orifice, or any trace of spermatozoa, lacks merit. The absence of spermatozoa in
XXX’s anal orifice does not negate the possibility of an erection and penetration. This
result does not contradict the positive testimony of XXX that the lower courts found
credible, natural, and consistent with human nature.
This court has explained the merely corroborative character of expert testimony and
the possibility of convictions for rape based on the victim’s credible lone testimony
In any case, the medico-legal explained that his negative finding of trauma in the anal
orifice does not remove the possibility of an insertion considering the flexibility of the
sphincter
B. Documentary Evidence
Consolidated Bank and Trust Company vs. Del Monte Works Inc.
G.R. No. 143338, July 29, 2005
J. Chico-Nazario
Facts:
 Petitioner filed before the RTC of Manila a complaint 3 for recovery of sum of
money against respondents, impleading the spouse of respondent Narciso O.
Morales (respondent Morales) in order to bind their conjugal partnership of
gains.
 It alleges therein that it extended in favor of respondents a loan in the
amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as evidenced by a promissory
note executed by respondents
 As respondents defaulted on their monthly installments, the full amount of
the loan became due and demandable pursuant to the terms of the
promissory note.
 Petitioner likewise alleges that it made oral and written demands upon
respondents to settle their obligation but notwithstanding these demands,
respondents still failed to pay their indebtedness
 Petitioner attached to its complaint as Annexes "A," "B," and "C,"
respectively, a photocopy of the promissory note supposedly executed by
respondents, a copy of the demand letter it sent respondents dated 20
January 1983, and statement of account pertaining to respondents' loan.
 Respondent corporation filed before the trial court a manifestation attaching
thereto its answer to petitioner's complaint
 On 26 September 1985, petitioner made its formal offer of evidence.
However, as the original copy of Exhibit "A" could no longer be found,
petitioner instead sought the admission of the duplicate original of the
promissory note which was identified and marked as Exhibit "E."
  The trial court initially admitted into evidence Exhibit "E" and granted
respondents' motion that they be allowed to amend their respective answers
to conform with this new evidence.
 Rspondent corporation filed a manifestation and motion for
reconsideration of the trial court's order admitting into evidence petitioner's
Exhibit "E." Respondent corporation claims that Exhibit "E" should not have
been admitted as it was immaterial, irrelevant, was not properly identified
and hearsay evidence.
 Respondent Morales similarly filed a manifestation with motion to reconsider
order admitting as evidence Exhibit "E"which, other than insisting that the
due execution and genuineness of the promissory note were not established
as far as he was concerned, essentially raised the same arguments contained
in respondent corporation's manifestation with motion for reconsideration
 The trial court granted respondents' motions for reconsideration. Petitioner
moved for the reconsideration of this order which was denied by the court a
quo
 Respondents separately filed their motions to dismiss on the similar ground
that with the exclusion of Exhibits "A" and "E," petitioner no longer
possessed any proof of respondents' alleged indebtedness.
 The case before the trial court was dismissed. The trial court's finding was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals
Issue:
Whether or not CA erred when it found that private respondents denied the material
allegations of petitioner, despite the presence of indubitable facts clearly pointing to
the fact that said private respondents admitted the genuineness and due execution of
the subject promissory note
Held:
YES. Under the Rules of Court, When an action or defense is founded upon a written
instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the
preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be
deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them and
sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an oath does not
apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or
when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.
In the early case of Songco v. Sellner, the Court expounded on how to deny the
genuineness and due execution of an actionable document, viz.:
. . . This means that the defendant must declare under oath that he did not sign the
document or that it is otherwise false or fabricated. Neither does the statement of the
answer to the effect that the instrument was procured by fraudulent representation
raise any issue as to its genuineness or due execution. On the contrary such a plea is
an admission both of the genuineness and due execution thereof, since it seeks to
avoid the instrument upon a ground not affecting either
In this case, both the court a quo and the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
respondents were able to specifically deny the allegations in petitioner's complaint in
the manner specifically required by the rules. In effect, respondents had, to all intents
and purposes, admitted the genuineness and due execution of the subject promissory
note and recognized their obligation to petitioner.
Moreover, bearing in mind that the risk of mistransmission of the contents of the
writing is the justification for the "best evidence rule," we declare that this rule finds
no application to this case. It should be noted that respondents never disputed the
terms and conditions of the promissory note thus leaving us to conclude that as far as
the parties herein are concerned, the wording or content of said note is clear enough
and leaves no room for disagreement.
In their responsive pleadings, respondents' principal defense rests on the alleged lack
of consideration of the promissory note. In addition, respondent Morales also claims
that he did not sign the note in his personal capacity. These contentions clearly do not
question the "precise wording" of the promissory note which should have paved the
way for the application of the "best evidence rule." It was, therefore, an error for the
Court of Appeals to sustain the decision of the trial court on this point.
Significantly, respondents failed to deny specifically the execution of the promissory
note. This being the case, there was no need for petitioner to present the original of
the promissory note in question. Their judicial admission with respect to the
genuineness and execution of the promissory note sufficiently established their
liability to petitioner regardless of the fact that petitioner failed to present the original
of said note. Indeed, when the defendant fails to deny specifically and under oath the
due execution and genuineness of a document copied in a complaint, the plaintiff
need not prove that fact as it is considered admitted by the defendant.
Besides, the "best evidence rule" as stated in our Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is
not absolute. As quoted earlier, the rule accepts of exceptions one of which is when
the original of the subject document is in the possession of the adverse party. As
pointed out by petitioner in its motion to inhibit, had it been given the opportunity by
the court a quo, it would have sufficiently established that the original of Exhibit "A"
was in the possession of respondents which would have called into application one of
the exceptions to the "best evidence rule."
Engr. Bayani Magdayao vs. People
G.R. No. 152881, August 17, 2004
 J. Calleo, Sr.
Facts:
 An Information was filed charging petitioner with violation of B.P. Blg. 22
 When the case for trial was called for the prosecution to adduce its evidence,
the petitioner and his counsel were absent. On motion of the prosecution,
the court allowed it to adduce evidence.
 The prosecution presented the private complainant, Ricky Olvis, who testified
on direct examination that on September 30, 1991, the petitioner drew and
issued to him Philippine National Bank (PNB) Check No. 399967 dated
September 30, 1991 in the amount of P600,000.00. The said check was
drawn against the latter's account with the PNB and issued in payment of the
petitioner's obligation with Olvis. The latter deposited the check in his
account with the BPI-Family but the drawee bank dishonored the check for
the reason "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds" stamped on the dorsal portion
of the check.
 Olvis testified that when informed that his check was dishonored, the
petitioner pleaded for time to pay the amount thereof, but reneged on his
promise. Olvis then filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22
 The petitioner again offered to repay Olvis the amount of the obligation by
retrieving the dishonored check and replacing the same with two other
checks: one for P400,000.00 and another for P200,000.00 payable to Olvis.
Taking pity on the petitioner, he agreed. He then returned the original copy
of the check to the petitioner, but the latter again failed to make good on his
promise and failed to pay the P600,000.00.
 After several postponements at the instance of the petitioner, he and his
counsel failed to appear before the court for continuation of trial. They again
failed to appear when the case was called for continuation of trial
 The prosecution offered in evidence the photocopy of PNB Check No.
399967, which the court admitted. The trial court, thereafter, issued an Order
declaring the case submitted for decision
 The petitioner filed a motion for a reconsideration of the Order, which the
trial court denied
 The petitioner then filed an Omnibus Supplemental Motion and to Allow Him
to Adduce Evidence alleging, inter alia, that despite the absence of the
original, with only a xerox copy of the PNB Check worth P600,000.00, and
further stressing that the same was paid, the prosecutor insisted, against the
vigorous objection of accused, in filing the case in Court. Plenty of water
passed under the bridge since then;
 In its Opposition to the said motion, the prosecution averred that it
dispensed with the presentation of the original of the dishonored check
because the same had been returned to the petitioner. It also pointed out
that the petitioner failed to object to the presentation of the photocopy of
the dishonored check.
 In a Special Manifestation, the petitioner insisted that the photocopy of the
subject check was inadmissible in evidence because of the prosecution's
failure to produce the original thereof. This was denied
 The trial court rendered judgment convicting the petitioner of the crime
charged. Affirmed by the CA
 Petitioner avers that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged because of the following: (a) the
photocopy of PNB Check No. 399967, adduced in evidence by the
prosecution, is inadmissible in evidence under Rule 129, Section 1 of the
Revised Rules of Evidence; hence, has no probative weight
Issue:
Whether or not lower court erred in convicting the accused of the crime charged
solely on the basis of the fPhotostatic copy of the PNB check
Held:
NO. We agree with the petitioner that it was incumbent upon the prosecution to
adduce in evidence the original copy of PNB Check No. 399967 to prove the contents
thereof, more specifically the names of the drawer and endorsee, the date and
amount and the dishonor thereof, as well as the reason for such dishonor. Section 3,
Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifically provides that when the subject
of inquiry is the contents of the document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original thereof.
The purpose of the rule requiring the production by the offeror of the best evidence is
the prevention of fraud, because if a party is in possession of such evidence and
withholds it and presents inferior or secondary evidence in its place, the presumption
is that the latter evidence is withheld from the court and the adverse party for a
fraudulent or devious purpose which its production would expose and defeat. As long
as the original evidence can be had, the court should not receive in evidence that
which is substitutionary in nature, such as photocopies, in the absence of any clear
showing that the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in
court. Such photocopies must be disregarded, being inadmissible evidence and barren
of probative weight
Furthermore, under Section 3(b), Rule 130 of the said Rules, secondary evidence of a
writing may be admitted when the original is in the custody or under the control of
the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice. To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the
original of a writing is in the custody or control of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule
130 provides if the document is in the custody or under the control of the adverse
party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after
satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary
evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss.
The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or control of the party
against whom it is offered does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The
offeror must prove that he has done all in his power to secure the best evidence by
giving notice to the said party to produce the document. The notice may be in the
form of a motion for the production of the original or made in open court in the
presence of the adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party
in custody of the original has sufficient time to produce the same. When such party
has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it or refuses to
produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted.
In this case, Olvis, the private complainant, testified that after the check was
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, he returned it to the
petitioner upon the latter's offer to pay the amount of the check by drawing and
issuing two checks, one for P400,000.00 and the other for P200,000.00. However, the
petitioner still failed to satisfy his obligation to Olvis
In his "Motion to Suspend Proceedings" in the trial court, the petitioner admitted that
he received the original copy of the dishonored check from the private
complainant and that he caused the non-payment of the dishonored check. The
petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the need for the production of the original copy
of PNB Check No. 399967, and the fact that the prosecution was able to present in
evidence only a photocopy thereof because the original was in his possession. In fact,
in the Omnibus Supplemental Motion dated February 8, 1996, and in his Special
Manifestation filed on May 28, 1996, the petitioner complained of the prosecution's
violation of the best evidence rule. The petitioner, however, never produced the
original of the check, much less offered to produce the same. The petitioner
deliberately withheld the original of the check as a bargaining chip for the court to
grant him an opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense, which he failed to do
following his numerous unjustified postponements as shown by the records.
Josef vs People
G.R. No. 146424, November 18, 2006
J. Corona
Facts:
 Petitioner, a Marikina-based manufacturer and seller of shoes, purchased
materials from respondent Agustin Alarilla, a seller of leather products for
which the former issued a total of 26 postdated checks against his account
with the Associated Bank and Far East Bank & Trust Company
 When private respondent presented these checks for encashment, they were
dishonored because the accounts against which they were drawn were
closed.
 Private respondent informed petitioner of the dishonor and demanded
payment of their value. After some negotiations, petitioner drew and
delivered a new set of postdated checks in replacement of the dishonored
ones. Private respondent, in turn, returned to petitioner the originals of the
dishonored postdated checks but retained photocopies thereof.
 When private respondent deposited the replacement checks in his account
with the Westmont Bank, these were also dishonored by the drawee bank
 As a result, the private respondent filed criminal complaints against
petitioner for violation of BP 22
 RTC convicted petitioner and CA affirmed it
 Petitioner claims that, under the Best Evidence Rule, the trial court should
not have admitted in evidence the photocopies of the checks until after he
had been given reasonable notice to produce the originals.
Issue:
Whether the trial court was incorrect to accept as evidence photocopies of the
original checks
Held:
NO. When he testified in the Court a quo, the Petitioner brought out the originals of
the checks and even marked the same in evidence as Exhibits "1" to "21", except five
(5) of the subject checks, which he claimed as missing and the Prosecution even
adopted the original checks as its evidence and Petitioner never alleged that the
photostatic copies of the checks marked and offered in evidence by the Prosecution
were not faithful copies of the originals of the checks.
By his testimony, the [Petitioner] thereby admitted that the photostatic copies of the
checks marked and offered in evidence by the Prosecution were the faithful
reproductions of the originals of the checks in his possession. Hence, the
Prosecution may mark and offer in evidence the photostatic copies of the checks.
By admitting that the originals were in his possession and even producing them in
open court, petitioner cured whatever flaw might have existed in the prosecution's
evidence. The fact that these originals were all stamped "account closed" merely
confirmed the allegations of the respondent that the checks were dishonored by
reason of the account being closed.
Lorenzana vs. Lelina
G.R. No. 187850, August 17, 2006
 J. Jardaleza
Facts:
 Ambrosia Lelina (Ambrosia), married to Aquilino Lelina (Aquilino), executed
a Deed of Absolute Sale6 over one-half (1/2) of an undivided parcel of land in
favor of her son, the respondent.
 The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, specified only an area of 810 sq. m. as
the one-half (1/2) of the property
 Immediately after the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, respondent
took possession of the property
 Respondent and his three tenants were invited at the Municipal Agrarian
Office of Tagudin, Ilocos Sur for a conference where they were informed that
the property is already owned by petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Final
Conveyance and tax declaration both in the name of petitioner.
 Respondent filed a complaint for quieting of title and cancellation of
documents claiming that there appears to be a cloud over his ownership and
possession of the property.
 In her Answer, petitioner alleged that she acquired a land with an area of
16,047 sq. m. through a foreclosure sale; that she became the judgment
creditor in a case for collection of sum of money (collection case) she filed
against Aquilino
 Thereafter, by virtue of a writ of execution to enforce the decision in the
collection case, the sheriff levied on a land with an area under the name of
Ambrosia. Petitioner claimed that she emerged as the sole and highest
bidder when the levied property was auctioned
 Respondent testified that sometime in 1975 and prior to the sale of the
property to him, the other half of the levied property was owned by
Godofredo Lorenzana (Godofredo).24 He also claimed that he and Godofredo
have agreed that he will hold in trust the latter's share of produce from the
other half of the land
 The RTC upheld respondent's ownership over the half of the levied
property.27 It ruled that the levied property is exclusively owned by
Ambrosia, and could not be held to answer for the obligations of her
husband in the collection case.
 The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC and upheld respondent's ownership
over the property.
 Petitioner argues that respondent's sole basis for his claim of ownership over
the property is the Deed of Absolute Sale, the original of which was not
presented in court. Since only the photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale
was presented, its contents are inadmissible for violating the best evidence
rule. Thus, respondent's claim of ownership should be denied.
Issue:
Whether respondent is the owner of one-half (1/2) of the levied property
Held:
YES. The best evidence rule requires that when the subject of inquiry is the contents
of a document, no evidence is admissible other than the original document itself
except in the instances mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court. As such, mere photocopies of documents are inadmissible pursuant to the best
evidence rule.
Nevertheless, evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly
considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. Courts are not precluded to accept
in evidence a mere photocopy of a document when no objection was raised when it
was formally offered.
In order to exclude evidence, the objection to admissibility of evidence must be
made at the proper time, and the grounds specified. Objection to evidence must be
made at the time it is formally offered. In case of documentary evidence, offer is made
after all the witnesses of the party making the offer have testified, specifying the
purpose for which the evidence is being offered. It is only at this time, and not at any
other, that objection to the documentary evidence may be made. And when a party
failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in
evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived. This is true even if by its
nature the evidence is inadmissible and would have surely been rejected if it had been
challenged at the proper time.
Moreover, grounds for objection must be specified in any case. Grounds for objections
not raised at the proper time shall be considered waived, even if the evidence was
objected to on some other ground. Thus, even on appeal, the appellate court may not
consider any other ground of objection, except those that were raised at the proper
time.
In this case, the objection to the Deed of Absolute Sale was belatedly raised.
Respondent submitted his Formal Offer of Evidence on February 12, 2003 which
included the Deed of Absolute Sale as Exhibit A. While petitioner filed a Comment and
Objection on February 21, 2003, she only objected to the Deed of Absolute Sale for
being self-serving
T he RTC admitted the Deed of Absolute Sale, rejecting the objection of petitioner.
Having failed to object on the ground of inadmissibility under the best evidence rule,
petitioner is now deemed to have waived her objection on this ground and cannot
raise it for the first time on appeal.
People vs. Cayabyab
G.R. No. 167147, August 3, 2005

Facts:
 Alpha Jane was six years and nine months old when the rape was committed
on August 7, 2001.
 When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then
ensued
 The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. It found the victim's testimony consistent with the medical
findings of the doctors from the PNP Crime Laboratory Moreover, it applied
the rule that an unsubstantiated defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail
over a positive and categorical testimony of a minor victim.
 Hence, the lower court hereby sentence accused Genaro Cayabyab y
Fernandez to DEATH
Issue:
Whether or not accused should suffer death penalty
Held:
YES. This special qualifying circumstance of age must be specifically pleaded or alleged
with certainty in the information and proven during the trial; otherwise the penalty of
death cannot be imposed
in Pruna the following guidelines was set in appreciating age, either as an element of
the crime or as a qualifying circumstance. Accordingly, the best evidence to prove the
age of a person is the original birth certificate or certified true copy thereof; in their
absence, similar authentic documents may be presented such as baptismal certificates
and school records. If the orginal or certified true copy of the birth certificate is not
available, credible testimonies of the victim's mother or a member of the family may
be sufficient under certain circumstances. In the event that both the birth certificate
or other authentic documents and the testimonies of the victim's mother or other
qualified relative are unavailable, the testimony of the victim may be admitted in
evidence provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
In Pruna, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document, such as the
baptismal certificate of the victim was presented to prove her age. The trial court
based its finding that Lizette was 3 years old when she was raped on the Medico-Legal
Report, and the fact that the defense did not contest her age and questioned her
qualification to testify because of her tender age. It was however noted that the
Medico-Legal Report never mentioned her age and only the testimony of her mother
was presented to establish Lizette's age. The Court found that there
was uncertainty as to the victim's exact age, hence, it required that corroborative
evidence, such as her birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other authentic
document should be introduced in evidence in order that the qualifying circumstance
of 'below seven (7) years old is appreciated.
Unlike in Pruna, the trial court in this case made a categorical finding that Alpha Jane
was only 6 years old at the time she was raped, based not only on the testimonies of
the complainant and her mother, but also on the strength of the photocopy of Alpha
Jane's birth certificate. It is well to note that the defense did not object to the
presentation of the birth certificate; on the contrary it admitted the same 'as to fact of
birth.
We are not unaware of our ruling in People v. Mantis that a mere photocopy of the
birth certificate, in the absence of any showing that the original copy was lost or
destroyed, or was unavailable, without the fault of the prosecution, does not prove
the victim's minority, for said photocopy does not qualify as competent evidence for
that purpose.
However, there are other exceptions to the 'best evidence rule as expressly provided
under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
In the present case, if falls under section 3 (d) of Rule 30 of the Rules of Court which
provides that when the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or
is recorded in a public office.
Without doubt, a certificate of live birth is a public record in the custody of the local
civil registrar who is a public officer. Clearly, therefore, the presentation of the
photocopy of the birth certificate of Alpha Jane is admissible as secondary evidence to
prove its contents. Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial
court's discretion, whenever in the case at hand the opponent does not bona fide
dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by
requiring production.
In the case at bar, the defense did not dispute the contents of the photocopied birth
certificate; in fact it admitted the same. Having failed to raise a valid and timely
objection against the presentation of this secondary evidence the same became a
primary evidence, and deemed admitted and the other party is bound thereby
Heirs of Margarita Prodon vs. Heirs of Maximo Alvarez
G.R. No. 170604, September 2, 2013
J. Bersamin

Facts:
 In their complaint for quieting of title and damages against Margarita Prodon
the respondents averred as the plaintiffs that their parents, the late spouses
Maximo S. Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina Clave, were the registered owners of
that parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
 that their parents had been in possession of the property during their
lifetime; that upon their parents’ deaths, they had continued the possession
of the property as heirs, paying the real property taxes due thereon
 that they could not locate the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 84797, but
the original copy of TCT No. 84797 on file with the Register of Deeds of
Manila was intact;
 That the original copy contained an entry stating that the property had been
sold to defendant Prodon subject to the right of repurchase; and that the
entry had been maliciously done by Prodon because the deed of sale with
right to repurchase covering the property did not exist.
 In her answer, Prodon claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had
executed ; deed of sale with right to repurchase; that the deed had been
registered with the Register of Deeds and duly annotated on the title; and
that she had then become the absolute owner of the property due to its non-
repurchase within the given 6-month period.
 During trial, the custodian of the records of the property attested that the
copy of the deed of sale with right to repurchase could not be found in the
files of the Register of Deeds of Manila.
 The RTC rendered judgmentfinding untenable the plaintiffs’ contention that
the deed of sale with right to repurchase did not exist. It opined that
although the deed itself could not be presented as evidence in court, its
contents could nevertheless be proved by secondary evidence in accordance
with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, upon proof of its execution or
existence and of the cause of its unavailability being without bad faith
 On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC ruling. The CA held that "Secondary
evidence of the contents of a document refers to evidence other than the
original document itself. A party may introduce secondary evidence of the
contents of a written instrument not only when the original is lost or
destroyed, but also when it cannot be produced in court, provided there is
no bad faith on the part of the offeror. However, a party must first
satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary evidence before he can
resort to secondary evidence. A party must first present to the court proof of
loss or other satisfactory explanation for non-production of the original
instrument. herefore, that before secondary evidence as to the contents of a
document may be admitted in evidence, the existence of [the] document
must first be proved, likewise, its execution and its subsequent loss.
Issue:
Whether the pre-requisites for the admission of secondary evidence had been
complied with
Held:
The Best Evidence Rule was not applicable herein. An analysis leads us to conclude
that the CA and the RTC both misapplied the Best Evidence Rule to this case, and their
misapplication diverted the attention from the decisive issue in this action for quieting
of title
The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving the terms of a written document the
original of the document must be produced in court. The rule excludes any evidence
other than the original writing to prove the contents thereof, unless the offeror
proves: (a) the existence or due execution of the original; (b) the loss and destruction
of the original, or the reason for its non-production in court; and (c) the absence of
bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the original can be
attributed
The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is to ensure that the exact contents of
a writing are brought before the court. The rule further acts as an insurance against
fraud
But the evils of mistransmission of critical facts, fraud, and misleading inferences arise
only when the issue relates to the terms of the writing. Hence, the Best Evidence Rule
applies only when the terms of a writing are in issue. When the evidence sought to be
introduced concerns external facts, such as the existence, execution or delivery of the
writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked. In
such a case, secondary evidence may be admitted even without accounting for the
original.
This case involves an action for quieting of title, a common-law remedy for the
removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property by reason of
any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or
effective, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable,
and may be prejudicial to said title. For an action to quiet title to prosper, two
indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (a) the plaintiff or complainant has a
legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and
(b) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his
title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
The action for quieting of title may be based on the fact that a deed is invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable. The terms of the writing may or may not be
material to an action for quieting of title, depending on the ground alleged by the
plaintiff. For instance, when an action for quieting of title is based on the
unenforceability of a contract for not complying with the Statute of Frauds, Article
1403 of the Civil Code specifically provides that evidence of the agreement cannot be
received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents. There is then no
doubt that the Best Evidence Rule will come into play.
It is not denied that this action does not involve the terms or contents of the deed of
sale with right to repurchase. The principal issue raised by the respondents as the
plaintiffs, which Prodon challenged head on, was whether or not the deed of sale with
right to repurchase, duly executed by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr., had really existed.
Considering that the Best Evidence Rule was not applicable because the terms of the
deed of sale with right to repurchase were not the issue, the CA did not have to
address and determine whether the existence, execution, and loss, as pre-requisites
for the presentation of secondary evidence, had been established by Prodon’s
evidence. It should have simply addressed and determined whether or not the
"existence" and "execution" of the deed as the facts in issue had been proved by
preponderance of evidence.
Indeed, for Prodon who had the burden to prove the existence and due execution of
the deed of sale with right to repurchase, the presentation of evidence other than the
original document, like the testimonies of Prodon and Jose Camilon, the Notarial
Register of Notary Eliseo Razon, and the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds,
would have sufficed even without first proving the loss or unavailability of the original
of the deed.
However, in case at bar, Prodon did not preponderantly establish the existence and
due execution of the deed of sale with right to repurchase. A review of the records
reveals that Prodon did not adduce proof sufficient to show the lossor explain the
unavailability of the original as to justify the presentation of secondary evidence.
Camilon, one of her witnesses, testified that he had given the original to her lawyer,
Atty. Anacleto Lacanilao, but that he (Camilon) could not anymore retrieve the original
because Atty. Lacanilao had been recuperating from his heart ailment. Such evidence
without showing the inability to locate the original from among Atty. Lacanilao’s
belongings by himself or by any of his assistants or representatives was inadequate.
Moreover, a duplicate original could have been secured from Notary Public Razon, but
no effort was shown to have been exerted in that direction.
In contrast, the records contained ample indicia of the improbability of the existence
of the deed. Respondents preponderantly established that the late Maximo Alvarez,
Sr. had been in and out of the hospital around the time that the deed of sale with
right to repurchase had been supposedly executed on September 9, 1975. The records
manifested that he had been admitted to the Veterans Memorial Hospital in Quezon
City on several occasions, and had then been diagnosed with the serious ailments or
conditions.
Marquez vs Espejo
G.R. No. 168387, August 25, 2012
J. Del Castillo
Facts:
 Respondents Espejos were the original registered owners of two parcels of
agricultural land, with an area of two hectares each. One is located
at Barangay Lantap, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya (the Lantap property) while the
other is located in Barangay Murong, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya (the Murong
property).
 The Murong property is tenanted by petitioners Salun-at Marquez (Marquez)
and Nestor Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz).
 The respondents mortgaged both parcels of land to Rural Bank of
Bayombong, Inc. (RBBI) to secure certain loans. Upon their failure to pay the
loans, the mortgaged properties were foreclosed and sold to RBBI. RBBI
eventually consolidated title to the properties and transfer certificates of title
(TCTs) were issued in the name of RBBI. ** TCT No. T-62096 (Murong
property.) and TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap property ) Both TCTs describe their
respective subjects as located in Bagabag Townsite, K-27, without any
reference to either Barangay Lantap or Barangay Murong.
 Respondents Espejos bought back one of their lots from RBBI. The Deed of
Sale.
 The Deed of Sale did not mention the barangay where the property was
located but mentioned the title of the property which title corresponds to
the Murong property. There is no evidence, however, that respondents took
possession of the Murong property, or demanded lease rentals from the
petitioners (who continued to be the tenants of the Murong property), or
otherwise exercised acts of ownership over the Murong property. On the
other hand, respondent Nemi (husband of respondent Elenita and brother-
in-law of the other respondents), continued working on the other property --
the Lantap property -- without any evidence that he ever paid rentals to RBBI
or to any landowner.
 Meanwhile RBBI, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, executed separate
Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners Marquez and
Dela Cruz, the tenants of the Murong property. Both VLTs described the
subject thereof as an agricultural land located in Barangay Murong. DAR
issued the corresponding Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to
petitioners Marquez and Dela Cruz
 More than 10 years after the Deed of Sale in favor of the respondents and
almost seven years after the execution of VLTs in favor of the petitioners,
respondents filed a Complaint before the Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (RARAD) for the cancellation of petitioners CLOAs, the deposit of
leasehold rentals by petitioners in favor of respondents, and the execution of
a deed of voluntary land transfer by RBBI in favor of respondent Nemi.
  The complaint was based on respondents theory that the Murong property,
occupied by the petitioners, was owned by the respondents by virtue of the
1985 buy-back, as documented in the Deed of Sale. They based their claim on
the fact that their Deed of Sale refers to TCT No. 62096, which pertains to the
Murong property.
 Petitioners filed their Answer and insisted that they bought the Murong
property as farmer-beneficiaries thereof. They maintained that they have
always displayed good faith, paid lease rentals to RBBI when it became the
owner of the Murong property, bought the same from RBBI upon the honest
belief that they were buying the Murong property, and occupied and
exercised acts of ownership over the Murong property. Petitioners also
argued that what respondents Espejos repurchased from RBBI in 1985 was
actually the Lantap property, as evidenced by their continued occupation and
possession of the Lantap property through respondent Nemi.
 RBBI answered that it was the Lantap property which was the subject of the
buy-back transaction with respondents Espejos.
 the OIC-RARAD concluded that the subject of sale was indeed the Murong
property.
 Upon appeal filed by petitioners, the DARAB reversed the OIC-RARAD
Decision.
 Upon appeal, CA agreed with the respondents. Using the Best Evidence Rule
embodied in Rule 130, Section 3, the CA held that the Deed of Sale is the
best evidence as to its contents, particularly the description of the land which
was the object of the sale. Since the Deed of Sale expressed that its subject is
the land covered by TCT No. T-62096 the Murong property then that is the
property that the respondents repurchased. The CA further ruled that as for
petitioners VLTs, the same refer to the property with TCT No. T-62836; thus,
the subject of their CLOAs is the Lantap property.
 Petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in using the best evidence
rule to determine the subject of the Deed of Sale and the Deeds of Voluntary
Land Transfer. They maintain that the issue in the case is not the contents of
the contracts but the intention of the parties that was not adequately
expressed in their contracts. Petitioners then argue that it is the Parol
Evidence Rule that should be applied in order to adequately resolve the
dispute.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in utilizing the Best Evidence Rule to determine the subject of
the contracts
Held:
YES. The appellate court erred in its application of the Best Evidence Rule. The Best
Evidence Rule states that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document,
the best evidence is the original document itself and no other evidence (such as a
reproduction, photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as a general rule. The original
is preferred because it reduces the chance of undetected tampering with the
document.
In the instant case, there is no room for the application of the Best Evidence Rule
because there is no dispute regarding the contents of the documents. It is admitted by
the parties that the respondents Deed of Sale referred to TCT No. T-62096 as its
subject; while the petitioners Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer referred to TCT No. T-
62836 as its subject, which is further described as located in Barangay Murong.
The real issue is whether the admitted contents of these documents adequately and
correctly express the true intention of the parties. As to the Deed of Sale, petitioners
(and RBBI) maintain that while it refers to TCT No. T-62096, the parties actually
intended the sale of the Lantap property (covered by TCT No. T-62836).
As to the VLTs, respondents contend that the reference to TCT No. T-62836
(corresponding to the Lantap property) reflects the true intention of RBBI and the
petitioners, and the reference to Barangay Murong was a typographical error. On the
other hand, petitioners claim that the reference to Barangay Murong reflects their
true intention, while the reference to TCT No. T-62836 was a mere error. This dispute
reflects an intrinsic ambiguity in the contracts, arising from an apparent failure of the
instruments to adequately express the true intention of the parties. To resolve the
ambiguity, resort must be had to evidence outside of the instruments.
The CA, however, refused to look beyond the literal wording of the documents and
rejected any other evidence that could shed light on the actual intention of the
contracting parties. Though the CA cited the Best Evidence Rule, it appears that what
it actually applied was the Parol Evidence Rule instead.
The Parol Evidence Rule excludes parol or extrinsic evidence by which a party seeks to
contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a valid agreement or
instrument.Thus, it appears that what the CA actually applied in its assailed Decision
when it refused to look beyond the words of the contracts was the Parol Evidence
Rule, not the Best Evidence Rule. The appellate court gave primacy to the literal terms
of the two contracts and refused to admit any other evidence that would contradict
such terms.
However, even the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the case at
bar. In the first place, respondents are not parties to the VLTs executed between RBBI
and petitioners; they are strangers to the written contracts. Rule 130, Section 9
specifically provides that parol evidence rule is exclusive only as between the parties
and their successors-in-interest. The parol evidence rule may not be invoked where at
least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written
document in question, and does not base his claim on the instrument or assert a right
originating in the instrument
Moreover, the instant case falls under the exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule, as
provided in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9:
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the
written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(1) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(2) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of
the parties thereto;
Here, the petitioners VLTs suffer from intrinsic ambiguity. The VLTs described the
subject property as covered by TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap property), but they also
describe the subject property as being located in Barangay Murong. Even the
respondents Deed of Sale falls under the exception to the Parol Evidence Rule. It refers
to TCT No. T-62096 (Murong property), but RBBI contended that the true intent was to
sell the Lantap property. In short, it was squarely put in issue that the written
agreement failed to express the true intent of the parties.
Based on the foregoing, the resolution of the instant case necessitates an examination
of the parties respective parol evidence, in order to determine the true intent of the
parties. Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the
contracting parties that prevails, for the intention is the soul of a contract, not its
wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold otherwise
would give life, validity, and precedence to mere typographical errors and defeat the
very purpose of agreements.
Rule 130, Section 13 which provides for the rules on the interpretation of documents is
likewise enlightening:
Section 13. Interpretation according to circumstances. For the proper construction of
an instrument, the circumstances under which it was made, including the situation of
the subject thereofand of the parties to it, may be shown, so that the judge may be
placed in the position of those whose language he is to interpret.
Applying the foregoing guiding rules, it is clear that the Deed of Sale was intended to
transfer the Lantap property to the respondents, while the VLTs were intended to
convey the Murong property to the petitioners. This may be seen from
the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties.
Rule on Electronic Evidence
Garcillano vs. House of Representatives Committee on Public Information
G.R. No. 170338, 179275, December 23, 2008
J. Nachura
Facts:
 These tapes includes the tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci"
tapes, allegedly contained the President’s instructions to COMELEC
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the
2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of
heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both
Houses of Congress.
 Petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition for
Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. He prayed that the respondent House
Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings of the "illegally
obtained" wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and for any
other purpose.
 A second Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by petitioners
Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of
Appeals,
 In this case, both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings, they have
different objectives–the first is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes
in the House and their subsequent inclusion in the committee reports, and
the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on
the wiretapped conversation.
 The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the
second, G.R. No. 179275.
Issue:
Held:
Yes. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned
legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of
the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or
the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements
of due process.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated
publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and,
despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and
accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise
known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid
publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an
electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a
written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely
recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data
messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for
publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in
violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject
of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the
Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules,
because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
People vs Enojas
G.R. No. 204894, March 10, 2014
J. Abad
Facts:
 PO2 Eduardo Gregorio, Jr. (PO2 Gregorio) testified that he and PO2 Francisco
Pangilinan (PO2 Pangilinan) were patrolling the vicinity of Toyota Alabang
and SM Southmall when they spotted a taxi that was suspiciously parked in
front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop
 The officers approached the taxi and asked the driver, later identified as
accused Enojas, for his documents. The latter complied but, having
entertained doubts regarding the veracity of documents shown them, they
asked him to come with them to the police station in their mobile car for
further questioning.
 Accused Enojas voluntarily went with the police officers and left his taxi
behind
 On reaching the 7-11, they stopped and PO2 Pangilinan went down to relieve
himself there. As he approached the store’s door, however, he came upon
two suspected robbers and shot it out with them. PO2 Pangilinan shot one
suspect dead and hit the other who still managed to escape. But someone
fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing his death.
 On hearing the shots, PO2 Gregorio came around and fired at an armed man
whom he saw running towards Pilar Village. He saw another man, who came
from the Jollibbee outlet, run towards Alabang-Zapote Road while firing his
gun at PO2 Gregorio. The latter returned fire but the men were able to take a
taxi and escape.
 On returning to his mobile car, he realized that accused Enojas, the taxi driver
they had with them had fled.
 Suspecting that accused Enojas, the taxi driver who fled, was involved in the
attempted robbery, they searched the abandoned taxi and found a mobile
phone that Enojas apparently left behind. P/Ins. Torred instructed PO3 Joel
Cambi (PO3 Cambi) to monitor its incoming messages
 PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that they monitored the messages in
accused Enojas’ mobile phone and, posing as Enojas, communicated with the
other accused. The police then conducted an entrapment operation that
resulted in the arrest of accused Santos and Jalandoni. Subsequently, the
police were also able to capture accused Enojas and Gomez.
 The prosecution presented the transcripts of the mobile phone text
messages between Enojas and some of his co-accused
 Manifesting in open court that they did not want to adduce any evidence or
testify in the case,7 the accused opted to instead file a trial memorandum for
their defense. They pointed out that they were entitled to an acquittal since
they were all illegally arrested and since the evidence of the text messages
were inadmissible, not having been properly identified.
 The RTC rendered judgment,8 finding all the accused guilty of murder
 The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the
conviction of the accused.
 The defense points out that the prosecution failed to present direct evidence
that the accused Enojas, Gomez, Santos, or Jalandoni took part in shooting
PO2 Pangilinan dead
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting the accused
Held:
NO. The defense may be true but the prosecution could prove their liability by
circumstantial evidence that meets the evidentiary standard of proof beyond
reasonable doubt. It has been held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented sufficiently
provides basis for the conviction of all the accused. Thus:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Enojas as the driver of the taxicab
suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop. The officers were bringing
him with them to the police station because of the questionable documents he
showed upon query. Subsequent inspection of the taxicab yielded Enojas’ mobile
phone that contained messages which led to the entrapment and capture of the other
accused who were also taxicab drivers.

2. Enojas fled during the commotion rather than remain in the cab to go to the police
station where he was about to be taken for questioning, tending to show that he had
something to hide. He certainly did not go to the police afterwards to clear up the
matter and claim his taxi.
3. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Gomez as one of the men he saw
running away from the scene of the shooting.
4. The text messages identified “Kua Justin” as one of those who engaged PO2
Pangilinan in the shootout; the messages also referred to “Kua Justin” as the one who
was hit in such shootout and later died in a hospital in Bacoor, Cavite. These messages
linked the other accused.
5. During the follow-up operations, the police investigators succeeded in entrapping
accused Santos, Jalandoni, Enojas, and Gomez, who were all named in the text
messages.
6. The text messages sent to the phone recovered from the taxi driven by Enojas
clearly made references to the 7-11 shootout and to the wounding of “Kua Justin,”
one of the gunmen, and his subsequent death.
7. The context of the messages showed that the accused were members of an
organized group of taxicab drivers engaged in illegal activities.
8. Upon the arrest of the accused, they were found in possession of mobile phones
with call numbers that corresponded to the senders of the messages received on the
mobile phone that accused Enojas left in his taxicab.
As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity
with the Court’s earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to
criminal actions. Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who
was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing
as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused in order to
identify and entrap them.
As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his
possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and was competent
to testify on them.
Maliksi vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 203302, March 12, 2013
J. Bersamin
Facts:
 During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed
Saquilayan the winner for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite.
 Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes,
brought an election protest in the RTC alleging that there were irregularities
in the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts.
 Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the votes, and, based on the results
of the revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus
commanding Saquilayan to cease and desist from performing the functions
of said office
 Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC
 In the meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi’s motion for execution pending
appeal, and Maliksi was then installed as Mayor.
 In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to
the parties, decided to recount the ballots through the use of the printouts of
the ballot images from the CF cards. Thus, it issued an order requiring
Saquilayan to deposit the amount necessary to defray the expenses for the
decryption and printing of the ballot images. Later, it issued another order or
Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit.
 The First Division issued a resolution nullifying the RTC’s decision and
declaring Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor.
 Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration
 COMELEC En Banc resolved to deny Maliksi’s motion for reconsideration
 Maliksi then came to the Court via petition for certiorari alleging that he had
been denied his right to due process because he had not been notified of the
decryption proceedings. He argued that the resort to the printouts of the
ballot images, which were secondary evidence, had been unwarranted
because there was no proof that the integrity of the paper ballots had not
been preserved.
 The Court, by a vote of 8-7, dismissed Maliksi’s petition for certiorari.
 Maliksi filed an Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
Issue:
Whether or not SC gravely erred in upholding the COMELEC FIRST DIVISION’s ruling to
dispense with the physical ballots and resort to their digital images notwithstanding
the fact that the best and most conclusive evidence of voters will and the ballot
images can only be resorted to only if the official ballots are lost or their integrity was
compromised as determined by the recount/revision committee, circumstances which
are warranting in this case.
Held:
YES. The picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that are regarded as
the equivalents of the original official ballots themselves. In Vinzons-Chato v. House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, the Court held that "the picture images of the
ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise ‘official ballots’ that
faithfully capture in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section
2(3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such, the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of
the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of
revision of votes in an electoral protest."
That the two documents—the official ballot and its picture image—are considered
"original documents" simply means that both of them are given equal probative
weight. In short, when either is presented as evidence, one is not considered as
weightier than the other.
But this juridical reality does not authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and the
Electoral Tribunals to quickly and unilaterally resort to the printouts of the picture
images of the ballots in the proceedings had before them without notice to the
parties. Despite the equal probative weight accorded to the official ballots and the
printouts of their picture images, the rules for the revision of ballots adopted for
their respective proceedings still consider the official ballots to be the primary or
best evidence of the voters’ will. In that regard, the picture images of the ballots are
to be used only when it is first shown that the official ballots are lost or their
integrity has been compromised.
For instance, the aforesaid Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 (In Re:
Comelec Rules of Procedure on Disputes In An Automated Election System in
Connection with the May 10, 2010 Elections), as amended by COMELEC Resolution
No. 9164, itself requires that "the Recount Committee determines that the integrity of
the ballots has been violated or has not been preserved, or are wet and otherwise in
such a condition that (the ballots) cannot be recounted" before the printing of the
image of the ballots should be made,
The rules on revision of ballots stipulate that the printing of the picture images of the
ballots may be resorted to only after the proper Revision/Recount Committee has first
determined that the integrity of the ballots and the ballot boxes was not preserved.
The foregoing rules further require that the decryption of the images stored in the CF
cards and the printing of the decrypted images take place during the revision or
recount proceedings. There is a good reason for thus fixing where and by whom the
decryption and the printing should be conducted. It is during the revision or recount
conducted by the Revision/Recount Committee when the parties are allowed to be
represented, with their representatives witnessing the proceedings and timely raising
their objections in the course of the proceedings. Moreover, whenever the
Revision/Recount Committee makes any determination that the ballots have been
tampered and have become unreliable, the parties are immediately made aware of
such determination.
When, as in the present case, it was not the Revision/Recount Committee or the RTC
exercising original jurisdiction over the protest that made the finding that the ballots
had been tampered, but the First Division in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction,
the parties should have been given a formal notice thereof.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Antonio T. Carpio advances the view that the
COMELEC’s finding of ballot tampering was a mere surplusage because there was
actually no need for such finding before the ballots’ digital counterparts could be
used. He cites Section 3, Rule 16 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended by
Resolution No. 9164
Justice Carpio posits that when a party files a motion for the printing of the ballots
that he or she deems necessary, there is actually no need for a finding of tampering of
the ballots or the ballot boxes before the COMELEC Division may grant the motion. He
states that a determination by the parties that the printing is necessary under Section
3 is a ground separate from Section 6(e)
However, the Court ruled that to interpret Section 3 as granting to any one of the
parties the right to move for the printing of the ballot images should such party deem
it necessary, and the COMELEC may grant such motion, is contrary to its clear
wording. Section 3 explicitly states: "in case the parties deem it necessary, they may
file a motion." The provision really envisions a situation in which both parties have
agreed that the ballot images should be printed. Should only one of the parties move
for the printing of the ballot images, it is not Section 3 that applies but Section 6(e),
which then requires a finding that the integrity of the ballots has been compromised.
Moreover, due process of law does not only require notice of the decryption, printing,
and recount proceedings to the parties, but also demands an opportunity to be
present at such proceedings or to be represented therein. Maliksi correctly contends
that the orders of the First Division simply required Saquilayan to post and augment
his cash deposit. The orders did not state the time, date, and venue of the decryption
and recount proceedings. Clearly, the First Division had no intention of giving the
parties the opportunity to witness its proceedings.
Bartolome vs. Maranan
 A.M. No. P-11-2979, November 18, 2014
Facts:
 The complainant alleged that the respondent asked money from her in the
amount of ₱200,000.00, which was later reduced to ₱160,000.00, to facilitate
the filing of her case for annulment of marriage. She further alleged that the
respondent undertook to have the case decided in her favor without the
need of court appearances during the proceedings of the case.
 To put an end to the respondent’s extortion activities, the complainant
decided to report the matter to the police authorities. During the
entrapment operation conducted by police officers of Imus Police Station, the
respondent was apprehended inside the premises of the RTC, Branch 20,
Imus, Cavite, in the act of receiving the money from the complainant.
 In support of her allegations, the complainant attached to her affidavit-
complaint the transcribed electronic communications (text messages)
between her and the respondent; a copy of an Electronic Psychiatric History
form given to her by the respondent for her to accomplish in filing the
petition for annulment of marriage and a versatile compact disc (VCD)
containing the video taken during the entrapment operation conducted
against the respondent
 The respondent denied the accusations against her. She alleged her belief
that Bartolome is a fictitious name as the affidavit-complaint does not
indicate the complainant’s exact address; that the complaint is pure and
simple harassment orchestrated by a lawyer or litigant who has a grudge
against her and who wants to publiclybesmirch her reputation
 Based on the complainant’s pleadings and evidence, the OCA, submitted its
Report to the Court finding enough evidence to prove the respondent’s
involvement in anomalous activities
Issue:
Whether respondent is found guilty of the offenses charged and be dismissed from
the service, with forfeiture of retirement benefits except her accrued leave credits and
with perpetual disqualification from employment in any government agency.
Held:
YES. The respondent’s bare denial cannot overcome the evidence supporting the
complainant’s accusation that she demanded money on the promise that she would
facilitate the annulment of her (complainant’s) marriage. The respondent’s actions
from the time the complainant started communicating with her on October 21, 2009
and thereafter through a series of messages they exchanged via SMS, until the
entrapment operation showed that the complaint is indeed meritorious. The
respondent’s text messages sent to the complainant corroborate that she promised to
expedite – in exchange for a monetary consideration of ₱160,000.00 and that she
would provide the lawyer who would file the annulment case – the complainant’s
annulment case once it is filed
Ephemeral electronic communications are now admissible evidence, subject to certain
conditions. "Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations,
text messages, chatroom sessions, streaming audio, streaming video, and other
electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or
retained. It may be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the
communications or has personal knowledge thereof
In the present case, we have no doubt regarding the probative value of the text
messages as evidence in considering the present case. The complainant, who was the
recipient of the text messages and who therefore has personal knowledge of these
text messages, identified the respondent as the sender through cellphone number
09175775982. The respondent herself admitted that her conversations with the
complainant had been thru SMS messaging and thatthe cellphone number reflected in
the complainant’s cellphone from which the text messages originated was hers. She
confirmed that it was her cellphone number during the entrapment operation the
Imus Cavite Police conducted
The complainant submitted two (2) copies of the VCD containing pictures taken during
the entrapment conducted by the Imus Cavite Police
Under Section 1, Rule 11 of A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, audio, photographic and video
evidence of events, acts or transactions shall be admissible provided it shall be shown,
presented or displayed to the court and shall be identified, explained or authenticated
by the person who made the recording or by some other person competent to testify
on the accuracy thereof.
We viewed the VCD and the video showed the actual entrapment operation. The
complainant herself certified that the video and text messages are evidence of her
complaint against the respondent, "Sapat at malinaw ang lahat ng ebidensya na
kasama ng aking reklamo na nagpapatunay na totoo lahat ang nakasaad sa aking
reklamo. Kitang kita sa video at sa mga text messages niya ang kanyang modus
operandi at paggamit niya ng pwesto sa gobyerno upang makapanghingi ng malaking
pera sa mga inosenteng tao." It is also well to remember that in administrative cases,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.
A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC specifically provides that these rules shall be liberally construed
to assist the parties in obtaining a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of
cases.
MCC Industrial Sales Corp. vs. Ssangyong Corporation
G.R. No. 170633, October 17, 2007
 J. Nachura
Facts:
 Petitioner MCC Industrial Sales (MCC) is engaged in the business of importing
and wholesaling stainless steel products. and one of its suppliers is the
Ssangyong Corporation (Ssangyong) an international trading company with
head office in Seoul, South Korea and regional headquarters in Makati City,
Philippines
 The two corporations conducted business through telephone calls and
facsimile or telecopy transmissions
 Ssangyong would send the pro forma invoices containing the details of the
steel product order to MCC; if the latter conforms thereto, its representative
affixes his signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to Ssangyong, again
by fax.
 Ssangyong Manila Office sent, by fax, a letter addressed to Gregory Chan,
MCC Manager [also the President of Sanyo Seiki Stainless Steel Corporation],
to confirm MCC's and Sanyo Seiki's order of 220 metric tons (MT) of hot
rolled stainless steel
 Chan, on behalf of the corporations, assented and affixed his signature on
the conforme portion of the letter.
 Ssangyong forwarded to MCC Pro Forma
 Containing the terms and conditions of the transaction. MCC sent back by fax
to Ssangyong the invoice bearing the conformity signature of Chan
 As stated in the pro forma invoice, payment for the ordered steel products
would be made through an irrevocable letter of credit (L/C) at sight in favor
of Ssangyong. Following their usual practice, delivery of the goods was to be
made after the L/C had been opened.
 In the meantime, because of its confirmed transaction with MCC, Ssangyong
placed the order with its steel manufacturer, Pohang Iron and Steel
Corporation (POSCO), in South Korea and paid the same in full.
 Because MCC could open only a partial letter of credit, the order for 220MT
of steel was split into two
 After series of communication via facsimile, Ssangyong then filed a civil
action for damages due to breach of contract against defendants MCC
 After Ssangyong rested its case, defendants filed a Demurrer to Evidence
alleging that Ssangyong failed to present the original copies of the pro
forma invoices on which the civil action was based.
 The court denied the demurrer, ruling that the documentary evidence
presented had already been admitted in the December 16, 2002 Order and
their admissibility finds support in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792, otherwise
known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000.
 the CA rendered its Decision affirming the ruling of the trial court. The
appellate court ruled, among others, that Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-
POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E", "E-1" and "F") were
admissible in evidence, although they were mere facsimile printouts of
MCC's steel orders.
Issue:
Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic
evidence and admissible as such
Held:
NO. The Court conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic
document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a
facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered
as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best
Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.
The Act is intended to apply, for example, to data on magnetic strips on cards, or in
smart cards. As drafted, it would not apply to telexes or faxes (except computer-
generated faxes), unlike the United Nations Model Law on Electronic Commerce. It
would also not apply to regular digital telephone conversations, since the information
is not recorded. It would apply to voice mail, since the information has been recorded
in or by a device similar to a computer. Likewise video records are not covered, though
when the video is transferred to a Web site it would be, because of the involvement of
the computer. Music recorded by a computer system on a compact disk would be
covered.
There is no question then that when Congress formulated the term "electronic data
message," it intended the same meaning as the term "electronic record" in the
Canada law. This construction of the term "electronic data message," which excludes
telexes or faxes, except computer-generated faxes, is in harmony with the Electronic
Commerce Law's focus on "paperless" communications and the "functional equivalent
approach hat it espouses. In fact, the deliberations of the Legislature are replete with
discussions on paperless and digital transactions
Thus, when the Senate consequently voted to adopt the term "electronic data
message," it was consonant with the explanation of Senator Miriam Defensor-
Santiago that it would not apply "to telexes or faxes, except computer-generated
faxes, unlike the United Nations model law on electronic commerce."
Facsimile transmissions are not, in this sense, "paperless," but verily are paper-based.
A fax machine is essentially an image scanner, a modem and a computer printer
combined into a highly specialized package. The scanner converts the content of a
physical document into a digital image, the modem sends the image data over a
phone line, and the printer at the other end makes a duplicate of the original
document
As held in Garvida v. Sales, Jr., a facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It
is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original,
there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine
and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be
a sham pleading.
Accordingly, in an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-
based information or data that is scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed
at the receiving end. Be it noted that in enacting the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000, Congress intended virtual or paperless writings to be the functional equivalent
and to have the same legal function as paper-based documents. Further, in a virtual or
paperless environment, technically, there is no original copy to speak of, as all direct
printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in all respects, and are considered as
originals.
Ineluctably, the law's definition of "electronic data message," which, as aforesaid, is
interchangeable with "electronic document," could not have included facsimile
transmissions, which have an original paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based
facsimile copy as received. These two copies are distinct from each other, and have
different legal effects.
Clearly then, the IRR went beyond the parameters of the law when it adopted
verbatim the UNCITRAL Model Law's definition of "data message," without
considering the intention of Congress when the latter deleted the phrase "but not
limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or
telecopy." Thus, if a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing
rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails, because the law cannot be broadened
by a mere administrative issuance—an administrative agency certainly cannot amend
an act of Congress.
Since a facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data message" or an "electronic
document," and cannot be considered as electronic evidence by the Court, with
greater reason is a photocopy of such a fax transmission not electronic evidence. In
the present case, therefore, Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-
POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E" and "F"), which are mere photocopies of the original fax
transmittals, are not electronic evidence, contrary to the position of both the trial and
the appellate courts.
Garvida vs. Sales
G.R. No. 124893, April 18, 1997
J. Puno
Facts:
 The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections nationwide was scheduled to be
held on May 6, 1996.
 Petitioner applied for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte
 The Board of Election Tellers, however, denied her application on the ground
that petitioner, who was then twenty-one years and ten (10) months old,
exceeded the age limit for membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan as laid
down in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824.
 petitioner filed a "Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataang Member and
Voter" with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
 In a decision the said court found petitioner qualified and ordered her
registration as member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan
 The Board of Election Tellers appealed to the Regional Trial Court
 In the meantime, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position
of Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of
Bangui, Province of Ilocos Norte
 Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo, disapproved petitioner's certificate
of candidacy again due to her age. Petitioner, however, appealed to
COMELEC Regional Director Filemon A. Asperin who set aside the order of
respondents and allowed petitioner to run
 Earlier and without the knowledge of the COMELEC officials, private
respondent Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a rival candidate for Chairman of the
Sangguniang Kabataan, filed with the COMELEC en banc a "Petition of Denial
and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy" against petitioner Garvida
for falsely representing her age qualification in her certificate of candidacy.
 The petition was sent by facsimile and registered mail on April 29, 1996 to
the Commission on Elections National Office, Manila.
 The same day respondent Rios issued the memorandum to petitioner, the
COMELEC en ban cissued an order directing the Board of Election Tellers and
Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo to suspend the proclamation of
petitioner in the event she won in the election
Issue:
Whether or not the petition itself complied with the requirements of pleadings under
COMELEC Rules of Procedure
Held:
NO. Every pleading before the COMELEC must be printed, mimeographed or
typewritten in legal size bond paper and filed in at least ten (10) legible copies.
Pleadings must be filed directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the COMELEC
personally, or, by registered mail.

In the instant case, the subject petition was not in proper form. Only two (2) copies of
the petition were filed with the COMELEC. Also, the COMELEC en banc issued its
Resolution on the basis of the petition transmitted by facsimile, not by registered mail.
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and
reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one
elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a
specified amount of electric current. The current is transmitted as a signal over regular
telephone lines or via microwave relay and is used by the receiver to reproduce an
image of the elemental area in the proper position and the correct shade. The
receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device that produces a printed record on
paper referred to as a facsimile.
Filing a pleading by facsimile transmission is not sanctioned by the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, much less by the Rules of Court. A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic
pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original
Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile
pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his
counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading. The uncertainty of the authenticity of a
facsimile pleading should have restrained the COMELEC en banc from acting on the
petition and issuing the questioned order. The COMELEC en banc should have waited
until it received the petition filed by registered mail.
NPC vs. Hon. Codilla Jr.
G.R. No. 170491, April 4, 2007
J. Chico-Nazario
Facts:
 M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned and operated by private
respondent Bangpai Shipping, Co., allegedly bumped and damaged
petitioners Power Barge 209
 petitioner filed before the Cebu RTC a complaint for damages against private
respondent Bangpai Shipping Co., for the alleged damages caused on
petitioners power barges.
 Thereafter, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint impleading herein private
respondent Wallem Shipping, Inc., as additional defendant, contending that
the latter is a ship agent of Bangpai Shipping Co.
 Both of them filed a motion to dismissed but was denied
 Petitioner, after adducing evidence during the trial of the case, filed a formal
offer of evidence before the lower court sisting of Exhibits A to V together
with the sub-marked portions thereof.
 Consequently, private respondents Bangpai Shipping Co.
and Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed their respective objections to petitioners
formal offer of evidence.
 public respondent judge issued the assailed order denying the admission and
excluding from the records petitioners Exhibits
 Upon appeal, the appellate court issued a Decision dismissing petitioners
petition for certiorari
 Aggrieved by the aforequoted decision, petitioner filed the instant petition.
 Petitioner insists that, contrary to the rulings of both the trial court and the
appellate court, the photocopies it presented as documentary evidence
actually constitute electronic evidence based on its own premise that an
electronic document as defined under Section 1(h), Rule 2 of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence is not limited to information that is received, recorded,
retrieved or produced electronically. Rather, petitioner maintains that an
electronic document can also refer to other modes of written expression that
is produced electronically, such as photocopies, as included in the sections
catch-all proviso: any print-out or output, readable by sight or other means.
Issue:
Whether the photocopies it offered as formal evidence before the trial court are the
functional equivalent of their original based on its inimitable interpretation of the
Rules on Electronic Evidence.
Held:
NO. An electronic document refers to information or the representation of
information, data, figures, symbols or other models of written expression, described
or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished,
or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes
digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means which
accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document
The rules use the word information to define an electronic document received,
recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This
would suggest that an electronic document is relevant only in terms of the
information contained therein, similar to any other document which is presented in
evidence as proof of its contents.
However, what differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based document is
the manner by which the information is processed; clearly, the information contained
in an electronic document is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,
retrieved or produced electronically.
A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will
reveal that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who
purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or produced electronically. By no
stretch of the imagination can a persons signature affixed manually be considered as
information electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,
retrieved or produced. Hence, the argument of petitioner that since these paper
printouts were produced through an electronic process, then these photocopies are
electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence is obviously an
erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having thus
declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents, it
is consequential that the same may not be considered as the functional equivalent of
their original as decreed in the law
Furthermore, the trial court was correct in rejecting these photocopies as they violate
the best evidence rule and are therefore of no probative value being incompetent
pieces of evidence. When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot
be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the
cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony
of witnesses in the order stated.
The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates thereof: (a) the
loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of the
proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine practices
of destruction of documents;(b) the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of
evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or destruction of the original
copy; and (c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search
has been made for the document in the proper place or places.
However, in the case at bar, though petitioner insisted in offering the photocopies as
documentary evidence, it failed to establish that such offer was made in accordance
with the exceptions as enumerated under the abovequoted rule. Accordingly, we find
no error in the Order of the court a quo denying admissibility of the photocopies
offered by petitioner as documentary evidence.
Section 4 – Original Document
BPI vs. SMP
G.R. No. 175466, Dec 23, 2009
J. Nachura
Facts:
 Maria Teresa Michaela Ong, as Sales Executive of SMP, Inc. undertook the
acceptance and servicing of a purchase order of CLOTHESPAK
MANUFACTURING PHILS. (Clothespak) for 4,000 bags or sacks of General
purpose (GPS) polystyrene products
 The ordered products were delivered, for which delivery receipts were
issued.
 As payment, Clothespak issued postdated checks in favor of plaintiff SMP and
delivered the same to Maria Teresa Michaela Ong.
 When the same were deposited by SMP Inc. on their maturity dates, the
drawee bank dishonored and returned said checks for the reason Account
Closed.
 In the meantime, a case was filed by herein defendant Far East Bank and
Trust Company against Clothespak for a recovery of sum of money with
prayer for issuance of preliminary attachment. The Pasig Court granted and
issued the writ n favor of the plaintiff bank. Real and personal properties of
the defendants were levied and attached.
 SMP, Inc. filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim claiming ownership of the
4,000 bags of General Purpose (GPS) polystyrene products taken at
Clothespak factory but with the filing by Far East Bank of the indemnity bond,
the goods claimed were not released
 Meanwhile, Far East Bank obtained a favorable judgment against
Clothespak. It has become final and executory which led to the
implementation and enforcement of said decision against Clothespaks
properties inclusive of the goods earlier attached.
 Hence, the instant case is filed by SMP, Inc. to recover from the
attaching bank the value of the goods it claims ownership and for
damages.
 SMP, Inc. alleges that there was wrongful attachment of the goods for
ownership of the same was never transferred to Clothespak. The former
anchors its claim of ownership over the goods by virtue of the Provisional
Receipt No. 4476 issued by Sales Executive Maria Teresa Michaela Ong to
Clothespak with the words, Materials belong to SMP Inc. until your checks
clear. She testified during the trial that the above words were in her own
handwriting.
 Defendant bank, however, ssails the admissibility of the receipt for it is a
mere triplicate copy; the original and duplicate copies were not presented in
court, in violation of the Best Evidence Rule. Neither was there secondary
evidence presented to conform to the rule.
 RTC and CA ruled in favor of SMI
 In order to discredit the claim of ownership by SMP, petitioner questions the
admissibility of the receipt presented by the former, wherein the ownership
was reserved for the buyer until after full payment of the purchase price.
Petitioner claims that the same was inadmissible in evidence and was in
contravention of the best evidence rule

Issue:
Whether or not there was a wrongful attachment of goods. Hence the goods were still
owned by SMI
Held:
Yes. The best evidence rule is the rule which requires the highest grade of evidence
obtainable to prove a disputed fact. Although there are certain recognized exceptions
when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself.
However, in the instant case, contrary to petitioners contention, the receipt presented
by SMP is deemed as an original, considering that the triplicate copy of the provisional
receipt was executed at the same time as the other copies of the same receipt
involving the same transaction. (Section 4, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court)
Capital Shoe Factory LTD vs. Travel Kids Inc
G.R. No. 200065, September 24, 2014
J. Mendoza
Facts:
 petitioner Capital Shoes Factory Ltd., (CSFL),a foreign corporation and
respondent Traveller Kids, Inc. (TKI),a domestic corporation entered into an
agreement, wherein they agreed that TKI would import the shoes and
sandals made by CSFL from its China factory.
 It was their arrangement that TKI would pay thirty (30%) percent of the
purchase price of the goods by way of letters of credit, and the balance of
seventy (70%) percent by way of telegraphic transfer, thirty (30) days from
the date of delivery of the goods.
 In 2004, however, TKI started to default in its payments. CSFL granted
numerous concessions and extensions to TKI. Thereafter, TKI was able to
make a partial payment on its unpaid accounts.
 Both verbal and written demand letters were made by CSFL to TKI for the
payment of its unpaid accounts, but to no avail.
 To protect its interest, CSFL filed a complaint for collection of sum of money
and damages against TKI before the RTC.
 During the trial, CSFL, through its witness, identified several sales invoices
and order slips it issued as evidence of its transactions withTKI. The latter
objected to the identification pointing out that the documents being
presented were mere photocopies.
 After the presentation of its last witness, CSFL filed its Formal Offer of
Exhibits seeking the admission of, among others, the sales invoices and order
slips earlier objected to by TKI. The latter objected to the admission of the
documents offered, contending that several of the sales invoices and order
slips should not be admitted because they were merely photocopies.
 RTC issued the Order admitting all the exhibits offered by CFSL.
 Instead of presenting evidence, TKI opted to file a petition for certiorariwith
prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction before the CA
 CA rendered a decision partially granting TKI’s petition. The CA explained that
while it was true that the original copies of the sales invoices were the best
evidence to prove TKI’sobligation, CSFL merely presented photocopies of the
questioned exhibits.
 Hemce, this petition
 CSFL basically argues that the excluded documents are admissible in
evidence because it was duly established during the trial that the said
documents were duplicate originals, and not mere photocopies, considering
that they were prepared at the same time as the originals.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s documents are admissible
Held:
YES. The Court held that duplicate originals were admissible as evidence. Records
reveal that Chiu, CSFL’s principal witness, was able to satisfactorily explain that
Exhibits "D" to "GG-1" and "HH" to "KK-1" were duplicate originals of invoicesand
order slips, and not mere photocopies.
The transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) clearly show that Chiu convincingly
explained that CSFL usually prepared two (2) copies of invoices for a particular
transaction, giving one copy to a client and retaining the other copy. The Court
combed through her testimony and found nothing that would indicate that the
documents offered were mere photocopies. Hence, as provided in Section 4(b), Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, when a document is in two or more copies executed at or
about the same time, with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as
originals.
Secondary Evidence
Dantis vs Maghinang
G.R. No. 191696, April 10, 2013
J. Mendoza
Facts:
  The case draws its origin from a complaint for quieting of title and recovery
of possession with damages filed by petitioner Rogelio Dantis (Rogelio)
against respondent Julio Maghinang, Jr. (Julio, Jr.) before the RTC
 Plaintiff Rogelio Dantis testified that he inherited 5,657 square meters of
land, through an Extrajudicial Partition of Estate of Emilio Dantis, executed in
December 1993 which land was titled later on under his name, Rogelio
Dantis, married to Victoria Payawal, as shown by copy of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-125918,
 According to him, defendant and his predecessor-in-interest built the house
located on said lot. When he first saw it, it was only a small hut but when he
was about 60 years old, he told defendant not to build a bigger house
thereon because he would need the land and defendant would have to
vacate the land. Plaintiff, however, has not been in physical possession of the
premises.
 Defendant Julio Maghinang, Jr., presented by plaintiff as adverse witness,
testified that he has no title over the property he is occupying. He has not
paid realty taxes thereon. He has not paid any rental to anybody. He is
occupying about 352 square meters of the lot. He presented an affidavit
executed on September 3, 1953 by Ignacio Dantis, grandfather of Rogelio
Dantis and the father of Emilio Dantis. The affidavit, according to affiant
Ignacio Dantis, alleged that Emilio Dantis agreed to sell 352 square meters of
the lot to Julio Maghinang on instalment
 Defendant Julio Maghinang, Jr. likewise testified that his father, Julio
Maghinang (Sr.), bought the said lot from the parents of Rogelio Dantis. He
admitted that the affidavit was not signed by the alleged vendor, Emilio
Dantis, the father of Rogelio Dantis. The receipt he presented was admittedly
a mere photocopy
 The RTC rendered its decision declaring Rogelio as the true owner
 CA reversed the decision
 ***( an affidavit allegedly executed by Ignacio Dantis (Ignacio), Rogelio’s
grandfather, whereby said affiant attested, among others, to the sale of the
subject lot made by his son, Emilio, to Julio, Sr. (Exhibit “3”) and an undated
handwritten receipt of initial downpayment in the amount of P100.00
supposedly issued by Emilio to Julio, Sr. in connection with the sale of the
subject lot (Exhibit “4”)
 Hence this petition
 Rogelio submits that Exhibit “3” and Exhibit “4” are devoid of evidentiary
value and, hence, deserve scant consideration. He stresses that Exhibit “4” is
inadmissible in evidence being a mere photocopy, and the existence and due
execution thereof had not been established.
Issue:
Whether there is a perfected contract of sale between Emilio and Julio, Sr. The
determination of this issue will settle the rightful ownership of the subject lot
Held:
No. In light of Rogelio’s outright denial of the oral sale together with his insistence of
ownership over the subject lot, it behooved upon Julio, Jr. to contravene the former’s
claim and convince the court that he had a valid defense. The burden of evidence
shifted to Julio, Jr. to prove that his father bought the subject lot from Emilio Dantis.
Julio, Jr. failed to discharge this burden. His pieces of evidence, Exhibit “3” and Exhibit
“4,” cannot prevail over the array of documentary and testimonial evidence that were
adduced by Rogelio. The totality of Julio, Jr.’s evidence leaves much to be desired.
To begin with, Exhibit “3,” the affidavit of Ignacio, is hearsay evidence and, thus,
cannot be accorded any evidentiary weight. Evidence is hearsay when its probative
force depends on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the
witness by whom it is sought to be produced. The exclusion of hearsay evidence is
anchored on three reasons: 1) absence of cross-examination; 2) absence of demeanor
evidence; and 3) absence of oath.
Jurisprudence dictates that an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its
affiant/maker did not take the witness stand.21 The sworn statement of Ignacio is of
this kind. The affidavit was not identified and its averments were not affirmed by
affiant Ignacio. Accordingly, Exhibit “3” must be excluded from the judicial
proceedings being inadmissible hearsay evidence. It cannot be deemed a declaration
against interest for the matter to be considered as an exception to the hearsay rule
because the declarant was not the seller (Emilio), but his father (Ignacio).
Exhibit “4,” on the other hand, is considered secondary evidence being a mere
photocopy which, in this case, cannot be admitted to prove the contents of the
purported undated handwritten receipt. The best evidence rule requires that the
highest available degree of proof must be produced. For documentary evidence, the
contents of a document are best proved by the production of the document itself to
the exclusion of secondary or substitutionary evidence, pursuant to Rule 130, Section
3
A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5,
which states that: when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause
of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or
by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated. Accordingly, the offeror of the secondary evidence is
burdened to satisfactorily prove the predicates thereof, namely: (1) the execution or
existence of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or its non-
production in court; and (3) the unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on
the part of the proponent/offeror. Proof of the due execution of the document and its
subsequent loss would constitute the basis for the introduction of secondary
evidence.

Guided by these norms, the Court holds that Julio, Jr. failed to prove the due
execution of the original of Exhibit “4” as well as its subsequent loss. A nexus of
logically related circumstance rendered Julio, Jr.’s evidence highly suspect.
Also, his testimony was riddled with improbabilities and contradictions which tend to
erode his credibility and raise doubt on the veracity of his evidence. First, the claim of
Julio, Jr. that Emilio affixed his signature on the original of Exhibit “4” in 1953 is highly
improbable because record shows that Emilio died even before that year, specifically,
on November 13, 1952. Second, Julio, Jr. tends to give the impression that the original
of the document was lost while it was in the possession of his parents. During cross-
examination, however, he testified that it was lost while it was in his possession.
Country Bankers Insurance Corporation vs. Antiono Lagman
G.R. No. 165487, July 31, 2011
J. Perez
Facts:
 Nelson Santos (Santos) applied for a license with the National Food Authority
(NFA) to engage in the business of storing not more than 30,000 sacks
of palay
 Under Act No. 3893 or the General Bonded Warehouse Act, as amended, the
approval for said license was conditioned upon posting of a cash bond, a
bond secured by real estate, or a bond signed by a duly authorized bonding
company, the amount of which shall be fixed by the NFA Administrator at not
less than thirty-three and one third percent (33 1/3%) of the market value of
the maximum quantity of rice to be received.
 Accordingly, Country Bankers Insurance Corporation (Country Bankers) issued
two Warehouse Bonds through its agent, Antonio Lagman (Lagman).
 In consideration of these issuances, corresponding Indemnity
Agreements were executed by Santos, as bond principal, together with Ban
Lee Lim Santos (Ban Lee Lim), Rhosemelita Reguine (Reguine) and Lagman, as
co-signors.
 The latter bound themselves jointly and severally liable to Country Bankers
for any damages, prejudice, losses, costs, payments, advances and expenses
of whatever kind and nature, including attorneys fees and legal costs, which
it may sustain as a consequence of the said bond
 Santos then secured a loan using his warehouse receipts as collateral
 When the loan matured, Santos defaulted in his payment. The sacks
of palaycovered by the warehouse receipts were no longer found in the
bonded warehouse
 By virtue of the surety bonds, Country Bankers was compelled to pay
 Consequently, Country Bankers filed a complaint for a sum of money
 In his Answer, Lagman alleged that the 1989 Bonds were valid only for 1 year
from the date of their issuance, as evidenced by receipts; that the bonds
were never renewed and revived by payment of premiums; that on 5
November 1990, Country Bankers issued Warehouse Bond No. 03515 (1990
Bond) which was also valid for one year and that no Indemnity Agreement
was executed for the purpose; and that the 1990 Bond supersedes, cancels,
and renders no force and effect the 1989 Bonds.
 The bond principals, Santos and Ban Lee Lim, were not served with summons
because they could no longer be found. The case was eventually dismissed
against them without prejudice. The other co-signor, Reguine, was declared
in default for failure to file her answer
 the trial court rendered judgment declaring Reguine and Lagman jointly and
severally liable to pay Country Bankers
 The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision reversing and setting
aside the Decision of the RTC and ordering the dismissal of the complaint
filed against Lagman
 Country Bankers filed the instant petition
 Country Bankers maintains that by the express terms of the 1989 Bonds, they
shall remain in full force until cancelled by the Administrator of the NFA. As
continuing bonds, Country Bankers avers that Section 177 of the Insurance
Code applies, in that the bond may only be cancelled by the obligee, by the
Insurance Commissioner or by a competent court.
 Further, Country Bankers questions the existence of a third bond, the 1990
Bond, which allegedly cancelled the 1989 Bonds on the following grounds:
First, Lagman failed to produce the original of the 1990 Bond and no basis
has been laid for the presentation of secondary evidence;
 Country Bankers notes that the receipts issued for the 1989 Bonds are mere
evidence of premium payments and should not be relied on to determine the
period of effectivity of the bonds. Country Bankers explains that the receipts
only represent the transactions between the bond principal and the surety,
and does not involve the NFA as bond obligee.
Issue:
Whether or not Lagman should be held liable
Held:
YES. The provision in the bonds which provides that This bond shall remain in
force until cancelled by the Administrator of National Food Authority is but in
compliance with the second paragraph of Section 177 of the Insurance Code, which
specifies that a continuing bond, as in this case where there is no fixed expiration
date, may be cancelled only by the obligee, which is the NFA, by the Insurance
Commissioner, and by the court.
Further, under the best evidence rule, the original document must be produced
whenever its contents are the subject of inquiry. The rule is encapsulated in Section 3,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that a photocopy, being a mere
secondary evidence, is not admissible unless it is shown that the original is
unavailable.
Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the
original, the offeror must prove the following:
(1) the existence or due execution of the original;
(2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its non-production in
court; and
(3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of
the original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence,
execution, loss, and contents.
In the case at bar, Lagman mentioned during the direct examination that there are
actually four (4) duplicate originals of the 1990 Bond: the first is kept by the NFA, the
second is with the Loan Officer of the NFA in Tarlac, the third is with Country Bankers
and the fourth was in his possession. A party must first present to the court proof of
loss or other satisfactory explanation for the non-production of the original
instrument. When more than one original copy exists, it must appear that all of them
have been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court before secondary evidence
can be given of any one. A photocopy may not be used without accounting for the
other originals.
Despite knowledge of the existence and whereabouts of these duplicate originals,
Lagman merely presented a photocopy. He admitted that he kept a copy of the 1990
Bond but he could no longer produce it because he had already severed his ties with
Country Bankers. However, he did not explain why severance of ties is by itself reason
enough for the non-availability of his copy of the bond considering that, as it appears
from the 1989 Bonds, Lagman himself is a bondsman. Neither did Lagman explain why
he failed to secure the original from any of the three other custodians he mentioned
in his testimony. While he apparently was able to find the original with the NFA Loan
Officer, he was merely contented with producing its photocopy. Clearly, Lagman failed
to exert diligent efforts to produce the original.
Republic vs. Spouses Mateo
G.R. No. 148025, August 13, 2004
J. Carpio Morales
Facts:
 Spouses Lorenzo and Feliciana Mateo filed before the Regional Trial Court a
petition for RECONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL COPY AS WELL AS THE
OWNERS DUPLICATE COPY OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-
38769 issued on July 16, 1971 by the Registry of Deeds of Bataan in the name
of one Jose Tan.
 From the Mateos petition for reconstitution, it is gathered that Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-38769 covers two parcels of land; that they
acquired from Jose Tan the above-described parcels of land by purchase on
September 3, 1978 by Deed of Sale dated September 3, 1978; that
the original copy of TCT No. T-38769 on file at the Registry of Deeds of
Bataan is missing and could not be located despite efforts to do so, hence,
deemed lost; while Lorenzo Mateo was in possession of the owners
duplicate copy of the title, due to his frequent reassignment as a former
military officer to different places from 1978 up to his retirement on
September 3, 1990, he misplaced said title among his files, although he has a
xerox copy [thereof]; and that despite efforts to locate the owners duplicate
copy of the title, the same proved futile and is now deemed lost;
 At the witness stand, Lorenzo Mateo testified to the fact of loss of the
owners duplicate copy of the title.
 He presented documentary evidence consisting of, among others:
1. Carbon copy of a September 3, 1978 Deed of Absolute Sale purportedly
executed by Jose Tan in favor of the Mateos
2. photocopy of TCT No. T-38769 issued to Jose Tan on March 14, 1972 (Exh.
I)
3. June 30, 1995 letter of B/Gen. LORENZO M. MATEO (Ret.) (Exh.
L) addressed to the Register of Deeds, Balanga, Bataan, informing the latter
that the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-38769 was missing and deemed
lost following futile efforts to locate it and requesting him not to entertain
any transaction covering the lands covered by the title
 Since this is a petition for the reconstitution of a transfer certificate of title
the applicable provision is Sec. 3 of Republic No. 26, as amended by Rep. Act
No. 6732 (That section provides that: SEC. 3, Transfer certificates of title shall
be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be
available, in the following order: (a) The owners duplicate of the certificate of
title; (b) That co-owners mortgagees, or lessees duplicate of the certificate of
title; (c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the
register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof; (d) The deed of transfer or
other document, on file in the Registry of Deeds, containing the description
of the property, or an authenticated copy thereof, showing that its original
had been registered, and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed transfer
certificate of title was issued; (e) A document on file in the Registry of Deeds
by which the property, the description of which is given in said document, is
mortgaged, leased, or incumbered, or an authenticated copy of said
document showing that its original had been registered, and (f) Any other
document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper
basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
 None of these sources ha[s] been presented by the petitioners. Hence ,
denied
  However, CA accordingly rendered judgment in favor of the Mateos
 Petitioner argues that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence is admissible other than the original document itself
except in the instances mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, adding that mere photocopies of documents are inadmissible
pursuant to the best evidence rule; Petitioner further argues that before
secondary evidence may be admitted, the proponent must first establish the
former existence of the instrument; Petitioner concludes that there being no
showing that the TCT previously existed, the photocopy not having
been authenticated by the Registry of Deeds of Bataan, admission of such
copy violates the best evidence rule
Issue:
Whether CA erred in giving evidentiary weight to the alleged photocopy of the
title basis of its order for the reconstitution of the original and owners copy of the
title.
Held:
YES. Since, except for the last above-enumerated document (Sec. 3 RA 26), the
Mateos have failed to present any of the other documents, the rule on secondary
evidence under Sec. 5 of Rule 130 applies
As the immediately quoted provision of the Rules directs, the order of presentation of
secondary evidence is: existence, execution, loss, contents. The order may, however,
be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. The sufficiency of the proof
offered as a predicate for the admission of an allegedly lost document lies within the
judicial discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the particular case
Assuming that the existence and execution of the original of the TCT has been
satisfactorily shown, and that it was taken in 1973 by the Department of Justice and
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in connection with the investigation of the
judge on whose order the OCT from which the TCT was transferred, which OCT was
also taken by said government agencies, there is no satisfactory showing that the TCT
has been lost.
By Lorenzo Mateos own information, a year before he testified, he talked to the NBI
agent, Ramon Befetel, who received the 93 documents for Vidal Tombo. Why said
agent, who admittedly was still in the NBI main office, was not presented to shed light
on the whereabouts of the TCT, no reason has been proffered.
In fine, the Mateos have not satisfactorily shown that the original of the TCT has been
lost or is no longer available. On this score alone, the Mateos petition for
reconstitution fails.
In any event, even assuming that the original of the TCT was lost or is no longer
available, not only is the photocopy of the alleged owners duplicate copy thereof Exh.
1 partly illegible. When, where and under what circumstances the photocopy was
taken and where it was kept to spare it from being also lost were not even shown.
These, not to mention the conduct by the Department of Justice and NBI of an
investigation behind the issuance of the OCT and TCT caution and lead this Court to
rule against the sufficiency of the Mateos evidence and propriety of a grant of their
petition for reconstitution.
Citibank, N.A. Mastercard vs. Teodoro
G,R, No. 150905, September 23, 2003
J. Panganiban
Facts:
 Respondent Efren S. Teodoro applied for membership with petitioner. After
his application was approved, he was issued Citibank, N.A. Mastercard No.
5423-3920-4457-7009.
 Respondent made various purchases through his credit card. Accordingly, he
was billed by petitioner for those purchases, for which he tendered various
payments.
 Petitioner claims that as of January 20, 1995, the obligations of respondent
stood at P191,693.25, inclusive of interest and service charges. Several times
it demanded payment from him, but he refused to pay, claiming that the
amount demanded did not correspond to his actual obligations. His refusal
prompted petitioner to file a Complaint for collection
 During the trial, petitioner presented several sales invoices or charge slips,
which added up to only P24,388.36. Although mere photocopies of the
originals, the invoices were marked in evidence as Exhibits F to F-4. Because
all these copies appeared to bear the signatures of respondent, the trial
court deemed them sufficient proof of his purchases with the use of the
credit card. Accordingly, the MTC’s Decision ordered him to pay petitioner
the amount of P24,388.36 plus interest and penalty fee. The material portion
of the Decision reads:
 The RTC affirmed the MTC Decision in toto.
 CA ruled that this evidence was insufficient to prove any liability on
respondents part. ( photocopies of the sales invoices or charge slips, marked
as Exhibits F to F-4)
 Petitioner contends that the testimony of its principal witness - Mark
Hernando, assistant manager of Citibank, N.A. Mastercard -- proves the
following: a) the existence or due execution of the original sales invoices
which sufficiently proved respondents liability of P24,388.36; b) the loss or
unavailability of the original sales invoices; and c) petitioners reasonable
diligence and good faith in the search for or attempt to produce the originals.
 It further argues that Hernando competently identified the signatures of
respondent on the sales invoices, having recognized them as identical to the
signature on the latters credit card application form.
  On the other hand, respondent maintains that petitioner failed to prove the
due execution of the sales invoices. According to him, Hernando was not
privy to such execution and could not have properly or competently declared
that the signatures on the invoices and on the application form belonged to
the former. The latter was not the person before whom the application form
was signed, executed or acknowledged; he was not even present then. As to
the sales invoices and respondents alleged signatures thereon, he saw them
only after the Complaint had been filed in court or long after those invoices
had been executed. He was therefore not competent to identify the
signatures.
 Because Hernandez had not actually witnessed the execution of the sales
invoices and the application form, respondent concludes that petitioner
failed to observe Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides
that the contents of the original may be proven by the testimony of
witnesses.
 Finally, respondent contends that the alleged loss or unavailability of the
original sales invoices was not sufficiently established. Allegedly, Hernandez
had requested the originals from Equitable Credit Card Network, Inc., but
failed to show in court that he had followed up his request as advised by
another witness, Zen Hipolito.Therefore, the requirement of reasonable
diligence and good faith in the search for or attempt to produce the originals
was not satisfied, because he had shown no proof of having followed up the
request.
Issue:
1. Whether the photocopies of the sales invoices or charge slips marked during trial as
Exhibits F to F-4 are admissible in evidence.
Held:
NO. Petitioner failed to prove that respondent had an obligation in the principal
amount of P24,388.36, because the photocopies of the original sales invoices it had
presented in court were inadmissible in evidence. Moreover, had they been
admissible, they would still have had little probative value
The original copies of the sales invoices are the best evidence to prove the alleged
obligation. Photocopies thereof are mere secondary evidence. As such, they are
inadmissible because petitioner, as the offeror, failed to prove any of the exceptions
provided under Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as well s the conditions of
their admissibility. Because of the inadmissibility of the photocopies in the absence of
the originals, respondents obligation was not established.
Applying Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court to the present case, before a
party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original
sales invoices, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution
of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its
nonproduction in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to
which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is
as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents. At the sound discretion of the
court, this order may be changed if necessary.
In the present case, the existence of the original sales invoices was established by the
photocopies and the testimony of Hernandez. Petitioner, however, failed to prove that
the originals had been lost or could not be produced in court after reasonable
diligence and good faith in searching for them. Indeed, the loss of the originals and
reasonable diligence in the search for them were conditions that were not met,
because the sales invoices might have been found by Equitable. Hernandez, testifying
that he had requested the originals from Equitable, failed to show that he had
subsequently followed up the request.
Finally, when more than one original copy exists, it must appear that all of them have
been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court before secondary evidence can
be given of any one. A photocopy may not be used without accounting for the other
originals
In the present case, triplicates were produced, although the cardholder signed the
sales invoice only once. During the trial, Hernandez explained that an original copy
had gone to respondent, another to the merchant, and still another to petitioner.
Each of these three copies is regarded as an original in accordance with Section 4 (b)
of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner failed to show that all three original
copies were unavailable, and that due diligence had been exercised in the search for
them.
Section 6
Bayani Magdayao vs. People
G.R. 152881, August 17, 2004
J. Callajeo Sr.
Facts:
 An Information was filed charging petitioner with violation of B.P. Blg. 22
 When arraigned, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not
guilty.
 When the case for trial was called for the prosecution to adduce its evidence,
the petitioner and his counsel were absent.
 On motion of the prosecution, the court allowed it to adduce evidence.
 The prosecution presented the private complainant, Ricky Olvis, who testified
on direct examination that, petitioner drew and issued to him Philippine
National Bank (PNB) Check No. 399967 dated September 30, 1991 in the
amount of P600,000.00. The said check was drawn against the latters
account with the PNB, Dipolog City Branch, and issued in payment of the
petitioners obligation with Olvis. The latter deposited the check on October
1, 1991 in his account with the BPI-Family Bank, Dipolog City Branch, but the
drawee bank dishonored the check for the reason Drawn Against Insufficient
Funds stamped on the dorsal portion of the check.
 Olvis testified that when informed that his check was dishonored, the
petitioner pleaded for time to pay the amount thereof, but reneged on his
promise. Olvis then filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22
 The petitioner again offered to repay Olvis the amount of the obligation by
retrieving the dishonored check and replacing the same with two other
checks: one for P400,000.00 and another for P200,000.00 payable to Olvis.
Taking pity on the petitioner, he agreed. He then returned the original copy
of the check to the petitioner, but the latter again failed to make good on his
promise and failed to pay the P600,000.00.
 The prosecution wanted Olvis to identify the petitioner as the drawer of the
check, but because of the latters absence and that of his counsel, the direct
examination on the witness could not be terminated. The prosecution moved
that such direct examination of Olvis be continued on another date, and that
the petitioner be ordered to appear before the court so that he could be
identified as the drawer of the subject check.
 After several postponements at the instance of the petitioner, he and his
counsel failed to appear before the court for continuation of trial. They again
failed to appear when the case was called for continuation.
 The prosecution offered in evidence the photocopy of PNB Check No.
399967, which the court admitted. The trial court, thereafter, issued an Order
declaring the case submitted for decision.
 The petitioner filed a motion for a reconsideration of the Order, which the
trial court denied
 The petitioner then filed an Omnibus Supplemental Motion and to Allow Him
to Adduce Evidence alleging that despite the absence of the original, with
only a xerox copy of the PNB Check worth P600,000.00, and further stressing
that the same was paid
 In its Opposition to the said motion, the prosecution averred that it
dispensed with the presentation of the original of the dishonored check
because the same had been returned to the petitioner. It also pointed out
that the petitioner failed to object to the presentation of the photocopy of
the dishonored check.
 The trial court rendered judgment convicting the petitioner of the crime
charged
 CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court.
 Petitioner avers that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged because of the following: (a) the
photocopy of PNB Check No. 399967, adduced in evidence by the
prosecution, is inadmissible in evidence under Rule 129, Section 1 of the
Revised Rules of Evidence; hence, has no probative weight; b) the
prosecution failed to present the BPI-Family Bank teller to testify on the
presentment of PNB Check No. 399967 and the dishonor thereof
Issue:
Whether the lower courts erred in convicting the accused of the crime charged solely
on the Xerox copy of the PNB check
Held:
NO. The petition has no merit. We agree with the petitioner that it was incumbent
upon the prosecution to adduce in evidence the original copy of PNB Check No.
399967 to prove the contents thereof, more specifically the names of the drawer and
endorsee, the date and amount and the dishonor thereof, as well as the reason for
such dishonor. Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifically
provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of the document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original thereof.
The purpose of the rule requiring the production by the offeror of the best evidence is
the prevention of fraud, because if a party is in possession of such evidence and
withholds it and presents inferior or secondary evidence in its place, the presumption
is that the latter evidence is withheld from the court and the adverse party for a
fraudulent or devious purpose which its production would expose and defeat
As long as the original evidence can be had, the court should not receive in evidence
that which is substitutionary in nature, such as photocopies, in the absence of any
clear showing that the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be
produced in court. Such photocopies must be disregarded, being inadmissible
evidence and barren of probative weigh
Furthermore, under Section 3(b), Rule 130 of the said Rules, secondary evidence of a
writing may be admitted when the original is in the custody or under the control of
the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice. To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the
original of a writing is in the custody or control of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule
130 provides that the adverse party must be given reasonable notice, that he fails or
refuses to produce the same in court and that the offeror offers satisfactory proof of
its existence
The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or control of the party
against whom it is offered does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The
offeror must prove that he has done all in his power to secure the best evidence by
giving notice to the said party to produce the document
The notice may be in the form of a motion for the production of the original or made
in open court in the presence of the adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum,
provided that the party in custody of the original has sufficient time to produce the
same. When such party has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer
to produce it or refuses to produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted
In this case, Olvis, the private complainant, testified that after the check was
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, he returned it to the
petitioner upon the latters offer to pay the amount of the check by drawing and
issuing two checks, one for P400,000.00 and the other for P200,000.00. However, the
petitioner still failed to satisfy his obligation to Olvis
In his Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the trial court, the petitioner admitted that
he received the original copy of the dishonored check from the private
complainant and that he caused the non-payment of the dishonored check.
The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the need for the production of the original
copy of PNB Check No. 399967, and the fact that the prosecution was able to present
in evidence only a photocopy thereof because the original was in his possession. In
fact, in the Omnibus Supplemental Motion dated February 8, 1996, and in his Special
Manifestation filed on May 28, 1996, the petitioner complained of the prosecutions
violation of the best evidence rule. The petitioner, however, never produced the
original of the check, much less offered to produce the same. The petitioner
deliberately withheld the original of the check as a bargaining chip for the court to
grant him an opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense, which he failed to do
following his numerous unjustified postponements as shown by the records.
There was no longer a need for the prosecution to present as witness the employee of
the drawee bank who made the notation at the dorsal portion of the dishonored
check to testify that the same was dishonored for having been drawn against
insufficient funds. The petitioner had already been informed of such fact of dishonor
and the reason therefor when Olvis returned the original of the check to him. In fact,
as shown by the testimony of Olvis, the petitioner drew and issued two other separate
checks, one for P400,000.00 and the other for P200,000.00, to replace the dishonored
check.
Moreover, petitioner’s contention that Olvis failed to identify him as the drawer of the
subject check is nettlesome. It bears stressing that Olvis was ready to identify the
petitioner after his direct examination, but the latter and his counsel inexplicably
failed to appear. The direct examination of Olvis had to be continued to enable him to
point to and identify the petitioner as the drawer of the check.
Section 7
Republic vs. Development Resources Corporation
G.R. No. 180218, December 18, 2009
J. Abad
Facts:
 Eighty-seven years ago on October 14, 1922 the Court of First Instance of
Davao, sitting as cadastral court, adjudicated Lot 544 in Davao City, in favor of
Antonio Matute.
 Three years later, or on December 15, 1925 the Register of Deeds issued
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) 493 to him and since then, several transfer
certificates of title (TCTs) derived from OCT 493 were issued, including TCT
44671, covering Lot 1 and TCT 44675, covering Lot 5 both in the name of
respondent Development Resources Corporation (DRC).
 Petitioner Republic, acting through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a
complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao for cancellation of
TCT 44671 and TCT 44675 and for the reversion of Lots 1 and 5 of Pcs-16678
to the public domain.
 The Republic claimed that no valid title vested in 1922 on Antonio Matute,
respondent DRCs predecessor, because all of Lot 544 from which the two lots
came was still a public forest and inalienable on October 14, 1922. The
Republic asserted that only on August 6, 1923 was Lot 544 declared alienable
based on LC Map 47
 The Republic presented a certification to this effect from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
 DRC, on the other hand, contended that its two lots could no longer be
reverted to the public domain because they are now private properties held
by purchasers in good faith
 RTC dismissed the complaint, holding that the Republic failed to prove that
the subject lots were still part of the public domain when the same were
adjudicated to Antonio Matute. It ruled that LC Map 47 has no probative
value because: (1) the copy presented in court was a reproduction and not
the original or certified copy; and (2) it does not show that the land was
declared alienable and disposable only as of August 6, 1923; rather that it
was certified on that date.
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court
holding that there is nothing in LC Map 47 which states that prior to August
6, 1923, Lot 544 was not yet alienable and disposable and not open to
private ownership
Issue:
Whether or not respondent DRCs titles over Lots 1 and 5 of Pcs-16678 of the Davao
Cadastre can be cancelled, having been supposedly issued when, based on LC Map 47,
these lots were still inalienable lands of the public domain.
Held:
NO. Since a complaint for reversion can upset the stability of registered titles through
the cancellation of the original title and the others that emanate from it, the State
bears a heavy burden of proving the ground for its action.
Here, the Republic fails to discharge such burden. For one, it failed to present the
original or a certified true copy of LC Map 47 but only its electronic reproduction,
which has no probative value.
The Court held in SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines hat a mere
photocopy of an LC Map is not a competent evidence of the existence of such
map. While evidence is admissible when the original of a document is in the custody of
a public officer or is recorded in a public office, as in this case, there is a need to
present a certified copy of it issued by the public officer having custody of the
document to prove its contents.
The Republic of course claims that its version of LC Map 47 should be regarded as the
original itself because it was the official copy of the region furnished by the National
Mapping and Resources Inventory Authority where the original is kept. But, as
admitted by Crisanto Galo, the Land Evaluation Coordinator for DENR Region XI, the
copy they presented was neither marked nor certified as a reproduction of the
original. Hence, it cannot be considered as an official copy, more so an original copy.
For another, the courts below correctly held that LC Map 47 does not state on its face
that Lot 544 became alienable and disposable only on the date appearing on that
Map, namely, on August 6, 1923, about 10 months after Lots 1 and 5 of Pcs-16678 of
the Davao Cadastre were adjudicated to Antonio Matute. The DENR certification has
no additional value since it was just based on the same map.
Bunagan-Bansig vs. Celera
A.C. No. 5581, January 14, 2014
Per Curiam:
Facts:
 Complainant Rose Bunagan-Bansig (Bansig) filed a petition for Disbarment
against respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera (respondent) for Gross
Immoral Conduct.
 In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and
Gracemarie R. Bunagan (Bunagan), entered into a contract of marriage, as
evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by
the City Civil Registry of Manila. Bansig is the sister of Gracemarie R.
Bunagan, legal wife of respondent.
 However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent
contracted another marriage on January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz
Torres Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of
marriage issued by the City Registration Officer of San Juan, Manila
 Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still
valid and in full legal existence when he contracted his second marriage with
Alba, and that the first marriage had never been annulled or rendered void
by any lawful authority.
 Respondent failed to submit his comment on the complaint, despite receipt
of multiple copies of the Court's Resolution
 The Court resolved to: (1) DISPENSE with the filing by respondent of his
comment on the complaint; (2) ORDER the arrest of Atty. Celera; and (3)
DIRECT the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to (a)
ARREST and DETAIN Atty. Celera for non-compliance with the Resolution
dated June 30, 2008; and (b) SUBMIT a report of compliance with the
Resolution. The Court likewise resolved to REFER the complaint to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.
 However, the Return of Warrant showed that respondent cannot be located
because neither Halili Complex nor No. 922 Aurora Blvd., at Cubao, Quezon
City cannot be located. During surveillance, it appeared that the given
address, i.e., No. 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City was a vacant lot with
debris of a demolished building. Considering that the given address cannot
be found or located and there were no leads to determine respondent's
whereabouts, the warrant of arrest cannot be enforced.
 The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, meanwhile, in compliance with the
Court's Resolution, reported that as per their records, the address of
respondent is at No. 41 Hoover St., Valley View Royale Subd., Taytay, Rizal.
 Respondent likewise failed to appear before the mandatory conference and
hearings set by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD), despite several notices. Thus, in an Order declared
respondent to be in default and the case was submitted for report and
recommendation.
 The IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended that
respondent Atty. Celera be suspended for a period of two (2) years from the
practice of law.
Issue:
Whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the
dispensation of justice
Held:
NO. The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in
custody thereof, are admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as provided for
under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court

In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted
a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage. The first marriage, as
evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October
3, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that respondent
Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on May, 8, 1997 with Gracemarie R.
Bunagan at the Church of Saint Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the second marriage,
however, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued
on October 4, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of San Juan, Manila, states that
respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on January 8, 1998 with Ma.
Cielo Paz Torres Alba at the Mary the Queen Church, Madison St., Greenhills, San
Juan, Metro Manila.
Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to prove that
respondent entered into a second marriage while the latter’s first marriage was still
subsisting. We note that the second marriage apparently took place barely a year
from his first marriage to Bunagan which is indicative that indeed the first marriage
was still subsisting at the time respondent contracted the second marriage with Alba.
Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being
admissible in evidence, also clearly indicate that respondent contracted the second
marriage while the first marriage is subsisting. By itself, the certified xerox copies of
the marriage certificates would already have been sufficient to establish the existence
of two marriages entered into by respondent. The certified xerox copies should be
accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents. For purposes of this
disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates bearing the name of respondent
are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which
renders him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar
SAAD AGRO-Industries Inc. vs. Republic
G.R. No. 152570, September 27, 2006
J. Tinga
Facts:
 On 18 October 1967, Socorro Orcullo (Orcullo) filed her application for Free
Patent for Lot No. 1434 located in Barangay Abugon,
Sibonga, Cebu. Thereafter, on 14 February 1971, the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources issued Free Patent No. 473408 for Lot No. 1434, while
the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cebu issued Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 0-6667 over the said lot
 Subsequently, the subject lot was sold to SAAD Agro- Industries,
Inc. (petitioner) by one of Orcullos heirs.
 Sometime in 1995, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General, filed a complaint for annulment of title and reversion of the lot
covered by Free Patent No. 473408 and OCT No. 0-6667 and reversion of Lot
No. 1434 of Cad-315-D to the mass of the public domain, on the ground that
the issuance of the said free patent and title for Lot No. 1434 was irregular
and erroneous, following the discovery that the lot is allegedly part of
the timberland and forest reserve of Sibonga, Cebu.
 The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that respondent failed to
show that the subject lot is part of the timberland or forest reserve or that it
has been classified as such before the issuance of the free patent and the
original title. According to the trial court, the issuance of the free patent and
title was regular and in order, and must be accorded full faith.
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals in its Decision reversed and set aside the
trial courts judgment. It held that timber or forest lands, to which the subject
lot belongs, are not subject to private ownership, unless these are first
classified as agricultural lands. Thus, absent any declassification of the
subject lot from forest to alienable and disposable land for agricultural
purposes, the officers erred in approving Orcullos free patent application
and in issuing the OCT; hence, title to the lot must be cancelled.
 Petitioner now questions the Court of Appeals reliance on the land
classification map (L.C. Map) presented by respondent. The trial court had
previously declared L.C. Map No. 2961 as inadmissible, finding that the
plaintiff has not duly proved the authenticity and contents. According to
petitioner, the L.C. Map presented in court is neither a certified true copy nor
one attested to be a true copy by any DENR official having legal custody of
the original thereof, and thus should not have been made the basis of the
cancellation of the free patent and title.
Issue:
Whether or not the TCT of petitioner should be cancelled since it is part of the public
domain
Held:
NO. The Court observes that the document adverted to is a mere photocopy of the
purported original, and not the blue print as insisted by respondent. A mere
photocopy does not qualify as competent evidence of the existence of the L.C.
Map. Under the best evidence rule, the original document must be produced, except:
1. When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
2. When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
3. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
4. When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded
in a public office

In this case, respondent claims that the presentation of the original L.C. Map is
unnecessary since it is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in the public
office.
Evidence, indeed, is admissible when the original of a document is in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office. However, to prove its contents, there is
a need to present a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof
In addition, while the L.C. Map may be considered a public document and prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein, the map, to be admissible for any purpose,
must be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having legal custody of the record
The rules of admissibility must be applied uniformly. The same rule holds true when
the Government is one of the parties. Failure to abide by the rules on admissibility
renders the L.C. Map submitted by respondent inadmissible as proof to show that the
subject lot is part of the forest reserve
Some officers from the CENRO office in Argao, Cebu testified that they personally saw
the subject lot and that it falls within the timberland or forest reserve. Ultimately,
however, the basis of their declaration is the L.C. Map which respondent failed to
present in accordance with the rules on admissibility. Assuming that the area is
covered by mangroves when they surveyed it, there is no proof that it was not planted
with trees and crops at the time Orcullo applied for free patent. Respondent was also
unable to establish that the subject lot has very deep and muddy soil or are mudflats,
such that it is unsuitable for fruit and non-fruit bearing trees
Even assuming that the L.C. Map submitted by respondent is admissible in evidence,
still the land in question can hardly be considered part of the timberland or forest
reserve. L.C. Map No. 2961, which purports to be the correct map of the areas
demarcated as permanent forest pursuant of the provisions of P.D. No. 705 as
amended was made only in 1980. Thus, the delineation of the areas was made nine
(9) years after Orcullo was awarded the free patent over the subject lot.
Cabugao y Sison vs. People
G.R. No. 158033, July 30, 2004
J. Puno
Facts:
 Petitioner was charged of violation of Article III, Section 15 of Republic Act
No. 6425
 During the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of SPO2 Augusto
P. Domingo, Police Superintendent Theresa Ann B. Cid, and SPO1 Rolando
Lomibao.
 They testified that they conducted a buy-bust operation at M.H. Del Pilar
Street in Dagupan City, against the petitioner Cabugao
 For his part, the petitioner denied that a buy-bust operation was conducted
against him by the police
 The petitioner Cabugao, 32 years old, testified that while he was eating at a
sidewalk store at M.H. Del Pilar Street SPO1 Domingo suddenly poked a gun
at him and warned him Dont move or else I will shoot you. On the other
hand, SPO1 Lomibao ordered him to raise his hands. He was bodily frisked
but nothing was found on him. He was handcuffed and pulled to an owner-
type jeep. He resisted as they did not have a warrant of arrest but to no avail.
He begged to be allowed to call his parents but was refused. He then shouted
for help so the people present would know what was happening. He was
kicked while a certain SPO1 Allan Daus fired his gun. He was then brought to
the police station, specifically to Senior Inspector Romeo Caramat. He was
forced to sign a blank paper but he did not. After that, he was incarcerated in
the city jail. He denied that a buy-bust operation took place and that a sachet
of shabu and a dagger were recovered from his possession. He said that
before the incident or on March 12, SPO2 Domingo and SPO1 Lomibao asked
him to act as an asset in apprehending two of his neighbors suspected to be
drug pushers. He agreed, but before he could help them, the suspects were
arrested by other members of the Dagupan City Police Station. He asked for
their forgiveness but they warned him: the time will come that you (the
petitioner) will have your day.
 Romeo Cabugao, 63 years old, the father of the petitioner, testified that his
son was also charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 or illegal
possession of deadly weapon. The charge was dismissed for the repeated
failure of SPO2 Domingo and SPO1 Lomibao to appear in court despite due
notice. A certified true copy of the resolution of the Summary Hearing
Officer of the PNP Regional Office I imposing a one-rank demotion against
SPO1 Lomibao, an authenticated copy of the decision of the Regional
Director of the PNP Regional Office I dismissing SPO2 Domingo from the PNP,
and the order of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Dagupan City, Branch 1,
dismissing the case against the petitioner for illegal possession of deadly
weapon, were marked and submitted as exhibits for the defense
 He also declared hat before the incident, SPO2 Domingo and SPO1 Lomibao
frequented their house looking for his son, Ramil. The two wanted his son to
act as an asset to apprehend suspected drug pushers living at the back of
their house. He advised his son to refuse as the two police officers have
questionable background. SPO1 Lomibao has been involved in drug pushing
while SPO2 Domingo has been found guilty of acts of lasciviousness and
dismissed from the service.
 After trial, the trial court convicted petitioner Cabugao
 Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction
 The respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), tries to
minimize the significance of these pieces of documentary evidence. It
 contends that they are hearsay evidence because they are not certified and
were only identified by the petitioners father, Romeo Cabugao
Issue:
Whether or not the lower courts erred in convicting the accused –appellant
Held:
YES. The decisions of both courts below failed to take into account vital pieces of
evidence that engender serious doubt on the guilt of the petitioner.
First, The Court considered the documentary evidence of the defense which cannot
but erode the credibility of prosecution witnesses SPO2 Augusto Domingo and SPO1
Rolando Lomibao. We refer to:
(a) the authenticated copy of the Order of Police Chief Superintendent Velasco dated
February 28, 1997 showing that SPO2 Domingo was found guilty of grave misconduct
for acts of lasciviousness and ordered dismissed from service; and
(b) the certified true copy of the Resolution of Police Senior Inspector Sotero Lucas
Soriano, Jr. dated December 8, 1997 showing that SPO1 Rolando Lomibao was
convicted of grave misconduct when he was found positive of metabolite (marijuana)
and demoted from the rank of SPO1 to PO3.
The contention of the respondent that the subject documents are uncertified is
erroneous. Under the Rules of Court, when the original of a document is in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved
by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. The Rules does not
require that the certification should be in a particular form.
The four-page Resolution dated December 8, 1997 contains a stamped certification
signed by Police Inspector David U. Ursua of the Legal Service, PNP Regional Office I of
Parian, San Fernando, La Union. The three-page Decision dated February 28, 1997 has
the handwritten authentication of Police Inspector Mario L. Aduan, also from the
same office, on each and every page. They ought to satisfy the requirement of the
Rules on certification.
Moreover, the respondent did not raise the hearsay objection when the subject
documents were offered in evidence by the defense. When the father of the
petitioner was asked during direct examination if he had proof that SPO2 Domingo
was dismissed from service and that SPO1 Lomibao was involved in drug activities, the
prosecution objected on other grounds, i.e., that the line of questioning is now
irrelevant and immaterial and that (t)his is not (sic) the character of the complainant
which is in issue. When the subject documents were marked as exhibits, the
prosecution again did not raise any objection. When the documents were formally
offered in evidence, the respondent once more did not object on the ground of
hearsay. The prosecution objected on the ground that the documents are off-tangent
to the issue in this case.
The Rules of Court requires that grounds for objection must be specified, whether
orally or in writing and failing to object to the testimony on the ground that it was
hearsay, counsel waived his right to make such objection and, consequently, the
evidence offered may be admitted.
At any rate, these documentary pieces of evidence cannot be cavalierly dismissed as
irrelevant. They have a material bearing on the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses, SPO2 Domingo and SPO1 Lomibao. SPO2 Domingo has been dismissed
from the service as of February 28, 1997. At the time of the incident on March 12,
1999, he was no longer a policeman and yet misrepresented himself as one. On the
other hand, SPO1 Lomibao has been found guilty of drug use. Their credibility as truth
tellers leaves much to be desired.
Furthermore, the participation of SPO2 Domingo in the alleged buy-bust operation
when he was no longer a member of the police force speaks ill of the regularity of the
operation. It is unusual for SPO2 Domingo to be given the role of poseur buyer when
he was at the time a dismissed policeman. As a dismissed policeman, he is not
entitled to the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. Yet this
presumption was used as a crutch to convict the petitioner.
Second, there is a major inconsistency in the testimonies of SPO2 Domingo and SPO1
Lomibao. The petitioner stressed that the two policemen could not agree on the
reason that prompted them to conduct the buy-bust operation. SPO1 Lomibao
testified that they were tipped by their informants. In contrast, SPO2 Domingo
declared that they conducted a 15-day surveillance prior to the operation and that he
personally made a pre-arrangement with the petitioner to buy shabu 15 minutes prior
to the alleged operation. No informer was involved in the operation.
Just recently, in People vs. Ong we held that it is the duty of the prosecution to
present a complete picture detailing the buy-bust operation - - - from the initial
contact between the poseur buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise
or payment of the consideration, until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of
the illegal subject of sale. Failing in this duty, the buy-bust operation will be greeted
with furrowed brows.
Second, the story of the prosecution that a dagger was found in the possession of the
petitioner further crushed the credibility of their witnesses. SPO1 Lomibao testified
that he bodily searched the petitioner and found a 9-inch dagger. In contrast, SPO2
Domingo never testified that a dagger was found from the petitioner. Several
witnesses for the defense categorically declared that no dagger was found during the
body frisk of the petitioner.
The records show that the charge for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 or illegal
possession of dangerous weapon against the petitioner was dismissed due to the
repeated failure of SPO2 Domingo and SPO1 Lomibao to appear before the court
despite due notice. This repeated failure strengthens the impression that the
prosecution story about the dagger taken from the petitioner is false. The falsity is not
of little significance. A witness who manufactures that kind of a lie that could lead to
the long time incarceration of the victim does not merit credence.

Third, the documentary and testimonial evidence showing ill motive on the part of the
police officers who witnessed against the petitioner cannot be shunted aside.
The petitioner claims that SPO2 Domingo and SPO1 Lomibao had reason to frame him
up for he repeatedly refused to become their police asset for the arrest of certain
neighbors believed to be drug pushers. He alleged that because of his refusal, other
police officers were able to arrest the suspects ahead of SPO2 Domingo and SPO1
Lomibao. As result, other police officers were promoted instead of SPO2 Domingo and
SPO1 Lomibao

His testimony was corroborated by his father, Romeo Cabugao.. The prosecution did
not rebut these allegations establishing the ill motive of SPO2 Domingo and SPO1
Lomibao. Their testimonies cannot therefore be taken hook, line and sinker.