WILLIAM MARBURY V.
JAMES MADISON within the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction may fall under the Court’s appellate
Topic: The Constitution as the Fundamental Law of the Land
FACTS:
Thomas Jefferson defeated John Adams, then incumbent President, in the
presidential elections of 1800. Before Jefferson took office, Adams and his Congress
enacted the Judiciary Act of 1801. This law essentially was an attempt by Adams and
his political party to frustrate the incoming opposition, since he used his new power
to appoint 16 new circuit judges and 42 new justices of the peace, a group known as
the "Midnight Judges." One of the new appointees was William Marbury who
received the position of justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. John
Marshall, the then Secretary of State, failed to deliver the commission of Marbury
before the term of Adams ended. With the change in administration, Marshall also
left his position as Secretary of State and was succeeded by James Madison.
Jefferson then ordered acting Secretary of State Levi Lincoln to cease delivering the
commissions, thus preventing the new appointees from taking their positions. The
Jefferson Congress proceeded to replace the Judiciary Act of 1801 with a new
Judiciary Act of 1802 that essentially restored the initial Judiciary Act of 1789.
Marbury then filed a writ of mandamus directly with the Supreme Court under
Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, asking it to order the executive branch to
deliver his commission.
ISSUE:
WON Marbury is entitled to the remedy of mandamus under Section 13 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789.
HELD:
No. Under the Constitution, to enable the Court to issue a mandamus to compel the
delivery of the commission of a public office by the Secretary of State, it must be
shown that it is an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or that it be necessary to enable
them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.
It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the
proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create the cause. The
authority given to the Supreme Court by the Judiciary Act of 1789 to issue writs of
mandamus to public officers appears not to be warranted by the Constitution.
Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorizing the United States Supreme Court
jurisdiction to provide the remedy of a writ of mandamus is unconstitutional. The
Judiciary Act of 1789 permits the Supreme Court to exercise original jurisdiction over
causes of actions for writs of mandamus. The problem is the provision directly
conflicts with the Constitution, specifically Article III. Article III serves as a limitation
on the types of cases the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over. Cases not
jurisdiction. In short, Section 13 of The Act is unconstitutional since it attempts to
expand the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the
law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and
interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Courts must decide on
the operation of each. So, if a law be in opposition to the Constitution, if both the
law and the Constitution apply to a particular case, so that the Court must either
decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitution, or
conformably to the Constitution, disregarding the law, the Court must determine
which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of
judicial duty. If, then, the Courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution
is superior to any ordinary act of the Legislature, the Constitution, and not such
ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.
NICOLAS v. ROMULO
Topic: The Constitution as the Fundamental Law of the Land
FACTS:
Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member of the United States
Armed Forces. He was charged with the crime of rape committed against Suzette
Nicolas, a Filipina, sometime on November 1, 2005. Pursuant to the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA) between Philippines and the U.S. entered into in 1998, the U.S.,
at its request, was granted the custody of Smith pending the proceedings. Later on,
he was found guilty by the RTC of Makati.
Defendant Smith was taken out of the Makati jail by a contingent of Philippine law
enforcement agents, purportedly acting under orders of the Department of the
Interior and Local Government, and brought to a facility for detention under the
control of the US government, provided for under new agreements between the
Philippines and the U.S, referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December
19, 2006.
Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of defendant L/CPL
Smith because, first of all, the VFA is void and unconstitutional. The provision of the
Constitution is Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 which states that “After the expiration in 1991 of
the Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America
concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be
allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and,
when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people
in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the
other contracting State.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the presence of US Armed Forces in Philippine territory pursuant to
the VFA is allowed "under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate xxx and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State."
HELD:
YES. First, as held in Bayan v. Zamora, the VFA was duly concurred in by the
Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as
attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the United States
government.
The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the United States
Senate does not detract from its status as a binding international agreement or
treaty recognized by the said State. For this is a matter of internal United States law.
Notice can be taken of the internationally known practice by the United States of
submitting to its Senate for advice and consent agreements that are policymaking
in nature, whereas those that carry out or further implement these policymaking
agreements are merely submitted to Congress, under the provisions of the so-called
Case–Zablocki Act, within sixty days from ratification.
Second reason has to do with the relation between the VFA and the RP-US Mutual
Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951. This earlier agreement was signed and duly
ratified with the concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and the United States
Senate. Article VII of the Mutual Defense Treaty states that “This Treaty shall be
ratified by the Republic of the Philippines and the United Nations of America in
accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force
when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Manila.”
The VFA, which is the instrument agreed upon to provide for the joint RP-US military
exercises, is simply an implementing agreement to the main RP-US Military Defense
Treaty. The Preamble of the VFA states: “Reaffirming their obligations under the
Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951.
Accordingly, as an implementing agreement of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty,
it was not necessary to submit the VFA to the US Senate for advice and consent, but
merely to the US Congress under the Case — Zablocki Act within 60 days of its
ratification. It is for this reason that the US has certified that it recognizes the VFA
as a binding international agreement, i.e., a treaty, and this substantially complies
with the requirements of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of our Constitution.
The provision of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of the Constitution, is complied with by virtue of
the fact that the presence of the US Armed Forces through the VFA is a presence
"allowed under" the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. Since the RP-US Mutual Defense
Treaty itself has been ratified and concurred in by both the Philippine Senate and
the US Senate, there is no violation of the Constitutional provision resulting from
such presence.
The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter
of international law to abide by its terms and provisions.
Different treatment when it comes to detention as against custody
The moment the accused has to be detained, e.g., after conviction, the rule that
governs is Sec. 10 of the VFA which states that “The confinement or detention by
Philippine authorities of United States personnel shall be carried out in facilities
agreed on by appropriate Philippines and United States authorities. United States
personnel serving sentences in the Philippines shall have the right to visits and
material assistance.”
It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the difference between custody
during the trial and detention after conviction, because they provided for a specific
arrangement to cover detention. And this specific arrangement clearly states not
only that the detention shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by authorities of
both parties, but also that the detention shall be "by Philippine authorities".
Therefore, the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006, which
are agreements on the detention of the accused in the United States Embassy, are
not in accord with the VFA itself because such detention is not "by Philippine
authorities".
Respondents should therefore comply with the VFA and negotiate with
representatives of the United States towards an agreement on detention facilities
under Philippine authorities as mandated by Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA.
Important Points:
First, the VFA is a self-executing Agreement, as that term is defined in Medellin
itself, because the parties intend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely because
the Agreement is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings under the RP-
US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFA has been implemented and
executed, with the US faithfully complying with its obligation to produce L/CPL
Smith before the court during the trial.
Secondly, the VFA is covered by implementing legislation, namely, the Case-
Zablocki Act, USC Sec. 112 (b), inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of the
US Congress that executive agreements registered under this Act within 60 days
from their ratification be immediately implemented. The parties to these present
cases do not question the fact that the VFA has been registered under the Case-
Zablocki Act.
Finally, the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty was advised and consented to by the US
Senate on March 20, 1952, as reflected in the US Congressional Record, 82nd
Congress, Second Session, Vol. 98 — Part 2, pp. 2594-2595.
As regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, military aid or
assistance has been given under it and this can only be done through implementing
legislation. The VFA itself is another form of implementation of its provisions.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED, and
the Court of Appeals' Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97212 dated January 2, 2007 is
MODIFIED. The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States, entered into on February 10, 1998, is UPHELD as
constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006
are DECLARED not in accordance with the VFA, and respondent Secretary of
Foreign Affairs is hereby ordered to forthwith negotiate with the United States
representatives for the appropriate agreement on detention facilities under
Philippine authorities as provided in Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA, pending which the
status quo shall be maintained until further orders by this Court.
The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve without delay the related matters
pending therein, namely, the petition for contempt and the appeal of L/CPL Daniel
Smith from the judgment of conviction.
DEMERTIA v. ALBA
Topic: The Constitution and the Three Branches of Government
FACTS:
Petitioners, as concerned citizens of this country, and as taxpayers whose vital
interests may be affected by the outcome of the reliefs prayed for, assailed the
constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177
(Budget Reform Decree of 1977) on the following grounds:
A. It infringes upon the fundamental law by authorizing the illegal transfer of
public moneys.
B. It is repugnant to the Consitution as it fails to specify the objectives and
purposes for which the proposed transfer of funds are to be made
C. It allows the President to override the safeguards, form and procedure
prescribed by the Constitution in approving appopriations.
D. It amounts to an undue delegation of legislative powers to the executive.
E. The threatened and continuing transfer of funds by the President and the
implementation thereof by the Budget Minister and the Treasurer of the
Philippines are without or in excess of their authority and jurisdiction.
Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of
petitioners. He further contended that the provision under consideration was
enacted pursuant to Section 16(5), Art.VIII of the 1973 Constitution and prohibition
will not lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate branch to enjoin
the performance of duties within the latter’s sphere of responsibility.
Subsequently, the Court required petitioners to file a Reply to the Comment.
Petitioners stated that as a result of the change in the administration, there is a need
to hold the resolution of the present case in abeyance.
The Solicitor General filed a rejoinder with a motion to dismiss setting forth as
ground therefore, abrogation of Section 16(5), Art.VIII of the 1973 Constitution by
the Freedom Constitution of March 26, 1986, which has allegedly rendered the
petition moot and academic.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Par. 1 of Section 44 of PD No. 1177 is unconstitutional. - Yes.
2. Whether prohibition can lie from one branch of government against a
coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the latter’s sphere
of responsibility – Yes.
HELD:
1. Yes. Par. 1 of Section 44 of PD No. 1177, being repugnant to Section 16(5) Article
VIII of the 1973 Constitution is null and void.
Said paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides: The President shall have the authority to
transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and
agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General
Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or
office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.
On the other hand, the constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:
Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however,
the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
and the heads of constitutional commis ions may by law be authorized to augment any
item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other
items of their respective appropriations.
The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit
and categorical under the 1973 Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the
different branches of the government and those of the constitutional
commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources, the
constitution allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for
the purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the
appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body concerned. The
leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and conditions for which funds
may be transferred were specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for the purpose of
augmenting an item and such transfer may be made only if there are savings from
another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body.
Par. 1 of Section 44 of PD No. 1177 unduly over extends the privilege granted under
said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from
one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any
program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the
General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to
whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from
which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only
completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting
to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor
thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null
and void.
2. Yes. The Constitution apportions the powers of government, but it does not make
it so that one branch is subordinate to another. In other words, all the branches are
created equal. When the legislative or executive branch is acting within the limits of
authority, the judiciary cannot interfere with the former. But the when former acts
beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it is the duty of the judiciary to declare
what the other branches had assumed to do as void. Respondents are not acting
within their sphere of responsibility and are hence, enjoined form acting under the
unconstitutional provision in question.
TANADA, ET AL v TUVERA
Topic: Effectivity of Laws
FACTS:
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel the Respondent public
officials to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, EO, letters of implementation, and AO invoking the people's
right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6,
Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution. The respondents (thru the Sol Gen)
moved for the case to be dismissed on the grounds that petitioners have no legal
personality or standing to bring the petition as they are not are personally and
directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential
issuance. As such they are not aggrieved parties within the meaning of the Rules of
Court. The respondents also submit that these issuances are not required to be
published as a sine qua non requirement for its effectivity because the laws
themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.
On the other hand, the petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition
concern a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty,
they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
ISSUE:
WON laws, presidential issuances, EOs, among others, must be published as a sine
qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws.
HELD:
Yes, the SC ruled that the publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those
cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date; in such
case, the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which
is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for
the date when it goes into effect. This is logically correct only insofar as at equates
the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication and does not do away with the
publication requirement.
Publication is necessary to give the general public adequate notice of the
laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens without such notice
and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia
legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden
a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not
even a constructive one. Thus, without publication, the people would have no means
of knowing what PDs have been promulgated.
The first clause of Sec 1 of CA 638 reads: "There shall be published in the
Official Gazette ..." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials
an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the
people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and
reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette.
Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to
what must be included or excluded from such publication. The publication of all
presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated
by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties
for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and
revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which
apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and
executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned.
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature"
or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that
before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application,
which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of
the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision
might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees
which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the
question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had
been enforced or implemented prior to their publication.
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the
presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette,
only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939,
inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of
these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever
their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has
ever been implemented or enforced by the government.
FALLO
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette
all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless
so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
ARAULLO v. AQUINO III
Topic: Operative Fact Doctrine
FACTS:
Sen. Jinggoy Estrada, in a privileged speech in the Senate, revealed that some
Senators, including himself, had been allotted an additional P50 Million each as an
“incentive” for voting in favor of the impeachment of CJ Corona. As a response to
Estrada, Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Secretary Abad explained
that the said funds released to the Senators had been part of the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP), a program designed by the DBM to ramp up spending
to accelerate economic expansion.
According to Secretary Abad, the funds had been released to the Senators based on
their letter of request for funding; and that it was not the first time that releases from
the DAP had been made because the DAP had already been instituted in 2011 to
ramp up spending after sluggish disbursements had caused the growth of the gross
domestic product (GDP) to slow down. He further explained that the DAP funds
were usually taken from (1) unreleased appropriations under Personnel Services; (2)
unprogrammed funds; (3) carry-over appropriations unreleased from the previous
year; and (4) budgets for slow-moving items or projects that had been realigned to
support faster-disbursing projects.
The DBM further listed the following as the legal bases for the DAP’s use of savings,
namely: (1) Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which granted to the
President the authority to augment an item for his office in the general
appropriations law; (2) Sec. 38 and 49, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code
of 1987; and (3) the General Appropriations Acts of 2011, 2012 and 2013.
As a result of Estrada’s revelation, nine petitions assailing the constitutionality of the
DAP and the issuances relating to the DAP were filed.
ISSUE #1:
Whether or not the transfer of funds under the DAP is valid?
HELD:
NO, the transfer of funds under the DAP is unconstitutional as it does not comply
with the requisites set forth in Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid, must be made upon a concurrence
of the following requisites, namely: (1) there is a law authorizing the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to
transfer funds within their respective offices; (2) the funds to be transferred are
savings generated from the appropriations for their respective offices; and (3) the
purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices.
For the first requisite, the GAAs of 2011 and 2012 lacked valid provisions to authorize
transfers of funds under the DAP. The said GAAs failed to carry the phrase “for their
respective offices” as required by Sec. 25(5). The impact of the phrase “for their
respective offices” was to authorize only transfers of funds within their offices.
Instead, the GAA provisions carried a different phrase (“to augment any item in this
Act”), and the effect was that the GAAs thereby literally allowed the transfer of funds
from savings to augment any item in the GAAs even if the item belonged to an office
outside the Executive. To that extent did the GAAs contravene the Constitution.
For the second requisite, there were no savings from which funds could be sourced
for the DAP. The power to augment could be used only when the purpose for which
the funds had been allocated were already satisfied, or the need for such funds had
ceased to exist. For only then could savings be properly realized. In this case, DBM
alleged that it had declared that part of the savings brought under the DAP came
from unreleased appropriations. However, the declaration of the DBM by itself does
not state the clear legal basis for the treatment of unreleased or unallotted
appropriations as savings. The fact alone that the appropriations are unreleased or
unallotted is a mere description of the status of the items. They have not yet ripened
into categories of items from which savings can be generated.
For the third requisite, no funds from savings could be transferred under the DAP to
augment deficient items not provided in the GAA. For there to be a valid transfer of
funds, the purpose of the transfer should be “to augment an item in the general
appropriations law for the respective office.” In this case, the “savings” pooled under
the DAP were allocated to PAPs that were not covered by any appropriations in the
GAAs.
Furthermore, cross-border transfers or cross-border augmentations from savings
are prohibited by the Constitution. Sec. 25(5) has delineated borders between the
offices of the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the Heads of the
Constitutional Commissions, such that funds appropriated for one office are
prohibited from crossing over to another office even in the guise of augmentation of
a deficient item/s. In the case at bar, Sec. Abad admitted making some cross-border
augmentations from the Executive to the COA and the House of Representatives.
ISSUE #2:
Whether or not the doctrine of operative fact is applicable?
HELD:
YES, the doctrine of operative fact is applicable to the adoption and implementation
of the DAP and its related issuances.
The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act
prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that
produced consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In
short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its effects. It provides an
exception to the general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect.
But its use must be subjected to great scrutiny and circumspection, and it cannot be
invoked to validate an unconstitutional law or executive act, but is resorted to only
as a matter of equity and fair play. It applies only to cases where extraordinary
circumstances exist, and only when the extraordinary circumstances have met the
stringent conditions that will permit its application. The application of the doctrine
to the DAP proceeds from equity and fair play. The consequences resulting from the
DAP and its related issuances could not be ignored or could no longer be undone.
The doctrine of operative fact extends to a void or unconstitutional executive act.
The term executive act is broad enough to include any and all acts of the Executive,
including those that are quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial in nature. Furthermore,
the Court in CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation declared that “for the operative fact
doctrine to apply, there must be a ‘legislative or executive measure,’ meaning a law
or executive issuance.” Thus, the Court opined there that the operative fact doctrine
did not apply to a mere administrative practice that has not been formalized into a
rule or ruling. This is because an administrative practice, if not formalized as a rule
or ruling, will not be known to the general public and can be availed of only by those
with informal contacts with the government agency.
The SC held that the adoption and implementation of the DAP and its related
issuances were executive acts. The DAP itself, as a policy, also transcended a merely
administrative practice especially after the Executive, through the DBM,
implemented it by issuing various memoranda and circulars.
Furthermore, as already mentioned, the implementation of the DAP resulted into
the use of savings pooled by the Executive to finance the PAPs that were not covered
in the GAA, or that did not have proper appropriation covers, as well as to augment
items pertaining to other departments of the Government in clear violation of the
Constitution. However, to declare the implementation of the DAP unconstitutional
without recognizing that its prior implementation constituted an operative fact
would be impractical and unfair. To undo everything that had been implemented in
good faith under the DAP would be enormously burdensome for the Government. It
has been adequately shown that the implementation of DAP yielded undeniably
positive results that enhanced the economic welfare of the country. Not to apply the
doctrine of operative fact to the DAP could cause the physical undoing of such
worthy results by destruction, and would result in most undesirable wastefulness.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION v EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Topic: Ratio legis est anima; Where there is ambiguity, the words of the Constitution
should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of the framers.
FACTS:
These 2 petitions were consolidated and are being resolved jointly as both seek to
declare EO284 issued by the Pres. Aquino, unconstitutional.
 · Sec 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a
member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other
appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary
position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government
corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor; Provided,
that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards,
councils or bodies of which the President is the Chairman.
· Section 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary
or other appointive official of the Executive Department holds more positions
than what is allowed in Section 1 hereof, they must relinquish the excess
position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case
shall any official hold more than two positions other than his primary position.
· Section 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the government in
government-owned or controlled corporations, at least one-third (1/3) of the
members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or
undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
Petitioners maintain that the EO in effect allows member of the Cabinet, USecs,
and ASecs, to hold other govt offices or positions in addition to their primary
position runs counter to Sec 13 Art VII of the Constitution.
· Sec 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and
their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They
shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or
in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict
of interest in the conduct of their office.
Petitioners also counter the position of DOJ and OSG by saying that Sec 7 par 2,
Art IX-B should be lumped together and in consonance with Sec 13 Art VII.
· Sec 7. "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions
of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
· In sum, EO 284 is being challenged by petitioners on the principal
submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than
those provided in the Constitution.
o According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution," the only exceptions
against holding any other office or employment in Government
are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-
President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under
Section 3, par. (2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the Secretary of
Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by
virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
o Petitioners further argue that the exception to the
prohibition in Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B on the Civil Service
Commission applies to officers and employees of the Civil Service
in general and that said exceptions do not apply and cannot be
extended to Section 13, Article VII which applies specifically to the
President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their
deputies or assistants.
ISSUE:
· WON the prohibition in Sec 13 Art VII admit of the broad exception
made for appointive officials under Sec 7 Art IX-B of the Constitution
RULING: NO
As a general rule, the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought
to be prevented or remedied.
· A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the
times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution
was framed.
· The practice of designating members of the Cabinet, deputies and
assistants as members of the governing bodies including GOCC became
prevalent during the time by former Pres Marcos.
· This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government
soon led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials who took advantage of
this scheme for purposes of self enrichment.
Thus, it was one of the strongest selling points of the 1987 Constitution during
the campaign for its ratification the assurance given by its proponent that such
scandalous practices of Cabinet members holding multiple positions would be
discontinued.
· The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other
offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned.
· The provision found in Art VII giving prohibition can be compared to
other provisions as far as prohibiting Senators (Art VI Sec 13), members of
 the Armed Forces (Art XVI Sec5) and even the Art IX-B which was relied by
the Respondents.
o However, compared to these provisions on
disqualifications, the provision found in Art VII is absolute, not
being qualified by the phrase "in the Government.
o The prohibition imposed on the President and his official
family is therefore all-embracing and covers both public and
private office or employment.
· The intent of the ConCom was articulated during the deliberations by
notable Commissioners saying that prohibitions have to be stricter with
the President and the members of the Cabinet because they exercise more
powers and, therefore, more checks and restraints on them are called for
because there is more possibility of abuse in their case
· Therefore, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot possibly refer to the broad
exceptions provided under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution.
o To construe said qualifying phrase as respondents would
have us do, would render nugatory and meaningless the manifest
intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution to impose a
stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, Members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding
other offices or employment in the government during their
tenure.
· To illustrate, by express provision of law, the Secretary of
Transportation and Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of the
Board of the Philippine Ports Authority, and the Light Rail Transit
Authority.
If the functions required to be performed are merely incidental, remotely
related, inconsistent, incompatible, or otherwise alien to the primary function of
a cabinet official, such additional functions would fall under the purview of "any
other office" prohibited by the Constitution.
· An example would be the Press Undersecretary sitting as a member
of the Board of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation.
· The same rule applies to such positions which confer on the cabinet
official management functions and/or monetary compensation, such as
but not limited to chairmanships or directorships in government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
·

The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under

Sec 13, Article VII must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied
by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in
an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of said officials' office.
· The reason is that these posts do not comprise "any other office"
within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly
an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials
· The term ex-officio means from office; by virtue of office.
· It refers to an authority derived from official character merely, not
expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to
the official position.
· Ex-officio likewise denotes an act done in an official character, or as a
consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority
than that conferred by the office."
· An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of
his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment.
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. HON. ZAMORA
Topic: Interpretation of the Constitution; Ratio legis est anima
FACTS:
The IBP filed a petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the order of President Estrada
commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the "Marines") to join the
PNP in visibility patrols around Metro Manila to address the alarming increase in
violent crimes therein. The IBP argued that the order is unconstitutional for being in
derogation of Article 2 Section 3 of the Constitution or that “Civilian authority is, at
all times, supreme over the military.”
The Solicitor General argue that the IBP has (1) no legal standing, (2) the question
involves a political question.
ISSUE:
WON the deployment ordered by the President of the Marines to the PNP involves
a political question?
WON the deployment ordered is unconstitutional?
1st HELD: NO
The issue involved whether the qualifications or conditions for the deployment of
Marines have been met or the limitations respected, is justiciable - the problem
being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom. Moreover, when political questions
are involved, the Constitution limits the justiciable determination as to whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned.
2nd HELD: NO, failed to prove President acted in grave abuse of discretion
According to Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines
and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent
or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion,
when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days,
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law.
The distinction between the power to call for martial law and the power to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus and the power to call out armed forces is intended by the
framers as different category otherwise they would have lumped them all together
with the same qualification. In the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law,
two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2)
public safety must require it. These conditions are not required in the case of the
power to call out the armed forces. The only criterion is that "whenever it becomes
necessary," the President may call the armed forces "to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion." The implication is that the President is given full
discretion and wide latitude
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where the terms are expressly limited to
certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other
matters. That the intent of the Constitution is exactly what its letter says, i.e., that
the power to call is fully discretionary to the President.
Given the wide discretion to the President, it is incumbent upon the IBP to show that
the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis that there is no justification
to call for the Armed Forces or that it was arbitrary
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO et al. vs. COMELEC,
Topic: Initiative and Referendum Act (RA 6735)
FACTS:
Delfin filed with COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term
Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" wherein Delfin asked the
COMELEC for an order:
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached
"Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general
and local circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in the Philippines, to them in
establishing signing stations.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he and the members of the Movement for People’s
Initiative and other volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. The provisions
sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and
Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution. According to Delfin, the said Petition for
Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least twelve
per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will be formally
filed with the COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, COMELEC issued an Order (a) directing the
publication of the petition and the notice of hearing in 3 daily newspapers of general
circulation; and (b) setting the case for hearing.
Senator Roco filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is
not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
Petitioners filed this SCA for prohibition with the following arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the
Constitution can only be implemented by law passed by Congress. No
such law has been passed.
(2) Although R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative
(initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation), it
failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution
indicating that the matter of people's initiative to amend the
Constitution was left to some future law.
(3) RA 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print
media. This indicates that the Act covers only laws and not
constitutional amendments because the latter take effect only upon
ratification and not after publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution on the conduct of initiative on the Constitution
and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires
since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for
the exercise of the right of initiative. Only Congress is authorized by
the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution,
not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes
a revision which is outside the power of the people's initiative to just
amend the Constitution.
(6) Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither
the COMELEC nor any other government department, agency, or
office has realigned funds for the purpose.
Delfin maintains as follows:
(1) There is a law, R.A. No. 6735, which governs the conduct of initiative to
amend the Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle for such
initiative is not fatal, since subtitles are not requirements for the
validity or sufficiency of laws.
(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition
in an initiative to amend the Constitution approved by the majority of
the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as of the day of
the plebiscite.
(3) Sec. 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution grants the COMELEC the power
to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall;
and (b) Sec. 20 of R.A. 6735 empowers the COMELEC to promulgate
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of the Act.
(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but mere
amendment to, the Constitution because it seeks to alter only a few
specific provisions of the Constitution, or more specifically, only those
which lay term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or overhaul the
entire document.
ISSUES:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735 was intended to include or cover initiative on
amendments to the Constitution (NO)
2. Whether COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations
Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative
and Referendum on National and Local Laws) on the conduct of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the
absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such
initiative (NO)
RATIO:
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY,
INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented
by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under
this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, stated that
although this mode of amending the Constitution is a mode of amendment which
bypasses congressional action, it still is dependent on congressional action. While
the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it
if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.

It was made clear during the interpellations that the Section 2 is limited to proposals
to AMEND — not to REVISE — the Constitution. Further, it clearly showed that it was
a legislative act which must implement the exercise of the right.
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was intended to cover initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. However, it is not a full compliance with the power
and duty of Congress to provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right.
1. Contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Section 2 does not suggest an
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The inclusion of the
word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought; it is silent as
to amendments on the Constitution.
Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. — The power of the people under a system of
initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole
or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any
legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby
affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
2. Although Section 3 of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the
Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative,
and that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional
requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must
submit the proposal, it does not provide for the contents of a petition
for initiative on the Constitution.
3. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum
(Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no
subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous
silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is
initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress
intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided
for a subtitle therefor.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and
Referendum because it is national in scope. Subtitle II and Subtitle III leaves
no room for doubt that the classification is not based on the scope of the
initiative involved, but on its nature and character. Hence, to complete the
classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle on initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.
The classification of initiative into national and local is based on Sec. 3 of the Act:
Sec. 3. Definition of terms xxx
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments
to the Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national
legislation; and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a
regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
While R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details in
the implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local legislation
thereby giving them special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the
system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned.
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND
REGULATIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
The COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A.
No. 6735.
Subject to recognized exception, the rule is that what has been delegated, cannot
be delegated. Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-
judicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of
legislative authority to administrative bodies covered by the exception. However, in
every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation
itself is valid. It is valid only if the law:
(a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and
(b) fixes a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and
determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A.
No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation.
The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the
Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those
promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution,
or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the
"completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently
enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly
enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution should no longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood,
energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying with the
constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right of the people
under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard
for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on
Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or
amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN
petition.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent
as against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private
respondents. Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved. SO
ORDERED.
GONZALES V. COMELEC
Topic: Doctrine of Proper Submission
Constitutional Amendments, Reapportionment of congressional districts, De facto
doctrine
FACTS:
On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed Joint
Resolutions:
(a) to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of
120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180 to be apportioned
among the several provinces;
(b) to call a convention to propose amendments to the present Constitution; and (c)
to amend Section 16, Article VI of the said Constitution so they can become
delegates themselves to the Convention.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill which became RA 4913, providing that the
amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions be
submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held
on November 14, 1967.
In this consolidated petition, petitioners Ramon A. Gonzales and PHILCONSA seek
to declare RA 4913 unconstitutional and to restrain COMELEC from holding the
plebiscite for the ratification of the constitutional amendments proposed in Joint
Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3.
It is further contested that said resolutions are null and void because:
(1) The Members of Congress, which approved the proposed amendments and the
resolutions are, at best, de facto Congressmen;
(2) Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives-- propose amendments or call
a convention-- but may not avail of both at the same time;
(3) The election, in which proposals for amendment to the Constitution shall be
submitted for ratification, must be a special election, not a general election.
ISSUE:
The issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting as a constituent
assembly — violates the Constitution is essentially justiciable, not political, and,
hence, subject to judicial review, and, (Note: to the extent that this view may be
inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, the latter should be
deemed modified accordingly)
HELD:
Not a Political Question
(Note: to the extent that this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, the latter should be deemed modified accordingly)
The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof.

Amendment of the Constitution
The power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not
included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress.
The power to amend the Constitution lies in the inherent powers of the people—as
the repository of sovereignty in a republican state—to make, and hence, to amend
their own fundamental law.
Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the
same explicitly grants such power. When exercising the same, Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as
component elements of a constituent assembly.
When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their authority from the
Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same function, for their
authority does not emanate from the Constitution—they are the very source of all
powers of government, including the Constitution itself.
Ratification of Constitutional Amendments- can be joined in a General Election
Also, the ratification of the amendments to the Constitution need not necessarily
be in a special election or plebiscite called for that purpose alone. While such
procedure is highly to be preferred, the Constitution speaks simply of “an election”
at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.”
To join the ratification of the proposed amendments with an election for candidates
to public office does not render it any less an election at which the proposed
amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification. No prohibition being
found in the plain terms of the Constitution, none should be inferred.
Effect of failure of Congress to reapportion congressional districts
The fact that Congress is under obligation to make apportionment, as required
under the Constitution, does not justify the conclusion that such failure rendered
Congress illegal or unconstitutional, or that its Members have become de facto
officers.
The Constitution does not support the view that, upon the expiration of the period
to make the apportionment, a Congress which fails to make it is dissolved or
becomes illegal. On the contrary, it implies necessarily that Congress shall continue
to function with the representative districts existing at the time of the expiration of
said period.
De facto doctrine
The title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally. It may not be contested
except directly, by quo warranto proceedings.
Neither may the validity of his acts be questioned upon the ground that he is merely
a de facto officer. And the reasons are obvious:
(1) it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and
(2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within the competence of his office, are valid,
insofar as the public is concerned.
The main reason for the existence of the de facto doctrine is that public interest
demands that acts of persons holding, under color of title, an office created by a valid
statute be, likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public—as distinguished from the
officer in question—is concerned.
Indeed, otherwise those dealing with officers and employees of the Government
would be entitled to demand from them satisfactory proof of their title to the
positions they hold, before dealing with them, or before recognizing their authority
or obeying their commands, even if they should act within the limits of the authority
vested in their respective offices, position or employment.
Nullification of legislative acts
For a law to be struck down as unconstitutional, it must be so by reason of some
irreconcilable conflict between it and the Constitution.
The sufficiency or insufficiency, from a constitutional angle, of the submission for
ratification to the people depends upon whether the provisions of RA 4913 are such
as to fairly apprise the people of the gist, the main idea or the substance of said
proposals. We believe that RA 4913 satisfies such requirement and that said Act is,
accordingly, constitutional.
The provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate
knows that Resolution No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators,
even if they should run for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention.
Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913
and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2)
cases must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs therein prayed for denied,
without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
TOLENTINO v. COMELEC
Topic: Doctrine of Proper Submission
FACTS:
The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two resolutions
of the Congress of the Philippines by Resolutions No. 2 and 4 on March 16, 1967 and
June 17, 1969, respectively.
On November 10, 1970, the delegates were elected. The Convention has its
inaugural session on June 1, 1971. Three months later, the Constitutional Convention
approved Organic Resolution No. 1. Constitutional Convention OR No. 1 lowered the
voting age to 18 years old and made women qualified to vote.
President Diosdado Macapagal sent letter to Comelec calling upon it to implement
the resolution. A day later, Comelec resolved to inform the Constitutional
Convention that it will hold the plebiscite. Constitutional Convention then passed a
series of resolutions to continue with the plebiscite. Plebiscite was scheduled on
November 8, 1971, which is the same day for the elections of other government
officials.
Petitioner assailed COMELEC’s resolution and the holding of the plebscite, arguing
that:
the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by Constitution, a power lodged
exclusively in Congress.
the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for
ratification separately from each and all of the other amendments. (Sec. 1, Art. XV –
partly stated above)
The COMELEC argued that the power to provide for, fix the date and lay down the
details of the plebiscite is within the authority of the Constitutional Convention and
that this power includes that of submitting such amendments either individually or
jointly.
ISSUE: Is there any limitation or condition in Section 1 of Article XV of the
Constitution which is violated by the act of the Convention of calling for a plebiscite
on the sole amendment contained in Organic Resolution No. 1?
HELD:
The Court holds that there is, and it is the condition and limitation that all the
amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the
people in a single "election" or plebiscite.
It being indisputable that the amendment now proposed to be submitted to a
plebiscite is only the first amendment the Convention propose We hold that the
plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the
people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the
Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent COMELEC in that
direction are null and void.
The language of the constitutional provision aforequoted is sufficiently clear. lt says
distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention
called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this Constitution," thus placing
no limit as to the number of amendments that Congress or the Convention may
propose. The same provision also as definitely provides that "such amendments shall
be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at
an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many "elections" or
plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the
same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the provision
unequivocably says "an election" which means only one.
LAMBINO v. COMELEC
Topic: Judicial Review of the Amending Process
FACTS:
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution
under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative
and Referendum Act.
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952
individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters,
with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its
registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election
registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.

The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying
Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII
(Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.”
These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their petition, the
COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters'
ratification:
“DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT
BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM,
AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE
ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?”
The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735
inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution
through a people’s initiative
HELD: No, the initiative petition does not comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on Direct Proposal by the people.
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision
that allows a people’s initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This
section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x
The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed
constitutional amendment” should be “ready and shown” to the people “before”
they sign such proposal. The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a
petition by the people.
Two essential elements must be present:
1. The people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf.
2. As an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a
petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such
complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition that
contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
In this case, the Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this
Court a copy of the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The
Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet after the oral
arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October
2006.
There’s not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the proposed changes in the
signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed
changes is attached to it. The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the
people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-
Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the
people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature
sheet. This omission is fatal.
Moreover, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they printed only 100,000 copies
of the draft petition they filed more than six months later with the COMELEC. The
Lambino Group expressly admit that "petitioner Lambino initiated the printing and
reproduction of 100,000 copies of the petition for initiative . . . .” This admission
binds the Lambino Group and establishes beyond any doubt that the Lambino
Group failed to show the full text of the proposed changes to the great majority of
the people who signed the signature sheets.
With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically impossible
for all or a great majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have seen the petition
before they signed the signature sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the
Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million signatories the full text of the
proposed changes.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V. GSIS
Topic: Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Provisions
FACTS:
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) pursuant to the privatization
program of the Philippine Government decided to sell through public bidding 30%
to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of MHC. The winner is to provide
management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and
financial support to strengthen Manila Hotel’s profitability and performance. In a
close bid, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corp., a Filipino corporation, offered to buy
51% of MHC at P41.58 per share, while Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, bid for the
same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder, Manila Prince
Hotel Corp. matched the bid price at P44.00 per share and sent a manager’s check
for P33 million pesos as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Firm which
GSIS refused to accept.
As such, Manila Prince Hotel filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
prohibition and mandamus where the Court issued a TRO enjoining respondents
from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm. Petitioner
invokes Sec. 10, par. 2., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution that Manila Hotel has
become a historical monument which reflects the vibrance of Philippine heritage
and culture and has become part of the national patrimony. Moreover, since 51%
shares of MHC is owned by a GOCC, the hotel business being part of the tourism
industry is a part of national economy which the same section applies. Petitioner
also argues that it should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of Renong
Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules that if the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded
the shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that are willing to match
the highest bid.
GSIS maintain that Sec. 10, par. 2., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is merely
a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and
requires implementing legislation. Further, it argues that Manila Hotel does not fall
under the term national patrimony.
ISSUE:
WON Sec. 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
HELD:
YES. Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is couched in such a way as
not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style.
But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce
the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the
Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without the self-executing
nature of constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact
legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution,
further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its
enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured
or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of
the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a
penalty for the violation of a self- executing constitutional provision does not render
such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a
constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is
not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule
is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust
legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more
available.17 Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the
subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is
a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very
words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se
judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that — qualified Filipinos
shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain
specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there
is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all
legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi
jus ibi remedium.
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al.
Topic: Self-Executing and Non- self -executing Provisions 
A self-executing provision
FACTS:
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers
who declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of
pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus,
Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five
(5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct
Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also
recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -
of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing
agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of
the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform
beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the
Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional
Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For
The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the
provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s
lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential
Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO
against respondents.
UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional,
and a cease and desist order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S.
Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to
Members of Congress
One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who
are members of political dynasties to accumulate funds to perpetuate themselves in
power, in contravention of Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution which states
that:
Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and
prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is a self-
executing law?
HELD:
NO, Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is not a self-executing law.
At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered as not self-
executing due to the qualifying phrase "as may be defined by law." In this respect,
said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable
constitutional right but merely specifies guideline for legislative or executive action.
Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on
political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely
speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System
would be able to propagate political dynasties.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED.
The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the funds subject
of these cases in the budgetary deliberations of Congress as the same is a matter left
to the prerogative of the political branches of government.
Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the government to,
within the bounds of reasonable dispatch, investigate and accordingly prosecute all
government officials and/or private individuals for possible criminal offenses related
to the irregular, improper and/or unlawful disbursement/utilization of all funds under
the Pork Barrel System.
This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.
SO ORDERED.
MAGALLONA v. ERMITA
Topic: The Philippine Archipelago
FACTS:
In 1961, the Congress passed RA 3046 which demarcates the maritime baselines of
the Philippines to conform with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) I which codified the sovereign right of States over their territorial sea.
RA 5446 was passed only to correct the typographical errors and reserved the
drawing of the baselines of Sabah. In 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting
RA 9522 to conform with UNCLOS III which prescribed the water-land ratio, length
and contour of baselines of archipelagic states.The enactment of RA 9522 shortened
one baseline, optimized basepoints around the Philippines, and classified the
Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and Scarborough Shoal as regimes of islands (islands
which generate their own applicable maritime zones).
The petitioners (Magallona, law professors and students) held that the RA 9522
(a) violates Art. I of 1987 Constitution as it reduces the Philippine Maritime territories
and reach of its sovereign; (b) violates Art II, Sec. 7, 8, 16 of 1987 Constitution as it
opens the Philippine waters to maritime passage by sea vessels and aircrafts which
in turn undermines sovereignty and national security of the country; and (c) the
classification of regime of islands not only results to the loss of maritime area and
the livelihood of fishermen but also weakens the country’s claim over Sabah.
The respondent (Hon. Eduardo Ermita) stated that RA 9522 does not violate the
constitution nor does it compromise in any way the security of the country or
relinquish the claim over Sabah.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 9522 is unconstitutional
HELD:
NO, RA 9522 is not unconstitutional
The RA 9522 is a statutory rule to demarcate the country’s maritime zones and
continental shelf under UNCLOS III, not to delineate Philippine Territory.
It has nothing to do with territory, it only regulates the sea-use rights of the country
by determining the basepoints and breadth of maritime zones and continental shelf.
RA 9522’s use of framework of Regime of Islands to determine maritime zones
of KIG and Scarborough Shoal is not inconsistent with Philippines’ claim of
sovereignty over these areas.
That RA 9522 results to loss of territorial waters is UNFOUNDED in both fact and law
as it actually increases total maritime space and Exclusive Economic Zone actually
extends beyond rectangular area of Treaty of Paris. Art 2 of RA 9522 itself states the
Philippines’ continued claim and sovereignty over KIG and Scarborough Shoal.
UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with Constitution’s Delineation of
Internal Waters.
Concerning the body of water lying landward of baselines regardless of how it’s
referred to (internal waters in Constitution, archipelagic waters in UNCLOS III),
Philippines still has sovereignty over it, including airspace above and submarine
underneath (this was AFFIRMED by UNCLOS III). HOWEVER, sovereignty does not
mean we are exempt from
municipal/international law. Innocent passage rights are a customary international
law, therefore it is automatically incorporated in Philippine Law.
NOTE:
BASELINES - lines drawn along the low water mark of an island/group of islands
which MARK THE END OF THE INTERNAL WATER and the BEGINNING OF THE
TERRITORIAL SEA
The petition was DISMISSED.
ARIGO v. SWIFT
Topic: Sovereign/ State Immunity
FACTS:
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the
US Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested
diplomatic clearance for the said vessel "to enter and exit the territorial waters of the
Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship
replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty." On January 6, 2013, the ship left
Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay. While transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on
the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-
southeast of Palawan.
U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Scott Swift, and US Ambassador expressed
regret for the incident in a press statement and assured that the United States will
provide appropriate compensation for damage to the reef caused by the ship."
Petitioners on their behalf and in representation of their respective
sector/organization and others, including minors or generations yet unborn, filed the
present petition of a Writ of Kaliaksan against Scott H. Swift in his capacity as
Commander of the US 7th Fleet and his team including Pres Benigno Aquino DFA
Sec, DENR Sec among others collectively the respondents.
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the
USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such
magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo,
Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-
Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology. They also seek a directive from this Court for the institution of civil,
administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of environmental
laws and regulations in connection with the grounding incident.
On the other hand, Respondents’ consolidated comment states that the
opposition to the application for a TEPO and ocular inspection and production
orders, respondents assert that: First, the grounds relied upon for the issuance of a
TEPO or writ of Kalikasan have become fait accompli as the salvage operations on
the USS Guardian were already completed; Second, the petition is defective in form
and substance; Third, the petition improperly raises issues involving the VFA
between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America; and
lastly, the determination of the extent of responsibility of the US Government as
regards the damage to the Tubbataha Reefs rests exclusively with the executive
branch.
It is also well contested by the Respondents herein that they are not part of the
United Nations on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), hence the doctrine of state
immunity applies
ISSUE: Whether or not the US government a non-party to the UNCLOS may be
held liable for damages caused by its warship
HELD:
Yes, the US government can be held liable under the UNCLOS, despite it
being a non-member, the principle of state immunity does not apply.
During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Carpio opined that the
conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation
of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter
within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS).
He explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity
from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an
exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and
regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latter's internal
waters and the territorial sea. According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date
has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy the US considers
itself bound by customary international rules on the "traditional uses of the oceans"
as codified in UNCLOS, as can be gleaned from previous declarations by former
Presidents Reagan and Clinton, and the US judiciary in the case of United States v.
Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd.
The international law of the sea is generally defined as "a body of treaty
rules arid customary norms governing the uses of the sea, the exploitation of its
resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes. It is a branch of
public international law, regulating the relations of states with respect to the uses of
the oceans." The UNCLOS is a multilateral treaty which was opened for signature on
December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It was ratified by the Philippines in
1984 but came into force on November 16, 1994 upon the submission of the 60th
ratification.
The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance
State sovereignty (mare clausum) and the principle of freedom of the high seas
(mare liberum).29 The freedom to use the world's marine waters is one of the oldest
customary principles of international law.30 The UNCLOS gives to the coastal State
sovereign rights in varying degrees over the different zones of the sea which are: 1)
internal waters, 2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive economic zone,
and 5) the high seas. It also gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction over foreign
vessels depending on where the vessel is located.
Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal
State exercises sovereignty, subject to the UNCLOS and other rules of international
law. Such sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its
bed and subsoil.
In the case of warships, as provided by Justice Carpio, they enjoy sovereign
immunity subject to the exceptions provided in Article 30 (Non-compliance by
warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal state), Article 31 (Responsibility
of the Flag State for damage caused by a warship) and Article 32 (Immunities of
warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes).
Clearly, sovereign immunity cannot be invoked by the US government
because their actions led to the violation of Articles 30, 31, and 32 of UNCLOS.
In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch on the matter
of compensation and rehabilitation measures through diplomatic channels.
Resolution of these issues impinges on our relations with another State in the
context of common security interests under the VFA. It is settled that the conduct of
the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the
executive and legislative-"the political" --departments of the government, and the
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to
judicial inquiry or decision.
On the other hand, the Court cannot grant the additional reliefs prayed for in the
petition to order a review of the VFA and to nullify certain immunity provisions
thereof. The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a
matter of international law to abide by its terms and provisions. The present petition
under the Rules is not the proper remedy to assail the constitutionality of its
provisions.
WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan
is hereby DENIED.
REAGAN V. COMMISSION OF INTERNAL REVENUE
Topic: National Territory
FACTS:
· The petitioner is a citizen of the United State and an employee of Bendix Radio,
Divison of Bendix Aviation Corporation, which provided technical assistance to the
United States Air Force was assigned at the Clark Air Base Pampanga, honor about
July 7, 19.
· Nine months, before his tour duty expires, petitioner imported a tax free 1960
Cadillac car which valued at $6443.83. More than two months after the car was
imported, petitioner requested the Clark Air Base Commander for a permit to sell
the car. The request was granted with the condition that he would sell it to a member
of the United States Armed Forces or an employee of the U.S. Military Bases.
· On July 11, 1960, petitioner sold the car to Willie Johnson for $6600, a private
in US Marine Corps, Sangby Point, Cavite as shown by a bill of sale executed at Clark
Air Base. On the same date William Johnson Jr. sold the car to Fred Meneses for
P32,000 as evidence by a deed of sale executed in Manila.
· The respondent after deducting the landed cost of the car and the personal
exemption, which the petitioner was entitled, fixed as his net income arising from
such transaction the amount of P17912.34 rendering him liable for income tax of
P2979.00. After paying the sum, he sought refund from the respondent claiming
that he is exempted. He filed a case within the Court of Tax Appeals seeking recovery
of the sum P2979.00 plus legal rate of interest
ISSUE: Whether or not the said income tax of P2979.00 was legally collected by
respondent from petitioner.
HELD:
· The Philippine is an independent and sovereign country or state. Its authority
may be exercised over its entire domain. Its laws govern therein and everyone to
whom it applies must submit to its term. It does not prelude from allowing another
power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional rights over certain portions of its
territory.
· Such areas sustain their status as native soil and still subject to its authority. Its
jurisdiction may be diminished but it does not disappear.
· Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and
sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion
thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its
commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies
must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and
personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a
diminution of its sovereignty.
· In the light of the above, the first and crucial error imputed to the Court of Tax
Appeals to the effect that it should have held that the Clark Air Force is foreign soil
or territory for purposes of income tax legislation is clearly without support in law.
As thus correctly viewed, petitioner's hope for the reversal of the decision
completely fades away.
· There is nothing in the Military Bases Agreement that lends support to such an
assertion. It has not become foreign soil or territory. This country's jurisdictional
rights therein, certainly not excluding the power to tax, have been preserved. As to
certain tax matters, an appropriate exemption was provided for.
· The Clark Air Base is one of he bases under lease to the American armed forces
by virtue of the Military Bases Agreement which states that a “national of the US
serving or employed in the Philippines in connection with the construction,
maintenance, operation, or defense of the bases and residing in the Philippines only
by reason such unemployment is not to be taxed on his income unless derived in the
bases which one clearly derived the Phil.
· By the [Military Bases] Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine
Government merely consents that the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain
cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency
over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of
jurisdiction over offenses committed therein."
· Therefore the Supreme Court sustained the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals
rendering the petitioner liable of the income tax arising from the sale of his
automobile that have taken place in Clark Air Field which is within our territory to
tax.
LIANG v PEOPLE
Topic: Sovereign/ State Immunity
FACTS:
· Petitioner is an economist working with the ADB. Sometime in 1994,
for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Cabal,
he was charged before the MTC Mandaluyong of grave oral defamation
· Petitioner was arrested but was subsequently released after posting of
bail to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB.
 · The next day, the MTC judge received an "office of protocol" from the
DFA stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under
Sec 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Phil Govt regarding the
Headquarters of the ADB in the country.
o Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from
suit, the MTC judge, without notice to the prosecution, dismissed the criminal cases.
· The Prosec filed MR which was denied. Then filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with the RTC
· RTC: Set aside the MTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the
warrant of arrest it earlier issued.
ISSUE: WON petitioner Liang is covered by immunity under the Agreement
HELD: NO, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication
from the DFA that petitioner is covered by any immunity.
· The DFA's determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is only
preliminary which has no binding effect in courts.
· In receiving ex-parte the DFA's advice and in motu proprio dismissing the criminal
cases without notice to the prosecution, the latter's right to due process was
violated.
· It should be noted that due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of
the prosecution.
· The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the
alleged utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be
presented at the proper time.
· The mere invocation of the immunity clause does not Ipso Facto result in the
dropping of the charges.
2. Under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:
"Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and
consultants performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges
and immunities:
a.) immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their
official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity."
The immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that
the act was done in "official capacity."
· It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioner's case falls within the ambit
of Section 45(a).
· Thus, the prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA
protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting
evidence, should it so desire.
3. Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity
agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as
defamation, in the name of official duty.
· The imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions.
· It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal
private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with
malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
4. Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent,
assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the
receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any professional or
commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state
outside his official functions.
5. On the contention that there was no preliminary investigation
conducted, suffice it to say that preliminary investigation is not a matter of right
in cases cognizable by the MTC such as the one at bar.
· Being purely a statutory right, PI may be invoked only when specifically granted
by law.
· The rule on criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is
required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
BARCELONA TRACTION, LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY LTD. (BELGIUM vs.
SPAIN)
Topic: Remedy of a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign government
FACTS:
Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company, Ltd was a corporation incorporated
in Canada, with Toronto headquarters, that made and supplied electricity in Spain.
It had issued bonds to non-Spanish investors, but during the Spanish Civil War(1936-
9) the Spanish government refused to allow BTLP to transfer currency to pay
bondholders the interest they were due. In 1948 a group of bondholders sued in
Spain to declare that BTLP had defaulted on the ground it had failed to pay the
interest. The Spanish court allowed their claim.
The business was sold, the surplus distributed to the bondholders, and a small
amount was paid to shareholders. The shareholders in Canada succeeded in
persuading Canada and other states to complain that Spain had denied justice and
violated a series of treaty obligations. However, Canada eventually accepted that
Spain had the right to prevent BTLP from transferring currency and declaring BTLP
bankrupt. Of the shares, 88 per cent were owned by Belgians, and the Belgian
government complained, insisting the Spanish government had not acted properly.
They made an initial claim at the International Court of Justice in 1958, but later
withdrew it to allow negotiations. Subsequent negotiations broke down, and a new
claim was filed in 1962. Spain contended that Belgium had no standing because
BTLP was a Canadian company.
ISSUE: Whether or not Belgium had legal interest in the matter to justify it bringing
a claim
HELD:
NO. The International Court of Justice held that Belgium had no legal interest in the
matter to justify it bringing a claim. Although Belgian shareholders suffered if a
wrong was done to the company, it was only the company's rights that could have
been infringed by Spain's actions. It would only be if direct shareholder rights (such
as to dividends) were affected, that the state of the shareholders would have an
independent right of action.
It was a general rule of international law that when an unlawful act was committed
against a company, only the state of incorporation of the company could sue, and
because Canada had chosen not to, this was the end. The idea of a "diplomatic
protection" of shareholders was unsound because it would create confusion and
insecurity in economic relations as shares are 'widely scattered and frequently
change hands'.
The court also said that a state is bound to give the same legal protection to foreign
investments and nationals, either for natural or legal persons, when it admits them
to its territory.
THE HOLY SEE vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR
Topic: Remedy of a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign government
FACTS:
Petitioner is the HOLY SEE who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in
Rome, Italy, and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio. Private
respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in
the real estate business.
This petition rose from the sale of 3 Lots located in the Municipality of Parañaque,
through Msgr. Cirilos, Jr. to Ramon Licup, wherein Lot 5-A is registered in the name
of PET HOLY SEE and Lots 5-B and 5-D are registered in the name of the Philippine
Realty Corporation (PRC). Meanwhile, the petitioner sold Lot 5-A to Tropicana Corp.
(Tropicana) in the midst of unfinished obligations under the sales contract to have
the squatters vacate the land involved in the sale. Ramon Licup filed a complaint
with the RTC Makati on the ground that the sellers breached the contract between
them. He thus prayed for the rescission of the Deeds of Sale between PET HOLY SEE
and the PRC on the one hand, and Tropicana on the other and the reconveyance of
the lots in question. PET HOLY SEE and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss
the complaint
RTC denied this after finding that PET HOLY SEE “shed off (its) sovereign immunity
by entering into the business contract in question. Motion for Intervention was filed
by the Department of Foreign Affairs, claiming that it has a legal interest in the
outcome of the case as regards to the diplomatic immunity of PET HOLY SEE. Court
decided that DFA has legal interest to intervene in the case in behalf of the Holy See,
finding that, in Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes
to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign
Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is
entitled to immunity.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the petitioner lost its sovereign immunity when it had entered into a
commercial transaction for the sale of its parcel of the land in the Philippines? NO.
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and
firmly established.
In the old theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in
the courts of another sovereign.
According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is
recognized with regard to public acts of a state, but not with regard to private acts.
The Court had to come out with guidelines: if the foreign state is not engaged
regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested
by its nature; if the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof,
then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
In the case at bench, the private respondent failed to dispute that petitioner has
bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate business. Moreover, the
petitioner has claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission in the
Philippines and merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living
thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the
donation.
2. W/N the respondent trial court has no jurisdiction over petitioner, being a foreign
state enjoying a sovereign immunity? NO.
The issue of petitioner's non-suability can be determined by the trial court without
going to trial in the light of the pleadings, particularly the admission of private
respondent. Where the plea of immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive
branch, it is the duty of the courts to accept this claim so as not to embarrass the
executive arm of the government in conducting the country's foreign relations.
HELD:
The petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183
against petitioner is DISMISSED.
BUT!!! PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS A REMEDY!
Not left without a remedy, private respondent can ask the Philippine government,
through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against the Holy See. Its first task
is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity of
its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the
impact of its espousal on the relations between the Philippine government and the
Holy See. Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the latter
ceases to be a private cause.
CALLADO VS. INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Topic: Sovereign / State Immunity; Express Consent; Special Law
FACTS:
Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the IRRI. On February 11,
1990, while driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident.
Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary investigation conducted by
the IRRI's Human Resource Development Department Manager. In view of the
findings, he was charged with:
(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under the influence of liquor; (2)
Serious misconduct consisting of your failure to report to your supervisors the failure
of your vehicle to start because of a problem with the car battery; (3) Gross and
habitual neglect of your duties.
Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the charges against him. However,
IRRI issued a Notice of Termination to petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner filed a
complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and
indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Private respondent IRRI, through counsel, wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him
that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1620, and that it invokes such diplomatic immunity and
privileges as an international organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not
having waived the same.
While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor Arbiter cited an Order issued
by the Institute to the effect that "in all cases of termination, respondent IRRI waives
its immunity," and, accordingly, considered the defense of immunity no longer a
legal obstacle in resolving the case.
The NLRC found merit in private respondent' s appeal and, finding that IRRI did not
waive its immunity, ordered the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and
the complaint dismissed.
Hence, this petition where it is contended that the immunity of the IRRI as an
international organization granted by Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620 may
not be invoked in the case at bench inasmuch as it waived the same by virtue of its
Memorandum on "Guidelines on the handling of dismissed employees in relation to
P.D. 1620."
ISSUE:
Whether or not IRRI waive its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an
employer-employee relationship.
HELD:
No. Supreme Court ruled in the negative and vote to dismiss this case.
IRRI’s immunity from suit is undisputed. Presidential Decree No. 1620, Article 3
provides: “Immunity from Legal Process. The institute shall enjoy immunity from any
penal, civil and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been
expressly waived by the Director-Genera of the Institute or his authorized
representatives.
The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and an express waiver by its Director-General
is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.
On the matter of waiving its immunity from suit, IRRI had made its position clear.
Through counsel, the Institute wrote the Labor Arbiter categorically informing him
that the Institute will not waive its diplomatic immunity. In the second place,
petitioner's reliance on the Memorandum with "Guidelines in handling cases of
dismissal of employees in relation to P.D. 1620" is misplaced.
IRRI also made guidelines when a dismissed employee files a complaint against the
Institute contesting the legality of dismissal -- “If the plaintiff’s attorney or the arbiter,
asks if IRRI will waive its immunity we may reply that the Institute will be happy to do
so, as it has in the past in the formal manner required thereby reaffirming our
commitment to abide by the laws of the Philippines and our full faith in the integrity
and impartially of the legal system.”
From the last paragraph of the foregoing quotation, it is clear that in cases involving
dismissed employees, the Institute may waive its immunity, signifying that such
waiver is discretionary on its part.
Petitioner’s allegation that he was denied due process is unfounded and has no basis.
He was given proper notice and adequate opportunity to refute the charges and
findings, hereby fulfilling the basic requirements of due process.
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.
YUJUICO v. ATIENZA
Topic: Express Consent; When Government Institutes Action in Court
FACTS:
● The City Council of Manila enacted an ordinance authorizing the City
Mayor to acquire by negotiation or expropriation certain parcels of land for the
construction of the Francisco Benitez Elementary School.
● The properties sought to be expropriated herein are those owned by
petitioner
● The Ordinance provides that an amount not to exceed the fair market
value of the land then prevailing in the area will be allocated out of the Special
Education Fund (SEF) of the City of Manila (City) to defray the cost of the
property's acquisition
● RTC: Ruled in favor of the City of Manila - decision became final and
executory
● A few months after the decision became final and executory, the
petitioner filed a motion for Execution of Judgment - which was granted by the
Trial Court
● It was discovered that the City had only paid petitioner Php 5,363,269 -
only a fraction of the full amount of Php 36,403,170
● The trial court ordered that the City pay the petitioner the said balance
● The petitioner sent letters to City School Board (CSB) in order for the
latter to comply with the said order
● The CSB did not act on the said letter
● Petitioner filed a petition for contempt against the CSB members and
subsequently a writ of mandamus to compel the CSB to pass a resolution
appropriating the necessary funds in favor of petitioner
● Petition for writ of Mandamus was granted
● The decision granting the petition for writ of Mandamus became final
and executory
● The respondent then filed a petition for relief from judgment - such was
granted by the Court
● Because of such ruling by the CA, the petitioners filed this present case.
● Respondents’ Arguments before the SC:
○ The CSB has a personality separate and distinct from the City such that
it should not be made to pay for the City's obligations.
ISSUE: Whether the CSB has a separate personality from the City of Manila
HELD:
● NO, the CSB does not have a separate personality from the City of
Manila. It is worthy of note that the records of this case clearly show that the
same counsel, OCLO, represented the City in the expropriation case and now,
all except one of the individual respondents in the case at bar.
● The manifestations made by the City of Manila during the hearing on
the Notice of Garnishment was made by the same counsel (Counsel of the CSB)
● The manifestation was made by the same counsel now claiming that it
is actually the City which should be made liable for the payment of its own
obligations. This, after it trotted out the CSB as the entity with authority to pass
a resolution that would satisfy the obligation it had vigorously pursued.
● The above circumstances, coupled with the rule that an act performed
by counsel within the scope of a 'general or implied authority is regarded as an
act of the client, render the City and, through it, respondents in estoppel.
● Contrary to respondents' claim, the law does not make the CSB an entity
independent from the City of Manila. This is evident from the provisions of the
Local Government Code of 1991, the law providing for the creation of school
boards.[1]
● The fact that the highest ranking official of a local government unit (LGU)
is designated as co-chairman of the school board negates the claim in this case
that the CSB has a personality separate and distinct from the City. The other
fact that government officials in the school board do not receive any
compensation or remuneration while NGO representatives merely receive
allowances underscores the absurdity of respondents' argument all the more.
Indeed, such would not be the situation if the school board has a personality
separate and distinct from the LGU.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order of the trial court dated 25 June
2004, granting respondents' Petition for Relief from Judgment is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE AND ITS DECISION DATED 9 OCTOBER 2002, ORDERING
RESPONDENTS TO IMMEDIATELY PASS A RESOLUTION FOR THE PAYMENT OF
THE BALANCE OF THE COURT-ADJUDGED COMPENSATION DUE PETITIONER,
IS REINSTATED.
[1]
TITLE IV.- LOCAL SCHOOL BOARDS
Section 98 . Creation, Composition and Compensation.-
(a) There shall be established in every
province, city or municipality a provincial, city, or municipal school
board, respectively.
(b) The composition of local school
boards shall be as follows:
...
(2) The city school board shall be composed of the city
mayor and the city superintendent of schools as co-
chairmen; the chairman of the education committee of
the sangguniang panlungsod, the city treasurer, the
representative of the 'pederasyon ng mga sangguniang
kabataan in the sangguniang panlungsod, the duly
elected president of the city federation of parents-
teachers associations, the duly elected representative of
the non-academic personnel of public schools in the city,
as members;
...
Section 101. Compensation and Remuneration.-
The co-chairmen and members of the provincial, city or municipal
school board shall perform their duties as such without
compensation or remuneration. Members thereof who are not
government officials or employees shall be entitled to traveling
expenses and allowances chargeable against the funds of the local
 school board concerned, subject to existing accounting and
auditing rules and regulations.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. VICENTE A. HIDALGO
Topic: Money Claims Arising from a Contract
FACTS:
MAIN ACTION: Petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, the Republic of the Philippines ("Republic," for short), thru the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), comes to this Court to nullify and set aside the
decision dated August 27, 2003 and other related issuances of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 37, in its Civil Case No. 99-94075. In directly
invoking the Court's original jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of
certiorari and prohibition, without challenge from any of the respondents, the
Republic gave as justification therefor the fact that the case involves an over TWO
BILLION PESO judgment against the State, allegedly rendered in blatant
violation of the Constitution, law and jurisprudence.
June 1999: Mendoza filed a suit with the RTC of Manila for reconveyance and the
corresponding declaration of nullity of a deed of sale and title against the
Republic, the Register of Deeds of Manila and one Atty. Fidel Vivar.
· Mendoza essentially alleged being the owner of the disputed Arlegui
property which the Republic forcibly dispossessed her of and over which the
Register of Deeds of Manila issued TCT No. 118911 in the name of the Republic.
Republic’s Answer: the State is immune from suit
Mendoza’s third amended complaint for recovery and reconveyance of the
Arlegui property:
· Mendoza sought the declaration of nullity of a supposed deed of sale dated
July 15, 1975 which provided the instrumentation toward the issuance of TCT No.
118911 in the name of the Republic.
· Since time immemorial, she and her predecessors-in-interest had been in
peaceful and adverse possession of the property as well as of the owner's duplicate
copy of TCT No. 118527.
· Such possession, she added, continued "until the first week of July 1975 when
a group of armed men representing themselves to be members of the Presidential
Security Group [PSG] of the then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, had forcibly entered
[her] residence and ordered [her] to turn over to them her . . . Copy of TCT No. 118525
. . . and compelled her and the members of her household to vacate the same . . .;
thus, out of fear for their lives, [she] handed her Owner's Duplicate Certificate Copy
of TCT No. 118527 and had left and/or vacated the subject property."
RTC RULING
The Republic had veritably confiscated Mendoza's property, and deprived her not
only of the use thereof but also denied her of the income she could have had
otherwise realized during all the years she was illegally dispossessed of the same.
Republic’s Contentions
· Urges the Court to strike down as a nullity the trial court's order declaring it
in default and the judgment by default that followed.
· Sought to be nullified, too, also on the ground that they were issued in grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, are the orders
and processes enumerated immediately above issued after the rendition of the
default judgment.
ISSUE: W/N the Arlegui Property was legally owned by Mendoza, thus, she is
entitled to reconveyance and monetary compensation
Given the above perspective, the obvious question that comes to mind is the level
of compensation which — for the use and occupancy of the Arlegui property —
would be fair to both the petitioner and the private respondent and, at the same
time, be within acceptable legal bounds.
RULING: YES.
The evidence adduced adequately supports a conclusion that the Office of the
President, during the administration of then President Marcos, wrested
possession of the property in question and somehow secured a certificate of title
over it without a conveying deed having been executed to legally justify the
cancellation of the old title (TCT No. 118527) in the name of the private respondent
and the issuance of a new one (TCT No. 118911) in the name of petitioner Republic.
Accordingly, granting private respondent's basic plea for recovery of the Arlegui
property, which was legally hers all along, and the reinstatement of her cancelled
certificate of title are legally correct as they are morally right.
While not exactly convenient because the Office of the President presently uses it
for mix residence and office purposes, restoring private respondent to her
possession of the Arlegui property is still legally and physically feasible.
For what is before us, after all, is a registered owner of a piece of land who, during
the early days of the martial law regime, lost possession thereof to the
Government which appropriated the same for some public use, but without going
through the legal process of expropriation, let alone paying such owner just
compensation.
The Court cannot, however, stop with just restoring the private respondent to her
possession and ownership of her property.
The restoration ought to be complemented by some form of monetary
compensation for having been unjustly deprived of the beneficial use thereof,
but not, however, in the varying amounts and level fixed in the assailed
decision of the trial court and set to be executed by the equally assailed writ of
execution.
The Court finds the monetary award set forth therein to be erroneous. And the
error relates to basic fundamentals of law as to constitute grave abuse of
discretion.
As may be noted, private respondent fixed the assessed value of her Arlegui
property at P2,388,990.00.
· And in the prayer portion of her third amended complaint for recovery, she
asked to be restored to the possession of her property and that the petitioner be
ordered to pay her, as reasonable compensation or rental use or occupancy
thereof, the sum of P500,000.00 a month, or P6 Million a year, with a five percent
(5%) yearly increase plus interest at the legal rate beginning July 1975.
· From July 1975 when the PSG allegedly took over the subject property to July
2003, a month before the trial court rendered judgment, or a period of 28 years,
private respondent's total rental claim would, per the OSG's computation, only
amount to P371,440,426.00.
In its assailed decision, however, the trial court ordered the petitioner to pay
private respondent the total amount of over P1.48 Billion or the mind-boggling
amount of P1,480,627,688.00, to be exact, representing the reasonable rental for
the property, the interest rate thereon at the legal rate and the opportunity cost.
This figure is on top of the P143,600,000.00 which represents the acquisition cost
of the disputed property. All told, the trial court would have the Republic pay the
total amount of about P1.624 Billion, exclusive of interest, for the taking of a
property with a declared assessed value of P2,388,900.00. This is not to mention
the award of attorney's fees in an amount equivalent to 15% of the amount due
the private respondent.
In doing so, the respondent judge brazenly went around the explicit command of
Rule 9, Section 3 (d) of the Rules of Court which defines the extent of the relief that
may be awarded in a judgment by default, i.e., only so much as has been alleged
and proved. The court acts in excess of jurisdiction if it awards an amount beyond
the claim made in the complaint or beyond that proved by the evidence.
To the Court, an award of P20,000.00 a month for the use and occupancy of the
Arlegui property, while perhaps a little bit arbitrary, is reasonable and may be
granted pro hac vice considering the following hard realities which the Court takes
stock of:
1. The property is relatively small in terms of actual area and had an assessed
value of only P2,388,900.00;
2. What the martial law regime took over was not exactly an area with a new and
imposing structure, if there was any; and
3. The Arlegui property had minimal rental value during the relatively long
martial law years, given the very restrictive entry and egress conditions prevailing
at the vicinity at that time and even after.
The assailed trial court's issuance of the writ of execution against government
funds to satisfy its money judgment is also nullified. It is basic that government
funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment
to satisfy such judgments. A judgment against the State generally operates
merely to liquidate and establish the plaintiff's claim in the absence of express
provision; otherwise, they cannot be enforced by processes of law.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila dated August 27,
2003 insofar as it nullified TCT No. 118911 of petitioner Republic of the Philippines
and ordered the Register of Deeds of Manila to reinstate private respondent
Tarcila L. Mendoza's TCT No. 118527, or to issue her a new certificate of title is
AFFIRMED. Should it be necessary, the Register of Deeds of Manila shall execute
the necessary conveying deed to effect the reinstatement of title or the issuance
of a new title to her.
It is MODIFIED in the sense that for the use and occupancy of the Arlegui
property, petitioner Republic is ordered to pay private respondent the reasonable
amount of P20,000.00 a month beginning July 1975 until it vacates the same and
the possession thereof restored to the private respondent, plus an additional
interest of 6% per annum on the total amount due upon the finality of this
Decision until the same is fully paid. Petitioner is further ordered to pay private
respondent attorney's fees equivalent to 15% of the amount due her under the
premises.
Accordingly, a writ of certiorari is hereby ISSUED in the sense that:
1. The respondent court's assailed decision of August 27, 2003 insofar as it
ordered the petitioner Republic of the Philippines to pay private respondent
Tarcila L. Mendoza the sum of One Billion Four Hundred Eighty Million Six
Hundred Twenty Seven Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Eight Pesos
(P1,480,627,688.00) representing the purported rental use of the property in
question, the interest thereon and the opportunity cost at the rate of 3% per
annum plus the interest at the legal rate added thereon is nullified. The portion
assessing the petitioner Republic for costs of suit is also declared null and void.
2. The Order of the respondent court dated December 19, 2003 for the issuance
of a writ of execution and the Writ of Execution dated December 22, 2003
against government funds are hereby declared null and void. Accordingly, the
presiding judge of the respondent court, the private respondent, their agents
and persons acting for and in their behalves are permanently enjoined from
enforcing said writ of execution.
However, consistent with the basic tenets of justice, fairness and equity,
petitioner Republic, thru the Office of the President, is hereby strongly
enjoined to take the necessary steps, and, with reasonable dispatch, make the
appropriate budgetary arrangements to pay private respondent Tarcila L.
Mendoza or her assigns the amount adjudged due her under this disposition.
TEOTICO v. CITY OF MANILA
Topic:LGUs liable for injuries or death caused by defective condition of roads or
public works under their control
DOCTRINE: A local government unit may be held liable for quasi-delict under a
special provision of the Civil Code.
FACTS:
On January 27, 1958, Teotico was at the corner of Old Luneta and P. Burgos
Avenue in Manila, within the “loading and unloading” zone, waiting for a
jeepney. Upon hailing one, he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney
and fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole. Due to the
fall, his eyeglasses broke causing broken pieces to pierce his left eyelid,
impairing his vision. He was brought to PGH where his injuries were treated.
These included: lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, contusions on the left
thigh, left upper arm, right leg and upper lip, abrasion on the right infra-patella
region. He was charged a total of P1,400 for medical treatment.
Teotico filed a complaint for damages against the City of Manila. At the time of
the incident, he was a practicing pubic accountant, a businessman, and a
professor at UE. He held responsible positions in various business firms and was
associated with several civic organizations. He has lost a daily income of
P50/day during his incapacity to work. Because of the incident, he was subject
to humiliation and ridicule; and during his treatment, he was under constant
fear and anxiety for the welfare of his minor children since he was their only
support.
The CA applied Article 2189 of the Civil Code, which provides:
"Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of,
or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or
supervision."
Teotico alleged in his complaint and amended complaint that injuries were due
to the defective condition of the a street which is “under the supervision and
control” of the City.
The defense presented evidence, oral and documentary, to prove that the
Storm Drain Section, Office of the City Engineer of Manila, received a report of
the uncovered catch basin/missing cover on several occasions, however the
same was covered on the day of the incident.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, respondent maintained that the present case
is governed by Sec. 4, RA 409 (Charter of the City of Manila), because RA 409 is
a special law, intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code
is a general law, applicable to the entire Philippines.
"The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property
arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city
officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance,
or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while
enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions."
City of Manila further alleged that it cannot be held for damages:
1. Because accident took place in national highway, pursuant to RA 917 and
EO 113—which withdraws and restricts authority of City.
2. Because City of Manila has not been negligent in connection therewith
 ISSUE:
1. Whether or not P. Burgos Ave is under control or supervision of the City of
Manila and whether or not the latter is guilty of negligence in connection w the
maintenance of said road. (YES)
HELD:
Yes. It is true that in case of conflict, a special law prevails over a general law;
that the charter of Manila is a special law and that the Civil Code is a general law.
However, looking at the particular provisions of each law concerned, the
provision of the Manila Charter exempting it from liability caused by the
negligence of its officers is a general law in the sense that it exempts the city
from negligence of its officers in general.
There is no particular exemption but merely a general exemption. On the other
hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code states that the provinces, cities and
municipalities liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by, any
person by reason”-specifically – “of the defective condition of roads, streets,
bridges, public buildings and other public works under their control or supervision”
At any rate, even though it is a national highway, the law regardless if whether
or not the road is national, provincial, city, or municipal, so long as it is under the
City’s control and supervision, it shall be responsible for damages by reason of
the defective conditions thereof.
In the case at bar, the City of Manila even admitted they have control and
supervision over the road where Petitioner fell when the City alleged that it has
been doing constant and regular inspection of the city’s roads, particularly P.
Burgos.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS v. KANLAON CONSTRUCTION
Topic: Incorporation of government owned or controlled corporations
FACTS:
Philippine National Railways (PNR) and Kanlaon entered into contracts for the
repair of three PNR station buildings and passenger shelters with a total cost of P6
Million. Kanlaon, alleging that it had already completed the three projects, sent a
demand letter to PNR for the release of retention money in the amount of P333k.
PNR denied Kanlaon’s demand due to Notices of Suspension issued by the
Commission on Audit (COA). Kanlaon then filed a complaint for collection of sum
of money plus damages against PNR for the recovery of the remaining balance of
the three projects and the retention money, thus totaling P865k. The COA was
likewise impleaded. PNR admitted the existence of the contracts but alleged that:
(1) Kanlaon did not comply with the conditions of the contracts; (2) Kanlaon did
not complete the projects; (3) PNR did not have any unpaid balance; and (4) the
refusal to release the retention money was valid because of the COA orders
suspending the release of payment to Kanlaon. The RTC ruled in favor of Kanlaon
and the CA affirmed the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contracts between PNR and Kanlaon are valid
HELD:
NO, the three contracts entered into by PNR and Kanlaon are void for violation of
Secs. 46, 47, and 48, Chapter 8, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative
Code of 1987, as well as Secs. 85, 86, and 87 of the Government Auditing Code of
the Philippines.
One of the reasons the COA issued the Notices of Suspension was because the
contracts did not contain a Certificate of Availability of Funds as required under
Secs. 85 and 86 of The Government Auditing Code of the Philippines (P.D. 1445).
Kanlaon, in fact, does not dispute the absence of the certification. The
Administrative Code of 1987 also contains the same provisions, expressly
prohibiting the entering into contracts involving the expenditure of public funds
unless two prior requirements are satisfied: First, there must be an appropriation
law authorizing the expenditure required in the contract. Second, there must be
attached to the contract a certification by the proper accounting official and
auditor that funds have been appropriated by law and such funds are available.
Failure to comply with any of these two requirements renders the contract void.
In several cases, the Court ruled that these two requirements – the existence of
appropriation and the attachment of the certification – are “conditions sine qua
non for the execution of government contracts.” The three contracts between
PNR and Kanlaon do not comply with the requirement of a certification of
appropriation and fund availability. Even if a certification of appropriation is not
applicable to PNR if the funds used are internally generated, still a certificate of
fund availability is required. Thus, the three contracts are void for violation of the
Administrative Code of 1987 and the Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines.
Kanlaon, however, is not left without recourse. Sec. 48 of the Administrative
Code of 1987 provides that “the officer or officers entering into the contract shall
be liable to the Government or other contracting party for any consequent
damage to the same extent as if the transaction had been wholly between
 private parties.” Thus, Kanlaon could go after the officers who signed the
contract and hold them personally liable.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the 26
February 2008 Decision and 26 May 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 70205. SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES JAYME v. APOSTOL
Topic: Incorporation of government owned or controlled corporations
FACTS:
On February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board
the Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, and employee of the Municipality
of Koronadal. The pick-up truck was registered under the name of Rodrigo
Apostol, but it was then in the possession of Ernesto Simbulan. Lozano only
borrowed the pick-up truck from Simbulan to bring Mayor Miguel to Buayan
Airport at Gen. Santos City to catch his Manila flight.
The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, son of the petitioners
in this case, while he was crossing the National Highway in Poblacion, South
Cotabato. The intensity of the collision sent Marvin some 50 meters away from
the point of impact. He sustained severe head injuries with subdural hematoma
and diffused cerebral contusion. He was initially treated at the Howard Hubbard
Memorial Hospital, but due to the seriousness of his injuries, he was airlifted to a
medical center in Davao for more intensive treatment. Despite medical attention,
Marvin expired 6 days after the accident.
Spouses Jayme filed a complaint with the RTC against respondents. They prayed
that all respondents be held solidarily liable for their loss. They pointed out that
the proximate cause of Marvin’s death was Lozano’s negligent and reckless
driving.
In respective answers, all respondents denied liability for Marvin’s death. Apostol
and Simbulan averred that Lozano took the pick-up truck without their consent.
Mayor Miguel and Lozano pointed out that Marvin’s sudden sprint across the
highway made it impossible to avoid the accident. Yet, Mayor Miguel denied being
on board the vehicle when it hit Marvin. Municipality of Koronadal adopted the
answer of Lozano and Miguel. First Integrated Bonding and Insurance Company
Inc., the vehicle insurer, insisted that its liability is contributory and is only
conditioned on the right of the insured.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of the Spouses and that Municipality of
Koronadal cannot be held liable for the damages incurred by other defendant
being an agency of the State performing governmental functions.
CA granted the appeal of Mayor Miguel and held that he should not be liable for
damages for the death of Marvin because Mayor Miguel was not the employer of
Lozano. That it is the Municipality of Koronadal who employed both Mayor Miguel
and Lozano. Mayor Miguel cannot be held liable for the damages caused by
Lozano because he was a mere passenger. It is the registered owner of a vehicle
who is jointly and severally liable with the driver for damages incurred by
passengers of third persons as a consequence of injuries or death sustained in the
operation of the vehicle.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal mayor may be held solidarily liable for the
negligent acts of the driver assigned to him, which resulted in the death of a minor
pedestrian.
HELD:
NO. Applying the four-fold test, CA correctly held that it was the Municipality of
Koronadal which was the lawful employer of Lozano at the time of the accident. It
is uncontested that Lozano was employed as a driver by the municipality. That he
was subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel during the time of the accident is of
no moment. This Court has, on several occasions, held that an employer-
employee relationship still exists even if the employee was loaned by the
employer to another person or entity because control over the employee subsists.
In the case under review, the Municipality of Koronadal remains to be Lozano's
employer notwithstanding Lozano's assignment to Mayor Miguel.
In the case at bar, Mayor Miguel was neither Lozano's employer nor the vehicle's
registered owner. There existed no causal relationship between him and Lozano
or the vehicle used that will make him accountable for Marvin's death. Mayor
Miguel was a mere passenger at the time of the accident.
As correctly held by the RTC, the true and lawful employer of Lozano is the
Municipality of Koronadal. Unfortunately for Spouses Jayme, the municipality
may not be sued because it is an agency of the State engaged in governmental
functions and, hence, immune from suit. This immunity is illustrated in
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme, where this Court held, “It has
already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their
charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are
generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental
functions and can only be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were
acting in proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State
merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in
a governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes
under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot
recover.”
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the
appealed Decision AFFIRMED.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION vs OÑATE
Topic: When it would be inequitable for the government to claim immunity
FACTS:
Respondent Oñate claimed ownership of a lot through the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement. On December 15, 1992, through his counsel, respondent sent a letter to
petitioner apprising it about the facts and circumstances affecting the elementary
school and its occupancy of the lot.
In an Answer, the Mayor denied the respondent’s claim of ownership of the disputed
lot as it alleged that sometime in 1940, the Municipality bought the said land from
Claro Oñate, respondent’s grandfather, and eventually the Municipality donated the
school site to petitioner DECS. Thus, asserting that it can also claim ownership
through adverse possession.
Defendants in said case filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
respondent’s suit was against the State which was prohibited without the latter’s
consent. Respondent countered with his Opposition, the trial court denied the Joint
Motion to Dismiss, ruling that the State had given implied consent by entering into
a contract.
Hence, the petition.
ISSUE:
1. WON DECS can be sued without its consent
2. WON DECS can be sued independently of the Republic of the Philippines
HELD:
1. YES. Petitioner DECS can be sued without its permission as a result of its being
privy to the Deed of Donation executed by the Municipality over the disputed
property. When it voluntarily gave its consent to the donation, any dispute that may
arise from it would necessarily bring the petitioner DECS down to the level of an
ordinary citizen of the State vulnerable to a suit by an interested or affected party. It
has shed off its mantle of immunity and relinquished and forfeited its armor of non-
suitability of the State.
2. YES. The Republic of the Philippines need not be impleaded as a party-defendant
in Civil Case no. 8715 considering that it impliedly gave its approval to the
involvement of petitioner DECS in the Deed of Donation. In a situation involving a
contract between a government department and a third party, the Republic of the
Philippines need not be impleaded as a party to the suit resulting from the said
contract as it is assumed that the authority granted to such department to enter into
such contract carries with it the full responsibility and authority to sue and be sued
at the same in its name.
CHAVEZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN
Topic: Scope of Consent
FACTS
Chavez, in his capacity as Solicitor General, challenges 2 resolutions (Jun 8, 1989 &
Nov 2, 1989) of the Sandiganbayan issued in a civil case which granted the motion
of JPE to implead Chavez as an additional party defendant in Enrile’s counterclaim
in the civil case.
On Jul 1987, the Republic of the PH, through the PCGG with the assistance of the Sol
Gen filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint against Cojuanco and JPE, among
others, for reconveyance, reversion, & accounting, restitution and damages.
After the denial of his motion to dismiss, JPE filed his answer with compulsory
counterclaim and cross-claim with damages. The RP filed its reply to answer and MD
to dismiss the counterclaim. The motion was opposed by JPE.
The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution ruling that the counterclaim against the
plaintiff government is deferred until after trial; while the matter of the additional
parties, the propriety of impleading them as 3 rd-party defendant requires leave of
court to determine the propriety thereof. Since no leave of court has been sought,
consideration cannot be entertained.
JPE then requested leave from the Sandiganbayan to implead the petitioner and the
PCGG officials as party defendants for lodging the alleged “harassment suit” against
him. On the 8th of Jun 1989, the controversial motion was later on granted.
On the 2nd Nov 1989, Sandiganbayan denied the MR.
Thereafter, all the PCGG officials filed their answer to the counterclaims invoking
their immunity from suits as provided in Sec 4 of EO No. 1. Instead of filing an
answer, the petitioner comes to this Court assailing the resolutions as rendered with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE
WON the petitioner was properly impleaded as an additional party defendant in the
counterclaim filed by JPE in the civil case.
HELD
No, Chavez must be dropped as a 3rd party defendant. The petitioner submits that
no counter-claim can be filed against him in his capacity as Sol Gen since he is only
acting as counsel for the Republic, exercising his duty under the law to assist the
Government in the filing and prosecution of all cases. The rule is that the appearance
of a lawyer as counsel for a party and his participation in a case as such counsel does
not make him a party to the action. The fact that he represents the interests of his
client or that he acts in their behalf will not hold him liable for or make him entitled
to any award that the Court may adjudicate to the parties, other than his
professional fees. The principle that a counterclaim cannot be filed against persons
who are acting in representation of another — such as trustees — in their individual
capacities could be applied with more force and effect in the case of a counsel whose
participation in the action is merely confined to the preparation of the defense of his
client.
There is no general immunity arising solely from occupying a public office.
The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts
claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have
acted ultra vires or where there is a showing of bad faith.
The SC held that Chavez’ argument that the immunity proviso under
Section 4(a) of EO No. 1 also extends to him is not well-taken. A mere invocation of
the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the charges being automatically
dropped. Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-
accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the
Republic.
Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as Sol Gen acts in bad faith,
"maliciously conspires with the PCGG in persecuting JPE by filing against him an
evidently baseless suit in derogation of the latter's constitutional rights and
liberties", there can be no question that a complaint for damages may be filed
against him. High position in government does not confer a license to persecute or
recklessly injure another.
The actions governed by Articles 19, 20, 21, and 32 of the Civil Code on
Human Relations may be taken against public officers or private citizens alike. The
issue is not the right of JPE to file an action for damages, it is whether or not that
action must be filed as a compulsory counterclaim in the case filed against him.
Under the circumstances of this case, the SC ruled that the charges pressed by JPE
for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code arising from the filing of an alleged
harassment suit with malice and evident bad faith do not constitute a compulsory
counterclaim.
In the case at bar, the counterclaim was filed against the lawyer, not against the
party plaintiff itself. To allow a counterclaim against a lawyer who files a complaint
for his clients, who is merely their representative in court and not a plaintiff or
complainant in the case would lead to mischievous consequences.
A lawyer owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest, warm zeal
in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning
and ability. A lawyer cannot properly attend to his duties towards his client if, in the
same case, he is kept busy defending himself.
The problem is particularly perplexing for the Solicitor General. As counsel
of the Republic, the Solicitor General has to appear in controversial and politically
charged cases. It is not unusual for high officials of the Government to unwittingly
use shortcuts in the zealous desire to expedite executive programs or reforms. The
Solicitor General cannot look at these cases with indifferent neutrality. His
perception of national interest and obedience to instructions from above may
compel him to take a stance which to a respondent may appear too personal and
biased. It is likewise unreasonable to require Government Prosecutors to defend
themselves against counterclaims in the very same cases they are prosecuting.
FALLO
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The questioned resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan are SET ASIDE insofar as they allow the counterclaim filed against
the petitioner.
U.P. v. HON. DIZON
Topic: Rule on Garnishment of Public Funds under a Contract
FACTS:
On Aug 30, 1990, UP entered into a General Construction Agreement with
respondent Stern Builders Corporation for the construction of the extension building
and the renovation of the College of Arts and Sciences Building of UP Los Banos.
Stem Building as per agreement, submitted 3 billings however UP paid only 2 out of
3 billings, prompting Stern Builders to sue the UP to collect the unpaid billing and to
recover various damages. RTC rendered in favor of Stern Billing.
UP filed a notice of appeal however it was filed late and RTC denied due course on
the appeal. While UP was exhausting the available remedies to overturn the denial
of due course to the appeal, RTC issued the writ of execution.
On June 23, 2003 and July 25, 2003, respectively, the sheriff served notices of
garnishment on the UP’s depository banks, namely: Land Bank and the
Development Bank (DBP).
UP assailed the garnishment through an urgent motion to quash the notices of
garnishment however RTC, through respondent Judge Dizon, authorized the release
of the garnished funds of UP.
UP argued that government funds and properties could not be seized by virtue of
writs of execution or garnishment and according to Section 84 of PD 1445 state that
"revenue funds shall not be paid out of any public treasury or depository except in
pursuance of an appropriation law or other specific statutory authority;"
CA dismissed UP’s petition for certiorari and that the garnished funds could be the
proper subject of garnishment because they had been already earmarked for the
project
ISSUE: WON UP funds may be subject garnishment?
HELD: NO
UP was founded as a government instrumentality by Act 1870 and expanded
through RA 9500 (The University of the Philippines Charter of 2008), where Congress
declared UP as the national university. According to Sec 2 of Act 1870, the
disbursement of all the funds going into the possession of the UP constitute a
"special trust fund” and should be in line with UP vision and mission.
Funds of UP are government funds that are public in character and may be spent
only for the attainment of its institutional objectives. Hence, the funds subject of this
action could not be validly made the subject of the RTC’s writ of execution or
garnishment.
In addition, suability of the State did not necessarily mean its liability because
Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable
law and the established facts. The liability of UP namely the moral and actual
damages can’t be executed through a writ of execution but through an actual law by
Congress for special appropriation to cover the liability.
According to Section 26 of PD 1445, The execution of the monetary judgment
against the UP was within the primary jurisdiction of the COA. Regardless that the
executory decision already validated the claim against the UP, the claim was still
subject to the primary jurisdiction of the COA and RTC had no authority to to direct
the immediate withdrawal of any portion of the garnished funds from the depository
banks of the UP.
Under Section 49-50 of PD 1445, All money claims against the Government must
first be filed with the Commission on Audit which must act upon it within sixty days.
BUISAN v. COA
Topic: Rule on Garnishment of Public Funds under a Contract
MACQUILING v. COMELEC
Topic: General Principles and State Policies; Sovereignty of the People and
Republicanism
FACTS:
● Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.However, as a
consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of
America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San
Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and
Re-acquisition was issued in his favor
● Arnado ran for Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte
● Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to
disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor
of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the May 2010 local and national
elections
● Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte
and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of
Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-
American."To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented
in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record indicating Arnado had
been entering and departing the Philippines using a U.S passport
● COMELEC First Division found that Arnado did not meet one-year residency
requirement. It also found that Arnado was not a Filipino citizen
● Petitioner Maquiling filed an MR saying Arnado should be proclaimed winner,
respondent Arnado claims Maquiling has no standing to intervene after decision has
been made by COMELEC
● COMELEC En Banc revered the division, ruled that Arnado had complied with
citizenship requirement ruling that by renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by
R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his Philippine citizenship as though he
never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009, that the
respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen again.
● The COMELEC En Banc also ruled that The use of a US passport … does not
operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there is
no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not operate to
"un-renounce" what he has earlier on renounced
● Maquiling later contests this decision by the COMELEC En Banc favoring
Arnado
ISSUE: 1.)Whether or not Arnado’s use of a foreign passport led to recant of his
Oath of Allegiance and 2.)whether he may still be validly proclaimed as winner
HELD: 1.) YES. His use of a foreign passport is a recant
● The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a
positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship;
it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath
of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
● Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first,
on 10 July 2008 when he applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the
Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the
execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the time, however, he
likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual
citizen.
● After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American
citizenship by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the
requirements for eligibility to run for public office.
● By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino
citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign
country.
● However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to
attack when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive
acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.
● Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after
renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in
and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November
2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether he was solely and exclusively
a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby
rendering him eligible to run for public office.
● Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30
November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times,
actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By
using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as
an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries
that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the
United States of America.
● The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be
professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and
perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and
political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship
● We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign
passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by
repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado
voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such
reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented
himself as an American citizen by using his US passport.
● This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship
is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a
disqualification to run for an elective local position.
● By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado
was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American
citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code he was not qualified to run for a local
elective position.
● 2.) NO. THE COC filed by Arnado is void and he cannot be proclaimed a
winner even if he received most number of votes
● The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice
of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the
candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the
deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the
Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and
renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the
COMELEC En Bane dated 2 February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any
local elective position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly
elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arnado did not comply with the requirements under RA
9225 and therefore disqualified from the mayoralty post
HELD:
ARNADO v. COMELEC
Topic: General Principles and State Policies
FACTS:
● Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who became a
naturalized American citizen
● In preparation for his plans to run for public office in the Philippines, he
applied for repatriation under RA 9225
● He took an oath of allegiance and an order was given approving his Citizen
Retention and Re-acquisition
● Arnado filed his CoC on November 30, 2009 for a mayoralty post in
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte
● Balua, another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado,
● According to Balua, Arnado continued to use his American Passport even
after the granting of his application for repatriation
● COMELEC First Division: the continued use of his US Passport negated his
April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Repatriation
● COMELEC En Banc: reversed the decision of the First Division, finding merit
to the argument of Arnado that he continued to use his US Passport
because he did not yet know that he had been issued a Philippine Passport
at the time of the relevant foreign trips. And that after receiving his PH
Passport, Arnado used the same for his subsequent trips.
● April 16, 2013 - the SC decided on Maquiling (to the detriment of Arnado)
● Despite this, the COMELEC still proclaimed Arnado as the winner for the
mayoralty race
● Capitan, private-respondent in this case, filed a petition to disqualify
Arnado pursuant to the SC decision in Maquiling
● COMELEC Second Division & COMELEC En Banc: Arnado is DISQUALIFIED
because he continued using his US Passport after executing his affidavit of
Repatriation
● YES, Arnado’s continued use of his US Passport even after the execution of
his affidavit of repatriation rendered the said affidavit void. He needed to
go through the repatriation and re-acquisition process again.
● Under Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code, a person with "dual
citizenship" is disqualified from running for any elective local position.
● In Mercado v. Manzano it was clarified that the phrase "dual citizenship" in
said Section 4(d) must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance.''
● Subsequent, Congress enacted RA 9225 allowing natural-born citizens of
the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization abroad to reacquire Philippine citizenship and to enjoy full
civil and political rights upon compliance with the requirements of the law.
● They may now run for public office in the Philippines provided that they: (1)
meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws; and, (2) make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath46 prior to or at the time of filing of their
CoC.
● In the case at bench, the Comelec Second Division, as affirmed by the
Comelec En Banc, ruled that Arnado failed to comply with the second
requisite of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225 because, as held in Maquiling v.
Commission on Elections his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was
deemed withdrawn when he used his US passport after executing said
affidavit. Consequently, at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 for
 purposes of the May 13, 2013 elections, Arnado had yet to comply with said
second requirement. The Comelec also noted that while Arnado submitted
an affidavit dated May 9, 2013, affirming his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation, the same would not suffice for having been belatedly
executed.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Comelec
Resolutions are AFFIRMED. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by this Court is
LIFTED.
PHILIP MORRIS v CA
Topic: Sovereignty of the People and Republicanism
FACTS:
Philip Morris, Incorporated is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of
Virginia, United States of America, and does business at 100 Park Avenue, New York,
New York, United States of America. The two other plaintiff foreign corporations,
which are wholly-owned subsidiaries of Philip Morris, Inc., are similarly not doing
business in the Philippines but are suing on an isolated transaction. As registered
owners "MARK VII", "MARK TEN", and "LARK" per certificates of registration issued
by the Philippine Patent Office, plaintiffs-petitioners asserted that defendant
Fortune Tobacco Corporation has no right to manufacture and sell cigarettes
bearing the allegedly identical or confusingly similar trademark "MARK" in
contravention of Section 22 of the Trademark Law, and should, therefore, be
precluded during the pendency of the case from performing the acts complained of
via a preliminary injunction.
Fortune Tobacco Corporation admitted petitioners' certificates of registration with
the Philippine Patent Office subject to the affirmative and special defense on
misjoinder of party plaintiffs. Private respondent alleged further that it has been
authorized by the Bureau of Internal Revenue to manufacture and sell cigarettes
bearing the trademark "MARK", and that "MARK" is a common word which cannot
be exclusively appropriated.
RTC denied petitioners, ruling that there is no proof whatsoever that any of
plaintiffs' products which they seek to protect from any adverse effect of the
trademark applied for by defendant, is in actual use and available for commercial
purposes anywhere in the Philippines
CA initially reversed, but eventually favored Fortune following a Motion for
Reconsideration.
Petitioners invoke Sec 21-A of the Trademark Law, which states:
“Sec. 21-A. Any foreign corporation or juristic person to which a mark or trade-name
has been registered or assigned under this act may bring an action hereunder for
infringement, for unfair competition, or false designation of origin and false
description, whether or not it has been licensed to do business in the Philippines
under Act Numbered Fourteen hundred and fifty-nine, as amended, otherwise
known as the Corporation Law, at the time it brings complaint: Provided, That the
country of which the said foreign corporation or juristic person is a citizen or in which
it is domiciled, by treaty, convention or law, grants a similar privilege to corporate or
juristic persons of the Philippines. “
Petitioners also invoke the Paris Convention of 1965 to which the Philippines is a
signatory in seeking a favorable decision on their part.
ISSUE: Whether or not a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines
may have the capacity to sue in the Philippines for trademark infringement?
HELD: YES. However, this may not apply if the trademark is not actually being used
in the Philippines.
Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal law on trademarks
regarding the requirement of actual use in the Philippines must subordinate an
international agreement inasmuch as the apparent clash is being decided by a
municipal tribunal.
The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not
by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the
municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries,
rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national
legislative enactments.
In other words, petitioners may have the capacity to sue for infringement
irrespective of lack of business activity in the Philippines on account of Section 21-A
of the Trademark Law but the question whether they have an exclusive right over
their symbol as to justify issuance of the controversial writ will depend on actual use
of their trademarks in the Philippines in line with Sections 2 and 2-A of the same law.
It is thus incongruous for petitioners to claim that when a foreign corporation not
licensed to do business in the Philippines files a complaint for infringement, the
entity need not be actually using its trademark in commerce in the Philippines. Such
a foreign corporation may have the personality to file a suit for infringement but it
may not necessarily be entitled to protection due to absence of actual use of the
emblem in the local market.
REPUBLIC V. MUPAS
Topic: Enforceability in the Philippines of Final Judgments of Foreign Courts
FACTS:
On July 12, 1997, the Government executed a Concession Agreement with Philippine
International Airport Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction,
development, and operation of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger
Terminal III (NAIA-IPT III) under a build-operate-transfer scheme. PIATCO engaged
the services of Takenaka, a local branch of a foreign corporation duly organized
under the laws of Japan and doing business in the Philippines, for the construction
of the NAIA-IPT III under an Onshore Construction Contract. PIATCO likewise
contracted the services of Asahikosan, a foreign corporation duly organized under
the laws of Japan, for the design, manufacture, purchase, test and delivery of the
Plant in the NAIA-IPT III. President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo declared in her speech
that the Government would not honor the PIATCO contracts. On the same day,
Takenaka and Asahikosan notified PIATCO that they were suspending the
construction of the NAIA-IPT III for PIATCO's failure to provide adequate security.
Thus, the Government filed a complaint for expropriation against PIATCO with the
RTC. Asahikosan filed a motion for leave to intervene while Takenaka filed a
Manifestation of its voluntary appearance.
Takenaka and Asahikosan informed the RTC that they had previously filed two
collection cases against PIATCO before the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench
Division, Technology and Construction Court in London, England, (London Court) on
August 9, 2004. In both instances, the London Court ruled in their favor. Takenaka
and Asahikosan asked the RTC to: (a) hold in abeyance the release of just
compensation to PIATCO until the London awards are recognized and enforced in
the Philippines; and (b) order that the just compensation be deposited with the RTC
for the benefit of PIATCO's creditors. RTC allowed intervention. In proving the
construction costs for purposes of computing just compensation, PIATCO included
the London awards as part of the construction costs which equalled
$360,969,790.82. Government opposed the computation and excluded the London
awards to the Japanes corporations and the sum was $300,206,693. Both the RTC
and the CA favored the computation of PIATCO, Takenaka and Asahikosan. Thus,
the present appeal of the Government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the London awards should be part of the construction cost.
HELD:
No. In any case, we cannot consider the London awards as evidence of the
construction cost of the NAIA-IPT III. To do so in this case is to recognize Claim No.
HT-04-248 and Claim No. HT-05-269 when their recognition and enforcement have
yet to be decided by this Court in G.R. No. 202166. It is a basic rule that Philippine
courts cannot take judicial notice of a foreign judgment or order. We can only
recognize and/or enforce a foreign judgment or order after a conclusive and a final
binding by Philippine courts that: (1) the foreign court or tribunal has jurisdiction
over the case, (2) the parties were properly notified, and (3) there was no collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
While the Government refers to a judgment rendered by a London court in favor of
Takenaka and Asahikosan against PIATCO in the amount of US$82 Million, it should
be noted that this foreign judgment is not yet binding on Philippine courts. It is
entrenched in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure that a foreign
judgment on the mere strength of its promulgation is not yet conclusive, as it can be
annulled on the grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. It is likewise recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence and international law that a foreign judgment may be barred from
recognition if it runs counter to public policy.
BPI v. GUEVARRA
Topic: Enforceability in the Philippines of Final Judgments of Foreign Courts
FACTS:
Petitioner, Ayala Corporation (Ayala), is known as a leading company in the
Philippines with numerous business ventures. Attributing to its corporate success,
Ayala expanded its enterprise and owned several other companies such as Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC), Philsec Investment Corporation
(PHILSEC), Ayala International Finance Limited (AIFL) which eventually became BPI
International Finance Limited (BPI-IFL), and Athona Holdings (ATHONA).
In 1958, Respondent, Edgardo Guevara (Guevara), was hired by Ayala Corporation
(Ayala), who later assumed various executive posts under the company as Head of
the Legal Department, President, and Vice-President among others. As President of
Ayala, Guevara was tasked to resolve the outstanding debt of Ventura Ducat
(Ducat), a stockholder, amounting to USD 3 Million which threatened the company’s
position in the Makati Stock Exchange.
To pay off his loan, Ducat proposed to give off in exchange one of his properties in
Harris County, Texas, United Stated which he owned with Drago Daic (Daic),
President of 1488, Inc. (1488), a US-based corporation. The said property was
allegedly appraised at USD 2.8 illion, as supported by both Ducat and Daic. Since the
proposal was endorsed by Guevara, Ayala agreed to the exchange of asset to settle
Ducat’s account. Final negotiations proceeded as follows – a) ATHONA bought
Harris County property from 1488, Inc. for the price of USD 2,807,209.02; b)
PHILSEC and AIFL granted ATHONA a loan of USD 2.5 Million, which ATHONA used
as initial payment to purchase the property; and c) ATHONA executed a promissory
note in favor of 1488, Inc. in the sum of USD 307,209.02 to cover the remaining
balance of the property. It was also decided that PHILSEC and AIFL would release
and transfer possession of Ducat's stock portfolio to 1488, Inc. which would then
become the new creditor of Ducat.
Unfortunately, as the real estate market in Texas became unpredictable,
Ayala was not able to sell off the Harris Country property, failing both to pay the
remaining USD 307,000 and transferring Ducat’s stocks to 1488. In turn, 1488 filed a
suit in the US courts against Ayala for failure to render its obligations. In response,
Ayala also filed counterclaims against 1488 and Guevara alleging fraud, negligence
and conspiracy in declaring the overpriced appraisal value of the property. However,
both the US District Court and US Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Guevara and
1488.
Despite the foreign ruling, Ayala refused to comply with the US courts
verdict. As such, Guevara instituted an action in the Philippine courts. Both the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) and Court of Appeals also rendered decision in favor of
Guevara’s claim to be paid USD 500,000 as was also previously ruled in the US courts.
Hence, the petition.
In its defense, Ayala asserted that the US courts committed a clear mistake of law
and fact in the issuance of its decision which is unenforceable in Philippine
jurisdiction. Ayala also stressed that Guevara, together with 1488, Ducat, and Daic,
connived to induce the former to agree to a fraudulent deal. Additionally, Ayala
lamented that Guevara endorsed the appraisal of the market value of the Harris
County property which was overvalued by more than 400%.
ISSUE:
Whether or not foreign judgments should be recognized and enforced under
Philippine jurisdiction?
HELD:
YES, foreign judgments should be recognized and enforced under Philippine
jurisdiction.
It is an established international legal principle that final judgments of foreign courts
of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious
subject to certain conditions that vary in different countries. In the Philippines, a
judgment or final order of a foreign tribunal cannot be enforced simply by execution.
Such judgment or order merely creates a right of action, and its non-satisfaction is
the cause of action by which a suit can be brought upon for its enforcement. An
action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment or final order in this jurisdiction is
governed by Rule 39, Section 48 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or
final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the
judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final
order is conclusive upon the title to the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order
is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision
dated December 19, 2003 and Resolution dated February 9, 2005 of the Court
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69348, affirming the Decision dated September 11, 2000
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 57 in Civil Case No. 92-1445, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that petitioner BPI Securities Corporation
is ordered to pay respondent Edgardo V. Guevara the sum of US$49,450.00 or its
equivalent in Philippine Peso, with interest at six percent (6%) per annum from the
filing of the case before the trial court on May 28, 1992 until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. JUDGE LANTION
Topic: Enforceability in the Philippines of Final Judgments of Foreign Courts
FACTS:
In 1977, Presidential Decree no. 1069 “prescribing the procedure for the
extradition of persons who have committed crimes in a foreign country” was
issued by then President Marcos. The Decree was founded on the intention of the
Philippines to enter into treaties like the extradition treaty with the Republic of
Indonesia with other interested countries. In 1994, then Secretary of Justice
signed the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the United States of
America, which was concurred and ratified by the Senate. In 1999, the
Department of Justice received from the US a request for the extradition of
Mark Jimenez. Attached to the request was the Grand Jury Indictment, the
warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents. The charges against
Jimenez included:
1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US;
2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax;
3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television;
4. False statement or entries;
5. Election contribution in the name of another.
The DOJ proceeded with the technical evaluation and assessment of the
extradition request pursuant to Section 5(1) of PD 1069. Pending this evaluation,
Jimenez addressed a letter to the Sec. of Justice requesting to be furnished with
copies of the official request from the US Government as well as to be given ample
time to comment on the request. This was subsequently denied on the grounds
that it was premature to furnish Jimenez with copies pending the evaluation of the
request’s sufficiency in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and the
extradition law. Jimenez then filed for a petition of mandamus, certiorari, and
prohibition with the RTC of the NCR, which ruled in his favour and ordered the
petitioners to “maintain the status quo by refraining from committing the acts
complained of; from conducting further proceedings xxx for the extradition of
the petitioner; xxx performing any act directed to the extradition of the
petitioner to the United States.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jimenez was deprived due process, specifically that to notice
and hearing, during the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings
HELD:
YES, Jimenez was deprived of due process
Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, the rules of international law form part of
the law of the land.
Efforts must be made to harmonize them with municipal laws. In a situation where
there is irreconcilable conflict, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law must be
upheld. The rights of the accused guaranteed in the Constitution should take
precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state.
Because of the possible consequences/threats to a prospective extraditee’s liberty
as early as that stage, the Court ruled that the nature of the evaluation process of
the extradition treaty is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative
proceedings, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such an
assessment sets off the procedure for the deprivation of liberty of the prospective
extraditee.
While there are certain constitutional rights ordinarily available only in criminal
prosecution, the Court has ruled that where the investigation of an administrative
proceeding may result in forfeiture of life, liberty, or property, the proceedings
are deemed criminal or penal. Essentially, the evaluation process is in nature that of
a criminal investigation. Thus, the extraditee must not be deprived of his
constitutionally guaranteed right of due process.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent
copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a
reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. The
incidents in Civil Case No. 99-94684 having been rendered moot and academic by
this decision, the same is hereby ordered dismissed.
TAÑADA v. ANGARA
Topic: Doctrine of Auto Limitation
FACTS:
On April 15, 1994, Secretary for Trade and Industry Rizalino Navarro signed the Final
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations. On
August 12, 1994, members of the Philippine Senate received a letter dated August
21, 1994 from President Fidel Ramos stating that the Uruguay Round Final Act was
was hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21,
Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. On August 13, 1994, members of the
Senate received another letter from the President stating that the Uruguay Round
Final Act, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Agreement (WTO Agreement),
the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments
in Financial Services were hereby submitted to the Senate for concurrence pursuant
to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution. On December 14, 1994, the Philippine
Senate adopted Senate Resolution No. 97 which resolved that the Senate concur in
the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement of Establishing
the WTO. On December 16, 1994, the President signed the Instrument of
Ratification, which was composed of the Agreement proper and the associated legal
instruments included in Annexes 1, 2, and 3 of said Agreement. The Final Act signed
by Secretary Navarro embodied was not only the WTO Agreement but also the
Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and Understanding on Commitments in
Financial Services.
On December 29, 1994, the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was filed. Petitioners argue that WTO
requires Philippines “to place nationals and products of member-countries on the
same footing as Filipinos and local products.” They also argue that the WTO
"intrudes, limits, and/or impairs the constitutional powers of both Congress and the
Supreme Court." Petitioners assail the WTO Agreement for violating mandates of
the Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos, to give preference to qualified Filipinos, and to
promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods.” They are praying for the nullification of the concurrence of the
Senate in the ratification of the Agreement through Senate Resolution No. 97, and
for prohibition of the Agreement's implementation and enforcement through the
release and utilization of public funds, the assignment of public officials and
employees, as well as the use of government properties and resources by
respondent-heads of various executive offices concerned therewith.
The Supreme Court to give due course to the petition.
ISSUE:
Do provisions of the WTO Agreement unduly limit, restrict and impair the Philippine
sovereignty, specifically the legislative power vested in the Congress by the
Philippine Constitution under Section 2, Article VI thereof?
HELD:
No, the WTO Agreement does not unduly limit, restrict and impaire the Philippine
sovereignty, specifically the legislative power of the Congress. The Senate acted in
the proper manner when it concurred with the President’s ratification of the
agreement.
While sovereignty has been traditionally absolute and all-encompassing on the
domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed
to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly as a member of the family of nations.
In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as a part of the law of the land, and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity,
with all nations.” By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally
accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically
part of our own laws. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international
law is pacta sunt servanda – international agreements must be performed in good
faith.
A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding
obligation on the parties. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the
absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some
aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived
from a convention or pact.
After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually
covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise
of their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been used to record
agreements between States concerning such widely diverse matters. The
sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute.
Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature
of membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty
stipulations.
The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade
without discrimination” cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are
rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from
envisioning a trade policy based on “equality and reciprocity,” the fundamental law
encourages industries that are “competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,”
thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade
environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that
can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and
Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally.
And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in
Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against
the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
PEOPLE vs. LAGMAN and SOSA
Topic: 1.4. Government as Protector of the People and People as Defender of the State
(Art. II, Sec. 4 and Sec. 5)
FACTS:
Appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation
of Section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law.
It is alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the age of
20 in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to register in the military service even
though they had been required to do so. The appellants were duly notified to appear
before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military service but still did not
register up to the date of the filing of the information.
The herein appellants argue that they did not register because de Sosa is fatherless
and has a mother and a brother eight years old to support, and Lagman also has a
father to support, has no military learnings, and does not wish to kill or be killed.
The CFI sentenced them both to one month and one day of imprisonment, with the
costs.
ISSUE:
1. WON the National Defense Law (Sec 60, Commonwealth Act No. 1) was
constitutional by virtue of Section 2, Article II of the Constitution? [YES]
RULING: Decision of CFI affirmed.
Section 2, Article II of the Constitution:
SEC. 2. The defense of the state is a prime duty of government, and in the
fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal
military or civil service.
The circumstance that the appellants have dependent families to support does not
excuse them from their duty to present themselves before the Acceptance Board
because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for deferment in complying with
their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to
attend to these family responsibilities.
The right of the Government to require compulsory military service is a consequence
of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the life,
liberty, and property of the citizen.

The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service,

does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful
compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be
performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will
of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there
be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.

In US cases, it was stated that the right of the Government to require compulsory
military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State; and, that a person
may be compelled by force to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country,
and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense.

What justifies compulsory military service is the defense of the State, whether actual
or whether in preparation to make it more effective, in case of need. The
circumstances of the appellants do not excuse them from their duty to present
themselves before the Acceptance Board because they can obtain the proper
pecuniary allowance to attend to these family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1).