FIRST DIVISION

A.M. No. RTJ-15-2439 (Formerly: OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3989-RTJ), August 26, 2015

ARIEL "AGA" MUHLACH, Complainant, v. EXECUTIVE JUDGE MA. ANGELA

ACOMPAÑADO-ARROYO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN JOSE CITY,
CAMARINES SUR, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This resolves the complaint dated 6 November 2012 filed by Ariel "Aga" Muhlach
(complainant) charging Executive Judge Ma. Angela Acompañado-Arroyo (EJ Arroyo),
Regional Trial Court (RTC), San Jose City, Camarines Sur with gross ignorance of the
law and abuse of discretion.

ANTECEDENT FACTS

On 5 October 2012, Francisco Perico Dizon, Edgar Malate, Crispin Imperial and
Ferdinand Fernando Felix Monasterio filed a petition before the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of San Jose-Presentacion, Camarines Sur praying for the exclusion of
Ariel and Charlene Mae G. Muhlach (Spouses Muhlach) from the list of voters of
Precinct No. 10A, Brgy. San Juan, San Jose, Camarines Sur. The case was docketed
as Spec. Pro. No. 80.

On even date, Hon. Angel A. Tadeo, MCTC, San Jose-Presentacion, Camarines Sur
voluntarily recused himself from hearing the case on the ground that petitioner Edgar
Malate is a cousin of his late mother-in-law and Francisco Perico-Dazon is the son-in-
law of the his former clerk of court, Florecito V. Patrocinio.1

Acting on such inhibition, EJ Arroyo scheduled the raffle of the case among judges of
the first level courts within her administrative jurisdiction to determine who among them
will be assigned to try and decide the case.

The case was eventually raffled to Judge Ricky C. Begino (Judge Begino).

In an Order2 dated 12 October 2012, Judge Begino set the case for hearing on 16
October 2012.

On 15 October 2012, Spouses Muhlach filed a motion to dismiss Spec. Procs. No. 80.

In the morning of 16 October 2012, the Office of the Clerk of Court received a copy of
the Order of Inhibition of Judge Begino, which states that:
An (sic) oral motion of the counsel of the respondents, undersigned judge hereby inhibit
(sic) himself from further trying and ruling of this case to avoid any doubt as to the
impartiality of this court.3
In the morning of 16 October 2012 also, the counsel for Spouses Muhlach filed with
MCTC, San Jose-Presentacion an Urgent Omnibus Motion: 1) to inhibit the Judge
Begino; and 2) to re-raffle and assign the case to another judge.

In the afternoon of the same date, EJ Arroyo issued the assailed order which rendered
ineffective the order of inhibition of Judge Begino. It further directed Judge Begino to
continue to hear and decide the case. EJ Arroyo noted that the counsel for Spouses
Muhlach's oral motion failed to state'the grounds to justify the inhibition of the judge. It
likewise did not explain why doubts as to the impartiality of the court could exist. 4

Judge Begino proceeded with the hearing of the case and on 19 October 2012,
resolved, among others, the 16 October 2012 Urgent Motion to Inhibit filed by counsel
for the Spouses Muhlach. He ruled, thus:
The Court is not convinced of the merit being shown by [Spouses Muhlach] for the
Undersigned Judge (Judge for brevity) to inhibit from hearing and deciding this case.

The movants miserably failed to show what judicial actuations made by the Judge which
may be perceived that he has already predetermined the facts and issues involved in
this case. If, the judicial actuations they are referring to is in connection with the Order
of the Judge denying their Motion to Dismiss, the same is not sufficient for a Judge to
inhibit himself from hearing and deciding the case considering that the denial was based
on law.

xxxx

All told, the [Spouses Muhlach[s] belief that the Judge and his sibling Agnes are political
allies of Mr. Fuentebella is unfounded, untrue and baseless.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, the Urgent Omnibus Motion to Inhibit the Honorable Presiding Judge
Ricky C. Begino and to Re-Raffle and Assign Case to Another Presiding Judge is
hereby ordered DENIED. The undersigned Judge will continue to hear and decide this
case with the assurance to all parties concerned that he will take his role to dispense
justice according to law and evidence without fear or favor.5
Dissatisfied, Spouses Muhlach filed on 23 October 2012 an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration (of the Orders dated 17 and 19 October 2012).

In a Decision6 dated 25 October 2012, Judge Begino granted the petition for exclusion
filed by Francisco Perico Dizon, Edgar Malate, Crispin Imperial and Ferdinand
Fernando Felix Monasterio. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition to exclude ARIEL AQUINO
MUHLACH and CHARLENE MAE BONNIN MUHLACH from the list of voters of
Precinct No. 10A Barangay, San Juan, San Jose, Camarines Sur is hereby GRANTED.
The Election Registration Board is hereby ordered to EXCLUDE THE NAMES OF THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FROM THE LIST OF VOTERS OF PRECINCT NO. 10A
BARANGAY SAN JUAN, SAN JOSE, CAMARINES SUR and REMOVE THEIR
REGISTRATION RECORDS FROM THE CORRESPONDING BOOK OF VOTERS and
to ENTER THE ORDER OF EXCLUSION therein; and thereafter, to PLACE THE
RECORDS IN THE INACTIVE FILE, for lack of residency requirement.7
Aggrieved, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint against EJ Arroyo. He
accused EJ Arroyo of having issued the Order dated 16 October 2012 with abuse of
authority and with gross ignorance of law and procedure. Complainant contended that
EJ Arroyo had no authority to reverse Judge Begino's order inhibiting himself as such
power is vested solely in the Supreme Court.

In her comment,8 EJ Arroyo explained that immediately upon receipt of Judge Begino's
order of inhibition, she noticed that the order, on its face, was improper or defective.
She stressed that the procedure prescribed for the disqualification of a judge must be
substantially followed, citing the resolution of the Supreme Court dated 31 August 1978
in A.M. No. 2128-JC.9 She averred that she was not ignorant of Administrative Circular
No. 1 dated 28 January 1998 when she issued the questioned order. Under the cited
circular, the duty of the executive judge is to appoint another trial judge under his/her
supervision to handle the inhibited case or to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.
Considering that the inhibition order issued by Judge Begino was "patently defective,"
she saw no point in referring the same to the Court, through the Office of the Court
Administrator, for evaluation "because in the first place, there was nothing for the latter
to evaluate."

EJ Arroyo further explained that the subject case is a petition for exclusion of the names
of Spouses Muhlach from the list of voters which should be decided within ten days
from its filing as provided for under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8189.10 In view of the status
of the Spouses Muhlach, EJ Arroyo claimed that no judge would want to handle the
case. Thus, when she received a copy of Judge Begino's order of inhibition, she felt that
it was her duty as executive judge to ensure that the case is decided, as much as
possible, within the period prescribed under the law. She reasoned that if she were to
approve Judge Begino's inhibition order which, on its face, was defective, nothing would
stop other judges from recusing themselves from the case on flimsy grounds. She felt
that it would result in an endless cycle leaving the case unresolved.

EJ Arroyo surmised that the complaint was filed for the sole purpose of delaying the
resolution of Spec. Pro. No. 80. She alleged that after Judge Begino decided the case in
favor of the petitioners and ordered the exclusion of Spouses Muhlach from the voters
list, Spouses Muhlach appealed the decision to the RTC. It was raffled to Branch 40
presided over by Judge Noel Paulite (Judge Paulite) who eventually rendered a
decision affirming the decision of Judge Begino. Spouses Muhlach thereafter filed a
Motion for the Inhibition of Judge Paulite on 13 November 2012, after the instant
complaint was filed on 7 November 2012. EJ Arroyo submits that should Judge Paulite
grant the motion for inhibition, a dilemma would arise because the case would be
assigned to Branch 58 where she is the presiding judge, there being only two branches
in RTC San Jose. She claimed that such scenario would lead her to inhibit from the
case because of the administrative complaint filed against her. Consequently, the case
will be referred to the nearest RTC and raffled among the judges in that jurisdiction. She
opined that other delaying tactics may be employed, and soon, it would already be
elections day without the case having decided.11

Finally, she averred that she had been a judge for 11 years and this is the first time that
an administrative case has been filed against her.

We find the charges of ignorance of the law and abuse of discretion bereft of merit.

The rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges is set forth in Section 1, Rule 137 of
the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in
which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to
the rules of civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee
or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision
is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by
them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The aforesaid rule enumerates the specific grounds upon which a judge may be
disqualified from participating in a trial. It must be borne in mind that the inhibition of
judges is rooted in the Constitution, specifically Article III, the Bill of Rights, which
requires that a hearing is conducted before an impartial and disinterested tribunal
because unquestionably, every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality
of an impartial judge. All the other elements of due process, like notice and hearing,
would be meaningless if the ultimate decision would come from a partial and biased
judge.12 Certainly, a presiding judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of
the parties-litigants.

We agree with EJ Arroyo that the inhibition of Judge Begino is lacking in some
elements. Judge Begino simply ruled that he is inhibiting from the case to avoid any
doubts as to the impartiality of the court. Although voluntary inhibition is primarily a
matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge, such should still
comply with the provisions of the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules,
that is, it should be based on just or valid reasons. In the subject order, the reason for
the inhibition of the judge was not stated. Neither could it be determined from the motion
of the Spouses Muhlach's counsel since the motion was done orally, in violation of
Section 213 of the same rule.

When EJ Arroyo declared that Judge Begino's order of inhibition was ineffective, she
was in a way, returning the case back to the presiding judge for the latter to either cure
the deficiency or take cognizance of the case if he finds no basis for the motion. As EJ
Arroyo explained, she was aware that she had no authority to revoke or disapprove the
order of inhibition, as such is vested only in the Supreme Court. It was for that reason
that she used the word "ineffective." Tersely put, EJ Arroyo did not reverse the Order of
Inhibition of Judge Begino. She correctly asked that the Order be completed to comply
with the Rule on Inhibition of Judges.

When Judge Begino continued with the proceedings, it was a manifestation and
admission on his part that he can hear and decide the case with the cold neutrality
expected from an impartial magistrate. His. subsequent ruling on the Urgent Omnibus
Motion filed by counsel for the Spouses Muhlach affirmed EJ Arroyo's position that the
earlier order issued on the basis of the oral motion was defective. The assailed order of
EJ Arroyo was issued in the proper exercise of her administrative functions.

Moreover, to be held liable for gross ignorance of the law, the judge must be shown to
have committed an error that was gross or patent, deliberate or malicious.14 Here, it was
clearly established that the only intention of EJ Arroyo was to ensure that the case is
decided expeditiously and within the period provided under the law. There was no
showing that she was moved by ill-will or malicious intention to violate existing Court
issuances. In fact, bad faith may be attributed to the complainant for filing successive
motions for inhibition.

While it was pronounced in relation to the performance by judges of their judicial

functions, we find that in the matter of their administrative duties, it can likewise be said
that as a matter of public policy, a judge cannot be subjected to liability for any of his
official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. To hold
otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the
facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the instant administrative

complaint filed by Ariel "Aga" Muhlach against Executive Judge Ma. Angela
Acompafiado-Arroyo, Regional Trial Court, San Jose City, Camarines Sur for ignorance
of the law and abuse of discretion is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ.,

concur.
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2405 January 12, 2015
[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3919-RTJ]

ANTONIO S. ASCAÑO, JR., CONSOLACION D. DANTES, BASILISA A. OBALO,

JULIETA D. TOLEDO, JOSEPH Z. MAAC, EMILIANO E. LUMBOY, TITA F.
BERNARDO, IGMEDIO L. NOGUERA, FIDEL S. SARMIENTO, SR., DAN T.
TAUNAN, AMALIA G. SANTOS, AVELINA M. COLONIA, ERIC S. PASTRANA, and
MARIVEL B. ISON Complainants,
vs.
PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE S. JACINTO, JR., Branch 45, Regional Trial Court, San
Jose Occidental Mindoro,Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ:

This is an administrative Complaint1 for gross and serious violations of the Canons of
the Code of Judicial Conduct & Judicial Ethics and Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
(R.A.) 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against
Judge Jose S. Jacinto Jr. (respondent) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45,
San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Complainants Antonio Ascafio, Jr., Consolacion D.
Dantes, Basilisa A. Obalo, Julieta D. Toledo, Joseph Z. Maac, Fidel S. Sarmiento, Sr.,
Dan T. Taunan, Amalia G. Santos, Emiliano E. Lumboy, Tita F. Bernardo, Igmedio L.
Noguera, Avelina Colonia, Eric S. Pastrana, and Marivel B. Ison (collectively,
complainants) were allegedly section leaders of the lessees of market stalls in the public
market ofOccidental Mindoro. The Mayor of the Municipality of San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro (the Municipality), Jose T. Villarosa (Mayor Villarosa or the Mayor) allegedly
wanted to demolish the public market, so that the Municipality can use the space to
erect the new "San Jose Commercial Complex."2 Thus, on 26 June 2012, complainants
filed a Petition for Prohibition With Urgent Application for the Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) against the
Municipality and Mayor Villarosa. The case was docketed as Special Civil Action No. R-
1731 and was raffled to respondent’s sala.

Respondent issued a TRO, which had a 72-hour validity, on 27 June 2012. Hearings for
the determination of the propriety of extending the TRO or issuing the WPI against the
Municipality were scheduled on 2 and 3 July 2012. Mayor Villarosa waived his right to
present his evidence and submitted the case for resolution.3

While the entire entourage of Mayor Villarosa, none of whom were parties to the case,
were all allowed inside the courtroom during the 2 July 2012 hearing,4 only 12 out of the
more than 500 members accompanying complainants on that day were allowed to
enter.5 Worse, upon the motion of the Mayor, all the complainants were escorted out of
the courtroom except for Julieta D. Toledo, who was scheduled to giveher testimony
that day.6
Complainants claimed that the questions propounded by respondent to their witnesses
"were all geared towards establishing" that they should have no right to oppose the
Mayor’s plan, as "this will be good for all and the progress and development of the
municipality."7

After the hearing, respondent issuedan open-court Order stating that "the Court is not
inclined to extend for seventeen (17) days the said TRO."8

At the next hearing held on 3 July2012, Mayor Villarosa stepped out of the courtroom to
take a call. He exited through the door used by the judge and the employees of the
court.9 According to complainants, the Mayor did not speak to anyone, not even his
lawyer, before leaving the courtroom. Thus, it came as a surprise to everyone when
respondent suddenly explained that the Mayor had to excuse himself for an important
appointment.10

Respondent eventually issued an Order lifting the TRO.11

Petitioners claimed that during the hearings held on 2 and 3 July 2012, respondent
"argued, berated, accused, scolded, confused and admonished petitioners without basis
or justification."12 They further claimed that respondent judge asked complainants
"confusing and misleading questions all geared and intended to elicit answers damaging
to the cause of petitioners and favorable to the cause of their adversary." 13

Complainants alleged that it is common knowledge to the entire community of San

Jose, Occidental Mindoro, that respondent is beholden to Mayor Villarosa and is
identified with the causes, friends, and allies of the latter.14 They also alleged that all
cases in the RTC before respondent involving Mayor Villarosa or his relatives, political
allies, supporters, and close friends were decided in favor of the Mayor or his relatives
and supporters.15 Thus, complainants filed the instant complaint charging respondent
with serious violations of the canons of the Codes of Judicial Conduct and Judicial
Ethics and for Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.

Respondent denied the foregoing accusations and cited several cases in which he
issued an order/ruling against Mayor Villarosaand the latter’s supposed supporters. 16

In a Resolution17 dated 25 November 2013, this Court referred the Complaint to the
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, Manila (CA) "for raffle among the Justices
thereat, for investigation, report and recommendation." The case was raffled to CA
Justice Pedro B. Corales on 24 February 2014. This Court received his Report and
Recommendation (Report)18 on 9 June 2014.

We adopt the findings and recommendation of Justice Corales.

Petitioners failed to substantiate their allegation that respondent acted with bias and
partiality. Mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough.19 Clear and convincing
evidence is necessary to prove a charge of bias and partiality.20 The circumstances
detailed by petitioners failed to prove that respondent exhibited "manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence" in the discharge of his judicial
functions, as required by Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, when he issued the Order lifting the
TRO.

This Court cannot accept the contention that respondent’s bias and partiality can be
gleaned from the mere fact that he did not allow the "more than 500 members" who
accompanied petitioners during the hearing to enter the courtroom. As indicated in the
report, due to the standard sizes of our courtrooms, it is highly improbable that this huge
group could have been accommodated inside.21 With respect to the exclusion of the
other witnesses while Julieta Toledo was giving her testimony, this is sanctioned by
Section 15, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.22

We now go to the claim of petitioners that respondent berated, scolded, confused and
admonished their witnesses without basis or justification. According to the investigating
justice, respondent failed to submit the transcript of notes for the 3 July 2012 hearing
without plausible reason.23 As regards what transpired in the 2 July 2012 hearing, the
investigating justice found that apart from raising his voice when addressing Toledo and
making "abrasive and unnecessary statements to her,"24 respondent also made the
following"insulting, sometimes needlessly lengthy statements"25 in open court:

1. Respondent declared that he no longer wanted to go to the market, because

he might be mistreated by petitioners.26

2. He told petitioners: "Mga taga-palengke na nagkakaso sa akin xxx pero ‘di

naman nila alam ang kanilang ginagawa."27

3. He told Toledo while the latter was testifying: "[B]asta na lang kayo pirma
pirma na gawa naman ng abogado niyo."28

4. He asked Toledo: "You mentioned about that ‘walang pwesto na nakikipwesto

sa inyo,’ is that not a violation to your lease contract that you are allowing
somebody to occupy your portion so that they can also engage in business? Is
this not an additional earning on your part and you are violating your lease
contract? Is that not depriving the coffer of the Municipal Government?" 29 The
investigating justice found that the foregoing statements "definitely imperiled the
respect and deference"30 rightly due to respondent’s position.

We agree.

As stated in the report, respondent raised his voice and uttered abrasive and
unnecessary remarks to petitioners’ witness.31 Respondent failed to conduct himself in
accordance with the mandate of Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,32 which reads:
SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the
court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers
and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar
conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence,
direction or control.

A Judge should be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his
court,33 viz:

It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness. The act betrays
lack of patience, prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in
his language. He must choose his words, written or spoken, with utmost care and
sufficient control. The wise and just man is esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing
speech increases his persuasiveness.34

This Court likewise finds that respondent violated Section 1 of Canon 2 and Section 1 of
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which read:

CANON 2

INTEGRITY

SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it
isperceived to be so inview of a reasonable observer.

CANON 4

PROPRIETY

SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.1âwphi1 The above provisions clearly enjoin judges not only from committing
acts of impropriety, but even acts that have the appearance of impropriety. 35 This is
because appearance is as important as reality in the performance of judicial functions. A
judge — like Ceasar's wife — must not only be pure and faithful, but must also be above
suspicion.36

In this case, instead of reprimanding Mayor Villarosa for not asking for the court’s
permission to leave while the trial was ongoing, respondent appeared to serve as the
former’s advocate. He did so by declaring in open court that the abrupt exit of the Mayor
should be excused, as the latter had an important appointment to attend. Respondent
does not deny this in his Comment.37 It was the Mayor’s lawyer, and not respondent
judge, who had the duty of explaining why the mayor left the courtroom without asking
for the court’s permission.

The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges
must not only maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; they must also
avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the people's faith in
the Judiciary.38 Members of the Judiciary should be beyond reproach and suspicion in
their conduct, and should be free from any appearance of impropriety in the discharge
of their official duties, as well as in their personal behavior and everyday life.39

The actions of respondent no doubt diminished public confidence and public trust in him
as a judge.1âwphi1 He gave petitioners reason to doubt his integrity and impartiality.
Petitioners cannot be blamed for thinking that respondent must have directly
communicated with Mayor Villarosa. Otherwise, he would not have been able to explain
that the Mayor could no longer return to attend the hearing after leaving, when not even
the latter’s own lawyers knew that. Thus, respondent is also guilty of violating Section 2
of Canon 3, which reads:

CANON 3

IMPARTIALITY

SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court,
maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal p rofession and litigants
in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.

It is clear from all the foregoing that respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming a judge.

We note that in a previous case, Taran v. Jacinto, Jr.,40 this Court has already found
Respondent Judge Jacinto liable for his failure to supervise his personnel closely and
for issuing orders relayed over the phone. Judge Jacinto was found guilty of violating
Supreme Court Circular No. 26-97 by failing to compel his Clerk of Court to issue official
receipts for all monies received by the latter. In the foregoing case, respondent judge
was fined in the sum of ₱11,000 and was warned that a repetition of the same or similar
act will be dealt with more severely. Under Section 10 in relation to Section 11(C),
paragraph 1 of Rule 14041 of the Rules of Court, as amended, "unbecoming conduct" is
classified as a light charge, punishable by any of the following sanctions: (1) a fine of
not less than ₱1,000, but not exceeding ₱10,000; and/or (2) censure; (3) reprimand; (4)
admonition with warning.42

Considering that this is respondent judge's second infraction already, the Court finds
that the penalties of a fine in the amount of Pl 0,000 and admonition with warning, as
recommended by the investigating justice, are proper under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr. guilty of
unbecoming conduct and is hereby FINED in the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(₱10,000) and REPRIMANDED with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
or a similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice, Chairperson
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2426 June 16, 2015
[Formerly A.M. No. 05-3-83-MTC]

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATION, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE ALEXANDER BALUT, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

Per Curiam:

On October 9, 2007, the Court partially resolved this case by disposing it as follows:

WHEREFORE the Court finds and declares:

1. Judge Alexander S. Balut GUILTY of undue delay in deciding 33 cases

submitted for decision and in failing to resolve 101 motions within the 90-day
reglementary period. He is FINED twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00), with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.

2. Judith En. Salimpade GUILTY of gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave
misconduct. She is DISMISSED from the service. She is DIRECTED to
RESTITUTE the amount of ₱1,817,378.59 representing the amount of shortages
in her collections. Her withheld salaries are to be applied to her accountabilities.
The Office of Administrative Services, OCA is DIRECTED to compute Ms.
Salimpade's leave credits and forward the same to the Finance Division, Fiscal
Management Office-OCA which shall compute the money value of the same, the
amount to be deducted from the shortages to be restituted.

3. Eduardo Esconde GUILTY of gross neglect of duty. He is DISMISSED from

the service. He is also ORDERED to restitute his accountabilities in the amount
of ₱58,100.00

4. Lydia O. Ramos GUILTY of neglect of duty. She is FINED ₱5,000, which

should be deducted from her retirement benefits.

The Office of the Court Administrator Legal Office is DIRECTED to file appropriate
criminal charges against Judge Alexander Balut, Judith En. Salimpade and Eduardo
Esconde.

SO ORDERED.

As stated in the October 9, 2007 Resolution, the facts of the case are as follows:

On May 3, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted a judicial audit
and physical inventory of cases at the Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs) of Bayombong and
Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. Judge Alexander S. Balut was the acting presiding judge in
both courts.

xxx xxx xxx

Aside from the judicial audit, a financial audit was also conducted in the MTCs of
Bayombong and Solano as well as the MCTC of Aritao-Sta. Fe.

In the MTC, Bayombong, where Judith En. Salimpade was Clerk of Court II, the audit
team found an unremitted amount of ₱18,702.oo representing the court's collection from
August 3, 2003 to August 18, 2003. Said amount was deposited only on August 18,
2003, upon advise by the audit team, in the Land Bank of the Philippines account.
Furthermore, 31 booklets of accountable forms issued to Ms. Salimpade by the Property
Division, SC and OCA were not accounted for. Also, the court had a total Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF) collection of ₱348,993.60 from January 1990 to August 2003.
However, only ₱186,330.98 was remitted by Ms. Salimpade leaving a balance of
₱162,662.62; the total Clerk of Court General Fund (CCGF) collections from January
1996 to August 2003 (audit scope) showed an unremitted amount of ₱30,411. 70; and
as of August 31, 2003 the Fiduciary Fund had a total cash shortage of ₱1,864,304.27
which covered the collections from 1995 to August 2003.

In sum, the shortages in the various funds incurred by Salimpade as of August 31, 2003
totalled ₱2,057,378.59.

Salimpade, when asked about the shortages, explained that Judge Balut, since 1995
had been getting money from the JDF collections. She had given in to the requests of
Judge Balut out of fear of him. She also admitted that she lent her co-employees money
which she took from her collections.

Parenthetically, in September 2003, Judge Balut turned over ₱240,000.00 to Salimpade

and the latter issued a certification stating that the former had completely settled his
monetary accountability to the MTC, Bayombong. Judge Balut delivered to the Fiscal
Monitoring Division, Court Management Office (CMO) OCA the certification and deposit
slip evidencing the turnover of the ₱240,000.00.

The audit team also found that Salimpade failed to regularly submit her monthly report
of collections, as required in Supreme Court Circular No. 32-93. Consequently,
Salimpade's salaries were withheld effective August 2003 to the present.

In the MTC, Solano, the spot cash count on the court's collection disclosed that Eduardo
Esconde, Clerk of Court, had an unremitted/undeposited cash on hand amounting to
₱59,545.oo. However, the Official Receipts issued to cover said amounts were not
accounted for. The said cash amount was deposited on August 21, 2003 to Land Bank
JDF Account No. 0591-0116-34.
A review of the receipts on file from May 2001 to July 2003 also showed a total cash
shortage of ₱106,527.80. However, on August 29, 2003, Esconde deposited in the
CCGF and JDF bank accounts sums corresponding to the said shortage. Esconde
explained to the audit team that Judge Balut borrowed various amounts from the
collections. He stated that Judge Balut started borrowing funds when the former was
still the Clerk of Court of MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe. He transferred to MTC, Solano, to get
out of the shadow of Judge Balut. But, much to his dismay, Judge Balut was designated
Acting Presiding Judge of MTC, Solano and continued the practice of borrowing money
from the collections of the court.

In the MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe, the audit team found that Lydia Ramos, Clerk of Court,
succeeded Eduardo S. Esconde on July 16, 2000, without proper turnover of
accountabilities. The team also found that the amount of ₱540.00, part of the JDF
collections from August 1, 2003 to August 21, 2003, remained undeposited at the time
of audit. Said amount was remitted to the Chief Accountant, Supreme Court on
September 10, 2003. Also, Mrs. Ramos opened an account at the Rural Bank of Aritao,
Inc. for the Fiduciary Fund of the court instead of maintaining an account with
Landbank. Said account was closed on September 11, 2003 and an account was
opened at Landbank, Bambang, on the same date. A comparison of the court's CCGF
collections and remittances for the period of November 1995 to July 2003 revealed a
shortage of ₱510.00. Mr. Esconde incurred during his incumbency a cash shortage of
₱430.00 while Mrs. Ramos incurred a shortage of ₱80.00 as of July 31, 2003. From
August 2003 to June 5, 2004, Mrs. Ramos incurred a shortage of ₱430.00. She
deposited the amount of ₱400.00 on August 23, 2004 leaving a shortage of 1!30.00.
Withdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund account on various dates, totalling ₱243,900.00
for the refund and return of cash bonds to 20 litigants, were not supported by any official
court orders. Of the 20 litigants 15 did not acknowledge receipt of the amount refunded.
The Fiduciary Fund collection of the court from April 1996 to August 31, 2003 amounted
to ₱2,064,978.00. As of August 31, 2003, however, the amount of ₱846,710.00 was
unaccounted for by Mr. Esconde and Mrs. Ramos. Both denied that the shortages
incurred were of their own doing and they instead pointed to Judge Balut as the
offender.

Ramos related to the audit team the constant requests/orders of Judge Balut to hand
over to him money from the Fiduciary Fund collections.1âwphi1 In these instances, she
requested Judge Balut to affix his signature at the back portion of the withdrawal slips
as the cash recipient. However, not all of the transactions were evidenced by an
acknowledgement receipt. Ramos further stated that Judge Balut also collected the
money through Salvador Briones, Court Interpreter of MCTC-Aritao-Sta. Fe, whose
signature also appeared at the back portion of withdrawal slips as cash recipient. The
total withdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund Account given to Judge Balut, as evidenced
by withdrawal slips bearing the signatures of Judge Balut and Briones, for the benefit of
the former, as cash recipients, amounted to ₱193,500.00.

Aside from these, withdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund account totalling ₱90,500.oo
were also given to Judge Balut. On the face of the slips of this class of withdrawals were
notations such as "Judge," "for Judge," "taken by Judge xxx" and "given to Judge"
written by Ramos.

On May 9, 2002, Judge Balut issued a Certification stating that his accountability with
the Fiduciary Fund collection of MCTC Aritao-Sta. Fe as of April 2002 amounted to
.₱207,774.42. However, before the final report on the court's shortages was completed,
various amounts totalling ₱802,299.82 were deposited by Judge Balut, Esconde and
Ramos in the court's LBP Account No. 3251-0544-51, as restitution/payment of part of
the shortage of ₱846, 710.00.

As of August, 2004, Ramos had fully settled the balance of her accountability. On the
other hand, Esconde still had a balance of accountability in MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe of
₱58,100.oo which, as of the time this case was submitted by the OCA for the Court's
consideration, has remained unsettled. (Emphases supplied)

In its Resolution,1 the Court ordered Respondent Judge Alexander Balut (Judge Balut)
to pay a fine for his failure to decide 33 cases and 101 motions without properly
requesting for an extension. The Court, however, did not rule on the administrative
liability of Judge Balut with respect to the result of the financial audit for the reason that
he was not given a chance to present his side on the matter.

Consequently, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its Memorandum, 2 sought
reconsideration of the Court's decision stating that although Judge Balut was not
formally required to comment on the findings of the audit team regarding the shortage in
the court collections, he was not denied due process of law. The OCA explained that
Judge Balut was able to present his side in his Letter3 to OCA, dated December 9,
2006. The OCA, thus, asked for the re-opening of the case or in the alternative, that
Judge Balut be required to comment on the findings of the financial audit.

In its Resolution,4 dated December 16, 2008, the Court directed Judge Balut to
comment on the audit report and, upon the recommendation 5 of the OCA, referred the
matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation, report and recommendation.6

Thereafter, the CA, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended the dismissal of
the charges against Judge Balut for failure of the OCA to clearly substantiate and prove
the participation of Judge Balut in the financial transactions of the courts. On his
admission that he borrowed money from the judiciary fund, the CA opined that Judge
Balut could no longer be penalized as he was previously fined by the Court in its
October 9, 2007 Resolution.

The Court finds itself unable to agree with the recommendation of the CA.

In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary is substantial evidence or such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.7 The standard of substantial evidence is justified when there is reasonable
ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even
if such evidence is not overwhelming or even preponderant. 8

A review of the records shows that Judge Balut actually messed with the court
collections. The three clerks of court of MTC Bayombong, MTC Solano and MCTC
Aritao-Sta Fe categorically stated that Judge Balut borrowed money from the court
funds and executed certifications to that effect. They separately reported that Judge
Balut had been borrowing money from the various funds of the court collections. In fact,
Lydia Ramos (Ramos), the Clerk of Court of MCTC-Aritao-Sta. Fe, presented several
withdrawal slips9 where the back portions were signed either by Judge Balut or his court
interpreter, Salvador Briones, as the recipient of the cash withdrawn from the funds of
the court. These withdrawal slips likewise bore the notations of Ramos such as "Judge,"
"for Judge," "taken by Judge," and "given to Judge" to serve as her reminder that the
money withdrawn were given to Judge Balut.

Significantly, Judge Balut himself issued the Certification10 stating that his cash
accountability as of April 2002 with the Fiduciary Fund was ₱207,774.42 and there were
certifications issued by the clerks of court attesting that he had settled his
accountabilities with the court funds.

The CA opinion that Judge Balut could no longer be penalized for his admission that he
had borrowed money from the judiciary fund because the Court already fined him in its
October 9, 2007 resolution is erroneous. In the said resolution, the Court categorically
stated that Judge Balut was fined for undue delay in deciding 33 cases submitted for
decision and for failing to resolve 101 motions within the 90-day reglementary period.

Once again, the Court stresses that judges must adhere to the highest tenets of judicial
conduct.11 Because of the sensitivity of his position, a judge is required to exhibit, at all
times, the highest degree of honesty and integrity and to observe exacting standards of
morality, decency and competence.12 He should adhere to the highest standards of
public accountability lest his action erode the public faith in the Judiciary. 13

Judge Balut fell short of this standard for borrowing money from the collections of the
court. He knowingly and deliberately made the clerks of court violate the circulars on the
proper administration of court funds.14 He miserably failed to become a role model of his
staff and other court personnel in the observance of the standards of morality and
decency, both in his official and personal conduct.

The act of misappropriating court -funds constitutes dishonesty and grave misconduct,
punishable by dismissal from the service even on the first offense. 15 For said reason,
the respondent deserves a penalty no lighter than dismissal. This Court has never
tolerated and will never condone any conduct which violates the norms of public
accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the
justice system.16
The Court has considered the recommendation of imposing the penalty of suspension.
That, however, would be unfair to Clerk of Court Judith En. Salimpade, Municipal Trial
Courts of Bayombong and Solano; and Clerk of Court Eduardo Esconde of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Arita-Sta. Fe, who were both dismissed from the service
for the same offense. Clerk of Court Lydia Ramos was fined but only because she had
already retired from the service. And it would send a wrong message to the public that
the Court has different standards - one for the magistrates and another for the rank-and-
file.

The fact that Judge Balut fully paid his cash liabilities will not shield him from the
consequences of his wrongdoings. His unwarranted interference in the Court collections
deserves administrative sanction and not even the full payment of his accountabilities
will exempt him from liability. "It matters not that these personal borrowings were paid
as what counts is the fact that these funds were used outside of official business." 17

Similarly, his nearly 22 years in the service would not serve to mitigate his liability. His
offense was not a single or isolated act but it constituted a series of acts committed in a
span of several years. In other words, he was a repeated offender, perpetrating his
misdeeds with impunity not once, not twice, but several times in three (3) different
stations. In the case of In Re: Report on the Judicial and Financial Audit Conducted in
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Koronadal City,18 it was written:

For misappropriating court funds in concert with Ines, Judge Sardido has been charged
with grave misconduct. Admitting that he indeed "borrowed" money from court funds,
the latter recounted that on four occasions in 1994, he had borrowed ₱130,ooo to be
able to purchase a car and thereafter borrowed intermittently through the years, for
reasons ranging from the schooling needs of his children to the illness of his parents.
That he intended to repay the amounts "borrowed" is immaterial. These funds should
never be used outside of official business. Rule 5.04 of Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct states:

"A judge or any immediate member of the family shall not accept a gift, bequest, favor
or loan from anyone except as may be allowed by law."

Time and time again, this Court has emphasized that "the judge is the visible
representation of the law, and more importantly, of justice. It is from him that the people
draw their will and awareness to obey the law. For the judge to return that regard, he
must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for others to follow."

Sadly, the foregoing facts clearly show that Judge Sardido has not only miserably failed
to present himself as an example to his staff and to others, but has also shown no
compunction in violating the law, as well as the rules and regulations. His dishonesty,
gross misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law tarnish the image of the judiciary and
would have warranted the maximum penalty of dismissal. were it not for the fact that he
had already been dismissed from the service in another administrative case. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied) WHEREFORE, finding Judge Alexander Balut GUILTY of
gross misconduct, the Court hereby imposes upon him the penalty of DISMISSAL from
the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-employment
in any branch of the government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations, except the money value of accrued earned leave credits.

Judge Balut is hereby ORDERED to cease and desist immediately from rendering any
order or decision, or from continuing any proceedings, in any case whatsoever, effective
upon receipt of a copy of this resolution.

This disposition is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

The Office of the Court Administrator shall see to it that a copy of this resolution be
immediately served on the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2426 June 16, 2015
[Formerly A.M. No. 05-3-83-MTC]

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATION, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE ALEXANDER BALUT, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

Per Curiam:

On October 9, 2007, the Court partially resolved this case by disposing it as follows:

WHEREFORE the Court finds and declares:

1. Judge Alexander S. Balut GUILTY of undue delay in deciding 33 cases

submitted for decision and in failing to resolve 101 motions within the 90-day
reglementary period. He is FINED twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00), with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.

2. Judith En. Salimpade GUILTY of gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave
misconduct. She is DISMISSED from the service. She is DIRECTED to
RESTITUTE the amount of ₱1,817,378.59 representing the amount of shortages
in her collections. Her withheld salaries are to be applied to her accountabilities.
The Office of Administrative Services, OCA is DIRECTED to compute Ms.
Salimpade's leave credits and forward the same to the Finance Division, Fiscal
Management Office-OCA which shall compute the money value of the same, the
amount to be deducted from the shortages to be restituted.

3. Eduardo Esconde GUILTY of gross neglect of duty. He is DISMISSED from

the service. He is also ORDERED to restitute his accountabilities in the amount
of ₱58,100.00

4. Lydia O. Ramos GUILTY of neglect of duty. She is FINED ₱5,000, which

should be deducted from her retirement benefits.

The Office of the Court Administrator Legal Office is DIRECTED to file appropriate
criminal charges against Judge Alexander Balut, Judith En. Salimpade and Eduardo
Esconde.

SO ORDERED.

As stated in the October 9, 2007 Resolution, the facts of the case are as follows:

On May 3, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted a judicial audit
and physical inventory of cases at the Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs) of Bayombong and
Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. Judge Alexander S. Balut was the acting presiding judge in
both courts.

xxx xxx xxx

Aside from the judicial audit, a financial audit was also conducted in the MTCs of
Bayombong and Solano as well as the MCTC of Aritao-Sta. Fe.

In the MTC, Bayombong, where Judith En. Salimpade was Clerk of Court II, the audit
team found an unremitted amount of ₱18,702.oo representing the court's collection from
August 3, 2003 to August 18, 2003. Said amount was deposited only on August 18,
2003, upon advise by the audit team, in the Land Bank of the Philippines account.
Furthermore, 31 booklets of accountable forms issued to Ms. Salimpade by the Property
Division, SC and OCA were not accounted for. Also, the court had a total Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF) collection of ₱348,993.60 from January 1990 to August 2003.
However, only ₱186,330.98 was remitted by Ms. Salimpade leaving a balance of
₱162,662.62; the total Clerk of Court General Fund (CCGF) collections from January
1996 to August 2003 (audit scope) showed an unremitted amount of ₱30,411. 70; and
as of August 31, 2003 the Fiduciary Fund had a total cash shortage of ₱1,864,304.27
which covered the collections from 1995 to August 2003.

In sum, the shortages in the various funds incurred by Salimpade as of August 31, 2003
totalled ₱2,057,378.59.

Salimpade, when asked about the shortages, explained that Judge Balut, since 1995
had been getting money from the JDF collections. She had given in to the requests of
Judge Balut out of fear of him. She also admitted that she lent her co-employees money
which she took from her collections.

Parenthetically, in September 2003, Judge Balut turned over ₱240,000.00 to Salimpade

and the latter issued a certification stating that the former had completely settled his
monetary accountability to the MTC, Bayombong. Judge Balut delivered to the Fiscal
Monitoring Division, Court Management Office (CMO) OCA the certification and deposit
slip evidencing the turnover of the ₱240,000.00.

The audit team also found that Salimpade failed to regularly submit her monthly report
of collections, as required in Supreme Court Circular No. 32-93. Consequently,
Salimpade's salaries were withheld effective August 2003 to the present.

In the MTC, Solano, the spot cash count on the court's collection disclosed that Eduardo
Esconde, Clerk of Court, had an unremitted/undeposited cash on hand amounting to
₱59,545.oo. However, the Official Receipts issued to cover said amounts were not
accounted for. The said cash amount was deposited on August 21, 2003 to Land Bank
JDF Account No. 0591-0116-34.
A review of the receipts on file from May 2001 to July 2003 also showed a total cash
shortage of ₱106,527.80. However, on August 29, 2003, Esconde deposited in the
CCGF and JDF bank accounts sums corresponding to the said shortage. Esconde
explained to the audit team that Judge Balut borrowed various amounts from the
collections. He stated that Judge Balut started borrowing funds when the former was
still the Clerk of Court of MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe. He transferred to MTC, Solano, to get
out of the shadow of Judge Balut. But, much to his dismay, Judge Balut was designated
Acting Presiding Judge of MTC, Solano and continued the practice of borrowing money
from the collections of the court.

In the MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe, the audit team found that Lydia Ramos, Clerk of Court,
succeeded Eduardo S. Esconde on July 16, 2000, without proper turnover of
accountabilities. The team also found that the amount of ₱540.00, part of the JDF
collections from August 1, 2003 to August 21, 2003, remained undeposited at the time
of audit. Said amount was remitted to the Chief Accountant, Supreme Court on
September 10, 2003. Also, Mrs. Ramos opened an account at the Rural Bank of Aritao,
Inc. for the Fiduciary Fund of the court instead of maintaining an account with
Landbank. Said account was closed on September 11, 2003 and an account was
opened at Landbank, Bambang, on the same date. A comparison of the court's CCGF
collections and remittances for the period of November 1995 to July 2003 revealed a
shortage of ₱510.00. Mr. Esconde incurred during his incumbency a cash shortage of
₱430.00 while Mrs. Ramos incurred a shortage of ₱80.00 as of July 31, 2003. From
August 2003 to June 5, 2004, Mrs. Ramos incurred a shortage of ₱430.00. She
deposited the amount of ₱400.00 on August 23, 2004 leaving a shortage of 1!30.00.
Withdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund account on various dates, totalling ₱243,900.00
for the refund and return of cash bonds to 20 litigants, were not supported by any official
court orders. Of the 20 litigants 15 did not acknowledge receipt of the amount refunded.
The Fiduciary Fund collection of the court from April 1996 to August 31, 2003 amounted
to ₱2,064,978.00. As of August 31, 2003, however, the amount of ₱846,710.00 was
unaccounted for by Mr. Esconde and Mrs. Ramos. Both denied that the shortages
incurred were of their own doing and they instead pointed to Judge Balut as the
offender.

Ramos related to the audit team the constant requests/orders of Judge Balut to hand
over to him money from the Fiduciary Fund collections.1âwphi1 In these instances, she
requested Judge Balut to affix his signature at the back portion of the withdrawal slips
as the cash recipient. However, not all of the transactions were evidenced by an
acknowledgement receipt. Ramos further stated that Judge Balut also collected the
money through Salvador Briones, Court Interpreter of MCTC-Aritao-Sta. Fe, whose
signature also appeared at the back portion of withdrawal slips as cash recipient. The
total withdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund Account given to Judge Balut, as evidenced
by withdrawal slips bearing the signatures of Judge Balut and Briones, for the benefit of
the former, as cash recipients, amounted to ₱193,500.00.

Aside from these, withdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund account totalling ₱90,500.oo
were also given to Judge Balut. On the face of the slips of this class of withdrawals were
notations such as "Judge," "for Judge," "taken by Judge xxx" and "given to Judge"
written by Ramos.

On May 9, 2002, Judge Balut issued a Certification stating that his accountability with
the Fiduciary Fund collection of MCTC Aritao-Sta. Fe as of April 2002 amounted to
.₱207,774.42. However, before the final report on the court's shortages was completed,
various amounts totalling ₱802,299.82 were deposited by Judge Balut, Esconde and
Ramos in the court's LBP Account No. 3251-0544-51, as restitution/payment of part of
the shortage of ₱846, 710.00.

As of August, 2004, Ramos had fully settled the balance of her accountability. On the
other hand, Esconde still had a balance of accountability in MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe of
₱58,100.oo which, as of the time this case was submitted by the OCA for the Court's
consideration, has remained unsettled. (Emphases supplied)

In its Resolution,1 the Court ordered Respondent Judge Alexander Balut (Judge Balut)
to pay a fine for his failure to decide 33 cases and 101 motions without properly
requesting for an extension. The Court, however, did not rule on the administrative
liability of Judge Balut with respect to the result of the financial audit for the reason that
he was not given a chance to present his side on the matter.

Consequently, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its Memorandum,2 sought
reconsideration of the Court's decision stating that although Judge Balut was not
formally required to comment on the findings of the audit team regarding the shortage in
the court collections, he was not denied due process of law. The OCA explained that
Judge Balut was able to present his side in his Letter3 to OCA, dated December 9,
2006. The OCA, thus, asked for the re-opening of the case or in the alternative, that
Judge Balut be required to comment on the findings of the financial audit.

In its Resolution,4 dated December 16, 2008, the Court directed Judge Balut to
comment on the audit report and, upon the recommendation 5 of the OCA, referred the
matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation, report and recommendation. 6

Thereafter, the CA, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended the dismissal of
the charges against Judge Balut for failure of the OCA to clearly substantiate and prove
the participation of Judge Balut in the financial transactions of the courts. On his
admission that he borrowed money from the judiciary fund, the CA opined that Judge
Balut could no longer be penalized as he was previously fined by the Court in its
October 9, 2007 Resolution.

The Court finds itself unable to agree with the recommendation of the CA.

In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary is substantial evidence or such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.7 The standard of substantial evidence is justified when there is reasonable
ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even
if such evidence is not overwhelming or even preponderant.8

A review of the records shows that Judge Balut actually messed with the court
collections. The three clerks of court of MTC Bayombong, MTC Solano and MCTC
Aritao-Sta Fe categorically stated that Judge Balut borrowed money from the court
funds and executed certifications to that effect. They separately reported that Judge
Balut had been borrowing money from the various funds of the court collections. In fact,
Lydia Ramos (Ramos), the Clerk of Court of MCTC-Aritao-Sta. Fe, presented several
withdrawal slips9 where the back portions were signed either by Judge Balut or his court
interpreter, Salvador Briones, as the recipient of the cash withdrawn from the funds of
the court. These withdrawal slips likewise bore the notations of Ramos such as "Judge,"
"for Judge," "taken by Judge," and "given to Judge" to serve as her reminder that the
money withdrawn were given to Judge Balut.

Significantly, Judge Balut himself issued the Certification10 stating that his cash
accountability as of April 2002 with the Fiduciary Fund was ₱207,774.42 and there were
certifications issued by the clerks of court attesting that he had settled his
accountabilities with the court funds.

The CA opinion that Judge Balut could no longer be penalized for his admission that he
had borrowed money from the judiciary fund because the Court already fined him in its
October 9, 2007 resolution is erroneous. In the said resolution, the Court categorically
stated that Judge Balut was fined for undue delay in deciding 33 cases submitted for
decision and for failing to resolve 101 motions within the 90-day reglementary period.

Once again, the Court stresses that judges must adhere to the highest tenets of judicial
conduct.11 Because of the sensitivity of his position, a judge is required to exhibit, at all
times, the highest degree of honesty and integrity and to observe exacting standards of
morality, decency and competence.12 He should adhere to the highest standards of
public accountability lest his action erode the public faith in the Judiciary.13

Judge Balut fell short of this standard for borrowing money from the collections of the
court. He knowingly and deliberately made the clerks of court violate the circulars on the
proper administration of court funds.14 He miserably failed to become a role model of his
staff and other court personnel in the observance of the standards of morality and
decency, both in his official and personal conduct.

The act of misappropriating court -funds constitutes dishonesty and grave misconduct,
punishable by dismissal from the service even on the first offense. 15 For said reason,
the respondent deserves a penalty no lighter than dismissal. This Court has never
tolerated and will never condone any conduct which violates the norms of public
accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the
justice system.16
The Court has considered the recommendation of imposing the penalty of suspension.
That, however, would be unfair to Clerk of Court Judith En. Salimpade, Municipal Trial
Courts of Bayombong and Solano; and Clerk of Court Eduardo Esconde of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Arita-Sta. Fe, who were both dismissed from the service
for the same offense. Clerk of Court Lydia Ramos was fined but only because she had
already retired from the service. And it would send a wrong message to the public that
the Court has different standards - one for the magistrates and another for the rank-and-
file.

The fact that Judge Balut fully paid his cash liabilities will not shield him from the
consequences of his wrongdoings. His unwarranted interference in the Court collections
deserves administrative sanction and not even the full payment of his accountabilities
will exempt him from liability. "It matters not that these personal borrowings were paid
as what counts is the fact that these funds were used outside of official business." 17

Similarly, his nearly 22 years in the service would not serve to mitigate his liability. His
offense was not a single or isolated act but it constituted a series of acts committed in a
span of several years. In other words, he was a repeated offender, perpetrating his
misdeeds with impunity not once, not twice, but several times in three (3) different
stations. In the case of In Re: Report on the Judicial and Financial Audit Conducted in
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Koronadal City,18 it was written:

For misappropriating court funds in concert with Ines, Judge Sardido has been charged
with grave misconduct. Admitting that he indeed "borrowed" money from court funds,
the latter recounted that on four occasions in 1994, he had borrowed ₱130,ooo to be
able to purchase a car and thereafter borrowed intermittently through the years, for
reasons ranging from the schooling needs of his children to the illness of his parents.
That he intended to repay the amounts "borrowed" is immaterial. These funds should
never be used outside of official business. Rule 5.04 of Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct states:

"A judge or any immediate member of the family shall not accept a gift, bequest, favor
or loan from anyone except as may be allowed by law."

Time and time again, this Court has emphasized that "the judge is the visible
representation of the law, and more importantly, of justice. It is from him that the people
draw their will and awareness to obey the law. For the judge to return that regard, he
must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for others to follow."

Sadly, the foregoing facts clearly show that Judge Sardido has not only miserably failed
to present himself as an example to his staff and to others, but has also shown no
compunction in violating the law, as well as the rules and regulations. His dishonesty,
gross misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law tarnish the image of the judiciary and
would have warranted the maximum penalty of dismissal. were it not for the fact that he
had already been dismissed from the service in another administrative case. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied) WHEREFORE, finding Judge Alexander Balut GUILTY of
gross misconduct, the Court hereby imposes upon him the penalty of DISMISSAL from
the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-employment
in any branch of the government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations, except the money value of accrued earned leave credits.

Judge Balut is hereby ORDERED to cease and desist immediately from rendering any
order or decision, or from continuing any proceedings, in any case whatsoever, effective
upon receipt of a copy of this resolution.

This disposition is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

The Office of the Court Administrator shall see to it that a copy of this resolution be
immediately served on the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
JUDGE RUBIA (A.M. No. RTJ-15-2416 )

Judge Rubia was the Presiding Judge of RTC-Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24, when he ran
as a candidate for Executive Vice-President of the PJA in the 2013 PJA elections. While
the reports on Ma'am Arlene were pending investigation, Judge Rubia was dismissed
from the service on June 10, 2014 for gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming a
judge as he violated Canons 2, 3, and 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct in relation
to three cases pending before his sala.28

By Investigating Court of Appeals Justice Barza 's determination, there was sufficient
evidence that Judge Rubia violated Section 4(a) of the Guidelines on the Conduct of
Elections of Judges' Associations. Investigating Court of Appeals Justice Barza wrote in
his Report on Investigation and Recommendation29that:

From the totality of the evidence adduced and after a judicious evaluation and scrutiny
thereof, the undersigned investigating justice has come up with a finding that the
respondent judge committed a violation of OCA Circular No. 54-2007 or the Guidelines
on the Conduct of Election of Judges' Associations.
For the violation pertaining to Section 4(a) on prohibited acts, on prohibition on distributing
or disseminating campaign materials other than flyers and curricula vitae, the
undersigned investigating justice finds the evidence submitted by the witnesses to have
substantially proven the infraction of respondent Judge Rubia. The investigating justice
had been provided with copies of photographs of the said campaign kit, which contained
1) a cap bearing the patch of the seal of the P JA in front, and on the back side of which
was embroidered the phrase "UNITY = STRENGTH Judge Mar E. Rubia for EVP", and
the inside flap thereof also bearing the embroidered phrase "Judge Mar E. Rubia for
EVP"; and 2) collared shirt with the patch of the seal of the PJA on the upper left portion
of the front shirt, with the phrase "UNITY= STRENGTH Judge Mar E. Rubia for EVP"
embroidered on the right sleeve thereof. Judge Rubia distributed these prior to the PJA
election and during the PJA convention.
The Judicial Affidavits submitted to the undersigned investigating Justice of Judges
Reyes and Nolasco, in compliance with the investigating justice's order dated 16
September 2014, alleged that "giveaways" consisting of a small bag, cap and t-shirt
bearing Judge Rubia's name and printed materials were received by their respective
courts during the campaign period preceding the October 2013 PJA Election.
The existence of the said kit as well as the allegation that the same had been distributed
before the election and during the PJA convention was confirmed by DCA Delorino,
Judges Reyes, Nolasco and Florendo during the hearing on 21 October 2014.

Judge Reyes admitted having received, through her staff in the RTC in the City of San
Fernando, Pampanga, on September 5, 2013, "giveaways" consisting of a T-shirt, cap
and printed materials from Judge Rubia. She also received the same giveaways in her
court in Manila. Without giving much importance to the said giveaways, Judge Reyes
gave the said giveaways away to whoever was interested. Having received the same,
however, gave her the impression that the kit and all its contents were campaign
materials. She voted in the PJA elections held in October 2013, where Judge Rubia lost.

Judge Nolasco also admitted having received on October2013 the same items, one of
which bore Judge Rubia's name. She turned over these items to the SC Investigating
Committee on January 23, 2014, when she was invited to be a resource person regarding
the 2013 PJA Elections, particularly the alleged involvement of a certain "Ma'am Arlene"
as well as the election protest of Judge Rubia who ran for Executive Vice-President of the
PJA, but lost.

As for the allegation that free hotel accommodation was provided by Judge Rub.ia to the
judges at the convention, Judge Nolasco confirmed that she had been informed that the
same was being provided by Judge Rubia, but she politely declined the offer.

Judge Florendo also complied with the above order of the investigating justice and
submitted her Judicial Affidavit stating therein that she was given flyers and calendar of
Judge Rubia by Heritage Hotel Personnel at the said hotel when she checked in for the
PJA Convention in October 2013. Her hotel accommodation was paid by the Provincial
Government of Nueva Ecija.

In her Judicial Affidavit, DCA Delorino, as directed by the SC Investigating Committee,

obtained three (3) sets of the said campaign kits distributed by Judge Rubia to members
of the PJA in his bid in the said elections. These were personally obtained from courts in
Pasay City, Dumaguete City and Malolos City, and had them presented to the SC
investigating committee. She was also able to secure a letter from Judge Rubia
addressed to the Clerk of Court, RTC Dumaguete City, Negros Occidental, requesting
that the campaign kits which Judge Rubia sent by mail, be distributed to all the judges
thereat.

During the hearing on 21 October 2014, DCA Delorino also submitted to the investigating
justice, a letter dated 17 September 2013 addressed to Judge Evelyn G. Nery, RTC-
Branch 19, Cagayan De Oro City, Misamis Oriental, wherein respondent Judge Rubia
stated that he is sending a kit (containing a cap, t-shirt, letter and endorsement from the
Rotary Club of Makati Southwest) to Judge Nery, which the latter might opt to bring and
use during the 2013 PJA Convention.

As can be gleaned from the evidence thus gathered, Judge Rubia committed a violation
of the Election Guidelines by intentionally distributing or disseminating campaign
materials other than flyers and curricula vitae to the PJA electorate in the 2013 PJA
Elections. There is no arguing that the said kit and all its contents exceeded the campaign
materials allowed to be distributed as set forth in the Election Guidelines.

Corollarily, and in agreement with the Summary of Findings of the SC Investigating

Committee, the said actions of Judge Rubia amount to a violation of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct, x x x

x x x x
Although the above violation of Judge Rubia does not pertain to the performance of his
official functions, it is mandated that his conduct shall be above reproach in all activities.
A judge's private life cannot be dissociated from his public life and it is, thus, important
that his behavior both on and off the bench be free from any appearance of impropriety.
As has been held, a judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of
impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance
of judicial duties, but also his everyday life should be beyond reproach.

x x x x

Judge Rubia's actions, however, exceeded or violated the parameters set forth in the
above Election Guidelines, quite-telling of his blatant disregard of the rules of the very
association of which he aspired to lead.

x x x x

Anent Section 4 (d) on prohibited acts, such as providing free transportation or free hotel
accommodations to members of judges' association, and Section 4(h) on prohibited acts,
such as the use of court personnel in the distribution of campaign materials and
paraphernalia, the undersigned finds the evidence gathered and presented as insufficient
to prove that Justice Rubia violated the same.
Investigating Court of Appels Justice Barza considered Judge Rubia's violation of
Section 4(a) of the Guidelines on the Conduct of Elections of Judges' Associations hs
gross misconduct, punishable by dismissal from service. However, since Judge Rubia
was already dismissed from service, Investigating Court of Appeals Justice Barza
recommended instead that Judge Rubia be ordered to pay a fine of more than
P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

As Investigating Court of Appeals Justice Barza found, substantial evidence supports

the charge that Judge Rubia violated Section 4(a) of the Guidelines on the Conduct of
Elections of Judges' Associations by distributing campaign materials other than
his curriculum vitae or biodata and acceptable flyers. It is undisputed that Judge Rubia
distributed to different RTCs around the country campaign kits, each consisting of a
small bag; a cap and a t-shirt bearing the seal of the PJA, Judge Barza's name and the
position he was running for, i.e., "for EVP," and his campaign slogan of "UNITY=
STRENGTH"; and printed materials, including a letter of endorsement from the Rotary
Club.

III
PENALTIES IMPOSED

The rulings of the Court on the charges against the four judges are summarized as
follows:

(a) Judge Aquino failed to maintain the appearance of propriety in booking room
accommodations for judges for the 2013 PJA Convention and election even when she
was running for re-election as PJA Secretary-General;

(b) Judge Lee is guilty of violating Section 4(a) of the Guidelines on the Conduct of
Elections of Judges' Associations for his use and distribution of prohibited campaign
materials such as desk calendars, posters, and tarpaulins;

(c) Judge Baybay is guilty of violating Section 4(a) of the Guidelines on the. Conduct of
Elections of Judges' Associations for giving away cellphones as raffle prizes at the 2013
PWJA Convention during the campaign period which were deemed prohibited campaign
materials, as well as Section 4 (d) of the same Guidelines for providing hotel room
accommodations with 25% discount to select judges during the 2013 PJA Convention
and election; and

(d) Judge Rubia is guilty of violating Section 4(a) of the Guidelines on the Conduct of
Elections of Judges' Associations for distributing prohibited campaign materials,
particularly, campaign kits consisting of a bag, cap, t-shirt, and printed materials.

The Guidelines on the Conduct of Elections of Judges' Associations itself provides,

under Section 7 thereof, for the liability for noncompliance with any of its provisions,
thus:

Sec. 7. Liability for Non-compliance with the Guidelines.- Failure by any member of the
judges' association to observe or comply with the provisions of this Resolution shall
constitute a serious administrative offense and shall be dealt with in accordance with
Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court. Court officials and personnel who violate
provisions of the Resolution shall be administratively liable and proceeded against in
conformity with existing Supreme Court and Civil Service rules and regulations.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies administrative charges as serious, less
serious, or light and enumerates the appropriate sanctions for each. For serious charge
or offense, Section 11 of Rule 140 prescribes the following sanctions:

Sec. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following
sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months: or

3. A fine of more than P20,000:00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

When the respondent is found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the penalty to be
imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge and the rest shall be
considered as aggravating circumstances.30

Given the foregoing, the Court deems it appropriate to impose upon Judge Lee and
Judge Rubia the penalty of a fine in the amount of P21,000.00 each for their respective
violations of Section 4(a) of the Guidelines on the Conduct of Elections of Judges'
Associations; and upon Judge Baybay the penalty of a fine in the amount of P30,000.00
for his violations of Sections 4(a) and 4(d) of the same Guidelines.
IV
FINAL WORDS

With this Decision, the Court hopes to impress upon the judges the strict standards of
conduct of their office. Section 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins
judges to ''avoid impropriety arid the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities." A judge's behavior, not only while in the performance of official duties but
also outside the court, must be beyond reproach.31 While all judges are required to hold
themselves to the strictest standards of conduct, it is only reasonable to expect more of
those who seek elective office in judges' associations as they can best lead by example.

The events surrounding the 2013 PJA elections were indeed unfortunate and
disappointing, but hopefully, these will no longer be repeated in the future with the
faithful adherence by judges not just to the plain language, but also to the spirit of the
Guidelines for the Conduct of Elections of Judges' Associations.

The Guidelines were approved by the Court in a Resolution dated May 3, 2007 in A.M.
No. 07-17-17-SC in recognition that "aspects of the elections of judges' associations
have the capacity to affect adversely the public perception of the judges' professional
and personal behavior"; and that "there is need to structure the elections of these
judges' associations along lines that would depoliticize this important activity and
redirect efforts towards acceptable and non-partisan interests[.]" There was a need for
the Guidelines to "ensure that the different judges' associations would prudently
manage as well as undertake honest, simple, clean, transparent and orderly elections of
their officers"; and "to keep the amount of campaigning and electioneering within
reasonable limits and to assist in the maintenance of a spirit of collegiality and essential
fairness in such elections[.]"

The Guidelines had been disseminated to the judges through OCA Circular No. 54-2007
dated May 21, 2007, and again through OCA Circular No. 120-13 dated September 30,
2013 with a reminder for the judges to strictly comply with the provisions thereof on the
elections of officers of their respective judges' associations.

The Court also lauds the election reforms undertaken by the PJA, upon the advice of
Court Administrator Marquez, among which is the holding of the election of its officers
apart from its annual convention and the use of an automated voting system. 32 The
PJA National Officers and Directors, in a meeting held in September 2015, issued a
Board Resolution adopting the automated system of election and setting the election
date to December 3, 2015, and had accordingly amended the By-Laws of the PJA.

The Court writes finis to these cases with the following reminder to judges from In re:
Solicitation of Donations by Judge Benjamin H Virrey33:

A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary. Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or
improper conduct of judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and the appearance
thereof. Being the su ject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly
accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen.

A magistrate must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official
and otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as
the epitome of integrity and justice. x x x The office of a judge exists for one solemn end
- to promote justice and thus aid in securing the contentment and happiness of the people.
A judge, so it has often been said, is like Ceasar's wife, and like her, he must be above
suspicion and beyond reproach. x x x. (Citations omitted.)
WHEREFORE, m view of the foregoing, judgment Is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In A.M. No. RTJ-15-2413 - OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. JUDGE

LYLIHA AQUINO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT oF MANILA, BRANCH 24, Judge
Lyliha A. Aquino isADMONISHED to be more circumspect in her actions so as to
maintain propriety and the appearance of propriety in her judicial as well as non-judicial
activities;

2. In A.M. No. RTJ-15-2414 - OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. JUDGE

RALPH LEE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 83, Judge
Ralph S. Lee is found GUILTY of violating Section 4(a) of the Guidelines on the
Conduct of Elections of Judges' Associations and isORDERED to pay a FINE of
Twenty-One Thousand Pesos (P21,000.00)

3. In A.M. No. RTJ-15-2415 - OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. JUDGE

ROMMEL BAYBAY, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY, BRANCH
132, Judge Rommel O. Baybay is found GUILTY of violating Sections 4(a) and 4(d) of
the Guidelineon the Conduct of Elections of Judges' Associations and ORDERED to
pay a FINE of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00); and

2. In A.M. No. RTJ-15-2416 - OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. JUDGE

MARINO RUBIA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF Biñan, LAGUNA, BRANCH
24, Judge E. Rubia is found GUILTY of violating Section 4(a) of the Guidelines on the
Conduct of Elections of Judges' Associations and is ORDERED to pay a FINE of
Twenty-One Thousand Pesos (P21,000.00).
SO ORDERED.

Leonardo-De Castro, C.J., Carpio, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe,

Leonen, Tijam, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
Jardeleza, J., on official leave.
Caguioa, J., on official business leave.
Reyes, J, Jr., J., no part.
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2383 (Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I No. 05-2301-RTJ), August 17, 2015

DR. CORAZON D. PADERANGA, DULCE P. GUIBELONDO, PATRIA P. DIAZ,

CARMENCITA P. ORSENO, AND DR. AMOR P.
GALON, Complainants, v. HONORABLE RUSTICO D. PADERANGA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 28, IN MAMBAJAO, CAMIGUIN, Respondent.

[A.M. No. RTJ-07-2033 (FORMERLY A.M. OCA I.P.I No. 06-2485-RTJ)]

PATRIA PADERANGA DIAZ, Complainant, v. HON. RTC JUDGE RUSTICO D.

PADERANGA, AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 28, IN MAMBAJAO, CAMIGUIN, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

A judge owes it to his judicial office to simply apply or obey a law or rule that is basic.
Otherwise, he is guilty of gross ignorance of the law or rule.1cralawrednad

Antecedents

Prior to his compulsory retirement from the Judiciary on September 24, 2013, the
respondent served as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
28, in Mambajao, Camiguin. He is now administratively charged based on two separate
complaints. The first complaint, dated June 17, 2005, initially docketed as OCA I.P.I.
No. 05-2301-RTJ but re-docketed as A.M. No. RTJ-14-2383, was brought by his own
sisters of the full blood, namely: Dra. Corazon D. Paderanga (Corazon), Dulce
Paderanga-Guibelondo (Dulce), Patria Paderanga-Diaz (Patria), Carmencita
Paderanga-Orseno (Carmencita) and Dra. Amor Paderanga Galon to charge him with
conduct unbecoming of a judge and grave misconduct.2 The second, dated January 16,
2006, initially docketed as OCA I.P.I No. 06-2485-RTJ but re-docketed as A.M. No.
RTJ-07-2033, was instituted by Patria to charge him with ignorance of the law,
disregard of the New Code of Judicial Conduct and abuse of authority.3cralawrednad

On October 1, 2007, with the completion of the administrative investigations, and upon
the submission of the separate reports and recommendations by the respective
Investigating Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals (CA), the Court consolidated
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2033 with A.M. No. RTJ-14-2383.4cralawrednad

A.M. No. RTJ-14-2383

On December 12, 2005, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) referred A.M. No.
RTJ-14-2383 to then CA Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo for investigation,
report and recommendation.5cralawrednad
In his report dated June 16, 2006,6 Justice Del Castillo summarized the factual
antecedents of A.M. No. RTJ-14-2383 as follows:cralawlawlibrary
Complainants and Respondent Judge are siblings of full blood being the children of the
late Narciso and Rosario Paderanga in the following order: Complainant Dulce;
Complainant Dra. Amor; Narciso D. Paderanga, Jr. (Narciso Jr.); Respondent Judge;
Complainant Carmen; Complainant Patria; and Complainant Dra. Corazon.

The five Complainants present common and separate causes of action against the
Respondent Judge. The allegations in their Complaint after amendments can be
summarized as follows:cralawlawlibrary
a) Common Allegations

Complainants aver that Respondent Judge, being a magistrate, failed to exert any effort
to mediate the differences and misunderstandings between his siblings. They refer
particularly to those incidents between Narciso, Jr. and Corazon culminating [in] the
filing of charges and counter-charges against each other as
follows:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

i) Civil Case No. 2003-325 for Torts and Damages entitled "Spouses Narciso D.
Paderanga, Jr. and Alma Paderanga v. Dr. Corazon D. Paderanga" wherein the latter
was enjoined to cease and desist from sending malicious text messages to the
spouses plaintiffs;

ii) Criminal Case No. M4-01-255 for Unjust Vexation entitled "People of the Philippines
v. Corazon D Paderanga";

iii) A criminal case for Illegal Possession of Firearms against Narciso D. Paderanga, Jr.
docketed as I.S. No. 2003-5193 which was dismissed by the City Prosecutor in a
Resolution dated November 14, 2003;

iv)Complaint for Deportation against Narciso, Jr. filed by Dra. Corazon before the
Bureau of Immigration; and

v) Criminal Case Nos. 410737-CR and 410738-CR for Falsification of Public Official
Document filed against Narciso, Jr. and Alma Paderanga, respectively.

The complainants also allege that Respondent Judge compounded the trouble between
his siblings when he instigated, encouraged and advised Narciso, Jr. to file charges
against his sister, Dra. Corazon. They likewise state that being a judge, Respondent
has the authority and moral obligation to settle disputes brewing within the family; that
since he is expected to encourage amicable settlement of disputes of other people, it
behooves upon him to zealously pursue the same thing for his brother and sister so as
not to bring shame and scandal on the family; that he showed apathy to the
Complainants' plight and clear bias for Narciso, Jr.'s claim when he merely sent a
Manifestation instead of appearing personally at the conciliatory hearing scheduled by
the Lupong Tagapamayapa.
Lastly, they assert that the Respondent Judge abused his power as a judge by
continuously trying to harass and oppress his female siblings by threatening to file Civil
and Criminal cases against Carmencita and Dulce for not giving him his share of the
fruits of the land held in common by the three of them, as evidenced by the letters dated
January 10, 2005 and February 3, 2005.

b) Dra. Corazon's Allegation

Dra. Corazon alleges that Respondent Judge took advantage of his powerful position
and unjustly enriched himself by encroaching on Lot 12910. According to her, she and
Respondent Judge agreed to share equally on Lot 9817; that his share on said lot is
designated as Lot 12910-B while her shares are designated as Lots 12910 and 12912;
that per Subdivision Sketch Plan prepared by Geodetic Engineer Antonio Ranara (with
the apparent conformity of respondent Judge), Lot 12910 belongs to her; however,
without asking for her consent or approval, Respondent Judge fenced and introduced
improvements therein.

c) Patria's Allegation

Patria avers that she and the respondent Judge live in their ancestral house located in
Tupsan, Mambajao, Camiguin; that respondent judge and his wife occupy the ground
floor while, she, together with her son Rudy and a 15 year old working student,
Christopher P. Odchigue, live on the second floor; that Narciso, Jr. occupies a room in
the second floor whenever he visits Camiguin.

On November 28, 2004, during one of his visits to Camiguin, Narciso, Jr. found his room
in disarray and claimed that there were valuable things missing. Upon hearing the
commotion created by his siblings on the second floor, respondent Judge went upstairs
and accused Patria of stealing the missing items, which included a camera. In that
occasion, complainant Patria claims that Respondent Judge uttered defamatory
remarks upon her. Later, it turned out that nothing was missing from Narciso, Jr.'s
belongings.

On April 15, 2005, Carmen and Patria sought the assistance of the Barangay Captain
with regard to their proposal that Respondent Judge accommodate Narciso, Jr. in the
ground floor rather than having him stay at one of the rooms in the second floor of the
ancestral house. The Barangay Captain thus invited the respondent Judge for a
dialogue on April 17, 2005 at 3:00 p.m. However, the respondent Judge requested that
the dialogue be moved at 11:00 a.m. of the same day so that Narciso, Jr. would also be
able to attend.

On the evening of April 16, 2005, respondent Judge went up to the second floor of the
ancestral house to see Patria. When he found her in the "comedor", he allegedly uttered
the following words: "Ikaw bugok, idiot aka. Epapreso taka anang imong kaso naa sa
Fiscal karon." Thereafter, the Respondent Judge went down to his living area.
Christopher Odchigue, who was in the nearby kitchen at that time and overheard this
utterance, corroborated the Complainant's allegation.

During the dialogue, Respondent Judge and Narciso, Jr. turned down the proposal of
Carmen and Patria. On the conciliation hearing set by the Lupong Tagapamayapa on
May 8, 2005 the respondent Judge, however, submitted a Manifestation waiving his
presence.

On June 17, 2005 Patria joined her sisters Dulce, Amor, Carmen and Corazon in filing
this Administrative Complaint with the OCA.

On November 8, 2005, an Information for Violation of Republic Act 7610 was filed
against Patria before the sala of Respondent Judge. The following day, he issued a
Warrant for the arrest of Patria.

Upon learning that police officers were after her, Patria surrendered to the Executive
Judge of the RTC of Misamis Oriental and posted a cash bond of P16,000.00 on
November 11, 2005. Subsequently, she filed a Motion for Disqualification against the
respondent Judge on the ground that respondent judge is related to her and the
complainant, Michelle P. Carillo, within the sixth degree of consanguinity.
The Respondent judge denies that he instigated and advised, coached and sided with
Narciso, Jr. in filing cases against his sisters. He also vehemently denies that he did not
even lift a finger to settle or mediate the disputes between his siblings. On the contrary,
he claims that he personally went to his brother Narciso, Jr. in Cagayan de Oro to
dissuade the latter from pursuing the cases he filed against Dra. Corazon and discuss a
possible settlement of said cases. Witness Narciso, Jr., who testified on Respondent
Judge's behalf, confirmed that the latter went to his house in Cagayan de Oro and
asked him to drop the cases he filed against complainant Dra. Corazon. Respondent
Judge also avers that he enlisted the help of a lawyer relative, Atty. Gael Paderanga, to
help him in exploring all possible avenues in setting the dispute in which his siblings are
embroiled in.

Secondly, the Respondent Judge claims that he merely requested for his share in the
fruits of the land that he co-owns with his sisters. He avers that his sisters misconstrued
the letters sent by him as accusing them of cheating him out of the inheritance from
their father's estate.

Thirdly, the respondent Judge vehemently denies that he uttered defamatory remarks
against Patria on November 8, 2004; and, that the recycling of the alleged utterance is
designed to malign his reputation as a judge.

Fourthly, the Respondent Judge denies that he took advantage of his position as a
Judge and unjustly enriched himself by appropriating unto himself Lot 12910. He claims
that the estate of his father has not yet been partitioned; that the sketch plan prepared
by Geodetic Engineer Antonio Ranara is not yet official because it does not bear the
conformity of the DENR; that at the time of the taking of the alleged survey, he was then
residing in Cebu and hence had no knowledge thereof; that contrary to the claim of Dra.
Corazon, the Sketch Plan obtained by him shows that he is entitled to Lot 12910 per
Survey Records, Mambajao, Camiguin together with Tax Declaration.

Lastly, with respect to the Warrant of Arrest issued by him on November 9, 2005 against
Patria, Respondent Judge posits that he merely exercised his ministerial duty as a
judge by virtue of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court; that he found probable
cause for the issuance of such warrant and did not find it necessary to receive further
evidence or conduct a preliminary hearing; that in issuing said warrant, he merely
followed the ruling enunciated in the case of Maddela vs. Dela Torre-Yadao; that at the
time of the issuance of the Warrant of Arrest "rule on mandatory inhibition as provided in
Section 1 Rule 137 has not yet come into play" (as he has not yet heard the evidence of
the parties nor had he resolved any motions or issued any order); that immediately
thereafter, specifically on November 18, 2005, he entered a compulsory disqualification
as mandated by Section 1 Rule 137 of the Rules of Court and Rule 3.12 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct; that the issuance of the Warrant of Arrest was nothing personal but
merely in the performance of his duties and was therefore in good faith; that even
assuming he erred in issuing said warrant, the lapse is merely an error of judgment and,
therefore, he cannot be held criminally, civilly or administratively liable as the same was
issued in good faith.7
In his report dated June 16, 2006,8 Justice Del Castillo recommended as
follows:cralawlawlibrary
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the Respondent Judge be
suspended form the service without compensation and benefits for a period of two (2)
months for the following acts:

a. One month for unilaterally appropriating a parcel of land belonging to

another; and

b. One month for acting on a case where his sister is a party litigant in
contravention of the prescribed compulsory or mandatory prohibition
enunciated in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court and Section 5,
Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

The seemingly light penalty is due to the fact that this is the Respondent's first offense.
Hence, it is also appropriate to warn Respondent Judge that a repetition of a similar
offense will be dealt with MORE SEVERELY. Also, the Office of the Court Administrator
is advised to study the possibility of recommending to the Supreme Court the temporary
assignment of Respondent Judge to another station within the Tenth Judicial Region
even only for six (6) months just so that the sibling litigants in this case may cool-off.
The undersigned opines that this is at best, a prudent measure if only to assuage the
antipathies existing among the siblings.

Respectfully submitted.
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2033
In the second complaint,9 dated January 16, 2006, Patria cited the following
grounds:cralawlawlibrary

I. FOR IGNORANCE AND/OR DEFIANCE OF THE LAW AND DISREGARD

OF THE CODE ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT.

II. FOR USING THE POWER OF HIS COURT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF

VENGEANCE.10

Patria averred, among others, that at about 6:00 p.m. on April 16, 2005, the respondent
had loudly and angrily uttered the following remarks at her: "Ikaw bugok, iduot taka,
epapreso taka anang imong caso naa sa fiscal!" ("You idiot, I will send you to prison in
that case against you pending now in the fiscal's office!"); that on November 9, 2005, he
did issue an order of arrest against her in violation of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of
Court and Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct; that he intentionally caused the
warrant of arrest to be served against her in her school to humiliate her; and that he had
been pressuring her and their sisters to execute an affidavit of desistance in relation to
the charges they brought against him in A.M. No. RTJ-14-2383.

The respondent countered that the charges in the second complaint were already
included in A.M. No. RTJ-14-2383 then being investigated by Justice Del Castillo; and
that he had already submitted his comment.11cralawrednad

The OCA recommended that: (1) OCA I.P.I No. 06-2485-RTJ be re docketed as a
regular administrative case (A.M. No. RTJ-07-2033); and (2) the records, together with
a copy of the comment of the respondent submitted in A.M. No. RTJ-14-2383, be
referred to the Executive Justice of the CA, Cagayan de Oro City Station, for
assignment, by raffle, to any of the Justices thereat for investigation, report and
recommendation.12cralawrednad

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2033 was in due course assigned to CA Associate Justice Michael P.
Elbinias.

On June 12, 2007, Justice Elbinias rendered his report in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2033,13 and
recommended that:cralawlawlibrary
x x x [A]n investigation apart from, and in addition to the one in A.M. No. OCA IPI No.
05-2301-RTJ, could very well turn out to be a needless and superfluous exercise.
Moreover, the parties themselves sought to avoid two conflicting decisions that could
result from proceeding likewise with the instant case.

Thus, in accordance with the parties' mutual objectives which are meritorious, the
instant case Administrative Matter No: RTJ-07-2033 (Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI
NO. 06-2485-RTJ) is referred to the OCAD, with the recommendation that the result of
this case be dependent on the outcome of OCA [P] No. 05-2301-RTJ, which in turn,
may likewise be considered as the full determination of the issues in the instant case.
Respectfully submitted.14
Issues

For resolution are the following issues, namely:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) Whether or not the following acts of the respondent constituted conduct unbecoming
of a judge, namely: (a) failing to exert efforts to mediate the differences and
misunderstandings among his siblings, particularly between Narciso, Jr. and Corazon,
that had led to the filing of civil and criminal cases against each other; (b) instigating
Narciso, Jr. to file charges against Corazon that compounded the misunderstanding
among his siblings; (c) threatening the filing of criminal cases against his sisters; (d)
accusing Patria of stealing Narciso, Jr.'s belongings, specifically his camera; (e) uttering
defamatory remarks against Patria; and (f) taking advantage of his position and unjustly
enriching himself by appropriating for himself Lot 12910 to the prejudice of the rightful
owner; and

(2) Whether or not his issuance of the warrant of arrest against Patria amounted to
gross misconduct, ignorance of the law, disregard of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct and abuse of authority.

Ruling of the Court

We find the recommendations of Justice Del Castillo to be well-taken.

1.

A.M. No. RTJ-14-2383

Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct provides that conduct above reproach is
essential not only in the proper discharge of the judicial office but also in the personal
life of judges. Section 1 of Canon 2 clearly states:cralawlawlibrary
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure. that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that
it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
In Lorenzana v. Austria,15 the Court has also stressed that:cralawlawlibrary
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity,
independence and respect for himself/herself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole.
He must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint.
He should choose his words and exercise more caution and control in expressing
himself. In other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas.
We agree with Justice Del Castillo that the respondent was not guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a judge or of grave misconduct under the first complaint except for his
appropriation for himself of Lot 12910 in order to unjustly enrich himself.

The respondent denied appropriating Lot 12910, insisting that the estate of their late
parents had not yet been partitioned among them; that the sketch plan prepared after
survey by Geodetic Engineer Antonio Ranara, which showed that Lot 12910 had been
allocated under the partition to Dra. Corazon, was not yet official for lack of approval by
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources; and that he had obtained
another sketch plan indicating that he was entitled to Lot 12910.

Disbelieving the respondent's denial, Justice Del Castillo pointed out that the
respondent's signature on the sketch plan reflected his actual knowledge and approval
of the partition of their parents' estate; and noted that his denial was inconsistent with
his acts, and was apparently implausible. Justice Del Castillo observed:cralawlawlibrary
x x x [W]ith respect to the Respondent Judge's appropriation of the 371 square meters
portion now identified as Lot 12910, the Investigating Justice finds his statements to be
inconsistent with his actions.

In open court, Respondent Judge acknowledged that he signed the Sketch Plan
prepared by Geodetic Engineer Antonio Ranara. x x x

xxxx

JUSTICE DEL CASTILLO:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Do you deny that this is your signature? (referring to the respondent)

JUDGE PADERANGA:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

That is my signature, your Honor. It was hurriedly signed, I know this is my signature.
But I remember when this was when the copy of this sketch plan was sent to me it was
not the original sketch plan, it was only a xerox copy also of the original sketch plan.

JUSTICE DEL CASTILLO:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Nevertheless, you said that is your signature.

JUDGE PADERANGA:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

I admit, your Honor. x x x x

These statements lead to the conclusion that he signified his conformity to the
Sketch Plan, and belies his earlier statement that he was unaware of the
preparation of said Sketch Plan. Contrary to the respondent Judge's claim of
innocence about the existence of the Sketch Plan (Exhibit F-4), he had actual
knowledge and apparent approval of such partition. Inevitably, the conclusion is
that respondent Judge was in bad faith when he unilaterally appropriated the
disputed portion in his favor.

xxxx

In addition, it should be noted that it is Respondent Judge's assertion that the

disputed portion is still part of the whole property owned in common by the
Paderanga heirs as the estate of their father has not yet been partitioned.
Respondent judge is of the opinion that each of the heirs owns an aliquot or
undivided share of the property. But at the same time he claims that by the
strength of the Sketch Plan as per Survey of the DENR, he is already entitled to a
part of the land and this is the reason why he fenced off the area that supposedly
belongs to him. These actuations of the respondent Judge run counter with his
claim of co-ownership.16
Based on the findings of Justice Del Castillo, the appropriation of Lot 12910 by the
respondent was really prejudicial to Dra. Corazon because he erected a fence around
the property and introduced improvements thereon without the conformity of the latter.
He did so at a time when he was still an active member of the Bench, and despite
knowing that he was expected to uphold the legal rights of others in their exclusive
property, whether the rights were under litigation in his court or elsewhere. Such
conduct on his part was unbecoming of any judge like him. He thereby disregarded the
sworn obligation of every judge to observe respect for the rights of others at all times if
he expected others to respect the courts and its judges, as well as the Judiciary as an
institution. His failure in this regard merited him the condign administrative penalty.

However, we sustain the conclusion of Justice Del Castillo that the other imputations
against the respondent were baseless, or were not subject to administrative sanction.
The following explanation by Justice Del Castillo of his conclusion is worth
reiterating:cralawlawlibrary
x x x While it is true that it is morally right for siblings to settle things among themselves,
there is nothing in law that compels or obliges a Judge to settle disputes between his
family members. A Judge is still but a man and not God who can dictate the actions of
people around him. Furthermore, in administrative proceedings, the complainant has
the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. Charges
based on mere suspicion or speculation cannot be given credence. In the instant case,
the suspicion of complainants that respondent Judge encouraged Narciso, Jr. to file
cases against his siblings remains unsubstantiated.

With respect to the alleged threats of the Respondent Judge to file cases against his
siblings, it should be noted that to date, he has not tiled any case against them. On the
contrary, the records disclose that it is the Complainants who have filed cases against
the Respondent Judge. "Threats" of filing civil and criminal cases remain to be empty
threats and not actionable wrongs. In any event, an administrative case is not the
remedy for such threats. The Complainants have other remedies in law, which is the
proper course of action against the alleged threats.

The same is true with respect to the malicious utterances allegedly made by the
Respondent Judge against Patria. An administrative complaint is not the proper remedy
for such utterances. The proper remedy is to file a criminal case for slander against the
Respondent Judge. x x x17
2.
 A.M. No. RTJ-07-2033

The charge of ignorance of the law, disregard of the New Code of Judicial Conduct and
abuse of authority under the second complaint related to the respondent's finding of
probable cause in the criminal case against Patria, and the issuance and the service of
the warrant of arrest on Patria in the school where she then worked. It was Patria's
submission that he should have disqualified himself early on under the rules on
compulsory disqualification of judges.

Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which governs the disqualifications of judicial
officials, including the Members of the Court itself, provides:cralawlawlibrary
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in
which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to
the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or
decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a
case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
Section 5, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct reprises the foregoing rule, to
wit:cralawlawlibrary
Section 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in
which they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a
reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such
proceedings include, but are not limited to, instances
where:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a) The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings;

(b) The judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness in the matter in
controversy;

(c) The judge, or a member of his or her family, has an economic interest in the
outcome of the matter in controversy;

(d) The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case
or matter in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during
their association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;

(e) The judge's ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;

(f) The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth civil
degree or to counsel within the fourth civil degree; or

(g) The judge knows that his or her spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir,
legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a
party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceedings;
The Court has been clear about the compulsory disqualification of judges related by
consanguinity or affinity to a party being a duty designed to free the adjudication of
cases from suspicion as to its fairness and integrity. In Garcia v. Dela Pena,18 for
instance, the Court has plainly but emphatically reminded:cralawlawlibrary
The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case where, as in the
instant case, the respondent judge is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity rests on the salutary principle that no judge should preside in a
case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. A judge
has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner
completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. The law
conclusively presumes that a judge cannot objectively or impartially sit in such a case
and, for that reason, prohibits him and strikes at his authority to hear and decide it, in
the absence of written consent of all parties concerned. The purpose is to preserve the
people's faith and confidence in the courts of justice.
The respondent's issuance of the warrant of arrest against his own sister was an
outright violation of the stringent rules on compulsory disqualification. For him, self-
disqualification was absolute and should have been immediate. It did not matter that he
presided in a single-sala station. Neither was it an excuse that the private complainant
in the criminal case against his sister could protest unless he acted as promptly as he
did on the case. No protest would be justified should self-disqualification be mandatory.
Consequently, he was not exempt from administrative liability for acting upon the
criminal case involving his own sister, and issuing the warrant of arrest against her.

His eventual self-disqualification from the criminal case did not render his liability any
less. He still did not act in good faith in issuing the warrant of arrest against Patria.
Worthy of note is that he inhibited himself only after Patria filed her Motion for
Disqualification. If he was acting in good faith, he needed no one to remind him about
the compulsory disqualification. Rather, he manifested his bad faith and ill will towards
Patria by letting the warrant of arrest be served on her in the school where she worked.
His obvious objective in so doing was to cause her greater embarrassment.

The rules on the disqualification of judges, particularly compulsory self-disqualification,

are basic legal guidelines that must be at the palm of every judge's hands.19 They are
as basic as a rule of thumb. That the respondent disobeyed them should render him
fully accountable for gross ignorance of the law or rule.20 The Court has
declared:cralawlawlibrary
x x x "As public servants, judges are appointed to the judiciary to serve as the visible
representation of the law, and more importantly, of justice. From them, the people draw
their will and awareness to obey the law." If judges, who have sworn to obey and uphold
the Constitution, shall conduct themselves as respondent did, in wanton disregard and
violation of the rights of the accused, then the people, especially those who have had
recourse to them shall lose all their respect and high regard for the members of the
Bench and the judiciary itself shall lose the high moral ground from which it draws its
power and strength to compel obedience to the laws.21
3.

Penalty

Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge under

Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,
which took effect on October 1, 2001.22Section 11(A) of the same Rule provides that the
penalty to be imposed if a respondent judge is found guilty of a serious charge is either:
(1) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not more than P40,000.00; or (2) suspension
from office without salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six
months; or (3) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the
Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government owned or controlled corporations.23cralawrednad

Conduct unbecoming of a judge, classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule
140 of the Rules of Court, is penalized under Section 11(C) of Rule 140 by: (1) a fine of
not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; or (2) censure; or (3)
reprimand; or (4) admonition with warning.24cralawrednad

Section 17 of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Civil Service Law states that if the
respondent official or employee is found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the
penalty imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge or counts and
the rest may be considered aggravating circumstances. The more serious charge
against the respondent was gross ignorance and disregard of the rule on compulsory
disqualification, relegating his conduct unbecoming of a judge to an aggravating
circumstance. Another aggravating circumstance was that the respondent had been
sanctioned for ignorance of the law and fined P20,000.00, with a stem warning that a
more severe penalty would be meted out for the commission of a similar
offense.25cralawredcralawrednad

Considering the foregoing, the Court agrees with the recommendations of Justice Del
Castillo that the respondent be meted with a two-month suspension. However,
suspension is no longer feasible considering that he is now retired from the Judiciary. In
lieu of suspension, the Court imposes on him a fine of P40,000.00 to be deducted from
whatever retirement benefits are still due him.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent RETIRED JUDGE

RUSTICO D. PADERANGA of Branch 28, Regional Trial Court in Mambajao,
Camiguin GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW and CONDUCT
UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE, and IMPOSES on him a FINEof P40,000.00 to be
deducted from the retirement benefits due him.
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary

Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ.,

concur.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
 SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3740-RTJ], February 04, 2015

JILL M. TORMIS, Complainant, v. JUDGE MEINRADO P. PAREDES, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

For consideration is the Report and Recommendation1 of Justice Maria Elisa Sempio
Diy (Justice Diy), Court of Appeals, Cebu City, submitted to this Court pursuant to its
January 14, 2013 Resolution,2referring the complaint filed by Jill M. Tormis (Jill) against
respondent Judge Meinrado P. Paredes (Judge Paredes), Presiding Judge, Branch 13,
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu City, for investigation, report and recommendation.

The Facts

In her Affidavit/Complaint,3 dated September 5, 2011, Jill charged Judge Paredes with
grave misconduct. Jill was a student of Judge Paredes in Political Law Review during
the first semester of school year 2010-2011 at the Southwestern University, Cebu
City. She averred that sometime in August 2010, in his class discussions, Judge
Paredes named her mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis (Judge Tormis), then Presiding
Judge of Branch 4, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cebu City, as one of the
judges involved in the marriage scams in Cebu City. Judge Paredes also mentioned in
his class that Judge Tormis was abusive of her position as a judge, corrupt, and
ignorant of the law.

Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in his discussions not only once
but several times. In one session, Judge Paredes was even said to have included in his
discussion Francis Mondragon Tormis (Francis), son of Judge Tormis, stating that he
was a “court-noted addict.”4 She was absent from class at that time, but one of her
classmates who was present, Rhoda L. Litang (Rhoda), informed her about the
inclusion of her brother. To avoid humiliation in school, Jill decided to drop the class
under Judge Paredes and transfer to another law school in Tacloban City.

Jill also disclosed that in the case entitled “Trinidad O. Lachica v. Judge
Tormis”5(Lachica v. Tormis), her mother was suspended from the service for six (6)
months for allegedly receiving payment of a cash bail bond for the temporary release of
an accused for the warrant she had issued in a case then pending before her
sala. Judge Paredes was the one who reviewed the findings conducted therein and he
recommended that the penalty be reduced to severe reprimand.

Jill, however, claimed that Judge Paredes committed an offense worse than that
committed by her mother. She averred that on March 13, 2011, Judge Paredes
accepted a cash bail bond in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) for the
temporary release of one Lita Guioguio in a case entitled, “People of the Philippines v.
Lita Guioguio,” docketed as Criminal Case No. 148434-R,6 then pending before Branch
8, MTCC, Cebu City (Guioguio case).

Thus, she prayed that Judge Paredes be administratively sanctioned for his actuations.

Comment of Judge Paredes

In his Comment,7 dated October 28, 2011, Judge Paredes denied the accusations
of Jill. He stated that Judge Tormis had several administrative cases, some of which
he had investigated; that as a result of the investigations, he recommended sanctions
against Judge Tormis; that Judge Tormis used Jill, her daughter, to get back at him; that
he discussed in his class the case of Lachica v. Tormis, but never Judge Tormis’
involvement in the marriage scams nor her sanctions as a result of the investigation
conducted by the Court; that he never personally attacked Judge Tormis’ dignity and
credibility; that the marriage scams in Cebu City constituted a negative experience for
all the judges and should be discussed so that other judges, court employees and
aspiring lawyers would not emulate such misdeeds; that the marriage scams were also
discussed during meetings of RTC judges and in schools where remedial law and legal
ethics were taught; that he talked about past and resolved cases, but not the negative
tendencies of Judge Tormis; that there was nothing wrong in discussing the
administrative cases involving Judge Tormis because these cases were known to the
legal community and some were even published in the Supreme Court Reports
Annotated (SCRA) and other legal publications; and that when he was the executive
judge tasked to investigate Judge Tormis, he told her to mend her ways, but she
resented his advice.

Judge Paredes further stated that when Jill was still his student, she did not complain
about or dispute his discussions in class regarding the administrative liabilities of her
mother; that the matter was not also brought to the attention of the Dean of
Southwestern University or of the local authorities; that he admitted saying that Judge
Tormis had a son named Francis who was a drug addict and that drug dependents had
no place in the judiciary; and that he suggested that Francis should be removed from
the judiciary.

He denied, however, having stated that Francis was appointed as court employee as a
result of the influence of Judge Tormis. She is not an influential person and it is the
Supreme Court who determines the persons to be appointed as court
employees. Judge Tormis, however, allowed her drug dependent son to apply for a
position in the judiciary.

Regarding the specific act being complained of, Judge Paredes admitted that he
personally accepted a cash bail bond of P6,000.00 for the temporary release of Lita
Guioguio on March 13, 2011. He claimed though that the approval of the bail bond was
in accordance with Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-62-SC which allowed
executive judges to act on petitions for bail and other urgent matters on weekends,
official holidays and special days. Judge Paredes explained that he merely followed the
procedure. As Executive Judge, he issued a temporary receipt and on the following
business day, a Monday, he instructed the Branch Clerk of Court to remit the cash bond
to the Clerk of Court. The Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond
and issued an official receipt. It was not his fault that the Clerk of Court acknowledged
the receipt of the cash bond only in the afternoon of March 21, 2011.

Lastly, Judge Paredes averred that the discussions relative to the administrative cases
of Judge Tormis could not be the subject of an administrative complaint because it was
not done in the performance of his judicial duties.

Reply of the Complainant

In her Verified-Reply,8 dated November 23, 2011, Jill countered that her mother had
nothing to do with the filing of the present complaint; that she was forced to leave her
family in Cebu City to continue her law studies elsewhere because she could no longer
bear the discriminating and judgmental eyes of her classmates brought about by Judge
Paredes’ frequent discussions in class of her mother’s administrative cases; that her
mother was indeed one of the judges implicated in the marriage scams, but when Judge
Paredes discussed the matter in his classes, the case of her mother was not yet
resolved by the Court and, thus, in 2010, it was still premature; and that Judge Paredes
was aware that administrative cases were confidential in nature.

Jill claimed that the intention to humiliate her family was evident when Judge Paredes
branded her brother, Francis, as a “drug addict.”

Rejoinder of Judge Paredes

In his Rejoinder,9 dated December 2, 2011, Judge Paredes asserted that it was not
premature to discuss the marriage scams in class because the scandal was already
disclosed by Atty. Rullyn Garcia and was also written in many legal publications, and
that the drug addiction of Francis was known in the Palace of Justice of Cebu City.

In its Report,10 dated September 12, 2012, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) stated that the conflicting allegations by the parties presented
factual issues that could not be resolved based on the evidence on record
then. Considering the gravity and the sensitive nature of the charges, a full-blown
investigation should be conducted by the CA.

On January 14, 2013, pursuant to the recommendation of the OCA, the Court referred
the administrative complaint to the Executive Justice of the CA, Cebu Station, for
investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the
records.11chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On March 26, 2013, the case was raffled to, and the records were received by, Justice
Diy. Thereafter, the appropriate notices were issued and the confidential hearings were
conducted. Afterwards, Justice Diy received the respective memoranda of the parties.

In her memorandum,12 Jill contended that Judge Paredes’ act of discussing Judge
Tormis’ cases in class where she was present was an open display of insensitivity,
impropriety and lack of delicadeza bordering on oppressive and abusive conduct, which
fell short of the exacting standards of behavior demanded of magistrates. She asserted
that the defense of Judge Paredes that he could not be made administratively liable as
the act was not made in the performance of his official duties did not hold water
because a judge should be the embodiment of what was just and fair not only in the
performance of his official duties but also in his everyday life.

Jill also averred that Judge Paredes violated the subjudice rule when he discussed the
marriage scam involving Judge Tormis in 2010 because at that time, the case was still
being investigated; that the administrative case relative to the marriage scam was
decided only on April 2, 2013; that Judge Paredes was not the Executive Judge of the
MTCC when he received the cash bail bond in the Guiguio case; that he could not prove
that the executive judge of the MTCC was unavailable before accepting the cash bail
bond; and that the assertion of Judge Paredes of his being an anti-corruption judge and
a lone nominee of the IBP Cebu City Chapter to the Foundation of Judicial Excellence
did not exculpate him from committing the acts complained of.

In his Reply-Memorandum,13 Judge Paredes reiterated the allegations contained in his

previous pleadings. He added that the marriage scams scandalized the Judiciary and
became public knowledge when Atty. Rullyn Garcia of the OCA held a press conference
on the matter; that, hence, every citizen, including him, may comment thereon; that in
the hierarchy of rights, freedom of speech and expression ranked high; that Judge
Tormis never intervened in the present case; that if he indeed made derogatory remarks
against Judge Tormis, she should have filed a criminal action for oral defamation; and
that calling for the ouster of drug addicts could not be considered an abuse, but was
meant for the protection of the Judiciary.14chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In her Report and Recommendation, Justice Diy found Judge Paredes guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a judge. She opined that his use of intemperate language during class
discussions was inappropriate. His statements in class, tending to project Judge Tormis
as corrupt and ignorant of the laws and procedure, were obviously and clearly
insensitive and inexcusable.

Justice Diy disregarded the defense of Judge Paredes that his discussions of the
administrative case of Judge Tormis in class was an exercise of his right to freedom of
expression. She cited the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary15 which urged members of the Judiciary to be models of propriety at all
times. She quoted with emphasis Section 6 which stated that “Judges, like any other
citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in
exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to
preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the
judiciary.”16chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Justice Diy likewise rejected Judge Paredes’ position that he could not be held
administratively liable for his comments against Judge Tormis and Francis as these
were uttered while he was not in the exercise of his judicial
functions. Jurisprudence,17 as well as the New Code of Judicial Conduct, required that
he conduct himself beyond reproach, not only in the discharge of his judicial functions,
but also in his other professional endeavors and everyday activities.

Justice Diy found merit in Jill’s allegation that Judge Paredes violated the subjudice rule
when the latter discussed the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010 when the
said issue was still being investigated. She cited, as basis for Judge Paredes’ liability,
Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

As regards Judge Paredes’ receipt of the cash bail bond in relation to

the Guioguio case, Justice Diy absolved him of any liability as the charge of grave
misconduct was not supported by sufficient evidence. She accepted Judge Paredes’
explanation that he merely followed the procedure laid down in Section 14, Chapter 5 of
A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC when he approved the bail bond.

Based on these findings, Justice Diy came up with the following recommendations,
thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The undersigned Investigating Justice finds that indeed Judge Paredes is guilty of
conduct unbecoming of a judge. Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light
offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, penalized under
Section 11 (c) thereof by any of the following: (1) a Fine of not less than P1,000.00 but
not exceeding P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with
warning.

Inasmuch as this is Judge Paredes’ first offense and considering the factual milieu and
the peculiar circumstances attendant thereto, it is respectfully recommended that Judge
Paredes be meted out with the penalty of REPRIMAND with a warning that a repetition
of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.18

The Court’s Ruling

The Court adopts the findings and recommendations of Justice Diy except as to the
penalty.

Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,

more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The
misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful
intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by
substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must
be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. Corruption, as an element of grave
misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and
wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for
another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.19chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to and be
connected with the performance of his official duties.20 Considering that the acts
complained of, the remarks against Judge Tormis and Francis, were made by Judge
Paredes in his class discussions, they cannot be considered as “misconduct.” They are
simply not related to the discharge of his official functions as a judge. Thus, Judge
Paredes cannot be held liable for misconduct, much less for grave misconduct.

Discussion of a subjudice matter, however, is another thing.

On subjudice matters, Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct

provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

CANON 3

IMPARTIALITY

SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come before
them, make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of
such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges
make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any
person or issue. (Emphasis supplied)

The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial
proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing
the administration of justice.21 The rationale for the rule was spelled out in Nestle
Philippines, Inc. v. Sanchez,22 where it was stated that it is a traditional conviction of
civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and
law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided
upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be
uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.23chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Notably, when Judge Paredes discussed the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in
2010, the investigation relative to the said case had not yet been concluded. In fact, the
decision on the case was promulgated by the Court only on April 2, 2013. 24 In 2010, he
still could not make comments on the administrative case to prevent any undue
influence in its resolution. Commenting on the marriage scams, where Judge Tormis
was one of the judges involved, was in contravention of the subjudice rule. Justice Diy
was, therefore, correct in finding that Judge Paredes violated Section 4, Canon 3 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct.

The Court shares the view of Justice Diy that although the reasons of Judge Paredes
for discussing the marriage scams in his classes seemed noble, his objectives were
carried out insensitively and in bad taste. The pendency of the administrative case of
Judge Tormis and the publicity of the marriage scams did not give Judge Paredes
unrestrained license to criticize Judge Tormis in his class discussions. The publicity
given to the investigation of the said scams and the fact that it was widely discussed in
legal circles let people expressed critical opinions on the issue. There was no need for
Judge Paredes to “rub salt to the wound,”25 as Justice Diy put it.

Judge Paredes in using intemperate language and unnecessary comments tending to

project Judge Tormis as a corrupt and ignorant judge in his class discussions, was
correctly found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge by Justice Dy.

Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to
exemplify propriety at all times. Canon 4 instructs:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

CANON 4

PROPRIETY

SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.

xxx

SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal

restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do
so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity,
independence and respect for himself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must
exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint. He
should choose his words and exercise more caution and control in expressing
himself. In other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. Furthermore, a
magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant
by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments. He is required to
always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in
language.26chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In this case, records show that Judge Paredes failed to observe the propriety required
by the Code and to use temperate and courteous language befitting a
magistrate. Indeed, Judge Paredes demonstrated conduct unbecoming of a judge.

When Judge Paredes failed to restrain himself and included Francis, whose condition
and personal circumstances, as properly observed by Justice Diy, had no relevance to
the topic that was then being discussed in class, it strongly indicated his intention to
taint their reputations.
The inclusion of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions was never denied by
Judge Paredes who merely justified his action by invoking his right to freedom of
expression. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that
judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. Such right,
however, is not without limitation. Section 6, Canon 4 of the Code also imposes a
correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they
should always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial
office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary. In the exercise of his right
to freedom of expression, Judge Paredes should uphold the good image of the Judiciary
of which he is a part. He should have avoided unnecessary and uncalled for remarks in
his discussions and should have been more circumspect in his language. Being a
judge, he is expected to act with greater circumspection and to speak with self-
restraint. Verily, Judge Paredes fell short of this standard.

The Court cannot sustain the assertion of Judge Paredes that he cannot be held
administratively liable for his negative portrayal of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class
discussions. Judge Paredes should be reminded of the ethical conduct expected of him
as a judge not only in the performance of his judicial duties, but in his professional and
private activities as well. Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of the Code
mandates:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

CANON 2

INTEGRITY

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but
also to the personal demeanor of judges.

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach,
but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.

SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the
integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be
done.
(Emphases supplied)

Any impropriety on the part of Judge Paredes, whether committed in or out of the court,
should not be tolerated for he is not a judge only occasionally. It should be emphasized
that the Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a
whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but
also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy
of morality, a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that
a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. A judge’s official life cannot simply be
detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus, being a subject of constant
public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. He should personify judicial
integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in
the performance of official duties and in private life should be above
suspicion.27chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Regarding the act of receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio case, Justice Diy
correctly found that it cannot be regarded as grave misconduct. The Court finds merit in
the position of Judge Paredes that the approval, as well as the receipt, of the cash bail
bond, was in accordance with the rules. Thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Finally, the Investigating Officer disagrees with Jill’s allegation that Judge Paredes
committed grave misconduct when he personally received cash bail bond in relation to
the Guioguio case. Judge Paredes justified his action by stating that he was merely
following the procedure set forth in Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-02-SC, which
authorizes executive judges to act on petitions for bail on Saturdays after 1:00 o’clock in
the afternoon, Sundays, official holidays, and special days. Said rule also provides that
should the accused deposit cash bail, the executive judge shall acknowledge receipt of
the cash bail bond in writing and issue a temporary receipt therefor. Considering that
Judge Paredes merely followed said procedure, he cannot be held administratively
liable for his act of receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio case.

Moreover, respondent judge is authorized to receive the cash bail bond under Section
17 (a), Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under said provision, the
bail bond may be filed either with the court where the case is pending, or with any
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the place of arrest, or with any judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court of the place of arrest.

Lastly, Section 1 (h), Chapter 4 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provides that executive judges
are authorized to exercise other powers and prerogatives which are necessary or
incidental to the performance of their functions in relation to court administration. In the
instant case, Judge Paredes was merely exercising powers incidental to his functions
as an Executive Judge since he was the only judge available when Lita Guioguio posted
bail. Notably, Lita Guioguio’s payment for cash bail bond was made on a Sunday. In
addition, the judge assigned to the court where the Guioguio case was then pending
and the executive judge of the MTCC, Cebu City were not available to receive the bail
bond. Judge Paredes was the only judge available since the practice was for one judge
to be present on Saturdays. However, there was no judge assigned for duty during
Sundays.

Relative to the matter above-discussed, the insinuation made by complainant Jill of any
irregularity reflected in the issuance of the two (2) orders of release of different dates is
not backed up by sufficient evidence.28

Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule
140 of the Rules of Court and penalized under Section 11(C) thereof by any of the
following: (1) A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2)
Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with warning.

Considering that this is the first offense of Judge Paredes, the appropriate penalty under
the circumstances is admonition.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Meinrado P. Paredes, Presiding Judge of Branch
13 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, administratively liable for conduct
unbecoming of a judge and ADMONISHEShim therefor.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Carpio, (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr.,* Del Castillo, , and Leonen, JJ., concur.
A.M. No. 12-8-160-RTC December 10, 2012

AMBASSADOR HARRY C. ANGPING and ATTY. SIXTO BRILLANTES, Petitioners,

vs.
JUDGE REYNALDO G. ROS, Regional Trial Court, Branch 33,
Manila, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

Before this Court is a complaint of petitioners Ambassador Harry C. Angping (Amb.

Angping) and Atty. Sixto Brillantes (Atty. Brillantes) filed against respondent Judge
Reynaldo G. Ros (Judge Ros) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Manila, Branch 33.
Petitioners charged Judge Ros for the violation of Canons 2 and 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.

The Facts1

Herein petitioner Amb. Angping with his counsel petitioner Atty. Brillantes filed before
this Court a letter-complaint dated June 28, 2010. The petitioners charged respondent
Judge Ros for violating Canons 2 and 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

The said letter-complaint emanated from the actions and rulings of Judge Ros relative
to Criminal Case Nos. 10-274696 to 10-274704 entitled, "People of the Philippines vs.
Julian Camacho and Bernardo Ong," for qualified theft.

Petitioners Amb. Angping and Atty. Brillantes were the representatives of the Philippine
Sports Commission (PSC), the private complainant in the aforesaid criminal cases.
Petitioners alleged that on March 23, 2010, the above cases were raffled to Branch 33,
RTC-Manila. However, on the very same day the said case was raffled to the
respondent judge, the latter issued an order dismissing the criminal cases for lack of
probable cause.

Petitioners subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration. After which, the respondent
issued an Order dated April 16, 2010 directing the accused in the above-cited criminal
cases (Julian Camacho and Bernardo Ong) to file within fifteen (15) days their
comment. In the same Order, respondent Judge Ros gave PSC another fifteen (15)
days from receipt of a copy of the accused’s comment to file a reply and thereafter the
motion for reconsideration would be resolved.

On May 26, 2010, the accused filed their comment after several motions for extension.
The petitioners averred that the PSC received its copy of the comment on June 3, 2010.
Thus, the petitioners claimed that they have timely filed their reply on June 18, 2010
since they were given a period of fifteen (15) days to file the same. However, on the
date petitioners filed their reply, the PSC received respondent Judge Ros’ Order dated
May 28, 2010, denying the motion for reconsideration. Petitioners asserted that the
respondent Judge resolved the motion for reconsideration without waiting for PSC’s
reply – a direct contravention of respondent’s Order dated April 16, 2010 where
petitioners were given fifteen (15) days to file their reply.

The aforesaid incidents started to create reservations in the mind of the petitioners on
the respondent Judge’s impartiality. They doubted Judge Ros’ fairness in handling the
aforementioned criminal cases because of the speed at which he disposed them when
they had just been raffled to him. The petitioners could not believe that he could resolve
the cases within the same day considering that the records thereof are voluminous
and that the criminal cases were raffled to him on the day he issued the order of
dismissal.

Nevertheless, the petitioners continued to respect the respondent’s order and sought
other legal remedies such as the filing of a motion for reconsideration. However, when
Judge Ros issued the order resolving the motion for reconsideration after two (2) days
from the filing of the comment and without awaiting for PSC’s reply, petitioners
were convinced that respondent Judge Ros acted with partiality and malice. Thus, the
petitioners filed the letter-complaint subject of this administrative case where the
petitioners charged respondent Judge Ros for violation of Canons 2 and 3 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct.

In his comment, respondent Judge Ros claimed that he overlooked the directive in his
order which gave the PSC fifteen (15) days to file its reply. He apologized, and averred
that he acted in good faith. He alleged that the oversight was due to his policy of
promptly acting on a motion for reconsideration within thirty (30) days after it has been
submitted for resolution. Notwithstanding the speed of the disposition of the criminal
cases, respondent Judge Ros claimed that the PSC was accorded due process
because he had taken into consideration the petitioners’ legal arguments in their motion
for reconsideration. The respondent also pointed out that, even if PSC’s reply had been
taken into account, his position would remain the same because petitioners did not raise
any new matter. He claimed that PSC merely rebutted the arguments raised in the
comment/objection of the accused in the concerned criminal cases, which arguments
were not even relied upon in his dismissal of the cases.

The respondent denied acting with partiality and malice. He maintained that he ordered
the dismissal of the criminal cases on the same day he had received them only after a
careful evaluation of the evidence on record. He also noted that the complainants never
questioned his ruling before the appellate court. Thus, respondent Judge Ros prayed for
the dismissal of the instant administrative case against him.

In its recommendation, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended

the dismissal of the instant administrative complaint against respondent Judge Ros for
lack of merit. The OCA pointed out that, while the speed at which the respondent Judge
rendered the March 23, 2010 Order may be surprising to those accustomed to court
delays, a judge is not precluded from deciding a case with dispatch. It also found that
the respondent Judge issued the said Order based on his independent evaluation or
assessment of the merits of the case. Furthermore, although there was a lapse in
judgment on the part of the respondent judge when he promulgated the May 28, 2010
Order without waiting for the petitioners’ reply, the OCA noted that the petitioners failed
to prove that the respondent’s action was motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or
corruption. The OCA added that the correctness of the judge’s evaluation is judicial in
nature, thus, it is not a proper subject of administrative proceedings.

Issue

Whether or not respondent Judge Ros is liable for violation of Canons 2 and 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct.

Our Ruling

After a careful evaluation of the records of the instant administrative complaint, this
Court partly concurs with the findings and recommendations of the OCA.

The respondent was charged with the violation of Canons 2 and 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. The said canons provide:

Canon 2 – A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities.

Canon 3 – A judge should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality and
diligence.

From the foregoing provisions, this Court partially agrees with the OCA when it
recommended the dismissal of the present administrative complaint in so far as the
respondent’s liability under Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct is concerned. The
OCA is correct in its observation that petitioners failed to present evidence necessary to
prove respondent’s partiality, malice, bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. In Alicia
E. Asturias v. Attys. Manuel Serrano and Emiliano Samson,2 the Court held that a
complainant has the burden of proof in administrative complaints. He must establish his
charge by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. In the instant case, petitioners Amb.
Angping and Atty. Brillantes failed to discharge by clear, convincing and satisfactory
evidence the onus of proving their charges under Canon 3 against respondent Judge
Ros.

Notwithstanding the above findings, this Court is not prepared to concede respondent
Judge’s liability as to Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides: "A judge
should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities." The failure
of the petitioners to present evidence that the respondent acted with partiality
and malice can only negate the allegation of impropriety, but not the appearance
of impropriety. In De la Cruz v. Judge Bersamira,3 this Court underscored the need to
show not only the fact of propriety but the appearance of propriety itself. It held that the
standard of morality and decency required is exacting so much so that a judge should
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities. The Court
explains thus:

By the very nature of the bench, judges, more than the average man, are required
to observe an exacting standard of morality and decency. The character of a
judge is perceived by the people not only through his official acts but also
through his private morals as reflected in his external behavior. It is therefore
paramount that a judge’s personal behavior both in the performance of his duties
and his daily life, be free from the appearance of impropriety as to be beyond
reproach. Only recently, in Magarang v. Judge Galdino B. Jardin, Sr., the Court
pointedly stated that:

While every public office in the government is a public trust, no position exacts a greater
demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the
judiciary. Hence, judges are strictly mandated to abide by the law, the Code of Judicial
Conduct and with existing administrative policies in order to maintain the faith of the
people in the administration of justice.

Judges must adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct. They must be the
embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. A judge’s conduct must be
above reproach. Like Caesar’s wife, a judge must not only be pure but above
suspicion. A judge’s private as well as official conduct must at all times be free
from all appearances of impropriety, and be beyond reproach.

In Vedana v. Valencia, the Court held:

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff
of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to
his behavior outside his sala as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a
public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in
order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must
behave with propriety at all times. As we have recently explained, a judge’s official life
can not simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus:

Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept
restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.

A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The
personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life
should be above suspicion.

As stated earlier, in Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge should

avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities. A judge
is not only required to be impartial; he must also appear to be impartial. Public
confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges.
Viewed vis-à-vis the factual landscape of this case, it is clear that respondent judge
violated Rule 1.02, as well as Canon 2, Rule 2.01 and Canon 3. In this connection, the
Court pointed out in Joselito Rallos, et al. v. Judge Ireneo Lee Gako Jr., RTC Branch 5,
Cebu City, that:

Well-known is the judicial norm that "judges should not only be impartial but
should also appear impartial." Jurisprudence repeatedly teaches that litigants are
entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The other elements
of due process, like notice and hearing, would become meaningless if the ultimate
decision is rendered by a partial or biased judge. Judges must not only render just,
correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free of any suspicion
as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity.

This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan and regional trial
court judges like herein respondent, because they are judicial front-liners who have
direct contact with the litigating parties. They are the intermediaries between conflicting
interests and the embodiments of the people’s sense of justice. Thus, their official
conduct should be beyond reproach.4 (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)

In the instant administrative complaint, while no evidence directly shows partiality and
malice on the respondent’s action, this Court cannot ignore the fact that the dispatch by
which the respondent Judge dismissed the criminal cases provokes in the minds of the
petitioners doubt in the partiality of the respondent. First, Judge Ros cannot deny the
fact that the Information for Criminal Case Nos. 10-274696 to 10-274704 dated
February 10, 2010 filed on March 22, 2010 with the RTC-OCC of Manila against therein
accused Camacho and Ong involved nine (9) counts of Qualified Theft. Thus, the
records of these cases were voluminous. Second, respondent cannot deny the fact that
the criminal cases were raffled to his office only on March 23, 2010 and that he
immediately rendered the questioned Order dismissing the charges against therein
accused on the same day for lack of probable cause. Thus, considering the nine (9)
counts of Qualified Theft, the records at hand, and the speed in arriving at a decision,
the respondent Judge would either appear to have decided with partiality in favor of the
accused or appear to have failed to thoroughly study the case. Third, granting por
arguendo that the dispatch by which he dispensed of the criminal cases were done in
good faith, this Court cannot close its eyes on the liberality by which the respondent
Judge granted several Motions for Extension of Time to File Comment by therein
accused, while the same liberality was missing when it was the turn of the petitioners to
file their reply. After the accused filed their comment, and even despite the fifteenday
period available to the petitioners, the respondent Judge simply disregarded his earlier
Order directing the petitioners to file their reply and went ahead with the denial of the
petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration. And he denied the Motion for Reconsideration
barely two days after therein accused filed their comment. From the foregoing, this
Court cannot but conclude that there was some semblance of partiality and malice on
the part of the respondent Judge.
The respondent Judge claimed that he had carefully evaluated the evidence on record
before he issued his order dismissing the criminal cases. He asserted that even if the
petitioners’ reply was considered, his position would not change. However, because he
failed to consider the reply in his evaluation of the criminal cases, he appeared to have
decided without the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. In not waiting for the
petitioners’ reply, the respondent Judge exhibited the appearance of bias and partiality.

In Borromeo-Garcia v. Pagayatan,5 this Court had the occasion to state:

[T]he appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to public confidence and the
administration of justice as actual bias or prejudice.

Lower court judges, such as respondent, play a pivotal role in the promotion of the
people’s faith in the judiciary. They are front-liners who give (sic) human face to the
judicial branch at the grassroots level in their interaction with litigants and those who do
business with the courts. Thus, the admonition that judges must avoid not only
impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety is more sternly applied to
them.6 (Citations omitted)

At the very least, the respondent Judge failed to consider further arguments which the
petitioners might have proffered when he failed to wait for their reply. Whether or not
such argument may justify the reconsideration of the dismissal of the concerned
criminal cases, the respondent Judge is at all times duty bound to render just, correct
and impartial decisions in a manner free of any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality
or integrity.7

We cannot blame the petitioners if they became suspicious of the action of the
respondent. The manner by which the latter handled the dismissal of the concerned
criminal cases was of such a character that could cause distrust, especially in the wary
eyes of a concerned party-litigant.

In his comment, the respondent Judge apologized for his omission and averred that he
acted in good faith. While we do not belittle the respondent's sincerity, we cannot simply
ignore his lack of prudence. This Court is duty bound to protect and preserve public
confidence in our judicial system. The careless manner at which he arrived at his March
23, 2010 Order and denied the petitioners' motion for consideration raised an air of
suspicion and an appearance of impropriety in the proceedings. Verily, in this instance,
the respondent Judge failed to live up to the demand and degree of propriety required of
him by the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Finally, this Court must emphasize that it is commendable when a judge, by his
dedication to the speedy administration of justice, attempts or causes the immediate
dismissal of a case. Normally, we do not dwell on the question of propriety of a judge's
action if he decides with speed the dismissal of a case based on lawful grounds.
However, apart from the strict observance of proper procedure, the entire affair should
be handled with care and reasonable sensitivity so as not to unduly offend litigants and
destroy the public's confidence in our justice system. This Court exhorts all judges to act
with prudence so as not to compromise the integrity of court processes and orders.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the charge against Judge Reynaldo G. Ros for
violation of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct is hereby DISMISSED. However,
for failing to live up to the degree of propriety required of him under Canon 2 of the
same Code, he is hereby ADMONISHED and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2472 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4141-RTJ]

JUDGE MARTONINO R. MARCOS (Retired), Complainant,

vs.
HON. PERLA V. CABRERA-FALLER, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 90, Dasmariñas City, Cavite, Respondent.

DECISION

Per Curiam:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 against Judge Perla V. Cabrera-

Faller (Judge Cabrera-Faller) of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñas City,
Cavite (RTC), filed by Martonino R. Marcos, a retired judge (complainant), for ignorance
of the law, misconduct, violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act, and for
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment/order.

The Antecedents

The controversy stemmed from the death of complainant's grandson, Marc Andrei
Marcos (Marc Andrei), during the initiation rites of Lex Leonum Fratemitas (Lex
Leonum) held on July 29, 2012 at the Veluz Farm, Dasmariñas City, Cavite.

A preliminary investigation was conducted and, thereafter, the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) issued its Resolution,2 dated May 8, 2013, recommending the
prosecution of several members of Lex Leonum for Violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8049, otherwise known as The Anti-Hazing Law. In the same resolution, the OCP also
recommended that Cornelio Marcelo (Marcelo), the person assigned to be the buddy or
"angel" of Marc Andrei during the initiation rites, be discharged as a state witness
pursuant to the provisions of Section 12 of R.A. No. 6981. 3

Thereafter, the Information4 for Violation of R.A. No. 8049 was filed against Jenno
Antonio Villanueva (Villanueva), Emmanuel Jefferson Santiago, Richard
Rosales (Rosales), Mohamad Fyzee Alim (Alim), Chino Daniel Amante (Amante), Julius
Arsenio Alcancia, Edrich Gomez, Dexter Circa, Gian Angelo Veluz, Glenn Meduen,
alias Tanton, alias Fidel, alias E.R., and alias Paulo, before the RTC. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 11862-13.

Finding probable cause to sustain the prosecution of the accused, Judge Cabrera-Faller
issued the Order,5 dated June 3, 2013, directing the issuance of a warrant of
arrest and, at the same time, the archiving of the entire record of the case until the
arrest of the accused.

On June 13, 2013, acting on the Omnibus Motion filed by Rosales, Alim and Amante,
Judge Cabrera-Faller issued another Order6 directing the recall of the warrants of
arrest of the three accused which she claimed were issued inadvertently.
On August 15, 2013, acting on the separate motions for the determination of probable
cause and to withhold issuance of warrants of arrest7 and extremely urgent motion to
quash warrant of arrest8 filed by the accused, Judge Cabrera-Faller issued the Omnibus
Order,9 quashing, lifting and setting aside the warrants for their arrest and
ultimately dismissing the case against all of them for lack of probable cause.

According to Judge Cabrera-Faller, she found no probable cause to indict the accused
for violation of R.A. No. 8049 as the statement of Marcelo and those of the other
accused "were not put in juxtaposition with each other for a clearer and sharper focus of
their respective weight and substance." 10 To her, "there were nagging questions left
unanswered by the testimony of Marcelo and some improbabilities therein that boggle
the mind and disturb the conscience into giving it absolute currency and credence." 11 In
her view, "the statement of Marcelo simply depicted the stages of initiation rites" 12 and
failed to show that the accused conspired to inflict fatal injuries on Marc Andrei. 13She
found the statements of the prosecution witnesses, Marcelo Cabansag (Cabansag) and
Jan Marcel V. Ragaza (Ragaza) either untruthful, immaterial and incompetent or
brimming with flip flopping testimonies. She brushed aside the admission of the accused
that initiation rites were indeed conducted on July 29, 2012 and that they were allegedly
present in the different stages of the initiation rites, and simply believed the version of
the accused that it was Marcelo, the recruiter and "angel'' of Marc Andrei, who inflicted
the fatal blows on him, causing his death. Thus, the decretal portion of the Omnibus
Order reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court holds to grant the motions filed by the
following accused, to wit:

(a) The motion for determination of probable cause filed by the accused Gian Veluz and
Edrich Gomez, which was received by this court on May 20, 2013;

(b) The motion for determination of probable cause, filed by the accused Julius Arsenio
A. Alcancia and Dexter S. Garcia;

(c) The motion for the determination of probable cause, filed by the accused
Mahammad Fyzee Alim, Richard Rosales and Chino Amante, which was received by
this court on May 23, 2013; although a warrant was issued inadvertently against the
accused on June 3, 2013, the same was lifted and recalled in view of the subject
motion;

(d) The motion for the determination of probable cause, filed by Emmanuel Jefferson A.
Santiago, which was received by this court on May 29, 2013, although a warrant was
issued inadvertently against the accused on June 3, 2013; the same was lifted and
recalled in view of the subject motion; [and] (e) The extremely urgent motion to quash
the warrant of arrest, filed by the accused Jenno Antonio Villanueva on June 14, 2013.
ACCORDINGLY, the warrant for the arrest, dated June 3, 2013, is hereby quashed,
lifted and set aside, and this case is hereby DISMISSED in so far as all the accused
named in the information is concerned, for the reasons already afore-stated.

SO ORDERED. [Emphases supplied]

The order of dismissal prompted complainant to file this administrative case against
Judge Cabrera-Faller. In his Letter-Complaint, 14 he alleged, among others, that:

1. On June 3, 2013, the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller issued an Order in Crim. Case No.
11862-13 stating that "Finding probable cause to sustain the prosecution of the above-
named accused for the crime charged in the criminal information, let a warrant for their
arrest be issued, in the meantime sent the entire record of this case to the ARCHIVES
until the said accused shall have been arrested."

However, on June 13, 2013, the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller issued another order
recalling the warrant against accused Emmanuel Jefferson A. Santiago because the
same was allegedly INADVERTENTLY issued.

The actuations of the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller clearly demonstrate her

incompetence and gross ignorance of the law and jurisprudence. Section 6, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court provides that "the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of
the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause,
he shall issue a warrant of arrest." When she issued the Order dated June 3, 2013, she
certified that she personally evaluated the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence and ruled that there was probable cause so she directed the
issuance of warrants of arrest against all the accused. When she subsequently held that
the warrant of arrest was inadvertently issued against accused Emmanuel Jefferson A.
Santiago, does this mean that she did not personally evaluate the records of the case
before directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest against all the accused? Does this
mean that the warrants of arrests issued against all the other accused were also
INADVERTENTLY issued? Does this mean that the Order dated June 3, 2013 finding
probable cause against all the other accused was likewise INADVERTENTLY issued
considering the fact that the basis for the issuance of the warrants of arrest against all
the accused is the said order dated June 3, 2013? A judge who issues a warrant of
arrest INADVERTENTLY has no place in the judiciary because such actuation clearly
shows her incompetence and gross ignorance of both substantive and procedural laws.

The Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller could likewise not claim that the warrant of arrest was
INADVERTENTLY issued because of the filing of the Omnibus Motion by accused
Emmanuel Jefferson A. Santiago. It must be pointed out that when the Hon. Perla V.
Cabrera-Faller issued the Order, dated June 3, 2013, finding probable cause against all
the accused and directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest against all the accused, the
said motion was already filed with the Honorable Court. Despite the fact that the said
Omnibus Motion was already filed with the court, the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller still
found probable cause and directed the issuance of warrants of arrests against all the
accused in its Order dated June 3, 2013. Consequently, it could not be said that the
warrant of arrest issued against the accused was INADVERTENTLY issued. It
could only be surmised that there are far more other reasons why the warrant of
arrest was recalled but definitely not due to its alleged INADVERTENT
issuance. Unless, of course, the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller admits issuing the Order
dated June 3, 2013 without evaluating the resolution of the public prosecutor and its
supporting evidence.

Very clearly, the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller manifested her incompetence and/or
gross ignorance of the law by issuing the Order, dated June 13, 2013. She was
probably swayed by reasons not based on the law but probably for some other reasons
to the great damage and prejudice of the relatives of Marc Andrei Marcos whose life
was lost at such a very young age.

xxxx

2. On August 15, 2013, Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller again issued an Omnibus Order in
Criminal Case No. 11862-13 quashing, lifting and setting aside the warrant of arrest,
dated June 3, 2013, and dismissing the case against all the accused in Criminal Case
No. 11862-13. In issuing the said Omnibus Order, the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller
again demonstrated her incompetence and/ or gross ignorance of the law as well as
manifest biased in favor of the accused in the said case.

In dismissing the case against the accused, the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller ruled in its
Findings and Conclusions that Marcelo's statement and the statements of the accused
were not put in juxtaposition with each other for a clearer and sharper focus of their
respective weight and substance. She then further held that the information in Criminal
Case No. 11862-13 was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dasmariñas City
only on the basis of the lone statement of Cornelio Marcelo, without any corroborating
testimony and that the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dasmariñas City, Cavite, was
swayed by public pulse, considering the media mileage caused by the incident. These
rulings of the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller are based solely on her own
conjectures and pre-determined decision to dismiss the case as clearly shown by
the fact that she recalled the warrants of arrests she earlier directed to be issued
even without conducting hearings and without waiting for any comment from the
public and private prosecutors.

A perusal of the Resolution, dated March 1, 2013, will readily show that the counter-
affidavits of the accused who submitted their counter-affidavits were duly considered in
the issuance of the resolution. In fact, a summary of their allegations were even put in
the body of the said Resolution. While the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dasmariñas
City, Cavite, might not have presented the resolution in the format desired by the Hon.
Perla V. Cabrera-Faller, it does not mean that the Office of the City Prosecutor did not
weigh the substance of the statements of the accused and the witnesses presented for
purposes of determining probable cause. The ruling of the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller
that the information in the case was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor only on the
basis of the statement of Cornelio Marcelo, without any corroborating testimony,
likewise shows her incompetence and manifests biased in favor of the accused. The
statement of Cornelio Marcelo was corroborated by the statements of Manuel
Adrian Cabansag and Jan Marcel V. Ragasa. A perusal of the statements of the said
neophytes clearly shows that they were subjected to hazing, together with the late Marc
Andrei Marcos and other neophytes, at the Veluz Farm in Dasmariñas City, Cavite, by
the members of the Lex Leonum Fraternity. The fact of hazing at the Veluz Farm was
likewise corroborated by statements of Rene Andaya and Roger Atienza, farm
overseers at the Veluz Farm. Consequently, the sweeping ruling by the Hon. Perla
V. Cabrera-Faller that the information was filed only on the basis of the statement
of Cornelio Marcelo, without corroborating testimony, and that the Office of the
City Prosecutor was swayed by public pulse is absolutely false and without any
basis.

In dismissing the case, the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller likewise held that the statement
of Marcelo merely depicted the stages of the initiation rites. However, she conceded
that there were physical infliction of the neophytes but further ruled that the statement
did not as much show that the accused conspired to inflict fatal injuries on this particular
neophyte, Andrei Marcos, and further ruled that conspiracy was not even established.
She further ruled that the story of Marcelo that the neophytes were subjected to
excessive beating with paddles and belts during the initiation rites is incredible and
uncorroborated. These rulings of the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller show
her incompetence and gross ignorance as a judge. Contrary to said rulings of the
Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller, the statement of Cornelio Marcelo did not just depict the
stages of initiation rites but detailed what was actually done to Marc Andrei Marcos and
other neophytes during the initiation rites which resulted to the death of the late Marc
Andrei Marcos. This was corroborated by the statement of Manuel Adrian Cabansag
and Jan Marcel V. Ragasa. Cornelio Marcelo stated that Marc Andrei Marcos was hit
with paddle, belt, and/or punched on the thighs and upper arms during the different
parts of the initiation rites. This was corroborated by the statements of Manuel Adrian
Cabansag and Jan Marcel V. Ragasa, two (2) neophytes who underwent initiation rites
with Marc Andrei Marcos and other neophytes, who stated that they were likewise
beaten with paddle at their thighs and/or arms during the different stages of the initiation
rites. Very clearly, the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller is incompetent and/ or blindfolded
just like the neophytes and failed or refused to see that the statement of Cornelio
Marcelo was corroborated by the statements of Manuel Adrian Cabansag and Jan
Marcel V. Ragasa.

The Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller likewise ruled that the statement of Marcelo did not
show that the accused have conspired to inflict fatal injuries on this particular neophyte,
Andrei Marcos, then proceeds to posit the question "Is it reasonable and normal to
suppose that all the accused resolved to paddle and hit Andrei Marcos to
death? Then ruled finally that no one is to be blamed for the death of Andrei
Marcos. These rulings of the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller clearly shows
her incompetenceand gross ignorance of our existing laws. It likewise shows her
manifest bias in favor of the accused in this case. Section 4 of RA 8049
provides that "If the person subjected to hazing or other forms of initiation rites
suffers any physical injury or dies as a result thereof, the officers and members
of the fraternity, sorority or organization who actually participated in the infliction
of physical harm shall be liable as principals x x x. " Based on this provision of
law, there is no need to prove that the accused has conspired to inflict fatal
injuries to Marc Andrei Marcos during the latter's initiation rites. There is no need
to prove that the accused resolved to paddle and hit Marc Andrei Marcos to
death. It is more than sufficient to prove that Marc Andrei Marcos was subjected
to hazing and initiation rites and he died as a result thereof. In fact, mere
presenceduring the hazing or initiation rites is already a prima facie evidence of
the participation therein as principal unless he prevented the commission of the
acts (Section 4, RA 8049).

The Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller then ruled that she "cannot somehow consign the
above-named accused to a life of untold infamy and cannot in conscience consign all
the accused to the dustbin of history simply on the basis of the uncorroborated and
incredible lone statement of Cornelio Marcelo" and proceeded to dismiss the case. In
coming up with this ruling and dismissing the case, the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller
again manifested her incompetence and gross ignorance of existing laws. It must be
pointed out that the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller is only called upon to determine the
existence of probable cause for purposes of the issuance of warrants of arrest against
the accused. She is not being called upon yet to determine the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. As held by the Supreme Court in Pp. vs. CA, et al. (G.R. No.
126005 January 21, 1999), the judge should not override the public prosecutor's
determination of probable cause to hold an accused for trial on the ground that the
evidence presented to substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant was insufficient. If
the information is valid on its face, and there is no showing of manifest error, grave
abuse of discretion and prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, the trial court
should respect such determination. The Supreme Court further held in the same case
that the rights of the people from what could sometimes be an "oppressive" exercise of
government prosecutorial powers do need to be protected when circumstances so
require. But just as we recognize this need, we also acknowledge that the State must
likewise be accorded due process. Thus, when there is no showing of nefarious
irregularity or manifest error in the performance of a public prosecutor's duties, courts
ought to refrain from interfering with such lawfully and judicially mandated
duties. 15 [Emphases and underscoring supplied]

In her Very Respectful Comment, 16 Judge Cabrera-Faller denied the accusations and
asserted that:

3) The undersigned very respectfully honors the grief of this grandfather who lost a
beloved grandson, but, charging the undersigned judge administratively for performing a
judicial function would cause a heavy toll on this respondent judge that always tries her
best to dispose of cases pending in the Regional Trial Court of Dasmariñas City, Branch
90, with justice and equity, regardless of the personalities involved in a particular case;
4) The grapevine, as well as newspaper accounts, has it that the private
complainant in Criminal Case No. 11862-13 has already received settlement from
all of the accused, except for the self-proclaimed witness for the prosecution, Cornelio
Marcelo, allegedly for the amount of 5 million pesos, and now Mr. Martonino R. Marcos
charges the undersigned with his perceived notions of corruption and dishonesty. If the
alleged "pay-off' is true, then, the cries of injustice of Mr. Martonino R. Marcos has
become a charade.

The undersigned respondent judge humbly and modestly states that the questioned
order is a twenty-page resolution, where the respective postures of the parties were
explicitly and painstakingly incorporated, and in the mind of the undersigned respondent
judge, negates corruption, malicious rendering of an unjust judgment and any signs of
shoddy disposition of the case. The private complainant has remedies under the law to
question the order of this court in Criminal Case No. 11862-13 for violation of the Anti-
Hazing Law; in fact, the private complainant, through its private counsel, had filed a
motion for reconsideration of the order of this court, and dated August 15, 2013, which
is yet pending resolution.

Jurisprudence held that the "alleged errors committed by a judge pertaining to the
exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative
proceedings but should instead be assailed through judicial remedies (A.M. No. MTJ-
001311, 459 Phil. 214 [2003]."17 [Emphasis supplied]

In his Reply, 18 complainant insisted that Judge Cabrera-Faller did not simply commit an
error of judgment but she knowingly rendered an unjust judgment which was contrary to
law, and prayed that she be held accountable for having committed patent gross
ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion and complete disregard of the law and
the rules of criminal procedure. Furthermore, complainant denied that they had been
paid the amount of ₱5 million pesos and asserted that Judge Cabrera-Faller should not
have believed or given credence to the "pay-off," which she heard from the "grapevine."
"Pay-off" was a term that she should not have even used as it did not exist under the
rules of criminal procedure. Granting that there was a "pay-off," Judge Cabrera-Faller
should know the basic rule that payment of civil liability was not equivalent to dismissal
of the criminal case.

Report of the OCA

In its Report, 19 dated June 10, 2016, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found
Judge Cabrera-Faller liable for gross ignorance of the law [1] for inadvertently issuing
the warrants of arrest against the accused; [2] for sending the record of the case to the
archives, even prior to the return/report that the accused could not be apprehended in
violation of the six (6)-month period under Administrative Circular (A.C.) No. 7-A-92; and
[3] for precipitately dismissing Criminal Case No. 11862-13. The OCA recommended
that Judge Cabrera-Faller be suspended from the service for a period of six (6) months
without salary and other benefits.
The Ruling of the Court

The findings of the OCA are well-taken, but the Court differs as to the recommended
penalty.

Without a quibble, Judge Cabrera-Faller demonstrated lack of knowledge and

understanding of the basic rules of procedure when she issued the questioned orders.

A. On the immediate archiving of Criminal Case No. 11862

Judge Cabrera-Faller violated Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92 when she issued the
June 3, 2013 Order directing the immediate archiving of Criminal Case No. 11862-13,
after ordering the issuance of the warrants of arrest against the accused in the same
order. The archiving of cases is a generally acceptable measure designed to shelve
cases but is done only where no immediate action is expected.20 A.C. No. 7-A-92
enumerated the circumstances when a judge may order the archiving of a criminal case
as follows:

(a) If after the issuance of the warrant of arrest, the accused remains at large for six (6)
months from the delivery of the warrant to the proper peace officer, and the latter has
explained the reason why the accused was not apprehended; or

(b) When proceedings are ordered suspended for an indefinite period because:

(1) the accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which
effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead
intelligently, or to undergo trial, and he has to be committed to a mental hospital;

(2) a valid prejudicial question in a civil action is invoked during the pendency of the
criminal case unless the civil and the criminal cases are consolidated; and

3) an interlocutory order or incident in the criminal case is elevated to, and is pending
resolution/ decision for an indefinite period before a higher court which has issued a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction; and

4) when the accused has jumped bail before arraignment and cannot be arrested by his
bondsman.

When Judge Cabrera-Faller issued the warrants, she also archived the case. She,
however, did not cite any ground in A.C. No. 7-A-92 for the suspension of the
proceedings. What she did was unprecedented. She did not even bother to wait for the
return of the warrants or wait for the six-month period. By doing so, she exhibited bias, if
not incompetence and ignorance of the law and jurisprudence. It could also be that she
knew it, but she opted to completely ignore the law or the regulations. Certainly, it
was a case of grave abuse of discretion as her actuations were not in accord with law or
justice.
B. On the recall of the warrants of arrest that were allegedly issued inadvertently

Judge Cabrera-Faller showed manifest bias and partiality, if not gross ignorance of the
law, when she issued the June 13, 2013 Order recalling the warrants of arrest against
accused Alim, Amante and Rosales claiming that they were issued inadvertently.

In the judicial determination of probable cause, no less than the Constitution mandates
a judge to personally determine the existence of probable cause before issuing a
warrant of arrest. This has been embodied in Section 2,21 Article III of the Philippine
Constitution and Section 6,22 Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Clearly, Judge Cabrera-Faller was mandated to personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable
cause and, on the basis thereof, to issue a warrant of arrest. Though she was not
required to personally examine the complainant or his witnesses, she was obliged to
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor before ordering the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

In the June 13, 2013 Order, Judge Cabrera-Faller recalled the warrants of arrest against
three of the accused.1awp++i1 She, however, failed to explain why she issued the
warrants inadvertently. She merely wrote that the warrants of arrest were "inadvertently
issued" without any explanation why there was such inadvertence in the issuance. The
Court cannot accept this. There was clearly an abdication of the judicial function. The
records of the case were forwarded by the OCP and they contained not only the
information but all the supporting documents like the statement of Cornelio Marcelo and
the corroborating statements of Cabansag and Ragaza and those of Rene Andaya and
Roger Atienza, the farm overseers at the Veluz Farm.

It could only mean that she failed to comply with her constitutional mandate to
personally determine the existence of probable cause before ordering the issuance of
the warrants of arrest. As the presiding judge, it was her task, upon the filing of the
Information, to first and foremost determine the existence or non-existence of probable
cause for the arrest of the accused.23 It was incumbent upon her to assess the
resolution, affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor to
satisfy herself that probable cause existed and before a warrant of arrest could be
issued against the accused. 24 If she did find the evidence submitted by the prosecutor
to be insufficient, she could order the dismissal of the case, or direct the investigating
prosecutor either to submit more evidence or to submit the entire records of the
preliminary investigation, or she could even call the complainant and the witness to
answer the courts probing questions to enable her to discharge her duty.

Most probably, she did her duty to examine and analyze the attached documents but
because she took pity on the young accused (never mind the victim), she chose to
ignore or disregard them. Nonetheless, "when the inefficiency springs from failure to
consider so basic and elemental a rule, law or principle in the discharge of duties,
the judge is either insufferably incompetent and undeserving of the position she
holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in
bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority."25

C. On the hasty dismissal of Criminal Case No. 11862-13

In the same vein, Judge Cabrera-Faller should be held administratively accountable for
hastily dismissing the Criminal Case No. 11862-13. The Court cannot ignore her lack of
prudence for it is the Court's duty to protect and preserve public confidence in our
judicial system.

The well-settled rule that once a complaint or information is filed before the trial court,
any disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of
the accused, rests on the sound discretion of the said court26 is not absolute. Although a
motion to dismiss the case or withdraw the Information is addressed to the court, its
grant or denial must always be in the faithful exercise of judicial discretion and
prerogative.27 For the judge's action must neither impair the substantial rights of
the accused nor the right of the State and the offended party to due process of
law. 28 In the case of People v. Court of Appeals, 29 the Court elucidated:

We are simply saying that, as a general rule, if the information is valid on its face and
there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part
of the public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for "want of evidence," because
evidentiary matters should be presented and heard during the trial. The functions and
duties of both the trial court and the public prosecutor in "the proper scheme of things"
in our criminal justice system should be clearly understood.

The rights of the people from what could sometimes be an "oppressive" exercise of
government prosecutorial powers do need to be protected when circumstances so
require. But just as we recognize this need, we also acknowledge that the State must
likewise be accorded due process. Thus, when there is no showing of nefarious
irregularity or manifest error in the performance of a public prosecutor's duties, courts
ought to refrain from interfering with such lawfully and judicially mandated duties.30

In the present case, the Court agrees with the observation of the OCA that there was
haste in the disposition of Criminal Case No. 11862-13. It must be noted that the
Information for the said case was instituted by the OCP on May 10, 2013. Thereafter, on
June 3, 2013, Judge Cabrera-Faller issued the order finding probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. Barely 10 days had lapsed, however, or on June 13,
2013, she recalled the warrants of arrest against three (3) accused due to oversight or
inadvertence. And on August 15, 2013, in the Omnibus Order, she lifted the warrants of
arrest she issued and dismissed the case for lack of probable cause.

Although no direct evidence was presented to show that Judge Cabrera-Faller was
influenced by improper considerations, the Court cannot close its eyes in the manner by
which Criminal Case No. 11862-13 was dismissed. Her actuations put in serious doubts
her integrity and honesty, both as a person and a member of the Bench, qualities which
every magistrate should possess. 31

Judge Cabrera-Faller dismissed Criminal Case No. 11862-13 without taking into
consideration the earlier resolution of the OCP and failed to evaluate the evidence in
support thereof, which sustained a finding of probable cause against the accused.

A perusal of the records would show that the OCP resolution was based on
the Sinumpaang Salaysay 32and the Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay33executed by
Marcelo, who recounted in detail the initiation rites that transpired on July 29, 2012, and
his participation as the designated "buddy or angel" of Marc Andrei, and enumerated
the names of those who were present and participated in the said initiation rites. This
testimony of Marcelo was corroborated by the two neophytes who were also present
during the initiation rites, Cabansag 34 and Ragaza. 35 In their respective statements,
they bravely narrated their harrowing experience on that fateful night. The sworn
statements and affidavits of these prosecution witnesses all presented a consistent and
coherent version of the events that took place on July 29, 2012.

Considering the strong evidence on hand presented by the OCP, it would have been
more prudent for Judge Cabrera-Faller to conduct summary hearings in view of the
conflicting statements of the prosecution and defense witnesses. Although this is not
actually required by the rules, when the direct and circumstantial evidence are so
detailed and corroborative of one another in every particular, it behooved upon her to
make further inquiries. Precipitate dismissal of the case, in the face of overwhelming
evidence, can only raise quizzical eyebrows.

Indeed, in her Omnibus Order36 dismissing the case, her reasoning that there was no
probable cause was strained and taxed one's credulity. As earlier stated, Judge
Cabrera-Faller wrote that the statement of Marcelo simply depicted the stages of
initiation rites and failed to show that the accused conspired to inflict fatal injuries on
Marc Andrei. Despite the admission on the part of the accused that initiation rites were
indeed conducted on July 29, 2012 and that they were present in the different stages of
the initiation rites, she brushed aside these admissions and the narrations of the
prosecution witnesses and simply opted to believe the claim of the accused that it was
Marcelo, and Marcelo alone, who inflicted the fatal blow on his recruit.

Judge Cabrera-Faller should know that the presence or absence of the elements of the
crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after
a full-blown trial on the merits. 37 A hearing is absolutely indispensable before a judge
can properly determine whether the prosecution's evidence is strong or weak. Under
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049, if the person subjected to hazing or other forms of initiation
rites suffers any physical injury or dies as a result thereof, the officers and members of
the fraternity, sorority or organization who actually participated in the infliction of
physical harm shall be liable as principals, and the officers and members
presentduring the hazing are prima facie presumed to have actually participated,
unless it can be shown that he or she prevented the commission of the punishable
acts.38 This disputable presumption arises from the mere presence of the offender
during the hazing.

Judge Cabrera-Faller must be reminded that a finding of probable cause does not
require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is
enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged39 for it would be unfair to require the prosecution to present all the evidence
needed to secure the conviction of the accused upon the filing of the information against
the latter.40

A judge may dismiss the case for lack of probable cause only in clear-cut cases when
the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause - that is when the
records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably
negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged.41

Hazing is commonly characterized by secrecy and silence and to require the

prosecution to indicate every step of the planned initiation rite in the information at the
inception of the criminal case would be a strenuous task.42Although a speedy
determination of an action or proceeding implies a speedy trial, it should be borne in
mind that speed is not the chief objective of a trial. It must be stressed that a careful and
deliberate consideration for the administration of justice is more important than a race to
end the trial. 43

Although judges are generally not accountable for erroneous judgments rendered in
good faith, such defense in situations of infallible discretion adheres only within the
parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply where the basic issues are so
simple and the applicable legal principle evident and basic as to be beyond permissible
margins of error.44

Time and again, the Court has earnestly reminded judges to be extra prudent and
circumspect in the performance of their duties. This exalted position entails a lot of
responsibilities, foremost of which is proficiency in the law.45 They are expected to
exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules and to
apply them properly in all good faith. 46 When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge
owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything less than that would be
constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.47

Moreover, judges are duty bound to render just, correct and impartial decisions at all
times in a manner free of any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality or integrity. 48 The
records must be free from the slightest suspicion that the trial court seized upon an
opportunity to either free itself from the usual burdens of presiding over a full-blown
court battle or worse, to give undue advantage or favors to one of the litigants. 49 Public
confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of
judges. 50 The appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to public confidence
and the administration of justice as actual bias or prejudice. 51
Thus, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to be the embodiment
of competence, integrity and independence.1avvphi1 They are likewise mandated to be
faithful to the law and to maintain professional competence at all times. 52 A judge owes
the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law. He is expected to keep
abreast of the laws and prevailing jurisprudence.53 Basic rules must be at the palms of
their hands54 for ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of
injustice. 55

Unfortunately, Judge Cabrera-Faller fell short of this basic canon. Her utter disregard of
the laws and rules of procedure, to wit: the immediate archiving of Criminal Case No.
11862-13, the recall of the warrant of arrest which she claimed were issued
inadvertently and the hasty dismissal of the case displayed her lack of competence and
probity, and can only be considered as grave abuse of authority. All these constitute
gross ignorance of the law and incompetence. 56

Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,
gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge, punishable by dismissal from service,
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months, or a fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding
₱40,000.00.57 In the case of Chua Keng Sin v. Judge Mangeten, 58 the respondent
judge was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law due to procedural lapses in
disposing the motions in the criminal case pending before his sala. The Court stated
that his careless disposition of the motions was a reflection of his incompetence as a
judge in discharging his official duties, thus, he could not be relieved from the
consequences of his actions simply because he was a newly appointed judge and his
case load was heavy.

Accordingly, considering the blatant violation of the law and rules committed by Judge
Cabrera-Faller and her grievous exercise of discretion, the appropriate penalty should
be dismissal from the service, with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except leave credits,
and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government,
including government-owned and controlled corporations.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Judge Perla V. Cabrera-Faller, Presiding Judge of

Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñas City, Cavite, GUILTY of gross ignorance
of the law and for violating Rule 1.01 and Rule 3. 01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, the Court imposes the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service,
with FORFEITURE of retirement benefits, except leave credits, and with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned and controlled corporations.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
 EN BANC

A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813 (Formerly A.M. No. 12-5-42-METC), November 22, 2016

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. JUDGE ELIZA B. YU,

METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH47, PASAY CITY, Respondent.

A.M. No. 12-1-09-METC

RE: LETTER DATED 21 JULY 2011 OF EXECUTIVE JUDGE BIBIANO G. COLASITO

AND THREE (3) OTHER JUDGES OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, PASAY
CITY, FOR THE SUSPENSION OR DETAIL TO ANOTHER STATION OF JUDGE
ELIZA B. YU, BRANCH 47, SAME COURT.

A.M. No. MTJ-13-1836 (FORMERLY A.M. No. 11-11-115-METC)

RE: LETTER DATED MAY 2, 2011 OF HON. ELIZA B. YU, PRESIDING JUDGE,
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 47, PASAY CITY.

A.M. No. MTJ-12-1815 (FORMERLY OCA IPI No. 11-2401-MTJ)

LEILANI A. TEJERO-LOPEZ, Complainant, v. JUDGE ELIZA B. YU, BRANCH 47,

METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, PASAY CITY, Respondent.

OCA IPI No. 11-2398-MTJ

JOSEFINA G. LABID, Complainant, v. JUDGE ELIZA B. YU,METROPOLITAN TRIAL

COURT, BRANCH 47, PASAY CITY, Respondent.

OCA IPI No. 11-2399-MTJ

AMOR V. ABAD, FROILAN ROBERT L. TOMAS, ROMER H. AVILES, EMELINA J.

SAN MIGUEL, NORMAN D.S. GARCIA, MAXIMA SAYO AND DENNIS
ECHEGOYEN, Complainants, v. HON. ELIZA B. YU, PRESIDING JUDGE,
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 47, PASAY CITY, Respondent.

OCA IPI No. 11-2378-MTJ

EXECUTIVE JUDGE BIBIANO G. COLASITO, VICE EXECUTIVE JUDGE

BONIFACIO S. PASCUA, JUDGE RESTITUTO V. MANGALINDAN, JR. JUDGE
CATHERINE P. MANODON, MIGUEL C. INFANTE (CLERK OF COURT IV, OCC-
METC), RACQUEL C. DIANO (CLERK OF COURT III, METC, BRANCH 45), EMMA
ANNIE D. ARAFILES (ASSISTANT CLERK OF COURT, OCC-METC), PEDRO C.
DOCTOLERO, JR. (CLERK OF COURT III, METC, BRANCH 44), LYDIA T. CASAS
(CLERK OF COURT III, METC, BRANCH 46), ELEANOR N. BAYOG (LEGAL
RESEARCHER, METC, BRANCH 45), LEILANIE A. TEJERO ( LEGAL
 RESEARCHER, METC, BRANCH 46), ANA MARIA V. FRANCISCO (CASHIER I,
OCC METC), SOLEDAD J. BASSIG (CLERK III, OCC-METC), MARISSA
MASHHOOR RASTGOOY (RECORDS OFFICER, OCC-METC), MARIE LUZ M.
OBIDA (ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER, OCC-METC), VIRGINIA D. GALANG
(RECORDS OFFICER I, OCC-METC), AUXENCIO JOSEPH CLEMENTE (CLERK OF
COURT III, METC, BRANCH 48), EVELYN P. DEPALOBOS (LEGAL RESEARCHER,
METC, BRANCH 44), MA. CECILIA GERTRUDES R. SALVADOR (LEGAL
RESEARCHER, METC, BRANCH 48), JOSEPH B. PAMATMAT (CLERK III, OCC-
METC), ZENAIDA N. GERONIMO (COURT STENOGRAPHER, OCC-METC), BENJIE
V. ORE (PROCESS SERVER, OCC-METC), FORTUNATO E. DIEZMO (PROCESS
SERVER, OCC-METC), NOMER B. VILLANUEVA (UTILITY WORKER, OCC-METC),
ELSA D. GARNET (CLERK III, OCC METC), FATIMA V. ROJAS (CLERK III, OCC-
METC), EDUARDO E. EBREO (SHERIFF III, METC, BRANCH 45), RONALYN T.
ALMARVEZ (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 45), MA. VICTORIA C.
OCAMPO (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 45), ELIZABETH LIPURA
(CLERK III METC, BRANCH 45), MARY ANN J. CAYANAN (CLERK III, METC,
BRANCH 45), MANOLO MANUEL E. GARCIA (PROCESS SERVER, METC,
BRANCH 45), EDWINA A. JUROK (UTILITY WORKER, OCC-METC), ARMINA B.
ALMONTE (CLERK III, OCC-METC), ELIZABETH G. VILLANUEVA (RECORDS
OFFICER, METC, BRANCH 44), ERWIN RUSS B. RAGASA (SHERIFF III, METC,
BRANCH 44), BIEN T. CAMBA (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 44),
MARLON M. SULIGAN (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 44),
CHANDA B. TOLENTINO (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 44),
FERDINAND R. MOLINA (COURT INTERPRETER, METC, BRANCH 44),
PETRONILO C. PRIMACIO, JR. (PROCESS SERVER, METC, BRANCH 45),
EDWARD ERIC SANTOS (UTILITY WORKER, METC, BRANCH 45), EMILIO P.
DOMINE (UTILITY WORKER, METC, BRANCH 45), ARNOLD P. OBIAL (UTILITY
WORKER, METC, BRANCH 44), RICARDO E. LAMPITOC (SHERIFF III, METC,
BRANCH 46), JEROME H. AVILES (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH
46), ANA LEA M. ESTACIO (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 46),
LANIE F. AGUINALDO (CLERK III, METC, BRANCH 44), JASMINE L. LINDAIN
(CLERK III, METC, BRANCH 44), RONALDO S. QUIJANO (PROCESS SERVER,
METC, BRANCH 44), DOMINGO H. HOCOSOL (UTILITY WORKER, METC, BRANCH
48), EDWIN P. UBANA (SHERIFF III, METC, BRANCH 48), MARVIN O.
BALICUATRO (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 48), MA. LUZ D.
DIONISIO (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 48), MARIBEL A. MOLINA
(COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 48), CRISTINA E. LAMPITOC
(COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 46), MELANIE DC BEGASA (CLERK
III, METC, BRANCH 46), EVANGELINE M. CHING (CLERK III, METC, BRANCH 46),
LAWRENCE D. PEREZ (PROCESS SERVER, METC, BRANCH 46), EDMUNDO
VERGARA (UTILITY WORKER, METC, BRANCH 46), AMOR V. ABAD (COURT
INTERPRETER, METC, BRANCH 47), ROMER H. AVILES (COURT
STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 47), FROILAN ROBERT L. TOMAS (COURT
STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 47), MAXIMA C. SAYO (PROCESS SERVER,
BRANCH 47), SEVILLA B. DEL CASTILLO (COURT INTERPRETER, METC,
BRANCH 48), AIDA JOSEFINA IGNACIO (CLERK III, METC, BRANCH 48),
 BENIGNO A. MARZAN (CLERK III, METC, BRANCH 48), KARLA MAE R.
PACUNAYEN (CLERK III, METC, BRANCH 48), IGNACIO M. GONZALES
(PROCESS SERVER, METC, BRANCH 48), EMELINA J. SAN MIGUEL (RECORDS
OFFICER, OCC, DETAILED AT BRANCH 47), DENNIS M. ECHEGOYEN (SHERIFF
III, OCC-METC), NORMAN GARCIA (SHERIFF III, METC, BRANCH 47), NOEL G.
LABID (UTILITY WORKER I, BRANCH 47), Complainant, v. HON. ELIZA B. YU,
PRESIDING JUDGE, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 47, PASAY
CITY, Respondent.

OCA IPI No. 12-2456-MTJ

JUDGE BIBIANO G. COLASITO, JUDGE BONIFACIO S. PASCUA, JUDGE

RESTITUTO V. MANGALINDAN, JR. AND CLERK OF COURT MIGUEL C.
INFANTE, Complainants, v. HON. ELIZA B. YU, PRESIDING JUDGE,
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 47, PASAY CITY, Respondent.

A.M. No. MTJ-13-1821

JUDGE EMILY L. SAN GASPAR-GITO, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH

20, MANILA, Complainant, v. JUDGE ELIZA B. YU, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 47, PASAY CITY, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

A judge embodies the law; she cannot be above it. She should not use it to advance her
personal convenience, or to oppress others. She should be obedient to the rules and
directives enunciated by the Supreme Court for the effective administration of justice;
otherwise, she becomes an arrogant tyrant. Being a magistrate of the law, she must
comport herself in a manner consistent with the dignity of her judicial office, and must
not commit any act that erodes public confidence in the Judiciary.

In these consolidated administrative proceedings, we resolve the several charges of

gross misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, gross insubordination, oppression, and
conduct unbecoming of a judge leveled by various complainants, some of.them her
fellow Judges, against respondent Judge Eliza B. Yu, the Presiding Judge of Branch 47,
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in Pasay City.

On June 4, 2013, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813 was consolidated with A.M. No. MTJ-12-1-09-
MeTC.1 Other closely-related administrative complaints involving the respondent,
specifically: A.M. No. MTJ-13-1863, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1815, OCA IPI No. 11-2398-MTJ,
OCA IPI No. 11-2399-MTJ, OCA IPI No. 11-2378-MTJ, and OCA IPI No. 12-2456-MTJ,
were similarly consolidated.2

Antecedents
 A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813
(Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Eliza B. Yu)

On January 27, 2011, the Court, through Chief Justice Renata C. Corona, issued
Administrative Order No. 19-20113 in response to the specific request of Secretary
Alberto A. Lim of the Department of Tourism (DOT) to establish night courts in Pasay
City and Makati City. A.O. No. 19-2011 designated the branches of the MeTC in Pasay
City and Makati City as night courts to expeditiously hear and try cases involving
nighttime apprehensions, special cases under the Rule on Summary Procedure, and
criminal cases involving tourists, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 19-2011

ESTABLISHING NIGHT COURTS IN THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS OF

PASAY CITY AND MAKATI CITY

WHEREAS, the Constitution mandates the speedy disposition of cases of all persons
before judicial bodies;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREAS, "the Executive Judges of the Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Trial
Courts in Cities of the cities and municipalities comprising Metro Manila x x x may
assign all judges to hold night court sessions daily from Monday to Friday and on official
holidays and special days."

WHEREAS, in line with the constitutional mandate on the speedy disposition of cases
and in the exercise of its power of administrative supervision over all courts, the
Supreme Court has ordered (a) the establishment of night courts in the Metropolitan
Trial Courts of Manila "to try and decide all special cases enumerated in the Rule on
Summary Procedure," and (b) the opening of two branches in the Metropolitan Trial
Courts of Quezon City as night courts to hear "cases involving nighttime apprehensions"
and special cases enumerated in the Rule on Summary
Procedure;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREAS, the Court held that the operational guidelines for the assignment of judges
and the holding of night court sessions in Manila shall also be applicable to the night
courts established in Quezon City;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREAS, the Court requires the expeditious disposition of criminal cases involving
tourists;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREAS, the Honorable Secretary Alberto A. Lim of the Department of Tourism has
requested the designation of night courts also in Pasay City and Makati City, in addition
to those already existing in Manila and Quezon City;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, it is hereby directed that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. Night courts similar to those designated in the Metropolitan Trial Courts of Manila City
and Quezon City be established in the Metropolitan Trial Courts of Pasay City and
Makati City;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

2. The operational guidelines for the assignment of judges and the holding of night court
sessions in the Metropolitan Trial Courts of Manila be applicable to the night courts in
the Metropolitan Trial Courts of Pasay City and Makati City, respectively, except
operating hours, which shall be from four-thirty in the afternoon (4:30 p.m.) until eleven
o'clock in the evening (11:00 p.m.);ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

3. The night courts of Pasay City and Makati City be authorized to try and decide cases
involving nighttime apprehensions and all special cases enumerated in the Rule on
Summary Procedure;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

4. The provisions of Administrative Circular No. 58-2002, dated 14 November 2002,

requiring an expeditious disposition of criminal cases involving tourists be complied
with; and

5. The Executive Judges of the Metropolitan Trial Courts of Pasay City and Makati City
(a) to inform the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Prosecutor's Office within their
respective jurisdictions of the schedule of the branches of the metropolitan trial courts
assigned to hold night sessions; and (b) make representations with the PNP and the
local government units to ensure that appropriate security measures are adopted to
protect the judges and their staff during night sessions.
Immediate compliance with this order is enjoined.

27 January 2011.
To comply with A.O. No. 19-2011, then Pasay City MeTC Executive Judge Bibiano G.
Colasito issued a Memorandum dated February 9, 20114 prescribing the schedules for
night court service of all Pasay City MeTC Judges and employees effective February
14, 2011. Under the Memorandum, MeTC Branch 47, presided by respondent Judge
Yu, was assigned night court duties every Friday. But Judge Yu did not desire to
comply, and so inscribed the following marginal note on the February 9, 2011
Memorandum of Judge Colasito, to wit:
February 11, 2011

Pls. I dissent with the night court assignment. I have pending legal question before the
Office of Court Administrator.5
The pending legal question Judge Yu adverted to had been posed in her letter dated
February 2, 2011 to the Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez, 6 as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sir:cralawlawlibrary

Our Court is in receipt of Administrative Order No. 19-2011 (Establishing Night Courts in
the Metropolitan Trial Courts of Pasay City and Makati City) today.

Among others, it is provided that: "3. The night Courts of Pasay City and Makati City be
authorized to try and decide cases involving night time apprehensions and all special
cases enumerated in the Rule on Summary Procedure."

With due respect, the police officers cannot apprehend, detain and bring the
arrested persons charged with cases covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure
at night without being liable for Arbitrary Detention. The arrested persons need
not post bail under the Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus, there is no legal basis
for the police officers to detain them prior to the hearing of their cases at night by
the court. Moreover, the public prosecutors cannot conduct inquest on the night
arrests of the suspected criminals because the penalty involved in cases covered
by the Rule on Summary Procedure is not more than six (6) months. Inquest can
be conducted only where the penalty is four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day and above. The night inquest without the release of the arrested suspects is
questionable. It can make the public prosecutors criminally and administratively
liable.

It is tedious for the public prosecutor and the public attorney to attend the night
court from 4:30 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. after attending an exhaustive hearing in the
morning then attend the hearing on the following day, without additional pay.

Unlike in Manila Metropolitan Trial Courts where the cases tried by night courts
are mostly violation of ordinances, in Pasay Metropolitan Trial Courts, most of the
cases filed are Theft, B.P. Blg. 6 and P.D. No. 1602 that entail full blown trial
because the accused refuses to enter into a plea bargaining. In this sense, the
establishment of night courts in Pasay City cannot unclog a court's criminal
docket. (Bold emphases supplied)

Please enlighten us on this concern.

Thank you.
It appears that the Station Investigation and Detective Management Section (SIDMS) of
the Pasay City Police Station received a copy of Judge Yu's letter to Court Administrator
Marquez. Wary of the potential criminal liability of apprehending officers adverted to in
the letter, Police Chief Inspector Raymund A. Liguden of the SIDMS sought clarification
from the Office of the Pasay City Prosecutor.7 In response, the Office of the Pasay City
Prosecutor explained through Prosecutor Dolores P. Rillera that the apprehending
officers could become liable for arbitrary detention only when they failed to refer the
arrested persons for inquest proceedings within the periods specified under Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code.8

Apprised of the explanation from the Office of the Pasay City Prosecutor, Judge Yu
requested Prosecutor Rillera to refer the matter to the Department of Justice (DOJ) and
request a legal opinion thereon,9 even as she requested Court Administrator Marquez to
have her letter to Prosecutor Rillera docketed as an administrative matter.10

Judge Yu communicated her reservations about the night court by letter directly to DOT
Secretary Lim,11pointing out that the DOT's request for the establishment of the night
courts was supported neither by statistical data nor by any study. After rendering a
lengthy discourse on the flaws of establishing night courts, she ended her letter with a
request for additional compensation and security in case she would undertake night
court duties. The pertinent portions of her letter ran as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Dear Sir:cralawlawlibrary

This Court learned that you requested for the designation of night courts in Pasay City
that resulted to the issuance of Administrative Order No. 19-2011 (Establishing Night
Courts in the Metropolitan Trial Courts of Pasay City and Makati City) dated January 27,
2011.

With due respect, there is insufficient basis for your request. There was no
statistical data present or there was no study conducted by your department
recommending the necessity of establishing night courts in Pasay City. For the
record, this Court is yet to hear a case involving any tourist. Moreover, the tourists
should be advised not to roam around the city at night so as not to be victims of
various crimes. Usually, the perception of the tourists who are going around the
city at night is negative, for they are likely to be engaging in unlawful nocturnal
activities. They are at their own risk at night.

There was no prior consultation with the police officers, public attorneys, public
prosecutors, judges and their staff before your department requested for the
creation of night courts in Pasay City.

There are many concerns which your department did not consider.

First, some of the rights of the accused who were charged with cases covered by
the Summary Procedure are impaired by the operation of night courts. x x x

xxxx

Second, night courts in Manila City and Quezon City are criticized for being
ineffective and non-functional. In Manila City, when I was a public prosecutor, I
questioned as to the legality of the detention of the accused being arraigned at night for
violation of ordinances. When I was not given any legal justification, I requested to be
relieved from night court. My experience showed that night court is a waste of time for
all. The cases tried at night court can be tried during day time without burdening the
three (3) pillars of our criminal justice system. xxx. The cases tried are violation of city
ordinances, mostly on illegal vending in the night courts. I heard that these cases were
filed for money making scheme by the police officers. From the information gathered,
only those accused who did not give them money were arrested, detained and brought
to the night courts.

Third, there is a grave violation of the right of government employees against

long and extended period of work with no additional pay at night. This is a form of
exploitation of workers whose rights are enshrined under the Constitution. It bears
pointing out that additional compensation for night time work is founded on public policy.
x x x x.

Fourth, it is very burdensome to attend the court at night.

x x x x.

Fifth, it is risky to work at night because of lack of security.

x x x x.
Lastly, the establishment of night courts in Pasay City will not unclog a court's
criminal docket. The situation in Manila City and Quezon City are not similar with
Pasay City. x x x. In Manila Metropolitan Trial Courts, majority of the accused pay the
fine for the violation of ordinances not involving any tourist crime during the night court
hearing. Also, a study must be conducted by your department, if necessary, about the
effectiveness of night courts in Manila City and Quezon City, and if these night courts
are attaining the purposes they were created. If not, there is no reason for the
establishment of a night court or tourism court here in Pasay City. Another thing, there
is uneven assignment of judges alone to the night court. x x x.

I hope you find merit with this letter. May your department reconsider your request for
the establishment of night courts in Pasay City. With due respect, it will be appreciated
if your department will give additional compensation and provide police security
to the judges, public prosecutors, public attorneys and the entire court staff, if it
insist of [sic] establishing night courts here without conducting any study.

x x x x. (Bold emphases supplied)

On May 5, 2011, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), through Assistant Court
Administrator (ACA) Thelma C. Bahia, responded to the concerns raised by the Judge
Yu in the following manner:12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This refers to your letter dated February 2, 2011 apprising us of certain concerns
relative to the establishment of night courts in Pasay City.

xxxx

The first concern has been ably explained in the attached letter dated February 25,
2011 of Prosecutor Dolores P. Rillera, Chief, Inquest Division, Office of the City
Prosecutor, Pasay City, addressed to Police Chief Inspector Raymond A. Liguden,
Chief SIDMS, Pasay City, who, having been furnished a copy of your letter dated
February 2, 2011, subsequently sought the guidance of Prosecutor Rillera on the
matter.

With respect to the second point you raised, prosecutors and public attorneys of Pasay
City had long been assigned their respective schedules to handle inquest proceedings
until 10 p.m. prior to the designation of night courts in Pasay City. Attending night courts
would not be as tedious as you surmise. Besides, prosecutors and public attorneys
already receive allowances for staying beyond office hours.

As to the third issue, the main consideration for the designation of night courts is to
address the matter of nighttime apprehension which include offenses enumerated in the
Rule of Summary Procedure. Priority is also given to those criminal cases where the
offended party or the complainant is a tourist or transient in the country as already
explained in Administrative Circular No. 58-2002 dated November 14, 2002.

Be reminded that judges, prosecutors and public attorneys are public officers who are
duty bound to serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency and whose main concern in the performance of their duties is public welfare
and interest.

Please be guided accordingly.13

Ostensibly not satisfied, Judge Yu replied,14 pertinently
stating:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx

With due respect, your letter did not address the issues raised in my letter dated
February 11, 2011 to Hon. Alberto A. Lim, Secretary of Tourism who did not reply said
letter to date [sic]. Attached is my letter dated March 22, 2011 address[ed] to Hon. Jose
Midas P. Marquez together with the attachments.

As per information from this Courts' Officer-in-Charge Emelina J. San Miguel who heard
from other staff of the Office of the Clerk of Court, there is (sic) no criminal case filed at
night since the start of the night courts here in Pasay until now showing the need to
review, if not abolish the administrative order creating it.
Back at the Pasay City MeTC, the continued refusal by Judge Yu to render night court
service prompted Executive Judge Colasito to assign additional night court duties to the
other MeTC Judges and their personnel.15

In view of Judge Yu's refusal to follow A.O. No. 19-2011, the OCA submitted a
memorandum to the Court,16 recommending that her insubordination, gross misconduct
and violation of The New Code of Judicial Conduct be docketed as an administrative
complaint against her. In due course, the Court required Judge Yu to comment.17

In her comment, Judge Yu denied the charges, and asserted that she did not commit
insubordination;18that her protest against night courts was a mere expression of her
opinion; that she would render night duty upon receiving a resolution on her protest from
the Court; that the OCAD should have submitted a complete study and report about the
effectiveness of night courts in the National Capital Judicial Region, particularly in
Pasay City;19 and that her protest was covered by her constitutional right to freedom of
speech20 and other legal principles.21
Judge Yu also asserted that based on her experience, holding night courts unduly
burdened the Judges and their court personnel, as well as other court employees; 22 that
A.O. No. 19-2011 merely reiterated Administrative Order No. 72 dated June 30, 1988
that had been based on the 1983 Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases but the
latter issuance had already been superseded by the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure;23 that A.O. No. 19-2011 did not make any reference to the 1991 Rules of
Summary Procedure which was a "huge legal blunder;"24 that the drafters of A.O. No.
19-2011 merely reiterated Administrative Circular No. 58-2002 dated November 14,
2002, and overlooked R.A. No. 4908 (An Act Requiring Judges Of Courts To Speedily
Try Criminal Cases Wherein The Offended Party Is A Person About To Depart From
The Philippines With No Definite Date Of Return);25 that night court duty violated the 8-
hour work period;26 that the Court should exercise judicial restraint;27 the A.O. No. 19-
2011 was invalid for non-compliance with the requirements of issuing a valid
administrative order;28 that A.O. No. 19-2011 did not provide any penalty in case of its
non-compliance;29 and that A.O. No. 19-2011 was an invalid order addressed solely to
the Executive Judges of the MeTC of Makati City and Pasay City.30

A.M. No. MTJ-13-1836

(Re: Letter dated May 2, 2011 of Hon. Eliza B. Yu, Branch 47, MeTC, Pasay City);
and

A.M. No. MTJ-12-1815

(Leilani A. Tejero-Lopez v. Judge Eliza B. Yu)

These administrative matters refer to the appointments of Ms. Leilani A. Tejero-Lopez

as the Branch Clerk of Court of MeTC Branch 47, and Ms. Mariejoy P. Lagman as Clerk
III of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 108, in Pasay City.

Respondent Judge Yu challenged the appointments.

I. Appointment of Ms. Tejero-Lopez as Clerk of Court III, MeTC Branch 47, Pasay
City

On July 9, 2010, Judge Yu requested to fill the position of Clerk of Court III in her
sala.31 Upon approval of her request32 and consequent posting of the notice of
vacancy,33 three applicants vied for the position, namely: Ms. Ellen D.L.S. Serrano, Ms.
Leilani A. Tejero-Lopez and Ms. Eloisa A. Bernardo.34 From the outset, Judge Yu
favored Ms. Bernardo for the vacancy.35

After evaluating the applicants' qualifications, the Selection and Promotion Board for the
Lower Courts under the OCA (OCA-SPBLC) recommended the appointment of Ms.
Tejero-Lopez, then a Legal Researcher assigned at MeTC Branch 46, in its Board
Resolution No. 12B-2011(A) dated April 4, 2011.36The OCA-SPBLC had found Ms.
Bernardo to have lacked the required training.37

On April 12, 2011, Chief Justice Corona, along with Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio
and Associate Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales, approved Ms. Tejero-Lopez's
appointment.

In the meantime, by letter dated March 31, 2011, Judge Yu requested the temporary
designation of Ms. Bernardo as the Clerk of Court,38 and furnished a copy of the letter to
Ms. Tejero-Lopez.39 In the letter, Judge Yu expressed her protest against the
appointment of "another applicant from Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 46, Pasay City,
as well as other applicants who cannot be appointed because they lacked the
requirement of the personal endorsement by the judge." She further declared that it
would be best to either hire a new lawyer or to call for another batch of applicants in the
event that Ms. Bernardo would not be appointed.

The OCA-SPBLC, through Deputy Court Administrator Nimfa C. Vilches, denied Judge
Yu's request for Ms. Bernardo's temporary designation pursuant to Section 2(b), Rule III
of the Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions in view of the
availability of a qualified applicant.40

On April 14, 2011, Ms. Tejero-Lopez learned from Ms. Emmie San Miguel, the then OIC
of Branch 47, that Judge Yu had wanted her to execute a waiver or withdrawal of her
application.

Wishing to settle the issue of the appointment amicably, Ms. Tejero-Lopez paid Judge
Yu a visit in her chambers. The meeting between them was hostile. In describing the
meeting, Ms. Tejero-Lopez pointed out that Judge Yu had shouted and exclaimed at
her: "Nanggugulo ka[!] Ikaw ang nanggugulo[!] katatawag ko lang sa Supreme Court,
Sabi ng Supreme Court, ikaw ang nanggugulo[!]." Ms. Tejero-Lopez recalled that Judge
Yu then demanded her withdrawal with a threat to revoke her appointment later on.
Faced with the prospect of eventually losing her job, Ms. Tejero-Lopez decided to
withdraw her application.41cralawred

On April 26, 2011, Judge Yu asked for the reconsideration with the OCA-SPBLC by
submitting a copy of the withdrawal of the application signed by Ms. Tejero-Lopez.42

However, by her letter dated May 10, 2011, Ms. Tejero-Lopez retracted her withdrawal,
and signified her intention to pursue her application.43

After an investigation that established that Ms. Tejero-Lopez did not voluntarily withdraw
her application, the OCA-SPBLC continued processing her appointment,44 and she was
eventually appointed Clerk of Court III effective May 31, 2011.45

Upon receiving her appointment on June 7, 2011, Ms. Tejero-Lopez went to Judge Yu's
chambers to take her oath, but the latter refused her request to administer her oath.
According to Ms. Tejero-Lopez, Judge Yu questioned the integrity of the selection
process, and told her directly that the Court had appointed her in retaliation to her
refusal to render night court service. Judge Yu threatened Ms. Tejero-Lopez with
criminal cases of grave coercion and trespassing, and contempt of court if she persisted
on taking her oath of office. Judge Yu further vowed to assail the appointment before
the Court and the Civil Service Commission (CSC).46

On the same day, Judge Yu wrote to Atty. Caridad A. Pabello, Chief of Office, OCA-
Office of Administrative Services (OCA-OAS),47 to protest the appointment, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Madam:cralawlawlibrary

Thank you for your telegram today. Please be informed that Leilani Lopez has
withdrawn her application as Clerk of Court III in this court [a] long time ago. She failed
to comply(sic) all the requirements for the consideration of her application for
such position because, among others, she has no personal endorsement from
this court despite her last ditch attempt to get it on March 7, 2011. This court did
not sign an important document for her relative to the position thus her application
cannot be considered by the Selection and Promotion Board for the Lower Courts at all.
Moreover, this court has continuing protest against her appointment in this court
to date. And this was reiterated to Leilani Lopez few moments ago.

Please be guided accordingly.

x x x x (Bold emphasis supplied)

A week later, Judge Yu sent another letter stating that she had apprised Ms. Tejero-
Lopez of her possible indictment for unlawful appointment, grave coercion and unjust
vexation, among others.48 She thereby also expressed her refusal to honor the "void ab
initio" appointment of Ms. Tejero-Lopez, which she characterized as "a big joke." For the
fullest appreciation of the contents, the letter is quoted herein
below:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Madam:cralawlawlibrary

Please be informed that today Leilani Lopez, the applicant for Clerk of Court III who has
withdrawn her application long time ago, sought to see me because of her
appointment, a legally infirm one. I accommodated her for a brief talk for the last time,
hoping to not see her again and never to bother me anymore.

It was explained to her that she will face possible indictment of, among others,
unlawful appointment, grave coercion and unjust vexation, all punishable under
the Revised Penal Code, if she forcibly insist to take a seat in this court despite of
numerous oral and written opposition by the court to her selection and
appointment. Likewise, she can be thrown to jail for contempt of court, if such
callousness and discourteousness continue to exist in this court. Moreover, she
was told that if thievery extends to public office, the elements of Theft under our penal
code were established prima facie, as the concept of apoderamiento or unlawful taking
predominates in this situation, an affront of the Rule of Law, showing that the Rule of
Jungle where might is right triumphs as can be gleaned in a paper, a null and void
appointment paper held by her. Her appointment is highly questionable. Leilani
Lopez received the proverbial forbidden apple, obviously grown from a toxic tree.
Our court advised her for the last time not to eat it, or she will suffer the grave
consequences, without any taint of threats to her. The ways of a scholar seem not
to have a place in this prestigious institution, for her appointment is an example
of brute force, they say it is a rape of the honor of this bench, others say it is a
spit of insult. However, this court will not press formal charges against the poor Leilani
Lopez, a sorry victim of a subtle power play. Article 24 of the New Civil Code says
indirectly that the court must be vigilant for the protection of morally dependent,
ignorant, indigent, mentally weak, tenderness of age or other handicap of a person.
Your office must be reminded that I took my oath seriously before SC Justice Antonio B.
Nachura, and I swore to him that I will uphold the Constitution, and I will remain faithful
to my oath even after his retirement in the judiciary. Consequently, this court will not
honor the void ab initio appointment of Leilani Lopez, a big joke and so this court
is laughing at herand all others who are like her, not to put her and others down, only
to treat this delicate matter lightly in jest strange things, sometimes contrary to law or
contrary to the spirit of the law, do happen in judiciary. The Selection and Promotion
Board for the Lower Court is funny, and it made me laugh. I rather laugh than be
angry, than feel helpless, than look powerless in this awful and mean situation.
Firmness of decision anchored on the principles of righteousness and justice is one of
the characteristic of this unassuming court. I am happy to feel that God is with me, and
He not Satan is cheering with me in this lonely fight as to what is right and just.

Thank you. (Bold emphasis supplied)

On June 17, 2011, Judge Yu submitted her formal protest49 against Ms. Tejero-Lopez'
appointment, as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Chief Justice Renato C. Corona
Supreme Court
P. Faura St., Manila City

FORMAL PROTEST TO THE APPOINTMENT OF LEILANI LOPEZ AS BRANCH

CLERK OF COURT OF METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT BRANCH 47, PASAY CITY

Sir:cralawlawlibrary

All the laws provide the inherent relief of protest by the incumbent judge to an
appointment of any staff in his or her court. The appointed applicant Leilani
Lopez is not qualified and not fit to work as the branch clerk of court in my sala.

Leilani Lopez lacked personal indorsement. The applicant knew this, and so she
said to me on June 14, 2011 that she does not know why she was appointed. She
attempted to get a personal indorsement from me on March 7, 2011 that I rejected. She
must submit her neuro-psychiatric test results to me and to the Board because it is
definitely abnormal, some kind of an obsession, to insist in clinging on to a position of a
branch clerk of court after numerous oral and written opposition by a judge she will be
working with. This alone is a sign that she is unfit for the job. Her obsession is dark, it is
destructive because she places her own personal interest over public interest[.] [w]ith
her presence in my court, the public will definitely suffer, and so the judiciary. I as a
judge will suffer. I am demoralized with this rotten system of appointing an unfit
applicant. I am unhappy right now of her appointment, and it will affect my
enthusiasm and productivity in court. I expressed my disgust unabashedly before
the Chief of OAS and the lawyer from the Legal Department, and so I felt
discourteous as I was a victim of discourtesy here. For showing lack of delicadeza,
Leilani Lopez was rejected openly[,] verbally[,] and in writing, made to her by me and
my court staff [sic] for numerous times, thus she is callous and discourteous.

Leilani Lopez deceived me by giving me a formal letter of her withdrawal of application,

only to find out yesterday that she filed her waiver of withdrawal which disclosure should
have been made to me by her in good faith. This qualifies her for the crime of Other
Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code. In doing this, she does not have
my trust and confidence, a biting reality since the time she applied for the position until
her numerous rejections. Dishonesty encompasses all that deviates sense of honesty.
Our workplace provides that "Dishonesty is a serious offense which reflects a person's
character and exposes the moral decay which virtually destroys honor, virtue, and
integrity. It is a malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary, as no other office in the
government service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness from an
employee than a position in the judiciary." If Leilani Lopez has a gull [sic] to deceive me
at this point in time, giving me her formal withdrawal letter and filing her waiver of her
withdrawal letter without my knowledge, and this was not disclosed to me by her despite
her opportunities to do so, this meant that she has a dishonorable and vicious
character, undeserving to be in my court. She did this deceitful conduct to me and she
showed unpredictable actuations to me and to the Board while she is still an applicant,
she will most likely do it as a branch clerk of court in my sala. And so I will always be
wary with her presence in my court, and it is a tremendous mental stress or for me as a
judge.

With due respect, there was a misconstruction of the laws on selection and
appointment of court personnel by the Board, it presupposes that all the applicants
submitted for consideration by the Board must have good and harmonious working
relationship with a judge he or she will work with and so the judge must have assented
or agreed to the proposed application of all applicants, expressly or impliedly. If an
appointed applicant is not the liking of the judge, there will be disharmony in the court.
The working relationship with [sic] be based on mistrust and distrust. It will not
accomplish anything good for the judiciary as a whole. Each other's working life as a
judge and as a branch clerk of court will be miserable. This is not the spirit of the letter
of all the laws pertaining to selection and appointment of Supreme Court employee
aspiring for confidential position such as branch clerk of court. In fact, I believe that the
branch clerk of court must be co-terminus with a judge's assignment in a particular
court. I do not engage in a power play, it happens that the personal indorsement
of a branch clerk of court is my prerogative as a judge and I want to exercise that
prerogative to accomplish excellently in my judicial and non-judicial tasks. There
were substantive and procedural flaws with her selection and appointment as
branch clerk of court. The laws surrounding the irregular appointment of Leilani
Lopez, including the fact of not resolving my grievance prior to her appointment,
were misapplied in her case. We do not uphold the laws that cause quarrel and
dissension in court. Assuming Leilani Lopez took her oath of an irregular
appointment which she is aware of, my recourse as a judge is to ask for her detail
to another court, preferable to the Selection and Promotion Board. This will not
contribute for the success of my court in the interest of public service. Our workplace
deprived me of a court staff who I can completely trust, and help me accomplish great
things in the judiciary. The Board deprived me already of my prerogative to choose my
branch clerk of court, and so I want this deprivation to be put on record. If I lose this
legal battle in this workplace, I am a winner because I brought to your attention, and all
Supreme Court justices, ultimately the public, such unrighteous and unjust manner of
selecting and appointing a branch clerk of court. You may have been misled by the
Board in signing her appointment. You have many things to do as Chief Justice,
sometimes, you may not have read the minutes of Board and merely followed its
recommendation. As a judge, I have my rights and privileges, and far more
considered than the rights and privileges of an applicant for a branch clerk of
court, a virtual stranger to me at the time of her application, and now her
character is dubious to me. Imagine, this kind of irregular appointment invites
suits and casts disrepute amongst us, I doubt if this is what our Supreme Court
envisions or our Constitution dreams for the Supreme Court. I re-plead all my
letters and the attachments dated June 15 and 16, 2011 pertaining to the appointment
of Leilani Lopez that were furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator and to you
to form part of this formal protest. Attached herewith is a formal complaint against
Leilani Lopez. (Emphasis supplied)

I am requesting for a Solomonic resolution of this protest.

Thank you.
Judge Yu submitted a supplemental formal protest dated June 28, 2011 describing the
appointment to be "tainted with irregularity in gross violation of the substantive and
procedural laws" and "void ab initio" for failure to obtain the favorable recommendation
from her as the presiding judge.50 She argued that the OCA-SPBLC had failed to
assess the competence and qualifications of Ms. Tejero-Lopez; that Ms. Tejero-Lopez
did not meet the minimum requirements for the position; and that the position of Branch
Clerk of Court was confidential.

In view of Judge Yu's refusal to honor her appointment, Ms. Tejero-Lopez requested
Executive Judge Colasito through her letter of June 11, 2011 for her detail to another
office.51

Ms. Tejero-Lopez ultimately executed a sinumpaang salaysay charging Judge Yu with

refusal to obey court order.52

On September 12, 2011, the Court dismissed Judge Yu's protest against the
appointment of Ms. Tejero-Lopez.53

Judge Yu was undaunted, however, and she filed a motion for

reconsideration,54 attaching the motion to her supplemental explanation.55
II. Appointment of Ms. Mariejoy P. Lagman, Clerk III, RTC Branch 108, Pasay City

In June 2010, Judge Yu initiated a complaint, docketed as A.M. No. P-12-3033 (formerly
A.M. No. 10-8-97-MeTC), entitled Memoranda of Judge Eliza B. Yu Issued to Legal
Researcher Mariejoy P. Lagman and to Court Stenographer Soledad J. Bassig, All of
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 47, Pasay City, against Ms. Mariejoy P. Lagman, Legal
Researcher II of Branch 47, for grave misconduct, falsification, usurpation of judicial
functions and dishonesty.

Citing "pressure within the working environment" and in order to have "a self-assured
and peaceful mind," Ms. Lagman requested her transfer to another branch of the MeTC
pending the hearing of the complaint against her.56 Eventually, the Court appointed her
as Clerk III of Branch 108 of the RTC in Pasay City effective October 5, 2010, a
demotion from her position as Legal Researcher in Branch 47.

Apparently, Ms. Lagman's appointment did not sit well with Judge Yu, who assailed it
before the OCA-SPBLC as a "fast appointment" for being made despite her pending
administrative complaint.57

On May 2, 2011, the OCA received a letter from Judge Yu requesting for updates on the
alleged delay in the appointment of a clerk of court in her branch, and her protest
against the appointment of Ms. Lagman, among others.58 She thereby threatened to file
formal charges against the members of the OCA-SPBLC,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sir:cralawlawlibrary

I am requesting your office to furnish me the information on the

following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) xxx;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(2) xxx;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(3) xxx;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(4) The report of an investigation of the very delayed appointment of our Branch Clerk of
Court, the position is vacant for over three (3) years now;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(5) x x x; and

(6) The report of an investigation on the appointment of Ms. Mariejoy P. Lagman in RTC
Branch 108, Pasay City despite the pending administrative cases involving grave
offenses against her.
I am requesting Atty. Wilma D. Geronga, Chief of Legal Department, Docket and
Clearance Division of your office, to docket my letter dated April 28, 2011 together with
the attachments addressed to the Selection and Promotion Board for the Lower Courts
that said office received on the same day touching on the foregoing matters for the
conduct of full investigation because I will take the appropriate action. I will not
hesitate to press formal charges against your office if there was a transgression
of the laws and if still necessary. (sic) Stamping out corruption of any form is one
of my advocacies in life.(Emphasis supplied)

Thank you.
The OCA filed a memorandum denouncing the misconduct and insubordination of
Judge Yu relative to the appointments of Ms. Tejero Lopez and Ms. Lagman.59

On January 30, 2012, the Court required Judge Yu to show cause and explain why she
should not be disciplined for her actions.60

In her explanation,61 Judge Yu denied the allegations, and maintained that she had only
exercised her freedom of speech; that it was her "statutory right as a judge" to question
the "irregular appointment" of a branch clerk of court whom she believed to be lacking in
the basic requirements for the position;62 that it was "strange to have a jurisprudence on
alleged misconduct and insubordination of a judge" based on mere letters; that her
letters were privileged communications and could not be used against her, pursuant to
her constitutional right against self-incrimination;63 that she had no evil intention in
writing her letters because she was thereby only expressing her honest-to-goodness
opinion without fear of censorship.64

A.M. No. 12-109-METC

(Re: Letter dated 21 July 2011 of Executive Judge Bibiano G. Colasito and Three
(3) Other Judges of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasay City, For the Suspension
or Detail To Another Station of Judge Eliza B. Yu, Branch 47, Same Court)

A.M. No. 11-2399-MTJ

(Amor V. Abad, et al., v. Hon. Eliza B. Yu); and

A.M. No. 11-2378-MTJ

(Executive Judge Bibiano G. Colasito, et al. v. Hon. Eliza B. Yu)

A.M. No. 11-2399-MTJ refers to the complaint65 filed by the court staff of MeTC Branch
47 charging Judge Yu with grave misconduct, oppression, gross ignorance of the law
and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

In OCA IPI No. 11-2378-MTJ, four MeTC Judges and 70 MeTC court personnel
assigned in Pasay City filed two affidavit-complaints dated May 12, 201166 and July 14,
2011,67 accusing Judge Yu with: (1) gross insubordination; (2) refusal to perform official
duty; (3) gross ignorance of the law or procedure; (4) serious and grave misconduct
constituting violations of Canon 3, Rules 3.0 and 3.08 of the Code of Judicial Conduct in
relation to Canon 6 of The New Code of Judicial Conduct of the Philippine Judiciary;
Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct; and Sections 1 and 2,
Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct; (5) violation of Supreme Court rules,
directives and circulars; (6) violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; (7) violation of the Lawyer's Oath and her oath of office as judge; (8)
oppressive conduct; and (9) violation of Article 23168 of the Revised Penal Code.

A.M. No. 12-109-METC relates to the Letter dated July 21, 201169 sent by her fellow
Pasay City MeTC Judges, namely: Executive Judge Bibiano G. Colasito (Branch 45),
Vice-Executive Judge Bonifacio S. Pascua (Branch 44), Judge Restituto V.
Mangalindan (Branch 46), and Judge Catherine P. Manodon (Branch 48), requesting
Judge Yu's immediate suspension or detail to another station pending investigation of
all the administrative cases filed against her.

The common issue in the three complaints concerned the conduct of Judge Yu in
relation to her staff, fellow Judges and other officers of the Supreme Court, her
disobedience of the Court's issuances, and her manner of disposing cases.

I. Oppressive conduct towards her staff

The complaining staffmembers of MeTC Branch 47 claimed that Judge Yu had

constantly threatened them with administrative complaints;70 that she had readily
attributed malice upon their actions, and had sown intrigue against their honor;71 that
she had impulsively declared in open court during the hearing of the case docketed as
Civil Case No. M-PSY-10-12032-CV entitled Fabra v. Global Classe that they had
engaged in irregular conduct;72 that she had berated Mr. Ferdinand Santos even in front
of all the other staff members;73 and that she had harassed the personnel who had
brought administrative complaints against her (i.e. by refusing to sign the applications
for leave of Noel Labid and Robert Froilan Thomas, and by requiring them to submit
unwarranted documents).74

The complaining staffmembers recalled that at one time they had overheard the
respondent uttering:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Mananalo tayo sa kaso sila ang mali. Tayo ang matuwid hindi sila. x x x Ferdie, ready
na nga pala yung permit to carry ko. Magdadala aka ng baril, Cal 45.75
by which they had felt threatened; and that seeing the door to the respondent's chamber
left wide open, they had sought refuge in the offices of her fellow Judges.76

Judge Yu also trained her sights on the Pasay City MeTC personnel when she
requested ACA Bahia to audit the Office of the Clerk of Court for allegedly unremitted
fees paid for the ex parte presentations of evidence in replevin cases.77 This incident,
according to the complaining staffmembers, caused demoralization among the Pasay
City court personnel.

II. Disrespectful attitude towards co-judges, SC officers and offices

The complainant Judges charged Judge Yu with being disrespectful towards other
Judges when she wrote Vice Executive Judge Caridad G. Cuerdo of the RTC Branch
113, and accused Executive Judge Pedro B. Corrales of the RTC Branch 118, Judge
Maria Rosario B. Ragasa of the RTC Branch 108, MeTC Executive Judge Colasito, and
MeTC ViceExecutive Judge Pascua with violations of Canon 1, Section 3 and Canon 2,
Section 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, and violation of Section 1, paragraph (c)
of Presidential Decree No. 1829 (obstruction of justice).78

Allegedly, Judge Yu used herOIC Ferdinand A. Santos in sending the letter to Clerk of
Court IV Miguel C. Infante.79 The letter insinuated that Judge Gina Bibat-Palamos and
Judge Josephine Vito-Cruz had failed to act despite their knowledge on the purported
selling of decisions by court employees, pertinently stating:80chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Lastly, this court experienced few attempts to withdraw cash bond without motions by
including in the orders granting release of cash bonds, including those confiscated, and
the public prosecutor did not object for failure to read previous order of confiscation,
presumably such order is detached from the court records, as there are instances the
pleadings, motions and oppositions are removed from the records, then attached again
after investigation of the court as to where is the particular paper. This is something old
because for example, Acting Judge Josephine VitoCruz was able to sign commitment
orders when records show that the accused was arrested and detained already, and
this fact was on paper immediately preceding the order that she can read it, if it was not
detached and attached again after her order; she was able to sign orders on two
arraignments of same accused in different dates in several occasions, and this court
noted that in calendaring, there were attempts to mislead by writing it is for arraignment
instead of pre-trial that to relay on it, the court will issue two arraignment orders; and
lost or detached exhibits that she decided on such point only to know later on the
receiving copy of the plaintiff that she decided adversely in the case of Equitable vs.
Chua Ty Kuen, Civil Case No. 2-03 for Replevin, as it seems the modus operandi is to
win or dismiss cases by argument that the evidence are photocopies, as also in this
court's experience in case of People vs. Basa, CC-00-1988 for Reckless Imprudence
decided on June 28, 1010, the material exhibits are photocopies, some are not attached
in the court records despite existence in the minutes and transcript of records, all these
examples are presumably, are warnings of existence of wicked harm in this court. Thus,
your office should scrutinize release of cash bonds. Of course, there were complaints of
alleged selling of decisions by court staff in cahoots with each other during Judge Gina
Palamos and Judge Josephine Vito Cruz who were aware of this money-making
devious scheme.

This court hopes that your office will take note of this letter which the contents here
were supplied by our judge that deserves to be acted upon swiftly by the Office of the
Court Administrator to eradicate, if not lessen corruption in the judiciary.
Moreover, Judge Yu issued a resolution in Civil Case No. B-03-08 entitled Rodelio
Hilario v. Shirley Pabilona,81 whereby she declared that she was not the co-equal of
Judge Vito-Cruz of the Municipal Trial Court in Cardona, Rizal, as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
With due respect, the principle of "co-equality" between the two courts provided in
paragraph 5 of the motion for reconsideration, to wit, "In essence, the incumbent
Presiding Judge cannot over-rule the regular procedure adopted by her predecessor
judge, because they are of the same level," finds no application in this case because a
predecessor's judge orders can be interfered and encroached upon by the incumbent
judge when they are contrary to the principle of equity, existing law and
jurisprudence. Moreover, the predecessor judge, Honorable Josephine A. Vito Cruz
is a Municipal Trial Court Judge of Cardona, Rizal while undersigned is a
Metropolitan Trial Court Judge of Pasay City, their salary grades are not at par
with each other so it is quite incorrect with defendant's counsel declaration that
the predecessor judge and the incumbent judge are of the same level.82 (Bold
emphasis supplied)
Aside from her failure to accord the respect due her fellow Judges, Judge Yu was
overheard uttering disparaging remarks against Court officers. In one instance, after the
OCA SPBLC had recommended Ms. Tejero Lopez to the position of Branch Clerk of
Court, Judge Yu made the following statement against Court Administrator Marquez, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Yang si Midas Marquez na iyan napaka-highly incompetent, kung lalaki lang ako
sinuntok ko na iyan, basta gwapo at maganda, mga walang utak. Oh, tandaan nyo yan
ha! Iyang OCAD kalaban natin hindi kakampi.83
Judge Yu also said at another occasion:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Iyang auditor na Cielo na iyan, traidor, sana noong pinakain ko nilagyan ko na lang ng
lason.
referring to SC Auditor Cielo Calonia who had earlier denied having informed her about
court personnel profiting from the collection of ex parte fees.84

The complainants claimed that Judge Yu's disrespectful attitude towards her fellow
Judges and the Court's officials constituted a violation of Section 3 of Canon 1, and
Section 3 of Canon 2 of The New Code of Judicial Conduct.

III. Gross ignorance of laws, rules and regulations

The complaining staffmembers averred that Judge Yu: (a) had assigned the duty of
correcting draft decisions, orders and resolutions to on the-job trainees (OJTs) in
violation of Memorandum Circular No. 5-2003 entitled Re: Prohibiting the
Accommodation of Students to Undergo On-TheJob Training/Practicum in the Different
Offices of the Court; (b) had designated an Officer-in-Charge (OIC) for Branch 47, who
did not possess the minimum qualifications for the position and without approval from
the Court; and (c) had ordered her staff to advetiise and offer for sale the books she had
authored in violation of SC Administrative Circular No. 09-99.85

The complainants in A.M. No. 11-2399-MTJ and OCA IPI No. 11-2378-MTJ alleged that
Judge Yu: (a) had authorized the prosecution of Criminal Case No. M-PSY-09-08592-
CR entitled People v. Ramil Fuentes, et al.86 without the presence and prior
endorsement of the public prosecutor; (b) had allowed the arraignment of the accused
in Criminal Case No. MPSY-11-13957-CR entitled People v. Balwinder Singh,87 and the
change of plea by the accused in Criminal Case No. M-PSY-11-13159-CR
entitled People v. Lito Manduriao88 in the absence of the public prosecutor;89 (c) had
ordered the presentation of ex parte evidence in Civil Case No. M-PSY-11-12626-CV
before the OIC who was not a member of the Bar in violation of Section 9, Rule 30 of
the Rules of Court;90 and (d) had required the plaintiffs in replevin cases to submit
receipts of payment of legal fees under Sections 8(e) and 21(e) of Administrative
Circular No. 35-2004, as well as an explanation why they were making payments to the
OIC and stenographers during the ex parte presentation of evidence.91

Judge Yu was being held to account also for her failure to protect and uphold the dignity
of her court by not castigating the opposing counsels who had physically attacked each
other during court proceedings. She was heard to have remarked: Hindi ko sila
kinontempt kasi wala naman akong mabibenefit.92

In her comment,93 Judge Yu denied the accusations, and attributed malice and fraud to
all the complainants, branding their accusation as the manifestation of a "tyranny in
numbers."94 She dismissed the charges against her as false, frivolous, meritless, and
intended to harass her95 and destroy her reputation.96 She declared that she did not
know most of the court employees who had executed and signed the complaint; and
warned that they had opened themselves to criminal, civil and administrative liabilities
by signing the complaint.97

Anent the charges of gross ignorance of the law, Judge Yu contended that the students
who were OJTs had sought permission to report to her court in compliance with their
school requirements, but they were told not to carry on judicial tasks;98 that the
memorandum dated November 2, 2010 was not followed, and was not officially given
because of the prohibition against OJTs in the courts;99 that Ms. Angelica Rosali had
acted only as an observer to comply with her school requirements, as an
accommodation of the request of her (Judge Yu's) parents;100 that her designation of
Mr. Santos as an OIC did not violate CSC Memorandum No. 6-2005 because the
position of OIC required trust and confidence;101 that she did not order her
staffmembers to sell and advertise her books;102 that she had cited the counsels
disrupting the court proceedings with contempt of court and had imposed the
corresponding fines on them;103 that there was recent jurisprudence allowing a trial to
proceed even in the absence of the public prosecutor provided no prejudice was caused
to the State;104 that there was a need to verify the case records with respect to the
allegations that she had allowed the prosecution of criminal cases in the absence of the
public prosecutor because of the complainants' propensity to falsify documents; that the
complainants were not the proper parties to raise any issues related to the criminal
proceedings;105 that there were provisions of the Rules of Court allowing the waiver of
certain rights according to the agreement of the parties;106 and that the provision on
reception of ex parte evidence is merely directory because of the word "may."107

As to the charge of oppression, Judge Yu countered that she had always been kind and
generous towards her staffinembers;108 that she did not humiliate Mr. Santos;109 that
she did not terrorize her staffmembers, although she had displayed her anger and
displeasure whenever they committed irregularities;110 that she had not sown intrigues
against her staffmembers, but had constantly reminded them to refrain from committing
any graft and corrupt practices;111 that in the hearing of the case of Fabra v. Global
Classe, she had only replied to the manifestation made by Atty. Agustin Javellana
regarding the false and irresponsible acts of her court staffmembers;112 that the alleged
threat in relation to her licensed firearm was untrue; and that the entering of the incident
in the police blotter was libelous.113

Judge Yu denied uttering statements against Court Administrator Marquez, and SC

Auditor Calonia.114She said that as far as the resolution alluding to Judge Vito Cruz was
concerned, the court minutes were falsified, as to which Ms. Soledad Bassig and the
lawyers were co-conspirators; that she harbored no ill will towards Judge Vito-Cruz; that
such statement was a rejoinder to the unfair comments of the defendants' lawyer; 115 that
the statement "spoke of the truth" and was not, therefore, defamatory;116that in not
furnishing to her the memorandum regarding the resolution prior to filing the
administrative complaint, Executive Judge Colasito had deprived her of the opportunity
to amend the same "just to suit their whims, caprices and fancies;" and that the filing of
the administrative complaint against her had been done treacherously.117

OCA IPI No. 12-2456-MTJ

(Judge Bibiano G. Colasito, et al., all of the Metropolitan Trial Court [MeTC] Pasay
City v. Judge Eliza B. Yu, MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City)

This administrative matter concerned the letter dated January 12, 2012 118 signed by
MeTC Executive Judge Colasito, Vice-Executive Judge Bonifacio S. Pascua, Judge
Restituto V. Mangalindan, Jr., and Clerk of Court Miguel C. Infante charging Judge Yu
with oppression in issuing the order dated December 1, 2011119 in Criminal Case No. M-
PSY-09-08592-CR entitled People v. Ramil Fuentes, et
al., viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The stenographer in this case Romer Aviles is directed to make and attach the
transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) dated September 7, 2011 within ten (10) days
from receipt of this order copy furnished to Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez
and Assistant Court Administrator Thelma C. Bahia by the process server Maxima Sayo
with corresponding return and proof of service and to surrender the tape containing the
recorded proceedings on said date to the Officer-in-Charge Ferdinand Santos. Failure
to comply with this will compel this Court to issue show cause for contempt of court
against the responsible stenographer. Moreover, he and Executive Judge Bibiano
Colasito, et al. who are signatories in the false and malicious complaint under
OCA IPI No. 11-2378-MTJ alleging gross ignorance of the law of this Court by
surreptitiously taking a TSN, minutes and order dated March 22, 2011 of this case
on the absence of public prosecutor, when a trial can proceed without public
prosecutor is allowed under our existing jurisprudence is directed to explain
within seventy-two (72) hours from the receipt of this order why they should not
be cited in contempt of court under Rule 71, Section 3(a) and (d) of the Revised
Rules of Court. Process server Maxima Sayo is directed to personally serve copies of
this order to Executive Judge Bibiano Colasito et al., with corresponding return.

Tentatively set the contempt proceedings February 15, 2012 at 8:30a.m.

SO ORDERED. (Bold emphasis supplied)

To avert a crisis and disharmony in the Pasay City MeTCs, the Court suspended Judge
Yu from office effective February 1, 2012.120

In her comment, Judge Yu m'aintains that she validly issued the subject order by virtue
of the inherent contempt powers of the court,121 and in accordance with the rulings
in People v. Godoy and Salcedo v. Hernandez;122 that the complainants should have
availed of the appropriate relief in questioning the order instead of filing the
administrative complaint; and that the OCA could not rule on the propriety of issuing the
subject order because doing so was beyond the OCA's power and prerogative. 123

OCA IPI No. 11-2398-MTJ

(Josefina G. Labid v. Judge Eliza B. Yu)

This administrative matter stemmed from the complaint filed by Mrs. Josefina G. Labid
charging Judge Yu with oppression, gross ignorance of the law, and conduct
unbecoming of a judge in connection with the fate of her son, Noel, who had served as
Utility Worker I at the MeTC Branch 47.124

Mrs. Labid narrated that in January 2011, Noel had been diagnosed with "Cancer of the
floor of the mouth, Stage IV-A;" that Noel had then applied for leave of absence
covering the period of his treatment from January 2011 until March 2011, which Judge
Yu had approved without any incident;125 that being the sole breadwinner of the family,
Noel had reported to work on April 4, 2011 against his doctor's advice; that she (Mrs.
Labid) had started noticing that Noel would appear exhausted and weak upon arriving
home from work; that Noel had confided to her that Judge Yu had directed him to go to
different offices in the Supreme Court to deliver copies of her orders and letters, as well
as her books or manuals, despite his medical condition;126 that shortly after arriving
home from work on June 7, 2011, Noel had become delirious and weak due to profuse
bleeding in the mouth; that on the following day, she had gone to Branch 47 to inform
the staff that Noel would not be reporting to work; that she had then learned that Noel
had moved a heavy table inside the office upon the instructions of Judge Yu; 127 that
Noel had reported back to work on June 10, 2011, but his bleeding had recurred and he
had been constantly brought to the hospital since then;128 that on June 28, 2011, she
had submitted Noel's applications for leave at Judge Yu's office covering the periods of
June 8 and 9, 2011,129 and of June 13-30, 2011;130 that she had returned on July 5,
2011 to the sala of Judge Yu, and had then learned that the latter had not signed Noel's
application; that she was then told by Court Stenographer Roman Aviles to see and talk
with Judge Yu; that she had met with Judge Yu in her chambers, and during their
conversation, Judge Yu had allegedly remarked:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Mabait naman ako sa anak mo. Pag-inuutusan ko siya binibigyan ko pa siya ng pera,
siguro aabot ng P15,000.00 sa isang taon ang maibibigay ko sa kanya. Pero bakil
pumirma siya sa petition na nagsasabi na bobo ako at corrupt? x x x halala pa na
dinagdag lang sita ni Emma Sayo kasi di nakatype ang pangalan nila. Kung ganoon ang
tingin nita sa akin, bakit di na lang sila magresign?131
that Judge Yu had replied that Noel would be in a better position to address her (Mrs.
Labid) concern; that she had begged Judge Yu to sign her son's application for leave,
explaining that she had to submit the document before the deadline in order to claim
monetary aid from the Supreme Court Health and Welfare Fund; that instead of signing,
Judge Yu had left her inside the chambers, and had given instructions to Mr. Santos;
that upon her return, Judge Yu had advised that Noel should first submit a medical
clearance before she would sign the application for leave; and that she had then
appealed to Judge Yu by leaving a handwritten letter requesting the approval on Noel's
application.132

Mrs. Labid recalled that she had returned the following day to again plead with Judge
Yu, but Mr. Santos had prevented her from seeing Judge Yu and had instead handed
her a memorandum for her son that reads as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Dear Mr. Labid,

You have been consistently absent in this court due to sickness. As per record, your
absences with leave due to treatment of cancer in the court are as follows: for the whole
months of February 2011 and March 2011, you also incur several days absences for
April and May 2011 while for the months of June, 2011 you incur 15 days absent (June
8, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 2011). Being a government
(public servant) employee, you are not suppose to be always absent from your work
and if the absences are due to sickness, you must submit original copy of medical
certificate. Your continued absence in your work affects the performance of this Court
that affects also the performance of your co-employees. As per Civil Service
Commission ruling; as a general rule, an employee whose continued absence from his
work due to his lingering illness, the Department Head, if he sees to it that the
performance of his office is much affected because of the continued absence of such
the employee, the Department Head in his own discretion, may ask his superior for a
replacement of such employee - thus the affected employee may file for permanent
disability or terminal leave.

In view of the above matters, you are required to submit the following documents:
Certificate of Fitn ss to Work (if not contagious), Duration of Recovery (from illness) and
Certificate of discharge from the hospital (June 17 and 24, 2011) prior to the approval of
your leave of absences for the months of June, 2011.

(sgd)
Ferdinand A. Santos
Officer-in-charge133
Mrs. Labid believed that Judge Yu had dictated the contents of the memorandum to Mr.
Santos after their previous conversation; and that Judge Yu's unjustified refusal to sign
Noel's application for leave had been motivated by malice and ill-will, arising from the
administrative complaint against her that Noel had signed and joined. She mentioned
that her son had later on died on August 15, 2011.134

In her comment,135 Judge Yu denied the imputations of Mrs. Labid. She justified her
denial of Noel's application for leave by citing in her undated and unsigned
Memorandum136 the ruling in A.M. No. 2004-41-SC (January 13, 2005) entitled Re:
Memorandum Report of Atty. Thelma C. Bahia against Ms. Dorothy Salgado. She
maintained that Mrs. Labid had not submitted the documents she had required. 137She
denied having received any handwritten letter from Mrs. Labid; and having known of
Noel's condition. She insisted that Noel had volunteered to lift the table as part of his job
as a utility worker.138

A.M. No. MTJ-13-1821

(Hon. Emily L. San Gaspar v. Hon. Eliza B. Yu)

This administrative matter emanated from the Letter-Complaint of Judge Emily L. San
Gaspar-Gito of MeTC Branch 20,139 whereby the latter imputed to Judge Yu conduct
unbecoming of a judge for constantly sending alarming messages with sexual
undertones via Facebook and electronic mail.

Judge San Gaspar-Gito and Judge Yu became acquainted in May 2009 when the latter
was the public prosecutor pinch hitting at the MeTC Branch 20 in Manila where the
former presided as Judge. They became Facebook friends upon Judge Yu's initiative,
and Judge San Gaspar-Gito accepted her request as a matter of courtesy.140 Judge
San Gaspar-Gito claimed that Judge Yu normally sent long messages that she had
ignored most of the time.141 On August 30, 2009, Judge San Gaspar-Gito received in
her Yahoo account a peculiar message from Judge Yu, as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
NATIONAL HEROES DAY'S THANK YOU Sunday, August 30, 2009 6:02 PM

From: "ELIZA YU"

To: emily_san_gaspar@yahoo.com
1 File (82KB)

(see image p. 37)

MEAL STUB

Hon, thank you for your MEAL STUB ... when and where can I claim it?
take care & love you.142
Judge Yu sent another message to Judge San Gaspar-Gito's Facebook account with
the subject Meal Stub, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
__________________________________ August 31, 2009
__________________________________

Eliza B. Yu 9:20am
MEAL STUB

dear ems, i sent your meal stub at your yahoo account to honor you this national heroes
day. it's good you gave me an idea of your preferred sexual position, there's no
need to study that 69, you'll get it from me spontaneously ... that's easy, pulled
down your underwear, and eat what's in between your thighs ... but you have to pay me
$10 first ... He He He! take care and see you later...143 (Bold emphasis supplied)
The message contained an attachment similar to the image of a man and a woman
juxtaposed in a 69 position appearing in the previous Yahoo message.144 Judge San
Gaspar-Gito ignored both communications, but Judge Yu continued sending more
puzzling messages to the complainant's Face book
account, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
__________________________________ September 1, 2009
__________________________________

Eliza B. Yu 11:21pm
YOUR MEAL STUB ...

giving me FEVER honey ... YOU ARE KEEPING ME WIDE AWAKE. I need a bath no
not a bath ... I need a sex therapist He He He

BLOWN KISS?? I haven't claim yet my meal stub now you are sending me a blown kiss
... why don't you send me your cell no. asap so we can practice your fave 69?

__________________________________ September 2, 2009

__________________________________

Eliza B. Yu
PRO LOVE (No Jokening Here) 7:43am

YES TO LOVE NO TO LUST!!

Why naman you are heating me up out of your hundreds FB friends?
HHHmmm ... don't fall in love online kasi you
are not supposed to kiss, kiss a pc monitor ... He He He
No dialogues from you lately, are we in a silent "titillating" movie?
Wala ba tayong rehearsals dito? FAMAS award na rin ba tayo?
Buti na lang magaan loob ko sa iyo,
SOUL MATES tayo. Isasauli ko na ang meal stub mo ... wala naman
nakalagay when and
where to claim, wala ring cell phone no. mo (siguro trip mo lang mag send ng lewd pic
kasi photographer ka in your past life, lewd photographer ... He He He).
Dami kong tanong sa iyo, pero impersonal kasi ang
computer kaya wala na akong masyadong tanong online ... maliban sa ano na ba civil
status mo, MAINIT KA MASYADO?? Yung photo profile mo, dina "cute little devil" ...
ikaw ay "red hot and horny"145 na ... tandaan mo
honey NO TO CYBERSEX! NO TO PHONE SEX! PAY ME $10 FIRST BEFORE 69
(prone to HIV AIDS na sexual position ang 69 kaya sa swimming pool yan ginagawa).
Take care and see you later.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 __________________________________ September 4, 2009
__________________________________

Eliza B. Yu 9:24pm
2 VISITS

hey ems, i really miss you, so i plan to visit you at your chamber this sept. 1 and 21. are
you available at these dates?? pls. reply. take care and see you later.

Eliza B. Yu 9:47pm

hey, wish me good luck for my report tom at justice rene corona's class, it's a "MIXED
NUTS" feelings to have a future chief justice as an audience (he's a "terrorist" ... he he
he ... but he did not give me a HIGH FEVER unlike you! ha ha ha!) pls. tell me what
time you will be at your chamber this sept. 7 and 21 so i can visit you? PREPARE THE
$10.x's and o's.146
Confounded, Judge San Gaspar-Gito finally confronted Judge Yu on the messages.
Instead of giving a direct reply, Judge Yu continued sending puzzling messages. Their
exchanges ran as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
__________________________________ September 6, 2009
__________________________________

Eliza B. Yu 10:41am
CLUELESS INQUIRER

hey what's that meal stub and 69, got no idea about it? Does my fb send something to
everyone? Ami in a game? huh, m wondering!

Eliza B. Yu 10:44am
A TRIBUTE TO ELVIS PRESLEY

Wise Men say

only fools rush in
but I cant help
falling in love with you

Shall I stay
would it be a sin
if I can't help falling in love with you...

Like a river flows, surely to the sea

Darlin so it goes, somethings are meant to be..
Take my hand, take my whole life too
for I can't help fallin in love with you...

Like a river flows, surely to the sea

Darlin so it goes, somethings are meant to be..

Take my hand take my whole life too for I can't help

falling in love with you

for I cant help falling in love with .... You.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

xxxxxxxxxxxx

__________________________________ September 12, 2009

__________________________________

Eliza B. Yu 7:07am
MOVIES

hey since you are a movie buff, watch "BROKEBACK MOUNTAIN", you will enjoy the
sex between 2 cowboys in a tent. The 1st sex was made out of lust while the 2nd sex
was made out of love! In the movie, the "measure of love was not jealousy but
sacrifice."

__________________________________ September 14, 2009

__________________________________

Eliza B. Yu 8:43am
l'Hymne A l'Amour

Hey, after watching "Brokeback Mountain", I recommend you to watch "When Night Is
Falling", there was a sizzling (red hot) sex between a university literature professor at a
religious college and a free-spirited circus performer inside a tent, too just like
"Brokeback Mountain". Certainly, you will enjoy "When Night Is Falling" more than
"Brokeback Mountain" because you liked Edith Piafs "l'Hymne A l'Amour."

xxxxxxxxxxxx

__________________________________ September 17, 2009

__________________________________

Eliza B. Yu 7:23pm
MOVIE AGAIN

Star Cinema's "In My Life," the ABS-CBN Movie outfit's grandest film offering for 2009,
earned a record P20 million in ticket sales on its first day of screening. I don't
recommend you and Owen this move (but Gener, Tiya and Yaya would enjoy watching
this together ... He He He) TAKE CARE!

__________________________________ September 18, 2009

__________________________________
 xxxxxxxxxxxx

Eliza B. Yu 7:00am
Some Kind

honey i'm some kind of sloth at home and enjoy much freedom, and i miss you, tsup!
tsup! tsup! take care always. see you later!

__________________________________ September 18, 2009

__________________________________

Emily San Gaspar 11:18pm

I think i would be watching in my life, have you watched it? Is it nice?

__________________________________ September 19, 2009

__________________________________

xxxxxxxxxxxx

Eliza B. Yu 4:07pm
IN MY LIFE

hey fb sweetie, ems not that i don't want to accompany you in a movie house, it's just
that you succeeded heating me up with that 69 meal stub, it will be dangerous ... to
watch this in my life movie together, i may go down on you in a movie house that would
be highly scandalous ... I will give you a dvd/vcd of it, I will go to video shops for it
tomorrow (whether you have watched it or not, even I did not recommend it to you) ... i
am trying to shrug off a fuzzy, groovy feeling with you, OH NO! anyways, take care, take
care, take care, i knew you have convention next week. if you are interested to join with
us at GUMBO resto next week, just say so (dean froilan is a great guy, and a genius,
interesting to meet him, this i recommend to you). Oh, i still have to give you
complimentary copies of my articles published in the lawyers review. you gotta wait, i
keep my promises. see you later . x's and o's for you. p.s. movie watching is not my
ideal activity with you (it's at the bottom of the list, i rather watch you than tagalog
movies).147
Judge San Gaspar-Gito decided to deactivate her Facebook account. Yet, the
deactivation did not deter Judge Yu from sending messages to Judge San Gaspar-
Gito's Yahoo account to expr ss her disagreement over the Facebook deactivation,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[No Subject] Friday, September 25,2009 6:14PM

From: "ELIZA YU"

To: emily_san_gaspar@yahoo.com
Dear Emily, what happened to your FB account?
I told you to rest, I understand that it's so tiring
after travelling, our bodies crave sleep!
If I have your mobile no., I could have flown there
and joined you. Still, I believe there is plenty of time
ahead of us. Anyway, I did not mean you stay away
from Facebook or me... COME ON, tell me, you are joking
giving up Facebook ... you have ovet 190 friends, they will
MISS you. You have my no. still (09175217828), you can contact me,
you should contact me, I am not running away from you, rain or shine.
I will stay even I am a problem. Take care always.
Talk and see you later. Of course, God bless us.148

Facebook Monday, September 28, 2009 5:45PM

From: "ELIZA YU"

To: emily_san_gaspar@yahoo.com

Dear Emily, I raised the issue

before, about 4 months ago, about your
membership in Facebook, your
answer was acceptable...

Your declaration about consensus

in the convention seems to be an
after-thought, logic rejects it
as plausible. But I BELIEVE you.
There is no reason not to TRUST you.
I also understand the consensus.

Because you seemed HAPPY connecting

to your friends particularly those very
far in FB, it's not a smart choice to sacrifice
your happiness at the expense of consensus.
Also, there are ways to circumvent
the consensus' prohibition. You can change your
name to your nickname, and remove traces that
will link it to your work. You blended your
work with your personal life in FB,
of course your work's nature extend to your
personal life, the price you pay, not because of
the demand of your work, it's the price for your
your idealism with your work. It's up to
you what perspective you take, you
are intelligent, you ought to choose the best
option. Your FB speaks a lot about you.
You may not talk much about yourself in mails
but by reading your posts and looking at
your photos, you give clues of yourself,
you leave lots of fingerprints online.
Deactivating it is not the best option,
For now...

By the way, our office told me, I cannot

troubleshoot in your court, because you
have two prosecutors already NO ROOM FOR ME THERE.
I told the staff to call you up about this.
I promised to troubleshoot next month, which
is not possible to happen. I learned that your
court was Hooded, I was at home when notified,
I failed to help you clean up the mess. That's why,
there is the importance of mobile connection.
Besides, I will only call you if I have your cell no.
not text you. An1way, take care always.
God bless you.149

PS Monday, September 28, 2009 6:06PM

From: "ELIZA YU"

To: emily_san_gaspar@yahoo.com

ems, don't be like

MeTC magistrate (one of
Your judges pals according to your FB posting) who
permanently dismissed a case on the ground of
speedy trial when accused
jumped bail.

When there was a MR by

the prosecutor, it was
granted on the basis of
substantive justice.

Of course, there was double jeopardy

already, the MR was granted
correctly. And the pemanent (sic)
dismissal was wrong.

You are intelligent, you

finished your law schooling at
24 years old ranked 5th in your
class ... DO NOT DE-ACTIVATE
YOUR FACEBOOK FOR MORE THAN
3 MONTHS.
Talk and see you later.150

Oh God, I Forgot ... Monday, September 28, 2009 8:47PM

From: "ELIZA YU"

To: emily_san_gaspar@yahoo.com

Tsup! Honey, next time you re-activate your FB,

pls. change your ...
PHOTO PROFILE
DELETE:
Your Status, Birthday,
School, Work,
and all your PHOTOS.
it's OK to be wild online...
Be cautious and prudent.
Take care always.

Couple of weeks, I will be very busy will [sic] school

papers due to ending sem and
my second wind, will re-lobby
for my promotion.
Sept 30, I have lunch with ...
Oct 1, I have dinner with ...
Oct 2, I have appointment with ...
Oct 3, I have my last report
I have dinner at Gumbo for Dean's birthday
Oct 5, I have lunch at Aristocrat
Oct 6, I have cocktail at Manila Hotel
Oct 7, I have appointment at Ajinomoto
Oct 8, I will meet ...
Oct 9, I will meet another ...

I am regular troubleshooter, too.

I will see you later. Of course, I miss you.
God bless. MWAH! tsup ...151
A month after sending the meal stub message, Judge Yu apologized for said message,
to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I AM SO SORRY ... Saturday, October 3, 2009 6:22AM

From: "ELIZA YU"

To: emily_san_gaspar@yahoo.com

Hello there Emily, I found out that Facebook sent

unauthorized gifts (lewd ones) to its account
subscribers, I asked my classmates if they sent
this and that gift applications and they said no.

I am so sorry for my nonsense replies to

that 69 gift application I received from your
Facebook account (which you wondered).
Now, I believe it was not you who sent it to me.
I could have been a Facebook computer system error
or maybe a Facebook prank hacker.

I deleted all your emails. I hope

you will delete my emails to you also
including this email for peace of mind
and as a safety measure.
OH FORGET ALL MY EMAILS TO YOU SINCE JUNE AFTER
READING & RIDDING THIS APOLOGY EMAIL. Deal??
This is our MOA.

It's a good choice to deactivate your Facebook

account - it will bring you good harm.
Sometimes, you have to convince yourself
that your status has changed a lot, you change friends, you change status, change
lifestyle and
... leave Face book.

I cannot deactivate my Facebook account,

it was Dean Froilan Bacungan who invited me to
join. I created my Facebook account for him.
Thank you. Take care always.
God bless you.

I'M SO SORRY AGAIN ... I gave you lots

of trashes online. Anyway, emails are easy to delete.152
Judge Yu subsequently sent an e-mail with a subject that read: "CONGRATS 4 UR
ELECTION AS P.R.O. CDO METC NATIONAL CONVENTION, W/ MORE REASON 2
DELETE MY EMAILS 2 U. TY. GOD BLESS," but without an accompanying
message.153

A few weeks later, Judge Yu confronted Judge San Gaspar-Gito regarding the
reactivation of her Facebook account in the following
manner:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CHILL OUT Friday, October 23, 2009 2:13AM

From: "ELIZA YU"

To: emily_san_gaspar@yahoo.com
Hey Milay, I have a trouble shooting assignment
this coming Monday (October 26) in MeTc Branch 23,
I will pass by your court for sure,
I will drop by, unless I'm in a bad mood
like you today! Chill out ... it's basic, when the answer
to the question is obvious DO NOT ANSWER!
Why did you re-activate your Facebook account?
Oh No, you gave a wrong answer!
As expected, you are an Oscar awardee, remember?
Hhhmmm... lots of Oscar trophies you quite
collected at Facebook (He He He).
Nobody can prohibit you in the
exercise of your POLICE POWER in the
Facebook - that's the force of lust (He He He).
Your little siesta wants your photos?

Of course not, you look prettier in person

than in photos. I don't think your
prettiest photo can substitute the real you,
you are so warm in person.
Take care always.154
Judge San Gaspar-Gito was prompted to explain that her sister had used her Facebook
account,155 but Judge Yu apparently disbelieved the explanation and retorted
instead:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Be Right Back Friday, October 23, 2009 10:42PM

From: "ELIZA YU"

To: emily_san_gaspar@yahoo.com

Hello there Ems, the sister act explanation was cool! I'm sure it will be accepted by your
MeTCJAP in case it found out you still maintain a Facebook account notwithstanding its
express prohibition. Congrats, you seemed to be a member of the "palusot".com! (He
He He)

What is the name of your sister? You mean having same parents? Affinity? Sorority?
Job-related? Religious Organization? I thought you were the youngest child. Did I hear it
right, you said while I was looking at your gold medal on the wall, you have 5 siblings?
Going back to your sister, why would she do that? First, isn't she confident enough to be
herself online? Second, she is unaware that it will put you in harm by feigning to be
you? Third, did you not warn her? Fourth, Why did you tolerate her? You could have
changed your password anytime so she cannot have an access.

I thought it was definitely a rude answer(@ yahoo) as to why you re activated you
Facebook account? Only, I cannot judge you or anyone online, ifs not my task to do so.
As I said before, it is OK to be wild, wild, wild online.
Actually, your FB account was checking my FB account at those times you de-activated
it. I laughed at you ... oh no, not you ... now, your sister for it. Still, it was the reason for
my writing of "daily activity" entries at FB that I was doing OK - after you went "PUFF" at
FB, without saying any goodbye. Of course, I may deserve it, you may expect
something, I failed to write, like a visit perhaps. But you did not give me your mobile no.
so no seeing, only reading mails. Hhhmmm ... so your sister got my mobile no. also. It's
so cool! There is a possibility, it was your sister, I talked to online or did those stuff
which I believed it was you from June to October. Well, then, I should meet your sister!
Is she living with your popsie? What is the name your father? Let us then visit them.

Anyway, I have to go, I will visit the Franciscan missionary after this. I will donate
biscuits and fruit juices for the abandoned children. I have a favourite cousin, with an
awesome academic credentials and very pretty, who is a miraculous real, real in flesh,
real in her words and deed, a sister belonging to the Franciscan missionary. She was
assigned in Italy for almost 10 years as a nun, and she can read, write, Italian. I have to
buy her a cake, it's her birthday today. Doesn't Italy means an abbreviation of I Trust
And Love You?

I will talk to you later. I will drop by at your court on October 26, for sure am to pass by
in going or coming from MeTc Branch 23, my first time to go there. I'm so accessible, so
simple. It was you, or it was your sister, should I say, that make things complicated. The
article, "A Tribute to a Great Mentor", it was your sister who wrote it? Well, Justice
Angelina Sandoval Gutierrez is her ideal woman. A tall order. Oh no, no need to tell me
the orientation or preference of the author of the article by mere reading of it. Take care
always. God bless you always. Be right back.156
The following day, Judge Yu sent another lengthy message apologizing for her previous
actions.157 But to add more confusion, Judge Yu sent a message on November 17,
2009 containing a La Paz Bachoy recipe, but with a notation at the end reading: we
shall claim the 69 meal stub in a dirty kitchen.158

Aside from attributing to Judge Yu the sending of messages containing sexual

innuendos, Judge San Gaspar-Gito accused her of creating a fake Facebook account
under the name "Rudela San Gaspar." That account contained captured photographs,
including that of the complainant's son allegedly taken from her deactivated account.
Judge San Gaspar-Gito confronted Judge Yu and threatened to initiate an
administrative complaint. This threat prompted the respondent to take down the fake
account.159

The complainant also received a message on April 2, 2010 with an attached image of a
boy holding a pair of scissors,160 and a sign reading Full Brazillian 5¢.161

The last straw came on July 4, 2010 when Judge San Gaspar-Gito received a message
from her friend, Juliet Tabanao-Galicinao, informing her that a certain Bambi Yu had
inquired about her sexual orientation, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Juliet Tabanao-Galicinao July 4 at 12:15am
(no subject)

Milay:cralawlawlibrary

Some crazy woman e-mailed me. Her name is bambi yu. I accepted her on Facebook
because she told me you were friends. Then last Friday, she sent me a weird message
asking if you were bisexual. I promptly answered her and after that, I deleted her from
my facebook list, as well as any common friends we might have. I am telling you this so
you will be warned that there are envious people like this. I am copying here the
contents of our exchange for your own records.

as follows:cralawlawlibrary

bambi yu:cralawlawlibrary

I read your post about judge of the year award to Milay today. I was about to comment
but your post disappeared. She wrote me months ago that she closed her Facebook
account because it became a Pandora's box. I'm curious, is she an AC DC?? (I am
actually laughing) You are listed as among her best friends, you must be competent to
answer this inquiry. Rest assured that this is highly confidential. Thanks. God bless..

Juliet Tabanao-Galicinao July 2 at 8:19am what is an AC DC?

Bambie Yu July 2 at 3:48pm Report

AC DC is non-offensive slang for bisexual. Is she a bisexual? Thanks for replying.

Judges have limited correspondence here at FB..

Juliet Tabanao-Galicinao July 2 at 8:45pm

Hi! Emily is definitely not bisexual. We have been friends and roomates in school for
ages and I can honestly say she is straight. She is also very happily married with one
kid. I am not saying this because we are friends. I am just stating a fact. I am not
offended though. Glad I was able to correct a mistake. What made you think so? (just
wondering)

Bambie Yu July 3 at 5:48am Report

What made me think Milay is an AC DC? It does not matter. While I thank you for your
honest to goodness answer, and I would like to return the favor by answering your
question but judges have restrictions and limited correspondence online. Judges are
expected to be courteous to fellow judges. I promised not to speak or write anything
about Emily that would put her in bad light. I honor my promises. She has high
aspirations in the judiciary which we should support. Besides, we are enemies for
judicial excellence awards. You can ask her directly the question please. She is the only
one who can answer it correctly. My lips are sealed this time. Have a nice day. Thank
you. God bless!

Bambie Yu July 3 at 6:04am Report

PS: Just to take advantage of your generosity, because Emily broke her vow not to
open her Facebook account which she claimed to be Pandora's box, can you do me a
little favor, to ask her to delete all my emails? She told me she kept all my old emails
despite my instruction to delete them after reading. Our emails contained gossips which
will lead to our disbarment as honorable members of the bar. Thus, I was anxious to
learn from your post that hinted she opened up her Facebook account again yesterday,
this meant she broke a vow. My emails may still be there, and I have waited for her
assurance that she have deleted all. I did not receive any such assurance from her that
my emails are gone except that she closed her FB account. I was relieved with that
closed FB account until yesterday. I kept writing her before to delete my emails. She
does not reply. Anyway, I am not going to speak anything bad against her. I would be
glad if I will get an assurance from you, as her bestfriend, that she already deleted the
emails. We are not speaking to each other because we have a huge misunderstanding
and, I said earlier, we are enemies, mortal enemies for the judicial excellence award.

Thank you again & good day.162

Judge San Gaspar-Gito formally filed the present administrative complaint on July 12,
2010.163

Judge Yu submitted her comment by way of a compliance dated October 12,

2010,164 and attached her own complaint-affidavit charging Judge San Gaspar-Gito with
conduct unbecoming of a judge, and requesting the OCA to conduct a discreet
investigation on the complaint.165 She manifested that she had come upon two versions
of Judge San Gaspar-Gito's complaint.166

The following day, Judge Yu wrote to the OCA expressing her dissatisfaction over the
investigation being conducted by the OCA.167

On October 22, 2010 Judge Yu submitted a supplemental manifestation arguing that

Judge San Gaspar-Gito did not only violate the Code of Judicial Ethics, the Civil
Code and the Revised Penal Code, but also Republic Act No. 8792, specifically Section
32168 on confidentiality of electronic messages. She described the complaint letters as
poison letters, and denied all the material averments stated therein. 169

Judge San Gaspar-Gito submitted her reply.170

Judge Yu wrote the OCA on March 18, 2011 formally withdrawing her complaint against
Judge San Gaspar-Gito.171

On July 22, 2011, Judge Yu sent a letter to Judge San Gaspar-Gito's brother, Atty.
Reynaldo L. San Gaspar,172 to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
National Capital Judicial Region
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT
Branch 47, Pasay City
Tel. No. 831-1109

July 22, 2011

Atty. Reynaldo L. San Gaspar

No. 154 P. Talavera St.,
Pakil, 4017, Laguna

Dear Atty. San Gaspar:cralawlawlibrary

Our court is inviting you for a brief conference in our court on August 5, 2011 around
1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. or any available and convenient time and place for you, to clarify
matters pertaining to the two (2) letters both dated July 12, 2010 of your sister Judge
Emily L. San Gaspar-Gito. She can come with you if she wants to.

Your cooperation is highly appreciated.

Thank you.

Very truly yours,

(sgd.)
Judge Eliza B. Yu

Copy furnished:
Judge Emily L. San Gaspar-Gito
Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 20, Manila
In the meantime, the Court referred the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA),173 and
directed Judge San Gaspar-Gito to allow the Chief of the Management Information
System Office (MISO) to gain access to her Facebook and Yahoo accounts.

Pursuant to the Court's directive, the MISO accessed the Yahoo and Facebook
accounts of Judge San Gaspar-Gito. Later on, Mr. Alexander M. Arevalo, the Acting
Chief of the MISO, submitted his report,174attaching and certifying to the
messages/communications extracted from the Yahoo and Facebook accounts of Judge
San Gaspar-Gito.175

In her memorandum,176 Judge Yu accused Judge San Gaspar-Gito with dishonesty and
violation of the right to privacy.177 She insisted on her innocence, claiming that Judge
San Gaspar-Gito had sent her the meal stub with the attached image; that based on her
research, the image was a photo engraving by Felicien Rops for Le Diable au Corps in
1865,178 which should be treated as an artwork rather than as pornography;179 that she
had treated the message as a joke, but Judge San Gaspar-Gito would continually send
similar graphics through the Facebook gift section everytime she would ask her to
troubleshoot in her sala;180 that she did not send some of the messages to Judge San
Gaspar-Gito whom she knew to be very much married;181 that she had become alarmed
upon learning that Judge San Gaspar-Gito had repeatedly read her messages, and had
treated the same as "treasures" that she had refused to delete;182 and that her
messages were intended to be "double entendres" and should not be considered as
having any sexual connotations but instead as having been innocently uttered. 183

In her September 26, 2013 manifestation,184 Judge Yu attached a copy of her credit
card bill supposedly showing that she had been charged $10.00 when she opened the
meal stub sent by Judge San Gaspar-Gito. She posited that the lewd graphics had
originated from Judge San Gaspar-Gito who had tampered the electronic messages
submitted as evidence herein.185

Regarding her exchanges with Ms. Galicinao, Judge Yu invoked the exclusionary rule
because she did not give her consent to use the private messages as evidence. 186

CA Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid conducted the investigation, and scheduled

several hearings. It appears that despite notice, Judge Yu did not appear in the
hearings, and instead manifested her willingness to submit the matter for decision
based on the records. She also waived her attendance, including the right to cross
examine the complainant,187 in order to avoid generating "hostile feelings and
antagonistic views" upon the entry of appearance as counsel of Atty. Gener Gito, Judge
San Gaspar-Gito's husband.188

Justice Abdulwahid submitted his Report and Recommendation dated September 26,
2013,189 wherein he recommended the suspension from office of Judge Yu for a period
of three months due to simple misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a judge. He
concluded that the barrage of inappropriate messages sent by Judge Yu, as well as her
stalking through the internet, constituted conduct unbecoming of a judge; and that her
use of her court's letterhead to summon the complainant's brother fell under the
category of simple misconduct.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Recommendation and Evaluation of the Office of the Court Administrator

On October 13, 2015, the Court directed the OCA to submit a comprehensive
evaluation, report and recommendation on the consolidated cases. 190

The OCA complied through Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa-
Delorino191 by submitting a Memorandum192 containing the following
recommendation:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the
Honorable Court that respondent Judge Eliza B. Yu, Branch 47, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Pasay City, be found GUILTY of INSUBORDINATION, GROSS IGNORANCE
OF THE LAW, REFUSAL TO PERFORM OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS, GROSS
MISCONDUCT AMOUNTING TO VIOLATION OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT, GRAVE ABUSE OF AUTHORITY, OPPRESSION, and CONDUCT
UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE, and be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with
forfeiture of all benefits, except accrued leave credits, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any Rublic office including government-owned or
controlled corporations.193
The OCA recommended that the charges of gross ignorance of the law in allowing OJTs
to perform judicial work and directing the court staff to sell the books authored by Judge
Yu, as well as the allegation of malicious utterances against Court Administrator
Marquez should be dismissed for being unsubstantiated;194 and upheld Judge Yu's
requiring the plaintiffs with pending replevin cases to pay legal fees for transcripts,
pursuant to her judicial prerogative to ensure that court funds were properly accounted
for.195

The OCA declared Judge Yu's refusal to comply with A.M. No. 19-2011 and to honor
the appointments of Ms. Lagman and Ms. Tejero-Lopez as insubordination; Judge Yu's
letter to DOT Secretary Lim as gross misconduct, and a violation of Section 6, Canon 4
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct; Judge Yu's conduct in relation to the request for
sick leave by Noel Labid, and the appointment of Ms. Tejero-Lopez as
oppression;196 regarded as gross ignorance of the law Judge Yu's acts of allowing the
criminal proceedings in her court to continue without the presence of the public
prosecutor, and of ordering the reception of evidence by the OIC who was not a
member of the Bar;197 and considered Judge Yu's issuance of the show cause order
against Executive Judge Colasito, et al. as grave abuse of her authority.198

The OCA agreed with the recommendation and findings of Justice Abdulwahid to
consider Judge Yu's actuations towards Judge San Gaspar Gito as conduct
unbecoming of a judge, but clarified that Judge Yu's use of the official letterhead of her
court in summoning the brother of Judge San Gaspar-Gito to a conference
demonstrated her abuse of power, and constituted a violation of Section 8, Canon 4 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct.199

Ruling of the Court

We agree with the findings and recommendations of the

OCA.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

I
Noncompliance with A.O. No. 19-2011

Judge Yu forthwith resisted the implementation of A.O. No. 19-2011 because of her
unresolved protest against the issuance. She explained that her compliance with A.O.
No. 19-2011 would render her protest moot. But her unresolved protest was not a
sufficient justification for her to resist the implementation of A.O. No. 19-2011. She was
quite aware that A.O. No. 19-2011 was issued pursuant to Section 6, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which confers to the Court the power of administrative supervision over all
courts,200 and was for that reason an issuance to be immediately implemented and
unquestioningly obeyed by the affected Judges.

The resistance by Judge Yu to the the implementation of A.O. No. 19-2011 was
unexpected. She was quite aware that A.O. No. 19-2011 was not a mere request for her
to comply with only partially, inadequately or selectively,201 or for her to altogether
disregard. At the very least, her resistance to A.O. No. 19-2011 manifested an
uncommon arrogance on the part of a Judge of a court of the first-level towards the
Court itself. Such attitude smacked of her unbecoming condescension towards the
Court and her judicial superiors. We cannot tolerate her attitude lest it needlessly sows
the seeds of aiTogance in others that can ultimately destroy the faith and trust in the
hierarchy of courts so essential in the effective functioning of the administration of
justice.

Moreover, Judge Yu's resistance to the implementation of A.O. No. 19-2011 disrupted
the orderliness of the other Pasay City MeTCs to the prejudice of public interest. This
effect became unavoidable, for Executive Judge Colasito necessarily required the other
courts to render additional night court duties to cope with her refusal to render night
court duties.

Judge Yu compounded her condescension towards the Court and her judicial superiors
by her bypassing them to directly communicate her personal reservations about A.O.
No. 19-2011 to Secretary Lim, the proponent of holding the night courts, and other
quarters like the police authority in Pasay City. Her reservations extended to assailing
the legal foundation and the practicality for holding the night courts. Her doing so
broadcast to them the notion that obedience to A.O. No. 19-2011 and similar issuances
of the Court could be deferred at the whim and caprice of a lowly ranked judicial officer
like her. Although she might have regarded her reservations as impressed with
outstanding merit, that was no justification for her to defer or reject the implementation
of A.O. No. 19-2011 in her court for any length of time, and to be public about it. A.O.
No. 19-2011 dealt with an administrative matter on the administration of justice and
procedure over which the Court was the supreme and sole authority. She should have
the maturity to know so, and to bow her head before that authority. Her freedom to
exercise her constitutional right to free speech and expression was not a consideration.
She had no privilege to disobey; hers was but to follow.

Judge Yu's having directly communicated her misgivings about A.O. No. 19-2011 to
Secretary Lim and to other quarters was beyond forgiving by the Court. She thereby
strongly hinted that the Court was altogether wrong and impractical about holding night
courts. What she accomplished from such exercise was to broadcast how little regard
she had for the Court and its issuances. Her attitude constituted an open
insubordination that extensively diminished the respect owed to the Court by the public,
especially by the latter who were directly affected in the implementation of A.O. No. 19-
2011. There is no question that when a Judge becomes the transgressor of the law that
she has sworn to uphold, she places her office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for
the law, and impairs public confidence in the integrity of the Judiciary itself.202
It is timely for the Courrto use this occasion to remind Judge Yu and other judicial
officers of the land that although they may enjoy the freedoms of speech and
expression as citizens of the Republic, they should always conduct themselves, while
exercising such freedoms, in a manner that should preserve the dignity of their judicial
offices and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary. As to this duty to observe
self-restraint, Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciaryis clear and forthright, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief,
association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct
themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the
impartiality and independence of the judiciary.
For sure, Judge Yu's expression of her dissent against A.O. No. 19-2011 was
misplaced. We may as well declare that she did not enjoy the privilege to dissent.
Regardless of her reasons for dissenting, she was absolutely bound to follow A.O. No.
19-2011. Indeed, she did not have the unbridled freedom to publicly speak against A.O.
No. 19-2011 and its implementation, for her being the Judge that she was differentiated
her from the ordinary citizen exercising her freedom of speech and expression who did
not swear obedience to the orders and processes of the Court without delay. 203 Her
resistance to the implementation of A.O. No. 19-2011 constituted gross insubordination
and gross misconduct,204 and put in serious question her fitness and worthiness of the
honor and integrity attached to her judicial office.205

According to Himalin v. Balderian,206 the refusal of a Judge to comply with any

resolution or directive of the Court constituted insubordination and gross
misconduct, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[A] judge who deliberately and continuously failed and refused to comply with a
resolution of this Court was held guilty of gross misconduct and insubordination, the
Supreme Court being the agency exclusively vested by our Constitution with
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel from the Presiding Justice
of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. The Court can hardly
discharge such constitutional mandate of overseeing judges and court personnel and
taking proper administrative sanction against them if the judge or personnel concerned
does not even recognize its administrative authority.
Insubordination is the refusal to obey some order that a superior officer is entitled to
give and to have ob yed. It imports a willful or intentional disregard of the lawful and
reasonable instructions of the employer.207 Judge Yu's obstinate resistance to A.O. No.
19-2011 displayed both her rebellious character and her disdain and disrespect for the
Court and its directives.

Judge Yu's unwillingness to comply with A.O. No. 19-2011 was also a betrayal of her
sworn duty to maintain fealty to the law,208 and brought dishonor to the Judiciary. In that
regard, her conduct amounted to gross misconduct, defined as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or
standard of behavior in connection with one's performance of official functions and
duties. For grave or gross misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be
corrupt or inspired by the intention to violate the law, or a persistent disregard of well-
known rules. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of
judgment.209
In all, Judge Yu exhibited an unbecoming arrogance in committing insubordination and
gross misconduct. By her refusal to adhere to and abide by A.O. No. 19-2011, she
deliberately disregarded her duty to serve as the embodiment of the law at all times.
She thus held herself above the law by refusing to be bound by the issuance of the
Court as the duly constituted authority on court procedures and the supervision of the
lower courts. To tolerate her insubordination and gross misconduct is to abet
lawlessness on her part. She deserved to be removed from the service because she
thereby revealed her unworthiness of being part of the Judiciary.210

II
Refusal to honor the appointments of court personnel

Although Judge Yu insisted on the irregularity of the appointment of Ms. Tejero-Lopez

for lack of personal endorsement from her as the Presiding Judge, and of the
appointment of Ms. Lagman due to a pending administrative complaint, the
appointments of Ms. Tejero-Lopez and Ms. Lagman were valid and regular. As such,
Judge Yu had no good reason to reject the appointments.

To start with, Ms. Tejero-Lopez and other applicants had undergone scrutiny and
processing by the duly constituted committee, and the OCA had then signed and
executed the appointment. Nonetheless, the authority to appoint still emanated from the
Court itself.211 Judge Yu's objection to Ms. Tejero-Lopez's appointment for lack of her
personal endorsement was not enough to negate the appointment. Judge Yu had no
right to reject the appointment, making her rejection another instance of gross
insubordination by her. This consequence has been elucidated in Edaño v.
Asdala,212 as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[R]espondent Judge Asdala, in insisting on the designation of respondent Nicandro as
OIC, blithely and willfully disregarded the Memorandum of this Court, through the OCA,
which approved the designation of Amy Soneja alone and not in conjunction with
respondent Nicandro - as OIC. While the presiding judge, such as respondent
Judge Asdala, can recommend and endorse persons to a particular position, this
recommendation has to be approved by this Court. Again, the respondent judge
ought to know that the Constitution grants this Court administrative supervision
over all the courts and personnel thereof. In the case at bar, despite the Court's
approval of Amy Soneja's designation, the respondent judge allowed, if not insisted on,
the continued discharge of the duties of OIC by respondent Nicandro. Respondent
Judge Asdala even had the gall to insist that as presiding judge she has the authority
and discretion to designate "anyone who works under her, as long as that person enjoys
her trust and confidence." Coming from a judge, such arrogance, if not ignorance, is
inexcusable. The memorandum from the OCA regarding the designation of court
personnel is no less an order from this Court. Court officials and personnel, particularly
judges, are expected to comply with the same. Respondent judge's gross
insubordination cannot be countenanced.213
Judge Yu could only recommend an applicant for a vacant position in her court for the
consideration of the SPBLC, which then accorded priority to the recommendee if the
latter possessed superior qualifications than or was at least of equal qualifications as
the other applicants she did not recommend.214 The SPBLC explained to Judge Yu the
selection process that had resulted in the appointment of Ms. Tejero-Lopez. She could
not impose her recommendee on the SPBLC which was legally mandated to maintain
fairness and impartiality in its assessment of the applicants215 based on performance,
eligibility, education and training, experience and outstanding accomplishments,
psycho-social attributes and personality traits, and potentials.216

Secondly, Judge Yu's rejection of the appointment of Ms. Lagman was just as
unwarranted.

Under Section 34, Rule II of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (URACCS),217a pending administrative complaint shall not disqualifY an
employee from promotion, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 34. Effect of the Pendency of an Administrative Case. - Pendency of an
administrative case shall not disqualify respondent from promotion or from claiming
maternity/paternity benefits.

For this purpose, a pending administrative case shall be construed as

follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a. When the disciplining authority has issued a formal charge; or

b. In case of a complaint filed by a private person, a prima facie case is found to exist by
the disciplining authority.
The rule, which is reiterated in Section 42 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service (RRACCS) of 2011,218 cannot be interpreted otherwise.

Accordingly, Judge Yu's administrative complaint had no bearing on Ms. Lagman's

appointment, more so because Ms. Lagman was held liable only for simple misconduct,
a less grave offense that did not merit termination from public service for the first
offense.219 It is relevant to point out, too, that Judge Yu had no personality to object to
or oppose Ms. Lagman's appointment, considering that only a qualified next-in-rank
employee has been recognized as a party-in-interest to file the protest in accordance
with paragraph 1.6.1, Article IX of the 2002 Revised Manual of Clerks of Court.220

Thirdly, we also take Judge Yu to task for disrespectful language uttered against the
Court, no less. She characterized the appointment of Ms. Tejero-Lopez as "void ab
initio" and "a big joke." The use of such language in assailing the Court's exercise of its
absolute power of appointment was highly offensive and intemperate. She thereby
disregarded her obligation to show respect and deference toward the Court and its
officials. She was thereby guilty of another serious misconduct.

And, fourthly, Judge Yu issued verbal threats of filing administrative, civil and criminal
charges against Ms. Tejero-Lopez unless she withdrew her application. Judge Yu
reiterated the threats in her letter dated June 14, 2011 addressed to Atty.
Pabello.221 Ms. Tejero-Lopez felt intimidated enough because she actually withdrew her
application (although she later went on with it). The making of the verbal threats by
Judge Yu to compel a subordinate to withdraw her application constituted grave abuse
of authority on the part of Judge Yu. Grave abuse of authority is committed by a public
officer, who, under color of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon a person any bodily harm,
imprisonment, or other injury; it is an act characterized with cruelty, severity, or
excessive use of authority. Also, the intimidation exerted upon Ms. Tejero-Lopez
amounted to oppression, which refers to an act of cruelty, severity, unlawful exaction,
domination or excessive use of authority.222

III
Issuing a show-cause order against fellow Judges and court personnel

According to the OCA, Judge Yu gravely abused her authority in issuing the show-
cause order against his fellow Judges, the complainants against her in OCA IPI No. 11-
2378-MTJ. The OCA rendered its finding thereon, as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
This Office finds it absolutely irregular for respondent Judge Yu to require the
complainants in OCA IPI No. 11-2378-MTJ to explain within seventy-two (72)
hours upon receipt of notice why they should not be cited in contempt for
surreptitiously taking the TSNs, orders and minutes of the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. M-PSY-09-08592-CR and using these as part of their
attachments to their complaint. As the respondent in OCA IPI No. 11-2378-MTJ,
respondent Judge Yu has no authority to summon the complainants (Executive
Judge Colasito, et al.) because it is only the Supreme Court who has the power to
issue directives requiring the parties in an administrative case to appear and to
present their respective arguments in support of their position.

Not only is her directive misplaced, it also shows respondent Judge Yu's utter lack of
respect and disdain for the Supreme Court. It must be noted that the parties in Criminal
Case No. M-PSY-09-08592-CR (the accused Ramil Fuentes et al. and the plaintiff
Republic of the Philippines) are outsiders to the administrative controversy between
respondent Judge Yu and the complainants in OCA IPI No. 11-2378-MTJ.
However, respondent Judge Yu acted as if she was the investigating authority
instead of being the respondent. She took undue advantage of her position as a
judge and used the judicial process for her own benefit. Such action clearly
depicts an abusive character which has no place in the judiciary. (Bold emphasis
supplied)223
The issuance of the show-cause order by Judge Yu represented clear abuse of court
processes, and revealed her arrogance in the exercise of her authority as a judicial
officer. She thereby knowingly assumed the role of a tyrant wielding power with
unbridled breadth. Based on its supervisory authority over the courts and their
personnel, the Court must chastise her as an abusive member of the Judiciary who
tended to forget that the law and judicial ethics circumscribed the powers and discretion
vested in her judicial office.
Nothing extenuated Judge Yu's abuse of authority and arrogance. Instead of accepting
the error of her ways, Judge Yu defended her conduct by insisting on having the
authority to initiate contempt proceedings against her fellow Judges and court
personnel. She supported her insistence by citing the rulings in People v.
Godoy,224Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan,225 and Salcedo v. Hernandez.226 But the cited
rulings had no relevance at all. People v. Godoy related to the contemptuous
newspaper article involving a case that the trial court had decided. Zaldivar v.
Sandiganbayan required the Tanodbayan-Ombudsman, a party in the case, to explain
his contumacious remarks about an ongoing case to the media. Salcedo v.
Hernandez concerned the contemptuous remarks by counsel for the petitioner in a
motion filed before the Court. In short, the factual settings for the cited rulings involved
parties or counsel of the parties, while the factual setting in this administrative matter
concerned the act of merely copying the records of Judge Yu's court for purposes of
producing evidence against her in the administrative cases her fellow Judges and the
concerned court employees would be initiating against he. The latter were not parties in
any pending case in her court.

Moreover, the Court notes that Judge Yu's issuance of the show-cause order emanated
from her desire to retaliate against her fellow Judges and the concerned court
employees considering that the allegedly contumacious conduct was the copying of
court records to be used as evidence in the administrative complaint against her. She
thereby breached her duty to disqualify herself from acting at all on the matter. Such
self-disqualification was required under Section 5, Canon 3, and Section 8 of Canon 4
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,
viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in
which they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a
reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such
proceedings include, but are not limited to, instances where:cralawlawlibrary

(a) The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

xxxx

Section 8. Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance their
private interest, x x x.
By insisting on her inherent authority to punish her fellow Judges for contempt of court,
Judge Yu wielded a power that she did not hold. Hence, she was guilty of gross
misconduct.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

IV
Refusal to sign the application for leave of absence and other allegations of
oppression
The 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court governs the approval of an application for
sick leave by court "personnel. Paragraphs 2.2.1227 and 2.2.2,228 Chapter X of the 2002
Revised Manual requires the submission of a medical certificate or proof of sickness
prior to the approval of the application for sick leave, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
2.2.1 Application for sick leave
All applications for sick leave of absence for one (1) full day or more shall be made on
the prescribed form and shall be filed immediately upon the employee's return from
such leave. Notice of absence, however, should be sent to the immediate supervisor,
and/or agency head. Application for sick leave in excess of five (5) successive
days shall be accompanied by a proper medical certificate.

xxxx
2.2.2. Approval of sick leave
Sick leave shall be granted only on account of sickness or disability on the part of the
employee concerned or of any member of his immediate family.

Approval of sick leave, whether with pay or without pay, is mandatory provided
proof of sickness or disability is attached to the application in accordance with the
applicable requirements. Unreasonable delay in the approval thereof or non-
approval without justifiable reason shall be a ground for appropriate sanction
against the official concerned. (Emphasis supplied)
Noel Labid complied with the 2002 Revised Manual by submitting the medical certificate
and the clinical abstracts issued and certified by the Medical Records Division of the
Philippine General Hospital (PGH). The medical certificate indicated that he had been
suffering from "Bleeding submandibular mass in hypovolemic shock Squamous cell
Carcinoma Stage IV floor of mouth,"229 while the clinical abstracts dated June 14,
2011230 and June 23, 2011231 indicated the same reason for his hospital admission.
However, Judge Yu was unconvinced by such submissions, and adamantly refused to
approve Noel's leave application supposedly based on the ruling in Re: Memorandum
Report of Atty. Thelma C. Bahia against Ms. Dorothy Salgado.232

Judge Yu apparently misapplied the cited ruling.

Re: Memorandum Report of Atty. Thelma C. Bahia against Ms. Dorothy

Salgado concerned the habitual absenteeism of the respondent court personnel, and
her belated submission of the medical certificates proving her illness. Crucial was the
finding that despite several attempts by her office to contact the respondent and to
inquire on her situation, she had deliberately failed to inform her superior of her absence
and her condition. This is not the same in the case of Noel.

Under paragraph 2.1.2233 of the 2002 Revised Manual, heads of offices like Judge Yu
possessed the authority to confirm the employee's claim of ill health. Being aware of
Noel's true medical condition after having met with Mrs. Labid who had seen her to
plead for the approval of her son's leave application, Judge Yu was not justified in
demanding a prior written notice about Noel's serious medical condition. Neither was
she justified in still requiring Noel to submit the certificate of fitness to work considering
that he had yet to report for work.

Noel's medical certificate and clinical abstracts had sufficiently established the reason
for his absence and his hospital admission. Despite his obvious critical condition, Judge
Yu chose to ignore the medical records certified by a government health institution, and
unjustifiably demanded the submission of documents that the 2002 Revised Manual did
not require. Judge Yu did not convincingly establish that her actions came within the
limits of her authority as a court manager, or were sanctioned by existing court
regulations and policies. Her unjustified refusal to approve Noel's leave application
exposed her to administrative sanction under paragraph 2.2.2 of the 2002 Revised
Manual. Accordingly, Judge Yu was again guilty of grave abuse of authority.

It is not hard to believe that Judge Yu deliberately refused to sign Noel's leave
application in order to cause additional hardship to him in retaliation for his joining the
administrative complaint against her. We consider to be credible Mrs. Labid's narration
that Judge Yu had expressed her resentment towards Noel for his signing the complaint
against her. By acting so, therefore, Judge Yu was vindictive, and exhibited indifference
to the plight of the critically ill subordinate in urgent need of assistance. She was guilty
of oppression, which is any act of cruelty, severity, unlawful exaction, domination or
excessive use of authority constituting oppression.234 Her oppression did not befit an
administrator of justice.

Nonetheless, we dismiss the other allegations of oppression towards the staffmembers

of Branch 47 for failure of the complainants to substantiate the same. In administrative
cases, the complainant bears the burden of proving by substantial evidence the
allegations in his complaint.235

V
Charges of gross ignorance of the law

I. Allowing on-the-job-trainees

In OCA IPI No. 11-2399-MTJ, the complainants charged that Judge Yu had allowed on-
the-job trainees (OJTs) to have access to court records. She denied this charge,
however, and claimed that the students were merely "observers" because of the
prohibition. The OCA found this charge unsubstantiated.

We do not agree with the OCA's finding.

The memorandum dated November 2, 2010236 issued by Judge Yu indicated her

intention to delegate the duties of an encoder to a certain Ms. Angelica Rosali, one of
the OJTs concerned, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
MEMORANDUM

TO: Mrs. Amor Abad, Officer-in-Charge, Mr. Romer Aviles and Mr. Froilan Robert
Tomas, Stenographers, Mrs. Emelina San Miguel, Records Officer, Mrs. Maxima Sayo,
Process Server, and Ms. Angelica Rosali, Encoder.

RE: Preference of Typing Orders, Encoding of Monthly Report, Submission of Monthly

Report, Typing of Pro-Forma Notices and Orders and Other Related Concerns

In the interest of service, the stenographers are ordered to type first the orders on
sentence, dismissal and archival of cases within the day of issuing the same in open
court. Said orders must be placed at the court's chambers before 2:00 p.m. for signature
after checking of the case titles and dates by the office[r]-in-charge. Thereafter, after
(sic) signing of these orders by the undersigned judge, these will be forwarded to the
encoder of the monthly report. The encoder shall encode immediately these orders
upon receipt thereof. The encoder shall be responsible for the typing of newly
filed criminal and civil cases, the cases submitted for decision, and the cases
decided, dismissed and archived. Upon receipt of the newly filed criminal or civil
cases within a day, the officer-incharge shall place them, at the court's chambers. After
the evaluation of these cases, the undersigned judge shall instruct the officer-in-charge
to turn over these cases to the encoder for typing. Thereafter, after (sic) these newly
filed criminal and civil cases are typed and printed within the day, a copy shall be
furnished to the undersigned judge. The said cases will be given by the officer-in-charge
to the records officer and process server for safekeeping. The monthly report must be
submitted within the 1st week up to the 2nd week of the following month.

All other orders must be typed within the week after their issuance in open court. Every
Friday, the Officer-in-Charge must see to it that all orders issued within the week are
typed within the same week.

After the receipt of the printed copy of the newly filed civil and criminal cases from the
encoder, the undersigned judge shall instruct the officer-in-charge to calendar these
cases and to delegate fairly the typing of the notices of these cases. The officer-in-
charge is directed to mimeograph the forms of subpoenas, summons, other notices,
order to file an answer or counter-affidavit in cases covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure, order for the issuance of warrant of arrest, warrant of arrest, commitment
order, minutes, pre-trial order and such other pro-forma orders as determined by this
Court subject to delegation. With respect to an order on archiving of a case, there must
be a corresponding warrant of arrest. The Officer-in-Charge is responsible for the
checking of the correct name of the case title, date, parties and addresses of
these proforma orders subject to delegation. Erroneous typing of case title, date,
parties and addresses, among others is considered gross inefficiency if
committed ten (10) consecutive times, and it calls [f]or an explanation. If re-
committed another ten (10) consecutive times, this merits disciplinary
sunction. (Emphasis supplied)

For strict compliance.

Thank you.
 (Sgd.) Eliza B. Yu
Judge
That the memorandum was not disseminated to the person concerned, and that it was
not implemented were immaterial to the charge. The fact that Judge Yu issued the
memorandum naming Ms. Rosali, a student, as the encoder and assigning to her court
duties similar to those of a regular court employee signified Judge Yu's intention to treat
Ms. Rosali as a trainee instead of as a mere observer. Ms. Rosali denied in
her sinumpaang salaysay237 that she had received the memorandum and performed
encoding tasks, but nonetheless confirmed that she was directed to docket the
decisions and staple the returns. The other student "observers," namely: Ms. Johaira O.
Mababaya, Ms. Catherine L. Sarate and Mr. Eduardo M. Pangilinan III, also attested
that they had conducted their court observation as "assistant court stenographer."

Under the circumstances, Judge Yu could not feign ignorance of the tasks assigned to
and performed by the OJTs. If she had been strict about accepting student trainees,
then she should not have assigned court-related tasks. In this regard, Judge Yu
deliberately ignored OCA Circular No. 111-2005 in prohibiting OJTs,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
OCA CIRCULAR NO. 111-2005

TO : THE COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAX APPEALS,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, SHARI'A DISTRICT COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS,
SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURTS

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 5-2003 Re: PROHIBITING THE

ACCOMODATION OF STUDENTS TO UNDERGO ON-THE-JOB
TRAINING/PRACTICUM IN THE DIFFERENT OFFICES OF THE COURT

The Supreme Court En Banc in its Resolution dated 6 September 2005, in A.M. No. 05-
7-16-SC, Re: Analysis of the Current Judicial System Using Information Technology by
Student of the De La Salle University, Resolved to direct the undersigned to
CIRCULARIZE to all lower courts Memorandum Circular No. 05-2003 dated 25 June
2003, to wit:cralawlawlibrary

"MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 5-2003

PROHIBITING THE ACCOMMODATION OF STUDENTS TO UNDERGO ON-THE-JOB

TRAINING/PRACTICUM IN THE DIFFERENT OFFICES OF THE COURT

It is observed that some offices of the Court allow students of different colleges and
universities to undergo on-the-job training/practicum without authority or approval by the
Chief Justice.

Due to security reasons which prompted the Court to deny previous requests of
colleges and universities for on-the-job training/practicum, it is noted that the practice of
some offices allowing students to undergo on-the-job training/practicum jeopardizes not
only the functions of some offices but also their confidential records. Notably, the
accommodation of these students pose as a security risk.

ACCORDINGLY, in order to ensure the security of officials and employees of the Court
as well as its records, all Chiefs of Offices/Services/Divisions of the Court, including
those of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, Judicial and Bar Council and the Philippine
Judicial Academy, are hereby directed to disallow on-the-job training/practicum in
their respective offices/services/divisions.

xxxx

The provision of the above memorandum shall likewise apply to all trial courts to
serve as a guide for similar requests of students and as reflective of the policy of
the Court on the matter.

For the information and guidance of all concerned.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
II. Designating an Officer-in-Charge

Judge Yu designated as OIC of Branch 47 of the MeTC Mr. Ferdinand Santos, who
occupied the position of Clerk III. Under the 2002 Revised Manual, the position of Clerk
III fell under the first level position with a minimum educational requirement of two years
of college studies,238 and a career service sub-professional eligible.239 The position of
Clerk of Court III was a second level position with a minimum educational requirement
of a Bachelor of Laws degree, at least one year relevant experience, four hours of
relevant training, and a professional career service eligible.240

On the other hand, the CSC Memorandum Circular No. 06-05 dated February 15, 2005
provides the following guidelines:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CSC MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 06-05

TO: All Heads of Constitutional Bodies; Departments, Bureaus and Agencies of the
National Government; Local Government Units; Government-Owned or
Controlled Corporations; and State Universities and Colleges

SUBJECT: Guidelines on Designation

In its Resolution No. 050157 dated February 7, 2005, the Commission has adopted the
following guidelines on Designation in the civil service:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx

B. Designees can only be designated to positions within the level they are currently
occupying. However, Division Chiefs may be designated to perform the duties of third
level positions.

First level personnel cannot be designated to perform the duties of second level
positions.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Designating a first-level personnel like Mr. Santos as OIC defied CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 06-05 because the position of OIC was reserved for personnel belonging to
the second level. It becomes immaterial whether nobody from Branch 47 opposed the
designation because the memorandum circular expressly prohibits designation of first
level personnel to a second level position. It is emphasized that the memorandum is
crafted in the negative; hence, the memorandum is mandatory, and imports that the act
required shall not be done otherwise than designated.241

Judge Yu's contention that the designation of the OIC was based on trust and
confidence had no basis. We underscore that the OIC referred to here was the acting
Branch Clerk of Court (Clerk of Court III). The 2002 Revised Manual enumerates the
following duties and responsibilities of a branch clerk of
court,viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1.3.1 Adjudicative Support Functions

1.3.1.1 Attends all court sessions

1.3.1.2 Supervises the withdrawal of all records of cases to be heard and the
preparation of the notices of hearings, court's calendar, reports, minutes,
monthly reports, inventory of cases, index of exhibits, and paging of records
of cases;

1.3.1.3 Sees to it that all returns of notices are attached to the corresponding
evidence properly marked during the hearing as collected in an exhibit
folder; and

1.3.1.4 Signs notices of orders and decisions for service to the parties, release
papers of detained prisoners who are acquitted and/or who filed their
corresponding bail bonds duly approved by the presiding judge.
1.3.2 Non-Adjudicative Functions

1.3.2.1 Plans, directs, supervises and coordinates the activities of all personnel in a
branch of a multiple sala for effectiveness and efficiency;

1.3.2.2 Keeps tab of the attendance and whereabouts of court personnel during
office hours;

1.3.2.3 Controls and manages all court records, exhibits, documents, properties
and supplies;
 1.3.2.4 Administers oath;

1.3.2.5 Issues certificates of appearances and clearances;

1.3.2.6 Drafts/prepares correspondence and indorsements for signature :of the

Judge; and

1.3.2.7 Performs other duties that may be assigned to him.

Clerks of court are officers of the law who perform vital functions in the prompt and
sound administration of justice. Their office is the hub of adjudicative and administrative
orders, processes and concerns. They perform delicate functions as designated
custodians of the courts funds, revenues, records, properties and premises. 242 The
functions of a clerk of court require a higher degree of education as well as
understanding of the law and court processes, that they cannot be delegated to first
level personnel such as Mr. Santos. The position requires not only trust and confidence,
but most importantly, education and experience. Ineluctably, the respondent ignored the
clear import of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 06-05 in designating Mr. Santos as OIC.

III. Ordering presentation of ex parte evidence before the OIC who was not a
member of the Bar

Judge Yu argued that she did not commit any irregularity in ordering the presentation
of ex parteevidence before herOIC who was not a member of the Bar because the rule
on the reception of evidence by a member of the Bar was only directory under Section
9, Rule 30 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, which uses the word may.

Judge Yu's argument does not impress.

Section 9, Rule 30 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure expressly requires that only
clerks of court who are members of the Bar can be delegated to receive evidence ex
parte, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 9. Judge to receive evidence; delegation to clerk of court. - The judge of the
court where the case is pending shall personally receive the evidence to be
adduced by the parties. However, in default or ex parte hearings, and in any case
where the parties agree in writing, the court may delegate the reception of
evidence to its clerk of court who is a member of the bar. The clerk of court shall
have no power to rule on objections to any question or to the admission of exhibits,
which objections shall be resolved by the court upon submission of his report and the
transcripts within ten (10) days from termination of the hearing. (Emphasis supplied)
The word may used in the rule related only to the discretion by the trial court of
delegating the reception of evidence to the Clerk of Court, not to the requirement that
the Clerk of Court so delegated be a member of the Bar. The rule on ex parte reception
of evidence was unequivocal on this point, and required no elaboration. Neither the
agreement by the parties nor their acquiescence could justify its violation. 243 It followed
that Judge Yu could not validly allow the presentation of evidence ex parte before Mr.
Santos who was a mere OIC because he was not a member of the Bar. Breach of the
rule on reception of evidence represented her ignorance of the rule of procedure in
question, and subjected her to administrative liability for misconduct.244

IV. Allowing criminal proceedings without the actual participation of the public
prosecutor

Anent the charge that she allowed the prosecution of criminal actions without the
presence of the public prosecutor, Judge Yu retorted that the complainants were not the
proper parties to assail her orders; that the accused in People v. Manduriao had begged
to be arraigned without counsel after being informed of the penalty for the offense
charged; and that the trial of the case could proceed without the public prosecutor, b ut
not in the absence of a judge.245

We are appalled that a Judge like the respondent would explain herself in such a
fundamentally wrong manner.

Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court states:cralawlawlibrary

Section 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. - All criminal actions commenced by
a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of
the prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule or in the event of lack of public
prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of
the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecution Office to prosecute the
case subject to the approval of the Court. Once so authorized to prosecute the
criminal action, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to the end
of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or
otherwise withdrawn.

xxxx

Accordingly all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control and direction of
the public prosecutor.246 The true reason is that the prosecution of criminal offenses is
always a public function.247In People v. Ramos,248 we cautioned that the exception
stated in Section 5, supra, should be strictly construed,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The exception provided in Section 5 must be strictly applied as the prosecution of
crime is the responsibility of officers appointed and trained for that purpose. The
violation of the criminal laws is an affront to the People of the Philippines as a
whole and not merely the person directly prejudiced, who is merely the
complaining witness. This being so, it is necessary that the prosecution be
handled by persons sldlled in this function instead of being entrusted to private
persons or public officers with little or no preparation for this responsibility. The
exception should be allowed only when the conditions therefor as set forth in Section 5,
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure have been clearly established.
In Pinote v. Ayco,249 the Court castigated the respondent judge for allowing the
presentation of the defense witnesses in the absence of the public prosecutor or the
private prosecutor specially designated for the purpose. A breach of the Rules of
Court like that could not be rectified by subsequently giving the Prosecution the chance
to cross-examine the witnesses. Judge Yu committed a flagrant error by allowing the
direct examination of the defense witness without the public prosecutor, or without the
private counsel duly authorized by the public prosecutor in Criminal Case No. M-PSY-
09-08592-CR.

In addition, Judge Yu disregarded Section 6, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court when she
allowed the change of plea by the accused in People v. Manduriao without the
assistance of counsel. Judge Yu justified herself by claiming that she had apprised the
accused of the penalty for the offense charged, which had then convinced the accused
to change his plea.

The Court cannot accept her justification. In Gamas v. Oco,250 we took the respondent
judge to task for conducting an arraignment without the presence of counsel, and
observed:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 6 of Rule 116 means that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[W]hen a defendant appears [at the arraignment] without [an] attorney, the court has
four important duties to comply with: 1-It must inform the defendant that it[,] is his right
to have [an] attorney before being arraigned; 2-After giving him such information the
court must ask him if he desires the aid of attorney; 3-If he desires and is unable to
employ [an] attorney, the court must assign [an] attorney de oficio to defend him; and 4-
If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a
reasonable time therefor.
Compliance with these four duties is mandatory. The only instance when the court can
arraign an accused without the benefit of counsel is if the accused waives such right
and the court, finding the accused capable, allows him to represent himself in person.
However, to be a valid waiver, the accused must make the waiver voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently. In determining whether the accused can make a valid
waiver, the court must take into account all the relevant circumstances, including the
educational attainment of the accused. In the present case, however, respondent judge
contends that complainants waived their right to counsel and insisted on their immediate
arraignment.251
The justification that the accused had waived his right to counsel, and had changed his
plea after the respondent Judge had explained to him the imposable penalty for the
offense did not stand considering that in order that the waiver by the accused of his right
to counsel would be valid, the trial court must ensure that the accused did so voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently, taking into account the capacity of the accused to give such
consent. We have nothing to show that Judge Yu took the pains to enforce the
safeguards.

Every judge was expected to know the fundamental substantive and procedural
requirements on arraignment and right to counsel.252 We have always been clear about
the right of the accused to counsel under the Constitution, and about the requirements
for the arraignment of an accused under the Rules of Court. As such, Judge Yu was
guilty of gross ignorance of the law, which is ignorance of the law when the law is so
elementary, and when one professes not to know it, or when one acts as if she does not
know it. Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct prescribes that competence is a
prerequisite to the due performance of the judicial office. In Judge Yu's case, her
competence was indispensable to her fair and proper administration of justice in her
office. By failing to adhere to and implement existing laws, policies, and the basic rules
of procedure, she seriously compromised her ability to be an effective
magistrate.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

VI
Sending of inappropriate messages was conduct unbecoming of a judicial officer

Judge Yu denied sending the messages to Judge San Gaspar-Gito, and countered that
it was the latter who first sent the "meal stub" message. She maintained that the
messages were confidential and inadmissible as evidence under the exclusionary rule.

Judge Yu's reliance on the exclusionary rule fails.

The exclusionary rule, or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, presupposes a
violation of law on the part of the agents of the Govemment,253 and bars the admission
of evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures expressly defined under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. 254 The
exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution refers to the
prohibition against the issuance of general warrants that encourage law e nforcers to go
on fishing expeditions.255

Judge Yu did not specify that the State had unlawfully intruded into her privacy. The
subjects of the present inquiry were the messages sent by her to Judge San Gaspar-
Gito. Regardless of the mode of their transmission, the ownership of the messages
pertained to the latter as the recipient. Considering that it was the latter who granted
access to such messages, there was no violation of Judge Yu's right to privacy. As
such, the grant of access by Judge San Gaspar-Gito did not require the consent of
Judge Yu as the writer.256 To recall, the Court directed the MISO to retrieve the
messages for purposes of these cases.257 Based on the certification issued by the
authorized MISO personnel,258 the messages were extracted from the Yahoo and
Facebook accounts of Judge San Gaspar-Gito with the use of her official workstation.
Hence, the exclusionary rule did not apply.

Judge Yu denied the imputed significance of the messages.

The denial lacked persuasion. In her October 3, 2009 message to Judge San Gaspar-
Gito's Yahoo account, Judge Yu apologized to Judge San Gaspar-Gito, and expressly
clarified that Judge San Gaspar-Gito had not sent the "meal stub." Judge Yu even
requested Judge San Gaspar-Gito to "forget all [her] emails ... since June ..."259 This
apologetic tone from Judge Yu rendered her denial of responsibility devoid of
substance.

Moreover, the barrage of messages, most of which were sent within the same day,
makes us believe that they had all come from Judge Yu. Although she insisted that
Judge San Gaspar-Gito had sent the "meal stub," Judge Yu did not offer any plausible
explanation on the other messages containing sexual innuendos.

It is notable that the Facebook and Yahoo messages started in August 2009 when
Judge Yu was still a public prosecutor. Nonetheless, she could still be disciplined for
such acts committed prior to her appointment to the Judiciary because her internet
stalking of Judge San Gaspar-Gito continued after she had herself become a MeTC
Judge in Pasay City on January 12, 2010 and lasted until July 2010.

Our reading of the messages supports the studied conclusions by CA Justice

Abdulwahid that they did contain sexual insinuations that were ostensibly improper for a
Judge to write and send to another. The messages, however they may be read and
understood, were at least vexatious and annoying. In any case, the sender showed her
deep-seated proclivities reflective of conduct unbecoming of a member of the Judiciary.

Finally, the OCA submits that Judge Yu's use of the letterhead of her office or court in
summoning to a conference Atty. Reynaldo San Gaspar, the brother of Judge San
Gaspar-Gito, constituted abuse of power, and violated Section 8, Canon 4 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Respondent Judge Yu's use of the letterhead of Branch 47, MeTC, to invite Atty.
Reynaldo San Gaspar, complainant Judge Gito's brother, to her court is no different
from the aforecited cases. Respondent Judge Yu's letter reads as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Our court is inviting you for a brief conference in our court on August 5, 2011 around
1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. or any available and convenient time and place for you, to clarify
certain matters pertaining to the two (2) letters both dated July 12, 2010 of your sister
Judge Emily L. San Gaspar-Gito. She can come with you if she wants to.

Your cooperation is highly appreciated.

Thank you.
It is worthy to note that aside from appropriating the court's letterhead, respondent
[J]udge Yu used the words "our court" to invite Atty. San Gaspar for the purpose of
clarifying matters relative to the ongoing controversy between her and complainant
Judge Gito. Even for an ordinary layman, receiving a letter from the court would already
create the impression that his presence in the said venue is compulsory. Indeed, the
letter to Atty. San Gaspar is a clear illustration of how respondent Judge Yu abuses her
power as a member of the bench so that others would give in to her wishes. She
undoubtedly took advantage of her position and used the same as a leverage against
complainant Judge Gito who filed a case against her. This is patently a violation of
Section 8, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates that judges
shall not use the prestige of such office to advance their personal interests. 260
The submission is well-founded.
In Ladignon v. Garong,261 we discoursed on the liability of Judges for using their official
letterhead to advance their personal interests, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x In Rosauro v. Kallos, we found the respondent Judge liable for violating Rule 2.03
of the Code of the Judicial Conduct when he used his stationery for his correspondence
on a private transaction with the complainant and his counsel parties with a pending
case in his court. The Court held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
By using his sala's stationery other than for official purposes, respondent Judge
evidently used the prestige of his office x x x in violation of Rule 2.03 of the Code.
We do not depart from this rule on the use of official stationary. We clarify, however,
that the use of a letterhead should not be considered independently of the surrounding
circumstances of the use-the underlying reason that marks the use with the element of
"impropriety" or "appearance of impropriety". In the present case, the respondent Judge
crossed the line of propriety when he used his letterhead to report a complaint involving
an alleged violation of church rules and, possibly, of Philippine laws. Coming from a
judge with the letter addressed to a foreign reader, such report could indeed have
conveyed the impression of official recognition or notice of the reported violation.

The same problem that the use of letterhead poses, occurs in the use of the title
of Judge or Justice in the correspondence of a member of the Judiciary. While
the use of the title is an official designation as well as an honor that an incumbent
has earned, a line still has to be drawn based on the circumstances of the use of
the appellation. While the title can be used for social and other identification
purposes, it cannot be used with the intent to use the prestige of his judicial
office to gainfully advance his personal, family or other pecuniary interests. Nor
can the prestige of a judicial office be used or lent to advance the private interests of
others, or to convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special
position to influence the judge. (Canon 2, Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct) To
do any of these is to cross into the prohibited field of impropriety.262
In the letter in question, Judge Yu used the phrase "our court" in issuing the invitation to
Atty. San Gaspar. She was obviously intending to use her authority as an incumbent
Judge to advance her personal interest. Such conduct was reprehensible because she
thereby breached Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 1
INDEPENDENCE

xxxx

SECTION. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence
judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to
advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the
impression that they are in a special position to influence the
judge.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge.

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities.

xxxx
VII
The Penalties

In fine, the administrative offenses Judge Yu committed were the following, to

wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. In A.M. No. MTJ-12-1823, insubordination and gross misconduct for

her non-compliance with A.O. No. 19-2011;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

2. In A.M. No. MTJ-13-1836 and A.M. No. MTJ-12-1815, gross

insubordinationfor her unwarranted refusal to honor the appointments of
court personnel and rejection of the appointment of Ms.
Lagman; disrespect toward the Court for her intemperate and
disrespectful language in characterizing Ms. Tejero-Lopez's valid
appointment as void ab initio and a big joke; and grave abuse of
authority and oppression for issuing verbal threats of filing
administrative, civil and criminal charges against Ms. Tejero-Lopez unless
the latter withdrew her application;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

3. In OCA IPI No. 11-2378-MTJ and OCA IPI No. 12-2456-MTJ, grave
abuse of authority and abuse of court processes for issuing the show-
cause order against her fellow Judges and court personnel; and gross
misconduct amounting to violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct for not disqualifying herself in acting on the supposedly
contumacious conduct of her fellow Judges and concerned court
personnel in copying the records of her court;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

4. In OCA IPI No. 12-2398-MTJ, refusal to perform official

functions and oppression for refusing to sign the application for leave of
absence despite the employee having complied with the requirements,
and for doing so in retaliation for the employee's having joined as
signatory of administrative complaint filed against
her;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

5. Gross ignorance of the law for: (a) allowing on-the-job trainees and
designating an OIC who did not possess the minimum qualifications for
the position and without approval from the Court (OCA IPI No. 11-2399-
MTJ; (b) ordering the presentation of ex parte evidence before the OIC
despite his not being a member of the Bar (OCA IPI No. 11-2378-MTJ);
 (c) allowing criminal proceedings to be conducted without the actual
participation of the public prosecutor (A.M. No. MTJ-12-1815); and (d)
authorizing the change of plea by the accused without the assistance of
counsel; and

6. In A.M. No. MTJ-13-1821, conduct unbecoming of a judicial officer for

sending inappropriate messages with sexual undertones to a fellow
female Judge, and for using the official letterhead of her judicial office in
summoning a lawyer to a conference.

In view of the totality of the serious infractions committed by Judge Yu, the OCA
recommended her dismissal from the service with the following ratiocination, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In all the cases subject of this consolidated administrative matters, the totality of the
infractions committed by Judge Yu, i.e.. Gross Ignorance of the Law, Insubordination
and Refusal to Perform Official Functions, Gross Misconduct Amounting to Violation of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, Grave Abuse of Authority, Oppression, and Conduct
Unbecoming a Judge, underscores the fact that she is not fit to occupy the position of a
judge. She has done more than enough harm to the reputation of the judiciary and the
administration of justice, exacerbated by the oppression she has inflicted on her
subordinates and her utter disrespect for her superiors.

In similar instances, the Supreme Court did not hesitate to impose upon erring judges
the ultimate penalty of dismissal from service as they have indeed fallen short of the
standards required of them as dispensers of justice. These same standards must be
required of respondent Judge Yu, failing which she must be meted the penalty of
dismissal from the service.263
The recommendation of the OCA is well-taken.

Judge Yu unquestionably committed several gross and serious administrative offenses

ranging from gross misconduct and gross ignorance264 to the lesser offense of conduct
unbecoming of a judicial officer.265Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
either gross misconduct or gross ignorance of the law is punished by either: (1)
dismissal from the service, forfeiture of benefits, and disqualification from reinstatement
to any public office; or (2) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for
more than three months but not exceeding six months; or (3) fine of more than
P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.266 Under Section 46B, Rule 10 of
the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
either oppression or gross insubordination - also considered grave offenses - is
punishable with suspension from office for a period ranging from six months and one
day to one year for the first offense, and dismissal from the service for the second
offense. Under Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, conduct unbecoming of a
judicial officer merits either: (1) fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding
P10,000.00; or (2) censure; or (3) reprimand; or (4) admonition with warning.

The grossness and severity of her offenses taken together demonstrated Judge Yu's
unfitness and incompetence to further discharge the office and duties of a Judge. Her
arrogance and insubordination in challenging A.O. No. 19-2011, and her unyielding
rejection of the appointments of court personnel constituted gross insubordination and
gross misconduct, and warranted her immediate dismissal from the Judiciary. Her
requiring her fellow Judges to submit to her authority by virtue of her showcause order,
whereby she revealed her utter disrespect towards and disdain for them, as well as her
conduct unbecoming of a judicial officer aggravated her liability. The administration of
justice cannot be entrusted to one like her who would readily ignore and disregard the
laws and policies enacted by the Court to guarantee justice and fairness for
all.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

VIII
Disbarment Cannot Be Meted
Without Due Process

The foregoing findings may already warrant Judge Yu's disbarment.

A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, dated September 17, 2002 and entitled Re: Automatic
Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and
the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are
Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and as
Members of the Philippine Bar,267 relevantly states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and court officials who are
lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of
members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of
breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the
discipline of lawyers.

In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be

considered a disciplinary action against the respondent Justice, judge or court
official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be
required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also
be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinarily sanctioned aa member of the
Bar. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or
resolution.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, an attorney may be disbarred on the
ground of gross misconduct and willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court. Given her wanton defiance of the Court's own directives, her open
disrespect towards her fellow judges, her blatant abuse of the powers appurtenant to
her judicial office, and her penchant for threatening the defenseless with legal actions to
make them submit to her will, we should also be imposing the penalty of disbarment.
The object of disbarment is not so much to punish the attorney herself as it is to
safeguard the administration of justice, the courts and the public from the misconduct of
officers of the court. Also, disbarment seeks to remove from the Law Profession
attorneys who have disregarded their I. awyer's Oath and thereby proved themselves
unfit to continue discharging the trust and respect given to them as members of the
Bar.268

The administrative charges against respondent Judge Yu based on grounds that were
also grounds for disciplinary actions against members of the Bar could easily be treated
as justifiable disciplinary initiatives against her as a member of the Bar. This treatment
is explained by the fact that her membership in the Bar was an integral aspect of her
qualification for judgeship. Also, her moral and actual unfitness to remain as a Judge, as
found in these cases, reflected her indelible unfitness to remain as a member of the Bar.
At the very least, a Judge like her who disobeyed the basic rules of judicial conduct
should not remain as a member of the Bar because she had thereby also violated her
Lawyer's Oath.269

Indeed, respondent Judge Yu's violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct
embodied in the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary would
constitute a breach of the following canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF
THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or
at lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 6 THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT
SERVICE IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL TASKS.
Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to
promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public
duties.
CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO
THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR
CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts.
The Court does not take lightly the ramifications of Judge Yu's misbehavior and
misconduct as a judicial officer. By penalizing her with the supreme penalty of dismissal
from the service, she should not anymore be allowed to remain a member of the Law
Profession.

However, this rule of fusing the dismissal of a Judge with disbarment does not in any
way dispense with or set aside the respondent's right to due process. As such, her
disbarment as an offshoot of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC without requiring her to comment on
the disbarment would be violative of her right to due process. To accord due process to
her, therefore, she should first be afforded the opportunity to defend her professional
standing as a lawyer before the Court would determine whether or not to disbar
her.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 IX
Final Word

The Court will not hesitate to impose the extreme penalty on any judicial officer who has
fallen short of the responsibilities of her worthy office. Any conduct that violates the
norms of public accountability and diminishes the faith of the people in the judicial
system must be condemned.270 No act or omission by a Judge or Justice that falls short
of the exacting norms of holding the public office of dispensing justice can be condoned,
for the most important thing for every Judge or Justice is to preserve the people's faith
and confidence in the Judiciary as well as in the individuals who dispense justice. The
image of the Judiciary must remain unsullied by the misconduct of its officials. The
Court will not shirk from its duty of removing from the Bench any Judge or Justice who
has stained the integrity and dignity of the Judiciary.271 This is what must be done now
in these consolidated cases.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES respondent JUDGE ELIZA B. YU

GUILTY of GROSS INSUBORDINATION; GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW;
GROSS MISCONDUCT; GRAVE ABUSE OF AUTHORITY;
OPPRESSION; and CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A JUDICIAL
OFFICIAL;and, ACCORDINGLY, DISMISSES her from the service EFFECTIVE
IMMEDIATELY, with FORFEITURE OF ALL HER BENEFITS, except accrued leave
credits, and further DISQUALIFIES her from.reinstatement or appointment to any public
office or employment, including to one in any government-owned or government-
controlled corporations.

Respondent JUDGE ELIZA B. YU is directed to show cause in writing within ten (10)
days from notice why she should not be disbarred for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics as outlined
herein.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator for its
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez,
Mendoza, Reyes, Jardeleza, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., see Concurring & Dissenting Opinion.
Peralta, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., on official leave.
Leonen, J., I join Justice Brion.
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200 April 2, 2014
(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2834-RTJ)

ANTONIO M. LORENZANA, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE MA. CECILIA I. AUSTRIA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Batangas
City, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve in this Decision the administrative complaints1 filed by Antonio M.

Lorenzana (complainant) against Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria (respondent), Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2, Batangas City.

The records show that the administrative complaints arose from the case "In the Matter
of the Petition to have Steel Corporation of the Philippines Placed under Corporate
Rehabilitation with Prayer for the Approval of the Proposed Rehabilitation Plan,"
docketed as SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, where the respondent was the presiding judge. The
complainant was the Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Steel
Corporation of the Philippines (SCP), a company then under rehabilitation proceedings.

i. Complaint

In his verified complaint dated January 21, 2008, the complainant alleged that in the
course of SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, the respondent committed Gross Ignorance of the
Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Gross Misconduct, Grave Incompetence, Irregularity in
the Performance of Duty, Grave Bias and Partiality, Lack of Circumspection, Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge, Failure to Observe the Reglementary Period and Violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, as shown by the following instances:

1. The respondent appointed Atty. Santiago T. Gabionza, Jr. as rehabilitation

receiver over SCP’s objections and despite serious conflict of interest in being
the duly appointed rehabilitation receiver for SCP and, at the same time, the
external legal counsel of most of SCP’s creditors; he is also a partner of the law
firm that he engaged as legal adviser.

2. The respondent conducted informal meetings (which she termed as

"consultative meetings" in her Order2dated May 11, 2007) in places outside her
official jurisdiction (i.e., a first class golf club, a hotel and sports club facilities in
Metro Manila) and where she arbitrarily dictated the terms, parameters and
features of the rehabilitation plan she wanted to approve for SCP. She also
announced in the meetings that she would prepare the rehabilitation plan for
SCP.
3. The modified rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza is a replica of
what the respondent dictated to him. Thus, the respondent exceeded the limits of
her authority and effectively usurped and pre-empted the rehabilitation receiver’s
exercise of functions.

4. The respondent ordered that the proceedings of the informal meetings be off-
record so that there would be no record that she had favored Equitable-PCI Bank
(EPCIB).

5. The respondent had secret meetings and communications with EPCIB to

discuss the case without the knowledge and presence of SCP and its creditors.

6. The respondent appointed Gerardo Anonas (Anonas) as Atty. Gabionza’s

financial adviser and, at the same time, as her financial adviser to guide her in
the formulation and development of the rehabilitation plan, for a fee of ₱3.5M at
SCP’s expense. Anonas is also the cousin-in-law of the managing partner of Atty.
Gabionza’s law firm.

7. The respondent encouraged EPCIB to raise complaints or accusations against

SCP, leading to EPCIB’s filing of a motion to create a management committee.

8. When requested to conduct an evidentiary meeting and to issue a subpoena

(so that SCP could confront EPCIB’s witnesses to prove the allegation that there
was a need for the creation of a management committee), the respondent denied
SCP’s requests and delayed the issuance of the order until the last minute.

9. At the hearing of September 14, 2007, the respondent intimidated SCP’s

counsel, Atty. Ferdinand Topacio; blocked his every attempt to speak; refused to
recognize his appearances in court; and made condescending and snide
remarks.

10. The respondent failed to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the
Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (Rules). She approved
the rehabilitation plan beyond the 180 days given to her in the Rules, without
asking for permission to extend the period from the Supreme Court (SC).

11. The respondent erroneously interpreted and applied Section 23, Rule 4 of the
Rules (the court’s power to approve the rehabilitation plan) to include the power
to amend, modify and alter it.

12. The respondent took a personal interest and commitment to decide the
matter in EPCIB’s favor and made comments and rulings in the proceedings that
raised concerns regarding her impartiality.

13. The respondent adamantly refused to inhibit herself and showed special
interest and personal involvement in the case.
ii. Supplemental Complaint

The complainant likewise filed a supplemental complaint3 dated April 14, 2008 where he
alleged that the respondent committed an act of impropriety when she displayed her
photographs in a social networking website called "Friendster" and posted her personal
details as an RTC Judge, allegedly for the purpose of finding a compatible partner. She
also posed with her upper body barely covered by a shawl, allegedly suggesting that
nothing was worn underneath except probably a brassiere.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in its 1st Indorsement4 dated March 18,
2008, referred the complaints to the respondent for comment.

a. Comment to January 21, 2008 Complaint

The respondent vehemently denied the allegations against her. While she admitted that
she crafted a workable, feasible rehabilitation plan best suited for SCP, she maintained
that she did so only to render fairness and equity to all the parties to the rehabilitation
proceedings. She also submitted that if indeed she erred in modifying the rehabilitation
plan, hers was a mere error of judgment that does not call for an administrative
disciplinary action. Accordingly, she claimed that the administrative complaints were
premature because judicial remedies were still available.5

The respondent also argued that the rules do not prohibit informal meetings and
conferences. On the contrary, she argued that informal meetings are even encouraged
in view of the summary and non-adversarial nature of rehabilitation proceedings. Since
Section 21, Rule 4 of the Rules6 gives the rehabilitation receiver the power to meet with
the creditors, then there is all the more reason for the rehabilitation judge, who has the
authority to approve the plan, to call and hold meetings with the parties. She also
pointed out that it was SCP which suggested that informal meetings be called and that
she only agreed to hold these meetings on the condition that all the parties would
attend.

As to her alleged failure to observe the reglementary period, she contended that she
approved the rehabilitation plan within the period prescribed by law. She argued that the
matter of granting extension of time under Section 11, Rule 4 of the Rules7 pertains not
to the SC, but to the rehabilitation court.

The respondent likewise refuted the allegations of bias and partiality. First, she claimed
that her denial of the complainant’s motion for inhibition was not due to any bias or
prejudice on her part but due to lack of basis. Second, she argued that her decision was
not orchestrated to favor EPCIB, as evidenced by the fact that EPCIP itself (as some
other creditors did) promptly appealed her decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). Third,
she did not remove Atty. Gabionza as SCP’s rehabilitation receiver because she
disagreed that the grounds the complainant raised warranted his removal.
She also found no merit to the allegation of conflict of interest. Lastly, she maintained
that the rest of the complainant’s allegations were not substantiated and corroborated
by evidence.

The respondent further alleged that she did not gravely abuse her authority in not
issuing a subpoena as Section 1, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules on Corporate
Rehabilitation of the Rules specifically states that the court may decide matters on the
basis of affidavits and other documentary evidence.

On the allegation of conflict of interest, she maintained that the allegations were not
proven and substantiated by evidence. Finally, the respondent also believed that there
was nothing improper in expressing her ideas during the informal meetings.

b. Comment to April 14, 2008 Supplemental Complaint

In her comment8 on the supplemental complaint, the respondent submitted that the
photos she posted in the social networking website "Friendster" could hardly be
considered vulgar or lewd. She added that an "off-shouldered" attire is an acceptable
social outfit under contemporary standards and is not forbidden. She further stated that
there is no prohibition against attractive ladies being judges; she is proud of her photo
for having been aesthetically made. Lastly, she submitted that the ruling of the Court in
the case of Impao v. Judge Makilala9 should not be applied to her case since the facts
are different.

On July 4, 2008, the complainant filed a reply,10 insisting that the respondent’s acts of
posting "seductive" pictures and maintaining a "Friendster" account constituted acts of
impropriety, in violation of Rules 2.01,11 2.0212 and 2.03,13 Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.

In a Resolution14 dated September 9, 2009, the Court re-docketed the complaints as

regular administrative matters, and referred them to the CA for investigation, report and
recommendation.

The CA’s Report and Recommendation

On November 13, 2009, Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, the Investigating Justice,

conducted a hearing, followed by the submission of memoranda by both parties. In her
January 4, 2010 Report and Recommendation,15 Justice Gonzales-Sison ruled that the
complaints were partly meritorious. She found that the issues raised were judicial in
nature since these involved the respondent’s appreciation of evidence.

She also added that while the CA resolved to set aside the respondent’s decision in the
rehabilitation proceedings, it was not by reason of her ignorance of the law or abuse of
authority, but because the rehabilitation plan could no longer be implemented in view of
SCP’s financial predicament.
On the allegation of grave bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings,
Justice Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complainant failed to present any clear and
convincing proof that the respondent intentionally and deliberately acted against SCP’s
interests; the complaint merely relied on his opinions and surmises.

On the matter of the respondent’s inhibition, she noted that in cases not covered by the
rule on mandatory inhibition, the decision to inhibit lies within the discretion of the sitting
judge and is primarily a matter of conscience.

With respect to the respondent’s informal meetings, Justice Gonzales-Sison found

nothing irregular despite the out-of-court meetings as these were agreed upon by all the
parties, including SCP’s creditors. She also found satisfactory the respondent’s
explanation in approving the rehabilitation plan beyond the 180-day period prescribed
by the Rules.

The foregoing notwithstanding, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the respondent’s

unnecessary bickering with SCP’s legal counsel and ruled that her exchanges and
utterances were reflective of arrogance and superiority. In the words of the Justice
Gonzales-Sison:

Rather than rule on the manifestations of counsels, she instead brushed off the matter
with what would appear to be a conceited show of a prerogative of her office, a conduct
that falls below the standard of decorum expected of a judge. Her statements appear to
be done recklessly and were uncalled for. xxx. Section 6[,] Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that: judges shall maintain order and
decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in
relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others whom the judge deals in an official
capacity. Judicial decorum requires judges to be temperate in their language at all
times. Failure on this regard amounts to a conduct unbecoming of a judge, for which
Judge Austria should be held liable.16

On the respondent’s Friendster account, she believes that her act of maintaining a
personal social networking account (displaying photos of herself and disclosing
personal details as a magistrate in the account) – even during these changing times
when social networking websites seem to be the trend – constitutes an act of
impropriety which cannot be legally justified by the public’s acceptance of this type of
conduct. She explained that propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to
the performance of all the activities of a judge and that judges shall conduct themselves
in a manner consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

Finally, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the CA’s May 16, 2006 Decision17 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 100941 finding that the respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering
the creation of a management committee without first conducting an evidentiary hearing
in accordance with the procedures prescribed under the Rules. She ruled that such
professional incompetence was tantamount to gross ignorance of the law and
procedure, and recommended a fine of ₱20,000.00. She also recommended that the
respondent be admonished for failing to observe strict propriety and judicial decorum
required by her office.

The Action and Recommendation of the OCA

In its Memorandum18 dated September 4, 2013, the OCA recommended the following:

RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the

Honorable Court that:

1) the Report dated January 4, 2010 of Investigating Justice Marlene Gonzales-

Sison be NOTED;

2) respondent Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, Branch 2, Regional Trial Court,

Batangas City, Batangas, be found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a judge and
for violation of Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct;

3) respondent Judge Austria be FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos

(Php20,000.00); and

4) respondent Judge Austria be ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of

impropriety with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or any similar act
will be dealt with more severely.19

In arriving at its recommendation the OCA found that the respondent was not guilty of
gross ignorance of the law as the complainant failed to prove that her orders were
motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.

The OCA also found that the charges of bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation
proceedings were not supported by evidence. It accepted the respondent’s explanation
in the charge of failure to observe the reglementary period.

Lastly, the OCA maintained that the allegations of grave abuse of authority and gross
incompetence are judicial in nature, hence, they should not be the subject of disciplinary
action. On the other hand, on allegations of conduct unbecoming of a judge, violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), lack of circumspection and impropriety,
the OCA shared Justice Gonzales-Sison’s observations that the respondent’s act of
posting seductive photos in her Friendster account contravened the standard of
propriety set forth by the Code.

The Court’s Ruling

We agree with the recommendation of both Justice Gonzales-Sison and the OCA for
the imposition of a fine on the respondent but modify the amount as indicated below.
We sustain Justice Gonzales-Sison’s finding of gross ignorance of the law in so far as
the respondent ordered the creation of a management committee without conducting an
evidentiary hearing. The absence of a hearing was a matter of basic due process that
no magistrate should be forgetful or careless about.

On the Charges of Grave Abuse of Authority;

Irregularity in the Performance of Duty; Grave
Bias and Partiality; and Lack of Circumspection

It is well settled that in administrative cases, the complainant bears the onus of proving
the averments of his complaint by substantial evidence.20 In the present case, the
allegations of grave abuse of authority, irregularity in the performance of duty, grave
bias and partiality, and lack of circumspection are devoid of merit because the
complainant failed to establish the respondent’s bad faith, malice or ill will. The
complainant merely pointed to circumstances based on mere conjectures and
suppositions. These, by themselves, however, are not sufficient to prove the
accusations. "[M]ere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof." 21

"[U]nless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will,
bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice, [the] respondent judge may not be held
administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of
official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, particularly in the
adjudication of cases."22

Even granting that the respondent indeed erred in the exercise of her judicial functions,
these are, at best, legal errors correctible not by a disciplinary action, but by judicial
remedies that are readily available to the complainant. "An administrative complaint is
not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by
a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration or an
appeal."23 Errors committed by him/her in the exercise of adjudicative functions cannot
be corrected through administrative proceedings but should be assailed instead through
judicial remedies.24

On the Charges of Grave Bias and Partiality

We likewise find the allegations of bias and partiality on the part of the respondent
baseless. The truth about the respondent’s alleged partiality cannot be determined by
simply relying on the complainant’s verified complaint. Bias and prejudice cannot be
presumed, in light especially of a judge’s sacred obligation under his oath of office to
administer justice without respect to the person, and to give equal right to the poor and
rich.25 There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge; mere
suspicion of partiality is not enough.26

In the present case, aside from being speculative and judicial in character, the
circumstances cited by the complainant were grounded on mere opinion and surmises.
The complainant, too, failed to adduce proof indicating the respondent’s predisposition
to decide the case in favor of one party. This kind of evidence would have helped its
cause. The bare allegations of the complainant cannot overturn the presumption that
the respondent acted regularly and impartially. We thus conclude that due to the
complainant’s failure to establish with clear, solid, and convincing proof, the allegations
of bias and partiality must fail.

On the Charges of Grave Incompetence

and Gross Ignorance of the Law

We agree with the findings of the OCA that not every error or mistake of a judge in the
performance of his official duties renders him liable.27 "[A]s a matter of policy, in the
absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity
are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous." 28

In the present case, what was involved was the respondent’s application of Section 23,
Rule 4 of the Rules, which provides:

Sec. 23. Approval of the Rehabilitation Plan. - The court may approve a rehabilitation
plan even over the opposition of creditors holding a majority of the total liabilities of the
debtor if, in its judgment, the rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and the opposition of
the creditors is manifestly unreasonable.29

The respondent approved the rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza, subject to
the modifications she found necessary to make the plan viable. The complainant
alleged that in modifying the plan, she exceeded her authority and effectively usurped
the functions of a rehabilitation receiver. We find, however, that in failing to show that
the respondent was motivated by bad faith or ill motives in rendering the assailed
decision, the charge of gross ignorance of the law against her should be dismissed. "To
[rule] otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try
the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in
his judgment."30

To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the decision, order or
actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law
and jurisprudence. It must also be proven that he was moved by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or corruption31 or had committed an error so egregious that it amounted to
bad faith.

In the present case, nothing in the records suggests that the respondent was motivated
by bad faith, fraud, corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in rendering her decision
approving the modified rehabilitation plan. Besides his bare accusations, the
complainant failed to substantiate his allegations with competent proof. Bad faith cannot
be presumed32 and this Court cannot conclude that bad faith intervened when none was
actually proven.

With respect to the action of the respondent in ordering the creation of a management
committee without first conducting an evidentiary hearing for the purpose, however, we
find the error to be so egregious as to amount to bad faith, leading to the conclusion of
gross ignorance of the law, as charged.

Due process and fair play are basic requirements that no less than the Constitution
demands. In rehabilitation proceedings, the parties must first be given an opportunity to
prove (or disprove) the existence of an imminent danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or
destruction of the debtor-company’s assets and properties that are or may be prejudicial
to the interest of minority stockholders, parties-litigants or the general public.33 The
rehabilitation court should hear both sides, allow them to present proof and
conscientiously deliberate, based on their submissions, on whether the appointment of
a management receiver is justified. This is a very basic requirement in every adversarial
proceeding that no judge or magistrate can disregard.

In SCP’s rehabilitation proceedings, SCP was not given at all the opportunity to present
its evidence, nor to confront the EPCIB witnesses. Significantly, the CA, in its May 16,
2006 decision, found that the respondent’s act of denying SCP the opportunity to
disprove the grounds for the appointment of a management committee was tantamount
to grave abuse of discretion. As aptly observed by Justice Gonzales-Sison:

[T]he acts of the respondent judge (Judge Austria) in creating a MANCOM without
observing the procedures prescribed under the IRPGICC clearly constitute grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.34

Indeed, while a judge may not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for every
erroneous order that he renders, this does not mean that a judge need not observe due
care in the performance of his/her official functions.35 When a basic principle of law is
involved and when an error is so gross and patent, error can produce an inference of
bad faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law.36 On this basis, we
conclude that the respondent’s act of promptly ordering the creation of a management
committee, without the benefit of a hearing and despite the demand for one, was
tantamount to punishable professional incompetence and gross ignorance of the law.

On the Ground of Failure to Observe

the Reglementary Period

On the respondent’s failure to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Rules,
we find the respondent’s explanation to be satisfactory.

Section 11, Rule 4 of the previous Rules provides:

Sec. 11. Period of the Stay Order. – xxx

The petition shall be dismissed if no rehabilitation plan is approved by the court upon
the lapse of one hundred eighty (180) days from the date of the initial hearing. The court
may grant an extension beyond this period only if it appears by convincing and
compelling evidence that the debtor may successfully be rehabilitated. In no instance,
however, shall the period for approving or disapproving a rehabilitation plan exceed
eighteen (18) months from the date of filing of the petition. 37

Under this provision, the matter of who would grant the extension beyond the 180-day
period carried a good measure of ambiguity as it did not indicate with particularity
whether the rehabilitation court could act by itself or whether Supreme Court approval
was still required. Only recently was this uncertainty clarified when A.M. No. 00-8-10-
SC, the 2008 Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, took effect.

Section 12, Rule 4 of the Rules provides:

Section 12. Period to Decide Petition. - The court shall decide the petition within one (1)
year from the date of filing of the petition, unless the court, for good cause shown, is
able to secure an extension of the period from the Supreme Court. 38

Since the new Rules only took effect on January 16, 2009 (long after the respondent’s
approval of the rehabilitation plan on December 3, 2007), we find no basis to hold the
respondent liable for the extension she granted and for the consequent delay.

On the Ground of Conduct

Unbecoming of a Judge

On the allegation of conduct unbecoming of a judge, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New

Code of Judicial Conduct states that:

SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the
court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers
and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar
conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence,
direction or control.39

A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity,
independence and respect for himself/herself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole.
He must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-
restraint.40 He should choose his words and exercise more caution and control in
expressing himself. In other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. 41

As held in De la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legazpi City) v. Judge Carretas, 42 a judge

should be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court; he
should always keep his passion guarded. He can never allow it to run loose and
overcome his reason. Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the level of a
sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and
sarcastic comments.

Similarly in Attys. Guanzon and Montesino v. Judge Rufon,43 the Court declared that
"although respondent judge may attribute his intemperate language to human frailty, his
noble position in the bench nevertheless demands from him courteous speech in and
out of court.

Judges are required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and
in language."

Accordingly, the respondent’s unnecessary bickering with SCP’s legal counsel, her
expressions of exasperation over trivial procedural and negligible lapses, her snide
remarks, as well as her condescending attitude, are conduct that the Court cannot
allow. They are displays of arrogance and air of superiority that the Code abhors.

Records and transcripts of the proceedings bear out that the respondent failed to
observe judicial temperament and to conduct herself irreproachably. She also failed to
maintain the decorum required by the Code and to use temperate language befitting a
magistrate. "As a judge, [she] should ensure that [her] conduct is always above
reproach and perceived to be so by a reasonable observer. [She] must never show
conceit or even an appearance thereof, or any kind of impropriety."44

Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that
it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.

In these lights, the respondent exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge and thus
violated Section 6, Canon 6 and Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct.

On the Ground of Impropriety

We are not unaware of the increasing prevalence of social networking sites in the
Internet – a new medium through which more and more Filipinos communicate with
each other.45 While judges are not prohibited from becoming members of and from
taking part in social networking activities, we remind them that they do not thereby shed
off their status as judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the same ethical
responsibilities and duties that every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday
activities. It is in this light that we judge the respondent in the charge of impropriety
when she posted her pictures in a manner viewable by the public.

Lest this rule be misunderstood, the New Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a
judge from joining or maintaining an account in a social networking site such as
Friendster. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that
judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. This right "includes
the freedom to hold opinions without interference and impart information and ideas
through any media regardless of frontiers."46 Joining a social networking site is an
exercise of one’s freedom of expression. The respondent judge’s act of joining
Friendster is, therefore, per se not violative of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, however, also imposes a
correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they
should always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial
office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary.

This rule reflects the general principle of propriety expected of judges in all of their
activities, whether it be in the course of their judicial office or in their personal lives. In
particular, Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct prohibit
impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities:

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities.

SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal

restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do
so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

Based on this provision, we hold that the respondent disregarded the propriety and
appearance of propriety required of her when she posted Friendster photos of herself
wearing an "off-shouldered" suggestive dress and made this available for public
viewing.

To restate the rule: in communicating and socializing through social networks, judges
must bear in mind that what they communicate – regardless of whether it is a personal
matter or part of his or her judicial duties – creates and contributes to the people’s
opinion not just of the judge but of the entire Judiciary of which he or she is a part. This
is especially true when the posts the judge makes are viewable not only by his or her
family and close friends, but by acquaintances and the general public.

Thus, it may be acceptable for the respondent to show a picture of herself in the attire
she wore to her family and close friends, but when she made this picture available for
public consumption, she placed herself in a situation where she, and the status she
holds as a judge, may be the object of the public’s criticism and ridicule. The nature of
cyber communications, particularly its speedy and wide-scale character, renders this
rule necessary.

We are not also unaware that the respondent’s act of posting her photos would seem
harmless and inoffensive had this act been done by an ordinary member of the public.
As the visible personification of law and justice, however, judges are held to higher
standards of conduct and thus must accordingly comport themselves. 47

This exacting standard applies both to acts involving the judicial office and personal
matters.1âwphi1 The very nature of their functions requires behavior under exacting
standards of morality, decency and propriety; both in the performance of their duties
and their daily personal lives, they should be beyond reproach. 48 Judges necessarily
accept this standard of conduct when they take their oath of office as magistrates.

Imposable Penalty

Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,
gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge. Under Section
11(A) of the same Rule, a serious charge merits any of the following sanctions:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court
may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations; provided,
however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave
credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three
(3), but not exceeding six (6), months; or

3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00, but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.

On the other hand, conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under
Section 10, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. It is penalized under Section 11(C) thereof
by any of the following: (1) A fine of not less than ₱1,000.00 but not exceeding
₱10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and ( 4) Admonition with warning.

Judge Austria's record shows that she had never been administratively charged or
found liable for any wrongdoing in the past. Since this is her first offense, the Court finds
it fair and proper to temper the penalty for her offenses.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria guilty of GROSS
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW for which she is FINED Twenty-One Thousand Pesos
(₱21,000,00). Judge Austria is likewise hereby ADMONISHED to refrain from further
acts of IMPROPRIETY and to refrain from CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE,
with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt
with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson