SEMANTIC, PRAGMATIC
Kent Bach
The distinction between semantics and pragmatics has received a lot of bad press
in recent years. It has been claimed to be faulty, confused, or even nonexistent.
However, these claims are based on misconceptions of what the distinction is and
of what it takes to show there to be something wrong with it. As I see it, the
semantic-pragmatic distinction fundamentally concerns two types of information
associated with an utterance of a sentence. Semantic information is encoded in
the sentence; pragmatic information is generated by, or at least made relevant by,
the act of uttering the sentence. This explains the oddity of such pragmatic
contradictions as "I am not speaking" and "It is raining but I don't believe it." In
"The Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction: What It Is and Why It Matters" (Bach
1999a), I develop this conception of the distinction and contrast it with alternatives.
Here I will to try clarify that conception by showing how it avoids certain objections.
Space will not permit going into much detail on the various linguistic data and
theoretical considerations that have been thought to undermine the semantic-
pragmatic distinction in one way or another.
This information does not literally determine that content. In no case does
the semantic content of the uttered sentence determine what the speaker is
communicating or, indeed, that he is communicating anything. That he is
attempting to communicate something, and what that is, is a matter of his
communicative intention, if he has one. If he is speaking literally and means
precisely what his words mean, even that is a matter of his communicative
intention. Communicative intentions are reflexive in the sense discovered by
Grice: a communicative intention is one whose fulfillment consists in its
recognition by the audience, partly on the basis that it is intended to be
recognized. The role of Grice's maxims, or presumptions as they might better be
regarded (Bach and Harnish 1979, pp. 62-65), is to provide inference routes
across any gap between what the sentence means and what the speaker aims to
be communicating in uttering it.
Now let us consider some reasons that might be suggested for rejecting the
semantic-pragmatic distinction. To the extent that the debate about it isn't entirely
terminological (e.g., many years ago "pragmatics" was the name for indexical
semantics), the main substantive matter of dispute is whether there is such a thing
as "pragmatic intrusion," whereby pragmatic factors allegedly contribute to semantic
interpretation. Here is an assortment of objections that are based on supposed
pragmatic intrusion of one sort or another. Each of these objections is predicated on
some misconception, as the responses indicate.
2. There are aspects of linguistic meaning that concern how a sentence is used,
not its truth-conditional content. So linguistic meaning is not merely a semantic
matter.
This objection alludes to the fact that the meanings of certain expressions, what I
call "utterance modifiers," such as "to conclude," "frankly," and "to be precise" (for a
catalog of them see Bach 1999b, sec. 5), as well as grammatical mood, concern
how a sentence is being used. However, all this shows is that semantics is not limited
to what is relevant to truth-conditional content. There is no reason to assume that
the linguistic meaning of a sentence cannot include information pertaining to how the
sentence is used.
These phenomena show only that sometimes the literal meaning of a sentence does
not determine a complete proposition or a precise proposition. They do not show
that there is no purely linguistic information on which language users rely. Take the
case of semantically underdeterminate sentences, which do not express complete
propositions, even modulo ambiguity and indexicality. Even though the following
sentences do not express complete propositions,
they still have determinate semantic contents. However, these are not complete
propositions. The semantics of (1) does not specify what Muggsy is too short or not
tall enough for, and the semantics of the sentences in (2) do not specify whether
Kurt finished painting, writing, reading or, for that matter, eating. However, what the
speaker means must include some such thing. So the completion of what the
speaker means involves the insertion of something that does not correspond to any
constituent of the sentence. This does not show that there is something wrong with
the semantic-pragmatic distinction but only that utterancs of semantically incomplete
sentences require pragmatic supplementation.
4. There are many sentences whose typical use is not what, according to the
compositional semantics of the sentence, the sentence means. Therefore,
pragmatic information somehow blends into semantic information.
(3) is likely to be used to assert that Jack and Jill went up the hill together and (4)
that they are married to each other, even though this is not predictable from the
meanings of the sentences. Nothing adverse to the semantic-pragmatic distinction
follows from this, however. These examples show merely that some sentences are
typically not used to mean what the sentences themselves mean. This is clear from
the fact that the analogous uses are not typical for sentences like (3') and (4'),
(3') Jack and Jill went up the hill separately/on different days.
5. There are certain expressions that are generally not used strictly and literally,
such as "empty," "everybody," and "circular". Therefore, their semantics does
not determine how they are standardly used and pragmatics enters in.
This is also true, but the existence of a distinction between semantics and
pragmatics does not imply or even suggest that expressions must standardly be
used literally. There may be a presumption of literality, but this presumption can
easily be overridden, especially with words like the ones above.
6. There are certain expressions that have a range of related meanings but are
neither clearly ambiguous nor clearly unambiguous. What such an expression
can be used to mean is always partly a pragmatic matter.
This idea is a definite improvement over the view that the words "go," "from,"
and "to" are used literally only in (5a), which involves movement from one place
to another, and that their uses in the other sentences are in various ways
"extended," hence nonliteral uses. However, it does not follow that pragmatics
intrudes on semantics. The existence of these various uses shows merely that the
meanings of such polysemous terms are more abstract than the movement model
would suggest (for further discussion see Bach 1994, sec. 7).
7. There are certain complex expressions whose meanings are not predictable
from the meanings of their constituents. Therefore, pragmatics impinges upon
semantics.
It is true that the meanings of phrases and compounds like the following are not
predictable, or at least not obviously predictable, from the meanings of their
constituents:
(6) a. sad girl
b. sad face
c. sad day
d. sad music
b. drug abuse
b. jury nullification
b. snow skiing
c. heliocopter skiing
b. goldfish
c. catfish
(11) a. clipboard
b. diving board
c. bread board
d. game board
e. headboard
These "intuitions" are not necessarily about what is said (see Bach 1994 and
"Seemingly Semantic Intuitions," this volume). They arise when one ignores the
distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts or assumes that the distinction
between what is explicit in an utterance and what is implicated by it is exhaustive.
Intuitions that are adverse to the semantic-pragmatic distinction are insensitive to
the in-between category of what is implicit in what is said (more accurately, in the
saying of it), and mistakenly include that in what is said. The same mistake is implicit
in relevance theorists' use of the term "explicature" for aspects of utterance content
that are not explicit and in the description of the entire content as "explicit."
9. The strict and literal semantic content of a sentence is often not calculated prior
to the hearer's determination of the content of a speaker's utterance. Therefore,
even if there is a theoretical role to the notion of semantic content, it has no
psychological import, hence no empirical significance.
Facts about "pragmatic processing" are not relevant to the semantic-pragmatic
distinction. They are often cited in support of claims about what is and what isn't
said and even used to argue that there are pragmatic elements in what is said.
However, nothing follows from such facts about what is or isn't said, since that's
a matter of what a speaker does in uttering a sentence, not what his listeners do
in understanding it. Moreover, the psychologically relevant category, if there is
one, is information that is available to pragmatic processing, not what goes on in
the processing itself.
Grice, Paul (1989), Studies in the Way of Words, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.