JACKBILT INDUSTRIES, INC.
VS JACKBILT EMPLOYEES WORKERS UNION- practice and, consequently, was ordered to pay respondent’s officers and
NAFLU-KMU [G.R. Nos. 171618-19, March 20, 2009]
F: Due to the adverse effects of the Asian economic crisis on the construction
industry beginning 1997, petitioner decided to temporarily stop its business
of producing concrete hollow blocks, compelling most of its employees to
go on leave for six months. Respondent immediately protested the
temporary shutdown. Because its CBA with petitioner was expiring during
the period of the shutdown, respondent claimed that petitioner halted
production to avoid its duty to bargain collectively. The shutdown was
allegedly motivated by anti-union sentiments. Respondent went on strike.
Its officers and members picketed petitioner’s main gates and deliberately
prevented persons and vehicles from going into and out of the
compound. Petitioner filed a petition for injunction with a prayer for the
issuance of a TRO in the NLRC. It sought to enjoin respondent from
obstructing free entry to and exit from its production facility.
Upon petition by the petitioner, NLRC issued a TRO directing the
respondents to refrain from preventing access to petitioner’s property;
however, respondent union violated the order. Thus, petitioner dismissed
the concerned officers and members and barred them from entering its
premises. Respondent then filed complaints for illegal lockout, runaway
shop and damages, unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal and attorney’s
fees, and refusal to bargain on behalf of its officers and members against
petitioner and its corporate officers.
In a decision, the labor arbiter dismissed the complaints for illegal lockout
and unfair labor practice for lack of merit. However, because petitioner did
not file a petition to declare the strike illegal before terminating
respondent’s officers and employees, it was found guilty of illegal dismissal.
Petitioner then assailed the decision of the NLRC before the Court of
Appeals, whereby, the appellate court dismissed the petition but modified
the decision of the NLRC. Petitioner was therefore guilty of unfair labor
employees’ backwages. Thus, this recourse.
ISSUE: WON the filing of a petition with the LA to declare a strike illegal is a
condition sine qua non for the valid termination of employees who commit
an illegal act in thecourse of such strike.
H: NO. The Court finds merit with the assertion of the Petitioner that the
filing of a petition to declare the strike illegal was unnecessary since the
NLRC had already found that respondent committed illegal acts in the course
of the strike. Article 264(e) of the Labor Code prohibits any person engaged
in picketing from obstructing the free ingress to and egress from the
employer’s premises. Since respondent was found in the NLRC decision to
have prevented the free entry into and exit of vehicles from petitioner’s
compound, respondent’s officers and employees clearly committed illegal
acts in the course of the strike. The use of unlawful means in the course of
a strike renders such strike illegal. Therefore, pursuant to the principle of
conclusiveness of judgment , the strike was ipso facto illegal. The filing of a
petition to declare the strike illegal was thus unnecessary. Petitioner clearly
had the legal right to terminate respondents’ officers and employees.
EDEN GLADYS ABARIA, ET AL VS NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, ET AL. [G.R. No. 154113, DECEMBER 7, 2011]
F: Metro Cebu Community Hospital, Inc. (MCCHI), presently known as the
Visayas Community Medical Center (VCMC), is a non-stock, non-profit
corporation organized under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. It
operates the Metro Cebu Community Hospital (MCCH), a tertiary medical
institution located at Osmea Boulevard, Cebu City. MCCH is owned by the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP) and Rev. Gregorio P. Iyoy
is the Hospital Administrator. The National Federation of Labor (NFL) is the
exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of
MCCHI. In 1995, since the CBA was about to expire NAVA wrote the
administrator of MCCHI, REV. IYOY, expressing the UNION’s desire to renew
the CBA, attaching to her letter a statement of proposals signed/endorsed
by 153 union members.
Before responding to NAVA, MCCHI first checked with Atty. Alforque as NFL
representative whether NFL endorses NAVA’s proposal. MCCHI found out
from Atty. Alforque that the proposed CBA submitted by NAVA was never
referred to NFL and that NFL has not authorized any other legal counsel or
any person for collective bargaining negotiations. Atty. Alforque
communicated with NAVA and other UNION officers that they were
suspended from the union membership for serious violation of the CBL of
NFL. The letter revealed that NAVA and other UNION officers of the local
chapter openly declared during a General Membership Meeting of the
Union that they submit to the authority of another union — KMU and no
longer to NFL. The next day, several union members led by NAVA and her
group launched a series of mass actions such as wearing black and red
armbands/headbands, marching around the hospital premises and putting
up placards, posters and streamers. NFL disowned the concerted activities.
On March 13 and 19, 1996, the DOLE Regional Office issued certifications
stating that there is nothing in their records which shows that NAMA-MCCH-
NFL is a registered labor organization, and that said union submitted only a
copy of its Charter Certificate on January 31, 1995.
ISSUE: WON MCCHI is guilty of unfair labor practice? [NO ULP]
H: Records of the NCMB and DOLE Region 7 confirmed that NAMA-MCCH-
NFL had not registered as a labor organization, having submitted only its
charter certificate as an affiliate or local chapter of NFL. Not being a
legitimate labor organization, NAMA-MCCH-NFL is not entitled to those
rights granted to a legitimate labor organization under Art. 242. Aside from
the registration requirement, it is only the labor organization designated or
selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate collective
bargaining unit which is the exclusive representative of the employees in
such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining, as provided in Art. 255.
NAMA-MCCH-NFL is not the labor organization certified or designated by
the majority of the rank-and-file hospital employees to represent them in
the CBA negotiations but the NFL, as evidenced by CBAs concluded in 1987,
1991 and 1994. To prove majority support of the employees, NAMA-MCCH-
NFL presented the CBA proposal allegedly signed by 153 union members.
However, the petition signed by said members showed that the signatories
endorsed the proposed terms and conditions without stating that they were
likewise voting for or designating the NAMA-MCCH-NFL as their exclusive
bargaining representative.
VISAYAS COMMUNITY MEDICAL CENTER (VCMC) vs ERMA YBALLE, ET AL
[G.R. No. 196156, January 15, 2014]
F: Respondents were hired as staff nurses (Ong and Angel) and midwives
(Yballe and Cortez) by petitioner Visayas Community Medical Center
(VCMC), formerly the Metro Cebu Community Hospital, Inc. (MCCHI). MCCHI
is a non-stock, non-profit corporation which operates the Metro Cebu
Community Hospital (MCCH), a tertiary medical institution owned by the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP). The NFL is the exclusive
bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of MCCH (now
VCMC). NAMA-MCCH-NFL is a local affiliate whose union leaders proceeded
to strike despite the fact that it is not a legitimate labor organization. The
respondents in this case are staff nurses and midwives of MCH who actively
joined and were believed to have took part in committing illegal acts during
the strike. Consequently, MCCH terminated the union leaders of NAMA-
MCCH-NFL as well as the respondents. The CA, however, found that
respondents cannot be considered to have committed illegal acts since their
participation was limited to the wearing of arm bands.
ISSUES: (1) WON the dismissal of the respondents is valid; (2) WON the
respondents are entitled to backwages
H: [1] NO. Article 263 (a) (par 3) provides that any union any union officer
who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union
officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a
strike may be declared to have lost his employment status. In the case at
bar, the respondents merely participated in the illegal strike but did not
commit any of the illegal acts. Hence, their termination is not valid.
[2] NO. The the principle of a "fair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor" remains
as the basic factor in determining the award thereof. If there is no work
performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay unless, of course,
the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out,
suspended or dismissed or otherwise illegally prevented from working. For
this exception to apply, it is required that the strike be legal. Since the strike
in the case at bar was illegal, the respondents cannot be awarded with
backwages.
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY vs DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION (DLSUEA-NAFTEU) [G.R. No. 169254, August 23, 2012]
F: On May 30, 2000, some of respondent’s members headed by Belen
Aliazas (the Aliazas faction) filed a petition for the election of union officers
in the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR).They alleged therein that there has
been no election for respondent’s officers since 1992 in supposed violation
of the respondent union’s constitution and by-laws which provided for an
election of officers every three years.It would appear that respondent’s
members repeatedly voted to approve the hold-over of the previously
elected officers led by Baylon R. Bañez (Bañez faction). BLR Regional Director
Alex E. Maraan issued a Decision ordering the conduct of an election of
union officers to be presided by the Labor Relations Division of the DOLE-
NCR. He noted therein that the members of the Bañez faction were not
elected by the general membership but were appointed by the Executive
Board to their positions since 1985 therefore in a hold-over capacity. Relyin
on this, DLSU said that there is a conclusion of fact that there is an absolute
void in the leadership of [respondent]. Furthermore, normal relations with
the union cannot occur until the said void in the leadership of [respondent]
is appropriately filled. Affected by the temporary suspension of normal
relations with [respondent] is the renegotiation of the economic provisions
of the 2002-2005 CBA. No renegotiation can occur given the void in the
leadership of [respondent.] That the decision of the BLR Director cannot be
be construed as an automatic termination of the incumbent officers’ tenure
of office.
ISSUE: WON an employer is guilty of ULP when it refuses to bargain
considering the intra union dispute concerning the election of officers, is not
yet settled.
H: YES. In the case at bar, the SC affirmed the decision of the SOLE which
said that the University is guilty of refusal to bargain amounting to an ULP
under Article 248 (g) of the Labor Code. Indeed there was a requirement on
both parties of the performance of the mutual obligation to meet and
convene promptly and expeditiously is good faith for the purpose of
negotiating an agreement.
Such an act constituted an intentional avoidance of a duty imposed by law.
There was nothing in the order of Director Maraan and Cacdac which
restrained or enjoined compliance by the parties with their obligations
under the CBA and under the law. The issue of union leadership is distinct
and separate from the duty to bargain. Anent the so called void in the Union
leadership, we declared that the same does not constitute a valid ground to
refuse to negotiate because [petitioner’s] duty to bargain under the law is
due and demandable under the law by [respondent] as a whole and not by
any faction within the union. Besides, it was clarified that there was no void
in the leadership in the first place. Furthermore, when Bañez faction won
the election eventually, still, the petitioner refused.
GENERAL SANTOS COCA-COLA PLANT FREE WORKERS UNION-TUPAS vs
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC. (GENERAL SANTOS CITY), ET AL [G.R.
No. 178647, FEBRUARY 13, 2009]
F: Respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Phil., Inc. (CCBPI) experienced a significant
decline in profitability due to the Asian economic crisis, thus to curb the
negative effects on the company, it implemented three (3) waves of an Early
Retirement Program. An inter-office memorandum was also issued
mandating to put on hold “all requests for hiring to fill in vacancies in both
regular and temporary positions in [the] Head Office and in the Plants.”
Faced with the “freeze hiring” directive, CCBPI Gen San engaged the services
of JLBP Services Corporation (JLBP), a manning agency. Petitioner then filed
with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a Notice of
Strike on the ground of alleged unfair labor practice committed by CCBPI
Gen San for contracting-out services regularly performed by union
members.
In a Resolution, the NLRC ruled that CCBPI was not guilty of unfair labor
practice for contracting out jobs to JLBP. The NLRC held that petitioner failed
to prove by substantial evidence that the system was meant to curtail the
right to self-organization of petitioner’s members. Petitioner filed a Petition
for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA uphold the NLRC’s finding
that CCBPI was not guilty of unfair labor practice. It held that the contract
between CCBPI and JLBP did not amount to labor-only contracting. It found
that JLBP was an independent contractor and that the decision to contract
out jobs was a valid exercise of management prerogative to meet exigent
circumstances. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE: WON CCBPI’s contracting-out of jobs to JLBP amounted to unfair
labor practice, and whether such action was a valid exercise of management
prerogative, call for a re-examination of evidence, which is not within the
ambit of this Court’s jurisdiction.
H: The petition is bereft of merit. Hence, the Court denies the Petition. The
CA squarely addressed the issue of job contracting in its assailed Decision
and Resolution. The CA itself examined the facts and evidence of the parties
and found that, based on the evidence, CCBPI did not engage in labor-only
contracting and, therefore, was not guilty of unfair labor practice. The NLRC
found – and the same was sustained by the CA – that the company’s action
to contract-out the services and functions performed by Union members did
not constitute unfair labor practice as this was not directed at the members’
right to self-organization. Both the NLRC and the CA found that petitioner
was unable to prove its charge of unfair labor practice. It was the Union that
had the burden of adducing substantial evidence to support its allegations
of unfair labor practice,17 which burden it failed to discharge. WHEREFORE,
the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS (NFSW) vs ETHELWOLDO R.
OVEJERA, ET AL [G.R. NO.L-59743, May 31 1982]
F: Petitioner NSFW (bargaining agent of the rank and file) and
respondent company (CAC) entered into a collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) wherein parties agreed to maintain the present practice on the
grant of Christmas bonus, milling bonus and amelioration
(improvement) bonus. On Nov. 30, 1981, petitioner and respondent entered
into a compromise agreement two days after the strike to compel
payment of the 13th month pay, agreeing to abide by the final decision
of the Supreme Court in any case involving the 13th month pay if it clearly
held that the employer is liable to pay the same separate and distinct
from the bonuses already given. Meanwhile, G.R. No. 51254, Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Marcopper Mining Corporation which
sought to annul the decision of the Labor Deputy Minister granting the
13th month pay to its employees in addition to mid-year and Christmas
bonuses under a CBA was dismissed on June 11, 1981 and became
final and executory on December 18, 1981. On January 22, 1982, NFSW
filed with the MOLE a notice to strike based on non-payment of the
13th month pay. Six days after, NFSW commenced a strike. One day after
the commencement of the strike, or on January 29, 1982, a report of the
strike-vote was filed by NFSW with MOLE. CAC filed a petition the Regional
Arbitration Branch, MOLE to declare the strike illegal, principally for being
violative of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, that is,the strike was declared
before the expiration of the 15-day cooling-off period for ULP strikes,
and the strike was staged before the lapse of seven days from the
submission to MOLE of the result of the strike-vote.Labor Arbiter Ovejera
declared the NFSW strike illegal. CAC filed for a restraining order for the
enforcement of the of LA’s decision. No restraining order was issued.
ISSUE: WON he strike declared by NFSW is illegal
H: The SC, in affirming the decision of the deputy of labor minister, ruled
that the failure of the NFSW to abide with the mandatory cooling-off
period and the 7 day strike ban made the strike illegal and the NFSW
cannot insist on its claim that its members are entitled to a 13th
month pay in addition to the bonuses already paid by CAC. Language of
the law. —The foregoing provisions hardly leave any room for doubt
that the cooling-off period in Art. 264(c) and the 7-day strike ban after
the strike-vote report prescribed in Art. 264(f) were meant to be, and
should be deemed, mandatory. When the law says "the labor union may
strike" should the dispute "remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite
number of days (cooling-off period) from the mandatory filing of the
notice," the unmistakable implication is that the union may not strike before
the lapse of the cooling-off period. Similarly, the mandatory character
of the 7-day strike ban after the report on the strike-vote is manifest in
the provision that "in every case," the union shall furnish the MOLE
with the results of the voting "at least seven (7) days before the intended
strike, subject to the (prescribed) cooling-off period." It must be stressed
that the requirements of cooling-off period and 7-day strike ban must
both be complied with, although the labor union may take a strike vote
and report the same within the statutory cooling-off period.
CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER, INC. vs NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, ET AL [G.R. No. 147080, April 26, 2005]
F: The petitioner’s refusal to negotiate for a collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) resulted in a union-led strike. The Sec. of Labor and Employment
rendered a decision directing the management of the Capitol Medical
Center to negotiate a CBA with the Capitol Medical Center Employees
Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers, the certified bargaining agent of
the rank-and-file employees. Pursuant thereto, the Union requested for a
meeting to discuss matters pertaining to a negotiation for a CBA but was
refused. Instead of filing a motion with the SOLE for the enforcement of the
resolutions of Undersecretary Laguesma as affirmed by this Court, the Union
filed a Notice of Strike on October 29, 1997 with the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board (NCMB), serving a copy thereof to the petitioner. The
Union alleged as grounds for the projected strike the following acts of the
petitioner: (a) refusal to bargain; (b) coercion on employees; and (c)
interference/ restraint to self-organization. Petitioner asserted that the
strike was illegal that no voting had taken place on November 10, 1997;
moreover, no notice of such voting was furnished to the NCMB at least
twenty-four (24) hours prior to the intended holding of the strike vote.
ISSUE: WON the strike was valid
H: NO. A union is mandated to notify the NCMB of an impending dispute in
a particular bargaining unit via a notice of strike. Thereafter, the NCMB,
through its conciliator-mediators, shall call the parties to a conference at the
soonest possible time in order to actively assist them in exploring all
possibilities for amicable settlement. In the event of the failure in the
conciliation/mediation proceedings, the parties shall be encouraged to
submit their dispute for voluntary arbitration. However, if the parties refuse,
the union may hold a strike vote, and if the requisite number of votes is
obtained, a strike may ensue. The purpose of the strike vote is to ensure that
the decision to strike broadly rests with the majority of the union members
in general and not with a mere minority, and at the same time, discourage
wildcat strikes, union bossism and even corruption. A strike vote report
submitted to the NCMB at least seven days prior to the intended date of
strike ensures that a strike vote was, indeed, taken. In the event that the
report is false, the seven-day period affords the members an opportunity to
take the appropriate remedy before it is too late. The 15 to 30 day cooling-
off period is designed to afford the parties the opportunity to amicably
resolve the dispute with the assistance of the NCMB conciliator/mediator,
while the seven-day strike ban is intended to give the DOLE an opportunity
to verify whether the projected strike really carries the imprimatur of the
majority of the union members.
TANDUAY DISTILLERY LABOR UNION vs NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, ET AL [G.R. No. 75037, April 30, 1987]
F: Private respondents were all employees of Tanduay Distillery, Inc., (TDI)
and members of the Tanduay Distillery Labor Union (TDLU), a duly organized
and registered labor organization and the exclusive bargaining agent of the
rank and file employees of the petitioner company. A Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA), was executed between TDI and TDLU. The CBA was duly
ratified by a majority of the workers in TDI including herein private
respondents and contained a union security clause which provides that “all
workers who are or may during the effectivity of the CBA, become members
of the Union in accordance with its Constitution and By-Laws shall, as a
condition of their continued employment, maintain membership in good
standing in the Union for the duration of the agreement.” While the CBA
was in effect and within the contract bar period the private respondents
joined another union, the Kaisahan Ng Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMPIL)
and organized its local chapter in TDI. KAMPIL filed a petition for certification
election to determine union representation in TDI, which development
compelled TDI to file a grievance with TDLU. TDLU created a committee to
investigate its erring members in accordance with its by-laws which are not
disputed by the private respondents. Thereafter, TDLU, through the
Investigating Committee and approved by TDLU's Board of Directors,
expelled the private respondents from TDLU for disloyalty to the Union. By
letter, TDLU notified TDI that private respondents had been expelled from
TDLU and demanded that TDI terminate the employment of private,
respondents because they had lost their membership with TDLU. The private
respondents were later on terminated. In their petition, private respondents
contend that their act of organizing a local chapter of KAMPIL and eventual
filing of a petition for certification election was pursuant to their
constitutional right to self-organization.
ISSUE: WON TDI was justified in terminating private respondents'
employment in the company on the basis of TDLU's demand for the
enforcement of the Union Security Clause of the CBA between TDI and TDLU
H: Article 249 (e) of the Labor Code as amended specifically recognizes the
closed shop arrangement as a form of union security. The closed shop, the
union shop, the maintenance of membership shop, the preferential shop,
the maintenance of treasury shop, and check-off provisions are valid forms
of union security and strength. They do not constitute unfair labor practice
nor are they violations of the freedom of association clause of the
Constitution. There is no showing in these petitions of any arbitrariness or a
violation of the safeguards enunciated in the decisions of this Court
interpreting union security arrangements brought to us for review. The
action of the respondent company in enforcing the terms of the closed-shop
agreement is a valid exercise of its rights and obligations under the contract.
The dismissal by virtue thereof cannot constitute an unfair labor practice, as
it was in pursuance of an agreement that has been found to be regular and
of a closed-shop agreement which under our laws is valid and binding.
Neither their ignorance of, nor their dissatisfaction with, its terms and
condition would justify breach thereof or the formation by them of a union
of their own.
NATIONAL BREWERY vs SAN MIGUEL BREWERY [G.R. No. L-18170,
AUGUST 31, 1963]
F: Appellant National Brewery & Allied Industries Labor Union of the
Philippines is the bargaining representative of all regular workers paid on
the daily basis and of route helpers of San Miguel Brewery, Inc. On October
2, 1959, it signed a collective bargaining agreement with the company.
Alleging that it had obtained benefits for all workers in the company and
that "defendant Independent S.M.B. Workers' Association refused and still
refuses to pay UNION AGENCY FEE to the plaintiff UNION and defendant
COMPANY also refuses and still refuses to deduct the UNION AGENCY FEE
from the wages of workers who are not members of the plaintiff UNION and
remit the same to the latter," the union brought suit in the Court of First
Instance of Manila on November 17, 1960 for the collection of union agency
fees under the bargaining contract. The lower court, in dismissing the
complaint, held that there was nothing in the Industrial Peace Act (Republic
Act No. 875) which would authorize the collection of agency fees and that
neither may such collection be justified under the rules of quasi contract
because the workers had not neglected their business so as to warrant the
intervention of an officious manager. The trial court also held the rules of
agency inapplicable because there was no agreement between the union
and the workers belonging to the other union as to the payment of fee nor
was there, said the court, any allegation in the complaint that the amount
of P4.00, which the union sought to collect from each employee, was the
expense incurred by the union in representing him. Its motion for
reconsideration having been denied, the union appealed to this Court.
ISSUE: WON such an agreement is a permissible form of union security
under Section 4(a) (4) as contended by the union.
H: In the case of General Motors Corp., 130 NLRB 481, the National Labor
Relations Board was faced with a similar question. In that case, the union
proposed to the company that employees represented by it and new
employees hired thereafter be required as a condition of continued
employment after 30 days following the date of the supplementary
agreement or of their initial employment (whichever was later) to pay to the
union a sum equal to the initiation fee and a monthly sum equal to the
regular dues required of union members at each location. The company
contended that the clause was illegal under Section 7 and Section 8 (a) (1)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.
In upholding the company's contention, the Board held that any union-
security agreement, including one providing" for an agency shop, necessarily
interferes with the Section 7 right of employees to refrain from assisting a
labor organization, and encourages membership in a labor organization.
Such an agreement is therefore clearly unlawful under Section 8 (a) (1) and
(3), unless it is saved by the proviso to Section 8(a) (3) of the Act. That
proviso permits an employer to make an agreement with a labor
organization 'to require as a condition of employment membership therein
on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or
the effective date of such agreement, whichever is later. There is, however,
no other provision in the Act which specifically legalizes the interference and
encouragement inherent in an agency-shop arrangement, and the only
question here is whether such an arrangement can be lawful under the
National Labor Relations Act in a State like Indiana, where it is clear that an
agresment requiring literal membership is prohibited by State lav. To hold
the agency shop lawful, one would have to conclude that Congress intended
the word 'membership' an Section 7 and 8 (a) (3) to encompass not only
literal membership, but also other relationships between employees and
the union in the picture, while at the same time intending that the same
word in Section 14 (b) encompass only literal membership; or further, that
Congress intended the word 'membership' to mean one thing in Indiana and
a different thing somewhere else. Such reasoning I am not prepared to
accept. Thus, the conclusion is inescapable that an agency-shop
arrangement, whatever its status under Indiana law, cannot be lawful under
National Labor Relations Act in a State like Indiana where employment
cannot lawfully be conditioned on literal membership.
Lastly, it is contended that the collection of agency fee may be justified on
the principle of agency. In answer to this point, it may be stated that when
a union acts as the bargaining agent, it assumes the responsibility imposed
upon it by law to represent not only its members but all employees in the
appropriate bargaining unit of which it is the agent. The Civil Code states
that agency is presumed to be for compensation unless there is proof to the
contrary. (Art. 1875). There can be no better proof that the agency created
by law between the bargaining representative and the employees in the unit
is without compensation than the fact that these employees in the minority
voted against the appellant union.
——————————————————————————————
DAVAO INTEGRATED PORT STEVEDORING SERVICES vs
RUBEN V. ABARQUEZ [G.R. NO. 102132, MARCH 19, 1993]
F: Petitioner and private respondent, THE ASSOCIATION OF TRADE
UNIONS (ATU-TUCP), entered into a CBA providing for 2 sections on
sick leave with pay benefits which apply to both the regular non-
intermittent workers or those workers who render a daily eight-hour
service to the company as governed by Section 1, Article VIII of the
1989 CBA, and the intermittent field workers who are members of the
regular labor pool and the present regular extra labor pool, as
governed by Sec. 3 thereof. Sec. 1, however, of said CBA had a
proviso that only those regular workers of the company whose work
are not intermittent, are entitled to the commutation of sick leave
privilege. A proviso not found in Sec. 3. Sick leave benefits, like other
economic benefits stipulated in the CBA such as maternity leave and
vacation leave benefits, among others, are by their nature, intended to
be replacements for regular income which otherwise would not be
earned because an employee is not working during the period of said
leaves. They are non-contributory in nature, in the sense that the
employees contribute nothing to the operation of the benefits. By their
nature, upon agreement of the parties, they are intended to alleviate
the economic condition of the workers. This caused the new assistant
manager to discontinue the commutation of the unenjoyed portion of
the sick leave with pay benefits of the intermittent workers or its
conversion to cash. The Union objected and brought the matter for
voluntary arbitration before the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board with respondent Abarquez acting as voluntary arbitrator who
later issued an award in favor of the Union. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: WON intermittent(irregular) workers are entitled to
commutation of their unenjoyed sick leave with pay benefits.
H: YES. The CBA has two (2) sections on sick leave with pay benefits
which apply to two (2) distinct classes of workers in petitioner’s
company, namely: (1) the regular non-intermittent workers or those
Commented [1]:
workers who render a daily eight-hour service to the company and (2)
intermittent field workers who are members of the regular labor pool
and the present regular extra labor pool. Sick leave benefits, like other
economic benefits stipulated in the CBA such as maternity leave and
vacation leave benefits, among others, are by their nature, intended to
be replacements for regular income which otherwise would not be
earned because an employee is not working during the period of said
leaves. They are non-contributory in nature, in the sense that the
employees contribute nothing to the operation of the benefits. By their
nature, upon agreement of the parties, they are intended to alleviate
the economic condition of the workers.