A.C. No. 5305 March 17, 2003 5.
2003 5. Membership in several sensitive LWUA committees such as the Prequalification, Bids, and
MARCIANO P. BRION, JR., petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
In this petition for disbarment, complainant Marciano Brion, Jr., charges the respondent, Atty.
Francisco Brillantes, Jr., of having willfully violated a lawful order of this Court in A.M. No. MTJ-
92-706, entitled Lupo Almodiel Atienza v. Judge Francisco F. Brillantes, Jr.1 The decretal portion
of our resolution in Atienza reads:
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and
retirement benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality or
agency of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations. This
decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.2
Respondent’s dismissal in the aforesaid case was ordered after he was found guilty of Gross
Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety during his incumbency as presiding judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.
Petitioner now avers that respondent violated our decree of perpetual disqualification
imposed upon him from assuming any post in government service, including any posts in
government-owned and controlled corporations, when he accepted a legal consultancy post
at the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), from 1998 to 2000. Said consultancy
included an appointment by LWUA as 6th member of the Board of Directors of the Urdaneta
(Pangasinan) Water District. Upon expiration of the legal consultancy agreement, this was
subsequently renewed as a Special Consultancy Agreement.
Petitioner contends that while both consultancy agreements contained a proviso to the effect
that nothing therein should be construed as establishing an employer-employee relationship
between LWUA and respondent, the inclusion of this proviso was only a ploy to circumvent
our order barring respondent from appointment to a government agency. Petitioner points
out in reality, respondent enjoys the same rights and privileges as a regular employee, to wit:3
1. Issuance of LWUA properties such as a cellular phone with accessories, as evidenced by the
covering Property Issue Slips with respondent signing as "Accountable Employee"; 4
2. Official travel to various places in the country as shown by Reports of Authorized Travel kept
by LWUA’s General Services Division5 and Report of Travel accomplished by respondent
himself;6
3. Designation as supervising officer over other LWUA employees as brought to light by written
instructions personally signed by respondent;7
4. Attendance in water district conventions and meetings held in various provinces;8
Awards Committee (PBAC), Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Committee, among others, with
receipt of corresponding honoraria as borne out by various Disbursement Vouchers;9
6. Sitting at meetings of the LWUA Board of Trustees as evidenced by the minutes of such
meetings;10 and
7. Receipt of Productivity Incentive Bonus in 1999.
Petitioner submits that all of the foregoing constitute deceitful conduct, gross misconduct, and
willful disobedience to a decree of this Court, and show that respondent is unfit to be a
member of the Bar.
In his comment,11 respondent admits the existence of the Legal Consultancy Contract as well
as the Special Consultancy Contract. However, he raises the affirmative defense that under
Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1993, services rendered
pursuant to a consultancy contract shall not be considered government services, and
therefore, are not covered by Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.
Further, says respondent, according to the same Memorandum Circular issued by the
Commission, consultancy contracts do not have to be submitted to the Commission for
approval. With respect to his designation as the 6th Member of the Board of Directors of the
Urdaneta Water District, respondent reasons out that the same is not a "reappointment",
which is prohibited by our ruling in Atienza, as said designation is not an organic appointment
to a LWUA plantilla position. Hence, according to respondent, the CSC need not pass approval
upon his temporary designation.
Respondent also argues that all the members of the Urdaneta Water District Board, especially
the 6th Member, who comes from the LWUA, assumed such functions merely by virtue of a
designation and only in addition to their regular duties. In any event, says respondent, his
designation as 6th Member was revoked in April 2000 and the Special Consultancy Contract
was pre-terminated on April 30, 2000. It has never been renewed since then. With respect to
his use of LWUA properties, respondent admits receiving the cellular phone unit but insists
that he merely borrowed it from one Solomon Badoy, a former LWUA Board of Trustees
Member.
In our Resolution of February 19, 2001, we referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline found that respondent willfully violated a lawful order of this Court and
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year and
fined ten thousand (P10,000) pesos.
There is no question that the LWUA is a government-owned and controlled corporation,
created by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 198.12 As such, our ruling in the Atienza case, A.M.
No. MTJ-92-706, which categorically prohibits respondent’s appointment to any position in
any government-owned and controlled corporation, clearly encompasses and extends to
LWUA positions.
In the instant case the respondent does not deny the petitioner’s allegations.13 Instead, he
offers the existence of Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1993 (MC No. 27, s. 1993) to
exculpate himself from the charge against him. However, it does not escape our attention that
the very Memorandum Circular that respondent cites before this Court provides that the
duties enumerated in the consultancy contract are mainly advisory in nature. 14
Without belaboring the definition of "advisory,"15 it appears obvious to us that the tasks and
duties that respondent performed pursuant to the consultancy contract cannot, by any stretch
of imagination, be deemed merely advisory in nature.
An adviser does not exercise supervisory powers over LWUA employees nor does he issue
written instructions to them. An adviser is not entitled to a seat in such vital LWUA committees
like PBAC and the BOT Committee. Also, respondent’s continuous receipt of honoraria for
sitting as a member of certain LWUA Committees, particularly the BOT Committee, belies his
claim that he is a mere consultant for the LWUA. The evidence on record clearly shows that
the LWUA Office Order implementing National Compensation Circular No. 75-9516 refers to
payments of honoraria to officials/employees in consideration of services rendered.
Most telling, in our view, is respondent’s acceptance of his 1998 Productivity Incentive Bonus
(PIB). The Board of Trustees Resolution No. 26, Series of 1999, of the LWUA,17 which governed
the release of the PIB, limited the entitlement to said bonus only to "officials" and "employees"
(permanent, temporary, casual, or contractual) of LWUA.
In sum, we find that for all intents and purposes, respondent performed duties and functions
of a non-advisory nature, which pertain to a contractual employee of LWUA. As stated by
petitioner in his reply,18 there is a difference between a consultant hired on a contractual basis
(which is governed by CSC M.C. No. 27, s. 1993) and a contractual employee (whose
appointment is governed, among others, by the CSC Omnibus Rules on Appointment and other
Personnel Actions). By performing duties and functions, which clearly pertain to a contractual
employee, albeit in the guise of an advisor or consultant, respondent has transgressed both
letter and spirit of this Court’s decree in Atienza.
The lawyer’s primary duty as enunciated in the Attorney’s Oath is to uphold the Constitution,
obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes. 19 That duty in its
irreducible minimum entails obedience to the legal orders of the courts. Respondent’s
disobedience to this Court’s order prohibiting his reappointment to any branch,
instrumentality, or agency of government, including government owned and controlled
corporations, cannot be camouflaged by a legal consultancy or a special consultancy contract.
By performing duties and functions of a contractual employee of LWUA, by way of a
consultancy, and receiving compensation and perquisites as such, he displayed acts of open
defiance of the Court’s authority, and a deliberate rejection of his oath as an officer of the
court. It is also destructive of the harmonious relations that should prevail between Bench and
Bar, a harmony necessary for the proper administration of justice. Such defiance not only
erodes respect for the Court but also corrodes public confidence in the rule of law.
What aggravates respondent’s offense is the fact that respondent is no ordinary lawyer. Having
served in the judiciary for eight (8) years, he is very well aware of the standards of moral fitness
for membership in the legal profession. His propensity to try to "get away" with an indiscretion
becomes apparent and inexcusable when he entered into a legal "consultancy" contract with
the LWUA. Perhaps realizing its own mistake, LWUA terminated said contract with respondent,
but then proceeded to give him a "special consultancy." This travesty could not be long hidden
from public awareness, hence the instant complaint for disbarment filed by petitioner. Given
the factual circumstances found by Commission on Bar Discipline, we have no hesitance in
accepting the recommendation of the Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
that respondent be fined and suspended from the practice of law. The Code of Professional
Responsibility, Rule 1.01, provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. For violating the Code as well as transgressing his oath as an
officer of the court, his suspension for one (1) year and a fine of ten thousand (P10,000) pesos
are in order.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco Brillantes, Jr., is found liable for having willfully
violated a lawful order of this Court in our decision of March 29, 1995 rendered in A.M. No.
MTJ-92-706, entitled Lupo Almodiel Atienza vs. Judge Francisco F. Brillantes, Jr. He is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and ordered to pay a FINE of Ten
Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
conduct shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Bar
Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the personal records of
respondent as well as circulated to all courts in the Philippines. This decision is immediately
executory.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6672 September 4, 2009
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan &
Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and
encroachment of professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced
his clients2 to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial
assistance3 and expeditious collection on their claims.4To induce them to hire his services, he
persistently called them and sent them text messages.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit5 of James Gregorio Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and
attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with circulation of the said calling card.7
complainant and utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of ₱50,000.
Complainant also attached "respondent’s" calling card:6 The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.8
Front
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and
recommendation,9 found that respondent had encroached on the professional practice of
complainant, violating Rule 8.0210 and other canons11of the Code of Professional Responsibility
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or
through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 13812 of the Rules of Court. Hence,
LAW OFFFICE
the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES repetition would merit a heavier penalty.
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the
Fe Marie L. Labiano recommended penalty.
Paralegal
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainant’s
professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by
Tel: 362-7820 respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm.
Fax: (632) 362- ethical rules.
M-01
7821
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by
Cel.: (0926)
Grace Park, Caloocan City which a lawyer’s services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
2701719
CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified
Back and objective information or statement of facts.

Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a
business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares.13 To
allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade
SERVICES OFFERED: the profession in the public’s estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high
character of service to which every member of the bar is called.14
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
business.
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD. Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers.15 Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for
1avvphi1
disbarment.16

Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:

(emphasis supplied) RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man’s cause.
Hence, this complaint.
This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business
by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) 17 as a measure
to protect the community from barratry and champerty.18
Complainant presented substantial evidence19 (consisting of the sworn statements of the very
same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondent’s office) to prove that respondent
indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals’ suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during
the mandatory hearing.
Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were
enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that respondent could
produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule
1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.1avvphi1
With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer
should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of
better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. 20 Again the Court notes that
respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from
Labiano’s "referrals." Furthermore, he never denied Labiano’s connection to his
office.21Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into another’s legal practice.
He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent
violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are
fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses
in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s
fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a
matter that he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free exercise
of his judgment may not be adversely affected.22 It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to
the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client’s cause. If the
lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the client’s case, the lawyer in effect
acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its
outcome.23Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery
rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in
the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the
client’s cause.24
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice25 which calls for the
exercise of the Court’s disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants
serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining
employment.26 Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the
Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal
profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on
lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a
wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyer’s best
advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based
on his character and conduct.27 For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their
services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyer’s name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.28
Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance." The phrase was clearly
used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of
loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original
lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This
crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal
profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court
is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing
and distribution of Labiano’s calling cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and
16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a period of one year effective
immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10567 February 25, 2015
WILFREDO ANGLO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE MA. V. VALENCIA, ATTY. JOSE MA. J. CIOCON, ATTY. PHILIP Z. DABAO, ATTY. LILY
UYV ALENCIA, ATTY. JOEY P. DE LA PAZ, ATTY. CRIS G. DIONELA, ATTY. RAYMUNDO T.
PANDAN, JR.,* ATTY. RODNEY K. RUBICA,** and ATTY. WILFRED RAMON M.
PENALOSA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an administrative case stemming from a complaint-affidavit1 dated December 4, 2009
filed by complainant Wilfredo Anglo (complainant) charging respondents Attys. Jose Ma. V.
Valencia (Atty. Valencia), Jose Ma. J. Ciocon (Atty. Ciocon ), Philip Z. Dabao (Atty. Dabao ), Lily
Uy-Valencia (Atty. Uy-Valencia), Joey P. De La Paz (Atty. De La Paz), Cris G. Dionela (Atty.
Dionela), Raymundo T. Pandan, Jr. (Atty. Pandan, Jr.), Rodney K. Rubica (Atty. Rubica), and
Wilfred Ramon M. Penalosa (Atty. Penalosa; collectively, respondents) of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), specifica1ly the rule against conflict of interest.
The Facts
In his complaint-affidavit, complainant alleged that he availed the services of the law firm
Valencia Ciocon Dabao Valencia De La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica Law Office(law firm), of
which Attys. Valencia, Ciocon, Dabao, Uy-Valencia, De La Paz, Dionela, Pandan, Jr., and Rubica
were partners, for two (2) consolidated labor cases2 where he was impleaded as respondent.
Atty. Dionela, a partner of the law firm, was assigned to represent complainant. The labor cases
were terminated on June 5, 2008 upon the agreement of both parties.3
On September 18, 2009, a criminal case4 for qualified theft was filed against complainant and
his wife by FEVE Farms Agricultural Corporation (FEVE Farms) acting through a certain Michael
Villacorta (Villacorta). Villacorta, however, was represented by the law firm, the same law
office which handled complainant’s labor cases. Aggrieved, complainant filed this disbarment
case against respondents, alleging that they violated Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of
the CPR,5 to wit:
CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
xxxx
RULE 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
xxxx
CANON 21 – A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN
AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.
In their defense,6 respondents admitted that they indeed operated under the name Valencia
Ciocon Dabao Valencia De La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica Law Office, but explained that their
association is not a formal partnership, but one that is subject to certain "arrangements."
According to them, each lawyer contributes a fixed amount every month for the maintenance
of the entire office; and expenses for cases, such as transportation, copying, printing, mailing,
and the like are shouldered by each lawyer separately, allowing each lawyer to fix and receive
his own professional fees exclusively.7 As such, the lawyers do not discuss their clientele with
the other lawyers and associates, unless they agree that a case be handled collaboratively.
Respondents claim that this has been the practice of the law firm since its inception. They
averred that complainant’s labor cases were solely and exclusively handled by Atty. Dionela
and not by the entire law firm. Moreover, respondents asserted that the qualified theft case
filed by FEVE Farms was handled by Atty. Peñalosa, a new associate who had no knowledge of
complainant’s labor cases, as he started working for the firm after the termination
thereof.8 Meanwhile, Atty. Dionela confirmed that he indeed handled complainant’s labor
cases but averred that it was terminated on June 13, 2008,9 and that complainant did not have
any monthly retainer contract.10 He likewise explained that he did not see the need to discuss
complainant’s labor cases with the other lawyers as the issue involved was very simple,11 and
that the latter did not confide any secret during the time the labor cases were pending that
would have been used in the criminal case with FEVE Farms. He also claimed that the other
lawyers were not aware of the details of complainant’s labor cases nor did they know that he
was the handling counsel for complainant even after the said cases were closed and
terminated.12 The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation13 dated September 26, 2011, the IBP Commissioner found
respondents to have violated the rule on conflict of interest and recommended that they be
reprimandedtherefor, with the exception of Atty. Dabao, who had died on January 17,
2010.14 The IBP found that complainant was indeed represented in the labor cases by the
respondents acting together as a law firm and not solely by Atty. Dionela. Consequently, there
was a conflict of interest in this case, as respondents, through Atty. Peñalosa, having been
retained by FEVE Farms, created a connection that would injure complainant in the qualified
theft case. Moreover, the termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for
a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client.15
In a Resolution16 dated February 12, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the IBP Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation with modification. Instead of the penalty
of reprimand, the IBP Board of Governors dismissed the case with warning that a repetition of
the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration17 thereof, which the IBP Board of Governors
granted in its Resolution18 dated March 23, 2014 and thereby (a) set aside its February 12,
2013 Resolution and (b) adopted and approved the IBP Commissioner’s Report and
Recommendation, with modification, (1) reprimanding the respondents for violation of the
rule on conflict of interest; (2) dismissing the case against Atty. Dabao in view of his death; and
(3) suspending Atty. Dionela from the practice of law for one year, being the handling counsel
of complainant’s labor cases.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondents are guilty of representing
conflicting interests in violation of the pertinent provisions of the CPR.
The Court’s Ruling
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR provide:
CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
xxxx
RULE 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
xxxx
CANON 21 – A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN
AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP IS TERMINATED.
In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,19 the Court explained the concept of conflict of interest in this wise:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties.1âwphi1 The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s
duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if
he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other
client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there
is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform
an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and
also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any
knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is
whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of
his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double dealing in the performance thereof.20
As such, a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of
a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally
unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy and good
taste.21 In this case, the Court concurs with the IBP’s conclusions that respondents represented
conflicting interests and must therefore be held liable. As the records bear out, respondents’
law firm was engaged and, thus, represented complainant in the labor cases instituted against
him. However, after the termination thereof, the law firm agreed to represent a new client,
FEVE Farms, in the filing of a criminal case for qualified theft against complainant, its former
client, and his wife. As the Court observes, the law firm’s unethical acceptance of the criminal
case arose from its failure to organize and implement a system by which it would have been
able to keep track of all cases assigned to its handling lawyers to the end of, among others,
ensuring that every engagement it accepts stands clear of any potential conflict of interest. As
an organization of individual lawyers which, albeit engaged as a collective, assigns legal work
to a corresponding handling lawyer, it behooves the law firm to value coordination in
deference to the conflict of interest rule. This lack of coordination, as respondents’ law firm
exhibited in this case, intolerably renders its clients’ secrets vulnerable to undue and even
adverse exposure, eroding in the balance the lawyer-client relationship’s primordial ideal of
unimpaired trust and confidence. Had such system been institutionalized, all of its members,
Atty. Dionela included, would have been wary of the above-mentioned conflict, thereby
impelling the firm to decline FEVE Farms’ subsequent engagement. Thus, for this shortcoming,
herein respondents, as the charged members of the law firm, ought to be administratively
sanctioned. Note that the Court finds no sufficient reason as to why Atty. Dionela should suffer
the greater penalty of suspension. As the Court sees it, all respondents stand in equal fault for
the law firm’s deficient organization for which Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR
had been violated. As such, all of them are meted with the same penalty of reprimand, with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar infraction would be dealt with more
severely.
As a final point, the Court clarifies that respondents' pronounced liability is not altered by the
fact that the labor cases against complainant had long been terminated. Verily, the termination
of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest
adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The client's confidence once reposed
should not be divested by mere expiration of professional employment.22
WHEREFORE, respondents Attys. Jose Ma. V. Valencia, Jose Ma. J. Ciocon, Lily Uy-Valencia,
Joey P. De La Paz, Cris G. Dionela, Raymundo T. Pandan, Jr., Rodney K. Rubica, and Wilfred
Ramon M. Penalosa are found GUILTY of representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule
15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and are therefore
REPRIMANDED for said violations, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar infraction would be dealt with more severely. Meanwhile, the case against Atty. Philip
Dabao is DISMISSED in view of his death.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondents' personal records as attorneys. Further, let copies of this Resolution be furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is
directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Adm. Case No. 2417 February 6, 2002
ALEX ONG, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is a disbarment1 case filed by Alex Ong, a businessman from Dumaguete City, against Atty.
Elpidio D. Unto, for malpractice of law and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP-Pasig City) found
Atty. Unto guilty of malpractice and recommended the penalty of one-month suspension from
the practice of law or, at the very least, a severe reprimand against him.2
First, we look at the antecedent facts. The records show that the complainant received a
demand-letter from the respondent, in the latter’s capacity as legal counsel of one Nemesia
Garganian. The full text of respondent’s letter3reads:
"Dear Mr. Ong:
This is in connection with the claim of support of Miss Nemesia Garganian (my client) from you
for your only child, Anson Garganian, with her (Miss Nemesia Garganian) and other claims
which Miss Garganian is demanding from you. It is now about two months that you have
abandoned your legal and moral obligations to support your only child with her (Miss Nemesia
Garganian) and up to this moment you have not given said financial support.
I am doing this as a preliminary basis to a possible amicable settlement, if you desire so, so
that you will not be dragged unnecessarily to a court proceeding in connection with your legal
and moral obligations to your son with Miss Garganian.
May I advise you that within three (3) days from your receipt of this letter, you should return
to her house her television and betamax which you got from her house during her absence
and without her knowledge and consent. Your failure to comply with this demand, this office
will be constrained to file the proper action in court against you.
I hope within three (3) days from your receipt of this letter you may come to my Law Office at
the above address or you may send your lawyer and/or representative to discuss with me
about the preliminary matters in connection with all the claims of Miss Garganian against you.
I hope that you will not fail us, so that we can thresh out this matter smoothly, otherwise your
intentional failure or refusal to discuss these claims amicably with our office might be
construed as your absolute refusal really.
Expecting you then.
Very truly yours,
ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO
Counsel for Miss Nemesia Garganian
Dumaguete City
WITH MY CONSENT:
NEMESIA GARGANIAN"
A few days thereafter, the respondent wrote a letter addressed to Dr. Jose Bueno (Agaw), an
emissary of the complainant. In this letter, the respondent listed down the alleged additional
financial demands of Ms. Garganian against the complainant and discussed the courses of
action that he would take against the complainant should the latter fail to comply with his
obligation to support Ms. Garganian and her son. The relevant portion of the respondent’s
second letter reads: 4
"These are the demands which my client would want to be complied (with):
1. ₱1,500.00 monthly – For the sustenance of Mr. Ong’s son. x x x (Note: That this amount of
P1,500.00 should be up to the completion of Mr. Ong’s son in the elementary course and this
is subject to adjustment when the son is already in the secondary course or up to his college
course).
2. ₱50,000.00 - This amount should be given to Miss Garganian as her starting capital for her
planned business venture to give her a source of her living since she cannot anymore be a
teacher in any government position because of her status, having a child without being lawfully
wedded. x x x.
3. The TV and the Betamax should be returned and delivered to the house of Miss Garganian,
without the presence of Mr. Alex Ong x x x.
4. The amount of ₱5,000.00 as my attorney’s fees should be given or paid to me tomorrow
before noon in my Law Office, through my cousin, Dr. Jose Bueno.
Criminal, civil and administrative actions that I am contemplating to file against Mr. Alex Ong
will be withheld pending the compliance by Mr. Ong of these compromise agreements.
Gaw, if not of (sic) your representation I believe that one-week time as grace period for Mr.
Ong is too long a time.
Thank you very much.
Very truly yours,
ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO
Counsel for Miss Nemesia Garganian"
It was alleged that the real father of Ms. Garganian’s son was the complainant’s brother and
that the complainant merely assumed his brother’s obligation to appease Ms. Garganian who
was threatening to sue them. The complainant then did not comply with the demands against
him.
Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint5 with the Office of the City Fiscal (now
Prosecutor’s Office) of Dumaguete City against the complainant, his wife, Bella Lim, and one
Albina Ong, for alleged violation of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law and the Anti-Dummy
Law.
The next day, the respondent filed another criminal complaint against the complainant, Lim,
Ong and Adela Peralta for their alleged violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.
In addition, the respondent commenced administrative cases against the complainant before
the Bureau of Domestic Trade, the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, and the
Office of the Solicitor General.6According to the complainant, these cases were subsequently
denied due course and dismissed by the aforesaid government agencies.
The foregoing prompted the complainant to file the present case for disbarment. Essentially,
the complainant alleged that the respondent "manufactured" the criminal and administrative
cases against him to blackmail him or extort money from him. He claimed that the respondent
solicited for any information that could be used against him in the aforementioned cases by
offering any informer or would-be witness a certain percentage of whatever amounts they
could get from him. The complainant branded the respondent’s tactics as "highly immoral,
unprofessional and unethical, constituting…malpractice of law and conduct gravely
unbecoming of a lawyer."
In support of his accusations, the complainant submitted the following documents: (1) the
afore-quoted letters of the respondent addressed to the complainant and Dr. Bueno; (2)
Nemesia Garganian’s affidavit where she denied any knowledge regarding the demands listed
in the letter addressed to Dr. Bueno; (3) an unsigned affidavit allegedly prepared by the
respondent for the complainant, wherein the latter was acknowledging that he sired Ms.
Ganganian’s son illegitimate child; (4) the criminal complaints filed against the complainant for
alleged violation of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law and the Anti-Dummy Law; and (5) an
affidavit of Manuel Orbeta, a neighbor of the complainant who claimed that a representative
of the respondent had asked him to sign an affidavit allegedly prepared by the respondent,
with an offer "to give any informer 20% and witness, 10%, of any amount he can get from Mr.
Alex Ong." To further bolster the disbarment case against the respondent, the complainant
also included a Supplemental Affidavit,7 citing several cases previously filed against the
respondent by other parties.8
The records show that the respondent was directed to submit his comment on the complaint
lodged against him.9 He did not file any. Subsequently, the case was endorsed to the Office of
the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. In turn, the OSG
forwarded the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Negros Oriental,
authorizing said office to conduct the investigation.
It appears that the respondent did not appear before the investigating officer, then Provincial
Fiscal Jacinto Bautista, to answer the charges against him. Instead, he moved for
postponement. After denying the respondent’s third request for postponement, Fiscal
Bautista proceeded with the reception of the complainant’s evidence. The respondent was
duly notified of the on-going investigation but he did not show up. When it was the
respondent’s turn to present evidence, notices of the preliminary investigation were sent to
his home address in Valenzuela, Negros Oriental, his law office in Dumaguete City and his last
known address in Quezon City. The return cards showed that he could not be located, although
his wife received some of the notices sent to his home in Dumaguete.
Meanwhile, the case was transferred from one investigating officer to another, with some of
them inhibiting from the investigation. Finally, the case was assigned to 2nd Asst. Provincial
Prosecutor Cristino Pinili. Atty. Pinili deemed the respondent’s absence as waiver of his right
to present his evidence. Finding merit in the complainant’s cause, the investigator
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one month, or, at
the very least, be severely reprimanded.
The records of the case were endorsed to the Office of the Solicitor General.10 Thereafter, the
OSG transmitted the records to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in Manila, "for proper
disposition, conformably with adopted policies and procedures."11 The IBP’s Commission on
Bar Discipline adopted Atty. Pinili’s report and recommendation in toto.12
We affirm with modification.
The complainant seeks the disbarment of the respondent. Thus, it is meet to revisit the
importance of the legal profession and the purpose of the disbarment as aptly discussed
in Noriega vs. Sison.13 We then held:
"In resolving this disbarment case, (w)e must initially emphasize the degree of integrity and
respectability attached to the law profession. There is no denying that the profession of an
attorney is required after a long and laborious study. By years of patience, zeal and ability, the
attorney acquires a fixed means of support for himself and his family. This is not to say,
however, that the emphasis is on the pecuniary value of this profession but rather on the social
prestige and intellectual standing necessarily arising from and attached to the same by reason
of the fact that every attorney is deemed an officer of the court.
The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has been wisely put by Chief Justice
Marshall of the United States Court when he said:
‘On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great importance to an individual and the
prosperity of his life may depend on its exercise. The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly
or capriciously taken from him. On the other hand, it is extremely desirable that the
respectability of the Bar should be maintained and that its harmony with the bench should be
preserved. For these objects, some controlling power, some discretion ought to be exercised
with great moderation and judgment, but it must be exercised.’
The purpose of disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a source
of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this function should be competent, honorable and reliable in order that
the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in them."
The relevant rule to the case at bar is Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.14 It
mandates lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law. Rule
19.01 further commands that "a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the
lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate or threaten to present
unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding."
Considering the facts of this case, we find that respondent has not exercised the good faith
required of a lawyer in handling the legal affairs of his client. It is evident from the records that
he tried to coerce the complainant to comply with his letter-demand by threatening to file
various charges against the latter. When the complainant did not heed his warning, he made
good his threat and filed a string of criminal and administrative cases against the complainant.
We find the respondent’s action to be malicious as the cases he instituted against the
complainant did not have any bearing or connection to the cause of his client, Ms. Garganian.
Clearly, the respondent has violated the proscription in Canon 19, Rule 19.01. His behavior is
inexcusable.
The records show that the respondent offered monetary rewards to anyone who could provide
him any information against the complainant just so he would have a leverage in his actions
against the latter. His tactic is unethical and runs counter to the rules that a lawyer shall not,
for corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding15and he shall not do any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business.16 In the case of Choa vs. Chiongson,17 we held:
"While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine
interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his right, as well as the exercise of
his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. He must give
a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of his client’s case with the
end view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain such
actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes
to be honestly debatable under the law. He must always remind himself of the oath he took
upon admission to the Bar that "he will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same"; … Needless to state,
the lawyer’s fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds of reason and common
sense. A lawyer’s responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not
warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other
party."
(emphases ours)
The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of
truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be
disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity.18 Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and
improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself
in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession.19
Finally, we note that during the investigation of the case, despite being duly notified thereof
as evidenced by the motions for postponement he filed on several occasions, the respondent
chose not to participate in the proceedings against him. His nonchalance does not speak well
of him as it reflects his utter lack of respect towards the public officers who were assigned to
investigate the case. He should be watchful of his conduct.20 The respondent should keep in
mind the solemn oath21 he took before this Court when he sought admission to the bar. The
lawyer’s oath should not be reduced to mere recital of empty words for each word aims to
promote the high standard of professional integrity befitting a true officer of the
court.1âwphi1
The recommended penalty for the unprofessional conduct of the respondent was one (1)
month suspension or reprimand. We believe that the same is too light vis-à-vis the misconduct
of the respondent.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO is hereby declared guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of five (5)
months and sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Unto’s personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and a copy thereof be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 75209 September 30, 1987
NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and THE UNION OF
FILIPRO EMPLOYEES, respondents.
No. 78791 September 30, 1987
KIMBERLY INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION FOR SOLIDARITY, ACTIVISM AND NATIONALISM-
OLALIA, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MANUEL AGUILAR, MA. ESTRELLA ALDAS,
CAPT. REY L. LANADA, COL. VIVENCIO MANAIG and KIMBERLY-CLARK PHILIPPINES,
INC., respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
During the period July 8-10. 1987, respondent in G.R. No. 75029, Union of Filipro Employees,
and petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism
and Nationalism-Olalia intensified the intermittent pickets they had been conducting since
June 17, 1987 in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Supreme Court building. They set up
pickets' quarters on the pavement in front of the Supreme Court building, at times obstructing
access to and egress from the Court's premises and offices of justices, officials and employees.
They constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered the
place with food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation. They
waved their red streamers and placards with slogans, and took turns haranguing the court all
day long with the use of loud speakers.
These acts were done even after their leaders had been received by Justices Pedro L. Yap and
Marcelo B. Fernan as Chairmen of the Divisions where their cases are pending, and Atty. Jose
C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, had been called in order that the pickets
might be informed that the demonstration must cease immediately for the same constitutes
direct contempt of court and that the Court would not entertain their petitions for as long as
the pickets were maintained. Thus, on July 10, 1987, the Court en banc issued a resolution
giving the said unions the opportunity to withdraw graciously and requiring Messrs. Tony
Avelino. Lito Payabyab, Eugene San Pedro, Dante Escasura, Emil Sayao and Nelson Centeno,
union leaders of respondent Union of Filipro Employees in the Nestle case and their counsel
of record, Atty. Jose C. Espinas; and Messrs. Ernesto Facundo, Fausto Gapuz, Jr. and Antonio
Gonzales, union leaders of petitioner Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity,
Activism and Nationalism-Olalia in the Kimberly case to appear before the Court on July 14,
1987 at 10:30 A.M. and then and there to SHOW CAUSE why they should not be held in
contempt of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas was further required to SHOW CAUSE why he should
not be administratively dealt with.
On the appointed date and time, the above-named individuals appeared before the Court,
represented by Atty. Jose C. Espinas, in the absence of Atty. Potenciano Flores, counsel of
record of petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, who was still recuperating from an operation.
Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court
for the above-described acts, together with an assurance that they will not be repeated. He
likewise manifested to the Court that he had experienced to the picketers why their actions
were wrong and that the cited persons were willing to suffer such penalty as may be warranted
under the circumstances. 1 He, however, prayed for the Court's leniency considering that the
picket was actually spearheaded by the leaders of the "Pagkakaisa ng Mangagawa sa Timog
Katagalogan" (PAMANTIK), an unregistered loose alliance of about seventy-five (75) unions in
the Southern Tagalog area, and not by either the Union of Filipro Employees or the Kimberly
Independent Labor Union. 2
Atty. Espinas further stated that he had explained to the picketers that any delay in the
resolution of their cases is usually for causes beyond the control of the Court and that the
Supreme Court has always remained steadfast in its role as the guardian of the Constitution.
To confirm for the record that the person cited for contempt fully understood the reason for
the citation and that they wig abide by their promise that said incident will not be repeated,
the Court required the respondents to submit a written manifestation to this effect, which
respondents complied with on July 17, 1987.
We accept the apologies offered by the respondents and at this time, forego the imposition of
the sanction warranted by the contemptuous acts described earlier. The liberal stance taken
by this Court in these cases as well as in the earlier case of AHS/PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES
UNION vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., G.R. No. 73721, March 30, 1987,
should not, however, be considered in any other light than an acknowledgment of the
euphoria apparently resulting from the rediscovery of a long-repressed freedom. The Court
will not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the full force of the law and punish for
contempt those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any
case pending before it. Grievances, if any, must be ventilated through the proper channels,
i.e., through appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due
to the Courts as impartial administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the disposition of
its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions
and tending to embarrass the administration of justice." 3
The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all free
governments. However, such right, natural and inherent though it may be, has never been
invoked to shatter the standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts. For "it is a
traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of
issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be
decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be
uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies."4
Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court by an
impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound
personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by
the courts, under the protection and forms of law free from outside coercion or
interference." 5 The aforecited acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the
dignity of this Court, but equality a violation of the above-stated right of the adverse parties
and the citizenry at large.
We realize that the individuals herein cited who are non-lawyers are not knowledgeable in her
intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware that even as the rights of free
speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution, any attempt to pressure or
influence courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof, is
no longer within the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize that any such
efforts to influence the course of justice constitutes contempt of court. 6 The duty and
responsibility of advising them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of
their counsel of record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did
his best to demonstrate to the pickets the untenability of their acts and posture. Let this
incident therefore serve as a reminder to all members of the legal profession that it is their
duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper
attitude toward courts of justice, and to labor leaders of the importance of a continuing
educational program for their members.
WHEREFORE, the contempt charges against herein respondents are DISMISSED. Henceforth,
no demonstrations or pickets intended to pressure or influence courts of justice into acting
one way or the other on pending cases shall be allowed in the vicinity and/or within the
premises of any and all courts.
SO ORDERED.