empowering the Comelec to promulgate rules and regulations is a form
AMENDMENT BY INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
Article XVII, Section 2
Santiago v. Comelec (1997)
Facts:
 Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with the Comelec a “Petition
to Amend the Constitution, To Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by
People’s initiative” (Delfin Petition) asking the latter for an order to fix
the time and date for signature gathering, publish the Delfin petition,
and instruct Municipal election registrars to assist in establishing the
signing stations.
 The petitioners, Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and
Maria Isabel Ongpin, filed this special civil action for prohibition with
the following arguments (I only included those which are discussed in
the case book):
o The constitutional provision on people’s initiative to
amend the Constitution can only be implemented by
law to be passed by Congress and no such law has
been passed;
o R.A. no. 6735 (“An Act Providing for a System of
Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds
Therefore”) failed to provide any subtitle initiative on
the Constitution… This deliberate omission indicates
that the matter of people’s initiative to amend the
Constitution was left to some future law.
o Comelec Resolution no. 2300, to “govern the conduct
of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and
referendum on national local laws”… is void since only
the Congress can pass the implementing law.
o The people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the
Constitution and not to revision thereof. Extending or
lifting term limits constitutes a revision and is,
therefore, outside the power of the people’s initiative.
Issues:
 W/N R.A. no. 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to
the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately
covers such initiative.
 W/N the portion of Comelec Resolution no. 2300 regarding the conduct
of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the
absence in the Law of Specific Provisions on the Conduct of such
initiative
 W/N the lifting of term limits of elective officials as proposed in the
Delfin petition would constitute a revision of, or an amendment to, the
Constitution
Held:
 R.A. no. 6735 intended to include the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, but is inadequate to cover that
system. It is wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as
initiative on amendment to the Constitution is concerned.
o Section 2 of Art. XVII is not self-executory. In other
words, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does
not provide for its implementation.
o Other reasons involve statutory constructions: 1) Sec. 2
of the said R.A. includes the word “Constitution” but it
is not relevant to said section w/c exclusively relates to
initiative and referendum on national laws and local
laws; 2) The R.A. does not provide for the contents of a
petition for initiative on the Constitution. It does not
include the provisions of the Constitution sought to be
amended; 3) While the R.A. provides subtitles for
National and Local Initiative and Referendum, no such
thing is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This
silence simply means that the main thrust of the R.A. is
initiative and referendum on National and Local laws.
 Comelec Resolution no. 2300, insofar as it prescribes rules and
regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is void. This is so because given the circumstances,
of delegation of legislative authority.
 Comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the
Delfin petition. (This one is a procedural matter)
o The Comelec acquires jurisdiction over a petition for
initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the
initiatory pleading. Since the Delfin petition is not the
initiatory petition under R.A. 6735 and Comelec
Resolution no. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given
cognizance by the Comelec. Hence, the said petition
was merely entered as UND, meaning undocketed.
That petition was nothing more than a scrap of paper
and in so dignifying it, the Comelec acted with grave
abuse of discretion.
 The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue whether the
proposal to lift the term limits of elective national and local officials is
an amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution is rendered
unnecessary, if not academic.
Lambino, et al. vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 174153, 25 October 2006) - Digest
Published October 25th, 2006 in Elections and Constitutional Law and
Digests.
On 15 February 2006, the group of Raul Lambino and Erico Aumentado
(“Lambino Group”) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition
to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group
filed a petition with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to hold a
plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)
and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.
The proposed changes under the petition will shift the present Bicameral-
Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
The Lambino Group claims that: (a) their petition had the support of
6,327,952 individuals constituting at least 12% of all registered voters, with
each legislative district represented by at least 3% of its registered voters;
and (b) COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3
million individuals.
The COMELEC, however, denied due course to the petition for lack of an
enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution,
pursuant to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Santiago vs. Commission on
Elections. The Lambino Group elevated the matter to the Supreme Court,
which also threw out the petition.
1. The initiative petition does not comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on direct proposal by the people
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing provision that
allows a people’s initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution.
While this provision does not expressly state that the petition must set forth
the full text of the proposed amendments, the deliberations of the framers of
our Constitution clearly show that: (a) the framers intended to adopt the
relevant American jurisprudence on people’s initiative; and (b) in particular,
the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before
they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full
text.
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition
by the people. This means two essential elements must be present.
First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf.
Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a
petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing
such complete proposal in a petition. The full text of the proposed
amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to
it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is
an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the
petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before - not after
- signing.
Moreover, “an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the
nature and effect of that which is proposed” and failure to do so is “deceptive
and misleading” which renders the initiative void.
In the case of the Lambino Group’s petition, there’s not a single word, phrase,
or sentence of text of the proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither
does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is
attached to it. The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the
people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-
Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to
the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign
the signature sheet. This omission is fatal.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to
the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a
deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That’s why the
Constitution requires that an initiative must be “directly proposed by the
people x x x in a petition” - meaning that the people must sign on a petition
that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue
as amending the nation’s fundamental law, the writing of the text of the
proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general or
special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.
2. The initiative violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
disallowing revision through initiatives
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the
Constitution. The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of
all its Members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. The
third mode is through a people’s initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to
“any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution.” In contrast, Section 2 of
Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to “amendments to this
Constitution.” This distinction was intentional as shown by the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission. A people’s initiative to change the
Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its
revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose
both amendments and revisions to the Constitution.
Does the Lambino Group’s initiative constitute an amendment or revision of
the Constitution? Yes. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift
from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system,
involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one
chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a
revision of a constitution. Revision broadly implies a change that alters a
basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of
powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the
change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change
affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand,
amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without
altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several
provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the
specific provision being amended.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the
Constitution without affecting any other section or article, the change may
generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. For example, a
change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years is an amendment
and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass
media companies from 100% to 60% is an amendment and not a revision.
Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for
election to the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision.
The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or
articles of the Constitution other than the specific provision being amended.
These changes do not also affect the structure of government or the system
of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment
or a revision. A change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution
may be a revision and not an amendment. For example, the substitution of
the word “republican” with “monarchic” or “theocratic” in Section 1, Article II
of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government
and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific
change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects
other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure of government, the
carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying
ideological basis of the existing Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions
of a constitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited
to undertake a revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several
provisions, but also the altered principles with those that remain unaltered.
Thus, constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent
assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other
hand, constitutions allow people’s initiatives, which do not have fixed and
identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only
amendments and not revisions.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions
to the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-
part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test
asks whether the proposed change is “so extensive in its provisions as to
change directly the ‘substantial entirety’ of the constitution by the deletion or
alteration of numerous existing provisions.” The court examines only the
number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the
change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed
change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will
“accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a revision.” Whether there is an alteration
in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, “a change
in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan” includes “change in its
fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches.” A
change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes
that “jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check
and balances.”
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group’s
initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the
Lambino Group’s proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the
Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions
in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter
substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to
parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as
when the three great co-equal branches of government in the present
Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the
Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging
the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of
government. The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of
Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a
revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of
Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and
constitutes a revision of the Constitution.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between “amendment” and
“revision” is only one of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group
posits that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the
Constitution, substantive changes are called “revisions” because members of
the deliberative body work full-time on the changes. The same substantive
changes, when proposed through an initiative, are called “amendments”
because the changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an
“occupation, profession, or vocation” out of such endeavor. The SC, however,
ruled that the express intent of the framers and the plain language of the
Constitution contradict the Lambino Group’s theory. Where the intent of the
framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated,
courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language.
3. A revisit of Santiago vs. COMELEC is not necessary
The petition failed to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to
amend the Constitution. There is, therefore, no need to revisit this Court’s
ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions” to cover the system of initiative to amend the
Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the
outcome of the present petition. It’s settled that courts will not pass upon the
constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved on some other
grounds.
Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, this will not change the result here
because the present petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution, which provision must first be complied with even before
complying with RA 6735. Worse, the petition violates the following provisions
of RA 6735:
a. Section 5(b), requiring that the people must sign the petition as
signatories. The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition or the
amended petition filed with the COMELEC. Only Attys. Lambino, Donato and
Agra signed the petition and amended petition.
b. Section 10(a), providing that no petition embracing more than one subject
shall be submitted to the electorate. The proposed Section 4(4) of the
Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose further
amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally
unrelated to the shift in the form of government.
Lambino (Reconsideration)
PROPOSAL OF AMENDMENTS
Tolentino vs. COMELEC
Del Rosario v. Comelec
Facts: Petitioner Simeon del Rosario filed a petition for praying that the entire
R.A. 6132 be declared unconstitutional. As a taxpayer, petitioner assails the
appropriation of P29M of the law as simply a waste of public funds because
there is no time limit for the duration of the Con-Con (Consti Convention)…
dubbing it a “Debating Club.”
Issue: W/N R.A. 6132 is unconstitutional
Held:
1) Petitioner’s charge that Congress abdicated its power as a
constituent body to propose amendment in favor of the Con-Con
is refuted by Art. 15 of the Constitution, which authorizes
Congress (sitting either as a Constituent Assembly) either to
propose amendments or to call a convention for the purpose. The
choice of either alternative is solely committed to Congress, which
cannot be inquired into nor interfered with by this Tribunal, the
same being purely a political question.
2) Whether there is necessity for amending the Constitution is also
addressed in the wise judgment of Congress acting as a
Constituent Assembly, against which the Court cannot pit its own
judgment.
3) And whether the Con-Con will only propose amendments to the
Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and
propose an entirely new Constitution…is of no moment; because
the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once
ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the
validity of the new Constitution.
4) The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and
replaced with a new one by the Con-Con…is no argument against
the validity of the law because “amendment” includes the
“revision” or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate,
whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or
totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same
is ratified by the sovereign people.
Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales vs. Comelec
Facts
Congress enacted RA 6132 or the Constitutional Convention Act of 1970, to
implement Resolutions No. 2 & 4. These resolutions were passed by
Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, which provided for the
composition of the ConCon, which stated that the Convention will be
composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the existing legislative
districts, 2 delegates each district and must have the same qualifications as a
member of the House of Representatives. Imbong and Gonzales, as members
of the Bar, taxpayers, and interested candidates for delegates to the ConCon,
assails the constitutionality of RA 6132 because it prejudices their rights as
delegates.
Issue
Basically, the relevant issue in this case for us is whether or not RA 6132 was
constitutionality enacted by Congress as a law-making body, without
considering yet the validity of its actual provisions.
Held
Yes, RA 6132 was constitutionally enacted by Congress as a law-making body
with broad legislative powers.
(1) First, Congress as a Constituent Assembly, may propose
amendments to the Constitution or call a constitutional
convention for that purpose, with ¾ vote of its members voting
separately in joint session.
(2) Second, the call for a constitutional convention necessarily
includes the power to fix the qualifications, number, appointment,
etc of the constitutional convention.
(3) Third, thus Resolution No. 2 & 4 which provided for a
constitutional convention AND the qualifications, were properly
passed by Congress as a Constituent Assembly.
(4) Fourth, Congress as a law-making body, and not as a Constitutent
Assembly may enact an implementing law to implement the
resolutions, which it did when it enacted RA 6132. And so long as
statutory enactments do not clash with constitutional provisions,
they are valid.
After deliberating on the validity of the specific provisions of RA 6132, Court
found that they are not unconstitutional.
Thus, that (1) enactment of RA 6132 was constitutional and (2) assailed
provisions of RA 6132 itself are constitutional, the petitions must fail.
Tolentino vs. COMELEC
RATIFICATION
Planas vs. COMELEC
Javellana v. Exec. Sec. (p. 1231)
*This is more or less a continuation of Planas v. COMELEC. Seriously, this case
is so confusing that even the judges had different opinions.
Facts:
Same facts under the Planas case. In this case now, they are questioning
whether Proclamation No. 1102 issued by then President Marcos, is valid.
Issues:
1) Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable or
political and there fore non-justiciable, question?
2) Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Consti Convention
been ratified validly?
3) Has the aforementioned proposed Consti been acquiesced in
(with or without valid ratification) by the people?
4) Are petitioners entitled to relief?
5) Is the aforementioned proposed Consti in force?
Held:
First issue: 6 judges said yes it is justiciable (no explanation given in the book)
Second issue: 6 judges said that it was not validly ratified (no explanation
given in the book)
Third Issue: 4 members of the SC said it was already accepted by the people,
2 said that it was not accepted, 3 did not vote
Fourth Issue: 6 justices voted to dismiss the petition
Fifth Issue: 4 said it is in force, 4 casted no vote, 2 said it is not in force.
So what was really held was:
Petition was dismissed. Being the vote of the majority, there is no further
judicial obstacle to the new Consti being considered in force and effect (ergo,
the birth of 1973 Consti)
Opinion of CJ Concepcion
As to the third issue:
According to CJ Concepcion, there are three essential steps in to revise /
amend the Consti. First step is proposal either by the Congress or by a
convention called for that purpose. Second is that such amendments should
be submitted to the people for their ratification at an election and last step is
such amendments be approved by a majority of the votes cast in said
election.
In his opinion, he raises 3 questions.
1) Has the contested draft of the new or revised Consti been
submitted to the people for their ratification conformably to Art.
15 of the Consti?
He was of the opinion that it was not. To answer this question, he further
asks (2nd question) who may vote in a plebiscite under Art. 5 of the Consti.
Recall that the results contained in Proclamation 1102 were taken from the
votes that were made by the Citizens Assemblies (CA). The CA were
composed of Filipino citizens 15 years and 6 months old above. This is clearly
in violation of the 1935 Consti because it prescribed that only Filipino citizens
21 years of age or older can vote (including plebiscites).
The last question he answered was: How should the plebiscite be held?
(COMELEC supervision indispensable, essential requisites)
What happened in the “plebiscite” in the Citizens Assemblies was they were
manned not by COMELEC but under the supervision of certain officers of the
Executive Department. Recall that COMELEC has sole authority over
plebiscites.
Opinion of Justice Makasiar
The opinion of Justice Makasiar supports the view that an entirely new Consti
does not have to be ratified in accordance with the existing constitutional and
statutory law. He basically anchored his argument on the birth of the
American Constitution. When the Philadelphia Convention met to revise the
articles of confederation they violated the requirements prescribed in the
Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union for the alteration and for the
ratification of the Constitution. So what they did, they asked Congress to pass
a resolution providing that the Federal Constitution should be submitted to
elected state conventions and if ratified by the convention in 9 states, the
said Constitution shall take effect.
Art 17 Sec 4(1C)
Ramon Mitra, Jr., Napoleon Rama, Emmanuel T. Santos, Ernie Rondon,
Antonio Martinez, Jejomar Binay, Rodrigo H. Melchor, Joaquin (Titong)
Roces, Rafael Yap, and Mel Lopez vs Commission on Elections (COMELEC) –
[short title: Mitra, Jr. vs COMELEC]
GR No L-56503 April 4, 1981
Facts:
Petitioners here are contending that the 1973 Constitution is not in force and
is thus praying for prohibition and mandamus. The case is similar to the
dismissed prohibition proceedings except that the petitioners herein are also
praying to hold a plebiscite so that the people may vote on the ratification of
the Constitution, which is already in force.
For the petitioners, the 1973 Constitution is still just in the stage of proposal.
The petitioners are also thinking that the 1935 Constitution was temporarily
lifted upon the establishment of martial law and could once more be
operative with the lifting of martial law on January 17, 1981.
Issue:
W/N the 1973 Constitution is in force.
W/N there should be a plebiscite so that the people may vote on the
ratification of the Constitution.
Held:
Yes, 1973 Constitution is in force.
No, a plebiscite is not necessary.
Rationale:
According to Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, a new Constitution could
come into force and effect by the acquiescence of the people. Once the fact
of acceptance by the people of a new fundamental law is made evident, the
judiciary is left with no choice but to accord it recognition. The fact that the
people went to the polls would be indicative of their acquiescence in the
present Constitution.
Accordingly, one of the separate opinions in the Javellana case reads:
"Independently of the lack of validity of the ratification of the new
Constitution, if it be accepted by the people, in whom sovereignty resides
according to the Constitution, then this Court cannot refuse to yield assent
to such a political decision of the utmost gravity, conclusive in its effect.
Such a fundamental principle is meaningless if it does not imply, to follow
Laski, that the nation as a whole constitutes the "single center of ultimate
reference, necessarily the possessor of that 'power that is able to resolve
disputes by saying the last word."
Separate Opinion by Justice Teehankee:
“…Petitioners pray for the holding of a plebiscite for the people to vote anew
on the ratification of the 1973 Constitution since six members out of the ten
members of the Supreme Court 3 held in the ratification cases, Javellana vs.
Executive Secretary, et al. 4 "that the (1973) Constitution proposed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with
Article XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one way
for ratification, i.e., 'in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law
and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters."
“Unless the Javellana ruling is overturned by this Court itself and the passage
and attrition of time show the futility of expecting such a contingency, the
1973 Constitution stands as the supreme law of the land, by which the
validity and constitutionality of officials acts are tested.”
SECURITY OF TENURE
Dario vs. Mison
Mendoza vs. Quisumbing
Facts:
The petitioners and intervenors who are permanent employees in the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to stop the
respondents from removing them from their positions in the DENR pursuant
to the 1987 reorganization of that department.
the DENR requested the DBM to restore 839 positions which DBM had
disapproved earlier. The request was approved on subject to the condition
that these positions shall be coterminous with the appointees but not to
exceed three (3) years.
The grounds relied upon by the petitioners are:
1. That the impending mass dismissal of petitioners from employment on
would violate their right to security of tenure
2. That the appointment of the petitioners to the so-called coterminous
positions deprived them of the right to due process;
Issue: W/N the reorganization was valid
Held:
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they
are pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in
"good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of dismissal) or separation
actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist.
That the reorganization of the DENR was not intended to achieve economy
and efficiency, is revealed by the admission in page 16 of the public
respondents' Comment that the new staffing pattern of the department
contains "991 positions more than the total number of permanent positions
in the DENR before the reorganization." Since the abolition of their positions
will not conduce to either "efficiency" or "economy" in the Service, which are
the principal justifications for any government overhaul, then, obviously, the
reorganization of the DENR is not justified.
The conversion of the petitioners from permanent to "coterminous"
employees is a wholesale demotion of personnel which is tantamount to
removal without cause and without due process. It is therefore null and void.
The removal of the petitioners and intervenors from office is declared null
and void. The respondent Secretary of the DENR is ordered to reinstate the
petitioners to their former or equivalent positions and to issue regular and
permanent appointments to them for the positions in the new organization
and staffing pattern corresponding to their positions in the 1986 plantilla. ALFREDO M. DE LEON VS. HON. BENJAMIN B. ESGUERRA, in his capacity as
OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal
EXTENT OF PCGG’s POWER August 31, 1987

Facts: In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M.
Article XVIII – Sec 26 – 2A – Cojuangco, Jr. v. Roxas, et al
De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and 5 other petitioners were elected
as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal under Batas
THE EXTENT OF PCGG’S POWER
Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received a Memorandum
I. PCGG May Not Exercise Acts of Ownership
antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor
PCGG cannot exercise acts of dominion over property sequestered, frozen, or
Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G.
provisionally taken over for it does not bring about a divestment of title over
Magno as Barangay Captain in his place, as well as 5 other individuals as
said property, it does not make the PCGG owner thereof.
councilmen.
Petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared
II. PCGG Has Only Powers of Administration
null and void and that respondents be prohibited from taking over their
Its essential role is that of conservator, caretaker or overseer; not manager,
positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respectively.
innovator nor owner.
Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act
of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall
III. Powers over Business Enterprises Taken Over by Marcos or Entities or
commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their successors shall
Persons Close to him; limitations thereon
have elected and shall have qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. It is also their
PCGG is given power and authority to “provisionally take it over in the public
position that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC
interest or to prevent its disposal or dissipation”. It may in this case exercise
Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their
some measure of control in the operation, running, or management of the
successors.
business. But even in this special situation, the intrusion into management
On the other hand, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional
should be restricted to the minimum degree necessary to execute legislative
Constitution, promulgated on March 25, 1986, which provided:
will. There should be no hasty or unreasoned replacement of management or
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
change in policies.
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation
or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification
IV. Voting of Sequestered Stock; Conditions Therefor
of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year
PCGG may properly exercise the prerogative to vote sequestered stock of
from February 25,1986.
corporations, granted to it by the President of the Philippines through a
memorandum which authorizes it to “pending the outcome of proceedings to
Examining the said provision, there should be no question that petitioners, as
determine the ownership of sequestered shares of stock, to vote such shares
elective officials under the 1973 Constitution, may continue in office but
as it may have sequestered at all stockholders’ meetings.”
should vacate their positions upon the occurrence of any of the
Directors are to be voted out only when it is essential to prevent
abovementioned events.
disappearance or wastage of corporate property. In this case, there was
Issue:
adequate justification to vote the incumbent directors out because the
a) W/N the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was
evidence showed prima facie that the former were just tools of the President
validly made during the one-year period which ended on February
Marcos and were no longer owners of any stock in the firm.
25, 1987.
b) W/N the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, the
Basically, the rule is the PCGG cannot perform acts of strict ownership. It may
date that the plebiscite for its ratification was held.
not vote the shares in a corporation and elect the members of the board of
Held:
directors. EXCEPT in the case of a takeover of a business belonging to the
A) NO. Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold
government or whose capitalization comes from public funds but which
that February 8, 1977, should be considered as the effective date of
landed in private hands, as in BASECO. Only after appropriate judicial
replacement and not December 1,1986 to which it was ante dated, in keeping
proceedings, when a clear determination is made that shares are truly ill-
with the dictates of justice.
gotten, may such takeover and exercise of acts of strict ownership are
But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year deadline, the
justified.
aforequoted provision in the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to
----
have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution
It is through the right to vote that the stockholder participates in the
reading:
management of the corporation. Note that it may make it difficult for the
SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its
PCGG to carry out its duties if the Board or officers are uncooperative or
ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose
hostile. Hence, it is necessary to balance the stockholder’s right to vote and
and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.
the conservator’s duty to recover and to conserve the assets. Two situations
arise.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By
that date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have
1. Sequestered shares of stock constitute a distinct minority of the voting
been superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor
shares of the corporation involved  PCGG must be represented in the BOD
could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to designate respondents
of the corporation, its subsidiaries, its Executive and Audit Committees
to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.
Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure specially
2.Sequestered shares of stock constitute a majority of the voting shares of
considering that the Barangay Election Act of 1982 declares it "a policy of the
the corporation involved  minimum safeguards must be put into place (a
State to guarantee and promote the autonomy of the barangays to ensure
lot! P. 1271 of casebook).
their fullest development as self-reliant communities. The Memoranda issued
by respondent OIC Governor on February 8, 1987 designating respondents as
More additional safeguards for both cases
the Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respectively are both
1. Sequestered shares may not be sold, alienated or disposed of
declared to be of no legal force and effect.
2. Dividends and liquidating distributions are not to be delivered
B) YES. The record of the proceedings and debates of the ConCom clearly
show that the clear, unequivocal and express intent of the Commission in
This decision must be implemented under the supervision and control of the
unanimously approving the aforequoted Section 27 was that "the act of
Sandiganbayan.
ratification is the act of voting by the people. So that is the date of the
ratification" and that "the canvass thereafter [of the votes] is merely the
DATE OF EFFECTIVITY OF THE CONSTITUTION mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the
plebiscite and the proclamation of the President is merely the official
confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino
people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of
the plebiscite."
FR. BERNAS. I would say that the ratification of the Constitution is on the
date the votes were supposed to have been cast.
MR. MAAMBONG. Let us go to the mechanics of the whole thing, Madam
President. We present the Constitution to a plebiscite, the people exercise
their right to vote, then the votes are canvassed by the Commission on
Elections. If we delete the suggested amendment which says: "THE
PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED," what would
be, in clear terms, the date when the Constitution is supposed to be ratified or
not ratified, as the case may be?
FR. BERNAS. The date would be the casting of the ballots. if the President
were to say that the plebiscite would be held, for instance, on January 19,
1987, then the date for the effectivity of the new Constitution would be
January 19, 1987.
MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, it would not depend on the actual issuance
of the results by the Commission on Elections which will be doing the
canvass?
FR. BERNAS. It would not, Madam President, because "ratification" is the act
of saying "yes" is done when one casts his ballot.
MR. MAAMBONG. So it is the date of the plebiscite itself, Madam President?
FR. BERNAS. Yes, Madam President.
By and after said date, February 2, 1987, absent any saying clause to the
contrary in the Transitory Article of the Constitution, respondent OIC
Governor could no longer exercise the power to replace petitioners in their
positions as Barangay Captain and Councilmen. Hence, the attempted
replacement of petitioners by respondent OIC Governor's designation on
February 8, 1987 of their successors could no longer produce any legal force
and effect. While the Provisional Constitution provided for a one-year
period expiring on March 25, 1987 within which the power of replacement
could be exercised, this period was shortened by the ratification and
effectivity on February 2, 1987 of the Constitution.