Literature Review

Introduction
“When it first entered political discourse, the word ‘terrorism’ was used with reference to the
reign of terror imposed by the Jacobin regime – that is, to describe a case of state terrorism.
Historians of the French Revolution have analysed and discussed that case in great detail. There
are also quite a few historical studies of some other instances of state terrorism, most notably of
the period of ‘the Great Terror’ in the Soviet Union. In a contemporary setting, however, state
terrorism is apparently much more difficult to discern. Discussions of terrorism in social sciences
and (to a lesser degree) in philosophy tend to focus on non-state terrorism. In common parlance
and in the media, terrorism is as a rule assumed to be an activity of non-state agents in virtue of
the very meaning of the word”. (Primoratz 2004)
Terrorism is the product of the post-Cold War policy failures of the world superpowers. Third
world countries have been most affected by this menace, because of their nascent and weak
governance systems.
To understand the concept of terrorism and before commencing the study on how to counter it, the
fundamental basics of these concepts must be understood. Terrorism, militant uprisings, armed
insurgencies, counter-terrorism, counter-violent extremism, radicalization and de-radicalization
are some cornerstone concepts that will be discussed later on, to establish a familiarity with the
paper.
Terrorism has not been defined in a universal of a concrete manner by any international
organization, i.e. each country has its own criteria of defining terrorism but the whole international
community has been unable to unanimously agree to a certain basic element which can constitute
to be labelled as terrorism.
However, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-NATO defines terrorism as "The unlawful use
or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or
intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives".
The United States State Department categorizes the use of force against non-combatants in any
context (civilian or not) as terrorism. MI5, security service of the United Kingdom defines
terrorism as “Terrorist groups use violence and threats of violence to publicize their causes and
as a mean to achieve their goals. They often aim to influence or exert pressure on governments
and government policies but reject democratic processes, or even democracy itself.”
European Union states that “Terrorism is a threat that does not recognize borders and may affect
states and peoples irrespective of their geographical location. EU States and citizens are not an
exception. Individuals and groups who believe that they can advance their political aims by using
terror pose a serious threat to the democratic values of our societies and to the rights and freedoms
of our citizens, especially by indiscriminately targeting innocent people. Acts of terrorism are
criminal and unjustifiable and must be treated as such under all circumstances.” (Migration and
Home Affairs n.d.)
The security service of the United Kingdom, MI-5, defines terrorism and divided it into three
categories by their area of scope. a) International terrorism b) Northern Ireland terrorism and c)
Domestic extremism. The first two are directly addressing the terrorist problem while the third
category points towards potential terrorism. The definition is: “Terrorist groups use violence and
threats of violence to publicise their causes and as a means to achieve their goals. They often aim
to influence or exert pressure on governments and government policies but reject democratic
processes, or even democracy itself.” (Terrorism n.d.). A prosecution body of the U.K. the Crown
Prosecution Service (CPS) states that “Terrorism is the use or threat of action, both in and outside
of the UK, designed to influence any international government organisation or to intimidate the
public. It must also be for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological
cause. It is important to note that in order to be convicted of a terrorism offence a person doesn't
actually have to commit what could be considered a terrorist attack. Planning, assisting and even
collecting information on how to commit terrorist acts are all crimes under British terrorism
legislation.” (Terrorism 2017)
The European Union’s Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism gave the definition of
terrorism in 2002 as “an intentional act which may seriously damage a country or an
international organisation, committed with the aim of seriously intimidating a population,
unduly compelling a Government or an international organisation to perform or abstain from
performing any act, seriously destabilizing or destroying fundamental political, constitutional,
economic or social structures by means of attacks upon a person’s life, attacks upon the physical
integrity of a person, kidnapping, hostage-taking, seizure of aircraft or ships, or the manufacture,
possession or transport of weapons or explosives” (Alonso 2008)

The literature of modern security is further worked upon by including various branching aspects
of this terrorism. For example, radicalization, extremism, violent extremism, religious extremism,
sectarianism, sectarian violence and ethnic violence. On the contrary, the governments also work
to reverse these issues and understand their root causes to avoid further alienation.
Counterterrorism, de-radicalization and counter violence extremism are a part of this domain.
Basically, all these terminologies deal with either the issue at hand i.e. terrorism or how to mitigate
this issue.
Radicalization:
Canada and North America’s leading research institute: Centre for Prevention of Radicalization
Leading to Violence (CPRLV) defines radicalization as “a process whereby people adopt
extremist belief systems—including the willingness to use, encourage or facilitate violence—with
the aim of promoting an ideology, political project or cause as a means of social transformation.”
Afterwards, it divides radicalization into four categories; a) Right Wing Extremism, b) Politico-
Religious Extremism, c) Left Wing Extremism, d) Single Issue Extremism.
Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies states that extremism and radicalization take place against a
contextual background and both have their own pull and push factors. Afterwards, it elaborates the
concept of extremism by defining it as: “Extremism means forcefully rejecting the existing means
of political participation, attempting to create new ideologies and narratives to bring about a
structural change in all spheres of life (social, political, economic or ethnic) by challenging the
legitimacy of existing system institutions.”
According to Abdul Basit’s study regarding counter violent extremism in Pakistan, our society’s
three major socio-economic classes are affected by three different types of radicalization. Namely,
the lower class is radicalized on sectarian basis. Middle income group is radicalized on the issues
of Afghanistan war and Kashmir problem, while the upper middle and elite of the country are
concerned with the ideas of Pan-Islamism and the revival of Caliphate.
The United States Institute of Peace has found out that the factors that lead an individual to
radicalization and militancy are multifaceted and dynamic in nature for example ideological,
economic, social, and psychological. Social delinquency and unavailability of opportunities to
channel the energy leads the deprived youth to take such radical steps. The combining of poor
social opportunities with the concepts of divine providence and an attractive afterlife present the
perfect case for a standard radical mind.
RAND, national security research division in Germany says, “the term radicalization is defined
as “the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support,
or facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal change.”
Radicalization is "the process by which individuals -- usually young people -- are introduced to
an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate,
mainstream beliefs towards extreme views." (Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2009).
Furthermore, radicalism does not always lead to violence. "a radical is a person who wishes to
effect fundamental political, economic or social change, or change from the ground up." (Horgan
2009). Therefore, it can be inferred that the term “radical” also comprises of such people who are
working for the betterment of their communities through legitimate means; thus, radicalism does
not always lead to violence.
Radicalization is a context bound phenomenon in which global. Political and sociological factors
matter as much as the ideological and psychological factors (Alonso 2008)
The contributing factors that lead to radicalization can be either simultaneous or horizontal in
order. For example, the feeling of rejection from mainstream social structure can drift them away
from the host society. This external push, when coupled with ill-education or financial difficulties,
the individual will resort to take out his frustration through violent means. Hence, violent
radicalization is born. It has also been observed that violent actions have a backdrop of personal
frustration more than ideological push or extremist motivations. (Alonso 2008)

Deradicalization:
Deradicalization is the mirror opposite of radicalization. As radicalization occurs by adopting
extremist views, deradicalization constitutes of abandoning such views and re-joining the general
public and a normal harmless lifestyle. USIP says that Pakistan does not have a proper well-
oriented deradicalization policy in place and the ideas are scattered across the policy board.
Deradicalization is the process of abandoning extremist worldview and concluding that it is not
acceptable to use violence to effect social change. As a part of the deradicalization process, there
is a recognition that social, economic and political transformation will occur slowly and through a
pluralistic environment (Koehler 2016)
It has been observed and experimented that deradicalization can also be initiated by a completely
angle. Though the method suggested is not conventional, but it holds weight because the outcome
could be promising. Instead of teaching the people and educating the children at schools about
how to stay away from radicalisation, the schools and concerned institutions should indulge the
subjects into this field. The students should be explained how an individual is radicalized and what
contributing factors are in motion. This will create a counter-analysis and self-assessment amongst
the people, hence leading to productive results (Macaluso 2016)
The relation between radicalization, extremism and terrorism and their types:
It has been observed that most of the terrorist attacks are planned and executed in groups rather
than by individuals. Because in group form, the required motivation and coordination help in
achieving the targets swift. Furthermore, to discover any backstage psychology of terrorists, just
like the Nazis and what drove them to commit mass atrocities, similar tests were conducted but
the results were negative. Therefore, it can be said that a terrorist can be perfectly normal person.
(Doosje, . Terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization. 2016)
To develop better understanding of the pressures leading to terrorism, radicalization was observed.
Radicalization can be divided into three stages, namely, 1) Sensitivity 2) Group membership and
3) Action. In the first phase, an individual feels alienated from the society or feels disassociated
from his surroundings. He seeks people with likewise ideas and stumbles upon such people (as a
society is made up of all types of people). As his ideas resonate with other now, he sets out to give
shape to these thoughts by action. This action can be either violent (by using weapons) or non-
violent (by joining activism). But, in most cases it has been observed that the end stage is an
appropriation of violent means. (Doosje, (2016). Terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization.
Current Opinion in Psychology, 11, 79-84. n.d.)
Furthermore, the radical groups belong to different categories where these groups take up arms
against the established order. These groups are listed as follows:
a) Nationalist or separatist
b) Extreme right wing
c) Extreme left wing
d) Single issue
e) Religiously motivated

(Doosje, (2016). Terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization. Current Opinion in Psychology,

11, 79-84. n.d.)
Radicalization leading to violence can be traced back to a number of political ideologies and their
movements to achieve their goals. It is not implied that all political thoughts lead to violent
radicalization but the fact that violent radicalization has also been used as a tool. The micro level
factors of radicalization are personal, psychological or deprivation and macro factors are mostly
social, political or economic. When these two domains come together under stressful
circumstances, radical movements arise. Because the deprived people want to release their
frustration and they need a platform to do so. A new social movement aiming to disturb the old
order is the right place for this act. For example, the communist revolution of 1920s. The Cuban
revolution and rise of Fidel-Che duo. Mao Ze Dong and creation of Communist China. These were
political movements, but they took the support of radicalism. (Dzhekova 2016)
Similarly, when this radical behavior is not adopted by a political movement, it takes the turn to
violence and ends up in the ultimate form of extremism leading to terrorism, in this case, no
political solution is acceptable to the extremist entity, hence the name, and it insists on replacing
the current status quo with its own radical system i.e. anarchy. (Dzhekova 2016)
Terrorism is the final act of radicalization. Radicalization begins on the grass-root level when an
individual alienates himself from the society on societal or ideological basis. Some people stay on
this stage, but others can form association with likeminded individuals. After they have increased
in numbers, next step is to implement their view of the society. This objective is usually achieved
through violent means. Hence, from radicalism, these people advance to extremism. Their basic
motivation is the combined context of sociological and ideological factors. Therefore, after
displacing themselves from peaceful means and accepting violent means as a way of expression,
terrorist ideas and organizations become a matter of choice for them, rather than an embodiment
of lawlessness and perpetrators of social anarchy. There are five steps, that lead an individual from
radicalism to terrorism, stated in the form of floors of a building;
1. Ground floor: Psychological interpretation of material conditions
2. First floor: perceived options to fight unfair treatment
3. Second floor: displacement of aggression
4. Third floor: moral engagement
5. Fourth floor: solidification of categorical thinking and the perceived legitimacy of the
terrorist organization
6. The terrorist act and sidestepping inhibitory mechanisms

(Moghaddam 2005)
Borum’s four stage model of the terrorist’s mindset:
The four-stage model begins from a very personal and individual feeling of not belonging to the
society. It remains one sided until the society reacts and isolates the individual. Once this happens,
the individual tries to vent out his anger and ends up using violent means to do so. (Borum 2011)

New York Police Department’s model of Jihadization

The New York police adopted Precht’s model of typical radicalization where an individual self
alienates himself from the normal people and finds solace in radical elements. (Borum 2011)

United States of America:

America has been the face of the western world in combating terrorism. Since the end of Cold War
and the disintegration of its arch enemy USSR, it emerged as the sole superpower of the world.
The Al-Qaeda attacks of 11 September 2001 were the symbolic declaration of war on the western
world by the Islamic radicals of the Muslim world. The American government passed the Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) six weeks after 9/11. This act enabled the federal government
to enforce surveillance on citizens and laid basis for the establishment of a new security apparatus;
Homeland Security. It became a focal point of debate after the contesting argument that whether
this act ensured more security or was a clamp down on civil liberties (McCarthy 2002). The
Congress also paved the way for waging war by passing the Authorization for the Use of Military
Force (AUMF) bill and a series of attacks on several countries were launched. Afghanistan was
declared as the “Al-Qaeda Core” and was subsequently attacked to eliminate the Al-Qaeda
leadership and bring the perpetrators of 9/11 to justice. By early 2002, this war against Al-Qaeda
was being called the “Global War on Terrorism” by the American officials. Yemen also suffered
drone strikes in the same context. The AUMF-1 provided the cause for attacking Iraq (Archick
2002)
American counterterrorism policy is not a mere response to the threat of terrorism, it is a reflection
of the domestic political process. It is a comprehensive process involving the politicians, media,
interest groups, government institutions, elites and the masses. But, the cornerstone of threat
perception is through a political lens. Normative argumentation was used to redefine the privacy
rights and the rights to individual liberty were loosened in order to affect a crackdown on terror
activities. Because individual liberty is followed by privacy, and in privacy such actions are
formulated (Heller 2012) As the years proceeded from 9/11 the US government spending on
counterterrorism measure also increased. Commencing from the USA PATRIOT Act and waging
war on Afghanistan and Iraq, the private individuals, corporations, municipal, county, regional and
state level also underwent a spending boom. Scientific side has also experienced growth to achieve
breakthroughs in weaponry and ammunition to save more soldiers from direct contact (Lum C.
2012)
The transition from George W. Bush administration to Barack Obama was a prominent one. Bush
followed an upright counterterror stance and had the conservatives, neoconservatives and religious
fanatics as his policy aides. Whereas Obama, who campaigned on the slogan of Change We Can
Believe In, has taken a more comprehensive and deep approach to counterterror policy. But the
new government’s liberal approach does not seem to bear any fruit. Diagnoses of this problem has
led to the conclusion that real policy change cannot occur until the Democrats and Republicans
are on the same page.
Another way to counter the threat of terrorism is to study the past events and try to predict the
future movement of terrorists. Counterterrorism is inherently the study of events that have not
taken place yet. The terrorist threat was prioritized after 9/11, however, an in-depth study revealed
that USA and terrorism go as far as 1970s’ when the state policy was more focused towards
interstate conflicts and Cold War. Terrorism is both provoked and hindered by technological
development. Globalization has made the world small, therefore making the security work easy
while providing cover for dangerous elements as well. President Nixon recognized terrorism as a
serious threat in his 1972 address. Counterterrorism is not limited to snubbing the terror groups,
but effective counterprograms must also include rigorous introspection and constant policy
evolution.
The Clinton administration of the 1990s’ adopted the multilateralism approach and came into
power with the motive to focus on domestic problems rather than international ones. It looked
away from the Afghanistan mujahideen scenario and countless non-state militant actors sprouted
up in Afghanistan which began to threaten the global security, especially human rights on
unprecedented scales.
The specific counter terrorism strategy of USA will be discussed ahead. Due to being the leader
of the developed world, USA policy and strategy will be pondered upon during our work.
However, for expanding the scope of counter terrorism strategies and to develop an understanding
of how several regions of the world, depending upon their development status, have dealt with
terrorism, will enhance our collective understanding of the chosen topic.
European Union:
European Union’s efforts to recognize terrorism as a serious threat and counter it effectively has
been on EU’s agenda since the peak time of Cold War. Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism and
political Violence Group-TREVI was formed in 1975, Rome to exchange information and share
data regarding violent agendas and activities. The establishment of TREVI laid basis for the
founding of Justice and Home Affairs-JHA in 1992. Despite the establishment of such
institutions, no comprehensive CT strategy was formulated which could be used at the time of 9/11
(Bures 2008)
The events of 9/11 were a watershed moment for European Union as well. EU wanted to tighten
the security around the ambit of its 28-member countries but the arguments of civil liberties,
individual privacy and freedom of speech were a hindrance for the Union. But, since 9/11, this
perception has changed. the governments now realise that their relax laws and easy cross-border
movement laws has also helped the terrorist cells to operate freely in Europe, especially the Al-
Qaeda cells.
Apart from terrorist movement, human trafficking, drug trafficking and financial fraud laws are
also being revised. The main issues that EU is facing in taking immediate effective steps are the
constitutions and laws of individual countries, which cannot be changed on sudden basis.
Intelligence sharing between several agencies is another problem. However, EU has made a lot of
progress since 9/11 and has extended its cooperation towards the American authorities as well
(Archick 2002)
The EU has worked on various fronts since the tragedy of 9/11. It drafted a comprehensive Plan
of Action and was able to confine terrorism to a single, mutually agreed upon definition.
Furthermore, a European Arrest Warrant was introduced to speed up the process crime
apprehension and a clamp down on crime financing was initiated. Europol (a law enforcement
agency) and Eurojust (a judicial cooperation agency) were strengthened to smoothen the law
enforcement process. The problem is the policy and implementation gap. Most of these measures
have successfully passed the paperwork stage but have gotten stuck at implementation due to
bureaucratic red-tape. But, 11th March 2004, Madrid attacks might provide the EU and its people
with new zeal to see the counterterror policies to a logical end (Bures 2008)
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon for Europe. It has been a constant part of its history, either
directly or indirectly. Initially, before 9/11, Europe dealt with terrorism through criminal law and
trying to understand the root causes. But the shock of 9/11 was horrifying, and it forced Europe to
review its counterterrorism policies. This policy revamp was however only event driven and laden
with confusion and inertia. 2005 London attacks became another flashpoint in EU’s
counterterrorism policy and EU began to realise terrorism as an internal threat rather than being
an external one. Therefore, deradicalization was given more prominence than before (Coolsaet
2010)
European Union can be termed as an ideal organization. Because no other regional body, unifying
needs and wants of all its members has been so much successful as EU. Therefore, its strategies
and policies for tackling the terror problem have a more “continental” outlook, rather than
revolving around a single country. The dynamics of a regional security apparatus are different
from a single country’s so, EU policy does not fit the profile of our topic. Therefore, the countries
which are a part of EU will be discussed and a relevance between NAP and EU member countries
will be sought.
United Kingdom:
England had its own 9/11 equivalent on 7 July 2005 aka the 7/7 London Bombings. Four
coordinated Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs’) went off, three at underground train and one
at a public service bus. 18 citizens lost their lives and almost 700 suffered injuries. The attack was
the deadliest since the 1988 Pan Am 103 bombing. 9/11 and 7/7 both were transnational in nature
i.e. carried out by international terror organization, but they had one big difference. While the
attackers of 9/11 came from outside the USA, the attackers of 7/7, on the other hand, were “home-
grown”. The British Secret Service had already hinted upon the idea that the concept of home-
grown threats was a matter of when and not if. The response to such threat is the community-
based approach, which is the cornerstone in rooting out suspicious people from the localities. This
CT approach was not new, since the issues with Northern Ireland, but the occurrence of 9/11 had
put the spotlight on international approach.
Preventing Extremism Together taskforce (PET) was established in August 2005. CONTEST,
The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism was established in 2003 but its
revised system was made public in 2006. It has 4 stages: a) Prevent b) Pursue c) Protect d) Prepare.
Since the 7/7 the funding of Prevent has increased to 6-million-pound sterling in 2006 to 140-
million-pound sterling in 2008/9 (Briggs 2010)
Since 9/11 and the CONTEST strategy implementation, researchers have been trying to understand
if the CT policies have been showing discriminatory behavior towards the Muslim community in
Britain. The CONTEST’s prevent strategy involved the controversial surveillance of the public. It
also asked the agencies to keep the Muslim community in check. As a result, the peaceful Muslims
of Britain cooperated with the authorities.
Psychology always plays a major role in countering the terrorist thought. Interrogation and torture
of the captured terrorists to induce deterrence in them is a well-spoken and controversial example.
One tool to discern the terrorist ideology is termed as PATH-Polarized, Absolutist, Threat-
Oriented and Hateful. Each header inflicts separatist tendency and creates an environment of “us
vs them”. Psychologists have helped a lot in breaking into an extremist’s mindset. The pathways
leading to extremist mindset, social and psychological patterns and economic factors that
contribute towards a radical behavior (Silke 2010)
World Trade Center attack on the United States, Madrid attacks in Spain and London bombings
of the United Kingdom were of the same international terror category. While Spain and UK had
encountered the terror problem prior to these events, the US was completely new to such disaster.
Therefore, the US took a “unilateral” approach towards terrorism and termed it as Global War on
Terrorism. While the UK took a more “regional multilateral” approach for countering terrorism.
UK also emphasized upon containment, peacekeeping and reconstructing the peace measures.
Such comprehensive and soft approach in countering terrorism shows that UK has been dealing
with such problems for a long time (Rees 2005)
The United Kingdom has come forth with several CT acts namely; the Terrorism Act 2000, the
Anti-terrorism and Security Act 2001, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 and Terrorism Act
2006. All these acts comprise of complex codes, structures and measures concentrating powers on
police force, financial institutions and criminal justice system. These laws and regulations are also
followed by huge criticism and controversies because of their overlap with privacy rights. But
over-reliance on these legislations can lead to their becoming futile because these regulations ask
of the officials to improve themselves and not rely on laws alone (Walker 2006)
UK has been the first-mate of the USA in the fight against terrorism on the world map. Every act
of Bush administration was mirror-imaged by Tony Blair from UK. The society of Britain is also
somewhat like that of Pakistan in a few aspects. Both countries i.e. UK and Pakistan have an
internalized social structure, unlike a disintegrated USA family system. Because of colonization,
Pakistan’s laws have been derived from UK laws. But the geographical difference between both
countries creates a major wedge between both. Britain is a small island. Pakistan is a large country
with a diverse population base. It is relatively easy to create consensus among the population of
UK rather than in Pakistan. Therefore, other European countries will be explored in detail.
France:
France and the UK, being close neighbors, have faced the terrorist problem on the same lines. But
their approach to counter it is different. While the British government has followed a formal
approach, led by establishing new institutions, the French government has taken a more informal
approach i.e. inculcating CT laws into the already established security agencies. Domestic
intelligence has been given priority in both counties. But, the formalized approach of the UK
government resulted into mutually trust-worthy and confident activities between the intelligence
and other security agencies. However, as the French adopted an informal approach for countering
terrorism, and these measures were primarily taken by entrepreneurial bodies rather than the
central government, the move in by Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (French intelligence
agency) was not reciprocated by the domestic law enforcement body i.e. the police. This
incoordination created a rift and lack of trust between the institutions (Foley 2009)
CONTEST drawn by the UK government after 9/11 to counter the threat of terrorism in UK has
served as a milestone in counterterrorism policy making. Its four basic angles: a) Prevent b) Pursue
c) Protect d) Respond have been adopted by other European countries as well. But, despite
following an almost identical pattern, the CT measures and policies of each European country
differs largely from the others. For example, if the CT approach type is categorized into a)
Maximalist approach b) human agent approach c) Confrontational approach (these approaches are
created and categorized based on which aspect of CONTEST a country chooses to follow). UK,
Germany, Denmark come in the Maximalist category i.e. they try to achieve all four angles while
France and Portugal come into the ambit of Confrontational approach. This approach focuses on
the Pursue aspect primarily. The governments confront terrorists with the matching force. They
are inclined towards a more on the ground approach. Evident by the name and the results this
approach will produce, it is not a long-term solution to the problem (Van Dongen 2010)
France’s unique stance, different from the United States is evident from the fact that when the
USA decided to attack Iraq and install a “democracy” there. French president Jacques Chirac said
that an outright attack on another Muslim country risked the creation of little Osama bin Ladens
(Shapiro 2006)
European countries and the USA also fund many counter terrorism programs in other parts of the
world with other governments. For example, French government has been funding a program of
counter terrorism with the Mali government. The Malian Government’s Special Program for
Peace, Security and Prosperity in Northern Mali-PSPSDN stands to receive a funding of one
million Euros from the French government for the year 2010 (Larémont 2011)
France’s governance has been revamped five times since 1789. After the Algerian war of
independence 1956-1963, French hero Charles de Gaulle was asked to restructure the state and
devise a new constitution. Therefore, the current governance system is the fifth republic of France.
The French counter terrorism system is incompatible because it is devised on the lines of EU’s CT
policy. Secondly, France has not dealt with the scale of terrorism that Pakistan has been witnessing
for at least a decade. Their policies seem applicable in theory, but they have never been tested
through varying circumstances. Thus, French CT strategies do not familiarize themselves with
NAP.
Germany:
Germany is a relatively ally of the United States. Defeated in WW-II, client in the aftermath,
conflict zone during the Cold War and slowly gained the status of a trusted ally. In spite this long
process, Germany CT policies display a clear contrast from those of United States. Being on the
warring side of the world in the first of half of 20th century, Germany has been taking a more
political approach to deal with the terrorist problem since 1970s’. It is more open to multilateralism
and has adapted formal, legal and technology-oriented approach to counter terrorism.
Germany dealt with political terrorism in the 70s’ and 80s’. Red Army Faction, Revolutionary
Cells, the Turkish and Kurdish diasporic wings engaged in terrorism against each other and did
not target the German government directly. Hence, German approach was always domestic rather
than international (Katzenstein 2003)
The fact that Germany had been battling home grown terrorism since long before 9/11 helped it a
lot in narrowing down the policy approach after the occurrence of 9/11. The government
established the Besondere Aufbauorganisation USA (special construction organisation USA) in
the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA, Federal Criminal Agency). Rasterfahndung was reactivated,
which meant that people who were under surveillance during the peak times of RAF were again
inspected for possible involvement in 9/11 (Von Hippel 2005)
Germany displayed a volatile legislative reaction to 9/11. The interior minister Otto Schily (SPD)
declared that the security apparatus of Germany needed to be revamped and the old system was
put under strict scrutiny for rooting out its flaws. As a result of this reviewal “security packages”
or “anti-terror packages” were introduced, these packages altered the existing security statutes and
ventured into the fundamental rights of the citizens. The debate between individuality and security
is not new in Germany, but 9/11 provided the government a cause to push its security agenda
without any major hindrance (Lepsius 2004)
In Germany, Human Rights activists have been fighting a hard battle for the freedom and rights of
the minorities since 9/11. The government had locked up hundreds of immigrants from Muslim
countries based on their affiliation with terrorist organizations, ignoring the fact that Islamic
terrorism is embedded in the Islamic religious way of life and it takes a keen eye to differ between
the two. The stand-off between Human Rights activists and Germany’s highest court the
Bundergerichstof has been telling of this environment (Zoller 2004)
Since the end of WW-II and reunification of Germany in 1990, the German politics has been
deprived of effective autonomy. The post WW-II German constitution drawn by victorious power
dispersed the political power in such a manner that no German party can fully form the government
with an absolute majority and follow its agendas to the end. Therefore, German CT policy and
strategy faces a lot of backlash from political opposition. While NAP was formed under complete
agreement of all in-power and opposition parties.
As the CT history of some countries have been discussed, now we will move towards the specific
strategies and policies adopted by some of these countries. NAP will be coordinated and matched
with these strategies. The strategy which will match with NAP most will be discussed in detail in
the theoretical framework. And a relation will be drawn between the two in conceptual framework.
Counterterrorism Models and Strategies:
Countries and cities around the world have devised specific set of characteristics, plans, models
and strategies to deal with terrorist situation in the most accurate manner. As terrorism is a specific
and graver offense than other crimes, the counterterrorism strategies must also have special
provisions and above average techniques.
NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau (CT):
The bureau has been established to counter the threat of domestic and international terrorism in
New York city. It is a multi-layered bureau, comprising of different teams who deal with various
aspects of terrorism. Critical Response Command is the initial responder to a threat. It comprises
of police officers, skilled in combat and hostage situation handling. (Counterterrorism).
Counterterrorism Division has the responsibility of handling situation arising from different angles
e.g. “Threat Reduction Infrastructure Protection Section (TRIPS)”, “Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives (CBRNE)”, “Tactical Radiological Acquisition
Characterization System (TRCS)”. Joint Terrorist Task Force works in coordination with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and other law enforcement agencies to extend its intelligence
network and preempt terrorists. And the “World Trade Center Command” deals with the security
of the specified area only. (Counterterrorism)
National Counterterrorism Security Office, London:
The NaCTSO is a police unit which works with the Home Office to support the a) Protect and b)
Prepare clauses of the PREVENT counterterrorism strategy. The office divides counterterrorism
in different sections, for handling different scenarios: (Advice and Support Countering Terrorism)
 ACT- Action Counters Terrorism asks the citizens to come forward with any kind of
information that can help the authorities with their investigations.
 Counterterrorism Security Advisors work with the Centre for the Protection of National
Infrastructure (CPNI) – which coordinates the nationwide CTSA network. These advisors
 provide briefings on hostile reconnaissance, contingency planning, search and evacuation
etc.
 It also provides guidelines for the citizen to react in certain situations e.g. Run Hide Tell,
directs the civilians to not get themselves involved in any situation but try to inform the
concerned authorities right away.

(Advice and Support Countering Terrorism)

National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the United States of America (Trump
Administration):
In October 2018, John Bolton, National Security Advisor, unveiled President Donald Trump’s
first counterterrorism strategy. It was stated that this strategy will be wholistic in nature and will
protect American soil from inside and outside threats.
The CT strategy will revolve around 6 main points: (1) pursuing terrorists; (2) isolation of
terrorists; (3) modernizing and integrating the counterterrorism; (4) protection of American
infrastructure and enhancing resilience; (5) countering terrorist radicalization and recruitment;
and (6) strengthening the counterterrorism abilities of U.S. international partners (Rollins 2019)
Counterterrorism Coordinating Agency Indonesia:
The CT strategy adopted by the Indonesian government against the insurgents in 2010 was both
Direct and Indirect rather than head-on approach of curbing terrorism. The government was
aiming to neutralize the terrorist threat by other means than hard-clamp down approaches, to hit
the terrorist mindset. The direct and indirect were further divided into: Supremacy of Law,
Coordination, Independence, Indiscrimination, Democracy and Participation.
The primary focus of this CT strategy was to: Incapacitate terrorist capabilities, demoralizing the
terrorists, re-establishing confidence among the public, asserting the supremacy of law and
adopting international and wholesome approach. Furthermore, the government also cracked
down on the communication networks of the terrorist cells and engaged in relentless shut down
of their operations (Tumanggor 2007)
As different CT strategies have been discussed, hailing from different countries. Now, we will
move towards our home country: Pakistan. To understand NAP and the reasons that led to its
formulation, we need to study the history of our country through a security perspective. Pakistan’s
history with terrorism will be discussed in detail and the buildup for necessity of NAP will be
established.
 History of Terrorism in Pakistan

Created in 1947, the area which now comprises of Pakistan was ruled by Muslims for about 1,145
years before the British officially colonized it in 1875. For Administrative and historical reasons,
it has been divided into four provinces (Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, KPK) and four areas
administered directly by the federal government, the federally administered areas consist of
Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT), Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) which is now a
part of KPK, Northern Areas and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). Pakistan is the sixth most
populous nation in the world, and the second biggest Muslim country with 95% of population is
Muslim, 1.85% Hindus, and 1.6% Christians. Out of the 95% Muslim population, 75% are Sunni
and 20% are Shia (with second largest Shia population after Iran) (Reference). The Sunni Shia
conflict dates back to the early history. The main Shia Suni conflict in Pakistan streams from the
idea that the Deobandi school of thought wants that the Shia’s be declared as Non-Muslim
Minority and Shia community reject this idea. Shia community represents the 20% of the Pakistani
population and have an active participation in country’s politics. Pakistani society is diverse and
vibrant, multi-ethnic, multicultural, and multilingual society still areas like Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) are of conservative nature and their way of living is guided by centuries-old
customs of the tribe. Muhajirs is Karachi express their anger over their loss of power which
resulted after the transfer of Capital from Karachi to Islamabad. The Baloch community has now
started showing its feeling of resentment and frustration towards the center due to its lack of
representation, Provincial representation, and lack of resources due to the growing control of the
center on the province’s resources. Such growing differences and conflicts emerging from
suppression have led to the creation of mainly four types of terrorist groups in Pakistan: ones base
on language, others being sectarian, race-based and religious-based. These diverse militant
groups in Pakistan have expressed their demand, which is the nationwide enforcement of Sharia
Law (Islamic law) in the country which will resemble the erstwhile Taliban Government that made
by Mullah Omer in Afghanistan , which is also happens to be their ultimate goal. Since its birth,
the country has suffered from a number of traumas, its lack of resources served as one of the main
reason why it has suffered had in the domain of stability and development. And in the following
years events like lack of political stability, separatist movements and acts of terrorism further
added to the worsening of the situation. Later the fall of East Pakistan and the creation of
Bangladesh in December 1972 left the west Pakistan in hands of a self-styled populist leader Z.A
Bhutto who in the absence of strong opposition parties at the grass root level, which would have
kept accountability in check, introduced wide ranging reforms in order to cool down the growing
political and social economic frustration and anger across the country and to show the public, that
the country was in responsible hands. The loss of East Pakistan shocked the economy of West
Pakistan to the depth of its roots. And not quite long after his term in the office that his style of
governance came to be known as ‘‘feudal’’ and slowly lost the support of public. During Bhutto
regime too there existed a mistrust between the government and other state institutions i.e.
Military, judiciary and bureaucracy. From 1971-1973, the political environment in the country was
marked with instability, the opposition parties and the provinces demanded a balance of power
between the federal and provincial government while threatening the government by taking the
campaign to road. “The situation in Baluchistan was also coming to a boil with Baluch hostility
towards the center threatened a repeat of the situation in East Pakistan. It was against the backdrop
of an armed revolt in the province of Baluchistan and the political crisis that the religious right
found its moment of glory.” ( Lieven, Pakistan: A Hard Country 2011). And in the following years
Jamaat-i-Islami with Saudi Arabia projected the Wahabi Ideology with newfound confidence and
instigated a fresh wave of anti-Ahmadi disturbances and in September 7, 1974 the constitutional
amendment declared the Ahmadis non-Muslims and opened the floodgates intolerance towards
those who were from different belief and smaller sects and this violence and instability was all
blamed on the incapacity o the state and it’s lack of religiosity. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, in 1978, was
replaced by Zia Ul Haq who started this new wave of Islamization in the country by building an
order which was based on Islamic Ideology and military supremacy in the country. “Islamization
was aimed at perpetuating the junta by manipulating the Islamic sentiments.” (Lieven, Pakistan
A Hard Country 2011) With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Pakistani society witnessed a
fundamental change in its character. With free flow of drugs, weapons and violence from the
Afghan border into the country infected Pakistan with Talibanization, Kalashnikov culture and
militancy. The involvement of Pakistan in Soviet-Afghan war had profound consequences and
repercussions for the country and its’s social, economic and political stability. An expansive state-
supported transnational *network of Muslim Militants was created to fight the Red Army in
Afghanistan as the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad brought in great cash flow into the country. “The
radical Deobandi clerics in the tribal areas were asked to give the call of jihad to their madrasah
students in exchange for large sum of money. In NWFP especially the JUI led by Mulana Fazlur
Rahman and the breakaway faction of JUI led by Sami ul Haq made the most advantage of this
policy. Many future leaders of afghan Taliban, like Mullah Omar, were educated at the madrasas
managed by Sami ul Haq” (Lieven, Pakistan A Hard Country 2011). Hence the balance of power
shifted in FATA from the elders to well-armed radical clerics.

“Pakistan’s role as a frontline state in the war against Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and the
administered flow of refugees from Afghanistan into Pakistan gave rise to arms and drug economy
in the country and no serious efforts were made by the then governments in controlling this influx.
The militant organizations hence formed in the country recruited a major portion of their wooers
from these refugee camps. Zia’s government with its Islamization policies was effective in turning
jihad into an instrument of state policy by actively encouraging jihad as the duty of Muslims, the
after effects of which on the state were wide reaching. Promoting Jihad in a country which was
already strategically vulnerable and politically unstable had devastating consequences. Buoyed by
the influx of dollar ISI became a vital state pillar.

In 1980s, the Islamic tribunal and military courts took over the civil judicial system which was a
move that neutralized the superior judiciary and was a blow to if any independent judiciary that
existed. “The 11 years of military rule in Pakistan from 1977-1988 wreaked havoc with the fragile
threads holding the federation together. With the influx of afghan refugees the country saw an
increase in the narcotics consumption so much so that in 1980s the Narcotics Control Board placed
the number of heroin addicts in Pakistan at 650,000 out of 1.9 million drug users and there was a
sudden increase in cases of depression and mental illness” (Lieven, Pakistan A Hard Country
2011). The false claim of Islamic morality in the form of jihad and Islamization that was introduced
during Zia’s regime has grave impact on the country and on the mindset of its people and the full
extent of that damage is what the country is still paying the price of. Under this scene the political
stage was dominate by the military and democracy was nowhere to be found.
 “Federal Shariat court was established with appellate powers to hear any case pertaining to
convictions and sentences under the Hudood laws which were passed in 1979 as part of Zia’s
Islamization policy. Zia’s Islamization policy was a means of empowerment to madrassa-educated
clerics by getting key positions within state bureaucracy” (Lieven, Pakistan A Hard Country 2011).

Zia’s regime played its role in prolonging the war in Afghanistan just so that it could install in
Kabul a government favorable to Pakistan and in doing so it compromised the states control over
the weapons and drugs flow in the country sectarian hatred manifested itself in to the core of
cultural print thereby increased the violence of armed militia. The simultaneous mushrooming of
mosques and madrasas with extremist ideology compounded the problem. This move towards
sectarian conflict in 1980s was matched by the growing antagonism between different linguistic
groups in Sindh. Mathematically Pakistan has been a key player and more important to the region,
the west and the world than Afghanistan is. Pakistan’s history depicts it as a negotiated stated, in
60 years of its history several attempts has been made to radically change the structure of state by
one civil and three military regimes. Yet they all failed. The personal closeness observed between
the parts of military personal to some of the Islamist finds its roots in three historical experiences;
The state sponsorship of Pathan Islamist Mujahedeen to fight against soviet in Afghanistan,
mobilization of militants to fight India and then the Benazir Bhutto’s government’s decision to
back Afghan Taliban in 1994 to conquer Afghanistan and create Islamic order. However
Musharraf did made efforts to remove this eliminate from Army by removing the sympathizers of
radical Islamist from the higher ranks of Army. “One of the main aim of the pro-Taliban Policy
of Pakistan during 1990s was to gain ‘’Strategic Depth” in Afghanistan in case of any future
potential tension or war with its hostile twin sister India” (Cheema 2016). “The top brass of
Pakistani leadership has always believed that Pakistan must have a friendly government in power
in Kabul or at least in the Pathan areas as they saw it important to steps in realist perspective to
minimize the security threat from India, which has always been Pakistan’s primary concern in
international system Therefore in the period of 1994 there was a strong perception in Islamabad
the supporting Pakistani Pashtun protégé Hikmatyar would be the best option to achieve its long
term military and economic objective in Afghanistan” (Lieven, Pakistan A Hard Country 2011).
Hence the policy of gaining a strategic depth in Afghanistan has been one of the major objectives
of Pakistan policy during 1990s; the main objective was to get strategic depth vis-a-vis India. In
1980s Benazir Bhutto questioned this strategic depth saying that she does not a land lock country
providing Pakistan and strategic depth. “In the subsequent years Pakistan payed a heavy price for
this policy as 60,000 Pakistanis died in Afghanistan and hampered the country’s economic revival”
(Musharraf 2007). However, despite the success of Taliban in Afghanistan, the Pakistani officials,
during 1998 realized that their policy in Afghanistan has gone wrong due to the entry of Osama
Bin Laden and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan as they were forced to leave Sudan, now they were
fighting against soviets and established close ties with the locals (Pathans) and integrated
themselves with the Taliban through ideological means and in 1998 carried out operations against
USA (Lieven, Pakistan A Hard Country 2011). In the subsequent years both the governments of
Nawaz Sharif and Pervez Musharraf asked the Afghan Taliban to end its ties with Al Qaeda and
enter into peace talks with USA. Despitess the changes in the subsequent regimes the basic policy
towards Afghanistan remained same. In 1997 Pakistan officially recognized Taliban, which
previously were referred to as the Islamic Militants or Mujahedeen after they launched an attack
on Mazar-e-Sharif in May, 1997 (Cheema 2016).
Pakistan, in May 25, 1997, under the then government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, became
the first country to extend recognition to the Taliban Government in Afghanistan and with that it
was welcome wide criticism from across the international arena and brought much political,
diplomatic and economic loss with no gain in its basket. Afghan war flooded Pakistan with lethal
weapons and imprinted militancy on its country’s political culture and gave birth to the
‘Kalashnikov culture’ which turned the sectarian violence within the country bloodier and
transformed militant organizations into paramilitary ones. With the rise of Taliban, In 1994
Pakistan saw a sharp increasing sectarianism. In 11, September 2001 the Al Qaeda attacked the
twin towers in USA and marked the start of real offensive of Pakistan against the Taliban as it
became the front line state in War against terrorism. Pakistan was still linked to afghan Taliban
when this attack happened and sky fell on them as USA Deputy Secretary of State in a call to the
than President of Pakistan gave two option, “either you stand with us on this war against terrorism
or we’ll bomb you to stone age”. Hesitation from Pakistan would have been very costly for the
state and the only way to escape the wrath of America, according to Musharraf was to side with
them in expelling Osama bin Laden and Taliban from Afghanistan (Musharraf 2007). It was a day
that changed the world.

Since after the attack of 9/11 Pakistan has been a frontline state in this war against terrorism and
teamed up with USA. It’s long standing involvement in this war against militancy at home and
abroad has laid enormous burden on the stateTerrorism in Pakistan is a multidimensional
phenomenon and, among many precipitating factors, the psychosocial factors play an important
role. Prior to this period the early governments were hesitant to talk about the militants who were
spreading fanaticism and extremism across the country. Islamist rebellion is not widespread in
Pakistan however the terrorist threat from Islamist extremists has been present. With the launch of
offensive against the Taliban in Afghanistan , due to the porous Pak –Agh boarder many of the
Taliban leaders including Osama fled to the countryside of adjacent Pathan areas and some to the
mountains of Quetta of Pakistan from where they launched their guerrilla warfare which lead the
US to demand Pakistan to lunch what became in effect a civil war on its own soil, which caused
immense trouble for Pakistan as the Pakistani Taliban started attacking the fellow Muslim Country
men and the civilian death toll rose unimaginably high. The Pakistan based terror groups of
Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad on December 13, 2001 launched an attack on the Indian
parliament which further intensified the crisis as the neighboring India started mobilizing its forces
on its border with Pakistan (Lieven, Pakistan A Hard Country 2011). Under immense pressure
from Washington, the President of Pakistan closed down a number of militant training camps and
banned he militant organizations like; Sipahe Sahaba Pakistan (SSP),Sipahe Muhammad (SM,
Shia), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Harkatu Mujaideen (HM) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (Cheema 2016).
This move by the Pakistan Government led to a reduction in the militant activities in India and a
relaxation in Pak-Indo relationship. Due to the strategic calculations by the Pakistani security
establishment the Musharraf regime avoided any strict operation against the Al Qaeda and Talban
in Pakistan’s tribal areas adjacent to Afghanistan border, especially Waziristan, for first three years
of war but adopted a strategy of encouraging the locals to isolate and drive out the foreign freedom
fighters which were aligned with the Pakistani Taliban, was a way of satisfying the US. The anti-
American feeling did not lead Pakistani population to support Taliban but in the areas like KPK
Taliban found the local support because following reasons; as according to the local public the
Taliban in their areas brought swift and fair justice as compared to the fractured state justice system
hence the Taliban claim to spread Islamic justice was central to their support in the country’s
Pathan areas as they were trying to implement a mixture of Shariah and the Pashtunwali in the
areas under their control, the weakness of state authority exercised in the areas like FATA, for the
sake of revenge from state of loss of their loved one in this war against terrorism, lack of
employment and poverty and the repulsive nature of semi-western, semi-modern culture. Islamist
rebels have always been urban phenomena. Pakistani Islam is a traditional and conservative one
which is are too conservative to support a revolution and far too diverse to submit themselves to
molithic version of Islam hence an Islamist extremism in Pakistan presents a real danger to the
state unless it is rarely weakened by the pressure from USA. Because of poverty most of the
children seek education in madrasahs which have served as key recruiting ground for the militants
throughout the history. Hence the attack of 9/11 was equally savage devastating for Pakistan,
whose ramifications was still face today, facing threats from within and without. In 2002 terrorists
attacked Islamic shrines, churches, Christian schools, Christian hospitals and struck terror and fear
into the public as the military and Taliban played cats and mouse with each other (Lieven, Pakistan
A Hard Country 2011). Pakistan military intervention in Waziristan came quite late due to the very
reason that neither the authority of government nor Pakistan military has ever been completely
extended to tribal areas and moved in as late as 2004 to fight the terror groups, with the underlying
fear that this move in to FATA may be a political and military debacle. In march 2004, exactly 3
years after the incident of 9/11, Pakistan carried out a major counterinsurgency operation in Wana
Valley in the south of Waziristan agency through the frontier crops (Musharraf 2007). By this time
Pakistan had been criticized for its duplicity for not launching a full offensive against the Taliban,
which was partially due to the fear of internal consequence and partially because of the non-
availability of enough drops as most of its troops were deployed against India. And it was also
during this period that the first targeted Drone Strike was held against the Taliban leader Nek
Muhammad Wazir in 2004 by USA, since then the number of US drone strikes in the region of
FATA range up to 400 and above and has contributed to civilian causality and eventually raised
the toll of extremism and terrorism in FATA thereby only worsening the situation (Musharraf
2007). Before 2007 the Taliban attacks were restricted to individual attacks of terrorism. It was
after the incident of Lal Masjid in July 2007 that the country experienced an explosive growth in
militant’s acts within and beyond the tribal areas and which also led to the formation of Pakistani
Taliban or Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) as different groups operating in the Pathan Tribal areas
come together (Lieven, Pakistan A Hard Country 2011). Lal Masjid had become a base of
extremist groups for launching attacks and most of the militant engaged such activities in
Islamabad were women, located less than 2 miles from the parliament, the cleric family which ran
this mosque was closely linked with the Pakistani establishment (Lieven, Pakistan A Hard Country
2011). The government was fearful of the consequences and most importantly the public opinion
that will result from any action against the masjid, but it was when the masjid had arrested Chinese
message girls followed by strong message from the Chinese government to take action that gave
the government the final push. And on 10th of July 2007, after the failure of a series of attempts
to negotiate that the government launched a full scale operation as Pakistani military troops
stormed the complex leading to a total casualty of 154 people including 19 soldiers (Lieven,
Pakistan A Hard Country 2011). This welcomed a storm of criticism from the civil society, media
and human rights organizations. TTP, having a loose alliance with the Baitullah Mahsud, declared
itself to be an ally of Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban. TTP’s statements about the Pakistan have
been quite very contradictory. On occasions they would launch hostilities against the state with a
determination to bring about Islamic Revolution in the country and on other occasions they had
declare no war against the Pakistani State and that their war with Pakistan army was only because
it supports USA. In order to understand the growth of militancy within the country it is foremost
important to understand the nature of border the two countries (Pakistan and Afghanistan) share.
The border diving the Pakistan and Pathan Afghanistan tribal areas is porous and weak, weak in
the sense that physical control exercised by the two states in frail, which has for long served as an
easy path of entry from one country to another. With little no check on the border the crossing of
border with explosive and lethal weapons was not an issue which eventually led to a rise in not
only lethal weapons in the country but also terrorism. The Pakistani Taliban being a loose alliance
of autonomous Islamist radical groups had a different direction and different leadership as that of
Afghan Taliban but they have the same source of inspiration; Implementation of Shariah Law
(Lieven, Pakistan A Hard Country 2011). TTP and other terrorist organization drew much of their
funding from illegal activities and the money raised from heroin trade, 0and have also been
involved in kidnapping and other crimes. Now by 2008 the sense of crisis became real as the
situation in the tribal areas became fairly worse. However, by August 2009, despite the
insecurities, there was a general feeling among the public that the situation was now getting under
control as the counter-offensive launched by the state was a classic example of classical Pakistani
response to a really serious threat, with the central role of military not only in the military operation
but in all of the other areas (Lieven, Pakistan A Hard Country 2011).

North Waziristan experienced an influx of the terrorist outfit as a result of the operation Rah-e-
Nijat in South Waziristan and operation Rah-e-rast in Swat Valley by the Pakistan army, as it
became the safe haven for the Taliban. “Throughout the period (2009-2011) the government and
the army chief was pressurized to launch an attack on the militants in North Waziristan but the
government decided to take on the to go for dialogues and in 2013 it was decided to bring the
Taliban to the negotiation tables for peace dialogues. Due to repeated failed efforts and ever
growing international pressure, the operation Zarb-e-Azab was launched on 15th June 2014 as a
full scale operation in North Waziristan Agency, FATA and Afghanistan Frontier” (Javaid,
Operation Zarb-e-Azb: A Successful Initiative to Curtail 2015 ). The operation was launched due
to the attack by the militant on Jinnah International Airport Karachi. In operation Zarb-e-Azab
around 30,000 Pakistani soldiers were deployed in North Waziristan to fight a gruella war against
the militant factions. Zarb-e-Azab was a test in itself for the army as it was trained to fight battels
on large scale and not on the small scale within the country so it was a new dynamic for the army.
“The aims of this operation are to wipe out the militants from the area and to retake control of
FATA and adjacent areas. This operation does not only mean the success of this operation, the
terrorism will be completely removed from Pakistani soil and fight will be continued till the end
of last terrorist” (Javaid, Operation Zarb-e-Azb: A Successful Initiative to Curtail 2015).
Following the launch of the operation the Pakistan Taliban (TTP) itself requested the government
to cease fire and to come to table for peace dialogues, but during the peace talks the Taliban
continued the attack across the country destroying the socio-economic fibres of the country as the
country experienced great loss not only in terms of causality but also huge economic losses as
most of the international investors refused to invest in the country, the country’s tourism industry
also experienced a sharp decline as the country was ranked as one of the most dangerous places
on world, an unsafe and unfriendly destination this lead to decrease in the inflow of foreign
investment. However due to the continuing attacks by the Taliban the government decided to carry
on the operation till the last terrorist was removed from the soil. “The operation got the final
impetus from the attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar, 132 schoolchildren, 9 staff
members and 7 attackers of TTP were massacred in APS and 121 others including 118 students
severely injured. This attack was termed “Pakistan’s 9/11,” claiming lives of 142 people, 132 of
whom were school children as a result of this the operation was taken up with new vigor, zeal and
the determination to cut down the roots of terrorism from the country” (Zahid, 2015). In an all
party’s conference the civilian and military established all came down under one roof and framed
a 20 points action plan for countering Terrorism and extremism. With the change in the military
leadership in 2016 and transfer of the office from Gen Raheel Sharif to Gen Qamar Javaid Bajwa
the military strategy also changed. Zarb-e-Azab was replaced by Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad in
2017. “The aim of this operation is threefold: eliminating the residual threat of terrorism;
consolidating the gains made thus far by military operations under Zarb-e-Azb; and de-
weaponization of the society. Pakistan Air Force, Pakistan Navy, Civil Armed Forces (CAF) and
other security and law enforcement agencies (LEAs) will continue to actively participate and
intimately support the efforts to eliminate the menace of terrorism from the country” (Khan 2017)
Besides the military the civil law enforcement agencies are now also taking up equal part in the
operation against militants. In these crucial times the role played by civil law enforcement agencies
has matured over the period of time. Since last many years, there has been sever negligence in
policy making institutes on police capacity building and engaging police in counter terrorism
(Cheema 2016) .Police is a provincial subject with all four provinces have their separate policy
system which falls directly under the control of the respective provincial governments and each
has its own Counter terrorism Department (CTD). Pakistan police lacks the basic training that is
required for their effective for fighting the terrorists. National Crises Management Centre (NCMC)
was created from ensuring coordination between the military and civil law enforcement agencies,
as a liaison (Cheema 2016). But the lack of proper transfer of information and coordination
between the military and civil law enforcement agencies aggravate the crisis. However, now we
see that the police has received the necessary training and in giving in positive input as if fights
the militants. Still, this is the start, many reforms and improvements are required and should be
introduced.

It is important to understand the role played by the Islamic parties, extremism and political violence
in Pakistan. The Islamic parties have been for long been associated by the west and policy makers
with the militants. In Pakistan the political parties based on Islam are of two types; Islamic parties
which are extremist in nature which firmly hold on to the belief that sharia should be strictly
implemented in Pakistan and that Islamic principles should guide the functioning of the
government and committed to building a theoretical state. The other ebbing the Muslim
democracies which calls for civil enforcement of some religious laws and that Islamic teachings
should inform public policy but are not extremist in nature (reference). These parties vary in their
interpretation of law and how strictly they play a role in the enforcement of Islamic laws. However,
in Pakistan the Religious parties have never been able to win a majority in any elections and have
remained a minority but their influence in the houses of government cannot be ignored (Devasher
2016). They play a major role in shaping the opinion of the majority of population. Parties like
Milli Muslim League have their militant wings Jamaat-ud-Dawa which assist the terrorist activities
in country. Recently America has laid great stress on the government to ban these organizations.
The two Islamization policies which were shepherd during 1968 till 1988 formed the ground for
the rise in sectarianism and went hands in hands with the rise of new forms of jihadism in the
country (Jaffrelot 2016 ). Sectarianism, in Pakistan, began in Zia’s period but was intensified as a
result of the impact caused by the Iranian revolution o the Shia population in Pakistan and reaction
of Saudi Arabia by promoting and funding the Wahhabism school of thought in Pakistan hence
waging a proxy war in Iran by backing Pakistani Sunni movement. Jihadism, on the other hand is
primarily an exogenous movement (Lieven, Pakistan A Hard Country 2011). These two
movements gradually merged and converged particularly in the FATA region where it found
backing by the Taliban as a means to take over the Pakistani state authority. In 2000s the Sunni
militants made their way into Punjab, which has been broken within by the Islamic extremists and
in the southern Punjab there exist strong sectarianism. Another reflection of the weakness of the
state lies in the fact the despite the several attempts made by successive regimes the state has failed
to exterminate the sectarian extremists. In 2010 the sectarian violence dramatically increased in
Baluchistan. Similarly, Karachi also saw an increase in the sectarian violence as result of massive
inflow of the displaced people, including militants from areas where military operations were
being carried out in 2009 (Jaffrelot 2016 ). The number of deaths in suspected or confirmed Sunni
Deobandi-Shia violence increased from 52 in 2010 and 77 in 2011 to 212 in 2012 and 283 in 2013
(Jaffrelot 2016 ). Sectarianism became a part of Pakistan’s daily life partly because of the attempts
of the PML(N) to mainstream the SSP/ASWJ as evident from the pervasiveness of anti-Shia
graffiti on the walls of some Pakistani cities. In the early years of post-independence sectarianism
in Pakistan had little significance whereas now it has become a structuring feature of its identity
rather identity crisis. Parties like Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal play a role in promoting sectarianism
in the country. In places like Karachi where the MQM may nevertheless offer the Shias protection.
85 Some Shias have also tended to find refuge in religiosity, a process that is nourished by “a deep-
seated feeling of fatalism. Since 1970s the rise in sectarianism in the country has introduced a
vertical split in Pakistani society that probably represents one of the biggest challenges to national
cohesion today. Especially since, besides peripheral groups like the Hazaras of Baluchistan 87 and
the Shias of Gilgit Baltistan 88 (where sectarian violence began in 1988), 89 one of the most
severely affected areas is the core province of Punjab (Jaffrelot 2016 )
The evolutionary process of anti-terrorism laws within Pakistan has proved not much productive
in efficiently fighting militancy, political violence and terrorism. Fighting terrorism in Pakistan,
the country has failed for years to pen down a comprehensive plan to deal with it. Though,
respective authorities and successive governments have come up with some laws, ordinances and
acts to curb militancy and terrorism, but every effort is in vain, especially after 9/11. In early years,
‘terrorism’ was more of political and local nature that is why before formulating and implementing
the ‘Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act (1975)’ successive regimes in Pakistan used the
Criminal Procedure Code, drafted by the British authorities. Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure
Code was used to control political activity and suppress anti-state activities. “In the early 1970s,
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto government faced violent opposition and upsurge of nationalist movements in
the NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Baluchistan. Soon after the violent episode in these
areas, Bhutto government decided to undertake all ‘necessary steps’ to stop the politics of terrorism
and secession.3 ‘Special courts’ for ‘suppression of acts of sabotage, subversion, and terrorism’
were formed in October 1974” (Cheema 2016)

1. “Anti-terror Mechanism in Pakistan

 A legal framework to deal with terrorism, ‘The Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special
Courts) Act of 1975, Antiterrorism Act (ATA) of 1997 and successive amendments to the
act and Pakistan Armed Forces (Acting in Aid of Civil power) Ordinance (PAFO)
November 20, 1998 (revoked) are few of the important legislations that were made and
used to fight terrorism and militancy in the country
 The main objective behind these anti-terrorism laws and establishment of different special
courts was to give a parallel justice system to what already is present in order to speed up
the judicial process.”

2. Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) of 1997

 Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) of 1997 was “an Act to provide for the prevention of terrorism,
sectarian violence and for speedy trial of heinous offences. With few inherent flaws in the
structure of ATA 1997, soon it was subjected to modification. The famous Mehram Ali
case is often cited as a pretext for the amendment of ATA 1997. After this, the court
declared certain sections of the ATA of 1997 ‘unconstitutional’ and addressed the need to
amend the draft. An act to provide for the prevention of terrorism, sectarian violence and
for speedy trial of heinous offences.
 Calling in of armed forces and civil armed forces in aid of civil power.-
 Punishment for acts of terrorism: Death of any person is caused, shall be punishable, on
conviction, with death or with imprisonment for life, and with fine.

3. Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance 1998

 Under this amendment the powers and jurisdiction of the military and civilian armed
forces were reduced and right was given to the accused to file an appeal in the Supreme
Court was also introduced. In this ordinance, a number of safeguards were provided to
the accused.

4. Pakistan Armed Forces (Acting in Aid of Civil Power) Ordinance (PAFO) 1998
 Under this act, civilians were now be tried in military courts instead of regular courts
the cases pending in these courts could be moved to newly established military courts
for further proceedings. These newly established military courts were given the
authority to award death sentences, death penalties as well. . A new term ‘civil
commotion’ in the list of crimes was introduced leading up to seven years of rigorous
 imprisonment. Due to immense pressure and criticism from various organizations and
institutions, On April 27, 1999 PAFO was revoked. The court dismissed certain
conditions and declared that no civilian could be charged in a military court. Under an
amendment introduced in 1999 a number of amendments were made in this act and one
of those amendments included the widening the definition of the “terrorist act”. Anti-
terrorism courts were introduced in the respective provinces through an amendment
made by the Nawaz Government in August 27,1999

5. Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Act

 Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Act 2001:
Under this (Amendment) which was made in August 15, 2001 a section was
introduced which banded militant sectarian outfits and made legislations to freeze
their financial assets. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of these courts was also
expanded.

 Anti-terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance 2002:

To add to the strength of the existing anti-terrorism efforts this ordinance was
introduced which aimed at enhancing the powers of the law enforcement agencies.
“By inserting Fourth Schedule into the ATA of 1997, clauses were added regarding
the ‘security of good behaviour’ to be fulfilled by the activists of the organization
or person whose name was recorded in the Fourth Schedule list. The Act also
provided law enforcement agencies to hold a suspect for up to one year without
challenge.” (Interior 2014-2018)

 Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance 2004:

 This Ordinance came in the view of curbing and restraining the network of militant
organizations across the country. As per this Ordinance, the government will take
all possible measures and actions if the banned militant outfits did not stop their
activities. Besides, strict measures were taken in this law, as the offices of the
banned outfits were sealed, their accounts were frozen and their literature in both
electronic and print media was also seized. “It enhanced the maximum punishment
for those found guilty of such assistance from 14 years to life imprisonment and
provided a right of appeal to the accused under Section 25(4).” (Interior 2014-2018)

 Anti-Terrorism (Second Amendment) Act 2005

Through this amendment, deterrence through enhanced penalties was sought. “A

lot of penalties were revised with higher punishments including the years of
punishment and imprisonment. The maximum punishment from 5 years to 10 years
(Section 7-B); from 14 years to life imprisonment (Section 7-C), from 7 years to 10
 years (Section 7-D), and imprisonment not exceeding 14 years to a prison term not
exceeding life imprisonment (Section 7-F)” (Interior 2014-2018)

National Internal Security Policy - 2014 – 18

In June, the Pakistan government unveiled the National Internal Security Policy
(NISP) 2018-2023. It is the second such policy report to be released during the
Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) tenure this first ever National Internal
Security Policy (NISP) is formulated to protect national interests of Pakistan by
addressing critical security issues as well as concerns of the nation. It is based upon
principles of mutual inclusiveness and integration of all national efforts iincludes
three elements
 “Dialogue with all stakeholders
 Isolation of terrorists from their support systems
 Enhancing deterrence and capacity of the security apparatus to neutralise
the threats to internal security of Pakistan.” (Interior, 2014-2018)
stakeholdersThe scope of this policy was that the policy will essentially remains
focused on Internal Security and National Security apparatus including Ministry of
Defence (MoD), will be dealing with this situation under political oversight. With
reconstruction rehabilitation, reconciliation and reintegration being the main
objectives of this policy the policy envision of to ‘‘Create a safe environment where
life, property, civil liberties and socioeconomic rights of the citizens are protected
and the people of Pakistan are able to live and prosper in harmony, freedom,
respect and dignity as enshrined in the Constitution of Pakistan.’’ (Interior, 2014-
2018).

National Action Plan-2014

On 16th December 2014, six gunmen of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
(TTP) conducted a deadly attack in Peshawar Army Public school killing 149 people
including 132 schoolchildren. This lead to a national emergency as public started
questioning the government and security apparatus of the state. In response to which,
on 24th of December 2014, the government of Pakistan lead by Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif called on an all party conference including the top military command
in order to devise a national security policy with the aim to formulate specific and
time bound and quantified agenda against terrorism. Prior to this 20 points National
Action Plan, there existed a National Security policy with detailed guidelines and
reforms in state institutions. This first ever National Internal Security Policy (NISP)
is formulated to protect national interests of Pakistan by addressing critical security
issues as well as concerns of the nation. It is based upon principles of mutual
inclusiveness and integration of all national effortsiincludes three elements (Interior,
2014-2018). But after the Peshawar APS attack the government felt the need that a
national security policy should be formulated mostly based on the hard approach
against the terrorist factions to come down hard on them hence NACTA was
assigned with the task to chalk out the 20 points action plan which was to be the
government’s 2nd consensual policy. National Action plan 1.0 consisted of some
controversial points which invited criticism from various sources let it be political,
media or public. Points like the lifting of ban from the death penalties welcomed
criticism from not only within but also from without the state. International bodies
like EU heavily criticised this move by the government and with increasing
international pressure the government was being asked to revise this policy, the other
clause with was equally controversial was the clause no.2 which states “Special trial
courts under the supervision of Army. The duration of these courts would be two
years.” (Interior, 2014-2018) This was widely criticized by the scholars and media
and political groups stating that instead of improving the existing civil criminal
justice system the government is again relying on the military giving them a upper
hand on the civil justice system was labeled as a mistake by the government.

The main aim of NAP was counter terrorism hence it focused on creating specialized
and dedicated counterterrorism force and goals for improving the overall security
situation. Steps were included to strengthen NACTA the Counter terrorism authority
and the counter terrorism department which falls under NACTA. NACTA remains
a significant challenge due to the lack of the political will. Since the enactment of
the NAP, there has not been a single meeting of the NACTA board of governors,
and despite the belated allocation of funds, it has failed to set up a Joint Intelligence
Directorate (JID) (Salahuddin, 2016).
Policy Evaluation
According to (Newby 1993) Public policy has radically transformed over the past few decades, we
as a nation has become much more sophisticated about the issues and challenges faced by the
public. This radical transformation is mainly because of three main changes “New public
Management”, “architecture of the state” i.e. focus on the relationship between executive and
legislature and “the customer paradigm” in public administration. These changes have transformed
our approaches towards public policy and policy analysis. “We have much more information,
better staff work, more attention to forecasting, more accurate costing, and more people involved
in the process of policymaking who are trained to consider options, to ask hard questions, and to
make decisions in an orderly way. The public policy community has learned a lot. Perhaps most
significantly it has learned that there are no easy answers to anything; almost any problem is more
complicated than it seems at first.” (Rivlin 1984)

Such changes have given a new direction towards how policy makers use the policy process to
design a policy that is correct and acceptable to the public. This increase in interest of designing
correct policies has also shifted the attention towards Evaluation. Nations and governments have
created new departments, agencies and institutions for the purpose of evaluation hence separating
the design process from Evaluation which in turn divides both of these processes in to “isolated,
in-itself-closed part of problem solving”. Policy makers may understand and acknowledge the
incorporation of evaluation in other policy making processes but the practical application of the
information and data collected through evaluation in designing and formulating the policy is not
very common despite the existence of evaluation units. “The focus of policy makers is still on the
future and on new beginnings, and not so much on analysis and learning from the past.” (Mosse
2004 )

According to (Scriven 1991) “Evaluation is the process of determining the merit, worth and value
of things and evaluations are the products of that process. Evaluation is not the mere accumulation
and summarizing of data that are clearly relevant for decision making…gathering and analyzing
the data that are needed for decision making comprise only one of the two key components in
evaluation, a second element is required to get to conclusions about merit or net benefits:
evaluative premises or standards. Evaluation has two arms: one in engaged in data gathering, the
other collects, clarifies and verifies relevant values and standards”. The efforts of scholars and
social scientist in incorporating evaluation in the policy making processes has been persistent but
according to Schneider the policy makers face two challenges either the information derived from
the evaluation activities are irrelevant to the existing policy idea or relevant information is not
produced from these activities. Another major challenge is that policy studies (Policy analysis,
evaluation etc.) derive its knowledge from different disciplines and point of views which has
render it a confusing state of affairs and has resulted in an absence of a proper framework of
evaluation.
Evaluation is part of every process of human life not just policy process and in administrative
processes each stage of the policy can be evaluated, in fact to make a decision between two or
more alternatives, each alternative is evaluated. One of the main characteristic of evaluation is
that it results in claims that are evaluative in nature and that can demonstrate the effectiveness or
impact of the claims based on evaluation. The values of the citizens should be considered while
evaluating policy and this requires the involvement of the policy makers and stakeholders in the
evaluating process. The Policy evaluations results in claims that may require the policy to be kept
unchanged, amend it or abrogate it. Policy analysis provides the data and information to carry out
the evaluation process. According to (Meiring n.d.) “Policy analysis is described as the dissection,
isolation and systematic examining and explaining of policy phenomena or components to
determine the effectiveness and efficiency of each part or action. Policy evaluation is seen as
complementary to policy analysis and is seen as an assessment, an appraisal of policy content and
to determine the impact and consequences.” Policy evaluation has three characteristics according
to (Meiring n.d.) 1) role that values play; 2) comparison of the end results of a policy with the set
objectives; and 3) determination of the effectiveness of the service(s) rendered and of the
objectives attained.
Policies are evaluated either at the initial stages of policy cycles or after the implementation to
evaluate its effects. Ex ante evaluation of the impact of public policy is a multidimensional analysis
that accompany not just the first stages of the policy process but also the public policy elaboration.
In this type of evaluation coherent public policies are elaborated which will make it possible to
achieve the desirable outcomes through the implementation of policies as regarded by the
authorities. “This process supposes the data collection and the analysis of other alternative
modalities of problem solution or objective achievement, and of the effects or consequences of
this Public Policy options. This type of evaluation will include in it the evaluation of budgetary,
administrative, economic, social and environmental implications of various modalities of this
problem solution.” (Moldova 2009)

Ex-post policy evaluations are carried out after the implementation of policy and is an essential
element of policy cycle. Ex post policy evaluation in general focuses on two main themes
efficiency and effectiveness of policy instrument. Most ex post evaluation methods focus on the
final outcome or final effect of a policy. According to (Mirjam Harmelink 2005) “Theory based
evaluation methods compared to ex post methods 1) Evaluates the whole policy implementation
process and not just focuses on the final effects, 2) Quantifies, to the extent possible, the “successes
and failures” of policy instruments through the development of indicators for each step in the
implementation process and 3) Provides insight on why policies succeeded or failed and how they
can be improved.” Theory based approach when applied to ex-post policy evaluation it opens every
element of policy implementation process to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of every step
of the implementation process. This unravelling provides insight into what went wrong during the
policy design and implementation and how the efficiency and effectiveness can be improved.
The theory driven evaluation methods gained prominence after Chen’s 1990 book of theory driven
approach. Evaluation theories describe or suggest what evaluators do and should do to evaluate
policies. It guides them by providing strategies, methods, instructions about the users and the uses,
roles and responsibilities of the evaluators among others. The evaluation theories are normative in
origin and are derived from practice rather than the theories that are put into practice. The idea of
theory driven approach gives more detail and explanation to evaluation but the problem resides in
its use. The theory driven evaluation methods are usually recommended as an alternative for
randomized experiments and have many synonyms and different applications but According to
(Coryn, et al. 2011) the term theory-driven evaluation denote any evaluation strategy or approach
that explicitly integrates and uses stakeholder, social science, some combination of, or other types
of theories in conceptualizing, designing, conducting, interpreting, and applying an evaluation.
Program theories are an essential part of theory driven methods and are usually represented in
graphical models that describes the relationship between the inputs or actions, outcomes and other
factors. Both linear model and nonlinear models are a representation of program theories. The
elements in these models that represent the program theory like inputs, activities and outcomes
which in combination give rise to both initial outcomes or loosely program process theory and
long term outcomes or program impact theory. In the program theory models input denotes the
resources, activities represent the actions necessary to meet the objectives and output are the
immediate outcomes. Most theorists in earlier times advocated the linear model of program theory
that is simplistic in its structure and emphasize on the relationship between the input, activities,
outputs and its long term and short term outcomes while not being considerate of other factors.
But the contemporary writers have actuated the use of linear models that other than the main
elements focuses on other factors that somehow influences the program process theory. (Coryn, et
al. 2011) suggests that “In general, these types of models are intended to integrate systems thinking
in postulating program theory, taking contextual and other factors that sometimes influence and
operate on program processes and outcomes into account.” But despite the integration of different
factors in the nonlinear model the extent to which they clearly and adequately describe the realities
and the complex, and continuously changing adaptive systems. In 1998, Scriven through his
minimalist theory criticized Chen’s program theory approach and suggested that the role of
evaluators is to figure out whether the program works not to determine how they work. Evaluators
according to Scriven do not have the capability to put forward or devise such explanations.

The Geelhoed-Schouwstra framework- A rational model of policy analysis and evaluation is

presented by Marije and Michael in 2006 which incorporates not just the usual elements of policy
cycle but also institutional and conceptual factors. This framework is a pragmatic and a useful tool
to design and evaluate policies and to figure out the factors that causes the actual outcomes of
policies to deviate from the intended outcomes. One of the most important characteristic of this
framework is that it gives equal significance to each factors based on the perception of the
evaluator, stakeholders, users and its audience. The second characteristic is its capability to explain
why it is unable to give the desired or intended results. Third, it can enable cross country
comparison in both – ex ante and ex post analyses- which will tell us whether the program is
successful and why some policies work in some countries not in others. The basic principle and
framework of the model is the schematic representation of the policy process and can be combined
with other methods and representations of policy and project planning and evaluation. The model
consists of six fundamental steps 1) Goals, 2) objective(s), 3) Methods/instruments 4) Activities,
5) Performances and 6) Evaluation. This is the basic framework of the model that is the basics of
the policy cycle which according to Marije and Michael further improved by incorporating
conceptual and institutional framework that influences each step. According to (Schouwstra and
Ellma 2006) “Underlying the goals, objectives, instruments, methods and activities chosen, policy
makers have assumptions and theories on how the policy is supposed to bring about the intended
effects, and hence achieve the objectives and goals. To clarify those, it is necessary to add an
additional layer to the framework in which the definitions, assumptions and theories are specified.”
The Geelhoed-Schouwstra framework is further extended by the incorporation of its constituent
elements like Theories and assumptions, definitions, Ideology: norms & values, attitudes and
behaviors. People have different historical background, culture, traditions and environment with
elements differing according to their location. Thus in order to find out why the actual outcome
deviate from the intended outcome it is necessary to extend the framework of policy analysis and
consolidate conceptual framework and other elements like culture, history and geography.
Incorporating conceptual framework in the model is not enough to establish the differences
between the actual and intended results. The institutional framework and their role in policy
making and evaluating is equally important. The institutional framework refers to the political,
social and economic setting. It refers to the legal setting, stakeholders and institutions that exert
influence on the policies. Thus (Schouwstra and Ellma 2006)“If the institutional requirements and
assumptions, theories, and definitions32 have also been incorporated in a policy document, then it
is possible to trace whether and why policies have or have not worked. Thus it is possible to make
the policy process a learning process, in which improving the efficiency and effectiveness of
policies and the improvement of accountability are central.”

Impact evaluation has been defined by (Purdon, et al. 2001) Evaluation to measure the impact a
policy or program has on defined outcome measures. It usually involves measuring the
counterfactual and “Also called the base case counterfactual is defined as the number of positive
outcomes that would have been observed amongst the eligible population if the program was not
in place. In most evaluations the counterfactual will be measured (with varying degrees of
accuracy) using a control group who are not in receipt of the program.” Measuring the
counterfactual is way more difficult than measuring the outcomes which is a straight forward
affair. Counterfactual is measured through different methods with a common characteristic of
comparing the population. The population includes the one that was the part of the program term
as the ‘intervention’ or treatment group or a group of people who are not part of the program
‘control group’. The characteristic of the people involve in both situations should be identical the
only difference should be their participation in the program. Impact evaluation design that ensures
equality among the treatment and the control group is randomized trial (often refer to as
experimental design). In a randomized trial the population is randomly divided into intervention
or control group and the latter is not subjected to the services of the program as though it does not
exist. The treatment group enjoys the program services. In randomized trial either the population
or the area is chosen randomly. The randomized trial is appraised as the ‘gold standard’ for
evaluation. The main advantage of such design as mentioned by (Purdon, et al. 2001) “The main
strength of the randomized trial or ‘experiment’, compared to quasi experimental designs, is that
the only two differences between the intervention and control group are ‘random differences’ and
‘the influence of the program’. Systematic differences, such as differences in motivation between
the members of the intervention and control groups, can be ruled out.” Another important
advantage is that no before program study is required to identify the similarities between the two
groups. Whereas according to this study when both the groups of people are selected from the
same population it can result in some serious practical issues. Non- Experimental designs consists
of matched area comparison design, the before-after study, the matched comparison group design,
and difference-in-differences. (Venetoklis 2002) explains the difference between experimental and
non-experimental designs as follows “The main difference between both of these designs is in the
method of assigning the treatment. Non experimental designs are used in retrospective evaluation
studies when the treatment has taken place already in the past. In those cases, the treatment has not
been distributed randomly, but rather, under certain predefined criteria. This creates the so called
“selection bias”.

The Matched comparison group design consists of a pilot project or a program that is introduced
to a group of people in a pilot area. The pilot area is then compared to the control group that is
selected on the basis of labor market characteristic. The population is chosen from the selected
area, either all the population or a sample is selected. Matched comparison group design is easy to
administer and considered more ethically acceptable than the randomized trials. In a Matched
Comparison Group Design, the population is first divided into participant and non-participant then
the intervening group is selected from the participant of the program and control group is selected
from the non-participants. According to (Purdon, et al. 2001) “The usual approach is to match each
selected participant uniquely to a nonparticipant. If the matching is done well, the non-participant
controls will be identical to their matched participants in all relevant respects with the single
exception that the participants participate and the controls do not.” Before and after study are
usually carried out in policies that are supposed to be nationally implemented. These policies have
no pilot stage and consist of the study of the condition of the population before and after the
implementation of the program. The main problem with the design is to distinguish between the
changes brought about by the introduction of the policy and the changes that would have occurred
anyway i.e. “Natural Changes”. “This is particularly problematic if the policy is expected to have
a relatively small impact, the worst case being where the expected change due to the policy is
smaller than the change that happens ‘naturally’ from year to year” (Purdon, et al. 2001).
Difference in difference is another quasi experimental design to evaluate the impact of a policy.
According to this design a group of people is selected from the eligible area and divided into the
intervention and control group. The before and after effect of the program is on these two groups.
“The idea behind the approach is that two measures of change over time (i.e. ‘differences’) are
calculated - one for the intervention group and one for the control group. The difference for the
control group gives an estimate of the change over time that would have happened if the program
had not been introduced (i.e. it measures ‘natural’ change). The difference for the intervention
group is a measure of this ‘natural’ change plus change due to the introduction of the program”.

Even though experimental designs are considered a valuable way to study the outcomes and
despite the theoretical support for their use in determining what works, practically they are not use
that often in criminal justice interventions. According to Lum and yang their rare use is usually
thought to be due to the practical issues or the ethical challenges and tend to oversimplify complex
social processes. But there are other reasons behind their rare use which is explained by Lum and
Yang in their research paper. In terms of training and disciplinary associations the use of
randomized controlled experiments is more frequent in psychology and sociology and are less
encouraged in criminology and criminal justice. “Criminology may be more policy-oriented, and
therefore, may fall prey to short-term political goals that may discourage researchers from what
they perceive as methodologies not conducive to public policy agendas. Differences between
disciplinary norms may also be related to differences in research settings and units of analyses”
(Lum and Yang 2005). Their research concluded that training both formal and informal are an
important aspect for methodological decision making. Informal training like collegiality,
mentorship and experience is equally important like the formal training. Rather than learning from
formal classroom settings the interaction with colleagues and mentorship is one way for the
researchers to learn skills, other research methods and research experiences. Funding pressures
and other requirements from the organization also influence the type of methods and
experimentation scientist use. “In particular, the power of the purse can encourage the use of more
rigorous designs, which are often connected to problems of implementation and practicality” (Lum
and Yang 2005). It is observed that if experimentation can be viewed as a method that improves
the quality of evaluation research in criminal justice, it can be said that there is much hope that
experimental methods can be promoted in evaluating the effects of treatment.

Different perspectives have developed in the field of program evaluation to study and question the
successes and failures of public policy and their effect on the public and the society. The positivist
paradigm or perspective emphasize on the objective evaluation of a policy as they believe that
there are unchangeable natural laws and objective reality that should be considered while
evaluating policy. The positivist believed that a methodological approach and an evaluation recipe
is required to objectively assess and then apply to public activities. “The positivist paradigm of
evaluation was developed through three key generations that were elaborated consecutively. The
first generation supports the concept of the measurement of evaluation. The second generation
investigates the concept of evaluation description. The third generation is a more judgement
oriented evaluation.” (Dessouky 2016) The constructionist perspective on the other hand views
policy evaluation or success and failure in a subjective or relativistic manner that cannot be
objectively assess and is open to interpretation by different political actors. “This is to view them
not as objectively assessable outcomes of policy-making, so much as judgements which are
inherently subjective or ‘interest’-inspired statements made by different policy actors about some
past, current or future state of affairs which lack the need for any objective status or characteristics
which would make them susceptible to classification and further analysis”. (Howlett M 2009) But
according to (Dessouky 2016) a group of researchers advocates the fifth generation of evaluation.
This new generation or researchers believes that researchers have to move from a constructivist to
a social constructionist paradigm. In this new ideology action research represents a useful tool of
evaluation to create a specific relationship between the theory and practice of evaluation. The
theory driven approach requires that the design and application of evaluation needs to be guided
by a conceptual framework called program theory. “Program theory is defined as a set of explicit
or implicit assumptions by stakeholders about what action is required to solve a social, educational
or health problem and why the problem will respond to this action. The purpose of theory-driven
evaluation is not only to assess whether an intervention works or does not work, but also how and
why it does so. The information is essential for stakeholders to improve their existing or future
programs.” (Chen 2012) Whereas the method driven approach follows methodical steps to evaluate
policy and does not take into consideration the stake holders . “According to method-driven
evaluation proposes the design of an evaluation is mainly guided by the predetermined research
steps required by a particular method, quantitative, qualitative, or mixed. Unlike method-driven
evaluation views evaluation mainly a theoretical, methodological activities, Method-driven
evaluation tends to ignore stakeholders’ view and concern in evaluation”. (Chen 2012) There are
other works that have rejected the relativistic/constructionist perspective and focused on
differentiating between policy success and failures, particularly in different types of failures, such
as “Policy fiascos” (Mark Bovens 1996), ‘Governance failures’ (Weimer, 1990), ‘policy
accidents’, (Dunleavy, 1995), ‘policy catastrophes’ (Moran, 2001) and policy Anomalies (Hall,
1993). “A common way to treat policy failures in this latter literature is as the reverse of policy
success: in the sense that whatever does not succeed is a failure, so that observers are seen not as
creating their own interpretive or discursive universe in a purely subjective way, but rather are
rendering judgements about an actually existing state of affairs”. (Howlett 2012)

(McConnell, why do policies fail? 2014) however, believes that policy success and failure is a
complex phenomenon and is rarely “all or nothing”. Usually, there are shades of grey that needs
to be considered while making a decision because sometimes judgement is required in terms of
the interpretation and significance that should be given to shortfalls, lack of evidence and conflicts.
Even without adopting a rational scientific perspective there is a logic that we should identify what
goals and objectives were set and then evaluate whether those goals were achieved or not. But
what if a policy achieves its goals partially? How shall the policy be labelled? Do the shortcomings
negate the success, or should we weigh up each, here a line needs to be drawn because there is no
scientific formula to make this decision.

(McConnell 2010) Divides policy into three strands Process, Programs and Politics on the basis of
succeeding or failing to present a holistic or heuristic approach to policy success or failure. This
helps to comprehend the different dimensions of policy in order to grasp the ways in which success
and failure may be manifest within them. Success and failures are not mutually exclusive and
exploring their dimensions takes us beyond the polarized portrayal of policy success as outcomes.
Identifying policy success and failure on a spectrum also allows meaningful cross-sectoral and
cross-policy comparisons.

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