VELASQUEZ v.

PEOPLE
G.R. No. 195021, March 15, 2017
LEONEN, J.:

Facts: At about 10:00 p.m., the spouses Jesus and Ana Del Mundo left their home to sleep in their nipa hut. Arriving at the nipa hut, the
Del Mundo Spouses saw Ampong and Nora Castillo having sex. Perceived to be a defilement of his property, Jesus Del Mundo shouted
invectives at Ampong and Nora, who both ran away. Jesus decided to pursue Ampong and Nora, while Ana Del Mundo (Ana) left to fetch
their son elsewhere. Jesus went to the house of Ampong's aunt, but Ampong and Nora weren’t there. He began making his way back
home when he was blocked by Ampong and his fellow accused. Without provocation, petitioner Nicolas hit the left side of Jesus' forehead
with a stone. Petitioner Victor also hit Jesus' left eyebrow with a stone. Accused Felix did the same, hitting Jesus above his left ear. Accused
Sonny struck Jesus with a bamboo, hitting him at the back, below his right shoulder. Ampong punched Jesus on his left cheek. The accused
then left Jesus on the ground, bloodied. Jesus crawled and hid behind blades of grass, fearing that the accused might return. He then got
up and staggered his way back to their house.

Jesus testified on his own ordeal. In support of his version of the events, the prosecution also presented the testimony of Maria
Teresita Viado (Maria Teresita). Maria Teresita was initially approached by Jesus' wife, Ana, when Jesus failed to immediately return
home. She and Ana embarked on a search for Jesus but were separated. At the sound of a man being beaten, she hid behind some
bamboos, where she saw the accused mauling Jesus. At the Del Mundo Spouses' residence, Maria Teresita recounted to them what she
had witnessed (Jesus had managed to return home by then). Ana and Maria Teresita then brought Jesus to the Barangay where he was
assisted to be brought to the hospital. After undergoing an x-ray examination, Jesus was found to have sustained a crack in his skull and
Positive in Alcoholic breath, as stated in his medico-legal certificate

Issue: Whether the Petitioners acted in defense of themselves, and also in defense of Mercedes, Nicolas' wife and Victor's mother,
invoking the first and second justifying circumstances under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code.

Ruling: To successfully invoke self-defense, an accused must establish: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
resorting to self-defense. Defense of a relative under Article 11 (2) of the Revised Penal Code requires the same first two (2) requisites as
self-defense and, in lieu of the third in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making the defense had no
part therein.

Contrary to what a successful averment of self-defense or defense of a relative requires, petitioners offered nothing more than a
self-serving, uncorroborated claim that Jesus appeared out of nowhere to go berserk in the vicinity of their homes. They failed to present
independent and credible proof to back up their assertions. The Regional Trial Court noted that it was highly dubious that Jesus would go
all the way to petitioners' residences to initiate an attack for no apparent reason. Furthermore, the Court takes judicial notice of (the) big
difference in the physical built of the private complainant and accused Victor Velasquez, Sonny Boy Velasquez, Felix Caballeda and Jojo
del Mundo, private complainant is shorter in height and of smaller built than all the accused. The said accused could have had easily held
the private complainant, who was heavily drunk as they claim, and disarmed him without the need of hitting him. The injuries which Jesus
were reported to have sustained spoke volumes. Even if it were to be granted that Jesus was the initial aggressor, the beating dealt to
him by petitioners and their co-accused was still glaringly in excess of what would have sufficed to neutralize him. It was far from a
reasonably necessary means to repel his supposed aggression. Petitioners thereby fail in satisfying the second requisite of self-defense
and of defense of a relative.

Petition is Denied. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

 PEOPLE vs. REGALARIO
G.R. No. 174483 March 31, 2009
LEONEN, J.:

Facts: On the night of February 22, 1997, a public dance and singing contest was held in Ligao, Albay. There was a commotion in the area
assigned to accused Ramon Regalario. When he approached the group where the disturbance was taking place, Rolando Sevilla suddenly
emerged from the group and fired a shot at him. Instinctively, and in order to disable Sevilla from firing more shots, he struck his assailant
with his nightstick and hit him at the back of his head. Sotero arrived and Ramon told him that Rolando still had the gun. So, Sotero
plunged at Rolando and they wrestled on the ground for the possession of the gun. Ramon knocked the gun off his hand and it fell near
the place where Jose Poblete was standing. Poblete just arrived at the scene along with Marciano Regalario. Poblete picked the gun up.
He was instructed by Marciano to keep it until it is turned over to the authorities. Bienvenido Regalario, the barangay tanod, was
instructed by Marciano, the barangay captain, to effect the arrest of Rolando Sevilla for the crime of shooting Ramon. So, he tied the
hands and feet of Rolando Sevilla for fear that he might be able to escape. On the early morning of February 23, a team of policemen
went to Natasan and found the dead body of Rolando Sevilla.

For automatic review is the decision of the CA which affirmed with modification, an earlier decision of the RTC, finding accused-
appellants Ramon, Marciano, Sotero, Bienvenido and Noel, all surnamed Regalario guilty of murder.

Issue: Whether the lower court erred in not finding that the deceased was killed in self-defense and/or defense of relative.

Ruling: When self-defense is invoked by an accused charged with murder or homicide, he necessarily owns up to the killing but may
escape criminal liability by proving that it was justified and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor. Hence, the three (3) elements
of self-defense, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel the aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself, must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence. However, without unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, either complete or incomplete.

By Ramon’s own account, after he was shot, he hit the victim at the back of the latter’s head and he continued hitting the victim who
retreated backward. From that moment, the inceptive unlawful aggression on the part of the victim ceased to exist and the continuation
of the offensive stance of Ramon put him in the place of an aggressor. There was clearly no longer any danger, but still Ramon went
beyond the call of self-preservation.

Ramon’s claim of self-defense is further belied by the presence of two (2) stab wounds on the neck, four (4) lacerated wounds on the
head, as well as multiple abrasions and contusions on different parts of the victim’s body. Even if it were true that the victim fired a gun
at Ramon, the number, nature and severity of the injuries suffered by the victim indicated that the force used against him by Ramon and
his co-accused was not only to disarm the victim or prevent him from doing harm to others.

In the case at bar, with the manner in which the attack against Rolando was carried out, and the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
positively identifying the accused-appellants as the assailants, SC concur in the rulings of the CA, affirming those of the trial court, in (a)
disregarding Ramon Regalario’s declaration that he attacked the victim in self-defense and (b) holding that all the accused-appellants
acted in concert and killed Rolando.
 PEOPLE v. DULIN
G.R. No. 171284, June 29, 2015
BERSAMIN, J.:

Facts: Tamayao was on Tamayao Street in Atulayan Norte, Tuguegarao at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening of August 22, 1990 when a
young man came running from the house of Vicente Danao towards the house of Batulan, shouting that his Uncle Totoy (Batulan) had
been stabbed. Tamayao rushed towards Danao’s house, which was about 30 meters from his own house, and there he saw Dulin stabbing
Batulan who was already prostrate face down. Dulin was on top of Batulan, as if kneeling with his left foot touching the ground. Dulin was
holding Batulan by the hair with his left hand, and thrusting the knife at the latter with his right hand. Seeing this, Tamayao ran towards
Batulan’s house to inform Estelita Batulan, the victim’s wife who was his aunt, about the incident. He went home afterwards. There has
been a long-standing grudge between Batulan and Dulin, and of seeing them fighting in April 1990. He recalled Dulin uttering on two
occasions: “He will soon have his day and I will kill him”. Cabalza, a barangay tanod, was in his house around 10:00 o’clock in the evening
of August 22, 1990 when he heard the commotion in Danao’s house which was facing his house. It was Carolina, Danao’s daughter,
screaming for help. He thus sought out a fellow barangay tanod. On his return to the scene, he found Batulan at the door of Danao’s
house, with Dulin wielding a sharp pointed instrument, about 6-7 inches long. Fearing for his safety, he rushed to the Barangay Hall to
seek the assistance of Edwin Cabalza and Nanding Buenaflor to bring Batulan to the Provincial Hospital in Carig, Tuguegarao At the
hospital, she was told that her husband had sustained two wounds in the back and several stab wounds in the front, and was being
attended to at the hospital’s intensive care unit (ICU) before he expired.

Defender’s Side: He was attacked first

RTC rendered its decision convicting Dulin of murder. CA affirmed decision

Issues:
Whether Dulin was in the act of self-defense

Ruling:
Although Batulan had initiated the attack against Dulin, the unlawful aggression from Batulan effectively ceased once Dulin had wrested
the weapon from the latter. Dulin testitified that after the initial stabbing attack on him, he was able to take possession of the weapon
and ran towards the second level of the house of Vicente Danao, away from Batulan. At that point, the unlawful aggression against him
ceased. When Batulan and Dulin grappled for possession of the weapon, Dulin now became the armed protagonist, and Batulan’s act of
trying to wrest the weapon cannot be considered as unlawful aggression. At that moment, appellant no longer faced any immediate
danger to his life from Batulan. In retaliation, the aggression that the victim started already ceased when the accused attacked him, but
in self-defense, the aggression was still continuing when the accused injured the aggressor. Hence Pursuant to Article 11 (1) of the Revised
Penal Code, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of Batulan to justify the fatal stabbing of Dulin.
 PEOPLE vs. FONTANILLA
G.R. No. 177743 January 25, 2012
BERSAMIN, J.:

Facts: Jose Olais was walking along the provincial road in Butubut Oeste,Balaoan, La Union when Alfonso Fontanilla suddenly struck him
in the head with a piece of wood called bellang. Olais fell facedown to the ground, but Fontanilla hit him again in the head with a piece
of stone. Fontanilla desisted from hitting Olais a third time only because Joel Marquez and Tirso Abunan, the sons-in-law of Olais, shouted
at him, causing him to run away. Marquez and Abunan rushed their father-in-law to a medical clinic, where Olais was pronounced dead
on arrival. At the trial, Fontanilla claimed self-defense. He said that on the night of the incident, he had been standing on the road near
his house when Olais, wielding a nightstick and appearing to be drunk, had boxed him in the stomach. Although he had then talked to
Olais nicely, the latter had continued hitting him with his fists, striking him with straight blows. Olais, a karate expert, had also kicked him
with both his legs. He had thus been forced to defend himself by picking up a stone with which he had hit the right side of the victim’s
head, causing the latter to fall face down to the ground. He had then left the scene for his house upon seeing that Olais was no longer
moving. The RTC rejected Fontanilla’s plea of self-defense. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC.

Issue: Is there a standard of proof required in order for self-defense to be appreciated?

Held: Yes. Pursuant to Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, In order for self-defense to be appreciated, Fontanilla had to prove by clear
and convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is
the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing,
for there is nothing to repel.

In the case at bar, by invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that caused the death of Olais. It is
basic that once an accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he
assumed the burden to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that would avoid his criminal
liability. Having thus admitted being the author of the death of the victim, Fontanilla came to bear the burden of proving the justifying
circumstance to the satisfaction of the court, and he would be held criminally liable unless he established self-defense by sufficient and
satisfactory proof. He should discharge the burden by relying on the strength of his own evidence, because the Prosecution’s evidence,
even if weak, would not be disbelieved in view of his admission of the killing. Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. A review of the
records reveals that Olais did not commit unlawful aggression against Fontanilla and Fontanilla’s act of hitting the victim’s head with a
stone, causing mortal injury, was not proportional to, and constituted an unreasonable response to the victim’s fistic attack and kicks.
Hence, The CA bad RTC concur that the suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack effectively denied to Olais the ability to defend
himself, proving the absence of the first element of self-defense under Article 11 of the RPC.
 RAMON JOSUE y GONZALES vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 199579 December 10, 2012
REYES, J.:

Facts: The petitioner was charged with the crime of frustrated homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.

That on or about May 1, 2004, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of ARMANDO MACARIO y PINEDA a.k.a. BOYET ORA, by then
and there shooting the said Armando Macario y Pineda a.k.a. Boyet Ora several times with a cal. 45 pistol hitting him on the different
parts of his body, thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of Homicide, as a consequence, but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able medical attendance rendered
to the said ARMANDO MACARIO y PINEDA a.k.a. BOYET ORA which prevented his death thereafter.

Dr. Tiongson (star witness) confirmed that Macario sustained three (3) gunshot wounds: (1) one on his right hand, (2) one on his left
elbow, and (3) one indicating a bullet's entry point at the posterior of the chest, exiting at the anterior line. Dr. Calalang took note of the
tiny metallic foreign bodies found in Macario's x-ray results, which confirmed that the wounds were caused by gunshots. Further, she said
that the victim's injuries were fatal, if not medically attended to. Macario incurred medical expenses for his treatments. Petitioner
declared to have merely acted in self-defense. He claimed that on the evening of May 1, 2004, he, together with his son Rafael, was
watching a television program when they heard a sound indicating that the hood of his jeepney was being opened. He then went to the
place where his jeepney was parked, armed with a .45 caliber pistol tucked to his waist. There he saw Macario, together with Eduardo
Matias and Richard Akong, in the act of removing the locks of his vehicle's battery. When the petitioner sought the attention of Macario's
group, Macario pointed his .38 caliber gun at the petitioner and pulled its trigger, but the gun jammed and failed to fire. The petitioner
then got his gun and used it to fire at Macario, who was hit in the upper arm. Macario again tried to use his gun, but it still jammed then
fell on the ground. As Macario reached down for the gun, the petitioner fired at him once more, hitting him at the back. When Macario
still tried to fire his gun, the petitioner fired at him for the third time, hitting his hand and causing Macario to drop his gun. The petitioner
got Macario's gun and kept it in his residence.

Issue: Whether Josue is entitled to claim Self Defense.

Ruling: No. Macario was unarmed at the time of the shooting, while the petitioner then carried with him a .45 caliber pistol. Granting
that the victim tried to steal the petitioner’s car battery, such did not equate to a danger in his life or personal safety. At one point during
the fight, Macario even tried running away, but the petitioner continued to chase him, using the .45 caliber pistol, fired and caused a
mortal wound on his chest. The weapon used, number of gunshots fired by the petitioner, plus nature and location of the victim’s wounds,
negate the claim of self-defense. In the case at bar, pursuant to Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code, “unlawful aggression”, there was
no unlawful aggression on the part of Macario, to reasonably justify the shooting of Josue.
 TOLEDO vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 158057 September 24, 2004
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Facts: This is a petition for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming on appeal, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Odiongan, Romblon, Branch 82 convicting the petitioner of homicide.

On September 16, 1995, Noe Toledo y Tamboong (Noe) went to a black-smith who made the design of his bolo. When he went home to
Tuburan, Odiongan, Romblon late in the afternoon, he saw the group of Lani Famero, Michael Fosana, Rex Cortez and Ricky Guarte
drinking gin at the house of the Spouses Manuel and Eliza Guarte, Ricky’s parents. His house is about five (5) meters away from the house
of Guarte Spouses. He requested the group of Ricky to refrain from making any noise and proceeded inside his house and went to sleep.
Around 9:00 p.m., Gerardo Faminia, Eliza Guarte’s brother arrived at the Guarte house and asked for any left-over food. Eliza prepared
dinner for him and after Gerardo finished eating, he went home accompanied by Ricky. Gerardo’s home is about 12 meters away from
the Guarte home. Minutes later, Ricky came back and together with Lani, Rex and Michael, went to sleep at the Guarte house. They had
not laid down for long when they heard stones being hurled at the roof of the house. The stoning was made three (3) times. Ricky rose
from bed and peeped through a window. He saw Noe stoning their house. Ricky went out of the house and proceeded to Noe’s house.
Ricky asked Noe, his uncle, why he was stoning their house. Noe did not answer but met Ricky at the doorstep of his house and, without
any warning, stabbed Ricky on the abdomen with a bolo. Eliza had followed his son Ricky and upon seeing that Ricky was stabbed, shouted
for help. Lani heard Eliza’s cry for help and immediately rushed outside the house. Lani saw Ricky leaning on the ground and supporting
his body with his hands. Lani helped Ricky stand up and brought him to the main road. Lani asked Ricky who stabbed him and Ricky replied
that it was Noe who stabbed him. Docloy Cortez arrived at the scene on board his tricycle. Accordingly, Ricky was put on the tricycle and
taken to the Romblon Provincial Hospital.

At the Romblon Provincial Hospital, Dr. Fetalvero operated on Ricky that very night. Ricky had sustained one (1) stab wound but due to
massive blood loss, he died while being operated on. Dr. Fetalvero issued a Medico-Legal Certificate showing the injuries sustained by
Ricky wherein there is a stab wound on the left chest with gastric & transverse colon evisceration measuring 6 cms. long, irregular-edged
at 8th ICS, left penetrating.

RTC rendered judgment finding the petitioner guilty as charged. The CA rendered judgment affirming the assailed decision with
modifications. The CA also denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereof. The appellate court ruled that the petitioner failed
to prove that he acted in self-defense. The Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the petitioner failed to prove self-defense with clear
and convincing evidence. Hence, the decision of the CA affirming, on appeal, the decision of the RTC is correct.

Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review, contending that the CA erred in not finding that he acted in self-defense
when he stabbed the victim by accident and prays that he be acquitted of the crime charged.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner acted on self-defense, and can he invoke Article 12, par. 12 of the RPC?

Ruling: No. The petitioner adopted in this Court two divergent theories – (1) that he killed the victim to defend himself against his unlawful
aggression; hence, is justified under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) that his bolo accidentally hit the victim and is,
thus, exempt from criminal liability under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.

It is an aberration for the petitioner to invoke the two defenses at the same time because the said defenses are intrinsically antithetical.
There is no such defense as accidental self-defense in the realm of criminal law. The petitioner failed to prove that the victim was killed
by accident, without fault or intention on his part to cause it. The petitioner was burdened to prove with clear and convincing evidence,
the essential requisites for the exempting circumstance under Article 12, paragraph 4.

The evidence on record revealed that there is no unlawful aggression on the part of Ricky. While it was established that Ricky was stabbed
at the doorstep of appellant’s house which would give a semblance of verity to appellant’s version of the incident, such view, however,
is belied by the fact that Ricky arrived at appellant’s house unarmed and had only one purpose in mind, that is, to ask appellant why he
threw stones at his house. With no weapon to attack appellant, or defend himself. Appellant was not justified in stabbing Ricky. There
was no imminent threat to appellant’s life necessitating his assault on Ricky. Pursuant to Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, Unlawful
aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense. For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there
must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. In the
absence of such element, appellant’s claim of self-defense must fail. Furthermore, with the failure of the petitioner to prove self-defense,
the inescapable conclusion is that he is guilty of homicide as found by the trial court and the CA. He cannot even invoke Article 12,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
 SHERWIN DELA CRUZ vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 189405 November 19, 2014
PERALTA, J.:

Facts: on January 1, 2005, at around 2:30 in the afternoon, petitioner went to the office of Sykes Asia Inc. located at the 25th Floor of
Robinson’s Summit Center,Ayala Avenue, Makati City. He went to the work station of the deceased victim, Jeffrey Wernher L. Gonzales
(Jeffrey), who, by according to the eye witness Antonette Managbanag’s sketch, was seated in front of his computer terminal, with his
back towards the aisle. As petitioner approached Jeffrey from the back, petitioner was already holding a gun pointed at the back of
Jeffrey’s head. At the last second, Jeffrey managed to deflect the hand of petitioner holding the gun, and a short struggle for the
possession of the gun ensued thereafter. Petitioner won the struggle and remained in possession of the said gun. Petitioner then pointed
the gun at Jeffrey’s face, pulled the trigger four (4) times, the fourth shot finally discharging the bullet that hit Jeffrey in the forehead,
eventually killing him. Finally, after shooting Jeffrey, petitioner fled the office.

The defense however states that on the same day, around 2:30 pm, the petitioner went to Sykes Asia with his children to fetch his wife,
Darlene dela Cruz from the 25th floor of Robinson’s Summit Building in Makati City to celebrate the New Years Together. Petitioner
underwent the regular security check-up procedures. He was frisked by the guards-on-duty manning the main entrance of said building.
No firearm was found in his possession. He registered his name at the logbook and surrendered a valid ID. He was frisked again in the 25th
floor, still no gun was found on him. He did not find his wide at the table however. The petitioner approached a man and asked the
whereabouts of his wife after introducing himself as Darlene’s husband. Petitioner was asked why he was looking for Darlene, he replied
that he was asked to fetch her. Jefferey replied, “Ayaw na nga ng asawa mo sayo sinusundo mo pa!” which shocked and appalled the
petitioner. Petitioner inquired who he was, and Jeffrey suddenly cursed at him. Jeffrey suddenly picked up something in his chair which
happened to be a gun. Jeffrey pointed it at petitioner’s face followed by a clicking sound. The gun did not fire. Petitioner grappled with
Jeffrey for the possession of the gun. The gun clicked for 2-3 more times, still did not fire. Petitioner was able to wrest away the gun from
Jeffrey and tried to run away to avoid further confrontation. Jeffrey blocked the path and shouted “Guard! Guard!”. Jeffrey then took a
fire extinguisher, aimed, and was about to smash the same on petitioner’s head. Acting instinctively, petitioner parried the attack while
still holding the gun. The gun accidentally fired and the single bullet hit Jeffrey’s forehead, which caused the latter to fall to the floor.
After the incident, Darlene left the petitioner along with their two young children. Petitioner later learned that Darlene had an illicit
relationship with Jeffrey.

Issue: Whether the privileged mitigating circumstance of self-defense is applicable in this case.

Ruling: No. The third element of self-defense recognized that unlawful aggression is a conditio sine qua non for upholding the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. If there is nothing to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of self-defense will have no basis. Hence,
there is no basis to entertain petitioner’s argument that a privileged mitigating circumstance of self-defense is applicable in this case,
because unless the victim has committed unlawful aggression against the other, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete,
on the part of the latter.
 GUEVARRA v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 170462, February 05, 2014
BRION, J.:

Facts: Rodolfo and Joey Guevarra were charged with the crimes of frustrated homicide on the person of Erwin and David Ordonez.
Petitioners claimed that Erwin, David and their companion Philip forced their way into the petitioners’ compound and threw stones at
the house and tricycle of Rodolfo. Moreover, petitioners alleged that David threatened to kill and proceeded to hit Rodolfo, who in self-
defense, hacked and stabbed the Ordonez brothers with a bolo. On the contrary, the prosecution claimed that, while walking home from
a party, David was suddenly stabbed by Joey and immediately thereafter Rodolfo hacked Erwin, hitting his arm and back. After which, he
was dragged into the petitioners’ compound where he was hacked and stabbed 13 times and ultimately lost consciousness. The RTS and
subsequently the Court of Appeals gave credence to the prosecution’s version of the incident and found the petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of frustrated homicide and homicide.

Issue: Whether or not the justifying circumstance of self-defense was present.

Ruling: No. There was no self-defense. By invoking self–defense, the petitioners, in effect, admitted to the commission of the acts for
which they were charged, albeit under circumstances that, if proven, would have exculpated them. With this admission, the burden of
proof shifted to the petitioners to show that the killing and frustrated killing of David and Erwin, respectively, were attended by the
following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the persons resorting to self–defense. Of all the burdens the
petitioners carried, the most important of all is the element of unlawful aggression which must be proven first in order for self–defense
to be successfully pleaded. There can be no self–defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful
aggression against the person who resorted to self–defense. In the case at bar, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the
victims as they were suddenly attacked by herein petitioners.
 PEOPLE vs. SEVILLANO
G.R. No. 200800 February 9, 2015
PEREZ, J.:

Facts: Pablo Maddauin was having their usual chit-chat with two other people at a vacant lot. While conversing, they saw Oscar Sevillano
coming toward them who could not walk straight and appeared to be drunk. Without warning, Sevillano pulled out a knife from his waist
and stabbed Maddauin on the chest. Maddauin’s companions tried to restrain the Sevillano from attacking, but one of them experienced
leg cramps and lost his hold on Sevillano. Sevillano turned again on Maddauin and continued to stab him several times more. The victim
was heard asking appellant, "Bakit?" The victim’s wife came to the scene and embraced appellant as she wrestled for the knife. Thereafter,
the victim was brought to the hospital, but died that same day.

Sevillano interposed self-defense to absolve himself from criminal liability. He averred that in the afternoon, he went to the vacant lot
simply to feed his chicken with his friends. While doing so, he claims that Maddauin, who had bloodshot eyes, stepped on his injured foot,
then came at him with a drawn knife but missed his target; that they grappled for the knife and that the latter was accidentally stabbed.

Issue: Whether the accused acted in self-defense.

Ruling: No. The accused did not act under self-defense.

Under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the RPC, the following elements must be present in order that a plea of self-defense may be validly
considered in absolving a person from criminal liability: First. Unlawful Aggression; Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel it; and Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Appellant’s version that it
was the victim who was armed with a knife and threatened to stab him was found by the lower court to be untenable. Assuming arguendo
that there was indeed unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, the imminence of that danger had already ceased the moment
appellant was able to wrestle the knife from him. Thus, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would justify the
need for him to kill the victim or the former aggressor. The Court has ruled that if an accused still persists in attacking his adversary, he
can no longer invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense. The fact that the victim suffered many stab wounds in the body that
caused his demise, and the nature and location of the wound also belies and negates the claim of self-defense. It demonstrates a criminal
mind resolved to end the life of the victim.
 PEOPLE vs. GENOSA
G.R. No. 135981 January 15, 2004
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts: Marivic Genosa, the appellant, on November 15, 1995, attacked and wounded her husband which ultimately led to his death.
According to the appellant, she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night and it was her husband who began the
provocation. The appellant said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her
baby safely. The appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five times, but that Ben would
always follow her and they would reconcile. The appellant said that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night
was because he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos. The appellant, after being interviewed by specialist, has been shown
to be suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome. The appellant with a plea of self-defense admitted the killing of her husband. She was
found guilty of the crime of parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the husband was attacked while asleep.

Issue: Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the Battered woman syndrome as constituting self-defense?

Ruling: No, since the existence of Battered woman syndrome, which the appellant has been shown to be suffering in the relationship
does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-
defense. Under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes
actual, sudden and unexpected attack on the life or safety of a person. In the present case, however, according to the testimony of the
appellant there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of the husband and her fatal attack upon him. She had
already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children's bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased
his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a
position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

Without continuous aggression there can be no self-defense. And absence of aggression does not warrant complete or incomplete self-
defense. The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence” supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and
Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents but appellant failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in
the past, she had gone through a similar pattern. Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle.