G.R. No. L-23051 October 20, 1925 At last the patience of the officers was exhausted.
atience of the officers was exhausted. So policeman Rosacker took hold of
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JOSE MA. VELOSO, defendant-appellant.
Claro M. Recto for appellant.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila finding the
accused, Jose Ma. Veloso, guilty of the crime of resistance of the agents of the authority,
in violation of article 252 of the Penal Code, and sentencing him to four months and one
day imprisonment, arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties, to pay a fine of P200,
with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs. The errors assigned by counsel for the accused as appellant, go to the proposition
that the resistance of the police was justifiable on account of the illegality of the John
Doe search warrant.
In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used
by an organization known as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time
a member of the House of Representative of the Philippine Legislature. He was also the
manager of the club.
The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was
nothing more than a gambling house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief
of the gambling squad, had been to the club and verified this fact. As a result, on May
25, 1923, Detective Andres Geronimo of the secret service of the City of Manila, applied
for, and obtained a search warrant from Judge Garduño of the municipal court. Thus
provided, the police attempted to raid the Parliamentary Club a little after three in the
afternoon of the date above- mentioned. They found the doors to the premises closed
and barred. Accordingly, one band of police including policeman Rosacker, ascended a
telephone pole, so as to enter a window of the house. Other policemen, headed by
Townsend, broke in the outer door.
Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the
police. One of them was the defendant Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted,
and the latter showed him the search warrant. Veloso read it and told Townsend that he
was Representative Veloso and not John Doe, and that the police had no right to search
the house. Townsend answered that Veloso was considered as John Doe. As Veloso's
pocket was bulging, as if it contained gambling utensils, Townsend required Veloso to
show him the evidence of the game. About five minutes was consumed in conversation
between the policemen and the accused the policemen insisting on searching Veloso,
and Veloso insisting in his refusal to submit to the search.
Veloso only to meet with his resistance. Veloso bit Rosacker in the right forearm, and
gave him a blow in another part of the body, which injured the policeman quite severely.
Through the combined efforts of Townsend and Rosacker, Veloso was finally laid down
on the floor, and long sheets of paper, of reglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and chips
were taken from his pockets.
All of the persons arrested were searched and then conducted to the patrol wagons.
Veloso again refused to obey and shouted offensive epithets against the police
department. It was necessary for the policemen to conduct him downstairs. At the door,
Veloso resisted so tenaciously that three policemen were needed to place him in the
patrol wagon. 1awph!l.net
In the municipal court of the City of Manila, the persons arrest in the raid were accused
of gambling. All of them were eventually acquitted in the Court of First Instance for lack
of proof, with the sole exception of Veloso, who was found guilty of maintaining a
gambling house. This case reached the appellate court where the accused was finally
sentenced to pay a fine of P500. (No. 22163. 1 )
The foregoing are the principal facts taken mainly from the findings of the trial judge,
the Honorable Vicente Nepomuceno. Counsel for the appellant makes no effort to
impugn these findings, except that he stresses certain points as more favorable to the
case of his client. The defense, as previously indicated, is planted squarely on the
contention that since the name of Veloso did not appear in the search warrant, but instead
the pseudonym John Doe was used, Veloso had a legal right to resist the police by force.
The nature of this defense makes it advisable to set forth further facts, relating
particularly to the search warrant, before passing to the law.
There are found in the record the application for search warrant, the affidavit for search
warrant, and the search warrant. The application reads:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF MANILA
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff, vs. JOHN DOE, Defendant.
APPLICATION FOR (G)
SEARCH WARRANT
Testimony taken before Hon. L. Garduño, Judge, Municipal Court, Manila.
Andres Geronimo, being duly sworn, testifies as follows:
Q. What is your name, residence and occupation? — A. Andres Geronimo, No. 47
Revellin, detective.
Q. Are you the applicant of this search warrant? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know the premises situated at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, District of W. C.,
City of Manila? — A. Yes. sir.
Q. Do you know who occupies said premises? — A. I do not know. According to the
best of my information the house is occupied by John Doe.
Q . What are your reasons for applying for this search warrant? — A. It has been reported
to me by a person whom I consider to be reliable that in said premises there are
instruments and devices used in gambling games, such as cards, dice, chips, lottery
tickets, lists of drawing and lists used in prohibited games kept. It has been reported to
me by a person whom I consider to be reliable that there are or there will be gambling
conducted in said premises. The aforesaid premises are known as gambling house. I have
watched the foregoing premises and believed it to be a gambling house and a place where
instruments and devices used in gambling games, such as cards, dice, chips, lottery
tickets, lists of drawing and lists used in prohibited games are kept.
I, Andres Geronimo, being duly sworn, depose and say that I have read the foregoing
questions and answers and that I find the same to correct and true to the best of my
knowledge and belief.
(Sgd.) ANDRES GERONIMO
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of May, 1923.
(Sgd.) L. GARDUÑO Judge, Municipal Court
The affidavit and the search warrant are so nearly alike that it will suffice to copy the
search warrant alone. This document reads:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF MANILA
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN DOE, Defendant.
SEARCH WARRANT (G)
The People of the Philippine Islands, to any member of the
Police Force of the City of Manila.
GREETING:
Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me by Andres Geronimo that he has
good reason to believe and does believe that John Doe has illegally in his possession in
the building occupied by him and which is under his control, namely in the building
numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippines Islands, certain devices and
effects used in violation of the Gambling Law, to wit: money, cards, chips, reglas,
pintas, tables and chairs and other utensils used in connection with the game commonly
known as monte and that the said John Doe keeps and conceals said devices and effects
with the illegal and criminal intention of using them in violation of the Gambling Law.
Now therefore, you are hereby commanded that at any time in the day or night within
ten (10) days on or after this date to make a search on the person of said John Doe and
in the house situated at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands, in
quest of the above described devices and effects and if you find the same or any part
thereof, you are commanded to bring it forthwith before me as provided for by law.
Given under my hand, this 25th day of May, 1923.
(Sgd.) L. GARDUÑO
Judge, Municipal Court
Coming now to the legal aspects of the case it is first worthy of mention that by reason
of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the eleventh and
eighteenth paragraphs of the Philippine Bill of Rights, as found in the present Organic
Act, the security of the dwelling and the person is guaranteed. The organic act provides
"that the right to be secured against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated." It further provides "that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the person or things to be seized."
In the Philippine Code of Criminal Procedure are found provisions of the same import
although naturally entering more into detail. It is therein provided, among other things,
that "a search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause and upon application
supported by oath particularly describing the place to be searched and the person of thing
to be seized." (Section 97.) After the judge or justice shall have examined on oath the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce, and shall have taken their depositions
in writing (section 98), and after the judge or justice is satisfied of the existence of facts
upon which the application is based, or that there is probable cause to believe that they
exist, he must issue the warrant which must be substantially in the following form:
. . . You are, therefore, commanded, . . . to make immediate search on the person of
............................, or in the house situated ...................................... (describing it or any
other place to be searched with reasonable particularity, as the case may be) for the
following property: . . . ." (Section 99.) It is finally provided that "a person charged with
a crime may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof
of the commission of the crime. (Section 105).
A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and
statutory provisions under which it is issued. Otherwise it has rightly been held, must be
absolutely legal, "for there is not a description of process known to the law, the execution
of which is more distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such
intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating and degrading effect." The warrant will
always be construed strictly without, however, going the full length of requiring
technical accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process
when an officer undertakes to justify under it. (24 R. C. L., pp. 711, et seq.; Reed vs.
Rice [1829], 2 J. J. Marshall [Ky.] 44; 19 Am. Dec., 122; Smith vs. McDuffee [1914],
72 Ore., 276; Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 947.)
The search warrant has been likened to a warrant of arrest. Although apprehending that
there are material differences between the two, in view of the paucity of authority
pertaining to John Doe search warrants we propose to take into consideration the
authorities relied upon by the appellant, thus following the precedent of Uy Kheytin vs.
Villareal ([1920], 42 Phil., 886), where the regularity of the issuance of the search
warrant was also questioned.
In the lower court, and again in this court, the attorneys for the defense quoted from
Wharton's Criminal Procedure. In that text at pages 51, 52, 54, 55, and 56 of volume 1
of the Tenth Edition, is found the following:
Form and Sufficiency of Warrant. Technical accuracy is not required. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Name and description of the accused should be inserted in the body of the warrant and
where the name is unknown there must be such a description of the person accused as
will enable the officer to identify him when found.
xxx xxx xxx
Warrant for apprehension of unnamed party, or containing a wrong name for the party
to be apprehended is void, except in those cases where it contains a descriptio personae
such as will enable the officer to identify the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
John Doe' Warrants. It follows, on principle, from what has already been said regarding
the essential requirements of warrants for the apprehension of persons accused, and
about blank warrants, that a warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true name
is unknown, by the name of "John Doe" or "Richard Roe," "whose other or true name in
unknown," is void, without other and further descriptions of the person to be
apprehended, and such warrant will not justify the officer in acting under it. Such a
warrant must, in addition, contain the best descriptio personae possible to be obtained
of the person or persons to be apprehended, and this description must be sufficient to
indicate clearly the proper person or persons upon whom the warrant is to be served; and
should state his personal appearance and peculiarities, give his occupation and place of
residence, and any other circumstances by means of which he can be identified.
Person apprehended in act of committing a crime, under a "John Doe" warrant, on the
other hand, the apprehension will not be illegal, or the officer liable, because under such
circumstances it is not necessary that a warrant should have been issued.
The authority most often cited to sustain the text, and quoted with approval by the United
States Supreme Court, is the case of Commonwealth vs. Crotty ([1865], 10 Allen
[Mass.], 403). It there appeared that one Peaslee had made a complaint to the police
court Lee, charging that "John Doe or Richard Roe, whose other or true name is to your
complainant unknown," had committed an assault and battery upon him; upon which
complaint a warrant was issued against "John Doe or Richard Roe, whose other or true
name is to your complainant unknown, named in the foregoing complaint." Neither the
complaint nor the warrant contained any further description or means of identification
of the person to be arrested. Crotty resisted the arrest upon the ground that the warrant
was invalid. Mr. Chief Justice Bigelow, as the organ of the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, said:
We cannot entertain a doubt that the warrant on which the officer attempted to arrest one
of the defendant at the time of the alleged riot was insufficient, illegal and void. It did
not contain the name of the defendant, nor any description or designation by which he
could be known and identified as the person against whom it was issued. It was in effect
a general warrant, upon which any other individual might as well have been arrested, as
being included in the description, as the defendant himself. Such a warrant was contrary
to elementary principles, and in direct violation of the constitutional right of the citizen,
as set forth in the Declaration of Rights, article 14, which declares that every subject has
a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, and that
all warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the order in the warrant to a civil
officer to arrest one or more suspected persons or to seize their property be not
accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest or
seizure. This is in fact only a declaration of an ancient common law right. It was always
necessary to express the name or give some description of a party to be arrested on a
warrant; and if one was granted with the name in blank, and without other designation
of the person to be arrested, it was void. (1 Hale P. C. 577. 2 Ib. 119. Foster, 312. 7 Dane
Ab. 248. 1 Chit. Crim. Law, 39. Mead vs. Haws, 7 Cow., 332, and cases cited.)
This rule or principle does not prevent the issue and service of a warrant against a party
whose name is unknown. In such case the best description possible of the person to be
arrested is to be given in the warrant; but it must be sufficient to indicate clearly on
whom it is to be served, by stating his occupation, his personal appearance and
peculiarities, the place of his residence, or other circumstances by which he can be
identified. (1 Chit. Crim. Law, 39, 40.)
The warrant being defective and void on its face, the officer had no right to arrest the
person on whom he attempted to serve it. He acted without warrant and was a trespasser.
The defendant whom he sought to arrest had a right to resist by force, using no more
than was necessary to resist the unlawful acts of the officer . . .
The defendants, therefore, in resisting the officer in making an arrest under the warrant
in question, if they were guilty of no improper or excessive force or violence, did not do
an unlawful act by lawful means, or a lawful act by unlawful means, and so could not be
convicted of the misdemeanor of a riot, with which they are charged in the indictment.
Appellant's argument, as based on these authorities, runs something like this. The law,
constitutional and statutory, requires that the search warrant shall not issue unless the
application "particularly" describe the person to be seized. A failure thus to name the
person is fatal to the validity of the search warrant. To justify search and arrest, the
process must be legal. Illegal official action may be forcibly resisted.
For the prosecution, however, as the arguments are advanced by the Attorney-General,
and as the law was summarized by the trial judge, there is much to be said. Careful and
logical reflection brings forth certain points of paramount force and exercising a decisive
influence. We will now make mention of them by correlating the facts and the law.
In the first place, the affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself
described the building to be searched as "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of
Manila, Philippine Islands." This, without doubt, was a sufficient designation of the
premises to be searched. It is the prevailing rule that a description of a place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain
and identify the place intended. (Steele vs. U. S. [1925], U. S. Supreme Court Advance
Opinions 1924-1925; 69 Law. ed., 757). The police officers were accordingly authorized
to break down the door and enter the premises of the building occupied by the so-called
Parliamentary Club. When inside, they then had the right to arrest the persons
presumably engaged in a prohibited game, and to confiscate the evidence of the
commission of the crime. It has been held that an officer making an arrest may take from
the person arrested any money or property found upon his person, which was used in the
commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime, or which may furnish the person
arrested with the means of committing violence or of escaping, or which may be used as
evidence on the trial of the cause, but not otherwise. (Moreno vs. Ago Chi [1909], 12
Phil., 439.)
Proceeding along a different line of approach, it is undeniable that the application for
the search warrant, the affidavit, and the search warrant failed to name Jose Ma. Veloso
as the person to be seized. But the affidavit and the search warrant did state that "John
Doe has illegally in his possession in the building occupied by him, and which is under
his control, namely, in the building numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila,
Philippine Islands, certain devices and effects used in violation of the Gambling Law."
Now, in this connection, it must not be forgotten that the Organic Act requires a
particular description of the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized,
and that the warrant in this case sufficiently described the place and the gambling
apparatus, and, in addition, contained a description of the person to be seized. Under the
authorities cited by the appellant, it is invariably recognized that the warrant for the
apprehension of an unnamed party is void, "except in those cases where it contains a
description personae such as will enable the officer to identify the accused." The
description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person upon whom the
warrant is to be served. As the search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling
apparatus in his possession in the building occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo,
City of Manila, and as this John Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the
police could identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso without difficulty.
Again, it must be remembered that No. 124 Calle Arzobispo was supposed to be used
for club purposes. It was not the home of Veloso; not the place of abode of the family,
which the law carefully protects in all of its sanctity. It was a club partially public in
nature. It was, moreover, a camouflaged club with a high sounding name calculated to
mislead the police, but intended for nefarious practices. In a club of such a character,
unlike in the home, there would commonly be varying occupancy, a number of John
Does and Richard Roes whose names would be unknown to the police.
It is also borne out by the authorities that, in defense of himself, any member of his
family or his dwelling, a man has a right to employ all necessary violence. But even in
the home, and much less so in a club or public place, the person sought to be arrested or
to be searched should use no more force than is necessary to repel the unlawful act of
the officers. To authorize resistance to the agents of the authority, the illegality of the
invasion must be clearly manifest. Here, there was possibly a proper case for protest.
There was no case for excessive violence to enforce the defendant's idea of a debatable
legal question. (Commonwealth vs. Crotty, supra; People vs. Chan Fook [1921], 42
Phil., 230; 3 Groizard, Codigo Penal, pp. 456, 457.)
The trial judge deduced from the searched warrant that the accused Veloso was
sufficiently identified therein. Mention was made by his Honor of the code provision
relating to a complaint or information, permitting a fictitious name to be inserted in the
complaint or information, in lieu of the true name. The Attorney-General adds to this the
argument that the police were authorized to arrest without a warrant since a crime was
being committed. We find it unnecessary to comment on this contention.
John Doe search warrants should be the exception and not the rule. The police should
particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized,
wherever and whenever it is feasible. The police should not be hindered in the
performance of their duties, which are difficult enough of performance under the best of
conditions, by superficial adherence to technicality or far fetched judicial interference.
We agree with the trial judge and with the Attorney-General in their conclusions to the
effect that the search warrant was valid, and that the defendant has been proved guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, of the crime of resistance of the agents of the authority.
The information alleges that at the time of the commission of the crime, the accused was
a member of the House of Representatives. The trial court was led to consider this
allegation in relation with the facts as an aggravating circumstance, and to sentence the
accused accordingly. We doubt, however, that advantage was taken by the offender of
his public position when he resisted the officers of the law. The offender did not
necessarily make use of the prestige of his office as a means to commit a crime.
Undoubtedly, Jose Ma. Veloso, as Juan de la Cruz, would have resisted the police just
as stoutly, as the Honorable Jose Ma. Veloso did. The penalty, accordingly, falls within
the medium of that provided by the Penal Code.
Finding present no reversible error, agreeing in all respects with the findings of facts as
made by the trial judge, and concurring with the trial judge in his legal conclusion, with
one exception, it results that the judgment appealed from must be, as it is hereby,
affirmed, with the sole modification that the defendant and appellant shall be sentenced
to two months and one day imprisonment, arresto mayor, with the costs of this instance
against him. Let the corresponding order to carry this judgment into effect issue.
G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and
KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE
LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation;
SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and
MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES;
JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN
CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG,
Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN
JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David
for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P.
de Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason
and Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 — hereinafter
referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges2 — hereinafter referred to as
Respondents-Judges — issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against
petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers, 5 directed to the
any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their
offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following
personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense,"
or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is
described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the
Constitution and the Rules of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with
particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not
mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish
evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents,
papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants,
to be disposed of in accordance with law — on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed
with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and
injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and
/or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof,
in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision
be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void,
and commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners
herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents,
papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in
question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants
are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said
warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects
seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged
illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in
the petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or
dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the
corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as
regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of
petitioners herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the
warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and
seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized
in the residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to
assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance
thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities,
separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount
of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever
the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a
seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,9 and
that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be
availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to
the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the
offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to
the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to
whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to
the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers
were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded,
they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next,
it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose
rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the
constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of
whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits
of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights
of another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that
the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search
and seizure does not extend to the personal defendants but
embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros.
Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners
herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary
injunction previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein
Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need
be settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and
seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the
preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may
be used in evidence against petitioners herein.1äwphï1.ñët
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general
warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null
and void. In this connection, the Constitution 13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1)
that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe
the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed,
the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person
therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words,
no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with
respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for
the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for
the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom
it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a
given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in
this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the
legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," —
as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate
provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one
of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the
sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the
mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought
to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called
general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen
political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even
though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed
search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the
former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of
Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a
paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search
warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched
for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and
related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions
were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners
and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening
the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized
be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the
elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors
maintain that, even if the searches and seizures under consideration were
unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in
evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are
unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be
abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the
criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has
blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence
unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages against the
searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and
against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment,
resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may
be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and
eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means
of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In
the language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which
has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending
official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the
prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their
wrong will that wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against
a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights
to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus
placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the
courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are
not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor
and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the
land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the
same Federal Court. 20After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held,
in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right
of privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books,
are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by
official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a
specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence
obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against
the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against
them by the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were
it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable
federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving
of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule
the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed
from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence
as not to permit this Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty." At the time that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to
the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had
steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion
of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that
proposition. The right to when conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was
not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and
enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne
Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches — state or federal — it was logically and
constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine — an essential part of the right
to privacy — be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly
recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional Right by
Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the
exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the
unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its
privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of
the exclusionary rule to "is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty
in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system
of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once
recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable
against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by
state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to
remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect
as other basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be
revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself,
chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to
the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him to the police
officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts,
that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit
of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure,
if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause
of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended,
then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of
the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then
it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no
justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not
justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a
crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to
establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search
warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the
constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof
are, in general, committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging
to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the
handicap under which the minority usually — but, understandably — finds itself in
prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the
psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is
watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had
been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court
dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen
Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and
Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises
considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill,
Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the
records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations above referred
to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive
possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest
rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and
control over the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal"
nature thereof, has Been Advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein, but
in the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962.
In other words, said theory would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said
petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and
amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to
said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either
inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by
petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion
for reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers
submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions
contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the
views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it
necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for
determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is
hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein
petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the
searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized
in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed
for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the
aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition
herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers
and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises
enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:
From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from
the import of the deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the following distinct
conclusions:
1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are
general warrants and are therefore proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of
section 1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;
2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search warrants
were consequently illegal;
3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, should be,
and is declared, abandoned;
4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners
are expressly declared null and void the searches and seizures therein made
are expressly declared illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued
against the use of the documents, papers and effect seized in the said residences is made
permanent; and
5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated
that they have legal standing to move for the suppression of the documents, papers and
effects seized in the places other than the three residences adverted to above, the opinion
written by the Chief Justice refrains from expressly declaring as null and void the such
warrants served at such other places and as illegal the searches and seizures made
therein, and leaves "the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future."
It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately
preceding paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.
I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity
of the search warrants served at places other than the three residences, and the illegibility
of the searches and seizures conducted under the authority thereof. In my view even the
exacerbating passions and prejudices inordinately generated by the environmental
political and moral developments of this case should not deter this Court from
forthrightly laying down the law not only for this case but as well for future cases and
future generations. All the search warrants, without exception, in this case are admittedly
general, blanket and roving warrants and are therefore admittedly and indisputably
outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and seizures made were therefore
unlawful. That the petitioners, let us assume in gratia argumente, have no legal standing
to ask for the suppression of the papers, things and effects seized from places other than
their residences, to my mind, cannot in any manner affect, alter or otherwise modify the
intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and
seizures made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing the said
warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal and remain
illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that "legal
standing" or the lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant
or of the lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.
On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings
submitted to this Court the petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the
suppression and return of the documents, papers and effects that were seized from places
other than their family residences.
Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial
construction and interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts have
invariably regarded as doctrinal the pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by
federal courts, especially the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of
Appeals.
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return
of documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure,
may be summarized as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives
"standing;" (b) ownership and/or control or possession — actual or constructive — of
premises searched gives "standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the
search warrant and the sworn application for search warrant are "primarily" directed
solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved person," gives "standing."
An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting
three, all were directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the
petitioners were named personally, followed by the designation, "the President and/or
General Manager" of the particular corporation. The three warrants excepted named
three corporate defendants. But the "office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the
said three warrants were also the same "office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to
be owned by or under the control of the petitioners in all the other search warrants
directed against the petitioners and/or "the President and/or General Manager" of the
particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of April 2, 1962). The
searches and seizures were to be made, and were actually made, in the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the petitioners.
Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."
Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to
return and suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search
and seizure regardless of their location at the time of seizure. Jones vs. United States,
362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the
defendant); Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal
and corporate papers of corporation of which the defendant was president), United States
vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in an apartment not belonging to the
defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925) (books seized from
the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United States, 310
F. 2d 680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in exclusive
possession of the defendant).
In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it was
held that under the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a
person places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his
home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile:
Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature and scope
of Fourth Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security
a man relies upon when he places himself or his property within a constitutionally
protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile. There he
is protected from unwarranted governmental intrusion. And when he puts some thing in
his filing cabinet, in his desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be
secure from an unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth
Amendment could not tolerate the warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the
purloining of the petitioner's private papers in Gouled, or the surreptitious electronic
surveilance in Silverman. Countless other cases which have come to this Court over the
years have involved a myriad of differing factual contexts in which the protections of
the Fourth Amendment have been appropriately invoked. No doubt, the future will bring
countless others. By nothing we say here do we either foresee or foreclose factual
situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct.
408 (December 12, 1966). See also U.S. vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93 (November
13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).
Control of premises searched gives "standing."
Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized,
the petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their
proprietary or leasehold interest in many of the premises searched. These proprietary
and leasehold interests have been sufficiently set forth in their motion for reconsideration
and need not be recounted here, except to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent,
directly or indirectly, for practically all the premises searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen
Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises 2008, Dewey Boulevard; 1436 Colorado
Street); maintained personal offices within the corporate offices (IBMC, USTC); had
made improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid for the filing cabinets in
which the papers were stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club); and individually, or
through their respective spouses, owned the controlling stock of the corporations
involved. The petitioners' proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the premises searched
therefore independently gives them standing to move for the return and suppression of
the books, papers and affects seized therefrom.
In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and
extent of the interest in the searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to
suppress. After reviewing what it considered to be the unduly technical standard of the
then prevailing circuit court decisions, the Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):
We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are
persuaded, however, that it is unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into the law
surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of
private property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped
by distinctions whose validity is largely historical. Even in the area from which they
derive, due consideration has led to the discarding of those distinctions in the homeland
of the common law. See Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying
out Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions such as those
between "lessee", "licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of gossamer strength, ought
not be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to constitutional
safeguards. See also Chapman vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).
It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched must
own the property seized in order to have standing in a motion to return and suppress.
In Alioto vs. United States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a Bookkeeper for several
corporations from whose apartment the corporate records were seized successfully
moved for their return. In United States vs. Antonelli, Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870,
873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the corporation's president successfully moved for the return
and suppression is to him of both personal and corporate documents seized from his
home during the course of an illegal search:
The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his own or the
corporation's was entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Under
the circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure were unreasonable and
unlawful. The motion for the return of seized article and the suppression of the evidence
so obtained should be granted. (Emphasis supplied).
Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place searched
or the articles seize had the necessary standing to invoke the protection of the
exclusionary rule. But in MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice
Robert Jackson joined by Justice Felix Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a guest
may expect the shelter of the rooftree he is under against criminal intrusion." This view
finally became the official view of the U.S. Supreme Court and was articulated in United
States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years later, in 1960, in Jones vs. Unite States,
362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step further. Jones was a mere guest
in the apartment unlawfully searched but the Court nonetheless declared that the
exclusionary rule protected him as well. The concept of "person aggrieved by an
unlawful search and seizure" was enlarged to include "anyone legitimately on premise
where the search occurs."
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that the defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of a
corporation had standing in a mail fraud prosecution against him to demand the return
and suppression of corporate property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th
Cir. 1961), supra. The court conclude that the defendant had standing on two
independent grounds: First — he had a sufficient interest in the property seized,
and second — he had an adequate interest in the premises searched (just like in the case
at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the corporation' premises and had
seized most of the corporation's book and records. Looking to Jones, the court observed:
Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person aggrieved
by an unlawful search and seizure." It tells us that appellant should not have been
precluded from objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and seizure of the corporation's
books and records merely because the appellant did not show ownership or possession
of the books and records or a substantial possessory interest in the invade premises . . .
(Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 651). .
Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir.
1962). In Villano, police officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's
place of employment; the defendant did not claim ownership of either; he asserted that
several employees (including himself) used the notebooks. The Court held that the
employee had a protected interest and that there also was an invasion of privacy.
Both Henzel and Villano considered also the fact that the search and seizure were
"directed at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 682; Villano
vs. United States, 310 F. 2d at 683.
In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and went
to Puerto Rico, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to
move to quash as unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution a grand jury subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of his
files. The Government contended that the petitioner had no standing because the books
and papers were physically in the possession of the custodian, and because the subpoena
was directed against the custodian. The court rejected the contention, holding that
Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal rights in
the books and papers as not to enable the question of unreasonable search and seizure to
be escaped through the mere procedural device of compelling a third-party naked
possessor to produce and deliver them. Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861
(8th Cir. 1956).
Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed against said
person gives "standing."
The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F.
Supp. 191 (1965, U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with an attorney certain
files and papers, which attorney, by the name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the seizing
of the records, Birrell's attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the records at his
home in the country and on a farm which, according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his
(Dunn's) "control and management." The papers turned out to be private, personal and
business papers together with corporate books and records of certain unnamed
corporations in which Birrell did not even claim ownership. (All of these type records
were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the search in Birrell was held invalid by
the court which held that even though Birrell did not own the premises where the records
were stored, he had "standing" to move for the return of all the papers and properties
seized. The court, relying on Jones vs. U.S., supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53
F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and Schwimmer vs. U.S.,
supra, pointed out that
It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed solely
and exclusively against Birrell. The only person suggested in the papers as having
violated the law was Birrell. The first search warrant described the records as having
been used "in committing a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, by
the use of the mails by one Lowell M. Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant was
captioned: "United States of America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198)
Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to move to
suppress. Such was the rule even before Jones. (p. 199)
If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records stored with
Dunn, it matters not whether he had any interest in the premises searched. See
also Jeffers v. United States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432
U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).
The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United
States did not appeal from this decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly
similar to the case of the present petitioners; as in Birrell, many personal and corporate
papers were seized from premises not petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the
searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED SOLETY AND EXCLUSIVELY" against
the petitioners. Still both types of documents were suppressed in Birrell because of the
illegal search. In the case at bar, the petitioners connection with the premises raided is
much closer than in Birrell.
Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants
regardless whether these were directed against residences in the narrow sense of the
word, as long as the documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent
that they were corporate papers) were held by them in a personal capacity or under their
personal control.
Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the
petitioners all personal and private papers and effects seized, no matter where these
were seized, whether from their residences or corporate offices or any other place or
places. The uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners in their, various
pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show that amongst the things seized from
the corporate offices and other places were personal and private papers and effects
belonging to the petitioners.
If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where
the objects of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be:
(a) personal or private papers of the petitioners were they were unlawfully seized, be it
their family residences offices, warehouses and/or premises owned and/or possessed
(actually or constructively) by them as shown in all the search and in the sworn
applications filed in securing the void search warrants and (b) purely corporate papers
belonging to corporations. Under such categorization or grouping, the determination of
which unlawfully seized papers, documents and things are personal/private of the
petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the lower courts which
issued the void search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression and/or return of
the said documents.
And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise
have clear legal standing to move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as
"President and/or General Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically
mentioned in the void search warrants.
Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my disquisition
were criminal prosecutions, the great clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal
searches and seizures do not withhold the mantle of their protection from cases not
criminal in origin or nature.
[G.R. No. 136292. January 15, 2002]
RUDY CABALLES y TAIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision[1] of respondent Court of Appeals dated
September 15, 1998 which affirmed the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court
of Santa Cruz, Laguna, finding herein petitioner, Rudy Caballes y Taio, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of theft, and the resolution[2] dated November 9, 1998
which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
In an Information[3] dated October 16, 1989, petitioner was charged with the crime of
theft committed as follows:
"That on or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the Municipality of Pagsanjan, and/or
elsewhere in the Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with intent of gain, and without the knowledge and consent
of the owner thereof, the NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away about 630-kg of
Aluminum Cable Conductors, valued at P27, 450.00, belonging to and to the damage
and prejudice of said owner National Power Corp., in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
During the arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the merits
ensued.
The facts are summarized by the appellate court as follows:
"[At] about 9:15 p.m. of June 28, 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro,
while on a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a
passenger jeep unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves.
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged
down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by appellant. When asked what was loaded on
the jeep, he did not answer; he appeared pale and nervous.
With appellant's consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered
bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by
National Power Corporation (NPC). The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued
at P55, 244.45. Noceja asked appellant where the wires came from and appellant
answered that they came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers away
from Sampalucan. Thereafter, appellant and the vehicle with the high-voltage wires
were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of the
appellant and the jeep loaded with the wires which were turned over to the Police Station
Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Appellant was incarcerated for 7 days in the
Municipal jail.
In defense, appellant interposed denial and alibi. He testified that he is a driver and
resident of Pagsanjan, Laguna; a NARCOM civilian agent since January, 1988 although
his identification card (ID) has already expired. In the afternoon of June 28, 1989, while
he was driving a passenger jeepney, he was stopped by one Resty Fernandez who
requested him to transport in his jeepney conductor wires which were in Cavinti,
Laguna. He told Resty to wait until he had finished his last trip for the day from Santa
Cruz, Laguna. On his way to Santa Cruz, Laguna, he dropped by the NARCOM
headquarters and informed his superior, Sgt. Callos, that something unlawful was going
to happen. Sgt. Callos advised him to proceed with the loading of the wires and that the
former would act as back-up and intercept the vehicle at the Sambat Patrol Base
in Pagsanjan.
After receiving those instructions, he went back to see Resty. Although Resty had his
own vehicle, its tires were old so the cable wires were loaded in appellant's jeep and
covered with kakawati leaves. The loading was done by about five (5) masked men. He
was promised P1,000.00 for the job. Upon crossing a bridge, the two vehicles separated
but in his case, he was intercepted by Sgt. Noceja and Pat. De Castro. When they
discovered the cables, he told the police officers that the cables were loaded in his jeep
by the owner, Resty Fernandez. But despite his explanation, he was ordered to proceed
to police headquarters where he was interrogated. The police officers did not believe
him and instead locked him up in jail for a week." [4]
On April 27, 1993, the court a quo rendered judgment[5] the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Theft of property worth P55,244.45, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer
imprisonment from TWO (2) [YEARS], FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY
of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of Prision Mayor, as
maximum, to indemnify the complainant National Power Corporation in the amount
of P55, 244.45, and to pay the costs."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction but deleted the
award for damages on the ground that the stolen materials were recovered and modified
the penalty imposed, to wit:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that
appellant RUDY CABALLES is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in
theft, defined and penalized under Articles 308 and 309, par. 1, Revised Penal Code, and
there being no modifying circumstances, he is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty of
Four (4) years, Nine (9) months and Eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as
minimum term, to Eight (8) years, Eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as maximum term. No civil indemnity and no costs."[6]
Petitioner comes before us and raises the following issues:
"(a) Whether or not the constitutional right of petitioner was violated when the police
officers searched his vehicle and seized the wires found therein without a search warrant
and when samples of the wires and references to them were admitted in evidence as basis
for his conviction;
(b) Whether or not respondent Court erred in rejecting petitioner's defense that he was
engaged in an entrapment operation and in indulging in speculation and conjecture in
rejecting said defense; and
(c) Whether or not the evidence of the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of
petitioner beyond reasonable doubt and thus failed to overcome the constitutional right
of petitioner to presumption of innocence."
The conviction or acquittal of petitioner hinges primarily on the validity of
the warrantless search and seizure made by the police officers, and the admissibility of
the evidence obtained by virtue thereof.
In holding that the warrantless search and seizure is valid, the trial court ruled that:
"As his last straw of argument, the accused questions the constitutionality of the search
and validity of his arrest on the ground that no warrant was issued to that effect. The
Court cannot again sustain such view. In the case of People v. Lo Ho [Wing], G.R. No.
88017, January 21, 1991, it has been held that considering that before a warrant can be
obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the
satisfaction of the issuing judge - a requirement which borders on the impossible in the
case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband
from one place to another with impunity, a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is
justified on grounds of practicability. The doctrine is not of recent vintage. In the case
of Valmonte vs. de Villa, G.R. No. 83988, May 24, 1990 (Resolution on Motion for
Reconsideration, September 29, 1989), it was ruled that automobiles because of their
mobility may be searched without a warrant upon facts not justifying warrantless search
of a resident or office. x x x To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and
searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave
society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most
depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances (Ibid.). In Umil v.
Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, and People vs. Ortiz, 191 SCRA 836, the Supreme Court held
that a search may be made even without a warrant where the accused is caught
in flagrante. Under the circumstances, the police officers are not only authorized but are
also under obligation to arrest the accused even without a warrant." [7]
Petitioner contends that the flagging down of his vehicle by police officers who were on
routine patrol, merely on "suspicion" that "it might contain smuggled goods," does not
constitute probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure. He insists
that, contrary to the findings of the trial court as adopted by the appellate court, he did
not give any consent, express or implied, to the search of the vehicle. Perforce, any
evidence obtained in violation of his right against unreasonable search and seizure shall
be deemed inadmissible.
Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their
persons and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under
Section 2, Article III thereof, which reads:
"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the
admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right.
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute
but admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence;[8] (2) seizure of evidence in plain view;[9] (3) search of moving
vehicles;[10] (4) consented warrantless search;[11] (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk
situations (Terry search);[12] and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.[13]
In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and
reiterated in the Rules of Court must be complied with. In the exceptional events where
warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be
performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable
search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the
circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or
absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the
place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured. [14]
It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police officers in the
case at bar was not authorized by a search warrant. The main issue is whether the
evidence taken from the warrantless search is admissible against the appellant. Without
said evidence, the prosecution cannot prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable
doubt.
I. Search of moving vehicle
Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation
of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity.[15] Thus, the rules governing search and seizure have over the years
been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the
basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the
place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the
issuing judge a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling
effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to
another with impunity. We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is
justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle
can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought.[16] Searches without warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of
preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws, provided such searches are
made at borders or 'constructive borders' like checkpoints near the boundary lines of the
State.[17]
The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited
discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the
interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause. [18] Still and all, the
important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which
must still be present in such a case.
Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies a reasonable ground
of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and
destruction by law is in the place to be searched.[19] The required probable cause that will
justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by a fixed formula but is
resolved according to the facts of each case.[20]
One such form of search of moving vehicles is the "stop-and-search" without warrant at
military or police checkpoints which has been declared to be not illegal per se,[21] for as
long as it is warranted by the exigencies of public order [22] and conducted in a way least
intrusive to motorists.[23] A checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it may
involve an extensive search.
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against
unreasonable search. The search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited
to the following instances: (1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a
vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds;[24] (2) simply looks into a
vehicle;[25] (3) flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors; [26] (4) where the
occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search;[27] (5) where the inspection of
the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection;[28] and (6) where the
routine check is conducted in a fixed area.[29]
None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar. The police officers
did not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of herein petitioner's
vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the
sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple
routine check.
In the case of United States vs. Pierre,[30] the Court held that the physical intrusion of
a part of the body of an agent into the vehicle goes beyond the area protected by the
Fourth Amendment, to wit:
"The Agent . . . stuck his head through the driver's side window. The agent thus effected
a physical intrusion into the vehicle. . . [W]e are aware of no case holding that an officer
did not conduct a search when he physically intruded part of his body into a space in
which the suspect had a reasonable expectation of privacy. [The] Agent['s] . . . physical
intrusion allowed him to see and to smell things he could not see or smell from outside
the vehicle. . . In doing so, his inspection went beyond that portion of the vehicle which
may be viewed from outside the vehicle by either inquisitive passersby or diligent police
officers, and into the area protected by the Fourth amendment, just as much as if he had
stuck his head inside the open window of a home."
On the other hand, when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such
a warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search,
that either the motorist is a law-offender or they will find the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched.[31]
This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial warrant an
extensive search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had emanated from a
package the distinctive smell of marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcotics Command
("Narcom") of the Philippine National Police ("PNP") had received a confidential report
from informers that a sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported along the route
where the search was conducted; (3) Narcom agents had received information that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited
drugs and when the Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a
conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other
identification papers when requested to do so; (4) Narcom agents had received
confidential information that a woman having the same physical appearance as that of
the accused would be transporting marijuana;[32] (5) the accused who were riding
a jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier received confidential
reports that said accused would transport a large quantity of marijuana; and (6) where
the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence information
and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy - one who participated in the
drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the accused belonged - that said
accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the country. [33]
In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the police
officers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of
the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual
and uncommon.
Pat. Alex de Castro recounted the incident as follows:
"ATTY. SANTOS
Q Now on said date and time do you remember of any unusual incident while you were
performing your duty?
A Yes, sir, at that time and date myself and Police Sgt. Noceja were conducting patrol
in the said place when we spotted a suspicious jeepney so we stopped the jeepney and
searched the load of the jeepney and we found out (sic) these conductor wires.
Q You mentioned about the fact that when you saw the jeepney you became
suspicious, why did you become suspicious?
A Because the cargo was covered with leaves and branches, sir.
Q When you became suspicious upon seeing those leaves on top of the load what did
you do next, if any?
A We stopped the jeepney and searched the contents thereof, sir." [34]
The testimony of Victorino Noceja did not fare any better:
"ATTY SANTOS
Q When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?
A Because I saw that the vehicle being drawn by Caballes was covered
by kakawati leaves, I became suspicious since such vehicle should not be covered
by those and I flagged him, sir."[35]
We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common
for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as
would justify the conduct of a search without a warrant.
In People vs. Chua Ho San,[36] we held that the fact that the watercraft used by the
accused was different in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise
over the Bacnotan seas coupled with the suspicious behavior of the accused when he
attempted to flee from the police authorities do not sufficiently establish probable
cause. Thus:
"In the case at bar, the Solicitor General proposes that the following details are
suggestive of probable cause - persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and
other contraband articles, CHUA'swatercraft differing in appearance from the usual
fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, CHUA's illegal entry into
the Philippines x x x, CHUA's suspicious behavior, i.e., he attempted to flee when he
saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which CHUA can return to and
navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas, beyond the reach
of Philippine laws.
This Court, however, finds that these do not constitute "probable cause." None of the
telltale clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other
prohibited drug, confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of courier
of prohibited drug and/or the time and place where they will transport/deliver the same,
suspicious demeanor or behavior, and suspicious bulge in the waist - accepted by this
Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in this case. There was no
classified information that a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing
prohibited drug on the date in question. CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a
police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no
resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in
the process of perpetrating an offense. x x x." (emphasis supplied)
In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any confidential report
or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which
could otherwise have sustained their suspicion. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases
where tipped information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect
a warrantless search and seizure.[37] Unfortunately, none exists in this case.
II. Plain view doctrine
It cannot likewise be said that the cable wires found in petitioner's vehicle were in plain
view, making its warrantless seizure valid.
Jurisprudence is to the effect that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly
exposed to sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself
is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the
package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency,
or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may
be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer
from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in
plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe
may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.[38]
It is clear from the records of this case that the cable wires were not exposed to sight
because they were placed in sacks[39] and covered with leaves. The articles were neither
transparent nor immediately apparent to the police authorities. They had no clue as to
what was hidden underneath the leaves and branches. As a matter of fact, they had to
ask petitioner what was loaded in his vehicle. In such a case, it has been held that the
object is not in plain view which could have justified mere seizure of the articles without
further search.[40]
III. Consented search
Petitioner contends that the statement of Sgt. Victorino Noceja that he checked the
vehicle "with the consent of the accused" is too vague to prove that petitioner consented
to the search. He claims that there is no specific statement as to how the consent was
asked and how it was given, nor the specific words spoken by petitioner indicating his
alleged "consent." At most, there was only an implied acquiescence, a mere passive
conformity, which is no "consent" at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee.
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right which may be waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to validate
an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and
intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. [41] Hence, consent to a
search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing
evidence.[42] The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a
question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. [43] Relevant
to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and
the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he
was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively
looked on;[44] (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of
coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will
be found;[45] (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the
questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
consenting.[46] It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive
testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily
given.[47]
In the case at bar, Sgt. Victorino Noceja testified on the manner in which the search was
conducted in this wise:
"WITNESS
Q On June 28, 1989, where were you?
A We were conducting patrol at the poblacion and some barangays, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q After conducting the patrol operation, do you remember of any unusual incident on
said date and time?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is that incident?
A While I was conducting my patrol at barangay Sampalucan, I saw
Rudy Caballes driving a vehicle and the vehicle contained aluminum wires, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?
A Because I saw that the vehicle being driven by Caballes was covered
by kakawati leaves, I became suspicious since such vehicle should not be covered by
those and I flagged him, sir.
Q Did the vehicle stop?
A Yes, sir, and after said vehicle stop[ped], I removed the cover of said vehicle and
by so doing, I saw the aluminum wires.
Q Before you saw the aluminum wires, did you talk to the accused?
A Yes, sir, I asked him what his load was.
Q What was the answer of Caballes?
A He did not answer and I observed him to be pale, "nagpapamutla" (sic), so I told
him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive.
Q And after you saw for yourself the aluminum wires loaded on the jeep, what did you
do?
A I asked him where those wires came from and he answered those came from
the Cavinti area, sir."[48]
This Court is not unmindful of cases upholding the validity of
consented warrantless searches and seizure. But in these cases, the police officers'
request to search personnel effects was orally articulated to the accused and in such
language that left no room for doubt that the latter fully understood what was
requested. In some instance, the accused even verbally replied to the request
demonstrating that he also understood the nature and consequences of such request. [49]
In Asuncion vs. Court of Appeals,[50] the apprehending officers sought the permission of
petitioner to search the car, to which the latter agreed. Petitioner therein himself freely
gave his consent to said search. In People vs. Lacerna,[51] the appellants who were riding
in a taxi were stopped by two policemen who asked permission to search the vehicle and
the appellants readily agreed. In upholding the validity of the consented search, the Court
held that appellant himself who was "urbanized in mannerism and speech" expressly
said that he was consenting to the search as he allegedly had nothing to hide and had
done nothing wrong. In People vs. Cuizon,[52] the accused admitted that they signed a
written permission stating that they freely consented to the search of their luggage by
the NBI agents to determine if they were carrying shabu. In People vs. Montilla,[53] it
was held that the accused spontaneously performed affirmative acts of volition by
himself opening the bag without being forced or intimidated to do so, which acts should
properly be construed as a clear waiver of his right. In People vs. Omaweng,[54] the
police officers asked the accused if they could see the contents of his bag to which the
accused said "you can see the contents but those are only clothings."Then the policemen
asked if they could open and see it, and accused answered "you can see it." The Court
said there was a valid consented search.
In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive
searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the
right exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of
the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish
the right.[55]
In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that the petitioner intentionally surrendered his
right against unreasonable searches. The manner by which the two police officers
allegedly obtained the consent of petitioner for them to conduct the search leaves much
to be desired. When petitioner's vehicle was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached
petitioner and "told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in
the positive." We are hard put to believe that by uttering those words, the police officers
were asking or requesting for permission that they be allowed to search the vehicle of
petitioner. For all intents and purposes, they were informing, nay, imposing upon
herein petitioner that they will search his vehicle.The "consent" given under intimidating
or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional
guaranty. In addition, in cases where this Court upheld the validity of consented search,
it will be noted that the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the
consent of the accused to be searched. And the consent of the accused was established
by clear and positive proof. In the case of herein petitioner, the statements of the police
officers were not asking for his consent; they were declaring to him that they will look
inside his vehicle. Besides, it is doubtful whether permission was actually requested and
granted because when Sgt. Noceja was asked during his direct examination what he did
when the vehicle of petitioner stopped, he answered that he removed the cover of the
vehicle and saw the aluminum wires. It was only after he was asked
a clarificatory question that he added that he told petitioner he will inspect the
vehicle. To our mind, this was more of an afterthought. Likewise, when Pat. de Castro
was asked twice in his direct examination what they did when they stopped the jeepney,
his consistent answer was that they searched the vehicle. He never testified that he asked
petitioner for permission to conduct the search.[56]
Neither can petitioner's passive submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to
the warrantless search. In People vs. Barros,[57] appellant Barros, who was carrying a
carton box, boarded a bus where two policemen were riding. The policemen inspected
the carton and found marijuana inside. When asked who owned the box, appellant denied
ownership of the box and failed to object to the search. The Court there struck down
the warrantless search as illegal and held that the accused is not to be presumed to have
waived the unlawful search conducted simply because he failed to object, citing the
ruling in the case of People vs. Burgos,[58] to wit:
"As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen,
the courts do not place the citizens in the position of either contesting an officer's
authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a
peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but
is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law."
Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are
insufficient to sustain petitioners conviction. His guilt can only be established without
violating the constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable search and seizure.
WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused
Rudy Caballes is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. Cost de oficio.
G.R. No. L-60349-62 December 29, 1983
CITY FISCAL NESTORIO M. PLACER, ASST. CITY FISCALS AGELIO L.
BRINGAS, ERNESTO M. BROCOY, RAFAEL V. FLORES, FELIXBERTO L.
GUIRITAN, MACARIO B. BALANSAG and ROSARIO F. DABALOS, all of
Butuan City, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE NAPOLEON D. VILLANUEVA, in his capacity as City Judge of
Butuan, respondent.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
ESCOLIN, J.:
The legal question raised in this petition is whether the certification of the investigating
fiscal in the information as to the existence of probable cause obligates respondent City
Judge to issue a warrant of arrest.
The antecedent facts are not disputed. During the period from March 30 to April 14,
12221 People vs. Benito Sy Ibañez Estafa
1982, petitioners, The City Fiscal of Butuan City and his assistants filed in the City Court
of Butuan the following informations, to wit:
12222 People vs. Benito Sy Ibañez -do-
CRIMINAL
These informations, except the last four, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 12219 12220,
CASE NO. TITLE 12221. and '2222, were certified to by the respective investigating Fiscals as Follows:
"that a preliminary examination has been conducted by me in this case, having examined
1220 People vs, Jimmy Tan Slight Phy. Inj. 'the complainant and his witnesses; that on the basis of the sworn statements, and other
evidence submitted before this Official there is reasonable ground to believe that the
crime charged has been commited and that herein accussed is probably guilty thereof "
12210 People vs. Carlito Fortun Violation of P.D. 1306 The informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 12219 and 12220 bore the certification of 3rd
Assistant Fiscal Felixberto Guiritan that I am filing this information upon directive of
12211 People vs. Jarail Majini -do- the Minister of Justice, who upon review of this resolution of the undersigned
investigating fiscal has found prima facie case against herein accused, 1 while the
informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 12221 and 12222 were certified to by 2nd Assistant
12212 People vs. Amelita Dy Violation. of B.P. 22 Fiscal Ernesto M. Brocoy in this wise: "I am filing this information upon directive of the
City Fiscal pursuant to the provisions of P.D. No. 911, who, upon review of the
12213 People vs. Angelito Dy -do- resolution of the investigating fiscal now on temporary detail with the office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Surigao del Sur, has found prima facie case against the herein
accused." 2
12214 People vs. Jesus Aloyan Estafa
Following receipt of said informations, respondent judge issued an order setting on April
5, 1982 the hearing of said criminal cases for the purpose of determining the propriety
12215 People vs, Bebot Lauron Mal. Mischief
of issuing the corresponding warrants of arrest. After said hearing, respondent issued the
questioned orders dated April 13, 15, 16 and 19, 1982, requiring petitioners to submit to
12216 People vs. Mariano Trani Usurption of authority the court the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence in
support of the informations to aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial review of
the findings of probable cause by petitioners. 3
Antonio Monghit authority
Petitioners filed two separate motions for reconsideration of said orders, contending that
12217 People vs. EIorde Subingbing Alarm & Scandal under P.D. Nos. 77 and 911, they are authorized to determine the existence of a probable
cause in a preliminary examination/investigation, and that their findings as to the
existence thereof constitute sufficient basis for the issuance of warrants of arrest by the
Fernando Sagay court. 4 On April 28, 1982, respondent judge denied said motions and reiterated his order
to petitioners to submit the supporting affidavits and other documents within five (5)
12218 People vs. Perla Trasga Grave oral defamation days from notice. 5

Hence, petitioners filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus to set aside the
12219 People vs. Renato Dayan Estafa aforesaid orders and to compel respondent to issue the warrants of arrest in Criminal
Cases Nos. 12209-12222.

12220 People vs. Edgardo Dayan Estafa Meanwhile, the respondent, in addition to his duties as presiding judge of Branch I of
the City Court of Butuan, was also assigned to preside over Branch II of said court, as
Judge Jesus Ruiz, presiding judge of said sala, had retired from the service. The
informations filed by petitioners in Branch II likewise remained dormant because of
respondent's firm refusal to issue the corresponding warrants of arrest for want of
affidavits of the witnesses. Thus, as disclosed by petitioner's urgent motion, 6 no
warrants had been issued in 113 informations as of July 15, 1982.
On July 12, 1982, respondent judge received Our May 19, 1982 Resolution requiring
him to comment on the petition. However, interpreting the same as a denial of the
petition itself, respondent issued on the following day, July 13, and Omnibus Order
directing petitioners to submit immediately the supporting affidavits and other evidence
in Criminal Cases Nos. 12209-12222. Having failed to secure a reconsideration of said
Omnibus Order, petitioners finally submitted the required affidavits and documents on
July 15, 1982 in order to avoid further delay in the prosecution of these cases.
This move on the part of the petitioners would have rendered the instant petition moot
and academic. But while respondent gave due course to some of said cases either by
issuing the warrants of arrest or taking some other appropriate action, 7 he refused to
issue the warrants in Criminal Cases Nos. 12417, 12418, 12419, 12420 and 12422, and
instead ordered the records thereof remanded to the City Fiscal "for further preliminary
investigation or reinvestigation," for on the bases of said affidavits, respondent found
no prima facie case against the accused.
Petitioners therefore filed a motion with this Court to restrain respondent from enforcing
the orders subject of the main petition and to compel him to accept, and take cognizance
of, all the informations filed in his court. They contend that the fiscal's certification in
the information of the existence of probable cause constitutes sufficient justification for
the judge to issue a warrant of arrest; and that such certification binds the judge, it being
supported by the presumption that the investigating fiscal had performed his duties
regularly and completely.
Upon the other hand, respondent justifies his order as an exercise of his judicial power
to review the fiscal's findings of probable cause. He further maintains that the failure of
petitioners to file the required affidavits destroys the presumption of regularity in the
performance of petitioners' official duties, particularly in the light of the long standing
practice of the Office of the City Fiscal of Butuan of attaching to the informations filed
with the court the affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent city judge may, for the purpose
of issuing a warrant of arrest, compel the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting
affidavits and other documentary evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation.
We sustain the position of respondent judge.
The primary requirement for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of
probable cause. Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides that-
... no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer, as may be recognized by law,
after examination under oath or affirmance of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce ....
P.D. No. 911 authorizes the fiscal or state prosecutor to determine the existence of
probable cause. Thus,
If on the basis of complainant's sworn statements and documents submitted, the
investigating dismiss the raise. If probable cause is established by complainant's
evidence, he shall notify the respondent by issuing a subpoena .... (Sec. 1 [b], RA 5180,
as amended by P.D. Nos. 77 and 911).
The fiscal or state prosecutor shall certify under oath in the information to be filed by
him that he has examined the complainant and his witnesses; that on the basis of the
sworn Statements and other evidence submitted before him there is reasonable ground
to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof
... (Sec. 1[d], Id.).
There is thus no dispute that the judge may rely upon the fiscal's certification of the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest, But does
such certification bind the judge to come out with the warrant? We answer this query in
the negative. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the
exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate. This is clear from the
following provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court:
Warrant of arrest, when issued. If the judge be satisfied from the preliminary
examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer that the offense
complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that
the accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for his arrest.
Under this section, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause
before issuing , a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of the information the judge
finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals certification and require the
submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of a probable cause. This has been the rule since U.S. vs.
Ocampo 8 and Amarga vs. Abbas. 9 And this evidently is the reason for the issuance by
respondent of the questioned orders of April 13, 15, 16, 19, 1982 and July 13, 1982.
Without the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other evidence which, as a matter
of long-standing practice had been attached to the informations filed in his sala,
respondent found the informations inadequate bases for the determination of probable
cause. For as the ensuing events would show, after petitioners had submitted the required
affidavits, respondent wasted no time in issuing the warrants of arrest in the cases where
he was satisfied that probable cause existed.
German to the issue at hand is the Rule on Summary Procedure in Special
Cases 10 applicable to the following, to wit:
I. B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violation of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental laws;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
(4) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged
does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment, or a fine of One Thousand Pesos
[1,000.00], or both irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or
of the civil liability arising therefrom; Provided, however, that in offenses involving
damage to property through reckless negligence, this Rule shall govern where the
imposable fine does not exceed Ten Thousand Pesos [10,000.00].
In said cases, the filing of the affidavits of witnesses with the court is mandatory. Section
9, par. 2 of said Rule prescribes that "the complaint or information must be accompanied
by the affidavits of the complainant and of his witnesses in such number of copies as
there are defendants plus two (2) copies for the court's files.
Section 10 of the Summary Rule provides:
On the basis of the complaint or information and the affidavits accompanying the same,
the court shall make a preliminary determination whether to dismiss the case outright
for being patently without basis or merit, or to require further proceedings to be taken.
In the latter case, the court may set the case for immediate arraignment of an accused
under custody, and if he pleads guilty, may render judgment forthwith. If he pleads not
guilty, and in all other cases, the court shall issue an order, accompanied by copies of all
the affidavits submitted by the complainant, directing the defendants to appear and
submit his counter-affidavit and those of his witnesses at a specified date not later than
ten (10) days from receipt thereof.
Failure on the part of the defendant to appear whenever required, shall cause the issuance
of a warrant for his arrest if the court shall find that a probable cause exists after an
examination in writing and under oath or affirmation of the complainant and his
witnesses.
The obvious purpose of requiring the submission of affidavits of the complainant and of
his witnesses is to enable the court to determine whether to dismiss the case outright or
to require further proceedings.
One last point. It appears that after petitioners had submitted the required affidavits of
witnesses, the respondent judge ordered Criminal Cases Nos. 12417, 12418, 12419,
12420 and 12422 remanded to the City Fiscal for further preliminary investigation or
reinvestigation. We hold that respondent did not abuse his discretion in doing so. From
the informations and affidavits presented to him, he found the charges patently without
basis or merit. For respondent to issue the warrants of arrest and try the accused would
only expose the latter to unnecessary harrassment, anxiety and expense. And as already
pointed out, under the Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases, the respondent
judge has the power to order the outright dismissal of the charge if, from the information
and the affidavits attached thereto, he finds the same to be patently without basis or
merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
G.R. Nos. 94054-57 February 19, 1991
VICENTE LIM, SR. and MAYOR SUSANA LIM, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NEMESIO S. FELIX and HON. ANTONIO ALFANE, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 94266-69 February 19, 1991
JOLLY T. FERNANDEZ, FLORENCIO T. FERNANDEZ, JR., NONILON A.
BAGALIHOG, MAYOR NESTOR C. LIM and MAYOR ANTONIO
KHO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NEMESIO S. FELIX and PROSECUTOR ANTONIO C.
ALFANE, respondents.
Francisco R. Llamas for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 94054-57.
Jolly T. Fernandez, Elenito Bagalihog, Orlando M. Danao and Hechanova, Ballicid &
Associates for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 94266-69.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
May a Judge without ascertaining the facts through his own personal determination and
relying solely on the certification or recommendation of a prosecutor that a probable
cause exists issue a warrant of arrest?
On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport
road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province
of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely
Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked
and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman
Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot
wound.
An investigation of the incident then followed.
Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator,
Harry O. Tantiado, TSg, of the PC Criminal Investigation Service at Camp Bagong
Ibalon Legazpi City filed an amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of
Masbate accusing, among others, Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate
(petitioners in G.R. Nos. 9405457), Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr.,
Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim and Mayor Antonio Kho (petitioners in
G.R. Nos. 94266-69) of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in
connection with the airport incident. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 9211.
After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order dated July 31,
1989 stating therein that:
. . . after weighing the affidavits and answers given by the witnesses for the prosecution
during the preliminary examination in searching questions and answers, concludes that
a probable cause has been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named
accused in the amended complaint, namely, Jimmy Cabarles, Ronnie Fernandez,
Nonilon Bagalihog, Jolly Fernandez, Florencio Fernandez, Jr., Vicente Lim, Sr., Susana
Lim, Nestor Lim, Antonio Kho, Jaime Liwanag, Zaldy Dumalag and Rene
Tualla alias Tidoy. (Rollo, p. 58, G.R. Nos. 94054-57)
xxx xxx xxx
In the same Order, the court ordered the arrest of the petitioners and recommended the
amount of P200,000.00 as bail for the provisional liberty of each of the accused.
Petitioners Jolly Fernandez and Nonilon Bagalihog filed a motion for the reduction of
bail which was granted by the court and they were allowed to post bail in the amount of
P150,000.00 each. Except for Jimmy Cabarles, all the rest of the accused posted bail at
P200,000.00 each.
On August 29, 1989, the entire records of the case consisting of two hundred sixty one
(261) pages were transmitted to the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate. Respondent
Acting Fiscal Antonio C. Alfane was designated to review the case.
On September 22, 1989, Fiscal Alfane issued a Resolution which affirmed the finding
of a prima facie case against the petitioners but differed in the designation of the crime
in that the ruled that ". . . all of the accused should not only be charged with Multiple
Murder With Frustrated Murder" but for a case of MURDER for each of the killing of
the four victims and a physical injuries case for inflicting gunshot wound on the buttocks
of Dante Siblante." (Annex "H", Comment of Fiscal Alfane, p. 186, Rollo, G.R. Nos.
94054-57) A motion to reconsider the Resolution filed by petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr.
and Mayor Susana Lim was denied.
On October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, four
(4) separate informations of murder against the twelve (12) accused with a
recommendation of no bail.
On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with us a
verified petition for change of venue. (Case No. A.M. No. 89-11-1270-MTC, formerly,
G.R. Nos. 90587-90)
On December 14, 1989, we issued an en banc Resolution authorizing the change of
venue from the Regional Trial Court of Masbate to the Regional Trial Court of Makati
to avoid a miscarriage of justice, to wit:
Acting on the petition for change of venue of the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 5811,
5812, 5813, and 5814 from the Regional Trial Court, Masbate, Masbate to any of the
Regional Trial Courts at Quezon City or Makati, the Court Resolved to (a) GRANT the
aforesaid petition for transfer of venue in order to avoid miscarriage of justice (Article
VIII, Section 5(4) of the Philippine Constitution); (b) DIRECT the Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court, Masbate, Masbate to transmit the records of the aforesaid cases to
the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Makati, for raffling among the other branches
of the court; and (c) ORDER the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate to desist
from further taking cognizance of the said cases until such time that the petition is finally
resolved.
The cases were raffled to Branch 56 presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix.
Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court several
motions and manifestations which in substance prayed for the following:
1. An order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary
inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the
best enlightenment of this Honorable Court in its personal determination of the existence
of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as its determination of the existence
of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant shall issue
unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself been personally convinced of such
probable cause.
2. Movants be given ample opportunity to file their motion for preliminary investigation
as a matter of right; and
3. In the event that this court may later be convinced of the existence of a probable cause,
to be allowed to file a motion for reduction of bail or for admission of bail. (p. 17, Rollo,
G.R. Nos. 94054-57)
In another manifestation, the Lims reiterated that the court conduct a hearing to
determine if there really exists a prima facie case against them in the light of documents
which are recantations of some witnesses in the preliminary investigation. The motions
and manifestations were opposed by the prosecution.
On July 5, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the
motions and manifestations and issued warrants of arrest against the accused including
the petitioners herein. The respondent Judge said:
In the instant cases, the preliminary investigation was conducted by the Municipal Trial
Court of Masbate, Masbate which found the existence of probable cause that the offense
of multiple murder was committed and that all the accused are probably guilty thereof,
which was affirmed upon review by the Provincial Prosecutor who properly filed with
the Regional Trial Court four separate informations for murder. Considering that both
the two competent officers to whom such duty was entrusted by law have declared the
existence of probable cause, each information is complete in form and substance, and
there is no visible defect on its face, this Court finds it just and proper to rely on the
prosecutor's certification in each information which reads: (pp. 19-20, Rollo, G.R Nos.
94054-57; Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioners then filed these consolidated petitions questioning the July 5, 1990
Order.
In a Resolution dated July 17, 1990 in G.R. Nos. 94054-57, we issued ". . . a
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, effective immediately and continuing until
further orders from this Court, ordering the respondent judge or his duly authorized
representatives or agents to CEASE and DESIST from enforcing or implementing the
warrant of arrest without bail issued against the petitioners in his Order dated July 5,
1990 in Criminal Cases Nos. 5811-14.
In another Resolution dated July 31, 1990 in G.R. Nos. 94266-69, we resolved:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . To ISSUE writs of (1) PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION, ordering
and directing the respondent judge to recall/set aside and/or annul the legal effects of the
warrants of arrest without bail issued against and served upon herein petitioners Jolly T.
Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr. and Nonilon Bagalihog and release them from
confinement at PC-CIS Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City; and (2)
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, effective immediately and continuing until
further orders from this Court, ordering the respondent judge or his duly authorized
representatives or agents, to CEASE AND DESIST from enforcing or implementing the
warrants of arrest without bail issued against petitioners Mayors Nestor C. Lim and
Antonio T. Kho.
The primary issue in these consolidated petitions centers on whether or not a judge may
issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification
and recommendation that a probable cause exists.
This is not a novel question. In the case of Placer v. Villanueva (126 SCRA 463 [1983]),
we ruled that a judge may rely upon the fiscal's certification of the existence of probable
cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. However, the certification does
not bind the judge to come out with the warrant of arrest. This decision interpreted the
"search and seizure" provision of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law,
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce . . .
We ruled:
. . . The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise
of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate. This is clear from the
following provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
Warrant of arrest, when issued. — If the judge be satisfied from the preliminary
examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer that the offense
complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that
the accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for his arrest.
Under this section, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause
before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of the information the judge
finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's certification and require the
submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of a probable cause. This has been the rule since U.S. v. Ocampo (18 Phil. 1)
and Amarga v. Abbas (98 Phil. 739). And this evidently is the reason for the issuance by
respondent of the questioned orders of April 13, 15, 16, 19, 1982 and July 13, 1982.
Without the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other evidence which, as a matter
of long-standing practice had been attached to the information filed in his sala,
respondent found the informations inadequate bases for the determination of probable
cause. For as the ensuing events would show, after petitioners had submitted the required
affidavits, respondent wasted no time in issuing the warrants of arrest in the case where
he was satisfied that probable cause existed.
The case of Soliven v. Makasiar (167 SCRA 393 [19881) was decided after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. We stated:
The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the
constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision
reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of
the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other respondent
officers as may be authorized by law", has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that
the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of arrest. This is not an
accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself
of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedures, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the
preliminary examinations and investigation of criminal complaints instead of
concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
The decision in People v. Honorable Enrique B. Inting, et al. (G.R. No. 88919, July 25,
1990), reiterated the above interpretation of "personal" determination by the Judge:
We emphasize important features of the constitutional mandate that ". . . no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge . . ." (Article III, Section 2, Constitution)
First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the
Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the
Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination.
Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely
assists him to make the determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have to
follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutor's certification of
probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of
stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's
certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination.
And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary
investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or
released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same
proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of
probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary
investigation proper –– whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the
accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be
subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial –– is the function of the
Prosecutor.
The Court made this clear in the case of Castillo v. Villaluz (171 SCRA 39 [19891):
Judges of Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance) no longer have
authority to conduct preliminary investigations. That authority, at one time reposed in
them under Sections 13, 14 and 16, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court of 1964, (See Sec. 4,
Rule 108, Rules of Court of 1940; People v. Solon, 47 Phil. 443, cited in Moran,
Comments on the Rules, 1980 ed., Vol. 4, pp. 115-116) was removed from them by the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, effective on January 1, 1985, (Promulgated on
November 11, 1984) which deleted all provisions granting that power to said Judges.
We had occasion to point tills out in Salta v. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 228, and to
stress as well certain other basic propositions, namely: (1) that the conduct of a
preliminary investigation is "not a judicial function . . . (but) part of the prosecution's
job, a function of the executive," (2) that whenever "there are enough his or prosecutors
to conduct preliminary investigations, courts are counseled to leave this job which is
essentially executive to them," and the fact "that a certain power is granted does not
necessary mean that it should be indiscriminately exercised.
The 1988 Amendments to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, declared effective on
October 1, 1988, (The 1988 Amendments were published in the issue of Bulletin Today
of October 29, 1988) did not restore that authority to Judges of Regional Trial Courts;
said amendments did not in fact deal at all with the officers or courts having authority to
conduct preliminary investigations.
This is not to say, however, that somewhere along the line RTC Judges also lost the
power to make a preliminary examination for the purpose of determining whether
probable cause exists to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest (or search warrant).
Such a power –– indeed, it is as much a duty as it is a power –– has been and remains
vested in every judge by the provisions in the Bill of Rights in the 1935, the 1973 and
the present [1987] Constitutions securing the people against unreasonable searches and
seizures, thereby placing it beyond the competence of mere Court Rule or Statute to
revoke. The distinction must, therefore, be made clear while an RTC Judge may no
longer conduct preliminary investigations to ascertain whether there is sufficient ground
for the filing of a criminal complaint or information, he retains the authority, when such
a pleading is filed with his court, to determine whether there is probable cause justifying
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It might be added that this distinction accords, rather
than conflicts, with the rationale of Salta because both law and rule, in restricting to
judges the authority to order arrest, recognize the function to be judicial in nature.
We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an
investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information
or it is an investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is
part of the prosecution's job. The second kind of preliminary investigation which is more
properly called preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the
Judge. . . .
Finally in the recent case of People v. Delgado, et al. (G.R. Nos. 93419-32, September
18, 1990) there is a statement that the judge may rely on the resolution of COMELEC
to file the information by the same token that it may rely on the certification made by
the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation in the issuance of the
warrant of arrest. We, however, also reiterated that ". . . the court may require that the
record of the preliminary investigation be submitted to it to satisfy itself that there is
probable cause which will warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest." (Section 2, Article
III, Constitution). Reliance on the COMELEC resolution or the Prosecutor's certification
presupposes that the records of either the COMELEC or the Prosecutor have been
submitted to the Judge and he relies on the certification or resolution because the records
of the investigation sustain the recommendation. The warrant issues not on the strength
of the certification standing alone but because of the records which sustain it.
It is obvious from the present petition that notwithstanding the above decisions, some
Judges are still bound by the inertia of decisions and practice under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions and are sadly confused or hesitant. Prosecutors are also interested in a clear
cut ruling. We will, therefore, restate the rule in greater detail and hopefully clearer
terms.
There is no problem with search warrants which are relatively fewer and far between
and where there is no duplication of work between the Judge and the Prosecutor. The
problem lies with warrants of arrest especially in metropolitan or highly urban areas. If
a Judge has to personally question each complainant and witness or go over the records
of the Prosecutor's investigation page by page and word for word before he acts on each
of a big pile of applications for arrest warrants on his desk, he or she may have no more
time for his or her more important judicial functions.
At the same time, the Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987 Constitution which
requires ". . . probable cause to be personally determined by the judge . . .", not by any
other officer or person.
If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the
records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined
probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The
constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of
discretion.
The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of
Masbate and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the
respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. There was no basis
for the respondent Judge to make his own personal determination regarding the existence
of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as mandated by the
Constitution. He could not possibly have known what transpired in Masbate as he had
nothing but a certification. Significantly, the respondent Judge denied the petitioners'
motion for the transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere certification and
recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists is sufficient for
him to issue a warrant of arrest.
We reiterate the ruling in Soliven v. Makasiar that the Judge does not have to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same
functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be a
report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal's bare certification. All of these
should be before the Judge.
The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on
the circumstances of each case.1âwphi1 We cannot determine beforehand how cursory
or exhaustive the Judge's examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound
discretion for, after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the
Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the circumstances of each case require.
To be sure, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification and investigation
report whenever necessary. He should call for the complainant and witnesses themselves
to answer the court's probing questions when the circumstances of the case so require.
It is worthy to note that petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim presented to the
respondent Judge documents of recantation of witnesses whose testimonies were used
to establish a prima facie case against them. Although, the general rule is that
recantations are not given much weight in the determination of a case and in the granting
of a new trial (Tan Ang Bun v. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. L-47747, February 15,
1990, People v. Lao Wan Sing, 46 SCRA 298 [1972]) the respondent Judge before
issuing his own warrants of arrest should, at the very least, have gone over the records
of the preliminary examination conducted earlier in the light of the evidence now
presented by the concerned witnesses in view of the "political undertones" prevailing in
the cases. Even the Solicitor General recognized the significance of the recantations of
some witnesses when he recommends a reinvestigation of the cases, to wit:
It must be pointed out, however, that among the documents attached to this Petition are
affidavits of recantation subsequently executed by Jimmy Cabarles and Danilo Lozano
and an affidavit executed by one, Camilo Sanano, father of the complainant's witnesses,
Renato and Romeo Sanano. It was precisely on the strength of these earlier written
statements of these witnesses that the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate found the
existence of a prima facie case against petitioners and accordingly recommended the
filing of a Criminal Information. Evidently, the same written statements were also the
very basis of the "Fiscal's Certification", since the attached affidavits of recantation were
not yet then available. Since the credibility of the prosecution witnesses is now assailed
and put in issue and, since the petitioners have not yet been arraigned, it would be to the
broader interest of justice and fair play if a reinvestigation of this case be had to secure
the petitioners against hasty prosecution and to protect them from an open and public
accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to
protect the State from useless and expensive trials (Salonga v. Paño G.R. No. 59524,
February 18,1985). (Rollo of G.R. Nos. 94054-56, pp. 200-201)
We reiterate that in making the required personal determination, a Judge is not precluded
from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of the
reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the Judge's sound
discretion. However, the Judge abuses that discretion when having no evidence before
him, he issues a warrant of arrest.
Indubitably, the respondent Judge committed a grave error when he relied solely on the
Prosecutor's certification and issued the questioned Order dated July 5, 1990 without
having before him any other basis for his personal determination of the existence of a
probable cause.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are hereby GRANTED. The questioned Order of
respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix of Branch 56, Regional Trial Court of Makati dated
July 5, 1990 is declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining
Orders and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction issued in the instant Petitions are made
PERMANENT.
[G.R. No. 112035. January 16, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PANFILO CABILES alias
NONOY, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
Accused-appellant, Panfilo Cabiles, alias Nonoy, seeks the reversal of the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region (Branch 124, Kalookan City),
finding him guilty of the crime of Robbery with Rape, as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused Panfilo
Cabiles alias Nonoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Rape as charged
and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua in accordance
with Paragraph 2 of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code to indemnify the victim
Luzviminda Aquino in the amount of P30,000.00 as consequential damages. Said
accused is also ordered to return to Marites Nas Atienza the stolen Seiko Wrist watch
worth P1,500.00 and one gold ring worth P500,00 and if unable to do so, to pay said
victim the corresponding prices of these articles as shown above to reimburse Marites
Nas Atienza the amount of P1,000.00 in cash and to pay the costs.
The accused shall be entitled to the full period of his preventive imprisonment, pursuant
to Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code provided with the conditions enumerated thereon
have been complied with.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 86-87, Rollo)
Through an Amended Information accused-appellant, together with the additional
accused, was charged as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of November 1989, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of
force and violence, with intent of gain, conspiring together and mutually helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob, and carry
away one (1) gold ring worth P500.00, one (1) ladies seiko watch worth P1,500.00, cash
money worth P1,000.00, one (1) bracelet worth P1,500.00 and one gold ring
worth P500.00 and if unable to do so, to pay the said victim the corresponding prices of
these articles as shown above to reimburse Marites Nas Atienza the amount of P1,000.00
in cash and to pay the costs.
(p. 7, Rollo)
Accused-appellants co-accused, Jaime Mabingnay, was neither apprehended nor
arraigned, whereas accused-appellant was arraigned on both original and amended
informations. After trial, following the entry of a not guilty plea, the above quoted
verdict was rendered. Hence, the instant appeal.
As deduced from the prosecutions evidence which came primarily from the testimony
of Marites Nas Atienza and Luzviminda Aquino, the inculpatory facts are as follows:
Marites Nas Atienza, a housewife whose husband was abroad, was residing at No. 224
Malambing St., Amparo Subdivision, Kalookan City. On the eve of November 5, 1989,
she was asleep with her 1 -year old daughter, Erica Dianne Atienza, inside her room at
her house. Approximately two steps away from her bed, Luzviminda Aquino, Marites
housemaid, was sleeping on a sofa. The house has an area of about 29 square meters. The
main door is located at the kitchen. In the kitchen, there is a stairway leading to the
store. To the left of the house is the bedroom where the three were asleep. The place was
illuminated by the light coming from a 25-watt electrical bulb which was outside the
rooms window (tsn, March 5, 1990, p. 6; tsn April 5, 1990, pp. 20-24, 28; tsn, April 26,
1990, pp. 4, 6, 8, 10, 17).
At around 1:15 oclock on the morning of November 5, 1989, a man suddenly barged
into the house of Marites by destroying the kitchen door and removing the lawanit wall
thereof, thus enabling him to reach the lock inside. The man suddenly poked a 6-inch
knife on the right side of Marites neck. This awakened her. She was told not to shout
otherwise she would be killed.Then the man placed a masking tape on her mouth and
ordered her to bring out her money and jewelry. At the point of the knife, Marites, while
carrying her baby, went to the cabinet outside the room, took cash amounting
to P1,000.00, a Seiko watch worth P1,500.00, a ladys wristwatch with the trademark
Chanel (also referred to in the records as Chanel) worthP850.00, a bracelet
worth P500.00, and a ring worth P500.00 and gave them to the man. Afterwards, they
went back inside the bedroom and Marites sat on her bed, still cuddling the baby (tsn,
March 5, 1990, pp.7-8, 11-12, 40; tsn, April 5, 1990, pp.19, 30, 31). Marites later
identified the man as accused appellant.
Meanwhile, Luzviminda was awakened by the crying of Marites baby. When she was
about to shout, the man poked the knife on her left side, causing her an injury. The man
then told her, Huwag kang sisigaw kundi papatayin kita. Meanwhile, Marites sat on her
bed, trembling with fear, as she cuddled her baby. The man also placed masking tape on
Luzvimindas mouth.Thereafter, he forcibly held both of her arms in front of
her. Notwithstanding her struggle to hide her hands at her back, accused-appellant
succeeded in tying her hands at the front with the use of a piece of shoestring (tsn, March
5, 1990, pp. 9-10, 16; tsn, April 5, 1990, pp. 34-35; tsn, April 26, 1990, pp. 6-9 27, 34,
44). Luzviminda likewise later identified the man as accused-appellant.
The man then went to the store which was only about 4-5 steps away from Marites
bed. He ransacked the same in search for more valuables. Thereafter, he took a bottle of
beer from the refrigerator and began drinking. Afterwards, he returned to the room and
sat beside Luzviminda (tsn, March 5, 1990, p. 10; tsn, April 5, 1990, p. 25.)
While the man continued to hold the knife, he tapped Luzvimindas thigh. When he was
about to consume the beer, he started removing Luzvimindas pants and underwear while
still holding the knife with his right hand. The man then rolled down his short pants to
his thighs. He poked the knife on Luzvimindaa right side and despite the latters
resistance, he succeeded inserting his sexual organ into Luzvimindas private parts and
forcibly lying on top of her. Luzviminda struggled and kicked, accidentally hitting with
her right foot the knife thus causing her injury. All the while, Marites was still cuddling
her daughter, as she sat on her bed in extreme fear. She was witnessing Luzviminda
being raped by the man. While on top of Luzviminda and continuously doing the sexual
act, the man uttered: Isusunod ko ang Ate mo pagkatapos ko sa iyo. Upon hearing those
words, Marites tried to escape by asking permission to prepare milk for her baby (tsn,
March 5, 1990, pp. 11-14, 16-17; tsn, April 5, 1990, pp. 36, 38, 40, 42; tsn April 26,
1990 pp. 10-11, 13-14, 27).
While carrying her child, Marites was able to run to the house of her neighbor, Arnel
Cericos, from whom she asked for help. Cericos house was approximately twelve steps
away from Marites house. Marites decided to hide at Cericos house. When Cericos
entered the room, the man was still on top of Luzviminda. However, upon seeing
Cericos, the man stood up right away and stabbed Cericos four times. Afterwards, they
chased each other outside the house. Meanwhile Luzviminda put on her pants and ran
toward Cericos house (tsn, March 5, 1990, pp. 18-19; tsn, April 26, 1990, pp. 15,18).
When Marites learned that Cericos was injured, she rushed back to her house to
administer first aid to him. Cericos sustained a stab wound on his chest, two stab wounds
on his left arm, and a stab wound on his right arm. Cericos then complained of difficulty
in breathing. Consequently, Marites brought him to a physician, one Col. Javier, for
treatment. When Cericos complaints continued, Marites decided to bring him to the V.
Luna Hospital in Quezon City at about 4 oclock that morning (tsn, March 5, 1990, pp.
19-22).
Attending physician Dr. Emmanuel Quedding noted that Cericos sustained four stab
wounds of different sizes, the most serious of which was the lacerated wound on the
interior chest which required Cericos to be placed under observation for 8-12 hours. Dr.
Quedding found that the wounds, if deep enough, could result in the laceration of the
lung, heart and some arteries and consequently, the victims death. After advising Cericos
not to work for about one week or more, he was permitted to leave the hospital at about
1 oclock that afternoon (tsn, April 5, 1990, pp. 4-5, 10, 12)
For her part, Luzviminda, at 9 oclock that morning, went to the Kalookan Police
Department and reported what happened to her. On November 6, 1989, upon referral by
the chief of Northern Police District, Kalookan City, Luzviminda subjected herself to a
physical examination conducted by Dr. Carmelita Belgica, a medico-legal
officer. Resultantly, Dr. Belgica found on Luzvimindas right foot a laceration, healing,
measuring 3.5 c.m., with scab formation and peripheral edema at the medine melcolus,
right side Her genital examination results showed an old healed laceration indicative of
sexual intercourse possibly occurring three months before the date of examination. Dr.
Belgica expounded that although the physical examination results manifested that the
occurrence of sexual intercourse also took place on November 5, 1989 without any
injury at the genital area, as it cannot be consulted medically because the opening is wide
enough (tsn, January 10, 1990, pp. 3-6, 8-10).
Later, on November 8, 1989, at about 1:40 oclock in the afternoon, Corporal Luciano
Caeda and Pfc. Manuel Rodriguez of the Kalookan City Police Station, along with
Romeo Nas, brother of Marites, went to a sash factory warehouse at the Marivic
Compound, Kalookan City. Outside the factory edifice, they saw accused-appellant
sleeping on a bench. Romeo Nas saw the accused-appellant wearing a bracelet which
the former recognized as the bracelet taken from Marites. Upon being awakened,
accused appellant, told the three men that the other things he took from Marites were
inside a plastic bag at the factory building. Consequently, Pfc. Rodriguez went inside
the building to get the plastic bag and it was found to contain a womans undershirt, a
light blue shirt, and a wristwatch with the brand name Chanel which was the one taken
from Marites (tsn, April 10, 1990, pp. 4-5, 7-8, 11, 14, 16, 25).
The following day, November 9, 1989, at about 3:30 oclock in the afternoon, Marites
saw accused-appellant at the Kalookan City Police Station. The latter admitted his guilt
and pointedto Jaime Mabingnay, Marites further recalled that she saw accused-appellant
at Mabingnays house on November 5, 1989, before the crime took place (tsn, March 5,
1990, p. 30; April 10, 1990, pp. 33-36).
Accused-appellant, on the other hand, relied and banked on denial and alibi.
Accused-appellant denied even having raped Luzviminda Aquino. He said that the first
time he ever saw Marites was at the Kalookan City Police Station on November 9,
1989. He said the same thing about Luzviminda (tsn, August 23, 1990, pp. 4-6).
Regarding the day of the incident, accused-appellant testified that on November 5, 1989,
at 1:30 oclock in the morning, he was at Marivic Subdivision, sleeping with his wife. He
had been residing at the Marivic Compound starting October 30, 1989 as he was
designated by the owner of the place to watch over the premises (tsn, August 23, 1990,
p.4).
As to accused-appellants arrest which took place on November 8, 1989 at around 1
oclock in the afternoon, he testified that he was lying on the bench at the Marivic
Compound when three men in civilian clothes arrived. He did not know the reason for
his arrest. He, however, admitted that a Chanel ladys watch was recovered from him at
the time of the arrest but insistedthat he owns the watch, the same having pledged to him
by his cousin Elizabeth Abantao when he was still at Wright, Samar, and which was
later sold to him. He denied that a plastic bag with stolen contents of the bag when he
was under detention at the Kalookan City Jail. As regards his sworn statement containing
a confession to the commission of the crime, he said he was forced by the policemen at
the station to execute the same. He did not read it and was just forced to sign it. He was
not assisted by counsel during that time (tsn, August 23, 1990, pp. 6-9).
Accused-appellants version of the event was corroborated by: (a) his wife Soledad
Cabiles who testified that she slept with accused-appellant at Marivic Subdivision in the
evening of November 4, 1989; (b) Conrado Bacoy, Sr., owner of the woodcarving
factory watched over by accused appellant, who testified that accused-appellant and his
wife were allowed to sleep within the factory premises; and (c) Melchor Mabini who
aside from supporting accused-appellants alibi, also said that accused-appellants captors
did not have a warrant when they made the arrest.
The trial court found no merit in accused-appellants defense. It found that his identity
was well established, based on the testimony of Marites and Luzviminda who were
adjudged as credible witnesses. From the testimony of said witnesses, the trial court
likewise observed that: (1) at the time of accused-appellants arrest, he was wearing a
bracelet which was said to be owned by Maritess; (2) that a shoestring was found inside
the plastic bag which accused-appellant stated as his own when he led the arresting
officers to the factory compound at Marivic, Baesa, Kalookan City; and (3) that said
shoestring was the one used by accused-appellant in tying Luzvimindas hands before
she was raped. The trial court likewise noted accused-appellants confession before
Marites and in the presence of Amy Maliwanag, a council woman of Amparo
Subdivision and Linda Pilahan, that accused-appellant robbed and raped Luzviminda,
and that Jaime Mabingnay instructed him to do so, to cause the blindness of Marites, and
to kill her. Mabingnay was said to have promised to help accused-appellant get a job
abroad and to help the latter financially. However, accused-appellant took pity on
Marites child.
As regards the crime of serious physical injuries, which, as charged in the Amended
Information, was allegedly committed by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the trial
court found that the evidence is insufficient to prove the commission of the same or any
of the physical injuries penalized in Subdivision 1 of Art. 263 of the Revised Penal Code.
We affirm that trial courts decision.
Accused-appellant argues as his sole assignment of error that the trial court erred in
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. He stressed the
following arguments, to wit: (1) that the medico-legal officer said several times that the
sexual intercourse occurred three months before the incident complained of; (2) that
verbal admissions are inadmissible against the accused; (3) that the bracelet and the
Chanel watch and even the improbable shoestring were the products of a poisonous tree,
not having fruits of a lawful warrantless arrest; and (4) that his identification based on
his built and voice is not an effective one.
We shall first discuss the procedural matters and circumstances surrounding the charge.
Accused-appellant, corroborated by defense witness Melchor Mabini, contends that his
arrest was an alleged warrantless one. However, such irregularity was only raised during
trial. In regard to this delay, this Court has consistently ruled that any objection involving
a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the
person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is
deemed waived (People v. Lopez, Jr., 245 SCRA 95 [1995]; People vs. Rivera, 245
SCRA 421 [1995]). Verily, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient complaint
after trial free from error; such arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction of
the accused (People vs. Manzano, 248 SCRA 239 [1995]). And it is much too late in the
day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid information had filed and
accused arraigned and trial commenced and completed and a judgment of conviction
rendered against him (People vs. Llenaresas, 248 SCRA 629 [1995]).
As regards the evidentiary weight of accused-appellants sworn statement wherein he
confessed to the crime charged, and his verbal confession made before robbery victim,
Marites Nas Atienza, we rule against the validity of the written confession but uphold
the admissibility of the verbal confession.
In People vs. Deniega, 251 SCRA 626 [1995], we laid down the four fundamental
requirements needed of admissibility of a confession, to wit: (1) the confession must be
voluntary; (2) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel; (3) the confession must be express; and (4) the confession must be
in writing.
Accused-appellant testified that he was forced to execute the sworn statement containing
his confession (tsn, August 23, 1990, p.9). Although this assertion is uncorroborated,
accused-appellants free will and volition in signing his confession will not cure the
defect that it was made without assistance of counsel. An admission made without the
assistance of counsel during custodial investigation is inadmissible in evidence (People
vs. Cascalla, 240 SCRA 482 [1985]). Even if the confession of an accused speaks the In this light, we are swayed by Marites spontaneous and straightforward testimony on
truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence how she recognized the culprit, to wit:
regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given (People vs.
Agustin, 240 SCRA 541 [1995]). An uncounselled extrajudicial confession without a Q Now, what was your basis in saying that it was the accused who was the one who
valid waiver of the right to counsel that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel is poked a kitchen knife on you?
inadmissible in evidence (People vs. Cabintoy, 241 SCRA 442 [1995]). A His height, his built, especially his voice, were my basis, sir, in saying that he was the
In contrast, accused-appellants verbal confession before Marites Nas Atienza is, person who poked a knife on me.
however, admissible in evidence. The case in point is People vs. Andan (G.R. No. Q What is so particular in his voice that you know that it was the voice of the accused-
116437, March 3, 1997) where we ruled that the accuseds verbal confession made in a appellant?
private meeting with the municipal mayor, spontaneously, fully and voluntarily done, is
admissible in evidence since it is to covered by the requirements of Section 12(1) and ATTY. CHAVEZ:
(3) of Article III of the Constitution. When said accused talked with the mayor as a
The question has already been answered, your Honor, his height, his built and his voice
confidant and as not a law enforcement officer, uncounselled confession did not violate
are the basis for her knowing accused Panfilo Cabiles.
his constitutional rights. Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not
apply to spontaneous statement, not elicited trough questioning by authorities, but given COURT:
in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admitted having committed the crime
as in the case at bar. Witness may answer.

In any event, we agree with the prosecutions contention that accused-appellants WITNESS:
conviction was deduced not on the basis of his admission of guilt, but on the trial courts
A Because I have seen him once and I heard his voice when he went to the house of my
assessment of the evidence presented before it.
brother-in-law, Jaime Mabingnay, on the last week of October, 1989.
We find no reason to disturb the trial courts finding as to the credibility of prosecution
FISCAL SISON:
witnesses Marites Nas Atienza and Luzviminda Aquinio, the victims of robbery and
rape, respectively. The time tested jurisprudence is that the findings and conclusions of Q When you said Jaime Mabingnay, he is one of the accused in this case?
the trial court on the credibility of witnesses enjoy a badge of respect for the reason that
trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify A Yes, sir.
(People vs. Gamiao, 240 SCRA 254 [1995]; People vs. Ramos, 240 SCRA 191 [1995];
Q Now, tell us how far is that house of Jaime Mabingnay to your house?
People vs. Cajambab, 240 SCRA 643 [1995]; People vs. Moran, 241 SCRA 709
[1995]). A perusal of the testimony of witness convenience us even more that there is A About six (6) steps away from our house, sir.
no strong and cogent reason to disregard the trial courts finding .
Q And when you heard the voice of Panfilo Cabiles, what were they doing then inside
We agree that the identity of accused-appellant was sufficiently established through the the house of Jaime Mabingnay?
following circumstances:
A They were having a drinking spree in the sala of the house of Jaime Mabingnay which
1. The room where the crime was committed covered a very small area of 29 square is just in front of the door of my house, sir.
meters (tsn, April 5, 1990, p. 24). It was illuminated by a lighted electric bulb outside
the jalousie window of said room (tsn, April 26, 1990, p. 17). The victims could have Q When you saw them drinking, what time was that?
easily noticed the physical features of their assailant, who was later identified as A Around 8:00 oclock in the evening, sir.
accused-appellant.
Q And up to what time did you see him inside the house of Jaime Mabingnay?
2. Two witnesses (Marites Nas Atienza and Corporal Luciano Caeda) testified that at the
time of accused-appellants arrest, he was wearing a bracelet (Exh. F) which Marites A I saw him there for about an hour and I dont know whether or not he slept there.
recognized as the one she surrendered to accused-appellant during the robbery on
November 5, 1989 (tsn, March 5, 1990, p. 35). Q Before last week of October, have you seen him?
ATTY. CHAVEZ:
We object to the question on the basis of, first, there is no basis; second, the Fiscal
interpreting in Tagalog gives an advance sign for an answer to the witness, your Honor.
FISCAL SISON:
Q So that at the time in October, that was the first time you saw the accused in this case,
I am referring to Panfilo Cabiles?
A Yes, sir.
Q Have you heard what he said?
A No, sir. But I heard his voice when he greeted my sister Imelda Nas.
Q When he greeted your sister Imelda Nas, where was he?
A He was there sitting at the sala while he was drinking with Jaime Mabingnay.
Q Where was your sister there at that time?
A She was standing at the door of Jaimes house and I was behind her.
Marites identification of accused-appellant is corroborated by Luzvimindas
identification of accused appellant as her rapist as follows:
Q Aside from that admission, what other basis have you to say that the accused was that
person if there is still any?
ATTY. ILAGAN:
I object your Honor, because there is no basis and after the witness answered that the
only sign she knows of the accused is when at the police headquarters he admitted before
De Leon to have allegedly sexually played on her, so I object.
FISCAL SISON:
If she has other basis, your Honor,aside from that admission he made.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
WITNESS (A):
His voice and his built, sir.
FISCAL SISON:
You mentioned about his built, when he had sexual intercourse with you that was you
said at about 1:15 in the morning, how come you were able to see the built of the accused
at that time?
A Because the light coming inside thru the jalousie window illuminates the inside of the
room, sir.
(tsn, April 26, 1990,pp. 16-17)
Q What awakened you?
A Because the baby of Ate Tes was crying and that awakened me sir, and when I opened
by eyes I saw that there was somebody standing.
Q And that person that you saw standing was facing his back to you, correct?
A No, sir. He was facing my direction.
Q So this person you said was facing in your direction was between you and your Ate
Marites, is that what you want us to understand?
A Yes, sir.
(tsn, April 26, 1990, p. 34)
3. Aside from the bracelet, the arresting officers found a Chanel ladys wristwatch (Exh.
G) which Marites likewise recognized as another of the objects taken by accused
appellant during the robbery. Accused-appellants assertion that said watch is his own is
not peruasive. Aside from the fact that his testimony is not corroborated, we likewixe
make the practical observation that Chanel is not an ordinary watch brand. It would be
too much of a coincidence that a watch of the same not very ordinary brand as that
involved in the robbery subject thereof was pledged to accused-appellant.
The trial court correctly cited the evidentiary presumption that a person found in
possession of thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer
of the whole act (Sec. 3[7], Rule 131, Revised Rules of Evidence). In People vs.
Newman (163 SCRA 496 [1988]), we ruled that where the accused offers no satisfactory
explanation as to the fact of his possession of stolen properties, such evidence would
abundantly incriminate him and proves that he took them with animus lucrandi. In the
case at bench, all that accused-appellant could offer as defense was denial which is a
weak defense. The defense of denial, if uncorroborated by clear and convincing proof,
is considered self-serving evidence undeserving of any weight in law (People vs.
Macario, 240 SCRA 531 [1995]).
Accused-appellant strongly relies on the finding of NBI medico-legal Officer, Carmelita
Belgica, that upon physical examination of the rape victim, it was found that the hymenal
lacerations took place three months before the date of examination, to rule out his
commission of the crime of rape. We are not persuaded.
Any prior sexual intercourse which could have resulted in hymenal laceration is
irrelevant in rape cases for virginity is not an element of rape (People vs. Delovino, 247
SCRA 519 [1995]). Hence, it is of no moment that there is a finding that sexual
intercourse occurred three months earlier than November 5, 1989. Too, the rape could
have been so slight as to leave no traces upon examination, for complete penetration of
the female organ is not necessary to constitute rape (People vs. Soan, 243 SCRA
622). The mere penetration of the penis by entry thereof into the labia minora of the
female organ suffices to warrant a conviction for rape (People vs. Sanchez, 250 SCRA
14 [1995]). The following circumstances are significant:
1. Luzviminda testified that she was raped by accused appellant. No young Filipina
would publicly admit that she had been criminally abused and ravished unless that is the
truth, as it is her natural instinct to protect her honor (People vs. Delovino, supra; People
vs. Namayon, 246 SCRA 646 [1995]; People vs. Rivera, 242 SCRA 26 [1995]).
2. Luzvimindas testimony is corroborated by that of Marites who herself witnessed the
rape (tsn, March 5, 1990, p. 16).
3. The shoestring that was found inside the plastic bag is also an indication of accused-
appellants commission of the crime rape. Luzviminda identified said shoestring as that
which was used on her to effect the crime of rape.
Lastly, accused-appellants defense of denial and alibi must fail considering that he was
positively identified by Marites and Luzviminda as the author of the crime. We have
consistently ruled that alibi, like denial, is inherently weak and easily fabricated. In order
to justify an acquittal based on this defense, the accused must establish by clear and
convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the crime
scene during the commission (People vs. Pontilar, G.R. NO. 104865, July 11, 1997;
People vs. Sumbillo, et al., G.R. No. 105292, April 18, 1997; People vs. Gamiao, supra).
In the case at bench, accused-appellant admitted being at Marivic Compound at Baesa,
Quezon City, during the night of the incident. He was allegedly with his wife (tsn,
August 23, 1990, p. 4). Defense witness Melchor Mabini even attested that the couple
spent the night at the compound on the eve of November 5, 1989. But did Mabini watch
over the couple the whole night? It is not impossible for accused-appellant to sleep at
the Marivic Compound on the night of November 4, 1989 and surreptitiously leave the
premises at midnight to get to Kalookan City. The distance between Quezon City and
Kalookan City is not significant.
Anent the award of consequential damages, we increase the indemnity in favor of the
rape victim Luzviminda Aquino from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 in line with recent
jurisprudence.We affirm the awards concerning the amounts corresponding to the value
of the items stolen, the same having been established through the testimony of Marites
Nas Atienza, including the P1,000.00 awarded for costs.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellant justified by the evidence
on record, the assailed decision is hereby affirmed with the modification above-stated.
G.R. No. L-61388 July 19, 1985
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR DR. AURORA PARONG, NORBERTO
PORTUGUESE, SABINO PADILLA, FRANCIS DIVINA GRACIA, IMELDA
DE LOS SANTOS, BENJAMIN PINEDA, ZENAIDA MALLARI, MARIANO
SORIANO, TITO TANGUILIG, LETTY BALLOGAN, BIENVENIDA
GARCIA, EUFRONIO ORTIZ, JR., JUANITO GRANADA and TOM
VASQUEZ, JOSEFINA GARCIA PADILLA, petitioner,
vs.
MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GENERAL FABIAN C. VER GENERAL
FIDEL V. RAMOS, and LT. COL. MIGUEL CORONEL, respondents.
Lorenzo Tanada, Jose W. Diokno, Joker P. Arroyo, Efren H. Mercado and Alexander A.
Padilla for petitioner.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Garcia Padilla v. Minister Enrile, 1 is an application for the issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus on behalf of fourteen detainees, nine of whom were arrested on July 6,
1982, 2 another four on July 7, 1982, 3 and the last one on July 15, 1982. 4 The writ was
issued, respondents were required to make a return, and the case heard on August 26,
1982. 5
In such return, it was alleged: "The detainees mentioned in the petition, with the
exception of Tom Vasquez, who was temporarily released on July 17, 1982, after his
arrest on July 15, 1982, are all being detained by virtue of a Presidential Commitment
Order (PCO) issued on July 12, 1982, pursuant to LOI No. 1211 dated March 9, 1982,
in relation to Presidential Proclamation No. 2045 dated January 17, 1981. The said PCO
was issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos for violation of P.D. No. 885 ... ." 6
The facts were set forth thus in the opinion of the Court penned by retired Justice Pacifico
de Castro: "At the time of the arrest of the nine (9) of the fourteen (14) detainees herein
on July 6, 1982, records reveal that they were then having conference in the dining room
of Dr. Parong's residence from 10:00 a.m. of that same day. Prior thereto, all the fourteen
(14) detainees were under surveillance as they were then Identified as members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) engaging in subversive activities and using
the house of detainee Dr. Aurora Parong in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, as their
headquarters. Caught in flagrante delicto, the nine (9) detainees mentioned scampered
towards different directions leaving on top of their conference table numerous
subversive documents, periodicals, pamphlets, books, correspondence, stationeries, and
other papers, including a plan on how they would infiltrate the youth and student sector
(code-named YORK). Also found were one (1) .38 cal. revolver with eight (8) live
bullets, nineteen (19) rounds of ammunition for M16 armalite, eighteen thousand six
hundred fifty pesos P l8,650.00) cash believed to be CPP/NPA funds, assorted medicine
packed and ready for distribution, a sizeable quantity of printing paraphernalia, which
were then seized. 7
According to the main opinion of the Court, concurred in full by six other
members: 8 "The function of the PCO is to validate, on constitutional ground, the
detention of a person for any of the offenses covered by Proclamation No. 2045 which
continues in force the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, if the
arrest has been made initially without any warrant. Its legal effect is to render the writ
unavailing as a means of judicially inquiring into the legality of the detention in view of
the suspension of the privilege of the writ. The grant of the power to suspend the said
privilege provides the basis for continuing with perfect legality the detention as long as
the invasion or rebellion has not been repelled or quelled and the need therefor in the
interest of public safety continues." 9 Further: "The significance of the confernment of
this power, constitutionally upon the President as Commander-in-Chief, is that the
exercise thereof is not subject to judicial inquiry, with a view to determining its legality
in the light of the bill of rights guarantee to individual freedom." 10
The opinion then went on to reiterate the doctrine that with the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the right to bail is likewise suspended and to hold
"that under LOI 1211, a Presidential Commitment Order, the issuance of which is the
executive prerogative of the President under the Constitution, may not be declared void
by the Courts, under the doctrine of 'political question,' as has been applied in the Baker
and Castañeda cases, on any ground, let alone its supposed violation of the provision of
LOI 1211, thus diluting, if not abandoning, the doctrine of the Lansang case." 11 Finally,
the Court held "that upon the issuance of the Presidential Commitment Order against
herein petitioners, their continued detention is rendered valid and legal, and their right
to be released even after the filing of charges against them in court, to depend on the
President, who may order the release of a detainee or his being placed under house arrest,
as he has done in meritorious cases." 12
The dispositive portion of the decision promulgated on April 20, 1983 reads as follows:
"[Wherefore], the instant petition should be, as it is hereby dismissed." 13
Thereafter, on June 6, 1983, a motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner Garcia
Padilla. The stress is on the continuing validity of Garcia v. Lansang 14 as well as the
existence of the right to bail even with the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. The motion asserted further that the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus does not vest the President with the power to issue warrants of
arrest or presidential commitment orders, and that even it be assumed that he has such a
power, the Supreme Court may review its issuance when challenged. It was finally
alleged that since petitioners were not caught in flagrante delicto, their arrest was illegal
and void.
In the comment of respondents on the motion for reconsideration, it was the submission
of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza that the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus raises a political, not a judicial, question and that the right to bail cannot
be invoked during such a period. On the question of whether or not the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus vests the President with the power to issue
warrants of arrest or presidential commitment orders, this is what the Comment stated:
"It is to be pointed out that this argument was not raised in the petition. Nonetheless,
suffice it to point out that an arrest order by the President incident to the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is essentially preventive in nature." 15 It added:
"Besides, PD No. 1836 and LOI 1211 have vested, assuming a law is necessary, in the
President the power of preventive arrest incident to the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. In addition, however, it should be noted that the PCO has been
replaced by Preventive Detention Action (PDA), pursuant to PD No. 1877 dated July
21, 1983. As provided for in the said decree, a PDA constitute an authority to arrest and
preventively detain persons committing the aforementioned crimes, for a period not
exceeding one (1) year, with the cause or causes of their arrest subjected to review by
the President or by the Review Committee created for that purpose." 16 The last argument
of petitioner, namely that the detainees were not caught in flagrante delicto and therefore
the arrest was illegal was refuted in the Comment thus: "Again petitioner simply misses
the point. As this Court correctly observed, the crimes of subversion and rebellion are
continuing offenses. Besides this point involves an issue of fact. 17
It suffices to refer to the above Comment for the resolution of the motion for
reconsideration. As therein noted, Presidential Decree No. 1877 dated July 21, 1983
limits the duration of the preventive detention action for the period not exceeding one
year. In the language of such Decree: "When issued, the preventive detention action shall
constitute authority to arrest the subject person or persons, and to preventively detain
him or them for a period not exceeding one year and sequester all arms, equipment or
properly used or to be used in the commission of the crime or crimes." 18 There is no
need to mention the amendments as there is no change as to the preventive detention
period remaining at "not exceeding one year." This Presidential Decree No. 1877
explicitly provides in its Section 8: "The Minister of Defense shall promulgate the rules
and regulations to implement this Decree." 19 Such implementing rules and regulations
were issued on September 7, 1983 by Minister of National Defense, respondent Juan
Ponce Enrile and duly approved by the President of the Philippines. One of its Sections
deals with the period of detention under a presidential commitment order thus: "The
period of detention of all persons presently detained by virtue of a Presidential
Commitment Order or its derivatives shall not extend beyond one (1) year from and after
the date of effectivity of Presidential Decree No. 1877, as amended. Upon the effectivity
of these rules and regulations, all cases of persons presently detained under a presidential
commitment order or its derivatives shall be governed by Presidential Decree No. 1877,
as amended, and its implementing rules and regulations." 20
Subsequently, on May 28, 1985, respondents filed the following Manifestation: "1. The
persons listed below who were detained by virtue of Presidential Commitment Order
(PCO) issued on July 12, 1982, and in whose behalf the above-captioned cases was filed
have been released detention by the military authorities concerned on the dates appearing
opposite their names, to wit: Names of Detainees — Dates of Release: a. Dr. Aurora
Parong-December 12, 1983: b. Norberto Portuguese- January 31, 1985; c. Sabino Padilla
— January 31, 1985; d. Francis Divinagracia — January 31, 1985; e. Imelda delos
Santos — October 20, 1983; f. Benjamin Pineda — January 3l 1985; g. Zenaida Mallari
— January 31, 1985 h. Tito Tanguilig — October 21, 1983; i. Letty Ballogan — March
4, 1983; j. Bienvenida Garcia — October 20, 1983; k Eufronio Ortiz, Jr. January 31,
1985; 1. Juanito Granada — October 20, 1983. 2. The foregoing information was
received from the Off ice of Civil Relations, Ministry of National Defense, through
Major Felizardo O. Montero, JAGS-GHO 3. As regards Tom Vasquez, who was
included in the instant petition, he was released on July 17, 1982, after his arrest on July
15, 1982, since he was not named in the PCO 4. Anent Mariano Soriano, the undersigned
have been informed by the Office of Civil Relations that the subject escaped from
detention two (2) years ago and as of date hereof is still at large." 21
There is no question, therefore, that the force and effectivity of a presidential
commitment order issued as far back as July 12, 1982 had ceased to have any force or
effect.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1877 and Section 8 of
the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 1877-A, the motion
for reconsideration should have been granted, and the writ of habeas corpus ordering the
release of the detainees covered by such Section 8 issued, but in the light of the foregoing
manifestation as to Norberto Portuguese, Sabino Padilla, Francis Divina gracia, Imelda
de los Santos, Benjamin Pineda, Zenaida Mallari, Mariano Soriano, Tito Tanguilig,
Letty Ballogan, Bienvenida Garcia, Eufronio Ortiz, Jr., Juanito Granada, and Tom
Vasquez, having been released, the petition as to them has been declared moot and
academic. As to Dr. Aurora Parong, since a warrant of arrest against her was issued by
the municipal court of Bayombong on August 4, 1982, for illegal possession of firearm
and ammunitions, the petition is likewise declared moot and academic. No costs.
Fernando, * CJ., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la
Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur in the result.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I concur in the result, i.e. to dismiss the case for having become moot and academic.
And if I had my way I would set the original decision aside because of its slavish tone.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
I maintain my original dissent from the decision of April 20, 1983, thus: "I am
constrained to dissent from the all encompassing scope of the main opinion of Mr.
Justice de Castro which would overturn the landmark doctrine of Lansang vs.
Garcia 1 which upheld the Supreme Court's authority to inquire into the existence of
factual bases for the President's suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus in
order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof and would revert to the
retrogressive and colonial era ruling of Barcelon vs. Baker 2 and Montenegro vs.
Castañeda 3 that the President's decision to so suspend the privilege of the writ 'is final
and conclusive upon the courts and all other persons,' and would further deny the right
to bail even after the filing of charges in court to persons detained under Presidential
Commitment Orders," and " 'The continuous flow of petitions for habeas corpus' filed
with this Court should not be decried nor discouraged. The Court stands as the guarantor
of the constitutional and human rights of all persons within its jurisdiction and must see
to it that the rights are respected and enforced. It is settled in this jurisdiction that once
a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the
judgment or before whom the case is pending is ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus
is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the detention. 4 So accused persons
deprived of the constitutional right of speedy trial have been set free. 5 And likewise
persons detained indefinitely without charges so much so that the detention becomes
punitive and not merely preventive in character are entitled to regain their freedom. The
spirit and letter of our Constitution negates as contrary to the basic precepts of human
rights and freedom that a person be detained indefinitely without any charges."
As stated therein, "the higher and superior mandate of the Constitution guarantees the
right to bail and vests the courts with the jurisdiction and judicial power to grant bail
which may not be removed nor diminished nor abdicated. We cannot but so hold, if we
are to be true to the fundamental precept that 'The Constitution is a law for rulers and for
people equally in war and in peace and covers with the shield of its protection all classes
of men at all times and under all circumstances.'
It should be noted that the Court's Resolution at bar reaffirms the restrictive
interpretation of preventive detention under section 3 of P.D. 1877 dated July 21, 1983
adopted by it in the Jimenez 6 and Villaber 7 cases, that it will set at liberty persons
preventively detained without charges for over one year. Specifically cited is section 8
of the Defense Minister's implementing rules and regulations duly approved by the
President that "The period of detention of all persons presently detained by virtue of a
Presidential Commitment Order or its derivatives shall not extend beyond one (1) year
from and after the date of effectivity of Presidential Decree No. 1877, as amended. Upon
the effectivity of these rules and regulations, all cases of persons presently detained
under a Presidential Commitment Order or its derivatives shall be governed by
Presidential Decree No. 1877, as amended, and its implementing rules and regulations."
The Court's Resolution further authoritatively states with the unqualified concurrence of
at least ten (10) members that "There is no question, therefore, that the force and
effectivity of a presidential commitment order issued as far back as July 12, 1982 had
ceased to have any force and effect," since the detention exceeded the prescribed one-
year limitation and that "pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1877 and
Section 8 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 1877-A,
the motion for reconsideration should have been granted, and the writ of habeas corpus
ordering the release of the detainees covered by such Section 8 issued," but for the
release of the detainees effected earlier, mostly in January this year.
The crucial issues raised in petitioner's motion for reconsideration of June 6, 1983 8 will
have to await determination in pending appropriate cases awaiting the Court's resolution.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I concur in the result, i.e. to dismiss the case for having become moot and academic.
And if I had my way I would set the original decision aside because of its slavish tone.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
I maintain my original dissent from the decision of April 20, 1983, thus: "I am
constrained to dissent from the all encompassing scope of the main opinion of Mr.
Justice de Castro which would overturn the landmark doctrine of Lansang vs.
Garcia 1 which upheld the Supreme Court's authority to inquire into the existence of
factual bases for the President's suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus in
order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof and would revert to the
retrogressive and colonial era ruling of Barcelon vs. Baker 2 and Montenegro vs.
Castañeda 3 that the President's decision to so suspend the privilege of the writ 'is final
and conclusive upon the courts and all other persons,' and would further deny the right
to bail even after the filing of charges in court to persons detained under Presidential
Commitment Orders," and " 'The continuous flow of petitions for habeas corpus' filed
with this Court should not be decried nor discouraged. The Court stands as the guarantor
of the constitutional and human rights of all persons within its jurisdiction and must see
to it that the rights are respected and enforced. It is settled in this jurisdiction that once
a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the
judgment or before whom the case is pending is ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus
is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the detention. 4 So accused persons
deprived of the constitutional right of speedy trial have been set free. 5 And likewise
persons detained indefinitely without charges so much so that the detention becomes
punitive and not merely preventive in character are entitled to regain their freedom. The
spirit and letter of our Constitution negates as contrary to the basic precepts of human
rights and freedom that a person be detained indefinitely without any charges."
As stated therein, "the higher and superior mandate of the Constitution guarantees the
right to bail and vests the courts with the jurisdiction and judicial power to grant bail
which may not be removed nor diminished nor abdicated. We cannot but so hold, if we
are to be true to the fundamental precept that 'The Constitution is a law for rulers and for
people equally in war and in peace and covers with the shield of its protection all classes
of men at all times and under all circumstances.'
It should be noted that the Court's Resolution at bar reaffirms the restrictive
interpretation of preventive detention under section 3 of P.D. 1877 dated July 21, 1983
adopted by it in the Jimenez 6 and Villaber 7 cases, that it will set at liberty persons
preventively detained without charges for over one year. Specifically cited is section 8
of the Defense Minister's implementing rules and regulations duly approved by the
President that "The period of detention of all persons presently detained by virtue of a
Presidential Commitment Order or its derivatives shall not extend beyond one (1) year
from and after the date of effectivity of Presidential Decree No. 1877, as amended. Upon
the effectivity of these rules and regulations, all cases of persons presently detained
under a Presidential Commitment Order or its derivatives shall be governed by
Presidential Decree No. 1877, as amended, and its implementing rules and regulations."
The Court's Resolution further authoritatively states with the unqualified concurrence of
at least ten (10) members that "There is no question, therefore, that the force and
effectivity of a presidential commitment order issued as far back as July 12, 1982 had
ceased to have any force and effect," since the detention exceeded the prescribed one-
year limitation and that "pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1877 and
Section 8 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 1877-A,
the motion for reconsideration should have been granted, and the writ of habeas corpus
ordering the release of the detainees covered by such Section 8 issued," but for the
release of the detainees effected earlier, mostly in January this year.
The crucial issues raised in petitioner's motion for reconsideration of June 6, 1983 8 will
have to await determination in pending appropriate cases awaiting the Court's resolution.
Fide et Amore