ART 12.

INSANITY

PEOPLE v. DOMINGO
March 2, 2009 (G.R. No. 184343)
PARTIES:
Plaintiff-Appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Accused-Appellant: JESUS DOMINGO

FACTS:

The Court of Appeals found appellant Jesus Domingo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder, attempted murder, frustrated murder, and frustrated homicide.
On or about the 29th day of March 2000, complainant and her children were sleeping inside their
house when Domingo when she was awakened when the accused entered their kitchen armed with
a screwdriver and a kitchen knife. He stabbed the complainant and her children. Raquel Indon,
complainant, pleaded the appellant to spare her daughter but teh appellant answered “Ngayon pa,
nagawa ko na”. Two of her children died.

Five years passed, the defense counsel said that nine days prior the commission of the
crime, appellant suffered sleeplessness, lack of appetite, and nervousness. Occasionally, a voice
would tell him to kill. Appellant averred that when he regained his memory, one week had already
passed since the incidents, and he was already detained. They submitted a psychiatric evaluation,
and psychological examination as evidence that appellant suffered from Schizophrenia, a mental
disorder characterized by the presence of delusions and or hallucinations, disorganized speech and
behavior, poor impulse control and low frustration tolerance. The doctor could not find out when
the appellant started to suffer this illness, but the symptoms of Schizophrenia which were
manifested by the patient indicated that he suffered from the illness six months before the Center
examined the appellant. The counsel of the appellant raised the defense of insanity of the appellant.

ISSUE: WON the appellant is exempt from criminal liability on the ground of insanity.

HELD:

No, the defense of insanity is unmeritorious. Insanity exempts the accused only when the
finding of mental disorder refers to appellant’s state of mind immediately before or at the very
moment of the commission of the crime. This was not the case in the issue at bar, what was
presented was proof of appellant’s mental disorder that existed five years after the incident, but
not at the time the crimes were committed. The RTC also considered it crucial that appellant had
the presence of mind to respond to Raquel Indon’s pleas that her daughters be spared by saying,
“Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na.”

Even assuming that nine days prior the crime the appellant was hearing voices ordering
him to kill people, while suggestive of an abnormal mental condition, cannot be equated with a
total deprivation of will or an absence of the power to discern. Mere abnormality of mental
faculties will not exclude imputability. The law presumes every man to be of sound mind.
Otherwise stated, the law presumes that all acts are voluntary, and that it is improper to presume
that acts are done unconsciously. Thus, a person accused of a crime who pleads the exempting
circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that he or she was
insane immediately before or at the moment the crime was committed.

TEST OF VOLITION:

PEOPLE v TANEO
G.R. No. L-37673
March 31, 1933

TOPICS: Criminal Law, Somnambulism, Sleep Walking, Legal Medicine

FACTS:

Potenciano Tadeo lived with his wife in his parent’s house. In January 1932, a fiesta was being
celebrated, and visitors were entertained in the house including Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao.
Early that afternoon, Potenciano Taneo, went to sleep and while sleeping, he suddenly got up, left
the room bolo in hand and, upon meeting his wife who tried to stop him, he wounded her in the
abdomen. Taneo attacked Tanner and Malinao and tried to attack his father after which he wounded
himself. Potenciano’s wife who was then seven months pregnant, died five days later as a result
of her wound, and also the foetus which was asphyxiated in the mother’s womb. Taneo was
charged with parricide. From this sentence, the defendant appealed.
It appears from the evidence that the day before the commission of the crime the defendant had a
quarrel over a glass of “tuba” with Enrique Collantes and Valentin Abadilla. On the day of the
commission of the crime, it was noted that the defendant was sad and weak, and early in the
afternoon he had severe stomachache. The defendant states that when he fell asleep, he dreamed
that Collantes was trying to stab him with a bolo while Abadilla held his feet, by reason of which
he got up; and as it seemed to him that his enemies were inviting him to come down, he armed
himself with a bolo and left the room. At the door, he met his wife who seemed to say to him that
she was wounded. Then he fancied seeing his wife really wounded and in desperation wounded
himself. As his enemies seemed to multiply around him, he attacked everybody that came his way.
The evidence shows that the defendant not only did not have any trouble with his wife, but that he
loved her dearly. Neither did he have any dispute with Tanner and Malinao, or have any motive
for assaulting them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Taneo is criminally liable.

RULING:

No. The Court concluded that the defendant acted while in a dream. His acts were not voluntary
in the sense of entailing criminal liability.
The Court took the special circumstances of the case, in which the victim was the defendant’s own
wife whom he dearly loved, and taking into consideration the fact that the defendant tried to attack
also his father, in whose house and under whose protection he lived, besides attacking Tanner and
Malinao, his guests, whom he himself invited as may be inferred from the evidence presented, the
Court found not only a lack of motive for the defendant to voluntarily commit the acts complained
of, but also motives for not committing said acts.
Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is also of the same opinion. The doctor stated that
considering the circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in a dream, under the
influence of a hallucination and not in his right mind.
The Court found that the defendant is not criminally liable for the offense with which he is charged,
and it is ordered that he be confined in the Government insane asylum, whence he shall not be
released until the director thereof finds that his liberty would no longer constitute a menace.

AGE:

Robert Sierra vs People of the Philippines GR 182941 (July 3, 2009)

Facts
Petitioner was 15 years old when he raped a minor. He was convicted of rape and was
imposed a penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and a fine. He elevated the case to CA
and during the pendence of the case, RA 9344 took effect. CA affirmed the conviction and denied
the defense of minority since the age was not established by presenting the birth certificate but
only alleged in the testimonial of the petitioner and his mother. According to them the burden of
proof of age is upon the prosecution.

ISSUES:

Who has the burden of proof in establishing the age of the accused?
Whether the law be given retroactive application.

HELD:
The duty to establish the age of the accused is not on the prosecution but on the accused.
Age can be established by birth certificate. Sec. 7 provides that in the absence of such document,
age may be based from the information of the child, testimonies of other persons, physical
appearance and other relevant evidence. Also in case of doubt, minority should be in favour of the
child. In the case at bar, minority was established by the testimonies of the petitioner and his
mother. This was not objected by the prosecution and did not even presented contrary evidence.
Thus, minority is established.
The law should be given retroactive application since this favors the accused as provided
for in the Revised Penal Code – penal laws favouring the accused should be given retroactive
effect. Hence the accused is considered a minor with an age of not above 15 years old. The case is
dismissed and the petitioner is referred to the appropriate local social welfare.

PAR 5: IRRESISTIBLE FORCE

People of The Philippines vs. Roderick Licayan, Roberto Lara And Rogelio "Noel" Delos Reyes [G.R.
No. 203961. July 29, 2015]
FACTS:

In an On-August 15, 2001 Decision, the Supreme Court (SC) affirmed the RTC Decision convicting
Roderick Licayan and Roberto Lara of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom of Joseph Tomas Co
and Linda Manaysay, and sentencing them to the penalty of death. A Writ of Execution was issued
ordering the execution of Licayan and Lara on January 30, 2004 at 3:00 p.m.

Before the date of Licayan and Lara's scheduled execution, two of their co-accused in the original
Information were arrested. Pedro Mabansag, a double arm amputee and suspected mastermind
of the kidnapping, and Rogelio Delos Reyes.

The Public Attorney's Office (PAO) filed with the Supreme Court an Urgent Motion to Reopen the
Case which the SC granted on the condition that insofar as the accused Lara and Licayan are
concerned, the evidence already taken shall stand, although additional evidence may be
introduced to be taken and considered.

The prosecution evidence showed that the victim Joseph Tomas Co owns a restaurant called
Goodies Pares Mami House with branches in Valenzuela, Cubao, and Sampaloc. Co's regular
routine was for him and Linda Manaysay, the restaurant's cashier and accounting officer, to make
the rounds of the three branches for inspection and collection of left-over food and cash sales.

On August 9, 1998, while Co was at the Sampaloc branch, supervising the loading of left-over
food into the back of his Tamaraw FX service vehicle, three men approached him from behind.
The men were armed with two caliber 45 pistols and a .38 revolver. None of the men wore any
mask. Co told the men that if they wanted money, they could get it from the store. They refused.
One of the men's guns went off. When Manaysay heard the shot, she came out. Co and Manaysay
were amde to board the Tamaraw and their hands were tied and their eyes taped, and that they
were made to wear caps over their heads. They were brought inside a room of a house and the
masking tape was removed from their eyes. Accused Lara was left to guard them inside the room.

On August 11, 1998, at around 4:30 p.m., Licayan who was guarding them at that time fell asleep
and Co and Manaysay somehow managed to escape without being noticed by the look-out
outside their room. Complainants took refuge in a house from which Co was able to call the
Marikina Police Headquarters.

Lara and Licayan were thereafter identified by Co and Manaysay in a line-up. Benjamin Co,
complainant Joseph Tomas Co's brother, also testified that he was twice called in his office by
unidentified persons who demanded P10 million for the release of complainants.

In 2005, Mabansag died while detained at the Marikina City Jail. The trial against Licayan, Lara
and Delos Reyes proceeded. In 2009, the RTC of Marikina City rendered its Decision finding
Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes guilty of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom under Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code and sentenced them each to reclusion perpetua.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes in toto.
In the appeal now before the Supreme Court, accused Delos Reyes reiterates his defense that the
exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear was present in his case while accused-appellants
Licayan and Lara seek to overturn their conviction on the basis of the newly discovered evidence
presented during their retrial.

Issue/s:

Whether or not Delos Reyes is entitled to the exempting circumstance of compulsion due to
irresistible force.

Ruling:

The exempting circumstances under Article 12, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code
refers to “Any person who act under the compulsion of irresistible force”

In People v. Dansal, this Court held that a person invoking the exempting circumstance of
compulsion due to irresistible force admits in effect the commission of a punishable act, and must
therefore prove the exempting circumstance by clear and convincing evidence. Specifically, he
must show that the irresistible force reduced him to a mere instrument that acted not only
without will but also against his will. The compulsion must be of such character as to leave the
accused no opportunity to defend himself or to escape.

The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending; and it must be
of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if
the act is not done. A threat of future injury is not enough. A speculative, fanciful or remote fear,
even fear of future injury, is insufficient.

ART. 13: SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION

URBANO v People

Facts:
In an Information filed before the RTC, petitioner was charged with Homicide

Tomelden and Urbano, both drunk from a picnic, had a heated altercation which resulted
into a fist fight. Urbano landed a lucky blow which caused Tomelden to fall. He was brought to
the hospital and discharged but he complained of feeling dizzy and frequently vomiting. He was
diagnosed with brain injury. Due to financial constraints he was released even without
improvement. He complained of severe head pain and was brought to the hospital and died later
on due to "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral
hemorrhage due to mauling incident."
Urbano claims that it was hypertension and not the injuries from mauling that was the proximate
cause of Tomelden’s death since he died 12 days after the incident and even reported to work in
between.

Issue:
Should Urbano be convicted of homicide or simply slight physical injuries?

Ruling:

It was through the direct accounts of the prosecution witnesses of the events that transpired
during the fisticuff incident more specifically the landing of the "lucky punch" on the face of
[Tomelden], taken together with the result of the medical examinations and autopsy report which
described the death of the victim as "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion
with resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident" that we are convinced that the "lucky
punch" was the proximate cause of [Tomelden’s] death.
The prosecution had satisfactorily proven that it was only after the incident that transpired on
September 28, 1993 that the victim was hospitalized on several occasions until he expired, twelve
days later. It is moreover of no consequence whether the victim was able to report for work during
the intervening days
The mitigating circumstances of no intention to commit so grave a wrong and sufficient
provocation on the part of the victim ought to be appreciated in petitioner’s favor.
In the instant case, Tomelden’s insulting remarks directed at petitioner and uttered immediately
before the fist fight constituted sufficient provocation. This is not to mention other irritating
statements made by the deceased while they were having beer in Bugallon. Petitioner was the
one provoked and challenged to a fist fight. In fact, petitioner, being very much smaller in
height and heft, had the good sense of trying to avoid a fight.
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Art. 13, RPC provide as follows:
Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances.––The following are mitigating circumstances:
xxxx
3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.
4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the
act.
Moreover, the mitigating circumstance that petitioner had no intention to commit so grave a wrong
as that committed should also be appreciated in his favor. Consider: Petitioner tried to avoid the
fight, being very much smaller than Tomelden. He tried to parry the blows of Tomelden, albeit
he was able, during the scuffle, to connect a lucky punch that ended the fight. And lest it be
overlooked, petitioner helped carry his unconscious co-worker to the office of the LIWAD’s
general manager.

ART 13. PAR 7: VOLUNTARY SURRENDER

PEOPLE VS VIERNES
G.R. Nos. 136733-35. December 13, 2001

FACTS:
 Catherine Linatoc, a minor who is 12 years old was raped by her stepfather, Eladio Viernes,
three times. The young girl confided the incident to her grandmother who reported it to the police.
The courts said that the testimony of the victim was clear, positive and steadfast while the
accused’s denial and alibi were unsubstantiated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Viernes is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender

RULING:

No. Viernes is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

The courts held that for the act of surrender to be voluntary, it must be spontaneous. It must
show unconditional surrender to authorities because of the acknowledgment of guilt, or the
intention of saving the authorities the trouble and the expense that search and capture would
require. Going to the police station to clear his name does not show any intent of the accused to
surrender unconditionally to the authorities.