02 MMDA V CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY

Date: December 18, 2008 GR No. 171947-48 Velasco, Jr., J.

Irish Aquino
Petitioners: Respondents:
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY,

AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT represented and joined by DIVINA V. ILAS,

AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS,1
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE
COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
MARITIME GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS,
JR., DINAH DELA PEÑA, PAUL DENNIS
QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA
CALOZA, FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE SEGARRA,
FRITZIE TANGKIA, SARAH JOELLE LINTAG,
HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS, FELIMON SAN-
TIAGUEL, and JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA

Doctrine:
Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but
not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other. Petitioners’
charters or enabling statutes and pertinent laws, as government agencies, enjoins them to
perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation,
protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay.

Sec. 17 or Upgrading of Water Quality of the Environment Code requires the concerned
government agencies to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as
water quality “has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best
usage.” Sec. 20 or Clean-up Operations of the Environment Code indicates that it is properly
applicable to a specific situation in which the pollution is caused by polluters who fail to clean
up the mess they left behind. Sec. 20 is complementary with Sec. 17 of the same code, such
that the specific duties of the agencies to clean up come in even if there are no pollution
incidents staring at them.
Facts:
1. On January 12, 1999, Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the RTC
in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, among them is Metropolitan
Development Authority (MMDA), for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the
Manila Bay.
2. The complaint alleged that the water quality of Manila Bay had fallen way below the
allowable standards set by law, specifically PD 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code.
This stemmed from the “reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission
or commission of the respondent agencies resulting in the clear and present danger to
public health and in the depletion and contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay.”
3. In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of
 petitioners in abating the pollution of Manila Bay constitutes a violation of several laws,
one of which is their constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology.
4. The respondents pray that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to
the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.
5. During the trial, Renato Cruz, the Chief of Water Quality Management Section of DENR
testified that the water samples collected from different beaches around Manila Bay
shown the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable
number (MPN)/ml. While the DENR prescribed safe level for bathing and other forms of
contact recreational activities should not exceed 200 MPN/100ml.
6. Rebecca de Vera of Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) testified in
behalf the petitioners about the MWSS’ efforts to reduce pollution along the Manila Bay,
while the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) presented its study being conducted on waste
treatment and disposal, and its Linis Dagat project.
7. RTC Ruling: It rendered a decision in favor of respondents. With DENR as the lead agency,
RTC ordered (within 6 months from receipt) the petitioners to act and perform their
respective duties by devising a consolidated, coordinated and concerted scheme of action
for the rehabilitation and restoration of the bay.
8. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed individual appeals before the CA and others in the SC. SC
sent the petition to the CA for consolidation of appeals. Before the CA, the petitioners
were one in arguing that pertinent provisions of the Environment Code relate only to the
cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. They also
asserted: (a) lack of funds for cleanup; and (b) cleaning of Manila Bay is not a ministerial
act which can be compelled by mandamus.
9. CA Ruling: It denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC, as the trial
court’s decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic
functions under existing laws.
10. Hence, this petition. Petitioners assert that they only have to perform cleanup operations
in the Manila Bay only when there is a water pollution incident and the erring polluters
do not undertake the containment, removal, and cleanup operations.
Issue/s: Ruling:
1. Whether or not the petitioners can be compelled by mandamus to 1. YES
clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay 2. YES
2. Whether or not Sections 17 (Upgrading of Water Quality) and 20
(Cleanup Operation) of PD 1152 envisage a cleanup in general
Ratio:
1. The petitioners’ duty to comply with and act according to the clear mandate of the law
does not require the exercise of discretion, making it a ministerial duty. Hence, the writ
of mandamus is available to compel action on part of the petitioners. Generally, the writ
of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. A ministerial duty is one that
“requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.” Mandamus is available to
compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise
of judgment or discretion one way or the other.

MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act
(RA 9003) which prescribes the minimum criteria for the establishment of sanitary landfills
and Sec. 42 which provides the minimum operating requirements that each site operator
shall maintain in the operation of a sanitary landfill. Its duty in the area of solid waste
disposal is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and the RA 9003, but also in
its charter as well. Thus, the duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be
characterized as discretionary.

Petitioners’ obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how they
are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the
implementation of MMDA’s mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the
enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial
in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. An examination of the petitioners’ charters
or enabling statutes and pertinent laws, as government agencies, enjoins them to perform
certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and
1
preservation of the Manila Bay.

2. Sec. 17 and Sec. 20 of the Environment Code are not conditional on the occurrence of any
pollution incident.
Sec. 17 or Upgrading of Water Quality of the Environment Code does not state that the
government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal,
and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. Rather, it requires them to
act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality “has
deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage.” Thus, Sec. 17
commands concerned government agencies to take measures as necessary to meet the
prescribed water quality standards.

Sec. 20 or Clean-up Operations of the Environment Code indicates that it is properly applicable to
a specific situation in which the pollution is caused by polluters who fail to clean up the mess they
left behind. This provision is complementary with Sec. 17 of the same code, such that the specific
duties of the agencies to clean up come in even if there are no pollution incidents staring at them.
Petitioners cannot hide behind the pretext that their cleanup

1Too many discussion on the laws for each gov’t agency so I just discussed MMDA’s obligation here since it is the
main petitioner.
mandate depends on the happening of a specific pollution incident, as the Environment Code
aims to introduce a comprehensive program of environmental protection and management.
This aim is better served by making Secs. 17 and 20 of general application rather than limiting
them to specific pollution incidents.

Assuming arguendo that the petitioners’ petition on the implementation of Sec. 20 is correct,
they have overlooked the fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and
scope that it is impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general pollution
incident. And it is practically impossible to apprehend the numerous nameless and faceless
polluters for apprehension. Also, nobody has been required to contain, remove, or clean up a
given water pollution incident.

The cleanup and restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the
long-term solution. The Court enjoins the petitioners and put upon them continuing notice
about, and to enjoin them to perform, their mandates and duties towards cleaning up the
Manila Bay and preserving the quality of its water to the ideal level. Under what other judicial
discipline describes as “continuing mandamus,” the Court may, under extraordinary
circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be
set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference.
 3 RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS v. REYES
April 21, 2015 GR No. 180771 Leonardo-De Castro
Reina Cayanong
Petitioners: Respondents:
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary
SEASCAPE TAÑON STRAIT, e.g., TOOTHED WHALES, of the Department of Energy (DOE), SECRETARY JOSE L.
DOLPHINS, PORPOISES, AND OTHER CETACEAN SPECIES, ATIENZA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department
joined in and represented herein by Human Beings Gloria of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio, in their LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, DENR Regional Director-
capacity as Legal Guardians of the Lesser Life-Forms and as Region VII and in his capacity as Chairperson of the
Responsible Stewards of God’s Creations Tañon Strait Protected Seascape Management Board,
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR),
DIRECTOR MALCOLM J. SARMIENTO, JR., BFAR Regional
Director for Region VII ANDRES M. BOJOS, JAPAN
PETROLEUM EXPLORATION CO., LTD. (JAPEX), as
represented by its Philippine Agent, SUPPLY OILFIELD
SERVICES, INC.
Doctrine:
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
xxx
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for large- scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic
growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use
of local scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within
thirty days from its execution.

Facts:
1. “Resident Marine Mammals” are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which
inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait.
2. The Tañon Strait is a narrow passage of water bounded by the islands of Cebu in the East and Negros in the
West. It harbors a rich biodiversity of marine life, including endangered species of dolphins and whales.
3. The Government of the PH, acting through the DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration
Contract (GSEC) with JAPEX. This contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait. The
studies included surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data. JAPEX,
assisted by DOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite surveys, as well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon
Strait.
4. DOE and JAPEX formally converted the GSEC into SC-46 for the exploration, development, and production of
petroleum resources in a block covering approximately 2,850 sq.m. offshore the Tañon Strait.
5. JAPEX committed to drill 1 exploration well during the second sub-phase of the project. Since the well was to
be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, where the Tañon Strait was declared a
 protected seascape in 1988, JAPEX agreed to comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
requirements.
6. The Protected Area Management Board of the Tañon Strait (PAMB-Tañon Strait) issued a resolution wherein it
adopted the Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX, and favorably recommended the
approval of JAPEX’s application for an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC).
7. The EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas exploration
project in Tañon Strait.
8. JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan town in the
western Cebu Province.
9. It was in view of the foregoing state of affairs that petitioners applied to this Court for redress, via 2 separate
original petitions where they commonly seek that respondents be enjoined from implementing SC- 46 for,
among others, violation of the 1987 Constitution.

PETITIONERS’ ALLEGATIONS
1. Aver that a study made after the seismic survey showed that the fish catch was reduced drastically by 50 to 70%.
They claim that before the seismic survey, the average harvest per day would be from 15 to 20 kilos; but after the
activity, the fisherfolk could only catch an average of 1 to 2 kilos a day. They attribute this “reduced fish catch” to
the destruction of the “payao,” also known as the “fish aggregating device” or “artificial reef.”
2. Impute the incidences of “fish kill” observed by some of the local fisherfolk to the seismic survey. And they
further allege that the ECC obtained by private respondent JAPEX is invalid because public consultations and
discussions with the affected stakeholders, a prerequisite to the issuance of the ECC, were not held prior to the
ECC’s issuance.

PUBLIC RESPONDENTS’ COUNTER-ALLEGATIONS

1. Petitioners have no legal standing to file the present petition
2. That SC-46 does not violate the 1987 Constitution and the various laws cited in the petitions
3. That the ECC was issued in accordance with existing laws and regulations
4. That public respondents may not be compelled by mandamus to furnish petitioners copies of all documents
relating to SC-46
5. That all the petitioners failed to show that they are entitled to injunctive relief.
Issue/s: Ruling:
Procedural issue:
Whether the petitioners have locus standi. YES.
Substantive issues:

1. Whether Service Contract No. 46 is violative of the 1987 Constitution. 1. YES.

2. Whether Service Contract No. 46 is violative of certain laws in force in the PH. 2. YES.
Rationale:

PROCEDURAL ISSUE:
The issue of whether or not animals or even inanimate objects should be given legal standing in actions before
courts of law is not new in the field of animal rights and environmental law. The primary reason animal rights
advocates and environmentalists seek to give animals and inanimate objects standing is due to the need to comply
with the strict requirements in bringing a suit to court.

Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which allow for a “citizen
suit,” and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our environmental laws. It is
worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the
named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be
possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to
possess the legal standing to file this petition.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1. SC-46 is null and void for noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution.

The SC has previously settled the issue of whether service contracts are still allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
In La Bugal, the Court has held that the deletion of the words “service contracts” in the 1987 Constitution did not
amount to a ban on them per se. Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals,
petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these
requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard or uniform terms,
conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible
insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an agreement is
presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over at different levels to
ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within 30 days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that branch of
government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.

REQUISITE 1: The General Law on Oil Exploration

The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous petroleum in the
Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972.
While PD 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for petroleum exploration and
extraction may be authorized the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the present case may
be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area.

REQUISITES 2 & 3: President was not the signatory to SC-46 and the same was not submitted to Congress
While the SC finds that PD 87 is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a general law, the absence of the two
other conditions, that the President be a signatory to SC-46, and that Congress be notified of such contract,
renders it null and void. As SC-46 was executed in 2004, its terms should have conformed not only to the
provisions of PD 87, but also to those of the 1987 Constitution. Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution requires that the President himself enter into any service contract for the exploration of
 petroleum. SC-46 appeared to have been entered into and signed only by the DOE through its then Secretary,
Vicente S. Perez, Jr., contrary to the said constitutional requirement.

The public respondents have failed to show that the President had any participation in SC-46. Their argument
that their acts are actually the acts of then President Macapagal-Arroyo, absent proof of her disapproval, must
fail as the requirement that the President herself enter into these kinds of contracts is embodied not just in
any ordinary statute, but in the Constitution itself.

2. SC-46 is null and void for being contrary to certain laws in force in the Philippines. (What is common among
these laws is that an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) is needed before any environmentally
critical project/activity may be started)

Proclamation No. 1234: Declaring the Tañon Strait situated in the Provinces of Cebu, Negros Occidental and Negros
Oriental as a Protected Area pursuant to the NIPAS Act and shall be known as Tañon Strait Protected Seascape. The
NIPAS Act defines a Protected Seascape to be an area of national significance characterized by the harmonious
interaction of man and land while providing opportunities for public enjoyment through recreation and tourism
within the normal lifestyle and economic activity of this areas; thus a management plan for each area must be
designed to protect and enhance the permanent preservation of its natural conditions. Consistent with this
endeavor is the requirement that an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) be made prior to undertaking any
activity outside the scope of the management plan. Unless an ECC under the EIA system is obtained, no activity
inconsistent with the goals of the NIPAS Act shall be implemented.

Presidential Decree No. 1586

The Environmental Impact Statement System (EISS) was established in 1978 under this law. It prohibits any person,
partnership or corporation from undertaking or operating any declared environmentally critical project or areas
without first securing an ECC issued by the President or his duly authorized representative.

Proclamation No. 2146

The Tañon Strait is an environmentally critical area, having been declared as a protected area in 1998; therefore,
any activity outside the scope of its management plan may only be implemented pursuant to an ECC secured
after undergoing an EIA to determine the effects of such activity on its ecological system.

DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30 (IRR of the preceding law)

It defines an environmentally critical area as “an area delineated as environmentally sensitive such that significant
environmental impacts are expected if certain types of proposed projects or programs are located, developed, or
implemented in it”; thus, before a project, which is “any activity, regardless of scale or magnitude, which may
have significant impact on the environment,” is undertaken in it, such project must undergo an EIA (process that
involves evaluating and predicting the likely impacts of a project on the environment during construction,
commissioning, operation and abandonment) to evaluate and predict the likely impacts of all its stages on the
environment.

National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992

SECTION 12. Environmental Impact Assessment.—Proposals SECTION 14. Survey for Energy Resources.—Consistent with
for activities which are outside the scope of the the policies declared in Section 2 hereof, protected areas,
management plan for protected areas shall be subject to an except strict nature reserves and natural parks, may be
 environmental impact assessment as required by law before
they are adopted, and the results thereof shall be taken into
consideration in the decision-making process.
No actual implementation of such activities shall be
allowed without the required Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) under the Philippine Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) system. In instances where such activities
are allowed to be undertaken, the proponent shall plan and
carry them out in such manner as will minimize any adverse
effects and take preventive and remedial action when
appropriate. The proponent shall be liable for any damage
due to lack of caution or indiscretion.
subjected to exploration only for the purpose of gathering
information on energy resources and only if such activity is
carried out with the least damage to surrounding areas.
Surveys shall be conducted only in accordance with a
program approved by the DENR, and the result of such
surveys shall be made available to the public and submitted
to the President for recommendation to Congress. Any
exploitation and utilization of energy resources found within
NIPAS areas shall be allowed only through a law passed by
Congress.

However, while an exploration done for the purpose of surveying for energy resources is allowed under Section 14
of the NIPAS Act, this does not mean that it is exempt from the requirement to undergo an EIA under Section 12.
Surveying for energy resources under Section 14 is not an exemption from complying with the EIA requirement
in Section 12; instead, Section 14 provides for additional requisites before any exploration for energy resources
may be done in protected areas.

The public respondents themselves admitted that JAPEX only started to secure an ECC prior to the second sub-
phase of SC-46, which required the drilling of an oil exploration well. This means that when the seismic surveys
were done in the Tañon Strait, no such environmental impact evaluation was done. The respondents’ subsequent
compliance with the EISS for the second sub-phase of SC-46 cannot and will not cure this violation.

CONCLUSION:
Moreover, SC-46 was not executed for the mere purpose of gathering information on the possible energy resources
in the Tañon Strait as it also provides for the parties’ rights and obligations relating to extraction and petroleum
production should oil in commercial quantities be found to exist in the area. While PD 87 may serve as the general
law upon which a service contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, the exploitation
and utilization of this energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress,
since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area. Since there is no such law specifically allowing oil exploration and/or
extraction in the Tañon Strait, no energy resource exploitation and utilization may be done in said protected
seascape.

§
 04 Merida v. People
June 12, 2008 GR No. 158182 Carpio, J.
Forestry Law Kathleen Endozo
Petitioners Respondents:
Sesinando Merida People of the Philippines

Doctrine: Section 80 of PD 705 does not prohibit an interested person from filing a complaint
before any qualified officer for the violations of Section 68 of said law which are as follows:
a. The cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber or other forest products
from any forest land without any authority
b. The cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber from alienable or disposable
public land or from private land without any authority
c. Possession of timber of other forest products without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations
Facts:
1. Petitioner is charged with violation of Section 68 of PD 705 for “cutting, gathering, collecting,
and removing” a lone narra tree inside a private land in Mayod, Ipil, Magdiwang, Romblon
(Mayod Property).
2. Tansiongco (claimed owner of Mayod Property) learned of the cutting of narra tree and
reported it to Royo, the punong barangay of Ipil.
3. Royo summoned petitioner to meeting with Tansiongco. Petitioner admitted cutting the tree
but claimed that he did so with permission of Vicar Calix (petitioner claims Calix bought the
Mayod property from Tansiongco under a pacto de retro sale)
4. Petitioner showed the written authorization of Calix but this was signed by his wife.
5. Tansiongco reported the tree cutting to DENR forester Hernandez. Petitioner reiterated his
earlier claim that he cut the tree with permission from Calix. Hernandez ordered petitioner
NOT to convert the felled tree trunk into lumber.
6. Tansiongco informed Hernandez that petitioner had converted portion of the trunk into
lumber. A larger portion of the trunk remained in the property.
7. Hernandez took custody of the six pieces of lumber and deposited them with Royo for
safekeeping. An apprehension receipt was given to petitioner.
8. Tansiongco filed complaint with the office of the provincial prosecutor of Romblon for
violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705. Petitioner reiterated his earlier claim that he cut the tree with
Calix’s permission. A criminal case was filed. During trial, petitioner’s defense changed, and he
testified that he had no part in the tree-cutting.
9. RTC Ruling: Guilty as charged. CA ordered the seizure of lumber in Tansiongco’s favor. The
decision was based on the fact that petitioner had repeated extrajudicial admissions that he
cut the narra tree and he had no DENR permit.
10. On appeal, petitioner claimed that court had no jurisdiction because the forest officer should
have filed the complaint.
 11. CA Ruling: Affirmed the decision but ordered the seized lumber confiscated in favor of the
government. There was no irregularity in the filing of the complaint because a preliminary
investigation was made. On the imposable penalty in the dispositive portion, CA sentenced
petitioner to 14 years , 8 months, 1 day to 17yrs of reclusion temporal. In the body of the
ruling, it says 14yrs, 8 months, 1 day to 20 yrs of reclusion temporal (same as RTC).
Issue/s: Ruling:
1. Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case even 1. Yes
though it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by
DENR forest officer
2. Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Sec 68 of PD 705 2. Yes
Ratio:
1. The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case.
“Reports and complaints” in Sec 80 of PD 705 1 refers to reports and complaints as may be
brought to the forest officer assigned to the area by the other forest officers or employees of
the Bureau of Forest Development or any of the deputized officers or officials, for violations
of forest laws not committed in their presence.

Hernandez cannot be faulted for not conducting an investigation to determine the prima facie
evidence to support complaint because it was not the forest officers or employees of BFD who
reported to him but a private individual. Also, Tansiongco is not precluded from filing a
complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lists
cases which must be initiated by specified individuals only but only refers to defamation and
crimes against chastity.

2. Petitioner is liable for cutting timber in private property without permit

Sec. 68 penalizes three categories of acts:
a. The cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber or other forest products
from any forest land without any authority
b. The cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber from alienable or disposable
public land or from private land without any authority
c. Possession of timber of other forest products without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations

1
Section 80 of PD 705 provides:
Xxxx
Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the offenses defined in this Chapter, not committed in
the presence of any forest officer or employee, or any of the deputized officers or officials, shall immediately be
investigated by the forest officer assigned in the area where the offense was allegedly committed, who shall
thereupon receive the evidence supporting the report or complaint.
If there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report, the investigating forest officer shall file the
necessary complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation of
criminal cases and file an information in Court.
 Petitioner has consistently admitted before trial that he cut the narra tree with permission
of Calix. Even if he denied this during trial, he was not able to refute the testimonies of Royo and
Hernandez. PD 705 did not define timber but only “forest product.” Timber includes lumber or any
processed log (Mustang Lumber v. CA). Section 68 makes no distinction between raw and processed
timber. Neither should we. In said case, timber was taken to mean “wood used for or suitable for
building or for carpentry or joinery.” Tree saplings or tiny tree stems that are too small for use as
posts, paneling, beams, tables or chairs cannot be considered timber. Based on the apprehension
receipt measured: 3pcs 2x16x16 and 3pcs 2x18x7. The larger portion of the felled log left measured
76cm at the big end and 65cm at the small end. Undoubtedly, petitioner felled and converted to
lumber was timber fit for building or for carpentry or joinery.

As to the Penalty

Violation of Section 68 of PD 705 is punishable as Qualified Theft under Art. 310 of the RPC. The
penalty imposed on petitioner was based on Hernandez’s testimony that the amounts stated in the
apprehension receipt he issued which are his estimates based on prevailing local price.

SC ruled that this is insufficient, prosecution must present more than a mere uncorroborated
estimate. In the absence of independent and reliable corroboration of estimate, courts may either
apply minimum penalty or fix the value. In this case, Court followed jurisprudence of People v. Dator 2
and sentenced accused to 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor to 3yrs, 4 months and 21 days of
prision correccional.

2 Here the accused was charged with possession of lumber without permit and the value was only an uncorroborated estimate of the
apprehending authorities. The minimum penalty was imposed.
 Mustang Lumber v. Court of Appeals
05 Date June 18, 1996 GR Number: 104988, Ponente:
106424, 123784 DAVIDE, JR., J
Sha Kumar
Petitioners: MUSTANG LUMBER, INC Respondents: HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR.,
Secretary, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), and ATTY.
VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions
and Investigation Division, DENR
Doctrine:

The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the
former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter
is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant."
Lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. The Code uses the term
lumber in its ordinary or common usage. Simply put, lumber is a processed log or
timber. Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or
processed timber. Neither should we.

Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. Punished in this section are:

1. the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest products

from the places therein mentioned without any authority; and

2. possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents as

required under existing forest laws and regulations.

1. Mustang Lumber was duly registered as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of
Forest Development (BFD)
2. On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra itches,
shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner, the Special
Actions and Investigation Division (SAID) of DENR organized a team of foresters
and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. They
saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck loaded with lauan and
almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. The team seized the truck
together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR.
3. 2 days later, the team was able to secure a search warrant. Hence, was able to
seize from the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings,
and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board
feet of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa.
4. Again, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard in
Valenzuela and placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of
almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber because the petitioner failed to produce upon
demand the corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally
 sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the lumber
to prove the legitimacy of their source and origin
5. Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending immediately the petitioner's
lumber-dealer's permit. He also ordered to confiscate the approximately 311,000
board feet of lauan, supa, and almaciga lumber, shorts, and sticks found inside the
petitioner's lumberyard
6. DENR agents went to the business and the team caught the petitioner operating as
a lumber dealer although its lumber-dealer's permit had already been suspended
7. An information was filed by the DOJ charging Ri Chuy Po, owner of Mustang
Lumber, with the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 otherwise known as the
Forestry Reform Code.
Issue/s: Ruling:
1. Whether or not the petitioner can be held liable for violation of 1. Yes

PD No. 705 even if the information charges an offense for

possession of lumber instead of timber, which is penalized in
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705.

Rationale/Analysis/Legal Basis:

1. Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No.

705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, which provides:

SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products
Without License. — Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or
other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other
forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws
and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309
and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in
addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

Punished then in this section are (1) the cutting, gathering, collection, or
removal of timber or other forest products from the places therein
mentioned without any authority; and (b) possession of timber or other
forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulations.

Indeed, the word lumber does not appear in Section 68. But conceding ex
gratia that this omission amounts to an exclusion of lumber from the section's
coverage, do the facts averred in the information in the CRIMINAL CASE validly
charge a violation of the said section? A cursory reading of the information readily
leads us to an infallible conclusion that lumber is not solely its subject matter.
It is evident therefrom that what are alleged to be in the possession of the private
respondent, without the required legal documents, are truckloads of:
 (1) almaciga and lauan; and

(2) approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species
including almaciga and supa.

This follows then that lumber is only one of the items covered by the
information. The public and the private respondents obviously
miscomprehended the averments in the information. Accordingly, even if
lumber is not included in Section 68, the other items therein as noted above
fall within the ambit of the said section, and as to them, the information validly
charges an offense.

Moreover, the Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or

lumber. While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q)
of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the
definition of "Processing plant"; which reads:

(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of

machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into
lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, blackboard, paper board, pulp, paper or
other finished wood products.

This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw
material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common
usage. Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.

It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and
phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common
usage meaning. And insofar as possession of timber without the required
legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended,
makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we.

§
 06 Paat v. Court of Appeals
Date: January 10, 1997 GR No. 111107 Torres, Jr., J.
PD 705, as amended by EO 277 Mart Amiel J. Laforteza
Petitioners: Respondents:
Leonardo A. Paat Court of Appeals
Jovito Layugan, Jr. Hon. Ricardo A. Baculi
Spouses Bienvenido and Victoria de Guzman
Doctrine:

Sec. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized

Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest
laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative,
may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or
possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the
commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws,
regulations and policies on the matter.
Facts:
1. Respondent’s truck, while on its way to Bulacan form Cagayan, was seized by the
DENR in Nueva Vizcaya. The driver could not produce the required documents for the
forest products found concealed in the truck.
2. Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer in Cagayan,
ordered for the confiscation of the truck, giving the owner 15 days to explain why it
should not be confiscated. Respondents failed to submit an explanation.
3. DENR (through Executive Director Baggayan) sustained the action for confiscation,
1
invoking Section 68-A of PD 705 as amended by EO 277. Spouses’ MR Denied.
4. Petitioners brought the case to the DENR Secretary pursuant to respondents’
statement in a letter that in case their MR be denied, then the letter should be
considered an appeal to the Secretary.
5. Pending resolution, respondents filed a suit of replevin against Baggayan with the
RTC, which issued an order to return the truck.
6. Layugan and Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the RTC contending that
respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. Trial court denied their motion.
7. Petitioners filed a certiorari with the CA which sustained the RTC order, ruling that the
question involved is purely a legal question.
8. Hence, this petition, with prater of TRO and/or preliminary injunction, seeking to
reverse the decision of the CA.

1Sec. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized Representative to Order
Confiscation. In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his
duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed or
possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to
dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.
Issue/s: Ruling:
1. Whether or not without violating the principle of exhaustion of 1. NO
administrative remedies, an action for replevin may prosper to
recover a movable property which the subject matter of an admin
forfeiture proceeding in the DENR pursuant to Section 68-A of PD
705?
2. Whether or not the DENR Secretary and his representatives are 2. YES
empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in
transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government?
Ratio:

1. Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he
should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him.

If a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes
within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court's
judicial power can be sought. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel
the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action.

Benefits: Lesser Expenses and Speedier Disposition of Controversies.

The courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away
from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed
and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every
opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case.

Exceptions: The rule is disregarded when:

• Violation of due process
• Issue involved is purely a legal question
• Administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction
• Estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned
• There is irreparable injury
• Respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter
• When to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable
• When it would amount to a nullification of a claim
• When the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings
• When the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
• When there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
 In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before the
Secretary of DENR when it was forwarded to him following the denial by the
petitioners of the motion for reconsideration of private respondents. By appealing to
him, they acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain remedy still available
and open to them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus, they cannot now, without
violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek court's
intervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the
pendency of an administrative proceedings.

2. The DENR should be free from judicial intrusion in determining a controversy within
its jurisdiction. Its power to confiscate is provided in Sec. 68-A of PD 705, as amended
by EO 277.

By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand
unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its
jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by
private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the
administrative agency's prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not
warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence.

To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the instant
controversy beyond the pale of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies
and fall within the ambit of excepted cases heretofore stated. However, considering
the circumstances prevailing in this case, we can not but rule out these assertions of
private respondents to be without merit. First, they argued that there was violation of
due process because they did not receive the May 23, 1989 order of confiscation of
petitioner Layugan. This contention has no leg to stand on. Due process does not
necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard.
One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many
times more creditably and practicable than oral argument, through pleadings. In
administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are
not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process
in its strict judicial sense.30 Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully
invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for
2
reconsideration, as in the instant case.

2The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when
the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is
frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or hearing.
 Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegality of seizure and forfeiture of
the truck because the administrative officers of the DENR allegedly have no power to
perform these acts under the law. They insisted that only the court is authorized to
confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products as can
be gleaned from the second paragraph of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O.
3
277.

Private respondents' interpretation of the subject provision unduly restricts the clear
4
intention of the law and inevitably reduces the other provision of Section 68-A.

The Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are given the authority to
confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest
laws, rules and regulations. The phrase "to dispose of the same" is broad enough to
cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation
is that it should be made "in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies
on the matter."

Private respondents, likewise, contend that the seizure was illegal because the
petitioners themselves admitted in the Order dated July 12, 1989 of Executive
Director Baggayan that the truck of private respondents was not used in the
commission of the crime.

Private respondents misread the content of the aforestated order and obviously
misinterpreted the intention of petitioners. What is contemplated by the petitioners
when they stated that the truck "was not used in the commission of the crime" is that
it was not used in the commission of the crime of theft, hence, in no case can a
criminal action be filed.

For clarity, the provision of Section 68 of P.D. 705 before its amendment by E.O. 277
and the provision of Section 1 of E.O. No. 277 amending the aforementioned Section
68 are reproduced herein, thus:

Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license. —
Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, or remove timber or other forest products from
any forest land, or timber from alienable and disposable public lands, or from private
lands, without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license

3 The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest
products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipments, implements and
tools illegaly [sic] used in the area where the timber or forest products are found
4 Sec. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized Representative To Order
Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his
duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or
possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to
dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter.
or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code . . . (Emphasis ours; Section 68, P.D. 705
before its amendment by E.O. 277)

Sec. 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is hereby amended to

read as follows:

Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without
license. — Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products
without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations,
shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code . . . (Emphasis ours; Section 1, E.O. No. 277 amending Section 68,
P.D. 705 as amended)

With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the
act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without
authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that
provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.

it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be sustained against the petitioners for the
subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in
pursuant to Section 68-A of the P.D. 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit
for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents' failure to exhaust
administrative remedies should have been the proper course.

A suit for replevin is founded solely on the claim that the defendant wrongfully
withholds the property sought to be recovered. It lies to recover possession of
personal chattels that are unlawfully detained.39 "To detain" is defined as to mean
"to hold or keep in custody,"40 and it has been held that there is tortious taking
whenever there is an unlawful meddling with the property, or an exercise or claim of
dominion over it, without any pretense of authority or right; this, without manual
seizing of the property is sufficient.41 Under the Rules of Court, it is indispensable in
replevin proceeding that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he is
entitled to the possession of property, that the property is wrongfully detained by the
defendant, alleging the cause of detention, that the same has not been taken for tax
assessment, or seized under execution, or attachment, or if so seized, that it is
exempt from such seizure, and the actual value of the property.42 Private
respondents miserably failed to convince this Court that a wrongful detention of the
subject truck obtains in the instant case.