JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. OMAR U. AMIN
FACTS:
An information charging Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as
having committed rebellion complexed with murder.
Another separate information was filed charging him for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 for delaying the
apprehension of said Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio "Gringo"
Honasan by harboring or concealing him in his house.
The petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion. Respondent
Judge Ignacio Capulong, as pairing judge of respondent
Judge Omar Amin, denied Senator Enrile's Omnibus
motion.
Enrile appealed to the SC on certiorari were:
a) The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen.
Enrile of Col. Honasan in a supposed meeting on
1 December 1989 is absorbed in, or is a
component element of, the "complexed" rebellion
presently charged against Sen. Enrile as alleged
co-conspirator of Col. Honasan on the basis of
the same meeting on 1 December 1989;
b) The orderly administration of Justice requires that
there be only one prosecution for all the
component acts of rebellion
Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation
of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case filed
against the petitioner on the theory that the former
involves a special law while the latter is based on the
Revised Penal Code or a general law.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner could be separately charged for
violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion
case earlier filed against him.
RULING:
No. In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the
prosecution's theory must fail. The rationale remains the
same. All crimes, whether punishable under a special law
or general law, which are mere components or
ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become
absorbed in the crime of rebellion and can not be isolated
and charged as separate crimes in themselves.
The Hernandez and other related cases mention common
crimes as absorbed in the crime of rebellion. These
common crimes refer to all acts of violence such as
murder, arson, robbery, kidnapping etc. as provided in the
Revised Penal Code. The attendant circumstances in the
instant case, however, constrain us to rule that the theory
of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to
common crimes but also to offenses under special laws
which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political
offense.
Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring or
concealing which was based on his acts of conspiring with
Honasan was committed in connection with or in
furtherance of rebellion and must now be deemed as
absorbed by, merged in, and Identified with the crime of
rebellion punished in Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.
The petitioner can not be tried separately under PD 1829
in addition to his being prosecuted in the rebellion case.
ROGER POSADAS, ROSARIO TORRES-YU, and
MARICHU LAMBINO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. OMBUDSMAN, THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, and ORLANDO V.
DIZON, respondents.
FACTS:
Dennis Venturina, a member of Sigma Rho at the
University of the Philippines, was killed in a rumble
between his fraternity and another fraternity. Petitioner
asked the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation
for assistance in determining the persons responsible for
the crime. NBI attempted to arrest the suspects in the
killing of Venturina.
Petitioners and Atty. Villamor, counsel for the suspects,
objected on the ground that the NBI did not have warrants
of arrest with them. Posadas and Atty. Villamor promised
to take the suspects to the NBI Office the next day. As a
result of their intervention, Taparan and Narag were not
arrested by the NBI agents on that day.
Dizon then filed a complaint in the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, charging petitioners Posadas, Torres-Yu,
Lambino, Col. Eduardo Bentain, Chief of the Security
Force of the U.P. Police, and Atty. Villamor with violation
of P.D. 1829,3 which makes it unlawful for anyone to
obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of criminal
offenders
ISSUE:
1. WON the attempted arrest of the student
suspects by the NBI could be validly made
without a warrant.
2. WON there was probable cause for prosecuting
petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829.
RULING:
1. NO. In view of Art. III, §2 of the Constitution, the rule is
that no arrest may be made except by virtue of a warrant
issued by a judge after examining the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce and after finding probable
cause to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed the crime. The exceptions when an arrest may
be made even without a warrant are provided in Rule 113,
§5 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be

arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been

committed, and he has personal knowledge of the
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it;

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner

who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

There is no question that this case does not fall under

paragraphs (a) and (c). The arresting officers in this case
did not witness the crime being committed. Neither are the
students fugitives from justice nor prisoners who had
escaped from confinement. The question is whether
paragraph (b) applies because a crime had just been
committed and the NBI agents had personal knowledge
of facts indicating that Narag and Taparan were probably
guilty.

2.NO. There is no probable cause to charge Posadas,

Torres-Yu, Lambino, Bentain and Atty. Villamor of
violating Section 1(c) of P.D. 1829. Probable cause is
defined as "sufficient ground to engender a well founded
belief that a crime cognizable by the court has been
committed and that the respondents are probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial" (Section 1, Rule 12,
Rules of Court). The absence of an arrest warrant, the
absence of knowledge or reasonable ground on the part
of the accused to believe that the students had committed
a crime, the absence of any law punishing refusal to
attend an investigation at the NBI, all show that there is
no sufficient ground to charge the accused with
Obstruction of Justice. On the contrary, the circumstances
show that the accused, in safeguarding the rights of
students, were acting within the bounds of law.

In this case, petitioners' objection to the arrest of the

students cannot be construed as a violation of P.D. No.
1829, §1(c) without rendering it unconstitutional.
Petitioners had a right to prevent the arrest of Taparan
and Narag at the time because their attempted arrest was
illegal. Indeed, they could not have interfered with the
prosecution of the guilty parties because in fact petitioner
Posadas had asked the NBI for assistance in investigating
the death of Venturina. On the other hand, just because
petitioners had asked for assistance from the NBI did not
authorize respondent Dizon and his men to disregard
constitutional requirements.