PEOPLE v BAYKER
However, the floor of the maximum
FACTS:
The accused-appellants were charged with the
crime of illegal recruitment and estafa. The RTC
rendered a decision against the accused. Upon
appeal, the CA affirmed with modifications the
decision of the trial court. In Criminal Case for
Illegal Recruitment, the fine imposed is REDUCED to
Pl00,000.00 and for Estafa, appellant is sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional as
minimum to nine (9) years of prision mayor as
maximum.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the application of indeterminate
penalty is proper.
RULING: NO.
Inasmuch as the prescribed penalty is prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor
in its minimum period, plus one year for each
additional Pl0,000.00 over P22,000.00, provided that
the total penalty shall not exceed 20 years, the
penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant
should depend on the amount defrauded. We note
that the RTC took into consideration only the sum of
P40,000.00, and the CA concurred with the RTC
thereon. Yet, the records reveal that Miparanum
paid to the accused-appellant and her co-
accused not only P40,000.00 but the aggregate
sum of P54,700.00 (i.e., the P6,000.00 for the
seaman's book, the additional P6,000.00 for the
seaman's book, the P40,000.00 for placement fee,
and P2,700 for his training certificate). The amount
of P54, 700.00 is the determinant of the penalty to
be imposed.
Pursuant to Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code,
the penalty prescribed for estafa in which the
amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not
exceed P22,000.00 is prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period (i.e., four years, two months and one day to
eight years); if the amount of the fraud exceeds
P22,000.00, the penalty thus prescribed shall be
imposed in its maximum period, and one year shall
be added for each additional Pl0,000.00 provided
the total penalty imposed shall not exceed 20
years. Considering that the penalty does not consist
of three periods, the prescribed penalty is divided
into three equal portions, and each portion shall
form a period, with the maximum period being then
1
imposed.
period – six years, eight months and 21 days - is
fixed in the absence of any aggravating
circumstance, or of any showing of the greater
extent of the evil produced by the crime, to which
is then added the incremental penalty of one year
for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, or three
years in all. The resulting total penalty is nine years,
eight months and 21 days of prision mayor, which
shall be the maximum of the indeterminate
sentence.
The minimum of the indeterminate sentence is
taken from prision correccional in its minimum
period to prision correccional in its medium period
(i.e., six months and one day to four years and two
months), the penalty next lower to that prescribed
by Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. We note
that the CA correctly fixed the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence at four years and two
months of prision correccional.
In view of the foregoing, the indeterminate
sentence for the accused-appellant is from four
years and two months of prision correccional, as
the minimum, to nine years, eight months and 21
days of prision mayor.
FRANCISCO v CA
FACTS:
The petitioner, then president and general
manager of ASPAC Trans Company, was charged
with the crime of multiple grave oral defamation by
uttering the words “You employees in this office are
all tanga, son of a bitches (sic), bullshit. Puro kayo
walang utak . . . . Mga anak ng puta . . . . Magkano
ba kayo . . . God damn you all.”
The MTC of Makati found him guilty. Aggrieved, he
elevated the case to RTC. The RTC affirmed his
conviction but appreciated in his favor a mitigating
circumstance analogous to passion or obfuscation.
Accordingly, petitioner was sentenced "in each
case to a STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS
imprisonment . . . . "3 After he failed to interpose an
appeal therefrom the decision.of the RTC became
final. The case was then set for execution of
judgment by the MeTC which, as a consequence,
issued a warrant of arrest. But before he could be
arrested petitioner filed an application for
probation which the MeTC denied.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is still qualified to avail
probation.
RULING: NO.
First. Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. 8 Its
benefits cannot extend to those not expressly
included. Probation is not a right of an accused,
but rather an act of grace and clemency or
immunity conferred by the state which may be
granted by the court to a seemingly deserving
defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors
of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of
which he stands convicted.
Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended,
mandates that "no application for probation shall
be entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction.”
The case of Llamado v CA, relied by the petitioner,
provides that an appeal should not bar the
accused from applying for probation if the appeal
is solely to reduce the penalty to within the
probationable limit. This interpretation, being
erroneous and contrary to the rule of statutory
construction which provides that “negative words
and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory
while those in the affirmative are merely directory. .
. . the use of the term "shall" further emphasizes its
mandatory character and means that it is
imperative, operating to impose a duty which may
be enforced.”
Second. The penalties imposed by the MeTC were
already probationable. Hence, there was no need
to appeal if only to reduce the penalties to within
the probationable period. Multiple prison terms
imposed against an accused.
Third. Petitioner appealed to the RTC not to reduce
or even correct the penalties imposed by the
MeTC, but to assert his innocence.
Fourth. The application for probation was filed way
beyond the period allowed by law. This is vital way
beyond the period allowed by law and crucial.
From the records it is clear that the application for
probation was filed "only after a warrant for the
2
arrest of petitioner had been issued . . . (and)
almost two months after (his) receipt of the
Decision" 22 of the RTC.
PADUA v PEOPLE
FACTS:
Petitioner Michael Padua and Edgar Allan Ubalde
were charged before the RTC, of violating Republic
Act No. 9165, for selling dangerous drugs.
The accused was found guilty and sentenced him
to suffer an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years
and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of
reclusion temporal as maximum and a fine of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00).
The accused Padua subsequently filed a Petition for
Probation alleging that he is a minor and a first-time
offender. However, public respondent Pairing
Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio denied the Petition for
Probation on the ground that under Section 24 19 of
Rep. Act No. 9165, any person convicted of drug
trafficking cannot avail of the privilege granted by
the Probation Law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of the application for
probation is proper.
RULING: YES.
SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for
Drug Traffickers and Pushers. – Any person
convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this
Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the
Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the
Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as
amended.
The elementary rule in statutory construction is that
when the words and phrases of the statute are
clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be
determined from the language employed and the
statute must be taken to mean exactly what it
says.29 If a statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. This is
what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba
legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi
sermo, or speech is the index of
intention.30 Furthermore, there is the maxim verba
legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a
statute there should be no departure.31
BALA v MARTINEZ
FACTS:
The petitioner had been indicted for removing and
substituting the picture of Maria Eloisa Criss Diazen
which had been attached to her United States of
America passport, with that of Florencia Notarte, in
effect falsifying a genuine public or official
document. The trial court found the petitioner guilty
of the crime of falsification of a public document.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court's decision.
After the case had been remanded to the court of
origin for execution of judgment, 2 the petitioner
applied for and was granted probation by the
respondent judge in his order dated August 11,
1982. The petitioner was then placed under
probation for a period of one (1) year, subject to
the terms and conditions enumerated therein.
On September 23, 1982, the probationer (petitioner)
asked his supervising probation officer for permission
to transfer his residence from BF Homes to Phil-Am
Life Subdivision in Las Piñas specifically 33 Jingco
Street. The probation officer verbally granted the
probationer's request as he found nothing
objectionable to it.
By the terms of the petitioner's probation, it should
have expired on August 10, 1983, 3 one year after
the order granting the same was issued. But, the
order of final discharge could not be issued
because the respondent probation officer had not
yet submitted his final report on the conduct of his
charge.
The respondent People of the Philippines, through
Assistant City Fiscal Jose D. Cajucom of Manila, filed
a motion to revoke the probation of the petitioner
on the ground that the petitioner had violated the
terms and conditions of his probation.
The petitioner filed his opposition to the motion on
the ground that he was no longer under
probation, 5 his probation period having terminated
on August 10, 1983, as previously adverted to. As
such, no valid reason existed to revoke the same,
he contended.
3
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner was no longer under
probation after its expiration.
RULING: NO
Probation is revocable before the final discharge of
the probationer by the court, contrary to the
petitioner's submission.
Section 16 of PD 968 8 is clear on this score:
See. 16. Termination of Probation. — After
the period of probation and upon
consideration of the report and
recommendation of the probation officer,
the court may order the final discharge of
the probationer upon finding that he has
fulfilled the terms and conditions of his
probation and thereupon the case is
deemed terminated.
Thus, the expiration of the probation period alone
does not automatically terminate probation.
Nowhere is the ipso facto termination of probation
found in the provisions of the probation law.
Probation is not coterminous with its period. There
must first be issued by the court of an order of final
discharge based on the report and
recommendation of the probation officer. Only
from such issuance can the case of the probationer
be deemed terminated.
ALMERO v PEOPLE
FACTS:
Petitioner was accused with the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and multiple
physical injuries. The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Labo, Camarines Norte found petitioner guilty and
sentenced him to suffer prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods.
Petitioner filed an Application for Probation,
reasoning that he was informed of his conviction
only upon being served the warrant for his
arrest.2 Prosecutor Analie Velarde opposed his
application on the ground that he was known to be
uncooperative, habitually absent, and had even
neglected to inform the court of his change of
address.
The MTC denied his application, prompting
petitioner to file a special civil action with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). While his first Petition
raised the sole issue of the denial of his application
for probation, he filed a Supplemental Petition,
assailing the validity of the promulgation of the MTC
judgment; and impleaded private complainants.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner stating that
the latter be immediately released.
The CA, however, reversed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled
probation.
RULING: NO.
Probation is a special privilege granted by the state
to a penitent qualified offender. It essentially rejects
appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible
convict to immediately admit his liability and save
the state of time, effort and expenses to jettison an
appeal. The law expressly requires that an accused
must not have appealed his conviction before he
can avail of probation. This outlaws the element of
speculation on the part of the accused — to wager
on the result of his appeal — that when his
conviction is finally affirmed on appeal… he now
applies for probation as an "escape hatch" thus
rendering nugatory the appellate court's
affirmance of his conviction.17
Aside from the goals of according expediency and
liberality to the accused, the rationale for the
treatment of appeal and probation as mutually
exclusive remedies is that they rest on diametrically
opposed legal positions. An accused applying for
probation is deemed to have accepted the
judgment. The application for probation is an
admission of guilt on the part of an accused for the
crime which led to the judgment of
conviction.18 This was the reason why the Probation
Law was amended: precisely to put a stop to the
practice of appealing from judgments of
conviction – even if the sentence is probationable –
for the purpose of securing an acquittal and
applying for the probation only if the accused fails
in his bid.19
Similarly, in the present case, petitioner cannot
make up his mind whether to question the
judgment, or apply for probation, which is
necessarily deemed a waiver of his right to
appeal.20 While he did not file an appeal before
applying for probation, he assailed the validity of
the conviction in the guise of a petition supposedly
assailing the denial of probation. In so doing, he
attempted to circumvent P.D. No. 968, as
amended by P.D. 1990, which seeks to make
appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.
VILLAREAL v PEOPLE
FACTS:
A criminal case was filed against the accused
to Aquilans. The RTC found them guilty of the crime
charged.
According to respondents, they immediately
applied for probation after the CA rendered its
Decision (CAG.R. No. 15520) lowering their criminal
liability from the crime of homicide, which carries a
non-probationable sentence, to slight physical
injuries, which carries a probationable sentence.
Tecson et al.contend that, as a result, they have
already been discharged from their criminal liability
and the cases against them closed and
terminated.
ISSUE:
Whether the completion by Tecson et al. of the
terms and conditions of their probation discharged
them from their criminal liability, and closed and
terminated the cases against them.
RULING: NO.
The orders of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 have
no legal effect, as they were issued without
jurisdiction.
First, Tecson et al. filed their Applications for
Probation with the wrong court. Part and parcel of
our criminal justice system is the authority or
jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate and decide
the case before it. Jurisdiction refers to the power
and capacity of the tribunal to hear, try, and
decide a particular case or matter before it.31 That
power and capacity includes the competence to
pronounce a judgment, impose a
punishment,32 and enforce or suspend33 the
execution of a sentence in accordance with law.
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the
provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it
4
shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant,
and upon application by said defendant within the
period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the
execution of the sentence and place the
defendant on probation for such period and upon
such terms and conditions as it may deem best;
Provided, That no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction. x x x x (Emphases supplied)
It is obvious from the foregoing provision that the
law requires that an application for probation be
filed withthe trial court that convicted and
sentenced the defendant, meaning the court of
origin. Here, the trial court that originally convicted
and sentenced Tecson et al.of the crime of
homicide was Branch 121 – not Branch 130 – of the
Caloocan City RTC.
Tecson et al. thus committed a fatal error when
they filed their probation applications with
Caloocan City RTC Branch 130, and not with
Branch 121. We stress that applicants are not at
liberty to choose the forum in which they may seek
probation, as the requirement under Section 4 of
the Probation law is substantive and not merely
procedural. Considering, therefore, that the
probation proceedings were premised on an
unwarranted exercise of authority, we find that
Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 never acquired
jurisdiction over the case.
Furthermore, since the accused appealed their
conviction to the CA, they could have been no
longer availed of probation.
PEOPLE v TULIN
FACTS:
The accused were charged with the crime of
piracy. The RTC found the accused guilty of the
crime charged. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
RTC decision.
Accused-appellant Hiong ratiocinates that he can
no longer be convicted of piracy in Philippine
waters as defined and penalized in Sections 2[d]
and 3[a], respectively of Presidential Decree No.
532 because Republic Act No. 7659 (effective
January 1, 1994), which amended Article 122 of the
Revised Penal Code, has impliedly superseded
Presidential Decree No. 532. He reasons out that
Presidential Decree No. 532 has been rendered
"superfluous or duplicitous" because both Article 122
5
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
Presidential Decree No. 532 punish piracy
committed in Philippine waters. He maintains that in
order to reconcile the two laws, the word "any
person" mentioned in Section 1 [d] of Presidential
Decree No. 532 must be omitted such that
Presidential Decree No. 532 shall only apply to
offenders who are members of the complement or
to passengers of the vessel, whereas Republic Act
No. 7659 shall apply to offenders who are neither
members of the complement or passengers of the
vessel, hence, excluding him from the coverage of
the law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of piracy.
RULING: YES
To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal
Code, before its amendment, provided that piracy
must be committed on the high seas by any person
not a member of its complement nor a passenger
thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No.
7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was
widened to include offenses committed "in
Philippine waters." On the other hand, under
Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the
coverage of the law on piracy embraces any
person including "a passenger or member of the
complement of said vessel in Philippine waters."
Hence, passenger or not, a member of the
complement or not, any person is covered by the
law.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor
amended the provisions on piracy under
Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no
contradiction between the two laws. There is
likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need
to construe or interpret the law. All the presidential
decree did was to widen the coverage of the law,
in keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as
well as neighboring states from crimes against the
law of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas"
clauses of Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is
"among the highest forms of lawlessness
condemned by the penal statutes of all countries."
For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as
amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree
No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.
PEOPLE v DELA PNEA
FACTS:
The accused-appellant was charged with the crime
of piracy. The RTC found him guilty of piracy. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision.
The accused alleged that the prosecution failed to
prove the elements of piracy under PD 532. He
posits that the Information failed to allege the
elements of the crime of piracy. Appellant
maintains that the Information did not state that the
vessel in question was in Philippine waters and that
its cargo, equipment, or personal belongings of the
passengers or complement were seized.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant is guilty of piracy.
RULING: YES
Section 2(d) of PD 532 defines piracy as follows:
Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the
taking away of the whole or part thereof or its
cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of its
complement or passengers, irrespective of the
value thereof, by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things,
committed by any person, including a passenger or
member of the complement of said vessel, in
Philippine waters shall be considered as piracy.
sacks of copra were part of the vessel's cargo. The
Information also stated that the vessel's equipment
which consisted of the engine, propeller tube, and
tools were taken and carried away by the
appellant. Furthermore, the Information also stated
that the personal belongings of the passengers
consisting of two watches, jewelry, cellphone, and
cash money were taken by the appellant and his
armed companions. The appellant was able to
seize these items when he, along with armed
companions, boarded the victims' pump boat and
seized control of the same. Armed with firearms,
appellant and his companions tied Jose's hands,
covered his head, and operated their pump boat.
They travelled to an island in Samar where they
unloaded the sacks of copra. Thereafter, appellant
and his armed companions travelled to another
island where the engine, propeller tube, and tools
of the pump boat were taken out and loaded on
appellant's boat.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that the
prosecution was able to establish that the victims'
pump boat was in Philippine waters when appellant
and his armed companions boarded the same and
seized its cargo, equipment, and the personal
belongings of the passengers.

The Information categorically alleged that the

incident happened along the river bank of Brgy.
San Roque, Municipality of Villareal, Province of
Samar. Under Section 2(a) of PD 532, "Philippine
waters''' is defined as follows:

[A]ll bodies of water, such as but not limited to,

seas, gulfs, bays around, between and connecting
each of the Islands of the Philippine Archipelago,
irrespective of its depth, breadth, length or
dimension, and all other waters belonging to the
Philippines by historic or Iegal title, including
territorial sea, the sea-bed, the insular shelves, and
other submarine areas over which the Philippines
has sovereignty or jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)

From this definition, it is clear that a river is

considered part of Philippine waters.

The Information also clearly alleged that the vessel's

cargo, equipment, and personal belongings of the
passengers were taken by the appellant and his
armed companions. It stated, in no uncertain terms,
that 13 sacks of copra were taken by the appellant
through force and intimidation. Undoubtedly, these
6