G.R. No. 91797 August 28, 1991
It alleged that the parcel of land is
WIDOWS AND ORPHANS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ORTIGAS & COMPANY
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, respondents.
Quijano & Padilla for petitioner.
Santiago & Santiago for private respondent.
Jose Teodorico V. Molina for intervenor-oppositor.
BIDIN, J.:
From the decision rendered by respondent court
dated November 27, 1989, declaring respondent
Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership (Ortigas)
as the registered owner of the disputed parcel of land,
petitioner Widows and Orphans Association, Inc.
(Widora), interposes this petition for review seeking
ng to annul the aforesaid judgment and prays that the
case be remanded to the trial court and there be tried
on the merits. The facts, as found by respondent
court, are as follows:
On August 27, 1974, respondent Widora filed LRC
Case No. Q-336 before the respondent (trial) court an
application for registration of title of a parcel of land as
shown in Plan No. LRC (SWO)-l5352. Widora alleged
that the parcel of land is covered by Titulo de
Propriedad Numero 4136, dated April 25, 1894,
issued in the name of the deceased Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban. Later, on June 14, 1978, Widora
filed an amended application for registration of the
said parcel of land.
situated at Malitlit-Uoogong, Quezon City, with an
area of 156 hectares, more or less, described in Plan
No. LRC (SWO)-15352; and that the applicant
acquired said property from the heirs of Don Mariano
San Pedro on December 12, 1954. The amended
application prayed that said parcel of land be ordered
registered in the name of Widora.
On August 25, 1978, respondent Dolores Molina filed
an opposition, claiming ownership over 12 to 14
hectares of Lot 8 (LRC) SWO-15352, and praying for
a decree of registration over said portions of Lot 8.
On October 24, 1978, petitioner Ortigas filed a motion
to dismiss the case alleging, among others, that
respondent court had no jurisdiction over the case,
the land being applied for having been already
registered under the Torrens System and in the name
of Ortigas under TCT 77652 and TCT 77653.
On April 20, 1979, the respondent (trial) court issued
an order directing the applicant to prove its contention
that TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 are not proper
derivatives of the original certificates of titles from
which they were purportedly issued, and setting the
case for hearing on June 28, 1979, at 8:30 a.m.
On June 27, 1979, petitioner Ortigas filed a motion for
reconsideration of said order of April 20, 1979,
alleging that a Torrens title becomes indefeasible
after a year and that the same becomes conclusive
upon the entire world; that the Land Registration
Commission itself has advised the court that the 156
hectare property sought to be registered is covered
by valid and subsisting titles in the name of Ortigas;
that Courts of First Instance and the appellate courts
in previous cases had sustained the Ortigas titles
over the land in question.
On October 3, 1979, the motion for reconsideration of
petitioner Ortigas was denied by the respondent (trial)
court, but the latter set the motion to dismiss for
hearing on October 18 and 19, 1979 at 8:30 a.m., for
the purpose of enabling the applicant to prove its
contention that TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 are not
proper derivatives of the original certificates of title
from which they were purportedly issued.
The parties presented their testimonial and
documentary evidence before the respondent (trial)
court in support of their respective positions.
On March 30, 1988, the respondent (trial) court
denied the motion to dismiss of petitioner Ortigas,
holding, among others, that TCT 77652 and TCT
77653 on their face show that they were derived from
OCT 337, 19, 336, 334, pursuant to Decree 1425; that
if there was error in the correct number of OCT on
said titles, no step or measure to rectify the same was
taken; that Decree No. 1425 shows that it covers a
total area of only 17 hectares, more or less, located in
Sta. Ana, Manila, which was four kilometers away
from the land subject of the application for registration
which covers an area of 156 hectares, more or less,
described in Plan No. LRC (SWO)-15352 situated at
Malitlit-Uoogong, Quezon City; that the contention of
Ortigas that Decree No. 1425 covers an area in
Manila and also a part of Rizal is not credible, for if
this were true then the area of said Rizal portion
should appear on the face of said decree of
registration, which is not the case; that TCT 77652
and TCT 77653 were not derived from any decree of
registration, and that the said TCTs being null and
void, cannot be used as basis to contest the right of
the applicant to apply for registration over the subject
land. The order of March 30, 1988, in its dispositive
portion stated:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Omnibus
Motion dated October 4, 1978 and Motion to Dismiss,
dated, October 23, 1978 filed by oppositor Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership are both DENIED for
lack of merit; while this Court's order of September
15, 1978 directing the City Assessor of Quezon City
to issue a separate tax declaration corresponding to
the 12 or 14 hectares which is an undivided portion of
the land applied for registration and now belonging to
the said Dolores V. Molina; further, authorizing the
City Treasurer of Quezon City to accept the
corresponding realty taxes due thereon; and further
the said Dolores V. Molina is allowed to intervene in
these proceedings, is hereby affirmed; likewise, the
City Treasurer is directed to accept the whole of the
taxes due on the property subject of the instant
petition from applicants Widows & Orphans
Association, Inc., as prayed for in its Manifestation
with Motion subject to the right of the oppositor
Dolores V. Molina as contained in this Court's order of
September 15, 1978."
On April 26, 1988, petitioner Ortigas filed a motion for
reconsider consideration of the said order of March
30, 1988, taking exception to the ruling that TCT Nos.
77652 and 77653 are null and void, and alleging,
among others, that respondent (trial) court had no
jurisdiction to hear an application for registration of a
previously registered land; that the parcels of land
applied for are covered by TCT 77652 and TCT
77653 in the name of Ortigas; that the parcels of land
covered by TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 are within the
parcel of land covered by OCT 351; and that OCT 351
is a copy of Decree No. 1425 issued on April 26,
1905. The motion for reconsideration prayed the
respondent court to reconsider its order of March 30,
1988 on the ground that it had no jurisdiction over the
application for registration, the parcels of land subject
thereof being already covered by Torrens Certificates
of Title.
On May 19, 1989, the respondent (trial) court issued
an order, denying the motion for reconsideration of
Ortigas, and setting the hearing on the merits on July
26, 1989, ... for the "eventual presentation of the
parties' respective evidence respecting their alleged
ownership of the property subject of this petition."
(Rollo, pp. 24-26)
Not satisfied, respondent Ortigas instituted an action
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before
respondent court praying for the annulment of the
March 30, 1988 and May 19, 1989 orders of the trial
court. It also prayed that the trial court be ordered to
dismiss the land registration case.
On November 27, 1989, respondent court rendered
the decision sought to be reviewed, the decretal
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus of petitioner Ortigas & Company
Limited Partnership is GRANTED. The orders of
March 30, 1988 and May 19, 1989 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83, in LRC Case
No. Q-336, are REVERSED and ANNULLED, and
said LRC Case No. Q-336 is DISMISSED. The
injunction issued by the Court, per Resolution of
August 8, 1989, is made permanent. (Rollo, p. 35)
Based on the plan and other evidence submitted by
respondent Ortigas at the hearing of its application for
preliminary injunction to enjoin the trial court from
proceeding with the hearing of LRC Case No. Q-336,
respondent court held that TCT Nos. 77652 and
77653, albeit reflecting their origins as OCT Nos. 337,
19, 336 and 334, are actually derivatives of OCT No.
351, the latter having been issued pursuant to Decree
1425 and that since OCT 351 is allegedly a copy of
Decree 1425, the mere fact that the original copy of
Decree 1425, or a certified copy thereof, can no
longer be located or produced, does not mean that
Decree 1425 covering the lots embraced in TCT Nos.
77652 and 77653 was not issued. Concluding,
respondent court said:
It may be that TCT 77652 and 77653 do not show on
their face (sic) that they were derived from OCT 351.
But the fact remains, as shown above, that the parcel
of land covered by OCT 351 embraced the parcels of
land, Lots 7 and 8, of TCT 77652 and 77653. There
was, therefore a mistake in the entries in TCT 77652
and 77653 when the same referred to OCTs 337, 19,
336, 337 (sic) and 334, as their source, for the correct
OCT insofar as Lots 7 and 8 are concerned, should
be OCT 351. (Rollo, p. 27)
In this petition, petitioner WIDORA avers that the
respondent Court of Appeals has decided questions
of substance contrary to law and the applicable
decisions of this Court because:
I THE COURT OF APPEALS INSISTED IN
UPHOLDING THE EXISTENCE OR VALIDITY OF
TCTs 77652 and 77653 DESPITE THE ABSENCE
OF A SUPPORTING DECREE OF REGISTRATION.
II THE QUESTIONED DECISION UTILIZED
SECONDARY EVIDENCE DESPITE THE
EXISTENCE AND AVAILABILITY OF THE
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT.
III THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO POWER
OR AUTHORITY TO ENJOIN THE TRIAL ON THE
MERITS OF LRC NO. Q-336 SINCE JURISDICTION
RESIDES WITH THE RTC ACTING AS A LAND
REGISTRATION COURT.
In essence, it is the contention of petitioner that
respondent court's grounds and reasoning in support
of its findings that respondent Ortigas is the registered
owner of the disputed property are baseless in law
and fact. Petitioner argues that respondent court
erred in sustaining the validity of TCTs Nos. 77652
and 77653 despite the absence of a supporting
decree of registration and instead utilized secondary
evidence, OCT 351 which is supposedly a copy of
Decree 1425. Petitioner maintains that Decree 1425
is itself existing and available at the Register of Deeds
of Manila and on its face shows that it covers a parcel
of land with an area of only 17 hectares in Sta. Ana,
Manila while the parcel of land applied for contains an
area of 156 hectares, located at Malitlit-Uoogong
Quezon City, four (4) kilometers away from Sta. Ana,
Manila and is certified by the Bureau of Lands and the
Bureau of Forestry as alienable and disposable.
Respondent Ortigas claims that respondent court
committed no error in rectifying the mistake in the
entries in TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 as regards their
sources and/or origins arguing that the correction was
justified by the fact that the plan of OCT 351 coincides
with the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 77652
and 77653; that OCT 351 was issued pursuant to
Decree 1425 and that OCT 351 is a copy of the
Decree itself.
We find the petition impressed with merit.
Undoubtedly, the evidence (i.e., plan submitted by
respondent Ortigas, testimony of its surveyor and
OCT 351) adduced by private respondent to prove the
contents of Decree 1425 and admitted by respondent
court is merely secondary and should not have been
admitted in the first place.
Before secondary evidence may be admitted, there
must be 1) proof of the execution of the original
writing and 2) that it has been lost or destroyed or
cannot be produced in court or that it is in the
possession of the adverse party who has failed to
produce it after reasonable notice (Michael and Co. v.
Enriquez, 33 Phil. 87 [1915]; Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 73 SCRA 146 [1976]). Private respondent
has not shown compliance with the above requisites
which would justify the admission of the secondary
evidence used and erroneously relied upon by
respondent court.
Furthermore, the unilateral action of respondent court
in substituting its own findings regarding the extent of
the coverage of the land included in TCT Nos. 77652
and 77653, ostensibly to correct the error in, and
conform with, the technical description found in OCT
351 based on the plan and other evidence submitted
by respondent Ortigas cannot be sustained. That
function is properly lodged with the office of the trial
court sitting as a land registration court and only after
a full-dress investigation of the matter on the merits. It
is before the land registration court that private
respondent must adduce the proof that the disputed
parcels of land is legally registered in its favor.
In Dioquino v. Intermediate Appellate Court (179
SCRA 163 [1989]), this Court held that "(w)hile it is
true that the Court of Appeals is vested with the
'power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive
evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to
resolve factual issues raised ..." (Sec. 9 [3], BP 129),
there was not even a request for evidentiary hearing
filed in this case. The Court of Appeals therefore
should not have admitted said evidence without giving
the adverse party opportunity to present counter
evidence, if any. Besides, "evidence necessary in
regards to factual issues raised in cases falling within
the Appellate Court's original and appellate
jurisdiction contemplates incidental facts which were
not touched upon, or fully heard by the trial or
respondent Court. The law could not have intended
that the Appellate Court would hold an original and full
trial of a main factual issue in a case, which properly
pertains to trial courts" (citing Lingner & Fisher GMBH
v. IAC, 125 SCRA 522 [1983]). In the case at bar, it
appears that the parties have yet to fully present their
respective evidence in support of their claims before
the trial court. As a matter of fact, the trial court had
set the case for hearing on the merits in its order
dated May 19, 1989. What is more, the case involves
a vast tract of land consisting of 156 hectares,
separately situated in two outlaying localities (i.e.,
Quezon City and Sta. Ana, Manila.) The resolution of
this controversy calls for a full-blown trial on the
merits if only to afford the contending parties their
respective days in court. Further, a ground for
dismissal based on disputed facts, as in this case is
not proper in a motion to dismiss (Spouses Jayme
and Solidarios v. Alampay, 62 SCRA 131 [1975]).
In the case at bar, respondent Ortigas alleges that
Decree 1425 embraces the lots covered by its TCT
Nos. 77652 and 77653 which are identical to the lots
applied for by petitioner. On the other hand, petitioner
maintains that Decree 1425 covers a 17-hectare lot
located at Sta. Ana, Manila while the lot applied for is
alienable and disposable as certified by the Bureau of
Lands and by the Bureau of Forestry and has an area
of 156 hectares located in Quezon City four (4)
kilometers away from Sta. Ana, Manila. Hence, the
necessity of a trial on the merits to ascertain the
disputed facts, i.e., whether the lot applied for is
covered by Decree No. 1425 or is alienable and
disposable. Under Act 496, it is the decree of
registration issued by the Land Registration
Commission which is the basis for the subsequent
issuance of the certificate of title by the corresponding
Register of Deeds that quiets the title to and binds the
land (De la Merced v. Court of Appeals, 5 SCRA 240
[1962]). Consequently, if no decree of registration had
been issued covering the parcel of land applied for,
then the certificate of title issued over the said parcel
of land does not quiet the title to nor bind the land and
is null and void.
Besides, an order denying a motion to dismiss is
merely interlocutory and, unless it constitutes clearly
a grave abuse of discretion or was issued without or
in excess of jurisdiction, the error, if any, should be
corrected by appeal in due time, after trial and
judgment on the merits and not by the extraordinary
writ of prohibition (Moreno v. Macadaeg, 7 SCRA 700
[1963]; National Investment and Development
Corporation v. Aquino, 163 SCRA 53 [1988]).
Furthermore, on grounds of pre-maturity, interlocutory
orders cannot be decided by the appellate courts until
the lower court shall have decided the merit of the
case. Thus, in Villegas v. Fernando (27 SCRA 1119
[1969]), this Court held:
This first assigned error (assailing the personality of
the appellees to ask for a review of the decision and
decree in the registration case) is actually directed at
an earlier order dated 26 April 1961 denying
appellants heirs' motion to dismiss the petitions for
review filed by the present appellees. And inasmuch
as said order of 26 April 1961 is interlocutory, there
being as yet no trial and decision on the merits of the
petition for review, it is premature to raise said
assigned error in appellants heirs' instant appeal. We
shall rule thereon only when the proper time comes, i.
e., after the lower court shall have settled not only the
still unresolved status and rights of the parties,
particularly those of petitioners (sic) for review, now
appellees herein, almost all of whom are claiming that
they are not mere homestead or free patent
applicants but patent or title holders, but also whether
the original decision should be maintained or not. For
the court below, after receiving and hearing the
parties, may still conclude in favor of appellants
herein. (Emphasis supplied)
But not only that. Respondent court committed a
procedural lapse in correcting the alleged error in the
questioned TCTs.1âwphi1 A certificate of title cannot
be altered, amended or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law (Sec. 48, PD
1529; Natalia Realty Corp. v. Vallez, 173 SCRA 534
[1989]; Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 [1915]).
Also, no correction of certificate of title shall be made
except by order of the court in a petition filed for the
purpose and entitled in the original case in which the
decree of registration was entered (Sec. 112, Act 496;
now Sec. 108, PD 1529). While the law fixes no
prescriptive period therefor, the court, however, is not
authorized to alter or correct the certificate of title if it
would mean the reopening of the decree of
registration beyond the period allowed by law
(Rodriguez, v. Tirona, 68 Phil. 264 [1939]).
Respondent Ortigas, on the other hand, argues that
this Court has already recognized the fact that the
parcel of land under TCT No. 227758 from which TCT
Nos. 77652 and 77653 were issued, are covered by,
among others, Decree 1425 issued in GLRO Record
No. 917 (Rollo, p. 94).
The argument is without merit True this Court
declared in Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership
v. Ruiz (148 SCRA 326 [1987]) that "petitioner is the
duly registered owner of the land * (then) in dispute as
evidenced by OCT Nos. 13, 33, 334, and 337 by
virtue of Decrees Nos. 240, 1942 and 1925 issued in
GLRO Record Nos. 699, 875 and 917 ..." Nowhere in
said decision, however, is a pronouncement that TCT
Nos. 77652 and 77653 were issued from TCT No.
227758. On the contrary, it is not disputed by the
parties that TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 themselves
show that they were derived from OCT No. 337, 19,
336 and 334 and not from OCT 351 or TCT 227758. If
indeed, the real origin thereof is OCT No. 351, what
respondent Ortigas should have done was to file a
petition for the correction of the TCTs in question as
stated earlier.
While it may be true, as respondent Ortigas argues,
that a land registration court has no jurisdiction over
parcels of land already covered by a certificate of title,
it is nevertheless true that the aforesaid rule only
applies where there exists no serious controversy as
to the certificate's authenticity visa vis the land
covered therein. In the case at bar, the claimed origin
of the questioned TCTs evidently appear to be
different from what is stated therein. It does not
appear indubitable that the disputed parcels of land
are properly reflected in the TCTs relied upon by
private respondent. Off-hand, and as the parties
admit, the TCTs do not show that they are actually
derivatives of OCT 351. Such being the case, the rule
relied upon cannot therefore apply. One who relies on
a document evidencing his title to the property must
prove not only the genuineness thereof but also the
identity of the land therein referred to (CF. Lasam v.
Director of Lands, 65 Phil. 637 [1938]). In the case at
bar, private respondent's TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653
trace their origins from OCT Nos. 337, 19, 336 and
334 and not from OCT 351 as it is now claimed by
respondent Ortigas.
The trial court cannot be faulted for not having
granted respondent Ortigas' motion to dismiss simply
because the TCTs relied upon by the latter do not
accurately reflect their supposed origin. Thus, in
Ledesma v. Municipality of Iloilo (49 Phil. 769 [1926])
this Court held that the "simple possession of a
certificate of title, under the Torrens System, does not
make the possessor the true owner of all the property
described therein. If a person obtains a title, under the
Torrens System, which includes by mistake or
oversight land which cannot be registered under the
Torrens System, he does not, by virtue of said
certificate alone, become the owner of the lands
illegally included (citing Legarda and Prieto v.
Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 [1915])." TMs pronouncement
was reiterated by the Court in Caragay-Layno v.
Court of Appeals (133 SCRA 718 [1984]; Coronel v.
Intermediate Appellate Court (155 SCRA 270 [1987];
Goloy v. Court of Appeals (173 SCRA 26 [1989]; and
Miranda v. Court of Appeals (177 SCRA 303 [1989]).
As it is in this case, a certificate of title cannot be
considered conclusive evidence of ownership where
the certificate itself is faulty as to its purported origin.

Further, the fact that respondent Ortigas' motion to

dismiss was denied does not mean that it could no
longer participate in the resolution of the case and
factual determination of the parties' allegations. As
correctly stated by the trial court, "(i)t is to be
stressed, however, that the denial of oppositor
Ortigas' instant motion for reconsideration does not
necessarily mean that it is deprived of any
participation in the instant petition. For as already
stated, what follows after its denial is the eventual
presentation of all the parties' respective evidence
respecting their alleged ownership of the property
subject of this petition." (Rollo, p. 65)

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of respondent

court is SET ASIDE and the orders of the trial court in
LRC Case No. Q336 entitled, "In Re-Application for
Registration of Title, WIDOWS and ORPHANS
ASSOCIATION, Inc., Applicant, ORTIGAS &
COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP and DOLORES
V. MOLINA, Oppositors", dated March 30, 1988 and
May 19, 1989 are hereby REINSTATED insofar as
the denial of oppositor Ortigas' motion to dismiss and
motion for reconsideration, respectively, are
concerned and the case remanded to the trial court
for trial and adjudication on the merits.

SO ORDERED.