Hipos vs.

Bay
G.R. No. 174813-15
March 17, 2009

Facts: Two informations for the crime of rape and one information for the crime of acts of
lasciviousness were filed against petitioners Hipos et al. before Branch 86 of the RTC of
Quezon City. Hipos et al., claiming that there was no probable cause to hold them liable
for the crimes charged, had filed their memorandum to dismiss the cases before the Office
of the City Prosecutor. However, the same office issued a Resolution affirming the
informations filed against the petitioners.

2nd Assistance City Prosecutor De Vera then reversed the Resolution, holding that there
was lack of probable cause. On the same date, the City Prosecutor filed a motion to
withdraw informations before Judge Bay. Judge Bay denied such motion.

Issue: Can the Supreme Court compel Judge Bay to dismiss the case through a writ of
mandamus by virtue of the second resolution of the Office of Prosecutor?

Held: No.

As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to

perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the
exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to
exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because
it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.

In the case at bar, the act which petitioners pray that the SC compel the trial court to do
is to grant the Office of the City Prosecutor’s Motion for Withdrawal of Informations against
petitioners. In effect, petitioners seek to curb Judge Bay’s exercise of judicial discretion.

[M]andamus is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a

particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of
either. In other words, while a judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw
Informations can be compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be
compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such Motion. In the case at bar,
Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw Informations; he had already
acted on it by denying the same.

In Re: del Castillo

A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC
 February 8, 2011

Facts: The Court, through Justice Mariano C. del Castillo, has promulgated the landmark decision
of Vinuya vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230. Discontented with the decision, the
petitioners in the Vinuya case filed a motion for reconsideration. They also filed a supplemental
motion for reconsideration accusing Justice del Castillo of plagiarizing and twisting passages from
three foreign legal articles to support the Court’s position in the Vinuya decision, namely:

(1) A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Professors Evan J. Criddle

(2) Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark Ellis
(3) Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law by Professor Christian J. Tams

Thereafter, the Court referred the charges against Justice del Castillo to its Committee on Ethics
and Ethical Standards for investigation and recommendation. The committee submitted its
findings and recommendations to the Court en banc.

Issue: Did Justice del Castillo plagiarize the works of authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis?

Held: No.

Justice Del Castillo examined and summarized the facts as seen by the opposing sides in a way
that no one has ever done. He identified and formulated the core of the issues that the parties
raised. And when he had done this, he discussed the state of the law relevant to their resolution.
It was here that he drew materials from various sources, including the three foreign authors cited
in the charges against him. He compared the divergent views these present as they developed in
history. He then explained why the Court must reject some views in light of the peculiar facts of
the case and applied those that suit such facts. Finally, he drew from his discussions of the facts
and the law the right solution to the dispute in the case. On the whole, his work was original.