Torts with Independent Civil Actions (Violation of Civil and Political rights)

Lim vs. Ponce De Leon

G.R. No. L-22554 August 29, 1975

Facts: Jikil Taha sold a motor launch named M/L "SAN RAFAEL" to Alberto Timbangcaya but a year later Timbangcaya filed
a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal that Taha forcibly took the motor launch. Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon
in his capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Palawan, filed an information for Robbery with Force and Intimidation upon
Persons against Jikil Taha and instructed Orlando Maddela, Detachment Commander of Balabac to impound and take custody
of the motor launch, which was already sold to Delfin Lim. Fiscal de Leon informed Maddela that the subsequent sale of the
launch to Delfin Lim could not prevent the court from taking custody of the same. Lim filed a complaint for damages against
Fiscal de Leon and Maddela. Lim contended that there was a violation of his constitutional rights when the motor launch was
seized without a search warrant. As defense, de Leon and Maddela contended that the motor launch was the corpus delicti in
an ongoing investigation and filed a counterclaim for malicious and groundless filing of the complaint by Lim and Taha. The
trial court upheld the validity of the seizure of the motor launch and ordered Taha and Lim to pay for damages.

Issue: Whether the constitutional rights of Jakil Taha and Delfin Lim was violated, and if so, whether they are entitled to
damages

Held: The taking of the motor launch was ruled to be in violation of the constitutional right of the parties against unreasonable
searches and seizure as provided in the Bill of Rights since it was effected without a search warrant, the authority of which lies
with a magistrate or judge and not a fiscal. With respect to damages, Delfin Lim and Jikil Taha were entitled to damages under
Article 32 and 2219 of the New Civil Code for the violation of their constitutional right. Good faith is not a defense against
liability under Article 32 of the NCC. To be liable it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the
plaintiffs and it is not required that the act was attended with bad faith or malice. Therefore, Fiscal de Leon was liable to pay
damages to Delfin Lim for violating his constitutional right; but Orlando Maddela cannot be held accountable because he acted
upon the order of his superior officer believing that there was a legal basis and authority to impound the launch.

Aberca vs. Ver

G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988

Facts: The intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM), were ordered
by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT). The plaintiffs complained that
in the execution of such order, the TFM raided several places using “defectively issued judicial warrants” and arrested the
plaintiffs without warrant, confiscated personal property, interrogated plaintiffs without council and employed threats, tortures
and other forms of violence. The plaintiffs filed an action for damages, which was dismissed by the trial court on the grounds
that (1) the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was suspended, (2) the defendants were performing their official duties and
(3)the complaint states no cause of action.

Issue: Whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches
conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution, and if so, who
should be made liable

Held: The contention that respondents are covered by state immunity for acts done in the performance of their official duties
was not accepted by the court because plaintiffs may have been ordered to conduct pre-emptive strikes against the communist
terrorists but this did not amount to “a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint”. In
carrying out their task and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards should still have been observed by respondents.
The plaintiff’s cause of action were not barred by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, which was
explicitly recognized in PD No. 1755: However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-delict)
arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving However, when the action (for injury to the
rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-delict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving
the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same
must be brought within one (1) year. Even if the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspended petitioners'
right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it did not extend to suspend their right to demand damages for
injuries suffered through the confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel
and their right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman
treatment. As to who should be made liable for damages, the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the case. Article
32 speaks of “an officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights
and liberties of another”. Thus, the person directly causing damage and the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for
the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions
those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violation.

MHP Garments vs. CA

G.R. No. 86720 September 2, 1994

Facts: MHP Garments, Inc. had the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies, badges,
and insignias. When MHP Garments received information that Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales
were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority, Larry de Guzman, an employee of MHP Garments,
together with members of the police constabulary, went to the stores of Cruz, Lugatiman, and Gonzales at the Marikina Public
Market and seized these items. The seizure caused a commotion to the embarrassment of Cruz, Lugatiman and Gonzales. MHP
Garments instituted a criminal complaint for unfair competition against the vendors. The Provincial fiscal dismissed the
complaint and ordered the return of the seized items. Cruz, Lugatiman and Gonzales instituteed an action for sums of money
and damages against MHP Garments and de Guzman. MHP Garments contend that they should not be made liable for damages
since they did not commit the act of seizure.

Issue: Whether MHP Garments and de Guzman should be held liable for the seizure of the goods in question although it was
the Police constabulary who effected the seizure

Held: The seizure was conducted without a warrant in evident violation of the constitutional right of the vendors. The facts of
the case did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of the vendors’ goods. There was sufficient time for de Guzman in
behalf of MHP Garments to secure a warrant from the time of receipt of the information and the raid of the stores. Although
the Philippine Constabulary conducted the raid, their omission as party to the complaint does not exculpate MHP Garments
and de Guzman from liability. The company was indirectly involved in transgressing the rights of Cuz, Lugatiman and
Gonzales. It was MHP Garments who instigated the raid and the raid was conducted with the active participation of their
employee, Larry de Guzman, who apparently assented to the conduct of the raid and is as liable to the same extent as the officers
themselves. The corporation is also liable to the same extent as the officers when it received the goods for safekeeping and
refused to surrender them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition.

Defamation, Fraud and Physical Injuries

Marcia et al. vs.CA

G.R. No. L-34529 January 27, 1983

Facts: A passenger bus operated by private respondent Victory Liner, Inc.,driven by its employee, Felardo Paje, collided with
a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and in physical injuries to Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. An
information for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against the driver while an action for
damages was filed by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap, and the heirs of Clemente Marcia against the Victory Liner, Inc. and
Felardo Paje. The trial court initially convicted Paje of the offense charged, but on appeal, Paje was acquitted after it was found
that he was not speeding and was diligent, but the collision, nevertheless, took place and was a fortuitous event. It further ruled
that criminal negligence was wanting and that Paje was not even guilty of civil negligence. The court dismissed the civil case
against Paje and Victory Liner ruling that they could not be held civilly liable after it had ruled in the criminal action that
negligence was wanting and that the collision was a case of pure accident.

Issue: Whether the acquittal in the criminal case would result in the dismissal in the civil case

Held: The judgment of acquittal included a declaration that the fact from which civil liability may arise did not exist. In
acquitting Paje, the court ruled that the event was an accident and that Paje was without fault, and it is only proper that the civil
case be dismissed. Furthermore, the charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide and physical injuries but for reckless
imprudence or criminal negligence resulting in homicide and physical injuries. They are not one of the three (3) crimes
mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code and, therefore, no civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
which provides: ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. Therefore, it was only proper that the court dismiss
the civil case against Paje and Victory Liner since Paje was acquitted of the fact from which the civil case arose.

Madeja v. Caro
211 Phil 469 (December 21, 1983)

Facts: Dra. Eva Japzon is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madejo after an
appendectomy. The widow of Madejo filed a criminal complaint and reserved her right to claim for a separate action for
damages. The judge dismissed the civil case because of Rule 111 3(a) but the petitioner appealed to the SC by using Rule 111
Section 2 ROC in relation to Article 33 of the NCC, which states: Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for
in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is
reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence." (Rule 111, Rules of Court.) Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
The Court found the case impressed with merit.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the civil case can carry on independently of the criminal case. (2) Whether or not physical injuries
of Article 33 encompass other bodily injury in its definition

Held: (1)Yes. Rule 111 Section 2 creates an exception to the rule when the offense is defamation, fraud, or physical injuries.
In these cases, a civil action may be filed independently of the criminal action, even if there has been no reservation made by
the injured party; the law itself in this article makes such reservation.

(2)Yes. The Code Commission discussed that the term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of
physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries by consummated, frustrated and
attempted homicide but also any other bodily injury including battery based on the American Law.

Arafiles v. Phil. Journalists

GR No 135306 (2003)

Facts: In 1987, Emelita Despuig, working as a grant-in-aid scholar at a Manila university and as an office worker at a
government office in Quezon City, was raped by her boss, a government agency director, last March 15, but afraid to lose her
job – and of being harmed – she chose to keep her ordeal to herself. On the second night, she was almost raped again by the
same man, Catalino Arafiles. However, the bellboy and the security guard noticed something suspicious as Emelita was fighting
back while they were checking in the Flamingo Hotel, thus the bellboy followed them to their room. Arafiles rushed to leave
as soon as he paid money to the bellboy and the security guard not to report the same. Emelita reported the same information
to the police and she was interviewed by Romy Morales, a journalist of People’s Journal Tonight. During the following day,
the news was part of the headlines in the said newspaper. After a year of publication, Arafiles filed a complaint for damages
arising from the said publication against the journalist and its employer. Arafiles alleged that on account of the “grossly
malicious and overly sensationalized reporting in the news item” prepared by respondent Morales, edited by respondent Buan,
Jr., allowed for publication by respondent Villareal, Jr. as president of Philippine Journalists, Inc., and published by respondent
Philippine Journalists, Inc., aspersions were cast on his character; his reputation as a director of the NIAS at the Philippine
Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) was injured; he became the object of public
contempt and ridicule as he was depicted as a sex-crazed stalker and serial rapist; and the news item deferred his promotion to
the position of Deputy Administrator of PAGASA. The RTC of Quezon City ruled in favor of Arafiles granting him awards for
damages. 1.) P1,000,000.00, as nominal damages; 2.) P50,000.00, as exemplary damages; 3.) P1,000.000.00, as moral damages;
4.) P50,000.00, as attorney’s fees; and 5.) Costs of suit. . CA reversed RTC’s decision. MR from CA made by Arafiles was
denied. Hence they elevated it to the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the publication of the news item was not attended with malice, hence, must free respondents of liability
for damages.

Held: Yes. There was no malice in the article. Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, shall require only a preponderance of evidence. Article 33 contemplates a
civil action for the recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case. A civil action for
libel under this article shall be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment and proved by preponderance of evidence separately
from and entirely independent of the institution, pendency or result of the criminal action because it is governed by the
provisions of the New Civil Code and not by the Revised Penal Code governing the criminal offense charged and the civil
liability arising therefrom In actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain libelous
material must be examined and viewed as a whole. The article must be construed as an entirety including the headlines, as they
may enlarge, explain, or restrict or be enlarged, explained or strengthened or restricted by the context. Whether or not it is
libelous, depends upon the scope, spirit and motive of the publication taken in its entirety. Arafiles brands the news item as a
“malicious sensationalization” of a patently embellished and salacious narration of fabricated facts involving rape and attempted
rape incidents. For, so petitioner argues, the police blotter which was the sole basis for the news item plainly shows that there
was only one count of abduction and rape reported by Emelita.

The presentation of the news item subject of petitioner’s complaint may have been in a sensational manner, but it is not
per se illegal. In determining the manner in which a given event should be presented as a news item and the importance to be
attached thereto, newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion.

Defamation

MVRS vs. Islamic

GR 135306 (January 28, 2003)

Facts: Bulgar, a local tabloid, published an article in 1992 about the Muslim’s practical customs stating: ALAM BA NINYO?
Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim? Para sa kanila ang mga ito
ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit na sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila
ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw
na tinatawag nilang ‘Ramadan’." Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines filed a complaint alleging the libelous statement
as insulting and damaging because words alluding to pig as the God of Muslims were with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult,
and disparage the Muslims and Islam. MVRS contended however, that they did not mention respondents as the object of the
article, thus not entitled to damages. In defense, the article was only an expression of their belief or opinion. The RTC dismissed
their case because there was no cause of action. The plaintiffs were not specifically identified for defmation. In 1998, the CA
reversed the decision. Hence, this review.

Issue: Whether or not the Islamic Council was entitled to moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s feed, and costs of
suit

Held: No. Words that are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se. Mere words of abuse whether written
or spoken do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. There is
NO identifiable person who was allegedly injured by the article. Muslims do not have a single common reputation that will
give them a common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.

Requisites to recovery are the following:

1. Published a statement
2. That was defamatory
3. Of and concerning the plaintiff

To maintain an action, the plaintiff must be the person with reference to whom the statement was made as this is vital for a
group or class to prove they have been defamed.

Fraud

Salta v. De Veyra
202 Phil 527 (September 30, 1982)

Facts: Amayra Salta was employed as branch manager of the Philippine National Bank (PNB). As such, his duty was to grant
loans or to recommend the granting of loans, depending on the the amount of the loan applied for. PNB filed two civil
complaints against Salta charging him of indiscriminately granting certain loans in a manner characterized by negligence, fraud,
and manifest partiality, and upon securities not commensurate with the amount of the loans. The two civil cases were assigned
to two different salas of the Court of First Instance of Manila. At the same time, the bank caused to be filed, a criminal case,
based on the same acts. Petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case on the ground that the elements of the crime charged were
not proven. Based on his acquittal petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss in each of the two civil cases. The two presiding judges
in the separate civil cases took diametrically opposing views. One judge denied his motion and the other granted it. Hence,
these petitions by the Philippine National Bank in one case and by Salta in the other.

Issue: Whether or not the motion to dismiss the civil cases should be affirmed or denied.

Held: The motion to dismiss should be denied and the other order granting such should be reversed. The filing in this case of
a civil action separate from the criminal action is fully warranted under the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code. The
criminal case is for the prosecution of an offense the main element of which is fraud. . Based on the same acts for which the
criminal action was filed, the civil actions very clearly alleged fraud and negligence as having given rise to the cause of action
averred in the complaints. The following allegation in the complaints unmistakably shows that the complaints do contain
sufficient averment of fraud: "That there was fraud committed by the defendant in granting the aforesaid loans which rendered
him liable for his acts, which fraud is positively and easily identifiable in the manner and scheme aforementioned." The civil
actions can be maintained regardless of the outcome of the criminal action. Physical Injuries

Physical Injuries

Capuno v. Pepsi Cola

G.R. No. L-19331 (1965)

Facts: The case arose from a vehicular collision which occurred on January 3, 1953 in Apalit, Pampanga. Involved were a
Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven by Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno. The collision proved fatal to the latter as
well as to his passengers, the spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras. Elordi was charged with triple homicide through
reckless imprudence; the information was subsequently amended to include claims for damages by the heirs of the three victims.
While the criminal case was pending, the Intestate Estate of the Buan spouse and their heirs filed a civil case. Included in the
complaint was a claim for indemnity in the sum of P2,623.00 allegedly paid by the Estate to the heirs of Capuno under the
Workmen's Compensation Act. On June 11, 1958 the parties in Civil Case No. 838 entered into a "Compromise and Settlement."
For P290,000.00 the Buan Estate gave up its claims for damages, including the claim for reimbursement of the sum of P2,623.00
previously paid to the heirs of Capuno "under the Workmen's Compensation Act." The Court approved the compromise and
accordingly dismissed the case on the following June 17. At that time the criminal case was still pending; judgment was
rendered only on April 15, 1959, wherein the accused Elordi was acquitted of the charges against him. Prior thereto, or on
September 26, 1958, however, herein appellants commenced a civil action for damages against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling
Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi. This is the action which, upon appellees' motion, was dismissed by the Court a quo
in its order of February 29, 1960, from which order the present appeal has been taken.

Issue: Whether or not the action had already prescribed.

Held: Yes. The action has prescribed. The civil action for damages could have been commenced by appellants immediately
upon the death of their decedent, Cipriano Capuno, on January 3, 1953 or thereabouts, and the same would not have been stayed
by the filing of the criminal action for homicide through reckless imprudence. But the complaint here was filed only on
September 26, 1958, or after the lapse of more than five years. In the case of Diocosa Paulan, et al. vs. Zacarias Sarabia, et
al., G.R. No. L-10542, promulgated July 31, 1958, SC held that an action based on a quasi-delict is governed by Article 1150
of the Civil Code as to the question of when the prescriptive period of four years shall begin to run, that is, "from the day (the
action) may be brought," which means from the day the quasi-delict occurred or was committed. The foregoing considerations
dispose of appellants' contention that the four-year period of prescription in this case was interrupted by the filing of the criminal
action against Jon Elordi inasmuch as they had neither waived the civil action nor reserved the right to institute it separately.
Such reservation was not then necessary; without having made it they could file — as in fact they did — a separate civil action
even during the pendency of the criminal case and consequently, as held in Paulan v. Sarabia, supra, "the institution of a
criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict."

Corpus v. Paje
G.R. No. L-26737 (1969)
Facts: On December 23, 1956, a passenger bus of the Victory Liner Transportation Co., Inc., driven by Felardo Paje, collided
within the municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and in
physical injuries to two other persons. An information for homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence was filed against Felardo Paje. In 1962, the heirs of Clemente Marcia reserved their right to institute a separate
civil action for damages. Paje was convicted and pending appeal, the heirs of the Clemente Marcia filed a separate civil action
for damages based on the criminal act and praying that Victory Liner pay jointly and severally the damages claimed by the
heirs. Paje was acquitted by the CA. During the pre-trial of the civil case, the Court dismissed the same because the cause of
action being a quasi-delict has prescribed.

Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of the case is proper by reason of prescription

Held: Yes. The trial court’s finding was correct that the cause of action has prescribed in 1962. An action upon a quasi-delict
must be instituted within four (4) years (Article 1146, Civil Code). The four-year prescriptive period began to run from the day
the quasi-delict was committed, or from December 23, 1956, and the running of the period was not interrupted by the institution
of the criminal action for reckless imprudence. Six years have already lapsed.

Madeja v. Caro
211 Phil 469 (December 21, 1983)

Facts: Dra. Eva Japzon is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madejo after an
appendectomy. The widow of Madejo filed a criminal complaint and reserved her right to claim for a separate action for
damages. The judge dismissed the civil case because of Rule 111 3(a) but the petitioner appealed to the SC by using Rule 111
Section 2 ROC in relation to Article 33 of the NCC, which states: Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for
in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is
reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence." (Rule 111, Rules of Court.) Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
The Court found the case impressed with merit.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the civil case can carry on independently of the criminal case. (2) Whether or not physical injuries
of Article 33 encompass other bodily injury in its definition

Held: (1)Yes. Rule 111 Section 2 creates an exception to the rule when the offense is defamation, fraud, or physical injuries.
In these cases, a civil action may be filed independently of the criminal action, even if there has been no reservation made by
the injured party; the law itself in this article makes such reservation.
(2)Yes. The Code Commission discussed that the term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of
physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries by consummated, frustrated and
attempted homicide but also any other bodily injury including battery based on the American Law.

Dulay v. CA
GR No 108017 (1995)

Facts: On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang
sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival,
shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay. The widow of Atty. Dulay filed an action for damages against the employer and the
security guard and prayed to be awarded actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. She alleges
that the Secuity agency has concurrent negligence as Torzuela, their employee: “ Defendant TORZUELA'S wanton and reckless
discharge of the firearm issued to him by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD was the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury, while the negligence of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its having failed to
exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury.”
SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state a valid cause of action.
SUPERGUARD claimed that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged
act of shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefore is governed by Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, which states: "ARTICLE 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. — Every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable." However, petitioner contends further that Article 2180 of the Civil Code shall govern and that it
is independent from the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. That the act of
Torzuela is actionable under Article 33 of the New Civil Code: "ARTICLE 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence."

Issue: Whether or not the civil action is founded on quasi-delict and should the employer be held jointly liable for damages.
Whether or not physical injuries include consummated homicide for Article 33 to apply in the case

Held: Yes to both issues. The SC ruled in favor of the petitioner. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not
only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. Private respondents further aver that
Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally committed pursuant to the ruling in Marcia v. CA.
However, the term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno
v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines). It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It
includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide