CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1

FILE No. 8

VI. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

a. PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT

i) Qualifications (Sections 2 and 3)

Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a

natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to
read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the
election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election.

Section 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same

qualifications and term of office and be elected with, and in the
same manner, as the President. He may be removed from office in
the same manner as the President.

The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet.

Such appointment requires no confirmation.

President Vice President

At least 40 years old on the day of At least 40 years old on the day
election of election
Natural-born citizen of the Natural-born citizen of the
Philippines Philippines

Able to read and write Able to read and write

Register voter Register voter

Resident of the Philippines for at Resident of the Philippines for at

least 10 years immediately least 10 years immediately
preceding the election preceding the election

Term of 6 years Term of 6 years

Unless otherwise provided by law, Unless otherwise provided by

term of office commence at noon of law, term of office commence at
June 30 next following the election noon of June 30 next following
the election

Single term only; not eligible for Term limitation: 2 successive

any re-election terms.
Any person who has succeeded as
President, and served as such for
more than 4 years shall NOT be
qualified for election to the same
office at any time.

CASES

• Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses: "No

person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least
forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such
election."

The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who

are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." The date,
month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939
during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history,
four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res
judicata and jus sanguinis[28] – had been in vogue. Only two, i.e.,
jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a
“natural-born” citizen of the Philippines. With the adoption of the
1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs.
Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would
now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.

“Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens

of the Philippines -
 “(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution
“(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who,
before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public
office in the Philippine Islands.
“(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
“(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
“(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.” (Tecson vs.
COMELEC, GR 161434, March 3, 2004).

ii) Election and Term of Office (Sections 4 and 5)

Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by

direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall begin at
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the
election and shall end at noon of the same date, six years
thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any re-election.
No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such
for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same
office at any time.

No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms.

Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the
service for the full term for which he was elected.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President

and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May.

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly

certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall
be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the
Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of
the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the
election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and
the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the
Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due
execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the
votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed

elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest
number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote
of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress,
voting separately.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the
certificates.

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.

Section 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the

President, the Vice-President, or the Acting President shall take
the following oath or affirmation:

"I do solemnly swear [or affirm] that I will faithfully and

conscientiously fulfill my duties as President [or Vice-President or
Acting President] of the Philippines, preserve and defend its
Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and
consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. So help me God." [In
case of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted].

1. Regular – second Monday of May, every six years;

2. Special

Requisites:

a. death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation

of both the President and the Vice President.

b. vacancies occur more than eighteen months before the next

regular presidential election;
c. a law passed by Congress calling for a special election to elect
a President and Vice President to be held not earlier than 45 days
nor later than 60 days from the time of such call (Sec. 10, Art
VII).

- Congress as canvassing board

- Supreme Court as Electoral Tribunal

CASES
• The term of office of the Senators who would be elected would be
six years, to commence at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election and to end at noon of 30 June 2001.
Protestant Santiago filed a certificate of candidacy for Senator in the
8 May 1995 election, campaigned for such office, and submitted
herself to be voted upon. She filed her certificate of candidacy for
the Senate without any qualification, condition, or reservation. In
so doing, she entered into a political contract with the electorate
that if elected, she would assume the office of Senator, discharge its
functions and serve her constituency as such for the term for which
she was elected. The term of office of the Senators elected in the 8
May 1995 election is six years, the first three of which coincides
with the last three years of the term of the President elected in the
11 May 1992 synchronized elections. The latter would be Protestant
Santiago's term if she would succeed in proving in the instant
protest. that she was the true winner in the 1992 elections.In
assuming the office of Senator then, the Protestant has effectively
abandoned or withdrawn this protest. Such abandonment or
withdrawal operates to render moot the instant protest. Another
reason why this case should now be dismissed is the fact that the
Protestant has decided to waive the revision of the remaining
unrevised ballots from 4,017 precincts out of the 17,527 precincts
of the designated three pilot areas. This is an unabashed reversal
from her original stand in her Motion and Manifestation dated 18
October 1993. Until the present, however, the Protestant has not
informed the Tribunal whether after the completion of the revision of
the ballots from her pilot areas, she still intends to present evidence
in connection therewith. This failure then, is nothing short of a
manifest indication that she no longer intends to do so. All told, a
dismissal of this election protest is inevitable (Defensor-Santiago vs.
Ramos, PET Case No. 001, Feb. 13, 1996).

iii) Privileges (Section 6)

Section 6. The President shall have an official residence. The

salaries of the President and Vice-President shall be determined by
law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in
said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the
term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved.
They shall not receive during their tenure any other emolument
from the Government or any other source.

v Official residence
 v Salary

Ø Official salaries are determines by law.

Ø Salaries cannot be decreased during the TENURE of the President
and the Vice-President
Ø Increases take effect only after the expiration of the TERM of the
incumbent during which the increase was approved.
Ø Prohibited from receiving any other emolument from the
government of any other source during their TENURE.

v Presidential Immunity

CASES

• It is elementary that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit

or from being brought to court during the period of their
incumbency and tenure (In re: Bermudez, 145 SCRA 160).

• The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of

immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties
and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering
that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside
from requiring all of the office-holder's time, also demands
undivided attention. But this privilege of immunity from suit,
pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked
only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the
President's behalf Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the
President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a
defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the
President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the
President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and
submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise
the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a
decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person
(Beltran vs. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393).

• Issue: Is the President's right to safeguard certain information,

using his "executive privilege" confidentiality power, entirely
immune from judicial review? No. The Court held that neither the
doctrine of separation of powers, nor the generalized need for
confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can
 sustain an absolute, unqualified, presidential privilege. The Court
granted that there was a limited executive privilege in areas of
military or diplomatic affairs, but gave preference to "the
fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair
administration of justice." Therefore, the president must obey the
subpoena and produce the tapes and documents. Nixon resigned
shortly after the release of the tapes (US vs. Nixon, 418 US 683, 41 L.Ed.
2D 1039).

• The President's absolute immunity is a functionally mandated

incident of his unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of
the separation of powers and supported by the Nation's history.
Because of the singular importance of the President's duties,
diversion of his energies by concern with private lawsuits would
raise unique risks to the effective functioning of government. While
the separation-of-powers doctrine does not bar every exercise of
jurisdiction over the President, a court, before exercising
jurisdiction, must balance the constitutional weight of the interest
to be served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and
functions of the Executive Branch. The exercise of jurisdiction is not
warranted in the case of merely private suits for damages based on
a President's official acts. Pp. 748-754.

• The President's absolute immunity extends to all acts within the

"outer perimeter" of his duties of office. A rule of absolute immunity
for the President does not leave the Nation without sufficient
protection against his misconduct. There remains the constitutional
remedy of impeachment, as well as the deterrent effects of constant
scrutiny by the press and vigilant oversight by Congress. Other
incentives to avoid misconduct may include a desire to earn
reelection, the need to maintain prestige as an element of
Presidential influence, and a President's traditional concern for his
historical stature (Nixon vs. Fitzgerald, 457 US 731).

• The court explained that the President, like other officials, is

subject to the same laws that apply to all citizens, that no case had
been found in which an official was granted immunity from suit for
his unofficial acts, and that the rationale for official immunity is
inapposite where only personal, private conduct by a President is at
issue. Moreover, immunities for acts clearly within official capacity
are grounded in the nature of the function performed, not the
identity of the actor who performed it. The separation of powers
doctrine does not require federal courts to stay all private actions
against the President until he leaves office. Even accepting the
unique importance of the Presidency in the constitutional scheme, it
 does not follow that that doctrine would be violated by allowing this
action to proceed. The doctrine provides a self executing safeguard
against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one of the three co
equal branches of Government at the expense of another (Clinton vs.
Jones, 520 US 681, May 27, 1997).

• Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being

brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure"
but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the
impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and
thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand
as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the
Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.
As to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a
non-sitting President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are
criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and
corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes,
especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by
the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner
cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to
commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity
from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an
inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and conditions. The rule
is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and
the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the
same footing as any trespasser (Estrada vs. Arroyo, GR 146738, March 2,
2001).

• Section 3 (7) of Article XI of the Constitution conveys two

uncomplicated ideas: first, it tells us that judgment in impeachment
cases has a limited reach. . .i.e., it cannot extend further than
removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the
Republic of the Philippines, and second, it tells us the consequence
of the limited reach of a judgment in impeachment proceedings
considering its nature, i.e., that the party convicted shall still be
liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to
law. No amount of manipulation will justify petitioner’s non sequitur
submission that the provision requires that his conviction in the
impeachment proceedings is a condition sine qua non to his
prosecution, trial and punishment for the offenses he is now facing
before the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner contends that the
private and public prosecutors’ walk out from the impeachment
proceedings “should be considered failure to prosecute... amounts
to an acquittal for purposes of applying the rule against double
jeopardy.” However, the Court rules that without ruling on the
 nature of impeachment proceedings, it rejects petitioner’s
submission. Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid
complaint; (2) before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4)
when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was
acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused. Assuming
arguendo that the first four requisites of double jeopardy were
complied with, petitioner failed to satisfy the fifth requisite for he
was not acquitted nor was the impeachment proceeding dismissed
without his express consent. Petitioner stubbornly clings to the
contention that he is entitled to absolute immunity from suit, and
oes a step further and avers that even a non-sitting President enjoys
immunity from suit during his term of office. Petitioner, however,
fails to distinguish between term and tenure. The term means the
time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right,
and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall
succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which
the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter
than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the
incumbent. From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear
that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with
his tenure and not his term (Estrada vs. Arroyo, GR 146738, Motion for
Recon., April 3, 2001).

iv) Prohibitions and inhibitions (Section 13)

Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the

Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in
the conduct of their office.

Prohibited from:

Ø Holding any office or employment during their tenure, UNLESS:

otherwise provided in the Constitution (e.g. VP can be appointed a
Cabinet Member, Sec. of Justice sits on Judicial and Bar Council); or
the positions are ex-officio and they do not receive any salary of
 other emoluments therefore (e.g. Sec. of Finance is head of Monetary
Board).

Ø Practicing, directly or indirectly, any other profession during their

tenure;

Ø Participating in any business;

Ø Being financially interested in any contract with, or in any

franchise, or special privilege granted by the government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including GOCC’s or
their subsidiaries.

v) Presidential Succession (Section 7,8,9,10 and 12)

Section 7. The President-elect and the Vice President-elect shall

assume office at the beginning of their terms.

If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-elect shall

act as President until the President-elect shall have qualified.

If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-elect

shall act as President until a President shall have been chosen and
qualified.

If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect

shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled, the
Vice President-elect shall become President.

Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or

shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or become
permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his
inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall act as
President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been
chosen and qualified.

The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one
who is to act as President shall be selected until a President or a
Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of death, permanent
disability, or inability of the officials mentioned in the next
preceding paragraph.

Section 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from

office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall
become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of
death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of
both the President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate
or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or
Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.

The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in

case of death, permanent disability, or resignation of the Acting
President. He shall serve until the President or the Vice-President
shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject to the same
restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Acting
President.

Section 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-

President during the term for which he was elected, the President
shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office
upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of

the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and
Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules
without need of a call and within seven days, enact a law calling for
a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be
held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days from
the time of such call. The bill calling such special election shall be
deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article V1 of this
Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on third
reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the special election
shall be charged against any current appropriations and shall be
exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article
V1 of this Constitution. The convening of the Congress cannot be
suspended nor the special election postponed. No special election
shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before
the date of the next presidential election.

Section 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public

shall be informed of the state of his health. The members of the
Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations and the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, shall not be
denied access to the President during such illness.

1. Vacancies at the beginning of the term.

 Vacancy
President-elect fails to qualify or
to be chosen
President-elect dies or is
permanently disabled.
Both President and VP-elect are
not chosen or do not qualify or
both die, or both become
permanently disabled.
Successor
VP-elect will be Acting President
until someone is qualified / chosen
as President.
VP becomes President.
1) Senate President or
2) In case of his inability, the
Speaker of the House shall act as
President until a President or a VP
shall have been chosen and
qualified. In case of death or
disability of (1) and (2) Congress
shall determine, by law, who will
be the acting President.

2. Vacancies after the office is initially filled:

Vacancy
President dies, is permanently
disabled, is impeached, or
resigns.
Both President and Vice-President
die, become permanently
disabled, are impeached, or
resign.
Successor
Vice-President becomes President
for the unexpired term.
1. Senate President or
2. In case of his inability, the
Speaker of the House shall act
as President until the President
or VP shall have been elected
and qualified.

3. Vacancy in office of Vice-President during the term

for which he was elected:
a) President will nominate new VP from any member of either House of
Congress.
b) Nominee shall assume office upon confirmation by majority vote of
ALL members of both Houses, voting separately. (Nominee forfeits seat
in Congress).

4. Election of President and Vice-President after vacancy

during term.
a) Congress shall convene 3 days after the vacancy in the office of both
the President and the VP, without need of a call. The convening o
Congress cannot be suspended.
b) Within 7 days after convening, Congress shall enact a law calling for
a special election to elect a President and a VP. The special election
cannot be postponed.
c) The special election shall be held not earlier than 45 days not later
than 60 days from the time of the enactment of the law.
d) The 3 readings for the special law need not be held
on separate days.
e) The law shall be deemed enacted upon its
approval on third reading.
BUT: No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within
18 months before the date of the next presidential election.

5. Temporary Disability of the President: The temporary inability of the

President to discharge his duties may be raised in either of two ways:
a) By the President himself, when he sends a written declaration to the
Senate President and the Speaker of the House. In this case, the Vice-
President will be Acting President until the President transmits a
written declaration to the contrary.
b) When a majority of the Cabinet members transmit to the Senate
President and the Speaker their written declaration.
i. The VP will immediately be Acting
President.
ii. BUT: If the President transmits a written declaration that he is not
disabled, he reassumes his position.
iii. If within 5 days after the President re-assumes his position, the
majority of the Cabinet retransmits their written declaration, Congress
shall decide the issue. In the event, Congress shall reconvene within 48
hours if it is not in session, without need of a call.
iv. Within 10 days after Congress is required to assemble, or 12 days if
Congress is not in session, a 2/3 majority of both Houses, voting
separately, is needed to find the President temporarily disabled, in
which case, the VP will be Acting President.

6. Presidential illness:
a) If the President is seriously ill, the public must be
informed thereof.
b) Even during such illness, the National Security Adviser, the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Chief of Staff of the AFP re entitled
to access to the President.

vi) Removal of the President

CASES

• Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from

a permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office of the
 President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath as
President. The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as
President or should be considered resigned as of January 20, 2001
when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the Public.
Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual
question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an
intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment.78 The validity of a resignation is not government by
any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written.
It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is
clear, it must be given legal effect. n sum, we hold that the
resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by
his leaving Malacanang. In the press release containing his final
statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as
President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality;
(2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the
presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due
to any kind inability and that he was going to re-assume the
presidency as soon as the disability disappears: (3) he expressed his
gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without
doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve
the people as President (4) he assured that he will not shirk from
any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of
our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after
occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5)
he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could
not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press
release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His
presidency is now in the part tense (Estrada vs. Arroyo, GR 146738, March
2, 2001).

• Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to

determine whether the President is incapable of performing his
functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of Article VII.
The recognition of respondent Arroyo as our de jure president made
by Congress is unquestionably a political judgment. It is significant
that House Resolution No. 176 cited as the bases of its judgment
such factors as the “people’s loss of confidence on the ability of
former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern” and
the “members of the international community had extended their
recognition of Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President
of the Republic of the Philippines” and it has a constitutional duty
 “of fealty to the supreme will of the people x x x.” This political
judgment may be right or wrong but Congress is answerable only to
the people for its judgment. Its wisdom is fit to be debated before
the tribunal of the people and not before a court of justice. Needles
to state, the doctrine of separation of power constitutes an
inseparable bar against this court’s interposition of its power of
judicial review to review the judgment of Congress rejecting
petitioner’s claim that he is still the President, albeit on leave and
that respondent Arroyo is merely an acting President (Estrada vs.
Arroyo, GR 146738, Motion for Recon., April 3, 2001).

b. PRESIDENTIAL POWERS

i) Executive Power

Ø Power to enforce and administer laws.

v President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus

and offices. He shall ensure that laws are faithfully executed (Sec. 17,
Art. VII).

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.

v Until and unless a law is declared unconstitutional, the President

has a duty to execute it regardless of his doubts as to its validity
(faithful execution clause) (Sec.1 and 17, Art. VII).

Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of

the Philippines.

CASES

• The Organic Act vests "the supreme executive power" in the

Governor- General of the Philippine Islands. In addition to specified
functions,he is given "general supervision and control of all the
departments and bureaus of the government of the Philippine
Islands as far as is not inconsistent with the provisions of this act.
"He is also made "responsible for the faithful execution of the laws
of the Philippine Islands and of the United States operative within
Philippine Islands."The authority of the Governor-General is made
 secure by the important proviso "that all executive functions of
Government must be directly under the Governor-General or within
one of the executive departments under the supervision and control
of the Governor-General. "(Organic Act, secs. 21, 22.) By the
Administrative Code, "the Governor-General, as chief Executive of
the Islands, is charged with the executive control of the Philippine
Government, to be exercised in person or through the Secretaries of
Departments, or other proper agency, according to law." It may
finally be inferred from the books that the appointment of public
officials is generally looked upon as properly an executive function.
The power of appointment can hardly be considered a legislative
power. Appointments may be made by the Legislature of the courts,
but when so made be taken as an incident to the discharge of
functions properly within their respective spheres. The Organic Act
of August 29, 1916, included what follows on the subject of
appointments. The governor-General "shall, unless otherwise herein
provided, appoint, by and with the consent of the Philippine Senate,
such officers as may now be appointed by the Governor-General,or
such as he is authorized by law to appoint." (Organic Act, sec. 21.)
The exception to the general grant is that the Philippine Legislature
"shall provide for the appointment and removal of the heads of the
executive departments by the Governor-General." (Organic Act, sec.
22.) Each House of the Philippine Legislature may also elect a
presiding officer, a clerk, a sergeant at arms, and such other officers
and assistants as may be required. (Organic Act, sec. 18.) The
Philippine Legislature is authorized to choose two Resident
commissioners to the United States. (Organic Act, sec. 20.)

The Administrative Code provides the following: "In addition to his

general supervisory authority, the Governor-General shall have
such specific powers and duties as are expressly conferred or
imposed onhim by law and also, in particular, the powers and
duties set forth," including th special powers and duties "(a) To
nominate and appoint officials, conformably to law, to positions in
the service of the Government of the Philippine Islands. (b) To
remove officials from office conformably to law and to declare vacant
the offices held by such removed officials. For disloyalty to the
Government of theUnited States, the Governor-General may at any
time remove a personfrom any position of trust or authority under
the Government of the Philippine Islands." (Sec. 64 [a], [b].) The
Administrative Code lists the officers appointable by the Governor-
General (Sec. 66.) (Springer vs. Government, 50 Phil 259).

• Article VII of the Constitution begins in its section 1 with the

declaration the "The Executive power shall be vested in a President
 of the Philippines." All executive authority is thus vested in him,
and upon him devolves the constitutional duty of seeing that the
laws are "faithfully executed." (Art. VII, sec. 11, subsec. 1, last
clause.) In the fulfillment of this duty which he cannot evade, he is
granted specific and express powers and functions. (Art. VII, sec.
11.) In addition to these specific and express powers and functions,
he may also exercise those necessarily implied and included in
them. The National Assembly may not enact laws which either
expressly or impliedly diminish the authority conferred upon the
President of the Constitution. The Constitution provides that the
President "shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices" (Art. VII, sec. 11 [1], first clause) and shall
"exercise general supervision over all location governments as may
be provided by law" (Ibid, second clause). This power of control and
supervision is an important constitutional grant. The President in
the exercise of the executive power under the Constitution may act
through the heads of the executive departments. The heads of the
executive departments are his authorized assistants and agents in
the performance of his executive duties, and their official acts,
promulgated in the regular course of business, are presumptively
his acts. The power of removal which the President may exercise
directly and the practical necessities of efficient government brought
about by administrative centralization easily make the President the
head of the administration. Independently of any statutory provision
authorizing the President to conduct an investigation of the nature
involved in this proceeding, and in view of the nature and character
of the executive authority with which the President of the
Philippines is invested, the constitutional grant to him of power to
exercise general supervision over all local governments and to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to
authorized him to order an investigation of the act or conduct of the
petitioner herein. Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an
active power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at least
implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to
render the power real and effective. If supervision is to be
conscientious and rational, and not automatic and brutal, it must
be founded upon a knowledge of actual facts and conditions
disclosed after careful study and investigation (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil
259).

• The President has the exclusive power to remove executive branch

officials, and does not need the approval of the Senate or any other
legislative body. Chief Justice William Howard Taft, writing for the
Court, noted that the Constitution does mention the appointment of
officials, but is silent on their dismissal. An examination of the
 notes of the Constitutional Convention, however, showed that this
silence was intentional: the Convention did discuss the dismissal of
executive-branch staff, and believed it was implicit in the
Constitution that the President did hold the exclusive power to
remove his staff, whose existence was an extension of the
President's own authority (Myers, Administratrix vs. US, 272 US 52).

ii) Legislative Powers

CASES

• Proclamation No. 1716 was issued by the late President

Ferdinand E. Marcos on February 17, 1978 in the due exercise of
legislative power vested upon him by Amendment No. 6 introduced
in 1976. Being a valid act of legislation, said Proclamation may only
be amended by an equally valid act of legislation. Proclamation No.
164 is obviously not a valid act of legislation. After the so-called
bloodless revolution of February 1986, President Corazon Aquino
took the reigns of power under a revolutionary government. On
March 24, 1986, she issued her historic Proclamation No. 3,
promulgating the Provisional Constitution, or more popularly
referred to as the Freedom Constitution. Under Article II, Section 1
of the Freedom Constitution, the President shall continue to
exercise legislative power until a legislature is elected and convened
under a new constitution. Then came the ratification of the draft
constitution, to be known later as the 1987 Constitution. When
Congress was convened on July 26, 1987, President Aquino lost
this legislative power under the Freedom Constitution. Proclamation
No. 164, amending Proclamation No. 1716 was issued on October 6,
1987 when legislative power was already solely on Congress.
Because this unauthorized act by the then president constitutes a
direct derogation of the most basic principle in the separation of
powers between the three branches of government enshrined in our
Constitution, we cannot simply close our eyes and rely upon the
principle of the presumption of validity of a law. There is a long
standing principle that every statute is presumed to be valid.
However, this rests upon the premise that the statute was duly
enacted by legislature. This presumption cannot apply when there
is clear usurpation of legislative power by the executive branch
(Municipality of San Juan vs. CA, Sept. 29, 1997).

• Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative

order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to
 issue. While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the
President executes the laws. The executive power is vested in the
President. It is generally defined as the power to enforce and
administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into
practical operation and enforcing their due observance. Thus, he is
granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his
control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying
policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental
organs. 21 It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of
administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his
agents. 22 To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules
and regulations. Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O.
No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by
an administrative order. An administrative order is an ordinance
issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with
the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law
and carrying out the legislative policy (Ople vs. Torres, GR 127685, July
23, 1998).

iii) Residual Powers

Ø Whatever is not judicial, whatever is not legislative is residual power

exercised by the President (Marcos v. Manglapus, 178 SCRA 760)

CASES

• As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive

power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." [Art. VII,
Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by "executive
power" although in the same article it touches on the exercise of
certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute
the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander-
in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of
Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the
power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the power
to submit the budget to Congress, and the power to address
Congress [Art. VII, Secs. 14-23].
 The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers
of the President did the framers of the Constitution intend that the
President shall exercise those specific powers and no other?
Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited
only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other
words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated.

Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow
the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under
the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in
arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and
uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the
Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and
advance the national interest.

To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare

and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain
individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to
protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of
the President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore
Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his duty
to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that
the needs of the nation demand. It is a power borne by the
President's duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also
may be viewed as a power implicit in the President's duty to take
care that the laws are faithfully executed [see Hyman, The American
President, where the author advances the view that an allowance of
discretionary power is unavoidable in any government and is best
lodged in the President (Marcos vs. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668).

v Power to Determine National Policy

CASES

• To avert a nationwide strike of steel workers in April 1952, which

he believed would jeopardize national defense, the President issued
an Executive Order directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize and
operate most of the steel mills. Under prior decisions of this Court,
there is doubt as to the right to recover in the Court of Claims on
account of properties unlawfully taken by government officials for
public use. The Court held that the Executive Order was not
authorized by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and it
 cannot stand. There is no statute which expressly or impliedly
authorizes the President to take possession of this property as he
did here. In its consideration of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947,
Congress refused to authorize governmental seizures of property as
a method of preventing work stoppages and settling labor disputes.
Authority of the President to issue such an order in the
circumstances of this case cannot be implied from the aggregate of
his powers under Article II of the Constitution. The Order cannot
properly be sustained as an exercise of the President's military
power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. Nor can the
Order be sustained because of the several provisions of Article II
which grant executive power to the President. The power here
sought to be exercised is the lawmaking power, which the
Constitution vests in the Congress alone, in both good and bad
times. Even if it be true that other Presidents have taken possession
of private business enterprises without congressional authority in
order to settle labor disputes, Congress has not thereby lost its
exclusive constitutional authority to make the laws necessary and
proper to carry out all powers vested by the Constitution "in the
Government of the United States, or any Department or Officer
thereof (Youngstown Co. vs. Sawyer, 343 US 579 ).”

v Prosecution of Crimes

CASES

• Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty

assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial
function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive and
legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes
appertains to the executive department of government whose
principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are
faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute
our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to
prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion the
discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of
which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best
appreciated by prosecutors. We thus hold that it is not
constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981
vesting in the Department of Justice the power to determine who
can qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be granted
immunity from prosecution. Section 9 of Rule 119 does not support
the proposition that the power to choose who shall be a state
witness is an inherent judicial prerogative. Under this provision, the
court, is given the power to discharge a state witness only because it
has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused.
The discharge of an accused is part of the exercise of jurisdiction
but is not a recognition of an inherent judicial function. Moreover,
the Rules of Court have never been interpreted to be beyond change
by legislation designed to improve the administration of our justice
system (Webb vs. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652).