Law Review

File with Blythe_rev 2018Oct 12
POLITICAL LAW
SURVEY OF RECENT SIGNIFICANT CASES (2010-2018)
As of October 8, 2018
by
DEAN SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA

ATENEO LAW SCHOOL
Article 1 (National Territory)
Magallona v. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011
Facts:
 R.A. No. 9522 (New Baselines Law) was passed which shortened one baseline,
optimized the location of some basepoints around the archipelago and classified
adjacent territories (Kalayaan Island Group and Scarborough Shoal) as “Regime of
Islands” under Article 121 of UNCLOS III.
 R.A. No. 9522 amended R.A. No. 3046, as amended by R.A. No. 5446.
 Petitioners questioned R.A. No. 9522 because (1) R.A. No. 9522 reduces Philippine
maritime territory as embodied in the Treaty of Paris and other treaties; and, (2) R.A.
No. 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by
all vessels and aircrafts.
Issue:
 Constitutionality of R.A. No. 9522
Ruling:
 R.A. No. 9522 is valid.
Reasoning:
 UNCLOS has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. It regulates sea-use
rights.
 Baselines laws are statutory mechanisms to delimit the extent of a state’s maritime
zones and continental shelves.
 R.A. No. 9522 merely followed the basepoints engaged by R.A. No. 3046, save for at
least nine points that R.A. No. 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints
and adjust the length of one baseline (to comply with UNCLOS III’s limitation on the
maximum length of baselines). This would have the effect of increasing the
Philippines’ total maritime space by 145,216 sq. nautical miles.
 The Philippines may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters
to regulate innocent and sea lane passages. Even without legislation, right of innocent
passage is customary international law. Article 53(12) of UNCLOS III allows
innocent passage by ships and aircrafts through archipelagic waters.
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Article 2, Section 1 (Government)
Funa v. MECO, G.R. 193462, February 4, 2014 – MECO is not a GOCC but
sui generis.
Update of PCA judgment
Permanent Court of Arbitration, South China Sea (SCS) Dispute Between Philippines and
People’s Republic of China, October 29, 2015 and July 12, 2016.
PCA ARBITRATION
29 October 2015 – Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility
Philippine position : The Philippines’ claims (15 in total) are entirely within its (Tribunal)
jurisdiction and are fully admissible.
Chinese position : The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over the case for the
following reasons:
1. the essence of the subject-matter is the territorial sovereignty over several maritime
features in the SCS, which is beyond the scope of the Convention and does not concern
the interpretation or application of the Convention;
2. China and the Philippines have agreed, through bilateral instruments and the Declaration
on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS, to settle their relevant disputes through
negotiations;
3. assuming, arguendo, that the subject matter of the arbitration were concerned with the
interpretation or application of the Convention, that subject matter would constitute an
integral part of maritime delimitation falling within the scope of the declaration filed by
China in 2006 which excludes disputes concerning maritime delimitation from
compulsory arbitration.
The Tribunal’s Award:
1. China’s non-participation does not deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction.

2. There is a dispute between the Parties but the matters submitted to arbitration by the
Philippines do not concern sovereignty.
3. The claims presented by the Philippines do not concern sea boundary delimitation, and,
therefore, not subject to the exception to the dispute settlement provisions of the
Convention.
4. The Tribunal also ruled that none of the existing instruments to which Philippines and
China are parties to, which provide for other means of dispute settlement, prevent the
Philippines from bringing the present claims to arbitration.
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12 July 2016 – Award on the Merits
Issues raised and the Tribunal’s Rulings
1. China’s historic right claim (nine-dash line):
Ruling: There is no legal basis for any Chinese historic rights, or sovereign rights and
jurisdiction beyond those provided in the Convention in the waters of the SCS
encompassed by the “nine-dash line”; maritime entitlements are to be claimed
only from baselines along the coast of continental land, island or rock above
water at high tide; all historic rights in EEZ, ECS and high seas were
extinguished upon effectivity of UNCLOS; no evidence existed that China
historically exercised exclusive control over the waters of the SCS or their
resources; China aligned its declared maritime rights in accordance with
UNCLOS; China only mentioned historical rights in relation to maritime
claims in 1998 through a law on EEZ and CS.
2. On Geologic Features in the Spratlys:
Ruling: None of the geologic figures (rocks and islands) in the Spratlys is capable of
human habitation or economic life of its own so as to be entitled to a 200 NM
EEZ; therefore, there could be no overlap of EEZ with Palawan, so, the
Tribunal has jurisdiction to rule on the maritime dispute; Spratlys cannot be
taken as a single unit to determine capability to sustain human habitation or
economic life; Itu Aba is only entitled to 12 NM territorial sea;
3. On China-Occupied Geologic Features in Spratlys:
Ruling:
HTE Reefs – Fiery Cross Reef, Johnson South Reef, Gaven Reef, Charteron Reef,
McKennan Reef (entitled to 12 NM territorial sea)
LTE Reefs – Mischief and Subi (no territorial sea); Mischief is within Philippine EEZ
and part of CS; only Philippines can erect structures or artificial islands on
Mischief; China’s structures are illegal; although not stated, Subi is within
Philippines ECS.
NOTE:
Reed Bank (totally submerged) is part of Philippine EEZ
Ayungin Shoal (occupied by the Philippines) is an LTE within Philippine EEZ.
(A rock above water at high tide is land territory that generates a 12 NM territorial sea and
territorial airspace above the land and its territorial sea. Reclamation may be done with due
regard to its coastal neighbors and the marine environment.)
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(In the EEZ and CS, a coastal state has exclusive right to construct artificial islands or
structures on LTEs.)
4. On Scarborough Shoal:
Ruling: Scarborough Shoal is a HTE entitled to a 12 NM territorial sea only; it is a
traditional fishing ground of various fishermen from the region and China
cannot prevent Filipino fishermen from fishing.
5. On Harm to the Environment:
Ruling: China violated its obligations under UNCLOS for having dredged and built
islands on reefs and for failing to prevent its fishermen from harvesting
endangered species like sea turtles, corals and giant clams in the Spratlys and
Scarborough Shoal causing “permanent and irreparable harm to the coral reef
system.”
Enforcement of the Award
By coastal state – conduct of naval and aerial patrols in EEZ; exploitation of resources
By other states – freedom of navigation and overflight in high seas and EEZs
Article 2, Section 3 (AFP as Protector) in Relation to Article 3, Section 1

(one Press) and Article 14, Section 5 (2) (Academic Freedom)
First Class Cadet Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia of the Philippine Military Academy v. the
Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), G.R. No. 211362, February 24,
2015
Facts:
 First Class Cadet Cudia was penalized by the PMA for having lied about the cause of
his tardiness during a lesson examination. He was dismissed after having been found
guilty by the PMA, pursuant to the Honor Code.
Issue:
 Was the dismissal valid?
Ruling:
 PMA complied with due process.
Reasoning:
 The schools’ power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their academic
freedom and that “the establishment of rules governing university-student relations,
particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not
merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very
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survival.” In this regard, the Court has always recognized the right of schools to
impose disciplinary sanctions, which includes the power to dismiss or expel, on
students who violate disciplinary rules.
 As the primary training and educational institution of the AFP, it certainly has the
right to invoke academic freedom in the enforcement of its internal rules and
regulations, which are the Honor Code and the Honor System in particular.
 Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and
hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice.
The PMA Honor Code explicitly recognizes that an administrative proceeding
conducted to investigate a cadet’s honor violation need not be clothed with the
attributes of a judicial proceeding. There is aversion to undue judicialization of an
administrative hearing in the military academy.
Article 2, Section 14 (Equality Between Women and Men) in relation to

Article 3, Section 1 (Equal Protection) and Article 8, Section 1 (Judicial
Power)
Garcia v. Hon. Judge Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013
Facts:
 R.A. No. 9262, An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children
(VAWC) is being assailed by a husband for being violative of the equal protection and
due process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.
 The immediate case: Rosalie Jaype-Garcia sued her husband, Jesus C. Garcia, under
R.A. No. 9262 claiming to be a victim of physical abuse, emotional, psychological,
and economic violence as a result of infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of
deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support. The victim sought
reliefs, such as, the Barangay Protection Order (BPO).
Issues:
 Is R.A. No. 9262 discriminatory against men?
 Does it violate the principle of undue delegation of judicial power to barangay
officials through the issuance of BPO by the latter?
Ruling:
 Family courts have jurisdiction to entertain constitutionality of R.A. No. 9262.
 There is a valid classification. The unequal power relationship that women are more
likely to be victims of violence; and, the widespread gender bias and prejudice against
women, make for real differences.
 The BPO is issued against a perpetrator to compel him to desist from (a) causing harm
to the woman or her child; and (b) threatening to cause the woman or her child
physical harm. This function is purely executive in nature pursuant to the LGC “to
enforce all laws and ordinances” and “to maintain public order in the barangay.
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Article 2, Section 12 (Sanctity of Family Life; Right of the Unborn) in

relation to Article 3, Section 1 (Life, Procedural Due Process, Equal
Protection), Article 3, Section 3 (Privacy), Article 3, Section 6 (Freedom of
Religion), Article 3, Section 18 (Involuntary Servitude), Article 6, Section 1
(Undue Delegation) and Article 6, Section 26 (One-Subject-One Bill)
Imbong v. Hon. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014
Facts:
 Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law)
Issues:
 Right to life of the unborn – even if there is a declared policy against abortion,
implementation of RH Law would authorize purchase of hormonal contraceptives,
intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives.
 Right to health and right to protection against hazardous products – contraceptives are
hazardous.
 Right to religious freedom – RH Law authorizes use of public funds for purposes
contrary to their beliefs and threatens conscientious objectors as it compels medical
practitioners (1) to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to
other doctors; and (2) to provide full and correct information on reproductive health
programs and service against their religious beliefs. Section 5.23 of the III – RH Law
excludes skilled health professionals who are public officers as conscientious
objectors and mandatory sex education as an affront to religious beliefs.
 Right against involuntary servitude – PhilHealth accreditation of medical practitioners
requires them to provide 48 hours of probono services for indigent women.
 Equal protection – RH discriminates against the poor.
 Void-for-vagueness – imposition of penalty for “any violation” is vague; section 7
removes from people the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of
health facility and services they shall offer.
 Right to free speech – while religious groups are free from the compulsion to explain
the full range of family planning methods, they are not exempt from the requirement
to refer their patients to another health care facility.
 Right to privacy – by giving absolute authority to the person undergoing reproductive
health care, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between spouses and parents of a
child who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to determine
whether their child should use contraceptives.
 Undue delegation – the delegation to the FDA the power to determine what is a non-
abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drug List.
 One subject/one bill rule.
 Natural law.
 Autonomy of LGU and ARMM.
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Ruling:
 Petitions partially granted. R.A. No. 10354 not unconstitutional except as to the
following:
 Section 7 (in relation to RH-IRR)
(a) requiring health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals
owned by religious groups to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, to another facility.
(b) allowing minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to

modern methods of family planning without written consent from their
parents/guardians.
 Section 23(a)(1) (in relation to RH-IRR) - in so far as they punish any healthcare
service provider who fails and/or refuses to disseminate information programs and
services on reproductive health regardless of religious belief
 Section 23(a)(2)(i) (in relation to RH-IRR) – in so far as they allow a married

individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, to undergo reproductive
health procedures without consent of the spouse
 Section 23(a)(2)(ii) (in relation to RH-IRR) – in so far as they limit the

requirement of parental consent only to surgical procedures
 Section 23(a)(3) (in relation to RH-IRR) – in so far as they punish any healthcare
service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in any emergency or
life-threatening case, to another health care service provider within the same
facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of religious belief
 Section 23(b) (in relation to RH-IRR and Section 5.24) – in so far as they punish
any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs regardless
of religious beliefs
 Section 17(in relation to RH-IRR) - rendering probono services in so far as they

affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation
 Section 3.01(a) and Section 3.01(j) of RH-IRR - added “primarily” in defining

abortifacients and contraceptives as ultra vires in violation of Article 2, Section 12
 On natural law – unless a natural right has been transformed into written law, it
cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law. Natural law is to be used sparingly
only in most peculiar circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law
is applicable.
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Article 2, Section 16 (Right to a Balanced and Healthful Ecology) in

relation to Article 8, Section 5 (2) (a) (Standing); Article 10, Section 2
(Local Autonomy), and Section 59 of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act
Paje v. Casiño, et al., G.R. No. 207257, February 3, 2015
Facts:
 Subic Bay Metropolitan authority (SBMA) entered into a MOU with Taiwan
Cogeneration Corporation (TCC) for the construction of a power plant. Another MOU
was entered into whereby TCC undertook to build and operate a coal-fired power
plant.
 An Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) by the SBMA Ecology Center was
issued in favor of TCIC, a subsidiary of TCC. Later, TCC assigned all its rights to
Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc. (RP Energy). RP Energy contracted GHD to prepare
an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the coal-fired power plant and to assist
RP Energy in applying for an ECC with DENR.
 The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Olongapo City issued a Resolution objecting to the
coal-fired power plant. Meanwhile, DENR issued an ECC. RP Energy amended its
ECC twice to include new components which DENR approved accordingly. The
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zambales and the Liga ng mga Barangay of Olongapo
City issued separate resolutions objecting to a coal-fired thermal plant and a coal-fired
power plant, respectively.
 Various petitioners led by Congressman Teodoro A. Casiño filed before the Supreme
Court a Petition for Writ of Kalikasan. The Writ was issued and the Court of Appeals
(CA) was ordered to hear and receive evidence and render judgment. Meanwhile, a
fourth amendment to the ECC was applied for.
 At the CA, petitioners contended: that the power plant project would cause grave
environmental damage and adversely affect the health of the residents of three
Zambales municipalities and Olongapo City; that the ECC was issued without
approval of the concerned Sanggunians under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local
Government Code; that the lease development agreement (LDA) was entered into
without prior certification of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
under Section 59 of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA); and that the DENR
had no authority to decide on requests for amendments of previously issued ECCs in
the absence of a new EIS.
 Meanwhile, a Certificate of Non-Overlap (CNO) was issued. DENR also granted the
third amendment to the ECC.
 The CA denied the privilege of the writ for failure of petitioners to prove that their
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology was violated or threatened.
However, the CA invalidated the ECC.
Issues:
 DENR – (a) a new EIS is not necessary since the first EIS was within the validity
period; and (b) no permits, etc... from other agencies are required in processing ECC.
 SBMA – (a) since there was not writ issued, CA should not have invalidated the LDA;
and, (b) SBMA has exclusive jurisdiction over projects with the freeport zone and no
prior consultations with the sanggunians and (CNO) are necessary, besides the
subsequent issuance of a CNO cured any legal defect.
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 RP Energy – CA has no power to grant reliefs prayed for in the absence of a Writ of
Kalikasan and that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Ruling:
 The petitioners failed to substantiate its claims.
 The CA erred in invalidating the ECC.
 The CA erred in invalidating the 1st and 2nd amendments to the ECC.
 The CA erred in invalidating the ECC for failure to comply with Section 59 of IPRA.
 The CA erred in ruling that compliance with Sections 26 and 27 are necessary prior to
issuance of an ECC; but validity of the third amendment to the ECC cannot be
resolved as it was not raised during the preliminary conference.
Reasoning:
 Requisites under Section 1 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases: (1) there is an actual or threatened violation of a constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or
entity; and (3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property
of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. The gravity of environmental
damage is to be decided on a case-to-case basis.
 The DENR reasonably exercised its discretion in requiring an Environmental
Performance Report and Management Plan (EPRMP) and a Project Description
Report (PDR) for the first and second amendments.
 The ECC is not a license or permit contemplated under Section 59 of IPRA which
required a CNO; but in the case of the LDA, it is necessary to secure a CNO because
it is necessary to rule out the possibility that the proposed lease site encroaches on an
ancestral domain in light of the history of Subic area as traditionally accessed by the
Aetas. However, the LDA cannot be invalidated for reasons of equity as it is the first
time this rule of action has been laid down in relation to Section 59 of IPRA.
 Prior approval by the sanggunians of the ECC is not necessary and does not violate
the principle of local autonomy because R.A. No. 7227 (Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992) grants broad powers of administration of SBMA over the
economic zone. The LGC and R.A. No. 7227 should be harmonized. Section 12 (a) (i)
of R.A. No. 7227 states that “Except as herein provided the local government units
comprising the Subic Special Economic Zone shall retain their basic autonomy and
identity.xxx”
West Tower Condominium Corporation v. FPIC, et al., G.R. No. 194239, June 16, 2015
Facts:
 FPIC operates two pipelines stretching from Batangas to Metro Manila. A leakage
was detected from one of the pipelines into the West Tower condominium basement
compelling residents to abandon their units. FPIC initially disowned the leak thus the
residents shouldered the expenses of hauling the waste water requiring the setting up
of a treatment plant to separate the fuel from the waste water. FPIC later admitted that
the source of the leak is one of the pipelines but placed the blame on the construction
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activities on the roads. West Tower Corporation filed a petition for issuance of a Writ
of Kalikasan. It was joined by civil society and public interest groups.
 The petition prayed, among others, (a) to check the structural integrity of the
pipelines; and (b) to open a trust fund to answer for contingencies in the future. The
Court issued a temporary protection order.
Issues:
 May the precautionary principle be invoked on the matter of the pipeline’s structural
integrity?
 May a trust fund be created in a petition for a Writ of Kalikasan?
Ruling:
 The precautionary principle does not apply.
 A trust fund is the proper subject of a separate proceeding.
Reasoning:
 Detecting the issue of a leak in the pipeline is different from determining whether the
spillage of hazardous materials into the surroundings will cause environmental
damage.
 A trust fund is limited solely for the purpose of rehabilitating or restoring the
environment. Section 15(e) of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
prohibits grant of damages.
LNL v. Agham Party List, G. R. No. 209165, April 12, 2016
Facts:
 LNL operates a mining claim in Zambales. It embarked on a project to build a
private, non-commercial port for shipping out ores from the mines. The ECC and
other national permits were secured. The communities and the Sangguniang Bayan of
Sta. Cruz consented to the project. LNL encountered problems with the Mayor
himself who refused to issue business and mayor’s permits arguing that there was
leveling of the mountain on the port site.
Issue:
 Did LNL violate environmental laws, rules or regulation?
Ruling
 The petition is denied. There was no violation of any environmental laws, rules or
regulations and neither was there a leveling of any mountain
Reasoning:
 LNL was given a tree cutting permit. The mining law was not applicable to the port
site project.
 There were neither expert evidence nor scientific studies to corroborate the allegation
of levelling a mountain. The elevated landform is neither a mountain or hill, but an
elongated landmass or mound.
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International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications v. Green Peace

Southeast Asia, et al., G.R. No. 209271, December 8, 2015 and July 26, 2016 (MR reversing
previous judgment)
Facts:
 A petition for Writ of Kalikasan and Continuing Mandamus was filed by respondents
alleging that the field trials of the pest-resistant crop described as “bioengineered
eggplant” (Bt talong) violate the right to health and a balanced ecology.
 Respondent argued that an ECC is required and that Bt talong is presumed harmful to
human health and the environment.
 The Court issued the Writs of Kalikasan and Continuing Mandamus.
Issue:
 Whether the precautionary principle applies.
Ruling:
 In its December 8, 2015 judgment (1st Decision), the Court held that the precautionary
principle applies in this case and there exists a possibility of serious and irreversible
harm. It also held that field testing should have been subjected to Environmental
Impact Assessment, considering that it involved new technologies with uncertain
results.
 In its July 26, 2016 judgment (MR), the Court granted the motions for reconsideration
on the ground that the field trials have been completed and, therefore, the case has
become moot.
Reasoning:
 In resolving the motions for reconsideration, the Court reasoned out that there is no
perceivable benefit to the public which may be gained from resolving respondents’
petition for Writ of Kalikasan. The exception to the mootness does not apply in this
case.
 The completion of the field tests does not mean that petitioners may inevitably
proceed to commercially propagate. But this is subject to permits and additional
requirements.
 Resolving the petition for Writ of Kalikasan would unnecessarily arrest the results of
further research and testing on Bt talong, and even GMOs in general, and hence, tend
to hinder scientific advancement on the subject matter.
 Besides, there is a new regulatory framework (JDC 01-2016) applied to GMO field
testing which corrects the inadequacies of DAO 08-2002. JDC 01-2016 provides for a
more comprehensive avenue for public participation and additional expertise in the
pool of scientists that evaluates the risk assessment for field trial.
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Article 2, Section 16 (Right to a Balanced and Healthful Ecology)in relation

to Article 7, Section 21 (Treaties), Article 16, Section 3 (State Immunity)
and Article 18, Section 25 (VFA)
Pedro Arigo v. Scott Swift, G.R. 206510, September 16, 2014
Facts:
 The USS Guardian requested diplomatic clearance to enter and exit territorial waters
of the Philippines. It ran aground at the Tubbataha Reefs about 80 miles east of
Palawan. The Tubbataha Reefs have been declared as a Natural Park. The U.S.
Ambassador expressed his regrets over the incident and assured the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs that appropriate compensation will be made. Salvaging was
undertaken by the U.S. Naval team.
 Petitioners sought a directive from the Supreme Court through the issuance of a Writ
of Kalikasan and the institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts in
violation of environmental laws and regulations.
 Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of
the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such
magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo,
Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-
Tawi, which events violate their constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology.
Issues:
 May the writ issue?
 May the respondents, representing U.S. Naval forces, be sued?
Ruling:
 The writ may not be issued.
 Respondents are immune from suit.
Reasoning:
 In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the “public right” of
citizens to “a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.” We declared
that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the
Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the
Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with
it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
 If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign
agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official
capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from
suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect,
suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual
but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim - par in parem, non habet
imperium - that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one
another. The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official
would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such
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as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him,
the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been
formally impleaded.
 In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding
officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and
its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of
the USS Guardian on the Tubataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) was committed while
they were performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a
judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of
funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The
principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court
over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
 Under Article 31, [t]he flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or
damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other
government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations
of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the
provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law.
 In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch on the matter of
compensation and rehabilitation measures through diplomatic channels. Resolution of
these issues impinges on our relations with another State in the context of common
security interests under the VFA. It is settled that “[t]he conduct of the foreign
relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and
legislative—“the political”--departments of the government, and the propriety of what
may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or
decision.”
 The VFA governs disputes involving US military ships and crew navigating
Philippine waters in pursuance of the objectives of the agreement. As it is, the waiver
of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to
special civil actions, such as, the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan.
In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case
against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed
separately: SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions.—The filing of a petition for the
issuance of the writ of kalikasan shall not preclude the filing of separate civil,
criminal or administrative actions.
Article 2, Sections 25 (Local Autonomy) and 26 (Political Dynasty), Article

6, Sections 1 (Undue Delegation), 25(4) (Special Purpose Fund), 25(6)
Discretionary Fund for Public Purpose), 27(2) (Item Veto), 29(1) (Payment
Pursuant to an Appropriation), Article 10, Sections 2 and 3 (Local
Autonomy) and Article II, Section 1 (Public Office and Public Trust)
Belgica v. Hon. Ochoa, et al., G.R. No. 208566..., November 19, 2013
Facts:
 “Pork Barrel” or Priority Development Assistance Fund.
 Definition: “an appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects
and secured safely or primarily to bring money to a representative’s district.”
13
 Philippines: “lump-sum discretionary funds of Members of the Legislative and the

Executive Branches.”
Issues:
 Constitutionality of the PDAF and the “Presidential Pork” (Malampaya Fund and
President Social Fund).
Ruling:
 Relationship of Executive and the Legislature in re: PDAF
Executive Legislative
 Proposes a budget  Passes the GAA
 Enforces the budget  Exercises the oversight function
 Implements the budget over the implementation of law
only through scrutiny or
investigation
 Violation under PDAF by Legislative Representatives –

 Identification of area of project
 Fund release
 Realignment
H: No post-enactment measure or authority may be exercised by legislators.
 Violation under “Presidential Pork”
(1) Section 8 of P.D. No. 910 (Malampaya Fund) provides:
“… and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President”
(2) Section 12 of P.D. No. 1869 (President Social Fund), as amended by P.D. No.
1993 provides:
“… to finance the priority infrastructure development projects …., as may be

directed and authorized by the Office of the President.”
H: Fails the test of non-delegability of legislative power. However, the phrase “to
finance the restoration of damaged facilities due to calamities” in Section 12 of P.D.
1869 remained valid.
14
Article 2, Section 28 (Full Public Disclosure)
En Banc Resolution, February 14, 2012, In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents
and the Attendance of Court Officials and Employees as Witnesses Under the Subpoena of
February 10, 2012 and the Various Letters for the Impeachment Prosecution Panel dated
January 19 and 25, 2012
Facts:
 Letters of Impeachment Prosecution Panel requesting for: (a) examination of rollo of
FASAP v. PAL Case, G.R. No. 178083 ; (b) certified true copies of the Agenda and
Minutes of the Deliberations of the Court in FASAP Case ; (c) examination of rollo of
Navarro v. Ermita, G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011 ; (d) examination of rollo of
Gutierrez v. HR Committee on Justice, G.R. No. 193459; and, (e) examination of rollo
of League of Cities v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499 and 178056.
 Clerk of Court of Supreme Court directed by Impeachment Court to produce
documents subject of the letters-request, such as, recordbooks of Raffle Committee,
letter of Atty. Estelito Mendoza in connection with FASAP Case; PGMA TRO
Petition, Mike Arroyo TRO Petition, CJ Corona’s travel order in November 2011, etc.
Issue:
 May the requested documents be furnished the Impeachment Prosecution Panel?
Ruling:
 Members of the Court, and Court officials and employees may not be compelled to
testify on matters that are part of internal deliberations and actions of the court while
testimony on matters external to adjudicatory functions may be subject of compulsory
processes (e.g. bribery charge).
 Rollo - No.
 Decisions, Orders, Resolutions – Yes.
Article 2, Section 28 (Full Public Disclosure) and Article 3, Section 1

(Privacy)
Philippine Savings Bank and Pascual M. Garcia III v. Senate Impeachment Court, G.R. No.
200238, February 9, 2012
Facts:
 Certiorari and Prohibition with TRO enjoining public respondents from implementing
the Subpoena Ad Testificandum et Duces Tecum against PSB Branch Manager in
regard to certain foreign currency deposits of Chief Justice Corona was filed.
Issue:
 May Prohibition lie?
Ruling:
 Yes.
15
Reasoning:
 A clear right to maintain the confidentiality of the foreign currency deposits is
provided under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 (Foreign Currency Deposit Act).
 FCDA establishes absolute confidentiality. The deposit may only be examined upon
written permission of the depositor.
 While impeachment may be an exception to the secrecy of bank deposits under R.A.
No. 1405 (law prohibiting disclosure of an inquiry into deposits with any banking
institution), it is not so in FCDA.
 Section 8 of FCDA states that “in no instance shall foreign currency be examined or
inquired into or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office
whether judicial or administrative or legislative, xxx”
 R.A. No. 1405 also includes deposit subject of bribery or litigation.
(NOTE: Some cases on R.A. No. 6426 have been the subject of discussions in the concurring
and dissenting opinions, namely: (a) Salvacion v. Central Bank (343 Phil 539 [1997]),
wherein the Court held that “The rule that exempts dollar deposits (of a transient) from
attachment, garnishment, or, any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body, cannot serve as an instrument of justice and
deprive a Philippine national who is the victim of a heinous crime of the damages awarded to
her by the court.”; (b) China Banking Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 140687, December
18,2006, wherein a waiver by the rightful owner was made. ; (c) Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. Nos.157294-95, November 20, 2006, which did not involve foreign currency deposits;
and (d) Republic v. Eugenio, G.R. No. 174629, February 14, 2008, where it was established
that the confidentiality of bank deposits remains a basic state policy and that bank accounts
are not covered by Article III, Section 7 or Article II, Section 28. )
Article 3, Section 1 (Right to Life, Liberty and Security; Writ of Amparo;

Writ of Habeas Data)
Burgos v. PGMA, et al., G.R. Nos. 183711-13, July 5, 2011
Facts:
 Abduction of Jonas Burgos on April 28, 2007 at Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth
Ave., Quezon City by alleged AFP personnel.
 CHR found one Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr. of the 56 th Infantry Battalion, 7th Infantry
Division, PA as one of the abductors.
 Consolidated Habeas Corpus, Writ of Amparo and Contempt actions were filed.
Issue:
 May the President be impleaded (then as incumbent)?
Ruling:
 PGMA dropped as party-respondent.
Rodriguez v. PGMA, et al., G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011
16
Facts:
 Abduction and torture of Rodriguez by the military but was later released through
CHR.
 Petition for Writ of Amparo which included PGMA was filed.
Issue:
 Legal characterization of command responsibility under Philippine law.
Ruling:
 Command responsibility in amparo cases applies.
Reasoning:
 The principle of command responsibility as customary international law applies
through the doctrine of incorporation.
 Its application is only for the purpose of determining who is accountable for the
disappearance to enable the court to devise remedial measures to protect petitioner’s
rights.
 Elements of command responsibility: (a) superior-subordinate relationship; (b)
knowledge of the superior or reason for the superior to know that a crime was about to
be committed or had been committed; and, (c) failure of the superior to take the
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the
perpetrators.
Boac v. Cadapan, G.R. No. 186050, December 13, 2011
Facts:
 Disappearance of Cadapan
 Writ of Amparo filed.
Issue:
 Relation of command responsibility to writ of amparo.
Ruling:
 Command responsibility cannot be applied as prelude to criminal prosecution or
disciplinary administrative proceedings.
Mison v. Hon. Gallegos, G.R. No. 210759, June 23, 2015
Facts:
 Interpol of Seoul requested Bureau of Immigration Chairperson Mison to locate and
deport Ja Hoon Ku. A Summary Deportation Order was issued after charging Ku for
being a risk to public interest under Section 69 of Act No. 2711. Ku was arrested and
confined at the BI detention center. Ku filed a petition for the issuance of writ of
amparo. Respondent judge granted the petition.
Issue:
17
 Was the issuance of writ of amparo valid?
Ruling:
 The writ may not be issued.
Reasoning:
 The case cannot be categorized as one of extralegal killing or enforced disappearance.
Ku was validly arrested and there was no refusal to give information on his
whereabouts. He was afforded visitorial rights and had access to counsel.
Hon. Zarate, et al. v. H.E. Aquino III, G.R. 220028. November 10, 2015
Facts:
 Members of the Manobo Tribe sought refuge at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines (UCCP) compound in Davao City due to persisting militarization of their
communities and alleged forcible recruitment to the paramilitary group. Certain
Manobos claimed, on the other hand, that they were deceived into going to Davao
City and were deprived of their freedom of locomotion and were held against their
will. Their repeated pleas fell on deaf ear until a fellow tribe member was found
dead. Complaints for kidnapping and anti-trafficking were filed. To determine who
would be charged, the complainants were shown “lists” identifying the petitioners in
this case. Petitioners contend that they have been under surveillance and were being
linked to the communist rebels. They sought the issuance of the writs of amparo and
habeas data.
Issue:
 May the writs issue?
Ruling:
 No.
Reasoning:
 Mere membership of petitioners in organizations, such as, Bayan Muna Party-List and
the Gabriela Women’s Party and their implication in certain cases do not suffice as an
“actual threat” that entitles one to a writ of amparo.
 Their right to privacy has not been violated given that the information contained in the
“lists” are only their names, positions in their respective organizations and
photographs. All these data are of public knowledge since petitioners are known
personalities.
Article 3, Section 1 (Substantive Due Process)
18
Valentino L. Legaspi v. City of Cebu, et al./Bienvenido P. Jaban, Sr., et al. v. Court Of

Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 159110/G.R. No. 159692, December 10, 2013
Facts:
 The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cebu City enacted Ordinance No. 1664 authorizing
traffic enforcers to immobilize any motor vehicle violating the parking restrictions
defined in Ordinance no. 801 (Traffic Code of Cebu City).
 The vehicle will only be released upon payment of the penalties.
Issue:
 Whether or not the ordinance authorizing the clamping of vehicles is constitutional?
Ruling:
 It is constitutional.
Reasoning:
 The tests to determine if an ordinance is valid and constitutional are divided into the
formal (i.e., whether the ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the
LGU, and whether it was passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law),
and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance
with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the
requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy).
 As to substantive due process, Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of
validity and constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations under the
Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason,
and its consistency with public policy. Considering that traffic congestions were
already retarding the growth and progress in the population and economic centers of
the country, the plain objective of Ordinance No. 1664 was to serve the public interest
and advance the general welfare in the City of Cebu. Its adoption was, therefore, in
order to fulfill the compelling government purpose.
 With regard to procedural process, the clamping of the petitioners’ vehicles was
within the exceptions dispensing with notice and hearing. As already said, the
immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by clamping the tires was necessary
because the transgressors were not around at the time of apprehension. Under such
circumstance, notice and hearing would be superfluous.
Article 3, Section 1 (Substantive Due Process; Equal Protection; Police

Power) in relation to Article 6, Section 26 (Riders in Bills)
Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, G.R. No.
197676, February 4, 2014
Facts:
 R.A. 9646 entitled, “Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines,” was signed into law
which aimed to professionalize real estate services by requiring persons and/or
entities to be duly licensed and certified before entering into the practice of real estate
service. The law exempted any person, natural or juridical, who shall directly perform
19
by himself/herself the acts mentioned in the law with reference to his/her or its own
property, except real estate developers. The latter argued that they are also property
owners and should also be exempt from the requirements.
Issue:
 Is the law violative of equal protection clause?
Ruling:
 No, the law is valid.
Reasoning:
 There is no deprivation of property as no restriction on their use and enjoyment of
property is caused by the implementation of Republic Act No. 9646. If petitioners as
property owners feel burdened by the new requirement of engaging the services of
only licensed real estate professionals in the sale and marketing of their properties,
such is an unavoidable consequence of a reasonable regulatory measure. No right is
absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has
always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power of
the State. The legislature recognized the importance of professionalizing the ranks of
real estate practitioners by increasing their competence and raising ethical standards
as real property transactions are susceptible to manipulation and corruption.
Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015
Facts:
 MCTC Judge Villanueva assailed the policy of the JBC requiring five years of service
as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level
courts as violative of the equal protection clause, due process and equal opportunity of
employment.
Issue:
 Is the policy unconstitutional?
Ruling:
 No.
Reasoning:
 The function of the JBC to select nominees is discretionary. Petitioner has no legal
right to be included in the list.
 Placing a premium on many years of judicial experience, the JBC is merely applying
one of the stringent constitutional standards of proven competence. A five year stint
can also provide evidence of integrity, probity and independence of judges seeking
promotion. This classification satisfies the “rational basis test.”
 There is no violation of due process. The JBC policy is not an administrative rule or
regulation exempted from the publication requirement. Therefore, it should comply
with the publication requirement of the assailed policy and other special guidelines.
However, JBC’s failure to publish the assailed policy has not prejudiced petitioner’s
private interest.
20
Ferrer, Jr. v. Mayor Bautista, et al., G. R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015
Facts:
 Two ordinances were imposed by the Quezon City government as follows: (a)
Socialized Housing Tax – a special assessment equivalent to 0.5% on the assessed
value of land in excess of P100,000 which shall accrue to the Socialized Housing
Programs of the City Government; and, (b) Garbage Fee – rates of the imposable fee
depend on land or floor area and whether the payee is an occupant of a lot,
condominium, socialized housing project or apartment.
Issue:
 Whether the SHT and the garbage fees violate the equal protection clause.
Ruling:
 The SHT is constitutional.
 The garbage fee is unconstitutional.
Reasoning:
 The SHT is a tax but with a regulatory purpose in pursuit of the Urban Development
and Housing Act (UDHA) and intended to rehabilitate and develop blighted and slum
areas. It does not favor informal settlers over real property owners. The disparity
between them as two distinct classes is too obvious.
 The garbage fee violated the equal protection clause as it failed to take into account
that there is no substantial distinction between an occupant of a lot and an occupant of
a unit in a condominium, socialized housing projects or apartment. Most likely, the
garbage output produced by these types of occupant is uniform and does not vary to a
large degree. The rates being charged are unjust: a resident of 200 sq. m. unit in a
condominium or socialized housing project has to pay twice the amount than a
resident of a lot similar in size; unlike unit occupants, all occupants of a lot with an
area of 200 sq. m. and less have to pay a fixed rate of P100; and the same amount of
garbage fee is imposed regardless of whether the resident is from a condominium or
from a socialized housing project.
1-UTAK v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015
Facts:
 COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 prohibited forms of election propaganda, such as,
displaying in public utility vehicles and within public transport terminals. Petitioner
sought clarification as regards the application of the resolution to “privately-owned
public utility vehicles” and private transport terminals.
Issue:
 Is the resolution violative of right to free speech and the equal protection clause?
Ruling:
 Yes, it is violative of Sections 1 and 4 of Article 3 of the Constitution.
21
Reasoning:
 In Adiong v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992) the Court struck down
the COMELEC’s prohibition against the posting of decals and stickers on “mobile
places”, such as, private vehicles.
 COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to operate but not the
ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals under Section 4, Article IX-C of the
Constitution.
 The owner of a thing has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other
limitations than those established by law, such as, franchises. However, a franchise is
a limitation only on certain aspects of the ownership of a vehicle, but not on the
totality of the rights of the owner over the vehicle.
 On the other hand, prohibitions on the posting of commercial advertisements on
windows of buses, because it hinders police authorities from seeing whether the
passengers inside are safe, is a regulation on the franchise.
Article 3, Section 1 (Right to Property; Procedural Due Process; Equal

Protection in relation to Article 3, Section 2 (Search and Seizure), Article 3,
Section 3 (Privacy); Article 3, Section 4 (Expression), Article 3, Section 21
(Double Jeopardy) and Article 3, Section 22 (Bill of Attainder), and Article
6, Section 1 (Undue Delegation)
Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335..., February 18, 2014
Facts:
 Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (R.A. No. 10175)
Issue and Ruling:
Provision SC Decision on Constitutional issues
a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access  “strict scrutiny” – no “speech” issue

involved
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The
following acts constitute the offense of
cybercrime punishable under this Act:
(a) Offenses against the confidentiality,

integrity and availability of computer data
and systems:
(1) Illegal Access. – The access to the whole

or any part of a computer system without
22
right.
b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference  “overbreadth” – none; failed to prove


and systems:
xxxx
(3) Data Interference. – The intentional or

reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or
deterioration of computer data, electronic
document, or electronic data message,
without right, including the introduction or
transmission of viruses.
c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting  “domain name” – no violation of

Equal Protection Clause; it is the evil
purpose punishable

and systems:
xxxx
(6) Cyber-squatting. – The acquisition of

domain name over the internet in bad faith to
profit, mislead, destroy the reputation, and
deprive others from registering the same, if
such a domain name is:
(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar

to an existing trademark registered with the
appropriate government agency at the time of
23
the domain name registration;
(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the

name of a person other than the registrant, in
case of a personal name; and
(iii) Acquired without right or with

intellectual property interests in it.
d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft  “right to privacy” – no violation; if

user made information public, then,
no theft unless used for illegitimate
purpose
xxxx
b) Computer-related Offenses:
xxxx
(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. – The

intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer,
possession, alteration, or deletion of
identifying information belonging to another,
whether natural or juridical, without right:
Provided: that if no damage has yet been
caused, the penalty imposable shall be one
(1) degree lower.
e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex  “freedom of expression” – consenting

adults not covered; “business”
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses.– The following
acts constitute the offense of cybercrime
punishable under this Act:
xxxx
(c) Content-related Offenses:
(1) Cybersex.– The willful engagement,

maintenance, control, or operation, directly
24
or indirectly, of any lascivious exhibition of

sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid
of a computer system, for favor or
consideration.
f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography  In re: to R.A. No. 9775; no violation
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following

acts constitute the offense of cybercrime
punishable under this Act:
xxxx
xxxx
(2)Child Pornography. — The unlawful or

prohibited acts defined and punishable by
Republic Act No. 9775 or the Anti-Child
Pornography Act of 2009, committed
through a computer system: Provided,
That the penalty to be imposed shall be
(1) one degree higher than that provided
for in Republic Act No. 9775.
g. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited  “Spam” is an allowable medium; akin
Commercial Communications to unsolicited ads by mail
 Commercial speech; option to delete

Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The anyway
NOTE: Dispositive portion of SC

xxxx
decision declared this
unconstitutional.
xxxx
(3) Unsolicited Commercial

Communications. – The transmission of
commercial electronic communication with
the use of computer system which seeks to
advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and
25
services are prohibited unless:
(i) There is prior affirmative consent from

the recipient; or
(ii) The primary intent of the communication

is for service and/or administrative
announcements from the sender to its
existing users, subscribers or customers; or
(iii) The following conditions are present:
(aa) The commercial electronic

communication contains a simple, valid, and
reliable way for the recipient to reject receipt
of further commercial electronic messages
(opt-out) from the same source;
(bb) The commercial electronic

communication does not purposely disguise
the source of the electronic message; and
(cc) The commercial electronic

communication does not purposely include
misleading information in any part of the
message in order to induce the recipients to
read the message.
h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel  “cyberlibel” – valid because it merely

incorporates RPC libel when
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. — The
committed thru computer system;
“similar means” applied
xxxx

xxxx
(4) Libel. — The unlawful or prohibited acts
of libel as defined in Article 355 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed
through a computer system or any other
similar means which may be devised in the
26
future.
i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and  “overbreadth” – e.g. liking;

Attempt in the Commission of commenting; sharing
Cybercrimes
 H: unconstitutional as in the US
Reno case; but should be applied to
Sec. 5. Other Offenses. — The following
other than libel; like Sec 4(a)(1) –
acts shall also constitute an offense:
4(a)(6) and computer forgery,
fraud, identity theft or cybersex..
(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission
of Cybercrime. – Any person who willfully
abets or aids in the commission of any of
the offenses enumerated in this Act shall
be held liable.
(b) Attempt in the Commission of

Cybercrime. — Any person who willfully
attempts to commit any of the offenses
enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.
j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree  simply makes a qualifying

Higher circumstance; valid
Sec. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by

the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
special laws, if committed by, through and
with the use of information and
communications technologies shall be
covered by the relevant provisions of this
Act: Provided, That the penalty to be
imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than
that provided for by the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, and special laws, as the case
may be.
k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under  except for online libel and online
both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) child pornography, no double
and R.A. No. 10175 jeopardy
27
Sec. 7. Liability under Other Laws. — A

prosecution under this Act shall be
without prejudice to any liability for
violation of any provision of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, or special laws.
l. Section 8 on Penalties  valid fixing of penalties; proportionate

to severity of deleterious cybercrimes
Sec. 8. Penalties. — Any person found guilty
of any of the punishable acts enumerated in
Sections 4(a) and 4(b) of this Act shall be
punished with imprisonment of prision
mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred
thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00) up to a
maximum amount commensurate to the
damage incurred or both.
Any person found guilty of the punishable

act under Section 4(a)(5) shall be punished
with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine
of not more than Five hundred thousand
pesos (PhP500,000.00) or both.
If punishable acts in Section 4(a) are

committed against critical infrastructure, the
penalty of reclusion temporal or a fine of at
least Five hundred thousand pesos
(PhP500,000.00) up to maximum amount
commensurate to the damage incurred or
both, shall be imposed.
Any person found guilty of any of the

punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)
(1) of this Act shall be punished with
imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at
least Two hundred thousand pesos
(PhP200,000.00) but not exceeding One
million pesos (PhP1,000,000.00) or both.

(2) of this Act shall be punished with the
28
penalties as enumerated in Republic Act No.

9775 or the “Anti-Child Pornography Act of
2009:” Provided, That the penalty to be
imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than
that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775,
if committed through a computer system.

(3) shall be punished with imprisonment of
arresto mayor or a fine of at least Fifty
thousand pesos (PhP50,000.00) but not
exceeding Two hundred fifty thousand pesos
(PhP250,000.00) or both.
m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of  information does not cover content

Traffic Data and identities; but is invalid because
it is too sweeping and akin to a
Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic
general warrant
Data. — Law enforcement authorities, with
due cause, shall be authorized to collect or
record by technical or electronic means
traffic data in real-time associated with
specified communications transmitted by
means of a computer system.
Traffic data refer only to the

communication’s origin, destination, route,
time, date, size, duration, or type of
underlying service, but not content, nor
identities.
All other data to be collected or seized or

disclosed will require a court warrant.
Service providers are required to cooperate

and assist law enforcement authorities in the
collection or recording of the above-stated
information.
The court warrant required under this section

shall only be issued or granted upon written
application and the examination under oath
29
or affirmation of the applicant and the

witnesses he may produce and the showing:
(1) that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that any of the crimes enumerated
hereinabove has been committed, or is being
committed, or is about to be committed; (2)
that there are reasonable grounds to believe
that evidence that will be obtained is
essential to the conviction of any person for,
or to the solution of, or to the prevention of,
any such crimes; and (3) that there are no
other means readily available for obtaining
such evidence.
n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer  valid; only preserved upon orders of

Data; law enforcement officers and not
accessible
Sec. 13. Preservation of Computer Data. —
The integrity of traffic data and subscriber
information relating to communication
services provided by a service provider shall
be preserved for a minimum period of six (6)
months from the date of the transaction.
Content data shall be similarly preserved for
six (6) months from the date of receipt of the
order from law enforcement authorities
requiring its preservation.
Law enforcement authorities may order a

one-time extension for another six (6)
months: Provided, That once computer data
preserved, transmitted or stored by a service
provider is used as evidence in a case, the
mere furnishing to such service provider of
the transmittal document to the Office of the
Prosecutor shall be deemed a notification to
preserve the computer data until the
termination of the case.
The service provider ordered to preserve

computer data shall keep confidential the
order and its compliance.
o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer  akin to subpoena; valid when done
30
Data with judicial intervention; executive

has power.
Sec. 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. —
Law enforcement authorities, upon securing
a court warrant, shall issue an order requiring
any person or service provider to disclose or
submit subscriber’s information, traffic data
or relevant data in his/its possession or
control within seventy-two (72) hours from
receipt of the order in relation to a valid
complaint officially docketed and assigned
for investigation and the disclosure is
necessary and relevant for the purpose of
investigation.
p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and  valid; merely outlines duties of law

Examination of Computer Data enforcement officers
Sec. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of

Computer Data. — Where a search and
seizure warrant is properly issued, the law
enforcement authorities shall likewise have
the following powers and duties.
Within the time period specified in the

warrant, to conduct interception, as defined
in this Act, and:
(a) To secure a computer system or a

computer data storage medium;
(b) To make and retain a copy of those

computer data secured;
(c) To maintain the integrity of the relevant

stored computer data;
(d) To conduct forensic analysis or

examination of the computer data storage
medium; and,
(e) To render inaccessible or remove those

computer data in the accessed computer or
computer and communications network.
31
Pursuant thereof, the law enforcement

authorities may order any person who has
knowledge about the functioning of the
computer system and the measures to protect
and preserve the computer data therein to
provide, as is reasonable, the necessary
information, to enable the undertaking of the
search, seizure and examination.
Law enforcement authorities may request for

an extension of time to complete the
examination of the computer data storage
medium and to make a return thereon but in
no case for a period longer than thirty (30)
days from date of approval by the court.
q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer  no violation of property right; user

Data could preserve information by himself
Sec. 17. Destruction of Computer Data. —

Upon expiration of the periods as provided in
Sections 13 and 15, service providers and
law enforcement authorities, as the case may
be, shall immediately and completely destroy
the computer data subject of a preservation
and examination.
r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking  Sol-Gen concedes invalidity; violates

Access to Computer Data freedom of expression and search and
seizure rules; no judicial warrant
Section 19 empowers the Department of
Justice to restrict or block access to computer
data:
Sec. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to

Computer Data.— When a computer data is
prima facie found to be in violation of the
provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an
32
order to restrict or block access to such

computer data.
s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice  valid; not bill of attainder; merely

incorporates the elements of P.D. No.
1829; judicial determination of guilt
Sec. 20. Noncompliance. — Failure to
still necessary
comply with the provisions of Chapter IV
hereof specifically the orders from law
enforcement authorities shall be punished as
a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829
with imprisonment of prision correctional in
its maximum period or a fine of One hundred
thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) or both, for
each and every noncompliance with an order
issued by law enforcement authorities.
t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation  valid; passed tests of completeness

and Coordinating Center (CICC); and and sufficiency; no undue delegation
Sec. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and

Coordinating Center.– There is hereby
created, within thirty (30) days from the
effectivity of this Act, an inter-agency body
to be known as the Cybercrime Investigation
and Coordinating Center (CICC), under the
administrative supervision of the Office of
the President, for policy coordination among
concerned agencies and for the formulation
and enforcement of the national
cybersecurity plan.
u. Section 26(a) on CICC’s Powers and  same, valid cybersecurity plan.

Functions.
Sec. 26. Powers and Functions.– The CICC

shall have the following powers and
functions:
(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity

plan and extend immediate assistance of real
time commission of cybercrime offenses
through a computer emergency response
team (CERT); x x x.
33
Article 3, Section 1 (Procedural Due Process; Trial by Publicity) in relation

to Article 3, Section 4 (Freedom of the Press) and Article 3, Section 14
(Rights of the Accused; Public Trial)
RE: Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the Multiple Murder Cases Against
Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan, et al.,A.M. Nos. 10-11-5-SC and 10-11-6-SC, June
14, 2011
Facts:
 Death of 57 people (including 32 journalists and media practitioners) in
Maguindanao.
 57 counts of murder and rebellion against 197 accused (People v. Datu Andal
Ampatuan, Jr., et al.).
 Journalists and broadcast media sought live television and radio coverages.
Issues:
 Revisit 1991 ruling in Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President
Corazon C. Aquino’s Libel Case and 2001 ruling in Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage
of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the Former President
Joseph E. Estrada.
 Standards/guidelines/tests which may be applied.
Ruling:
 Partially granted pro hac vice the request, subject to guidelines.
Reasoning:
 The 1965 case of Estes v. Texas relied upon in Aquino and Estrada was borne out of a
jury system as distinguished from a judge. Members of the jury are not normally
schooled in the law unlike the judge.
 Later jurisprudence in Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981) and trends in 50
states of the U.S.A. allow varying degrees of openness.
 The “totality of circumstances” test in People v. Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v.
Desierto must apply. There must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a
judge to render a bias-free decision.
 The Ampatuan Coverage Guidelines: (a) audio-visual recording for documentary
purposes and transmittal to live radio and television broadcasting; (b) letter of
application by media entities; (c) installation of a single fixed compact camera
operated by Supreme Court; (d) transmittal of the audio-visual recording with the
least physical disturbance of the proceedings; (e) continuous broadcasting of entirety
of proceedings; (f) no commercial break; (g) no voice-overs in general; (h) no repeat
airing until after finality of judgment; (i) original audio recording deposited in the
National Museum; (j) recording under control of the court; (k) special committee; (l)
apply all other present directives.
34
Article 3, Section 2 (Search and Seizure) in relation to Article 3, Section 3

(Right to Privacy) Article 2, Section 28 (Full Public Disclosure)
Pollo v. Chairperson Constantino-David (Civil Service Commission), G. R. No. 181881,

October 18, 2011
Facts:
 Memo issued by CSC Chairperson to back up all the files in the computers found in
CSC’s two divisions headed by Pollo, triggered by an allegation that Pollo is
lawyering for an accused government employee with a pending case in CSC.
 40-42 documents found in computer files containing draft pleadings/letters in
connection with administrative cases in CSC.
Issue:
 Legality of the search conducted in Pollo’s computer in a government agency.
Ruling:
 Valid search. Employee- Pollo had no reasonable expectation of privacy.
Reasoning:
 Cited O’Connor test stating that public employers, unlike criminal law enforcers,
have a direct and overriding interest in ensuring that the work of the agency is
conducted in a proper and efficient manner. A probable cause requirement in this case
would impose intolerable burdens on public employers.
 Special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement make the probable cause
requirement impracticable, for legitimate, work-related misconduct.
 Cited US v. Simons where a warrantless entry into Simon’s office was reasonable
ground for suspecting that the hard drive would yield evidence of misconduct, such
as, downloading pornographic images. (Here, the CIA later secured warrants to search
Simon’s office and copied contents of computer, etc…)
 As applied to the Pollo case, the following tests will be employed:
a. Employee’s relationship to the item seized; (b) Whether the item was in the
immediate control of the employee; and, (c) Whether the employee took actions to
maintain his privacy in the item.
 Thus, where the employee used a password on his computer, did not share his office
with co-workers and kept the same locked, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy.
(US v. Ziegler)
 Pollo failed to allege he had a separate closed office or password. There was also an
express office MEMO policy on use of the computer. The policy stated that the use of
password does not imply privacy.
 Pollo’s case is distinguished from a court employee who used his personal computer
during working hours to prepare pleadings for personal cases. The Court did not
allow evidence obtained from the personal computer.
Article 3, Section 3 (Right to Privacy)
Spouses Bill and Victoria Hing v. Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy, G.R. No.
179736, June 26, 2013
Facts:
35
 Petitioner spouses Hing are registered owners of a parcel of land used for business
beside Aldo Development and Resources, Inc. owned by respondents.
 The respondents set-up and installed on the building of Aldo two video surveillance
cameras facing petitioners’ property.
Issue:
 May the cameras be allowed?
Ruling:
 The cameras should not be allowed.
Reasoning:
 An individual‘s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be
confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to
exclude the public or deny them access.
 The phrase "prying into the privacy of another‘s residence," therefore, covers places,
locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private, including a
business office. In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed
practically everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone.
 The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover places where there is
reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to
privacy would be affected, was obtained.
 Simply put, a person has a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in his property,
whether he uses it as a business office or as a residence and that the installation of
video surveillance cameras directly facing his property or covering a significant
portion thereof, without his consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy.
Article 3, Section 3 (Right to Privacy; Writ of Amparo; Writ of Habeas Data)
Rhonda Ave S. Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014
Facts:
 Two students from St. Theresa’s College Cebu City took pictures of themselves while
changing their swimsuits for a beach party. They were clad only in their
undergarments.
 The pictures were uploaded by one Angela on her facebook profile. A computer
teacher reported the matter.
 The students were all barred from joining the commencement exercises on account of
their actions.
 Petitioner-parents sought issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data arguing that their
children have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Issue:
Ruling:
 The petition is denied.
36
Reasoning:
 The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. It is an independent and summary
remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth
and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information
regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
 Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her Online Social Network
activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case the children of
petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts private, through the
employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. And this
intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s privacy
tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in cyber
world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised
that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any
proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If
such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to
informational privacy.
 That the photos are viewable by “friends only” does not necessarily bolster the
petitioners’ contention. In this regard, the cyber community is agreed that the digital
images under this setting still remain to be outside the confines of the zones of
privacy in view of the following: (1) Facebook “allows the world to be more open and
connected by giving its users the tools to interact and share in any conceivable way”;
(2) A good number of Facebook users “befriend” other users who are total strangers;
(3) The sheer number of “Friends” one user has is usually by the hundreds; and (4) A
user’s Facebook friend can “share” the former’s post, or “tag” others who are not
Facebook friends with the former, despite its being visible only to his or her own
Facebook friends. It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile
detail’s privacy to “Friends” is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by
another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content.
 Without proof that they placed the photographs subject of this case within the ambit
of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an
expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.
Dr. Joy Margate Lee v. P/Supt. Neri A. Ilagan, G.R. No. 203254, October 8, 2014
Facts:
 Petitioner P/Supt. Ilagan and Dr. Lee were common-law partners. He visited Lee at
the latter’s condominium and rested for a while and thereafter, proceeded to his office.
Upon arrival, petitioner noticed that his digital camera was missing.
37
 He confronted Lee regarding a purported sex video she discovered from the camera
involving petitioner and another woman. Ilagan slammed Lee’s head against a wall
and walked away.
 Lee used the video as evidence against petitioner for violation of Anti-VAWC law.
 Petitioner claimed that Lee’s acts of reproducing the video and threatening to upload
it in the internet violated his right to privacy, thus he sought issuance of the Writ of
Habeas Data.
Issue:
Ruling:
 The petition is denied.
Reasoning:
 The Court finds that petitioner Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right
to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed
reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan
purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video — which he fears would
somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public
consumption — he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any
violation of his right to life, liberty or security.
 Indeed, courts cannot speculate or contrive versions of possible transgressions. As the
rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving
the nexus between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security
are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on either account certainly
renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case.
Article 3, Section 4 (Expression)
GMA Network, Inc. v. Commission On Elections, et al., G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014
Facts:
 COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 introduced a radical departure from the previous
COMELEC resolutions relative to the airtime limitations on political advertisements.
The resolution computed the airtime on an aggregate basis involving all the media of
broadcast communications compared to the past where it was done on a per
station basis. This effected a drastic reduction of the allowable minutes within which
candidates and political parties would be able to campaign through the air.
Issue:
 Whether the Resolution is within the power of the COMELEC to do or not.
Ruling:
 It is not within the power of the COMELEC to do so.
38
Reasoning:
 The assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as
it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach
out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the
“aggregate-based” airtime limits – leveling the playing field – does not constitute a
compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the
freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies,
platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a
clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure.
 What the COMELEC came up with does not measure up to that level of requirement
and accountability which elevates administrative rules to the level of respectability
and acceptability. Those governed by administrative regulations are entitled to a
reasonable and rational basis for any changes in those rules by which they are
supposed to live by, especially if there is a radical departure from the previous ones.
 The law, on its face, does not justify a conclusion that the maximum allowable airtime
should be based on the totality (aggregate) of possible broadcast in all television or
radio stations. Senator Cayetano has called our attention to the legislative intent
relative to the airtime allowed – that it should be on a “per station” basis.
Diocese of Bacolod et al. v. Comelec, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015
Facts:
 Petitioners posted two tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San
Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin, approximately six feet by ten feet in
size, was posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view.
 The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” while the second
contained the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH)
Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark.
 The tarpaulins were neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate.
 COMELEC ordered the tarpaulins removed for being oversized.
Issue:
 Would the removal of the tarpaulin violate the constitutional right of the petitioners?
Ruling:
 Yes, this violated the freedom of speech of petitioners.
Reasoning:
 COMELEC had no legal basis to regulate expression made by private citizens. The
tarpaulins were not campaign materials belonging to candidates. Existing election law
provisions on the subject refer to matters done by or on behalf of and in consideration
with candidates and political parties.
 Section 79 of B.P. 881 defines an election campaign as an “act designed to promote
the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office.” It also
provides that “Public expressions or opinions or discussions of probable issues…
shall not be construed as part of any election campaign, or partisan political
activity…”
39
 The tarpaulin in question contains speech as a matter of public concern within the
realm of petitioners’ right to freedom of expression. Every citizen’s expression with
political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
 COMELEC contends that removal of the tarpaulin is a content-neutral regulation. But
petitioners found it as content-based as it applies to political speech. Assuming
arguendo that the size restriction is a mere time, size and manner regulation, it is still
unconstitutional for lack of a clear and reasonable nexus with constitutionally
sanctioned objective. There is no compelling state interest endangered by the posting
of the tarpaulin.
 Finally, the tarpaulin remained the private property of petitioners even if readily seen
by the public. Their right to property is likewise protected by the Constitution.
 The tarpaulin and its message are not religious speech. It did not convey any religious
doctrines of the Catholic Church.
Davao City Water District v. Aranjuez, et al. G.R. No. 194192, June 16, 2015
Facts:
 Private respondents are officers and members of Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Davao
City Water District (NAMADACWAD) who were charged with several administrative
cases due to acts committed during the fun run anniversary celebration of DCWD,
such as, wearing of t-shirts with inscriptions and posting of bond papers outside the
designated places. The inscriptions and postings bore employees’ grievances.
 The private respondents were found administratively liable.
Issue:
 Were the constitutional rights to assemble and petition for redress of grievances
violated?
Ruling:
 Yes, there was a violation of Section 4 of Article 3.
Reasoning:
 The prohibition on concerted mass action done within the regular government office
hours pursuant to Sections 5 and 6 of CSC Resolution No. 021316 is anchored on two
operative phases, namely: (a) “any collective activity”; and, (b) “work stoppage or
service disruption.” Without intent at work stoppage or service disruption, the
concerted activity is not prohibited, even if done within government hours.
 The wearing of t-shirts with inscriptions during the fun run fall within the description
of “any sports attire” that the office memo allowed to be worn.
SWS and Pulse Asia v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 208062, April 7, 2015
Facts:
 COMELEC Resolution No. 9674 pursuant to the Fair Elections Act required SWS and
Pulse Asia as well as “other survey firms of similar circumstance” to submit to
40
COMELEC the names of all commissioners and payors of all surveys published from
February 12, 2013 to April 23, 2013, including those of their “subscribers”.
Issue:
 Whether the resolution violates petitioners’ freedom of speech (political speech) and
the non-impairment clause in relation to Section 26 of Article II, Section 4 of Article
IX-C and Section 26 of Article XIII which guarantee equal access to opportunities for
public service.
Ruling:
 There is no constitutional violation.
Reasoning:
 Petitioners’ free speech rights must be weighed in relation to the Fair Elections Act’s
purpose of ensuring political equality and, therefore, the speech of others who want to
participate unencumbered in our political spaces.
 While election surveys are not per se election propaganda, when published, however,
the tendency to shape voter preference comes into play. In this respect, these surveys
partake of the nature of election propaganda, hence, subject to regulation under
Section 5.2 of the Fair Elections Act.
 The resolution does not suppress expression but merely regulates the manner of
publication by disclosing those who commissioned and/or paid for, including those
subscribed to, published election surveys.
 Existing contracts of petitioners with third parties must be understood to have been
made in reference to possible exercise of the COMELEC’s regulatory powers.
Article 3, Section 5 (Freedom of Religion)
Perfecto v. Esidera, 763 SCRA 323, July 22, 2015
Facts:
 Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-Esidera married Richard Tang Tepace on May 7, 1989
in a civil ceremony. There was no valid license to marry.
 On March 18, 1990, Judge Desales-Esidera married Renato Esidera under a Catholic
wedding rite (Matrimonio de Conciencia) but the priest had no authority under civil
law.
 On October 3, 1990, Judge Desales-Esidera gave birth to a daughter with Renato.
 On January 27, 1992, Judge Desales-Esidera’s marriage to Tepace was declared void.
 On June 3, 1992, Judge Desales-Esidera entered into a second marriage with Renato
but this with all the formalities required by law.
 On July 15, 2010, Eladio Perfecto filed an administrative complaint against Judge
Desales-Esidera for falsification of a public document and dishonesty because she
41
falsified her daughter’s birth certificate to make it appear that she and Renato were
married on March 18, 1990 and that their daughter was a legitimate child.
 Judge Desales argued that everything she did was legal and in accordance with her
religious beliefs. The office of Court Administrator found her guilty of disgraceful,
immoral and dishonest conduct.
Issue:
 May the judge be found guilty of violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility?
Ruling:
 Judge Desales-Esidera’s liability was distinguished by the Court as follows: (a) She
disobeyed the law against bigamy when she and her second husband conducted a
marriage ceremony on March 18, 1990; (b) her omission to correct her child’s birth
certificate is not sufficient to render her administratively liable because the error was
attributed to the husband who signed as informant; and (c) her alleged affair and
failure to compost according to the Catholic faith is not within the Court’s jurisdiction
to decide.
Reasoning:
 For purposes of determining liability of lawyers and judges, “immoral conduct” should
relate to their conduct in Court. Religious morality is not binding whenever the Court
decides the administrative liability of lawyers and judges. The Court, in resolving cases
that touch on issues of morality, is bound to remain neutral and should limit the bases
of its judgment on “secular moral standards”.
 While Judge Desales-Esidera was not found administratively liable for immorality, the
Code of Professional Responsibility directs lawyers to obey the laws and promote
respect for the law. Respondent judge may have disobeyed the law, particularly Article
350 of the Revised Penal Code, which prohibits knowingly contracting marriages
against the provisions of laws. She knew that the solemnizing officer in the 1990
marriage had no civil authority to solemnize, but, unless the judge’s act of participating
in a marriage ceremony according to her religious beliefs violates other peoples’ rights
or poses grave and imminent danger to the society, the court will not rule that she is
administratively liable. The test of benevolent neutrality must be applied.
 However, Judge Desales-Esidera knowingly entered into a civil marriage with her first
husband knowing the effects under existing laws. She had sexual relations with her
second husband while her first marriage was subsisting. This act is obviously not in the
exercise of her religious expression. Her conduct affects the credibility of the courts in
dispensing justice.
Article 3, Section 6 (Liberty of Abode and Freedom to Travel) in relation to

Article 3, Section 1 (Due Process), Article 3, Section 4 (Speech, Expression
and Assembly), Article 3 Section 5 (Religion) and Article 2, Section 12
(Primary Right of Parents to Rear their Children)
42
SPARK, et al. v. Quezon City , G. R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017
Facts:
 Three curfew ordinances for minors (Quezon City, Manila and Navotas) were
challenged as violative of the following constitutional provisions: Article 2, Section
12 (primary right of parents in the rearing of their children); Article 3, Section 1 (due
process); Article 3, Section 4 (free speech, expression and assembly); Article 5,
Section 5 (religion); Article 3, Section 6 (liberty of abode and right to travel); and,
Article 3, Section 8 (association). R.A. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act was
also alleged to have been violated.
The Quezon City ordinance provided Disciplinary Hours for minors from 10:00 pm to
5:00 am but Section 4 provided for exemptions: (a) those accompanied by parents or
guardians; (b) those on their way to and from a party, graduation ceremony, religious
mass, and/or other extra-curricular activities of their school or organization wherein
their attendance are required or otherwise indispensable, or when such minors are out
and unable to go home early due to circumstances beyond their control as verified by
the proper authorities concerned; (c) in case of an emergency situation; (d) if minor is
in authorized employment or going to or returning home from the same place of
employment without any detour or stop; (e) if inside a motor vehicle or on travel
accompanied by an adult; (f) in case of official school, religious, recreational,
educational, social, community or private activity sponsored by the city, barangay,
school or other private civic/religious group (recognized by the community); and (g)
when the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a student and was
dismissed from his/her classes in the evening or that he/she is a working student. The
Quezon City Ordinance under Section 8 penalizes the parent /guardian but does not
penalize the minors.
 The Manila City Ordinance declared the hours from 10:00 p.m. to 4:00 a.m. as
Barangay Curfew Hours for minors. There are four (4) exemptions, namely:
(a) minors accompanied by their parents, family members of legal age or guardian; (b)
those running lawful errands; (c) night school students and those who, by virtue of
their employment, are required in the streets or outside their residence after
10:00 p.m.; and, (d) those working at night. The ordinance could impose various
sanctions, such as reprimand, admonition, imprisonment and fine on the offender.
 The Navotas Ordinance contained the following exemptions: (a) minors with night
classes; (b) those working at night; (c) those who attended a school or church activity,
in coordination with a specific barangay office; (d) those travelling towards home
during curfew hours; (e) those running errands under supervision of their parents,
guardians or persons of legal age having authority over them; (f) those involved in
accidents and calamities; and (g) specific occasions, such as, Christmas eve,
Christmas day, New Year’s eve, New Year’s day, the night before a barangay fiesta,
fiesta day, All Saints’ and All Souls’ Day, Holy Thursday, Good Friday, Black
Saturday and Easter Sunday. The Ordinance requires the minor, along with his/her
parents/guardians to render social civic duty and community service should the
parents/guardians be unable to pay the fine.
Issue:
 Are the curfew ordinances unconstitutional?
43
Ruling:
 Quezon City Ordinance is valid.
 The Manila and Navotas Ordinances are void.
Reasoning:
 Article 139 of PD 603 explicitly authorizes local government units to set curfew hours
for children. This is the statutory basis to restrict the minors’ exercise of the right to
travel.
 The void for vagueness doctrine does not apply. Petitions only point to the ordinances’
lack of enforcement guidelines but failed to assert any confusion as to what conduct
the ordinances prohibit or not prohibit.
 In implementing the ordinances, law enforcement agents are bound by the parameters
of R.A. 9344 in the determination of the age of the child through a birth certificate,
baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these
documents, any other information from the child or other persons or through physical
appearance would suffice.
 The primary right of the parents in rearing their children is qualified by the state’s
legitimate interest to promote public welfare or the well-being of the child.
 The curfew ordinances apply only when minors are not, whether actually or
constructively, accompanied by their parents. This only amounts to a minimal or
reasonable infringement upon a parent’s right to bring up his/her child.
 The contention on the violation of the right to travel of minors is partly meritorious.
Public safety may be basis to restrict the minors’ right to travel. Under the strict
scrutiny test government must prove that the classification (1) is necessary to achieve
a compelling state interest; and, (2) is the least restrictive means. The local
government units showed compelling state interest, but as regards the restrictions it
appears that the Manila and Navotas ordinances are not narrowly drawn and run the
risk of overly restricting the minors’ fundamental freedoms. The list of exceptions in
the Quezon City ordinance is more narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the minors’
right to association, free exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably assemble and of free
expression.
 On the penal sanctions, in relation to R.A. 9344, Sections 57 and 57-A of this law
prohibit the imposition of penalties on minors for status offenses such as curfew
violations. What the law prohibits is the imposition of penalties on minors.
Community service is a valid form of intervention program. Admonition is a mere
warning. These are not penalties. On the otherhand, reprimand and fines and/or
imprisonment are penalties prohibited by R.A. 9344.
Article 3, Section 7 (Right to Information in relation to Article 2, Section 28

(Public Disclosure)
Sereno v. Committee, G.R. No. 175210, Feb. 1, 2016
44
Facts:
 Sereno, as executive director of the Association of Petrochemical Manufacturers of
the Philippines (APMP) filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Committee on
Tariff and Related Matters (CTRM)-NEDA to provide him a copy of the minutes of
its May 23, 2005 meeting as well as all official records, documents, papers and
government research data as basis for the issuance of E.O. 486 which lifted the
suspension of tariff reduction on petrochemical resins and other plastic products under
the ASEAN Free Trade Area – Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme (AFTA-
CEPT). The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition.
Issue:
 Will mandamus lie?
Ruling:
 No.
Reasoning:
 Section 3, Rule IV of the IRR of R.A. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees) states:
“Sec. 3. Every department, office or agency shall provide information, records

and documents to any requesting public except if:
xxxx
(c) the information, record or document sought falls within the concepts of
established privilege or recognized exceptions as may be provided by law or settled
policy or jurisprudence;
(d) such information, record or document comprises drafts of decisions,

orders, rulings, policies, memoranda, etc.
 The CTRM-NEDA is an advisory body composed of various department heads or

secretaries and is classified as cabinet meetings which may fall under the category of
privileged information.
 The burden of showing the exemption from access to the information rests upon the
government agency.
Article 3, Section 9 (Eminent Domain)
National Power Corporation v. Manalastas, G.R. No. 196140, Jan. 27, 2016
45
Facts:
 NPC constructed a transmission line sometime in 1977 to 1978 on Manalastas’
property without the knowledge or consent of Manalastas and without initiating
expropriation proceedings and without any compensation.
 Manalastas filed a complaint with the RTC of Naga City demanding removal of the
power lines and payment of damages or in the alternative, payment of the fair market
value of the affected areas at 800.00 per square meter.
 The RTC ordered NPC to pay 92,827,351.00 by way of compensation. On appeal to
the CA, NPC argued that the devaluation of the peso should not have been factored in
the computation of the fair market value of the land. The CA ruled that NPC could no
longer assail the valuation recommended by NPC itself. NPC is estopped.
Issues:
 May estoppel lie against NPC?
 Should inflation be factored in the computation of just compensation?
 May the Court review the formulation of just compensation?
Ruling:
 Estoppel does not lie against the State even if the persons representing the
government were negligent.
 The just compensation due to the landowners amounts to an effective forbearance on
the part of the State – a proper subject of interest computed from the time the property
was taken until the full amount of just compensation is paid – in order to eradicate the
issue of the constant variability of the value of the currency over time.
 Therefore, the valuation of the land for purposes of determining just compensation
should not include the inflation rate of the peso because this is sufficiently
recomprised through payment of interest on the market value of the land.
 It is the Court, not NPC’s counsel which decides on the proper interpretation or
application of the law, such as, the determination of rightful compensation.
Article 3, Section 10 (Non-Impairment Clause)
Goldenway v. Equitable Bank, G.R. No. 195540, March 13, 2013
Facts:
 Goldenway executed a real estate mortgage in 1985 in favor of Equitable Bank to
secure a loan. Goldenway failed to settle the loan obligation and the properties
mortgaged were sold.
 Goldenway’s counsel offered to redeem the properties but was informed that it is no
longer possible because R.A. 8791 applied and, therefore, barred the redemption.
 Goldenway argued that Act No. 3135 should instead apply which allowed a one-year
period of redemption and not the shorter term under R.A. 8791, otherwise it would
impair its obligation of contract.
Issue:
 Was the right of Goldenway violated when the amendatory law, R.A. 8791, was in
effect when the mortgage was foreclosed?
46
Ruling:
 There is no impairment of the obligation of contract.
Reasoning:
 Section 47 of R.A. 8791 did not divest juridical persons of the right to redeem
foreclosed properties but only modified the time for the exercise of such right by
reducing the one-year period originally provided in Act No. 3135.
 There is, likewise, no retroactive application of the new redemption period because
Section 47 exempts from its operation those properties foreclosed prior to its
effectivity and whose owners retain redemption rights under Act No. 3135.
Article 3, Section 13 (Right to Bail)
Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015, 767 SCRA 282
Facts:
 Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder. When the Sandiganbayan
ordered him arrested, Enrile voluntarily surrendered and was later on confined at the
PNP General Hospital. He filed a Motion to Fix Bail. He argued (a) that the
prosecution has not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) that
the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal; and, (c) he was not a flight
risk, and his age at 90 and physical condition must further be seriously considered.
The Sandiganbayan denied bail.
Issue:
 Should Enrile be granted bail?
Ruling:
 Yes, he may be granted bail.
Reasoning:
 Enrile’s social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the
authorities indicate that the risk of flight or escape is highly unlikely.
 The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification
for his admission to bail. This is borne out by the findings of Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the
Director of Philippine General Hospital.
 Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should
be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued
incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life.
Article 4, Sections 2 and 3 (Citizenship)
Casan Macode Maquiling v. COMELEC, Rommel Arnado Y. Cagoco, Linog G. Balua, G.R.
No. 195649, April 16, 2013 and July 2, 2013 (MR).
47
Facts:
 Respondent Arnado, a natural born Filipino citizen, acquired American citizenship by
naturalization. He later on reacquired Filipino citizenship by taking an Oath of
Allegiance to the Philippines and Renounced his American citizenship. Later, Arnado
used his U.S. passport at least four times.
 Petitioner contends that Arnado should be deemed to have been disqualified to run for
public office even as he has already finished his term of office in May 2010 under the
Local Government Code.
Issue:
 Whether or not respondent Arnado is disqualified to run for a local elective office?
Ruling:
 Respondent is disqualified.
Reasoning:
 The act of using a foreign passport does not divest one of his Filipino citizenship,
which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as a foreign
citizen, he voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen.
Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant he represented himself as
a foreign citizen by using his foreign passport.
 Dual citizens by naturalization are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in
order to qualify as a candidate for public office. If by the time an aspiring candidate
filed his certificate of candidacy, he was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and
privileges of Filipino and foreign citizenship, he was qualified to vote, but by the
express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, he was
not qualified to run for a local elective position. By being barred from even becoming
a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning.
 Being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This
leaves the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore,
the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.
Article 4, Sections 2 and 3 (Citizenship) in relation to Article 12, Sectios 7

and 8 (Acquisitions of Private Land Distinguished from Public Land)
David v. Editha A. Agbay and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 19911, March 18, 2015
Facts:
48
 In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became Canadian citizen by

naturalization. Upon their retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the
Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a 600-square meter lot along the beach
in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential house.
However, in the year 2004, they came to know that the portion where they built their
house is public land and part of the salvage zone.
 On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease application (MLA) over the
subject land where with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) at the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in
Socorro. In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen. A
complaint was filed against petitioner for falsification of public documents.
 Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired Filipino citizenship under R.A. 9225 as evidenced
by Identification Certificate No. 266-10-07 issued by the Consulate-General of the
Philippines in Toronto, Canada on October 11, 2007.
 Private respondent, Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that
petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land.
Issue:
 Is the petitioner disqualified to own land in the Philippines and, therefore, subject to
prosecution for falsification of public documents?
Ruling:
 Petitioner may be proceeded against for violation of the Revised Penal Code based on
a misrepresentation that he is a Filipino citizen qualified to acquire land.
Reasoning:
 When petitioner re-acquired Filipino citizenship under R.A. 9225, the falsification
was already a consummated act and the law did not have a retroactive effect insofar as
his dual citizenship status is concerned.
 Besides, while Section 2 of R.A. 9225 states the general policy that Filipinos who
have become citizens of another country shall be deemed “not to have lost their
Filipino citizenship,” such is qualified by the phrase “under the conditions of this
Act.”
 Section 3 of R.A. 9225 makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who
became foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225.
 The first paragraph of Section 3 refers to re-acquisition while the second paragraph
covers retention of citizenship.
 Petitioner belongs to the first category wherein retroactivity of natural-born Filipino
citizenship cannot be applied. Besides, even assuming that the principle applies, it
will not work for petitioner’s cause because he had not alleged that he applied for
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship before he made the declaration in the public
land application that he is a Filipino.
 The rule that a favorable interpretation in favor of petitioner applies to a penal statute
and not to R.A. 9225 which is not a criminal statute.
Article 4, Sections 1, 2 and 3 (Citizenship)
49
Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016
Facts:
 Several COMELEC cases were filed against Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-
Llamanzares on account of the filing of her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the
Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. The oppositors questioned her declaration as
a natural-born citizen and her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May
2016 as would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005.
She also attached her “Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship.”
 It appears that Poe-Llamanzares was an abandoned newborn when she was found in
the Parish church of Jaro, Iloilo by Edgardo Militar on 3 September 1968. Custody
over Poe-Llamanzares was passed to Emiliano Militar and his wife, who registered
Poe-Llamanzares as a foundling with the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. She was given
the name, Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar.
 Poe-Llamanzares was later on adopted by Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando
Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) through a judgment of the
Municipal Trial Court of San Juan City.
 When Poe-Llamanzares reached eighteen (18) years of age, in 1986, she registered as
a voter in San Juan City. She was issued a Philippine passport on 04 April 1988. She
renewed her passport in 1993 and 1998. She initially studied in U.P. but decided later
on to continue her studies in the US in 1988. On 27 July 1991, she married Teodoro
Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, who happened to be a dual citizen (Philippines and
U.S.A.) The couple flew back to the U.S. two days after the wedding in San Juan City.
Poe-Llamanzares became a naturalized American citizen on 18 October 2001 and,
subsequently, obtained a U.S. passport. She went back in 2004 to support her father’s
presidential candidacy. She returned to the U.S. on 8 July 2004. She had to
immediately come back to the Philippines to take care of her father until 3 February
2005. When her father died, she and the family decided to move and reside
permanently in the Philippines in the first quarter of 2005. In nearly 2006, the couple
acquired a 509-square meter lot in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City where they built a
family home. On 7 July 2006, Poe-Llamanzares took her Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. 9225 and filed a sworn petition to
reacquire the Philippine citizenship. Poe-Llamanzares registered as a voter of
Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31 August 2006. On 6 October 2010, she was
appointed as Chairperson of MTRCB but before assuming her post, she executed an
“Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the U.S.A. and Renunciation of American
Citizenship.” Thereafter, she stopped using her U.S. passport. On 12 July 2011 she
executed before the Vice-Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an “Oath of
Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States.” She was issued by
the Vice-Consul a “Certificate of Loss of Nationality” on 9 December 2011, effective
21 October 2010.
 On 2 October 2012, Poe-Llamanzares filed her COC for Senator for the 2013
Elections wherein she answered “6 years and 6 months” to the question “Period of
residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013.”
 On 15 October 2015 she filed her COC for the Presidency. The COMELEC First
Division granted the oppositors’ contentions and ruled that: (a) Poe-Llamanzares is
not a natural-born citizen; (b) she failed to complete the ten (10) year residency; and,
(c) she committed material misrepresentation in her COC.
50
Issue:
 Is Poe-Llamanzares qualified to run for the Presidency for being a natural-born
Filipino citizen?
Ruling:
 She is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Reasoning:
 The Solicitor-General offered official statistics that from 1965-1975, the number of
foreigners born in the Philippines was 15, 986 while the total number of Filipinos
born in the country was 10, 558, 278. The statistical probability that any child born in
the Philippines that decade is natural-born Filipino was 99.83%. Poe-Llamanzares
showed that in Iloilo province in 1960, there was 962, 532 Filipinos and 4,734
foreigners. This translates to 99.62% Filipino population. In 1970, the figures showed
1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. In terms of child-producing ages
(15-49), in 1960, there were 230,528 female Filipinos as against 730 female
foreigners or 99.68%. In the same year, there were 210, 349 Filipino males and 886
male aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970, there were 270, 299 Filipino females versus 1, 190
female aliens, or 99.56%. That same year, there were 245,740 Filipino males as
against only 1, 165 male aliens or 99.53 %. Other circumstantial evidence showed that
Poe-Llamanzares has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black
hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.
 As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935
Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language
which would exclude foundlings either. The Rafols amendment intended to include
“children of unknown parentage” in the 1935 Constitution as natural-born citizens
was not carried simply because their number was not significant enough to merit
specific mention.
 Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. An
adoptee must be a Filipino.
 The process of acquiring a foundling certificate is done by the State and is not
analogous to naturalization or the election of citizenship.
 Foundlings are citizens under international law. Under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR), “everyone has a right to nationality” (Article 15). Similarly,
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), a child has “a right to
acquire a nationality” (Article 7, par.1). In the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) “every child has the right to acquire a nationality” (Article
24, par. 3). Two other international law instruments, while yet unratified by the
Philippines, form part of the generally accepted principles of international law,
namely: (a) Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating
to the Conflict of Nationality laws under which a foundling is presumed to have the
“nationality of birth;” and, (b) Article 2 of the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction
of Statelessness which states that “ a foundling found in the territory of a Contracting
State shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born
within the territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State. Supported by
99% statistics that Poe-Llamanzares’ parents are probably Filipino nationals, she
should be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen.
51
 Bengson III v. HRET explained that repatriation results in the recovery of one’s
original nationality. So, in the case of Poe-Llamanzares, her repatriation in July 2006
restored her to her natural-born citizenship.
 Poe-Llamanzares’ domicile had been timely changed as of 24 May 2005. She
permanently settled back with her family on this date.
Rizalito Y. David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal and Poe-Llamanzares, G.R. No. 221538,
September 20, 2016
Facts:
 David sought to unseat Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares as a Senator for allegedly not
being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. The SET found Poe-Llamanzares to be
a natural-born citizen. David argued that SET committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
Issue:
 Did SET commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction?
Ruling:
 No.
Reasoning:
 The assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born citizens unless there is
substantial evidence to the contrary.
 David’s reliance on Article 4, Section 1(2) and the need to establish bloodline is
misplaced. Between Article 4, Section 1(2) and Section 2, it is Section 2 that is on
point. To determine whether Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born citizen, one must look
into whether she had to do anything to perfect her citizenship. In view of Bengson III
ruling, she did not have to go through the naturalization process to become a Filipino.
The investiture of citizenship on foundlings benefit children, individuals whose
capacity to act is restricted. It is a glaring mistake to liken them to an adult filing
before the relevant authorities a sworn petition seeking to become a Filipino, the grant
of which is contingent on evidence that he or she must himself or herself adduce.
 R.A. 9225 is premised an immutability of natural-born status and proceeds from an
entirely different premise from the restrictive process of naturalization.
 Physical features, genetics, pedigree, and ethnicity are not determinative of
citizenship, nor identity.
 The burden of evidence does not shift to Poe-Llamanzares by the mere showing that
she is a foundling.
 In Tecson, the issue on FPJ’s citizenship was resolved on the basis of presumptions. It
is true that in Paa v. Chan (128 Phil. 815) it was ruled that presumptions cannot be
entertained in citizenship cases. This is no longer true in light of Tecson. Besides, the
factual backdrop of Paa is markedly different. In Paa, evidence showed that
respondent Quintin Chan was registered as an alien. His father was likewise registered
as an alien. Go v. Ramos (614 Phil 451) cited Paa but revising it to make it appear that
the same pronouncement was generally applicable. Go was decided by a Division
52
unlike Tecson, which was decided by the court sitting En Banc. Go involved
deportation not an election controversy. In Go, copies of birth certificates
unequivocally showed Chinese citizenship of Go.
 Article 4, Section 1(2) must be read with Article 2, Sections 11 and 13; Article 15,
Section 3; Article 3, Section 1; and, Article 13, Section 1.
 The equal protection clause prohibits differentiation of foundlings from children with
known Filipino parents.
Article 5, Section 1 (Suffrage)
Kabataan Party-List v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221318, December 18, 2015
Facts:
 Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. 10367 entitled, “An Act Providing for
the Mandatory Biometrics Voter Registration,” and COMELEC Resolution Nos.
9721, 9863 and 10013 related thereto. The law provides that only voters who fail to
submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of application for registration
for purposes of the May 2016 elections shall be deactivated.
 Petitioners contended that biometrics validation rises to the level of “additional,
substantial qualification” and applying the strict scrutiny test, there is no compelling
reason for state regulation and, hence, an unreasonable deprivation of the right to
suffrage.
Issue:
 Is R.A. 10367 (including related COMELEC resolutions) unconstitutional?
Ruling:
 Petition has no merit. The law is valid.
Reasoning:
 The State may impose statutory disqualifications, with the restriction that the same do
not amount to a “literacy, property or other substantive requirement.”
 The concept of “qualification” should be distinguished from the concept of
“registration,” insofar as suffrage is concerned. The act of registering is only one step
towards voting, and it is not one of the elements that makes the citizen a qualified
voter. Registration is a form of regulation not a qualification. Registration is a mere
procedural requirement as pronounced in AKBAYAN-Youth v. COMELEC (407 Phil
618).
 R.A. 8189 governs the registration process. R.A. 10367 built on the policy
considerations behind R.A. 8189 to systematize the present method of registration in
order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters.
 Biometrics is a quantitative analysis that provides a positive identification of an
individual. Validation is the process of taking the biometrics of registered voters
whose biometrics have not yet been captured.
 The regulation passes the strict scrutiny test. There is a compelling state interest
involved, i.e., to cleanse the national voter registry so as to eliminate electoral fraud.
 The regulation is the least restrictive means to achieve this end. There was sufficient
information and time afforded the public to abide by the law.
53
Article
Arroyo v. DOJ, 681 SCRA 181 [2012] – collaboration of two committees
La Suerte v. CA, 739 SCRA 489 [2014] – taxability of stemmed leaf tobacco.
Quezon City PTCA v. Department of Education, G.R. 188720, February 23, 2016
Article 6, Section 1 (Undue Delegation of Legislative Power) in relation to

Article 7, Section 17 (Ensure Faithful Execution of Laws) and Article 3,
Section 1 (Equal Protection)
Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. Nos. 192935, 193036, December 7, 2010
Facts:
 E.O. No. 1 of July 30, 2010 created the Philippine Truth Commission, founded on P-
Noy’s anti-corruption drive, with the “powers of an investigative body under Section
37, Chapter 9, Book 1 of the Administrative Code of 1987” and tasked to conduct a
fact-finding investigation of the reported cases of graft and corruption during the
“previous administration.”
Issue:
 Constitutionality of E.O. No. 1: (a) separation of powers; (b) quasi-judicial powers;
and, (c) equal protection.
Ruling:
 E.O. No. 1 is unconstitutional in so far as it is violative of the equal protection clause.
Reasoning:
 PTC cannot determine if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an
information; neither could it impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or
sanctions.
 PTC is different from truth commissions in other states emerging from periods of
internal unrest to serve as mechanisms for transitional justice. The main goals range
from retribution to reconciliation.
 The PTC could not be borne out of the power of the President to “reorganize” under
Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code because this contemplates situations
where a body or an office is already existent. Neither is it justified by the power of
control.
 The PTC, however, is justified by Article 7, Section 17 on the duty of the President to
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Ad hoc investigating committees have
been resorted to by the Chief Executive in the past, (PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO,
54
Feliciano Commission, Melo Commission and Zenarosa). No quasi-judicial powers

vested in these committees.
 There is no “appropriation” for PTC but mere allocation of existing funds.
 By singling out the previous administration, the PTC embarks on “an adventure in
partisan hostility”. Neither will E.O. No. 1, Section 17 be able to save the infirmity of
singling out PGMA by stating that “If and when in the judgment of the President there
is a need to expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to
include the investigation of cases during the prior administrations, such mandate may
be so extended accordingly by way of a Supplemental Executive Order.” There is no
guarantee that other administrations would be covered.
 In the case of PCGG, Virata v. Sandiganbayan declared the PCGG Charter as valid
and does not violate the equal protection clause (without any explanation though).
Article 6, Section 1 (Undue Delegation) in relation to Article 7, Section 21

(Treaties) and Article 8, Section 14 (Standards in Decision)
Deutsche Bank v. CIR, G.R. No. 188550, August 19, 2013
Facts:
 Deutsche Bank alleged that it made an overpayment of P22, 562,851.17 representing
its branch profit remittance tax (BPRT) and thereby sought a refund. It also requested
from the International Tax Division (ITAD) of the BIR confirmation of its entitlement
to the preferential tax rate of 10% under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.
 BIR denied the claim for refund on the ground that the application for a tax treaty
relief was not filed with the ITAD prior to the payment by Deutsche Bank of its BPRT
and actual remittance of its branch profits to DB Germany, or prior to its availment of
the preferential rate of 10% pursuant to the treaty under the 15-day period mandated
by Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 1-200 following the Supreme Court
Resolutions in Mirant dated 12 November 2007 and 18 February 2008 in G.R. No.
168531.
Issues:
 Was there a violation of the principle on undue delegation of legislative power in
relation to our treaty obligation?
 Does Article 8, Section 14 apply to SC Resolutions?
Ruling:
 BIR should not impose new requirements to burden or negate resort to tax reliefs
under the treaty.
 The purpose of a tax treaty is to eliminate precisely international juridical double
taxations and to encourage the free flow of goods and services, capital, technology
and persons.
 The MIRANT ruling in a Minute Resolution is not a binding precedent. Besides,
MIRANT does not apply to Deutsche Bank’s case because the latter’s case is a refund
case which does not require compliance with the 15-day period enunciated in
MIRANT.
55
(NOTE: In CBK Power Co. v. CIR, 746 SCRA 93, the Supreme Court reiterated this
ruling.)
Article 6, Section 5 (1), (3), (4) (Legislative Districts)
Aquino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010
Facts:
 R.A. No. 9716 entitled “An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1 st) and
Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby
Creating a New Legislative District from Such Reapportionment.”
 CamSur Population – 1,693,821 with four (4) legislative districts.
 The new district, which will now be the 2 nd legislative district, was carved out of the
1st district (5 towns) and the former 2nd district (2 towns).
 The result is that the new 1st district had a population of only 176,383 while the new
2nd district has 250,000. The rest of the 3 districts have more than 250,000 population.
Issue:
 Whether or not R.A. No. 9716 violates the requirements under Article 6, Section 5(1),
(3), (4) of the Constitution.
Ruling:
 R.A. No. 9716 is valid.
Reasoning:
 The 250,000 population requirement does not apply to creation of legislative districts
in provinces. This only applies to creation of a legislative district in a city.
 There is no fixed population requirement for the reapportionment of districts in
provinces.
 Population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the
composition of additional district.
NOTE: Read this with Mariano v. Comelec, 312 Phil. 259 (1995), which dealt with
conversion of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City with the effect of creating an
additional legislative district. The Supreme Court sustained the additional district even if
the 1990 census of Makati stood at 450,000 because the application of the 250,000
minimum population for cities is limited to its initial legislative district. It does not have
to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district. The
same rule should apply then to additional districts in provinces, considering that a
province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and regardless of the
population. The earlier case of Tobias v. Abalos, 239 SCRA 106 (1994), had raised the
issue of the lack of showing that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the
minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify separation into two legislative
districts. But the Court merely applied the presumption of validity in favour of the
passage of the law converting the municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized
56
City. In another related case of Samson v. Aguirre, 315 SCRA 53 (1999), the Supreme
Court inquired into the allegation of oppositors to the creation of Novaliches City out of
15 barangays of Quezon City that there were no certifications as to income, population
and land area presented to the Congress during the deliberations on R.A. No. 8535. Only
an oral manifestation was made by the NSO representative that the population in the
proposed city of Novaliches would comprise 347,310. Congress presumed that the
requirements were met in the passage of R.A. No. 8535. But in Aldaba v. Comelec, G.R.
No. 188078, January 25, 2010, R.A. No. 9591, creating a separate legislative district for
Malolos City and amending the City Charter of Malolos, was questioned. The Court laid
down the rule that the requirement of 250,000 minimum population for a city to have a
legislative district cannot be based on an assumption. Thus, R.A. No. 9591 was declared
unconstitutional. Malolos failed to meet the requirement even on a growth rate projection
by 2012 elections. It will be noted that Malolos City was part of the First Legislative
District of Bulacan together with 5 municipalities. The certification issued by the
Regional NSO Director projecting 254,030 population by 2010 is without legal effect
because he has no authority to do so, unless declared official by the National Statistics
Coordination Board. Finally, in Sema v. Comelec, G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008, the
Supreme Court emphasized that the power to create a legislative district is legislative in
character and, therefore, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the 8 municipalities in the 1st District of Maguindanao.
Article 6, Section 5(2) (Party-List)
Atong Paglaum v. Comelec, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013
Facts:
 COMELEC disqualified more than 52 party-list groups and organizations from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections either by denying petitions for
registration or cancellation of registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.
Issue:
 Was there GADLEJ on the part of COMELEC?
 Whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang
Bagong Bayani and BANAT v. COMELEC should be applied by the COMELEC in
the May 2013 party-list elections?
Ruling:
 No GADLEJ but remand cases applying new parameters.
 New parameters laid down by the Court:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties
or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need

to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized
and underrepresented” sector.
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3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under
the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A
political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that
can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and

underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is
enough that their political advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of
their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented: include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined
political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the

“marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies”
must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that
represent those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must
belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for
their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if

some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one
nominee who remains qualified.
Article 6, Section 5(2) (Party-List)
Lico v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205505, September 20, 2015
Facts:
 Ating-Koop participated in the Party-list Representation for the May 10, 2010
elections. It had Isidro Lico as first nominee, while Roberto Mascariñas was second
nominee.
 Ating-Koop won a seat and Lico took his oath of office on 9 December 2010. It
appears that several months prior to its proclamation as a winner, Ating-Koop had
resolved a term-sharing agreement among the nominees. Lico would serve for the first
year.
 On 5 December 2011, or almost one year after Lico had assumed office, he was
expelled from Ating-Koop for disloyalty and for having refused to honor the term-
sharing agreement. Lico sought a reconsideration of the party’s decision. Meanwhile,
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intramurals within the party led to assumption of a new leadership headed by the
Rimas group.
 The Rimas group filed a petition before COMELEC and prayed for Lico to vacate the
office of Ating-Koop in the House of Representatives and allow the second nominee
to sit.
 COMELEC Second Division upheld the expulsion of Lico from Ating-Koop and
declared Mascariña as the duly-qualified nominee of Ating- Koop. It characterized the
expulsion of Lico as an intra-party leadership dispute which it could resolve as an
incident of its power to register political parties.
 On reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc, the latter ruled: (a) upholding the
validity of Lico’s expulsion from Ating-Koop; (b) it had no jurisdiction to expel Lico
from the House of Representatives; and, (c) recognizing the Rimas group.
Issue:
 Were the resolutions of COMELEC valid?
Ruling:
 COMELEC’s En Banc Resolution dated 31 January 2013 and COMELEC Second
Division Resolution dated 18 July 2012 are annulled and set aside insofar as it
declares valid the expulsion of Lico from Ating-Koop and it upholds the Rimas group
as the Legitimate Party-list group.
 The legitimate Central Committee or set of officer are those prior to the split of Ating-
Koop.
Reasoning:
 COMELEC has no jurisdiction to expel Lico from the House of Representatives.
 The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) acquires jurisdiction over a
distinguished case upon proclamation of the winning party-list, oath of the nominee
and assumption of office.
 COMELEC in upholding the validity of the expulsion of Lico from Ating-Koop
touched upon the qualification requiring a party-list nominee to be a bonafide member
of the party-list group sought to be represented.
 COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring the Rimas group as the
legitimate set of Ating-Koop officers for the simple reason that the amendments to the
Constitution and By-laws were not registered with COMELEC. Its jurisdiction to
settle intra-party leadership dispute is well-settled.
Article 6, Section 6 (Qualifications; Domicile)

Tagolino v. HRET, G.R. 195540, March 19, 2013 – one-year residency.
Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. 207264, June 25, 2013 – one-year residency in relation to AG,
Sec. 17 on jurisdiction of HRET over election contests.
59
Article 6, Section 16 (Officers; Minority)

Baguilat v. Speaker Alvarez, G.R. 227757, July 25, 2017 – minority leader who voted for
majority.
Article 6, Section 21 (Legislative Inquiries)

Balag v. Senate, G.R. 234608, July 3, 2018 – limitation on detention of witness.
Article 6, Section 23 (2) (State of Emergency) in relation to Article 7,

Section 17 (Executive Power of Control) and Article 10, Section 16
(Presidential Supervision over Autonomous Regions)
Ampatuan v. Secretary Puno, G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011

Facts:
 PGMA issued Proclamation 1946 placing the provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan
Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a “state of emergency” and directing the AFP
and PNP to undertake measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to
prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence.
 Three days later, Administrative Order 273 “transferring” supervision of ARMM from
the O.P. to the DILG but this was amended by Administrative Order 273-A
“delegating” supervision of ARMM to DILG.
Issue:
 Constitutionality of Proclamation 1946 and Administrative Order 273 to 273-A.
Ruling:
 Valid and constitutional.
Reasoning:
 DILG Secretary did not exercise control. Vice-Governor Adiong assumed the vacated
post of Ampatuan based on succession provision in R.A. No. 9054 (ARMM Law)
 PGMA only exercised calling out power which did not require congressional
authority.
 The Supreme Court may inquire into the factual basis of the Proclamation.
(Note: Read these cases in relation to Lacson v. Perez, 410 Phil 78, and Sanlakas v.
Executive Secretary, 466 Phil 482, on the superfluity of a declaration of a state of
rebellion for purposes of calling out the AFP.)
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Article 6, Section 23 (2) (State of Emergency) in relation to Article 7,

Section 18 (Commander-in-Chief Powers)
Lagman v. Executive Secretary Medialdea, G.R. 231658, July 4, 2017 and MR February 6,
2018 – Martial Law in Mindanao.
Article 6, Section 25 (5) in relation to Article 6, Section 29 (1)
Nazareth v. Villar, 689 SCRA 385 [2013] – augmentation.
Araullo v. President Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014 and February 3, 2015 (MR)
Facts:
 Disbursement Allocation Program (DAP) sourced funds from:
(1) unreleased appropriations under personnel services (void)

(2) unprogrammed funds (void)
(3) carry-over appropriations unreleased from previous years
(4) budgets from slow-moving items or projects that had been realized to support
faster-disbursing projects
Issue:
 Did this violate standards under Article 6, Section 25(5)?
 DAP is unconstitutional.
Reasoning:
 DAP is not a fund or appropriation but a program of prioritizing spending in pursuit of
Executive Power to faithfully execute the laws. There is no need for a law to validate
the program.
 But, unreleased appropriations and withdrawn unobligated allotments under the DAP
were not savings and the use of such violated Article 6, Section 25(5).
 The GAA 2011 and 2012 gave open-ended power to the President to use “savings” for
even outside the Executive (cross-border).
 The GAA 2013 corrected the deficit but other requisites were still not complied with
such as the definition of savings and the need for augmentation.
 Operative fact – As a rule, it applies only to a law and an executive act, not a mere
administrative practice. There should be a ruling or regulation by an administrative
body not just an administrative practice. DAP is covered by a circular and not just a
mere practice which produced effects. The good faith rule still applies. The Court
extended this to the proponents and implementors of DAP.
Ruling:
Article 6, Section 28 (Exemptions)
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CIR v. St. Lukes Medical Center, G.R. 195960, September 26, 2012 -
Article 6, Section 29 (3) (Special Fund)
Philippine Coconut v. Republic, 663 SCRA 514 [2012] – coco levy as public fund.
Article 7, Section 4 (PET)
Macalintal v. PET, 635 SCRA 783 [2010] – constitutionality of PET.
Article 7, Section 13 (Other Officers)
Espiritu v. Lutgarda, G.R. 204964, October 15, 2014
Article 7, Section 15 (CJ Appointment 2 Months Before Elections)
De Castro v. JBC, 615 SCRA 666 [2010]- provision read with A8, Sec. 4c.
Article 7, Section 16 (Appointments)
Velicaria-Grafel et al. v. O.P., G.R. 203372, 206290 and 209138, June 16, 2015, 758 SCRA
414 - March 10, 2010
Facts:
 Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, President Gloria Macapagal –Arroyo
(PGMA) issued more than 800 appointments to various positions in several
government offices. For purposes of 2010 elections, 10 March 2010 was the cut-off
date for valid appointments and the next day, 11 March 2010 was the start of the ban
on midnight appointments.
 On 30 June 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III (P-Noy) issued EO 2 recalling,
withdrawing and revoking appointments issued by PGMA in violation of the ban on
midnight appointments.
 Petitioners were among those affected by EO 2 and whose appointments were
revoked.
Issue:
 Were the appointments in violation of Article 7, Section 15?
Ruling:
 The appointments were void.
Reasoning:
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 The following elements must exist in making a valid appointment: (a) authority to
appoint and evidence of exercise of such authority; (b) transmittal of appointment
paper and evidence of such transmittal; (c) vacant position at the time of appointment;
and, (d) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the
appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
 Petitioners failed to show compliance with all four elements. They cannot prove with
certainty that their appointment papers were transmitted before the appointment ban
took effect. They admitted that they took their oath of office during the ban.
Article 7, Section 17 (Control)
Boy Scouts v. COA, G.R. 1771Boyscouts v. COA, G.R. 1771, June 7, 2011
Article 7, Section 17 (Faithful Execution of Laws)
Ocampo v. Rear Admiral Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, 225984, 226097, 226116, 226117,
226120, and 226294, November 8, 2016
Facts:
 During the 2016 Presidential Election campaign, candidate Rodrigo R. Duterte
announced that he would allow the burial of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at
the Libingan ng Mga Bayani (LNMB). A few months after he assumed as President,
Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, General Ricardo R. Visaya,
stating that, “in compliance with the verbal order of the President, preparations must
be undertaken in coordination with the Marcos Family for the interment of the
President’s remains at LNMB. The former President would also be given military
honors accorded for a President, who was a Medal of Valor awardee.
 The following provisions of the Constitution were cited to question the planned
burial: Article 2, Sections 2, 13, 22, 23, 26, 27 and 28; Article 3, Section 1, Article 7,
Section 17; Article 11, Section 1, Article 14, Section 3(2); and Article 18, Section 26.
Issue:
 Is the Marcos burial at the LNMB violative of the Constitution?
Ruling:
 No. The interment is a political question. Petitioners failed to seek reconsideration of
the Memorandum before the Secretary of National Defense.
Reasoning:
 The provisions cited in the Article 2 of the Constitution are not self-executing in
character. Neither did any of the provisions prohibit the act of interment.
 Article 7, Section17 (on faithful execution of laws) empowers the President to take
necessary and proper steps as Chief Executive. He acted also pursuant to E.O 292
over land of the public domain devoted for national military cemetery and military
63
shrine purposes. This is a question of policy. There is no factual basis that President
Duterte “paid back” the Marcoses. This is purely speculative and the Court is not a
trier of facts.
 The argument that R.A. 298 (National Pantheon) intended to provide a burial site for
former Presidents, National Heroes and Patriots, is not the same as the LNMB. The
burial at LNMB did not confer a title of a hero to Marcos.
 AFP Regulation G 161-375 of September 11, 2000 allowing the interment of
Presidents at LNMB was not amended or repealed by R.A. 10368 (a law providing
compensation for human rights victims). Necessarily, R.A. 10368 did not have the
effect of extinguishing the Marcos burial at LNMB. Former President Marcos was
never convicted by final judgment so as to disqualify him under any law or regulation
to be buried at LNMB.
 The National Historical Commission of the Philippines has no jurisdiction over
military memorials (which are under the Philippine Veterans Affairs of the DND),
including LNMB.
 President Duterte is not bound by a 1992 Agreement between former President Fidel
V. Ramos and the Marcos family limiting the burial of former President Marcos at
Batac, Ilocos Norte. This is a mere political commitment.
 The Court concluded by saying that, “we agree with the proposition that Marcos
should be viewed and judged in the totality of his person. While he was not all good,
he was not pure evil either. Certainly just a human who erred like us.”
Article 7, Section 18 ( Calling–Out Power) in relation to Article 18, Section

24 (Armed Groups)
Jamar M. Kulayan, et al. v. Gov. Abdusakur M. Tan, et al., G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012
Facts:
 Governor Tan of Sulu declared a state of emergency in Sulu citing the kidnapping of
ICRC members, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act. He
also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code bestowing him the power to
carry out emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters and calamities,
and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress
disorder and lawless violence.
 The Proclamation further called upon PNP and Civilian Emergency Force to set up
checkpoints, conduct general search and seizures, including arrests, and other actions
to ensure public safety.
Issue:
 Does the Governor have such powers pursuant to Section 465 in relation to Section 16
of the Local Government Code?
Ruling:
 The Governor does not possess the same calling-out powers as the President.
 A provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at
his own bidding. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is
64
exclusive to the President, and an exercise by another official, even if he is the local
chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section
465 of the Local Government Code. Neither is the provincial governor authorized to
convene a local civilian group or an organization of private citizens as it is proscribed
pursuant to the national policy to establish one police force and under Sec. 24 of
Article XVIII of the Constitution.
Article 7, Section 18 (Commander-in-Chief Powers)
Lagman v. Executive Secretary Medialdea, G.R. 231658, 231771, and 231774, July 4, 2017
Facts:
 On 4 September 2016 President Rodrigo R. Duterte declared a state of national
emergency (Proclamation 55) on account of lawless violence in Mindanao, triggred
by the Maute terrorist group attacks in February 2016 in Butig, Lanao Del Sur and the
mass jailbreak in Marawi City in August 2016.
 On 23 May 2017, the Maute group took over a hospital in Marawi City, Lanao Del
Sur, established check points, burned down government facilities and inflicted
casualties on government forces, and started flying the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria. In response, the President, while in Russia, declared a state of martial law
(Proclamation 216) in the Mindanao group of islands for a period not exceeding 60
days and the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was also suspended. A report was
submitted to Congress establishing the factual basis of Proclamation 216.
 Petitioners questioned the lack of factual basis for Proclamation 216 stating that there
is no rebellion or invasion; that acts of terrorism did not constitute rebellion; and, that
the extraordinary powers of the President should be dispensed sequentially.
Issue:
 Was the declaration of Martial Law in accord with Article 7, Section 18?
Ruling:
 Proclamation 216 is constitutional.
Reasoning:
 The void-for-vagueness rule does not apply to the Proclamation which involved
conduct and not speech. In A7, S18, on the declaration of Martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, standing is relaxed whereby
any citizen, even not a taxpayer, may question the declaration. The process may be
triggered by a complaint, petition or a matter to be resolved by the court.
 The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review the exercise of the extraordinary
powers to declare Martial Law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
distinct from A8, Section 1 and Article 8, Section 5. This is sui generis in character.
 The 1987 Constitution codified the ruling in Lansang (149 Phil. 547), which held that
an inquiry into the factual basis of the declaration of Martial Law and/or suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political question. The 1987
Constitution further extends judicial review to the determination of the sufficiency of
65
the factual basis for the declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus.
 Three (3) parameters must be satisfied initially by the Court in inquiring into
Proclamation 216, namely: (a) actual (not mere threat) of existence of rebellion or
invasion; (b) public safety requires exercise of Presidential power; and, (c) probable
cause, meaning, common sense that more likely than not a crime has been committed
and there is no need to resort to calibration of rules of evidence but only to weigh
facts and circumstances. The precise extent or range of rebellion cannot be measured
by exact metes and bounds. Rebellion may be a predicate crime under a special law
on terrorism (Human Security Act) but does not result to an automatic absorption of
rebellion in terrorism.
 The sequence of the three (3) Commander-in-Chief powers is not exclusive but
merely refers to scope. A nullification of Proclamation 216 does not affect the prior
Proclamation 55 calling out the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
 A comparison of the three Commander-in-Chief powers shows as follows: (a) In the
calling-out power, the Court could examine whether the President acted within
permissible constitutional boundaries and not with grave abuse of discretion and that
ordinary police action may be undertaken. The actual use of AFP is not within judicial
review; while, (b) In Martial Law or suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas
corpus, there must be actual invasion or rebellion; effectivity of the declaration on
suspension is for 60 days; Congressional and judicial review may be undertaken; and,
liberties may be curtailed.
 The power of the Supreme Court to review Proclamation 216 may be exercised
simultaneously with the Congressional review mechanism. While judicial review is
passive in nature, the Congressional mechanism is automatically exercised. The Court
will not require absolute correctness of the facts or factual basis underlying Martial
Law or suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus but Congress may inquire
into the accuracy of such facts. The President makes a judgment call based on
information prior to the proclamation or suspension. He may withhold some
confidential information so as not to prejudice operations. There is even no need for
the Defense Secretary’s recommendation as a condition precedent before the President
acts to issue the proclamation or suspension. This is one he should act in person.
Article 7, Section 19 (Pardon) in relation to Article 9-C, and Section 5

(COMELEC and Recommendation)
Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal v. Alfredo Lim, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015
Facts:
 Former President Estrada was extended clemency by former President Arroyo, by way
of pardon, as follows: “…. Whereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed
to no longer seek any elective position or office… He is hereby restored to his civil
and political rights…”
 The pardon was received and accepted by former President Estrada.
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 Later, he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. He lost during
that elections.
 He would again file a Certificate of Candidacy this time for the position of Mayor of
the City of Manila.
 A petition for disqualification is filed against former President Estrada under Section
40 of the Local Government Code in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code, which disqualified a candidate unless he has been given plenary pardon or
granted amnesty in cases where the candidate have had previously sentenced to a
penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude.
Issue:
 Is former President Joseph Estrada qualified to run?
Ruling:
 He is qualified to run as Mayor.
Reasoning:
 Former President Estrada was granted absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil
and political rights, including the right to seek public elective office.
 The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action as
provided in Articles VII, Section 19 and IX-C, Section 5 of the Constitution. Articles
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be interpreted to mean a diminution of
the President’s power.
 It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in
which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases;
(2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving
violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable
recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any
act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of
the President.
 The disqualification of the former President under Section 40 in relation to Section 12
of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon.
 The preambular provision is not an essential part of an act and neither did it make the
pardon conditional.
Article 7, Section 19 (in relation to A8, Section 1 (Judicial Powers)
San Diego v. People, G.R. 176114, April 8, 2015, 755 SCRA 260
Facts:
 Grace San Diego was charged with qualified theft before the RTC of Bulacan. The
trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and
sentenced her “to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for forty years without
pardon before the lapse of forty years and with the accessory penalties of death under
Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code…”
Issue:
 May the Judge impose the penalty without possibility of clemency?
67
Ruling:
 The portion “without pardon” in the decision is unconstitutional.
Reasoning:
 This had the effect of limiting the power of the Chief Executive.
The exercise of pardoning power is discretionary on the part of the President.
Article 7, Sections 20 and 21 (Loan Agreement)
Landbank of the Philippines v. Atlanta Industries, G.R. No. 193796, July 2, 2014
Facts:
 Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (IBRD) entered into a loan agreement 4833-H which required the
participation of two (2) local governments by way of a subsidiary loan agreement
(SLA) with LBP. LBP subsequently signed a SLA with Iligan City which provides
that the goods, works and services to be financed out of the proceeds of the loan were
to be procured in accordance with the IBRD procurement guidelines.
 Atlanta Industries participated in the bidding but was disqualified. During the re-
bidding, Atlanta called the attention of the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) for not
having applied the bidding process prescribed the Government Procurement Policy
Board. The BAC declared that the bidding was not covered by R.A. 9184.
 Atlanta filed a suit to enjoin the bidding before the RTC which ruled that Iligan City
cannot claim exemption from R.A. 9184 because it was LBP which entered into the
agreement with IBRD. The RTC ruled that R.A. 9184 applies.
Issue:
 Is the loan agreement (SLA) between the LBP and Iligan City an executive agreement
similar to the loan agreement between LBP and IBRD (4833-H) and deemed exempt
from the application of R.A. 9184?
Ruling:
 The RTC decision is reversed. The petition for prohibition is dismissed.
Reasoning:
 R.A. 9184, Section 4 recognizes the country’s commitment to abide by its obligations
under any treaty or international or executive agreement. The terms and conditions of
loan agreement between LBP and IBRD (4833-H) were incorporated and made part of
the SLA. The latter agreement cannot be treated as an isolated contract but as a
conjunct of 4833-H. It is a mere accessory contract whose nature and consideration
are thus the same as the principal contract.
Hontiveros – Baraquel v. TRB, G.R. 181293, February 23, 2015 -
Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426 and 212444 January 12, 2016
68
Facts:
 The Philippines and the United States entered into the Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Agreement (EDCA) in 2014. The Senate through Resolution 105 expressed strong
sentiment for EDCA to become valid and effective, it must first be transmitted to the
Senate for deliberation and concurrence.
 Based on the terms of EDCA there will be an identification of Agreed Locations
where the following activities may be undertaken by the American Military and
civilian personnel and American contractors: training, refueling of aircraft, bunkering
vessels, temporary accommodation, preposition of equipment, deploying of forces and
materiel, etc…
 Petitioners argued that EDCA must be in the form of a treaty and that it infringes on
the sovereignty of the Philippines.
Issue:
 What is the legal characterization of EDCA?
Ruling:
 It is an executive agreement.
Reasoning:
 There are two types of executive agreements, namely: (a) purely independent of
legislative action (e.g. exchange of notes); and, (b) subject to congressional
authorization (e.g. commercial agreements) but without need of Senate concurrence.
 The Department of Foreign Affairs determines whether an agreement is an executive
agreement or a treaty but the Court has a task or determining whether the agreement is
consistent with applicable limitations as provided by the Constitution, statutes or
treaties.
 The President has the prerogative to choose to enter into executive agreement, unless
required by law or the Constitution to do otherwise.
 The term “international agreement” under Article 7, Section 21 of the Constitution is
not the same as executive agreement but the latter, nevertheless, has the effect of an
international agreement under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
 Unlike a treaty proper, an executive agreement cannot create new international
obligations not expressly allowed or reasonably implied in the law it purports to
implement. A treaty is superior over executive agreements just like a statute. If a later
law or treaty is passed or adopted inconsistent with an executive agreement, the latter
is deemed revoked/ineffective.
 As applied to EDCA, Article 18, Section 25 does not cover activities done after entry
of troops or establishment of bases or facilities. EDCA is a mere adjustment in detail
in the implementation of the Mutual Defense Treaty and Visiting Forces Agreement,
both of which have undergone concurrence by the Senate. The 2002 Mutual Logistics
Support Agreement was intended to facilitate the reciprocal provision of logistics
support, supplies and services between military forces of two countries inclusive of
billeting, operations support, construction and use of temporary structures and storage
services during an approved activity under the existing military arrangements.
 EDCA, therefore, is a mere contract of use and access. Operational control is less than
effective command and control. Operational control inside the Agreed Locations is
limited to construction activities.
69
 The Philippines never ceded sovereign power over the Agreed Locations. Under the
VFA, the Philippines allowed construction during “temporary visit” of U.S. personnel
(authorized presence); while under EDCA, it allowed the building of “permanent
facilities” to be owned later by the Philippines (authorized activities).
 To determine “basing” under Article 18, Section 25, the following may be applied: (a)
independence from foreign control; (b) exercise of Philippine sovereignty and
applicable law; and, (c) respect for national security and territorial integrity.
 For purposes of application of International Humanitarian Law, the principle of
distinction on military targets should exclude the Agreed Locations under EDCA as
legitimate targets by U.S. enemy state.
 In sum, the test upon entry of foreign troops or establishment of military bases or
facilities is Article 18, Section 25, while activities thereafter will no longer require
Article 7, Section 21 (Peace Treaties; International Agreements; Foreign

Relations Power)
Vinuya, et al. v. Romulo, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010 and August 12, 2014 (MR)
Facts:
 A group called MALAYA-LOLAS, alleged victims of Japanese military sexual
slavery and abuses during the 2ndWorld War, sought to compel the Executive
Department (DOJ, DFA, and OSG) to espouse their claims for official apology and
other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice and
other international tribunals.
Issues:
 May the Executive be compelled, through an injunctive relief, by the Court?
Ruling:
 No. The Court can only urge and exhort the Executive Department.
Reasoning:
 Espousal of claims on behalf of nationals is a discretionary act lodged in the
Executive Branch.
 It is not the individual’s rights that are being asserted, but the state’s own rights.
 There is no sufficient evidence to establish a general international obligation for states
to exercise diplomatic protection of their own nationals abroad.
 The San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the Bilateral Reparations Agreement of
1956 have dealt with all claims of the Philippines and its nationals referring to Article
14 of the Treaty of Peace on payment of reparations for damage and suffering caused
by Japan and a waiver of all reparation claims arising out of any actions taken by
Japan.
 International settlements generally wipe out the underlying private claims thereby
terminating any recourse under domestic law.
70
 Tokyo courts have dismissed suits by former comfort women.

 The US tribunals have also dismissed similar suits.
 The Asian Women’s Fund was established in 1995 by Japan representing the
government’s concrete attempt to address its moral responsibility. A MOU was signed
in 1997 by the Philippines and Japan for medical and welfare support programs for
comfort women.
 There is no showing that crimes committed as of the Treaty of Peace constituted jus
cogens. Neither is the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes an erga
omnes obligation or part of jus cogens.
Bayan Muna v. Executive Secretary Romulo, G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011
Facts:
 In 2000, the Philippines signed the Rome Statute.
 In 2003, through an exchange of diplomatic notes, a Non-Surrender Agreement
(NSA) between U.S. and the Philippines sought to protect “persons” of R.P. and U.S.
from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in
international tribunals. The agreement prohibits surrender or transfer to any
international tribunal, or any other entity or third state for the purpose of surrender or
transfer to any international tribunal, unless the tribunal has been established by the
U.N. Security Council.
 The Philippines considered the exchange of diplomatic notes as mere executive
agreement while the U.S. treated it as legally binding under international law which
did not require the advice and consent of Senate.
Issue:
 Whether or not the NSA contravenes our obligation under the Rome Statute and
universally recognized principles of international law.
 Whether or not the NSA requires concurrence by the Senate.
Ruling:
 NSA is valid and constitutional.
Reasoning:
 Characterization of international agreements is not cast in stone. Choice of the form is
based on intent of parties.
 The principle of complementarity underpins the creation of ICC. Besides under
Article 98 of the Rome Statute, the ICC “may not proceed with a request for surrender
which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations
under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is
required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the court can first
obtain the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the
surrender.”
 The Philippines is a mere signatory State not ratifying State and, therefore, merely
obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty.
 But even under Article 90(4) of the Rome Statute, “if the requesting State is a State
not Party to this Statute, the requested State, if it is not under an international
71
obligation to extradite the person to the requesting State, shall give priority to the
request for surrender from the Court.”
 NSA does not amend R.A. No. 9851 on International Humanitarian Law, specifically
Section 17 (Jurisdiction) which provides options for the Philippine authorities, in the
event another court or international tribunal is already conducting investigation or
undertaking prosecution of crimes covered by R.A. No. 9851. The Philippine
authorities have the option to surrender or extradite suspected or accused persons in
the Philippines to an international court or to another State pursuant to extradition
laws and treaties. R.A. 9851 is a subsequent law to the NSA.
China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. v. Santamaria, 665 SCRA 189, February 7,
2012
Facts:
 Documents signed:
(1) MOU between CNMEG and NORTH RAIL – feasibility study on Railway line
Manila – San Fernando, La Union.
(2) MOU between EXIMBANK of China and DOF/GRP – China to give Preferential
Buyer’s Credit to GRP to finance Northrail Project.
(3) NOTE: China designated EXIMBANK as lender

GRP named DOF as borrower
(P 400,000,000 ; 20 yrs. to pay ; 3% / yr. interest)
CNMEG as Prime Contractor
(4) Northrail and CNMEG Contract to Construct - US$ 421,050,000
(5) GRP and EXIMBANK Counterpart Financial Agreement or Buyer Credit Loan
Agreement – EXIMBANK to extend Preferential Buyers Credit (US$
400,000,000) to finance construction of Northrail.
 Complaint to annul (1) Contract to Construct and (2) Loan Agreement
Issues:
 Nature of: (a) CNMEG – as agent of Chinese government.
(b) Northrail Project as product of executive agreement
(c) Transaction as jure imperii
Held: (a) CNMEG is not immune from suit.

(a) Contract agreement is not an executive agreement.
Reasoning:
 Two types of sovereign immunity: (a) absolute ; and, (b) restrictive.
 Prevailing practice is “restrictive immunity” in matters of purely commercial
activities of states.
 CNMEG is engaged in proprietary activity – construct railway.
 Read the Contract Agreement between CNMEG and Northrail in relation to other
documents (MOUs) showing that it is CNMEG’s initiative not the Chinese
Government’s intent to carry out transaction.
72
 CNMEG is a “state corporation” within PRC, but, the use of the term is only
descriptive of its nature as a GOCC and its assignment as Primary Contractor did not
imply it was acting on behalf of China in the performance of the latter’s sovereign
functions. It is akin to a GOCC without an original charter and, therefore, may be
sued and could sue under Section 36 of the Corporation Code.
 The Loan Agreement is not an executive agreement. The choice of laws of PRC as
governing law. There is a waiver of immunity. The Loan Agreement must be viewed
in relation to the Contract Agreement, i.e., purely commercial in nature.
 The certification executed by the Economic and Commercial Office of PRC’s
Embassy stating that the Northrail project is in pursuit of a sovereign activity is not
the kind of certification that can establish CNMEG’s entitlement to immunity from
suit. Neither would the OSG’s and OGCC’s indorsements be sufficient.
 An agreement to submit disputes to arbitration, similar to the U.S. Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 is an implicit waiver of immunity from suit. The place of
arbitration shall be in Hong Kong International Arbitration Center.
 The Contract Agreement is not an executive agreement because the contract shall be
construed in accordance with Philippine laws. It is but an ordinary commercial
contract.
Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) v. Munoz,

G.R. No. 207342, August 16, 2016
Facts:
 Juan Antonio Muñoz, a public servant, is the former head of the Treasury Department
of the Central Bank of the Philippines (CBP). He was instructed to raise 700 million
U.S. dollars to fund the buyback of Philippine debts and the purchase of zero coupon
U.S. Treasury bonds.
 Muñoz recommended that the amount obtained through gold loans/swaps, for which,
seven (7) contracts of 100 million U.S. dollars each were to be awarded to accredited
parties. Two (2) contracts were awarded to Mocatta, London.
 Muñoz allegedly entered into transactions with one Ho Chi (CHI), an executive of
Standard Chartered Bank – The Mocatta Group (Hongkong) (MHK). Some funds
were disbursed to the benefits of CHI and Muñoz personally without knowledge of
CBP.
 Muñoz was charged with criminal cases – three (3) counts of accepting an advantage
as an agent, contrary to Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap.
201 and seven (7) counts of conspiracy to defraud, contrary to Common Law of
HKSAR.
 HKSAR sent Note No. SBCR 11/1/2916/80 dated July 9, 1977 to the Philippine
Consulate General in Hong Kong for the purpose of extradition of Muñoz pursuant to
the HKSAR-RP extradition agreement of 1995. Muñoz was arrested but,
subsequently, allowed bail.
 The RTC ruled that the “crimes of conspiracy to defraud and accepting an advantage
as an agent” were extradible offenses.
 The CA, however, concluded on appeal by Muñoz, that the crime of “accepting an
advantage as an agent” should be excluded due to non-compliance with the double
criminality rule.
73
Issues:
 Is the crime of “accepting an advantage as an agent” compliant with the double
criminality rule”?
Ruling:
 No. The crime must be dropped from the request for extradition.
Reasoning:
 The crime of conspiracy to defraud included in the agreement is analogous to Article
315 (2) of the Revised Penal Code on “estafa through false pretense.” But it is
disputed that the crime of “accepting an advantage as an agent” is also punished as a
crime in the Philippines.
 Muñoz argued that the crime of “accepting an advantage as an agent” under
Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO), Cap. 201 applied to
private individuals not one belonging to the public sector. The RTC, on the otherhand,
concluded that this act was analogous to the crime of corrupt practices of public
officers, under Section 3 of R.A. 3019.
 Experts in Hong Kong shared the opinion that the POBO provision was derived from
Section 1 of the U.K. Prevention of Corruption Act of 1906 which pertained to private
sector bribery.
Article 8, Section 1 in relation to A17 (Justiciability; Constitutional

Amendments)
Philconsa v. GPH, G.R. Nos. 218406, 218761, 204355, 218407 and 204354
Facts:
 The government negotiating panel and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
negotiating panel signed the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB)
and the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) on 27 March 2014 and 12
October 2012, respectively.
 The CAB and FAB essentially called for an autonomous political entity named
Bangsamoro, replacing ARMM. Several Annexes and an Addendum were later signed
and formed part of the CAB and FAB. These additional instruments referred to
transitional arrangements, revenue generation and wealth sharing, power sharing,
normalization and Bangsamoro waters and Zones of Joint Cooperation. The
relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro is asymmetrical in
character.
 Petitioners questioned the CAB, FAB and its Annexes as unconstitutional for being a
mere reincarnation of the earlier Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain
with MILF but was declared unconstitutional.
 An implementing law, i.e., Bangsamoro Basic Law, has yet to be passed.
Issue:
 Whether the CAB, FAB and its annexes are unconstitutional?
74
Ruling:
 The petition is dismissed. Any question on the constitutionality, without the
implementing legislation (i.e. of Bangsamoro Basic Law), is premature.
Reasoning:
 The CAB and the FAB mandate the enactment of the Bangsamoro Basic Law in order
for these peace agreements to be implemented. In the MOA-AD, there was nothing in
the agreement which required the passage of any statute to implement the provisions
of the MOA-AD.
 Under the MOA-AD, the Executive branch assumed the mandatory obligation to
amend the Constitution to conform to the MOA-AD. In the present case, there is no
such guarantee.
 The Bangsamoro Transition Commission is tasked to draft proposals for Bangsamoro
Basic Law.
Article 8, Section 5(2) (a) (Standing)
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace

Southeast Asia (Philippines), G.R. No. 209271 and December 8, 2015 (MR) – (supra.)
Article 8, Section 5(2) (a) (Operative Fact)
Film Development Council v. Colon Heritage Realty Corporation, G.R. 203754, June 16,
2015
Facts:
 Cebu City passed an ordinance pursuant to Section 140 of the Local Government
Code, requiring proprietors, lessees or operators of theatres, cinemas, concert halls,
circuses, boxing stadia and other places of amusement, to pay an amusement tax
equivalent to 30% of the gross receipts of admission fees.
 A decade later, on June 7, 2002, R.A. 9167, amending Section 140 of the LCG,
created the Film Development Council of the Philippines and provided for an
amusement tax reward scheme for films which obtained “A” or “B” grading. All
revenue from the amusement tax on the graded film which may otherwise accrue to
the cities and municipalities in Metropolitan Manila and highly urbanized and
independent component cities in the Philippines shall be deducted and withheld by the
proprietors, operators, or lessees of theaters or cinemas and remitted to the Council
which shall reward the corresponding amusement tax to the producers of the graded
film. Cebu City never complied with the law.
 The Council demanded payment but Cebu City refused and, instead, filed for
declaratory relief before the RTC which declared Sections 13 and 14 of R.A. 9167 as
unconstitutional.
Issue:
75
 Did the RTC err in declaring Sections 13 and 14 of R.A. 9167 unconstitutional?
Ruling:
 No. However, all remittances of amusement taxes pursuant to Sections 13 and 14 of
R.A. 9187 prior to the date of finality of this Decision shall remain valid.
Reasoning:
 R.A. 9187 infringed on the principle of local autonomy. What Congress did in this
instance was not to exclude the authority to levy amusement taxes from the taxing
power of the covered LGUs, but to earmark, if not altogether confiscate, the income
to be received by the LGU from the taxpayers in favor of and for transmittal to FDCP,
instead of the taxing authority. This is a clear contravention of the constitutional
command that taxes levied by LGUs shall accrue exclusively to the LGUs and is
repugnant to the power of LGUs to apportion their resources in line with their
priorities.
 On the otherhand, to order the Council and the producers of graded films which may
have already received the amusement tax incentive reward pursuant to R.A. 9167, to
return the amounts received to the respective taxing authorities would impose a heavy
financial burden upon them, who merely relied on good faith in R.A. 9167. The
application of the operative facts doctrine is proper.
Article 8, Section 5(5) (Rule-Making Authority of the Supreme Court)
Estipona Jr. v. Hon. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017
Facts:
 Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. was accused of violating R.A. 9165, particularly Section 11,
Article II (possession of dangerous drugs). He filed a motion to be allowed to enter
into a plea bargaining agreement. Section 23 of R.A. 9165, however, prohibited plea
bargaining. Accused Estipona, Jr. argued that this violates the Rule 18 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure.
Issue:
 Does Section 23 of R.A 9165 violate the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court?
Ruling:
 Yes.
Reasoning:
 The 1987 Constitution altered the provisions of the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions by
deleting the concurrent power of Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying in one
body the Court’s rule – making powers.
76
 Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure found in Section 2 of Rule 116 and Rule 118 of
the 2000 Rules. It is allowed during arraignment, pre-trial, or even up to the point
when prosecution already rested its case.
Article 8, Section 8 and 9 (JBC; Nominations; Clustering)
Hon. Aguinaldo v. H.E. President Aquino III, G.R. 224302, November 29, 2016 and August 8,
2017 (MR)
Facts:
 The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) published in the Philippine dailies and posted on
the JBC website an announcement calling for applications or recommendations for the
six newly created position of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. Later, the JBC
submitted to the President six (6) Shortlists in six (6) separate letters.
 The President appointed six (6) new SB Associate Justices: Musngi and Econg (in
cluster 6); R. Cruz (in cluster 4); Mendoza-Arcega (in cluster 2); Miranda (in cluster
5); and Trespeses (in cluster 3).
 Petitioners, all nominees in the shortlist for the 16th SB Associate Justice, argued that
the President could only choose one nominee from each of the six separate shortlists
submitted by the JBC for each specific vacancy, and no other. They cited that the
appointments of Musngi and Econg, who belonged to the same shortlist for the
position of 21st Associate Justice in cluster 6 were in violation of Article 8, Section 9
of the Constitution.
Issue:
 Did the President violate Article 8, Section 9 of the Constitution?
Ruling:
 No. The clustering of nominees by the JBC is unconstitutional. The appointments of
Musngi and Econg are valid.
Reasoning:
 The JBC, in sorting the qualified nominees into six (6) clusters, one for every
vacancy, could influence the appointment process beyond its constitutional mandate
of recommending qualified nominees to the President. Clustering impinges upon the
President’s power of appointment, as well as restricts the chances for appointment of
the qualified nominees.
 The Court noted that clustering is a new practice of the JBC. Previously, the JBC
submitted only one shortlist for two or more vacancies in a collegiate court.
 To meet the minimum requirement under Article 8, Section 9, on the three (3)
nominees per vacancy, there should at least be 3 nominees from the JBC for the six
(6) vacancies.
Article 10, Section 6 (Just Share in National Taxes)
77
Villafuerte v. Robredo, G.R. 195390 December 10, 2014.
Mandanas v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. 199802, July 3, 2018 – computation of just
share
Article 10, Section 6 (Just Share in National Taxes) and Article 10, Section
10 (Creation of Cities) in relation to Article 3 (Equal Protection)
League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499, 178056,
November 18, 2008; March 31, 2009; December 21, 2009; August 24, 2010; February 15,
2011; April 12, 2011; June 28, 2011
Facts:
 Constitutionality of Cityhood Laws

 11th Congress - 33 municipalities converted to cities but 24 other municipalities
not acted upon.
 12th Congress - R.A. No. 9009 (30 June 2001) amended LGC, Section 450
increasing annual income requirement for conversion of a
municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million.
12th Congress - Joint Resolution No. 29 sought to exempt from the P100
million income requirement the 24 municipalities but the 12 th
Congress ended without Senate approving JR No. 29.
 th
13 Congress - House of Representatives re-adopted JR No. 29 as JR No. 1 but
Senate failed to approve.
th
13 Congress - 16 of the 24 municipalities filed cityhood bills, with a common
provision exempting them from P100 million income
requirement, which were approved by both Houses (except
Naga, Cebu which was passed later); cityhood bills lapsed into
law.
Issue:
 Alleged violation of Article 3 (equal protection) and Article 10, Sections 6 and 10.
Ruling:
 November 18, 2008 (Carpio) – Cityhood Laws unconstitutional (6-5)
 March 31, 2009 (MR) – Denied MR (6-6)
 April 28, 2009 – Denied 2nd MR (6-6)
 December 21, 2009 (Velasco) – Constitutional (6-4)
 August 4, 2010 (Carpio) – Unconstitutional (7-6)
 February 5, 2011 (Bersamin) – Constitutional (7-6)
 April 12, 2011 (Bersamin) – Ad Cautelam MR denied (6-6)
 June 28, 2011 (Bersamin) – MR denied and Entry of Judgment granted (7-5)
Reasoning:
 Article 10, Section 10, which sets the standard for the creation of LGUs by
mentioning the “criteria established in the local government code and subject to the
78
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected,” has been interpreted to mean that:
“Congress can, via either a consolidated set of laws or a much simpler,

single-subject enactment, impose the said verifiable criteria of
viability. These criteria need not be embodied in the Local
Government Code, albeit this Code is the ideal repository to ensure, as
much as possible, the element of uniformity. Congress can even, after
making a codification, enact an amendatory law, adding it to the
existing layers of indicators earlier codified ... In this case, the
amendatory R.A. No. 9009 upped the already codified income
requirement from PhP20 million to PhP100 million. At the end of the
day, the passage of amendatory laws is no different from the enactment
of laws, i.e., the cityhood laws specifically exempting a particular
political subdivision from the criteria earlier mentioned. Congress, in
enacting the exempting law/s, effectively decreased the already
codified indicators.”
 No substantial reduction in “just share” of LCP after Cityhood Laws. Shares, in fact,
increased.
 The deliberations in the Senate (between Drilon and Pimentel) indicated the non-
retroactivity of R.A. No. 9009 to pending cityhood bills.
 There is substantial distinction because the 16 respondent LGUs had pending
cityhood bills before R.A. No. 9009. They complied with all the requisites under the
old Section 450 of the LGC. The extraneous circumstances which left the bills
unacted upon by Congress were not attributable to respondent LGUs.
Article 10, Sections 8 (Term of Local Officials)
Abundo v. COMELEC, G.R. 201716, January 8, 2013 – three-term limit
Naval v. COMELEC, G.R. 207851, July 8, 2014
Article 10, Sections 10 (Creation of Province)
Navarro v. Ermita, G.R. No. 180050, July 20, 2012 (1st Decision) and April 12, 2011 (MR)
Facts:
 R.A. No. 9355 created the Province of Dinagat Islands out of Surigao del Norte.
 Petitioners opposed the law because Dinagat had 802.12 sq. kms. only and a
population of only 106,951 contrary to the requirement of Article 10, Section 10 of
the Constitution and Section 461 of the Local Government Code.
79
 The LGC provides for 2,000 sq. kms. and 250,000 population for creation of a
province.
Issue:
 Constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355.
Ruling:
 1st decision – unconstitutional.
 2nd decision – constitutional.
Reasoning:
 Under Article 9 (2) of the IRR of the LGC: “The land area requirement shall not apply
where the proposed province is composed of 1 or more islands.”
 In Section 442 and 450 of the LGC if the LGU to be created is a municipality or a
component city, consisting of 1 or more islands, then, these are exempt from the land
area requirement. This is absent in section 461 of the LGC (referring to a province)
but is in Article 9 (2) of the IRR of LGC.
 There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and
municipalities, but not to provinces. There was an inadvertent omission in Section 461
of the LGC. The IRR intended to correct the Congressional oversight.
Cagas v. COMELEC, G.R. 209185, October 25, 2013 – plebiscite.
Umali v. COMELEC, G.R. 203974, April 22, 2014 – plebiscite in Cabanatuan.
Article 10, Sections 14 (Regional Development Councils)
Pimentel v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, 676 SCRA 551 [2012]
Article 10, Sections 15-22 (ARMM), in relation to Article 6, Section 1

(Legislative Power), Article 6, Section 16 (2) (Majority Vote), Article 6,
Section 26 (2) (Urgent Bills), Article 7, Section 16 (Appointment), and
Article 18, Sections 1, 2 and 5 (Transitory Provisions)
80
Abas Kida v. Senate, G.R. Nos. 196271, 196305, 197221, 197280, 197282, 197392, 197454,
October 18, 2011
Facts:
 R.A. No. 10153 of 2011 was passed providing for the synchronization of the elections
in ARMM with national and local elections and it also granted the President the power
to appoint OICs for the Regional Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly.
 Since the passage of the Organic Act for ARMM (R.A. No. 9054), several
amendments also allowed re-setting of ARMM regional elections.
Issues:
 Validity of synchronization of elections.
 Validity of passage of R.A. No. 10153 in relation to Article 6, Section 26 (2),
 Validity of a supermajority vote and plebiscite (2/3 of both Houses voting separately)
in amending or revising ARMM Law (R.A. No. 9054) in relation to Article 6, Section
1 and 16 (2).
 Is ARMM autonomy violated?
 Validity of grant of power to the President to appoint OICs.
 Validity ofspecial elections.
Ruling:
 R.A. No. 10153 is constitutional.
Reasoning:
 The Transitory Provisions contemplating synchronization of national and local
elections include regional elections (“local”).
 Presidential certification of R.A. No. 10153 as urgent is allowed with a waiver of the
“3-separate days readings” requirement pursuant to Article 6, Section 26 (2), as
interpreted in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance.
 R.A. No. 10153 and R.A. No. 9333, which re-set ARMM elections, did not amend the
ARMM Law (R.A. No. 9054) because the latter did not fix the date of the regular
elections in ARMM but merely fixed the first ARMM elections.
 The supermajority voting in R.A. No. 9054 is unconstitutional because even Article 6,
Section 16 (2) only requires a simple majority to constitute a quorum to do business.
To allow a supermajority vote would give R.A. No. 9054 the character of an
irrepealable law.
 Even the plebiscite requirement under R.A. No. 9054 for amending the date of
ARMM elections is inconsistent with Article 10, Section 18 of the Constitution
because only amendments to the Organic Act in the following instances require
notification through a plebiscite:
(a) Basic structure of regional government; (b) region’s judicial system; and, (c)
grant and extent of legislative powers constitutionally conceded to the regional
government under Article 10, Section 20 of the Constitution.
 The appointment of OICs as interim measure has been done in the creation of Quezon
del Sur and Dinagat Islands. Holdover violates the express mandate under Article 10,
81
Section 8 of the Constitution. Holdover, by exception, has been allowed only in

regard to barangay or Sanggunian Kabataan officials whose terms of office are not
explicitly provided for in the Constitution. Comelec has no power to order special
elections except as provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body to
whom Congress may have delegated a power to ascertain or fill-in details. B.P. No.
881 only allows Comelec to postpone elections due to unforeseen circumstances.
 The power to appoint OICs is justified by Article 7, Section 16 on the third group of
officers, i.e., “those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint.” R.A.
No. 10153 is the source of such power in this instance.
 Autonomy is not violated. Besides autonomy cannot defeat national policies and
concerns.
Article 11, Section 3 (5) (Simultaneous Referral of Complaints)
Gutierrez v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011
Facts:
 On July 22, 2010, Rissa Hontiveros-Baraquel, et al. filed an impeachment complaint
against Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez upon endorsement of Party List
Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello.
 On July 27, 2010, the complaint was transmitted to House Speaker Belmonte.
 On August 3, 2010, Renato Reyes, et al. filed another impeachment complaint against
the Ombudsman with a resolution of endorsement by another group of Party List
Representatives. On even date, the House of Representatives provisionally adopted
the Rule of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress.
 On August 10, 2010, the two complaints were included in the Order of Business for
the following day, August 11, 2010.
 On August 11, 2010, the House of Representatives simultaneously referred both
complaints to the Committee of Justice.
 On September 1, 2010, the Committee on Justice found both complaints sufficient in
form and considered these as having been referred to it at exactly the same time.
 Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15 th Congress
was published on September 2, 2010.
 On September 7, 2010, Ombudsman Gutierrez applied for injunctive reliefs with the
Supreme Court. A status quo ante order (SQAO) was issued by the Court en banc.
Issue:
 Validity of simultaneous referral of impeachment complaints.
Ruling:
 Valid referrals.
Reasoning:
 In exercising its power of judicial review, the Court noted that “ (t)he unusual act of
simultaneously referring to public respondent (Committee on Justice) two
impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial power.”
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 The Court was asked by the Ombudsman to look into the narration of facts
constitutive of the offenses in relation to her submission disclaiming the allegations in
the complaints. To this the Court reiterated the Francisco ruling that such
determination is a “purely political question.”
 On the matter of provisional adoption of the Rules of Impeachment of the 14 th
Congress, to meet the exigency of early filing, the Court found no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the House of Representatives.
 Neither would the absence of publication in the Official Gazette or newspaper of
general circulation amount to a violation of due process in light of the “discretion of
Congress to determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules.”
 Finally, the Court found nothing objectionable to the simultaneous referral of multiple
complaints filed. Applying the Francisco ruling, the Court said that “referring the
complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment proceeding.”
NOTE: The Supreme Court rulings on impeachment cases have so far indicated that the
Court will readily review questions of law arising from impeachment proceedings.
However, there is no indication concretely of a matter which has been raised from the
impeachment trial itself that has been ruled upon by the Court except for the fact of
declaring that the impeachment trial has been rendered functus officio in the Estrada case,
including the possibility of prosecution of the respondent thereafter. The all-embracing
provision of Article 8, Section 1 of the Constitution on the power of the Supreme Court to
declare an act of the Impeachment Court as in grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction remains to be tested. The following cases are also
instructive:
(a) Romulo v. Yñiguez
On August 13, 1985, more than one-fifth (1/5) of all members of the
Batasan signed Resolution No. 644 calling for the impeachment of President
Marcos together with a verified complaint for impeachment. The Committee on
Justice, Human Rights and Good Government found the complaint not sufficient in
form and substance and dismissed all the charges contained in the complaint.
Attempts by the petitioners, mostly opposition members in the Batasan, to recall
from the archives Resolution No. 644 and the verified complaint were disapproved
by the Batasan.
On August 17, 1985, in G.R. No. L-71688, IBP members Arturo M. De

Castro and Perfecto L. Cagampang, filed a petition to annul the Resolution of the
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government but the Supreme
Court held in a Resolution dated September 3, 1985 that the action of the
Committee involves a political question. The Court further noted that the petition
failed to allege that the Batasan had violated any provision of the Constitution. It
emphasized:
“x x x The fact that the Committee on Justice dismissed the petition on the same
day it was filed after deliberating on it for several hours as reported in the
newspapers, radio and television (which must have been the bases of petitioners’
claim that the Committee had acted with undue haste in unceremoniously
dismissing the complaint for impeachment) does not provide basis for concluding
that there had been a violation of any provision of the Constitution which would
justify the Court’s intervention to ensure proper observance of constitutional norms
and conduct.”
Finally, the Court maintained that “(t)he interpretation and application of

(impeachment) rules are beyond the powers of the Court to review.” It declined to
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issue a writ of mandamus against the Batasan in deference to the doctrine of

separation of powers.
The present petitioners, Romulo, et al., alleged that Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings are unconstitutional principally
because these rules “empowered a smaller body to supplant and overrule the
complaint to impeach endorsed by the requisitive 1/5 of all the members of the
Batasan Pambansa and that said questioned provisions derail the impeachment
proceedings at various stages by vesting the Committee on Justice, etc, the power
to impeach or not to impeach, when such prerogative belongs solely to Batasan
Pambansa as a collective body.”
The Supreme Court noted that petitioners are seeking relief “in order that the
impeachment trial can be conducted forthwith by the Batasan as a body.”
Answering in the negative, the Court found no inconsistency in the Rules in
relation to the Constitution.”
(b) In Re Raul M. Gonzales
A letter-complaint against Justice Marcelo B. Fernan dated December 14,

1987 was filed by Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court before the
Tanodbayan/Special Prosecutor Raul M. Gonzales. The latter endorsed the letter to
the Supreme Court on March 16, 1988.
The letter contained, among others, charges for disbarment of Justice

Fernan. On February 17, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the charges for utter
lack of merit and required complainant to show cause why he should not be
administratively dealt with for making unfounded serious accusations against
Justice Fernan.
In dismissing the charges against a sitting magistrate, the Supreme Court

reasoned out in the following manner:
“It is important to underscore the rule of constitutional law here involved. The
principle may be succinctly formulated in the following terms: A public officer who
under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a
qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only
by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of
such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be
charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any court with any offense which
carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service of which
would amount to removal from office.”
The Court emphasized the underlying rule behind the strict constitutional
route under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution:
“The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence and
separation of powers x x x. Without the protection of this rule, Members of the
Supreme Court would be vulnerable to all manner of charges which might be
brought against him by unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties
who, for any number of reasons, might seek to affect the exercise of judicial
authority by the Court.”
(c) Estrada v. Desierto
On October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. accused President

Estrada of receiving P220 million in jueteng money from Governor Singson from
November 1998 to August 2000 and that the President took from Governor Singson
P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. A joint
84
investigation was conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and the
Committee on Justice. On the part of the House of Representatives, a similar
investigation was conducted by the Committee on Public Order and Security.
Other representatives moved to impeach the President.
On November 13, 2000, House Speaker Villar, presiding over a

tumultuous session, transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115
representatives to the Senate. Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
presided over the trial.
The testimony of Clarissa Ocampo revealed that she was one foot away
from the President when he affixed the signature “Jose Velarde” on documents
involving a P500 million investment agreement with Ocampo’s bank on February
4, 2000. Further revelations by other witnesses led to an intensified trial.
On January 16, 2001, on an 11-10 vote, the senator-judges ruled against

the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing
the President held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name “Jose
Velarde.” This triggered a walkout by the public and private prosecutors and
spontaneous outburst of anger by the public.
On January 17, 2001 the public prosecutors tendered collective resignation

and withdrew their appearance with the impeachment court. Senator Raul Roco
moved for the indefinite postponement of the impeachment proceedings until
resolution of the issue of resignation of the public prosecutors.
Meanwhile, mass action against the Estrada Administration led to the

change in power in favor of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the

Impeachment Court is functus officio and has been terminated.
Former President Estrada later faced criminal charges before the Office of
the Ombudsman. He instituted the present suits principally to enjoin the
Ombudsman from resolving the criminal cases.
The Supreme Court addressed, among others, the issue of “Whether

conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the
criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada.”
The Court ruled that “since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio,
it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then
convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual
bar against his prosecution.”
(d) Francisco v. The House of Representatives, et al.
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution (H.

R. No. 260), sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which
directed the Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation,
on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). This would later on
trigger on June 2, 2003 the filing of an impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and seven Associate Justices.
85
On October 13, 2003, the House Committee on Justice ruled that the
impeachment complaint was sufficient in form but voted to dismiss it on October
22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. The Committee Report was not sent to
the House in plenary in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution.
Later, a second impeachment complaint was filed four months and three
weeks since the filing of the first complaint on June 2, 2003 by Representative
Gilberto C. Teodoro and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Davide,
Jr. founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by the
Resolution No. 60. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all
the Members of The House of Representatives.
The Supreme Court’s exercise of its power of judicial review was pleaded
by petitioners in determining the validity of the filing of a second impeachment
allegedly in violation of the “one impeachment in one year” rule under Section 3(5)
of Article XI of the Constitution.
Of special interest is the argument raised by the legislators on the need for
judicial restraint in addressing issues confronting the Impeachment Court. The
Supreme Court categorically declared that “the power of judicial review includes
the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.”
Speaker de Venecia raised the fear that judicial review of impeachment

might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between Congress and the Judiciary. But
according to the Supreme Court “a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court
to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases.”
The Court proceeded to inquire into the validity of Sections 16 and 17 of

Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules in relation to Section 3(5) of Article XI of
the Constitution on the meaning of the term “initiate.”
Citing the Constitutional Commission proceedings, the Court found that

“the word ‘initiate’ in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the
complaint and take initial action on it.” Amicus curiae Father Joaquin G. Bernas,
S.J. explained:
“x x x that when Section 3(5) says, ‘No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period of one year,’ it means that
no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on
Justice for action.”
Thus, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules,

providing a different meaning to the term “initiate,” ran afoul the constitutional
standard. Initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint
and referral to the House Committee on Justice. Considering that the first
impeachment complaint was filed on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint on
October 23, 2003 violates the Constitution.
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Article 11, Section 5 and 12 (Independence of the Ombudsman; Power to

Investigate)
Gonzales III v. Office of the President, 714 SCRA 611
Facts:
 Manila Police District Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza and four others were
charged with robbery, grave threat, robbery exhortation and physical injury. An
administrative charge for grave misconduct was subsequently filed with the National
Police Commission (NAPOLCOM).
 Emilio A. Gonzales III, Deputy Ombudsman for military and other law enforcement
officers, directed NAPOLCOM to turn over the record of Mendoza’s case to his
office. On February 16, 2009, after preparing a draft decision on Mendoza’s case,
Gonzales forwarded the entire records to the office of then Ombudsman Merceditas
Gutierrez for her review. The latter approved Gonzales’ recommendation finding
Mendoza guilty of grave misconduct and imposed the penalty of dismissal. Mendoza
filed a motion for reconsideration.
 On August 23, 2010, pending final action by the Ombudsman, Mendoza hijacked a
tourist bus and held the foreign tourist as hostages. The hostage-taking ended
tragically, resulting in deaths of Mendoza and some tourists. In the aftermath,
President Aquino directed DOJ and DILG to investigate the incident. The
investigation report found the Ombudsman and Gonzales accountable for their “gross
negligence and grave misconduct in handling the case against Mendoza.” Gonzales
was formally charged before the office of the President and found guilty for Gross
Neglect of Duty. He was dismissed from the service.
Issue:
 Does the Office of the President have administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over a
Deputy Ombudsman?
Ruling:
 No.
Reasoning:
 Under Section 21 of R.A. 6770, it is the Ombudsman who exercises administrative
disciplinary jurisdiction over the Deputy Ombudsman.
 Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770 is unconstitutional with respect to the Office of the
Ombudsman. The exercise of the President of the power to remove a Deputy
Ombudsman violates the independence of the office of the Ombudsman.
 Executive power to remove and discipline key officials of the Ombudsman would
result in an absurd situation wherein the office of the Ombudsman is given the duty to
adjudicate on the integrity and competences of the very persons who can remove or
suspend its members.
87
Article 11, Section 13 (Powers of the Ombudsman; Injunctions against

Investigation conducted by Ombudsman) in relation to “Condonation
Doctrine”
Carpio-Morales v. CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015
Facts:
 The Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) issued an Order preventively suspending

Mayor Binay, Jr. and other public officials of the City of Makati in relation to various
cases accusing them of plunder and corruption. The Court of Appeals (CA) issued a
temporary restraining order (TRO) against implementation of the OMB’s order.
 The OMB argued that the CA had no jurisdiction to issue a TRO citing Section 14 of
R.A. 6770 which states that no injunctive writ could be issued to delay the OMB’s
investigation unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter is outside
the latter’s jurisdiction.
 Mayor Binas, Jr. argues, on the otherhand, that the OMB committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and posits that it is incumbent
upon the OMB to have been apprised of the condonation doctrine in determining the
imposition of the preventive suspension.
Issues:
 Is Section 14 of R.A. 6770 constitutional?

 Is the condonation doctrine applicable?
Ruling:
 The second paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. 6770 is unconstitutional.

 The condonation doctrine is abandoned.
Reasoning:
 Section 14 of R.A. 6770 which provides that “no appeal or application for remedy
may be heard against the decision or findings of the OMB, with the exception of the
Supreme Court on pure question of law” is vague. Congress cannot alter procedural
matter in the Rules of Court. In fact, the questioned provision increased the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction without its consent under Article 6, Section 30 of the
Constitution.
 The CA, therefore, has subject matter jurisdiction over Mayor Binay, Jr.’s petition.
 The Court finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine which
originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija
under the 1935 Constitution.
 Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, however, liability
arising from administrative offenses may be condoned by the President under Section
19, Article 7 of the Constitution as interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos.
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 This abandonment of the doctrine should be prospective in application.
Article 12, Section 2 (Service Contract)

Resident Marine Mammals v. Secretary Reyes, G.R. 180771 and 181527
Facts:
 A Service Contract between the Philippine Government thru DOE Secretary Vicente
S. Reyes, Jr. and Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. (JAPEX) was entered into which
allowed the exploration, development and exploitation of petroleum resources within
Tanon Strait, a narrow passage of water situated between the islands of Negros and
Cebu.
 Petitioners are toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises and other cetacean species, which
inhabit the water in the Tanon Strait. These are joined by legal guardians and friends
known as “stewards”.
Issues:
 Do the mammals have standing?
 Is the Service Contract valid?
Ruling:
 The mammals do not have standing.
 The Service Contract is void. It was not signed by the President.
Reasoning:
 Our own Rules of Court demand that parties to a suit be either natural or juridical. In
this case, the stewards are the real parties in interest.
 In La Bugal, the Court held that the deletion of words “Service Contract” in the 1987
Constitution did not amount to a ban on them per se.
 Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements (FTAA) under the present Constitution
are in fact service contracts but entered into with foreign corporations acting as
contractors. The safeguards today include the President as signatory to FTAAs with a
notice requirements to Congress within 30 days of the executed agreement.
Article 12, Section 10 (in relation to A14, Section 15 (Historic Sites: Arts
and Culture) and A3, Section 9 (Expropriation)
Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, G.R. No. 213948, April 25, 2017
Facts:
89
 DMCI planned to construct the Torre de Manila 49-storey condominium located near
Taft Avenue, Ermita beside the former Jai-Alai Building behind the Rizal Park. The
City Council of Manila temporarily suspended the Building Permit on the ground that
the condominium will rise up high above the back of the national monument to clearly
dwarf the statue of Jose Rizal. Later, on 23 December 2013, the Manila Zoning Board
of Adjustments recommended approval of DMCI’s project which was eventually
adopted by the City Council.
 The Knights of Rizal (KOR) argued that the Rizal Monument, as a National Treasure,
is entitled to full protection of the law. KOR cited the National Historical Commission
of the Philippines (NHCP) Guidelines on Monuments Honoring National Heroes,
Illustrious Filipinos and other Personages, and the International Charter for the
Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites (Venice Charter) to bolster its
claim.
 Article 14, Section 15 has also been cited as a source of constitutional duty of the
State to conserve, promote, and popularize the nation’s historical and cultural
heritage.
Issue:
 Was there a violation of the Constitution when DMCI was allowed to construct a
condominium at the back of Rizal’s monument?
Ruling:
 No.
Reasoning:
 No law prohibits the construction. City Ordinance 8119 on historic sites is a mere
“guide” but does not prohibit construction of a building outside a historic site or
facility.
 R.A. 10066 protects the physical integrity of heritage property if there is a danger of
destruction or significant alteration from its original state.
 Stoppage of DMCI’s construction would constitute a taking without compensation.
 The Venice Charter is a mere codification of guiding principles and not a treaty
instrument.
 DMCI’s condominium is not a nuisance per se.
 The SC is not a trier of facts, RTC is the proper venue.
 Article 14, Section 15 is not a self-executing provision.
Article 12, Section 2 (Service Contract)

Resident Marine Mammals v. Secretary Reyes, G.R. 180771 and 181527
Facts:
90
 A Service Contract between the Philippine Government thru DOE Secretary Vicente
S. Reyes, Jr. and Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. (JAPEX) was entered into which
allowed the exploration, development and exploitation of petroleum resources within
Tanon Strait, a narrow passage of water situated between the islands of Negros and
Cebu.
 Petitioners are toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises and other cetacean species, which
inhabit the water in the Tanon Strait. These are joined by legal guardians and friends
known as “stewards”.
Issues:
 Do the mammals have standing?
 Is the Service Contract valid?
Ruling:
 The mammals do not have standing.
 The Service Contract is void. It was not signed by the President.
Reasoning:
 Our own Rules of Court demand that parties to a suit be either natural or juridical. In
this case, the stewards are the real parties in interest.
 In La Bugal, the Court held that the deletion of words “Service Contract” in the 1987
Constitution did not amount to a ban on them per se.
 Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements (FTAA) under the present Constitution
are in fact service contracts but entered into with foreign corporations acting as
contractors. The safeguards today include the President as signatory to FTAAs with a
notice requirements to Congress within 30 days of the executed agreement.
Article 12, Section 11 (Foreign Ownership in Public Utility)

Gamboa v. Secretary Teves, et al., G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011 (1st Decision) and October
9, 2012 (MR)
Facts:
 PLDT is a telecom franchise holder licensed in 1928.
 In 1969, GTE, an American company and a major stockholder of PLDT sold 26% of
outstanding common shares to Philippine Telecom Investment Corporation (PTIC).
 In 1977, Prime Holdings (PHI) became owners of 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC but
these shares (46.125 of outstanding capital stock of PTIC) were sequestered by PCGG
and declared as owned by the Republic.
 In 1999, First Pacific, a Bermuda-registered, Hong Kong-based firm, acquired 54% of
outstanding capital stock of PTIC.
 In December 2006, Parallax Venture Fund bid for the 46.125% of outstanding capital
stock of PTIC.
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 First Pacific announced its right of first refusal as a PTIC stockholder and interest to
buy the 46.125% shares, but failed to do so.
 In February 2007, First Pacific, through its subsidiary, MPAH, entered into a
conditional sale of the 46.125% shares.
 PTIC being a stockholder of PLDT, the sale of 46.125% of PTIC shares is an indirect
sale of 12 million shares or 6.3% of outstanding common shares of PLDT.
 With the sale, First Pacific’s common shareholding in PLDT increased from 30.7% to
37%, thereby increasing the common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to 81.47%
Issues:
 Does the transaction violate Article 12, Section 11 which limits foreign ownership of
the capital of a public utility to not more than 40%?
 What does “capital” mean in Article 12, Section 11?
Ruling:
1st Decision
 The term “capital” refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of
directors, and thus only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital
stock (common and non-voting preferred shares).
2nd Decision— Motions for Reconsideration denied.

 The Court emphasized that the term “capital” refers to shares with full beneficial
ownership. This is precisely because the right to vote in the election of directors,
coupled with full beneficial ownership of stocks, translates to effective control of a
corporation.
Reasoning:
 The interpretation is consistent with the intent of the framers of the Constitution to
place in the hands of Filipino citizens the control and management of public utilities.
The deliberations of the Con-Com reveal that “capital” refers to voting stock or
controlling interest.
 By way of illustration, there will be a glaring circumvention of the Constitution if a
broad definition of capital were to be applied as follows: “Let us assume a corporation
has 100 common shares owned by foreigners and 1,000,000 non-voting preferred
shares owned by Filipinos, with both classes of share having a par value of one peso
(P1.00) per share. Under the broad definition of the term capital, such corporation
would be considered compliant with the 40% constitutional limit on foreign equity of
public utilities... This is obviously absurd. In the example given, only the foreigners
holding common shares have voting rights in the election of directors, even if they
hold only 100 shares.”
 PLDT does not dispute that, in fact, foreigners hold 120,046,690 common shares
while Filipinos hold only 66,750,622 (64.27% - 35.73% ratio). This is effective
control by foreigners.
Roy III v. Chairperson Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016
92
Facts:
 The Securities and Exchange Commission issued Memo Cir. No. 8, Series of 2013
pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court in Gamboa v. Finance Secretary Teves
(G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011 and October 9, 2012) where it interpreted Article 12,
Section 11 of the Constitution as follows:
“ …the term ‘capital’ in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987

Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the
election of directors, and thus in the present case only to common
shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock (common and
non-voting shares). Respondent Chairperson of the Securities and
Exchange Commission is DIRECTED to apply this definition of the
term ‘capital’ in determining the extent of allowable foreign
ownership in respondent Long Distance Telephone Company, and if
there is a violation of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, to
impose the appropriate sanctions under the law.”
 Pursuant to the Gamboa directive, Section 2 of SEC-MC No. 8 provides:
“Section 2. All categories shall, at all times, observe the

constitutional or statutory ownership requirement. For purposes of
determining compliance therewith, the required percentage of
Filipino ownership shall be applied to BOTH (a) the total number of
outstanding shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of
directors; and, (b) the total number of outstanding shares of stock,
whether or not entitled to vote.”
Issue:
 Is SEC-MC No. 8 constitutional?
Ruling:
 Yes.
Reasoning:
 SEC-MC No. 8 is consistent with the Gamboa decision and resolution and is not
tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Article 13, Section 4 (Rights of Farmers and Farmworkers) in relation to

Article 3, Section 1(Due Process) and Article 3, Section 10(Contract Clause)
Hacienda Luisita Inc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, et al., G.R. No. 171101, July
5, 2011
Facts:
 Hacienda Luisita (HL) was bought by TADECO (owned by Jose Cojuangco) from
Compania Tabacalera in 1950s.
93
 On May 7, 1980 the Martial Law Administration filed a suit before RTC-Manila
against TADECO, et al. to surrender HL to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform so that
the land can be distributed to farmers at cost. The RTC ordered TADECO to surrender
HL.
 On March 17, 1988 the OSG moved to withdraw the government’s case against
TADECO which the Court of Appeals granted but subject to the obtention by
TADECO of PARC’s approval of a stock distribution plan (SDP). R.A. No. 6657,
Section 31 allows either land or stock transfer as options for farmer beneficiaries.
 TADECO later organized a spin-off corporation, HLI, as vehicle to facilitate stock
acquisition. TADECO assigned and conveyed to HLI 4,915.75 hectares in exchange
for HLI shares of stock.
 On May 9, 1989, 93% of farmworker-beneficiaries complement of HL voted for SDP
and a MOA was entered into by TADECO, HLI and farmworkers.
 On October 14, 1989. 5,117 farmworkers, in a follow-up referendum by DAR, opted
to receive shares while 132 chose actual land distribution.
 On August 15, 1995, HLI applied for conversion of 500 hectares to industrial use.
Another 80.51 hectares were detached from coverage as part of SCTEX, only
4,335.75 hectares remained of the 4,915 hectares TADECO ceded to HLI.
 In 2003, a Supervisory Group of HLI sought revocation of the SDOA.
 DAR Secretary Pangandaman recommended revocation and the acquisition of HL
through compulsory acquisition scheme. The PARC endorsed DAR’s actions. A
Mediation Panel failed to settle various disputes arising from the emergence of a new
faction from the farmer-beneficiaries.
Issues:
 Validity of PARC’s revocation of the SDOA in relation to vested property rights of an
innocent purchaser for value over portions of converted property covered by notice of
coverage.
 Constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657, Section 31 (stock distribution).
Ruling:
 PARC has authority to revoke the SDOA by necessary implication from R.A. No.
6657 which gives it authority in the first place to approve the SDOA.
 There is no impingement of the impairment clause. A law authorizing interference in
contractual relations is deemed read into the contract. The SDOA is a special contract
imbued with public interest. The rights, obligations and remedies of the parties to the
SDOA are governed by R.A. No. 6657, a special law. The present impasse between
HLI and private respondents is not an intra-corporate dispute.
 R.A. No. 6657, Section 31 is constitutional and does not violate Article 13, Section 4.
Besides, R.A. No. 6657, Section 31 vis-a-vis stock distribution has now been
amended by R.A. No. 9700, Section 5 which provides: “That after June 30, 2009, the
modes of acquisition shall be limited to voluntary offer to sell and compulsory
acquisition.”
 Article 13, Section 4 has not been violated insofar as it provides farmers who are
landless to own directly or collectively the lands they till.
 Innocent purchasers for value of converted portions of HL are protected.
 6,296 qualified farmer-beneficiaries have the right to choose whether to remain as
HLI stockholders or not, pursuant to the 2010 Compromise Agreement.
94
 The reckoning date for “taking” is November 21, 1989 when PARC approved HLI’s
SDP.
On Motion for Reconsideration (November 22, 2011):
 Motion for Reconsideration partially granted with respect to the option granted to the
original farmworker-beneficiaries of HL to remain with HLI which is recalled and set
aside.
Article 14, Section 4 (3) in relation to A6, Section 28 (3) (Tax Exempting
Educational Institutions)
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. DLSU, G.R. Nos. 196596, 198841, and 198941,
Nov. 9, 2016
Facts:
 The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) assessed DLSU deficiency taxes: (1) income
tax on rental earnings from restaurants/canteens and bookstores operating within the
campus; (2) value-added tax (VAT) on the business income; and, (3) documentary
stamp tax (DST) on loans and lease contracts. DLSU protested citing Article IV,
Section 4 (3) exempting all revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational
institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes from
taxes and duties.
Issue:
 Is DLSU exempt from a portion of its rental income?
Ruling:
 DLSU is exempt from a portion of its rental income.
Reasoning:
 The taxpayer institution must show proof that revenues and assets of its institution
must have been used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes before
it can claim exemption.
 DLSU is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution.
 DLSU is granted a broader tax privilege, while those institutions subject of Article 6,
Section 28(3) are exempt merely from property tax. It only exempts the assets, while
DLSU’s revenues and assets used actually, directly and exclusively for educational
purposes are exempt from taxes and duties.
95

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File with Blythe_rev 2018Oct 12

DEAN SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA

Article 1 (National Territory)

Magallona v. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011

Article 2, Section 1 (Government)

Update of PCA judgment

29 October 2015 – Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility

The Tribunal’s Award:

1. China’s non-participation does not deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction.

12 July 2016 – Award on the Merits

Issues raised and the Tribunal’s Rulings

1. China’s historic right claim (nine-dash line):

2. On Geologic Features in the Spratlys:

3. On China-Occupied Geologic Features in Spratlys:

Reed Bank (totally submerged) is part of Philippine EEZ

Ayungin Shoal (occupied by the Philippines) is an LTE within Philippine EEZ.

5. On Harm to the Environment:

Enforcement of the Award

Article 2, Section 3 (AFP as Protector) in Relation to Article 3, Section 1

Article 2, Section 14 (Equality Between Women and Men) in relation to

Article 2, Section 12 (Sanctity of Family Life; Right of the Unborn) in

Imbong v. Hon. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014

 Section 7 (in relation to RH-IRR)

(b) allowing minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to

 Section 23(a)(2)(i) (in relation to RH-IRR) – in so far as they allow a married

 Section 23(a)(2)(ii) (in relation to RH-IRR) – in so far as they limit the

 Section 17(in relation to RH-IRR) - rendering probono services in so far as they

 Section 3.01(a) and Section 3.01(j) of RH-IRR - added “primarily” in defining

Article 2, Section 16 (Right to a Balanced and Healthful Ecology) in

Paje v. Casiño, et al., G.R. No. 207257, February 3, 2015

LNL v. Agham Party List, G. R. No. 209165, April 12, 2016

International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications v. Green Peace

Article 2, Section 16 (Right to a Balanced and Healthful Ecology)in relation

Pedro Arigo v. Scott Swift, G.R. 206510, September 16, 2014

Article 2, Sections 25 (Local Autonomy) and 26 (Political Dynasty), Article

 Philippines: “lump-sum discretionary funds of Members of the Legislative and the

 Violation under PDAF by Legislative Representatives –

H: No post-enactment measure or authority may be exercised by legislators.

 Violation under “Presidential Pork”

(1) Section 8 of P.D. No. 910 (Malampaya Fund) provides:

“… to finance the priority infrastructure development projects …., as may be

Article 2, Section 28 (Full Public Disclosure)

Article 2, Section 28 (Full Public Disclosure) and Article 3, Section 1

Article 3, Section 1 (Right to Life, Liberty and Security; Writ of Amparo;

Burgos v. PGMA, et al., G.R. Nos. 183711-13, July 5, 2011

Rodriguez v. PGMA, et al., G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011

Boac v. Cadapan, G.R. No. 186050, December 13, 2011

Mison v. Hon. Gallegos, G.R. No. 210759, June 23, 2015

 Was the issuance of writ of amparo valid?

Article 3, Section 1 (Substantive Due Process)

Valentino L. Legaspi v. City of Cebu, et al./Bienvenido P. Jaban, Sr., et al. v. Court Of

Article 3, Section 1 (Substantive Due Process; Equal Protection; Police

1-UTAK v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015

Article 3, Section 1 (Right to Property; Procedural Due Process; Equal

Provision SC Decision on Constitutional issues

a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access  “strict scrutiny” – no “speech” issue

(a) Offenses against the confidentiality,

(1) Illegal Access. – The access to the whole

b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference  “overbreadth” – none; failed to prove

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The

(a) Offenses against the confidentiality,

(3) Data Interference. – The intentional or

c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting  “domain name” – no violation of