CRIM PRO CASE I
THIRD DIVISION Execution and RTC-Br. 16 issued a Writ of Execution
G.R. No. 194767, October 14, 2015
EDGAR T. BARROSO, Petitioner, v. HON. JUDGE
GEORGE E. OMELIO, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 14, DAVAO CITY AND
TRAVELLERS INSURANCE & SURETY CORPORATION,
ANTONIO V. BATAO, REGIONAL
MANAGER, Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
This deals with the Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court praying that the
Order1dated July 29, 2009, and the Order2 dated
September 15, 2010, both of the Regional Trial Court
of Davao City, Branch 14 (RTC-Br. 14), be reversed
and set aside.
The antecedent facts are as follow.
Sometime in 2007, herein petitioner filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 16 (RTC-
Br. 16) a Complaint for sum of money, damages and
attorney's fees against Dennis Li. The complaint
included a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
attachment, and after Dennis Li filed his Answer,
RTC-Br. 16 granted herein petitioner's application for
a Writ of Attachment and approved the
corresponding attachment bond. On the other hand,
Dennis Li filed a counter-attachment bond
purportedly issued by herein respondent Travellers
Insurance & Surety Corporation (Travellers).
On January 7, 2008, petitioner filed a Motion for
Approval of Compromise Agreement. Thereafter,
RTC-Br. 16 issued a Judgment on Compromise
Agreement dated January 22, 2008. However,
Dennis Li failed to pay the sums of money as
provided for under said Judgment on Compromise
Agreement. Herein petitioner then filed a Motion for
Declaration of Nullity, Prohibition, Injunction with
solely against Dennis Li. When said Writ of Execution
against Dennis Li was returned by the Sheriff
unsatisfied, petitioner then filed a Motion for
Execution of Judgment upon the Counterbond.
Acting on said Motion, RTC-Br. 16 issued an
Order3 dated April 2, 2009, pertinent portions of
which read as follows:cralawlawlibrary
Since the Writ was returned "UNSATISFIED", plaintiff
filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment upon the
Counter-Bond, a copy of which was sent to the Head
Office of Travellers Insurance Surety Corporation. In
accordance with the Rules, a summary hearing to
determine the liability under the counterbond was
set. Notice of said hearing was likewise sent to the
Head Office of the surety corporation at the address
appearing on the face of the counterbond issued.
For reasons unknown, the notice was simply
returned.
The case law cited by movant x x x justifies the
issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution against the
Defendant Dennis Li but this time including the
Travellers Insurance Surety Corporation based on its
counterbond. x x x.4chanrobleslaw
An Alias Writ of Execution dated April 28, 2009 was
then issued against both Dennis Li and respondent
Travellers based on the counterbond it issued in
favor of the former, and pursuant to said writ,
Sheriff Anggot served a Demand Letter on Travellers.
In a letter dated July 1, 2009 addressed to Sheriff
Anggot, Travellers asked for a period of seven (7)
days within which to validate the counterbond and,
thereafter, for its representative to discuss the
matter with complainant, herein petitioner.
However, on July 10, 2009, instead of appearing
before RTC-Br. 16, Travellers filed a separate case for
Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction &
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), and Damages,
which was raffled to RTC-Br. 14. Said petition prayed
for the following reliefs: (a) the issuance of a TRO
enjoining Sheriff Anggot and herein petitioner from
implementing and enforcing the Writ of Execution
dated April 28, 2009, and after hearing, the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction; (b) judgment be
rendered declaring the counterbond and its
supporting documents to be null and void; ordering
Sheriff Anggot and herein petitioner to desist from
further implementing the Writ of Execution dated
April 28, 2009; and (c) ordering Sheriff Anggot and
herein petitioner to pay Travellers actual and moral
damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.
After hearing on the application for a writ of
preliminary injunction, herein respondent judge
issued the assailed Order dated July 29, 2009
directing the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction. RTC-Br. 14, in its Order dated July 29,
2009, ratiocinated, thus:cralawlawlibrary
Be it noted that under letter (b) of paragraph six (6)
of respondents' [herein petitioner among them]
answer with counterclaim they alleged that: "x x x
The evidence the counter-attachment bond is fake
has yet to be proven by the petitioner [Travellers] in
the proper forum. Till then, said judicial officers
enjoy the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their judicial duties . . ."
Precisely, herein petitioner [comes] before this
Court, which is the "proper forum" referred to by the
respondents in their answer, to prove that the
counter-attachment bond which herein respondents
are about to implement, is fake. And the only
remedy for the petitioner to hold in abeyance the
enforcement of the subject writ of execution lest the
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CRIM PRO CASE I
decision of this Court on the merit more so if
favorable to the petitioner will become moot and
academic or phyrric victory, is the writ of preliminary
injunction.
Anent the respondents' defense that "this Court has
no jurisdiction to interfere with the judgment of RTC,
Branch 16 in Davao City" x x x, suffice it to state that
this Court is not interfering with the Order or
judgment of RTC-Br. 16 which is a coordinate Court.
On the contrary[,] this Court is merely exercising its
complementary jurisdiction with that of the
jurisdiction of RTC 16 - a coordinate court, the latter
- to hypothetical ly state, was hoodwinked into
believing as to the regularity and due production of
the subject counter-attachment bond now subject to
be executed and enforced against herein petitioner.
While this Court is aware of this doctrine of non-
interference by a Court against the Order or
judgment of another coordinate court, this doctrine,
however, is not without exception. The maxim is: For
every rule, there is an exception; for in every room,
there is always a door. This case is an exception, x x
x5chanrobleslaw
On July 30, 2009, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
was issued, commanding Sheriff Anggot to refrain
from implementing the Writ of Execution dated April
28, 2009. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of
the afore-quoted Order was denied in the Order
dated September 15, 2010.
Hence, the instant petition was filed with this Court,
alleging that respondent judge committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction and gross ignorance of the law by (1)
acting on respondent Travellers' petition despite the
lack of jurisdiction of RTC-Br. 14; (2) issuing the writ
of preliminary injunction without requiring Travellers
to put up an injunction bond; and (3) assuming
jurisdiction over the action for prohibition and
injunction against the executive sheriff of a coequal
court.
Herein petitioner, while acknowledging that the
Court of Appeals (CA) had concurrent jurisdiction
over this petition, justified his immediate resort to
this Court by pointing out that respondent judge's
conduct shows his gross ignorance of the law, and
any other remedy under the ordinary course of law
would not be speedy and adequate.
Private respondents, on the other hand, counter that
its petition before RTC-Br. 14 involved the issue of
the validity of a contract, hence, the court presided
by respondent judge had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the same. Private respondent then
reiterated its arguments regarding the dubious
authenticity and genuineness of the counterbond
purportedly issued by Travellers and filed by Dennis
Li before RTC-Br. 16.
It must first be emphasized that trifling with the rule
on hierarchy of courts is looked upon with disfavor
by the Court. Said rule is an important component of
the orderly administration of justice and not
imposed merely for whimsical and arbitrary reasons.
This doctrine was exhaustively explained in The
Diocese of Bacolod, represented by the Most Rev.
Bishop Vicente M. Navarra and the Bishop Himself in
His Personal Capacity v. Commission on Elections and
the Election Officer of Bacolod City, Atty. Mavil V.
Majarucon6 in this wise:cralawlawlibrary
x x x we explained the necessity of the application of
the hierarchy of courts:
The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy
on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the
policy is not to be ignored without serious
consequences. The strictness of the policy is
designed to shield the Court from having to deal
with causes that are also well within the
competence of the lower courts, and thus leave
time for the Court to deal with the more
fundamental and more essential tasks that the
Constitution has assigned to it. The Court may act
on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely
necessary or when serious and important reasons
exist to justify an exception to the policy.
xxxx
The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy
of courts was created by this court to ensure that
every level of the judiciary performs its designated
roles in an effective and efficient manner.
Trial courts do not only determine the facts from the
evaluation of the evidence presented before them.
They are likewise competent to determine issues of
law which may include the validity of an ordinance,
statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to
the Constitution. To effectively perform these
functions, they are territorially organized into
regions and then into branches. Their writs generally
reach within those territorial boundaries.
Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important
task of inferring the facts from the evidence as these
are physically presented before them. In many
instances, the facts occur within their territorial
jurisdiction, which properly present the "actual case"
that makes ripe a determination of the
constitutionality of such action. The consequences,
of course, would be national in scope. There are,
however, some cases where resort to courts at their
level would not be practical considering their
decisions could still be appealed before the higher
courts, such as the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an
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appellate court that reviews the determination of
facts and law made by the trial courts. It is collegiate
in nature. This nature ensures more standpoints in
the review of the actions of the trial court. But the
Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction over
most special civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its
writs can have a nationwide scope. It is competent
to determine facts and, ideally, should act on
constitutional issues that may not necessarily be
novel unless there are factual questions to
determine.
This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by
breaking new ground or further reiterating - in the
light of new circumstances or in the light of some
confusion of bench or bar - existing precedents.
Rather than a court of first instance or as a
repetition of the actions of the Court of Appeals, this
court promulgates these doctrinal devices in order
that it truly performs that role.7chanrobleslaw
However, in the same case, it was acknowledged
that for exceptionally compelling reasons, the Court
may exercise its discretion to act on special civil
actions for certiorari filed directly with it. Examples
of cases that present compelling reasons are: (1)
those involving genuine issues of constitutionality
that must be addressed at the most immediate time;
(2) those where the issues are of transcendental
importance, and the threat to fundamental
constitutional rights are so great as to outweigh the
necessity for prudence; (3) cases of first impression,
where no jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the
lower courts on such issues; (4) where the
constitutional issues raised are better decided after
a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and
with the concurrence of the majority of those who
participated in its discussion; (5) where time is of the
essence; (6) where the act being questioned was
that of a constitutional body; (7) where there is no
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law that could free petitioner
from the injurious effects of respondents' acts in
violation of their constitutional rights; and (8) the
issues involve public welfare, the advancement of
public policy, the broader interest of justice, or
where the orders complained of are patent nullities,
or where appeal can be considered as clearly an
inappropriate remedy.8
Verily, the issues in this case could have been
competently resolved by the CA, thus, the Court was
initially inclined to reject taking cognizance of this
case. However, we cannot close our eyes to the
unbecoming conduct exhibited by respondent judge
in obstinately issuing an injunction against the
orders of a co-equal court despite this Court's
consistent reiteration of the time-honored principle
that "no court has the power to interfere by
injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court
of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. The various
trial courts of a province or city, having the same or
equal authority, should not, cannot, and are not
permitted to interfere with their respective cases,
much less with their orders or judgments."9 The
issue raised in this case, therefore, falls under one of
the exceptions to the rule on hierarchy of courts, i.e.,
where the order complained of is a patent nullity.
Atty. Cabili v. Judge Balindong10 is closely analogous
to the present case. In Cabili, the RTC of Iligan City
issued a writ of execution, but the judgment debtor,
instead of complying with said writ, filed a separate
petition for prohibition and mandamus with
application for issuance of temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction with the
RTC of Marawi City. After the hearing, the Presiding
Judge of the RTC of Marawi City issued the TRO
restraining the sheriff from enforcing the writ of
execution issued by the RTC of Iligan City.
In the aforementioned case, the Court struck down
such action of the RTC of Marawi City, ruling
thus:cralawlawlibrary
The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference
in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal
court is an elementary principle in the
administration of justice: no court can interfere by
injunction with the judgments or orders of another
court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to
grant the relief sought by the injunction. The
rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of
jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over
the case and renders judgment therein has
jurisdiction over Its judgment, to the exclusion of all
other coordinate courts, for its execution and over
all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of
justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in
connection with this judgment.
Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an
execution order has been issued is considered as still
pending, so that all the proceedings on the
execution are still proceedings in the suit. A court
which issued a writ of execution has the inherent
power, for the advancement of justice, to correct
errors of its ministerial officers and to control its
own processes. To hold otherwise would be to divide
the jurisdiction of the appropriate forum in the
resolution of incidents arising in execution
proceedings-Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious to
the orderly administration of justice.
xxxx
To be sure, the law and the rules are not unaware
that an issuing court may violate the law in issuing a
writ of execution and have recognized that there
should be a remedy against this violation. The
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CRIM PRO CASE I
remedy, however, is not the resort to another co-
equal body but to a higher court with authority to
nullify the action of the issuing court. This is
precisely the judicial power that the 1987
Constitution, under Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph
2, speaks of and which this Court has operationalized
through a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
xxxx
It is not a viable legal position to claim that a TRO
against a writ of execution is issued against an erring
sheriff, not against the issuing Judge. A TRO
enjoining the enforceability of a writ addresses the
writ itself, not merely the executing sheriff x x x As
already mentioned above, the appropriate action is
to assail the implementation of the writ before the
issuing court in whose behalf the sheriff acts, and,
upon failure, to seek redress through a higher
judicial body, xxx.11chanrobleslaw
Applying the foregoing ruling, it is quite clear that, in
this case, the issuance of the subject writ of
preliminary injunction was improper and, thus,
correctible by certiorari. Herein respondent judge
does not have jurisdiction to hinder the enforcement
of an order of a co-equal court. He must be aware
that said co-equal court had the exclusive
jurisdiction or authority to correct its own issuances
if ever there was, indeed, a mistake. There is no
question, therefore, that subject writ of preliminary
injunction is null and void.
Further, had Judge Omelio not been dismissed from
the service in 2013 for gross ignorance of the law
and violation of judicial conduct, he could have been
subjected to an investigation again for gross
ignorance due to his unprecedented acts in the case
at bar.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and
the Orders dated July 29, 2009 and September 15,
2010, both issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City, Branch 14, are hereby SET ASIDE and
declared NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED
EN BANC
August 15, 2017
G.R. No. 226679
SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner, vs.
HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay,
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari and
prohibition1 is the constitutionality of Section 23 of
Republic Act (R.A.)No. 9165, or the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, "2 which provides:
SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person
charged under any provision of this Act regardless of
the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail
of the provision on plea-bargaining.3
The facts are not in dispute.
Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the
accused in Criminal Case No. 13586 for violation of
Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of
Dangerous Drugs). The Information alleged:
That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the
City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, not being lawfully authorized to
possess or otherwise use any regulated drug and
without the corresponding license or prescription,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have, in his possession and under his
control and custody, one (1) piece heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet marked as VOP 03/21/16-
l G containing 0.084 [gram] of white crystalline
substance, which when examined were found to be
positive for Methamphetamine
Hydrocloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow
the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining
Agreement,5 praying to withdraw his not guilty plea
and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of
Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of
Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other
Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty
of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time
offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous
drug seized in his possession. He argued that Section
23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law
expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2) the
rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution;
and (3) the principle of separation of powers among
the three equal branches of the government.
In its Comment or Opposition6 dated June 27, 2016,
the prosecution moved for the denial of the motion
for being contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165,
which is said to be justified by the Congress'
prerogative to choose which offense it would allow
plea bargaining. Later, in a Comment or
Opposition7 dated June 29, 2016, it manifested that
it "is open to the Motion of the accused to enter into
plea bargaining to give life to the intent of the law as
4
CRIM PRO CASE I
provided in paragraph 3, Section 2 of [R.A. No.]
9165, however, with the express mandate of Section
23 of [R.A. No.] 9165 prohibiting plea bargaining, [it]
is left without any choice but to reject the proposal
of the accused."
On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Legazpi
City, Albay, issued an Order denying Estipona's
motion. It was opined:
The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA
No. 9165, which prohibits plea bargaining,
encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of
the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure
because plea bargaining is a "rule of procedure."
Indeed, plea bargaining forms part of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, particularly under Rule 118, the
rule on pre-trial conference. It is only the Rules of
Court promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant
to its constitutional rule-making power that breathes
life to plea bargaining. It cannot be found in any
statute.
Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23
of Republic Act No. 9165 is unconstitutional because
it, in effect, suspends the operation of Rule 118 of
the Rules of Court insofar as it allows plea bargaining
as part of the mandatory pre-trial conference in
criminal cases.
The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused
that it is also the intendment of the law, R.A. No.
9165, to rehabilitate an accused of a drug offense.
Rehabilitation is thus only possible in cases of use of
illegal drugs because plea bargaining is disallowed.
However, by case law, the Supreme Court allowed
rehabilitation for accused charged with possession
of paraphernalia with traces of dangerous drugs, as
held in People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, 13
December 2010. The ruling of the Supreme Court in
this case manifested the relaxation of an otherwise
stringent application of Republic Act No. 9165 in
order to serve an intent for the enactment of the
law, that is, to rehabilitate the offender.
Within the spirit of the disquisition in People v.
Martinez, there might be plausible basis for the
declaration of Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which bars
plea bargaining as unconstitutional because indeed
the inclusion of the provision in the law encroaches
on the exclusive constitutional power of the
Supreme Court.
While basic is the precept that lower courts are not
precluded from resolving, whenever warranted,
constitutional questions, the Court is not unaware of
the admonition of the Supreme Court that lower
courts must observe a becoming modesty in
examining constitutional questions. Upon which
admonition, it is thus not for this lower court to
declare Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165 unconstitutional
given the potential ramifications that such
declaration might have on the prosecution of illegal
drug cases pending before this judicial station.8
Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it
was denied in an Order9 dated July 26, 2016; hence,
this petition raising the issues as follows:
I.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165,
WHICH PROHIBITS PLEA BARGAINING IN ALL
VIOLATIONS OF THE SAID LAW, IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF
THE LAW.
II.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT ENCROACHED UPON THE
POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE
RULES OF PROCEDURE.
III. WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS
PRESIDED BY HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO,
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO DECLARE
SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 AS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.10
We grant the petition.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
The People of the Philippines, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), contends that the
petition should be dismissed outright for being
procedurally defective on the grounds that: (1) the
Congress should have been impleaded as an
indispensable party; (2) the constitutionality of
Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be attacked
collaterally; and (3) the proper recourse should have
been a petition for declaratory relief before this
Court or a petition for certiorari before the RTC.
Moreover, the OSG argues that the petition fails to
satisfy the requisites of judicial review because: (1)
Estipona lacks legal standing to sue for failure to
show direct injury; (2) there is no actual case or
controversy; and (3) the constitutionality of Section
23 of R.A. No. 9165 is not the lis mota of the case.
On matters of technicality, some points raised by the
OSG maybe correct.1âwphi1 Nonetheless, without
much further ado, it must be underscored that it is
within this Court's power to make exceptions to the
rules of court. Under proper conditions, We may
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CRIM PRO CASE I
permit the full and exhaustive ventilation of the
parties' arguments and positions despite the
supposed technical infirmities of a petition or its
alleged procedural flaws. In discharging its solemn
duty as the final arbiter of constitutional issues, the
Court shall not shirk from its obligation to determine
novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-
reaching implications.11
Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities
normally take a backseat when issues of substantial
and transcendental importance are present.12 We
have acknowledged that the Philippines' problem on
illegal drugs has reached "epidemic," "monstrous,"
and "harrowing" proportions,13 and that its
disastrously harmful social, economic, and spiritual
effects have broken the lives, shattered the hopes,
and destroyed the future of thousands especially our
young citizens.14 At the same time, We have equally
noted that "as urgent as the campaign against the
drug problem must be, so must we as urgently, if not
more so, be vigilant in the protection of the rights of
the accused as mandated by the Constitution x x x
who, because of excessive zeal on the part of the law
enforcers, may be unjustly accused and
convicted."15 Fully aware of the gravity of the drug
menace that has beset our country and its direct link
to certain crimes, the Court, within its sphere, must
do its part to assist in the all-out effort to lessen, if
not totally eradicate, the continued presence of drug
lords, pushers and users.16
Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal
issues raised in this petition, technical matters
should not deter Us from having to make the final
and definitive pronouncement that everyone else
depends for enlightenment and guidance.17 When
public interest requires, the Court may brush aside
procedural rules in order to resolve a constitutional
issue.18
x x x [T]he Court is invested with the power to
suspend the application of the rules of procedure as
a necessary complement of its power to promulgate
the same. Barnes v. Hon. Quijano Padilla discussed
the rationale for this tenet, viz. :
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure
should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of
Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or
even disregard rules can be so pervasive and
compelling as to alter even that which this Court
itself has already declared to be final, x x x.
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to
afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity
for the proper and just determination of his cause,
free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and
again, this Court has consistently held that rules
must not be applied rigidly so as not to override
substantial justice. 19
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Rule-making power of the Supreme
Court under the 1987 Constitution
Section 5(5), A1iicle VIII of the 1987 Constitution
explicitly provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission
to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice
and procedure is now Our exclusive domain and no
longer shared with the Executive and Legislative
departments.20 In Echegaray v. Secretary of
Justice, 21 then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice)
Reynato S. Puno traced the history of the Court's
rule-making power and highlighted its evolution and
development.
x x x It should be stressed that the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure
was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to
enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice
Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity,
courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the
maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice."
Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this
power to this Court for it enhances its
independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the
power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it
appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for
it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal,
alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII
provides:
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CRIM PRO CASE I
"Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing
laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of
Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to
alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have
the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines."
The said power of Congress, however, is not as
absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re:
Cunanan Congress in the exercise of its power to
amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding
admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar
Flunkers Act of 1953 which considered as a passing
grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations
after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71 % in the
1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the
law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice
Diokno held that "x x x the disputed law is not a
legislation; it is a judgment - a judgment
promulgated by this Court during the aforecited
years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and
although this Court certainly can revoke these
judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no
less certain that only this Court, and not the
legislative nor executive department, that may do
so. Any attempt on the part of these departments
would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the
case with the law in question." The venerable jurist
further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the
ultimate power to grant license for the practice of
law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law
passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive
character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix
the minimum conditions for the license." By its
ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the
power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement
the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law
in the Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not
changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973
Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be
repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa x x x." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of
its Article X provided:
xxxx
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers.
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, and the integration of the Bar,
which, however, may be repealed, altered, or
supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such
rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights."
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution
further strengthened the independence of the
judiciary by giving to it the additional power to
promulgate rules governing the integration of the
Bar.
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and
more independent judiciary. Among others, it
enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its
Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
xxxx
"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, the admission
to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court. "
The rule making power of this Court was
expanded. This Court for the first time was given the
power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.
The Court was also granted for the .first time the
power to disapprove rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most
importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the
power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In
fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is no longer shared by this
Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. x x
x.22
7
CRIM PRO CASE I
Just recently, Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals
(Sixth Division)23 further elucidated:
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion
the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by
constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the
power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts belongs exclusively to this Court.Section 5
(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
xxxx
In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray), the
Court traced the evolution of its rule-making
authority, which, under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, had been priorly subjected to a
power-sharing scheme with Congress. As it now
stands, the 1987 Constitution textually altered the
old provisions by deleting the concurrent power of
Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying in one
body the Court's rule-making powers, in line with
the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a " [
s] tronger and more independent judiciary."
The records of the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission would show that the
Framers debated on whether or not the Court's
rulemaking powers should be shared with Congress.
There was an initial suggestion to insert the
sentence "The National Assembly may repeal, alter,
or supplement the said rules with the advice and
concurrence of the Supreme Court," right after the
phrase "Promulgate rules concerning the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission
to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged[,]" in the
enumeration of powers of the Supreme Court. Later,
Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete
the former sentence and, instead, after the word
"[under]privileged," place a comma(,) to be followed
by "the phrase with the concurrence of the National
Assembly." Eventually, a compromise formulation
was reached wherein (a) the Committee members
agreed to Commissioner Aquino's proposal to
delete the phrase "the National Assembly may
repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the
advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court"
and (b) in turn, Commissioner Aquino agreed to
withdraw his proposal to add "the phrase with the
concurrence of the National Assembly." The changes
were approved, thereby leading to the present lack
of textual reference to any form of Congressional
participation in Section 5 (5), Article
VIII, supra. Theprevailing consideration was that
"both bodies, the Supreme Court and the
Legislature, have their inherent powers."
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to
repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure.x x x.24
The separation of powers among the three co-equal
branches of our government has erected an
impregnable wall that keeps the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure within the sole province of this
Court.25 The other branches trespass upon this
prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that
effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the
procedural rules promulgated by the Court.26 Viewed
from this perspective, We have rejected previous
attempts on the part of the Congress, in the exercise
of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of
Court (Rules), to wit:
1. Fabian v. Desierto27 -Appeal from the decision of
the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative
disciplinary case should be taken to the Court of
Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of
the Rulesinstead of appeal by certiorari under Rule
45 as provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-
Purpose Cooperative, Inc. 28 - The Cooperative Code
provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on
summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of
the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fees; 29 Baguio
Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative
(BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes;30 In
Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation
from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; 31 and Rep. of
the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al. 32 - Despite
statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and
NPC are not exempt from the payment of legal fees
imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth
Division)33 - The first paragraph of Section 14 of R.A.
No. 6770, which prohibits courts except the
Supreme Court from issuing temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, is
unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule 58 of
the Rules.
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively
modified the Rules, this Court asserted its discretion
to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of
procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and
executive branches of government. To reiterate, the
Court's authority to promulgate rules on pleading,
practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the
safeguards of Our institutional independence.34
Plea bargaining in criminal cases
8
CRIM PRO CASE I
Plea bargaining, as a rule and a practice, has been
existing in our jurisdiction since July 1, 1940, when
the 1940 Rules took effect. Section 4, Rule 114
(Pleas) of which stated:
SEC. 4. Plea of guilty of lesser offense. - The
defendant, with the consent of the court and of the
fiscal, may plead guilty of any lesser offense than
that charged which is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the complaint or information.
When the 1964 Rules became effective on January 1,
1964, the same provision was retained under Rule
118 (Pleas).1âwphi1 Subsequently, with the
effectivity of the 1985 Rules on January 1, 1985, the
provision on plea of guilty to a lesser offense was
amended. Section 2, Rule 116 provided:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - The
accused with the consent of the offended party and
the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead
guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or
not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or
is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the
trial court. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary. (4a, R-118)
As well, the term "plea bargaining" was first
mentioned and expressly required during pre-trial.
Section 2, Rule 118 mandated:
SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. - The pre-trial
conference shall consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of facts;
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the
parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of
evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair
and expeditious trial. (n)
The 1985 Rules was later amended. While the
wordings of Section 2, Rule 118 was retained,
Section 2, Rule 116 was modified in 1987. A second
paragraph was added, stating that "[a] conviction
under this plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of
the offense charged for purposes of double
jeopardy."
When R.A. No. 8493 ("Speedy Trial Act of 1998 ') was
enacted,35 Section 2, Rule 118 of the Rules was
substantially adopted. Section 2 of the law required
that plea bargaining and other matters36 that will
promote a fair and expeditious trial are to be
considered during pre-trial conference in all criminal
cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan.
Currently, the pertinent rules on plea bargaining
under the 2000 Rules37 are quoted below:
RULE 116 (Arraignment and Plea):
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At
arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed
by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense
which is necessarily included in the offense charged.
After arraignment but before trial, the accused may
still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense
after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No
amendment of the complaint or information is
necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)
RULE 118 (Pre-trial):
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all
criminal cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan,Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and
within thirty (30) days from the date the court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused,
unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws
or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial
conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the
parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of
evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the
accused admits the charge but interposes a
lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and
expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects
of the case. (Sec. 2 & 3, Cir. 38-98)
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure
The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue,
amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to the
preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former
should not diminish, increase or modify the
latter.38 "Substantive law is that part of the law
which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which
regulates the right and duties which give rise to a
cause of action; that part of the law which courts are
established to administer; as opposed to adjective or
remedial law, which prescribes the method of
9
CRIM PRO CASE I
enforcing rights or obtain redress for their
invasions."39 Fabian v. Hon. Desierto40 laid down the
test for determining whether a rule is substantive or
procedural in nature.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn
between those rules or statutes which are
procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's
rule-making power, and those which are substantive.
In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one
context and substantive in another. It is admitted
that what is procedural and what is substantive is
frequently a question of great difficulty. It is not,
however, an insurmountable problem if a rational
and pragmatic approach is taken within the context
of our own procedural and jurisdictional system.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the
Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of
the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any
substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive
law and for justly administering remedy and redress
for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes
away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule
creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates
as a means of implementing an existing right then
the rule deals merely with procedure.41
In several occasions, We dismissed the argument
that a procedural rule violates substantive rights. For
example, in People v. Lacson, 42 Section 8, Rule 117
of the Rules on provisional dismissal was held as a
special procedural limitation qualifying the right of
the State to prosecute, making the time-bar an
essence of the given right or as an inherent part
thereof, so that its expiration operates to extinguish
the right of the State to prosecute the
accused.43Speaking through then Associate Justice
Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., the Court opined:
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the
Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two
years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally
dismissed with the express consent of the accused
and with a priori notice to the offended party. The
time-bar may appear, on first impression,
unreasonable compared to the periods under Article
90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the
time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests
and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy
disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice
to the State and the accused. It took into account
the substantial rights of both the State and of the
accused to due process. The Court believed that the
time limit is a reasonable period for the State to
revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent
of the accused and notice to the offended parties.
The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected
unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short
or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of
justice. The petitioners failed to show a manifest
shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar.
The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee
on the Revision of the Rules and approved by the
Court en banc primarily to enhance the
administration of the criminal justice system and the
rights to due process of the State and the accused by
eliminating the deleterious practice of trial courts of
provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion of
either the prosecution or the accused or jointly,
either with no time-bar for the revival thereof or
with a specific or definite period for such revival by
the public prosecutor. There were times when such
criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due
to causes beyond the control of the public
prosecutor or because of the indolence, apathy or
the lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to
the prejudice of the State and the accused despite
the mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges
to expedite criminal proceedings.
It is almost a universal experience that the accused
welcomes delay as it usually operates in his favor,
especially if he greatly fears the consequences of his
trial and conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the
hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been
known to expire.
The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of
criminal cases may impair or reduce the capacity of
the State to prove its case with the disappearance or
nonavailability of its witnesses. Physical evidence
may have been lost. Memories of witnesses may
have grown dim or have faded. Passage of time
makes proof of any fact more difficult. The accused
may become a fugitive from justice or commit
another crime. The longer the lapse of time from the
dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the more
difficult it is to prove the crime.
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional
dismissal of a criminal case does not terminate a
criminal case. The possibility that the case may be
revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not
derail, the chances of the accused for employment,
curtail his association, subject him to public obloquy
and create anxiety in him and his family. He is unable
to lead a normal life because of community
suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to suffer
those penalties and disabilities incompatible with
the presumption of innocence. He may also lose his
witnesses or their memories may fade with the
passage of time. In the long run, it may diminish his
capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the
fairness of the entire criminal justice system.
10
CRIM PRO CASE I
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the
Court to excise the malaise that plagued the
administration of the criminal justice system for
the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the
accused only.44
Also, We said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et
al. 45 that Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules, which
provides that an accused who failed to appear at the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall
lose the remedies available against the judgment,
does not take away substantive rights but merely
provides the manner through which an existing right
may be implemented.
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not
take away per se the right of the convicted accused
to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is the
failure of the accused to appear without justifiable
cause on the scheduled date of promulgation of the
judgment of conviction that forfeits their right to
avail themselves of the remedies against the
judgment.
It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the
Rules of Court diminishes or modifies the
substantive rights of petitioners. It only works in
pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court to
"provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases." This provision
protects the courts from delay in the speedy
disposition of criminal cases - delay arising from the
simple expediency of nonappearance of the accused
on the scheduled promulgation of the judgment of
conviction.46
By the same token, it is towards the provision of a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases in all courts47 that the rules on
plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of
disposing criminal charges by agreement of the
parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an
"important," "essential," "highly desirable," and
"legitimate" component of the administration of
justice.48 Some of its salutary effects include:
x x x For a defendant who sees slight possibility of
acquittal, the advantages of pleading guilty and
limiting the probable penalty are obvious - his
exposure is reduced, the correctional processes can
begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a
trial are eliminated. For the State there are also
advantages - the more promptly imposed
punishment after an admission of guilt may more
effectively attain the objectives of punishment; and
with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and
prosecutorial resources are conserved for those
cases in which there is a substantial issue of the
defendant's guilt or in which there is substantial
doubt that the State can sustain its burden of
proof. (Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752
[1970])
Disposition of charges after plea discussions x x x
leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most
criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive
impact of enforced idleness during pretrial
confinement for those who are denied release
pending trial; it protects the public from those
accused persons who are prone to continue criminal
conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by
shortening the time between charge and disposition,
it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative
prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately
imprisoned. (Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,
261 [1971])
The defendant avoids extended pretrial
incarceration and the anxieties and uncertainties of
a trial; he gains a speedy disposition of his case, the
chance to acknowledge his guilt, and a prompt start
in realizing whatever potential there may be for
rehabilitation. Judges and prosecutors conserve vital
and scarce resources. The public is protected from
the risks posed by those charged with criminal
offenses who are at large on bail while awaiting
completion of criminal proceedings. (Blackledge v.
Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 [1977])
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined
as "a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory
disposition of the case subject to court
approval."49 There is give-and-take negotiation
common in plea bargaining.50 The essence of the
agreement is that both the prosecution and the
defense make concessions to avoid potential
losses.51 Properly administered, plea bargaining is to
be encouraged because the chief virtues of the
system - speed, economy, and finality - can benefit
the accused, the offended party, the prosecution,
and the court.52
Considering the presence of mutuality of
advantage,53 the rules on plea bargaining neither
create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead,
it operates as a means to implement an existing right
by regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights
and duties recognized by substantive law and for
justly administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them.
The decision to plead guilty is often heavily
influenced by the defendant's appraisal of the
prosecution's case against him and by the apparent
likelihood of securing leniency should a guilty plea
be offered and accepted.54 In any case, whether it be
to the offense charged or to a lesser crime, a guilty
plea is a "serious and sobering occasion" inasmuch
as it constitutes a waiver of the fundamental rights
11
CRIM PRO CASE I
to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, to be heard by himself and counsel, to meet
the witnesses face to face, to bail (except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong), to be
convicted by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and
not to be compelled to be a witness against
himself.55
Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea
bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him
rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor
need not do so if he prefers to go to trial.56 Under
the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to
plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends
on the consent of the offended party 57and the
prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid
plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily
included in the offense charged.58 The reason for this
is that the prosecutor has full control of the
prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always
prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or
graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can
sustain.59
[Courts] normally must defer to prosecutorial
decisions as to whom to prosecute. The reasons for
judicial deference are well known. Prosecutorial
charging decisions are rarely simple. In addition to
assessing the strength and importance of a case,
prosecutors also must consider other tangible and
intangible factors, such as government enforcement
priorities. Finally, they also must decide how best to
allocate the scarce resources of a criminal justice
system that simply cannot accommodate the
litigation of every serious criminal charge. Because
these decisions "are not readily susceptible to the
kind of analysis the courts are competent to
undertake," we have been "properly hesitant to
examine the decision whether to prosecute. "60
The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion
of the trial court, which may allow the accused to
plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily
included in the offense charged. The
word may denotes an exercise of discretion upon
the trial court on whether to allow the accused to
make such plea.61 Trial courts are exhorted to keep
in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than
that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed
as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the
convenience of the accused.62
Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment,
the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the
prosecution already rested its case.63 As regards plea
bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court's
exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave
abuse thereof.64 "Grave abuse of discretion" is a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion
or hostility; it arises when a court or tribunal violates
the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.65
If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser
offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the
prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a
plea only when the prosecution does not have
sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime
charged.66 The only basis on which the prosecutor
and the court could rightfully act in allowing change
in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing
more and nothing less than the evidence on record.
As soon as the prosecutor has submitted a comment
whether for or against said motion, it behooves the
trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's
evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which
the accused made his change of plea to the end that
the interests of justice and of the public will be
served.67 The ruling on the motion must disclose the
strength or weakness of the prosecution's
evidence.68 Absent any finding on the weight of the
evidence on hand, the judge's acceptance of the
defendant's change of plea is improper and
irregular.69
On whether Section 23 of R.A. No.
9165 violates the equal protection
clause
At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of
whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to
the constitutional right to equal protection of the
law in order not to preempt any future discussion by
the Court on the policy considerations behind
Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165. Pending deliberation on
whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in
toto or a qualified version thereof, We deem it
proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against
plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is
made part of the rules of procedure through an
administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and
prohibition is GRANTED. Section 23 of Republic Act
No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional for being
contrary to the rule-making authority of the
Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
De Lima vs. Guerrero
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri
2017/oct2017/gr_229781_2017.html
12
CRIM PRO CASE I
Ha Datu Tawahig vs. Lapinid
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/4124/
xxxx
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 115407 August 28, 1995
MIGUEL P. PADERANGA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
The adverse decision in this case
promulgated by respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32233 on
November 24, 1993, as well as its
resolution of April 26, 1994 denying
the motion for reconsideration thereof,
are challenged by petitioner Miguel P.
Paderanga in this appeal
by certiorari through a petition which
raises issues centering mainly on said
petitioner's right to be admitted to bail.
On January 28, 1990, petitioner was
belatedly charged in an amended
information as a co-conspirator in the
crime of multiple murder in Criminal
Case No. 86-39 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 18 of Cagayan de Oro
City for the killing of members of the
Bucag family sometime in 1984 in
Gingoog City of which petitioner was
the mayor at the time. The original
information, filed on October 6, 1986
with the Regional Trial Court of
Gingoog City,1 had initially indicted for
multiple murder eight accused
suspect, namely, Felipe Galarion,
Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito
Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter
Doe And Richard Doe as the alleged
conspirators in the indiscriminate
slaying of the spouses Romeo and
Juliet Bucag and their son, Romeo, Jr.
However, only one of the accused,
Felipe Galarion, was apprehended,
tried and eventually convicted.
Galarion later escaped from prison.
The others have remained at large up
to the present. 2
In a bizarre twist of events, one
Felizardo ("Ely") Roxas was implicated
in the crime. In an amended
information dated October 6, 1988, he
was charged as a co-accused therein.
As herein petitioner was his former
employer and thus knew him well,
Roxas engaged the former's services
as counsel in said case. Ironically, in
the course of the preliminary
investigation therein, said accused, in
a signed affidavit dated March 30,
1989 but which he later retracted on
June 20, 1990, implicated petitioner as
the supposed mastermind behind the
massacre of the Bucag family.3
Then, upon the inhibition of the City
Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City
from the case per his resolution of July
7, 1989, the Department of Justice, at
the instance of said prosecutor,
designated a replacement, State
Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, for
purposes of both the preliminary
investigation and prosecution of
Criminal Case No. 86-39. Pursuant to
a resolution of the new prosecutor
dated September 6, 1989, petitioner
was finally charged as a co-
conspirator in said criminal case in a
second amended information dated
October 6, 1992. Petitioner assailed
his inclusion therein as a co-accused
all the way to this Court in G.R. No.
96080 entitled "Atty. Miguel P.
Paderanga vs. Hon. Franklin M.
Drilon, Hon. Silvestre H. Bello III, Atty.
Henrick F. Gingoyon, Helen B. Canoy
and Rebecca B. Tan." In an en
banc decision promulgated on April
19, 1991, the Court sustained the filing
of the second amended information
against him.4
Under this backdrop, the trial of the
base was all set to start with the
issuance of an arrest warrant for
petitioner's apprehension but, before it
could be served on him, petitioner
through counsel, filed on October 28,
1992 a motion for admission to bail
with the trial court which set the same
for hearing on November 5, 1992.
Petitioner duly furnished copies of the
motion to State Prosecutor Henrick F.
Gingoyon, the Regional State
Prosecutor's Office, and the private
prosecutor, Atty. Benjamin Guimong.
On November 5, 1992, the trial court
proceeded to hear the application for
bail. Four of petitioner's counsel
13
CRIM PRO CASE I
appeared in court but only Assistant
Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the
Regional State Prosecution's Office
appeared for the prosecution.5
As petitioner was then confined at the
Cagayan Capitol College General
Hospital due to "acute
costochondritis," his counsel
manifested that they were submitting
custody over the person of their client
to the local chapter president of the
integrated Bar of the Philippines and
that, for purposes of said hearing of
his bail application, he considered
being in the custody of the law.
Prosecutor Abejo, on the other hand,
informed the trial court that in
accordance with the directive of the
chief of their office, Regional State
prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado, the
prosecution was neither supporting
nor opposing the application for bail
and that they were submitting the
same to the sound discretion of the
trail judge.6
Upon further inquiries from the trial
court, Prosecutor Abejo announced
that he was waiving any further
presentation of evidence. On that note
and in a resolution dated November 5,
1992, the trial court admitted petitioner
to bail in the amount of P200,000.00.
The following day, November 6, 1992,
petitioner, apparently still weak but
well enough to travel by then,
managed to personally appear before
the clerk of court of the trial court and
posted bail in the amount thus fixed.
He was thereafter arraigned and in the
trial that ensued, he also personally
appeared and attended all the
scheduled court hearings of the case.7
The subsequent motion for reconsideration of
said resolution filed twenty (20) days later on
November 26, 1992 by Prosecutor Gingoyon
who allegedly received his copy of the petition
for admission to bail on the day after the
hearing, was denied by the trial court in its
omnibus order dated March 29, 1993. On
October 1, 1993, or more than six (6) months
later, Prosecutor Gingoyon elevated the
matter to respondent Court of Appeals
through a special civil action for certiorari.
Thus were the resolution and the order of the
trial court granting bail to petitioner annulled
on November 24, 1993, in the decision now
under review, on the ground that they were
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.8
Respondent court observed in its
decision that at the time of petitioner's
application for bail, he was not yet "in
the custody of the law," apparently
because he filed his motion for
admission to bail before he was
actually arrested or had voluntarily
surrendered. It further noted that apart
from the circumstance that petitioner
was charged with a crime punishable
by reclusion perpetua, the evidence of
guilt was strong as borne out by the
fact that no bail was recommended by
the prosecution, for which reasons it
held that the grant of bail was doubly
improvident. Lastly, the prosecution,
according to respondent court, was
not afforded an opportunity to oppose
petitioner's application for bail contrary
to the requirements of due process.
Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner argues that, in accordance
with the ruling of this Court in Santiago
vs. Vasquez etc., et al.,9 his filing of
the aforesaid application for bail with
the trial court effectively conferred on
the latter jurisdiction over his person.
In short, for all intents and purposes,
he was in the custody of the law. In
petitioner's words, the "invocation by
the accused of the court's jurisdiction
by filing a pleading in court is sufficient
to vest the court with jurisdiction over
the person of the accused and bring
him within the custody of the law."
Petitioner goes on to contend that the
evidence on record negates the
existence of such strong evidence as
would bar his provisional release on
bail. Furthermore, the prosecution, by
reason of the waiver by Prosecutor
Abejo of any further presentation of
evidence to oppose the application for
bail and whose representation in court
in behalf of the prosecution bound the
latter, cannot legally assert any claim
to a denial of procedural due process.
Finally, petitioner points out that the
special civil action for certiorari was
filed in respondent court after an
unjustifiable length of time.
On the undisputed facts , the legal
principles applicable and the equities
involved in this case, the Court finds
for petitioner.
14
CRIM PRO CASE I
1. Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended,
defines bail as the security given for
the release of a person in custody of
the law, furnished by him or a
bondsman, conditioned upon his
appearing before any court as
required under the conditions
specified in said Rule. Its main
purpose, then, is to relieve an accused
from the rigors of imprisonment until
his conviction and yet secure his
appearance at the trial.10 As bail is
intended to obtain or secure one's
provisional liberty, the same cannot be
posted before custody over him has
been acquired by the judicial
authorities, either by his lawful arrest
or voluntary surrender.11 As this Court
has put it in a case "it would be
incongruous to grant bail to one who is
free."12
The rationale behind the rule is that it
discourages and prevents resort to the
former pernicious practice whereby an
accused could just send another in his
stead to post his bail, without
recognizing the jurisdiction of the court
by his personal appearance therein
and compliance with the requirements
therefor.13 Thus, in Feliciano
vs. Pasicolan, etc., et al.,14 where the
petitioner who had been charged with
kidnapping with murder went into
hiding without surrendering himself,
and shortly thereafter filed a motion
asking the court to fix the amount of
the bail bond for his release pending
trial, the Supreme Court categorically
pronounced that said petitioner was
not eligible for admission to bail.
As a paramount requisite then, only
those persons who have either been
arrested, detained, or other wise
deprived of their freedom will ever
have occasion to seek the protective
mantle extended by the right to bail.
The person seeking his provisional
release under the auspices of bail
need not even wait for a formal
complaint or information to be filed
against him as it is available to "all
persons"15 where the offense is
bailable. The rule is, of course, subject
to the condition or limitation that the
applicant is in the custody of the law.16
On the other hand, a person is
considered to be in the custody of the
law (a) when he is arrested either by
virtue of a warrant of arrest issued
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or by
warrantless arrest under Section 5,
Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule
112 of the revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, or (b) when he has
voluntarily submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court by
surrendering to the proper
authorities.17 in this light, the
ruling, vis-a-vis the facts in Santiago
vs. Vasquez, etc., et al.,18 should be
explained.
In said case, the petitioner who was
charged before the Sandiganbayan for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, filed through counsel
what purported to be an "Urgent Ex-
parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash
Bail Bond." Said petitioner was at the
time confined in a hospital
recuperating from serious physical
injuries which she sustained in a major
vehicular mishap. Consequently, she
expressly sought leave "that she be
considered as having placed herself
under the jurisdiction of (the
Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the
required trial and other proceedings."
On the basis of said ex-parte motion
and the peculiar circumstances
obtaining in that incident, the
Sandiganbayan authorized petitioner
to post a cash bail bond for her
provisional liberty without need of her
personal appearance in view of her
physical incapacity and as a matter of
humane consideration.
When the Sandiganbayan later issued
a hold departure order against her,
she question the jurisdiction of that
court over her person in a recourse
before this Court, on the ground that
"she neither been arrested nor has
she voluntarily surrendered, aside
from the fact that she has not validly
posted bail since she never personally
appeared before said court" In
rejecting her arguments, the Court
held that she was clearly estopped
from assailing the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan for by her own
representations in the urgent ex
parte motion for bail she had earlier
recognized such jurisdiction.
Furthermore, by actually posting a
cash bail was accepted by the court,
she had effectively submitted to its
jurisdiction over her person.
Nonetheless, on the matter of bail, the
Court took pains to reiterate that the
15
CRIM PRO CASE I
same cannot be posted before
custody of the accused has been
acquired by the judicial authorities
either by his arrest or voluntary
surrender.
In the case of herein petitioner, it may
be conceded that he had indeed filed
his motion for admission to bail before
he was actually and physically placed
under arrest. He may, however, at that
point and in the factual ambience
therefore, be considered as being
constructively and legally under
custody. Thus in the likewise peculiar
circumstance which attended the filing
of his bail application with the trail
court, for purposes of the hearing
thereof he should be deemed to have
voluntarily submitted his person to the
custody of the law and, necessarily, to
the jurisdiction of the trial court which
thereafter granted bail as prayed for.
In fact, an arrest is made either by
actual restraint of the arrestee or
merely by his submission to the
custody of the person making the
arrest.19 The latter mode may be
exemplified by the so-called "house
arrest" or, in case of military offenders,
by being "confined to quarters" or
restricted to the military camp area.
It should be stressed herein that
petitioner, through his counsel,
emphatically made it known to the
prosecution and to the trail court
during the hearing for bail that he
could not personally appear as he was
then confined at the nearby Cagayan
Capitol College General Hospital for
acute costochondritis, and could not
then obtain medical clearance to leave
the hospital. The prosecution and the
trial court, notwithstanding their
explicit knowledge of the specific
whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted
a finger to have the arrest warrant duly
served upon him. Certainly, it would
have taken but the slightest effort to
place petitioner in the physical custody
of the authorities, since he was then
incapacitated and under medication in
a hospital bed just over a kilometer
away, by simply ordering his
confinement or placing him under
guard.
The undeniable fact is that petitioner
was by then in the constructive
custody of the law. Apparently, both
the trial court and the prosecutors
agreed on that point since they never
attempted to have him physically
restrained. Through his lawyers, he
expressly submitted to physical and
legal control over his person, firstly, by
filing the application for bail with the
trail court; secondly, by furnishing true
information of his actual whereabouts;
and, more importantly, by
unequivocally recognizing the
jurisdiction of the said court.
Moreover, when it came to his
knowledge that a warrant for his arrest
had been issued, petitioner never
made any attempt or evinced any
intent to evade the clutches of the law
or concealed his whereabouts from
the authorities since the day he was
charged in court, up to the submission
application for bail, and until the day of
the hearing thereof.
At the hearing, his counsel offered
proof of his actual confinement at the
hospital on account of an acute
ailment, which facts were not at all
contested as they were easily
verifiable. And, as a manifestation of
his good faith and of his actual
recognition of the authority of trial
court, petitioner's counsel readily
informed the court that they were
surrendering custody of petitioner to
the president of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, Misamis Oriental
Chapter.20 In other words, the motion
for admission to bail was filed not for
the purpose or in the manner of the
former practice which the law
proscribes for the being derogatory of
the authority and jurisdiction of the
courts, as what had happened
in Feliciano. There was here no intent
or strategy employed to obtain bail in
absentia and thereby be able to avoid
arrest should the application therefore
be denied.
2. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution
lays down the rule that before conviction, all
indictees shall be allowed bail, except only
those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of
guilt is strong. In pursuance thereof, Section 4
of Rule 114, as amended, now provides that
all persons in custody shall, before conviction
by a regional trial court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter
of right. The right to bail, which may be waived
16
CRIM PRO CASE I
considering its personal nature21 and which, to
repeat, arises from the time one is placed in
the custody of the law, springs from the
presumption of innocence accorded every
accused upon whom should not be inflicted
incarceration at the outset since after trial he
would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt
be established beyond reasonable doubt.22
Thus, the general rule is that prior to
conviction by the regional trial court of a
criminal offense, an accused is entitled to be
released on bail as a matter of right, the
present exceptions thereto being the
instances where the accused is charged with
a capital offense or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment23 and the evidence of guilt is
strong. Under said general rule, upon proper
application for admission to bail, the court
having custody of the accused should, as a
matter of course, grant the same after a
hearing conducted to specifically determine
the conditions of the bail in accordance with
Section 6 (now, Section 2) of Rule 114. On
the other hand, as the grant of bail becomes a
matter of judicial discretion on the part of the
court under the exceptions to the rule, a
hearing, mandatory in nature and which
should be summary or otherwise in the
discretion of the court,24 is required with the
participation of both the defense and a duly
notified representative of the prosecution, this
time to ascertain whether or not the evidence
of guilt is strong for the provisional liberty of
the applicant.25 Of course, the burden of proof
is on the prosecution to show that the
evidence meets the required quantum.26
Where such a hearing is set upon proper
motion or petition, the prosecution must be
give an opportunity to present, within a
reasonable time, all the evidence that it may
want to introduce before the court may resolve
the application, since it is equally entitled as
the accused to due process.27 If the
prosecution is denied this opportunity, there
would be a denial of procedural due process,
as a consequence of which the court's order
in respect of the motion or petition is void.28 At
the hearing, the petitioner can rightfully cross-
examine the witnesses presented by the
prosecution and introduce his own evidence in
rebuttal.29 When, eventually, the court issues
an order either granting or refusing bail, the
same should contain a summary of the
evidence for the prosecution, followed by its
conclusion as to whether or not the evidence
of guilt is strong.30 The court, though, cannot
rely on mere affidavits or recitals of their
contents, if timely objected to, for these
represent only hearsay evidence, and thus are
insufficient to establish the quantum of
evidence that the law requires.31
In this appeal, the prosecution assails what it
considers to be a violation of procedural due
process when the court below allowed
Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the
Regional State Prosecutor's Office to appear
in behalf of the prosecution, instead of State
Prosecutor Henrick P. Gingoyon who is
claimed to be the sole government prosecutor
expressly authorized to handle the case and
who received his copy of the motion only on
the day after the hearing had been conducted.
Accordingly, the prosecution now insists that
Prosecutor Abejo had no authority at all to
waive the presentation of any further evidence
in opposition to the application for bail and to
submit the matter to the sound discretion of
the trial court. In addition, they argue that the
prosecution was not afforded "reasonable
time" to oppose that application for bail.
We disagree. Firstly, it is undisputed that the
Office of the Regional State Prosecutor acted
as the collaborating counsel, with State
Prosecutor Henrick Gingoyon, in Criminal
Case No. 86-39 on the basis of an authority
from then Chief State Prosecutor Fernando de
Leon which was sent through radio message
on July 10, 1992 and duly received by the
Office of the Regional State Prosecutor on the
same date. This authorization, which was to
be continuing until and unless it was expressly
withdrawn, was later confirmed and then
withdrawn only on July 12, 1993 by then
Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon. This
was done after one Rebecca Bucag-tan
questioned the authority of Regional State
Prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado and State
Prosecutor II Erlindo Abejo to enter their
appearance as collaborating government
prosecutors in said criminal case.32 It was in
fact by virtue of this arrangement that the
same Prosecutor Zozobrado and Prosecutor
Perseverando Arana entered their
appearance as collaborating prosecutor in the
previous hearing in said case.33 Hence, on the
strength of said authority and of its receipt of
the notice of the hearing for bail, the Regional
State Prosecutor's Office, through Prosecutor
Abejo, could validly represent the prosecution
in the hearing held on November 5, 1992.
Secondly, although it is now claimed
that Prosecutor Abejo was allegedly
not familiar with the case, he
nonetheless was explicitly instructed
about the position of the Regional
State Prosecutor's Office on the
matter. Prosecutor Zozobrado, whose
17
CRIM PRO CASE I
office received its copy of the motion
on the very day when it was sent, that
is, October 28, 1992, duly instructed
Prosecutor Abejo to manifest to the
court that the prosecution was neither
supporting nor opposing the
application for bail and that they were
submitting the matter to its sound
discretion. Obviously, what this meant
was that the prosecution, at that
particular posture of the case, was
waiving the presentation of any
countervailing evidence. When the
court a quo sought to ascertain
whether or not that was the real import
of the submission by Prosecutor
Abejo, the latter readily answered in
the affirmative.
The following exchanges bear this out:
PROSECUTOR ERLINDO ABEJO:
I was informed to appear in this case
just now Your Honor.
COURT:
Where is your Chief of Office? Your
office received a copy of the motion as
early as October 28. There is an
element of urgency here.
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
I am not aware of that, Your Honor, I
was only informed just now. The one
assigned here is State Prosecutor
Perseverando Arena, Jr. who
unfortunately is in the hospital
attending to his sick son. I do not
know about this but before I came I
received an instruction from our Chief
to relay to this court the stand of the
office regarding the motion to admit
bail. That office is neither supporting
nor opposing it and we are submitting
to the sound discretion of the
Honorable Court.
COURT:
Place that manifestation on record.
For the record, Fiscal Abejo, would
you like to formally enter your
appearance in this matter?
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
Yes, Your Honor. For the government,
the Regional State Prosecutor's Office
represented by State Prosecutor
Erlindo Abejo.
COURT:
By that manifestation do you want the
Court to understand that in effect, at
least, the prosecution is dispensing
with the presentation of evidence to
show that the guilt of the accused is
strong, the denial . . .
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
I am amenable to that manifestation,
Your Honor.
COURT:
Final inquiry. Is the Prosecution willing
to submit the incident covered by this
particular motion for resolution by this
court?
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Without presenting any further
evidence?
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
Yes, Your Honor.34
It is further evident from the foregoing
that the prosecution, on the
instructions of Regional State
prosecutor Zozobrado, had no
intention at all to oppose the motion
for bail and this should be so
notwithstanding the statement that
they were "neither supporting nor
opposing" the motion. What is of
significance is the manifestation that
the prosecution was "submitting (the
motion) to the sound discretion of the
Honorable Court." By that, it could not
be any clearer. The prosecution was
dispensing with the introduction of
evidence en contra and this it did at
the proper forum and stage of the
proceedings, that is, during the
mandatory hearing for bail and after
the trial court had fully satisfied itself
that such was the position of the
prosecution.
18
CRIM PRO CASE I
3. In Herras Teehankee vs. Director of
Prisons,35 it was stressed that where
the trial court has reasons to believe
that the prosecutor's attitude of not
opposing the application for bail is not
justified, as when he is evidently
committing a gross error or a
dereliction of duty, the court, in the
interest of Justice, must inquire from
the prosecutor concerned as the
nature of his evidence to determine
whether or not it is strong. And, in the
very recent administrative
matter Re: First Indorsement Dated
July 21, 1992 of Hon. Fernando de
Leon,Chief State Prosecutor,
Department of Justice; Alicia
A. Baylon, City Prosecutor of Dagupan
City vs. Judge Deodoro Sison, 36 the
Court, citing Tucay vs. Domagas,
etc., 37 held that where the prosecutor
interposes no objection to the motion
of the accused, the trial court should
nevertheless set the application for
hearing and from there diligently
ascertain from the prosecution
whether the latter is really not
contesting the bail application.
No irregularity, in the context of
procedural due process, could
therefore be attributed to the trial court
here as regards its order granting bail
to petitioner. A review of the transcript
of the stenographic notes pertinent to
its resolution of November 5, 1992
and the omnibus order of March 29,
1993 abundantly reveals scrupulous
adherence to procedural rules. As
summarized in its aforementioned
order, the lower court exhausted all
means to convince itself of the
propriety of the waiver of evidence on
the part of the prosecution. Moreover,
the omnibus order contained the
requisite summary of the evidence of
both the prosecution and the defense,
and only after sifting through them did
the court conclude that petitioner
could be provisionally released on
bail. Parenthetically, there is no
showing that, since then and up to the
present, petitioner has ever committed
any violation of the conditions of his
bail.
As to the contention that the
prosecutor was not given the
opportunity to present its evidence
within a reasonable period of time, we
hold otherwise. The records indicate
that the Regional State Prosecutor's
Office duly received its copy of the
application for bail on the very same
day that the it was filed with the trial
court on October 28, 1992. Counted
from said date up to the day of the
hearing on November 5, 1992, the
prosecution had more than one (1)
week to muster such evidence as it
would have wanted to adduce in that
hearing in opposition to the motion.
Certainly, under the circumstances,
that period was more than reasonable.
The fact that Prosecutor Gingoyon
received his copy of the application
only on November 6, 1992 is beside
the point for, as already established,
the Office of the Regional State
Prosecutor was authorized to appear
for the People.
4. What finally militates against the
cause of the prosecutor is the
indubitably unreasonable period of
time that elapsed before it questioned
before the respondent court the
resolution and the omnibus order of
the trial court through a special civil
action for certiorari. The Solicitor
General submits that the delay of
more than six (6) months, or one
hundred eighty-four (184) days to be
exact, was reasonable due to the
attendant difficulties which
characterized the prosecution of the
criminal case against petitioner. But
then, the certiorariproceeding was
initiated before the respondent court
long after trial on the merits of the
case had ensued in the court below
with the active participation of
prosecution lawyers, including
Prosecutor Gingoyon. At any rate, the
definitive rule now in that the special
civil action for certiorari should not be
instituted beyond a period of the three
months,38 the same to be reckoned by
taking into account the duration of
time that had expired from the
commission of the acts complained to
annul the same.39
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32233,
promulgated on November 24, 1993, annulling
the resolution dated November 5, 1992 and
the omnibus order dated March 29, 1993 of
the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro
City, as well as said respondent court's
resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the
motion for reconsideration of said judgment,
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
19
CRIM PRO CASE I
aforesaid resolution and omnibus order of the
Regional Trail Court granting bail to petitioner
Miguel P. Paderanga are hereby
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 158763 : March 31, 2006]
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and
ROMEO B. OCON, Petitioners, v. VIRGILIO M.
TULIAO, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the 18 December
2002 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 67770 and its 12 June 2003 Resolution denying
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. The
dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge
Anastacio D. Anghad to have acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders, the instant
petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is
hereby GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE, and it is
hereby ordered:
1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001,
Order dated September 21, 2001, Joint Order dated
October 16, 2001 and Joint Order dated November
14, 2001 dismissing the two (2) Informations for
Murder, all issued by public respondent Judge
Anastacio D. Anghad in Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523
and 36-3524 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
another entered UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,] and
REINSTATING the Order dated June 25, 2001 and
Joint Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by the then
acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan;
2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are
hereby ordered REINSTATED in the docket of active
criminal cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial
Court of Santiago City, Isabela; andcralawlibrary
3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is
DIRECTED to ISSUE forthwith Warrants of Arrest for
the apprehension of private respondents Jose
"Pempe" Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3
Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T. Maderal in said
Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524.2
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case
are as follows:
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were
discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which
were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente
Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent
Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness
protection program.
Two informations for murder were filed against
SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1
Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel
Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22
April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all of the
accused and sentenced them to two counts
of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was
yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The
case was appealed to this Court on automatic review
where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused
therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was
arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn
confession and identified petitioners Jose C.
Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P.
Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe,
as the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente
Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for
murder against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and
Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of
SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding
Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest
against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion
to complete preliminary investigation, to
reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the
warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001,
Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners
and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion
on the ground that, since the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be
properly heard by the court. In the meantime,
petitioners appealed the resolution of State
Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of
Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge
Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and issued a
Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge
Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the
cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against
20
CRIM PRO CASE I
petitioner Miranda. He likewise applied this Order to
petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21
September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and
respondent Tuliao moved for the reconsideration of
the said Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of
Judge Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration
was denied in a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001
and the prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint
Order dated 22 October 2001.
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a
petition for certiorari, mandamusand prohibition
with this Court, with prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad
from further proceeding with the case, and seeking
to nullify the Orders and Joint Orders of Judge
Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001,
16 October 2001, and 22 October 2001.
On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a
Resolution resolving to grant the prayer for a
temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad
from further proceeding with the criminal cases.
Shortly after the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad
issued a Joint Order dated 14 November 2001
dismissing the two Informations for murder against
petitioners. On 19 November 2001, this Court took
note of respondent's cash bond evidenced by O.R.
No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued
the temporary restraining order while referring the
petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on
the merits.
Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to
Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that
Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed
contempt of court when he issued on 15 November
2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing
the informations for murder." On 21 November
2001, we referred said motion to the Court of
Appeals in view of the previous referral to it of
respondent's petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus .
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals
rendered the assailed decision granting the petition
and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases
in the RTC of Santiago City, as well as the issuance of
warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2
Maderal. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of
this Decision, but the same was denied in a
Resolution dated 12 June 2003.
Hence, this petition.
The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners
bring forth to this Court the following assignments of
error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals
gravely erred in reversing and setting aside the Joint
Order of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad dated August
17, 2001, September 21, 2001, October 16, 2001 and
November 14, 2001 issued in criminal cases
numbered 36-3523 and 36-3524; and, erred in
upholding, affirming and reinstating the Order dated
July 6, 2001 issued by then Acting Presiding Judge
Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an
accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not
submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals
gravely erred in directing the reinstatement of
Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524 in the
docket of Active Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the
Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Philippines, and
in ordering the public respondent to re-issue the
warrants of arrest against herein petitioners.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error in ordering the
reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and
No. 36-3524 in the docket of active criminal cases of
Branch 36 of the regional trial court of Santiago City,
Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to
issue warrants of arrest against herein petitioners,
the order of dismissal issued therein having become
final and executory.
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of
arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person
of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of
the accused.
The first assignment of error brought forth by the
petitioner deals with the Court of Appeals' ruling
that:
[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he
does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the
court. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused
may be acquired either through compulsory process,
such as warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary
appearance, such as when he surrenders to the
police or to the court. It is only when the court has
already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an
accused may invoke the processes of the court (Pete
M. Pico v. Alfonso V. Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-
764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must first
be placed in the custody of the law before the court
may validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs. 3
21
CRIM PRO CASE I
Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals
ruled that petitioners Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio
cannot seek any judicial relief since they were not
yet arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty at
the time they filed their "Urgent Motion to complete
preliminary investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall
and/or quash warrants of arrest."4
Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of
Appeals by arguing that jurisdiction over the person
of the accused is required only in applications for
bail. Furthermore, petitioners argue, assuming that
such jurisdiction over their person is required before
the court can act on their motion to quash the
warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over their
person was already acquired by the court by their
filing of the above Urgent Motion.
In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is
required only in the adjudication of applications for
bail, petitioners quote Retired Court of Appeals
Justice Oscar Herrera:
Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for
the court to first acquire jurisdiction over the person
of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other
relief. The outright dismissal of the case even before
the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is authorized under Section 6(a), Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In
Allado v. Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case was
dismissed on motion of the accused for lack of
probable cause without the accused having been
arrested. In Paul Roberts v. Court of Appeals (254
SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to hold the
issuance of a warrant of arrest in abeyance pending
review by the Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson v.
Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 1025 ), the Court
ordered the case transferred from the
Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually ordered
the dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause.6
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over
their person was already acquired by their filing of
the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our
pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D.
Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez7 :
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby
the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is
accomplished either by his pleading to the merits
(such as by filing a motion to quash or other
pleadings requiring the exercise of the court's
jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment,
entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail,
since the same is intended to obtain the provisional
liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be
posted before custody of the accused has been
acquired by the judicial authorities either by his
arrest or voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction
between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the
person. Custody of the law is required before the
court can act upon the application for bail, but is not
required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought
by the defendant where the mere application
therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.8 Custody of the law is accomplished either
by arrest or voluntary surrender,9 while jurisdiction
over the person of the accused is acquired upon his
arrest or voluntary appearance.10 One can be under
the custody of the law but not yet subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as
when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a
motion before arraignment to quash the warrant.
On the other hand, one can be subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not
be in the custody of the law, such as when an
accused escapes custody after his trial has
commenced.11 Being in the custody of the law
signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby
deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to
become obedient to the will of the law.12 Custody of
the law is literally custody over the body of the
accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 13 cited
by the Court of Appeals should not have been
separated from the issue in that case, which is the
application for admission to bail of someone not yet
in the custody of the law. The entire paragraph of
our pronouncement in Pico reads:
A person applying for admission to bail must be in
the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his
liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke
the processes of that court. Respondent Judge
should have diligently ascertained the whereabouts
of the applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction
over the body of the accused before considering the
application for bail.13
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico
insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a
general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court.15 As we held in the aforecited case of
Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court,
whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes
voluntary appearance.
Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is
the special requirement of the applicant being in the
custody of the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan, 16 we
held that "[t]he purpose of bail is to secure one's
release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to
22
CRIM PRO CASE I
one who is free. Thus, 'bail is the security required
and given for the release of a person who is in the
custody of law.' " The rationale behind this special
rule on bail is that it discourages and prevents resort
to the former pernicious practice wherein the
accused could just send another in his stead to post
his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the
court by his personal appearance therein and
compliance with the requirements therefor.17
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing
pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes
voluntary appearance, and the consequent
submission of one's person to the jurisdiction of the
court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is
precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the
court, which only leads to a special appearance.
These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, whether or not other
grounds for dismissal are included; 18 (2) in criminal
cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The
first two are consequences of the fact that failure to
file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of
lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a
consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of
the court process forcing the submission of the
person of the accused that is the very issue in a
motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in
criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is deemed waived by the accused when he
files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief,
except in cases when he invokes the special
jurisdiction of the court by impugning such
jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow
cases involving special appearances, an accused can
invoke the processes of the court even though there
is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of
the law. However, if a person invoking the special
jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first
submit himself to the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special
appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the
accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative
relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement
for him to be in the custody of the law. The following
cases best illustrate this point, where we granted
various reliefs to accused who were not in the
custody of the law, but were deemed to have placed
their persons under the jurisdiction of the court.
Note that none of these cases involve the
application for bail, nor a motion to quash an
information due to lack of jurisdiction over the
person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest:
1. In Allado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer of the
accused in a petition for certiorarion the ground of
lack of probable cause, we issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing the
warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein
from further proceeding with the case and, instead,
to elevate the records to us.
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20 upon the
accused's Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to
Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on
the ground that they filed a Petition for Review with
the Department of Justice, we directed respondent
judge therein to cease and desist from further
proceeding with the criminal case and to defer the
issuance of warrants of arrests against the accused.
3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21 on the prayer of
the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
Sandiganbayan, we directed the Sandiganbayan to
transfer the criminal cases to the Regional Trial
Court even before the issuance of the warrants of
arrest.
We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require
custody of the law in applications for bail are not
present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If
we allow the granting of bail to persons not in the
custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many
persons who can afford the bail will remain at large,
and could elude being held to answer for the
commission of the offense if ever he is proven guilty.
On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of
warrants of arrest to persons not in the custody of
the law, it would be very rare that a person not
genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free.
This is because it is the same judge who issued the
warrant of arrest who will decide whether or not he
followed the Constitution in his determination of
probable cause, and he can easily deny the motion
to quash if he really did find probable cause after
personally examining the records of the case.
Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity
of official functions, the warrant continues in force
and effect until it is quashed and therefore can still
be enforced on any day and at any time of the day
and night.22 Furthermore, the continued absence of
the accused can be taken against him in the
determination of probable cause, since flight is
indicative of guilt.
In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to
one who is free, it is likewise incongruous to require
one to surrender his freedom before asserting it.
Human rights enjoy a higher preference in the
hierarchy of rights than property rights,23demanding
23
CRIM PRO CASE I
that due process in the deprivation of liberty must
come before its taking and not after.
Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a
subsequently filed Petition for Review with the
Secretary of Justice and based on doubts
engendered by the political climate constitutes grave
abuse of discretion.
We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in
the assailed actions of Judge Anghad. Judge Anghad
seemed a little too eager of dismissing the criminal
cases against the petitioners. First, he quashed the
standing warrant of arrest issued by his predecessor
because of a subsequently filed appeal to the
Secretary of Justice, and because of his doubts on
the existence of probable cause due to the political
climate in the city. Second, after the Secretary of
Justice affirmed the prosecutor's resolution, he
dismissed the criminal cases on the basis of a
decision of this Court in another case with different
accused, doing so two days after this Court resolved
to issue a temporary restraining order against
further proceeding with the case.
After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest
of petitioners, petitioner Miranda appealed the
assistant prosecutor's resolution before the
Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after
assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest on
the basis of said appeal. According to Judge Anghad,
"x x x prudence dictates (that) and because of
comity, a deferment of the proceedings is but
proper."24
Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It
is inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan as
lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he
issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners just
because the petitioners might, in the future, appeal
the assistant prosecutor's resolution to the Secretary
of Justice. But even if the Petition for Review was
filed before the issuance of the warrants of arrest,
the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for
the review of the prosecutor's resolution is not a
ground to quash the warrants of arrest.
In Webb v. de Leon,25 we held that the petitioners
therein cannot assail as premature the filing of the
information in court against them on the ground
that they still have the right to appeal the adverse
resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of
Justice. Similarly, the issuance of warrants of arrest
against petitioners herein should not have been
quashed as premature on the same ground.
The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the
quashal of the warrant of arrest is in order if true:
violation of the Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad
asked and resolved the question:
In these double murder cases, did this Court comply
or adhere to the above-quoted constitutional
proscription, which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of Rights;
to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure
and to the above-cited decisional cases? To this
query or issue, after a deep perusal of the arguments
raised, this Court, through [its] regular Presiding
Judge, finds merit in the contention of herein
accused-movant, Jose "Pempe" Miranda.26
Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision
of the Constitution as having been violated by Judge
Tumaliuan:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.27
However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of
the case, including the supporting evidence to the
resolution of the prosecutor in his determination of
probable cause, we find that Judge Anghad gravely
abused his discretion.
According to petitioners:
In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge
Tumaliuan, for the arrest of the petitioners is
apparent from the face of the order itself, which
clearly stated that the determination of probable
cause was based on the certification, under oath, of
the fiscal and not on a separate determination
personally made by the Judge. No presumption of
regularity could be drawn from the order since it
expressly and clearly showed that it was based only
on the fiscal's certification.28
Petitioners' claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuan's Joint
Order contains no such indication that he relied
solely on the prosecutor's certification. The Joint
Order even indicated the contrary:
Upon receipt of the information and resolution of
the prosecutor, the Court proceeded to determine
the existence of a probable cause by personally
evaluating the records x x x.[29]
The records of the case show that the prosecutor's
certification was accompanied by supporting
documents, following the requirement under Lim, Sr.
24
CRIM PRO CASE I
v. Felix30 and People v. Inting.31 The supporting
documents are the following:
1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor
Leo S. Reyes;
2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto
Gutierrez;
3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;
4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of
Mayor Jose C. Miranda and Reynaldo de la Cruz;
5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;
6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 41 in Criminal Case No. 97-
160355;
7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel
Maderal;
8. Information dated 22 June 2001;
9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao;
andcralawlibrary
10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer
Tuliao and Vicente Buazon.
Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was
no violation on the part of Judge Tumaliuan of
Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution. Judge
Anghad, however, focused on the substantive part of
said section, i.e., the existence of probable cause. In
failing to find probable cause, Judge Anghad ruled
that the confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible for
the following reasons: (1) it was given after almost
two years in the custody of the National Bureau of
Investigation; (2) it was given by someone who
rendered himself untrustworthy for being a fugitive
for five years; (3) it was given in exchange for an
obvious reward of discharge from the information;
and (4) it was given during the election period
amidst a "politically charged scenario where
"Santiago City voters were pitted against each other
along the lines of the Miranda camp on one side and
former City Mayor Amelita S. Navarro, and allegedly
that of DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the
other."32
We painstakingly went through the records of the
case and found no reason to disturb the findings of
probable cause of Judge Tumaliuan.
It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on
the credibility of a witness is not within the province
of the determination of probable cause. As we held
in Webb33 :
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that more likely than not a crime
has been committed and was committed by the
suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear
and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on
evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt
and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United
States, while probable cause demands more than
"bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence
which would justify x x x conviction." A finding of
probable cause merely binds over the suspect to
stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of
guilt and should be determined in a summary
manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of
trial x x x.
Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision
of this Court in another case with different accused
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on
the ground, among other things, that there was a
Petition for Review of the assistant prosecutor's
resolution before the Secretary of Justice. However,
after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the
prosecutor's resolution, Judge Anghad summarily
dismissed the two criminal cases against the
petitioners on the basis of the following explanation:
Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People v.
Wilfredo Leano, et al., RTC, Branch 41, Manila, and
based from his sworn statements, he pinpointed to
Mr. Miranda - the mastermind and with him and the
other police officers as the direct perpetrators, the
October 9, 2001 Decision of the Supreme Court
absolving the five cops of murder, certainly makes
his sworn Statements a "narration of falsehood and
lies" and that because of the decision acquitting said
officers "who were likewise falsely linked by said
Rodel Maderal in his April 27, 2001 statements, it is
now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made
untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and
therefore the same is without probable value." This
Court agrees with the defense's views. Indeed, of
what use is Maderal's statements when the Supreme
Court rejected the prosecution's evidence presented
and adduced in Criminal Case No. 97-160355. Rodel
Maderal is supposed to turn state witness in these
two (2) cases but with the Supreme Court decision
adverted to, the probative value of his statements is
practically nil.
xxx
This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the
accused Miranda dated October 18, 2001, praying
25
CRIM PRO CASE I
for the summary dismissal of the two (2) murder
charges in view of the latest decision of the Supreme
Court in People of the Philippines v. Wilfredo Leaño,
et al., G.R. No. 13886, acquitting the accused therein
and in effect disregarding all the evidence presented
by the prosecution in that case. Accordingly, the two
(2) informations [for] murder filed against Jose
Miranda are ordered dismissed.34
This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge
Anghad had no right to twist our decision and
interpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal, who
was still at large when the evidence of the
prosecution in the Leaño case was presented. A
decision, even of this Court, acquitting the accused
therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the
dismissal of criminal case against different accused
for the same crime. The blunder of Judge Anghad is
even more pronounced by the fact that our decision
in Leaño was based on reasonable doubt. We never
ruled in Leaño that the crime did not happen; we
just found that there was reasonable doubt as to the
guilt of the accused therein, since the prosecution in
that case relied on circumstantial evidence, which
interestingly is not even the situation in the criminal
cases of the petitioners in the case at bar as there is
here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The accused in
Leaño furthermore had no motive to kill respondent
Tuliao's son, whereas petitioners herein had been
implicated in the testimony of respondent Tuliao
before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
It is preposterous to conclude that because of our
finding of reasonable doubt in Leaño, "it is now
beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful,
fabricated and perjured statements and therefore
the same is without probable value."35 On the
contrary, if we are to permit the use of our decision
in Leaño, an acquittal on the ground of reasonable
doubt actually points to the probability of the
prosecution's version of the facts therein. Such
probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria of
probable cause.
We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghad's
dismissal of the informations two days after we
resolved to issue, upon the filing of a bond, a
temporary restraining order prohibiting him from
further proceeding with the case. The bond was filed
the day after the informations were dismissed.
While the dismissal of the case was able to beat the
effectivity date of the temporary restraining order,
such abrupt dismissal of the informations (days after
this Court's resolve to issue a TRO against Judge
Anghad) creates wild suspicions about the motives
of Judge Anghad.
Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with
it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the
nullified proceeding.
In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim
that the Court of Appeals did not recall or reinstate
the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan,
but instead directed Judge Anghad to issue
apparently new warrants of arrest.36According to the
petitioners, it was an error for the Court of Appeals
to have done so, without a personal determination
of probable cause.
We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered
the issuance of new warrants of arrest or merely
ordered the reinstatement of the warrants of arrest
issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely a matter of
scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy whereof
should not be allowed to affect the dispositions on
the merits, especially in this case where the other
dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to the
other direction. Firstly, the Court of Appeals had
reinstated the 25 June 2001 Order of Judge
Tumaliuan,37 which issued the warrants of arrest.
Secondly, the Court of Appeals likewise declared the
proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void.
Certainly, the declaration of nullity of proceedings
should be deemed to carry with it the reinstatement
of the orders set aside by the nullified proceedings.
Judge Anghad's order quashing the warrants of
arrest had been nullified; therefore those warrants
of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed.
Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed
the issuance of new warrants of arrest based on a
determination of probable cause, it would have been
legally permissible for them to do so. The records of
the preliminary investigation had been available to
the Court of Appeals, and are also available to this
Court, allowing both the Court of Appeals and this
Court to personally examine the records of the case
and not merely rely on the certification of the
prosecutor. As we have ruled in Allado v. Diokno and
Roberts v. Court of Appeals, the determination of
probable cause does not rest on a subjective criteria.
As we had resolved in those cases to overrule the
finding of probable cause of the judges therein on
the ground of grave abuse of discretion, in the same
vein, we can also overrule the decision of a judge
reversing a finding of probable cause, also on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion.
There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of
a criminal case dismissed before arraignment
In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim
that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases
No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524, alleging that the order
of dismissal issued therein had become final and
executory. According to petitioners:
26
CRIM PRO CASE I
It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the
Joint Order of Judge Anghad dated November 14,
2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders which were
assailed in the private respondent Tuliao's Petition
for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition filed by
the private respondent before the Court of Appeals.
As carefully enumerated in the first page of the
assailed Decision, only the following Orders issued
by Judge Anghad were questioned by private
respondent, to wit:
1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;
2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;
3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001;
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4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.
Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001
of Judge Anghad, which ultimately dismissed
Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is NOT
included in the list of the assailed Order/Joint
Orders. Hence, the Court of Appeals should not have
passed upon the validity or nullity of the Joint Order
of November 14, 2001.38
Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent
Tuliao's Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus was filed not with the Court of Appeals,
but with this Court. The Court of Appeals decided
the case because we referred the same to them in
our 19 November 2001 Resolution. Such petition
was filed on 25 October 2001, around three weeks
before the 14 November 2001 Order. Upon receipt
of the 14 November 2001 Order, however,
respondent Tuliao lost no time in filing with this
Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in
Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately
and willfully committed contempt of court when he
issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14
November 2001 dismissing the informations for
murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said
motion to the Court of Appeals, in view of the
previous referral of respondent Tuliao's petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus .
Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to
Cite Public Repondent in Contempt places the 14
November 2001 Order within the issues of the case
decided by the Court of Appeals. In claiming that
Judge Anghad committed contempt of this Court in
issuing the 14 November 2001 Order, respondent
Tuliao had ascribed to Judge Anghad an act much
more serious than grave abuse of discretion.
Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued
the 14 November 2001 Order on 15 November 2001,
antedating it so as to avoid the effects of our 12
November 2001 Resolution. In said 12 November
2001 Resolution, we resolved to issue a temporary
restraining order enjoining Judge Anghad from
further proceeding with the criminal cases upon the
respondent Tuliao's filing of a bond in the amount
of P20,000.00. Respondent Tuliao had filed the bond
on 15 November 2005.
While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge
Anghad in contempt, seeing as disobedience to
lawful orders of a court and abuse of court processes
are cases of indirect contempt which require the
granting of opportunity to be heard on the part of
respondent,39 the prayer to cite public respondent in
contempt and for other reliefs just and equitable
under the premises should be construed to include a
prayer for the nullification of said 14 November 2001
Order.
In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case
dismissed before arraignment does not constitute
double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked
where the accused has not been arraigned and it
was upon his express motion that the case was
dismissed.40
As to respondent Tuliao's prayer (in both the original
petition for certiorari as well as in his motion to cite
for contempt) to disqualify Judge Anghad from
further proceeding with the case, we hold that the
number of instances of abuse of discretion in this
case are enough to convince us of an apparent bias
on the part of Judge Anghad. We further resolve to
follow the case of People v. SPO1 Leaño,41by
transferring the venue of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523
and No. 36-3524 to the City of Manila, pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 4, of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated 18 December 2002 and the Resolution dated
12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby
AFFIRMED, with the modification that Criminal Cases
No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and
raffled in the Regional Trial Court of the City of
Manila. In this connection,
1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the
Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago,
Isabela, who is directed to effect the transfer of the
cases within ten (10) days after receipt hereof;
2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of
Santiago, Isabela, is likewise directed to report to
this Court compliance hereto within ten (10) days
from transfer of these cases;
3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall
proceed to raffle the criminal cases within ten (10)
days from the transfer;
27
CRIM PRO CASE I
4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is
likewise directed to report to this Court compliance
with the order to raffle within ten (10) days from
said compliance; andcralawlibrary

5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are

raffled is directed to act on said cases with
reasonable dispatch.

6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to

issue forthwith warrants of arrest for the
apprehension of petitioners Jose C. Miranda, Alberto
P. Dalmacio, Romeo B. Ocon, and accused Rodel T.
Maderal, conformably with the decision of the Court
of Appeals dated 18 December 2002.

The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this

Court dated 4 August 2003 is hereby LIFTED. Costs
against Petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

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