8/29/2019 Three Ways to Answer Skepticism – Briefly

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Skepticism
POSTED ON MARCH 15, 2012 BY VICTORY BRIEFS

In debate we use the term “skepticism” to refer to a

broad set of arguments which conclude that no sound
normative conclusions can be drawn. It is therefore
never appropriate, the argument goes, to say that a
given action or policy is morally right or wrong.
Arguments with skeptical conclusions go in and out of
fashion in LD. Right now you see them most o en
intertwined with permissibility debates. “If nothing is
prohibited then everything is permissible.” That is a highly questionable conclusion,
but not directly the subject of this article. My hope is to give you a set of intuitive
answers to skeptical arguments without the need to resort to theory.

Caveat: These answers should not be a substitute for research. There is voluminous
scholarly commentary on the various forms of skepticism which you should
absolutely dive into if you want to be at your best when answering skeptical
positions. Most of the answers I suggest below exist in a more sophisticated form in
the literature, so please, no “Torson 2012” cards.

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8/29/2019 Three Ways to Answer Skepticism – Briefly

1. It’s defense.

Skepticism, by its nature, cannot prescribe an action. To say that debaters, judges, or
the agent in the resolution “ought” to do anything is inconsistent with its basic
conclusion, which is that there are no valid “ought” statements.

Put yourself in Peter Singer’s famous drowning child scenario. You walk by a pond
and see a drowning child in it. Option A is to save the child, option B is to do nothing.
An angel pops up on your le shoulder and says “There is a near universal intuition
that pain is a moral evil, so you should try to minimize the amount of pain in the
world. Saving this drowning child would reduce the amount of pain in the world, so
you should save her.” A devil pops up on your right shoulder and says “You can’t
know for sure that there are any objective moral rules.” At this point, it seems to me,
you have no good reason not to save the child. You have a reason to save the child
which may or may not be true, but no argument as to why the preferable alternative
is not saving the child.

In other words, the skeptical claim is just defense. It points to the probability that an
advocacy may be unjusti ed, but all offensive arguments might be untrue. A dubious
reason to choose option A is more compelling than the absence of a reason to choose
option B.

2. Debaters can’t escape normative claims.

“There are no valid ought-statements, therefore you ought to vote for the negative.”
The contradiction is apparent. Debaters cannot avoid making normative claims that
are essential to their ballot story. At the very least they are assuming a paradigm for
evaluating arguments and picking a winner that itself includes normative
underpinnings. There may be ways to resolve this apparent contradiction, but those
trying to do so will have to do some fancy footwork. Press on these tensions in cross-
ex to highlight the double-bind. Either skepticism is false or their ballot
story doesn’t follow.

3. “The only serious business is living…”

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Skeptical hypotheses pose an interesting challenge for theorists, but they tell us
relatively little about applied ethics. Bernard Williams puts it this way:

Bernard Williams [Prof. of Philosophy, University of Cambridge, University of

California at Berkeley], Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Cambridge: Harvard
University Press (1985), pp. 116-117

“The main consequences that this discussion has for ethical argument is that
re ective criticism should basically go in a direction opposite to that encouraged by
ethical theory. Theory looks characteristically for considerations that are very
general and have as little distinctive content as possible, because it is trying to
systematize and because it wants to represent as many reasons as possible as
applications of other reasons. But critical re ection should seek for as much shared
understanding as it can nd on any issue, and use any ethical material that, in the
context of the re ective discussion, makes some sense and commands some loyalty.
Of course that will take things for granted, but as serious re ection it must know it
will do that. The only serious enterprise is living, and we have to live a er the
re ection; moreover (though the distinction of theory and practice encourages us to
forget it), we have to live during it as well. Theory typically uses the assumption that
we probably have too many ethical ideas, some of which may well turn out to be
mere prejudices. Our major problem now is actually that we have not too many but
too few, and we need to cherish as many as we can.”

Responsibility seems omnipresent – our choices affect those around us (and

ourselves). It may be the case that all human practice is ultimately without normative
signi cance, but it does not seem possible for human beings to simultaneously go on
living and accept that assumption. If this is a plausible implication of skepticism,
then perhaps we should reject it. The meaningfulness of human choices is a
fundamental axiom for debate about normative concepts.

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 A rmative Ethics Choice by Ryan Lawrence

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Charles Rutter • 7 years ago

I have to disagree with a lot of the points here, but first and foremost with point one. It is all
about how one is framing the skeptical position. For example, if the negative claims the
resolution has a burden to prove the resolution true under a truth-testing paradigm and the
resolution is making some sort of moral evaluation how does skepticism not negate? It may
seem like defense as it simple states the affirmative cannot prove the resolution true but then
because of how it is framed one would have to negate. If a topic says something is morally
permissible and the affirmative proves permissible means no prohibition exists then how
does skepticism not affirm? Clearly there are instances in which skepticism proves to be
offensive in its implications.Also, the second point is clearly a mischaracterization of most
well-run skeptical positions. The argument does not flat out say it is true or it is prescriptive.
Not only that, but many would contend that claims against categorical moral truths are not
moral judgments themselves. Clearly there are more nuanced debates to be had than "skep
is itself a morally prescriptive judgment".
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Adam Torson > Charles Rutter • 7 years ago

Re your first point - skepticism more plausibly affirms under a truth-testing paradigm.
The first suggestion amounts to a claim that we oughtn&#039t evaluate the debate in
that way because the negative doesn&#039t have to advocate anything.I don&#039t
get the second paragraph - how would a skeptical argument be framed so that a
valid normative conclusion can be derived from it?
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Charles Rutter > Adam Torson • 7 years ago

So the argument remains that skepticism then would serve as offense.and the
second paragraph has two main points. The first was simply that no smart
skep position would say There are no valid ought-statements, therefore you
ought to vote for the negative. The position is not posited as an "ought". The
second argument is that while skepticism evaluates the concept of morality
and moral judgement of action it itself is not a moral or ethical judgement. It
functions on a separate level from "ethical considerations", it is not a
prescriptive statement.
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Adam Torson > Charles Rutter • 7 years ago

It is offense under a paradigm for evaluating debate rounds which this
argument suggests is not preferable.I still don&#039t follow the
argument in the second paragraph. You say no good skep position
would claim there aren&#039t "ought" statements and that it
"evaluates" morality without itself being an ethical judgment. Perhaps
an example would be helpful - what skeptical argument powerful
enough to deny the truth of all normative ACs is consistent with an
"evaluation" of morality and the assertion of a judging procedure to
pick a winner?
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Charles Rutter > Adam Torson • 7 years ago

To clarify, the second point was not to say that skep does not claim
"there aren&#039t ought statements". It does say there are not ought
statements but the second half of your claim that it is followed by
"therefore you ought to vote negative" is the problem. The negative is
not prescribing an ought statement when running skep. Because
skepticism is not a moral guide for action, it is instead a rejection of
such a framework as a guide for action. Thus my point is that it itself is
not attempting to dictate our action but change how we evaluate
action, by stopping the practice of making categorical statements.
Saying we should not use ought statements as a dictate for action
without context is not itself a moral judgement of moral judgements.
Thus it is not subject to its own criticism.
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Jacob Nails • 7 years ago

I don&#039t think the #2 is very convincing. A debater forwarding a util framework
doesn&#039t have to show that signing the ballot aff is a utilitarian good, and I don&#039t
think you could answer egoism with "his standard justifies voting for whoever you feel like".
A judge isn&#039t obligated to donate to charity every time he/she votes aff on the Nov-Dec
11 topic. Debate is nonpolitical in almost every other context, so I don&#039t see why
skepticism should be held to a uniquely higher standard
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8/29/2019 Three Ways to Answer Skepticism – Briefly
skepticism should be held to a uniquely higher standard.
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Adam Torson > Jacob Nails • 7 years ago

A couple thoughts:1. My claim is not that judges have to make choices that are
consistent with the positions they vote for. #2 is just an argument debaters can make
to demonstrate that skepticism is logically inconsistent with other claims being
advanced in the round. Using your example, if utilitarianism was a true standard (and
not positionally contextualized), it certainly would be legitimate to answer it by saying
"you claim that people should pursue utilitarian goods but acknowledge that this rule
does not hold as applied to the judge." I don&#039t see why that holds the argument
to a higher standard. If a debater says a norm should apply in one situation but not
another, they should be required to explain the apparent contradiction.2. There is a
difference between saying one norm should be preferred to another and saying that
there are no norms at all. Most standards are plausibly applied to the resolutional
actor and are therefore easily distinguished from the particular norms that apply to
judging. Skepticism, on the other hand, makes a universal claim about normativity. It
is impossible for the latter not to be implicated in the rules a judge applies to
decision-making. So, unlike most standards arguments, it is legitimate to test to
validity of a skeptical position by applying it to in-round practices like judging.
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Anonymous > Adam Torson • 20 years ago

This argument confuses pre and post fiat implications. A debater running util
would have to advance his norm that it is net benificial for the judge and
debaters to be debating rather then helping save people in africa. Or that one
debater should win because he will sell the trophy and donate the money to a
cancer fund, ect. No one uses these arguments to challenge util for the same
reason they are non-responsive to skepticism.
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Anonymous > Anonymous • 7 years ago

You&#039re looking at it the wrong way. It&#039s not that skepticism
justifies pre-fiat action, it&#039s the other way around -- the fact that a
debater has normative pre-fiat arguments dejustifies skepticism, which
posits a universal negative claiming no normative truths. No
one&#039s saying that "since skepticism is true you should just sign
your ballot for me!" is a good argument (which would be analogous to
your util example), but instead "She&#039s claiming both that no
normative truths exist and that you ought to vote for her which is
contradiction".Your appeal to the pre/post fiat distinction as being
"necessary for debate" is normative which, guess what, concedes that
skepticism isn&#039t true. Which means that it&#039s still a total
contradiction.You could try to say that using implicit assumptions
about the role of the ballot could take out other normative theories, but
that&#039s much less plausible. For one thing, as mentioned, actor-
specific theories would take that out It just isn&#039t true that the
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specific theories would take that out. It just isn&#039t true that the
"vast majority" of util justifications aren&#039t specific to governments;
see Sunstein and Vermuele, trade-offs and paralysis, and every single
social contract argument ever made (not that these have been used
much this year due to lack of government-focused topics). But even for
agent-neutral theories it&#039s ambiguous; one could just as easily
argue that rewarding the better debater maximizes our education which
matters more in the long run than one person promising to give money
to charity. What&#039s not ambiguous is that "absolutely no normative
facts" and "you ought to vote for me" are completely incompatible.
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Jacob Nails > Anonymous • 7 years ago

I don&#039t see how the first paragraph is responsive. The same kind
of contradiction you mention can be pointed out versus an opponent
who reads a util AC but doesn&#039t donate to charity. It also applies
to anyone who hasn&#039t forwarded the same moral theory every
single round and/or hasn&#039t adhered perfectly to that theory.As
regards the last paragraph, your intuitions about plausibility seem
mistaken. It&#039s hard to imagine that every moral theory but
skepticism commits one to judging high school debate rounds and
voting on the flow. Actor-specific justifications (a) usually aren&#039t
very good, (b) don&#039t apply to many (e.g. any universal) moral
theories, and (c) don&#039t help much when every topic this year has
had an individual actor.
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Samir Reddy > Anonymous • 7 years ago

I don&#039t think this is particularly responsive to the second
argument which is standards arguments (that are good at least) are
actor-specific. Debaters can absolutely collapse the post-fiat/pre-fiat
distinction if they wish. It&#039s a matter of whether it makes sense. If
someone says governments must use util. and a debater says you
should vote to maximize utility that conflates the judge with a
government. Pre/post-fiat is a construct that must be defended
otherwise.
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Anonymous > Samir Reddy • 7 years ago

Actor-specificity is a non-issue. The vast majority of justifications for
util do not appeal to the government as an actor specifically so I do not
see why those are at all relevant. Pre/post fiat is a needed distinction
for switch-side debate, otherwise the activity is non-sensical as every
round is a performative contradiction from what happened in the
previous one. This might be relevant if a debater claims that skep takes
out theory, but ive never seen that argument actually used or won.
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Adam Torson > Anonymous • 7 years ago

I don't follow why the pre/post-fiat distinction is necessary for switch
side debate. Skepticism is not a post-fiat argument because it does
not implicitly or explicitly defend an advocacy. It's not pre-fiat in any
meaningful sense of that term because it claims to deny the truth of a
post-fiat prescription, and in any case it doesn't advocate anything

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