CIVIL LAW REVIEW CASE DIGESTS
CASE FACTS
1. Del Socorro vs. Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan
Van Wilsen Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on
September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were blessed
744 SCRA 516 , with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time
December 10, 2014 of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by
virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of
Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months
old.5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the
Philippines.6
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide
monthly support to their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty
(250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or
less). However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the
Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son,
Roderigo.8
Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and
remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been
residing thereat. To date, all the parties, including their son,
Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.1
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a
letter demanding for support from respondent. However,
respondent refused to receive the letter.
RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the
instant criminal case against respondent on the ground that the
facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with
respect to the respondent who is an alien
ISSUE
1. Whether or not a foreign national
has an obligation to support his
minor child under Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national
can be held criminally liable under
R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified
failure to support his minor child.
RULING
We find the petition meritorious.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A.
No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal obligation to support exists.
I. We agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article
195 of the New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent,
who is a foreign citizen, since
Article 15 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality.
In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically
the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies
to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to
foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with
respect to family rights and duties. The obligation to give support to
a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the
respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with
the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to
Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his
child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to
support petitioner’s son under Article 195 of the Family Code as a
consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. ​This
does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to
support petitioner’s son altogether​.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law
applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign
law. In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a
national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the
matter of provision of and capacity to support. While respondent
pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that
he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. It is
incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law
of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation
to support their child (either before, during or after the issuance of a
divorce decree), because ​Llorente v. Court of Appeals,​ 345 SCRA
592 (2000), has already enunciated that: True, foreign laws do not
prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, ​they
must be alleged and proved​.
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the
Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption
shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not
properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the
foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.
Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to
support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant
case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which

2. Loria vs. Muñoz, Muñoz filed a complaint for aum of money and damages against
Jr. 738 SCRA 397 , Loria with the RTC of Legazpi City. Muñoz alleged that he has
October 15, 2014 been engaged in construction, Loria visited him in his office in
Daraga, Albay. Loria invited Muñoz to advance 2million for a
subcontract of a 50million river-dredging project. Loria
represented that he would make Elizaldy Co, owner of Sunwest
Construction would turn out to be the lowest bidder for the
project. Elizaldy Co would pay P8,000,000.00 to ensure the
project’s award to Sunwest. After the award to Sunwest,
Sunwest would subcontract 20% or P10,000,000.00 worth of the
project to Muñoz. Since Muñoz knew Loria for 5 years, he
accepted the offer.
Muñoz requested for the release of 3M from his bank Allied
bank, and gave it to Grace delos Santos and from Delos Santos
to Loria. 4 days later 1.8m of the 3m was returned to Muñoz.
Sometime after, Loria collected Muñoz’s 800k balance. After
deducting Loria’s personal loans from Muñoz, Muñoz issued a
check to Loria for P481,800.00. Loria acknowledged receiving
this amount from Muñoz.
When the bidding started, the lowest bidder was Sunwest,
however Sunwest finished dredging the project without sub
contracting Muñoz. Since the project is already finished, Muñoz
demanded from Loria to return this 2m. Loria did not return the
money.
Muñoz filed filed a criminal case vs Co and Loria with estafa, but
WON Loria is liable to Muñoz
enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and
penalizing the noncompliance therewith
Moreover, ​foreign law should not be applied when its application
would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the
forum​. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a
law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the
fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither
enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the
noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in
the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to
be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
II.
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may
be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for
unjustly refusing or failing to give support to petitioner’s son.
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial
support to the child is considered an act of violence against women
and children.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The
Court of Appeals’ decision and resolution in C.A.G.R. CV No. 81882
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to interest rate. Petitioner
Carlos A. Loria shall pay respondent Ludolfo P. Muñoz, Jr.
P2,000,000.00 in actual damages, with interest of 12% interest per
annum from the filing of the complaint until June 30, 2013, and 6%
interest per annum from July 1, 2013 until full payment.
Yes. The principle of unjust enrichment requires two conditions: (1)
that a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and
(2) that such benefit is derived at the expense of another. (Flores vs.
Lindo, Jr., 648 SCRA 772 [2011])
Under Article 22 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, “every person
who through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of
the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.”
There is unjust enrichment “when a person unjustly retains a benefit
to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property
of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and
good conscience.” The principle of unjust enrichment has two
conditions. First, a person must have been benefited without a real
or valid basis or justification. Second, the benefit was derived at
another person’s expense or damage.
Generally, parties to an illegal contract may not recover what they
gave under the contract. Under the doctrine of in pari delicto, “no
action arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal contract[.] No suit
 was dismissed for lack of probable cause. Muñoz then filed the
complaint of sum of money.
Loria admitted having received 481,800 but said that sice he
followed up the project’s approval with the Central Office of the
DPWH as agreed, therefore he is entitled to his representation
expenses. He also said Muñoz is guilty of forum shopping.
RTC ruled that Loria must pay Muñoz for the 2m plus 12%
interest as damages until full payed and no one should enriched
themselves at the expense of another. Loria appealed, CA
sustained the trial court’s factual findings but deleted the award
of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Considering that
Muñoz did not benefit from paying Loria P2,000,000.00, the
appellate court ruled that Loria must return the money to Muñoz
under the principle of unjust enrichment. Hence, this petition.
3. Willaware Respondent Jesichris Manufacturing Company filed this present
Products complaint for damages for unfair competition with prayer for
Corporation vs. permanent injunction to enjoin petitioner Willaware Products
Jesichris Corporation from manufacturing and distributing plastic-made
Manufacturing automotive parts similar to those of respondent.
Corporation 734
SCRA 238 , Respondent alleged that it is a duly registered partnership
September 03, 2014 engaged in the manufacture and distribution of plastic and metal
products
Respondent further alleged that in view of the physical proximity
of petitioner's office to respondent's office, and in view of the fact
that some of the respondent's employees had transferred to
petitioner, petitioner had developed familiarity with respondent's
products, especially its plastic-made automotive parts.
That sometime in November 2000, respondent discovered that
petitioner had been manufacturing and distributing the same
automotive parts with exactly similar design, same material and
colors but was selling these products at a lower price as
respondent's plastic-made automotive parts and to the same
customers.
Whether or not petitioner committed
acts amounting to unfair competition
under Article 28 of the Civil Code.
can be maintained for its specific performance, or to recover the
property agreed to be sold or delivered, or the money agreed to be
paid, or damages for its violation[.]” Nevertheless, this court allowed
Tarnate, Jr. to recover 10% of the retention fee. According to this
court, “the application of the doctrine of in pari delicto is not always
rigid.” An exception to the doctrine is “when its application
contravenes well-established public policy.” In Gonzalo v. Tarnate,
Jr., 713 SCRA 224 (2014), this court ruled that “the prevention of
unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy of the State.” It is,
therefore, an exception to the application of the in pari delicto
doctrine.
Yes.
Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that “unfair competition in
agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through
the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other
unjust, oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a right of
action by the person who thereby suffers damage.”
From the foregoing, it is clear that what is being sought is ​not
competition per se but the use of unjust, oppressive or
high-handed methods which may deprive others of a fair
chance to engage in business or to earn a living. Plainly, what
the law prohibits is unfair competition and not competition where the
means used are fair and legitimate.
In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two
characteristics: ​(1) it must involve an injury to a competitor or
trade rival, and (2) it must involve acts which are characterized
as "contrary to good conscience," or "shocking to judicial
sensibilities," ​or otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law,
these include force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other
unjust, oppressive or high-handed method. The public injury or
interest is a minor factor; the essence of the matter appears to be a
private wrong perpetrated by unconscionable means.
Here, both characteristics are present. First, both parties are
competitors or trade rivals, both being engaged in the manufacture
of plastic-made automotive parts. Second, the acts of the petitioner
were clearly “contrary to good conscience” as petitioner admitted
having employed respondent’s former employees, deliberately
copied respondent’s products and even went to the extent of selling
these products to respondent’s customers.
Therefore, petitioner is guilty of unfair competition under Article 28 of
the Civil Code.
4. R.V. Santos A Construction Contract was executed by Belle and RVSCI.
Company, Inc. vs. RVSCI undertook to construct an underground electrical network
Belle Corporation for Belle’s Tagaytay Woodlands Condominium Project in
Tagaytay City ​with a project cost that shall not be more than P22
682 SCRA 219 ,
October 03, 2012 Million, inclusive of all taxes, government fees and the service
fee. As part of the contract, Belle gave an advanced payment of
Principle of Unjust P11 Million. The project was supposed to be completed within
Enrichment 180 calendar days from receipt by RVSCI of the notice to
commence from Belle. RVSCI was not able to complete the
project on April 1998.
2 months after, Belle placed additional work orders with RVSCI,
Belle admittedly approved RVSCI’s cost estimates for Additional
Order Nos. 1 and 2 but Belle allegedly did not approve the cost
estimate for Additional Order No. 3 which Belle estimated should
only cost P22K.
On August 1998, RVSCI submitted its Progress Billing to Belle,
claiming 53.3% accomplishment of the project, the total amount
billed by RVSCI was P5.3 Million. Belle made its own
assessment of the work accomplished by RVSCI and
determined that it was only worth P4.6 Million. Belle made an
additional payment for electrical works to RVSCI in the amount
of P476K. Belle likewise remitted the amount of P122Kto the BIR
representing the withholding tax due from RVSCI. Belle engaged
the services of an assessor, R.A. Mojica and Partners, to
determine the value of the work done by RVSCI. R.A. Mojica
reported to Belle that the work accomplished by RVSCI on the
main project only amounted to P4.8 Million and not P7.1 Million
as billed by RVSCI. RVSCI allegedly refused to return the
excess payment despite repeated demands. Thus, relying on the
arbitration clause in the Construction Contract, Belle brought the
matter before the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
(CIAC).
CIAC ruled that Belle indeed made an overpayment to RVSCI.
Since the date when RVSCI commenced work on the Project
and the supposed completion date cannot be determined, the
CIAC found no basis to award liquidated damages in favor of
Belle. The arbitral tribunal likewise denied RVSCI’s
counterclaims.
Both Belle and RVSCI filed petitions for review with the CA. CA
dismissed their petitions and affirmed the CIAC’s decision.
Hence this petition.
WON RVSCI is liable to return what
it had received beyond the actual
value of the work it had done for
Belle.
Yes.
The rationale underlying the owner’s right to seek an evaluation of
the contractor’s work is the right to pay only the true value of the
work as may be reasonably determined under the circumstances.
This is consistent with the law against unjust enrichment under
Article 22 of the Civil Code which states that ​“every person who
through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of
the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.”
We have held that ​“the principle of unjust enrichment essentially
contemplates payment when there is no duty to pay, and the
person who receives the payment has no right to receive it.”
We uphold the CIAC’s factual finding that the value of the total work
accomplished by RVSCI on the main project was P4.8 Million while
the cost of the additional work amounted to P1.7 Million plus P22K,
for a total of P6.6 Million. On the other hand, Belle had made
payments in the total amount of P11.5 Million. It is thus undeniable
that RVSCI had received payments from Belle in excess of the value
of its work accomplishment. In light of this overpayment, it seems
specious for RVSCI to claim that it has suffered damages from
Belle’s refusal to pay its Progress Billing, which had been proven to
be excessive and inaccurate. Bearing in mind the law and
jurisprudence on unjust enrichment, we hold that RVSCI is indeed
liable to return what it had received beyond the actual value of the
work it had done for Belle.
5. Ochosa vs. Alano Jose, a young AFP lieutenant, met Bona, a 17 yr old college
640 SCRA 517 , dropout in the 70s. They married in Oct 27, 1973 in Basilan.
January 26, 2011 They acquired no property and bore no child. But they found an
abandoned infant and they named her Ramona. During their
marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of the
Philippine archipelago as an officer in the AFP. Bona did not
cohabit with him in his posts, preferring to stay in her hometown
of Basilan.
Sometime in the 80s, they were given living quarters at Fort
Bonifacio, Makati City where they resided with their military
aides. However, Jose was charged with rebellion for his alleged
participation in the failed coup d’etat. He was incarcerated in
Camp Crame.
News reached Jose that Bona entertained male visitors in her
bedroom whenever Jose was out of their living quarters. On one
occasion, Bona was caught having sex with Jose’s driver,
Corporal Gagarin. Rumors of Bona’s sexual infidelity circulated
in the military community. When Jose could no longer bear these
rumors, he got a military pass from his jail warden and
confronted Bona. Bona admitted the chismis and she flew to
Basilan with Ramona.
In 1994, Jose filed for dec of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psycho incapax. Dr. Rondain diagnosed Bona with ​Histrionic
Personality Disorder ​on account of her family history, having
for a father a gambler and a womanizer and a mother who was a
battered wife. There was no possibility of a cure since Bona
does not have an insight of what is happening to her and refused
to acknowledge the reality. Bona had excessive emotion and
attention seeking behavior.
OSG appealed to CA. Then reached SC.
6. Chi Ming Tsoi vs. After the celebration of marriage, petitioner Chi Ming Choi and
Court of Appeals defendant Gina Lao-Tsoi slept together on the same bed in the
266 SCRA 324 , same room for the first night of their married life. However,
January 16, 1997 contrary to Gina’s expectation, there was no sexual intercourse
between them during the first night. The same thing happened
on the second, third and fourth nights.
Even when the two spent their honeymoon in Baguio City,
nothing happened between them. Instead, the Chi Ming Choi
avoided her. There was no attempt of sexual intercourse
between them. Defendant claims, that she did not even see her
husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Gina said that her husband is impotent, and a closet
WON Bona should be deemed
psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital
obligations.
Whether the alleged refusal of both
the petitioner and the private
respondent to have sex with each
other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both.
YES
NO. PETITION DENIED. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Dr. Rondain evaluated Bona’s psychological condition ​indirectly
from the information gathered solely from Jose and his
witnesses​. This factual circumstance evokes the possibility that the
information fed to the psychiatrist is tainted with bias for Jose’s
cause, in the absence of sufficient corroboration.
Bona had no manifest desire to abandon Jose at the beginning of
their marriage and was, in fact, living with him for the most part of
their relationship from 1973 up to the time when Jose drove her
away from their conjugal home in 1988. On the contrary, the record
shows that it was Jose who was constantly away from Bona by
reason of his military duties and his later incarceration. A reasonable
explanation for Bona’s refusal to accompany Jose in his military
assignments in other parts of Mindanao may be simply that those
locations were known conflict areas in the seventies. Any doubt as
to Bona’s desire to live with Jose would later be erased by the fact
that Bona lived with Jose in their conjugal home in Fort Bonifacio
during the following decade.
The badges of Bona’s alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her
sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be convincingly traced
to the period of time after her marriage to Jose and not to the
inception of the said marriage.
Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce
law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage.
Add-on:​ NO requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse
should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer
necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36
of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that
psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence,
and incurability can be duly established.
“If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is
senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological
incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual
intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity.”
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family
Code is “To procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end
of marriage.” Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally
destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at
 homosexual. According to her, Chi Ming Choi married her in bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to
order to acquire or maintain his residency status here (in PH). fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
On the other hand, petitioner does not want their marriage
annulled, saying that: he loves her so much; that he is physically
and psychologically capable; and their differences can still be
reconciled.

Petitioner admitted that there was no sexual contact between

them. He attributed the blame to Gina, saying that it was her
who always avoided him.

It was contended by petitioner that Gina filed the case for

annulment against him because she is afraid that she will be
forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother. Chi Ming
Choi also added that Gina is afraid that he will consummate the
marriage.

When Chi Ming Choi submitted himself to physical examination,

it was revealed that there was no evidence of impotency—he is
capable of erection. It was also found out that petitioner’s penis
size is 2 inches (flaccid); and 3 inches (when erect).

RTC declared their marriage as void. The CA, on the other hand,
affirmed the decision of the trial court.

7. Republic vs. [Law applied here is Civil Code, as marriage was celebrated
Dayot 550 SCRA before the Family Code took effect.]
435 , March 28,
2008 In 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. In
lieu of a marriage license, the couple executed a sworn affidavit
attesting that, being unmarried, they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years.
Is there a valid marriage? NO. A marriage performed without the corresponding marriage
license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate
consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of
the marriage contract. The rationale for the compulsory character of
a marriage license is that it is the authority granted by the State to
the contracting parties, after the proper government official has
inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.

In 1993, Jose filed for declaration of nullity. He contended that
his marriage to Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony
was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the
sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband
and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the
marriage was secured through fraud.
According to Jose, Felisa was his landlady. She made him
accompany her to city hall so she could claim a package from
her brother. At city hall, a man bearing three folded pieces of
paper joined them and they were told that Jose needed to sign
the papers so the package could be released to Felisa. He
reluctantly signed the papers and gave them to man, who
immediately left. It was only in 1987, a year later, that he
discovered that he contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged
that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala
of Felisa’s house, which he discovered to be a copy of his
The falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties
have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement,
effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage
license. Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the
exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite
of a marriage license, and under the rules of statutory construction,
exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably
construed.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 of the Civil Code
leaves the Court with no other expediency but to read the law as it is
plainly written—the exception of a marriage license under Article 76
applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The question
as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is
factual in nature.
 marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, she
feigned ignorance.
Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and defended the validity of
their marriage. According to her, while their marriage was
subsisting, Jose contracted marriage with a Rufina in 1990. This
prompted her to file an action for bigamy.
RTC: valid marriage. Jose’s version was dismissed as
implausible. The claim that he did not consent to the marriage
was belied by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa as his wife
when he wrote her name in the duly notarized statement of
assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after
he discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to be
sham and false. Furthermore, he wrote her name on his
company ID as the person to be contacted in case of
emergency. Jose’s sister was put on the witness stand, where
she testified that she signed her name voluntarily as witness to
the marriage in the marriage certificate and further testified that
Jose voluntarily affixed his signature to the marriage contract as
well.
CA: originally affirmed RTC but overturned itself after Jose filed
a motion for reconsideration.
8. Almelor vs. Manuel and Leonida, both medical practitioners, an
Regional Trial Court anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, were married on January 29,
of Las Piñas City, 1989. They met at San Lazaro Hospital where they worked as
Br. 254 563 SCRA medical student clerks. They have 3 children. After eleven (11)
447 , August 26, years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las
2008 Piñas City to annul their marriage on the ground that Manuel
was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations.
Leonida’s claims:
- Manuel was a harsh disciplinarian and has an unreasonable
way of imposing discipline on their children, the cause of their
frequent fights as a couple.
- He has unusual lavish affection Manuel has for his mother, on
whom he depended on for his decision-making.
- His concealment to her of his homosexuality. She caught him
manifesting his affections to a male caller ,found several
pornographic homosexual materials in his possession, and even
saw him kiss another man.
Manuel denied everything. When she left their home with her
children, Manuel stopped giving support. Dr. Valentina del Fonso
Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove Leonida’s
claim. The dr. concluded that Manuel is psychologically
incapacitated.
Manuel, for his part, admitted that he and Leonida had some
petty arguments here and there but claims marital relationship
was generally harmonious. The petition for annulment filed by
WON there are sufficient grounds to
annul the marriage. [NO]
The falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the
period of the parties’ cohabitation, which would have qualified their
marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license,
cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that
the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the
parties under oath—if the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a
lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect.
An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. Jose and Felisa’s
marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other
conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this
case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and
may be raised any time.
To settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the
five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a
five-year period computed back from the date of celebration of
marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of a marriage.
The trial court was wrong for annulling the marriage. It declared that
Leonida’s petition for nullity had “no basis at all because the
supporting grounds relied upon ​can not legally make a case under
Article 36 of the Family Code​.” It went further by citing ​Republic v.
Molina​:
“Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable
differences, incessant quarrels and/or beatings, unpredictable mood
swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment, and difficulty, neglect, or
failure in the performance of some marital obligations do not suffice
to establish psychological incapacity.”
If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the petition for
not meeting the guidelines set in ​Molina.​ What Leonida attempted to
demonstrate were Manuel’s ​homosexual tendencies ​by citing overt
acts generally predominant among homosexual individuals. She
wanted to prove that the perceived homosexuality rendered Manuel
incapable of fulfilling the essential marital obligations. But instead of
dismissing the petition, the trial court ​nullified ​the marriage between
Manuel and Leonida on the ground of vitiated consent by virtue of
fraud. Wrong.
A marriage may be annulled when the consent of either party
was obtained by fraud, such as concealment of homosexuality.
It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality
per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent party. ​The law is
clear—a marriage may be annulled when the consent of either party
was obtained by fraud, such as concealment of homosexuality.
Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by preponderance of
evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his
 Leonida came as a surprise to him. He claims that the true
cause of Leonida’s hostility against him was their professional
rivalry. Leonida’s family owns Christ the King Hospital which is
situated in the same subdivision as Manuel’s clinic and
residence. In other words, he and her family have competing or
rival hospitals in the same vicinity. He denied maltreating their
children and claimed that she also fabricated tales about
pornographic materials found in his possession to cast doubt on
his masculinity. He presented his brother, Jesus, who usually
stayed at their home during his weekly trips to Manila, to testify
to the generally harmonious relationship between Manual and
Leonida. Manuel expressed his intention to refute Dr. del Fonso
Garcia’s findings by presenting his own expert witness.
However, no psychiatrist was presented.
RTC: granted petition for annulment, not on the ground of Article
36, but Article 45 of the Family Code.
CA: denied Manuel’s appeal because he pursued the wrong
remedy by filing the extraordinary remedy of petition for
annulment of judgment.
9. Bondagjy vs. Fouziy Ali Bondagjy and Sabrina Artadi were married according
Artadi 561 SCRA to Islamic Law. Unfortunately, the marital union turned sour after
633 , August 11, a few years. On the ground of neglect or failure to provide
2008 support for her and the family, the Artadi filed a complaint for
divorce by faskh before the Third Sharia Circuit Court at Isabela,
Basilan which was dismissed since the grounds by which she
relied upon do not exist and that she does not reside in
Zamboanga City. It was also counter argued he does not neglect
his wife and children, these are but allegations without evidence
to support such claims.
10. Republic vs. Lynnette and Martini started as pen pals. Later they got married
Cabantug-Baguio and decided to live together in Lynnette’s parents. Martini,
556 SCRA 711 , however, stayed there only on weekends, and during weekdays
June 30, 2008 he stayed with his parents. While Lynnette suggested that the
two of them stay in the house of Martini’s parents, Martini
disagreed, claiming that there were many already living with his
parents.
Lynnette soon realized that Martini was a "mama’s boy." And
she noticed too that when she would call up Martini at his
parent’s house and his mother was the one who answered the
call, she would deny that he was around.
Is a wife, a Christian who converted
to Islam before her marriage to a
Muslim and converted back to
Catholicism upon their separation,
still bound by the moral laws of Islam
in the determination of her fitness to
be the custodian of her children?
No.
Whether Martini’s alleged personality
traits are of the nature contemplated
by Article 36 of the Family Code.
NO
marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to his wife. It is the
concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that
vitiates the consent of the innocent party. Such concealment
presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the other party in giving
consent to the marriage. ​Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the validity of marriage.​
To reiterate, homosexuality ​per se ​is only a ground for legal
separation. It is its concealment that serves as a valid ground to
annul a marriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petition in the trial court to
annul the marriage is DISMISSED.
Proof of Artadi’s capacity to have custody of her children is not
restricted to Muslim laws. The Family Code shall be taken into
consideration in deciding whether a non- Muslim woman is
incompetent. What determines her capacity is the standard laid
down by the Family Code now that she is not a Muslim. Indeed,
what determines the fitness of any parent is the ability to see to the
physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children, and
the ability to give them a healthy environment as well as physical
and financial support taking into consideration the respective
resources and social and moral situations of the parents. The
minors’ welfare is the controlling consideration on the issue. Article
211, family Code provides joint parental authority over the couple’s
children. PD 1083 provides that where the parents are not
divorced/legally separated, the father and mother shall jointly
exercise parental authority. However, under the circumstances of
the parties, Artadi has more capacity and time to see to the
children’s needs. Nevertheless, Bondagjy gets visitorial rights.
The mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" does not constitute psychological incapacity. Nor does
failure of the parties to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons.
The doctor’s findings and conclusion were derived from his interview
of Lynnette and her sister and Lynnette’s deposition. From
Lynnette’s deposition, however, it is gathered that Martini’s failure to
establish a common life with her stems from his refusal, not
incapacity, to do so. It is downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect
or difficulty, much less ill will, which renders a marriage void on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
On the insistence of his mother, Martini’s monetary allotment
was shared equally between her and Lynnette. Martini worked
as seaman.
Later Lynnette stopped receiving her share of the allotment. She
was informed her that he had already disembarked.
Martini told Lynette that they are not compatible and should just
part ways.
On investigation, Lynnette learned that Martini declared in his
employment records that he was "single" and named his mother
as principal allottee.
In less than three years after their marriage, respondent Lynette
filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage, on the
ground of Martini’s psychological incapacity to comply with the
essential marital duties and obligations.
The Psychological Evaluation Report concluded that defendant
shows immature personality disorder, dependency patterns, and
self-centered motives. The situation is serious, grave, existing
already during the adolescent period, and incurable because
personality and character are stable whether or not it is normal
and adaptive. Moreover, according to the report, the defendant
is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations in marriage and family.
The Cebu City RTC found Martini psychologically incapacitated
at the time the couple exchanged their marriage vows.
The Solicitor General, via appeal, challenged before the Court of
Appeals the trial court’s decision. However, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Article 36 must be read in conjunction with the other articles in the
Family Code, specifically Articles 35, 37, 38, and 41 which provide
different grounds to render a marriage void ab initio, as well as
Article 45 which dwell on voidable marriages, and Article 55 on legal
separation. Care must be observed so that these various
circumstances are not to be applied indiscriminately as if the law
were indifferent on the matter. And Article 36 should not be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefor manifest themselves, nor with legal separation in
which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity
but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment, and the like.
Psychological incapacity” has been elucidated on as follows: The
term “psychological incapacity” to be a ground for the nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have
certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics
associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly a doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
“psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. x x x [T]he root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness, and its
incapacitating nature must be fully explained x x x.